REPORTERS IN HONG KONG WHO WERE WORKING FOR 21
CHINESE-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS WERE MAILED QUESTIONNAIRES TO ELICIT
INFORMATION ON THE FOLLOWING: HOW NEWS ORGANIZATIONS IN A HIGHLY
POLITICIZED ENVIRONMENT EXERCISE CONTROL ON RECRUITMENT, POLICY
DIRECTION WITH REGARD TO THE COVERAGE OF CONFLICTING ISSUES, AND THE
RESOLUTION OF POSSIBLE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE PRESS AND JOURNALISTS.
RESPONDENTS WERE ENCOURAGED TO RETURN THE QUESTIONNAIRE WITH THE
ASSURANCE OF ANONYMITY. THE FINDINGS REVEALED THAT (1) POLITICAL
IDEOLOGY OF THE PRESS DETERMINES STAFF RECRUITMENT, POLICY GOVERNING
THE COVERAGE OF CONFLICTING ISSUES, AND THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS
BETWEEN THE PRESS AND JOURNALISTS; (2) REPORTERS ARE HIGHLY CONGRUENT
WITH THEIR EMPLOYING ORGANIZATIONS IN TERMS OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY ON
A RIGHTIST-CENTRIST-LEFTIST CONTINUUM; (3) THE PARTY-OWNED PRESS HAS
A HIGHER PROPENSITY TO IMPOSE POLICY CONTROL OVER THE COVERAGE OF
SOCIAL ISSUES THAN THE NONPARTY PRESS; (4) REPORTERS ON OCCASION
DISPUTE POLICIES; AND (5) OLDER REPORTERS WORKING IN THE PARTY PRESS
TEND TO BE MORE SUBMISSIVE TO POLICY CONTROL THAN THEIR COUNTERPARTS
IN THE NONPARTY PRESS, AND THE MORE EDUCATED REPORTERS ARE LESS
COMPLIANT AT BOTH TYPES OF NEWSPAPERS. (HOD)
Political Ideology and News Organizational Control

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Political ideology and News Organizational Control

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Abstract

This survey shows how political ideology of the Hong Kong Chinese press exercises organizational control. Political ideology of the press determines staff recruitment, policy governing the coverage of conflictual issues, and the resolution of conflicts between the press and journalists. The reporters are found to be highly congruent with their employing organizations in terms of political ideology on a rightist-centrist-leftist continuum. The party-owned press has a higher propensity to impose policy control over the coverage of social issues than the non-party press. While the reporter's ideological commitment usually conforms to the editor's, disputes over policies may occur on occasion. Older reporters working in the party press tend to be more submissive to policy control than their counterparts in the non-party press while the more educated reporters are found to be less compliant at both types of newspapers.
Introduction

Compared with the rest of the world, the American press is ostensibly less ideological. This is not to imply that the American press has no ideology, but to suggest that elsewhere political ideology plays a much more central role in journalism. In the U.S., the two major parties battling for the center are ideologically close. Hence, political controversies tend to be incorporated within the existing social structure by journalistically counter-balancing the views of the leaders of the two major parties or those of the different branches of the government (Tuchman, 1978). Historically, media professionalism was developed in response to the rise of market democracy, while the party press has long demised since the 1830's (Schudson, 1978).

Media professionalism is viable only if the dominant ideology is not questioned. American journalism often prides itself on professionalism, defined as adherence to cannons of objectivity and neutrality with facts rigidly segregated from opinion. Claiming to "mirror the reality" and to report news "from nobody's point of view" (Epstein, 1973), news organizations vehemently reject the popular charge that American journalists are left of the center. Professionalism holds the journalist's political ideology in check.

Even when the mainstream neutral-gatekeeper model of journalism was called into question by the radical movements of the 1960s, as Janowitz (1975) observed, the alternative participant-advocate model that critics called for did not nearly approach the European model. While rejecting the neutral role of the press as abdicating political responsibilities, critics did not advocate a press explicitly linked to political parties or factions.
A national survey (Johnstone et al., 1976) showed that the majority of American journalists continued to subscribe to a "professional" view. The radical alternative has produced some impact on "new journalism" and the counter-culture press but its influence on the mainstream press is negligible (Smith, 1980).

In most European and Third World nations, however, journalism is more susceptible to ideological influence and has stronger linkages with political parties. In what is referred to as "press-party parallelism," Seymour-Ure (1974) observes that the European and the Third World press is affiliated with political parties, is loyal to party goals, and caters to partisan audiences. This parallelism is strongest in one-party systems, followed by multi-party systems, but is weaker in two-party systems. In no party systems, the press typically is left to private ownership with governmental "supervision." The centrality of political ideology in communication is also noted by Edelstein (1982) as a comparativist.

Political Ideology and Press Structure

Hong Kong has no formal party system of its own. It is either called a "colonial city-state" (King, 1975) or an "administrative no-party state" (Harris, 1978: p.11). In the absence of local parties, "politics" seem to be sharply divided on the line of the struggle between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), a struggle which has characterised modern Chinese politics. Although both parties are not registered with the Hong Kong Government, they either work underground or behind the veils of socially acceptable institutions. Between Taiwan and China, the Hong Kong Government tries to maintain some kind of
balance and to play one against the other, giving itself room to maneuver. This is otherwise celebrated as "freedom without democracy." All groups, rightist or leftist, are allowed to organize trade unions, publish newspapers, distribute propaganda, and engage in party polemics as far as they do not disrupt the law.

Even though Hong Kong is an "administrative no-party state," the press has similarly been structured by the interparty struggle between the CCP and the KMT. The press-party parallelism grows not out of local politics but is a residual extension of modern Chinese party politics. The press of Hong Kong in the last century has interwined with the political changes on the mainland: the press tried to effect structural changes in China on the one hand and was influenced by them on the other. Since the era of the rift between revolutionaries and constitutional monarchists in the late Ching dynasty, Hong Kong has served as a key listening post and propaganda base for Chinese politics, with many dissident journalists and politicians taking refuge in Hong Kong to advocate their doctrines (Ting, 1974). The protracted KMT-CCP struggle has made Hong Kong's press system a microcosm of yesterday's China. Even today there are papers directly financed by the CCP or the KMT and still others, though not directly financed, are clearly identified with either party in goal orientation.

Against this large backdrop, not until the early 1970s did "centrist" newspapers loyal to Hong Kong and critical of both Peking and Taipei, begin to proper. These profit-motivated commercial papers are beneficiaries of Hong Kong's rapidly expanding economy and its formidable advertising industry. While devoting significant coverage to Chinese politics, they appear to focus more on local issues and the immediate concerns of Hong Kong citizens at large. It is not in their interest to identify too closely
with either external party.

In 1980, there were 350 copies of newspaper consumption per 1000 population in Hong Kong, second to Japan (497 copies) in Asia. Of the 485 publications registered with the Government, 57 were newspapers. Half of these 57 newspapers, devoted to horse-racing tips and entertainment gossip, appeared irregularly. Only about twenty newspapers were serious enough to warrant the Government’s monitoring.

The political ideology of the press falls into four categories (ultra-leftist, centrist, rightist, ultra-rightist) based on the following criteria: (1) source of financial support and party affiliation; (2) place of registration; (3) choice of national day celebration and calendar; (4) ways of addressing the Peking regime and the Taipei regime (for a more detailed description, see Lee, 1985b):

(1) Ultra-leftist: The ultra-leftist papers, registered in Hong Kong and mainland China, celebrate national day on October 1, adopt the Western calendar, refer to Taiwan as “Taiwan Province,” “the Taiwan authorities,” or “the Chiang Clique,” but call Peking “our country,” “our government,” or “China.” The leftist papers in our sample include Ta Kung Pao, Wen Wei Po, New Evening Post, Ching Pao Daily and the Hong Kong Commercial Daily. All these papers are directly owned and supervised by Peking as its overseas propaganda mouthpieces. There is a division of labor among themselves: Wen Wei Pao appeals to students and laborers; Ta Kung Pao attracts intellectuals and business people; both Ching Pao and the Hong Kong Commercial Daily cater to the lower classes; New Evening Post draws the general public.

(2) Centrist: The centrist papers are market-directed, economically
Independent and not linked to any political party. They register only with the Hong Kong government, adopt the Western calendar, do not observe either national day, call the Taipei regime "Taiwan," "the National Government" and the Peking regime "Communist China," "Mainland China," or "China." The centrist papers include Ming Pao Daily News, Ming Pao Evening News, the Hong Kong Economic Journal, Sing Pao Daily News, The Star, Tin Tin Yat Pao, and the Oriental Daily News. The former two are oriented towards the intellectuals, whereas the latter three cater to the mass tastes.

(3) Rightist: The sample includes Sing Tao Jih Pao, Sing Tao Man Pao, Wah Kiu Yat Pao, Wah Kiu Man Pao, the Hong Kong Daily News, and the Express. They are responsive to the Hong Kong market, yet mildly tilting to Taiwan out of political ideology and historical ties with the KMT rather than for financial assistance. They register both in Taiwan and Hong Kong, observing the KMT's national day on October 10, calling the Taiwan regime "the Republic of China" or "China" and referring to mainland China as "Communist China," "the Mainland," instead of the "People's Republic of China".

(4) Ultra-rightist: The sample includes the Hong Kong Times, Kung Sheung Daily, and Kung Sheung Evening News. The Hong Kong Times was established by the KMT in 1949 as a propaganda outpost in the wake of its defeat by the Communists on the mainland and withdrawal to Taiwan. Kung Sheung Daily, founded in 1925 with the expressed aim of checking the Communist movement in China, was once enormously influential but gradually lost its comparative advantage and closed in 1984.
Political Ideology and Organizational Control

In Hong Kong, political ideology vitally structures the press system and determines its practices. Chalk and Lee (1984) have theorized how political ideology constructs "journalistic paradigms" which in turn govern the way events are covered and editorialized. In examining a civil protest, they discover that the rightist press is more likely than its centrist, and even more so than the leftist counterpart, to support the government's use of force, to attribute an indigenous-born civil protest to ulterior conspiracy, and to denounce such a protest as defying traditional morality. Similarly, Lee and Lee (1985) showed that leftist press tended to frame the 1967 Riot in terms of China's Cultural Revolution; the rightist press interpreted it from Taiwan's anti-Communist vantage point, whereas the centrist press stood by the Hong Kong government to maintain the status quo. Furthermore, these different "journalistic paradigms", as structured by political ideology, also "set limits" and "exert pressure" on the way government information is edited by the press (Lee, 1985a). This seems to parallel the ideological reporting in France where the partisan press exists side by side with the commercial press (Gerbner, 1964; Freiberg, 1981).

Every complex organization faces an uncertain environment. This is especially the case with news organizations because of their non-routine nature. News organizations frequently have to cope with unexpected occurrences, and for which there are no formal, fixed, logical rules but intuition, experience, and luck (Tunstall, 1971). To reduce the uncertainty and to facilitate the productive processes, many adaptative mechanisms may be developed by the organization. (For an elaboration of this insight
by organizational theorists, see Perrow, 1970; Katz and Kahn, 1967.) As part of such adaptive mechanisms, Sigelman (1973) identifies how news organizations exercise controls over selective recruitment, policy guidance and socialization. Selective recruitment refers to hiring of journalists whose worldviews are generally compatible with those of news organizations. For example, of the British special correspondents interviewed by Tunstall (1971), 81% reported a high degree of political congruence with their employing organizations; Gans (1979) also found similar support in America. Policy guidance is a formalized form of organizational control, outlining specific news angles to be followed or avoided. Socialization as revealed by the pioneering Breed study (1955), is an informal form of social control whereby journalists absorb the newsroom norms and the prevailing definition of news through day-to-day work contacts.

The present survey seeks to bring to the fore how news organizations in a highly politicized environment exercise control on recruitment and news policy. It is noteworthy that previous studies have been done in societies with solid political consensus. The Hong Kong setting may serve to amplify the intricate relationships between political ideology and news organizational control in a highly divided society.

Sampling

In Hong Kong, there is no single source where a roster of journalists is obtainable. Such information is treated with strict confidence by media organizations, due partly to the political friction and the inherently suspicious attitude. The two press associations attract only a tiny fraction of active journalists, and the turnover rate in the field is so high
(because of low pay) that the published membership directory is partial, outdated and of little use. Therefore, we had to rely on our students as informants who were serving their summer internship program with individual media organizations in spring 1981. Through their assistance, a total of 329 local reporters were estimated to be working for 21 Chinese-language dailies, thus constituting the population of this study. The 21 newspapers were chosen on the basis of their political significance, circulation and representativeness of partisanship (See Lee, 1985b). The criteria excluded the English-language papers, entertainment gossip papers, and the "mosquito" papers specialized in mireseracing.

Some media organizations expressly prohibited their employee from participating in academic research of this sort. We thus asked our informants to cultivate the good will of their newsroom co-workers in responding to our brief questionnaires. In the spring of 1981, a total of 327 questionnaires were distributed through our informants. This proceeded with a deliberate sense of informality so as not to offend their superiors who were constantly suspicious of any ulterior political conspiracy in such a study. Furthermore, our respondents were encouraged to return the questionnaire to our informants or by mail, with the assurance to protect anonymity. Most were returned to our informants.

A total of 176 questionnaires were collected, yielding a response rate of 54%. There appeared to be significant variations among media organizations: Ultra-rightist, 58%; rightist, 37%; centrist, 56%; and leftist, 76%. The rightist reporters scored the lowest response rate chiefly because we did not have informants in four of the six rightist papers (Wah Kiu Yat Pao, Wah Kiu Man Pao, Sing Tao Yat Pao, Sing Tao Man Pao and the Hong Kong Daily News) and instead had to request the
assignment desk editors for personal assistance. The leftist reporters had the highest response rate because the informants had developed stronger relations with them. The general low response rate can be accounted for by the difficulty involved in tracking down reporters who had haphazard working hours. In addition, social surveys were officially prohibited at the largest newspaper, the Oriental Daily, which had a staff of 55. The informant succeeded in only soliciting 26 responses out of the 55 through personal connections, hence depressing the response rate.

According to our informants, however, few non-responses were outright refusals. Nor could we detect any systematic bias in the response rate that was attributable to political ideology. Strictly speaking, the resultant sample is not a probability sample, so the statistical tests to be reported will have to be interpreted with caution.
Hypotheses and Findings

This paper analyzes how the press, as determined by political ideology, exercises organizational control in the process of recruitment, policy direction with regard to the coverage of conflictual issues, and the resolution of possible conflicts between the press and the journalists.

Hypothesis 1: The journalist's political ideology is closely linked to the press organization's political ideology.

In the absence of strong ideological partisanship and because of the importance of professional norms, the American press generally does not use political ideology as a prime criterion of recruitment. This is not to deny the fact that job applicants always "self-select"; they make sure that their political views are in accord with the paper's editorial policy (Sigelman, 1973). The journalist's self-selection process is part of the overall informal organizational control and implicit newsroom socialization.

In Hong Kong, this organizational control is much more formal and explicit. The press is so intensely interwoven with political organizations and partisan goals that it invariably enforces very strict ideological standard in both recruitment and day-to-day work setting. This is especially characteristic of the papers of ideological extremity, whose funds are controlled by either the CCP or KMT and whose propaganda and ideology are tightly regulated by them. There have been occurrences of detainment of prominent editors of Communist papers by the CCP when they strayed too far from the approved ideological field. As propaganda machine, these papers are staffed by people with the party loyalty. It is inconceivable for the party press to hire someone whose ideology runs
The partisan press seldom relies on open channels for recruitment. Personal recommendations by politically trustworthy sources are essential. There is no need to probe political views of the job applicant in the interviews as the newspaper organization has been informed by the referees in advance. The recruitment process appears to be reciprocal and can be initiated by either the newspaper organization or the potential reporter. However, this control over selection is never complete. We know in some cases where job applicants try to disguise or dilute their ideological commitments for fear of discrimination or isolation. Handicapped by the shortage of manpower, the partisan press at times has to somewhat relax its ideological requirements to recruit enough people to man their operations. In contrast, the centrist press often advertises job openings. While abhorring ideological extremism to the left or right, they seldom take pains to sort out the applicant's political viewpoints. Priding itself on journalistic professionalism, the centrist press recruits journalists primarily on the grounds of competence rather than partisan allegiance.

(Table 1a here)

(Table 1b here)
This gives rise to the hypothesis that the journalist's and the press' political ideology tend to be congruent. This hypothesis is confirmed in Table 1a. The reporter's political ideology is designated on the basis of an ordinal scale measuring the strength of their identification with either the CCP or KMT. The political ideology of individual journalists is strongly correlated ($G^2 = 52.1, df = 6, p < .01$) with that of the press organization for which they work. The same relation holds when the journalist's education and age are controlled. Political ideology, as expected, is found to be an important determinant in the mutual selection process between the press and their reporters.

This ideological congruence seems to be most acute among the ultra-leftist newspapers (68.9%), followed by the ultra-rightists (52.9%), rightists (43.6%) and centrists (45.1%). Ultra-leftist papers adhere most strictly to the ideological criterion because they have the tightest system to control the ideological purity of their personnel. The ultra-rightist press may accommodate a sizable centrist journalists but no leftists. It is intriguing to note that the rightist press, knowingly or unknowingly, has recruited some "left-leaning" journalists (10.3%) who prefer to identify with mainland China but are not themselves members of the CCP. Holding idealistic spirits, these left-leaning journalists can be quite critical of the wrongdoings of the Communist regime. They also exercise self-constraint in expressing their political preference in public. The centrist newspapers show a well-balanced distribution, with 45.1% of the journalists identified with the middle of the road and the rest almost
equally split between the leftist (28.2%) and rightist (26.8%).

As Illustrated in Table 1b, the selection process is sustained by the ideological structure of Hong Kong's journalism education ($G = .44, x^2 = 23.9, df=3, p < .01$). Colleges are classified to be rightist if they are organizationally or ideologically linked with KMT. Many Hong Kong journalists have been trained in Taiwan's journalism schools. Among the four journalism departments in Hong Kong, two are linked with the KMT government while the other two are more locally oriented and ideologically "neutral". The large number of graduates from these rightist colleges become the major source of manpower not only for the ultrarightist press (100%) but also for the rightist (68.0%) and centrist press (65.9%) as well. The political orientation of the two locally oriented schools can probably be described as "neutral" and "liberal". Though many of their graduates do not stay long as journalists, they always start off their journalism careers in the centrist and rightist press. Since there are no leftist journalism schools or colleges in Hong Kong, the leftist press has to depend on a small pool of high school and college graduates who have been radicalized in student movements.
Hypothesis 2: The party press is expected to have a higher propensity to exercise policy control on the coverage of conflictual issues.

Breed (1955) and Gieber (1964) have observed that in the United States it is an “ethical taboo” for publishers to impose reportorial policy on subordinates, although reports to the contrary abound. Sigelman (1973) argues that the newspaper management has the power to decide on what to cover, who to cover, and what to print, although the journalists may enjoy a good measure of working autonomy. If this is so with the “professional” press, journalistic autonomy may be even more significantly eroded in such a partisan press system as Hong Kong. It is hypothesized that the party press will show a higher propensity to exercise policy control on the coverage of controversial social issues.

(Table 2a here)

H2 appears to be supported in Table 2a. As a measure of the dependent variable, the respondents were asked to state how often they were subject to reportorial control when covering conflictual issues. The frequency at which they experience such control are collapsed into two categories: High and low. Party linkage, the independent variable, consists of “the party press” (i.e. the ultra-rightist and the ultra-leftist
press) and "the non-party press" (i.e. the centrist press and the "rightist" press).

Table 2a shows that the press's party linkage tends to be linked with higher frequency of policy control when reporting social issues. (G=.34, \( \chi^2=4.6, \) df=1, \( p<.03 \)). About 43% of the journalists working in the party press, compared with only 27% in the non-party press, confessed that they often experienced policy control in the coverage of social issues.

Table 2b Here

A breakdown of the frequency of reportorial policy by the four ideological press categories is shown in Table 2b. The ultra-rightist press (59%) leads in policy control and followed in a descending order by the ultra-leftist (37%), the rightist (33%) and the centrist (24%). The ultra-leftist press exercises the most stringent control over the recruitment process but does not lead policy control in the coverage of conflicts. This seeming discrepancy might be partly explained by both the divergent attitudes that the partisan press holds about social conflicts. In another study, we (Chan and Lee, 1984) have found that the ultra-leftist press tend to be more favorably disposed to social conflicts and social change, while the ultra-rightist press tend to be suspicious of such conflicts as Communist agitations. Conflicts are perceived to be
threatening to the ultra-rightist press and thus may engender stricter control on its staff in the coverage of such issues.

(Table 2c and Table 2d Here)

When age is controlled, the original correlation between reportorial control and the press' party linkage (G= .34, p<.03) virtually disappears for journalists below age 25 (G=.02, X^2=.01, df=1, p<.93) and becomes enhanced for journalists above age 25 (G=.58, X^2=7.4, df=1, p<.01). It appears that the party press are more likely to assign the older, presumably more experienced, journalists to cover conflictual issues which are more policy-inviting than non-controversial news. Controlling education, the partial correlations become insignificant but the general relation remain more or less the same. (For journalists with less than college education, G=.34, X^2=2.0, df=1, p<.16; for journalists with college education, G=.27, X^2=1.6, df=1, p<.21.)

Hypothesis 3: Reporters working in party newspapers (where the control over the selection process is more complete) are more likely than those working in non-party newspapers to comply with policy control.

Since there is always ideological leakage, organizational conflicts between editors and reporters are bound to occur sometimes. Editors,
being closer to the power center of a newspaper organization than reporters, can reasonably be assumed to be subject to tighter ideological control. Conflicts between editors and reporters over reportorial policies can therefore be viewed as conflicts between reporters and the policies of their host organizations.

According to organizational sociologists, when conflicts occur, organizational pressure usually prevails over individuals working within it. Gieber (1964) found that reporters responded most strongly to their immediate bureaucratic surroundings. Even if committed to professional ideals, reporters also saw themselves as hired employees of an organization that imposed its news policy upon them (Breed, 1955). Tuchman (1978) found that journalists often used their organizational superiors rather than professional peers as their frame of reference.

It is hypothesized that when disputes over reportorial policies occur, reporters working in the party press are more likely to succumb to their superior's directives. In non-party newspapers, reporters are expected to have a stronger commitment to professionalism and therefore enjoy a higher level of autonomy.

Since the journalist's ideology is in high accord with the organization's, most disputes that occur do not concern ideological issues in nature (ultra-rightist, 18%; rightist, 26%; centrist, 24%; and ultra-leftist, 9%). Instead, as our data show, most conflicts seem to arise out of the discrepancy between (a) the editor's higher hierarchical position in the organization and (b) the journalist's superior knowledge about events being covered by virtue of the latter's first-hand observation (ultra-rightist, 72%; rightist, 74%; centrist, 76%; and ultra-leftist, 92%).
This discrepancy leads to different perceptions as to how the events should be covered. The tension is applicable to all press organizations, regardless of ideology.

Six choices, ranging from total compliance to rejection, were asked of reporters as to what they usually did when they disagreed to their editors' policies on the coverage of controversies. The degree of compliance falls into two categories: high (obey policy; voice views but obey policy if views are not accepted) and low (write views subtly into the story without arguing; arguing with the editor but write views subtly into the story if views are not accepted; keep trying to persuade the editor while writing views subtly into the story; hold on to views despite disapproval). The press are grouped according to whether they are directly party-controlled or not.

(Table 3a Here)

Table 3a indicates that journalists working in the party press tend to submit to their superiors' directive more readily than their counterparts in the non-party press ($G^2 = 2.22, X^2 = 1.8, df = 1, p < .18$). The majority of journalists working in both types of newspapers exhibit a low degree of compliance. Further examination discloses that the great
majority of reporters prefer writing their views into the story in a subtle way.

Controlling age, the original correlation between the press's party linkage and the journalist's propensity to comply vanishes for journalists below age 25 ($G = .02, \chi^2 = 0, df = 1, p < .95$); For journalists over age 25, the correlation becomes significant ($G = .53, \chi^2 = 4.7, df = 1, p < .03$). It appears that the older journalists working in the party press are more thoroughly socialized to the political ideology of organization.

When education is controlled, the original relationship disappears for journalists with less than college education ($G = .01, \chi^2 = 0, df = 1, p < .98$) but is enhanced for those with higher education ($G = .36, \chi^2 = 2.5, df = 1, p < .11$), indicating that the college-educated journalists working in the party press tend to be more compliant than their counterparts in the non-party press. Table 3c also shows that the more educated journalists are less compliant at both the party and the non-party press.

As Hong Kong is characterized by a high party-press parallelism, political ideology is the key determinant of information control. In order to reduce organizational ambiguity and smooth out production operation, the press exercises organizational control over recruitment and the
issuance of policy guidance. The reporters in Hong Kong are found to be
highly congruent with their host newspapers in terms of political
ideology. The party press are more inclined than the non-party press in
imposing reportorial policy on the coverage of conflictual issues -
especially so when older journalists are responsible for such coverage.
When disputes over policies between reporters and editors occur, older
reporters working in the party press tend to be more submissive to policy
control than their counterparts in non-party press while the more
educated reporters are less compliant in both types of newspapers.

Since 1981 when this survey was conducted, much has occurred. As
Hong Kong is due to be returned to Chinese sovereignty as a special
administrative zone in 1997, the press has exercised greater
self-restraint in its criticism of the Chinese Communist authorities. The
implications of this change to press freedom, the press structure, and
"journalistic paradigms" have been elaborated elsewhere (Lee, 1985b).
### Tables

**Table 1a: Mutual selection between journalists and newspapers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Press Ideology</th>
<th>Ultra-rightist</th>
<th>Rightist</th>
<th>Centrist</th>
<th>Ultra-leftist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reporters' Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rightist</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(71)</td>
<td>(45)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=172, θ=.65, χ²=52.1, df=6, p<.01

**Table 1b: Reporters' Schooling and Press Ideology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Press Ideology</th>
<th>Ultra-rightist</th>
<th>Rightist</th>
<th>Centrist</th>
<th>Ultra-leftist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Inclination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rightist</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=95*, θ=.44, χ²=23.9, df=3, p<.01

* N=95 because only half of the journalists working for the Chinese daily newspapers in Hong Kong are college graduates.
### Table 2a: Frequency of policy control by press’ party linkage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (n)            | (63)        | (111)           |

N = 174, $G = 3.4, x^2 = 4.6, df = 1, p < .03.

### Table 2b: Frequency of policy control by press ideology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Press Ideology</th>
<th>Ultra-rightist</th>
<th>Rightist</th>
<th>Centrist</th>
<th>Ultra-leftist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Report Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (n)                 | (17)           | (39)     | (72)     | (46)          |
Table 2c: Frequency of policy control by press' party linkage by age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Reportorial Policy Control</th>
<th>Below Age 25*</th>
<th>Above Age 25**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $\theta=.02, \chi^2=.01, df=1, p<.93, N=79$

** $\theta=.58, \chi^2=7.4, df=1, p<.01, N=95$

Table 2d: Frequency of Reportorial Policy Control By The Press' Party Linkage By Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Reportorial Policy Control</th>
<th>Less Than College*</th>
<th>College Graduates**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $\theta=.34, \chi^2=2.0, df=1, p<.16, N=64$

** $\theta=.27, \chi^2=1.6, df=1, p<.21, N=109$
Table 3a. Reporters' propensity to comply by the press' party linkage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Compliance</th>
<th>Party Press</th>
<th>Non-Party Press</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(n) 100% 100%

(G^2= 0.22, \chi^2= 1.8, df= 1, p< 0.18, N= 172)

Table 3b. Reporters' propensity to comply by the press' party linkage by age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Compliance</th>
<th>Below Age 25*</th>
<th>Above Age 25**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Press</td>
<td>Non-Party Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Press</td>
<td>Non-Party Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total % 100% 100%

(n) (39) (40)

* G= 0.2, \chi^2= 0, df= 1, p< 0.95, N= 79

** G= 5.3, \chi^2= 5.9, df= 1, p< 0.02, N= 93

Table 3c. Reporters' propensity to comply by the press' party linkage by education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Compliance</th>
<th>Less Than College*</th>
<th>College Graduates**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Press</td>
<td>Non-Party Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Press</td>
<td>Non-Party Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total % 100% 100%

(n) (29) (36)

* G= 0.01, \chi^2= 0, df= 1, p< 0.98, N= 65

** G= 3.6, \chi^2= 2.5, df= 1, p< 0.11, N= 106
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