
Stanley Foundation, Muscatine, Iowa.

Oct 84

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Collected Works - Conference Proceedings (021)

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UNESCO; United States; USSR; Weapons

Proceedings are summarized of a conference in which 62 foreign policy professionals met to recommend strategies for peace in the areas of U.S.-Soviet competition in the Third World, space weapons and arms control, objectives of U.S. economic and security assistance, and the United States and UNESCO. Four sections focusing on each of these areas are presented. Section 1 examines the history and development of U.S. and Soviet policies toward the Third World, identifies regions with the greatest risk of direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, evaluates the consequences of U.S.-Soviet competition on individual nations and on the world community, and formulates options for U.S. policymakers. The second section deals with fundamental disagreements about U.S. objectives in space, ways to increase satellite survivability, policy alternatives, antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities and ballistic missile defense (BMD) issues, and methods for improving the arms control debate. The third section describes how participant examination of U.S. foreign aid objectives began with an identification of the major problems in the Third World to which economic and security assistance should be directed. Discussion focused on desirable objectives of foreign aid, security and development, and considerations in achieving aid objectives. The final section focuses on pros and cons of the United States' withdrawal from UNESCO. Sixteen suggestions for the United States, for UNESCO member states, and for the UNESCO organization itself conclude the report. (LH)
STRATEGY FOR PEACE 1984

THE STANLEY FOUNDATION
US FOREIGN POLICY
CONFERENCE REPORT

1. US-Soviet Competition in the Third World
2. Space Weapons and Arms Control
3. Objectives of US Economic and Security Assistance
4. The United States and UNESCO

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C. Maxwell Stanley, founder and president of the Stanley Foundation, died on September 20, 1984. As a lasting tribute to this man of peace, the foundation will continue to strive toward the goal of a world without war, a world of secure peace with freedom and justice.
Economic and Security Assistance Participants
INTRODUCTION

Strategy for Peace, the Stanley Foundation's US foreign policy conference, annually assembles experts from the public and private sectors to assess specific foreign policy issues and to recommend future direction.

At the 1984 conference, 62 foreign policy professionals met at Airlie House conference center to recommend elements of a strategy for peace in the areas of:

1. US-Soviet Competition in the Third World
2. Space Weapons and Arms Control
3. Objectives of US Economic and Security Assistance
4. The United States and UNESCO

The work of the conference was carried out in four concurrent round-table discussions. These sessions were informal and off the record. The rapporteurs have tried to convey the conclusions of the discussions and the areas of consensus and of disagreement.

All reports were written following the conference and were not reviewed by group members. Thus it should not be assumed that participants subscribe to all recommendations and conclusions of their discussion group. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Stanley Foundation.

The entire report is offered in the hope that it will stimulate further thought and discussion. You are welcome to duplicate or quote any part or all of this report so long as proper acknowledgment is made. Additional copies are available free from:

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“Today we face the anomalies of a nuclear confrontation, intractable bilateral differences, a redefinition of global relationships, and a crisis in multilateralism that our practice of ‘normal foreign policy’ seems unable to resolve. The themes of past policy are not working. Perhaps this period calls for a revolution, not in the streets, but in our thinking.”
This is the 25th anniversary of our Strategy for Peace conference series. During the past quarter century this annual conference has endeavored to bring together experts from diverse backgrounds and varying viewpoints to discuss and to develop thinking and recommendations on US policy concerning some of the world’s most pressing problems. I am pleased that you have chosen to participate in this conference, and I am confident that your cumulative knowledge and skills will contribute greatly toward dealing with the critical matters which you will address.

Our challenge has always been great, but in these days it may be more so than ever before. More than the normal practice of your formidable talents is needed if we are to achieve some small measure of success in dealing with the global problems which confront us. New thinking, new ways of viewing our world, and creativity are demanded; for the problems of today seem like a drug-resistant infection for which old cures are failing to secure the good health of peace, justice, and security.

Our Global Paradigm

Since the end of World War II, US foreign policy has, with a great degree of consistency, been based on a number of continuing themes. These have reflected the mainstream of our nation’s view of the world—our global paradigm. The themes have included:

1. A commitment to participation in international affairs in order to protect national interests and to influence other nations to our way of thinking.
2. A commitment to contain communism, especially that of the Soviet Union.
3. Resulting from this, an international perspective cast predominantly in terms of East-West competition.
4. Reliance on mutual military deterrence.
5. A consideration of emerging and developing nations pri-
arily in terms of our ability to maintain them within our sphere of economic and political influence.

6. An emphasis on national initiatives and bilateral actions rather than global interdependence and multilateral solutions.

In the development and practice of US foreign policy we experienced our differences, but they were largely differences about methodology and intermediate goals within a commonly accepted context. They were seldom differences about the basic premises of that policy. Until recently, reliance on these themes seemed to work—we have avoided involvement in another global war and have maintained a preeminent economic and political position. But now we are encountering a series of problems that tend to defy solution. These problems, growing in number and intensity, have driven us into a period where change seems necessary but new directions hard to come by. We are in a state of perplexity and bewilderment. Old methods are not working and new world views are needed.

**Portentous Times**

My view of a troubled world is not unique. William Bundy, former editor of *Foreign Affairs*, surveyed the world situation in the annual “America and the World” edition of that journal published at the start of the year. He concluded that “the overall situation today is as threatening and truly portentous as it has been at any time since World War II.” I agree. We are collectively holding our breaths because we are just not sure what is coming next.

It is perhaps difficult to accept the notion that our policies are failing to solve problems and that they have in some instances helped to create new problems; but this unfortunate circumstance is no more clearly illustrated than in the development of nuclear weapons and attempts to control those weapons. In early years optimists thought that nuclear weapons would provide the deterrent to another world war. Later, as it became apparent that the nuclear arms race was a problem by itself, arms control efforts were launched. Even as negotiations proceeded and treaties were signed, however, warheads multiplied at a phenomenal rate. Now even modest attempts at control are in disarray, and the arms race is superheated. How can we really get a handle on these things? There seems to be no consensus. It is often said that “we cannot put the genie back in the bottle.” This phrase reveals a sense of despair.
The new weapons and technologies currently being developed, tested, and deployed shake our confidence in deterrence and add urgency. We are at a threshold—about to make a transition—into a new and, I believe, even more frightening weapons era. The weapons now being developed promise to defy future control efforts. Their existence may be impossible to verify, and their first-strike capability may radically cut the time decision makers have to consider their use against an enemy. The development of space weapons, for example, is more likely to fuel the arms race than to bring security. That has been the pattern of every new weapon. Our future, if we are to have one, requires that we work to alleviate this threat, and the stark realization of past failures to control nuclear weapons must serve as a powerful incentive to revolutionize our thinking and ideas.

US-Soviet Relations

For nearly 40 years our Soviet policy has been competition in weapons and containment. Recently recurring changes in Soviet leadership have contributed to an uneasiness and concern in both the Soviet Union and the United States, the magnitude of which we have not experienced for some time. These changes, combined with the massive military power of both countries and the fear and mistrust characteristic of all but a few years of our now nearly 70-year relationship, have created a very dangerous situation for both countries.

The dangers of an unchecked military competition have already been illustrated; the continuing dominance of our focus on containment is also suspect. Containment policy has been played out in the Third World where we have competed with the Soviets for the hearts and minds of one country after another. Increasingly, though, we and the Soviets find the favor of developing countries to be elusive; Third World leaders, maintaining their prerogatives and not wishing to be permanently identified with one side or the other, play the two superpowers against each other, understandably looking to advance their own stature and development.

Still, the United States and the Soviet Union feel compelled to continue the competition, frequently encouraging if not providing the potentially explosive military element. US-Soviet competition in the Third World has served as a breeding ground for fear and chronically poses the opportunity for the military escalation that neither side wants but both might find irresistible.
Changing Global Relationships

In the pursuit of competition and containment we have failed to adjust to a significant shift in global relationships. For 40 years we have assigned overriding importance to the East-West competition. Today legions of citizens in the developing part of the world, which we call the South are telling us that they think our ideological competition is not very important to them. They are preoccupied with a life and death issue of their own—development. For more than two decades they have challenged us to reexamine international economic institutions, to give them a better chance. Undoubtedly, some of their demands have been unreasonable, but it is also true that many of our responses have been miserably inadequate.

Ultimately, North-South relations will be equal, if not more important, to our peaceful and prosperous existence than East-West relations. How we respond to the call for a dialogue between the North and South will not only determine how we are viewed by the rest of the world but also how we view ourselves as a nation. In the short term, the structure of our foreign assistance programs will indicate whether we see the South as merely a battleground for continued East-West competition or rather as a partner in the continuing struggle to make human life better.

Multilateral Approaches

Let us also consider our attitude toward multilateral approaches to problem solving. Since the end of World War II, the United Nations has had its successes and failures like any other institution. When it was formed, it was structured to represent the political, economic, and military realities of the world in 1945. The United States was dominant and dominated the United Nations. We liked it that way.

However, through the years the rapidly increasing number of nations changed the political balance of power at the United Nations. We no longer dominate the United Nations. While other countries have acquired military and economic muscle, the voting majority at the United Nations General Assembly, mostly Third World countries, represents a bloc of nations without much clout behind its resolutions. Consequently, we have a situation where UN actions are increasingly ignored by the United States.

Recent attacks and criticism of the United Nations and its
agencies, some of it justified, call into question the willingness of the United States and others to commit to the future of the United Nations and multilateral problem solving. Is the announced pullout from UNESCO by the United States the first step in a US policy of retreat from multilateral international activities? I hope not. We have a choice: we can ignore or run away from the United Nations, or we can shift our thinking, helping it to work out some of its problems and reach its full potential. The latter course offers far more hope.

**Challenge**

In all of these areas and others as well we face major decisions. If we live in a perplexing world, if we are finding more and more problems to be seemingly unsolvable, perhaps our thinking is stale.

The current difficulty calls to mind a theory put forth by Thomas Kuhn in a book titled *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. In this work Kuhn attempted to explain the history of science and how it has changed and progressed. He challenged traditional theory which held that science was a progression of building blocks each advancing the discipline as more science was successfully practiced. Instead, Kuhn postulated that scientific disciplines exist in paradigms or ways of looking at the discipline. Scientists work on problems, or puzzle solving, within the bounds and according to the rules of the current paradigm—a practice Kuhn called normal science: in the course of conducting normal science, scientists would encounter problems that could not be solved, or results that could not be explained within the context of the paradigm, as Copernicus did in the practice of Ptolemaic astronomy and as Einstein did in the application of Newtonian physics. He called these difficulties anomalies. As more anomalies developed, creating a crisis in the discipline, a new paradigm, a new and different way of looking at that discipline, would emerge. If the new paradigm successfully addressed itself to the known body of data and resolved the anomalies there would subsequently, although not always willingly, be a shift to it.

Kuhn recognized the parallel between his scientific arguments and political developments:

Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, often restricted to a segment of the political community, that existing institutions have ceased to adequately meet
the problems posed by an environment that they have in part created.

Today we face the anomalies of a nuclear confrontation, intractable bilateral differences, a redefinition of global relationships, and a crisis in multilateralism that our practice of "normal foreign policy" seems unable to resolve. The themes of past policy are not working. Perhaps this period calls for a revolution, not in the streets, but in our thinking.

Do we have the courage to admit that ever increasing arsenals offer only an illusion of security? Do we then have the will to look elsewhere for security? Can we redefine the nature of superpower relationships? Must we be adversaries in every instance?

Do we have the national confidence to live up to our commitments and break out of the bounds of bilateralism in order to make multilateral institutions such as the United Nations work, even if we no longer control them? Can we challenge ourselves to see the South as a partner in the world progress and not as an exploitable dependent?

We have the opportunity and the requirement to duplicate the genius of Einstein in our own political world. Are we imaginative enough to admit that Einstein was right not only in applying a new paradigm to physics but also in calling for a new paradigm in the way we think? As he stated,

"We must never relax our efforts to arouse in the people of the world, and especially in their governments, an awareness of the unprecedented disaster which they are absolutely certain to bring on themselves unless there is a fundamental change in their attitudes toward one another as well as in their concept of the future.

Can we accept his challenge?"
Herbert Ellison, Chair
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This report was prepared by the rapporteur following the conference. Participants neither reviewed nor approved the text; therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all recommendations, observations, and conclusions.
Introduction

The issue of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union has its roots in the gradual emergence of the Soviet Union during the post-war years as a superpower capable of exerting its influence far beyond its own borders. According to the discussants, this extension of Soviet power began after World War II once the stabilization of Europe was complete, sometime during the mid-1950s. Soviet interests inevitably ran head-on into those of the West in general, and of the United States in particular, creating intense conflicts of interest between the world's two greatest powers. This sort of confrontation, combined with the regional turmoil that characterizes many areas of the developing Third World, was viewed by a majority of the group as posing the greatest threat to a peaceful world. As noted by one participant, there are as many as twenty wars being waged around the globe today, and therefore policy toward the Third World must be seen as a central aspect of US-Soviet relations. With little disagreement, members of the group considered their purposes to be:

1. To examine the history and development of US and Soviet policies toward the Third World.
2. To identify regions with the greatest risk of direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.
3. To evaluate the consequences of US-Soviet competition in the Third World on individual nations and on the world community.
4. To formulate reasonable options for US policymakers that take into account regional differences and are tailored to the legitimate needs of the United States and the individual countries involved.

Soviet Policies Toward the Third World

Current Soviet policies toward the Third World, according to most members of the group, have been shaped by a complex set of factors, none of which is easily recognized as being most important. Several participants noted that Soviet Third World policy has been unpredictable at best. For example, Western
analysts did not expect the Soviets to invade Afghanistan, whereas many experts were certain that the Soviet Union would intervene in Poland and Iran. Furthermore, according to the group, there seems to be a great deal of debate among the Soviets themselves concerning their own foreign policy; however, one prominent impetus for pursuing a foreign policy at all is to buttress the Soviet quest for legitimacy, both at home and abroad. It was also emphasized by more than one of the group members that Soviet policy toward the Third World is highly differentiated by region, making uniform analysis extremely difficult.

The factors most easily identifiable as major contributors to the development and implementation of Soviet Third World policy are ideological, military/strategic, and economic. Of these, the factor that sparked the greatest amount of controversy among the conference participants was the degree to which ideological concerns govern Soviet foreign policy. Although a majority of the members felt that there was no identifiable "global scheme" on the Soviets' part, several felt that the Soviets do present a clear ideological vision that applies to the Third World. One member bolstered this latter point by arguing that, from the Soviet perspective, a strong communist party in a Third World country makes that country more reliable. An example cited was Ethiopia, where the Soviets long have demanded a communist party, which finally was created in September 1984. The point was made that the evident significance of building a vanguard party is an expression of the importance the Soviets attach to ideology.

This importance of ideology in the formulation of Soviet policy toward the Third World was questioned strongly by a significant number of participants. According to this faction, although the Soviets might on occasion use ideology to legitimize a relationship with a Third World country, the Soviets have become less and less ideologically strident, and the essence of the debate is whether the Soviets' ultimate goal is world communism. On this latter point, one discussant thought not, citing that other communist countries have not always been reliable Soviet allies (for example, Albania, Yugoslavia, and China), and second that communist parties in Third World countries—once established—have not always proven effective, as in Angola and Mozambique. It was suggested that much as the United States tolerates allies that are less than perfect democracies, the Soviets do not place great importance on a strong communist party in a Third World country.
The notion of building vanguard communist parties for ideological reasons even has its critics in the Soviet Union. Reputedly, some Soviet policymakers are of the opinion that the establishment of a communist party in a Third World country limits the Soviet Union's options for the future by making it more difficult for the Soviets to get out of their obligations should that become necessary. Furthermore, another participant noted, none of the major recipients of Soviet economic and military aid (Syria, Egypt, Iraq, India, and others) can qualify as “good Leninists”; thus, the argument goes, ideology must be viewed as merely another factor in the formulation of Soviet policy toward the Third World.

Although it is unclear whether ideology plays a concrete role in developing Soviet policy toward the Third World, one member suggested that it nevertheless may provide a helpful framework for explaining the underpinnings of that policy. It might well be that the two-stage approach to revolution formulated by Lenin (national liberation followed by communization) remains viable in Soviet policymaking circles and, according to this participant, the Soviet Union is attempting to accelerate that process from stage one to stage two, taking its cue from Castro's experience in Cuba. If true, this phenomenon could pose a major ideological threat to the United States and the West.

A second major factor in the shaping of Soviet policy toward the Third World is economic, according to several participants. The Soviet Union is in dire need of hard currency, and the sale of arms to Third World countries nets the Soviets a substantial income. One member suggested that the Soviet Union is economically dependent on the sale of arms. Indeed, according to another, an estimated 70 percent of Soviet arms transfers involve hard currency exchange.

Although the economic factor is important, most participants agreed that the Soviets place more weight on military and strategic considerations, especially with regard to Third World countries close to their borders, particularly the southern border, and in the Eastern Mediterranean. (The potential for military and strategic concerns to take overwhelming precedence over other factors that shape Soviet policy is well illustrated by the situation in Afghanistan, according to one discussant.) In fact, several participants opined that the Soviets have shifted their emphasis from the economic to the military and strategic spheres. In one member's view, an impor-
tant indication of this shift is the increased militarization of many Third World regions, including Northeast and South Asia. This phenomenon was explained by some as a reflection of the fact that economic aid to Third World countries is rather amorphous in nature; it is much easier to provide armaments than a steel mill, for example, and results are much more immediate and tangible. Other participants suggested that the shift was in response to the US-sponsored military buildup in the Third World.

Most agreed that the Soviet Union is highly concerned with achieving political parity and maintaining military parity with the United States. This is to be gained through two significant and interrelated goals that are the driving forces behind implementation of Soviet policies toward the Third World: First is the Soviet attempt to expand its influence in the world, and second is the desire to undermine US interests in the Third World. According to the group, the extent to which the Soviets are successful is often dependent on how opportunities are exploited. Opportunism is, of course, highly volatile from an analytical perspective and was viewed by most as a function of geopolitical and security concerns. (Several participants, however, considered opportunism to be the absolute central ingredient in Soviet Third World policies.)

Although most were careful not to understate the importance of opportunism in Soviet conduct in the Third World, several members suggested that there may have been a subtle shift in emphasis in Soviet policy away from backing the smaller, less strategically important Third World countries, such as, South Yemen and Angola. It was noted that considerable evidence exists that many Soviet policymakers believe the Soviet Union is squandering its resources on Third World ventures with little chance for substantial gains. Instead, it was conjectured, the Soviets may be moving toward establishing better ties with industrialized Third World countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and Nigeria. Similarly, it was noted, such a change in course would enable the Soviets to develop an increased number of mutually beneficial relations, as opposed to ties with countries that merely tend to be economic drains on the Soviet economy.

The final major factor identified in Soviet policy toward the Third World was the use of proxies, such as, Cuba and several of the East European nations. The general consensus was that this phenomenon is a highly destabilizing element in the Third
World, especially, as one member stated, the "transformation of Cuba into a modern-day Sparta." As one participant explained, Soviet policy toward the Third World is designed in part to protect its strategic interests and defend against the US threat. Obviously, in a nuclear age, this policy is difficult to pursue through the use of conventional Soviet troops; thus the Soviet solution is to deploy proxies, or advisers, confident that the United States will not take steps to counter such a strategy. Another discussant responded that this strategy may be reevaluated as a result of the October 1983 invasion of Grenada by US and East Caribbean forces.

US Policies Toward the Third World

When confronted by the task of evaluating US policy toward the Third World, it was generally agreed that the increase in power and influence of the Soviet Union has greatly complicated the task of formulating that policy. (It was also conjectured by one member that the United States is relatively new in the role of superpower and that policymaking has suffered as a result.) Not only must US policymakers deal with direct Soviet actions, but also with the activities of such countries as Cuba, East Germany, and Bulgaria, whose policies are dictated—or at least heavily influenced—by Moscow. Several participants noted, however, that these difficulties are countered by the overwhelming political, military, and economic advantages the United States holds over the Soviet Union in the Third World. Although these advantages are not always properly exploited by the United States, they do provide a base for optimism, according to several discussants.

The group first considered the role that containment has played in US Third World policy. Several participants argued that containment has been central to US policy since it was originally conceived by George F. Kennan over thirty years ago. Proponents of containment suggested that it is quite obvious that there exists an anti-Soviet animus in US Third World policy (as well as an anti-US animus in Soviet Third World policy) that is simply not explained by geopolitical considerations. Therefore, it was argued, containment must be behind our Third World policies, especially in light of the fact that countries falling to communism are a big political issue in the United States. It was also argued by one member that containment was emphasized by the US during the 1970s when Soviet ventures in the Third World were on the increase. Others discounted the major role attributed to containment, citing US
partiality to decolonization, which is hardly consistent with a containment policy.

A few participants suggested that the role of containment in US policy can best be evaluated in terms of the strong anticommunist sentiment that pervades US society. First, it was argued, containment policy is necessary because of the reputed irreversibility of communism once it has taken hold in a Third World country. In fact, it was noted, the United States would sooner support a right-wing dictatorship than a democratic communist government because of the irreversibility issue. This point was heatedly debated by some members of the group, who felt that the concept of irreversibility is not helpful in evaluating US policy because it depends largely on how one defines communism. The point was made that several countries that were firmly along the road to communism, such as Indonesia and New Guinea, did reverse direction. Additionally, it was noted, analysts who advance the irreversibility issue as a reason to counter communism invariably confuse Eastern Europe (which is dominated by the Soviet physical presence) with Third World countries outside Europe, where the role of the Soviet Union is vastly different. One member of the group suggested that but for Soviet military intervention, several East European countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland) might arguably have turned to the West. Besides, a good deal of evidence suggests that the Soviets themselves recognize the geographical, cultural, and political limitations to a doctrine of irreversibility.

Several members of the group suggested that anticommunism in the United States was rooted in 1) a concern for the observance of fundamental human rights by totalitarian regimes; 2) a vested interest in protecting foreign investment in unstable regions of the world; 3) a desire to protect US national security from a perceived direct or indirect Soviet military threat; and 4) a widespread ignorance among the US public and political leadership of the nature of communism. One participant labeled this US anticommunism as paranoia, suggesting that US security would not be threatened seriously even if all of Central America fell to communism. This latter point was hotly disputed, however, with several participants noting the historic strategic importance of the Caribbean Basin as a logistical supply line in times of crisis.

A majority of the group was willing to broaden the scope of the anticommunist US policy to include any totalitarian
regime that is antithetical to US and Western traditional democratic institutions. It was felt that US policymakers are uneasy about any unstable conditions in countries of the Third World with poor economies and growing populations. This is especially true regarding countries in close proximity to US borders where a refugee problem could have a profound impact on the US economy and society. According to the group, the United States is not only disturbed by Cuban- and Nicaraguan-style transformations, but also by the spread of Islamic or other religious fundamentalism (such as in Guyana in 1978).

A majority of the participants were of the opinion that the United States has badly mismanaged its Third World policy, failing to exploit especially significant political and economic advantages. Several members offered the following typical scenario: The United States aligns itself with the reactionary right-wing leadership of a Third World country, disinterested in either managing continuing problems or encouraging reform. Additionally, the United States does not recognize—either overtly or covertly—opposition or left-wing parties, and as a consequence those parties are encouraged to turn to Moscow for support. Then, as conditions worsen, revolution of a leftist nature takes place, the United States attempts belatedly to disassociate itself from the right, and the successor regime is in no position to have good relations with the United States. Once the revolution has passed, with a leftist government in power, the United States announces that the Soviet Union has won and returns to a position of disinterest in the Third World country involved.

According to several participants, the key problem area for US policy in the Third World in the above scenario is a tendency not to distinguish among leftist forces to determine which most closely identify with Western democratic institutions. Indeed, the United States is often alarmingly misinformed on the domestic political situations in Third World countries. Instead, the United States is recognized as part of the problem by postrevolutionary regimes in the Third World, as in Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua, and, perhaps in the very near future, the Philippines.

Finally, most members of the group felt that the US policy of not allowing the Soviet Union to participate fully in settling regional disputes (particularly in the Middle East, where the Soviet interest is most compelling) has a highly destabilizing effect on global problems. Although some cautioned that involv-
The Soviets might create more problems than are solved, most agreed that this would be a risk worth taking.

**Consequences of US-Soviet Competition in the Third World**

The fact of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Third World has had a profound effect not only on Third World countries themselves, but also on broader US-USSR relations, according to a clear majority of the participants. It was further suggested by several that the existence of the competition also made expansionist tendencies on the part of both United States and the Soviet Union inevitable, creating an uncertain future for much of the Third World. Most participants felt that the thirty years of competition have exacerbated almost all regional conflicts. According to some, the central reason for this has been the increased militarization of countries aligned with both East and West, along with the accompanying growth in worldwide conventional capabilities. In addition to the obvious added potential for armed conflict, this process of militarization has had economic consequences, according to one group member. First, the Third World countries are spending large amounts of money on armaments, thus limiting the resources available for economic development; second, and equally important, as a Third World country becomes increasingly militarized, advancement in society is through the military, thus diverting a great deal of talent away from other sectors of society.

Although most agreed that the US-Soviet competition preceded the marked militarization of many regions of the world, a few countered that the conventional arms buildup—with the consequential threats to security all around—is not necessarily solely due to the US-Soviet competition. It can hardly be disputed that many Third World leaders exploit the superpower competition to achieve their own goals (with Egypt and Libya coming immediately to mind as examples) and otherwise to pursue their own best interests. Furthermore, another participant noted, there is evidence to suggest that some Third World countries consider the Soviet Union as a “superpower for hire”.

The attractiveness of the Soviet and US (Western) models to Third World leaders was an issue given particular emphasis by the discussants. In general, most felt that over the last twenty years, the development of the Third World could more
appropriately be characterized as "Westernization" than as "Sovietization." Despite much policy mismanagement (as noted earlier), not to mention the potential for anti-Western sentiment during a period of active decolonization, the United States and the West have maintained and even increased their military, political, and economic influence in much of the Third World. As one participant noted, evidence as obvious as the dramatic cultural dominance of the West and the increasing prevalence of the English language are indicators of how unsuccessful the Soviets have been.

It was agreed by most that while technology and the Western system of economic incentives gain the United States considerable favor in the Third World, the US tendency to emphasize the private sector can be alienating to many Third World countries where the public sector plays important political and social roles. The Soviet economic model, on the other hand, has been largely discredited by most of the Third World, according to several participants; it has great short- and long-term costs, and does not always work. In fact, as one member noted, the Soviets themselves seem to have diminished expectations for their system; they no longer emphasize perhaps because of the economic strain it places on the Soviet Union itself—ambitious capitalization projects in Third World countries.

Although the attractiveness of the Soviet Union to Third World leaders is limited in terms of economic advantages, the Soviets do offer a method for seizing, organizing, consolidating, and holding power. According to most members of the group, this attraction is not lost on many Third World leaders who, as noted by one participant, see the Soviet Union as "sort of a patron." While some thought that the Soviet Union is usually reliable and quick to protect its allies' interests, others were more skeptical. This latter group pointed to Cuba where the Soviets have promised to do nothing and Grenada where they did nothing to defend Marxism-Leninism; to Egypt, where economic assistance was exceedingly sparse; and to Afghanistan, Somalia, Mozambique, and Angola, where the Soviets have been involved in acts of political subversion. (In the Afghan situation, however, one participant dissented, arguing that the Soviets' installation of Babrak Karmal was an indication of Soviet reliability, because Karmal was considered to be a better Leninist than Hafizullah Amin.)

The US-Soviet competition has had as profound an effect
on broader US-Soviet relations as it has had on the Third World countries themselves, according to most of the participants. In fact, it was argued by more than one that neither superpower had great enough interests to protect in the Third World to overcome the strains on direct US-Soviet relations caused by Third World ventures on both sides during the 1970s. Not only did these ventures wreak havoc on detente, but the chaos generated by the competition greatly detracted from progress on issues vital to the best interests of both superpowers, such as arms control.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Without a formal vote and with some qualifications, the group drew the following conclusions and recommendations, which are meant only to summarize and highlight the major areas of discussion.

1. The United States should seriously engage the Soviet Union in taking positive steps to avoid further militarization of Third World conflicts through control of arms transfers, especially concentrating on areas of great promise, such as the Indian Ocean and wherever the qualitative arms buildup has been minimal. These steps should be taken first in countries where it is mutually advantageous for the United States and the Soviet Union to reach an agreement, such as in Iran, and perhaps Argentina, Chile, Chad, and Lebanon.

2. US political leaders should meet regularly with Soviet leaders to continue the dialogue to minimize risks of confrontation in this nuclear age and to reemphasize the positive aspects of US Third World policy, such as human rights.

3. The United States should consider involving the Soviet Union as a partner in managing global problems, particularly in the Middle East. First, however, the United States must evaluate whether such an act would lead to a solution there, and whether there would be larger global political repercussions.

4. The United States should formulate its policy toward the Third World on a regional basis, taking care not to view the Third World solely in East-West terms.

5. The United States should avoid becoming closely aligned with right-wing authoritarian regimes, and should distinguish among, and be knowledgeable about, leftist opposition part...
ties. In dealing with leftist opposition parties, the United States should maintain its identity with democratic values and continue to have relations with the national leadership, perhaps covertly, cultivating ties with the opposition. The United States should also avoid becoming the exclusive provider of military and economic aid to Third World countries and participate in more multilateral aid programs.

6. The United States should take immediate steps to prevent the Philippines from following in the violent footsteps of Iran and Nicaragua.

7. The United States should distinguish between economic and political communism, acknowledging that totalitarianism, not necessarily communism, is the evil to be countered. The United States should attempt to control political and military subversion, particularly where vital strategic interests are at stake, such as, in Central America and the Caribbean Basin.

8. Although the existence of a Marxist-Leninist regime may or may not constitute a threat to US national security, none should be tolerated in the Western Hemisphere.

9. The United States should formulate a positive policy designed to develop healthy economic and democratic institutions in the Third World.

10. US management and economic expertise should be made available to Third World governments, notwithstanding the mixed nature of their economies. The United States should not leave public sector development to the Soviet Union.

11. The Stanley Foundation should hold a joint US-USSR conference on “Managing the US-Soviet Relationship in the Third World,” including a specific seminar on Iran and a general seminar on promoting stability and peaceful change.
This report was prepared by the rapporteur following the conference. Participants neither reviewed nor approved the text; therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all recommendations, observations, and conclusions.
Introduction

Both space weapons and arms control encompass enormous subjects. The group focused its attention on the more limited area defined by the intersection of these two subjects. Anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, which are now limited by an arms control agreement, and some aspects of ballistic missile defense (BMD), which are severely constrained by the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, fall in this intersection. Both are currently prominent political issues. The United States is on the verge of realistically testing an ASAT weapon. Advocates of the program believe the United States needs to match, if not exceed, the ASAT capability which the Soviet Union has already tested. Opponents fear an arms race in space and reductions in the survivability of satellites. They believe agreements limiting ASAT capabilities should be negotiated before further tests and deployment of ASAT systems make mutual limitations more difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate and verify. President Ronald Reagan’s speech of March 23, 1983 (commonly known as the “star wars” speech), which resulted in the strategic defense initiative (SDI), placed BMD at the top of the political and strategic agenda. Basic questions have been reopened about both the feasibility and the desirability of BMD designed to protect the US homeland from Soviet nuclear attack.

Satellites now provide five types of military support functions—communications, reconnaissance and surveillance, navigation, meteorology, and geodesy. It is frequently said that basing a BMD or ASAT system in space would fundamentally change the nature of the military use of space, that is, space would be weaponized. There was general agreement that, contrary to this conventional wisdom, space is already weaponized. The dividing line between ground-based weapons and these space-based support components is, at best, blurry. Since systems based on the ground can be used to attack satellites, placing ASAT weapons in space would not result in a fundamental change. Instead, it is more accurate to say that the superpowers face the prospect of a large increase in the degree of space weaponization.
Objectives

The group agreed that it is desirable for US satellites to be survivable. There was some disagreement, as listed below, over whether the United States is better off when Soviet satellites are survivable.

—Some members of the group focused on the need to deny the Soviet Union the ability to perform military missions. The United States could control the military situation if it could completely survey Soviet actions, deny Soviet surveillance, deny the Soviet Union the ability to attack the United States with intercontinental forces, and apply force instantaneously everywhere in the world. The only capabilities the United States wants the Soviet Union to have are early warning (so that the Soviet Union knows that it is not being attacked) and the ability to issue a cease fire order to its forces. Ideally the United States would be able to destroy all other Soviet command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities because they enable the Soviet Union to use its forces more effectively. Moreover, even the early warning capability should be vulnerable to attack. There are situations in which the United States might want to deny the Soviet Union information from its early warning satellites.

—The objectives of other members of the group were quite different from those just described. First, they were most concerned about the survivability of US capabilities, not the denial of Soviet capabilities. ASAT arms control was seen as a feasible policy which could contribute to the maintenance of satellite survivability. However, ASAT arms control would help maintain the survivability of Soviet satellites as well. Consequently, they saw a tradeoff between the survivability of US systems and the vulnerability of Soviet systems. Second, they were concerned that making Soviet early warning satellites vulnerable would reduce Soviet confidence in its early warning capabilities. This reduction was judged quite dangerous and could not be justified by the benefit in certain scenarios of destroying the Soviet Union's early warning capabilities.

—Some members of the group believed maintaining the survivability of both US and Soviet satellites was especially important because attacking satellites during a conventional war could increase the probability of escalation to full-scale nuclear war. More specifically, there was debate about Soviet radar ocean reconnaissance satellites (RORSAT) that would support Soviet attacks against the US fleet. Support-
ers of ASAT limitations argued that an ASAT attack on RORSAT should be avoided due to the risk of nuclear war. First, because the United States could launch a nuclear attack from its aircraft carriers, the Soviet Union could consider the loss of RORSAT to be a loss of early warning capabilities. Second, attacking RORSAT could increase Soviet estimates that their early warning satellites would be attacked. Fear of losing these satellites could increase the pressure on Soviet leaders to escalate to full-scale war. Others argued that RORSAT (or the Soviet follow-on to this system) would play a vital role in a Soviet attack on the US fleet and that the United States should, therefore, have the capability to destroy these satellites.

Certain members of the group tended to agree that the United States could afford not to have an ASAT capability today but were worried about space-based capabilities that the Soviet might acquire in the future. Of particular interest in this category were systems that would reduce the US ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons, including a Soviet space-based BMD and satellites capable of finding and tracking US strategic submarines and bombers. The implication was that because the United States may in the future need ASAT weapons to destroy these Soviet systems, a ban on ASAT systems was not in the United States’ interest.

In summary, the group expressed fundamental disagreement about US objectives in space: some stressed the importance of holding Soviet satellites vulnerable; others stressed the importance of maintaining the survivability of US satellites and did not see Soviet satellite survivability as a prohibitive cost. Almost no one in the group, however, favored the most extreme objectives: demilitarization of space, a permanent sanctuary for systems in space, or complete vulnerability of space systems. Everyone agreed that there were significant benefits in at least some military uses of space. Although many in the group favored limits on ASAT systems, no one was interested in maintaining space as a sanctuary for all activities, with the greatest concerns raised by the future possibility of Soviet systems that would threaten US strategic nuclear retaliatory capabilities. The vast majority saw a net benefit in maintaining Soviet confidence in the survivability of its early warning capabilities.
Ways to Increase Satellite Survivability

The group discussed both unilateral and negotiated arms control approaches to increase the survivability of US satellites. Unilateral measures include hardening satellites to direct attack, moving them beyond the destructive range of directed energy weapons, proliferating satellites to increase the number of satellites the Soviet Union must destroy to deny the United States a specific military support capability, and developing the capability to replace quickly satellites destroyed by the Soviet Union. In addition, the importance of satellite vulnerability could be reduced by planning to perform the military support functions from the ground or in the air as well as from space.

Possible arms control agreements covered a wide spectrum ranging from rules of the road to comprehensive bans on ASAT weapon testing and deployment. Rules of the road might be used to increase warning time of an attack by defining "keep out zones," that is, areas which the adversary's space weapons are prohibited from entering. (This type of agreement would not be useful against directed energy weapons.) Violating this prohibition would be viewed as the forerunner of a more general attack and would therefore, provide additional time to react. The group discussed a variety of approaches to limit ASAT systems, including: refrain unilaterally from testing until the Soviet Union performs additional tests; test the US ASAT system until it is as capable as the Soviet ASAT system, then stop testing; ban all testing; ban testing except of low-altitude ASAT weapons; and ban the deployment of certain or all types of ASAT weapons. Less than total bans on deployment might include exceptions for current ASAT systems or for directed energy weapons below a specified power. Some members of the group, reacting to the concern aroused by possible future threats to the United States nuclear retaliatory capability, suggested ASAT weapon bans of limited duration or with clauses that allowed withdrawal from the treaty if certain space-based capabilities are developed by the Soviet Union.

A key area of general agreement was that almost any significant limitation of ASAT capabilities would require additional limitations on testing BMD systems. The ABM treaty allows testing of fixed land-based BMD systems. Tests of these BMD systems could advance ASAT capabilities. Development of an effective BMD is likely to be a more difficult task than development of an effective ASAT system, so a BMD system
that can reach a satellite will almost certainly be able to destroy it. Additional limits on BMD would not require formal amendment of the ABM treaty. An alternative would be to include restrictions on BMD in the ASAT agreement. Some argued that this was the preferable approach since a failure in the negotiations would not immediately jeopardize the ABM treaty.

Policy Alternatives
Unilateral Measures
The group agreed that the United States should pursue a wide variety of unilateral measures to protect the military support functions it now performs from space. As noted previously, these include measures to increase the survivability of space-based components as well as the maintenance or development of the capability to perform these functions from the ground. These measures should be pursued whether or not an ASAT agreement is achieved, because ASAT arms control cannot eliminate all ASAT capabilities. Satellites can also be destroyed by systems built for other purposes: BMD and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) could be used to attack satellites; and satellite rendezvous procedures developed for civilian space programs could be used to intercept satellites with other satellites. The inherent ASAT capabilities of deployed systems which were not designed and deployed as ASAT weapons and which would not be constrained by an ASAT arms control agreement, are termed residual capabilities.

Arms Control
The group was divided over the desirability of ASAT arms control. A number of reasons were offered for not pursuing this route:
1. The United States can ensure the survivability of its satellites without cooperative agreements with the Soviet Union.
2. The United States needs an ASAT capability to destroy Soviet satellites, including RORSAT and early warning satellites.
3. The residual ASAT capabilities that would remain under any ASAT agreement are so large that the agreement would provide little, if any, reduction in the survivability of US satellites.
4. ASAT agreements cannot be verified. Bans on the deployment of the existing Soviet ASAT system and on ground-based lasers could not be verified with confidence. Unverifiable Soviet action could provide the Soviet Union with an ASAT capability essentially equivalent to an unrestricted capability.
5. The Soviet Union does not abide by arms control treaties. Therefore, an ASAT treaty would create an asymmetric situation in which the United States would not build ASAT weapons and the Soviet Union would.

6. An ASAT treaty will reduce US willingness to pursue unilateral survivability measures. As a result, ASAT arms control is, on net, not in the US interest.

7. Unrestricted competition between defense (that is, measures to improve satellite survivability) and offense is likely to result in a desirable outcome. If ASAT capabilities dominate, that is, if ASAT weapons make satellites vulnerable at costs far lower than the cost of satellites, then the superpowers will decide not to depend on space. If the reverse is true, the superpowers will unilaterally curtail their ASAT programs. If ASAT dominance occurs, then a great deal of money might be saved because space systems will no longer be built.

A comparable array of reasons were presented in support of ASAT arms control:

1. Arms control can reduce Soviet confidence in its ASAT capability. Untested residual capabilities are of significantly less value than extensively tested dedicated ASAT capabilities. A Soviet leader would be far less certain that residual capabilities could successfully perform their mission and would, therefore, be less willing to undertake military actions which depend on successful ASAT attack.

2. Limiting the Soviet Union to residual ASAT capabilities could enable the United States to achieve a given level of survivability at costs lower than without ASAT limits. Similarly, for a given expenditure in survivability measures, ASAT arms control can increase US confidence in the survivability of its satellites.

3. The United States depends more on satellites than does the Soviet Union. Therefore, the United States would gain more from an ASAT agreement than would the Soviet Union.

4. The United States would be best off if neither it nor the Soviet Union could destroy the other's tactical reconnaissance capabilities. It is correct that US ability to fight a conventional war might be reduced by allowing RORSAT to survive. However, as previously discussed, attacking RORSAT could increase the probability of nuclear war. In addition, not banning ASAT systems to enable the United States to hold RORSAT vulnerable has other costs. First, the capability to destroy RORSAT would also reduce, somewhat, the survivability of Soviet early warning satellites. Second,
if ASAT weapons are not banned, then the United States will continue to improve its ASAT capabilities, which will further reduce the survivability of Soviet early warning satellites. Moreover, the costs to the United States of foregoing ASAT capabilities to destroy RORSAT are reduced by the existence of alternative methods of denying the Soviet Union intelligence information.

5. Advocates of ASAT arms control, responding to the argument that unrestricted competition between ASAT weapons and satellite defense would likely lead to a desirable outcome, argue that unrestrained competition in ASAT systems will not increase US security, but will result in an arms race that further damages US-Soviet relations and wastes money. Even if the outcome of this competition is ASAT dominance, the costs to US forces will increase. Neither superpower will be willing to get out of the satellite business. (Recall US reluctance to allow the Soviet Union to force it to give up ICBMs.) Both will invest heavily in satellite survivability as well as in ASAT capability.

6. Unconstrained development of ASAT systems will threaten the ABM treaty. First, technology developed for advanced ASAT missions could be used to circumvent the treaty. For example, deploying a laser in space to counter strategic ballistic missiles is banned by the ABM treaty. Some members of the group, however, believed that a laser deployed in space to destroy satellites is not banned by the ABM treaty. Thus, ASAT systems could provide an opportunity to exploit loopholes in the treaty. Research and even deployment of BMD could be pursued under the guise of ASAT programs. Second, there was some concern that certain ASAT systems could be interpreted as violations of the ABM treaty, thereby leading to a breakdown of the treaty regime.

Some members of the group stressed the positive interaction between unilateral measures to increase survivability and ASAT arms control. The residual ASAT threat and potential Soviet treaty violations pose a far more significant threat against today's satellites than against a redundant, hardened, reconstructible satellite capability. In addition, the extent of Soviet violations required to reduce significantly US security increases as the survivability of US satellites increases. Thus, the acceptability of our ability to verify ASAT agreements improves as the survivability of US satellites increases.

An interesting caution about ASAT arms control was offered based upon the following paradox: arms control makes satel-
lites more survivable; greater survivability increases one's reliance on space; greater reliance on space increases one's adversary's interest in ASAT weapons; thus, ASAT arms control will create an unstable equilibrium. The counterargument is that arms control need not increase reliance on space, but instead can be used purposefully to increase US confidence in the survivability of US satellites and to reduce the cost of maintaining survivable satellites. Arms control should neither reduce reliance on ground-based systems nor lead to inadequate investment in measures to increase unilaterally the survivability of US satellites. Therefore, the paradox need not exist; it depends upon US behavior.

ASAT and BMD Issues

ASAT issues are related to BMD issues, and therefore to the SDI. Not only do some believe that ASAT systems provide an opportunity to exploit a loophole in the ABM treaty, but as previously noted, the group agreed that restricting ASAT systems would likely require further restricting BMD systems. Consequently, most advocates of the SDI feel strong pressure to oppose ASAT limits. Similarly, opponents of the SDI can view ASAT arms control as a way to restrict severely the SDI. Because the strategic implications of BMD and especially the SDI almost certainly dwarf those of ASAT weapons, it may be that one's views about BMD are a key factor in determining one's views about ASAT systems.

Some members of the group opposed placing further restrictions on BMD testing because BMD might play a valuable role in defending ICBMs, command and control facilities, and other segments of the retaliatory forces. They maintain that defending retaliatory capabilities with BMD strengthens deterrence and that, therefore, there should be little logical opposition to this BMD mission. If ASAT arms control would require foregoing this option, then it is too costly and should be rejected. Others questioned this argument, pointing out that allowing extensive defense of ICBMs could be the first step in the unraveling of the ABM treaty. The political, strategic, and economic costs of unconstrained BMD deployment would be high. Consequently, foregoing BMD to defend retaliatory force might be in the US interest, even when the added benefit of limiting ASAT weapons is not included.

Many members of the group who were particularly worried about unrestricted ASAT competition were also worried about
the implications for BMD. They imagined a likely outcome to be unrestricted BMD competition in which space-based BMD systems were highly vulnerable to ASAT weapon attack. This outcome is undesirable because the nuclear situation would be highly unstable in a crisis—each superpower would want to attack the other's BMD as soon as nuclear attack appears highly probable. In response to this objection, some proponents of the SDI argued that the BMD could be made survivable.

Improving the Debate

Although the group represented a rich spectrum of views, a large percentage of its members believed strongly either that ASAT arms control could make a significant contribution to US security or that it could not. Many members felt that in large part this split reflected fundamental differences in philosophies and world-views and, as such, could not be reduced by additional hard facts. The differences of opinion do not result primarily from disagreements about the feasibility of ASAT technology or satellite hardening or even the immediate costs and benefits of deploying ASAT systems. Instead, the differences are based upon:

—Conflicting views of the Soviet Union, especially the value of agreements with the Soviet Union to limit military capabilities.

—Opposing views about the desirability of pursuing technology to the fullest extent possible. Some members of the group tended to believe that technologically sweet weapons (that is, weapons which can achieve their military objective while in an action-reaction deployment competition with the adversary's forces) should not be limited. Moreover, due to political and military pressures for deployment, these technologies may not actually be possible to limit. Others tended to believe that technologies should be limited, to the extent possible, with the objective of increased security explicitly directing policy.

—Opposing views about whether the United States can increase its security by developing and deploying BMD to protect the homeland. These divergent assessments depend upon both the feasibility of highly effective BMD and the desirability of these systems.

The case that disagreements about ASAT systems are devoid of specific disagreements about ASAT issues per se should not be carried too far. For example, on both sides of the debate
members of the group stressed the importance of keeping the residual ASAT threat in the proper perspective. As already discussed, there are disagreements about the proper US objectives in space. If, however, the preceding issues are among the key areas of disagreement about ASAT systems, then it would be useful to highlight their significance. The lines of debate are relatively well drawn on the ASAT specific disagreements. Perhaps the most valuable observations of the group as a whole were in identifying some of the underlying sources of disagreement. These disagreements may be so basic that few people are likely to change their minds as a result of further examination. However, if the debate focuses entirely on the details of ASAT capabilities, satellite hardness, and arms control agreements, then ASAT policy is likely to be justified by factors that are at least one step removed from its true determinants.
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OBJECTIVES OF US ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Economic assistance and security assistance have long been uneasy partners in the US foreign aid program. Although both were intended to serve US interests in the Third World of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, they have had different immediate objectives. Over the years they have customarily been cast as competitors for limited aid resources, and often their goals have been seen as not only different but, indeed, conflicting.

Controversy over the objectives of US foreign aid is not new and was particularly vigorous during the 1960s and early 1970s. From the mid-seventies into the early eighties, there was a period of relative calm, but during the Reagan administration a fresh examination of aid objectives (and methods) has been taking place both in the executive branch and in the Congress. Four recent high level public commissions—the Carlucci Commission, the Kissinger Commission, the Grace Commission, and the Andreas Commission—have devoted all or part of their attention to the goals and operation of US foreign assistance.

Although the dichotomy in foreign aid goals is frequently expressed in terms of economic versus security assistance, the two potentially conflicting categories of aid are more accurately identified as aid directed toward a Third World country's economic and social development and, on the other, aid aimed at enhancing a country's security capability. In the current jargon of US aid programs, these two categories of development assistance and military assistance are joined by a third category, economic support funds (ESF), which is economic aid used in pursuit of political goals.

Despite the incorporation of development aid and military aid under the common rubric of foreign aid, it is a curious fact that people professionally concerned with one program or the other have remarkably little professional communication with each other. Enriching the dialogue between these two bodies of expertise was a major purpose in assembling the group which discussed US foreign assistance objectives.
Third World Problems

The group's examination of US aid objectives began with an identification of the major problems in the Third World to which economic and security assistance should be directed.

On the security side, the continuation of East-West tension was seen as the predominant consideration over the next 10 to 15 years. Participants thought that the Third World would remain an area of rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that their competition would take place in a context of persistent small regional conflicts, internal turmoil in many countries, continued terrorist activity, a probable proliferation of armaments and armaments production, and little progress towards political unification among developing countries.

On the economic side, although a generation of development efforts has produced marked differences in levels of development among Third World countries, as many as 1 billion people still live in dire poverty. Population growth is continuing at a high, though declining, rate (with large numbers desiring family planning services and not getting such help) and is contributing to widespread unemployment and underemployment, chaotic urbanization, and increasing pressure on natural resources.

Desirable Objectives of Foreign Aid

Faced with these problems (here only briefly summarized), the group agreed that a continuation of both economic and security aid was desirable. Concern was expressed over the rapid escalation of military and politically motivated economic aid, which is up 43 percent and 35 percent respectively in real terms since 1981, while the level of development assistance has remained unchanged in the same period. It was agreed, moreover, that the objectives of such aid need to be set forth as precisely as possible. Clear-cut objectives would facilitate the optimal allocation of resources, make aid programs more accountable, stimulate greater professionalism in implementation, and build better understanding of the programs both within the government and among the public.

The prevailing view in the group was that the principle purpose of US foreign aid should be to alleviate poverty in Third World countries in a way that promotes economic development and fosters greater equity and participation among
the citizenry. It was recognized, however, that economic aid could and should have other objectives, such as, building closer relations between the United States and the aid-receiving country and stimulating regional cooperation. Support was expressed for encouraging national self-reliance by Third World countries as an appropriate goal and for giving more emphasis to strengthening the increasingly interdependent world economy. All agreed that being indifferent to the world's poverty is morally unacceptable.

Enhancing the capacity of a recipient country to deter external threats was seen by some as a worthwhile goal of aid and as the principal objective of security assistance. Other objectives identified by a few were fostering stability within developing countries and assuring US access to areas of strategic importance.

Most of the group's discussion was not about the general objectives of US assistance policy but rather focused on (1) the proper relationship between economic and security aid and (2) the practical difficulties of defining goals in operational terms and carrying out programs which would implement them.

Security and Development

One fundamental question discussed was the relationship between security assistance and development goals within a Third World country. In one view, security assistance was considered essential to development since it would ensure stability without which development could not take place. An opposite view was that for development to occur, destabilizing change was required and that security—in the sense of the preserving the status quo—was, therefore, inimical to development.

Several members of the group pointed out that security is a broad term which in fact embraces a number of differing concepts. Apart from the greater security which the United States might obtain by strengthening the military capabilities of developing countries, the country itself might find security of two kinds—security from external attack and security from internal subversion. Beyond that, the personal sense of security which individual citizens feel is still another dimension of the term.

It was argued by many that it is precisely such personal
security which best insures the security of the state—and indeed of the United States—since a nation whose people feel secure is neither likely to threaten the security of other nations nor to be susceptible to threats from others. In this connection, some members of the group particularly regretted continued assistance to such countries as Zaire which is often referred to as a “kleptocracy” and the Philippines because of its violations of human rights.

Those giving special weight to security assistance pointed out that providing a secure environment creates a favorable climate for economic growth, and, also, that professionalization of a nation’s armed forces through US military assistance is a way to take the military out of politics and thus foster sound political development. They recognized, however, that under some circumstances too much emphasis on enlarging military capability could divert resources from true economic development, increase a government’s ability to oppress its people, and stimulate a dangerous arms race with neighboring countries.

Another range of problems appears in seeking to define more precisely the “elimination of poverty.” Some argued that meeting material needs per se is the first requirement, while others placed at least as much emphasis on providing more equal opportunities for people to participate in the shaping of their own destinies. To achieve such participation might require major reforms—for example, land reform—in economic and social systems.

Considerations in Achieving Aid Objectives

In providing both economic and security assistance, a major question concerns the conditions which the United States should attach to its aid. The group as a whole favored performance conditions to assure that aid was effectively used for the purposes intended. These conditions should not be unilaterally imposed but worked out through a process of mutual agreement with each recipient country, based on a realistic understanding of its particular situation. On the other hand, political conditions—that is, using aid as an instrument to achieve other foreign policy objectives—are fraught with the danger that by attempting to achieve a short-term advantage—for example, a vote in the United Nations—US long-term interests in development progress may suffer.

It was noted, however, that attaching too many strings to
our aid by legislative mandate is not satisfactory from the viewpoint of those who administer US aid. Indeed, the requirements imposed by law on development assistance funds are now so numerous that US aid officials frequently prefer to use economic support funds for development purposes, even though such funds were originally designed for other objectives. One unfortunate result is that desirable criteria written into the law with respect to development assistance may be ignored when using ESF aid for development goals. The group noted that channeling development aid through multilateral agencies such as the World Bank is a useful way to ensure that appropriate conditions are applied for effective use of the funds. This is true not only because the recipient countries have some voice in the policy-making of those agencies, but also because fewer overt political purposes can be attributed to them and because on the whole they are better staffed and have greater continuity than the bilateral aid program. Increasing US funding of multilateral development agencies also holds the potential of leveraging an increase of aid funds from other donor nations, as well as strengthening the international institutions which underlie the world economic system.

Other important issues in the discussion were the magnitude of aid, the determination of which countries should receive it, and the weighing of short-term and long-term national interests. By and large, on the development side at least, the group favored an increase in assistance but recognized that current budgetary deficits precluded any substantial growth in appropriated funds. It looked, therefore, to other ways to expand the resource flow, such as, changing the World Bank's "gearing ratio" to permit more loans against the same level of reserves and expanding the IMF. Neither change would have major budgetary implications for the United States.

In examining the question of which countries should receive aid, it was recognized that recipient countries have a fundamental responsibility to request aid and to use it effectively. Discipline is needed, however, when responding to those requests. It was pointed out that current aid practices are largely inconsistent with the objectives on which the group had generally agreed. Some politically motivated aid seems to be almost out of effective budgetary control. The largest share of all US bilateral aid goes to two countries, Israel and Egypt, where the aid programs are not apparently consistent with their realistic security and development needs. Much military aid (for example, to Pakistan) appears to have less to do with
countering direct Soviet military threats and more to do with political rivalry among neighboring countries. Most development aid, on a per capita basis, does not go to countries with the greatest poverty but, rather, to middle income countries already well up the development ladder.

These observations led to a discussion of the constant tension between long-range and short-range concepts of national interests. The very term national interest is often defined narrowly to refer only to an immediate political or strategic advantage. Although recognizing that such considerations are sometimes important, the group felt generally that the long-range national interest in building healthy nations is too often wrongly subordinated to short-term interests. Moreover, when an effort is made to use development-related aid to achieve a political benefit (for example, to enhance the prestige of a government), it can prove fruitless or even backfire because development is a slow process and the political payoff may come long after the government has fallen.

On the question of how closely security and development assistance should be linked, the group reached general agreement that the two aid programs should be more closely coordinated. This could best be done, as recommended by the Carlucci Commission, through country programming, since the relative weight to be given to each element of aid can only be determined by reference to the specific requirements of each country. Several members of the group noted that aid should also be closely integrated with other instruments of US economic policy (trade policy, investment promotion, etc.) as well as with the aid programs of other donor countries.

Conclusions

No formal recommendations were made by the group and considering the disparity of backgrounds and interests of group members, it would have been difficult to reach firm agreements in the time available. Nevertheless, from the wide ranging and unusually frank discussions some areas of consensus seemed to emerge:

1. In pursuit of its national interest the United States needs clearly defined long-term objectives for its overseas assistance programs. Only with such objectives can aid be effectively planned, accomplishments properly assessed and results publicly examined.
2. The major objective, which is long-range and to which both economic and security assistance can contribute, is to improve the quality of life of the people of the developing world, by helping them out of their poverty in an atmosphere of individual security, opportunity, and participation within sustainable environmental limits.

3. Other objectives can also legitimately be served by US aid programs, but it must be recognized that conflicts can arise between these (usually) short-range goals and the long-range objective previously mentioned. There is a tendency for too much aid to be aimed at short-term ends. Statesmanship is required to avoid an apparently natural human tendency to respond to short-term demands without taking proper account of the effect on achieving more fundamental long-range purposes.

4. Aid must be acknowledged as an imperfect instrument in working towards its objectives, and constant attention to quality is as important as providing sufficient quantity. To this end, there is need for political leaders to give greater weight to the recommendations given by their professional staffs regarding both military and economic aid. Moreover, even though security aid and development aid should in principle be mutually reinforcing, experience has shown that at times these programs are in tension with each other and can undercut desired ends.

5. Thus US aid must be given under conditions which will most likely insure that its purpose is efficiently achieved. International development agencies, especially the World Bank’s International Development Association as well as private voluntary organizations, have a particularly important role to play in alleviating poverty. A poverty focus calls for staffing and methods of operation aimed at alleviating poverty.

6. Wider public understanding of our foreign aid program is needed through general preparation of citizens for international questions through such long-range educational programs as languages and area studies as well as expanded and more specific public information activities by private groups. Wider understanding will strengthen support for an aid program beyond fragmented constituencies, each of which is interested in a single aspect of the program and thus will give the stability of national consensus which, in the long run, underlies any successful foreign policy.
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This report was prepared by the rapporteur following the conference. Participants neither reviewed nor approved the text; therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all recommendations, observations, and conclusions.
THE UNITED STATES AND UNESCO

What Is at Issue

The question, currently before the Reagan administration, whether or not to withdraw the United States from participation in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), thus affirming our announced intention, is a watershed event in US relations with world organizations. The group felt that in a climate of growing concern and dissatisfaction with the entire United Nations family of organizations, what is decided about UNESCO will have a critical impact on US dealings with these other bodies. Hence, the decision will have extremely broad implications for government, business, and private organizations and will affect the way the world perceives the United States as a world citizen. The issue involves much more than operational considerations; it is ideological and far transcends the need for specific reforms in UNESCO or questions about their exact nature.

The United States was a founding member of UNESCO, which as first envisaged was to be an apolitical, collegial grouping of nations which would work together to help improve education, diffuse scientific knowledge, and nurture culture throughout the world, particularly in developing countries. Its day-to-day governance was in the hands of the Executive Board, whose members were appointed not by nationality but by virtue of their intellectual or artistic stature and achievements. This changed in the 1950s. Membership grew rapidly, then explosively—going from 28 in 1946 to 162 by late 1984. At US insistence, Executive Board members started being appointed as representatives of their countries rather than as accomplished individuals.

These changes began the politicization of what was to have been an organization devoted to nonpolitical, beneficent activities. That process, accompanied by the development of other flaws, led to the crisis that has convulsed US relations with UNESCO and created divisions both between the United States and other nations and within the US government.

Today there is a strong belief in some quarters that UNESCO
is no longer controlled by its member nations, that it is unduly profligate, that it is poorly managed, and that political considerations have intruded so profoundly into its procedures that its work is gravely hampered. Such concerns led the United States to announce in December 1983 that it would withdraw from membership as of December 31, 1984. That decision included President Ronald Reagan’s declaration that “I am prepared to review the decision to withdraw should concrete changes materialize.” Since then, US governmental agencies and the Congress have watched closely to determine whether indeed such progress is being made.

The group noted that the position of the United States regarding UNESCO has changed sharply since its founding. As one example of that change, it was pointed out that the United States presented the first resolution to come before UNESCO, encouraging that body to aid the pursuit of peace. Today the United States officially deplores the emphasis on peace, holding that this should be the concern of other agencies.

Some members of the group noted that the United States has given UNESCO less than the most effective possible leadership and support. Over the past decade and longer, US delegations and permanent delegation members—many of whom were appointed as a reward for political services—have often not been qualified or sufficiently well prepared. The staff of the US National Commission for UNESCO, which participants thought was of great potential importance, has been reduced from a one-time level of 45 to zero. At one point the State Department canceled all funds for the commission’s support, a decision which Congress reversed by appropriating $250,000 for its use.

During the past 15 years, there has also been a gradual erosion of US support for the UN system as a whole. Participants thought that UNESCO member nations made the organization a forum for retaliation by regularly attacking and denouncing the United States, just as a time when US sympathy for other countries was declining.

It was recognized that UNESCO has performed important services for all nations in its work in promoting scientific exchange, maintaining copyrights, advancing literacy, and preserving cultural monuments. It has often served as a catalyst for programs that without its efforts would not have been carried out. The United States in fact derives many substantial
benefits from membership in UNESCO in the form of contacts, information, and involvement with activities that contribute richly to all humanity. What is at stake for the United States, it was held, is its very participation in an interdependent world in which multilateral institutions are of increasing importance. Leaving, it was argued, would be very harmful—as one group member expressed it, "perfectly wrong."

UNESCO: US Expectations

A fundamental problem contributing to the present imbroglio, the group concluded, is that the United States has never fully and clearly stated just what reforms it demands. This has made the task of those trying to improve the situation, both within the organization's Secretariat and in other member delegations, difficult and has created in some quarters a suspicion that the United States is not acting in good faith. Several group members reported that support for the US position among certain Western nations, which at first was not inconsiderable, has diminished substantially.

It was also pointed out that while a stated objective of the State Department is to increase the number of US citizens employed in the Secretariat, there is no effective mechanism for seeking out candidates for such positions.

It was charged, in addition, that the United States has at times sought to use UNESCO to help increase acceptance of US objectives throughout the world in ways that show little concern for the true aims of UNESCO, an example being US insistence that UNESCO support the US initiative in the Korean conflict.

In a discussion of the alternatives to funneled development assistance money through UNESCO or providing it bilaterally, as the administration now advocates, it was noted that every dollar the United States gives UNESCO is multiplied fourfold, since other nations provide three quarters of the budget. Reports of increasing problems in other donor countries with bilateral aid were cited as evidence that bilateral programs are not a promising solution, but there was some support in the group for the bilateral approach.

Why Is the United States Pulling Out?
The group concluded that the administration has declared and undeclared reasons for withdrawing—if that is the ultimate
The announced reasons were expressed in the official letter of notification from Secretary of State George Shultz to UNESCO Director General Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow. Briefly, they are:

1. Mismanagement. An increasingly diffuse set of programs in an everwiding circle of concern led Secretary Schultz to write "... a few things done well have more impact than superficial examination of all the world's ills." Mismanagement was also seen in inadequate planning, in the lack of effective evaluation of programs, in personnel practices, and in other areas.

2. Budget profligacy. The United States urged zero budget growth, but Director General M'Bow proposed a budget in 1983 that the United States claimed showed an increase of 9.7 percent over the preceding budget.

3. Politicization. Secretary Schultz wrote that the trend seemed to be toward pursuing programs that furthered "... politically-motivated ends which emanated from member states rather than from within the organization itself." Among the US concerns have been attacks on Israel, support for the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the frequent denunciations of the United States expressed by other member nations in UNESCO debates, although, significantly, these denunciations are not attributable to the Secretariat.

4. Policy. UNESCO has created the impression that it is less than enthusiastic about values the Western nations count as all-important, such as, human rights and freedom of the press. Its initiatives in the communication field have been particularly objectionable. At the same time it gives what the United States considers undue support to statist and thus undemocratic concepts.

The main undeclared reasons advanced by members of the group were focused around one central thesis: Washington has a hidden agenda which seeks to reduce US involvement in multilateral organizations, particularly those making up the United Nations family. The explanations for this belief included the theory that such organizations give too much power to Marxist-Leninist influence groups. A parallel, and not necessarily contradictory, thought is that there is a neo-isolationist proclivity within the Reagan administration in contrast with the internationalist beliefs held in former administrations. The upshoot of this thinking, whatever its roots, is that bilateral solutions are thought to be best because they are more readily controlled and can be better targeted.
The group theorized that UNESCO was chosen for attack because it is the most vulnerable and least loved of the UN agencies—some said it had literally singled itself out for attack—and that if the United States disassociated itself from UNESCO, other ruptures with UN organizations would likely follow. A more moderate theory advanced was that the US administration chose UNESCO as a model on which to try changes it would like to enact in other UN agencies.

Other undeclared reasons mentioned by group members included allegations of improprieties, such as, scholarships and travel grants awarded to relatives or friends of the director general and the hiring of former members of the Executive Board as employees of the Secretariat with the implication that this was sometimes done to gain goodwill and support from the new employee’s country. Others pointed out that hiring former Executive Board members allows continued access to knowledge that will prove useful in UNESCO operations.

Constructive Impact of US Withdrawal

One constructive result of the US withdrawal announcement, the group stated, is the intensive scrutiny of UNESCO operations that has taken place during recent months and the changes and improvements that such scrutiny will engender. A number of reports have been produced by member nations and Secretariat staff members which propose significant approaches to make the organization work better.

The US threat to withdraw has made both member nations and the Secretariat very much aware of the need for improvement. One result is that the proposed budget for UNESCO’s next biennium is close to zero growth, a major US objective. An internal committee made up of present and former Secretariat members has produced a strikingly forthright report for the director general indicating that there is indeed much duplication in UNESCO programs and advocating elimination of some 50 or 60 of them. Participants who had recently been at UNESCO headquarters in Paris, or who had talked with persons there, reported support for the proposal to create a permanent drafting and negotiating group. (Presently such a group, which works on problems that cannot be resolved in the General Conference, is only set up if the director general decides to do so.) It was also reported that there is an inclination to create a permanent monitoring group which would exercise continuing surveillance over UNESCO initiatives and should thus help to improve its management.
The group discussed the US withdrawal from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) as an example of the favorable results of withdrawing. It was observed that before going back into ILO, the government carefully examined what it wanted to get and set up a continuing high-level group to choose delegates and to brief and debrief them. As a result, the United States is better prepared to argue its case at ILO.
It was suggested, too, that the threat of US withdrawal, always a possibility in recent years, has been the force that has checked UNESCO members in their desire to attack Israel. Some in the group thought withdrawal would also allow the United States to develop other mechanisms for cooperating with developing countries without the burdens of UNESCO complexities and precedents and would thus permit more efficient use of US aid moneys.
Negative Effects of Withdrawal

The group discussed the US proposal presented at the October 1984 Executive Board meeting to introduce some form of veto over UNESCO actions by the major contributors to its budget. The idea has been variously reported as requiring approving votes from nations contributing 51 percent of the budget or comprising 85 percent of the membership of the Executive Board. Whatever form the proposal might take, it will most likely be defeated, because it would be seen as a threat to the entire UN system, group members agreed, and would clearly be to the disadvantage of the majority of member nations. (Note: Since this report was completed, the US veto proposal has been withdrawn.) However, the fact that such an idea has been proposed at the last minute of the present negotiations has raised suspicions among other countries about the United States and its intentions. It has given support to the view that the US threat to withdraw is blackmail, or chantage, as it is more delicately put in French.

There was strong concern among some in the group that by leaving UNESCO, the United States would give up its not unimportant influence in shaping and directing educational and scientific endeavors around the world and leave the field to those who would install Marxist models. UNESCO, it was said, helps guide the school systems of many developing countries. It is of great value to the United States, group members said, to have foreign students come to the United States, learn the language, and become familiar with US institutions and people. This has commercial advantages because when those students return to their countries and assume positions of importance, as many do, they will think of the United States as a source of expertise and equipment. Similarly, it is important for the United States to retain an influence in UNESCO as that organization goes about its standard-setting and rule-making activities, even though these rules are often without the effect of law. The absence of the United States when guidelines are being drawn up for science, for education, or for communication can have harmful results—there are many willing candidates ready to fill any void the United States may leave.

As one group member stated, "UNESCO is a place where ideas get legitimation, and these ideas have real political effects."
UNESCO resolutions, which have no legal force, nevertheless provide some justification to authoritarian regimes to do what they want, and if such resolutions are adopted by a number of countries, they begin to assume the mantle of legitimacy. An example cited was the Mass Media Declaration of 1978, the language of which was tempered significantly by the efforts of the US delegation which was present and actively involved, while it was hammered out.

If the United States is absent from UNESCO, it is quite possible that US allies may not pursue the fight to keep communications open and free as vigorously as the United States would like, the group suggested. Summing up these arguments, one group member said, "It is vital to recognize that UNESCO is a battleground of ideas—it is THE place for argument and to think it serves the US national interest to withdraw is beyond belief."

The use of withdrawal as a threat to gain US objectives was also discussed. One group member warned that the threat does have a useful effect on the organization, but each time it is invoked it strengthens the cause of those in the United States who oppose multilateralism. The next time the question arises, less domestic support exists because some previous supporters have been converted by the charges made to justify withdrawal.

The impact of US withdrawal on US institutions and businesses was also discussed. The National Academy of Sciences has estimated, one group member reported, that it would cost 90 percent of the present US contribution to the science sector of UNESCO to replace what would be lost to the US scientific community by withdrawing. The US Navy reportedly has estimated that it would cost $1.5 billion to gather the information that it now receives from the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, including replacement of observatory facilities and personnel and ships. The cost to US business of a pullout is hard to estimate, but a group member cited one report indicating that the United States now has about $49 billion of the $60 billion world market in communication equipment and that this US share would be put at risk by withdrawal. Exports of educational, publishing, and other cultural products totaling billions of dollars are often facilitated by various UNESCO agreements. The United States also gets a large proportion of foreign study fellowships and scholarships generated by UNESCO and through the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP). In addition, many of the consultants hired by UNESCO are from the United States.

The group also discussed the effect of a withdrawal, even if only temporary, on US personnel and US-proposed programs. When the United States left the ILO, one group member recalled, it had 14 percent of the staff jobs there, but when it returned three years later, US personnel was down to 7 percent, and it will take years to build it back up. Similarly, it takes many years to bring some programs to fruition; the momentum built up for programs the US supports would be lost if it were to withdraw, even if it were to return later.

**Observations and Conclusions**

In the course of the discussion, participants generated a number of recommendations for the US government, for UNESCO member nations, and for UNESCO itself.

**For the United States**

1. The group strongly endorsed creation of a high-level, permanent committee to supervise US involvement in UNESCO, to assure that planned reforms are carried out (even if the United States is absent), and to seek to involve the private sector to a much greater extent in US-UNESCO activity. Such a group might consist of the secretary of state, the secretary of education, and the heads of the National Security Council, the United States Information Agency, the National Academy of Sciences, the National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Arts, and the Smithsonian Institution. A similar group was formed to supervise our relations with the ILO and was able to bring about many improvements. It was also suggested that we take the politics out of US-UNESCO relations by transferring responsibility away from the Department of State.

2. A parallel and complementary move would be to rejuvenate the US National Commission for UNESCO providing it with funds, a permanent and adequate staff, and a strong endorsement of its efforts. The commission could then seek out highly-qualified specialists needed to serve on US permanent and visiting delegations and could provide the all-important continuity so necessary for effective participation in UNESCO proceedings.

3. Regarding withdrawal, the group suggested that the United States stay in UNESCO at least another year to see if agreed-upon reforms are really carried out and really help. As the
United States considers withdrawal, it should reflect on long-range implications—the longstanding US endorsement of multilateralism, how the United States sees itself and how the world sees the United States and the increasing need for cooperation between nations. The United States should recognize that it has a very important influence in UNESCO and should not throw that away by pulling out. At the worst, if it does withdraw, the United States should seek ways to remain involved in programs of particular value, such as Man and the Biosphere and oceanographic work. If the United States does withdraw, it should do so with due deliberation and notice to Congress, which the group congratulated for its careful attention to problems in relations between the United States and UNESCO, including its series of comprehensive hearings.

4. The United States should take careful note of improvements with an eye toward seeing whether the various concessions and changes being made add up to an acceptable transformation of UNESCO.

5. The United States should consider sending a very high-level, experienced, and prestigious US negotiator to meet with Director General M'Bow to attempt to find accommodation which would allow the United States to remain in the organization.

6. At the very least, Washington should spell out exactly what changes would make its return possible, and the undelivered evaluation report promised to Congress by the Department of State should be delivered.

7. The United States should also begin thinking about long-term, more fundamental reforms for UNESCO, and other international institutions generally, and create a framework for such formal consideration.

For UNESCO Member Nations

1. The United States should formally advise other member nations in UN organizations that they are harming themselves by perverting those bodies and risking forcing the United States out of them. It should recommend some self-restraint, noting that they are engaging in reckless endangerment of the future of world cooperation and that just as they demand that the United States give them and UNESCO respect, they too should respect the forum in which they appear.

2. The member nations should take forceful action to put control of the organization back in the hands of the Executive Board, rather than leaving it largely to the Secretariat.
To this end, the Executive Board should be provided with its own independent staff, entirely separate from the UNESCO Secretariat. The Executive Board should exert control over management, hiring, personnel policies, discretionary funds, and spending, as well as, of course, programs.

3. UNESCO activities should be subjected to rigorous, objective evaluation by an impartial outside body.

4. Steps should be taken to reform voting and approval procedures, taking into account the vastly disproportionate contribution made by the major contributors and their program preferences. This should apply at the Executive Board as well as the General Conference.

5. Major donors should meet formally and act in concert on matters of mutual interest; precedent for such a body is found, for example, in the Group of 77 which meets regularly to pursue its own interests in UNESCO.

6. Members should avoid their all-too-frequent resolutions on extraneous issues, which sour debate and generate antagonisms, and instead concentrate on the proper concerns of UNESCO.

For UNESCO

1. A high-level US appointee is needed in UNESCO. The United States once held the top job and the second-highest post; as the major contributor, there is no reason why the United States should not have a similarly high post now.

2. The director general should move vigorously to resolve present problems involving budget, management and personnel, and programs along the lines suggested repeatedly by various member nations.

3. UNESCO should be aware that, failing efforts of its own to change its procedures, there is some backing in the United States to work toward such change by other means, obviously including withdrawal but not limited to that. The feeling in the United States is that UNESCO should be willing to adapt itself to some extent to US requirements, rather than expecting the United States to make all of the concessions.

The aim of all concerned should be to return UNESCO to the administrative control of its member states, which was the original intention of the founders and which intention should be honored today.
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