Journalism historians in recent years have made good use of agenda-setting theory in research, but there has been one drawback: in concentrating on the political and economic views of publishers, editors, and reporters, the agendas of those working behind the scenes, the public relations men and women have been overlooked. The public relations agenda was particularly important in the 1920s, when it was estimated that over half of all stories in the "New York Times" and other major newspapers originated in public relations offices. Ivy Lee, the "father of modern public relations," had an agenda that can best be understood through an analysis of his economic and theological beliefs in an early twentieth-century context. Lee was one of the first public relations practitioners to oppose competitive enterprise and espouse alliances of large corporations with each other and the federal government. He combined sophisticated economics with "situational ethics" developed through assimilation of popularized Darwinian theory and Freudian thought. Lee's beliefs concerning economics and theology allowed him to conceal his major objectives with almost total assurance that he was working for a greater good. This helps to explain why Lee had such great success in dealing with the press: He was seen as a proponent of the economics of the future, and his liberalism proved influential. (Author/DF)
THE AGENDA-SETTING OF IVY LEE

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Presented to the History Division at the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication Annual Convention in Memphis, Tn., August, 1985.
ABSTRACT

THE AGENDA-SETTING OF IVY LEE

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Journalism historians in recent years have made good use of agenda-setting theory in research, but there has been one drawback: In concentrating on the political and economic views of publishers, editors, and reporters, we often have overlooked the agendas of those working behind the scenes, the public relations men and women. The public relations agenda was particularly important in the 1920s, when it was estimated that over half of all stories in the New York Times and other major newspapers originated in public relations offices.

Ivy Lee, the "father of modern public relations," had an agenda which can best be understood through an analysis of his economic and theological beliefs in an early twentieth century context. Lee was one of the first public relations practitioners to oppose competitive enterprise and espouse corporate collaborationism, i.e., alliances of large corporations with each other and with the federal government. He combined sophisticated economics with "situational ethics" developed through assimilation of popularized Darwinian and Freudian thought. Lee's beliefs concerning economics and theology allowed him to conceal his major objectives with almost total assurance that he was working for a greater good.

This is a different perception of Ivy Lee than is common among public relations practitioners, but it helps to explain why Lee had such great success in dealing with the press. He was seen as a proponent of the economics of the future, and his liberalism proved influential.
THE AGENDA-SETTING OF IVY LEE

Journalism historians in recent years have begun using agenda-setting theory in research. Agenda-setting theory, developed by McCombs and Shaw, is based on the concept that journalists do not tell the public what to think, but they tell them what to think about. Agenda-setting research has often concentrated on the political and economic views of editors and publishers.

One limitation of such concentration, though, is that from the 1920s to the present many newspaper stories have originated not with editors, publishers, or reporters, but with public relations men and women. In the 1920s, for instance, Silas Bent observed that at least 147 of 255 stories (58 percent) in a typical issue of the New York Times originated in public relations work. John Jessup, a long-time editor of Fortune and Life, recounted estimates during the 1930s that 60 percent of the New York Times originated with publicists. In 1930 political scientist Peter Odegard concluded that half of news items in newspapers across the United States came from public relations offices. Odegard observed, "Many reporters today are little more than intellectual mendicants who go from one publicity agent or press bureau to another seeking 'handouts.'"

To advance agenda-setting research, then, it is vital to
analyze not only the views of editors, publishers, and reporters, but the beliefs of those who provided stories on the basis of their own agendas. This paper begins that process by examining in a new way the ideas of the man known as the "father of modern public relations," Ivy Lee.

Ivy Lee's career presents a problem of words versus deeds. He liked making bold proclamations of integrity. In 1906, at age 29, he even sent newspaper editors a "Declaration of Principles" which introductory public relations textbooks often quote: "This is not a secret press bureau. All our work is done in the open." Yet Lee gained a reputation -- largely justified, as we will see -- for subtle manipulation in the service of his clients. Lee's critics called him "Poison Ivy." A friendly New York World reporter asked about Lee, "Why is it then that this amiable gentleman, who provides so many good stories, is so generally disliked by newspaper men?" Even Lee's supporters were surprised when the "defender of capitalism" wrote a book filled with sympathy for Stalin. Many historians have not known what to make of Lee. Reading contradictory appraisals of his role prompts the question, "Will the real Ivy Lee please stand up?"

This paper argues that Ivy Lee can best be understood through an analysis of his economic and theological beliefs in an early twentieth century context. Lee was one of the first public relations practitioners to oppose competitive enterprise and espouse corporate collaborationism i.e. alliances of large corporations with each other and with the federal government. He
combined sophisticated economics with "situational ethics" developed through assimilation of popularized Darwinian and Freudian thought. Lee's beliefs concerning economics and theology allowed him to conceal his major objectives with almost total assurance that he was working for a greater good. He was thus the perfect representative for major corporate clients whose goal was to sell middle-size businesses and the public on the concept of reducing competition: "in the public interest."

This is a different perception of Ivy Lee than is common. Ray Hiebert's excellent biography, Courtier to the Crowd: The Story of Ivy Lee and the Development of Public Relations, has become almost the last word on Lee. Upon publication in 1966, it rightly became a model of diligent research and clear writing. But, since Hiebert portrayed Lee as a defender of private enterprise against socializing tendencies, new insights into the Progressive Era have emerged from historians of both political left and political right, including Kolko, Bernstein, Wiebe and Schlossberg. The common thrust of their analyses, despite presuppositional differences, points us toward a closer examination of three trends in political economy which particularly influenced Lee as he developed his own public relations agenda.

First, in 1900 and thereafter industrial leaders such as J. P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller were emphasizing consolidation rather than competition. They could look back on a dizzying period of national economic improvement, since from 1865 to 1900 U.S. output increased threefold. This was real growth, for
deflation dominated prices during the postbellum third of a century, but it was not always easy growth. Economic winners and losers abounded. The winners, who generally had triumphed through innovation and intense competition, knew how easy it was to be toppled, or to at least suffer falling prices and declining profits. They tried to develop price and marketing agreements to give themselves a guaranteed rate of return, but agreements of that sort always seemed to fall through. New technologies, new sources of investment capital, new methods of transportation and communication, rapidly expanding markets due to massive population increases, and easy entry into most of those markets made anti-competitive agreements short-lived.

Second, as anti-competitive agreements fell through, industrial leaders began to see federal intervention and regulation as the way to assure profits for a longer period of time. (As historian Gabriel Kolko put it pungently, "It was not the existence of monopoly that caused the federal government to intervene in the economy, but the lack of it." ) Rockefeller and H.H. Rogers of Standard Oil joined with groups such as the Association of Manufacturers and Distributors of Food Products in calling for national incorporation laws and national regulations which would help them keep out competition by raising barriers to entry. Federal regulation, according to Daniel Willard, president of the Baltimore and Ohio, could "so harmonize all...conflicting interests that, in the long run, the greatest good may come to the greatest number." Railroad executive James J. Hill spoke in 1901 of the need to "obviate ruinous
competition." James Logan of the American Envelope Co. argued that competition must be controlled because it "means death to some of the combatants...." An American Tobacco Co. believed that the federal presence could help corporations engage in "rational cooperation in lieu of cut-throat competition."

Third, the public generally did not support collaborationist notions. Most Americans preferred a continuation of competitive enterprise with political involvement minimized. For instance, small shippers did not want to have to play politics to get their goods to market. They just wanted equal rates, and not rebates to the favored few. Leaders such as J. P. Morgan brought out statistics attempting to prove (with some justification) that trusts backed by governments could produce many goods more efficiently than could a variety of small and mid-sized competitors. But the public was not buying. Deep-rooted feelings about liberty and competition could not be budged through economic argumentation.

Leading collaborationists looked for different means of persuasion. They needed a strategist, one with a sophisticated understanding of both economics and popular psychology. They needed a spokesman who could create the impression that "selling to the public" was inferior to "serving the public interest." They needed someone who could stride into board rooms and convince businessmen committed to selling that a new style of assessing corporate conduct -- not just good sales but good "public relations" -- was needed.
That someone was Ivy Lee. Lee's years in college and as a young professional were part of the greatest era of trust-building yet seen. From 1895 to 1904 over 3000 companies disappeared into mergers. Lee, top economics student in the Princeton class of 1898, saw what was going on. His yearbook said of Lee, "What he doesn't know about trusts is not worth knowing." Lee's economic thinking was firmly in the collaborationist camp. Capitalism, he would note, "had advanced faster than the ability of the human intelligence to cope with it." Lee argued that "restrictions must be placed on the use of capital so as to obtain, at the same time, the utmost good for the community as a whole." He never defined the "utmost good" or said who would define it, but this notion became common at Princeton as the Germanic, positive notion of state power was taking root. Lee even brought himself to write an article explicitly titled "Co-ordinating Business Through Co-operation." In it he opposed traditional competition and urged "cooperation" through industrial institutes and trade associations.

Crucially, Lee understood not only the new political economy but the practical political and psychological steps that would have to be taken along the way. He knew that the new collaborationism could be put into place only if businessmen were fully united behind it. That could happen only if businessmen saw collaboration as an inevitable development to which their enterprises must bend in order to avoid breaking. To convince skeptical businessmen, regulation would have to be packaged as something which could increase economic liberty rather than
stifle it. A public relations counselor would also have to convince businessmen that it was improper simply to think of companies responding to customer desires as expressed in the marketplace. He would have to convince waverers that special investigation of public needs was required, with the goal of administering rather than selling to markets.

On its face such an approach was not particularly sensible. Experienced businessmen had learned to trust the person who has to make a sale, not the one who can act any way he chooses and still do well economically. They had learned to expect better results from the person who had to fulfill a contract rather than the person who may simply feel like being nice. They had, in short, a realistic view of human nature. The concept that "public relations mindedness" would be an improvement on the old-fashioned hard-headed desire to sell a product would ordinarily have been laughed at. But Lee had an ace up his sleeve: He added to his economic studies an awareness of currents in popular theology.

Lee, son of a minister who preached a liberalized Protestantism, grew up with social gospel ideas that man could create heaven on earth by establishing a new, "cooperative" social order. Lee was further exposed to new thought at Princeton, where Darwinian ideas were applied to economic trends to show (supposedly) that movement toward larger economic units, and perhaps eventually one state economy, was a movement of inevitable economic progress. As Charles Francis Adams Jr., a
outstanding railroad president, had said, "the principle of consolidation...is a necessity -- a natural law of growth." Competition must be followed by combination, for "The law is invariable. It knows no exceptions."

Lee kept up an interest in theological questions throughout his career. He became a strong partisan of modernism in Christianity. He personally paid for the printing and nationwide distribution of one of the crucial sermons in American ecclesiastical history, Harry Emerson Fosdick's "Shall the Fundamentalists Win?" Fosdick, an early proponent of situational ethics, later said his sermon opposing orthodox Christianity might have had "no unusual result if it had not been for Ivy Lee." Lee used all his public relations skills to make Fosdick and his beliefs famous and influential. Lee and others even urged John D. Rockefeller Jr. to contribute $26 million toward construction of a new church to house Fosdick, who resigned under fire from his old ministry. Rockefeller did.

Lee also put his theology to immediate professional use as he examined the crucial question of how to sell collaborationism to competition-oriented businessmen and to the general public. He argued that competition was un-Christian. He suggested that businessmen who emphasized competition did not love their neighbors but were only out to make a buck. He argued that creation of government-backed cartels would lead to better care for the public because naturally good-hearted businessmen would be able to follow their better instincts instead of acting under pressure for short term sales.
Lee was able to utter such statements with a straight face for two reasons. First, he had thrown over the orthodox Christian concept of original sin. He apparently had come to believe that environmental factors were more essential than natural disabilities in determining conduct. If only the business environment were changed, covetousness would give way to kindness. Second, he had been taught a different standard of ethics, than the traditional. While it was improper to lie, he thought neither the Bible nor anything else provided a truly objective standard of judging human activities, so all analysis was essentially subjective.

Lee, combining an emphasis on subjectivity with what he had read from popularized Freudian psychology, arrived at a strategy which he termed the "psychology of the multitude." Give up attempts to explain economic laws through rational discourse, he advised businessmen, for people "will not analyze statistics... Since crowds do not reason, they can only be organized and stimulated through symbols and phrases." Communication proceeded better when public relations spokesmen played on "the imagination or emotion of the public..." Those favoring collaboration merely had to find "leaders who can fertilize the imagination and organize the will of the crowd... the crowd craves leadership."

Lee made a career of telling leaders of the new economic order how to merge the new economics with the new psychology. He told a group of railroad managers that "Crowds are led by symbols
and phrases. Success in dealing with crowds rests upon the art of getting believed in. We know that Henry the Eighth by his obsequious deference to the forms of the law was able to get the people to believe in him so completely that he was able to do almost anything with them." Appearances, Lee argued, were the base on which a superstructure of reality could be erected.

In short, Lee understood in 1917 what Lenin was putting into practice, what Joseph Goebbels would refine in the 1930s, and what Jacques Ellul would criticize in the 1950s: the idea that "In propaganda, truth pays off." As Ellul concluded, "...in propaganda we must make a radical distinction between a fact on the one hand and intentions or interpretations on the other; in brief, between the material and the moral elements. The truth that pays off is in the realm of.f. s. The necessary falsehoods, which also pay off, are in the realm of intentions and interpretations."

Lee's tactic of factual accuracy in order to insinuate impressions was far more effective than the policy of J.P. Morgan, who generally did not allow his conclusions to outrun his factual base. It was also a departure from the typical press agent policy of outlandish statements with little factual basis. Lee found the appearance of truthfulness to be as useful to him as it had been in the days of Henry VIII. Listeners who believed him on small points, for good reason, were more likely to follow him to his collaborationist conclusions.

Editors who scorned press agents listened to Lee. By
covering machinations with talk of cooperation in the public interest, Lee’s clients escaped criticism they might otherwise have received. Lee’s thinking went into, and preserved from substantial criticism, the Copper and Brass Research Association; it became the organization devoted to pooling resources to control markets for 42 of the largest copper producers and manufacturers in the United States. Lee sold to the public the anti-competitive plans of the Anthracite Coal Operators Conference, composed of 102 companies, saying that the barriers to entry established by the Conference would be a means of preventing adulterated product. Lee worked with lawyer Thomas Chadbourne to establish the International Sugar Council, which developed a plan in 1930 to cut out competition in order to stabilize sugar prices. “Laissez faire” competition, Lee argued, “may mean ruin to large numbers…”

Whenever those favoring competitive enterprise criticized Lee’s efforts, he created a smokescreen. When criticized for his role in formation of the Cotton Yarn Association, Lee acknowledged that the objective was “establishment of a protective minimum price, trusting thereby to deal with the surplus capacity of the trade and eliminate those sellers of yarn in the market who, by force of circumstances, have been obliged to dispose of their output without reference to price.” It would take a moment to cut through such rhetoric to see that the Association’s mission was to clamp down on discount sellers. In the meantime, Lee would have moved on.
Seeing Lee as a proponent of collaboration rather than competitive enterprise, and as a person who combined the new economic thinking with an ethic of fact accuracy but impression manipulation, clears up part of what has been the mystery of Ivy Lee. For instance, we can now reassess his famous "Declaration of Principles." Yes, Lee claimed that all his work was done in the open, but at the time he made that pronouncement Lee was employed by International Harvester to write an article for Moody's Magazine. The article would praise Harvester as "An Open and Above-Board Trust." Lee would not be identified as a company spokesman. In 1907, when Lee wrote a Moody's Magazine article on behalf of his new employer, the Pennsylvania Railroad, his corporate connection once again was not mentioned.

Did such behavior mean that all of Lee's work was not done in the open? No, his "Declaration of Principles" was factually accurate: The articles were published and his name was on them. But Lee's declaration created an inaccurate impression of a willingness to lay his cards on the table. This he did not do except under pressure. He continued to abide by the letter of his self-imposed accuracy law, but not the spirit.

A close look at the "Declaration of Principles" shows how artfully Lee chose his words. For instance, "I send out only matter every detail of which I am willing to assist any editor in verifying for himself." Such a statement was factually correct in that all of Lee's details were generally verifiable, but Lee knew that effective propaganda contains in it only information which can be verified. Lee's goals was to slant his readers and
clients toward anti-competitive policies, but so subtly that he would leave with them a belief that they had made up their own minds.

A view of Lee as master propagandist (but not a liar by his own "situation ethic" standards) makes what seem to be mistakes and anomalies part of this newly understood pattern. For instance, Lee was employed by John D. Rockefeller Jr. to repair damage caused to business-government collaboration by press coverage of the 1914 "Ludlow Massacre." This tragedy was the culmination of a coal miners' strike in Colorado which led to considerable violence, including an April 20 battle between strikers and the Colorado State Militia in which two women and eleven children at Ludlow were killed.

Lee ascertained that the women and children, while fleeing in panic from an out-of-control militia outfit, had overturned a stove and set off the fatal fire in which most of them died. Lee could therefore suggest, in a bulletin sent to newspaper editors, that the women and children may have been the victims of their own carelessness. Some reporters, of course, pointed out the foolishness of expecting persons fleeing in panic to watch their step," and cursed Lee as a Pharisee. But he could state with accuracy that he had not lied.

Lee became adept at creating dishonest impressions from factual statements. In his post-Ludlow cleanup Lee circulated a bulletin, "How Colorado Editors View the Strike," which contained statements made at a conference of Colorado editors. Judging
from the bulletin, the editors were surprisingly supportive of coal company interests. What went unmentioned in the bulletin was that of 331 newspaper editors in the state, only fourteen attended the conference and only eleven signed the report. All eleven were from papers controlled by the coal companies.

The view of Lee as an advocate of collaboration rather than competition clears up other mysteries, such as Lee’s relations with, and book promoting, the Soviet Union. In 1930 Business Week was astounded when Lee became so great a defender of the Soviet Union that some said he must be a paid agent. "In instinct, doctrine, career," Business Week noted, Lee was "the subtlest of protectors of capitalists, their arch advocate, the veritable high priest of their whole controversial business—a professional director of public relations. That he of all men should support Soviet objectives "is the anomaly, enigma, and mystery of cynical Wall Street." C. W. Barron, editor of the Wall Street Journal, asked Lee directly, "What are you doing all this for? Who is paying you for it?"

Lee said the Soviet connection was his "hobby," yet Business Week sniffed, "Sophisticated managing editors frankly do not believe a word of it. It is simply impossible that Ivy Lee, aide to millionaires and millionairedom, should be serious in all this stuff about Soviet Russia. What a colossal axe he must be grinding." Speculation about Soviet payments to Lee was rampant, but one letter purportedly showing a payoff proved a forgery, and nothing ever has been proven.
Whether or not money was a bond, though, mind apparently was. When Lincoln Steffins toured the Soviet Union, he thought he was seeing the future in a society based on collaborationism taken to its extremes. Lee may not have gone so far, but he did see the United States moving closer to the Soviet Union in social perspective. "The United States started with complete individualism, every man for himself," and the Soviets have the opposite position, Lee wrote, but "we have found it necessary to restrict the power of the individual..."

As the two countries' political futures converged, Lee expected that the economic possibilities also would become apparent: "Within five years Russia will have the biggest tractor plant, the biggest paper mills, the biggest of many other industries in the world." Lee's belief in domestic collaboration could easily extend itself into proclamations of the beauty of a U.S.-Soviet deal. He practiced what he preached by advising Standard Oil and Vacuum Oil to buy Soviet petroleum and also offer loans to the Soviet government.

The New York Times reported that deal in March, 1926, and noted Lee's participation, observing that "the best known and most expensive of publicity agents, who among other activities is the advisor on public relations to the Standard Oil interests, has begun to display keen interest in the recognition of the Soviet government." The Times also reported that Lee had sent letters to many of his associates urging closer contacts with the Soviets. Editors noted the cooperation of Lee and Ruth Stout,
Lee was widely criticized for his Soviet-related activities. Elihu Root asked Lee if he wanted Americans to "accept the principles of the Bolsheviki as something equally as good" as the principles of competitive enterprise. Representative Hamilton Fish Jr. proclaimed Lee a "notorious propagandist for Soviet Russia." In 1929 Representative George Tinkham of Massachusetts called Lee an "open propagandist" against American interests, with "no country, no flag, and no allegiance except the power of money, and what money can compel or buy."

That was not true. Lee's career is consistent in his opposition to competitive enterprise and his embrace of government-industry "partnerships" both at home and abroad. He was also consistent in his use of factual accuracy to effectively mold perceptions.

In 1929, at age 52, Lee looked back on his career and indicated satisfaction at his accomplishments in affecting American political and economy thinking, but concern about the personal cost. He wrote to a friend, "A good many years ago I started on the work I am doing, feeling that there was a real field in it for usefulness. I now know that there is a great deal to be done that is useful...[But I have found] the greatest difficulty in getting people to take anything I say as an independent expression of opinion. I am always merely a propagandist...Sometimes in my low moments I have thought of throwing the whole thing overboard and taking a minor job as a
Lee, of course, never did. He had helped to make the concept of collaboration welcome in many corporations. He had seeded some of the largest with public relations counselors. Lee had to be satisfied with that. In 1934 his last experiment in the advocacy of extreme collaborationism led him to a short-lived consulting arrangement with the German government, for which he received great criticism. In October, 1934, advising the executive board of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Lee suddenly could not remember to whom he was speaking. Lee had suffered a cerebral hemorrhage. One month later, at age 57, he died.

Lee’s agenda lived on, though. Editor Stanley Walker wrote in 1934 that Lee commonly was seen “as the greatest example of what a newspaperman may do when he enters upon publicity work.” Recent agenda-setting research has concentrated on analysis of themes and examination of how an audience rates issues before and after media coverage. Lee’s consistent economic theme -- the importance of corporate collaborationism, with competition avoided whenever possible -- is clear, and by the close of his career it was considerably more popular than it was at the beginning.

Thousands of politicians, pundits, and public relations practitioners, along with substantial economic changes, contributed to that transition, of course. It is impossible to assess with accuracy Lee’s personal contribution. Since the historian cannot pre-test and post-test audiences, we must mainly rely on subjective assessments such as Walker’s in judging Lee’s
importance as an agenda-setter. Still, before we leap to the conclusion that newspaper leaders during the early twentieth century were setting agendas, we should analyze the impact of Lee and other public relations men and women. In his time Lee was seen as extremely effective in getting newspapers to cover what he wanted them to cover, and in perhaps swaying the audience to his point of view. He did not settle for the insertion of a few puffs. His goal was to create a new economic agenda.

Footnotes


5. Kolko, p. 5.
7. Wiebe, p. 204.
10. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 1912, p. 126. 'Quoted in Kolko, p. 14.'
12. Hiebert, p. 29.
17. Ivy Lee, "The Human Nature of Publicity," Electric Railway Journal, August 4, 1917, p. 172; Lee, Publicity for Private Service Corporations (New York: privately printed, 1916); quoted in Hiebert, p. 21. Freudianism became popular among intellectuals during this period, particularly after Freud himself came to the United States and spoke at Clark University in 1909. Others were influenced also: Walter Lippmann, for one, accepted the new view of man and, as early as 1917, began to think about its implications for policy. Popularized Freudianism swept the country during Lee's years of greatest influence. How-to volumes such as The Psychology of Package Labels and The Psychology of Selling Life Insurance were eagerly read by businessmen and others.
18. Collier and Horowitz, p. 117.
Psychology provided the theoretical framework for the new view. Merle Curti found that Printers' Ink articles moved in about 1910 from the concept of man as a rational creature capable of spotting lies to that in which men could be swayed by attention-getting stimuli and appeals to the senses.

20. Hiebert, p. 178. Lee performed similar chores for many clients, and sometimes even developed synergistic programs. Working in 1923 for both The Copper and Brass Research Association and John D. Rockefeller, who was helping to fund work on the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, Lee wrote an article describing the cathedral and pointing out that many important pipes and other parts were made of copper, "A metal whose worthiness had been proved by its centuries of service on churches and cathedrals in England and on the continent." (Raucher, p. 99)

21. Ibid., p. 177.


24. Cutlip and Center, p. 79

25. Tedlow, p. 37; Hiebert, p. 101. Lee did receive great abuse at this time; Sandburg called him a "paid liar," and his Ludlow activity "dirty work." It was coarse. It was cheap. It was desperately bold and overplayed... Ivy Lee is below the level of the hired gunman and slugger. His sense of right and wrong is a worse force in organized society than that of the murderers..."


36. Ibid., pp. 284-293. Lee apparently found the national socialistic aspects of the new German economy attractive, but he opposed Nazi persecution of Jews. Lee's defense of Hitler, unlike his appreciation of Stalin, was very short-lived.