Designed to clarify the roles played by prizes as evaluative mechanisms in journalism, a study examined journalists' attitudes toward both internal (professional) and external (nonprofessional) reward systems and then examined the ability of both individual-level and organizational-level variables to predict these attitudes and prize-seeking behaviors. A sample of 506 randomly selected persons from the Society of Professional Journalists was mailed a questionnaire, from which 190 responses were subjected to factor analysis. Path modeling was selected as the analysis strategy. Findings showed that individual journalists do view professional prizes as part of the normative occupational behavior, that journalists do differentiate between professional and nonprofessional reward systems, that journalists see prizes as a means of "getting along" and "getting ahead" within the occupation, and that organizational prize activities have an impact on the individual's prize-seeking behaviors that is independent of individual level variables. (Tables of findings and the questionnaire are appended.)
Individual and Organizational Predictors
of Journalistic Prize-Seeking

by

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Individual and Organizational Predictors of Journalistic Prize-Seeking

Like any occupation, journalism has evolved ways of trying to separate the good work from the bad. With some regularity, both individual journalists and media organizations are rewarded for "exemplary" work, while others are chastised for efforts judged to be inferior.

Such evaluative efforts are important to the survival of any occupation. One cannot logically assume that all members of an occupation perform their work identically, so some kind of performance hierarchy must exist. And most occupations proffer "ideal" forms of behavior as models to which their members can aspire; one cannot build these models without some means of identifying good normative behavior.

But how is journalistic performance evaluated? Who decided what constitutes good work? And what criteria are employed on an occupational-wide basis?

So far, little research has been brought to bear on these questions. This paper builds on that meager empirical base while at the same time offering some theoretical rationales for exploring the question of "evaluation" within journalistic work. Our topic of inquiry: the ubiquitous journalistic contest.

Evaluation Process in Journalism

Evaluation is the process of determining the worth or quality of some entity. While researchers have long recognized that the professional milieu may reward one type of behavior while the organization in which a professional works may reward another,1 most of the systematic studies of this phenomenon have been located within nonmedia businesses or among scientists working in industry. When it comes to the mass media, the research emphasis has been on strategies of social control that utilize informal reward mechanisms;2 one rarely sees any exploration of formal evaluative mechanisms. But despite the dearth of research
related to such evaluation, one aspect seems clear: although media organizations spend most of their resources generating revenue, the journalistic occupation seems to apply nonrevenue criteria to the task of separating "good" products from "bad" ones when it undertakes a formal evaluation.

Tunstall\(^\text{3}\) has noted that media organizations have the peculiar quality of being two organizations in one: a larger, revenue-generating group and a smaller group with a nonrevenue goal—producing the product.

Thus, for example, the bulk of a newspaper's employees will work in such revenue-producing departments as advertising and circulation. Yet, if that newspaper is evaluated by members of the journalistic occupation, it is probable that commercial, revenue-generating criteria will not be taken into account. Rather, the occupation will most likely evaluate the media organization in terms of its product, using such nonrevenue criteria as the product's accuracy, its comprehensiveness, or its ability to communicate information to a wide public.

One can see this nonrevenue emphasis in the plethora of attempts to identify such things as the "best" newspapers in the country\(^\text{4}\) as well as in the thousands of contests staged annually to evaluate the work of individual journalists. But to our knowledge, no researcher has attempted to isolate general criteria that may underlie these evaluative attempts. Nor has anyone ascertained, further, whether or not existing criteria are applied systematically.

In addition to understanding the meaning of "evaluation" relative to the curious combination of revenue/nonrevenue goals of media organizations, one can also ponder the role played by evaluation within professionalization.

Researchers have long been interested in the "professionalization" of the news business.\(^\text{5}\) But few have considered evaluative mechanisms as part of the
professionalization process. In one of the few studies to address this topic, Soloski notes that, while the journalism "profession" has established its own reward system, that system may conflict with reward systems offered by other components of the news process. In his paper, Soloski contrasts the professional reward system in journalism with sets of rewards offered by media organizations themselves, arguing that the former may result in increased salary, rank or autonomy while the latter may serve to increase one's power within the media organization through increased supervisory or managerial responsibilities.6

But the mass media also are subject to evaluative attempts that are external to both the journalism "profession" and media organizations. One might label these "source" or "constituency" evaluations. They come in the form of contests, and the clear aim is to reward journalists and/or media organizations for "good" work. Examples of such contests are those run by the American Heart Association, Westinghouse and the American Meat Institute.

Thus, through contests alone, journalists are faced with a variety of reward systems. And the extent to which they attend to or value one system over another may serve as a professionalization marker.

One attribute of a highly evolved profession is its ability to make its own, internal evaluative system the dominant one. Illustrative of this level of evolution is science, which has turned the process of separating good science from bad into an inhouse operation. Rewards for good work, thus, are internal,7 so much so that external rewards are nearly taboo.8

Do internal rewards dominate the evaluative system for journalism as well? Again, few studies have looked at this question. In the only systematic study of
journalists' attitudes toward contests that we could locate, Blankenburg found that newspaper editors preferred professional contests (those sponsored by such organizations as the Society for Professional Journalists, Associated Press Managing Editors, or local newspapers) to those staged by entities external to the profession.9 Similarly, a more informal survey of editors and reporters by Zinman found that most respondents felt it was unethical to accept prizes from contests sponsored by external entities.10

In other words, the existing research suggests that journalists indeed prefer professional, internal prizes to nonprofessional, external ones. But the extent to which external evaluative mechanisms still play a role in determining "good" journalistic work is still unclear.

The Study at Hand

Although this study does not address all the questions raised in the preceding theoretical section, it was designed to clarify the roles played by prizes as evaluative mechanisms in journalism.

Why prizes? Journalistic contests are one of the most ubiquitous manifestations of journalistic evaluation. They number well into the thousands,11 and they range in scope from national to local. Just as importantly, however, they also constitute both internal and external reward systems. Professional organizations within journalism sponsor many of the contests each year. But many contests also are sponsored by groups external to journalism. So by focusing on contests as evaluative mechanisms, we have an opportunity to study journalists' reactions to both internal and external reward systems.

Secondly, prizes are discrete entities, concrete testaments to some form of evaluation. That makes it possible for journalists to view them not only as
ways to reward good work within the profession but also as means of "getting ahead" in the occupation. Within this latter context, prizes could function as bargaining chips within the occupation without having much professional value. Studying contests allows us to look for variation in this professional/utilitarian continuum.

And finally, contests may have an organizational as well as an individual role to play. Prizes are generally awarded to journalists. But media organizations also may derive rewards from these evaluative systems; one need only look at the pages of Editor & Publisher magazine to see newspapers making quality claims through their employment of prize-winning journalists. An examination of journalistic contests thus enables us to look for the impact of both individuals and organizations on attitudes about prizes, as well as on prize-seeking behaviors of journalists.

The goals of this study, then, were to (1) examine journalists' attitudes toward both internal (professional) and external (nonprofessional) reward systems and then (2) examine the ability of both individual-level and organizational-level variables to predict to these attitudes and to actual prize-seeking behavior itself.

We asked a national sample of journalists about their attitudes toward both professional and nonprofessional contests. We also asked them to describe for us the contests they had entered in recent years. Finally, we gathered information on a number of individual- and organizational-level variables that might serve as predictors of both attitudes and prize-seeking behaviors.

The individual-level variables included gender, age, income, level of mobility within the profession and education. We also generated a measure of
"professional" activities that we hoped would predict to attitudes toward professional prizes and to professional prize-seeking behavior.

The organizational-level variables were three in number: the size of the media employer's market, the level of job diversity of the respondent (the greater an individual's level of job diversity, we reasoned, the smaller the media organization), and an index incorporating several measures of actual organizational activities relative to contests.

Our general expectations were that:

* Journalists would evaluate professional prizes differently from nonprofessional prizes;

* These attitudes would predict to prize-seeking behaviors; that is, beliefs that professional prizes have value would predict to professional prize-seeking, and beliefs that nonprofessional prizes have value would predict to nonprofessional prize-seeking; and

* Individual- and organizational-level variables would predict differentially to both attitudes and behavior.

Since we were interested in the ability of individual- and organizational-level demographic variables to predict to attitudes and in the ability of attitudes, in turn, to predict to behavior, we turned to path analysis as our main statistical strategy.

Methods

Sample

This study reports data gathered by the authors at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in the spring of 1984. The sampling frame was the national
mailing list of the Society for Professional Journalists, the nation's largest journalism organization. More than 18,000 members strong, the SPJ mailing list was chosen because it is one of the few reasonably comprehensive national lists of journalists available. However, despite the fact that membership in the organization is limited to working journalists, substantial proportions of members work in other occupations, such as public relations or academe. Individuals who were obviously involved in nonjournalistic work were removed at the time the sample was drawn.

A sample of 506 persons was selected using simple random procedures. Questionnaires, along with a personally signed cover letter and a stamped, self-addressed return envelope, were mailed in April, with a second wave of questionnaires mailed in June. The two mailings produced 280 responses, a response rate of 55 percent. However, questionnaire responses indicated that a substantial proportion of these individuals also were not employed by media organizations, so they were removed from the analysis. The final number of usable cases upon which this paper is based is 190.12

The sample demographics indicate that 61.5 percent of the respondents were male, 38.5 percent female. The median age was 35. A plurality (41.5 percent) of the sample were college graduates with an additional 23 percent having taken some graduate coursework and another 23 percent actually having earned graduate degrees. Mean annual income was more than $20,000, with almost 35 percent of the sample reporting earnings of between $14,000 and $20,000 annually. Nearly 12 percent reported incomes of more than $50,000.13

Measurement

The questionnaire was a diverse instrument designed to tap journalists' attitudes toward both professional and nonprofessional prizes, actual
prize-seeking behaviors of both journalists and their organizations, and prizes won. Other sections gathered information about the respondents' organizations, such as market or circulation size, and still other questions called for information about respondents' professional activities, education, experience in journalism, as well as other attributes of their work.14

A list of the items from the questionnaire employed in this particular analysis is provided in an appendix. We also indicate in the appendix how specific items were combined into indices and provide appropriate reliability coefficients for additive indices.

Factor analyzing attitudes toward prizes. Our first goal in this analysis was to see if we could discern any attitudinal patterns among our respondents with respect to prizes. As indicated in the appendix, we had asked journalists to respond to a set of 16 attitudinal items, once with professional prizes in mind and again with nonprofessional prizes in mind.

Factor analysis was used to reduce the 32 attitudinal items to a manageable set of constructs. Principal factoring methods were used, in which 1's in the diagonal of the correlation matrix were replaced with communalities estimated by the squared multiple correlation coefficient of a particular variable on the others in the analysis.

The resulting solution yielded eight factors with eigenvalues of greater than 1 and explaining 69.8 percent of the variance. All of the factors were interpretable, but in the interests of parsimony and on the basis of the screen test15 we decided to retain and rotate only six factors. The factors were subjected to varimax rotation that yielded the solution displayed in Table 1.
Missing data were replaced by the mean sample value. This allowed all 190 cases to be used in the factor solution, although at the expense of reduced variance in the variables with the most missing values. While 190 cases is a somewhat small number to subject to factor analysis because of the instability of the correlation coefficients, we judged it acceptable here because the technique is being used primarily as a data reduction strategy. The findings, however, should be interpreted with some caution because of the relatively small sample size.

Individual attitudinal variables in the factor analysis were examined and those with more than 10 percent missing values were dropped from the analysis. The remaining 24 items were then refactored. The factor structure remained basically unchanged and regression factor scores were estimated from this solution for use in subsequent analyses.

Path analysis. Because our main research question involves examining the relationship of various individual and organizational antecedent variables to attitudes toward prizes and then the relationship of attitudes and antecedent variables to prize-seeking behavior, path modeling was selected as the analysis strategy. This technique, in a simplified recursive form, allows us to examine the relationships of the antecedent variables to both the attitudinal variables derived from factor analysis and the ultimate dependent variable, professional prize-seeking.

Two path models using standardized multiple regression coefficients were planned: one for external (nonprofessional) awards and one for internal
professional) awards. However, since the dependent variable for the external prizeseeking analysis—number of nonprofessional prizes sought—included only 34 valid responses, that model had to be abandoned. The analysis of external awards was thus limited to an examination of the ability of our individual and organization variables to predict to attitudes toward external prizes rather than to external prizeseeking behaviors, as originally planned.

The first path model, predicting internal prizeseeking behavior, was initially estimated using education, the professional activities index, gender, mobility, income, job diversity, organizational prizeseeking activities and market rank of the organization as predictors. Subsequently, nonsignificant predictors such as job diversity and education were dropped and the model was reestimated. Income was initially not significant. We later recoded it as a dummy variable to denote the presence of high income (more than $50,000 per year).

Because of the skewed nature of the distribution common when a variable represents something that is counted, such as contest entries, the dependent variable, internal prize seeking, was re-expressed with a natural log transformation.$^{17}$

Before moving to a discussion of the results, it should also be noted that the small number of cases affects the results in important ways, primarily by making it difficult to achieve results statistically significant at conventional p<.05 levels. For this reason, and to avoid the potential type II error of missing important relationships that might be significant with more statistical power, we will report some coefficients that do not achieve conventional significance levels. We will clearly indicate when this is being done.
Results

Attitudes toward prizes. Factor analysis identified six clear factors when subjected to orthogonal rotation. See Table 1 for rotated factor loadings.

Factor I, nonprofessional or external prize efficacy, has a number of external prize opinion items loading heavily on it, including the attitudes that such prizes are useful in helping reporters find new jobs (.86), obtain better beats (.78), get ahead (.78), obtain bigger raises (.77), and can increase the esteem of one's peers (.71). Other variables loading strongly on Factor I include obtaining the esteem of editors, and three reversed variables that properly load negatively on the factor: statements that such prizes are a waste of time, editors don't care about them, and that they don't help reporters build power in the organization.

Factor II, internal professional prize efficacy, has eight variables loading strongly on it, including the attitude that professional prize-winning helps reporters get bigger raises than those who don't win them (.80), helps reporters get ahead (.76), and helps reporters obtain new jobs (.73) and better beats (.72). Other variables loading on the factor include statements about editor esteem, power enhancement, peer esteem (reversed item) and editor's caring (reversed item).

Factor III is an interesting factor made up of both internal and external items that reflect an attitude strongly supportive of the role of prizes as normative evaluators. Because both types of prizes load similarly, the factor appears to represent positive attitudes toward prizes and a view that prizes of both types do serve useful roles for journalists by providing forums for the recognition of quality work. Four variables load on this factor: the feeling
that the better stories win professional prizes (.72) and nonprofessional prizes (.68), and the feeling that journalists who win these awards have higher standards than those who don't win them. The high standards attitude variable loaded highly when referencing both professional (.62) and nonprofessional prizes (.70).

Factor IV, like Factor III, has both external and internal contest attitudes loading on it, but this time the items reflect a negative view of all such prizes. This negative factor has generally low loadings compared to the other factors in the solution, but the items clearly denote a rejection of the values implied in the previous factor. The five items and their loading are: statements that the best work in the field is not represented by the work awarded both nonprofessional (.51) and professional prizes (.48). Similarly, professional prizes are deemed a waste of time (.54), and there is agreement that "journalists don't care about winning awards" whether they are external (.57) or internal awards (.40).

Factor V is primarily a source factor, defined by attitudes that professional prize winning enhances a reporter's stature with sources and makes sources more helpful to reporters (.70). Sources are also perceived to be more impressed with a reporter's work if he or she is a prize winner, and source esteem of the reporter is also believed to be enhanced (.60). The notion that professional prizes are useful for countering the critics of a reporter's work loads weakly on this factor as it does on several of the other factors.

Factor VI contains the same variables as Factor V, but for the nonprofessional or external items only.

In summary, reporters' attitudes toward prizes in this study seem to reflect both professional and more general, generic components. Four of the six factors
point to a professional/nonprofessional split in attitudes: Factors I and II deal with the efficacy of external and internal prizes, respectively, while Factors V and VI suggest differences in the way sources are expected to react to external and internal prizes.

Factors III and IV, on the other hand, contain a mixture of professional/nonprofessional items, suggesting dimensions underlying each one that may not be related to that distinction. Instead, the factors seem to measure attitudes toward prizes in general, with Factor III suggesting overall support and Factor IV arguing that prizes are wastes of time.

Predicting prize-seeking behavior. As we noted earlier, we designed two path models, one to predict professional prize-seeking behavior and another to predict nonprofessional prize-seeking behavior. Our intent was to examine the ability of individual and organizational variables to predict attitudes toward prizes and the ability of those attitudes to predict behavior. Our factor analysis had produced six attitudinal constructs that could be used in our models. In the interest of parsimony, however, we used only factors I, II, III, and IV (nonprofessional prize efficacy, professional prize efficacy, prizes as normative markers, and prizes as wastes of time, respectively).

As originally designed, the two path models would have looked roughly like the following:

**Professional Prize-Seeking Model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual variables</th>
<th>Professional prize efficacy (Factor II)</th>
<th>Professional prize seeking behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizational variables</td>
<td>Normative value of prizes (Factor III)</td>
<td>Prize-seeking behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prizes a waste of time (Factor IV)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nonprofessional Prize-Seeking Model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual variables</th>
<th>Nonprofessional prize efficacy (Factor I)</th>
<th>Nonprofessional prize seeking behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizational variables</td>
<td>Normative value of prizes (Factor III)</td>
<td>Prize-seeking behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prizes as a waste of time (Factor IV)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
But, as noted earlier, nonprofessional prize-seeking behavior contained too little data to be useful as a dependent measure. Additionally, several of the individual and organizational variables did not predict to either attitudes or behavior so were dropped from the models.

Two path models were finally estimated, one for internal prize seeking and one more limited model with external prize efficacy (Factor 1) as the dependent variable. The correlation coefficients for all the variables in the two models are shown in Table 2.

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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
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Figure 1 displays the outcome for the first model with internal prize seeking as the dependent variable; the antecedent variables are professional activities, mobility, gender, income, organizational prize seeking, and market rank and the attitudinal prize role orientations (Factors II, III and IV) serve as the intervening variables.

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FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
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Figure 1 displays only paths significant at at least the .10 level; those significant at a level greater than p<.05 are noted. The path model shows several significant paths from the antecedent variables to the intervening attitudinal variables and several direct paths from the antecedent variables to the dependent variable, but none from the intervening variables to the dependent measure. One path, from Factor II to professional prize-seeking, yields a beta= -.10, which is nonsignificant.
Predicting the individual intervening factors was more successful, with mobility (beta = .16) and gender, or being female (beta = .15) having significant paths to Factor II, internal prize efficacy. Factor III, the normative role factor, is predicted only by organizational prize seeking, the propensity of the organization to encourage contest entries by having a committee to screen entries, by paying entry fees and by putting together contest entries. Factor IV, the negative attitude toward both external and internal prizes, is predicted by one significant path, gender (beta = .13). Income generates a nonsignificant beta of .11.

Prize seeking is best predicted by several antecedent variables with only direct paths to it. Professional activities—attending professional seminars, reading professional journals and magazines, and membership in professional organizations—is the strongest predictor in the model, somewhat surprising since there is severe attenuation at work in this variable. Because of the sampling frame employed, every respondent has some affiliation with at least one professional organization, SPJ. Consequently, we would expect an even stronger relationship for this variable to be evident in a more representative sample of journalists.

A similar direct path (beta = .20) is evident from organizational prize seeking to the professional prize-seeking dependent variable, indicating that organizational activities of this type can be a force in prize seeking regardless of individual attitudes. Organizations that seem hungry for prizes and take positive steps to gain them do in fact have more prize submissions than those without similar activities, and this is apparently done without affecting individual attitudes toward prizes.
Two other betas do much to suggest that prize seeking has a distinctively utilitarian purpose for many journalists. Market rank has a significant direct relationship ($\beta = -0.16$) to prize seeking, indicating that persons at smaller organizations seek prizes more actively than those at larger ones, perhaps because of their desire to move to a larger organization in search of higher salary, better working conditions or more prestige. This utilitarian view is also suggested by the direct negative coefficient from income ($\beta = -0.14$). Those with lower incomes are more likely to seek professional prizes, perhaps as a way of improving their income level.

Our variables did not do a good job of predicting nonprofessional prize efficacy, as Figure 2 indicates. Only two coefficients approached conventional significance levels: mobility ($\beta = 0.14$) and organizational prize seeking ($\beta = 0.13$).

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FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

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Both predictors are interesting, however, because they suggest that such external evaluative mechanisms as nonprofessional prizes are valued in part because individuals perceive that even those kinds of awards can help them get ahead in the occupation (mobility) and because organizational factors promote this kind of reward system.

DISCUSSION

This study suggests that journalists do differentiate between professional and nonprofessional reward systems in their attitudes toward prizes, although they also display more general, generic attitudes toward contests as either wholly "good" or wholly "bad."
But we failed to find any relationship between these attitudes and actual prize-seeking behavior; apparently, journalists who valued prizes were just as likely to seek them (or not) as were reporters who considered prizes to be wastes of time.

Measurement error, of course, could account in part for this predictive failure. But the chasm between attitudes and behavior in this study could also be a function of true differences between the two. Attitudes gleaned from our journalistic sample could reflect the ways in which respondents think the occupation should work while telling us little about how individuals actually behave. For example, a reporter could profess a real wariness of prizes as evaluative mechanisms for the occupation but might participate wholeheartedly in the prize-seeking process if she felt prizes had some utilitarian value for her personally.

And finally, relationships between attitudes and behaviors may not show up if some other factor is obscuring them. For example, a journalist may feel that prizes are good evaluative mechanisms but may be prevented from acting on those feelings by an organization that takes control of the prize-seeking process away from its employees.

Attitudes aside, however, other predictors in this analysis were more successful. And they suggest three major conclusions:

*Individual journalists do view professional prizes as part of the normative fabric of the occupation. Our professional activities index—primitive though it was—was the best predictor of professional prize-seeking. And it suggests that some journalists indeed view professional contests as part of a larger, shared concept of normative occupational behaviors.
At the same time, journalists also see prizes as utilitarian bargaining chips, as means of "getting along" within the occupation. Reporters in this study who were more mobile, worked in smaller markets and made less money were all more likely to seek prizes than were other types of journalists. Irrespective of the ability of prizes to reward good work, in other words, journalists seemed to view prizes as ways of individually "getting ahead."

Organizational prize activities have an impact on individuals' prize-seeking behaviors that is independent of individual-level variables. While this is not surprising, the presence of organizational prize activities as a predictor of positive attitudes about the efficacy of nonprofessional prizes suggests that organizations are not contributing to the internalization of media reward systems but instead may be helping external reward systems to remain viable.

Finally, these data do suggest that journalists to some extent rely on external evaluative mechanisms as ways of winnowing good work from bad. Although most of our sets of attitudinal indices created by factor analysis reflected differences in affective responses to professional and nonprofessional contests, two did not. And one of them is provocative. Factor III is a set of items strongly supportive of both internal and external rewards as means of recognizing quality work. Thus, reward systems outside the professional domain apparently still function as part of the normative system for journalism. To that extent, then, journalism may be utilizing evaluative mechanisms more appropriate to an occupation than to a profession.

END
The authors acknowledge the assistance of Derek Allen and Gene Hintz in helping to collect and organize these data.
Footnotes


11. *Editor & Publisher* magazine provides a directory of journalism awards and fellowships. The current (1985) directory is available in the December 29, 1984, issue.

12. Our examination of the numbers of responses coming from individuals employed in jobs outside the media suggests that nearly a third of the SPJ mailing list is made up of such persons. If we reduced our sample of 506 by that 32 percent, to 344, the usable sample of 190 would constitute 55 percent of the remaining journalistic sample.

13. Compared with 1980 Census sample figures on reporters and editors, the SPJ sample is more highly educated and better paid. It also underrepresents journalists working in the Northeast and overrepresents journalists working in the West. The mean ages and gender distributions of both the SPJ and the Census sample are about the same. For an analysis of the 1980 Census sample, see Randal A. Beam, "Changes in the Journalistic Workforce, 1970-1980," unpublished paper, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1984.

14. Part of the reason for designing this research project was to examine reporters' expectations of prizes and to see if the expected results of winning prizes were related to actual outcomes. That analysis is included in Randal A. Beam, Sharon Dunwoody and Gerald M. Kosicki, "Journalists and Their Prizes: The Relationship of Status, Job Morale and the Competition for Organizational and Occupational Recognition," unpublished paper, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1985.


Table 1: Varimax rotated factor analysis of 32 attitudes toward prizes (N=190).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Find new job</th>
<th>Factor I</th>
<th>Factor II</th>
<th>Factor III</th>
<th>Factor IV</th>
<th>Factor V</th>
<th>Factor VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better beats</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get ahead</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bigger raises</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer esteem</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editor's esteem</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste of time</td>
<td>-.46</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editor's don't care</td>
<td>-.45</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Bigger raises* | .02      | .80       | .08        | -.01      | .68      | .11       |
| Get ahead*     | .18      | .76       | .07        | -.08      | .10      | .04       |
| Find new job*  | .11      | .73       | -.13       | -.05      | .05      | .11       |
| Better beats*  | .17      | .72       | .03        | .02       | .14      | .15       |
| Editor's esteem* | .22    | .66       | .08        | -.00      | .28      | -.07      |
| Power*         | -.07     | -.63      | -.02       | .14       | .02      | -.11      |
| Peer esteem*   | .25      | .47       | .12        | -.24      | .37      | -.17      |
| Editor's don't care* | -.02 | -.46 | .01 | .18 | .08 | .30 |

| Better ones win* | .05      | .11       | .72        | -.17      | .19      | .04       |
| Higher standards | .26      | -.06      | .70        | -.01      | -.04     | .21       |
| Better ones win* | .32      | .06       | .68        | -.06      | -.14     | .19       |
| Higher standards* | -.03     | -.01      | .62        | -.03      | .29      | -.02      |

| Don't care      | -.30     | .06       | .10        | .57       | .13      | -.04      |
| Waste of time*  | .07      | -.25      | .00        | .54       | -.17     | .02       |
| Not best work   | -.16     | .05       | -.24       | .51       | .06      | -.07      |
| Not best work*  | -.07     | -.11      | -.17       | .48       | -.11     | .05       |
| Don't care*     | .11      | -.26      | .08        | .40       | -.18     | .09       |

| Sources helpful* | .13      | .27       | .14        | -.14      | .70      | .27       |
| Sources esteem*  | .20      | .26       | .18        | -.11      | .60      | .21       |
| Counter critics* | .22      | .26       | .21        | .03       | .27      | .15       |

| Sources helpful | .28      | .17       | .14        | .00       | .13      | .67       |
| Sources esteem  | .36      | .18       | .20        | .01       | .26      | .64       |
| Counter critics | .28      | .01       | .31        | .00       | .13      | .38       |

| Initial eigenvalue | 8.40  | 3.68  | 2.58  | 2.16  | 1.46  | 1.24  |
| Percent of variance| 26.2  | 11.5  | 8.1  | 6.8  | 4.6  | 3.9  |

*These items related to professional (internal) prizes; all others deal with nonprofessional (external) prizes.
Table 2: Zero-order correlation coefficients for variables in path models (N=164 to 190).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Prize seeking</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Factor I</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Factor II</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Factor III</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.26*</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Factor IV</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.57*</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Prof. activities</td>
<td>.36*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Org. prize seeking</td>
<td>.27*</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Nobility</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Market Rank</td>
<td>-.25*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>-.19*</td>
<td>-.23*</td>
<td>.26*</td>
<td>-.15*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean: 1.24  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  5.78  3.76  2.05  0.00  1.38  0.12
Standard Deviation: 1.02  0.97  0.59  0.48  0.92  3.07  1.91  0.89  0.94  0.49  0.32

*Significant at p<.05
Figure 1: Path diagram of individual, organizational and attitudinal predictors of professional prize seeking.

Path coefficients are significant at p<.05.
*Significant at p<.10

Total fit for model: Prize seeking dependent, $R^2 = .26$
Factor II dependent, $R^2 = .06$
Factor III dependent, $R^2 = .02$
Factor IV dependent, $R^2 = .03$

Factor II: Professional prize efficacy
Factor III: Normative value or prizes
Factor IV: Prizes as wastes of time
Figure 2: Path diagram of individual and organizational predictors of attitudes toward external awards.

**Factor 1:** Nonprofessional prize efficacy

*Significant at p<.10

Total R² for model = .04
Appendix

Attitudes toward prizes:
The same set of items was administered twice, with the following introductions:

The next group of statements concerns prizes, awards or honors given to journalists. Consider only those prizes, awards or honors judged by journalists or journalism educators. The Pulitzer prizes, the Society of Professional Journalists' awards and press association or news service honors might be examples. Again, please circle the number that best indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement.

Now, we are going to repeat the above statements. This time, consider only those prizes, awards or honors judged by people who are not journalists or journalism educators. The School Bell awards, honors from the Chamber of Commerce and prizes given by businesses, trade associations or special-interest groups might be examples. Again, please circle the number that best indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement.

Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Disagree

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Professional Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>Non-professional Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Journalists who win awards are more likely to get bigger pay raises than journalists who don't win awards.</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning awards makes it easier for a journalist to find a job with another news media organization.</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists who win awards get better beats and assignments than journalists who don't win awards.</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning awards won't enhance a journalist's power within the organization.</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources cooperate more readily with journalists who win awards than with journalists who don't win awards.</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning awards helps a journalist get ahead in this business.</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists who win awards are held in higher esteem by peers at work than journalists who don't win awards.</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists don't care about winning awards.</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33
Journalists who win awards are held in higher esteem by their editors than journalists who don't win awards.

Entering journalism contests is a waste of time and money.

Journalists who win awards are held in higher esteem by their sources than journalists who don't win awards.

Journalists who win awards have higher professional standards for their work than journalists who don't win awards.

The better journalists win the awards.

Editors and news directors don't care about their reporters winning awards.

Winning an award for a story or series helps counter criticism of that story or series.

Awards don't recognize the best work in this business.

**Mobility:**

How many years have you worked for news media organizations on a permanent, full-time basis?

How many news media organizations have you worked for on a permanent, full-time basis?

How long have you worked for your current employer?

Mobility was calculated by dividing years with media by number of media organizations. This number was dichotomized and entered into a two by two table with years with current employer.

**Job diversity:**

\[ JD = -(-700) + \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{8} (\text{Var58}_i - 12.5)^2 / 12.5} \]

Where: Var58 are the following measures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Non-professional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34
About what percentage of your work week do you spend doing the following:

(1) reporting or writing
(2) editing the work of others
(3) managing or supervising the work of others
(4) laying out pages, editing film or cropping pictures
(5) doing public relations or advertising
(6) anchoring or broadcasting news or features
(7) photographing news or features
(8) other (please specify)

Organizational prize seeking behavior:

How often does your employer pay the entry fee for contests in which you want to take part? Most times, sometimes, never, don't know.

How often does your employer put together the entries for the contests in which you want to take part? Most times, sometimes, never, don't know.

At the place you are employed, is there a committee or some formal group that decides whose work will be entered in contests? Yes, no, don't know.

Cronbach's Alpha = .609 Average interitem correlation = .344

Professional activities:

Please list any professional journals or magazines you read.
How many if any, journalism conventions or seminars have you attended during the last year?
Please list any professional organizations to which you belong.

Cronbach's Alpha = .636 Average interitem correlation = .371

Rank (Relative size of the organization's market area):

If you work for a newspaper or magazine, what is its approximate circulation?

If you work for a radio or television station, what is the approximate population of the community in which it is located? What is the national ranking of the market area it serves?

These measures were standardized and added to form a single index of market rank.
Professional prize seeking:

As best you can remember, how many reporting, editing, layout writing or photography contests have you entered during the last five years? Please list those contests.

Seeking is the number of contests listed multiplied by the number of times each one was entered.

Income:

What was your approximate salary in 1983?

- Less than $10,000
- $10,000 through $19,999
- $20,000 through $29,999
- $30,000 through $39,999
- $40,000 through $49,999
- $50,000 or more

Education:

Please indicate your highest level of education.

- Some high school
- High school graduate
- Some college
- College undergraduate degree
- Some graduate or post-secondary school
- Graduate degree