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*Brown v Board of Education

Although many school districts and classrooms have desegregated since the 1954 Brown decision, desegregation is neither complete nor uniform. Moreover, racial isolation is growing in some regions and cities, and new forms of separation are arising within desegregated schools. New desegregation strategies and policies are needed, but these will be constrained by current demographic trends (such as the general move away from Northeastern cities to the suburbs and to the South) and economic phenomena, such as the growing poverty of cities. Similarly, citizens' changing political preferences are cause for pessimism, especially the decline in fervor for civil rights initiatives. Even among blacks, doubts are increasing that mandatory desegregation is either possible or advisable. Yet civil rights proponents should not despair: surveys reveal that Americans strongly and increasingly endorse racial integration and deplore segregation and racism. Policy makers must attempt to resolve debate over interpretation of the Brown decision. Of the three main interpretations—a "color-blind constitution"; "desegregation first"; and "educational quality"—the first must be ruled out as politically, morally, and constitutionally flawed. The other two are also unsatisfactory, but this does not mean that desegregation is doomed. If they are linked together, both quality education and desegregation can be achieved. Successful desegregation means avoiding resegregation, magnetizing all schools, fostering constructive interracial activities, and above all, desegregating on a metropolitan-wide basis. (KH)
Thirty Years after Brown

Jennifer L. Hochschild
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# TABLES

1. Racial composition of schools, by percentage minority enrollment and region, 1968-1980  
2. Reactions of parents whose children have been bused for racial reasons, 1978-1983
Far from settling the issue of school desegregation, the Supreme Court's decision on Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka in 1954 opened a new battleground: how were segregation—and the effects of segregation—to be remedied? The following year, in a second Brown decision, the Court gave its first response to that question, and it has been explaining, refining, and extending that response ever since.

Thirty Years after Brown commemorates those decisions, at a time when it is imperative that we take stock of both the aspirations expressed in Brown I and the strategies initiated in Brown II. As in so many areas of American life, the social and legal issues are more complex than they were three decades ago. The policy choices need to be sorted out in relation to the original principles on which the Supreme Court declared segregation unconstitutional.

Jennifer Hochschild, the author of this study, notes that in the petitioners' brief before the Court, and in the Court's decision, school desegregation and the quality of educational opportunity for blacks were intimately linked. But in the struggle to desegregate, those twin goals often have not been addressed with equal vigor. Thus, as this study shows, school systems have been desegregated only to leave many black students segregated within individual schools or to impose upon blacks a disproportionate share of the burdens of reform. On the other hand, the words "quality education" have often served as code words for avoiding integration. Especially as the country grapples with the worst remaining cases of school segregation—those of large urban centers that are themselves becoming more and more racially and economically isolated—the relationship between desegregation and educational quality is increasingly difficult to define.

On the strategy side, legal arguments that proved useful in fighting de jure segregation are less effective in addressing de facto segregation. In some places, demographic conditions may
make desegregation impracticable. In jurisdictions where desegregation plans were instituted under court order after Brown, the courts are now deciding whether the plans have been successful (whether the school systems are now "unitary" rather than "dual") and whether judicial oversight can be terminated. All these circumstances require a clear and current understanding of the meaning of school desegregation.

We hope this volume will open up a new dialogue on this subject. The principles embodied in the Brown decisions grew out of the combined thinking of lawyers, civil rights activists, sociologists, historians, psychologists, political leaders, and many others. Again, as Dr. Hochschild points out, all these perspectives are needed to understand the "history and future" of school desegregation. Dr. Hochschild gives us a lucid overview of the kinds of arguments that have emerged to date and a solid basis for exploring the strategies available for the future.

Eddie N. Williams
January 1985
Washington, D.C.
I. INTRODUCTION

School desegregation as a constitutional mandate is 30 years old. Students in the 1960s warned us not to trust anyone over 30; one may reject that view but still heed the warning that complacency and rigidity increase with age. So it is worth examining the history of school desegregation to see whether we are becoming, without warrant, complacent or rigid in desegregation's early middle age. Even more important is Martin Luther King's question, "Where do we go from here?"—which can be answered only after we understand where we are now.

A broad overview of the history and future of school desegregation requires a range of analytic lenses. Desegregation is at once a matter of constitutional law, federal and local politics, individual psychology, demography, teaching techniques, and liberal democratic ideals. Looking at desegregation through only some of these lenses gives a partial and distorted view. Thus the analysis must range from the legal meaning of Brown to patterns of black-suburbanization. One of my tasks, in fact, is to show how different lenses yield different, and even contradictory, images of school desegregation. If we can understand those partial views and contradictions, we will go a long way toward understanding why desegregation is both so important and so difficult to achieve.

One note on terminology: the question inevitably arises about who is considered a minority, and who is to be integrated with whom. Blacks and Anglos are on every desegregation list, of course, but what about Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans, and so on? In cities such as Los Angeles and San Francisco, ethnic groups (e.g., Hispanics and Asians) are an integral part of the desegregation plan. In some places, they are treated as whites to be integrated with blacks; in others, as minorities to be integrated with Anglos; and in still others, as one leg of a tri- or quadri-ethnic stool. Furthermore, nonblack minorities in some ways resemble blacks but in other ways present special problems
and have distinct desires and needs. In this study, my resolution of this complexity is largely to ignore nonblack minority groups. After all, Brown v. Board of Education originally dealt only with whites and blacks, and the problems between these two races have arguably produced the most serious cleavage in American history, completely eclipsing the problem of integrating successive waves of non-Anglo immigrants. Therefore, unless explicitly stated otherwise, in this study, I am discussing only whites and blacks.
2. THE CURRENT STATUS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

The first step in analyzing the history and future of Brown v. Board of Education is to understand the present. Just where are we with regard to school desegregation, and why?

Regional and District-Level Trends

A lot, but not enough, has changed since 1954 (Table 1). Across the United States, the proportion of blacks in predominantly (more than 50 percent) minority schools dropped from 77 percent in 1968 to 63 percent in 1980. The proportion of blacks in racially isolated schools (90-100 percent minority) declined even more, from two-thirds in 1968 to one-third in 1980.

These summary statistics, however, hide variations in the pace and location of change. Most of the decline in racial isolation occurred between 1968 and 1972; we have seen no lessening of segregation since 1976. The South and the border states witnessed the greatest reduction; racial isolation has increased considerably in the Northeast and is accelerating. As a consequence, almost one-half of northern black students now attend all-minority schools, compared to only one-quarter of southern black students.

We find variation at district as well as regional levels. Some districts have dramatically reduced racial isolation. St. Petersburg (Florida), Winston-Salem (North Carolina), and Oklahoma City (Oklahoma) have all increased the number of white students in the typical black student's school by over 40 percent since 1968. In other districts, racial isolation is growing. In Sacramento (California), Paterson (New Jersey), and New Haven (Connecticut), the number of whites in the typical black student's school has declined by 14 percent or more.
Table 1. Racial composition of schools, by percentage minority enrollment and region, 1968-1980.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage of black students in schools with 50 percent or more minority students</th>
<th>Percentage point change, 1968 to 1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. average</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border states</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage of black students in schools with 90-100 percent minority students</th>
<th>Percentage point change, 1968 to 1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. average</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border states</td>
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<td>42.7</td>
<td>46.9</td>
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<td>58.0</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Resegregation within Desegregated Schools

Even these district-level data do not present the full picture. On average, 5 percent more classrooms than schools have more than half minority students; 3 percent more classrooms than schools have over 90 percent minority students. Resegregation or second-generation discrimination within desegregated schools is considerable, and it takes several forms.

One form of second-generation discrimination is the disproportional placement of black students in classes for the educable mentally retarded (EMR). Such classes are intended to aid, not harm, slow students, and EMR placement need not imply discriminatory treatment. Nevertheless, placing a much greater share of black than white students in EMR classes at best separates the races and associates "blackness" with "slowness" in the minds of many. At worst, such placements reflect unconscious or deliberate prejudice, and they can be academically and emotionally devastating for students wrongly placed. (Even if we assume that disproportionally black EMR placements result from need rather than from discrimination, the benefits of "pull-out" classes are sufficiently dubious that placement in them may slow students' progress rather than speed it.) In the South, blacks were overrepresented in EMR classes by a factor of 330 percent in 1968; overrepresentation increased to 540 percent by 1974.

Classrooms also become racially isolated through ability grouping or tracking. Among students with the same socio-economic status, blacks and especially Hispanics are more likely than whites to be placed in compensatory education classes. Blacks and Hispanics are less likely than whites of similar backgrounds to be in programs for the gifted and talented or in college preparatory programs. About half of all black students are in low-achievement reading groups, compared to one-fifth of whites; over one-quarter of whites but fewer than one-tenth of blacks are in high-achievement reading groups. As with EMR placements, ability grouping may not result from deliberate segregation, but it has deleterious results. In psychological terms, racial tracking isolates students, associates skin color with skill, and leads parents, teachers, and students alike to expect little and demand less from blacks. In academic terms, on average, students in upper tracks gain slightly from tracking, but students in low tracks are more likely to lose than gain.

Post-desegregation separation also occurs through disproportionate suspension, punishment, and expulsion of black students. In 1973, between 35 percent and 85 percent of southern school districts (depending on the state) punished blacks more than twice as often as whites. On average, blacks are suspended at a younger age, for a longer time, and more often than
whites.10 Punishment rates vary; in a few districts, minorities are expelled 5 to 10 times more often than whites.

It may be that "black students are disproportionately disciplined because they are disproportionately disruptive."12 But regardless of the reason, with punishment, as with tracking and EMR treatment, differential treatment separates blacks from whites in ways that harm race relations and blacks' ability to benefit from desegregated schooling. Furthermore, the fact that the black punishment rate is greatest in districts with the most equal proportions of blacks and whites13 raises the possibility (although it does not prove) that punishment depends more on authorities' choice than on students' behavior.

In brief, then, many school districts and classrooms have desegregated, but desegregation is neither complete nor uniform. More seriously, racial isolation is growing in some regions and cities, and new forms of separation are springing up in place of the old.
3. DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS

We now have a picture, or at least a broad outline, of where we have been and are now. The next question is where do we go from here? The political choices to be made will be governed by the demographic and economic trends that are the subject of this chapter.

Demographic Constraints

The story on demographics is simple and stark: if we do not desegregate schools in the largest cities and their suburbs, we will have no further desegregation. Most racially isolated black students now live in large northern central cities surrounded by white suburbs. Over one-third of the nation's blacks live in seven major urban centers, none of which is involved in a metropolitan area-wide desegregation plan, and only two of which have any mandatory desegregation plan at all. The same point can be put another way: the nation's five largest cities (New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Houston) have no mandatory student assignment plan. More than 70 percent of the black students in half of the nation's 20 largest districts are in majority black schools.14 Taken together, these facts imply that desegregation efforts in the 1980s must focus on a few large cities if they are to have a significant impact.

Furthermore, demographic trends are making desegregation more and more difficult. Nineteen of the 20 largest districts lost from 2 to 30 percent of their white enrollment between 1968 and 1980.15 Only 1 of the 10 largest cities has more than one-third white enrollment in its public schools. Despite some blacks' migration away from metropolitan areas, the proportion of blacks living in central cities is rising—from 41 percent in 1950 to 38 percent in 1980.16
Some population movements could make desegregation
easier, depending on how school districts respond to them. For
example, as blacks and (especially) whites leave cities and move
to the South, old northern cities are losing population and
therefore school-aged children. Thus the traditional problem of
overcrowded schools is being replaced with the new problem of
underused schools and school closings. Such changes could benefit
desegregation efforts if school officials use the superfluous
facilities for programs that would stimulate integration. Such
potential, however, is generally outweighed by the fact that with
fewer city voters with school-aged children, there is less support
for school taxes and less political pressure for good schools.

Black movement to the suburbs has had similarly ambiguous
effects on desegregation. Almost one-fourth of blacks now live in
suburbs; blacks make up 6 percent of the suburban population; and
black suburbanization is accelerating. Some of the black movers
are upwardly mobile middle-class families who have entered
predominantly white neighborhoods, thus reducing racial isolation
of blacks and whites alike. But many—perhaps most—are only
marginally better off than the blacks they have left behind, and
they have moved into neighborhoods that simply extend the
ghetto across city boundaries.\textsuperscript{17} Black suburbanization, then,
does not necessarily break down old racial or class barriers. And
wherever black families are moving, black suburbanization can do
nothing to reduce racial isolation among the majority of still-
poorer blacks left in the city.

These demographics—cities with more and more predomi-
nantly black populations and resistant white suburbs—make the
legal constraints of the 1974 Supreme Court decision in \textit{Milliken
v. Bradley} (\textit{Milliken II})\textsuperscript{18} profoundly important. In that case, the
Court ruled that suburban districts cannot be required to
participate in a desegregation plan with a nearby city unless the
districts or the state are found guilty of participating in deliber-
ate or foreseeable segregation of city and suburban schools.
Given the enormous difficulty and expense of proving such \textit{de jure}
segregation, and given where people are living and moving, it will
be extremely hard to desegregate in the 1980s.

\section*{Economic Constraints}

Economic phenomena reinforce (and partly create) the
demographic problems just described. Old northern central cities
are poor as well as black, and well-off white (and black) subur-
banites are not rushing to provide financial and personal resources
to city schools. Poverty reinforces racial isolation; relatively
wealthy suburbanites are understandably reluctant to send their
children to schools that are poor, run-down, and demoralized. We must beware here of simple and incorrect assumptions: many financially poor schools are educationally rich, and wealthy schools certainly be academically impoverished. But, other things being equal, wealthier districts have better schools, at least in parents' eyes, and central cities are not among the wealthier districts. Poor cities also imply poor students, of course, with all the cultural, psychological, and behavioral differences from middle-class students that economic status creates regardless of race.

With economics as with demographics, the trends are working against school desegregation. The median income of black families living in central cities declined (in constant dollars) from 1969 to 1979, and the poverty rate for urban blacks increased during the same period. Industry is leaving the cities as fast as the middle class, taking with it jobs and tax money. Urban residents are increasingly dependent on public aid, and the cities are generating fewer tax dollars with which to pay it. Thus many cities are becoming more and more economically depressed. Any desegregation plan in the 1980s must take into account the likelihood that central-city schools will have fewer resources, poorer (because low-paid) teachers, less successful students, and fewer opportunities for those students than schools in the surrounding suburbs.
Citizens' political preferences are also cause for pessimism about the future of school desegregation. The 1980s seem an inauspicious time for any civil rights initiatives for several reasons. First, the civil rights fervor of the early 1960s is gone and will not return soon. We must not romanticize that era too much; it saw resistance to the point of murder as well as indifference and cynical manipulation. Nevertheless, in the early 1960s, the United States experienced a stronger national consensus on the moral imperative of ending racism and its consequences than it had for a century.

By the 1970s, however, citizens and their political representatives began to associate school desegregation with "forced busing," "crime in the schools," and "judicial arrogance." Opposition to mandatory desegregation is now vociferous, widespread, and rising. At least 80 percent of white adults in all national surveys oppose mandatory transportation of students for desegregation, and up to two-thirds of blacks do also.\textsuperscript{20} Whites oppose, almost as much, any change beyond token desegregation in housing and jobs—changes that might make mandatory busing unnecessary.

Furthermore, the "easy" cases are over. School desegregation in the rural South and small cities across the country was far from simple, but desegregating the districts that remain racially isolated may be even harder. Data convincingly show that small or rural school systems, districts with few minority students, districts in states with clear findings of \textit{de jure} segregation, relatively well-off districts, and countywide school systems generate less resistance and white flight than systems with the opposite characteristics.\textsuperscript{21} And as we saw in the last chapter, the districts left to desegregate have none of those features. The New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles school systems are enormous and urban, with a very high proportion of minority students, firm boundaries between city and suburbs, no clear
history of de jure segregation, great poverty and correspondingly poor schools, and politically powerful white environs. Thus the districts with the largest number of racially isolated students in 1984 are those in which white opposition to mandatory desegregation will be greatest.

A factor complicating further school desegregation is Hispanic interests. The Hispanic population—and its corresponding political strength—is growing astonishingly fast in some areas. In Los Angeles, for example, Hispanic enrollment in public schools has risen from 20 percent of the total enrollment in 1968 to 49 percent in 1982. And Los Angeles is by no means unique; in 5 of the 50 largest central-city districts, Hispanic students had become the largest single minority group by 1980. The interests of Hispanics often differ from those of both blacks and whites. On the one hand, many Hispanics do not want desegregation, which they perceive to be disruptive of Hispanic communities and bilingual education programs. On the other hand, Hispanics do not want, any more than blacks do, to be excluded from the resources and opportunities of white society. Sometimes, whites seek to play blacks and Hispanics off against one another; sometimes, blacks and Hispanics feel more threatened by each other than by whites. As a consequence, relations among black, Hispanic, and white opinion on this issue are often confused and nonproductive.

Even among blacks, doubts are increasing that mandatory desegregation is either possible or the best available alternative for their children. Black support for desegregation in general declined in the past two decades—from 78 percent in 1964 to 55 percent in 1978. The number of blacks who wish the federal government to ensure school desegregation decreased from 75 percent in 1964 to 60 percent in 1978. In 4 of 38 large cities in one study, black protests increased (and white protests declined) after desegregation plans were implemented. Former civil rights lawyer Derrick Bell and Howard University's Journal of Negro Education now publish articles claiming that busing may be detrimental to black children's interests, and that physical desegregation is neither necessary nor sufficient for true racial integration. Black journalists ask "Why is busing the only route?" and decry "government by snobs." A black school board member tells the Wall Street Journal that racial isolation in Washington, D.C., neither surprises nor distresses him: "Our responsibility is to provide the best education we can for the students we have." Many blacks argue that school desegregation has meant blacks have borne the burdens of busing disproportionately; black children have been subjected to prejudice in hostile environments outside their own neighborhoods; second-generation discrimina-
tion has developed; black political power has been diffused or blocked; and that black culture and communities have been destroyed. They note the patterns of tracking, EMR placement, and of suspension and expulsion described earlier and that thousands of black teachers and principals were fired, demoted, and not hired when the South desegregated.29 They point to studies showing that "school desegregation, if it has any effect, lowers rather than raises the self-esteem of black children."30 Black students in Detroit and Florida have been bused from local black schools to distant, slightly less black schools; black schools in Milwaukee were shut while white schools were turned into high-quality magnets. Black schools have been fumigated or refurbished when whites were assigned to them; whites seem to be pampered and solicited far more than blacks to keep them from fleeing desegregated public schools.

Desegregation Techniques and Public Opinion

Rising black opposition to mandatory busing points to a critical problem of school desegregation: the desegregation techniques most acceptable to whites are often those most harmful or least attractive to inner-city blacks. For example, white flight is minimized when blacks bear the burden of desegregating—that is, when (1) blacks are bused to white schools rather than the reverse; (2) the proportion of blacks in each school is kept below roughly one-third; (3) the white power structure of the schools and of the school system is retained; and (4) mandated reductions in racial isolation are relatively slight.31 Similarly, whites are most willing to accept desegregation when it is tied to educational programs that especially benefit middle-class, comparatively successful students. Whites usually endorse tracking, which, as we saw earlier, sometimes benefits students in upper tracks but harms those in lower tracks. Whites also strongly endorse magnet schools, especially when they have programs for the gifted and talented, for math and science students, or for other academically successful children.32 These special schools benefit the few students who qualify for them but do little to help the many who do not and often drain away from the other schools both resources and the most talented and motivated teachers, principals, and students.33 Finally, parents of both races (but especially whites) resist most strongly many desegregation techniques that have proven most successful in improving student achievement and race relations. Virtually all studies find that the younger students are when desegregated, the more successful the desegregation process is—on all measures of desegregation success.34 The more
grades are desegregated, the greater the stability of the school system and the commitment of students and teachers to making it work. The faster a plan is implemented once it is announced, the less white flight and organized resistance it encounters and the more it reduces racial isolation. Court-ordered plans are often more efficient, equitable, and stable than school board-ordered plans. Metropolitan area-wide plans reduce racial isolation and white flight, improve minorities’ academic achievement, speed up housing desegregation, increase educational options for all students, and enhance stability. Those techniques that meet the most resistance in the short run often have the best results in the long run.

How schools are desegregated, then, makes as much difference as whether they are. In our evaluation of desegregation in the 1980s, we cannot afford to ignore the specifics of desegregation plans and the great political obstacles to implementing plans that will be most beneficial.

All these factors together subject school desegregation to what Anthony Downs calls the “issue attention cycle.” Americans typically notice (or define) a problem, devote a great deal of time, energy, and resources to solving it, discover after a while that it has not been resolved, realize that its resolution is much more complex or entails much more change than they had bargained for, become discouraged, and move on to a new problem. This normal decay of attention is particularly likely to occur when most of the population does not suffer from the problem’s persistence; when the suffering that does occur is generated by social arrangements that benefit the majority; when the changes crucial to its resolution are tedious, complicated, expensive, and repetitious; when the issue is politically divisive; when there is no clear scapegoat; and when public opinion is not unanimous about the justice of the case.

Conversely, attention might be maintained, and the problem might even move toward resolution if a new solution suddenly presents itself; if the problem can be reformulated or associated with a problem on the up-swing side of the cycle; if it develops a powerful constituency, entrenched federal bureaucracy, or a dedicated political hero; or if the costs of its solution can be hidden in higher prices rather than exposed through higher taxes. School desegregation in the 1980s has all of the features that speed the decay of attention but lacks most of the qualities that would delay such a decay. Thus it is likely to be crowded off the policy agenda of even sympathetic public officials, simply because they can only address a few burning issues at a time, and this one has few visible pay-offs for the majority and many visible costs.
Positive Attitudes

But civil rights proponents should not despair. Despite the inauspicious conditions detailed in the last few pages, public attitudes toward school desegregation are not entirely negative. For one thing, Americans strongly and increasingly endorse racial integration and deplore segregation and racism. Given a choice among "desegregation, strict segregation, and something in between," the proportion of the population choosing "strict segregation" declined from 23 percent in 1964 to 5 percent in 1978.38 The proportion of southern white parents who object to sending their child to a half-black school declined from 83 percent in 1959 to 27 percent in 1981, and the proportion of objectors in the rest of the country declined from one-third to one-fifth in the same period.39 Explicit verbal racism is no longer acceptable to most Americans; desegregation is.

Not only do more Americans endorse desegregation, an increasing number experience and expect it. Whites report more black friends, co-workers, and even employers than 20 years ago, and the overwhelming majority describe integrated work relations as "pleasant and easy." In 1978, over half of all whites expected most children to be attending desegregated schools within five years, and another quarter expected at least some children to be in such schools.40

Most astonishing, whites who have experienced school desegregation—even with forced busing—no longer object to it. The vast majority of both white and black parents of bused children find busing partly or entirely satisfactory (Table 2). White parents continue to oppose it in theory (79 percent objected to the idea of busing in a 1981 survey) but are content to live with it in practice. When asked why they found busing satisfactory, parents of both races most frequently reported "no problems, no complaints from children" (39 percent of whites; 28 percent of blacks) and claimed that "children learn to live with each other" (16 percent of whites and blacks). The most common objections were distance (12 percent of whites, 8 percent of blacks) and trouble or fighting (about 8 percent of both races).

National polls of students find even more support for mandatory desegregation. A majority see it as improving race relations and black achievement, and over 50 percent of 1983 college freshmen endorsed busing for desegregation.41 For parents and students alike, the reality of a desegregated school is much more satisfactory than its anticipation and sometimes even preferable to the previous segregated school.

Case studies of desegregated school districts also offer some encouragement. In one southern countywide suburban district, white parents whose children were directly involved in a
Table 2. Reactions of parents whose children have been bused for racial reasons, 1978-1983.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question: &quot;How did the busing of children in your family to go to school with children of other races work out?&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responses</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blacks:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Whites:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not satisfactory</td>
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</table>

*Respondents were first asked, "Have any of the children in your family been picked up by bus to go to a school with children of other races, or hasn't that happened?" In 1978, 35 percent of blacks and 10 percent of whites answered affirmatively. In 1981, 43 percent of blacks and 19 percent of whites with school children answered yes; in 1983, the figures are 36 percent of blacks and 23 percent of whites with children in school. The question about busing experience was asked only of these respondents.*

mandatory desegregation plan became consistently more supportive of the idea of desegregation, of mandated desegregation techniques, of the outcome of their new plan, and of their children's education than were parents of uninvolved white children. In New Castle County (Wilmington), Delaware, praise for the school system plummeted from 72 percent to 44 percent in 1978, the first year of desegregation, but rose to 62 percent by 1983. Parents who have children in the public schools are more supportive of the desegregated school system than adults who do not. Over two-thirds of public school parents are satisfied with their child's school atmosphere, discipline, and bus safety—up from one-half the first year of desegregation. Strong opposition to busing persists, with three-quarters of the citizenry continuing to oppose it. But "whether a child rode a bus to school was not related to parents' school district evaluation"; public school parents' ratings are predicted better by information about the schools than by attitudes toward busing. Finally, both whites and blacks in New Castle County are now much more likely than they were before desegregation to agree that blacks have equal educational opportunity.

In short, mandatory desegregation increases expectations of more desegregation, acceptance of it, and even support for it from those initially opposed. Opposition to mandatory busing seems often to be sui generis—to bear no relation to families' or districts' actual experience of busing or desegregation. Thus we have hints here of a positive cycle of reinforcement operating independently of views on "forced busing."

The political climate for more school desegregation, then, is chilly but not frozen. Citizens' general views of desegregation and some of their specific experiences are encouraging. But attitudes toward the policies needed to desegregate further, the nature of the remaining cases, and our present place in the issue attention cycle are discouraging. Proponents of desegregation have little cause for joy, but no cause for despair.
5. THE MANDATE OF BROWN: THREE INTERPRETATIONS

Few argue that policy decisions implementing a constitutional mandate should depend on public opinion, demographics, or economics. In principle, Americans must obey the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, regardless of how they feel about it or how it affects their lives. But many do argue that the precise meaning of the mandate of Brown and its requirements for implementation are not clear and are appropriate subjects for policy debate. What do Brown and succeeding desegregation decisions demand? How do they envision our racial future and propose to reach it? Lawyers and activists have debated that question ever since May 17, 1954, but have yet to reach a consensus.

The brief but eloquent paragraphs of Brown have lent themselves to several interpretations. Each has distinct philosophical and empirical assumptions, as well as powerful adherents. And each interpretation proposes different paths away from the general problem of illegal segregation and around the specific constraints just described.

A "Color-Blind" Constitution

The earliest and probably the most popular interpretation of Brown is that it demands a color-blind Constitution and treatment of citizens. The American political tradition of liberal rights requires that individuals be judged only according to their accomplishments and actions, not according to ascriptive criteria such as race or sex. Racial classifications are permissible only if related to a "pressing public necessity." Few legitimate governmental actions require racial classifications, so laws that distinguish by race are suspect, and "courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." Such laws will usually be deemed impermissible; certainly they are in public schools, according to Brown.
Nevertheless, the "color-blind Constitution" interpretation of Brown is a conservative doctrine—at least in comparison with its main alternatives—in that it endorses an end to state-sanctioned segregation but rejects most efforts to compensate for prior harm or for persisting effects of prior harm. Proponents argue that too often remedial action merely creates new racial classifications and thus new racial discrimination. They argue also that federal intervention penalizes individual whites for harms which they did not cause, thereby violating their rights, and that federal intervention gives courts and nonelected officials more power than a democracy warrants. Thus active remediation violates individual rights and political freedom on behalf of a practice that is, on the face of it, unconstitutional.

This interpretation of Brown dominated courts' reading of Brown's remedial mandate for the first decade and a half of school desegregation efforts. Courts were encouraged in this interpretation by some of the language in the implementation decree for Brown (Brown II, handed down in 1955), in which the Supreme Court called for ending segregation "with all deliberate speed... considering problems... arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis... and revision of local laws." Both supporters and opponents of mandatory desegregation agreed that this formula "delayed the process of outlawing segregation," although their opinions of that delay differed considerably.

Whether the courts' reasoning was based on constitutional theory or practical politics, the outcome was the same. Until 1968, federal district courts and the Supreme Court required no more than elimination of de jure segregation and freedom of choice in school attendance in southern school districts. In northern states with no history of de jure segregation, racially separated school districts are still not required to end racial isolation if courts find no history of deliberate racial classifications in school assignments. The same rule holds for second-generation racial isolation; where courts or the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) find no deliberate resegregation in tracking, hiring, and punishment procedures; practices that have the effect of separating black from white students are permitted to continue.

The "color-blind Constitution" interpretation of Brown is endorsed by the Reagan Justice Department, which argues that the federal government should rescind all governmentally sponsored or supported actions that make racial distinctions. In this view, courts should dismantle mandatory busing plans or at least not promulgate new ones; federal legislation should abjure
quota systems for students, faculty, or employees; and states should not be required to use federal monies to aid school systems in implementing mandatory desegregation plans. As the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights put it in 1984, "Such racial preferences (i.e., affirmative action quotas) merely constitute another form of unjustified discrimination, create a new class of victims, and, when used in public employment, offend the constitutional principle of equal protection of the law for all citizens."50

The second and third interpretations of Brown—and court decisions after 1968—agree that de jure segregation is unconstitutional and must be eliminated. They disagree, however, on remediation of prior wrong-doing. The first interpretation, as we saw, holds that any remedies beyond elimination of illegitimate laws are unconstitutional, since they set up new and equally illegitimate racial distinctions. The other two interpretations both argue that remediation is necessary, but disagree on its nature. One focuses on the abolition of segregation regardless of educational outcomes, the other on the abolition of unequal educational opportunity regardless of desegregation.

Desegregation First

The "desegregation first" argument is the most easily discerned in Brown. The phrases are famous and apparently self-evident: "Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, de jure, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does." And, "We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." A straightforward reading of these passages appears to leave no room for dispute: racial isolation must be eliminated in school districts found guilty of deliberate segregation, regardless of citizens' (whether black or white) preferences, educational outcomes, local conditions, or individual guilt and benefit. Thus Nathaniel Jones, former general counsel to the NAACP, has argued that "constitutional issues are, under our form of government, not resolved by public opinion polls or plebiscites," and Thomas Atkins, also former general counsel to the NAACP, responds to accusations that school desegregation cases divide the country by asserting, "You're damn right we're dividing the country. We're dividing it between right and wrong. . . . To weaken now would be morally wrong, tactically unwise, and . . . constitutionally impermissible."51 Both assert that Brown is not a case dealing with education, but rather a case dealing with race in which the setting happened to be schools.
This interpretation of Brown's meaning and requirements for remediation was most prominent during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Starting in 1966, the Office of Civil Rights (then part of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) began requiring southern school districts to take active steps to end racial isolation, not merely to cease legal segregation. Supreme Court rulings in Green v. New Kent County and especially Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg reinforced OCR's and civil rights activists' claim that the remedy must extend far enough to cure the violation and its lingering effects, even if the remedy of mandatory busing was "administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre." Federal district courts became involved in designing and overseeing complex plans to bring black and white students together in districts found guilty of deliberate segregation.

By the late 1970s, however, resistance to "racial balance plans" became loud and powerful, and the pace of desegregation slowed considerably. The reasons are many, including the economic and demographic constraints and the political preferences described earlier. Thus a third interpretation of the remedies required by Brown—the need for equal educational opportunity, regardless of racial isolation—began to gain prominence.

Educational Quality

The final interpretation of Brown is the hardest to characterize, in part because it has both supporters who are more conservative and supporters who are more radical than the "desegregation first" proponents just described. On the one hand are those who agree that remedies must extend beyond simple abolition of de jure segregation but who recoil from "forced busing," "racial balance," and the amount of government intervention those terms imply. On the other hand are those who are disillusioned by the difficulty of desegregating and the ambiguity of its results and who now conclude that desegregation per se is insufficient to abolish racism and its consequences. They are returning to what many now claim was the real goal of the plaintiffs in Brown—good schools, by whatever means necessary.

Thus U.S. District Court Judge Robert Carter, an attorney in Brown and former NAACP general counsel, argues that, in 1954, plaintiffs and Supreme Court alike agreed that "equal education and integrated education ... were synonymous," but that that view may have been mistaken. Desegregation does not in many cases eliminate racism, poor education, and white dominance, which are the real evils of segregated schooling.
Perhaps equal education, regardless of the racial composition of classrooms, will do a better job. Judge Carter is not sure, but he warns against "allowing ourselves to become the prisoners of dogma" and insisting on desegregation regardless of its consequences.

This interpretation of Brown is less evident in the language of the decision than is the "desegregation first" interpretation. Its proponents claim that it is implied by the arguments and intent of the plaintiffs during the 1954 trial, by the Supreme Court's use of social science evidence in footnote 11 of Brown, by the Court's statements that education "is the very foundation of good citizenship" and that the state must make educational opportunity "available to all on equal terms," and perhaps by the Court's recognition that "we must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life." This context and these statements taken together imply that the Court saw equal educational opportunity as an intrinsic part of "equal protection of the laws" and that it was willing to allow empirical evidence, not only constitutional doctrine, a role in determining just how education can foster racial equity. Therefore, concludes this argument, if the history of school desegregation shows that the goal of eradicating racism and its consequences is better met by improving the quality of blacks' education than by seeking to end racial isolation, then educational quality should be our primary focus.

Within this interpretation lie variations in emphasis. A fairly weak claim is that black schools should receive as many resources (such as buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible' factors) as white schools. A stronger claim is that racially isolated blacks should be given enough extra resources to ensure that they reach the same educational outcomes as whites, allowing for differences in individual ability. Still stronger is the claim for black control of black schools. In this view, educational equality is best achieved by giving blacks the right to make and carry out curricular, budgetary, personnel, and other decisions for students of their own race, just as whites have always done.

Since the late 1970s, some courts have adopted variants of the educational quality interpretation of Brown and its remedies. Courts sometimes permit schools to remain racially isolated even in districts found guilty of segregation so long as black schools receive extra funding and extensive remedial support. Such compensatory rulings generally occur only when the second interpretation of Brown ("desegregate first") is impossible to achieve because not enough whites remain in the school system to eliminate racial isolation. The first and epitomizing case here is Detroit. Once the Supreme Court struck down an interdistrict
remedy in Milliken I, the district court ordered in Milliken II, a variety of compensatory "educational components," funded in part by the state, to "remedy the impact of previous, unlawful educational isolation" for the still-isolated students of Detroit. Court orders in Boston and Los Angeles and a consent decree in Chicago have similarly mandated extra resources in place of student reassignments in some schools.54

We have, then, three significant interpretations of Brown, or at least of the remedies it requires. No responsible policy analyst or politician disagrees that Brown requires the elimination of state-imposed racial segregation in schools. Disputes arise over what else Brown requires—nothing, elimination of the racial isolation that results from state-imposed segregation, or elimination of the educational deficiencies that result from state-imposed segregation. How are we to choose among these interpretations? Each has powerful adherents who point to evidence that supports their interpretation and to fundamental American values that underlie it. But the interpretations lead to different, even contradictory, policy prescriptions.
6. EVALUATING THE INTERPRETATIONS

The "Color-Blind" Interpretation

In my view, the first of the three interpretations of Brown—eliminating state-imposed segregation with no further efforts to achieve integration—cannot be supported. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated, in decisions such as Green v. New Kent County, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Milliken II, and even (among civil rights optimists) Milliken I, that desegregative remedies must reach far enough not only to correct current constitutional violations but also to remedy remaining effects of previous violations. Even the cautious Burger Court has said equitable principles require that a remedy "directly address and relate to the condition offending the Constitution," and simply eliminating legal segregation does not remedy the condition of segregation and its direct consequences.

Merely eliminating state-imposed segregation and providing no further remedy is politically unwise as well as constitutionally dubious. Large cities with large numbers of poor and frustrated blacks cannot be ignored, as the 1980 riots of Liberty City, Miami, show us. Those few days were the first time in the long history of American racial violence that blacks deliberately sought out white victims, and neither race can afford to let many more such riots erupt. They will, however, unless black youths are given convincing demonstrations that they, too, are a part of and can benefit from America's vaunted structure of equal opportunity. One place to begin such a demonstration is in the schools.

Most important, however, are normative arguments against the "color-blind Constitution" interpretation of Brown. This interpretation assumes that simply eliminating state-imposed segregation will suffice in the long run to eradicate the consequences of racial discrimination. Such an outcome would be plausible only if blacks and whites were in roughly the same
circumstances, or if circumstances such as family wealth, education, and personal connections made no difference in a child's chances for success. That is, simply providing the legal framework for equal opportunity would be fair only if, once legal barriers to mobility were removed, both races could compete equally for success and power.

That is simply not the case. Obviously, some blacks are well-off, and some blacks are better able to take advantage of opportunities than some whites. But every measure we have of aggregate well-being—from income to education to health to crime statistics—shows that, on average, blacks occupy considerably worse positions in American society than whites. One can demonstrate statistically that merely eliminating de jure segregation without making any effort to overcome the effects of three centuries of discrimination is to condemn one race to lower status, on average, than the other. Add to those statistics the fact that prejudice persists—even blacks with the same background and qualifications as whites face an extra hurdle in what remains a white man's society—and the prospects of success for more than a few blacks look pretty dim. Such an outcome is unacceptable in a liberal democratic society that prides itself on individual equality and freedom.

Despite its political, constitutional, and moral flaws, however, the "color-blind Constitution" interpretation of Brown should give us pause. Using racial classifications, requiring sacrifices from whites who are not directly responsible for racial discrimination, and placing courts or federal bureaucrats in control of school systems are all normatively undesirable and constitutionally suspect. When and where blacks and whites are similarly situated, remedies beyond abolition of state-imposed segregation are unnecessary and wrong. But at least with regard to schooling in large cities, that circumstance is a long way away.

The Desegregation-First Interpretation

The most difficult issue of school desegregation lies in choosing between "desegregation first" or "quality education first." We can begin to choose, however, by realizing that eliminating racial isolation merely by reassigning students without changing what goes on in the schools does little to remedy the effects of past discrimination and may actually harm the students it is intended to help. We have seen one reason already; absent great care, a desegregated school simply resegregates within the school building.

This means that blacks and whites remain as distant from one another as they began, but with new costs. First, the
community has probably gone through considerable expense, anguish, and anger to desegregate its schools and has no increase in racial interaction to show for its efforts. Second, stereotypes are reinforced in a resegregated school—white stereotypes of blacks' inability or unwillingness to learn and black stereotypes of white prejudice, selfishness, and intransigence. Third, black self-esteem may suffer in poorly managed desegregation plans. This outcome is especially ironic, given Brown's warning about segregation's harm to the "hearts and minds" of black children. But being placed in lower tracks, special education classes, or regular classes without provision for anxiety and differences in background often diminishes black children's self-confidence and eagerness to achieve. Too many teachers assume that newly desegregated blacks are ill-prepared or "slower" than whites; low expectations are reinforced in a tracked school or classroom geared to traditional middle-class teaching methods; continued low expectations further diminish blacks' likelihood of success; and the vicious cycle continues. Fourth, the few political leaders who risk public endorsement of desegregation are not vindicated if the schools merely resegregate, so they and other leaders learn that such endorsements have high costs and few rewards.

Regardless of what happens after the students enter the school building, common patterns of student reassignment themselves harm blacks. As we saw earlier, whites are much less resistant to desegregation when a relatively small number of blacks are bused into white schools, rather than whites being bused into black schools. Courts and policy makers, anxious to avoid white protest and flight, often accede to this preference, particularly since white schools tend to have better resources and facilities. Such a busing pattern is especially likely to occur where, as in many large city districts, declining populations and budgets mandate closing some schools. School administrators are naturally inclined to close the smallest, oldest, most run-down, least politically powerful schools—which are often in black neighborhoods. This pattern, however, entails severe costs for blacks: communities find their children dispersed, their teachers and administrators scattered, their channels for student and staff leadership curtailed, and their culture and history ignored.

Typically, only when white children are to be brought into predominantly black inner-city schools have school districts, cities, states, and the federal government devoted great resources to making desegregation work. But here, too, more blacks may be harmed than helped. Magnet schools and special programs aid their recipients but do nothing for the majority of students left out; they sometimes "serve as an escape route for whites assigned to predominantly black schools"; and "the magnet..."
concept itself sets[ ] up a new type of dual structure with unequal educational opportunities."59 Most magnet schools select only the best or most motivated students, receive extra funding and resources, acquire the most competent principals who handpick the best teachers, and are permitted to avoid standard bureaucratic procedures. All of these features help magnet schools improve the quality of education and race relations within the school, but they drain resources, skills, and commitment from the 60 to 95 percent of the students left out.60 After all, what principal, teacher, or student would be pleased to remain in the nonmagnetized, mediocre school left behind?

The "desegregation first" interpretation of Brown, in its pure form of "desegregate, regardless of educational and psychological consequences" is, then, almost as problematic as the "color-blind Constitution" interpretation. Constitutionally, it is implausible that the Warren Court intended the remedy of Brown to worsen black self-esteem or educational outcomes; if a desegregation plan has those effects, surely there is something wrong. Politically and morally, it is even clearer that a "remedy" that causes great anguish to whites, does little to help blacks, and in some ways harms both is hardly remedial. In sum, if a desegregation plan is limited to ending racial isolation (as much as possible in the given district) across schools, it is insufficient at best and harmful at worst.

The Educational Quality Interpretation

What about the third interpretation of the remedies called for by Brown: improving the educational resources or achievements of black students in the absence of white classmates? There are two reasons for endorsing high-quality, racially isolated schools. First, the very existence of powerful and widespread black support for them is a strong argument in their favor. The opinions of those whom state actions have harmed ought surely to count in deciding what state restitution should be. Attitudes are not definitive; civil rights and constitutional mandates do not depend on public opinion, no matter whose. But attitudes should count as tie-breakers. If we have several options for fulfilling the constitutional mandate of equal educational opportunity, perhaps the beneficiaries of that mandate ought to be able to choose among them. In addition, strong minority support for separate but equal schools takes some of the sting out of that phrase by making opposition to desegregation no longer automatically synonymous with racism or capitulation to it. After all, blacks who call for high-quality, black-run public schools are asking for no more than whites have had for more than a century.
Second, some of desegregation's substantive problems can be alleviated in black-run schools with sufficient resources. Black teachers and staff are not demoted or shunted aside because of race. Black students are not presumed slower or less motivated than their classmates. Black culture and perspectives are more likely to be taken seriously and incorporated into the curriculum. Disciplinary action does not vary (and is not perceived to vary) by race. Cheerleaders, class presidents, and other student leaders are black. Ability groups are not associated with skin color. Parents do not feel such a high barrier between themselves and their children's teachers. Blacks are relieved of the disproportionate burdens of busing and can retain neighborhood schools, which they prefer as strongly as whites. The inevitable conflicts among students and between students and teachers will not be blamed on racism. Obviously, black-run schools can be as dismal educationally and socially as white or desegregated schools, and obviously black teachers and students can treat each other as badly as whites can. Nevertheless, the invidious comparisons and conflicts endemic to many desegregated schools do not exist in a school of black students and staff.

All-black schools present problems, however, even if they are one-race by choice of blacks. Two are especially serious. First, isolated blacks may not learn to defend against or overcome white racism and may not be prepared to live in a society in which they remain the minority. School will not help them to overcome their fears and stereotypes of whites or to cope with white fears and stereotypes of them. (The converse, of course, is equally true for whites deprived of black classmates.) Students in all-black schools will also lack the contacts and loose acquaintanceships that are apparently extremely important in attaining jobs and promotions. Blacks do not need to get jobs through whites, of course, but the simple arithmetic of the races suggests that the majority white world provides more opportunities than the black world does. Thus the social, psychological, and occupational limits of all-black schools will partly inhibit the goal of equal educational opportunity, no matter how good the academic training or how supportive the environment.

The other problem with remedying segregation by creating high-quality black schools is money—"green follows white." Since whites tend to control resources, black schools are in grave danger of being short-changed. History shows that whites invest resources in black schools only when blacks might otherwise try to leave or when whites must enter.

The relationships between resources and education quality and between resources and the racial composition of schools are not simple. Nevertheless, studies of some districts, such as Chicago and Hartford, Connecticut, show that black-dominated
schools have had smaller budgets, poorer facilities, less-qualified teachers, and other effects of few resources.\textsuperscript{63}

Money \textit{does} make a difference: improving the quality of secondary education through "increased expenditures per student has a large and statistically significant direct impact on the earnings of blacks." Specifically, a national study of high schools found that increasing expenditures by 1 percent increases blacks' later earnings by 0.53 percent, compared to an increase of 0.16 percent in later earnings for whites.\textsuperscript{64} The problem of school funding is especially acute in large, old, northern cities—where most racially isolated black students remain. These cities cannot increase school funding without harming other essential services, and they can expect, at the moment, few new resources from state or federal governments. In short, if black-controlled schools are impoverished, they cannot promote equal educational opportunity, so they cannot fulfill the mandate of the third interpretation of \textit{Brown}.

Neither problem is insuperable. Black children can learn outside the classroom to manage in a white world; they may perhaps be more successful coming from a supportive environment with fairly good schools than from a hostile environment in which they occupy the lowest rungs of excellent schools. Moreover, many educational improvements—most notably, the "effective schools movement" that is currently the favorite reform in urban schools—do not require much new money.\textsuperscript{65} In addition, funds and in-kind aid from new sources such as local businesses and colleges are available to imaginative school administrators.

Thus the pure form of the third interpretation of \textit{Brown}—quality education, regardless of racial isolation—is risky but not unacceptable. If demographics make it impossible materially to reduce racial isolation, or if—more controversially—desegregation will not move beyond merely reducing racial isolation at the school level, then "quality education" is a plausible alternative. But if policy-makers do nothing to reduce racial isolation and also do nothing to improve education in racially isolated schools, then the mandate of \textit{Brown} is violated. We have no assurance that choosing "quality education" over "desegregation first" will not recapitulate \textit{Plessy v. Ferguson} and demonstrate again that once separation is certain, any chance for equality approaches the vanishing point.
7. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION STRATEGIES FOR THE 1980s

At this point, we appear to face a choice between one almost unacceptable and one rather unsatisfactory alternative. Ruling out the "color-blind Constitution" interpretation, both the "quality education" path and the "desegregation first" path carry strong risks of harming blacks more than they help. Does this mean that school desegregation is doomed to failure?

No. What it means is that both quality education and desegregation can be achieved if they are linked together. The "color-blind Constitution" model provides the floor and ceiling for action—that is, at a minimum, we must ensure that state-sanctioned segregation is abolished, and at a maximum, we must avoid racial classifications and court-ordered remedies where blacks and whites are already truly on an equal footing. The other two models together provide the furniture for the room. We have compelling evidence that desegregation works if it is done well—if it is done in a way that both eliminates racial isolation and improves the quality of education for all students.

In these circumstances, those changes that most help blacks improve their education and enjoy better race relations are also the changes that most help whites do the same things. We do not face a choice between benefitting blacks or benefitting whites, nor must we accept harm to some as the cost of help to others. We face instead a choice of benefitting both races or neither. The history of school desegregation suggests ways to benefit everyone, if only we have the policy skill and political will to learn from the past.

How Can Desegregation Be Done Well?

In general, it is not hard to see how desegregation done well helps both races. Reforms that improve the quality of education for blacks, after all, are likely to improve the quality of educa-
tion for whites in the same building and classroom. Changes that improve race relations for blacks intrinsically improve race relations for whites.

It is true that both whites and blacks must pay costs—long bus rides, uncertainty and fear, the denial of special privileges and special consideration—to obtain the benefits of a well-run desegregated school system. In the best of all possible worlds, we would reap benefits without paying costs. But we do not live in such a world; we do, however, live in a world in which the benefits to both blacks and whites can outweigh the costs to the two groups.

"Desegregation done well" involves several changes. First, resegregation within the schools can be avoided by:

1. making most classes heterogeneous in race and ability, and training teachers to manage this new environment;
2. establishing interracial work groups within and across classrooms;
3. monitoring placement in special education classes and classes for the educable mentally retarded to ensure that the benefits of being "pulled out" of classrooms outweigh their costs for each participant;
4. developing clear, fair, and consistently enforced discipline codes that focus on real violations rather than stylistic differences among students;
5. enhancing counseling programs and designing in-school suspension programs for disruptive students;
6. expanding extracurricular activities and making sure that they are desegregated;
7. enhancing art and music classes and mingling students of different abilities in them; and
8. ensuring that faculty and staff are desegregated and that members of both races hold positions of power.

Such changes clearly work. To take just one example, 72 studies support, and only one rejects, the hypothesis that interracial work groups do more to improve race relations than do interpersonal competition or total individualism. Cooperation also increases academic achievement, the help that students give one another, cross-racial interactions outside the schoolroom, self-esteem, liking for teachers, and the ability to share the emotional perspective of others. Cooperation reduces stereotyping and school crime. What parent, white or black, would
not be delighted to see such changes in his or her child's schooling?

The advantages of magnet schools and programs can be retained and the disadvantages avoided by making changes beyond student reassignments in all schools. The high morale, extra resources, sense of mission, freedom from unnecessary restrictions, and desire to attract students that typify the best magnet school programs should be expanded to as many schools as possible. Obviously, every system has untalented and unmotivated teachers and administrators, and no system can spend as much as it would like to. But every district can give each school a distinctive mission, recruit or train teachers to make those programs work, seek outside resources (whether from state or federal agencies or the private sector), get parents and other citizens involved in classrooms and social activities, demonstrate to teachers the profound effects of high expectations and unremitting efforts to meet them, and otherwise substitute creativity and commitment for money and raw talent. I do not mean to be utopian here; none of this is easy or certain. I do mean to point out that the benefits of magnet schools must not be restricted to a few middle class whites and lucky blacks and that tight budgets and standard operating procedures are no excuse for not improving all schools.

In fact, desegregation can be the catalyst for educational changes that the schools have needed and sought for a long time. We should be wary of testimonials from school officials, but those that combine general enthusiasm with specific data are encouraging. One example is the testimony of an assistant superintendent in Hillsborough County, Florida, who partly associates rising achievement scores for both blacks and whites in his district with desegregation:

The implementation of our desegregation plan provided an opportunity to do a number of things that we either did not have the courage to do beforehand or did not sufficiently feel a need of doing or did not feel it feasible to do. Some of these opportunities were: (1) Study and re-evaluate curriculum; (2) Re-study organizational patterns; (3) Institute special teacher training programs; (4) Implement training programs for administrators and support personnel; (5) Re-study our assessment instruments; and (6) Study our total educational delivery system. The opportunity to do the aforementioned things contributed to the academic progress of our students in an integrated setting.
In other districts, desegregation has brought an infusion of money, community involvement, new and ambitious educators, reorganization, and other phenomena that have improved the quality of education for black and white alike.70 Perhaps the most encouraging sign of all is evidence that improved quality of education is associated with better race relations in magnet schools.71 We need not choose education or desegregation; we can have both if we take the right steps, and we will have neither if we take the wrong steps.

To be sure, racial hostility often increases after desegregation, and both blacks and whites have plenty of horror stories about violence and racism in desegregated schools. But a closer look at the evidence shows that such negative results are by no means inevitable. Interracial contact, when status and power are equal, when goals and some outlooks are shared, and when authorities of both races support change, does increase respect, accommodation, and even friendship across racial lines.72 Changes that have been shown to improve race relations include:

(1) ensuring that schools have some black superiors and white subordinates on the teaching and administrative staff;
(2) ensuring that neither race is less than 20 percent of the student body;
(3) changing slogans, mottos, and other symbols of the newly desegregated school so that neither race is "invading" the other's culture and society;
(4) making extracurricular activities accessible, attractive, and varied, and possibly mandating racial balance in key student activities;
(5) enabling parents of both races to participate fully and equally in social activities and the classroom;
(6) enabling staff and students to have open, unconstrained discussions of racial differences and problems; and
(7) ensuring that textbooks and class discussions incorporate black perspectives and events of importance.

All these practices can be ineffective if poorly implemented, but if done well, they can go far toward making interracial contact continuous, equal, productive, and rewarding. Under these conditions, desegregation does indeed move toward integration.

The changes I have discussed so far—avoiding resegregation, magnetizing all schools, fostering constructive interracial activities—are relatively safe politically. Although whites in general resist mandatory desegregation, they are unlikely to resist and may even support many of these changes. Again, one
must avoid utopian thinking here—the fact that a change will benefit its recipient does not mean that the recipient will endorse it. Nevertheless, school districts can plausibly demonstrate to white parents that the reforms discussed so far will benefit white students as much as blacks.

The final feature of "desegregation done well" lacks this political advantage. It may be the most important but it also evokes the greatest resistance from whites. This is the issue of metropolitan area-wide desegregation.

Metropolitan Area-Wide Desegregation Strategies

Metropolitan desegregation can take several forms. The central city school district can combine with all of the surrounding suburban districts to form one large city-suburban district. The merger of districts in Wilmington and New Castle County, Delaware, is one example of this type of metropolitan plan. Such a plan has the advantages of great flexibility in student and faculty reassignment and in school reorganization, but it has the disadvantages of administrative unwieldiness, the possibility of very long bus rides, and a decline in parents', teachers', and students' sense of involvement and "ownership."

Alternatively, the central city district and surrounding suburban districts can first be merged and then divided into several new districts, each of which combines part of the city and some of the suburbs. The advantages and disadvantages of such a plan are the converse of those of one large city-suburban district described above, and on the whole, seems far preferable for large cities. The federal district judge presiding over the Richmond, Virginia, school desegregation case accepted such a plan (although it was overturned on appeal), and similar proposals were made for Los Angeles, California.74

A third possibility is extensive interdistrict transfers among city and suburban students without dissolving the legal and organizational structures of the existing districts. This possibility is soon to be implemented in St. Louis, Missouri. Its advantages are minimizing disruption and coercion; its disadvantages are the great expenses needed to overcome the inefficiency of individual transfers and to improve city schools enough to induce suburban whites to attend them. In addition, it faces the standard problems of all voluntary plans: usually only a few students participate—the blacks who are most likely to succeed in any case and the whites who are least racially prejudiced to begin with. Nevertheless, an interdistrict voluntary program that reaches most students could be an excellent solution to the constitutional constraints imposed by the Milliken decision.
Unless it is handled extraordinarily badly, almost any form of metropolitan plan, when combined with significant changes within the schools, has more virtues and fewer defects than a single-district plan. Metropolitan plans minimize white flight; they are most effective in reducing racial isolation; they maximize year-to-year stability of the plan; they can take advantage of both the wealth of the suburbs and the culture of the city; they can mix economic as well as racial groups; they can actually decrease busing distances and school district size from some city-only alternatives; and they do more to promote and maintain integrated housing than any other currently used policy.

Benefits of Successful Desegregation

What precisely are the benefits of successful desegregation? There are many. Black student achievement increases, sometimes at a faster rate than white student achievement and sometimes to the point that differences in the performance levels of the two races disappear. White student achievement does not decline from desegregation. Race relations improve, sometimes generating friendships between blacks and whites, more often producing mutual understanding and appreciation of differences, reducing fear and stereotyping, and increasing acceptance of authority figures of the other race. Community morale can improve, particularly if "Let's make it work" campaigns reach bystanders and opponents. Schools become more accessible to parents; patronage systems for hiring teachers and staff are shaken up; black teachers and administrators have more options.

Long-term benefits are as important as short-term ones. Blacks from desegregated schools are more likely than racially isolated blacks to have professional aspirations, to attend college and do well, to attend desegregated colleges, to attain a first job soon after high school and to be promoted in it, to be in desegregated work groups, to hold nontraditional jobs, to live in desegregated neighborhoods, to have children in desegregated schools, and to have interracial friendships. Whites are disabused of the ideas that "white is better" and that "normal" behavior is the behavior usually engaged in by whites. Controlling for sex, region, education, and type of job, whites from desegregated schools are slightly more likely than whites from segregated schools to work in racially heterogeneous settings. Some even like desegregation; in testimonials, white students describe their school as more "interesting" and "cohesive" and describe themselves as surprised at the "niceness" of their new classmates.
A community does not have to experience trauma to achieve these benefits. Most blacks still endorse desegregation even with mandatory busing; most whites endorse and expect more desegregation, although they continue to oppose mandatory busing. Most schools desegregate peacefully; when violence does accompany desegregation, it almost always ends completely after a year or two. White flight is neither inevitable nor irreversible, and whites are returning to some desegregated public schools. Black teachers are no longer displaced and segregated, and many schools now have black administrators.

What we have here, then, is not a problem of trade-offs between benefitting whites and benefitting blacks. Done right, desegregation can benefit both groups. The problem, rather, is that those changes which will ultimately produce the most good are precisely those which are politically least popular.

Let me briefly recapitulate the evidence for this claim. Metropolitan desegregation, movement of the youngest children, reductions in tracking, significant changes in the content and style of teaching, spending considerable tax money on schools (even schools that are not in one's own community), changing school symbols, enhancing nonacademic and extracurricular activities, desegregating faculty and staff and ensuring that some senior positions are held by nonwhites, ensuring that minorities are not less than 20 percent of the school population—all these actions generate much good and little harm, but most are strongly opposed by many whites and their political representatives. Conversely, moving only a few of the oldest children, requiring minimal change within the schools, setting up a few specialized magnet programs and programs for the gifted and talented, maintaining tracking and the symbols of the old environment, not reassigning faculty and staff, keeping desegregation voluntary—all these actions produce little good for anyone and considerable harm to blacks, but they generate the least political opposition from white citizens and their representatives. This paradox is exacerbated by the political climate of skepticism about government action in general and desegregation in particular and by the economic and demographic facts of the districts left to desegregate.

Leadership for School Desegregation

If ever there was an instance in which elected officials should lead rather than follow, this is it. Policy makers must concentrate on reducing racial isolation and simultaneously improving the quality of education and conditions for interracial contact. Several leadership groups and types of actions could help fulfill the promise of Brown over the next few years.
The courts, for one, should recognize educational improvements as an appropriate and feasible part of a desegregation remedy. Courts have generally subscribed to the "color-blind" and "desegregation first" interpretations of Brown more than the "educational quality" interpretation. They are reluctant to become involved in complex cases of on-going remediation of a large social institution such as a public school system. Nevertheless, many are learning how to get the expert help and set up the institutional framework they need to oversee improvements in educational quality. Judges need relevant legal arguments and information about the nature and effects of court-ordered educational reforms in other districts. They need to know, for example, about citizen monitoring groups, special masters and court experts, desegregation administrators, sources of funding for the school district, and evaluation procedures. Many are now highly sophisticated in this new realm of the law, but a surprising number lack such knowledge.

Central city and suburban school officials could ally in efforts to foster educational reform along with student reassignment. Although many do not realize it, they share some interest in desegregation's success. Since the baby boom generation graduated, suburbs have had decreasing numbers of students, and individual districts are often too small to provide specialized programs and expensive equipment. Even if they too are losing population, cities still have plenty of students; they also contain the museums, libraries, universities, and neighborhoods that are invaluable in enriching children's education. The threat of a suit, particularly if a judge is known to be aware of the benefits of metropolitan desegregation, may go far to give suburban officials the incentive (or the political cover) they need to cooperate with the city. Such alliancés are developing in several communities—most notably St. Louis—and should be explored elsewhere, perhaps by beginning with a voluntary interdistrict program.

State legislatures have traditionally done all they could to stay out of desegregation controversies, and they have been less than helpful when brought in. But that situation could change. There are more black state legislators now than there have been at any time since Reconstruction, and they are acquiring legislative power. Black registration and voting are rising, and blacks can become more influential in state politics. At present, black (and sympathetic white) state officials lack information about the benefits of desegregation and the most successful desegregation techniques, as well as sophistication about acceptable alternatives. But armed with knowledge and a constituency, state legislators could be effective proponents of state-mandated change—or at least more effective than their predecessors have been.
The great advantage of state involvement is that it makes metropolitan plans possible despite the restrictions of the Milliken I decision. Since local school districts are creations of the state, they can be changed without constitutional violation if the state wishes to do so. Special-purpose regional districts are not uncommon; they range from sewer systems to mass transit to school consolidation. State governments can therefore desegregate large cities and their suburbs. In addition, or alternatively, they can provide more funds for central-city schools, magnet programs, city-suburban voluntary programs, and so on.

Other potential leaders are the new cohort of black mayors. Our second, third, fourth, and sixth largest cities (among others) now have black mayors who bring with them new staff (sometimes including school superintendents) and new constituencies. We cannot assume that all black mayors support school desegregation or that they can achieve it even if they do. But they are presumably more concerned about the issue than were many of their predecessors. Like black legislators, new black mayors may lack the information and political ammunition they need to desegregate and simultaneously improve schools. But such information is available and should be imparted so that city officials and civil rights advocates can work together on school issues rather than battling one another.

To be sure, the courts are hardly new to the scene, and state legislators have generally been more detrimental than helpful. Nevertheless, all of these parties face different circumstances, incentives, and possibilities in the 1980s than in the 1970s, and it may now be possible to enlist them in the cause of desegregation and improved education.

Mobilizing Support for Successful Desegregation

What strategies should these and other leaders pursue? The worst possible strategy for achieving successful desegregation is that of the Reagan administration, for at least two reasons. Justice Department efforts to rescind existing mandatory plans in cities such as Nashville, East Baton Rouge (Louisiana), and Seattle fly in the face of history, which shows clearly that the benefits of desegregation do not appear until a plan has been in place for several years. Once the dust has settled, parents, teachers, staff, and students all develop better racial attitudes, stop protesting, and engage in more interracial activities. Black student achievement improves, but only several years after desegregation occurs; long-term effects on black college attendance show up only after several years of desegregation; and white flight declines (in some cases, to pre-desegregation levels) several years after implementation.
Furthermore, people accept what they cannot change, but if they see hope for avoiding an undesirable future, they will struggle to do so. If whites are suddenly given reason—through a Justice Department challenge—to believe that they can be released from a plan, their declining opposition will skyrocket. Thus the very districts in which desegregation is beginning to work are those in which white resistance is being encouraged. Intentionally or not, the Reagan administration's actions are making desegregation as difficult and unsuccessful as it can be.

Policy makers and parents should instead be encouraged to focus on the relatively long run rather than the very short run. Focusing on the long run includes recognizing that desegregation—and all the effort it entails—is not finished after the buses start rolling. It includes postponing full-scale evaluation of a desegregation plan for several years after it is put into effect; accepting substantial disruption during the first few months of a new plan to lay the groundwork for later improvements; countering excessive optimism from supporters of the change and excessive pessimism from opponents and implementers; and establishing a system for monitoring changes in racial isolation and in educational outcomes and relaying findings to the school, court, media, and public. Above all, it entails convincing people that they should focus on the long run, so they neither take steps they may later regret (such as leaving the district) nor avoid steps they will later desire (such as changing classroom organization).

Another disastrous strategy of the Reagan administration was folding Title IV of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (the Emergency School Aid Act, known as ESAA) into the 1981 education block grant (the Educational Consolidation and Improvement Act—ECIA). ESAA, at its height, provided about 300 million dollars to desegregating districts—mostly, but not exclusively, to large cities. Its purpose was to ease the transition to unitary schools by providing seed money and support for educational improvements. ESAA was effective legislation, despite some inefficiencies and inequities. ESAA-funded human relations projects improved black students' interracial attitudes and behavior; ESAA-funded elementary schools enhanced black achievement; ESAA-funded schools had less second-generation discrimination than schools without such funds; ESAA provided teachers' aides, librarians, and other staff to enrich the quality of school life. Most ironic of all, given the Reagan administration's endorsement of voluntary desegregation, is the fact that ESAA funding was critical in establishing and maintaining many magnet school programs in large cities.86

Under the new ECIA, states are permitted but not required to give school districts funds to aid desegregation. In general, they do not: "the loss of ESAA funds has crippled desegregation
projects. Ninety-four percent of the school districts surveyed are not using Chapter 2 funds [the analogous program under ECIA] for desegregation purposes; the funds are simply not available in the quantity necessary. As a consequence, magnet schools either lose funding, which reduces their quality and appeal, or take even more funds away from the majority of students remaining in other schools. To the degree that the quality of educational reform determines the success of student reassignment and to the degree that voluntary transfers are preferable to mandatory ones, the abolition of the only federal program to aid voluntary, quality desegregation could not be more mistaken.

Reauthorizing and funding ESAA or an equivalent program would do even more than allow large-city school districts (and others) to improve the quality of education significantly while (or instead of) desegregating. ESAA could be used as an incentive in complex political negotiations over what types of programs will be supported, in which districts, to what degree, with how much oversight, and so on. Policy makers such as state legislators and mayors, for example, may be willing to endorse transfer programs or restructuring of school districts if the federal government provides new resources at the same time. Even a modest, well-targeted federal program to improve educational quality while desegregating could mean the difference between success and failure of desegregation in large, financially strapped districts.

In 1979, David Tatel, then director of the Office of Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, proposed setting up a task force to coordinate the flow of funds from various federal agencies into one city (in that case, Chicago). The task force mechanism was supposed to ensure that Community Development Block Grants, Department of Labor vocational education programs, and housing subsidies from the Department of Housing and Urban Development all reinforced school desegregation. Tatel's recommendation was never implemented, and the political climate for such an effort is more hostile now than it was then, but the idea warrants consideration. Even if it is politically impossible at the federal level, some states might be willing to consider such a coordination of programs and funds in a few key districts. Cities themselves could take a few relatively simple steps to improve the communication and mutual reinforcement among housing, school, and economic development programs.

More generally, we are beginning to see some imaginative and fluid plans for tying cities and suburbs together. Interdistrict voluntary transfer plans, which place magnet programs in some city schools and at the same time increase access to some suburban schools, are increasingly viable ideas. These plans are hardly a panacea; they are profoundly unpopular in many quarters,
they require a high level of funding to work, and at best, they involve only a few students. If they turn out to be only token plans, they are very hard on the students involved. Such plans can demoralize the schools left behind by removing the smartest and most energetic students and can lead people to believe that "enough is being done." But as school officials and parents become more comfortable and experienced with full-scale interdistrict programs, these plans may provide an attractive intermediate step for state legislators and mayors who seek to end racial isolation but are unwilling to take on a major fight for mandatory transfers.

Where mandatory student reassignment is not a viable part of a desegregation plan—for whatever political, demographic, legal, or socioeconomic reasons—we should turn to the third interpretation of Brown described earlier. That is, policy makers must take the necessary steps to ensure that minority schools get the additional funding, excellent staff and faculty, and maneuvering room they need to turn an unsuccessful school into a successful one.

My point here is political as well as educational: civil rights advocates should, in some cases, think of high-quality, black-dominated schools as an attractive alternative to mandatory reassignment rather than merely as a palliative or surrender to white resistance. After all, student reassignment by itself may cause more harm than good, whereas quality isolated education lacks some important virtues but causes little harm. In addition, black and white parents, school personnel, state legislators, and mayors may all support such efforts. Blacks are frequently apprehensive about desegregation and satisfied with a less risky alternative; whites and politicians of both races may find additional funding more palatable than student reassignment and be glad to be "let off the hook" through such measures.

Policy makers can take other actions on a smaller scale. They need to adjust existing desegregation plans to account for demographic shifts. They should use litigation or regulatory action to desegregate the remaining "easy" (i.e. small, predominantly white) districts. They should seek any federal or state money available for any program, even when (as is likely) the funds will address general issues of quality education or particular populations (e.g., the handicapped) that are politically less sensitive than black issues.

The private sector should become involved in the schools, too. Pairings with local businesses, universities, and museums could bring new people and resources into the schools. Local real estate agencies and businesses could work with schools to encourage and guide housing desegregation.
Even marginal changes are worthwhile, and perhaps they are all that can be achieved in most districts in the near future. But marginal changes seldom lead to fundamental reform, and if they generate the impression of change without its actuality, they can reinforce white complacency and black frustration. The broader strategies described above generate a different kind of frustration: they offer little that is new and exciting. But we do not need lots of "new ideas." What we do need is a willingness to learn the right lessons from the last 30 years, and to recognize that desegregation need not fail. We know how to desegregate schools in ways that benefit both blacks and whites. Our job now is to disseminate those findings and to help policy makers acquire the courage, strength, and skill to implement them.
NOTES

Chapter 2


2. The data in this and the next two paragraphs come from Gary Orfield, Public School Desegregation in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1983).


6. Among poorly achieving students, for whom compensatory education programs are designed and who presumably benefit from them, more whites than blacks and Hispanics are selected as participants. V.J. Breglio, R. H. Hinkley, and R.S. Beal, Students' Economic and Educational Status and Selection for Compensatory Education (Santa Monica, California: System Development Corporation, 1978).


Chapter 3

14. William P. O'Hare et al., Blacks on the Move: A Decade of Demographic Change (Washington, D.C.: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1982), 7; Bullock, "Equal Education Opportunity" (see note 5), 70-71.

15. Orfield, Public School Desegregation (see note 2), Appendix B.
16. During the same three decades, the proportion of whites living in central cities declined from 32 percent to 25 percent. O'Hare et al., Blacks on the Move (see note 14), 21.


Chapter 4

20. See, for example, Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), 102-18; and Andrew M. Greeley, "School Desegregation and Ethnicity." In School Desegregation: Past, Present, and Future, edited by Walter G. Stephan and Joe R. Feagin, 133-55 (New York: Plenum Press, 1980). The Social Science Research Center of the University of Michigan and the Harris Poll find similar results. Polling agencies use slightly different wording in their questions and probes in their surveys, but regardless of how the issue is phrased, the least opposition whites ever report for mandatory busing is 80 percent opposed; in some polls opposition rises to 95 percent. Black responses vary a little more, but in recent years, black opposition has hovered around half.


29. Discrimination against black faculty has been, but is no longer, a very serious fallout from school desegregation. In 1968, black faculty were underrepresented by 180 percent in the South; by 1974 that figure had increased to 220 percent. Bullock, "Equal Education Opportunity" (see note 5), 73. Black faculty were dismissed, demoted, or not hired by the hundreds in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See American Friends Service Committee et al., The Status of School Desegregation in the South, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: American Friends Service Committee, 1971); and John Smith and Bette Smith, "Desegregation in the South and the Demise of the Black Educator," Journal of Social and Behavioral Sciences 20 (Winter 1974). Informants in the Office for Civil Rights, however, say that the problem of faculty discrimination and segregation has been largely solved.


38. Converse et al., American Social Attitudes (see note 24), 61.


43. Jeffrey A. Raffel, Nancy J. Colmer, and Donald L. Berry, Public Opinion toward the Public Schools of Northern New Castle County (Wilmington, Delaware: University of Delaware, College of Urban Affairs and Public Policy, 1983).


Chapter 5

45. Unless otherwise noted, the quotations in this section are from Brown I.


Chapter 6

55. Milliken II, emphasis in original.


60. See citations in notes 32 and 33.


64. Increasing the number of years of schooling without changing quality (measured as increased expenditures) yields "negligible returns." Charles Link and Edward Ratledge, "Social Returns to Quantity and Quality of Education," Journal of Human Resources 10 (Winter 1975): 78-89.


Chapter 7


71. Blank et al., Survey of Magnet Schools (see note 32), 108; Appendix 4, p. 9.


80. See National Institute of Education, Violent Schools--Safe Schools (see note 68); and Gary Gottfredson and Denise Daiger, Disruption in Six Hundred Schools (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University, Center for the Social Organization of Schools, 1979).

81. Raffel et al., Public Opinion Toward the Public Schools of Northern New Castle County (see note 43), 86-90. In 15 of 52 large desegregated districts, white enrollment has increased or remained stable since a plan was implemented. Morgan and England, Assessing the Progress (see note 21), Appendix E.


83. In 1983, there were 2,700 elected black municipal officials and 380 elected black state officials (compared to 620 and 170, respectively, in 1970). "Largest Increase in BEOs since 1976," Focus 12 (January 1984): 8. My thanks to David Tatel for pointing out the importance of the increasing number of black mayors and state legislators and their need for relevant information.

84. Eleven of the 50 largest cities have black mayors; 27 cities with populations over 50,000 have black mayors. In 1983, 1,400 blacks held elected posts in education, 600 in the judiciary and law enforcement agencies, and 500 in county government (compared with 360, 210, and 90, respectively, in 1970). "Largest Increase in BEOs since 1976," Focus 12


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