This paper explores the notion of philosophic-mindedness as it relates to the conceptions of educational leadership and democracy. Three essential questions are treated: (1) Ought educational leaders to be philosophic in their work? (2) Need educational leaders be democratic? and (3) How do these conceptions of leadership, democracy, and philosophic-mindedness interrelate in the context of educational administration? The discussion of these issues focuses on what constitutes leadership in an educational setting, how educational leadership differs from other forms of leadership, and how educational leaders are to be distinguished from other kinds of managers. The argument is presented that an understanding of these qualities (philosophic-mindedness, leadership, and democracy) is crucial to the governance of educational institutions, and that they merit attention as a philosophical problem. Two pages of references are included. (Author/TE)
Administrative Leadership, Democracy and the Qualities of Philosophic Mind

by

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This paper explores the notion of philosophic-mindedness as it relates to the conceptions of educational leadership and democracy. Three essential questions are treated: 1) ought educational leaders to be philosophic in their work?; 2) need educational leaders be democratic?; and, 3) how do these conceptions of leadership, democracy and philosophic mindedness interrelate in the context of educational administration? In exploring this nest of issues, I shall discuss what in fact leadership is supposed to be in an educational setting, how educational leadership differs from other sorts of leading, and how educational leaders are to be distinguished from other sorts of managers. The argument this paper seeks to make is that what is meant by philosophic-minded, leadership, and democracy is crucial to the governance of educational institutions and that as a species of philosophic problem it requires attention.
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Introduction

The practical question is this: should administrative leaders be philosophic in their educational work? The more theoretical matters revolve around what we take administrative leadership and philosophic mind to be vis-a-vis other notions of management and expertise; and how conceptions of democracy in education may bear on the entire issue of school administration. This nest of questions is not entirely new, yet they remain highly charged. Without a clear notion of what we mean by 'leadership,' 'democracy,' 'educational administration,' and 'philosophic mind,' it is difficult to confront rather practical issues such as how we shall educate school administrators. In this paper, I shall attempt to deal with some of these questions and to argue that educational administrators should be philosophic, and that the political cultural context should be a democratic one in which they work.

The Claims

There are a number of logically discrete claims that may be made relative to the need of educational administrators for philosophy skills. These viewpoints have been over-simplified for the purposes of emphasis:

1) "The school administrator should be prepared primarily for educational leadership and only secondarily to perform administrative tasks." (Smith, 1956, p. 83) Smith goes on to say that the best way to do this is to teach the new administrator to be "philosophic minded." Without going into the details of Smith's argument, let us characterize his position as L + PM (for Leadership plus Philosophic Mindedness).

2) Another viewpoint may be termed Sergiovanni #1 (for it was proposed a number of years ago and the author has since modified his position). In this second point of view, the claim is that
administrators have so much to do it is too much to ask of them that they lead the school as well as administer it. Therefore this position argues that the primary task of educational administration programs is to teach administrators specific administrative tasks and skills. Since this approach focuses on skills and specific tasks, we may assume that such educational executives need not be trained in philosophy to accomplish them. (Sergiovanni, 1979) This viewpoint I shall call A - PM/L (for Administration without Philosophic Mind or Leadership).

3) A third viewpoint has it that "...if heads [school administrators] are characterized by philosophic competence, we should be thankful for their leadership." (Barrow, 1981) Following Plato, Barrow seems to be saying that how a school is organized (autocratically, democratically, etc.,) is not so important as the fact that the shots are called in a competent manner. It may be assumed here, for the sake of argument, that what this position holds is that school administrators should be (hopefully) philosophic in their work, and if they are then they are capable of leadership. But how schools are organized does not really matter. This view we may characterize as PM + L - C (or Philosophic Mind plus Leadership, minus democratic contextual organization).

4) A fourth viewpoint is also authored by Sergiovanni. This position (we will call Sergiovanni #2) holds that:"Leadership and administration are operationally so interrelated that, practically speaking, both behavior modes should be considered as necessary and important variations in administrative style." (Sergiovanni et. al., 1979 p. 7) This position is somehow interested in countering the notion that administration is "...a less essential lower-status activity, while leadership is viewed as superior." Sergiovanni goes on to say that we find unrealistic expectations of administrators when leadership is prescribed. Sergiovanni writes: "...the professional administrator is likely to view his or her role as that of one who finds out what consumers want from schools and who delivers educational services accordingly. The educational leader, by contrast, is very much concerned with the issues of purpose and direction. Sergiovanni here equates "antecedents" with what I wish to term 'philosophic mind.' (Sergiovanni, 1982)

Neither alone is sufficient, for the educational administrator will need to bring to his or her work both a vision of what ought to be and
knowledge of the means to achieve these ideals. (Sergiovanni, et al., 1979, pp. 4-21) Sergiovanni would wish the educational leader to be philosophic. He talks of their working "beneath the surface of events and activities, seeking a deeper meaning and deeper value...leaders bring to the school a sense of drama in human life..." (Sergiovanni, et al., 1979, p. 18) Some balance is needed, therefore between leadership and administration. This position may be characterized as SOME A + SOME L + PM (or some Administration plus some Leadership, plus some Philosophic Mindedness).

Although these four views are not the only ones dealing with the issue of administrative leadership and philosophic competence, they may begin to show the need for analysis. At this juncture let us turn to the notion of administrative leadership as it is related to democracy.

Administrative Leadership and Democracy

The popular view is that educational administrators ought to be leaders. But, as we see above, it is not entirely clear what criteria are to accompany this recommendation. On the one hand, leadership is seen as a superordinate class of philosophic or intellectual insights, while on the other leadership is taken to be synonymous with administration and tends to be reduced to the tasks of managing the school. These tasks are specifiable and lend themselves to repeat performance over time. Leadership given this latter view is nothing but the routine tasks of administration. Moreover, it is assumed that anyone trained in these tasks can be an administrative leader. According to John Wilson & Barbara Cowell (1983), "...leaders ought to be chosen on the basis of their expertize, and on no other basis (although ultimately they should be accountable to all of us..." (Wilson & Cowell, 1983, p. 114) We should assume, "...[T]he fact that some people just are better at politics or indeed morality --- flies very much in the face of the Protestant, post-Kantian culture in which we have (most of us) been raised." (Wilson & Cowell, p. 113) In place of arguing for an ideological view (e.g. democracy or totalitarianism) on the basis of its stylistic or regime status, they substitute arguing for philosophic-mindedness arising out of the assumed notions that we 1) have pluralistic epistemological
notions (some varying according to local conditions); and, 2) that an elite of "better" governors ought to be placed in leadership roles. (Wilson & Cowell, p. 114) In his article, "Politics and Expertise," (1971), Wilson argues that there can be "political experts," in the sense that "there are people better equipped than others to decide what is right, in the context of ends as well as means, for a society or a state..." (p. 34) But, such experts are not entitled to enforce their status as experts, or their decisions on society. At most, Wilson argues, it would be wise for us to entrust such decisions to these experts. In seeking to justify this claim, Wilson assumes that we would all agree that lunatics and children ought not to be regarded as political experts, but it is easy for us to determine who in fact are political experts.

I wish to argue that it is not at all that easy, and simply ruling out people by virtue of their gross mental disability or age does not get us out of the woods. Rather, those who lay claim to political expertise are often difficult to evaluate in terms of their claim. This fact is further confused by the the raw power, genetic inheritance, or social class that gives certain individuals a prior claim to the corridors of political expertise. We are not far along the way in clearing up what we mean by "political expertise" through Wilson's simple sorting.

Wilson goes on to assert that there are some standard interests and needs that are common to human beings; that not everyone is aware of these; and, that political experts have a greater understanding of what people need (as opposed to what they want). The conclusion is that the political expert can tell us what is in our own best interest (or what it is that we need). Unfortunately, what happens in this kind of argument is that needs are equated to what it is that makes people happy: A utilitarian assumption that 20th Century citizens of advanced technological states can no longer make. Clearly, there are things that we need, in the sense of should have, which will not make us happy (either in the short or the long run). The notion that somehow political experts know what is best for us (meets our needs) flies in the face of rational good sense. For who knows better than the human being what he or she really wants, and what service does the institution of the school,
church, and family serve except to teach us how to sort out actual needs from simple desires and wants. It must be recognized too that human beings differ in their needs, and that political experts do not automatically possess psychological insight. Often the contrary case abides. Special education for the handicapped, for example, did not come into existence owing to political experts, but because a number of parents of handicapped children in the United States began applying pressure to the legislators to pass laws removing restrictions. This is to say that a political expert may simply fail to understand human needs where they exist. The political expert may understand them and still fail to implement policy to satisfy them, for purely selfish reasons (it would lose votes). (Wilson, 1971, pp. 34-37)

One of the difficulties with this particular view of the political expert qua leader, (i.e. that leaders are experts, and they are selected for their knowledge of facts or processes) is that it sounds strangely like Plato's Republic. We are not far from the view that certain people, either because of heredity or particular gifts of circumstance, are just superior in leadership than others. The idea is that leadership is not so much a set of learned skills, as it is a delegated honor bestowed upon the virtuous "philosopher kings" or guardians. The Republic sets out alternative future states, with merits and demerits outlined in advance. What remains is the primary assumption that certain types of conceptual notions (i.e. a view of what 'justice' is, for example) legitimates the authority of the leader. We must then have leaders (men and women, and here Plato was clearly ahead of our own time) who possess the capacity to think rationally and make proper judgments based upon their insights into the "sovereignty of the Good." It is the type of person you are that determines the place (status) you take in society or the state. Leaders are not artisans...and never can be...Leadership revolves around the type of knowledge base that leading requires. Since knowledge is virtue, and one can learn to be virtuous if one has the "right stuff," there is no doubt that the leaders will govern wisely and justly.

It would be incorrect to assume that Wilson & Cowell simplisticly wish to adopt Plato's suggestions, because they point out "...he too put his money on one specific regime." (Wilson & Cowell, 1983, p. 116)
However, there is much in Wilson and Cowell that Plato would applaud. Certainly, he strongly recommended that we exile the poets, because they portrayed the gods in anthropomorphic terms. This can be translated into Wilson and Cowell's suggestion that our leaders should be persons we imitate. Plato too wished that children imitate good role models and not bad or evil ones. Hence, he called for clear moves of censorship of teaching materials, role models, and those who would pervert his normative ideological values. In fact, Plato did not really wish to suggest the single utopian solution to all governmental functions; he provides only one kind of ideological scenario for us to contemplate, and it is not clear that he saw his Greece actually adopting any of his views in total.

If we peel back the conception of human nature in this account, it is clear that these leaders are special. Just as the reason why democracy and participation "are popular with certain types of people; briefly, it makes them feel powerful...", so it is the case that the reason an a-ideological context is to be preferred is that it allows for the philosopher-king to rise to the position of leadership. Even the method of electing leaders is wrong for Wilson & Cowell (i.e. "No serious business or other organization would choose a leader by the sort of public methods which seems to apply for selecting presidents of the USA, or emperors in the later Roman Principate...") Since we need rule by experts, the capriciousness of democratic vote is to be jettisoned as too risky. Democratic consensus yields demagogues rather than experts, according to Wilson and Cowell. (Wilson & Cowell, 1983, p.114)

What we may call 'democracy' is only one term representing a much broader doctrine or ideology currently rampant in the West. The indictment has it that 'democracy' does not mean anything very clear; and that it seems to be related to the notion of power (which translates to mean: 1) what one thinks important in life; and 2) what particular area or time of conflict or negotiation one is considering). It is assumed, that we commonly take for granted the conventional notions as to what is important are the only possible ones; and that democracy refers to styles of doing things or regimes. If we buy this argument, then philosophy is rather useless if it focuses on such styles or regimes and how they ought to suit certain sorts of people, under certain
conditions. These authors warn philosophers not to take for granted one substantive or specific set of values: to do so makes them "mere ideologists," they argue. Thus 'democracy' refers simply to a style or regime. We are led to believe that it is nice if circumstances allow for democracy and autonomy, but these conditions do not justify democracy. (Wilson & Cowell, 1983, p. 112)

What seems to be at stake is whether democracy possesses some agreed upon normative status. Wilson and Cowell state: "Many philosophers in fact more or less assume that there is general agreement about the merits of democracy, and hurry on to the question of its practicability." (p. 113) Taking issue with Pat White's (1983) treatment of democracy, it is asserted that outside of an asylum, everyone can: 1) assume people can master some body of knowledge; 2) that people are capable of reasoning about moral aspects of political problems; and, 3) that people are capable to some extent of altruism. These three factors form the basis of White's assumed value of democracy, it is claimed. (Wilson & Cowell, 1983, p. 113)

What the authors put in the place of White's participatory theory of democracy is a kind of 19th century liberal notion of the democratic state: i.e. the well-governed state or government takes it that: 1) different qualities and kinds of knowledge are acceptable and (some of these depend on local conditions); 2) we ought to set our sights high, and select our leaders form the top 10% of the population...for "those presumably are the people we want to govern." (Wilson & Cowell, 1983, p.113)

Thus, in the final analysis we must reject:

...the idea (to repeat) that there must be a single regime which mirrors or incorporates reason, as if political life had somehow throughout to reproduce the social conditions for a philosophical seminar. But (a) this conception of reason is too narrow; it is also (often) reasonable to defer to authority, give and take orders, accept expertise and so forth...(b), it is not even true of seminars; here too there are --- so long as we are serious about meeting certain standards --- authorities, leaders, experts, the wise, people to be listened to and imitated more than others. (Wilson & Cowell, 1983, p. 116)

It seems clearly wrong to argue (as have Wilson & Cowell, 1983) that democracy is a style of administration and that it does not much matter
relative to education. Democracy is not a "myth" as Wilson and Cowell assert, but a reality. What is mythic is the notion that democracy means very narrowly what certain political definitions make it out to mean; i.e. a form or style of governance of underlings. The fundamental question that seems to undercut all the discussion of the viability of democracy in education is what 'democracy' is to mean in this context. Wilson and Cowell, set it out as meaning majority rule and then point out rather blatantly that it is often the case that an expert authority is more useful as a head or educational administrator than an ignorant majority. Moreover, we are told that there is nothing to say that a single democratic individual has a more reasonable solution, decision, etc., to a problem than an enlightened authoritarian.

What is getting mixed up is the reduction of democracy to some style of administering or managing an institution (e.g. a school). What is paramount is getting things done correctly (reasonably) and that groups may not, by their very nature as groups, do much better than an enlightened leader. My point is that democracy is more than decision-making and that it is quite a bit better to run the risk of wrong decisions or messy policy-making, if we preserve the right of members of groups (like teachers) to play a role in that policy or decision. It seems to me that autocrats generally get into power because the masses of men do not want to be bothered with the petty details, are told that they do not have the requisite skills, or some other such rubbish. Actually, the risky bet that one places on universal suffrage is not all that risky if we add the ingredient of freedom.

R.S. Peters writes: "The point is that methods and forms of organization in schools can never just be regarded as ways of promoting particular objectives. For schools are educational institutions, which means that everything that goes on must be regarded as something that can be learnt, as well as an aid to learning. Thus the authoritarian or business-like efficiency of the head cannot be looked on simply as aids or hindrances to learning. They also provide learning experiences for children on how to treat others." (Peters, 1976, p. 7)

Contrast the above with Robin Barrow's comments: "...To some people the above issue [should schools be democratically organized?] is of burning importance. I cannot see it that way. At the theoretical
level, it seems to me to make little difference who calls the shots, provided that they are called in a competent manner. I do not recognize any obvious weighty point of principle. In practice, therefore, I would see no reason to complain at variations between schools, some autocratically led by wise and inspired heads, others given over to democracy. All that does matter, both in theory and practice, is that decision-making should be carried out by those with requisite qualities, which must include philosophic competence." (Barrow, 1981, p. 98)

What is surprising about such a view is its avowed a-ideological style. Would that we could create an ideologically free context. Actually, when we dip beneath the surface of Wilson and Cowell's argument we find a very classical liberal position at work. The barebones of this view would be, if flushed out, that the best people somehow rise to the surface and become administrators, if allowed to; that somehow public and private distinctions must be kept intact; that fraternity is rather meaningless, at least it is not as important as governing well; that equality must never be sacrificed to excellence; and, that somehow merit is bestowed. Wilson and Cowell's philosophically-minded educational administrator would be sufficiently gifted with reason such that there would be one right sort of reasonable way of thinking and doing, and that not everyone would be expected to know what this is. Certain experts would be shown to have such knowledge and must be placed in positions of power and authority (in schools, etc.,) as leaders.

Actually, two notions of democracy and philosophic-mind are seriously undersupported here. Leadership that does not mine both the cooperative efforts of the governed (one of the tenants of democracy as Jefferson set it forth), is doomed to destruction, for those that would be subjected to measures they neither understand nor have an opportunity to forge would revolt. Authoritarianism has within it the seeds of its own destruction. Certainly on the other side, democracy contains within itself a propensity to self-destruct when the majority fails to register its wishes. Actually Wilson and Cowell seem to collapse the positivist notion of knowledge (that there is one so-called philosophic truth and one such method) with the liberal notion of mild consensus from the governed. It is as if we ought to respect the office-holder because of the office, even though he or she is a thief or scoundrel. This kind of
meritocracy smacks of a status quo ante mentality clearly associated with the rationalizations of Herbert Spencer and others relative to 19th century empire building (e.g. "white man's burden").

A Popperian argument may be deployed that argues participatory democracy provides a check against poor decision-making stemming from human fallibility. (Smithson, 1983, p. 279) A participationist approach to social and cultural organization is quite old, but the notion that Popper added emphasizes the need to protect the social or governmental mechanisms from the unsuccessful administrators. We must have a way of locating and getting rid of the erroneous policy. Never mind trying to find good or excellent policy, the notion here is that we must seek to eliminate errors from policy making. As Smithson puts it:

Democratic policy-making, for all its recognizable warts, does emphasize the give and take of argument and the free play of criticism, it is a structural recognition of human fallibility and value pluralism, it acts as a crucial mechanism for error elimination, and thus shapes and is free to correct policies, be they at school or government level. When this is borne in mind, the claims of philosophic competence can be kept in proper perspective. (p. 280)

The point is that methods and forms of organization in schools can never be seen solely as the ways to achieve the ends of schooling. Rather, they are part of the baggage that we find students taking with them when they leave schools.

Certainly, there is nothing to prevent us from using the term 'democracy' to refer to the kind of rule of experts that Wilson and Cowell seem to be favoring. Carole Pateman (1970) points out that the solution to the problems of industrial democracy need not lay in greater participation upon the part of workers in governance. Not enough research exists to tell us if participation in this sense really amounts to much. On the other hand, an argument may be made for education in this regard. For it may be assumed that by educating people to participate would probably lead to greater participation on their part. (Pateman, 1970, pp. 106-107)

A more reasonable view of democracy was set forth by John Dewey. Leadership in the formation of the controlling aims, methods and materials of the schools must be placed in the hands of teachers or their
representatives, democratically chosen, Dewey argued. The gradual realization of this fact, Dewey remarks in 1937, was finally coming into its own. And even if there were "no authorized regular way in which the intelligence and experience of the teaching corps was consulted and utilized, administrative officers accomplished that end in formal ways." (Dewey, 1937, p. 460)

Despite the expansion of democratic principles in educational administration, Dewey saw the major inroads being made in the application of democracy to pupils. Dewey believed that if teachers were subjected to authoritarian treatment by administrators, they would be apt to treat their own students in an autocratic manner. The argument that teachers were not ready to assume the responsibilities of participation, and that some mechanism like natural selection actually placed the "best" people in positions of authority, were both faulty. Dewey felt that until and unless teachers were given the opportunity to participate, they could never assume the responsibility to do so: "...habitual exclusion has the effect of reducing a sense of responsibility for what is done and its consequence." Democratic theory argues that the best way to produce initiative and constructive power is to exercise it: "Power, as well as interest, comes by use and practice." Dewey goes on to argue that teaching the young requires support for teachers, and that they can hardly expect to understand what they are doing without sharing in the formation of its guiding ideas. (Dewey, 1937, pp. 460-462) Teachers are in direct contact with students, while administrators are at their best in indirect contact. Teachers need to be in contact with one another so that they may pool their shared ideas relative to methods and results: to deny this cooperative effort is to promote waste, Dewey reasoned. (Dewey, 1937, p. 462)

Perhaps more than any other philosopher of education, John Dewey stressed the relationship between democracy and education. He wrote:

The political and governmental phase of democracy is a means, the best means so far found, for realizing ends that lie in the wide domain of human relationships and the development of human personality... It is as we often say, though perhaps without appreciating all that is involved in the saying, a way of life, social and individual.... (p. 457)
Going on to lay emphasis on the participatory nature of democracy, Dewey states: "The keynote of democracy as a way of life may be expressed, it seems to me, as the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in formation of the values that regulate the living of men together..." (Dewey, 1937, p. 457) He asserts that "...all those who are affected by social institutions must have a share in producing and managing them." (Dewey, 1937, pp. 457-458) The exclusion from participation is a subtle form of suppression, according to Dewey. For, it prevents individuals the opportunity to reflect and decide the methods and means by which subjects may arrive at the enjoyment of what is good for them. The mass of men may be unaware that they have a claim to the development of their own powers. Individuals suffer, but so does the entire social body. (Dewey, 1937, pp. 457-458)

Dewey pegs his conception of participatory democracy to human nature. He proposes that we must have faith in the capacities of human nature, human intelligence, and pooled and cooperative experience. Dewey finds himself in direct opposition to the view that some autocrat or authoritarian scheme is better. The notion that a select superior few, because of inherent natural gifts, are endowed with the ability or right to control the conduct of others, Dewey finds contrary to his ideal of democracy. Although his conception of democracy is relatively recent in history, he says: "men's minds and feelings are still permeated with ideas about leadership imposed from above, ideas that developed in the long early history of mankind..." (Dewey, 1937, p. 458)

Another criterial mark of Dewey's democracy is a belief in equality. This is not a belief in equal distribution of natural endowments, but equality of treatment by law and its administration. Dewey goes so far as to say that within institutional settings, the individual has equal right to express himself and his judgments, "...although the weight of his judgment may not be equal in amount when it enters into the pooled result to that of others." (Dewey, 1937, pp. 458-459) Dewey also proposed that we require equality of opportunity, because of the unequal distribution of natural and psychological factors. Finally, Dewey added the criterion of freedom to his list. He called not so much for freedom of action, as for freedom of mind. He had in mind the freedom of intelligence rather than the freedom to do as one pleases.
He points out that the Bill of Rights set forth this intellectual freedom. (Dewey, 1937, p. 459)

The significance of democracy for philosophic mind is fundamental: the democratic ethos calls for a full and free flow of information, for the open discussion of issues, etc. Being philosophically minded, then, is to be democratic given this meaning of democracy. But, in what ways do the qualities of philosophic mind differ from mere expert knowledge?

The Qualities of Philosophic Mind

There is a brand of argument, set forth in a number of places, and actually quite ancient, that says that philosophy to be really correct or adequate must take place according to the tenants of Reason, and that it is never dependent upon the organizational (governmental, institutional, or other) arrangements surrounding it. Philosophical-mindedness is, from this point of view, a completely a-historical or a-contextual phenomenon.

Smithson (1983) seriously misreads Robin Barrow's call for philosophic competence upon the part of school administrators in the policy-making function. First, Smithson imputes a conception of 'competence' that is neither implicit or explicit in Barrow's argument. For Smithson, "...there is a clear technocratic implication in Barrow's position [relative to the philosophically competent headmaster]." (Smithson, 1983, pp. 275-276) The clue to this technocracy is located, for Smithson, in Barrow's remarks relative to the policy-making competencies of heads. (Smithson, 1983, p. 276) Without penetrating into the finer points of their disagreement, as it has appeared in the pages of The Journal of Philosophy of Education, it is sufficient to point out that these two scholars seem to be missing the fundamental feature of the argument. At least one significant difference is found in the philosophic attempt of Barrow to propose through conceptual exercise a state-of-affairs that Smithson refuses to think of except as warranting actual school administrative practice. Barrow engages in the what if form of argument, while Smithson treats it as necessarily descriptive of actual administrative conditions in the schools.
Smithson believes that Barrow has it wrong when he defines "philosophic competence" in the context of curriculum policy-making, as knowledge about content of curriculum. Content knowledge, in this instance, for Barrow seems to be more philosophic in nature—which Smithson reads as "technical knowledge." Smithson, would have the philosophically competent head having expertise relative to curriculum. But Barrow talks about policy-making expertise relative to curriculum and this knowledge is clearly different (and less significant for Smithson). For Smithson, knowledge of curriculum content is knowledge about curriculum and how it relates to policy-making; while for Barrow, it seems that one may be expert in curriculum policy-making without being a curriculum specialist in Smithson's narrower meaning of the term 'competent.' (Smithson, 1993, p. 277)

According to Smithson, Barrow's philosophically competent head can only be an expert in policy-making if he is treating curriculum policies technically, (i.e. as a means to ends that have been determined elsewhere). However, according to Smithson, if the head is determining ends, then the philosophically competent head cannot be a policy-making expert given Barrow's definition of the task. For, according to Smithson, the head is merely expediting the "right" policies determined elsewhere, and being an expert on right policies is clearly nonsense, for Smithson. (Smithson, 1983, pp. 277-278)

Simply put, for Smithson, Barrow's philosophically competent head is a technocrat. This is to say that the philosopher-administrator is one who seeks ways to implement policies set by others. But Smithson wishes his headmasters to be philosophic in a prior sense (ivory tower philosophers), asking basic questions that set the scene for effective policy-making but never getting into hard questions of decision-making and application or implementation (let alone test). In addition, Smithson has a rather naive notion of the policy-making function of the school executive; it is not separate from implementation and testing. Barrow seems to have a more realistic view of the policy-making process, although he stops short of making policy-makers responsible for the consequences of their policies and wishes to evaluate them on the formation side only. (Maxcy, 1984, pp. 327-336)
Thus, we see two distinct notions of the qualities of philosophic mind as they apply to education administration and leadership. For Barrow, according to Smithson, the philosophically competent administrator must be a technocrat and an authoritarian, because he or she is an expert in the narrow sense of representing certain interests. Smithson, on the other hand wishes the philosophically competent head to yield to the democratic interests of participatory governance, making policy responsive to the school-based (teacher) curricular interests. (Smithson, 1983, pp. 276-279) Smithson is concerned that a technocracy tends to insulate policy issues from public scrutiny and control. Where one has a technocratic view of the philosophically competent head, then he or she fails to recognize the rights of teachers (and others) to share in the power of curriculum making. (Smithson, 1983, p. 280) Administrators in the name of "professionalism" wish to retain full control over curriculum (and here we have the British context in mind rather that the American), while teacher organizations wish this function to be shared with teachers. There is a real danger in this, however. For Smithson sees teachers assuming the same sort of technocratic rationale for power and control over curriculum matters that administrators have held. He is distrustful of any monopoly over curricular policy. Once teachers have assumed more of a voice in curricular policy-making, they run the risk of becoming technocratic like the headmasters. The consequence would be future parental and citizen resentment, Smithson believes.

What then is the place of philosophic mind in educational administration? An alternative viewpoint is found in the work of Philip G. Smith (1956). Nothing in Smith's conception of "philosophic minded" points to a requirement for expertise, in the sense of knowledge of some particular domain. This is to say that it is possible to be philosophic regarding a policy arena, without being an expert (in the sense of trained as a policy analyst, let us say). Philosophy here refers to a set of intellectual skills that may be applied to a wide variety of matters. In Smith's view, philosophically minded administrators are ones who have a generalized or foundational set of processing capacities. He identifies the "... philosophically-minded individual...", as someone who "...seems to exhibit characteristics which may be grouped
along three interrelated dimensions, namely, comprehensiveness, penetration, and flexibility..." (Smith, 1956, pp. 30-31) These characteristics are defined as:

**COMPREHENSIVENESS**
1. Viewing particulars in relation to a large field
2. Relating immediate problems to long-range goals
3. Utilizing the power of generalization
4. Maintaining tolerance for theoretical considerations

**PENETRATION**
1. Questioning what is taken for granted or is self-evident
2. Seeking for and formulating fundamentals
3. Utilizing a sensitivity for implication and relevance
4. Basing expectations on an abductive-deductive process

**FLEXIBILITY**
1. Being free from psychological rigidity
2. Evaluating ideas apart from their source
3. Seeing issues as many-sided and developing alternative hypotheses
4. Maintaining a tolerance for tentativeness and suspended judgment. (Smith, 1956, pp. 30-31)

Rather than being trained in particular narrow disciplines, we may argue that educational administrators ought to be prepared to be philosophically minded. Smith writes: "It is believed that the truly philosophic educator makes decisions concerning problems of education in the light of a relatively systematic and carefully formulated set of philosophic insights." (Smith, 1956, p. 93) These insights are gathered from a variety of sources. A person's philosophic mind is rather like his character or personality, Smith argues. Moreover, it is never fully complete, but subject to change and modification over time. As such a philosophic mind, is not simply given or taught to another person: it must be worked at and refined through actual transaction with others. (Smith, 1956, p. 93) Hence, for Smith, educational administrators ought to be philosophic. As such, they are not narrow experts in curriculum or reading methods, etc., but much more like emergency room medics, capable of responding to the unusual as well as the usual administrative difficulties.

But how far does philosophic mind extend for administrators? Douglas J. Simpson and Michael B. Jackson, in their text *The Teacher as Philosopher* (1984) argue that teachers (and we may expect
administrators) ought to develop philosophic qualities of mind that not only help in school situations but in life generally. Simpson and Jackson identify three dimensions of philosophic mind: analytic, normative and synoptic. We are told that teachers (administrators) ought to develop along these three dimensions and this development should be lifelong. The claim is that these qualities of philosophic mind cut across the disciplines and domains of expertise and provide insight and understanding that narrow training in the fields of knowledge overlook. We are led to believe that in classroom, staffroom, or faculty reports, there is room for this overarching kind of philosophic mind.

Now, the critical hinge upon which the argument over philosophic competence as a feature of administrative leadership seems to hang is that of 'expertise.' The claim that Barrow and Wilson, for example, may be espousing "technocratic rationality" with their injunction that our leaders ought to be primarily "experts" is perhaps no more dangerous than the recommendation that leaders be philosophically-minded; if we have in mind just another ideological viewpoint. Certainly, there is a similarity in the fact that both notions provide networks of guiding concepts and normative standards for conducting inquiry and solving problems. This is to say that we really are no farther along by countering a technocratic model of democracy with a philosophic one of Marxist or other orientation. Thus, we may argue that a leader does not remove the taint of ideological mind by assuming philosophic mind. Philosophic mind may be ideological as well (in fact, there are certainly a number of definitions of "philosophic mind" that could be used in this context).

There is certainly no doubt that today we defer to the authority of experts rather routinely and with increasing regularity. Whether such experts have our best interests at stake is often unknown, yet we are suspicious that it may be the case that expertise is dis-interested in the client's individual welfare. Rather than asking for, and/or receiving "good reasons" for expert authority decisions, we are likely to simply defer to the authority of the expert. Thomas L. Haskell (1984) writes: "...in ordinary parlance one of the best reasons we can offer for choosing a course of action is that it comports with the advice of a
recognized expert." (Haskell, 1884, p. x) We rely upon experts because we lack the fundamental knowledge that is required. Moreover, it is assumed that in many instances we would be foolish not to follow the advice of the expert (e.g. in the case of a physician diagnosing cancer or legally consulting the construction engineer for girder stress limits, etc.).

We assume 1) that there must be good reasons behind the decision of the expert authority; and 2) that the area of expertise is not that of ordinary experience. We see educational administration becoming a domain of knowledge that is no longer ordinary. In the past, it was believed that school-keeping was common-sense (more like house-keeping than engineering). Today, we find the knowledge level and complexity requires special skills and knowledge. Hence, it is often believed that such difficulty requires expert knowledge. The vocabulary and theory have become increasingly remote from the ordinary language experience of the school teacher. This trend in not unique, having invaded the business community as well. Because our lives are constantly confronted by experts, it may be argued that expert authority and the status and deference associated with such authority have become the defining characteristics of modern life. (Haskell, 1984, p. xii)

In recent years we have become somewhat disenchanted with aspects of expert authority. Malpractice suits in medicine and law mounted at alarming rates. A decided trend of late has been toward a less antagonistic approach toward experts and the social class they inhabit, but there is a continuing raw suspicion that something may be wrong with the ultimate faith and trust we have lodged in expert authority. Coupled with this distrust is that of the relationship that has emerged between expert authority and power. Critics of expert authority point out that the special privilege that experts have relative to knowledge provides a real opportunity to turn it against individuals and groups. Since expert authority has an interest in preserving its control, it is not entirely unlikely that this authority could be used to subvert the interests of those it purportedly serves. The possibility that such power could be misused is evident.

The general issue of expert authority throws light on the sources of that authority. The role of education (i.e. colleges and
universities) in credentialing experts is open to criticism. There is a sense in which the gate-keeping function of the university and college, professional school, etc. is a kind of power or control that requires scrutiny. The curriculum expert, increasingly is a graduate (degree) person from an "accredited" program in an institution of higher learning. The educational institution or credentialing agency, determines who and how many experts are produced. Magali Larson (1984) points out that the function of the educational institution is to socialize us into accepting deference toward the experts it produces. The educational institution recruits and trains these experts, and in the process undermines efforts to challenge the elite nature of the enterprise. (Larson, 1984, p. 28-80) Larson writes: "Expertise, it can be argued, increasingly provides a base for attaining and exercising power by the people who can claim special knowledge in matters that their society considers important." (p. 28) Whether this group of professional experts constitutes a "class" and whether it will provoke an ideological war between elites in the community is open to question, however in education there seems currently to be no evidence of such a dispute emerging: school boards, for example, seem content with educational administrative expertise as it stands.

In the light of this discussion, we see that Wilson & Cowell, and Barrow give witness to the replacement of the ideology of participatory democracy in education as a norm, with the ideology of expert authority and professionalization. Rather than resting on reason, the doctrine of expert authority is based upon the private monopoly of expert knowledge, originating in universities and colleges and sanctioned by credentialing bodies. There is a group of educated experts, exercising intelligence and drawing upon a knowledge base unavailable to the average person. A new professionalism yields an intellectual strata of society, and supports the meritocratic assumptions of this model, further advancing its power to affect decision-making and policy in education.

What is questionable is whether educational administration constitutes this unique knowledge domain and the fact that the public cannot gain access to it --- or barring this, cannot decide educational policy questions without it. Whether or not expert authorities, too, have some responsibility for making public the processes used in arriving at
policy is legitimate to ask. What are the limits of power expert
authority may exercise? There is a very real danger that a monopoly
over knowledge domains may lead to excesses of political power over
social groups (teachers, students, parents, etc.). For example, there
has been an erosion of interest in civil rights and education, and a
heightened concern for taxonomizing and organizing "disadvantaged"
pupils. As a result, the real problem is seen as diagnostic in nature.
By building on the medical model of expertise as opposed to the politi-
cal-legal model, the chances of public scrutiny and check is minimized.
The desegregation of schools has taken a back seat to the identification
of "gifted and talented" youth.

Conclusions

From the foregoing it is evident that administrative leadership
changes its meanings in terms of the type of political culture (in this
case democratic) it operates in, and the kind of notion it has of
expertise (narrowly intellectual vs. philosophic-minded). I have argued
that there are certain dangers in assuming that democracy is mere
ideology and that any ideological context is as good as any other, so
long as the task of administering is done well. Moreover, I have
cautionsed that expert authority is not free from crucial moral-ethical
difficulties, and that philosophic-mindedness may be better seen as a
set of skills of thought than a body of administrative theory/knowledge.
On the other hand, it seems that certain conceptions of democracy go
well with what one means by philosophically competent. What is surpris-
ing is the readiness of some philosophers of education to hamstring
philosophic mind in exchange for efficiency of administrative action.
While the problems of educational leadership are enormous, I wish to
argue that we are not better off by trying to make philosophy into a
positivist science. What seems to emerge from this analysis is that
educational administration should be more philosophic first, and that
such competence may count toward what we mean by leadership. There is,
in addition, a need for being democratic, if by this we mean that the
avenues of communication and dialogue be kept open and free.
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