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ABSTRACT In the first of seven chapters of this comprehensive review of research in social studies, William B. Stanley presents an overview of current issues and approaches relevant to research in social education. The second chapter, by Catherine Cornbleth, is a review of critical thinking and cognitive process research. Special attention is given to "myths" that guide current research and practice. In the third chapter, Richard K. Jantz and Kenneth Klawitter review early childhood and elementary education research in social education. In Chapter 4, James S. Leming analyzes the research on a wide range of approaches to socio-moral or values education. In Chapter 5, Jane J. White discusses ethnographic research and the paradoxes and problems it raises for social education. Chapter 6, by William B. Stanley, is a discussion of recent research and development in the foundations of social education. The chapter focuses on the wide variety of rationales developed, critiqued, and refined by mainstream social educators since 1976. In the final chapter, Jack L. Nelson and James P. Shaver discuss the status of and limitations inherent in social education, each author taking a different position regarding the future of research in social education. Throughout the reviews, implications for practice and further investigation are addressed. (LH)
REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION
1976-1983

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Richard K. Jantz  James P. Shaver
Kenneth Klawitter  Jane L. White
James S. Leming

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PREFACE

This book combines the efforts of a group of social educators interested in trying to make some sense out of a field divided by conflicts regarding rationales, content, values, and approaches to research. Each author was well aware of the limitations inherent in such a project. At best, we have been able to explore and discuss some of the most important issues and topics related to research in social education. Still, I think the effort has been worthwhile and I hope the Social Science Education Consortium and the National Council for the Social Studies continue to support periodic reviews of research in the field.

There are a number of people who deserve special thanks for their contributions to this project. James E. Davis, the former associate director of the Social Science Education Consortium, believed it was time for an updated review of research and got the project started. His recommendation was given the full support of the leadership at SSEC. In addition we received many constructive suggestions from the NCSS Publications Board, the NCSS Advisory Committee on Research, and Charles Rivera, the director of NCSS publications.

I wish to thank personally each of the authors for their effort, thoughtful analysis, and open minds. Jack Nelson and Jim Shaver were especially helpful in providing critical reaction to each of the review chapters and an excellent summary chapter. The reactions of the external reviewers provided by SSEC also helped to improve the quality of each chapter.

Finally, I want to thank Kay K. Cook, the SSEC editor. Her patience, support, editorial skills, and suggestions were invaluable.

William B. Stanley

Dedication

To Lynn, John, and Kristian whose love and support make it all worthwhile.
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The past decade has been a difficult time for social education. The reform and curriculum development efforts of the 1960s and early 1970s have waned, and funding for such activities has all but disappeared. One social educator has remarked that "the recent period has been quiet, some would say virtually dead" (Newmann 1984, 12). Indeed, there has been a backlash reaction to earlier reforms, and the nation still seems to be in the grip of a "back-to-basics" movement. The new reform impulse appears to place an undue emphasis on content mastery, testing, basic skills, and teacher accountability (e.g., The National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983; Task Force on Education for Economic Growth 1983; Carnegie Corporation of New York 1983). This movement also tends to link the desired outcomes of education to the needs of the American business community (Giroux 1984). Finally, there are indications that our society is increasingly preoccupied with self-interests or narrow interest-group agendas and less concerned with collective social needs and issues (Lasch 1979). None of these developments is supportive of social education research and reform oriented toward the reflective critical analysis of public issues in a democratic context.

I. Purpose and Approaches

Despite such conditions, research and development in social education has continued with many significant results. The pace may have slowed, but the field is far from being moribund. The purpose of this book is to outline and discuss recent research in, or related to, the field of social education. In part, it brings up to date an earlier review of research in social education covering the period from 1970 to 1975 (Hunkins and others 1977). This review of research covers a slightly longer period from 1976 to 1983.

Although this book covers several areas discussed in the 1977 review, it has a further purpose, i.e., to present a discussion of research
approaches and areas omitted from the earlier review. The authors of that review offered two main reasons for content selection. In part "because of the categories provided the authors...and [in part] because of the inclination of the authors themselves, the studies selected for review are largely of the 'empirical' or 'scientific' variety" (Hunkins and others 1977, 6). In the selection process, the authors excluded "historical, philosophic, and anthropological research in the field, as well as research patterned on new modes of investigation, such as [the] phenomenological framework" (p. 5).

The editor and authors of individual chapters in this volume were also given guidelines regarding areas to review. These included suggestions to consider research related to cognition, critical thinking skills, early childhood and elementary social studies, values education, and the foundations of social education. In addition, consultation revealed that there were not enough recent developments to warrant a new chapter on the dissemination of social studies materials. As a result of these guidelines, this volume does cover two areas included in the 1977 review: cognition and values education. However, the discussion of cognition research is divided between two chapters. The first is a chapter on cognition and critical-thinking processes and the other chapter is a discussion of research on early childhood/elementary social studies. The foci on critical thinking and early childhood/elementary social studies represent new areas of discussion in this review.

As in the 1977 review, there is a separate chapter on research related to values education. There was general agreement that values education remains a major area of interest and research in the field. But even in this instance, new subtopics were discussed that were not covered in the earlier review. Consequently, although three of the five chapters in this volume deal with areas discussed in the previous review, at least some shift of focus has occurred in each case.

An even more significant change is the inclusion of approaches to research not discussed in the 1977 review, in particular ethnographic research and research in the foundations of social education. There were a number of reasons for including these topics. In the case of ethnographic research, a growing body of data that provides some new insights into the process of social education has accumulated and should
important analytical concepts, and unduly limits the explanatory power of our investigations.

Some further comments are in order regarding the consequences of adopting one research paradigm as opposed to another. As van Manen (1975) and Popkewitz (1984) explain, different research models or paradigms entail more than disputes over various methodologies. Each model also represents a complex set of social assumptions, values, practices, and commitments. In short, research is never truly value free, and the values underlying each model shape the course of research, raise certain questions, and exclude others. For example, a commitment to an empirical-analytic model of research rests on certain assumptions such as a universal notion of theory, a view of science as objective or disinterested, a preference for mathematics as an analytic tool, and the potential for developing systematic, lawlike generalizations independent of social or historical contexts (Popkewitz 1984, 36-40).

Quite different assumptions underlie the symbolic (phenomenological) and critical research models. For instance, in both of these paradigms knowledge is perceived as socially constructed, i.e., dependent on and derived from social and historical contexts. Cornbleth (1982) has noted the tendency of researchers to "decontextualize" their research efforts. She argues that instead of dichotomizing thought and action, we should seek to understand the participant's construction of meaning in classroom situations (p. 6). However, while the symbolic research approach still attempts to be neutral in its description of reality, the critical approach is oriented by explicit values and rejects both the possibility or theoretical value of neutrality. Consequently, a fundamental goal of critical research is to penetrate and demystify the ideological rationalizations of our dominant culture and institutions. Such concerns would not likely be raised in the empirical-analytic approach. In fact, they would be seen as distorting the research process. For the critical researcher, the research process is always value oriented and therefore biased. Thus, by making the values of research explicit and subjecting them to critical reflection, the research process will have greater explanatory potential.

Most reviews of research in education, including social education research, tend to focus on the empirical-analytic model as described by
be examined. In addition, this research does not merely reflect a differ-
ent investigatory technique, but rather an alternative research para-
digm. Thus, it raises new questions and provides a different way to in-
terpret social phenomena.

Research in the foundations of social education accounts for most of the publication in the field. Thus, to ignore it is to ignore much of what constitutes the field of study. Furthermore, this area of investi-
gation represents a wide variety of research methodologies, includ-
ing historical and philosophical analyses. It is here that developments related to rationale building, definitions of social studies, the history and philosophy of the field, and other significant normative issues are explored. In many instances, the foundations of social education provide the theoretical models and guidelines that orient other forms of research and establish criteria for evaluating current practice.

Studies related to the foundations of social education also represen-
t a number of different research models, including the phenomenologi-
cal and critical approaches to research (see Popkewitz 1984). It should be emphasized that in this volume the concept of research is broadly construed as purposeful, systematic inquiry or investigation, which in-
cludes varieties of qualitative as well as quantitative studies. Thus philosophic and linguistic analyses (e.g., Cherryholmes 1983) as well as historical studies (e.g., Sherman and Barth 1980, Nelson 1980) should be considered examples of research just as are empirical-analytic studies (e.g., Larkins and McKinney 1982). Each of these approaches represents a different way of knowing, analyzing, and explaining social phenomena. We need not compare the relative merits of each approach since judgments concerning the effectiveness of each are highly related to the questions being investigated and the specific context of the study. In addition, what constitutes an important research question or evaluation criterion depends on the values one holds regarding research as well as on one’s world view. It is not unreasonable to debate the value and application of various research models. However, it makes no sense to judge one research model solely by the criteria of another model or to attempt to impose a single model’s standard on all research in the field (Popkewitz 1984). Such judgment or imposition amounts to an overly narrow concep-
tion of research which deprives our field of alternative insights and
Popkewitz (1984). There is no denying the value of this paradigm, but it is also limited and excludes certain issues and methods of investigation. This volume seeks to provide at least some insight into research related to alternative paradigms. Specifically, the chapter on ethnography deals with the symbolic research paradigm; the discussion of research on the foundations of social education includes some discussion of the critical approach.

II. Organization of the Book

This volume is divided into seven chapters. Following this introductory chapter, there are five chapters, each of which reviews a different area of research related to social education. These chapters (through 6) might be read in any order. Because social education research overlaps with social science, psychological, and general educational research, studies in these other areas are discussed when relevant in each chapter. In addition, the review of separate areas of research in social education is a construct to facilitate discussion and analysis. These separate areas do not represent what actually goes on in practice; i.e., in reality the various areas of research blend together in a number of ways. Consequently, this reality is occasionally reflected in the chapters as similar topics are explored from different vantage points.

The second chapter is a review of critical thinking and cognitive process research as it relates to social education. The author, Catherine Cornbleth of the University of Pittsburgh, argues that much of our thinking about critical thinking and cognitive processes is based on erroneous conceptions and untested assumptions and beliefs. At times such beliefs become myths guiding research and practice. As a result, there has been a great deal of misunderstanding and misinterpretation of such research. She posits a different approach, discusses the related research, and suggests implications for practice and further investigation. Cornbleth also presents a different discussion of stage theory and schema theory, two topics covered in the next chapter.

In the third chapter Richard K. Jantz of the University of Maryland and Kenneth Klawitter of the York County, Pennsylvania, Public Schools review early childhood/elementary social education research. The authors
place particular emphasis on the development of the young child's self-concept and the concept of racial awareness, spatial and temporal relationships, concept formation, information processing, and information retrieval. As noted above, readers should compare this chapter's somewhat different treatment of stage theory and schema theory with the analysis provided by Cornbleth in chapter two. Jantz and Klawitter relate their interpretations to classroom practice and suggest guidelines for further research.

Chapter 4 addresses research concerning interventions in the socio-moral domain. The author, James Leming of the University of Southern Illinois-Carbondale, analyzes the research on a wide range of approaches to socio-moral or values education. Among the values education programs discussed in this review are values clarification, values analysis, and cognitive-developmental approaches. Leming also examines attempts to infuse democratic practices in classrooms and schools, teacher and public attitudes toward values education, student political values, and bias in social education materials and classrooms. The review presents some interesting conclusions regarding which approaches to values education appear to be most efficacious and what direction future research should take.

In chapter 5, Jane White of the University of Maryland-Baltimore County discusses ethnographic research and the paradoxes and problems it raises for social education. White explains why she believes ethnography represents a different research paradigm that raises new questions and provides different ways of seeing and understanding social behavior. She also discusses some of the disputes regarding what does and does not constitute ethnographic research. The review of relevant ethnographic studies is analyzed in terms of how it helps us understand the process of social education. White posits that, in contrast to empirical-analytic studies, ethnographic research is much less prescriptive in its findings.

Chapter 6 is a discussion of recent research and developments in the foundations of social education. William B. Stanley of Louisiana State University examines the significance of investigations in this area and explores the course of rationale building in the field over the last decade. The chapter focuses on the wide variety of rationales de-
veloped, critiqued, and refined by mainstream social educators since 1976. Stanley also examines the emergence of a revisionist critique and counter proposals. This latter development has received relatively little attention by mainstream social educators; yet it amounts to a rejection of many of the values and processes supporting mainstream rationales. In addition, it represents another research paradigm. An attempt is made to describe the strengths and weaknesses of the various rationale proposals and to relate them to classroom practice and curriculum development.

In chapter 7, Jack L. Nelson of Rutgers University and James P. Shaver of Utah State University discuss the current status of research in social education. They also examine some serious limitations inherent in educational research in general and social education in particular. Each author takes a different position regarding how such limitations ought to shape future research in the field. Finally, given the findings and limitations of this review, Nelson and Shaver suggest implications for practitioners and other areas in need of investigation.

III. Final Thoughts

This book is addressed to a wide audience. It is designed to provide a relevant synthesis of recent studies of interest to social education researchers. However, the authors have also attempted to write in a style that will make the various chapters interesting and accessible to teachers, administrators, and others concerned with contemporary issues, practice, and curriculum development in social education. These are ambitious goals, yet it is hoped they will be achieved to some extent. All school subjects are of value to students, but there can be none more basic or important than social education in a democratic society. Indeed, social education is an area of study which permeates the entire school.

There are many ways of analyzing and explaining the process of social education, and each can help sensitize us to the nature of the field. It is important to understand what research says regarding instructional practice. But it is equally important to understand current thinking regarding the purpose of social education and the factors that determine which kinds of knowledge we tend to accept as valid. All of these con-
siderations are relevant to our efforts to build curriculum, teach, and conduct research. This volume does not suggest definitive guidelines for such activities. However, it is hoped that it will serve to provide new insights into social education research and practice and generate further discussion and investigation.

REFERENCES

Some of the items listed below are followed by an ED number. This identifies the item as an ERIC document. ERIC documents are indexed and abstracted in the monthly index, Resources in Education (RIE). For ordering information, readers should check the ED number in RIE.


Chapter 2

CRITICAL THINKING AND COGNITIVE PROCESS

Catherine Cornbleth
University of Pittsburgh

Cognitive process research has burgeoned in the last two to three decades, surpassing behavioral psychological research in status and promise for informing and improving classroom instruction. Not surprisingly, however, the interests of cognitive researchers do not always coincide with those of social studies educators. The focus of current cognitive research is on how people, particularly "experts," accomplish certain tasks. How experts become experts and how the development of expertise might be facilitated—questions closer to the concerns of social studies educators—have received much less attention to date. In addition, the areas of cognitive process research such as memory, comprehension, problem solving, and metacognition do not fit neatly with the knowing, thinking, valuing, and citizen action goals of social studies education. Therefore, this review does not follow convention by taking a given area of research and surveying it for implications for teaching social studies. Instead, a major goal of social studies—critical thinking—is taken as the starting point, and the cognitive and social studies research relevant to understanding and teaching for critical thinking is reviewed.

In his introduction to the 13th Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies, Teaching Critical Thinking in the Social Studies, editor Anderson (1942, v) noted that "critical thinking has long been accepted as a goal of instruction in the social studies...[and that it might be more accurate to say that social studies teachers] have accepted critical thinking in principle without bothering to define the term precisely or to do much by way of direct instruction to see that this goal was achieved." More than 40 years later, we find ourselves in much the same situation. Critical thinking is gaining renewed attention and endorsement while typical patterns of social studies classroom practice appear less than conducive to critical thought (Fancett and Hawke 1982, Goodlad 1963, Herman 1977, Shaver, Davis, and Helburn 1978).
Knowledge and use of the cognitive process research that might well inform critical thinking and teaching does not seem to be widespread in social studies education. Instead, inaccurate and misleading "folk psychology" models of the mind and how it works seem to prevail in classroom practice (Norman 1980). The use of rehearsal or "saying it over" as a means of learning is a prime example. As will be shown, this kind of rote memorization is both inefficient and antithetical to critical thinking. It reflects one of several persistent but questionable beliefs about critical thinking, teaching, and learning.

This review has three main parts. In Part I, I offer a conception of critical thinking and teaching as a framework for what follows. While preparing this review, it became increasingly clear that a number of questionable beliefs or myths impede our thinking about and teaching for critical thinking. In Part II, I examine four of these myths in relation to the counterarguments and evidence from cognitive research and theory. Then, in Part III, research from the areas of problem-solving, knowledge structures, and metacognition is reviewed with particular attention to cognitive processes underlying or contributing to critical thinking. Implications for classroom practice and, indirectly, curriculum design and teacher education as well, are noted throughout the review.

I. Critical Thought and Teaching for Critical Thinking

Nature of Critical Thinking

While much has been written in the name of critical thinking, the intended meaning of the concept is rarely made explicit. Educators seem to assume that critical thinking is inherently knowable and, further, that all of us would recognize it when it appeared. Taking critical thinking for granted and assuming a doubtful consensus has served to obscure rather than clarify its meanings and implications. Our conceptions and forms of reasoning both reflect and shape how we think, talk about, study, and act on our world. They ought not to be left unexamined.

In an effort to provide focus to critical thinking for social studies instructional and research purposes, Feely (1976) distinguished two models of critical thinking in the social studies and general education literature, the mental and the logical. He found the mental conception:..
essentially undefined, like the hyphen in S-R theory, and therefore un-
satisfactory. The logical approach, exemplified by Ennis' (1962) analy-
sis of the "aspects" of critical thinking, informal logic, and task anal-
ysis, was found to be sufficiently precise to be helpful to instructional
practice and research. Although seemingly precise, the logical paradigm
fragments rather than defines critical thinking by reducing it to a list
of skills. Both mysterious mentalism and analytic reduction can be un-
derstood in relation to the psychologies dominant at the time. And these
psychologies, Gestalt and behaviorism, respectively, reflect broader
movements in science and society. Behaviorism, for example, can be seen
as part of a movement for administrative efficiency and technical control.

While the conception of critical thinking employed here is compat-
ible with current cognitive psychology and information processing theory,
particularly as they address so-called ill-structured domains, it is not
a psychological formulation. Instead, it draws on work in social science
and philosophy. In purpose and broad contour, it resembles Dewey's
notion of reflective thought as "active, persistent, and careful consider-
eration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the
grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends"
(1933, 9). The essence of critical thinking is informed skepticism, a
trusting, yet skeptical, orientation to the world. It is active inquiry
rather than passive acceptance of tradition, authority, or "common sense."
One who thinks critically does not take the social world as given or

Critical thinking involves questioning the ideas we encounter. It
is, therefore, a dynamic process of questioning and reasoning, of raising
and pursuing questions about our own and others' claims and conclusions,
definitions and evidence, beliefs and actions. In so doing, we look to
the past and future as well as the present, considering what might have
been and what may yet be. Critical thinking thus reflects a particular
disposition or quality of mind, a critical spirit (Passmore 1967) or
reflective skepticism (McPeck 1981). It is a socially and historically
shaped human endeavor that is neither mysterious nor mechanical.

Critical thinking can occur within widely accepted frameworks of
core beliefs and values, or it can involve questioning an established
framework. Oliver and Shaver's (1966) jurisprudential approach, for
example, proposes a framework for the analysis of public issues based on
democratic principles of human dignity and rational consent. In con-
trast, Cherryholmes (1980, 1982) and Giroux (1980) would have students
question popular epistemological, political, and social assumptions as
well as particular beliefs and practices. The difference between ques-
tioning within a framework and questioning the framework itself is par-
allel to that between attempting to improve the energy efficiency of the
internal combustion gasoline engine and seeking alternative power sources
for automobiles or even other means of personal transportation. "Build
a better mousetrap, and the world will beat a path to your door," Ralph
Waldo Emerson is reported to have advised. Oliver and Shaver might
prompt us to consider alternatives to the trap while Giroux and Cherry-
holmes might ask why we want to catch the mouse.

Note that the present conception of critical thinking is not limited
to the analysis and evaluation of statements, arguments, or public policy
issues. It is generative as well as evaluative and appropriate to the
range of ideas and events we encounter, including our own ideas and ex-
periences. Ideally, critical thinking is reflexive or self-reflective. It
both requires and enables awareness of and reflection on our beliefs
and actions, either in self-review or in anticipation of future conse-
quences of alternative actions. I might ask myself, for example: Why
do I believe that? How do I know? How have I reached that conclusion?
What are my biases in this situation? What might happen if I do this?

Two caveats are in order here. First, critical thinking is not
inherently negative. Skepticism is not synonymous with negativism. It
means questioning what might otherwise be taken for granted or summarily
rejected. Critical thinking can lead to affirmation on firmer grounds
as well as to debunking and modification or rejection of ideas. Critical
thinking thus has both conservative and liberating potential. Second,
the skepticism that characterizes critical thinking is not frivolous.
It does not mean automatically questioning anything and everything. It
is warranted, for example, by apparent weaknesses in an argument or by
seemingly discrepant information.

It should be clear by now that critical thinking is not a single
activity or a pre-specifiable set of activities. It is best described
in terms of features rather than components. These features, in varying
room and configuration, depending on the situation, reflect an informed skepticism and include question raising; seeking information, including evidence and examples relevant to one's questions; reasoning, including explanation or argument and generating and exploring alternatives; evaluating options; reflecting on one's thinking; and raising and pursuing further questions.

Teaching for Critical Thinking

It seems unlikely that critical thinking can be directly taught. Certainly, it is not some "thing" that can be transmitted from teachers to students. Teachers can, however, provide opportunity and support for critical thinking. And we can provide instruction to help students develop the knowledge and reasoning skills that enable critical thinking. By providing the occasion, encouragement, and assistance, we can help students to question and examine the ideas they encounter, for example, in textbooks and newspapers, on television and the street, from public officials and peers—and teachers.

Opportunity. Opportunity refers to the classroom activities in which students are expected to participate and the cognitive or academic tasks that they are asked to accomplish. Activities are viewed as social settings for academic tasks (Korth and Cornbleth 1982). Typical classroom activities are seatwork (e.g., completing worksheets) and question-and-answer with teacher elaboration, a modification of the conventional recitation. Tasks might involve, for example, information acquisition or recall, convergent or divergent comprehension, or critical thought.

Providing opportunity for critical thought is, of course, no guarantee that students will be able or willing to think critically. Even students who have the necessary knowledge and reasoning skills are unlikely to risk critical thinking unless support is also provided.

Support. Support is both material and interpersonal. Material support means providing access to multiple resources with different data sources and points of view. Interpersonal support refers to the quality of teacher-student and student-student relations. Mutual respect seems to be crucial to interpersonal relations and classroom environments supportive of critical thinking. It is fostered by teachers who acknowledge, accept, and encourage student effort and initiative. Ample time
is provided for students to think about, respond to, and raise questions. In such environments, students feel more comfortable trying out ideas and questioning authority without fear of reprisal. They are also likely to see the benefits of a skeptical attitude and come to value critical thinking.

Opportunity and support are not sufficient conditions for critical thinking if students lack the knowledge and reasoning skills to raise and pursue questions about the ideas they encounter. If students are to take advantage of opportunity and support for critical thinking, instruction is also needed.

Instruction. Instruction means more than opportunity to learn or to think critically. What has been popularized as "direct instruction" on the basis of process-product studies of teacher effectiveness (e.g., Rosenshine 1979) would seem to be more appropriately described as a management system that provides opportunity to learn. By instruction, I mean assisting students' learning by actively mediating between students and what is to be learned (Korth and Cornbleth 1980). Such mediation can involve showing or telling students how to do it or asking a series of questions so that students can figure it out for themselves (Cornbleth and Korth 1981). Instruction would not include presenting information per se, giving directions (to do a task as opposed to how to do it), or offering evaluative feedback. Nor would it involve imposing a particular strategy by insisting that students "do it my way" instead of employing feasible alternatives.

Evidence available from classroom studies suggests that instruction as defined here is infrequent in social studies and other subjects (e.g., Durkin 1978-79; Korth and Cornbleth 1982; Leinhardt, Zigmond, and Cocley 1981). What forms of instruction directed toward what knowledge and skills are conducive to critical thinking? Answers will be sought from the research to be reviewed in relation to persistent myths and plausible alternatives.

II. Persistent Myths

Myth is a widely held belief with questionable connection to pertinent evidence or circumstance. Sometimes myth is elaborated as a theory or story, sometimes it is simplified as a proverb or slogan. In
ancient societies, myths were "true" stories about historical origins as distinguished from false stories or legends. Today, we tend to think of myth as false belief and to assume that we have rid ourselves of such vestiges of a pre-scientific age. All cultures, however, have their guiding myths although we may not think of our own myths as such. Like the ancients, we see these beliefs as "truths"—as common sense, empirically established fact, or natural law. Myth is an integral, often unexamined part of our contemporary culture, including our professional discourse and practice in social studies education.

Many widely held myths have positive value. They serve as ideals that orient a culture. For example, "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are...." Myths that are widely held and held sacred by many educators and laypersons alike, in one way or another, contradict such values as educational equity and quality or subvert attempts to realize them. They are the myths of:

1. critical thinking skills
2. stages and styles
3. the right answer
4. experience

In the following sections, each of these beliefs is examined and found wanting in view of contrary evidence, alternative interpretations, or abuse in practice. For me, there are significant grounds to warrant questioning their viability and value to the social studies. Some readers may find favored beliefs undermined while others will find their skepticism confirmed.

My questioning of these usually taken-for-granted beliefs can be seen as an attempt to engage in critical thinking and to prompt readers to do the same by raising and pursuing questions about the ideas they encounter here. Disagreement characterizes most fields of scientific inquiry, including physics, cognitive psychology, and social studies education. The disagreements are conceptual, procedural, and interpretive. The beliefs that I have characterized as myths reflect such points of disagreement among knowledgeable, well-intentioned researchers and educators (for example, see the Jantz chapter in this volume for a dif-
ferent perspective on the question of stages).

The Myth of Critical Thinking Skills

This is a double-barrelled myth. One part asserts that critical thinking is composed of a number of discrete cognitive skills and strategies. The second asserts that these skills and strategies are content-free or generic. Together, they direct us to teach "critical thinking skills" apart from subject matter. To do so, however, misrepresents critical thinking and places students at a disadvantage. The problems with the first part of this myth are largely conceptual; the weaknesses of the second are both conceptual and empirical.

Skill A + B + C = critical thinking. In the social studies and general education literature, one often encounters the phrase, "critical thinking skills." It is not unusual to open a social studies curriculum, a teacher's guide, or a methods text and find critical thinking presented as a list of discrete skills or a series of steps. One might well infer that critical thinking consists of the sum of these skills or steps.

There are at least three interrelated problems with this position. One is that, without being offered some conception of the nature of critical thinking, we cannot tell whether the skills or steps might add up to critical thinking or something else or nothing at all. A second is that lists and steps imply that critical thinking is or should be linear, which it rarely, if ever, is or could be. Instead, critical thinking tends to be recursive; as one question is explored, for example, others may be raised and pursued while the initial question is put "on hold" or abandoned altogether. A sequence of skills or steps is not logic-in-use but a reconstructed logic (Kaplan 1964) that misrepresents what occurs while one is thinking critically. It also ignores the dispositional quality of critical thought.

The third and more serious problem concerns the reductionist assumption. If a number of components or skills add up to critical thinking, the corollary assumption is that critical thinking can be cut into pieces and reassembled without damage. This reductionist assumption is untenable. It destroys the substance and spirit of critical thought. You cannot dissect a live frog. When critical thinking is conceived as questioning the ideas we encounter, the questions raised and the means needed
to pursue them will depend to a large extent on the situation, including the ideas encountered, the social context of the encounter, and the prior knowledge and values of the questioner. Thus, particular aspects of critical thinking are situation-dependent and cannot be predetermined or specified out of context (Mishler 1979). Even if critical thinking could be decontextualized, it probably could not be meaningfully divided into discrete components or skills (McPeck 1981). Facets of critical thinking are overlapping and interacting such that any separation would be arbitrary and distorting. Even if critical thinking could be subdivided, its restoration would not simply be a matter of addition or cumulation because of the importance of pattern or arrangement.

If critical thinking consisted of a number of skills or a series of steps, one might expect considerable agreement as to the constituent skills or steps. However, there appears to be little or no such agreement; there is not even consensus as to what constitutes a skill (Beyer 1984a). One might also expect that students who had mastered a given set of skills would demonstrate critical thinking. Ennis (1962), for example, has distinguished 12 aspects of critical thinking, which he defines as "the correct assessing of statements." If we accept his definition and list of critical thinking abilities, we might expect that the more abilities students have acquired, the more likely it is that they will correctly assess statements (or that they will assess statements more correctly). To my knowledge, however, there is no such evidence. Students who have mastered one or another skill have done just that. It does not necessarily follow that the skills will result in or be used in the service of critical thought. It is also conceivable that preoccupation with skills might dull one's critical capacity.

But what about skills such as those listed in various National Council for the Social Studies publications (e.g., Carpenter 1963, NCSS 1981, 1984)? For example: interpreting and evaluating information, recognizing the need to change conclusions when new information warrants, making sensible predictions. Given the conception of critical thinking followed here, no list of skills is either necessary or sufficient for critical thought. Any or all of them, however, may contribute to critical thinking in a given case. This position is similar to Dewey's (1910/1933) description of the interdependent phases of reflective thought as depend-
ent on, but not equivalent to, diverse skills such as observation and
inference.

Consider two claims that provide occasion for critical thought and
the skills that might be employed in raising and pursuing questions about
each.

Claim A: The cause of world peace is best served by strengthening
the U.S. military as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. Nuclear
disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union will be hastened by
increasing our nuclear arsenal. The recent U.S. military build-up
has made the world a safer place.

Claim B: If you're looking for a quality bicycle at a reasonable
price, you'll want a Speedster from Raymond's. Buy now and save.

Thinking critically in these two situations clearly involves different
skills. It also involves different knowledge and different values and
priorities.

Critical thinking cannot be reduced to a universally applicable
formula of skills or steps to follow except by conceptual or empirical
alchemy. It is creative or generative in ways analogous to writing
poetry or sculpting. There is a feeling for the whole, an unwillingness
to automatically accept things as they seem to be, and a playfulness or
flexibility with ideas, objects, and language (Popkewitz 1977). The
seeming rationality of specifying critical thinking skills and sequencing
them in a logical or psychological order for instruction is appealing.
But that rationality is illusory. Analytically distinguishable elements
are interdependent in practice, and logical or psychological order bears
little resemblance to the organization of practice. Despite claims to
the contrary (e.g., Beyer 1984b), there is no reason or evidence to ex-
pect that further efforts to specify and sequence skills will be any
more productive of critical thought than previous ones.

Skills and strategies are content independent. This second part of
the myth of critical thinking skills follows from the first. If criti-
cal thinking consists of a number of skills, the underlying assumption
is that these skills are independent of the subject matter content to
which they might be addressed. Critical thinking skills and strategies
(patterned combinations of skills) are assumed to be knowledge-free or
generic and transferable from one situation to another. The myth
encourages efforts to teach skills in isolation from subject matter as well as critical thought (e.g., deBono 1974).

Increasing evidence, however, indicates that the development of critical thinking and associated skills is highly knowledge dependent (Chi, Glaser, and Rees 1981, Glaser 1983, Greenwood 1980, Hayes-Roth, Klahr, and Mostow 1981, Siegler 1983, Voss in press a). In other words, we cannot think very critically about ideas we encounter unless we know something about the area in question. With the possible exception of metacognition, which will be considered later, skills and strategies that contribute to critical thinking also tend to be domain specific. The clear implication is that courses and units on generic reasoning skills are of questionable value (McPeck 1981; Voss in press a).

The conceptual argument for the domain specificity of critical thinking is well presented by McPeck (1981), drawing particularly on the earlier work of Toulmin (1958). The "received view" of critical thinking as a collection of generic skills reflects a "tendency to reify the sort of items listed in B.S. Bloom's taxonomy" (McPeck 1981, 55), the assumption being that there are generalized abilities transferable across knowledge domains. However, the evidence regarding transfer is mixed at best. (e.g., Belmont and Butterfield 1977). There is no "set of supervening skills" that can replace substantive knowledge of the field in question. 8

Consider, for example, the following aspects of critical thinking from Ennis' (1962) list: grasping the meaning of a statement; judging whether a statement is specific enough; judging whether a statement is actually the application of a certain principle; judging whether the problem has been identified; judging whether a definition is adequate. How could one grasp the meaning of a statement and reasonably make such judgments about the statement without knowledge of its subject area context? Unless we are knowledgeable about biology, how are we to employ these purportedly generic skills to think critically about the once controversial claim that "fermentation is a living function of yeast cells" (Polyani 1957)?

The knowledge in which critical thinking is embedded is more than empirical and conceptual. The various fields of knowledge have different logics or modes of reasoning. While not mutually exclusive, the stan-
dards of judgment for what counts as sound knowledge and argument differ from one subject area to another. What constitutes good reason and evidence for belief in history differs from that in economics, law, and chemistry. "Just as there are different kinds of knowledge, so there are different kinds of reasons, evidence, and modes of justifying them" (McPeck 1981, 23). The domain of knowledge that is crucial to critical thinking is procedural and normative as well as empirical and conceptual. Consequently, the separation of subject matter content and critical thinking process is arbitrary and misleading.

Because each area of knowledge has its own distinctive logic, the criteria or expectations for critical thinking vary from one to another. The legitimacy of these differences has been well argued by Toulmin (1958). To impose the standards of one field such as mathematics on another, say anthropology, is absurd.

If we ask about the validity, necessity, rigour or impossibility of arguments or conclusions, we must ask these questions within the limits of a given field, and avoid, as it were, condemning an ape for not being a man or a pig for not being a porcupine (p. 256).

Toulmin's additional argument that the natural sciences are distinguished "not by the types of objects with which they deal, but rather by the questions which arise about them" (1977, 149) seems equally apropos of the social sciences. There are also intra-field differences in questions raised and acceptable grounds for belief such as those between behavioral and cognitive psychology. The differences in questions raised and means of pursuit between and within fields point to a further distinction that cuts across subject matter or disciplinary boundaries in the social sciences. This is the paradigmatic distinction. A paradigm is a world view or framework of knowledge and belief through which we "see" and investigate the world. Scientific paradigms consist of working assumptions about the world and how it is to be studied, understood, and acted upon, i.e., interrelated concepts and values, questions, procedures, and actions. Commitment to a particular scientific paradigm involves affiliation with a community of scholars who share, sustain, and shape the paradigm.

Critical thinking, then, varies with the domain investigated and the paradigm adopted. To argue that critical thinking is neither absolute nor universal is not to suggest that it is either idiosyncratic or individual.
Critical thinking is a social as well as a cognitive activity, shaped by the setting and the norms of the community in which it occurs. The complexity and pluralism of the knowledge underlying critical thinking renders generic critical thinking skills illogical and impotent.

The empirical evidence for the domain specificity of critical thinking and associated skills and strategies comes largely from recent studies of reasoning and problem solving in math, science, and social science. [Glaser (1983) and Voss (in press a) provide excellent reviews.] The conclusion to be drawn from this research is that while general skills and strategies can be identified, they are relatively weak and useful only when one does not know much about the field or problem in question. Greeno (1980), for example, has critiqued his own earlier problem-solving process typology (1978) as inadequately accommodating knowledge factors. He indicates that there are probably classes of problems for which similar kinds of problem-solving processes are appropriate but no set of generic skills. Efforts to identify common patterns in children's reasoning across tasks, Siegler (1983) observes, have not been "notably successful." If such generic strategies exist, they are "extremely difficult to identify." Like Greeno, Siegler concludes that similarities suggesting generic skills and strategies are more likely to be found when people lack specific knowledge. These "fall-back rules," however, are "weak methods" that are not especially helpful, e.g., generate and test, means-ends analysis, divide and conquer [see Newell (1980) for a summary of "weak methods" of problem solving]. "Strong methods," in contrast, tend to be domain specific.

The available evidence indicates both that generic skills and strategies for critical thinking are weak methods at best and that efforts to teach them are unlikely to foster critical thinking in a particular domain. In contrast, teaching particular skills associated with critical thinking in a field does not seem to be feasible if the skills are taught as an integral part of the subject matter (Glaser 1983). There is evidence that instruction in specific problem-solving strategies or domain-related skills can be effective, especially when the instruction includes the conditions under which the skill or strategy might be appropriately used. Further, problem solving is enhanced when instruction includes explanation of why as well as what to do (Voss in press a). In other
words, students need to learn when and why as well as how to do it. Yet to be answered is the question of whether particular means of instruction are differentially effective for teaching skills associated with critical thinking in a social studies context. It may be, as Siegler (1983) suggests, that the efficacy of a mode of instruction is not absolute but a function of its interaction with students' prior knowledge and dispositions. One implication is that rather than search for one "best" mode of instruction, it would be preferable to identify the features of successful instruction in various contexts.

By misrepresenting critical thinking, the "skill A + B + C" part of the myth of critical thinking skills tends to mislead curriculum designers and teachers into teaching skills in lieu of critical thinking. The generic part of the myth tends to further mislead by focusing attention and effort on weak rather than strong skills and strategies. Attempts to realize quality education for critical thinking are thus diverted and diluted.

The Myth of Stages and Styles

This, also, is a composite myth, encompassing various beliefs about the existence and implications of stages of cognitive development and styles of cognition or learning. Whereas stages usually refer to presumed abilities of one sort or another, styles usually refer to modes of information processing or learning, i.e., cognitive and learning styles. Both stages and styles are assumed to determine, among other things, one's critical thinking capacity regardless of the situation or subject area. There are similar problems with stage and style forms of differentiation and categorization of students. The myth is detrimental to critical thinking insofar as it negatively affects our expectations regarding students' ability or disposition to engage in critical thinking and their "readiness" to develop the necessary knowledge and reasoning skills. It might also negatively affect our expectations regarding whether and how critical thinking can be taught. For example, if critical thinking is assumed to be dependent on having reached the formal operations stage in Piaget's hierarchy, then we would not expect students assigned to the concrete operations stage to be capable of critical thinking or of learning how to think critically.
There seems to be a "catch-22" in this line of reasoning that limits the possibilities of teaching and learning. If students have reached the appropriate stage, they can do it, and either could benefit from instruction or do not need it; if not, they cannot do it, and are not "ready" to be taught. Yet, there is evidence of instruction "bringing children who were not even on the verge of acquiring a particular logical form of thought to complete mastery of tasks that supposedly require that form of thought" (Case 1981, 144).

Beyond questions of teaching and learning, there are questions about the consistency of developmental stages, specifically the assumption that an individual at a particular stage functions at that level across tasks and subject areas. According to this interpretation of stage theory, one would not be at a formal operational level in one domain, say history, and at a concrete operational level in another, say mechanics. The empirical evidence, however, is to the contrary: "careful reviews of the research literature do not support the picture of homogeneity of cognitive activities at particular ages assumed by the Piagetian stage model" (Estes 1978, 13; also see Case 1981, Mandler 1983). In social studies, Kennedy (1983) found a significant relationship between students' historical understanding and their information processing capacity but no significant relationship between information processing capacity and developmental level.

Task-relevant knowledge rather than developmental stage or capability may better explain identified age-related differences in students' reasoning (Chi 1983, Chi and Glaser 1983, Ortony 1980). Children's use of particular cognitive strategies, Chi (1983) observes, is not simply a function of maturation or development, but of the interaction of knowledge of a strategy with the "amount and structure of the content knowledge to which the strategy is applied" (p. 2). Thus, how well students categorize a given set of items depends not simply on their stage of development or "categorizing ability," but also on their knowledge of the items and the kinds of categories into which they might be sorted. Ortony (1980) suggests similar interpretation of studies of children's comprehension of metaphor, many of which did not control for "world-knowledge." The reported developmental trends, he argues, "seem to be consistent with the view that, as children grow older and learn more
about the world in which they live and the words used to describe it, so their ability to understand metaphors increases" (p. 353). Prior content knowledge is also important to problem solving. Whether and how a problem is solved is dependent on the knowledge one brings to the situation (Chi and Glaser 1983). In sum, it increasingly appears that "changes in such [domain] knowledge may underlie other changes previously attributed to the growth of capabilities and strategies" (Siegler and Richards 1982, 930).

The stages myth, then, inappropriately diverts attention from teaching for critical thinking. The styles myth also functions as a diversion, in part by characterizing some students as effectively unteachable with respect to critical thinking. By identifying numerous styles, it also makes "individualized" teaching seem so complex as to be near impossible.

Cognitive style is a psychological construct created to both describe and account for differences among individuals in their manner of information processing. An individual's style is assumed to be consistent across situations. Thus, individuals have been characterized as field dependent or independent, reflective or impulsive, and so forth, regardless of the situation. Further, "these predominant modes of information processing are presumed to be relatively stable and somewhat trait-like" (Frederico 1980, 12).

Learning style is a related and not always clearly distinguishable psychological construct created to describe and account for differences among individuals in academic performance. It is "a predisposition on the part of some students to adapt a particular learning strategy [pattern of information-processing activities] regardless of the specific demands of the learning task" (Schmeck 1983, 233). Learning style, then, adds a dispositional element to cognitive style, suggesting a preferred way of approaching learning tasks. While everyone is presumed to have a cognitive style, only "some students" are presumed to have identifiable learning styles, and learning styles are usually treated as modifiable. However, there is considerable variation among researchers and their followers about definition of cognitive and learning style, the measures used to distinguish style, and the styles so identified.
As with the stages myth, there are contrary data and alternative explanations of observed differences attributed to style. A major challenge comes from studies showing that styles are context-dependent, i.e., they vary with the learning task (e.g., Laurillard 1979). Given more than one kind of task, students demonstrate more than one style. Differences appear to stem from the nature of the subject matter, the nature of the task (e.g., recall, comprehension, problem solving), and the student's perception of the teaching. "Individual differences, if they exist, exist at the level of how the student interprets his learning environment rather than at the level of choice of learning style" (Laurillard 1979, 407). Interestingly, many studies purporting to show individual differences in cognitive or learning style employed only one task or kind of task. There was no opportunity for students to demonstrate task-related differences.

So-called style seems to be less an inherent characteristic of individuals than a function of contextual factors such as the nature of the task, subject matter content, teaching mode, and expected kind of test. Research reviewed by McConkie (1977) indicates that "students seem quite willing and able to change their learning strategies in response to task structure characteristics" (p. 27), particularly the nature of the test they expect to take (also, see Marton and Saljo in press). Thus, students adjust their "style" of information processing depending on whether recall, comprehension, reasoning, or critical thinking is anticipated. Similarly, Chi and Glaser (1983) note that the task characteristics of a problem-solving situation are a major determinant of problem-solving behavior. The evidence strongly indicates that identifiable styles do not exist in the individual, but, if at all, in the interaction of individual and situation.

An extreme version of the styles myth is the right-left brain fallacy. It is based on the following, very tenuous line of evidence and reasoning. First, a verbal, analytic, sequential, syllogistic mode of information processing has been associated with left-hemisphere activity for normal [non-brain damaged] right-handed individuals; a spatial, synthetic, simultaneous, intuitive mode of information processing has been associated with right-hemisphere activity for such individuals. (Frederico 1980, 19) Second, verbal or spatial "cognitive style has
been reliably related to patterns of spontaneous electroencephalographic (EEG) lateral asymmetry" (p. 19) with less EEG evidence of information processing occurring within the right hemisphere when "normal" people perform verbal-analytic tasks and less evidence of information processing occurring within the left hemisphere when they perform spatial-synthetic tasks. Together with the observation that some people typically employ a verbal-analytic approach to learning tasks while others typically employ a spatial-synthetic approach (ignoring those who are neither analytic or synthetic but simply flexible or muddled), some school people have concluded that students can be easily (non-EEG) categorized as "right-brained" or "left-brained" with sufficient reliability to warrant differentiated instructional treatment. The belief that people are right- or left-brained is a prime example of mythic reification.

The right-left brain version of cognitive style not only overreaches the supportive data, but it ignores contrary evidence and explanation. Other data suggest that "there is no one-to-one correspondence between specified cognitive activity and a specific cerebral site" and that "practically every region of the brain contributes to many different functions" in varying degrees (Frederico 1980, 20). At best, right-left brain distinctions have been exaggerated in the education literature. And, the supposed benefits of differential instruction for supposedly right- and left-brained people have yet to be demonstrated. Similarly, there may be measurable individual differences attributable to cognitive style, but identified differences have not been found to be instructionally significant in social studies (e.g., Betres, Zajano, and Gumieniak 1984, Glenn and Ellis 1982).

Stages can be imposed on anything that changes over time; styles can be imposed on anything that varies. The danger in categorizing students according to their presumed developmental level or their presumed learning or cognitive style is twofold. It lies both in the category labels and in the school practices that are based on such labelling. First, the labels are neither neutral nor helpful to teaching or learning. Not only do they obscure the individual, but they tend to be explanatory fictions whose undesirable social consequences have been well noted (e.g., Apple 1975). Pedagogical consequences include negative teacher expectations for many students and the formal or informal track-
ing of students with the concomitant denial opportunity to those students deemed unready or incapable of certain kinds of learning such as critical thinking.

Instead of assuming that students are "this way" or "that way" as an inevitable consequence of their inherent cognitive or learning style, consider the possibility that they have or have not learned to approach given tasks in particular ways. If students have not yet developed the requisite knowledge and reasoning skills for critical thinking, then opportunity and instruction should be provided, not denied. To do otherwise contradicts the value of educational equity. The myth of stages and styles diverts attention and energy from efforts to adapt instruction to relevant individual differences and provide quality education to all students.

The Myth of the Right Answer

According to this myth, a correct student response to a teacher or textbook question is evidence of student thought and learning. Right answers are sought by teachers and rewarded with praise and points that add up to good grades. They tend to be valued regardless of the question or the means by which students produce them. Right answers do not necessarily demonstrate student learning. Students may just be repeating what they already know. Nor do right answers necessarily demonstrate subject matter knowledge or critical thought. They may just be the result of a lucky guess, figuring out "what the teacher wants," or other survival strategies (see Anderson, Brubaker, Alleman-Brooks, and Duffy 1984).

The myth of the right answer also misrepresents the social world insofar as it suggests that most if not all questions have right answers. Many important social questions do not have knowable, right, or even good answers. Presumed facts may turn out not to be facts at all (e.g., Who discovered America?). More knowledge and thought may result in less certainty about how things are or should be. The right answer myth is particularly inimical to critical thinking, which calls for skepticism, not certainty, and questioning the ideas we encounter, not providing predetermined answers to someone else's questions. A clear implication is that social studies teachers need to be knowledgeable and sensitive
to the complexity and uncertainty of curriculum topics and issues in order to help students raise and explore alternatives and formulate well-reasoned positions.

The right answers that are valued by this myth are typically answers to simple knowledge recall or memory questions. The myth of the right answer tends to encourage rote memorization rather than thinking things through. Rote memorization can also be seen as a myth. The memorization myth asserts that information must be acquired (i.e., memorized) before one can use it for critical thinking or any other purpose and that rote memorization is an effective means of information acquisition. Learning by rote refers to rehearsal, drill, or "saying it over," none of which necessarily involve knowledge comprehension, integration, or application. Once again, the evidence does not support the claim. Instead, we find that rote memorization is usually an inefficient means of information acquisition and that it does not provide a functional knowledge base for critical thinking (e.g., Simon 1980).

Recent cognitive process research has resulted in modification of our understanding of memory. Memory appears not to be a passively acquired "essentially unordered storehouse" of information as seems to have been assumed, but an actively constructed and more or less organized interpretation of experience (see Estes 1978). The belief that teachers' words or textbook definitions of a list of terms are acquired directly by students as usable knowledge is a fallacy (Simon 1980). Instead, long-term memory involves the conversion of external information into an internal representation. Conversion, which cognitive psychologists call elaboration, can occur at various levels, ranging from superficial, rote forms of elaboration to deeper, interpretive ones where we attempt to make sense of or give meaning to experience, often by relating new information to what we already know. Weinstein's (1978) studies indicate that more successful students are more likely to use meaningful rather than rote elaboration strategies. Bransford's studies (e.g., Bransford, Stein, Vye, Franks, Auble, Mezynski, and Perfetto 1982) provide similar results as well as evidence that instruction can help students develop and use meaningful elaborations.

How information is elaborated and organized in memory appears to affect its accessibility and usefulness. Rote elaboration strategies do
not foster the organization and integration of information that enable retrieval and use in new situations. According to Simon (1980, 87), "rote memorization, as we all know too well, produces the ability to repeat back the memorized material but not to use it in solving problems." The same applies to concepts, procedures, and other kinds of knowledge. Unless they are appropriately interrelated in memory, they are not likely to be useful to critical or other thinking (Norman, Gentner, and Stevens 1976). Thus, the myth of the right answer and rote memorization fosters an illusion of knowing that subverts construction of a functional knowledge base for critical thinking; it thereby undermines educational quality.

The Myth of Experience

The myth of experience, which exaggerates the value of learning by doing or learning from exposure, is widely held throughout our culture. There are several classroom versions of this myth. One is that students learn by osmosis or exposure, for example, to a film or to other students' right answers in a recitation. Another is that students learn from involvement in classroom activities. If students are doing the work, say completing a worksheet, they must be learning. The third is that students learn from practice of a series of similar activities such as "reading" maps, graphs, or tables. The pervasiveness of this myth in classroom practice is evidenced by the importance teachers seem to attach to student participation and "keeping busy" (e.g., Cornbleth and Korth 1984; Jackson 1968).

Experience is no guarantee of the substance or means of learning, and in some cases, it may be miseducative. Underlying the learning-by-exposure assumption is the belief that truth, critical thinking, or whatever is to be learned is self-evident. However, in-class experiences and even field trips may provide little to learn from, and what is offered may not be all that clear or valid (see Brehmer 1980; Buchmann and Schwille 1982). Experience in the form of a classroom activity and assigned task may provide opportunity to learn if students already have the knowledge needed to take advantage of the opportunity. If not, the experience is probably useless, and perhaps frustrating, unless instruction is also provided. As has already been noted, instruction is an
infrequent event in most classrooms. "We tell our students what to learn," Weinstein (1978, 32) observes, "but we say nothing about how to go about learning." The assumption that students will study, learn, or think when or because we ask, tell, or urge them to is unfounded. Similarly, practice without reflection and corrective feedback may simply perpetuate mistakes. Practice does not necessarily make perfect; experience is necessary but not sufficient to learning, and some experiences are more meaningful and beneficial than others.

But what if students are doing the work—for example, completing assigned seatwork? Evidence from classroom studies (e.g., Anderson and others 1984) indicates that apparent student involvement or time-on-task can be misleading. Some students may be filling in the blanks with little understanding of the filled-in words or the task as a whole. What these students are learning from the experience is not at all what the teacher intended.

Experience per se is not the best teacher; it is no teacher at all. The myth of experience detracts attention from the quality of experience. It encourages teaching without instruction and blaming students who do not learn for not taking advantage of the experiences provided. In so doing, it perpetuates an unwarranted sociobiological determinism and contradicts values of educational quality and equity.

If we relinquish these myths, what are we left with to guide and justify teaching for critical thinking in social studies? Among other things, we would have the time and energy to provide opportunity, support, and instruction for critical thinking. Instruction might well focus on an appropriate knowledge base as well as domain-related and metacognitive skills and strategies. The research base for these plausible alternatives is presented in the section that follows.

III. If Not Myth, Then...

The past decade's social studies research on teaching tends to be less informative with respect to critical thinking than the earlier work associated with the new social studies and inquiry movements of the 1960s (for a review of the earlier research, see Wiley 1977; a recent review is Armento in press). For the most part, the intent of recent social studies empirical research relevant to critical thinking has been to
determine the efficacy of two or more teaching approaches in fostering learning of particular reasoning skills or problem-solving strategies.

In contrast, the focus of the relevant cognitive process research has been identification of the knowledge, skills, and strategies that characterize problem solving in specific domains, especially mathematics and physical science. A common approach to this task has been to compare experts and novices, e.g., physics professors and beginning physics students. Comparisons are usually based on clinical interviews and analyses of think-aloud protocols obtained by asking "subjects" to talk about how they are solving a given problem as they do it (see Larkin and Rainard 1984). Only recently has the attention of cognitive process researchers turned to learning how novices become expert, and instruction to facilitate the development of expertise. Three areas of cognitive process research--social science problem solving, knowledge structures, and metacognition--are briefly reviewed here.

Social Science Problem Solving

Most of the cognitive process research on problem-solving has been conducted in "well-structured" domains such as chess, geometry, and physics. Well-structured or well-defined problems are characterized by clearly delineated problem statements and goal states and known (though not necessarily to the problem-solver) means of solution. In a sense, well-defined problems are self-contained. The social sciences and social studies, however, are "ill-structured" domains. The nature of social problems and acceptable goals are often unclear or at issue, and means of problem resolution are unknown or disputed (see Simon 1973, 1978 on well- and ill-structured problems). Information that would guide solution is not contained in the problem statement, there is no straighforward means of identifying alternative possibilities, and the boundaries of relevant information are uncertain. Very few cognitive process researchers have ventured into the uncertainty and complexity of illstructured domains such as the social sciences. The major studies are those conducted by Voss and his colleagues (Voss, Greene, Post, and Penner 1983, Voss, Tyler, and Yengo 1983, also see Voss in press a) with political science problems.
An important difference between the problem situations studied by Voss and others and those associated with critical thinking is the source of the problem. However ill-defined or fuzzy, the problems in the problem-solving research are presented or given. A defining feature of critical thinking is problem finding or problem generation, i.e., question raising (see Getzels 1979 on the importance of problem finding and its neglect in the cognitive process literature; also Brown and Walter 1983). Unless problems are recognized or created by making "givens" problematic, there is no critical thought. Once questions have been raised, however, pursuit of satisfactory answers can be seen as problem solving. "Solutions," however tentative, provide a basis for understanding, judgment, and action.

Using clinical interview and protocol analysis procedures, Voss and others (1983) asked 6 experts (university political science faculty whose field of specialization was the Soviet Union), 10 novices (undergraduate students taking a course on Soviet domestic policy), and 15 others (including faculty and graduate students with various specializations) to solve "the Soviet agriculture problem":

Assume you are the head of the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture and assume crop productivity has been low over the past several years. You now have the responsibility of increasing crop production. How would you go about doing this? (Voss, Tyler, and Yengo 1983, 211)

While one might question the assumed expertise of university faculty and novice status of undergraduate students, there were substantive differences in the nature of their responses to the problem that could inform teaching for critical thinking by suggesting what students ought to know or learn.

Voss and others characterize the Soviet agriculture problem as representative of a broad class of open-ended social science problems "where there is an undesirable state of affairs that requires improvement" (Voss, Tyler, and Yengo 1983, 208). Neither the specific nature and causes of the problem nor what constitutes a solution is "known" in the sense of being given, demonstrated, or agreed upon. Since proposed solutions to most social problems cannot readily be tested to determine their viability or efficacy, alternative means of evaluation have been developed. These usually focus on the justification or argument provided
in support of a proposed solution. While there are some commonalities, means of justification and evaluation criteria tend to vary with the domain or paradigm. In political science, Voss and others suggest that evaluation involves determination of the feasibility of a solution in relation to the constraints entailed by the problem situation (e.g., Soviet ideology, amount of arable land) and in light of the problem's history (e.g., the fate of previous solution attempts).

Since social science problem solving involves a reasoning component that is not typically employed in solving puzzle or mathematic problems, Voss and others modified and extended the information-processing framework for analyzing problem solving, which was developed for well-structured problems, to incorporate a framework for argument evaluation derived from the work of Toulmin (1958, Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik 1979). Problem-solving protocols were analyzed in terms of (a) the problem representation and solution process, and (b) the reasoning structure or argument provided to justify the proposed solution. (For a description of this "problem solving-reasoning model," see Voss, Greene, Post, and Penner 1983, 171-173).

The major findings of interest here concern differences between experts' and novices' means of problem representation, solution, and justification. Problem representation involves interpreting and structuring the nature of the problem and goal, which then guides the solution process. Experts gave considerable attention to problem representation, engaging in extensive review and interpretation of the problem context or situation. Typically, they classified the problem in terms of a single abstract category or cause (e.g., technical, political) and delineated constraints and relevant history that served to rule out some possible solutions and generate others. Novices, in contrast, gave little attention to problem representation; they responded to surface features of the problem rather than undertaking a qualitative analysis of its "deep structure." Novices tended to list likely causes of low agricultural productivity (e.g., shortage of tractors, lack of incentives) and then jump to solutions without explicit consideration of constraints, history, or interrelations among identified problem components.

The typical solution strategy was to propose and justify means of eliminating or alleviating the identified problem cause(s). Novices
offered several separate, simple solutions to the problem causes they had identified, with little argument development to justify or evaluate their proposed solutions. The warrants they did offer were based on general logical or psychological knowledge (e.g., people work harder when there are incentives to do so) much more than knowledge specific to the Soviet situation. Experts, in contrast, offered a few abstract or encompassing solutions that subsumed more specific solutions to previously identified subproblems, side effects, or contingencies. They also developed elaborate supporting arguments and evaluated their solutions in relation to their problem representations. Their lines of reasoning were extensive and complex, and the warrants they offered were largely based on specific knowledge of the Soviet Union.

Expertise seems to rest on a sophisticated knowledge base of domain specific and general declarative knowledge, reasoning skills, and problem-solving strategies. This knowledge base is sophisticated in at least three respects: density, organization, and accessibility. Density refers to amount of relevant information. Not only do experts know more than novices, but their knowledge seems to be hierarchically patterned, i.e., organized in such a way that specific facts or cases are linked to categories or concepts, and these concepts, in turn, are integrated into principles or generalizations and networks or theories. As a consequence, experts are able to "see" particular problem situations as instances of more abstract classes and to interrelate various factors in their problem representations and proposed solutions. The abstract organization of expert knowledge also makes it more accessible for use in a variety of situations. Recognition of one aspect of a new problem situation, for example, seems to trigger retrieval of a larger pattern abstracted from similar situations that can be used to interpret the new case. Although novices in the Voss and others studies evidenced domain-specific knowledge of the Soviet Union, they "were not effective in using it in the problem-solving context...their knowledge seemed to consist of 'bits and pieces' of information that were not well integrated" (Voss, Greene, Post, and Penner 1983, 206).

Density, organization, and accessibility also seem to characterize experts' reasoning skills and problem-solving strategies (what cognitive process researchers call procedural knowledge). Experts seem to know
what to do and how to do it. They have the procedural as well as the empirical and conceptual knowledge that enables them to systematically integrate, elaborate, and clarify proposed solutions; evaluate solutions in relation to their problem representations; and support their solutions with reasons and evidence to show how and why they are likely to be achievable and effective.

Developing problem-solving expertise, it seems, involves not merely information acquisition but the construction, expansion, and refinement of conceptual networks that interrelate factual information, concepts, principles, and procedures (Chi, Glaser, and Rees 1981, Chi and Glaser 1983, Larkin, Heller, and Greeno 1980). Commenting on the implications of his studies, Voss (in press b) notes that "it is one thing to 'learn' or memorize information but to have such information serve as 'working knowledge' requires experience in organization and utilization," which suggests that skills and strategies not be taught in isolation from one another or from the subject matter content and problems with which they are to be used. One implication of the research is that social studies instruction should not end with evidence of students' comprehension of a single concept or concept pair. Rather, instruction, including practice with informative feedback, should extend to relationships among several concepts and the use of these conceptual networks in interpreting new situations, problem solving, and critical thinking. And, the "list of terms" to define should be a rarity rather a commonplace in social studies classrooms. At the least, students might be asked and helped to interrelate and map or diagram the relationships among the terms rather than copy, memorize, and reproduce definitions. Dansereau and his colleagues (1979), for example, describe a networking strategy for identifying and representing the major links among ideas in text material.

The problem-solving research also has implications for the problem-finding and question-raising aspects of critical thinking. Students might be taught to recognize and interpret the various types of problems they are likely to encounter in and out of school. These include problems involving the meaning and credibility of claims and arguments as well as macro social problems such as the Soviet agriculture problem or the nuclear peace problem. Studies by Garner and her colleagues (cited in Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, and Campione 1983, 114) found that upper
elementary and junior high students, particularly those identified as poor readers, had difficulty recognizing inconsistencies in written passages, especially when the contradictory statements were located in different sections of the passage (cf. Brown 1980). Inconsistencies in descriptions as well as claims and arguments are one kind of problem that students might be taught to detect and attempt to resolve.

In addition to problem finding, students might be taught what to look for or what questions to raise in different problem situations. A major task for social studies research and teaching is exploration of means for helping students identify a problem, recognize what kind of problem it seems to be, and determine what questions to ask. In questioning the ideas they encounter, for example, students might raise questions about (a) the adequacy of evidence, examples, and explanations; (b) underlying assumptions, apparent motive, and frame of reference; (c) implicit values and priorities; and (d) implications and alternatives. They might also raise questions about possible counterarguments and counterexamples such as: What else might account for (a given conclusion)? What would be an exception to that (generalization)? On the basis of their answers to such questions, students would accept, reject, or modify their own and others' explanations and generalizations. In addition, students could learn to raise special purpose questions, for example, about the authenticity of an artifact or historical document, the causes of an event, or the dynamics of revolutions and social change as suggested by Fancett, Johns, Hickman, and Price (1968) and Fenton (1971). Such instruction should not, of course, preclude students' raising and pursuing questions of concern to them beyond those offered by their teachers, textbooks, and other sources.

Knowledge Structures

From the research already cited, it is clear that organized knowledge is crucial to critical thinking. The cognitive research on knowledge structures, like the problem-solving research, usually involves expert/novice comparisons and is more descriptive of desired states than of how functional knowledge structures are created or enhanced via instruction. The value of this research to social studies education generally and to critical thinking in particular is largely conceptual and
heuristic. It suggests a reorientation of our ways of thinking about, studying, and teaching for knowledge acquisition. What matters most is not simply how much we know, but what we know and how we organize our knowledge.

Knowledge structures encompass what cognitive process researchers call procedural knowledge (e.g., reasoning skills, problem-solving strategies) as well as declarative or propositional knowledge, which is both empirical and conceptual. Sharp distinctions are not made between knowledge and skills, as is common in the social studies literature, probably because the knowledge that underlies comprehension and problem solving is composed of integrated procedural and declarative forms. However, normative beliefs and values, which shape text and social problem interpretation and critical thinking, are usually ignored by cognitive researchers.

Two aspects of recent work on knowledge structures are considered here, schema theory and knowledge acquisition.

Schema Theory. Based on the work of earlier theorists including Kant, Bartlett, and Piaget (see Rummelhart 1980) as well as contemporary cognitive theory and research, schema theory is essentially a theory of knowledge construction. It attempts to account for the organization of knowledge in memory and the retrieval and use of knowledge in situations ranging from interpreting sensory data to critical thinking. Schemata (the plural of schema) are assumed to exist inside our heads as mental representations of knowledge that have "a holistic character which cannot be understood as simple functions of their constituents" (Anderson 1977, 418). They are modifiable information structures, usually portrayed as networks or maps consisting of nodes (concepts, events, objects) and links (relationships among the nodes). Schemata do not specify the details of any particular situation; rather, they provide a model or skeleton from which particular situations can be interpreted.

Schemata are more than organized representations of declarative knowledge. They also include procedural information about knowledge use (Norman, Gentner, and Stevens 1976), including when and how declarative knowledge is applicable, in a manner similar to Simon's (1980) model of production systems or condition-action pairs (e.g., if conditions X and Y are present, then take action W). Schemata thus play a crucial role
in reasoning and critical thinking. According to Rummelhart (1980, 55), "it seems that most of our reasoning ability is tied to particular schemata related to particular bodies of knowledge."

Schemata are constructed at varying levels of abstraction. The assumed hierarchical organization of schemata, internally and in relation to one another, is seen to facilitate selective rather than random memory search, retrieval of relevant knowledge, interpretation, and appropriate action in a given situation. Individuals vary with respect to the number and sophistication (i.e., complexity, differentiation, elaboration) of their schemata within and across domains as shown in the expert/novice problem-solving studies. Yet, even young children evidence hierarchical organization of knowledge into superordinate and subordinate categories (Mandler 1983).

Of particular interest are schemata at a level of generality and sophistication, possibly including subschemata, that enable interpretation of new information and situations as a case of the schema prototype. For example, an airport schema that includes subschemata for security checks, customs, and immigration enables one to anticipate and negotiate most unfamiliar airports with relative ease. A less elaborate airport schema might be inadequate for international travel.

People typically attempt to understand new experiences in terms of what they already know, i.e., their schemata. Meaning is not in the text or situation but is created by the individual interacting with it. Comprehension involves selection and verification (or rejection) of a schema to guide representation and interpretation of a particular text or situation. The schema that is adopted then shapes interpretation of the situation. Different schemata "yield different interpretations of the same situation, and different features of a situation will take on more or less importance as a function of that interpretation" (Rummelhart and Norman 1978, 48). For example, interpretations of a presidential press conference will differ considerably when one person brings a "conniving politician" and the other brings a "beneficent leader" schema to the viewing.

Even apparently routine schema use involves active construction of an interpretation of the situation, e.g., airport, because each one is unique. Schemata also guide us to fill in gaps in a situation by seeking
out the missing information (e.g., looking for the airport information counter to inquire about ground transportation options) or making inferences from the schema prototype (e.g., looking for ground transportation signs just past the baggage claim area).

The importance of schemata to recognition and comprehension of situations is most evident when we lack an appropriate schema to guide interpretation or when the situation provides inadequate clues for schema selection. In these cases, understanding is all but impossible even if individual pieces "make sense." Consider, for example, the following untitled paragraph from Bransford and Johnson's (1973) studies of text comprehension and try to make sense of it.

The procedure is actually quite simple. First you arrange things into different groups. Of course, one pile may be sufficient depending on how much there is to do. If you have to go somewhere else due to lack of facilities, that is the next step, otherwise you are pretty well set. It is important not to overdo things. That is, it is better to do few things at once than too many. In the short run this may not seem important but complications can easily arise. A mistake can be expensive as well. At first the whole procedure will seem complicated. Soon, however, it will become just another facet of life. It is difficult to foresee any end to the necessity for this task in the immediate future, but then one can never tell. After the procedure is completed, one arranges the materials into different groups again. Then they can be put into their appropriate places. Eventually they will be used once more and the whole cycle will then have to be repeated. However, that is part of life. (Cited in Rummelhart 1980, 48.)

Without being told that the paragraph is about washing clothes, most readers do not understand it even though individual sentences are comprehensible. This example may not be too dissimilar from the practice of asking students to read a section in their text without explaining what it is about, suggesting what to look for, or providing any necessary background. Students who do read the assigned pages will not remember or understand very much unless they bring appropriate schemata to the text.

Consistent with the implications of the problem-solving research, one implication of schema theory for critical thinking is that we help students create schemata that will enable them to recognize potentially problematic situations and raise appropriate questions. Such schemata would integrate the features of various kinds of situations and their interrelations (declarative knowledge) with questions that might be
raised under certain conditions (procedural knowledge). As these critical thinking schemata area created and refined, they could be linked at points of commonality to form increasingly sophisticated knowledge structures. The importance of the schema concept, beyond its promise for explaining many aspects of human information processing, is that it directs attention to patterns of usable knowledge rather than isolated bits of information and disparate skills. With interrelated conceptual and procedural knowledge, students would be able to take advantage of and create their own critical thought opportunities.

**Knowledge acquisition.** From a cognitive perspective, knowledge acquisition or learning is a constructive, generative process which cannot be reduced to the transmission of information from a source to a recipient. It is "much more than the successful storage [in memory] of increasing amounts of information" (Rummelhart and Norman 1978, 37). Knowledge acquisition is an active, interactive process of elaboration, organization, and meaning-making. We learn by incorporating new information in an existing schema, by modifying an existing schema to accommodate new information, and by building new schemata out of existing ones to deal with new situations. Rummelhart and Norman (1978) characterize these three qualitatively different modes of schema-relevant learning as accretion, tuning, and restructuring.

A accretion involves the incorporation of new facts or instances to an existing schema. For example, upon seeing a Basenji for the first time, one would likely attach Basenji to a dog schema. Basenjis are an African breed similar to fox terriers, so one probably would not modify a dog schema to create a new one, just add another member to the existing category. With accretion, "a person's knowledge base is merely incremented by a new set of facts" (Rummelhart and Norman 1978, 38). Tuning and restructuring, in contrast, require schema change.

Tuning involves the modification of an existing schema to accommodate new information or situations that seem to be instances of the schema prototype but do not quite fit. An existing schema node or link can be altered or deleted, or a new one can be added. Suppose, for example, that students have constructed "revolution schemata" on the basis of their study of the American and French revolutions. These schemata will be helpful to understanding of other revolutions such as the Mexican
and Russian revolutions of the early 20th century, but they will not be entirely satisfactory. Some extension and refinement of existing schemata will be necessary to account for the particulars of these cases.

Restructuring involves creating schemata to make sense of new situations that cannot be interpreted with existing schemata, even with some tuning. In a manner described by Norman, Gentner, and Stevens (1976) as learning by analogy, new schemata are constructed from old ones. Critical thinking, for example, is like problem solving in some ways but different in important other ways. Thus, one might build a critical thinking schema from a portion of his/her problem-solving schema. Rarely, it seems, do we create a schema "from scratch." New information is rendered meaningful in relation to what we already know. In some cases, the new schemata are used to reinterpret previous experiences and understandings as when we revise our ideas about "nuclear deterrence," male-female relationships, or teaching for critical thinking.

Thus, prior knowledge--declarative, procedural, and normative--affects subsequent knowledge acquisition and organization as well as comprehension, reasoning, and critical thought. It is more than a matter of the rich getting richer or the smart getting smarter. Prior knowledge can actively interfere with or enhance learning, qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Information presented in the classroom, for example, is not simply acquired as given, even by cooperative, able students. Learning involves active elaboration of new information by the learner in relation to existing schemata. New information that is compatible with what students already know or believe is more easily acquired than discrepant information. The latter is likely to be rejected or reinterpreted to fit with prior knowledge; prior knowledge is not readily modified or displaced.

For example, in physical science, students who mistakenly believe that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones are not easily dissuaded. Contrary evidence is often insufficient to alter misconceptions. Observing two objects of unequal mass in free fall, many students persist in believing that the heavier object reaches the ground first; they claim that the difference is simply undetectable (Champagne, Klopfer, and Anderson 1980, Champagne, Klopfer, Solomon, and Cahn 1980). Similarly, students who believe that blacks are inferior to whites or that women
are inferior to men might well rationalize contrary evidence and dismiss counterexamples as exceptions to the "rule."

Just as students are likely to resist information incompatible with their misconceptions, educators who hold to the previously questioned beliefs that I characterize as myths are likely to reject or rationalize the evidence that undermines them. Most people tend to resist modifying existing schemata or creating new ones. Substantial tuning or restructuring is likely a "dialectical process which entails a confrontation with difficulties in one's current schema and coming to appreciate the power of an alternative" (Anderson 1977, 429). Critical thinking can be seen as an invitation to schema tuning and restructuring by questioning, not blindly accepting and assimilating, ideas we encounter.

There are several implications here for critical thinking and teaching. One is the difficulty of the task. Critical thinking is not usually part of students' school experience. To expect and encourage students to think critically is to change the rules of the game, and such change is likely to be resisted, particularly by students who were doing well by the old rules. Critical thinking is especially difficult to foster when the ideas to be questioned are compatible with students' prior knowledge. Difficulty, however, is not synonymous with impossibility. Critical thinking can be encouraged initially with activities that arouse curiosity and questions. Such activities might present a puzzling situation, a seeming contradiction, something out of the ordinary, or something different from what is usually taken for granted, as has been suggested by Hunt and Metcalf (1968) and Kownslar (1974).

A second implication concerns diagnosis. Appropriate diagnosis of readiness for critical thinking is not a matter of general ability, however measured, but of the nature and organization of students' situation-relevant knowledge. For example, students are more likely to recognize inconsistencies in a written communication when they are familiar with the topic; they are also more likely to generate plausible means of resolving them (Brown and others 1983). To be functional, diagnosis must be task specific. It should also be ongoing and interactive as students encounter ideas and raise and pursue questions about them. Once means of tapping the extent and organization of students' knowledge about a topic before, during, of after instruction is the concept mapping proce-
dure developed by Champagne and Klopfer (1980). Briefly, the procedure involves presenting a list of concepts and asking students to (a) organize the concepts in a way that shows how they understand them, and (b) explain why they organized the concepts that way. For example, students might be asked to map and explain their organization of the following concepts: conflict, war, revolution, civil war, cold war, space race, trade. Or: separation of power, checks and balances, federalism, legislature, executive, judiciary. Teachers can also probe students' thinking by asking how they arrived at the answer to a question, regardless of the quality of their response. Students' explanations are likely to reveal the nature and extent of their understanding and misconceptions.

A third implication pertains to accretion. Beginning with the familiar has long been assumed to facilitate learning of new information. What now seems clear is the desirability of explicit linking the new to the known rather than assuming automatic or incidental association. One cannot learn by analogy, for example, unless the analogous elements are recognized and understood.

A fourth implication concerns schema tuning and restructuring to revise misconceptions. Once misconceptions have been identified, students can be confronted with alternatives and helped to test, evaluate, and modify their ideas. Tuning may be more likely at first as students attempt to accommodate anomalous cases. Restructuring may not occur until students are convinced that the misconception has become too cumbersome or just cannot handle so many exceptions. There are several ways to provide confrontation. Differing interpretations of an event or opposing viewpoints on an issue can be presented for comparison and evaluation. Or, teachers can raise questions and introduce situations that challenge students' assumptions and inferences. Collins and Stevens (1982, 1983) have analyzed the questioning strategies of exemplary Socratic teachers and offer a complex but intriguing model of strategic questioning to promote reasoning and critical thought. While their focus is on teacher questioning, with teachers in effect modeling critical thinking, the kinds of questions identified as appropriate in particular circumstances could also be raised by students for self- or peer-questioning. For example, if a student proposes an explanation or makes a prediction based on one or more factors that are necessary but insuffi-
cient, the teacher might present a counter example and ask a question that suggests additional factors for consideration as in the following dialogue.

T: Why is rice grown in Louisiana?
S: There's a lot of water.
T: O.K. Water is important. There's a lot of water in Washington and Oregon too, but they don't grow rice there. Why not?

**Metacognition**

A third, related area of relevant cognitive process research is metacognition. In addition to sophisticated knowledge structures, use of metacognitive strategies seems to be crucial to successful problem solving and critical thinking. Metacognition enables informed, purposeful orchestration of critical thought. The research in this area is exemplified by the work Flavell and Brown and their colleagues (e.g., Brown, Bransford, Ferrera, and Campione 1983; Flavell and Wellman 1977). While the context of descriptive and experimental training studies has been memory and text comprehension, many metacognitive operations are assumed to be similar across tasks and situations (Brown 1978). The available data (e.g., Brown 1980, 470-471) appear to support Glaser's (1983) position that metacognitive strategies may be more generally applicable than problem-solving processes such as those previously reviewed, and particularly important in unfamiliar situations, but such domain independent strategies are insufficient for "evaluation of specific task features that enable a problem to be solved" (p. 29).

What counts as metacognition is not neatly agreed upon in the cognitive process literature (see, e.g., Flavell 1979, Lawson 1984). Both reflective awareness and purposeful control of one's cognitive activity have been subsumed under the metacognitive rubric. The former is sometimes called metacognitive knowledge, knowing what we know, while the latter is called metacognitive strategy, executive function, or control structure. The executive function is seen to encompass strategies that enable the "coordination and control of deliberate attempts to study, learn, or solve problems" (Brown 1980, 454). These self-monitoring strategies include prior planning and ongoing checking, evaluating, and editing or modifying one's cognitive activity (Brown 1980, Brown and other-
They frequently involve recognizing what one needs to know in order to accomplish a task and raising questions to solicit the needed information.

The metacognitive executive function, which is of primary interest here, seems to be dependent on metacognitive knowledge. We cannot meaningfully plan, check, evaluate, and so forth, without knowing what we know, have done, and might do. Possession of metacognitive knowledge and strategies, however, is no guarantee of their appropriate use. Further, apparent lack of metacognitive knowledge or strategies is "more a function of inexperience in a new (and difficult) problem situation" than of age-stage development (Brown 1980, 475). Both metacognitive and cognitive sophistication appear to be highly contextualized, culturally as well as in terms of subject matter content (Brown 1978).

The reflexive, self-questioning character of critical thinking (see "Nature of Critical Thinking" section) necessarily entails reflecting on what we know and acting on that awareness. It is here that the interplay between general and domain-specific knowledge is evident. To make use of the more general metacognitive strategies in problem solving or critical thinking, we need declarative, procedural, and normative knowledge of the domain in question in order to know what and how to plan, evaluate, modify, and so forth.

How does metacognition fit in with what has already been presented regarding critical thinking and cognitive process? At least two interpretations are plausible. First, metacognitive knowledge and strategies can be seen as superordinate schemata linked to various more specific schemata to which they are applicable. Critical thinking as questioning the ideas we encounter represents one such superordinate schema. Alternatively, metacognitive knowledge and strategies can be seen as a special kind of procedural knowledge integrated into other schemata. Not only might one know which questions to ask in a particular situation (procedural knowledge), but one can be aware of this knowledge and purposefully employ it (metacognitive knowledge and strategies) along with other (declarative normative) knowledge to make sense of or resolve a problematic situation.

That metacognitive strategy makes a difference in problem solving is suggested by the studies of Voss and others (1983) on social science
problem solving. Experts differed from novices in the extent to which they engaged in planning, monitoring, and evaluation. Elsewhere, Voss notes that poor problem solvers "tend to be inappropriately satisfied with their own solutions" and that successful problem solving "includes a critical component which permits the individual to evaluate the quality of a solution" (in press a). This critical component would seem to be a metacognitive one. In a sense, metacognitive knowledge and strategies enable us to step outside ourselves and examine our own thinking. In so doing, we can gain awareness and control instead of proceeding blindly.

Similar evidence of the importance of metacognitive strategy is provided by a study of adult problem solving in an everyday situation (Goldin and Hayes-Roth 1980, cited in Brown and others 1983, 113). Participants were presented with a fictional but realistic situation and asked to describe how they would plan to handle a list of errands given insufficient time to complete them all. Compared to the poor problem-solvers, the good solvers evidenced more metacognitive awareness and deliberate control over their own planning and more use of relevant world knowledge not presented in the problem statement. They also showed greater flexibility in attending to and integrating various elements of the problem, and they were more likely to make abstract or global decisions that incorporated more specific ones. Poor solvers were less likely to display these metacognitive planning and evaluation strategies.

The metacognitive strategies that have been shown to have a substantial positive influence on task performance (cf. Wagner and Sternberg 1984), from recall and comprehension to problem solving and critical thinking, are teachable. Again, the research is more informative with respect to what to teach than how to teach it. The so-called training studies, while focusing on metacognitive strategies to facilitate memory and text comprehension, specifically identifying main ideas (Brown 1980) and summarizing (Brown, Campione, and Day 1981), do offer some suggestions for metacognitive instruction to enhance critical thinking.

A major feature of successful metacognitive instruction identified by Brown and her colleagues is that it provides for gradual ceding of control from teacher to students. Initially, the teacher describes, demonstrates, and prompts the target metacognitive strategy, say self-questioning, to check one's reasoning. Over time and with practice and
informative feedback, students are expected to begin to question them-
selves instead of depending on the teacher to ask them questions about
their reasoning. Teachers relinquish some control, and students assume
more responsibility for thinking critically. The goal is to teach stu-
dents to "think dialectically in the sense of the Socratic teaching meth-
od" (Brown 1978, 156) so that they take on the Socratic interrogation
role for themselves. The long-range goal of purposeful dialectic think-
ing is well stated by Brown and others (1983, 124).

Mature thinkers are those who provide conflict trials for
themselves, practice thought experiments, question their own
basic assumptions, provide counterexamples to their own rules,
and so on...the child learns not only how to get a particular
task done independently but also learns how to set about learning
new problems. In other words, the child learns how to learn.

Toward this end, it is preferable to focus on one or a few
metacognitive strategies at a time rather than introduce several at
once. Otherwise, thinking about one's thinking may become so cumbersome
that it interferes with thinking about the target problem. Brown (1978,
156) suggests four criteria for strategy selection. Any metacognitive
strategy selected for instruction should have "transituational
applicability" and real-life counterparts. In other words, it should be
useful in a range of situations in and out of school. Further, the
strategy should be seen by students as "a reasonable activity that
works," and its component processes should be sufficiently identified
and understood so that appropriate instruction can be designed. The
last criterion may be the most difficult to meet with respect to
critical thinking since there are so few natural history studies of
critical thinking to draw on. One possible self-questioning
metacognitive strategy for critical thinking in social studies is
suggested for illustration.

If we have encouraged students to question the ideas they encounter,
and they have learned what kinds of questions to ask in different
problematic situations, then metacognitive instruction would focus on
managing one's critical thinking by means of self-questioning. For
example, with a problematic situation such as two political candidates'
conflicting proposals for reducing unemployment, students might learn to
ask themselves planning questions such as:
  What's the problem? Why is that a problem?
  What's my goal?
  What should I do? (What question should I ask?)
  Where should I start? Then what?

Whiling raising and pursuing their questions, students might learn to ask themselves monitoring questions such as:
  How am I doing?
  What else do I need to know?
  How well have I accomplished my goal?

When self-evaluation yields less than satisfactory outcomes, students might learn to ask themselves debugging questions such as:
  How/why did this happen?
  What can I do about it?

For manageability, one segment of the strategy (planning, monitoring, and debugging) would be introduced at a time. Further, students would be encouraged to modify, add, or delete self-questions as appropriate to the situation. At no time would this or any other metacognitive strategy be treated as a formula to be applied mechanistically.

The actual instruction of metacognitive strategies advised by Brown and her colleagues on the basis of their experimental training studies is specific and explicit. Instruction involves an interactive dialogue that communicates what to do, how to do it, and why it is worth doing. What and how are explained and demonstrated, and opportunities for guided student practice in different, meaningful contexts are provided. When and where the strategy can be used is also made explicit to promote transfer. (For descriptions of such instruction, see Brown 1980, Brown and others 1981, and Brown and others 1983). While the possibility of incidental learning is not dismissed, the emphasis is on the systematic instruction that many students seem to need.

These guidelines for metacognitive instruction are strikingly similar to those offered for cognitive instruction for critical thinking throughout previous sections of this review. They also are consistent with the findings of the social studies teaching methods research that has compared more and less explicit skills instruction (e.g., Curtis 1980, Glenn, and Ellis 1982, Glenn, Gregg, and Tipple 1982, Whitehead 1978). Cognitive and metacognitive knowledge and strategies, and instruction in their behalf, are compatible and complementary within the social studies context.
Toward Critical Thinking and Teaching

Having examined persistent myths that impede critical thinking and teaching, and recent cognitive process research and theory that provide alternatives to these myths, we now return to the question of teaching for critical thinking. The research provides considerable support for the opportunity/support/instruction framework that was presented earlier, particularly the instruction component. It is suggestive of what should be taught and how instruction should be carried out. Regarding the latter, in addition to what to do and how to do it, instruction should be specific and explicit regarding where or when and why to do it.

In sketching the outlines of a cognitive theory of instruction, Olson (1976) distinguishes among instructional modeling, muddling, and medduling. Medduling is the specific, explicit kind of instruction that has received the most attention in this review. Olson notes that some complex knowledge probably cannot be taught directly. Indirect instruction by means of modeling and trial/error/feedback muddling are appropriate in these cases. Teacher modeling of critical thinking, particularly the modeling of skepticism and questioning, reasoning, and willingness to entertain alternatives, can be enhanced by accompanying commentary about what one is doing or has done, i.e., thinking aloud about one's thinking. Feedback on students' muddling is most helpful when it involves specific prompts (telling, showing, or demonstrating) or questions to assist students in figuring out their errors and generating alternative. The external form of instruction (e.g., whole class or individual, with or without visual aids or computer assistance) is probably less important than the extent to which and how the instruction facilitates students' cognitive processing (see, e.g., Tobias 1982).

In sum, the research reviewed here clearly indicates that we can teach for critical thinking in social studies and that our students can learn to think critically. We can encourage critical thinking by providing opportunity and support for student questioning and by providing instruction as needed for raising meaningful questions and pursuing well reasoned answers. While specific teaching suggestions have been noted throughout this review, no blueprints are offered. Given our still limited knowledge, any blueprint for critical thinking and teaching would rest on a precarious foundation. More important, by its very nature,
critical thinking resists prefabrication. Teaching for critical thinking requires knowledgeable, thoughtful social studies teachers, not skillful technicians. The value of research and theory to such teachers is interpretive more than instrumental (Cornbleth 1982). That is, research and theory are used to refine or restructure conceptual frameworks for observing and interpreting classroom events and enlarging one's knowledge and comprehension of classroom phenomena. On this basis, teachers make their own situation-specific and appropriate decisions rather than relying on the dubious prescriptions of others.

Social studies researchers interested in critical thinking might also consider interpretive uses of cognitive research and theory. Among the implications are the previously noted challenges to behaviorist and developmental assumptions. In addition to rethinking these assumptions and conventional experimental procedures, we might direct energies to critical ethnographic studies of cognitive and metacognitive processes and instruction for critical thinking in social studies contexts, what Erickson (1982) describes as "taught cognitive learning in its immediate environments" (cf. Davidson and Klich 1984). Such naturalistic histories could well inform social studies teaching for critical thinking.

The ideas and suggestions that have been presented in this review can be used to evaluate and, if necessary, modify current teaching practices, curriculum, and research in social studies teacher education as well as elementary and secondary classrooms. Too often and for too long, our practices have reflected and sustained dysfunctional beliefs. Now, we have the knowledge to question these beliefs and pursue alternatives. We will never have all the answers about teaching for critical thinking or other social studies goals. There are at least two reasons why this is and will continue to be so. One is that conditions change and old answers rarely fit new circumstances. Two is that there will always be new questions. Instead of fretting about our inescapably human and social situation of change and uncertainty, we can begin to act on what is known and seek further knowledge through research and practice.
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NOTES

1. Cognitive process research is also sometimes referred to as cognitive psychology, cognitive science, and cognitive information processing.

2. I do not mean to imply that knowledge about critical thinking and how it might be fostered is sufficient to transform classroom practice. There are political, social, and epistemological as well as pedagogical reasons why critical thinking has not been established as an integral aspect of schooling.

3. This section draws heavily on papers and materials from the Pittsburgh Critical Thinking Project in which I have been working since 1983, particularly an unpublished working paper, "Some Thoughts about Critical Thinking, Thinking about Critical Thought," that Tom Popkewitz and I developed; An Orientation to the Critical Thinking Project (Critical Thinking Project Steering Committee 1983); and A Proposal for Measuring Critical Thinking (Moss and Petrosky 1983).

4. C. Wright Mills' The Sociological Imagination (1959) has been particularly influential. Also see: Berger (1974); Bernstein (1976); Cherryholmes (1982); Dewey (1910/1933); Passmore (1967); Popkewitz (1977); Toulmin (1982). John E. McPeck's Critical Thinking and Education (1981) provided strong post hoc support for the views expressed here.

5. This account of teaching for critical thinking is necessarily tentative and nonprescriptive. It is intended as a framework, consistent with the present conception of critical thinking, for examining the research that might inform our efforts to promote critical thought. I will return to it later in summarizing implications of the research.

6. Elaboration of the nature and function of myth and its appeal in education is provided elsewhere (Cornbleth, in progress). On myth
more generally, see, for example: Barthes (1957/1972); Eliade (1963); Toulmin (1982).

7. Drawing on Aristotle, Wiggins (1978) makes a similar case with respect to "practical reasoning." According to Aristotle, "the openness, indefiniteness and unforeseeability of the subject matter of praxis" resists codification. Wiggins suggests that those who seek "a system of rules" hope "to spare themselves some of the agony of thinking and all of the torment of feeling and understanding that is actually involved in reasoned deliberation" (p. 150). From a psychological perspective, Shulman (1984) has also argued against reductionism and the assumption of universality with respect to reasoning and rationality. Formulaic approaches to reasoning and critical thinking are increasingly eschewed in both philosophical and psychological work [see McPeck (1981) for a particularly detailed and devastating critique].

8. See Toulmin (1958) on the illogic of applying formal logic to practical reasoning and McPeck (1981) on the inadequacy of informal or formal logic as a basis for critical thought.


10. Problem-solving may be a misnomer in the context of the social sciences and social problems. Not only are "solutions" tentative and tenuous, but the "solution process" seems to involve reasoning more than solving by selecting, applying, and testing algorithms as is the case with most well-structured problems. Further, the representation, solution, and justification of social problems is dependent upon prior beliefs and values as well as empirical and conceptual knowledge. In addition to a knowledge base, we bring our world views to bear on social problems. Thus, experts in the studies by Voss and others (1983) differed in their interpretation of the nature of the Soviet agriculture problem and in the substance of the solutions and arguments they offered in response.

11. In this respect, the cognitive perspective is compatible with the social construction of knowledge perspective. An important difference is the cognitive researcher's focus on the individual and relative neglect of the role of social context and culture in shaping individual
meanings and actions. On the limits of current cognitive psychology, see Estes (1978) and Sampson (1981).

REFERENCES

Some of the items listed below are followed by an ED number. This identifies the item as an ERIC document. ERIC documents are indexed and abstracted in the monthly index, Resources in Education (RIE). For ordering information, readers should check the ED number in RIE.


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Cornbleth, C. In progress. "The Persistence of Myth in Curriculum and Schooling."


Social studies involves the integration of knowledge from the social science disciplines into the content that deals with human relations and social phenomena. Wesley, who was one of the founders of the National Council for the Social Studies, in an interview with Shermis and Barth (1978, 37-38), talked about the nature of social studies:

I always started my concept with stick figures on the blackboard. I draw one big stick figure and say...He isn't material for social studies....So, now I'm ready to draw another stick figure and to draw a sort of semi-circle between the two, and I make a big 'R' between the two....the R is Relationship. Now, then, I call for social studies teachers and say...we're ready, we've got something for you to operate on. We've got some relationships started...we've got some interaction....And then don't forget this--all these relationships...are not harmonious...beautiful and appealing. These relationships may even be hostile....well, now, you add all these 'R's' together and you're ready to define the social studies. The social studies are studies that are directly concerned with human relations.

A focus on relationships involving people and their environments at the early childhood and elementary school levels may enable children to understand better the world in which they live and participate. Decisions involving the selection and implementation of social studies curriculum for these children require an understanding of the ways in which children form a more complex social perspective, develop a values and belief system, and acquire knowledge and skills. These components are reflected in the recent statement from the National Council for the Social Studies on the essentials of the social studies and the statement from the early childhood committee of NCSS on social studies for young children.

The purpose of this chapter is to present recent research related to these major components so that social studies educators are more informed in making teaching decisions involving content, pupil behaviors, and
teacher behaviors, and are more aware of research potentials in early childhood and elementary social studies. The selection of studies to be included in this chapter reflects an eclectic approach to social studies for young children. The chapter is not organized around a particular theory or set of principles, but instead has been organized around the general areas that the profession has indicated are important to early childhood/elementary social studies.

Social studies for young children is perceived as a field of study, rather than a discipline. With this perception, theory and research from a number of disciplines can be examined for their contributions to this field. This chapter incorporates findings from developmental psychologists, social psychologists, and educators in its attempt to provide guidance for teaching decision making in the "what" and "how" of learning. Elkind (1982, 7) indicates that "clearly children learn in many different ways and what mode of learning is employed depends very much upon what is to be learned." He goes on to caution about the separation of form and content.

Psychologists concerned with social learning are repeating the mistake that was made in studies of nonsocial learning. Namely, they are ignoring the content of what is to be learned. Each position wants to arrive at a set of principles that will describe all social learning regardless of content... To abstract learning processes from the material to be learned is a distortion of both.

This eclectic approach is evident, for example, in the following section on developing a social perspective. Different theories on how social learning takes place are examined; Bandura's social learning approach involving observation and modeling, Turiel's position on the construction of social knowledge by an individual, and Erickson's dynamic developmental approach all reflect different theories on how social learning comes about. Each has implications for early childhood/elementary social studies.

The scope of this chapter does not permit coverage of all aspects of early childhood and elementary social studies. The topics selected for inclusion reflect those areas, deemed most critical by the authors, that link people, place, and time relationships to ways in which children process information and acquire knowledge. The first part of this chapter examines the literature on the development of a social perspec-
tive, a concept of self, and the concept of racial awareness. The importance of social learning is related to the formation of values. The readers are directed to James Leming's chapter on values, which focuses on political, moral, and citizenship issues and includes sections on the teaching of values and discussion on biases in social studies materials and classrooms.

The next section of this chapter examines spatial and temporal relationships as they relate to early childhood and elementary social studies. Developing understanding, including concept formation, verbal and textual processing of information, and retrieval of information, is then covered. This information is related to Cornbleth's chapter, "Critical Thinking and Cognitive Processes," which extends the work of Martorella (1977) on instructional variables and learner characteristics as they are related to cognition, problem-solving, reasoning, and critical thinking.

There are some differences in perspective between this chapter on early childhood/elementary social studies and the Cornbleth chapter on thinking processes. While there are limitations to stage theory and while research is needed on their application to social studies for young children, the research can provide some general guidance in making teaching decisions. Cornbleth cautions against using age-developmental stages to determine critical thinking capacity across situations and subject areas. These cautions extend to young children and need to be considered as one makes decisions about early childhood/elementary social studies or plans research investigations involving differences in student performance for children at these age levels. There is also some overlap in the discussion of schema in the two chapters. This chapter relates schema theory to information processing and concept formation. Cornbleth's chapter presents schema in terms of critical thinking and cognitive processes. Further research on these perspectives and others as they relate to social studies and young children are needed.

The final section of this chapter contains implications for further research in early childhood and elementary social studies.
I. Social Perspective

The focus on social relationships as a central theme of early childhood and elementary social studies is dependent upon knowledge of how children develop a social perspective. Social knowledge is primarily derived from the interactions of an individual with the social environment; the social studies are directly concerned with the human relationships resulting from these interactions. Bandura (1977) has identified a number of distinctive features of social learning theory that are related to the integration of social knowledge and the formation of human relationships.

1. Self-regulatory process - Individuals themselves serve as the principle agents of their own change.
2. Symbolic functions - The extraordinary capacity of humans to use symbols enabled them to represent events, to analyze their conscious experiences, to communicate with others at any distance in time and space, to plan, to create, to imagine, and to engage in foresightful action...
3. Observation and experience - Human thought, affect, and behavior can be markedly influenced by observation, as well as by direct experience.
4. Reciprocal interactions - Cognitive, behavioral, and environmental determinants. Neither casts people into the role of powerless objects controlled by environmental forces nor free agents who can become whatever they choose. Both people and their environments are reciprocal determinants of each other (p. vii).

Social knowledge can be "transmitted to the individual by other persons, so that the knowledge acquired is dependent on what is transmitted, or it can be taken to mean that it is knowledge constructed by individuals specifically about social phenomena" (Turiel 1983, 1).

The construction of social knowledge by an individual is based upon developing understanding of the social world through making inferences and forming theories about experienced social events. Individuals form "coherent systems of thinking, including discriminations, in their understanding of the diverse elements of their social world. Social judgments are neither random nor simply reflective of external content....As an example, children's concepts of games as constitutive systems and of game rules as definitional of the context reflect the application of analysis and reason to a social realm" (Turiel 1983, 217).
Children can also develop social perspectives by modeling the behaviors transmitted to them by others. Denzin (1982, 31) has identified categories of significant others in the lives of young children: the socio-legal, from the immediate family of young children; the socio-others, which might include extended family babysitters; the coequal, the playmates or peer group that has a strong socialization influence; child care experts, such as the doctor and teacher; and the public place others, such as the mailman or store clerks.

Much of the behavior of children is learned observationally by modeling the behavior of others. There are a number of component processes that relate to observational learning that can affect the child's social learning of the modeled behavior. Attentional processes, retentional processes, motor reproduction processes, and motivational processes influence the child's learning by observation. Not all observed behavior is modeled; however, a model "who repeatedly demonstrates desired responses, instructs others to reproduce the behavior, prompts them physically when they fail, and then rewards them when they succeed, may eventually produce matching responses in most people" (Bandura 1977, 29). On the other hand "failure of an observer to match the behavior of a model may result from any of the following: not observing the relevant activities, inadequately coding modeled events for memory representatives, failing in retaining what was learned, physical inability to perform, or experiencing insufficient incentives" (p. 29).

The social lives, social environments, and resulting social interactions of children are constantly changing. Likewise their social structures are not static but dynamic, as can be seen in movement of children from an egocentric orientation to a more cooperative orientation based upon their perceptions of themselves as partners in the social structure. These changes are reflected in Erickson's (1963) eight ages of man, two of which are particularly relevant to early childhood and elementary social studies. At stage three, Initiative vs. Guilt, children have an abundance of energy and interact with life. Children develop a sense of initiative gained from their mastery of spoken language and increased mobility. They engage in play with others and are able to create a world of fantasy and make-believe. This social mobility and these new social interactions expand the social roles available to the
children and permit new role initiatives. The social institutions offer children at this age "an economic ethos, in the form of ideal adults recognizable by their uniforms and their functions and fascinating enough to replace the heroes of picture books and fairy tales" (Erickson 1963, 258). At the same time, the development of a sense of guilt at this age could result in an inhibition of role taking and a lessening of identity with significant others.

Stage four, Industry vs. Inferiority, is the school-age stage. During this stage, children begin to identify the tasks and responsibilities associated with the expanded role identities that they have acquired. School and work become dominant in their thinking, and they begin to develop a sense of differential opportunity. They also begin to develop a sense of their own effectiveness while at the same time they start to realize the danger that if people accept "work as [their] only obligation, and 'what works' as [their] only criterion of worthwhileness, [they] may become the conformist and thoughtless slave of [their] technology and those who are in a position to exploit it" (Erickson 1963, 261). These feelings then may result in promoting a sense of inferiority.

The changing social structures and social perspectives of children are influenced by the child's own changing cognitions, their peer groups, the adults in their lives, and their environment. There are a number of emerging themes relating to a child's development of a social perspective.

1. Competency by Age 3. Children are not viewed as passive recipients of adult socialization. Rather, children are seen as linguistically, imaginatively, and interpersonally competent by age 3. By that age, children successfully negotiate peer interactions, express complexity in their verbal utterances, and exact considerable power in their relations with adults, peers, and siblings.

2. The Role of Adults. Far from being omnipotent socialization agents, adults are seen, however, as necessary to children's social development by virtue of their superior knowledge and experience in the world. Adults are particularly necessary in constructing favorable milieus for social experience including providing adequate time and space for close, emotionally supportive interactions....Moreover, by using language that addresses their self-aware cognitive processing of immediate, shared experiences, teachers and parents create a context of interpreting the world.

3. The Role of Peers. Peers, especially close friends who are age mates and the same sex are vigorous, highly salient foils
against whom the child can bounce a wide range of feelings, interpretations and actions.

4. The Importance of Social Milieu. The time for considering children's social lives and social development as though they occur in a vacuum is over....The cultural, historical, and economic contexts all define the child-rearing milieu and shape the pattern of child rearing in subtle and potentially harmful ways for larger numbers of children in this and in every changing society (Borman 1982, xvi-xvii).

In summary, social learning theory can help us understand how children develop a social perspective through the use of language and reciprocal interactions. Social knowledge is both a product of a child's construction of social phenomena and a result of observational learning modeled from others. The child lives in a changing social world and is influenced by these changes in the development of a social perspective.

Self Concept

The conceptualization of the self involves an awareness and understanding of one's own characteristics and the characteristics of others. It includes "all those aspects of the perceptual field to which I refer when we say 'I' or 'Me'. It is the organization of perception about self which seems to the individual to be who he is" (Combs, Avila, and Purkey 1971, 39). The focus on "I" establishes the individuality of a person. It is based upon the separation of one's self from society; it permits the individual to accept or reject society's evaluations of the self, and determines the value of the social world to the individual. The "Me" involves a social self; it includes recognition of social relationships like teammates or best friends, and group regulation such as cooperation or recognition of classroom rules. The conceptualization of the self then "is a function of the relationship of the structures of self and the others' actions. Thus, self-knowledge is both a consequence of interaction and also helps to determine that interaction" (Lewis 1979, 418).

Damon (1983) makes a distinction between the individual's self-knowledge and the individual's self-esteem. Self-knowledge is "everything that one knows about one's own experience in the world as an individual, about one's own unique position and status in the social order, about one's personal characteristics, and about one's identity over time.
Self-esteem "is an evaluation orientation toward the self, generally assessed in terms of its positive or negative value" (p. 225). Self-esteem is related to ways in which an individual successfully adapts to changing conditions. Measures of self-esteem with children may employ rather general statements such as "On the whole, I am satisfied with myself" or specific statements such as "I'm popular with kids my own age." In general, researchers have found that children with high self-esteem come from homes in which the parents exercise control in a nonpermissive but democratic manner, communicate clearly with the child, and encourage the child to display affection and other emotions. Children with low self-esteem are often those who really have had trouble in school, are unpopular, or act in embarrassing ways" (p. 227).

The majority of studies examining the concept of self have focused on self-esteem. Although there are methodological problems with the study of the self that deal with the nature of self-report, study design, and instrumentation (Wylie 1974a), and that question the relationships between self-esteem and the changing developmental nature of self-understanding (Damon and Hart 1982), there is a body of evidence linking self-concept to school performance and social relationships. It should be cautioned, however, that the vast majority of these studies are associative in nature and do not permit the establishment of cause/effect relationships. The evidence from earlier reviews of the literature seems to indicate:

1. Self-concept is related to academic achievement at each grade level, and changes in one seem to be associated with changes in the other (Purkey 1970).

2. Some association exists between children's perceptions of themselves and their perceptions of their parents' attitudes toward them (Wylie 1974b).

3. Parents of children with high self-esteem are concerned and attentive toward their children, structure their children's environment along lines they believe to be proper and appropriate, and permit relatively greater freedom within these structures. The limits and rules they establish are likely to have enhancing and facilitating effects and
their performance within these limits is likely to be moderate, tolerant, and generally civilized (Coopersmith 1967).

Self-concept influences one's behavior by acting as a filtering system involving one's perceptions and one's construction of reality. Several recent studies have emphasized the multifaceted nature of self-concept related to academic behavior. Shavelson and Bolus (1982) tested the assumption of a multifaceted self-concept with 99 junior high school age children. Based upon this study and extensive reviews of the literature they concluded: "Self-concept is a multifaceted construct. General self-concept can be interpreted as distinct but correlated with academic self-concept. Furthermore, subject-matter-specific facets of self-concept can be interpreted as distinct but correlated with another and with academic and general self-concept" (p. 16). They found that self-concept is hierarchical in nature with general self-concept at the apex and subject-matter-specific self-concept the base. Self-concept and school achievement are more highly correlated when the measure of self-concept is more subject matter specific. It should be cautioned, however, that although there is some evidence that self-concept becomes increasingly stable toward the apex of the hierarchy, their data did not support this assumption. Likewise, the "data did not support the interpretation that changes in self-concept operate from the base of the hierarchy upward. Rather, an upward operating model could not be distinguished from a downward operating model" (p. 16).

Shavelson's hierarchical model was applied to seven dimensions of self-concept with 958 fifth- and sixth-grade students in Australia (Marsh, Parker, and Smith 1983). The dimensions included in this study were physical abilities/sports, physical appearance, relationships with peers, relationships with parents, reading, mathematics, school subjects (student ratings of their ability and enjoyment/interest in all school subjects), total non-academic self-concept, total academic self-concept, and total self-concept. Their findings support the multifaceted hypothesis of self-concept. They found that "academic self-concept in this study was substantially correlated with academic achievement, teacher ratings of academic ability, and teacher ratings of student self-concept in the academic areas" (p. 72). Marsh, Parker, and Smith also found that academic abilities tended to be uncorrelated with non-academic di-
dimensions of self-concept. Academic self-concept was more highly correlated with students who had high academic ability or who were of high socio-economic status.

Osborne and LeGette (1982) examined the variables of sex, race, grade level, and social class differences as they were related to global and specific self-concept measures. They employed three instruments to measure self-concept: the Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale (Piers 1969), the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory, Form A (Coopersmith 1975), and the Self-Concept of Ability Scale (Brookover and others 1962). They found few differences on global measure but substantial differences on the specific self-concept measures. They concluded "that even when total mean scores are quite similar for the various sub-groups of subjects on a given self-concept instrument, there may be rather dramatic differences in sub-scale scores for the sex, race, age, or social class groupings. The absence of significant differences in mean global self-concept scores can, therefore, be deceptive" (p. 200).

Several other studies tend to confirm that children's school behavior is related to the child's self-concept. Stevens and Pihl (1982) had teachers identify their "top" students and the students they thought were "at risk" for failure in the next grade from 1,075 students in the sixth grade. They found that the "most able students not only have better auditory comprehension, spoken language, better knowledge of time and space, and higher verbal and non-verbal competence, they also display more competent personal and social behavior than do the 'at risk' group. They are less anxious, have higher self-concepts, and feel more attractive and popular" (p. 544). There was a significant correlation between final grades and self-concept. Yeger and Miezitis (1980) also found that children with low self-concepts had more academic problems and were more socially withdrawn than were children with high self-concepts.

In a study of self-concept and higher level thought processes in minority children, Campbell (1981) found a positive relationship between self-concept and reading achievement, listening comprehension achievement, science achievement, and social studies achievement. A positive relationship was also found between self-concept and four Piagetian tasks dealing with length, area, weight, and volume. Campbell concluded that
"self-concept enhancement is more a function of high level thought than it is low level thought" (p. 203).

Self-concept has also been linked to academic achievement and locus of control. A study of academic achievers/underachievers (Kanoy III, Johnson, and Kanoy 1980) found no differences between the two groups on a total self-concept score but significant differences between the two groups on the intellectual and school status self-concept subscales. High achievers also scored significantly higher on internal locus of control than did the underachievers. The underachievers have stronger feelings of control by others and may not perceive themselves in control of their own learning relative to their peers. It may be that perceptions of self, perceptions of control, and academic achievement, in effect, reinforce each other.

There may be a circular effect to developing a self-concept in that "it corroborates and supports the already existing beliefs about self and so tends to maintain and reinforce its own existence" (Combs, Avila, Purkey 1971, 44). Gifted children often have lower expectations for success in their social endeavors compared to their academic expectations. Ross and Parker (1980) in a study of 147 gifted fifth- through eighth-graders found that for both male and female students their academic self-concepts were significantly higher than were their social self-concepts. This may be due in part to their efforts to maintain and reinforce their already advanced academic skills, or it may be due in part to their perception of being "different" from their peers, supporting their belief that indeed they are different socially from others.

There is evidence that children have realistic perceptions of their capabilities. In a study of 20 second-grade and 20 third-grade students, Cauley and Murray (1962, 474) tested the hypothesis that a child "as a knower of himself might allow him to evaluate simultaneously the effects of two familiar attributes of himself, namely, his ability and his effect, on an ordinary school task (reading words)." Children were asked to read and define words that might be found in a reader at their grade level. Some of these words were easy, while others were hard; they were to do their best. After being given these randomly chosen words, the children were asked six questions, including: Why do you think you did well or poorly? What does that mean? Could it mean that you tried hard,
were smart, just knew the words, or were lucky? Then they were asked eight additional questions probing at their perceptions of ability and effort as they relate to performance. Those who failed weighed low ability less heavily than low effort. Children also gave the impression that they were more likely to succeed if they tried harder than if they were older and knew more. The perceptions of the children in terms of ability and effort were compared to a group of adults. The responses of the two groups were very similar. Cauley and Murray (1982, 479) concluded that "these young children do seem to be able to reason in a relatively sophisticated adult way about the separate and combined efforts of their ability and effort in their success and failure. They are able to discriminate attribution, and their attributions are similar in success and failure."

There has been some question as to the accuracy of young children's rating of their own self-concept and their ratings by their peers. Stipek (1981) tested children's ratings of classmates' abilities. She compared the perceptions of 32 kindergarten and first-grade students with 32 second- and third-grade students. Children most often used an example of a specific task that they could perform such as counting to 100 for rating their own ability and most often made comments about work habits when rating their own peers. The perceptions of their own ability by the younger group were not supported by either the teacher's ratings of their achievement or the ratings from their peers. The older group's perceptions reflected both the teacher's perceptions of their ability and their classmates' ratings of their competence. There was some evidence that behaviors such as effort, following directions, and completing tasks have some bearing on a child's perception of ability. This may have some implications for teaching in that comments about poor work habits by the teacher may be perceived as a negative reflection on ability by the young child. It would also appear that, as expected, "children begin to assess critically their peers' performance at an earlier age than they do their own performance" (p. 409).

Just as children have reasonably accurate perceptions of their peers' abilities, so do teachers' judgments reflect an accurate assessment of a student's ability and self-concept (Marsh, Parker, and Smith 1983; Stevens and Pihl 1982; Yeger and Miezitis 1990). Self-concept is
in part a learned behavior that can be influenced by a significant other, such as a teacher. Children learn who and what they are by interactions with others and through these "interactions with such people, each of us learns that he is liked or unliked, acceptable or unacceptable, a success or a failure, or respectable or of no account" (Combs, Avila, and Purkey 1971, 48).

If self-concept is indeed a socially learned behavior, then some teaching behaviors should be effective in promoting positive self-concepts. Schempp and others (1983) found that when children were encouraged to share in classroom decision making that it had a more positive effect on the children's self-concept than being in a teacher-dominated classroom. In another study (Benninga and others 1981), students in grades one, two, and three rated 23 different teachers. Two different teaching typologies seemed to emerge. One group of teachers appeared to like teaching, was more democratic, and felt responsible for a positive classroom climate. The second type had a high self-regard but was also more authoritative and controlling of children. Teachers who expressed a greater need to control children were perceived by the children as having less rapport with the children. Some teachers promoted a more positive self-esteem as reflected by children's comments such as "She likes me" or "She thinks I can do a lot on my own." Those teachers that were rated as highly interactive and not negative were also rated highly in fostering a positive self-esteem.

The relationship between student perceptions of self and the effectiveness of teacher training was investigated by Nummela and Avila (1980). In this study, teachers were given a packaged program on teacher effectiveness training. The students in the study were assigned to either the treatment group (three teachers) or a control group (three teachers) which did not receive the teacher effectiveness training. The students were all enrolled in the laboratory school in grades three to five and were pre- and post-tested on the How I See Myself Scale (Gordon 1968). The students in the classes with teachers who were given the treatment showed a significant increase in a positive self-concept over the students in the control group.

The research seems to indicate that some teacher behaviors may be influential in promoting a positive self-concept in children. It shou.
cautioned, however, that the research on teacher effectiveness as it relates to the development of self-knowledge is limited and that causal relationships have not been established. It could be argued that teacher behaviors, related to motivation, retention, reinforcement, and transfer that have been substantiated in the literature on learning, would have application to the promotion of positive self-concepts. This would be particularly true for those principles that are applied to specific academic performance to promote successful learning by students. This area holds particular promise for research in early childhood and elementary social studies.

Recent investigations in the area of self-understanding have focused upon developmental differences in the acquisition of self-knowledge. Damon and Hart (1982) have reviewed the research and indicate that children at different age levels exhibit different traits associated with a concept of self. They argue for a cognitive basis for self-understanding that is experienced in age-related characteristics. They propose a "systematic developmental model in which changes along multiple dimensions are shown to interact with one another in the course of ontogenesis" (p. 860). The model proposes four levels of development (infancy and early childhood, middle and late childhood, early adolescence, and late adolescence) interacted with the concept of "Me" and the concept of "I". The "Me" is comprised of the physical, active, social, and psychological self-constituents, and the "I" is based upon continuity, distances, volition, and self-reflection. Children at all ages have some knowledge of the constituent self-schemes but in the course of development each self-scheme changes in character. For example the social self develops along these lines:

1. Infancy and Early Childhood (Physical Self) - Fact of membership in particular social relations or groups.

2. Middle and Late Childhood (Active Self) - Activities that are considered with reference to reactions (approval and disapproval) of others.

3. Early Adolescence (Social Self) - Social-personality characteristics.
4. Late Adolescence (Psychological Self) - Moral or personal choices concerning social relations or social personality characteristics. (Damon and Hart 1982, 860)

A particular aspect of the self dominates and serves as the organizing principle for each level. Each of the four aspects of self-knowledge (physical, active, social, and psychological) are present at each level, but they:

share characteristics deriving from the dominant conception of self at that level. At level 1, all self-understanding is to some extent physicalistic in the sense that it is chiefly descriptive of surface features. That is, even when concerned with the self's actions, social interaction or emotions, it treats these only taxonomically and descriptively, as if they were physical objects. (Damon and Hart 1982, 861).

Damon and Hart argue that their proposed model of development of self-understanding can be empirically tested but that "existing instruments for measuring self-concept and self-esteem in children and adolescents are gravely in error, since none of these takes into account the developmental transformation outlined on this review" (p. 862). They propose that assessment measures must take into account the changing nature of self-understanding, such as "when young children are involved, test items should focus on the body and its physical activities; whereas, with adolescents, items must focus on the social and psychological aspects of self, and/or nature of the self's unique, volitional, and self-reflective experience" (p. 862).

In summary, the literature on self-concept seems to indicate that it is a multifaceted construct that may very well be developmental in nature. School performance is related to self-concept although causal relationships have not been established. Both children and teachers seem to be able to assess accurately other students' abilities and efforts. Since a concept of self is a learned behavior, there ought to be specific teaching behaviors that foster a more positive self-concept in children. These teaching behaviors in early childhood and elementary social studies need further research.

Concept of Race

One of the earliest concepts of others that children develop is that of race. The development of a concept of race is a complex process
in which children exhibit racial awareness characteristics that are age-related. Semaj (1980) hypothesized that impersonal cognitive factors were precursors to social cognitive factors and that social cognition was a precursor to the development of racial preference and affective responses. His hypotheses were partially confirmed, but the relations between social cognition and social affect were more complex than originally hypothesized. Nevertheless, Semaj did find that the characteristics children exhibited were age-related. By age four or five, children can classify people according to ethno-racial groups but do not understand the basis for these classifications nor the permanent nature of these ethno-racial classifications. The child's "ethno-racial evaluations are independent on self-evaluations since self-group interaction is not fully comprehended" (p. 76). Between approximately six and nine years of age the child develops the acquisition of conservation behaviors which is related to the development of racial constancy. Classification skills improve and a better understanding of self and group develops. The child's racial identity group is perceived as "better than the out-group" (p. 76). This egocentric orientation tends to disappear towards the end of this state and an increase in social cognitive development occurs between ages eight and eleven. There are both qualitative and quantitative changes in social affect related to race awareness where "both cognitive and other experiential factors improve the child's perception of social reality" (p. 77).

Semaj (1980) also found that young children had difficulty differentiating between the colors black and white and the concepts of black and white as they are associated with social reality. This finding was also supported by Stabler and others (1982) who investigated children's association of white with good and black with bad. As children became older their differentiation between the colors and their perceptions of people increased. Williams and Morland (1976, 283) contend that the early black/white distinction exhibited by young children "is not primarily racial in its origin, but becomes racial in its effect as children learn about race and their own racial identity." They propose a developmental theory of color and race bias which indicates that the early preference for light over darkness "develops initially as a result of aversive early experiences involving darkness and a positive experience with
light" (p. 281). Once the light/darkness bias is generalized, it may be extended to skin color by general cultural practices, sub-culture practice and familial influences.

There appears to be a developmental sequence in the acquisition of racial attitudes in children. Katz (1976a) has identified eight overlapping, but separable steps in the formation of racial attitudes in children. These series of actions involving the formation of concepts and attitudes are elaborated upon throughout childhood. They occur over a period of approximately ten years in the lives of children with some crystallization of racial attitudes occurring about the end of the elementary school grades. These developments appear to be age-related; however, there is much of the process that is not yet understood. The overlapping progression identified by Katz includes:

1. Early observation of racial cues. These generally occur by about age three and may be based upon chance environmental events.

2. Formation of rudimentary concepts. Once some verbal discrimination takes place then the chances are that a label will be supplied by an older sibling or surrounding adult. These labels may also be accompanied by either positive or negative evaluation comments.

3. Conceptual differentiation. Increased experiences will bring additional opportunities to observe positive and negative examples of the concept and feedback for the child's responses.

4. Recognition of the irrevocability of cues. Some person-cues that the child must learn about are subject to change over time. Size differentials change, but the child must learn that racial cues do not change with age.

5. Consolidation of group concepts. This process normally begins during the latter part of the preschool period and may extend over a considerable period of time. The development of an accurate concept of a racial group requires that the child can correct identify, label, and recognize the immutable nature of group membership.

6. Perceptual elaboration. The process begins in preschool children and continues throughout the elementary grades. Differences among groups may be accentuated whereas differences within a group become diminished.
7. Cognitive elaboration. This is the process by which early cognitive attitudes become the more complex racial attitudes associated with older children and adults. A child's school experiences with other-race children and adults, and the attitudes expressed by teachers and peers are important in the elaboration of racial attitudes. The early grade school years may be important focal points in attitude transition.

8. Attitude crystallization. This probably occurs during the later grade school period and the effects of cultural conditioning are apparent at this level (148-150).

The acquisition of racial concepts in children is a complex and multifaceted process which relates to both cognitive and social development. The studies on school desegregation seem to indicate that when attention is given to the social structure and activities related to social climate then more positive race relationships are exhibited by children. Katz (1976b, 434) in a review of the research indicated elements of positive attitude changes in children.

Changing children's intergroup attitudes may be a less formidable task than changing adult attitudes....Concomitants of success may include a cooperative rather than competitive atmosphere [and]...the structuring of groups in ways that increase the amount of positive contact....Teaching positive association to the color black...and increasing a child's familiarity with other race faces or his ability to differentiate them or his capacity to perceive things from the other's perspective had some generalizability to attitudes toward others.

Studies in the early 1940s indicated that black children not only could identify race differences but they also preferred the lighter skin color (Clark and Clark 1947). Black children growing up in segregated schools were exhibiting a preference for light skin color and did not have a clear perception of their own racial identity. These findings questioned the idea that "schools were separate but equal" and influenced the 1954 Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, that dealt with desegregation.

After almost 30 years of desegregation there is some evidence that this pattern of black children's preferring light skin color is changing (Raba and Grant 1971, Mahan 1976, Reaves and Friedman 1982). This may be due in part to changing societal conditions and in part to increased pride in black children's cultural identity.
To compare changes in racial identification and racial preference over time, Farrell and Olson (1983) repeated the Clarks' studies with present-day black kindergarten children. They found major differences between the groups of light-skinned and dark-skinned black children. In terms of racial identification, 92 percent of the dark-skinned blacks in the Farrell-Olson study correctly identified themselves by race compared to 77 percent of the dark-skinned children in the Clarks' study. For the light-skinned blacks, the identity was 79 percent in the Farrell-Olson study compared to only 20 percent in the Clarks' study. Both of these differences were statistically significant. In terms of positive preference, the dark-skinned children in the Clarks' tended to favor white children (65 percent), as did the light-skinned children (76 percent). In the Farrell-Olson study, both the light (52 percent) and dark-skinned (53 percent) children favored black children. In terms of negative racial preference, the children in the Clark's study overwhelmingly selected black children on the negative preference items (light-skinned, 86 percent and dark-skinned, 77 percent). In the Farrell-Olson study the dark-skinned children selected white children 64 percent of the time as the negative reference. The light-skinned children in their study selected blacks and whites equally. Based upon these findings Farrell and Olson offered both a conclusion and a caution in terms of the social significance.

Thus, it appears that the massive social transformation in our society during the past thirty years may have resulted in a closing of the gap of the racial identification and racial preference patterns (positive and negative) of contemporary black children. Moreover, when compared with the Clarks' dark-skinned and light-skinned black subjects of the 1940's, the contrasts were indeed startling.... Nevertheless, these salutary findings do not obviate the fact that color consciousness and racial preference among children and the larger black community are still issues (p. 293-294).

The social issue of desegregation in the schools is still with us. Studies of children in integrated classrooms indicate that these children have a more accepting attitude toward race than do children in segregated schools (Asher and Singleton 1978, Friedman 1980, Goldstein and others 1979, Stabler and others 1982).

An in-depth examination of the effects of desegregation on the racial tolerance of children in the public schools was conducted by Scott
and McPartland (1982). They analyzed the response of a nation-wide sample of 6,900 students at 9, 13, and 17 years of age who had taken the citizenship test of the National Assessment of Educational Progress. They found that "interracial hostility or intolerance is now a minor problem among the nation's students" (p. 403). In analyzing the data, sex and age were strong correlates of racial attitudes with females and the younger students being more tolerant. There were also some race differences on selected items. Blacks were less tolerant than whites in having someone from a different race cut their hair or be their beautician. Whites were less tolerant than blacks in their willingness to have someone of a different race live in their neighborhood. In general, however, they concluded that "desegregation as a national policy has had positive effects on racial tolerance" (p. 413).

Social climate and social structure may be important variables in desegregation attempts to reduce prejudice in the schools. Rosenfield, Sheehan, Marcus, and Stephan (1981) speculated that the relative status of whites and minorities in the classroom and the percentage of minorities in the desegregated classroom were important structural variables. The amount of hostility encountered from the other ethnic group and the self-esteem of students were important social climate variables to be tested. To test these ideas, they examined the determinants of prejudice in fourth-grade white students during the first year of a court-ordered desegregation plan in a southwestern school district. The ethnic composition of the 767 students in the study was 39 percent white, 46 percent black, 14 percent Mexican-American, and 17 percent Asian and American Indian. The students were tested again after one year of desegregation. They found that:

(a) the higher the percentage of minorities in a class, the more minority friends the white students had; (b) the more the minorities in a class displayed hostility toward whites, the more negative were the whites' attitudes toward minorities in general; (c) the more equal the social class and achievement levels of the whites and minorities in a class, the more minority friends the white students had; and (d) the higher the self-esteem of the whites in a class, the more positive their ethnic attitudes. (p. 17)

Other studies of integration efforts suggest that the activities that take place in the school contribute to more positive race relations. Johnson and Johnson (1982) in examining the behavior of fourth graders
found that cooperative learning experiences promoted more interactions and more positive cross-ethnic attitudes than did competitive or individualistic learning experiences. Dramatic plays focusing on Black, Puerto Rican, Jewish, and Chinese ethnic groups coupled with post-play activities were effective in reducing prejudice in fourth, fifth, and sixth graders (Gimmestad and de Chiara, 1982). The authors concluded that "small ethnically heterogeneous groups of children who are asked to work together on learning tasks where some success is guaranteed tend to develop positive attitudes toward each other" (p. 49). Another study successfully applied reinforcement theory to 5- and 8-year-old students to change their evaluations of color concepts and racial attitudes (Traynham and Witte 1976). It would appear that the social learning principles associated with positive interaction, appropriate modeling behaviors, and reinforcement could be effectively employed to foster more positive race relationships.

It should be cautioned, however, that integrated classrooms by themselves do not create more positive racial attitudes (Speelman and Hoffman 1980). In a study of 38 black and 25 white kindergarten children, Finkelstein and Haskins (1983) found same-color preferences in the children's social behavior. This tendency was greater during recess than it was in classroom activities and increased over the school year. They speculate that these preferences may be due to differences in behavior style between the two groups. Asher and Singleton (1978) found more positive interracial attitudes in integrated classrooms when the measure was one of acceptance rather than friendship.

In a study of sharing behavior, Zinser, Rich, and Bailey (1981) found that younger children preferred to share their bubble gum with a white child more often than with a black child. These young children also preferred to be in school with, sit with, have supper with, and spend the night with a white child over a black child; however, they expressed no difference in their preferences to be in class with black or white children. Third and fifth graders did not express a race preference for the school-related activities (to be in school with, class with, or sit with) but did express a preference to have supper with or to spend the night with a white child.
In summary, children are aware of some of the racial biases found in our society. A study (Kleinke and Nicholson 1979, p. 85) of third-, fourth-, and fifth-grade children showed "clearly that white and black children at all grade levels were aware of the unlikelihood of a mixed-race couple getting married, an opposite-race family buying a house on their street, an opposite-race man joining their church, and an opposite-race woman becoming their father's boss."

The early development of racial bias may be related to family influences. Porter (1971, 14) indicated that "one of the most important agents of attitude transmission is the family." A child with limited experience is influenced by the values of those around him. Children's racial attitudes are often modeled after their parents and show a strong relationship to the racial attitudes of their parents (Griffore and Schweitzer 1983).

The racial identification and preferences of black children appear to be changing. This may be due in part to the changing social conditions and in part to the integration of racial groups. Integration seems to be more successful when attention is given to social climate and social structure. The development of a concept of race is a complex process that is related to cognition and social awareness. This development appears to be age-related, but there are many aspects that we do not yet understand.

II. Spatial and Temporal Understandings of Children

Spatial Understanding

Stoltman (1979) has identified three major research themes that are identifiable with geographic/skill development. The first, known as the classical concerns theme, is centered on cognitive and developmental theory. "Piaget's studies of the child's conception of space and perspective ability have revealed a wealth of information pertinent to maps and mapping in the classroom" (p. 31). This research has emphasized that the teaching and learning of map skills are closely related to the intellectual development of the child.

Jantz (1976) cited research by Copeland (1974) and Mitchell (1934) that was supportive of the contention that children progress through successive stages of mapping capabilities. Hatcher (1983, 311) noted
that, "maps and map reading have been neglected because teachers have been cautious about the appropriate introduction of geographic skills to young children. Moreover, Piaget's work has demonstrated the futility of early introduction of concepts beyond the grasp of young children and their pre-logical thought pattern."

In the past, the classical concerns theme has been greatly influenced by the work of Jean Piaget and Jerome Bruner (Stoltman 1979). Their research has indicated that children's abilities with maps increase proportionately with the development of logical thought. Children pass through stages of ability that eventually culminate in the ability to read, analyze, abstract, and infer information from maps, usually when they attain the formal operations stage. Yet recent work in the second major area of research, children's spatial abilities, has indicated that these widely held assumptions may require further evaluation.

The reluctance of teachers to introduce mapping to young children because they feel the children may lack the appropriate cognitive structures may not be warranted. Hewes (1982) argued that Piaget's theory of development suggests preschool children are ready for instruction in geographic skills when they begin to codify and systematize their world. Hatchet (1983) cited research by Portugaly (1976), Robinson and Spodek (1965), and Blaunt and Stea (1974) that indicated young children possess spatial skills and the ability to abstract information from map symbols.

Park and James (1983) conducted research in this area in an attempt to further define the spatial abilities of young children. They examined first-, third-, and fifth-grade students to determine their ability to process spatial and color information. They reported no evidence that the strategies used by the first-grade subjects to process spatial information was any less sophisticated than those strategies used by the fifth-grade subjects.

Lane and Pearson (1983) did report the possibility of developmental differences in spatial perspective abilities, but they concluded that children, like adults, had the ability to change their attentional focus in reading symbols according to the demands of the task.

Liben, Moore, and Golbeck (1962) studied the spatial abilities of 20 preschoolers and 10 student teachers. The subjects were asked to reconstruct their classroom, using either a model or the actual class-
The adults performed almost perfectly in either situation. The children, however, performed significantly better on the actual classroom task than on the model. Whenever informational cues were provided for the model, the children performed better than they did on the model without cues.

These results caused the author to issue a caution to neo-Piagetian theorists who argue "that young children really have the competencies of older children but that they are unable to demonstrate these competencies because of their inability to meet superfluous task demands (e.g., Gelman 1978)" (Liben and others 1982, 1283). According to the authors more research is required before the field can accurately estimate children's spatial abilities.

This caution should be well heeded by those attempting to design curriculum or to teach lessons that deal with mapping skills. Hewes (1982, 94) wrote that, "during their early years, from birth to age six, children should develop a sense of self in time and space that will allow them to acquire the concepts, the inductive and deductive reasoning leading to generalizations, and the value clarification and analysis that are stressed in today's geography and social studies curricula. If a firm foundation of understanding is to be provided, then research must be conducted to determine the true parameters of children's spatial abilities. To date we possess only the broadest of generalizations based on the work of Piaget, Inhelder, and Bruner. These theories need to be examined further and applied to specific situations, (e.g., environment effects, verbalization effects, experiential effects, and imaginal effects on spatial understandings), if we are to understand the spatial abilities of children.

The third major theme which has received considerable attention is the map skills sequence (Stoltman 1979). Map-reading skills have received the majority of research attention. Stoltman has summarized the findings of this research in five identifiable stages of map-reading abilities. Beginning with simply visualizing the symbols on the map, they quickly proceed to the more complex. The second stage is relating the symbols to what they represent. The third stage involves the development of recognizing patterns and location of items on the map and being able to verbalize their relationships. The fourth stage begins with the.
understanding of numerical scale. The final stage is noted by the ability to extract the data directly from the map and to make inferences about the area from the observed information.

While less attention has been given to the second map skills area, map drawing, Stoltman (1979) contends this ability also apparently develops through a set of stages. The first stage, which includes most 5 to 7-year-olds, manifests itself in unkempt, rugged maps. Completed maps demonstrate few, if any, correct relationships to the real environment. In the second stage, age 7 to 9, an attempt to relate the map to the real environment is made, though the child "is unable to coordinate the objects perceived" (p. 31). Eight- to 11-year-olds, while still operating in stage two, are usually able to picture reality on the map. They seldom, however, are able to conceptualize the total relationship of the objects pictured. This ability to conceptualize the relationship of the objects mapped and to infer information based on those relationships is developed during the third stage, ages 9 to 11.

Hatcher (1983, 314) believes that the teaching of mapping skills "should be on a continuum from the concrete to the abstract." Map reading and drawing skills such as representation, symbolization, perspective, and scale should begin with familiar places in the children's environment (classroom, playground, bedroom, school, the route home, and the neighborhood).

Hawkins (1979, 33) proposed that the elementary schools should (1) not separate mapping skills from life situations, (2) use maps as tools to collect, store, and share information, and (3) integrate map and globe activities with textual content and the "youngsters' observations of the world about them."

Maps are concrete observable tools for instruction. It seems evident from the research completed that maps also contain an element of abstraction that requires that they be introduced on a continuum beginning with the concrete. It seems equally evident that a final understanding of children's spatial abilities has yet to be determined. Since spatial abilities are crucial to any theoretical understandings or practical applications of mapping, future research would seem to be required in an attempt to determine exactly how children develop and process spatial understandings.
Temporal Understandings

Jantz (1976, 95) indicated that "the underlying principles of time and chronology are formulated upon abstract relational concepts that are difficult for children to obtain." As with spatial understandings, basic temporal understandings must precede more sophisticated understandings.

Craig (1981, 37) wrote that "Piaget argues that the child's understanding of time changes as he or she matures. Many have thought, quite incorrectly, that the temporal sense comes late in the child's understanding." According to Piaget, 4- to 8-year-old children in the pre-operational stage can order actions in sequence to achieve a goal. They can appreciate events as they appear in succession as in a television program or in their daily schedule. They can also separate time from distance, though only at rudimentary levels. During the concrete operational stage of development, children develop the ability to coordinate temporal events. Children are able to conceptualize a temporal succession of events, notions of duration of permanence, and simultaneity of events. "Thus, for Piaget, space and time are developmental concepts, real only in a contextual sense" (Craig 1981, 37). Children develop their own systems for measuring time, dependent solely on their cognitive developmental levels of understanding. This temporal understanding appears at an early age, apparently growing from spatial understandings, and becomes more sophisticated as maturity occurs.

It should be noted, however, that Piaget's conception of psychological temporal development continues to receive critical attention. The notion that the time concepts of duration and succession spring from spatial understanding has been investigated by Levin and others (1978) and Levin and Gilat (1983). Both studies reported findings that suggested young children dealt with certain time concepts in temporal, rather than spatial, terms. The theoretical underpinnings of how temporal understandings are developed have yet to be finalized.

Preston and Herman (1974) stated that the elementary schools were responsible for developing time skills in four areas. First, the concepts of temporal units, such as day, date, and daily schedules should be developed. Second, events should be viewed as parts of a chronological series (e.g., a specific class in the daily schedule). A timeline is a useful strategy to facilitate the concept of chronological order.
The third major responsibility is to teach children to think of an event being separated from the present by measured units. For instance, recess begins at 10:30 a.m. At 9:30 a.m. the students would be told that recess will begin in one hour. The final responsibility of schools is to develop historical temporal understandings. As Jantz (1976, 99) indicated, "this requires fully developed time concepts and is a skill that tends to be refined in the upper elementary, junior high, and high school grades."

As with spatial development, more research investigating how temporal understandings are developed is required. This research should be concerned with both the underlying theory and the practical classroom implications. To date, the social studies field has largely ignored how temporal understandings are developed in young children.

III. Developing Understandings

Moyer (1980) has indicated that much of the work completed to date concerning information processing has been nondevelopmental in nature. This observation is rather disheartening to the social studies educator in view of the fact that the same observation was noted over 30 years ago. Ragan and McAulay (1973) wrote, "In 1950 Arnold Gesell expressed the opinion that 'Our present knowledge of the child's mind is comparable to a fifteenth-century map of the world—a mixture of truth and error'" (p. 26). It is readily apparent that more research is required in this area if we are to understand fully the child's thought processes and their applications to the social studies.

Yet, it must also be noted that much of the recent research using high school, college, or adult subjects has provided "many valuable suggestions for helping elementary-school pupils think critically in relation to the social studies topics" (Ragan and McAulay 1973, 26). Similarly, studies conducted with children in other disciplines also prove to be invaluable sources of information with application to the social studies. Finally, research conducted within the field, though limited, has significantly increased our perception of the manner in which children develop social studies understandings. Research from these areas will be presented in an effort to explain how children form concepts, process information, and retrieve information.
Piagetian Considerations

Twenty years ago Taba (1965) pioneered the notion that the social studies educator must be cognizant of the developmental abilities of the child. Taba suggested that the field consider Piagetian research in the area of genetic epistemology when determining curricular and/or teaching strategies. Taba wrote, "It appears also that the elementary school years are the period during which the concrete thinking or thinking with concrete objects and events, is being transformed into formal thinking or thinking with symbols" (p. 537). With the realization that Taba's suggestion remains meritorious, a brief Piagetian perspective concerning children's thinking capabilities will be presented.

Extensive differences exist in children's and adult's thinking processes. Children have difficulty in differentiating between what derives from their environment, between reality and appearance, between fact and fantasy, and between physical and mental. Children view their world in terms of absolutes and sharp dichotomies or permanent alterations. Children also possess a less dynamic thought process than that of adults. "Children see the world in static terms, as a series of still pictures rather than as a cinematic progression. Although they are eager for the new, they seldom see its relation to the old" (Penrose 1979, 9).

The young child possesses only the most global understanding of materials and events at the onset, but with experience and growth soon begins to examine the substructures and operation of the phenomena. To Piaget, learning and thinking involved the participation of the learner. "Knowledge is not transmitted verbally or otherwise; it must be constructed and reconstructed by the thinker/learner. Therefore, when a child is learning and thinking (that is, when his intelligence is developing) he is going through the process of absorbing his experiences and of integrating them into his internal, mental, or cognitive structure" (Penrose 1979, 18).

We should note Piaget's conclusion that children could not construct conceptual knowledge by looking at objects. Rather, knowledge is evolved by the child's being actively involved through experience and interaction. This important premise is especially pertinent for the age group considered in this paper. Social studies education at the pre-operation-
al and concrete operational levels requires a multi-experiential interactive approach.

Ragan and McAulay (1973) indicated that such research has revealed that young children are capable of understanding causal relationships and thinking critically. They have also cited research that demonstrates both the importance of conceptual understanding and the normal stages of conceptual development in the average child. The research by Bruner (1966) parallels the findings of Piaget and has direct implications on the presentation of facts, concepts, and generalizations in the social studies.

**Concept Formation**

Taba (1965) was among the first to train students in the cognitive tasks of concept formation, interpretation of data and inference, and in the application of principles using social studies material. Taba counted as false the previously widely held assumptions that thinking cannot occur without a sufficient body of facts and that thought is an automatic by-product of study. Taba argued that "the specification of thinking as an object of educational effort permits a clearer analysis of the appropriate pedagogical functions necessary to make this objective both more realistic and attainable" (pp. 531-542). Furthermore it was advanced that such an effort would facilitate the sequenced systematic processing of information for students of all ages and of all levels of abilities. This hypothesis was later successfully applied in the Contra Costa Social Studies Program under Taba's guidance.

According to Taba, concept formation consisted of three separate processes. First, the child must be able to differentiate the properties or characteristics of objects or events. Second, the child must be able to abstract certain of the common characteristics into groups. Finally, the child must be able to categorize or provide labels that encompass and organize the objects or events.

Gagne (1970) defined concept formation as "putting things into a class and responding to the class as a whole" (pp. 171-172). This requires that an individual be able to take a particular case or example, such as their family unit, and generalize this instance to the class as a whole, in this case the social group families. This is in part a lan-
language function requiring clear, well articulated criteria for making judgments about whether a particular case is an instance of a class, and in part a cognitive function relating the cognitive structure of an individual to that individual's construction of reality. Concepts may be concrete and defined by observations of their physical properties, or abstract and defined by relationships or a set of rules. Gagne indicates "the great value of concepts as means of thinking and communicating is the fact that they have concrete references" (pp. 187). While concepts in themselves are not words, the naming of the class permits an element of mutual understanding by permitting the child to "communicate his intentions, his actions, and his thoughts to other people...because the specific words he employs arouse concepts in his hearers that function just as his do" (pp. 186). This makes instruction in the schools possible. It frees the child from "the control of specific stimuli in his environment and therefore [they can] learn by means of verbal instruction" (pp. 185).

Sugarman (1982) studied the cognitive development of 2- and 3-year-olds and concluded that the ability to think or conceptualize paralleled language development. The subjects were required to select objects and maneuver them into various arrangements, a manipulative pre-operational task. At age 2, the arrangements demonstrated the construction of equivalent classes. By age 3, however, the children demonstrated the ability to shift between classes, which in turn demonstrated a higher level of critical thinking.

Knowledge about a concept is present when the child can verbalize a definition and can discriminate among examples and non-examples of the concept. For example, the child with knowledge about a concept may define an island as a body of land surrounded by water and can discriminate islands from other bodies of land, such as peninsulas, or from another concept--lake--involving land, water, and aroundness. This child can also generalize to the class on islands as a whole and apply the definition to specific instances to determine if they are specific examples of the concept. Knowing the definition and appropriate exemplifications are important considerations in the learning and testing of concepts; however, concepts "can neither be taught or tested by single examples" (Markle 1975, 3). Familiarity with a concept is often a limited knowl-
edge of the concept. This familiarity permits the child to form a particular image of an instance of the concept, but the child may have a hazy, implied, or unclear understanding of the general class that the concept label identifies. For example, another child may have experiences of going to an island, have seen islands on television, or located islands on a map or globe. The child has some familiarity with the concept but may not be able to discriminate examples from non-examples of the concept or to generalize to the broad class of the concept. This familiarity may be an insufficient brand of knowledge about the concept.

It should be cautioned, though, that verbalization of a concept does not always indicate conceptual mastery. In a review of studies linking vocabulary knowledge and reading comprehension, Mezynski (1983) concluded "that students could know definitions, yet apparently be unable to use the words to comprehend textual information" (pp. 272).

When attempting to develop concepts, teachers must accurately assess the entry knowledge of their students and then choose the appropriate concept formation or attainment activities. Concept formation is an inventive process where new categories and labels are formed. There are a number of important processes involved in concept formation. Of primary importance is the identification of the key attributes or distinctive features associated with a concept. For example, children may be presented with an number of instances where they have some bodies of land surrounded by water and other instances where the land is only partially surrounded. In this case they would (1) differentiate the land from the water and differentiate aroundness from partially around, (2) group those instances where the land is surrounded by water and those instances where the land is only partially surrounded, and (3) label each instance as either an example of the concept island or non-example of the concept.

Concept attainment occurs when the concept already exists and judgments are made as to whether a particular example is an instance of the class (Joyce and Weil 1972). The process of concept attainment is "the search for and testing of attributes that can be used to distinguish exemplars from non-exemplars" (Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin 1956, 233). This process can be employed when children have already formed a concept and it is desirable to apply this generalized idea to another particular
instance. Suppose that the children are asked to identify the major islands in the North Atlantic Ocean. They know that the critical attributes of an island are land, water, and aroundness, with the idea that the water is around the land. They may then use these critical attributes as criteria to make judgments about whether Greenland, Iceland, Newfoundland, and Norway are islands in the North Atlantic Ocean or whether they are examples of another concept with similar attributes as criteria.

The task of "using a concept is deeply imbedded in the fabric of cognitive life; that indeed it represents one of the most basic forms of inferential activity in all cognitive life" (Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin 1956, 79). This inferential activity is the basis for determining if an exemplar is an instance of a concept or not. The use of examples and non-examples can facilitate the learning of a concept and provide a basis for judgments concerning future encounters with the concept (Shumway and others 1983).

The number and relationship of the critical attributes or central dimensions may be an important consideration in the learning of concepts. If we reverse the relationship of aroundness in the island example to where we have a body of water surrounded by land, we now have a lake or pond rather than an island. To distinguish lake from pond or island from continent size becomes an additional important dimension. Kagan (1971) indicated that "some concepts derive their essential meanings from one or two central dimensions; other concepts rest on a set of dimensions that are of equal importance in defining them" (pp. 88). A pond could be distinguished from a lake on the basis of size; a young child could be distinguished from an elderly person on the basis of age; with the concept of living thing the set of dimensions relating to the basic life processes are of equal importance.

The concreteness or abstraction of a concept is also an important consideration in concept development. Concepts such as city, state, or nation, which are based upon political constructs are more difficult to learn than less abstract concepts such as family members or globe. In a study of 4- to 8-year-olds, Thornburg (1983) found that the concepts in such basic questions as "What is your address?" "Is Kentucky or Lexing-
"Is it getting smaller?" and "Can you name three cities?" were too abstract for the children involved.

In the development of concepts there are some characteristics of the learner that teachers also need to consider. The cognitive developmental level of the learner is one. Most elementary school children, those beyond about age 6 or 7, exhibit what Piaget calls concrete operational behavior. Children who operate at this level "can form concepts of classes, relations, and numbers, thereby greatly expanding their conceptual world. Also, children who can perform concrete operations can learn and follow rules that have been formulated by others. Thus, middle childhood is a prime period for instructing children in certain skills and knowledge they will need in order to function effectively in their society" (Elkind and Weiner 1978, 380).

Recent research has been conducted to determine suitable strategies for teaching social studies concepts to elementary children. Ewert and Randall (1978) studied the use of inquiry and non-examples as a method of teaching concepts. Tennyson and Park (1980), after reviewing the literature that dealt with classroom instructional strategies, proposed a four-step process for concept teaching. First, the concept structure should be analyzed for superordinate, coordinate, and subordinate attributes. After the taxonomical structure is determined, a definition should be prepared complete with a set of examples. The examples should be arranged in sets according to their critical attributes for the third step. The final step should be the orderly presentation of the concept examples according to their difficulty level.

The Merrill and Tennyson model of concept formation was tested with first-grade students (McKinney and others 1982). This model is based upon a deductive approach and includes a definition, expository presentation, attribution isolation, inquisitorial practice presentation, and test. Three lessons on land, air, and water pollution were developed to test the concept formation model. There was a large statistically significant difference between the control and experimental groups, indicating that the Merrill and Tennyson model was effective in teaching social studies concepts to first-grade children.

McKinney and others (1983) compared a reading-recitation approach with Gagne's model and Merrill's and Tennyson's model for teaching con-
cepts to fourth graders and reported that while each approach varied significantly from the control group, the differences between the three instructional strategies were not significant. The results, however, did tend to favor the Merrill and Tennyson model.

Martorella (1982), in a review of research on cognition, identified a number of principles that have been successful in concept development. He summarized these principles as:

1. The instructor must begin with a clear and conventionally accepted definition of the concept.
2. At some point, instruction should include definition and/or its primary attributes.
3. Varied examples and non-examples of the concept should be provided and some strategy should be included to help the learner determine which discussion pertains to examples and which to non-examples.
4. Unless students know the critical attributes of a concept, they should be taught them prior to or currently with instruction.
5. Some opportunities to experiment with identifying examples and non-examples should be incorporated, along with feedback on the correctness or incorrectness of the responses.
6. Finally, where young children are involved, pictures or other visual stimuli, rather than strictly verbal stimuli, may facilitate concept learning (pp. 7-8).

As teachers promote the learning of concepts by their students they need to consider some of the ideas that have been discussed. Judgments need to be made concerning the focus of the unit of instruction and whether students need to have knowledge or familiarity with the concepts involved for any given phase of the units. It is also important to decide whether students should engage in the inventive process of concept development or if strategies for concept attainment should be utilized for the key concepts involved. The identification of appropriate examples or non-examples to highlight the critical core of attributes can facilitate the learning of the concept. Finally, it should be remembered that concrete concepts are normally easier for children to learn than abstract concepts.

While it appears that strategies can be successfully employed to promote concept development with children, few studies of the appli-
tions of these principles have been conducted on the development of social studies concepts across the various grade levels in early childhood and elementary education. It would appear that additional research comparing these various models of concept formation and studies examining the efficacy of inductive vs. deductive approaches to concept development with young children are needed. Perhaps the renewed interest in teacher effectiveness research will result in more applications of these principles of concept development in the social studies.

IV. Information Processing

As Bloom (1976) noted, learning occurs daily throughout the world in the absence of a totally acceptable theory. Knowledge representations and processes remain theoretical. Greeno (1980) wrote, "Our conceptualization of the organization of knowledge has evolved considerably since about 1970. The nature of knowledge of facts and concepts is represented in a variety of theories, all of which are based on the concept of a schema" (pp. 718). The core of information processing models seems to center on these schemata and the memory system.

Rumelhart (1980, 33-34) wrote that schema are, the fundamental elements upon which all information processing depends. Schemata are employed in the process of interpreting sensory data (both linguistic and nonlinguistic), in retrieving information from memory, in organizing actions, in determining goals and subgoals, in allocating resources, and, generally, in guiding the flow of processing in the system...According to schema theories, all knowledge is packaged into units. These units are the schemata. Embedded in these packets of knowledge is, in addition to the knowledge itself, information about how this information is to be used.

Schemata are directly related to concept formation since they are hypothesized as existing as a hierarchical network of subschemata representing information concerning the conceptual constituents of the concept being presented. During any information processing or retrieval act, schemata are capable of simultaneously examining both the abstract and concrete referents of the concept under consideration. If enough conceptual referents are located, the information processing act will continue and the concept formation process will be enhanced. If inadequate references exist, the processing act is hindered and the concept will fade from the memory system.
The core of information processing models seems to center on these schemata and the memory system. Greeno (1980) has identified at least three memory systems that enjoy broad empirical support. The first, known as a short-term sensory storage system, has the capacity to receive large quantities of information simultaneously. With a holding capacity of only a fraction of a second, any information not forming a connection with the second memory system is quickly lost.

This second system, referred to as short-term memory, has a much smaller input capacity and can hold the information for a few seconds. During these few seconds an attempt to organize the information by relating it to the individual's prior knowledge is made. If the attempt is successful and a relationship can be found to organize the information, it will be stored in the third memory system. However, if the attempt fails the information is lost.

The third system, or intermediate-term memory system, is often called long-term memory in the literature. While its input capacity is smaller than the short-term system, its retention capacity is larger and ranges from a few minutes to several hours. And if the organization or relationship of the incoming information to the prior information is of sufficient strength, "the information may become integrated as a part of the individual's permanent structure of concepts and factual knowledge and thus become a part of the person's store of semantic and factual knowledge" (Greeno 1980, 717).

In verbal information processing the subject must have an adequate command of the language to facilitate the development of a relationship between incoming data and information previously stored. "It seems that our ability to remember a given set of materials is strongly affected by both prior and subsequent learning" (Houston 1981, 305). Incoming information must be enhanced if it is to pass from sensorial memory to short-term memory and subsequently to long-term memory. Normally the subject's attention to the incoming information moves the information from the sensory register to the other memory system. If the child fails to attend to the task, the unelaborated sensorial impression usually decays and is lost. Even with attention, the sensorial mode can be lost if an incomplete or inadequate store of prior knowledge prevents a relationship from forming.
Assuming that the transfer is made to the short-term memory system, the problem of how to move the information to long-term memory with eventual integration into the subject's permanent store remains. Several strategies, however, exist to facilitate this movement and integration of information. The teacher should be both aware of these strategies and proficient in their use for education to occur at its optimal level.

An excellent strategy to use is to relate the material to be learned with the child's prior knowledge. Beginning with the known and relating it to the unknown enhances the possibility of meaningful learning. Houston (1981) also mentions rehearsal as a technique to use in transferring material to long-term storage. Additionally Houston links the durability of the memory trace to the depth of the processing required. If the child must attend only to the structural properties of the material (i.e., the child merely looks at the words, pictures, or objects), the memory trace will usually be weak since this type of processing is shallow. Conversely, if the child has to attend to the acoustic or semantic properties (i.e., the child listens and participates in a discussion of the concept) of the material, the memory trace will be more durable since these types of processing occur at deeper levels.

Another strategy of importance in enhancing verbal information processing with pre-school and elementary age children is the use of imaginal mediation. Bruner (1966) has identified three distinct modes of learning for children which relate to concept formation. Children learn through manipulative experience, which Bruner calls the enactive mode. They learn through the formation of mental images, which Bruner calls the iconic mode, and they learn through a series of abstract symbols or representations, which is called the symbolic mode. As children progress through the grades they depend less on the enactive and more upon mental imagery and symbolic operations using abstract words.

Pressley (1977) reported research that children as young as 2½-years-olds could spontaneously label pictures that they had been asked to remember. Bender and Levin (1976) reported that even nursery school children benefit from the ability to generate internal imaginal elaborations. Begg and Anderson (1976), Kemler and Juczyk (1975), and Pressley and Levin (1977) demonstrated that first- and second-grade children can
gainfully apply the imagery strategy when provided with verbal material to learn.

Tennyson (1978) tested three types of imaginal and pictorial supports with elementary children as aids for concept and rule learning. In one case the children were given programmed drawings highlighting the relevant features of the concept and rule learning. In the second case the students were guided to produce student-generated drawings highlighting the relevant features. In the third instance the students were asked to generate mental images of the relevant features. The students were divided into two groups; the first group received full pre-training in one of the three techniques, and the second group were given only practice items without training. The group receiving the treatment performed significantly better in all three categories than the group that received no training. The group receiving training were given sets of examples that included written statements and pictorial cues. They were instructed on how to process the information focusing upon the relevant features of the concepts and rules. They were instructed to store the verbal and visual pictorials as a dual image and given practice in matching each example with a new set. On tests involving recall of concepts, knowledge of the concept and rule level, and the rule-using level, the group receiving treatment on programmed drawings with relevant features performed better than the group receiving instruction on student-generated drawings or the one on forming images. Tennyson (1978) concluded that "programmed drawing can have a significant effect on learning concepts and rules when they serve as images for encoding content for later use as well as in initial learning" (p. 297).

It would appear that for young children, learning concepts and rules can be facilitated by providing pictorials or by having students generate pictorials to accompany the text, and by providing specific instruction for these tasks. While this study was conducted with third and fourth grades using mathematical concepts and rules, it holds promise for social studies instruction as well. Research conducted earlier provides a wide support base for the combination of verbal and imaginal mediation during the act of processing information (Paivio 1969, Paivio and Csapo 1969, Reese 1965, Rohwer, Lynch, Levin, and Suzuki 1967, Yarmey and Csapo 1968).
Merely providing increasing amounts of information verbally does not necessarily move the child to a more advanced cognitive stage, nor does it ensure that the child will meaningfully process the supplied information. The child's ability to think is frequently more advanced than the ability to use language. "Verbal language alone is unsuitable as a means of stimulating the development of thinking in children" (Penrose 1979, 21).

Teachers must realize that knowledge is seldom gained by children sitting in class listening to lectures. Knowledge is constructed from within and is facilitated by a teacher who combines verbal labels with experiential activities. To stimulate verbal information processing, the teacher must guide children through both the activity and the ensuing discussion.

Houston (1981) has identified three common verbal learning tasks. The first, serial or sequential learning, seems to be an integral part of everyday life. Examples of this type of learning include phone numbers, alphabet, nursery rhymes, and songs. In the social studies, sequential learning would include historical information such as the evolution of the family concept, the migration of specific Indian tribes, or the history of a nation. The second task, paired associate learning, involves pairing a stimulus with an appropriate response. Examples of this type of learning would include matching job titles with pictures of people, geographic concepts, or capital cities with states. The third verbal learning task identified was free recall, where subjects were required to recall given information. Examples of this type of task would include the recall of rules and laws, societal roles, or the effect of urbanization on the natural environment. It is interesting to note that the organization of the recalled information often mirrors the individual's organizational processes.

Children faced with processing information presented in a text are operating in the symbolic mode (Bruner 1966). For understanding or comprehension to occur, the textual message must be linked to the appropriate memory structures. As with verbal information processing, the information must be directed through sensorial memory to short-term memory to long-term memory and then to the individual's permanent store of knowledge. Lack of attention, low quality input information, or a lack of
appropriate memory structures may prohibit or confound the processing of the information. Since "the child cannot move very far in any social studies program until he has acquired the skill to read and interpret textbooks, printed articles, monographs, and such materials pertinent to the social studies" (Ragan and McAulay 1973, 227), it is imperative that the social studies teacher be aware of strategies to facilitate textual comprehension.

Reading comprehension relies on prior knowledge (Smith 1978). Pearson, Hanson, and Gordon (1979) matched second graders on the variables of intelligence and reading ability. Their subjects varied, however, on the amount of prior knowledge possessed concerning the situations read. Those students with prior knowledge scored significantly better than those who lacked sufficient prior knowledge on the comprehension tasks administered. Bloom (1976) reviewed research that dealt with students' prior knowledge, and reported similar findings concerning its effectiveness as a comprehension aid.

Reading social studies text materials can also be facilitated by making some passages more concrete. Strategies to link mental images with corresponding concepts have been shown to increase the recall of key ideas. Gagne and White (1978) have indicated: "On the whole, the evidence favors the idea that supplementary imagery can enhance the recall of individual verbal items and also of semantically organized material. This effect occurs particularly when the images represent concrete objects and events, even though the sentences themselves may contain abstract words" (p. 201). For example, a series of pictures representing clear differences in the four seasons, coupled with instructions to children to assist them in forming images of fall, winter, spring, and summer, can help children make the concept "seasons" more concrete and help facilitate the learning of the concept. Likewise, a diagram or web of the structure of the city government could assist a student in developing the concept of city government as the student reads about it in a social studies text.

Other researchers have been investigating the role of imaginal mediation in textual comprehension (Eddy and Glass 1981, Hargis and Glickling 1978, Papineau and Lohr 1981, Peterson and Jacob 1978). The
combined results of these studies seem to indicate that sentence comprehension and recall is facilitated by using imagery.

Children who understand conceptual relationships seem to process textual information easier than those who lack such understanding. This seems particularly true when the child understands the rules for arranging concepts in a hierarchical position from superordinate to subordinate. Examples of this could include knowing the superordinate concept bird and the subordinate concepts of robin, sparrow, wren; or being able to categorize bodies of saltwater by size (i.e., ocean, sea, gulf, bay). Lawton and Wanski (1979) reported that, "the child who knows both the high-order rules and their relationship does best" (p. 235).

Research has shown that social studies teachers may employ other techniques as well to increase the student's textual information processing skills. Valentine and Francks (1979) suggested that information should be clustered into compact thought units, such as phrases and clauses. These chunks of information are then combined into increasingly larger units of information as the students grasp the conceptual ideas. Bernstein (1983) advocated the use of contextual function clues to aid concept formation. Mayer (1983) reported that increased recall of conceptual principles was associated with the technique of using repetition and advance organizers. Bloom (1984) found advance organizers to be effective in the content texts and recommended that the classroom teacher emphasize these relational aids through stated objectives, discussion, pictures, or ideas.

If the student is to function effectively at increasingly higher levels of critical thinking, those facts, concepts, and principles lodged in the permanent store must be readily accessible. The act of processing information, especially at the deeper levels, causes retrieval to occur as the reader or listener strives to make sense of the incoming data. Gumenik (1979) asserts that there is storage of meaning that can be cued by context with common features. Thus, if the social studies textual presentation is centered on community resources such as the supermarket, druggist, and fire station, the readers or listeners should be able to comprehend the concept of community by retrieving information previously stored concerning their own supermarket, druggist, and fire station. This conceptual link of the textual community with their own community
helps the student formalize ideas of what resources are familiar to all communities. The retrieval of information from their permanent store was integral to forming the understanding.

Teachers should be aware of the importance of fostering information retrieval when attempting to develop social studies understanding. Many of the strategies mentioned as being facilitative of information processing are equally feasible as retrieval strategies since they are attending to moving information through the memory system. Taba's (1965) strategy of training students to think and the use of the various concept teaching models (Merrill and Tennyson 1979, Martorella 1982, and Gagne 1970) are both excellent retrieval strategies. The use of imagery, advance organizers, webbing, chunking, repetition, and contextual clues are also useful to enhance retrieval. The use of questioning techniques and various modes of language (descriptive, explanatory, controlling, legitimating, prescriptive, and affiliative) also have a relevance when attempting to cause retrieval of information (Wilson 1982).

The ways in which students function cognitively during their various developmental stages are of paramount importance to the social studies educator. Unfortunately, a review of the recent research demonstrated a relative lack of investigation into the areas of concept formation, information processing, and information retrieval within the social studies field.

V. Implications for Future Research

This chapter has examined recent research regarding early child/elementary social studies education. Specifically, we have been concerned with how children develop a social perspective, spatial and temporal relationships, form concepts, and process information. Each of these areas has a special importance when discussing implications for future research.

Of particular importance to early childhood education is research conducted to investigate the development of a social perspective. Formerly the domain of educational psychologists and sociologists, this area is recognized as being vital to the classroom teacher who seeks to exert a positive educational influence. Research is needed to define more clearly the role that the school, its agents, and its policies play in
helping to determine a child's social perspective. A question of importance involving social climate and social structure might be. Does assignment to a particular school, class, or group have any significant effect on students' developing perspective of their status?

Equally important in determining procedures that facilitate a positive social perspective is research that is designed to investigate teacher characteristics or behaviors that relate to social learnings. It must be established that the teacher can serve as a primary agent in the development of a student's self-concept, in the promotion of positive racial attitudes, and in the reduction of stereotypes and biases toward members of diverse cultural groups.

Finally, when the development of a social perspective is being pondered, it must be remembered that there are certain curricular considerations that may be of importance. The elementary social studies curriculum has been criticized as having a "preoccupation with content and an underemphasis of process; and from a failure to dramatize powerful social science concepts that establish connective tissue...between subject matter and life" (Rubin 1977, 11). Rubin continues by writing,

Teaching materials, say Hunt and Metcalf, should be drawn from a selection of conflicting propositions in such controversial areas as race and minority-group relations, social class, economics, sex, courtship, marriage, religion and morality, and patriotic beliefs, plus a wide range of relevant data to be used in testing them.... One might say, therefore, that in any given learning situation teaching materials should be drawn from (1) broadly social and highly controversial issues of the culture; (2) knowledges, values, and attitudes of students; and (3) relevant data of the social sciences. (p. 11)

It remains for research to determine if such an approach would be apropos to the early childhood/elementary situation and if indeed it would aid in the development of social perspectives promoting positive human interactions.

Several studies in the area of developing a social perspective offer promise for research. Certainly the model proposed by Damon and Hart (1982) that suggests that self-concept is a multifaceted construct that may be developed in nature is in need of empirical investigation. The work of Semaj (1980) and Katz (1976a) on the development of racial awareness has implications for further research and school practices. The consolidation of group concepts and the crystallization of racial atti-
tudes are two areas that ought to be of particular concern to social studies educators.

Research in the area of spatial and temporal understandings involving children and social studies is lacking. To a large extent much of what is known has been based on the tenets of Piaget, though some recent research has challenged these basic assumptions. Several areas hold particular promise for social studies investigation. Research on individual differences, the development of temporal/spatial concepts, and the sequencing of content are all in need of further research. For example, there is some evidence that sex differences exist in the performance of spatial tasks and that systematic training can have some effect on spatial learning and help neutralize sex differences in this area for young children (Miller 1985). Student performance on the Boeing Test of Basic Concepts indicates that young children know basic concepts related to location, direction, orientation, dimension, time, and quantity. The guidelines for geographic education suggest grade-level placements for geographic learnings (Joint Committee on Geographic Education 1984). These areas all need further testing to provide guidance in making teaching decisions.

The social studies should also address the larger question of cognitive development in children. Flavell (1979) has proposed a model that focuses on the metacognitive abilities of children. This model addresses the problem that children have limited metacognitive knowledge and do little to monitor their own comprehension. Research, particularly in the area of reading, indicates that children can increase their metacognitive awareness and can be taught to monitor their own comprehension. (Brown and others 1983, Brown and Campione 1978, Flavell 1978, Garner 1980, Paris and Myers 1981, Pearson 1982, Raphael 1982, Wagoner 1983, Winograd and Johnston 1982.) Research employing these strategies with social studies materials is needed.

Additional research in the area of concept development with young children should continue to prove productive. McKinney (1985) reviewed previous work involving the Merrill and Tennyson model of concept formation and hypothesizes that the inquisitory practice presentation might be the most effective part of that model. This hypothesis was tested with 70 undergraduate students enrolled in social studies methods class-
es. The results in part support this hypothesis. Research is needed to
determine whether or not the hypothesis is generalizable to young chil-
dren in social studies classrooms. Replication of the Merrill and
Tennyson model is also needed, employing a variety of social studies
content at different grade levels as well as comparisons of inductive
and deductive approaches to concept formation.

Betres, Zajano, and Gumieniak (1984) conducted a study concerned
with cognitive styles, teacher methods, and concept attainment in the
area of social studies. Research in this area is particularly germane
to the topic being discussed and should be continued. The Betres study
reported that concept attainment lessons appeared to provide immediate
facilitative effects on learning, but that they did not have any long-
term carry-over. Likewise, the Taba inductive method of instruction was
superior to both the inquiry and expository methods of instruction stud-
ied. (The McKinney and others studies support a deductive approach which
contradicts this finding.) Finally, Betres and others reported "no em-
pirical support for the hypothesis of aptitude treatment interactions
between factors of cognitive style and the two types of preinstructional
activities" (p. 16). These researchers studied 102 fifth graders, but
their study could easily be replicated with younger children. The field
as a whole should undertake more of these concept studies and should
expect and accept numerous replications. As Herman (1980) noted, "repli-
cation-type studies establish the reliability and generalizations of
findings" (pp. 26).

Studies designed to research the interactive effects of material
and teaching methods, and their application to school practice possess
the potential of having a powerful effect on the social studies field.
Social studies researchers should not ignore the innovative practices in
the public schools, but should seek ways to establish collaborative ef-
forts with school-based personnel. Many opportunities exist for this
type of collaboration. For example, Baldwin (1984, 79) writes that their
school system is "systematically teaching formal thinking to students
through a Thinking Strand in social studies. Every teacher, grades
K-12, participated in an inservice program, based on the taxonomies of
Benjamin Bloom and Norris Sanders, that taught them exercises that ena-bled them to move their students from the knowledge level of thinking to
the higher levels of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. The program also teaches them to write objectives, design activities, develop questions, analyze and evaluate responses, and participate in meaningful dialogue. Baldwin sums up the program by saying,

With the Thinking Strand, our teachers are not merely exposing students to information but are structuring the content and activities so that students can process information more effectively and make better, more rational decisions. (p. 80)

In addition to directing future research toward assisting educators in preparing a social studies curriculum that addresses the development of concepts and the processing of information, investigations should be conducted in several peripheral areas. Slightly more removed but still quite relevant is Egan's (1984) suggestion that the social studies curriculum be reevaluated. It should be a safe assumption that social studies content and its presentation are important variables in the learning act. Egan argues that our current interpretation of teaching from the known to the unknown is flawed. "If we take the fundamental categories rather than the content of their (children's) experience as what is 'known', then we can build a quite different curriculum" (p. 72). By fundamental categories, Egan is referring to those powerful conceptual categories children possess that are used to make sense of their world. Though Egan's argument seems theoretical, it may already be linked to some degree to a practical curricular suggestion made by Superka and Hawke (1982). Superka and Hawke have suggested basing the social studies curriculum on the concept of social roles. For a detailed explanation of this future prospect, the reader is directed to their Project SPAN Report.

Finally, Egan (1984) in supporting his argument touches on two other areas that deserve research attention. The first deals with curriculum itself. "As far as I can see the main defense of the social studies curriculum is that it is there and has been for three quarters of a century. It is hard to find intellectual defenses for it today" (p. 70). Egan has extended the gauntlet, and whether the assumption is correct or incorrect remains to be determined.

Similarly, Egan mentions the danger of blind acceptance of Piaget's theory of development. "As Piaget's theory comes apart under conceptual and empirical attack, we may see the value of turning to theories remote
from our actual concerns for enlightenment" (p. 74). The implication is clear in that future research concerning the development of social studies understandings in children need not be bridled by Piaget's tenets. Results must be examined in terms of possible alternative sociological and psychological theory.

In conclusion, this chapter has explored recent research dealing with young children and how they develop social studies understandings. It is not an exaggeration to note that research in certain areas within this broad scope is lacking. The social studies field must commit itself to further study in this area if wise curricular and teaching designs are to be enacted.

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Some of the items listed below are followed by an ED number. This identifies the item as an ERIC document. ERIC documents are indexed and abstracted in the monthly index, Resources in Education (RIE). For ordering information, readers should check the ED number in RIE.


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The phrase "social studies education" connotes a concern with matters of social consequence. Not only has the practice of social studies education traditionally involved the study of the past and present social environment, but the profession has held that this study should be conducted in such a manner as to influence positively students' orientation to social life. While this interest in the social development of students has typically focused on political development, this perspective has also been interpreted to include a range of outcomes that only indirectly have a political emphasis, such as trans-cultural understanding, moral development, prosocial behaviors, and non-sexist, non-racist interpersonal relations.

This chapter will review a wide range of empirical studies on social studies curricular and instructional practices that provide insight into the relationship between the practice of social studies education with school age youth and the influences of that practice on students' socio-moral development. Life in any society is inherently a moral enterprise in that many of one's actions as a citizen inevitably have an influence on the rights and well-being of others. Social studies education has a focus on socio-moral outcomes to the extent that it attempts to foster behavior, thinking, and dispositions that will enable students to participate in society in a manner consistent with basic democratic principles such as respect for human dignity, freedom, and equality.

This concern regarding the socio-moral development of youth can be interpreted from a variety of frameworks. One useful perspective is in terms of the types of outcomes present in the research literature. First, studies have focused on student reasoning regarding socio-moral issues. Typical outcomes have involved such areas as the development of analytic skills and the ability to generate rationally defensible posi-
tions on social and political questions. A related area of interest has been on student reasoning from a cognitive-developmental perspective and the potential contribution of the social studies curriculum to the facilitation of individual moral development. A final perspective in this regard has been the use of clarification strategies to develop student reasoning and understanding of personal value decisions.

A second area of outcomes related to a socio-moral focus in the social studies has been on the effect of curriculum on the beliefs, attitudes, and values of students, most typically as they relate to political phenomena. One repeatedly finds in the literature attempts to document program effects in such areas as political trust (belief that political life is consistent and governed by positive motivation), social integration (belief that one is meaningfully connected to one's social environment), political efficacy or confidence (belief that through one's actions one can have an influence on political activities), and interest (beliefs about political life that predispose one to respond positively). Studies have also focused on student attitudes—positive or negative evaluations of such areas of the socio-moral environment as ethnic groups, basic democratic values, political participation, and the presidency.

A third set of outcomes researched in the socio-moral domain involve social behaviors. Most frequently the research attempts to assess the anticipated socio-moral behavior of students as inferred from responses to paper-and-pencil questionnaires. Typically, studies report student expectations that at a future time they will be involved in positive, political activities (e.g., voting, expressing one's viewpoints to elected officials, or running for office). Only infrequently does one find a study reporting changes in student's real-life behaviors in socio-moral contexts as a dependent variable. These three classes of outcomes are not generally researched within a single study. As will become apparent in the discussion of the research below, researchers typically restrict their evaluation of a given intervention to only one of the sets of outcomes discussed above.

Another perspective on the content of this review can be achieved by shifting the perspective from outcomes to models of curricular and instructional practice. From this perspective it is possible to talk
about three broad areas of research. These areas, and subdivisions within, will comprise the organization of this chapter.

The first section of this review consists of reports concerning the effectiveness of specific curricular approaches commonly labeled as moral or values education. In this first section I will review the available research on the following approaches: values clarification, moral dilemma discussion, value analysis, social action/community involvement, cooperative learning, and directive moral education. The next section of the review will consider the research available on the outcomes of infusing democratic practices into the classroom and school. In this section literature on the impact of democratic climates as well as on the incorporation of decision making about controversial social issues into the curriculum will be discussed. Finally, I will examine research which is not directly related to specific curricular interventions, but has significance for the practice of social studies education designed to achieve socio-moral outcomes. This section will review (1) the influence of the standard curriculum, (2) bias in social studies materials and classrooms, (3) teacher and public attitudes toward the practice of values education, and (4) recent analyses of political values of youth.

It should be noted that this review adopts a broad interpretation of social studies research. That is, I do not limit myself strictly to those research studies designed by social studies educators to achieve social studies goals. Rather, in a variety of research areas I will review literature which, although not pure social studies research, represents innovative practices in schools with outcomes consistent with those traditionally espoused by the social studies profession. This broad interpretation of social studies research will result in the inclusion of sections on cooperative learning and democratic schooling practices. In my judgment the study of a wide range of topics related to social-studies-curriculum can help the profession to understand its potential and conceptualize more meaningful studies in the future.

This review of research will attempt to build on the previous review by Ehman (1977). As a result, the time period covered will be from 1975 to 1984. In an attempt to be thorough, and due to the sheer volume of relevant studies, it is not possible to evaluate critically each individual piece of research. While I am not comfortable with uncritically
reporting questionable research, this approach can be defended from three perspectives. First, in areas where there exist only a few studies, I have attempted to evaluate the confidence warranted in the findings. Second, where a large number of findings exist, I will attempt to evaluate the quality of the research in aggregate. Finally, I take solace in the observation that one can rarely find a piece of research that is immune to questions concerning internal and external validity. However, through the accumulation of a large number of studies, some strong, some weak, the danger of reaching unwarranted conclusions may be lessened. I am encouraged in this perspective by the observations of N. L. Gage (1978):

The invulnerable piece of research in any field of the behavioral sciences is non-existent....Thus the path to increasing certainty becomes not the single excellent study that is nonetheless weak in one or more respects, but the convergence of findings for many studies that are also weak, but in many different ways. The dissimilar or non-replicated weaknesses leave the replicated finding more secure. Where the studies do not overlap in their flaws but do overlap in their implications, the research synthesizer can begin to build confidence in those implications. (p. 233).

I. Curricular Interventions

Values Clarification

The research on the values clarification approach to values education is impressive on a number of accounts. First, the research program has demonstrated sustained vitality and strength over the 28 years the approach has been in existence. Prior to the period covered by this review (pre-1975), over 25 values clarification studies were completed. In the past ten years well over 75 studies have been conducted.

The results of this research are a well-kept secret, in that over 90 percent of the values clarification research has been unpublished doctoral dissertations. Generally, unless one is willing to undergo the tedious and expensive effort to procure the actual dissertations, the cumulative results of this research would remain hidden.

As impressive as the string of research on values clarification is, and it is continuing unabated into the 1980s, it is even more remarkable in light of the consistently unimpressive results of the findings. One of the earliest values clarification studies completed by Sidney Simon
(1958), under the direction of Louis Raths at New York University, found the results "cast in confusion." Subsequent studies have, in a consistent and predictable manner, repeatedly failed to confirm the researcher expectations. Two previous reviews (Leming 1981, Lockwood 1978) have documented the failure of the methodology to produce predicted results. This review, covering the period from 1975 to 1984, reaffirms this conclusion.

In the original search for research on values clarification for this review, over 75 studies were identified within the given time period. This number was pared down to the 42 described below by eliminating those studies that did not test for curricular effectiveness, did not use school age subjects, did not use a control group, did not test for the statistical significance of results, or studied dependent variables that were highly atypical or arcane. The above criteria were used to eliminate those studies of little interest and in which little confidence could be placed. That is not to say, however, that the remaining studies were not flawed, for the genre is not in an area typified by quality research.

Table 1 presents a simplified summary of the values clarification research over the 1975-1984 period. Length restrictions prohibit a detailed discussion of the nature of individual studies. In table 1, the grade level of the intervention and the subject matter are reported in the first two columns. In the majority of the studies, the values clarification intervention was not subject specific (NSS). That is, the values clarification was not woven into an existing curriculum area or was not presented as an "add on" within a given subject area. The remainder of the table reports the results of the research by the seven most commonly occurring clusters of dependent variables. Self-concept and change in values were the most frequently studied. The research on self-concept typically used scales such as the Tennessf. Self-Concept Scale. Change in values was usually measured by value shifts from pretest to posttest on instruments such as the Rokeach Value Survey. In some cases this dependent variable involved changes in prejudice toward others. Four of the studies attempted to detect more positive attitudes toward schooling, teachers, or subject matter as a result of values clarification exercises. Those studies typically used research-constructed atti-
tude surveys. Ten of the studies attempted to document increased knowledge of subject matter or, more generally, improved academic achievement. Ten studies also attempted to detect value-related behavior changes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Grade Level</th>
<th>Subject Area</th>
<th>Self-Concept</th>
<th>Academic Achievement</th>
<th>School Attitudes</th>
<th>Value Change</th>
<th>Value Behavior</th>
<th>Value Thought</th>
<th>Dogmatism</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>+</td>
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<td>+</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Greco (1977)</td>
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TABLE 1 (Continued)

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<td>-</td>
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<td>N.S.S.</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>N.S.S.</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Psychology</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Purdy (1975)</td>
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<td>Bio-ethics</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>N.S.S.</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Watkins (1977)</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aIn this table, + refers to the predicted result achieved at the .05 level, 0 means that the predicted result was not achieved at the .05 level, and - identifies a case where the control group gained more at the .05 level on the dependent variable than the values clarification group. The symbol +/- identifies studies which, due to multiple measures of the dependent variable, achieved mixed results.
In some cases these behaviors were student reported, in other cases teacher reported. An additional ten studies analyzed students' value-related thinking processes, e.g., did they become more aware of their values, more clear in their thinking, more analytical, etc. Finally, four studies attempted to find out if students became more open-minded and less dogmatic as a result of values clarification.

The results of the studies summarized in Table 1 would have to be discouraging to any proponent of values clarification. In only 17.5 percent of the studies that used self-concept as a dependent variable was self-concept enhanced as a result of a values clarification treatment. An increase in academic achievement was found in only 10 percent of the relevant studies. While 50 percent of the relevant studies did find better attitudes toward schooling, this was based on a total of only four studies and in one of the studies the findings were mixed on two different measures. Shifts in student values were found in 20 percent of the studies and 33 percent found significant value-related behavior change. Of the studies focusing on thinking processes, 40 percent detected positive changes, while 25 percent of the relevant studies found dogmatism reduced as a result of values clarification strategies. Values clarification activities designed for and implemented in social studies classes demonstrated the same failure to achieve the predicted results as interventions in other subject areas.

Values clarification research is apparently a regressive research program. That is, normally in scientific inquiry one expects changes in theory or the research stratagems adopted to accommodate unanticipated experimental findings. One notes no such evolution in values clarification theory or research over time. In examining the review of literature sections of existing dissertations, one gets the distinct impression that the field is ahistorical. The literature reviews are highly selective and frequently misrepresent the findings of previous studies. Although the genre has many problems, at a minimum the research needs to interpret more carefully the nature of the intervention. The methodology of values clarification is amorphous and involves the students in such diverse activities as reflective thought about consequences of actions, searching for consistency between feelings and actions, and analyzing one's lifestyle for hidden value meanings (Raths, Harmin, and
Simon 1978). In addition, the values clarification literature is full of handy activities for classroom use (Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum 1978). The attractiveness of these activities for teachers and students are in part the reasons for the continuing popularity of the approach. The research on values clarification largely selects, willy-nilly, existing activities with the end result being that no two studies expose the students to similar activities. In order for the research on values clarification to proceed in a more systematic manner, there is a need for more careful definition of, and attention to, the nature of the intervention. For example, is the focus of the activity on choosing, prizing, or acting, or on some combination of these? At least with greater precision concerning the nature of the treatment there exists the possibility that the research could begin to build on past mistakes and negative findings. If future research remains as undisciplined as past research, it is likely that the results will be little different. This seems to be a waste of time and energy which could be put to more educationally and socially useful purposes.

**Moral Dilemma Discussion Approach**

The dilemma discussion approach of Lawrence Kohlberg, like the values clarification approach, is a research area that has attracted considerable interest over the past ten years. Unlike the values clarification approach, the weight of the evidence supports the claim of the approach that the discussion of moral dilemmas can stimulate development through the stages of moral reasoning. By now the details of the methodology, creating cognitive disequilibrium through engaging students in moral discussions about moral dilemmas and ensuring that they are exposed to the next highest stage, are well known. Previous reviews by Enright and others (1983), Lawrence (1980), Leming (1981), and Lockwood (1978) have documented the extent of the research and the general findings. In this section I will first present the relevant research conducted with the approach over the past ten years, utilizing those studies conducted in school settings with school-age subjects. I will next discuss those studies specifically embedded within social studies curricula. Finally, I will conclude with a brief discussion of related relevant research from the cognitive developmental perspective that is not a direct test
of the dilemma discussion strategy, but still of interest for the practice and evaluation of social studies education.

It should be noted that the moral dilemma discussion methodology no longer summarizes the complete approach of Lawrence Kohlberg to moral education. The reader is referred to the section below on the "just community" approach for a discussion of recent revisions in Kohlbergian theory and the supporting research.

Thirty-five studies were identified that conducted a test of the moral dilemma discussion approach in school settings with school-age subjects. These studies generally consist of teacher-led discussions of moral dilemmas and a measure of moral reasoning as the dependent variable. Most frequently student reasoning was assessed by the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) in which a subject is interviewed on a series of dilemmas and the responses stage scored by procedures developed by Kohlberg and his associates (Colby and others 1979). Occasionally a study will use a written form of the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI-W), but in this format much lower reliability is achieved due to the inability to probe subject responses. An objective measure of moral development, Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test (DIT) is used in some studies to assess student development. However, since the DIT yields data on percentage of reasoning at the principled level (P score), and most school-age subjects have yet to develop to this level, one must question the appropriateness of the use of this instrument especially, as is frequently the case, only P-score data is used in the statistical analysis.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Study</th>
<th>Grade Level</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Mean Stage</th>
<th>Change</th>
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<td>Cross-cultural experiences (16)</td>
<td>MJI</td>
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<td>Moral dilemmas (14)</td>
<td>SPC</td>
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<td>Children's literature (7, 18)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rundle (1977)</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>Moral dilemmas (12)</td>
<td>MJI</td>
<td>1/2&lt;sup&gt;j&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schepps (1977)</td>
<td>11th, 12th</td>
<td>Justice course (12)</td>
<td>MJI</td>
<td>NSD&lt;sup&gt;k&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schlimpert (1980)</td>
<td>9th-12th</td>
<td>Religious education (18)</td>
<td>DIT</td>
<td>NSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schneiberg (1979)</td>
<td>7th, 8th</td>
<td>Social studies (6)</td>
<td>DIT</td>
<td>1/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selman &amp; Lieberman (1977)</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>Moral dilemmas (16)</td>
<td>MJI&lt;sup&gt;l&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sullivan (1980)</td>
<td>11th, 12th</td>
<td>Psychology (32)</td>
<td>MJI</td>
<td>2/5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sullivan &amp; Beck (1975)</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>Ethics course (16)</td>
<td>MJI</td>
<td>1/6&lt;sup&gt;m&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tinkler (1981)</td>
<td>6th, 7th</td>
<td>Citizenship (8)</td>
<td>ICS&lt;sup&gt;n&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>NSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams (1974)</td>
<td>2nd, 3rd</td>
<td>Moral dilemmas (8)</td>
<td>MJI&lt;sup&gt;l&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>NSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wright (1978)</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>Moral dilemmas (6)</td>
<td>MJI</td>
<td>NSD</td>
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</table>

a. The length of the treatment is given in number of weeks in parentheses.

b. Stage Preference Checklist—a researcher-constructed instrument.

c. Significant change found only for the longer treatment.

d. In half the study (Boston) the finding was significant at the .05 level. In the other half the finding was significant only at the .10 level.
e. The control group was drawn from a democratically-run alternative school and also demonstrated marked moral development over the same time period.

f. A peer-led discussion group did grow one-third of a stage in comparison with a teacher-led discussion group.

g. The subjects in the moral dilemma discussion actually regressed pre- to post-test. The feelings exploration and moral discussion treatment demonstrated significant growth compared to other two treatments. No control group was used.

h. Significant change was found for a treatment consisting of a combination of values clarification and moral discussion.

i. This change was found only with sixth graders.

j. This change was found only within the context of democratic classroom. The traditional discussion of moral dilemmas and control group showed no significant change in moral reasoning.

k. The control group was another class drawn from the alternative school. It too experienced marked moral development over the treatment period.

l. Used an adapted form of interview especially constructed for young children.

m. Occurred only on a delayed post test.

n. Used Important Considerations Survey, a researcher-constructed instrument that correlated with the MJI at .45.

Table 2 summarizes the findings of the 35 studies. At first glance it would appear that the dilemma discussion approach was successful in only about half of the studies in achieving stage growth when compared with a control group. However, if one takes into account length of treatment by eliminating those studies of less than one semester, one finds that 10 out of 15 studies (67 percent) resulted in moral development. Support for the notion that length of treatment is a significant factor in inducing stage growth can be found in the Biskin and Hoskisson (1977) study where treatments of two durations were studied (7 weeks and 18 weeks). Only in the longer treatment was stage growth detected.

It is interesting to note that in the five studies that involved at least a semester intervention and did not find upward movement in mean moral reasoning, two dealt with issues of sexuality and personal rela-
tionships (Di Stefano 1980, Bower 1980) and two dealt with moral dilemmas within a religious context (Rosenzweig 1976, Schlimpert 1980). This pattern suggests that they may be content areas in which reasoning is less amenable to change. It should also be noted that the two studies that drew their control groups from an alternative school (Di Stefano 1980, Schepps 1977) found that the control groups also advanced in their moral reasoning and as a result the treatment group did not demonstrate significant development in comparison. Researchers would be advised to insure that the control groups are not in environments where they are confronted repeatedly with significant decision-making dilemmas.

In the social studies, the most extensive study conducted using the moral dilemma discussion approach was the final evaluation of a field experiment at Harvard University and Carnegie-Mellon University (Colby and others 1977). In this study 20 teachers were trained in the moral discussion method and used social studies materials developed by Edwin Fenton at Carnegie-Mellon University. Research was conducted in the Boston area and the Pittsburgh area. Classes in the Boston area studied two one-semester programs on comparative political and comparative economic systems. In the Pittsburgh area students studied a U.S. history program. Twelve dilemmas per semester were developed and integrated into the curricula. In the Boston area schools the mean moral maturity change in the 13 classes at the end of the treatment was 13.5 points (a change of 100 points would represent a full stage change). In comparison with control classes this change was found to be statistically significant (P <.01). In the Pittsburgh sample of 19 classes, the mean moral maturity change was 17 points. However, this change was not found to be statistically significant. A secondary analysis of the results revealed that not all of the experimental classes showed mean upward change, indicating that some of the teachers were better developmental educators than others. In Boston, 5 of 13 classes were change classes whereas in Pittsburgh, 7 of 19 were change classes. In the change classes, the mean moral maturity change was 31 points or about one third of a stage.

Anne Higgins (1980), in a report on the Danforth Project, raises questions about the use of the dilemma discussion approach in content-oriented social studies classes. Higgins describes two classes, one an honors level U.S. history class taught by Ladenberg and the other a
regular track U. S. history class taught by Oakes. The Ladenberg class used extensive role playing while the Oakes class used both historical and hypothetical dilemmas. Both were one-semester classes. Neither class showed significant moral growth. Higgins concluded that: "These two studies allow us to suggest tentatively that the enhancement of moral judgment development may be more difficult when the teacher has strong curricular priorities and when the moral dilemmas are defined by, and focus upon, a particular academic content. In some cases it may be that the idea that there are social and historical 'facts' and 'right answers' to tests inhibits full involvement by the students in the moral dilemma discussions" (p. 100).

Although it would be difficult to test Higgins' hypothesis, evidence does exist, such as the Colby and others study cited above, that facilitating moral development within social studies content-oriented curricula is possible. Schneiberg (1979) and Lambert (1981) both report moral development as a result of moral discussions within social studies classes. On the other hand, Kenven (1981) and Tinkler (1981) report no significant moral development as a result of their social studies moral discussion interventions. Kenven's finding is not unexpected in that it involved classroom discussion of only six dilemmas. Tinkler reports that teacher logs reveal that there was a problem with teacher implementation.

Additional important questions for social studies teachers regarding the dilemma discussion approach center around the impact it has on students' attitudes toward the subject and their mastery of subject matter content. Both Lambert (1980) and Brock (1978) found that students who had participated in the Carnegie Mellon Social Studies Curriculum, in comparison with classes without moral dilemmas, scored significantly higher on measures of attitude toward social studies and achieved higher mastery of subject matter content. The Brock study, strangely enough, did not report whether the treatment had any influence on moral reasoning.

Another important consideration for social studies teachers is the relationship between moral reasoning and political reasoning. Studies by Endo (1973), Harmon (1973), and Lockwood (1975) all indicate that moral and political reasoning go hand in hand and that the underlying cognitive
structures for both are similar. This suggests that not only may the
discussion of moral dilemmas stimulate thinking about personal moral
obligation, but also may contribute to the development of political under-
standing. This is especially important in that through movement to stage
five reasoning, which embodies the morality of our constitutional democ-
racy with its emphasis on individual rights and the pursuit of justice
with a legal framework, one can achieve understanding of and appreciation
for our political system as well as individual moral maturity. It is at
this point that the cognitive developmental approach to moral education
becomes even more salient for social studies education. The mere fact
that teachers can facilitate small gains in moral development over a
given time period in itself may not have particular appeal for social
studies educators. However, when that development is a prerequisite for
a full understanding of the moral basis of our system of government the
approach takes on additional importance.

To sum up, the evidence suggests that social studies teachers, by
the regular incorporation of moral dilemma discussions into their teach-
ing over the academic year, can facilitate the moral development of their
students. While the moral growth in a given year may appear minimal or
even trivial to some teachers, the cumulative result can be the achieve-
ment of stage five reasoning. Achieving stage five most likely will not
occur during high school; however, the foundation for movement to this
stage as an adult can be prepared. One of the results of not engaging
in developmental activities in the classroom may be that the adult popu-
lation fails to fully understand the moral basis of our governmental
system. Based on Kohlberg's original longitudinal sample, only about 10
percent of the adult population currently reason above stage four (Colby,

Value Analysis

Value analysis is an approach to moral education that has its roots
in the social studies (Metcalf 1971). It holds that while moral judg-
ments can vary widely in the extent to which they are rational and logi-
cal, the goal of value education should be to develop in individuals the
ability to make rationally and logically defensible moral judgments. To
achieve this objective students are taught a set of skills essential to
reasoning about moral/value questions that require that they carefully identify the value question, assemble a set of relevant facts, arrive at a value decision, and finally test the value principle entailed in the decision through the application of four tests: role exchange (willingness to exchange positions with the least advantaged person in the agreement); universal consequences (if everyone followed the course of action, would the consequences be acceptable?); new cases (are the consequences of the action acceptable in new similar situations?); and subsumption (does the principle follow from a higher acceptable principle?). While one finds several variations of the approach in the literature, these alternatives all share a common emphasis on the logical and systematic analysis of value reasoning involving collecting relevant facts and reaching conclusions that follow logically from one's value premises and facts.

Only two studies were identified that were empirical tests of the Coombs and Meux values analysis strategies presented in the 1971 National Council for the Social Studies Yearbook (Metcalf 1971). Evans (1978), using 285 high school students in three high schools in Salt Lake City, instructed students in value analysis over a period of 20 weeks. The instrument used to evaluate the program was the research-constructed Value Reasoning Test (VRT). The VRT was designed to measure student comprehension of the four standards of rationality that are entailed by the value analysis approach. The program was also evaluated by having two individuals trained in ethics and logic evaluate a class research project on the bombing of Hiroshima. It was found that the experimental classes scored significantly higher on the VRT, indicating that as a result of the value analysis experience, the students in the experimental classes attained a significantly higher comprehension of the four standards of rationality of value analysis than did students in control groups. It was also found that the experts in logic and ethics judged the experimental classes' research project superior to that of the control group. Apparently the intervention had no significant impact on achievement as measured by ACT scores.

Woods (1979), in a study with ninth-grade civics students, inquired if value analysis can promote a moral perspective on the part of stu-
In this study, students applied the value analysis strategies to nine different cases that contained value conflict. It was found that as the proximity of the cases changed from proximate to distal, the students' moral perspectives (the range of one's referents considered when formulating a justification for a value judgment) shifted from self-referents to universal referents. Unfortunately, the influence of proximity was so strong and the nine cases not equally balanced between treatment and comparison groups, that Woods was unable to ascertain if the value analysis experience accounted for any change in students' reasoning.

The Association for Values Education and Research (AVER) at the University of British Columbia has developed a comparable series of value exercises to that of Coombs and Meux. The AVER program attempts to develop in students the abilities to differentiate values claims from other claims, to understand the logic of values claims so as to judge if they are sound, and to test the adequacy of standards used in making value judgments. Student activities in this approach typically involve distinguishing between factual and value claims, use of the practical syllogism to insure that conclusions follow from premises, reasons assembly charts, and moral principle testing activities. Early research on this approach has met with mixed results (AVER 1975, AVER 1978). In the 1975 study, it was found that as a result of a program on value analysis, high school juniors performed better in their ability to identify logically valid normative reasoning than did control group students. However, the value analysis students did not perform better than control group students on their ability to make fact/value distinctions and on a measure of prejudice reduction. The value analysis students also did not demonstrate advanced moral reasoning (as measured by the Defining Issues Test) when compared with control group students.

In the latter study (AVER 1978), somewhat different results were obtained. Again, on the normative reasoning measure, the value analysis measure increased significantly when compared to control groups in normative reasoning ability. In this study, unlike the earlier results, students' ability to make fact/value distinctions increased. Like the 1975 study, no significant moral development was observed as a result of the treatment. Finally, it was found that prejudice was reduced, but
only toward a specific ethnic group which was part of the curriculum. A general prejudice orientation was unchanged.

Two additional studies which utilized value analysis activities are deserving of comment. Hahn and Avery (1984), using 240 subjects in 10th- and 11th-grade U. S. history classes, tested a value analysis approach developed by Banks (1973). The experimental classes used a bimonthly compilation of editorials about controversial issues as reading material. Experimental Group I consisted of four intact classes which met one day per week for ten weeks and discussed, using value analysis strategies, one issue at each class meeting. Experimental Group II, also consisting of four classes, read the same material and discussed it, but the discussion did not follow the value analysis model. The control group consisted of five intact classes that did not engage in value analysis readings or class discussions. Hahn found that students who participated in regular systematic value analysis discussions increased in political confidence, political interest, and social integration, but did not increase significantly in political trust. Generally, Experimental Group II scored the lowest of these groups on political attitude scales. Observer reports from the Group II classrooms found that the teachers had a tendency to ask literal questions of the students regarding their readings about controversial issues. Additionally, this study found no posttest differences between groups on a measure of reading comprehension.

An additional study which uses value analysis-like strategies is reported by Stahl (1981). In this study, 18 intact 11th-grade American history classes were divided into experimental and control classes. Students in the experimental classes responded in groups of four to six students to values dilemmas that were developed out of the existing curriculum. One activity was developed per week and used the entire period. The teacher’s role was largely passive in that the students worked on the values dilemma activity completely in the small group. This program was evaluated in two ways. First, a test involving content recall and recognition was administered. A substantial and statistically significant result was found favoring the experimental classes. Second, using a research constructed inventory of values and attitudes, a slight but statistically significant change in all ten subscales favoring the values analysis group was found. The subscales attempted to measure student
attitudes and values in such areas as decision making, openness to participation, and empathy. Hunt (1981), however, using the same methodology and instruments with junior high school students, found far fewer significant changes in the inventory of values and attitudes and no increased subject matter mastery.

Because of the variety of interpretations of value analysis in practice and the exploratory nature of many of the studies, it is difficult to reach any certain conclusions about value analysis. It would appear that changes in reasoning skills and abilities directly related to the approach may be affected, but more general orientations such as moral development are not similarly influenced. The findings also seem to suggest that there may be some influence on social and political attitudes, but this generalization must be considered highly tentative at this time.

Social Action/Community Involvement

In this section I will review those programs which, as a regular part of the school curriculum, place students outside of the school and in the community where they assume participatory roles with real social consequences. These roles may range from performing public service activities to direct participation in social action activities. The rationale for such programs is that through such involvement and subsequent reflection on the experience, students will develop positive attitudes about civic and political involvement, acquire relevant interpersonal, intellectual, and political skills, and become more active and effective participants in civic life. Thus, these programs attempt to share student attitudes, values, and behavior by breaking down the walls that separate students from adult society. While there are many variations of out-of-school experiences, in this review I will limit myself to an analysis of two general kinds of programs: those that are designed to involve students in service activities and contribute in a general way to their social or moral development, and those that have a political participation flavor and are designed to contribute in a positive manner to the development of democratic values and skills. In limiting this review to these two areas, a large body of literature on out-of-school
learning will not be discussed, most notably adventure learning and career internships.

The available research on the influence of these programs on students comes from four primary sources. First is Jones' (1974, 1975a, 1975b, 1976) reports of the final evaluation of the 1973 Citizenship Education Clearing House (CECH) program in the St. Louis Metropolitan area. This program, in 32 schools involving over 2,000 students and 65 teachers, was based on the assumption that if students were given an opportunity to participate in the disposition of a real political issue, they would develop the attitudes and skills needed to become effective participants in a democratic society. The specific participation of the 8th- to 12th-grade social studies students within this program included activities such as helping start school breakfast programs, assisting in geriatric centers, seeking support for constitutional amendments, and establishing birth control centers. It involved the students in defining problems, policies, and strategies, as well as taking action in order to bring about change.

Jones (1974) included four relevant dependent variables in her evaluation of the CECH program: political awareness, sense of efficacy, perceptions of officials, and desire to be a public official. It was found that only with regard to efficacy was there a program influence. This influence, however, was far from dramatic as it was based primarily on the students' general agreement that voting is an effective way to influence political decisions. It was found that there was no significant difference between CECH students and non-CECH students on political awareness, positive perception of officials, and students' desires to be politically involved. In secondary analyses of the CECH data, Jones (1975b) found only insignificant correlations (.10 range) between extent of involvement and student attitude change on political efficacy. She reports (Jones 1975a) only a slight increase in interest in political concerns as a result of community involvement. With black students, it was found that participation per se had little overall effect on political efficacy, cynicism, or citizen duty (Jones 1976).

The second primary source of data on the influence of these programs comes from the Conrad and Hedin (1981, 1982) evaluations of the impact of experiential education programs on the social, psychological, and
intellectual development of secondary school pupils. In the late 1970s, approximately 1,000 students in 27 experiential programs nationwide were administered a questionnaire to assess the impact of these programs. All students were pre- and post-tested near the first and last days of the program. Six of the experiential samples had comparison groups from nonexperimental programs drawn from comparable populations. The various types of experiential programs studied were: volunteer community service (N=400), career internships (N=244), community study/political action (N=241), and outdoor adventure education (N=152). The discussion below is based primarily on the findings from the one community service (N=41) and two community study programs (N=51, N=94) for which there existed comparison groups.

In the community service and community study programs, self-esteem increased; however, these increases were slight and the comparison group in one of the community study programs also gained in self-esteem. To assess moral reasoning, the Defining Issues Test was administered to students of two experiential programs and one comparison group. The type of program(s) is not reported. Both experiential groups attained small significant gains, while the comparison group did not. This finding, however, must be qualified by two related studies. Corbett (1977) found that over a two-year period with students in a community involvement program involving the out-of-school solution of social problems there was no impact on moral reasoning. Reck (1978), however, found that some students involved in in-school service programs did experience statistically significant moral development, namely, those students with the longer experience (105 hours or more).

With regard to social development, Conrad and Hedin used a researcher-constructed Social and Personal Responsibility Scale (SPRS). This scale assessed the extent to which a student: (a) feels a sense of personal duty; (b) feels a concern for the welfare of others; (c) feels competent to act responsibly; (d) has a sense of efficacy, and; (e) acts responsibly. The overall results from the SPRS showed a statistically significant movement for the experimental programs and no movement or negative movement for the comparison groups. On the subscales of the SPRS it was found that the strongest gains were recorded for sense of competence and performance followed by social efficacy and sense of duty. Additionally,
it was found that students in community service and community study programs showed large, consistent changes toward more positive attitudes toward adults. This was especially pronounced in students' evaluations of people they came into contact with in the process of their community participation. It was also found that community service and community study students increased in their attitude toward being involved in the community. Over the entire range of experiential programs studied, the strongest gains in social development were by students involved in community study/social action programs.

Three additional findings by Conrad and Hedin are deserving of comment. First, the social growth of students was greatest in those programs where there was a regularly scheduled time for collective reflection on the experience. Second, the impact on students was greater in those programs of longest duration. Third, characteristics of the individual experience, rather than program characteristics or individual characteristics, were the most important in accounting for student growth. What students reported as characteristics of their individual experience accounted for 15 to 20 percent of the variance in pre- and post-gain, whereas program characteristics and individual characteristics accounted for not more than 8 percent of the gain. Among the most significant characteristics reported by students were (in order): discussing the experience with teachers; doing things on one's own; not experiencing adult criticism; assuming adult responsibilities; developing personal relations; and having the freedom to explore one's own interests. This finding suggests that student's experiences of such programs is largely idiosyncratic. The strongest gains in social development were by students involved in community study/social action programs.

Overall, the findings of Conrad and Hedin (1982) must be considered encouraging; however, as Newmann and Rutter (1983) point out, the study contains some features which must qualify the results. First, the magnitude of the change is small and the number of the statistically significant comparisons is, in all probability, primarily the result of the large sample size. Second, comparison group students in the Conrad and Hedin study declined from pre- to post-test on each of the variables. This suggests a motivation problem in the testing of comparison students that enhanced the probability of achieving positive results for program
students. Third, Conrad and Hedin limited their analysis of data to comparisons of gain scores which can be heavily influenced by group means at pre-test and correlations between pre- and post-tests. Also it should be noted that the gain scores reported by Conrad and Hedin seldom exceeded 3 percent of the scale's range.

The third source of data is drawn from a study by Newmann and Rutter (1983). This study, unlike the Conrad and Hedin study, was limited only to an examination of community service programs. In this tightly controlled study, eight schools were identified where there existed on-going community service programs in which students were given academic credit for the experience and were involved in at least four hours per week of service in the community. Comparison groups were drawn from each of the schools and both groups were pre- and post-tested at the beginning and end of the spring 1983 semester. The program and comparison groups consisted of 150 students each. Demographic data were collected on each student, and selected students were interviewed regarding their motivations for entering the programs and their perceptions of the experience. Data collection consisted of a questionnaire that assessed the range of developmental opportunities provided within the programs, as well as six measures of social development.

The measures of social development used by Newmann and Rutter were researcher-constructed multiple item Likert scales. The six areas measured were sense of community and school responsibility, sense of social competence, political efficacy, anticipated future community involvement, and anticipated future political participation. The study concluded that community service programs increased students' sense of community responsibility and sense of personal competence in a very modest way (about 1.5 percent on a 5-point scale), but had no impact on the other variables studied. In studying the specific developmental activities that differed from program to program, it was found that these variations within programs failed to account for those changes that accrue to individual students. Thus, community service programs, regardless of the experiences provided, were found to have no discernable impact on sense of school responsibility, political efficacy, and anticipated future involvement in community and political affairs.
Finally, it is worth noting that there have been two evaluations of Newmann's pioneering work in implementing education for citizen action programs. Marsh (1973), in a pilot study of a community issues program found that the program students had a significantly higher interest in political events and a more positive attitude toward political participation than did controls. However, there was no significant difference between community issues students and controls on measures of risk taking, political efficacy, civic tolerance, and political trust. Newmann (1979) reports an evaluation of his Community Studies Program at Memorial High School in Madison, Wisconsin. The yearlong program (1978-1979) involved students in the study of public institutions, a course designed to improve communication skills, a community service internship, and a culminating action project designed to change something in the students' school or community. Due to the small size of Newmann's program and control groups (N = 9), statistical significance (P .05) was seldom achieved in program/control group comparisons. Newmann does, however, report the data (in terms of percent gain on variable) in such a way as to suggest potentially educationally significant program effects. For example, Newmann found that with regard to knowledge of government and knowledge of inquiry skills, program students demonstrated a 30 percent gain whereas control students gained less than 10 percent. On the Defining Issues Test of moral reasoning, program students gained 31 percent in principled reasoning; control students gained only 7 percent. With regard to anticipated political participation, program students showed a gain of 41 percent compared with a gain of 4 percent for control students; however, program students also decreased from pre- to post-test on scales of political tolerance and trust. Political efficacy increased only slightly among program students in comparison to control students.

Overall, the findings of research on programs involving community participation and social action can be considered tentative and only slightly encouraging. All of the findings are based on data results of a very small effect size. The Conrad and Hedin (1981), Reck (1978), and Newmann (1979) studies suggest that these programs may have a slight impact on moral development; however, this finding must be balanced against the no-development finding of Corbett (1977). All studies found either slight or no increase in sense of political efficacy associated with
student participation in community programs. Perceptions of public officials (political trust) were not enhanced by any of these programs; however, Conrad and Hedin did find more positive attitudes toward adults among students in experimental programs. The evidence is inconsistent on the question of influence on student political interest or anticipation of political participation. Jones, Conrad and Hedin, and Marsh all find increased political interest among students in experimental programs, but the Newmann and Rutter study indicates no growth in this area. The data on anticipated political participation are encouraging in that Marsh and Newmann found positive gains for program students; however, the Newmann and Rutter data find no such gain. Finally, both the Conrad and Hedin and Newmann and Rutter studies suggest that these programs may have a slight impact on student sense of personal and social responsibility.

Reasons why researchers are unable to find strong consistent significant social and political development as a result of participation in such programs is puzzling, especially in light of the enthusiasm that staff and students show for the programs and their conviction that the programs have an effect (Newmann and Rutter 1983). One possible explanation is that the time period covered by the majority of the studies is only one semester. It may be that given the nature of the dependent variables, longer treatment time is necessary to observe growth. It also could be that the results of the experience only manifest themselves later in life. Another possible reason for the failure to detect mean growth for program students may be that each individual field experience is perceived idiosyncratically by the student. The net result is a wide range of responses, both positive and negative, with the mean response relatively unaffected. Whatever the reasons for the pattern of findings reported above, this is an area in which careful systematic research is clearly called for. The potential effect of involvement in community life on student development is a question of supreme importance to social education.

Cooperative Learning

Cooperative learning methods in the classroom have received considerable attention from educational researchers over the past ten years.
Although cooperative learning has not, on any large scale, been perceived by social studies academics and teachers as a new approach to the teaching of values, many of the researched outcomes focus on topics that have an undeniable value emphasis and traditionally have been held to be of great importance within the social studies profession. In addition, a significant portion of the research has either been conducted in social studies classrooms or in utilized social studies content. In this section I will describe the nature of cooperative learning and the primary methodologies used, describe the research findings of the effects of cooperative learning in general, and discuss three studies that have been carried out in social studies classrooms.

Robert E. Slavin (1982, 1983), a major proponent of cooperative learning, advocates the practice of cooperative learning in order to redress the inconsistency between the obvious importance of cooperation to adult success and the schools' competitive and individualistic academic system. I will now briefly describe four of the more widely studied methodologies.

Student Teams-Achievement Divisions (STAD) is a method in which students are assigned to four- or five-member teams. Teams are composed in such a manner as to be representative of the class as a whole with each team consisting of students with widely varying academic ability. Each week the teacher introduces new material and team members then study the materials in any way they wish, not finishing until all members of the group are sure they understand the material. Students than take quizzes individually and teachers compute a team score. The contribution of the individual score to the team score is figured by the amount the student exceeds his/her previous average test score. Each student can earn up to ten points for each point their test score is above their base score. The teams with the highest scores are recognized in a weekly one-page class newsletter.

The Teals-Games-Tournaments (TGT) approach uses the same teams, instructional format, and worksheets as STAD; however, students now play academic games to show their individual mastery. The academic game consists of students of equal academic ability drawn from the different teams randomly selecting questions over the content and competing against each other to score points by getting the right answer or challenging
incorrect responses of others. After the tournament, team scores are figured and a newsletter is used to recognize the highest scoring teams and tournament table winners.

In Aronson's (1978) Jigsaw method, students are assigned to six-member teams. The teacher breaks down a given body of academic material into five sections with each student assuming responsibility for a given section, except for two students who share a section in case a team member might be absent in the future. Students who have read the same sections meet in expert groups to discuss their sections. They then return to their teams and take turn teaching their content to their teammates. Following the team reports, students take individual quizzes over the material and receive individual grades. Slavin has modified Aronson's approach into what he calls Jigsaw II. In this approach, rather than having students read only an isolated portion of the total material, all students read a common narrative. Each student is then given a topic in which to become an expert. The students meet with other experts to study their assigned topic. They then return to their group and share what they have learned. Students take individual quizzes which are formed into team scores. Highest scoring teams and individuals are then recognized in a class newsletter. While both Jigsaw and Jigsaw II make a cooperative task structure, only Jigsaw II, through recognition earned by academic performance of the group, has a cooperative reward structure.

In addition to the competitive cooperation structure described above, there has also been extensive research on the Group Investigation Model, which attempts to eliminate competition entirely. This model involves cooperative group inquiry emphasizing data-gathering by pupils, interpretation of information through group discussion, and synthesis of individual contributions into a group project. Detailed descriptions of this approach can be found in the work of its major proponents and researchers, Sharan and Lazarowitz (1980) and Johnson and Johnson (1975). The parallels between the Group Investigation Model and the inquiry approach to social studies education are striking. One can only wonder whether the inquiry approach would have been more successful if it had more of a cooperative learning emphasis and the research base of the Group Investigation Model.
The extensive field experimental research on cooperative techniques in the classroom can be summarized as follows: cooperative learning methods in general, when compared with non-cooperative learning groups, produce greater academic learning, better intergroup relations among black, white, and Hispanic students, enhanced self-esteem, and improved relationships between mainstreamed academically handicapped students and normal-progress students. It has also been found that cooperative learning develops general mutual concern and interpersonal trust among students and increases in students the propensity for prosocial behavior (Slavin 1980, 1983, Sharan 1980). In a meta-analysis of the research literature Johnson and others (1981) reviewed 122 studies on cooperative learning. Their analysis supported the overwhelming superiority of cooperation for promoting student achievement and productivity. Although this conclusion has not gone unchallenged (Slavin 1983, 12, Sharan 1980), the overall weight of the evidence supports the relationship.

More directly related to the focus of this review is the finding that cooperative learning has a positive effect on race relations. The social studies profession has long seen itself as deeply involved in the task of multicultural education. However, as is frequently the case, the results of traditional methods and curricula are discouraging. Slavin and Madden (1979), in a secondary analysis of data collected in a national sample of high schools by the Educational Testing Service (Forehand, Ragosta, and Rock 1976), found that teacher workshops, multi-ethnic texts, minority history, heterogenous groups, and classroom discussions of race relations had very limited effects on students' social attitudes and behavior. On the other hand, the assignment of students of different races to work with each other and the participation of students on multiracial sports teams had strong and consistent effects on race relations. The finding parallels that of Ehman (1980b) in that the regular secondary school social studies curriculum is found to have no significant impact on students' civic attitudes and values.

The research on the effects of cooperative learning on racial attitudes has involved placing students in heterogenous groups where the groups have an academic task to complete that requires that all members of the group have mastered the material. Improvement in race relations is usually measured in one of two ways: socio-metric scores of cross-
social friendships, and attitude measures. The most dramatic changes have been found in the gain on cross-ethnic reciprocal friendship choices.

Although space limitations and the number of available studies prevent discussing each social studies study separately, the Johnson and Johnson (1981a) study is typical of the social studies research. The curriculum unit under study involved the lifestyle and culture of Ojibwa and Dakota Indians. The study used fourth graders (N=51) where approximately 20 percent of the students were minority students. A cooperative group and an individualistic group were formed by random assignment. In the cooperative condition, consisting of 18 majority students and 7 minority students, students were presented with an assignment sheet and in smaller groups were to complete the assignment, making sure that all students had mastered the material. The teacher praised or rewarded the group as a whole. In the individualistic group, the students worked on their own on the assignment sheets. The treatments lasted for 16 days at 55 minutes each day. The results of the study suggest a facilitative effect on race relations. It was found that there was statistically significant more cross-ethnic interaction in the cooperative learning group during both instructional and free time. Also, on the social scheme figure placement task, cooperative learning students placed more majority and minority students together into free time social groups. On attitude scales, the cooperative group also supported the finding that cooperative learning experiences benefit intergroup relations.

Studies at the junior (Slavin 1979) and senior high school levels (Gonzales 1979, DeVires, Edwards, and Slavin 1978) yield results consistent with studies conducted in social studies classes at the elementary level. Studies designed to increase the acceptance of mainstreamed academically handicapped students (e.g., Madden and Slavin 1983, Johnson and Johnson 1981b) demonstrate a similar facilitative effect on student acceptance.

Research on two additional dependent variables suggests that cooperative learning has the potential to become an important tool in social and moral education. Mutual concern among students is measured in many of the cooperative learning studies by obtaining from students ratings of peers and perceptions of being liked by peers. Studies by Slavin and
his associates frequently use Walberg and Anderson's (1968) Learning Environment Inventory, which consists of items concerning students' liking of their classmates and feelings of being liked by them. The finding, regardless of the model of cooperative learning utilized, has been highly positive with regard to the promotion of interpersonal liking, attraction, trust, and sense of being accepted by teachers and peers. In a study by Cooper, Johnson, Johnson, and Wilderson (1980) students (N=60) from an inner-city junior high school were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: cooperative (working as a group and being remanded as a group), competitive (striving to be the best in their group), and individualistic (working on one's own and not interacting with other students). Over a three-hour block of time for 15 days the students experienced the experimental condition in science, English, and geography classes. It was found that when students who were initially prejudiced against one another were present in the same condition, the cooperative experience promoted more interpersonal attraction than did the other conditions.

Research with selected cooperative learning methods in the classroom also indicates that it can be a significant tool for developing prosocial or altruistic behavior. For example, Johnson, Johnson, Johnson, and Anderson (1976) found that pupils in cooperative small-group learning, without inter-group competition or reward interdependence, respond more prosocially on an altruistic versus individualistic choice task than pupils in an individual learning condition. Hertz-Lazarowitz, Sharan, and Steinberg (1980) found similar results with a multidimensional scale to measure prosocial decision making with several hundred elementary-age students. This study found that students who had experienced the Group- Investigation condition made more altruistic choices than did control students. The student who had experienced the cooperative classroom also cooperated better when assigned to new groups for an experimental task. Finally, Ryan and Wheeler (1977), using the social studies curriculum, found that students had studied cooperatively and made more cooperative and helpful decisions in a subsequent simulation game than did students who had studied competitively. In this study, fifth- and sixth-grade students either worked cooperatively in groups or individually in an inquiry type activity in identical workbooks. The workbooks involved
a series of 18 lessons on the Iban of Borneo and the Eskimo of Northern Alaska. Awards were presented either for the best group workbook in the cooperative group, or the best workbooks in the competitive treatment. At the end of the 18 lessons, both groups played the simulation Seal Hunt, a component of Man: A Course of Study. It was found, through the analysis of video tapes, that during the simulation, cooperative subjects manifested significantly more (P .05) cooperative behavior, such as instituting and implementing group strategies and rendering assistance to one another.

Cooperative learning appears to be a promising method by which social studies teachers can simultaneously achieve both academic and socio-moral objectives. To date, the research has not examined whether the results achieved persist over time. Also, there has been little research conducted with high school subjects. Nevertheless, the findings are sufficiently promising to warrant future serious consideration by social studies teachers and researchers.

Directive Moral Education

There appears to be a renewed interest in an approach to moral education that subscribes to the ideal that schools have a responsibility to inculcate basic cultural and political values and behaviors. The approach is directive in that the proponents do not eschew indoctrination and instead advocate a range of nonrational methods, such as use of stories and historical accounts of exemplars of the basic American values and behaviors, active teacher advocacy, and reward of student expression and behavior consistent with these values. Torney-Purta and Schwille (1983) have recently commented on the rise of this new emphasis. At the present time a significant body of empirical research on the approach does not exist. Like most emerging movements in education, directive moral education currently consists of advocacy pieces and untested curricular programs.

At a number of sites in the United States, efforts have been made to develop curricula consistent with the goals of a directive approach to moral education. Most notable has been the work of the American Institute for Character Education in San Antonio with their Character Education Curriculum, and the American Freedoms Compact Program of the
Salt Lake City School District (Thomas and Richard 1979). At the present time neither program has been systematically evaluated concerning the effects on students, although the American Institute for Character Education will provide letters from school districts that claim reductions in discipline problems, reduced vandalism, improved attendance, and improved teacher and student morale as a result of implementation of the program. 5

At the present time careful research on the influence of directive approaches is almost nonexistent. McKellar (1976) presented second-grade students with taped stories drawn from children's literature containing an explicit moral value. The teacher elicited similar cases from the students where the same value was stressed to reinforce the value. The treatment consisted of two 45-minute sessions per week for five weeks. Not surprisingly, no change in moral reasoning was detected as a result of treatment.

Larsen (1981) has developed an instrument to discriminate between students who exemplify the values taught in a directive program and students who do not. The Ethical Democratic Values Test is an objective group test applicable to grades 5 through 12. It consisted of 17 hypothetical situations and potential responses, only some of which are consistent with the 12 basic values in the Salt Lake City values education program. Larsen attempted to validate his instrument by establishing its ability to discriminate between students nominated by teachers as exemplifying the 12 values and students whose behaviors do not exemplify the value-related behaviors. The Larsen dissertation is a careful and thorough example of instrument construction and validation. I was unable to identify any cases where the instrument had been used to evaluate a directive moral education program.

Although there is no research to warrant confidence that a directive approach to moral education would be either effective or ineffective in instilling in students an allegiance to basic social or democratic values, the fact that the learning theory underlying the approach is similar to social learning theory suggests that such an approach, if implemented consistent with those principles, may hold promise. In this regard, Staub (1975) has discussed the implications for educational planning of research designed to enhance prosocial behavior and Leming (1981) has
summarized the findings on modeling as they relate to the practice of social education.

It is clear that one of the goals of social studies education is to instill in youth a basic commitment to democratic values. In my judgment, the profession has not taken seriously enough the possibility that nonrational, indoctrinative methods may be required as part of a broader total program to achieve this goal. If I am correct in my assumption that socio-moral learning is partially nonrational, then the process and principles by which this learning takes place would seem to be a fruitful area for research. For example, in what manner and to what effect do social studies teachers, consciously and unconsciously, model values for students? Are some teachers more effective as models than others? If so, why? A related and interesting research question centers around teacher advocacy, e.g., a teacher advocating interethnic understanding when faced with a class of highly ethnocentric students. Under what conditions, if any, could a teacher make a positive contribution to student socio-moral development through advocacy? One of the neglected areas in social studies research has been the study of the differing characteristics of individual teachers and how they influence students' socio-moral development.

II. Democratic Content and Practices

It has long been one of the paradoxes of social studies education, and of all schooling in the United States, that education for participation in a democratic system of government takes place in schools and classrooms which themselves are authoritarian and undemocratic. It is not that social studies educators are unaware of this paradox. A recent bulletin of the National Council for the Social Studies (Hepburn 1983b) deals exclusively with the topic of democratic education in schools and classrooms. In this volume, and in the literature in general, one is struck by the amorphous conception of democratic schooling, as held by social studies educators, as well as by the scarcity of reported instances of democracy in practice in schools. This scarcity of reported instances of democratic schooling results in a meager research field from which to draw conclusions concerning the potential impact of demo-
cratic experiences in schools on student's knowledge, values, and be-

havior.

What constitutes democratic experiences for students in schools is
not always clear in the literature. The recent NCSS bulletin (Hepburn
1983b) is a case in point. Three interpretations of the meaning of dem-
cratic schooling are presented. In this volume, Sampson and Jenisch
(1983) report on the School Council of Upper Valley High School. The
School Council is made up of faculty and students and makes policy on
matters affecting student and faculty life as long as their areas of
concern are not abruptly controlled by local or state education policy.

What was this experiment in school democracy able to accomplish? The
authors report that, over the principal's veto, a decision was reached
to place a candy machine in the cafeteria, a tepid statement supporting
the principal on disciplinary actions taken against a sports team for
the use of alcohol was issued, and consideration was given, but no action
taken, on an outdoor shelter for smokers. In the case of the Upper Val-
ley High School, the model of democracy is that of the traditional stu-
dent council in both organization and in the issues considered.

Two additional interpretations of democratic schooling can also be
found in the bulletin. VanSickle (1983) focuses on what can be called
democratic classroom experience. VanSickle identifies five values that
characterize a learning situation where democracy is practiced: (1) each
student has an equal opportunity to learn; (2) the welfare of each indi-
vidual is maximized; (3) the system of rewards and penalties is respon-
sive to individual performance; (4) each individual is held responsible
for his or her effect on the welfare of others; and (5) knowledge,
skills, and attitudes are taught that promote each individual's welfare
and the welfare of others. The thrust of VanSickle's approach is not
dissimilar from that of any humanistic teacher in that the emphasis is
on the individual and individual responsibility. While this emphasis is
consistent with democratic practices, his perspective does not focus on
involvement of students in active decision making concerning the nature
of the social environment in which students act out their school lives.

Only one of his 13 suggestions for promoting democratic classroom expe-

riences recommends involving students in making decisions about classroom
issues. His recommendations are based on the observation that "democracy
is relative" (p. 52), and that through a variety of means, one of which may be involving students in decision making, teachers should try to make classrooms more democratic.

Radz (1983) presents a third perspective on democratic schooling. His perspective, that of a school principal, focuses on establishing a democratic school climate. His perspective is similar to that of VanSickle except that the unit of analysis is the school rather than the classroom. Radz urges the involvement of teachers in sharing the leadership for establishing a democratic climate. While Radz' suggestions are somewhat general, the ideal is to establish a school that respects the individual, and presents models of democratic behavior for students. The extent to which students would be allowed to participate in making meaningful decisions that affect their lives is unclear.

Hepburn's (1983a) recent review of research on democratic classrooms and schools both reflects the paucity of evidence available as well as the eclectic interpretations of democratic education in the literature. Hepburn's review focuses on three types of data: school climate, teacher leadership style, and content and teaching methods. Hepburn discusses school climate in terms of Halpin and Croft's (1963) conceptualization of the different types of day-to-day working behavior between principal and teachers. Six types of climate are presented, ranging from open to closed. Teacher leadership style is discussed in terms of White and Lippett's (1960) three types of classroom leadership: autocratic, democratic, and laissez-faire. Under content and teaching methods, Hepburn discusses the implications of infusing controversial issues, the result of cooperative strategies (see section I of this chapter), and the encouraging of student expression. What is missing from Hepburn's review, and also to a large extent from the literature, is studies that are instances in which students are involved in a significant way in the democratic formulation of policies and regulations which govern their lives in classrooms and schools.

In order to provide a framework for interpreting the varying conceptions of democratic schooling and examining the relevant research, I have developed table 3. This table categorizes democratic schooling experiences according to the emphasis in subject matter content and the nature of teacher-student interactions.
### TABLE 3
**DEMOCRATIC SCHOOLING INTERPRETATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Schooling</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Adult/Student Interactions</th>
<th>Recent Studies Reporting Research Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-democratic</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>Authority based</td>
<td>Boesel (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dillon and Grout (1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Metzger and Barr (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic/open</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>Teacher behaviors based on dignity of and respect for individual—all treated equally and fairly. Teacher encourages student expression. Teacher, however, is still the authority-maker and enforcer of rules.</td>
<td>Ehman (1980b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>climate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fowlkes (1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hawley (1977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ponder and Button (1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Torney, Oppenheim, and Farnen (1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic climate +</td>
<td>Controversial</td>
<td>Same as above.</td>
<td>Ehman (1980b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public issues</td>
<td>issues added to curriculum</td>
<td></td>
<td>Goldenson (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dealing with public policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Long and Long (1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>issues.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oliver and Shaver (1966)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shaver and Larkins (1969)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi-democratic</td>
<td>Classroom or school issues now</td>
<td>Same as above with the exception that there is now potential ambiguity concerning teacher's role—-as equal partner in deliberations or still the one to make final decisions.</td>
<td>Koblas (1983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>focus on deliberation. However,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sampson and Jenisch (1983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>topics are usually peripheral to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to the typology presented in table 3, there are two broad pre-democratic participation interpretations. In the first, the teacher treats students in a manner consistent with democratic principles that emphasize respect for the individual and fair and equal treatment. In the second interpretation, not only do teachers conduct themselves in a manner that is consistent with democratic principles, but through the introduction of public issues into the curriculum, expose the students to the content of public policy decision making in democratic life. These first two interpretations of democratic schooling, while treating students in a manner consistent with democratic values, do not necessarily provide youth with the opportunity to make decisions about matters that influence their lives in classrooms and schools.

The third characterization of democratic schooling found in the literature I have called quasi-democratic experiences. Here students are involved in deliberation about matters that are within their school experience; however, the range of the issues and the acceptable alternatives are clearly circumscribed by teachers and administrators. Typical examples of this kind of democratic experience are student councils, student clubs, and class organizations. Typically, such issues as how to raise money for a field trip, the theme of the senior prom, election of class officers, and a candy machine in the cafeteria are the content of deliberation. Issues such as open campus, tardiness policies, and a host of other school rules that frequently are perceived as arbitrary and capricious by students are not generally the focus of deliberation. The final characterization of democratic schooling, what I call true democratic experiences, open most issues that affect students' lives in classroom or school to deliberation and decision making. In practice such instances are rare, but they do currently carry the democratic ideal in its purest form into schools. In the remainder of this section I will discuss the relevant research for each of the interpretations of democratic schooling. I will devote the most attention to the purest form of democratic principles in schools.

Non-Democratic School Climates

The research on schools where students are not allowed to experience meaningful participation in classroom or school life suggests that the
resultant student attitudes, values, and behavior are undesirable. Dillon and Grout (1976) found that students become alienated when they are denied meaningful participation in school and classroom life. In this study, midwest schools were ranked according to the degree of pupil-initiated purposeful learning activities observed. Children’s attitudes (N=801, grades 5-8) were then assessed toward school and teachers. It was found that alienation was highest when others set goals for students. This finding is consistent with that of an earlier study by Rafalides and Hoy (1971) in that students in “custodial” schools were most likely to express feelings of alienation than students in humanistic schools.

In the Safe Schools Study (Boesel 1978), a clear relationship was detected between school climate and organization and the rate of school violence and crime. Student perceptions that they had no control over their lives in school were associated with higher rates of crime. Metzger and Barr (1978) found that in comparing two school environments, one comprehensive and characterized by little perceived student involvement and the other an alternative school characterized by a higher sense of participation in governing procedures, students in the less democratic setting demonstrated significantly lower scores on a measure of political interest, integration, trust, and political confidence. This finding is consistent with Ehman and Gillespie's (1975) finding that in schools characterized by a high degree of teacher and administrative direction, students have more negative attitudes toward policies, being less integrated, trusting, and confident than other students. The above studies do not exhaust the recent literature on this topic. Additional findings reported below also throw light on the impact of non-democratic schooling in that the comparison groups used in the studies are frequently characterized by lesser degrees of democratic climate and student participation.

Democratic/Open Classroom Climate

In this section I will examine the recent research regarding classrooms where the teacher actively solicits student expression and does so in a manner that is accepting and respectful of the ideas generated. Although Ehman's (1980b) study on change in high school students' political attitudes as a function of social studies classroom climate focuses
on the influence of controversial issues, a portion of his findings are relevant to this section. His major finding was that perceived student freedom to express opinions during discussions was one of the strongest predictors of positive political attitudes. This suggests that an open classroom climate can be a positive factor in social studies classrooms. This important study will be discussed at greater length in the following section. Ehman's finding is consistent with that of Torney, Oppenheim, and Farnen (1975). In their ten-nation study they found that classroom climate was the only consistent and positive influence on civic attitudes.

Rossell and Hawley (1981) attempted to test the hypothesis that a teacher who treats a student in a fair and democratic manner will reduce student cynicism of other authorities, specifically political authorities. Their sample consisted of 1,625 fifth-grade students drawn from 79 classrooms. Using a correlational analysis between variations in teacher fairness and democratic practices and student cynicism, the researchers found the predicted relationship between the correlation in the .20 to .30 range for the five indices of teacher behavior studied.

Ponder and Button (1975), in a study of four experimental high school government units designed to teach for political efficacy, found a moderate positive correlation between the incidence in classes of student-initiated interaction and political cynicism (r=.37, p <.05) and two scales of political efficacy (r=.47, p <.01; r=.58, p <.001). This finding also suggests that in a classroom where students feel free to express their opinions there will be a positive impact on political attitudes.

Hawley (1977), in a study with fifth-grade students, assessed the degree to which the teacher's respect for student ideas and encouragement of their expression increased student tolerance and interest regarding fellow students' opinions. A positive relationship was found; however, Hawley concluded that the teachers' support for this style of interaction was more important than the actual classroom interactions. Fowlkes (1976) studied the congruence between high school student satisfaction with the way discussions are conducted and the trust students have in the teacher. Fowlkes found a positive relationship between open discussion style and teacher trust. He also found trust in the individual teacher to be a source of a more general political trust. The weight of
the evidence on the relationship between political attitudes and an open democratic climate in which the individual student is accorded respect and his/her opinions are valued by the teacher suggests that the classroom climate in social studies classes can be a significant factor in developing positive democratic attitudes.

Controversial Issues Within the Social Studies Curriculum

What effect does the regular discussion of controversial issues within the social studies curriculum have on student attitudes or values? Only two studies could be identified that directly addressed this question. Goldenson (1978) examined the impact of a special three-week civil liberties unit taught in four senior social studies classes. The unit consisted of a series of controversial topics in which the focus was on the implications of abstract constitutional civil libertarian principles in concrete situations. It was found that close to 20 percent more of the experimental than of the control group students had undergone supportive attitude change with regard to civil liberties. The experimental students also increased in the degree of concern about specific civil liberties compared with the control students. Goldenson also studied the impact of teacher credibility and found that when one removes those students who attribute low credibility to their teachers, the experimental students were even more likely to have experienced supportive attitude change with regard to civil liberties.

Ehman (1980b), in a three-year longitudinal study of 339 high school sophomores from nine schools, analyzed changes in students' political attitudes of trust, integration, confidence, and interest toward school and society. Ehman related these attitudes to three social studies classroom variables: the extent of discussion of controversial issues, the extent to which teachers treated more than one side of controversial issues, and the extent to which students felt free to express their own opinions while discussing controversial issues. Among Ehman's findings are that perceived exposure to controversial issues is associated with increased social integration and political interest; frequent treatment of controversial issues results in decreased political confidence (Ehman conjectures this may be due to political realism); students reporting a wider range of views in their classrooms generally demonstrate more posi-
tive political attitudes in general and toward school; students who feel free to express their opinions generally manifest more positive political attitudes; and, across time, the trend is for the classroom climate factor to accentuate the development of positive political attitudes. While the findings of Goldenson and Ehman are encouraging regarding the place of controversial issues in fostering pro-democratic attitudes, the research of Long and Long (1975) confounds the picture with their finding of a low positive relationship between the discussion of controversial issues and political cynicism. Also, the inconclusive findings associated with the impact of the jurisprudential (Harvard Social Studies Project) approach on interest in political issues (Oliver and Shaver 1966, Shaver and Larkins 1969) suggest that a degree of caution may be warranted regarding the claim of a relationship between discussion of controversial issues and the development of positive political attitudes.

Quasi-Democratic Experiences

In this section the focus will be on the impact of circumscribed democratic participation on the development of political attitudes. A form of democratic participation enters many schools through such devices as student councils or school clubs, where in limited areas circumscribed by teachers or administrators, students are permitted to make decisions and carry out those collective decisions. That students are obviously aware that democratic principles apply only to a narrow range of issues and contexts and are subordinate to the desires of teachers and administration, warrants examining these data separately from the research on true democratic practices described in the preceding section.

As mentioned above, reports of limited democratic experiences in schools for youth are long on narrative and short on the systematic and rigorous identification of outcomes in terms of student attitudes and behavior. Narrative accounts, such as that of Sampson and Jenisch (1983) and Koblas (1983) provide highly subjective impressions concerning the impact of such programs. There exists a body of literature on the impact of student participation in school activities on political attitudes which suggests that more positive attitudes toward political life may result. For example, Cuccia (1979) examined the effect of participation in extracurricular activities on high school students' socio-political
attitudes. Cuccia found that students that participated in extracurricular activities manifested significantly more positive political attitudes (trust, efficacy, integration, interest) than did students not participating in extracurricular activities. Most of this type of literature, however, does not attempt to assess whether these activities are democratic. Many would obviously be highly teacher-centered and non-democratic (e.g., music, sports) and, as a result, interpreting these findings as quasi-democratic experiences would be unwarranted.

Recently Eyler (1982) has challenged this body of literature with her finding that general political attitudes of students may transfer to the school as a political system and these school-based attitudes in turn are predictors of participation in extracurricular activities, particularly governance groups. Eyler's analyses suggest that students become involved in areas like student council because of pre-existing attitudes. Consistent with Eyler's thesis, Horowitz (1978) found differences between students electing to participate in an alternative option within a high school and those who did not. Students choosing the alternative option were found to strive for more enduring and personal contact with peers, to attach more importance to concerns of equity, and to focus more on personal feelings in interactions with other students. Thus, from Eyler's perspective it would not be unexpected that students electing to participate in school extracurricular activities would be found to manifest higher levels of pro-democratic attitudes than students electing not to participate. Whether the experience of quasi-democratic activities enhance or diminish these pre-existing attitudes is uncertain.

True Democratic Experiences

The complete realization of democratic participation by students in the governance and operation of classrooms and schools is an exciting prospect. There has not only been a growth in the incidence of true democratic experiences in schools for youth over the past ten years, but sufficient research has been completed to allow tentative generalizations concerning the influence of such experiences on student attitudes and values. The existing research literature has had two foci. First, there exist a small number of studies which have analyzed the impact of alternative schools or student political attitudes. Second, there is a body
of literature that analyzes the impact of the Kohlbergian just-community interventions on individual moral development and the development of collective norms.

Three major studies were identified that assessed the impact of alternative schools on the political orientations of students. Siegel (1977) studied students in five Massachusetts high schools, one of which was an alternative school governed as a democratic community. Students in the alternative school were found to possess a higher sense of efficacy than students at the four other schools. Students at three of the traditional schools were found to show more interest in political affairs in and out of school than did the students in the alternative school. The students at the alternative school, while the most trusting of the leaders in their school, were the most cynical on a measure of general political trust. The findings from the Siegel study are mixed. On the one hand, a democratic school atmosphere was found to be associated with increased feelings of efficacy but with a lower interest in politics and general cynicism regarding politicians. On the other hand, students in traditional authoritarian schools were found overall to demonstrate higher interest in political life. Wilson (1974) too found increased political efficacy positively associated with participation in a democratically run alternative high school program. Consistent with Siegel's findings on cynicism, Tanck (1978) found in a study of 8th- and 11th-grade students that participation in school decisions was negatively correlated with political trust.

Metzger and Barr (1978) studied the influence on attitudes of student participation in an alternative high school within a larger high school. The political system within the small alternative school was found to be democratic in that there was frequent and significant participation by the students in decision making. Alternative school students scored significantly higher than students in the regular school on measures of political interest, integration, trust, and political confidence where the focus was the general society. On the same measures, when the focus was on the school, the alternative school students also scored significantly higher on all attitude variables except for school political interest.
Travers (1983) reports cohort data indicating that alternative school students are strikingly different from the rest of the student body in reported attitudes and political efficacy. Travers' data was collected in 1979 from 28 School-within-a-School (SWS) students and cohorts drawn from the regular school program in Brookline, Massachusetts. SWS was an alternative school patterned along the lines of Kohlberg's just community (see below). Travers' research utilized three sets of researcher-constructed scales: attitudes toward school, attitudes toward the political process, and reports of political participation. SWS students, in comparison to regular program students, were found to be much more desirous of exerting influence over school affairs, less likely to perceive that equality of opportunity exists for all students at the school, and no different from other students in their satisfaction with the learning process at the school. With regard to attitudes toward the political system, SWS students had a higher sense of political efficacy, a more critical view of the qualifications of leaders, and lower faith in our system regarding its ability to provide equity. Finally, it was found that SWS students reported significantly higher rates of involvement in a variety of political activities.

The studies cited above found a heightened sense of political efficacy associated with participation in a democratically run alternative school experience. Political interest, on the other hand, seemed not to be as strongly associated with democratic experiences. Faith or trust in the political system and its leaders was found in the majority of the cases to be negatively influenced. That is, participation in democratic experiences was associated with a heightened sense of cynicism. The results from these studies present, therefore, a mixed picture of the impact of true democratic schooling on the basic political orientations of students. Due to the difficulty in accurately assessing the true character of school environments and the possibility of research's failure to consider that students may elect to participate in these programs, due to already existing positive attitudes toward the political system, final judgment should await further inquiry. In general, however, one can place little, if any, confidence in studies that attempt to make claims concerning the influence of students of extracurricular activities or alternative program participation, if those studies have not either
randomly assigned students to the different conditions, or statistically controlled for relevant pre-existing differences among students that may be the result of the self-selection process that is usually associated with participation.

Kohlberg has recently revised his thinking regarding proper approach to moral education (Kohlberg 1978, 1980). This shift was marked by a movement away from the moral discussion approach and toward the just-community approach. The research on the moral discussion approach is summarized in section I of this chapter. Below I will briefly discuss the rationale supporting the just-community approach and then report the relevant research findings.

It is Kohlberg's current position that the teacher must become a socializer and advocate and move into the realm of indoctrination. This shift is primarily the result of the realization that teachers must deal with the real-world behavior of students in the school and that, as moral educators, they cannot afford to wait until students arrive at stage five, the developmental point at which moral thought presumably leads to moral action. As a result of this realization Kohlberg now holds that moral education can involve advocacy or "indoctrination" without violating the child's rights, as long as the advocacy is democratic, subject to the constraints of recognizing student participation in the rule-making and value-upholding process and recognizing the shared rights of teachers and students (Kohlberg 1978). The role of moral education, from this revised perspective, is to facilitate the functioning of peer-group collective norms that are motivationally based on a strong sense of community. The focus of moral education now becomes group, rather than individual, development, and the major area of study and concern becomes group norms and expectations, something which Kohlberg says is neither internal consciousness or external behavior.

The research on democratic classrooms and schools which are outgrowths of Kohlbergian theory vary significantly from the research discussed above in terms of the dependent variables reported. Studies of Kohlbergian just communities have not generally used political orientations such as efficacy or trust as dependent variables. Instead, the studies have assessed the impact of democratic experiences on growth in stages of moral reasoning and the development of collective norms.
Three studies were identified which implemented just-community practices on a classroom level. Stuhr and Rundle (1980) report the results of a 12-week program with fifth-grade students. It was found that students who participated in the experimental class improved one-half stage in moral reasoning, achieving a solid stage two. Crockenberg and Nicolayev (1979) report the results of a yearlong program with eighth- and ninth-grade students. It was found that the mean moral reasoning of students shifted from stage two to stage three. Hayes (1980) implemented a democratic classroom with high school students and was able to detect no significant stage growth as a result.

A democratic classroom as an oasis within an authoritarian school may not have a significant impact on moral development. Full-day experiences appear more promising for influencing moral reasoning. Stuhr and Rundle report (p. 246) that the year prior to implementing a successful program, a similar program had failed. They attribute this failure to the fact that the classroom was not self-contained and the students were taught by five or six different teachers per day. The Hayes study also was only a period-per-day experience. On the other hand, at the elementary level, Crockenberg and Nicoyalev were able to provide a total school day experience. McCann and Bell (1975) report that in a French-Canadian Frienet School the full-day experience resulted in moral development. Their study utilized two matched samples of 20 students between the ages of 6 and 7. One group attended a Catholic school, the other a Frienet school that encourages democratic self-government. Using a Piagetian measure of moral development, a statistically significant difference was found favoring the students in the Frienet school.

The most detailed information concerning the nature of just-community intervention is found in Wasserman's (1980) description of the now defunct Cluster School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The Cluster School was an alternative high school within the Cambridge High and Latin School, in which students and staff were given equal say over the operation of the school. A student staff ratio of ten to one existed with approximately 70 students selected from a lottery of volunteers to participate in this school-within-a-school. At the heart of the school was the community meeting. At this weekly meeting, real-life issues facing the school
were discussed and decisions reached. Frequently these issues were moral in nature and, as Wasserman describes, standard moral discussion techniques were followed by staff. To this extent the just-community approach represents "old wine in new bottles," with the difference being that the dilemmas are real-life rather than hypothetical. However, the focus on collective norms sets the approach apart from being just another way to facilitate individual moral reasoning.

An important empirical question is what happens to students, "morally speaking," as a result of their experience in a school-based just-community. First, it has been shown that students will experience development in their moral reasoning. Power (1979a) reports that the mean stage change for all studies in the Cluster School was approximately one-quarter stage for the first year. Over two years the mean change was approximately one-third of a stage, and over three years the mean change exceeded one-half stage. The change was the greatest for the first year of the school, with 28 percent showing upward stage movement between one-half and one stage and 33 percent advancing between one-third and one-half stage.

A similar program, the School-within-a-School (SWS) in Brookline, Massachusetts, is richly described by Mosher (1980b). Mosher reports results similar to those found by Power, in that students appear to have experienced one-third of a stage growth as a result of participation in the democratic school experience. Higgins, Power, and Kohlberg (1984) compare students from the Cluster School and School-within-a-School with cohorts drawn from the regular schools. They report that democratic school students rated higher in making judgments of responsibility and in stage of moral judgment. In addition, they were more likely to make prosocial choices, demonstrate a higher sense of collective prosocial norms, and express a stronger sense of community. Preliminary reports from a just-community intervention in Scarsdale, New York, report similar findings with students experiencing approximately one-fifth stage upward movement over the first year (Kohlberg and others 1981). Plimpton (1979) reports that no significant difference in moral reasoning was detected in eight Michigan junior high schools when students in schools with more open and democratic school climate were compared with more closed school.
climates. Because Plimpton defined open democratic climate based upon professional staff evaluations, it is difficult to tell from the study how democratic the schools actually were. As a result, the confidence one may place in the findings is questionable.

An alternative perspective on evaluation of the just-community approach has developed out of the work of Power and Reimer (Power 1979a, 1979b, 1979c, 1981, Reimer 1977, 1981, Power and Reimer 1978, Reimer and Power 1980). Their studies are based on the first four years (1974-1978) of the Cluster School. They focused on the moral atmosphere of the school, and in the process develop a sociological rather than psychological perspective. Specifically, they were concerned with the question of how social norms come into existence and the process by which individual behavior is brought into compliance with these norms. Reimer and Power outline a sequence of phases of the development of collective norms and degree of valuing of community within groups. These phases describe the development of group norms from a phase of normal proposal, to norm acceptance, to expectation of compliance, and finally to collective norm enforcement. Paralleling the evolution of collective norms is the development of the sense of value attached to collective life.

Over the four-year period studied by Reimer and Power, four normative areas emerged which were of major importance within the school: social interaction, respect for property (stealing), drug usage, and attendance (absenteeism). It was recognized that in the study of the evolution of norms, one also needs to understand the motivational dynamic by which individuals agree to act in accordance with the norms. This motivational dynamic was presented in terms of a sense of community characterized by mutual trust and care. Building mutual trust and care was seen as essential in that this sense of community was to provide the motivation for students to voluntarily put limits on their personal behavior for the collective good.

It is reported that in three of the four normative areas collective norms developed and student behavior was brought into compliance with these norms. In one of these areas (drugs) no such norm emerged, and, as Reimer and Power (1980) report, the fourth-year retreat of the Cluster School was a disaster with widespread drug usage and physical confrontations over the issue. The students had not seen the need for such a
TABLE 4
PHASES OF THE COLLECTIVE NORM AND DEGREE OF COMMUNITY VALUING

**Phases of the Collective Norm**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 0: No collective norm exists or is proposed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective norm proposal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1: Individuals propose collective norms for group acceptance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective norm acceptance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2: Collective norms are accepted as group ideal but not agreed to. They are not acknowledged as expectations for behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3: Collective norms are accepted and agreed to but are not yet acknowledged as expectations for behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective norm expectation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 4: Collective norms are accepted and expected (naive expectation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 5: Collective norms are expected but not followed (disappointed expectation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective norm enforcement</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 6: Collective norms are expected and upheld through expected persuading of deviant to follow norm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 7: Collective norms are expected and upheld through expected reporting of deviant to the group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases of the Degree of Community Valuing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instrumental extrinsic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The school is valued as an institution that helps the individual to meet his or her own academic needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>&quot;Esprit de corps&quot; extrinsic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The school is valued as an institution that helps the individual and the individual feels some loyalty toward the school, as manifested in team spirit and support of teams or groups in school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spontaneous community intrinsic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The school is valued as the kind of place in which members feel an inner motivation to help others in the group community and the community generates special feelings of closeness among members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communal intrinsic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The school as a community is valued for its own sake. Community can obligate its members in special ways and members can expect special privileges or responsibilities from the group and other members.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer (1983), 56-57.
norm, and teachers had adopted advocacy positions which obviously had little impact. As a result of the retreat, it became obvious that the sense of community which had been evolving over the years was indeed very fragile.

It is frequently the case that educational researchers "do things" to students, assess the impact on students, but seldom check the meanings students derive from the experience. It is often just as important to find out how students feel about the intervention as it is to find out if change has occurred on researcher-determined variables. Certainly one would need to reevaluate a program that produced the desired changes but to which students had a strong negative reaction. An important question, therefore, is, what do students "think about" Kohlbergian programs? As a result of being in such a program, do student attitudes change toward talking about moral questions? Do they "buy" the stage concept and accept it as a significant educational goal or do they see it as just another educational game? One could argue that regardless of how students react to Kohlbergian programs, as long as moral development is facilitated, the approach is a valid one. However, it could also be argued that if the approach trivializes moral questions in the students' minds or creates a pattern of withdrawal from moral issues, then the collateral learnings demand consideration.

The published evidence on the above questions is sketchy. I could locate only two sources, both students who had been participants in just-community interventions. The Kolber (1981) perspective is very positive and focuses on the affectively satisfying nature of the experience of participation in a just-community. Kolber found the idea of living together and building a sense of community around the ideal of justice a personally rewarding experience. Zalaznick (1980), on the other hand, while concurring with many of Kolber's observations, has some serious concerns about the just-community experience. Zalaznick discussed with his fellow students their impressions at the Scarsdale Alternative School. His overall view was positive, primarily due to the emotional satisfaction engendered as a result of the closeness developed between students in their efforts to develop self-governance in the school. My own work in alternative schools confirms the observation that students find close relationships among peers and between peers and teachers very
satisfying. An environment of mutual caring and concern is attractive to many students when compared to a larger depersonalized school and social environment. This is especially true with regard to the more collegial teacher/student relationships that occur in more democratic settings.

Zalaznick and his fellow students expressed two major areas of concern. First is what Zalaznick refers to as moral intimidation. In spite of greater participation by students in the governance of the alternative school, students could sense that there was a purpose to the school that they could not influence. That is, students were aware that the goal to "make us moral" had been planned out and students could not affect it. Students resented the fact that the school, in this regard, no longer belonged to them.

Zalaznick also notes the negative influence of developmental theory being shared with the students. The awareness of higher stages being better led to feelings of intimidation among lower-stage students and reactions of the sort, "I'm stage two and proud of it." In addition, students reported resenting the feeling that they were being pushed to higher stages. It is also reported that students developed an awareness that there were right sides (higher stage) and wrong sides (lower stage) to moral issues. As a result of this awareness, students seemed to be less open to moral dialogue.

Zalaznick labeled the second area of concern as abuse of stage hierarchy. It was reported that students sensed that not only were there better "contents," but also there were better or smarter students. It seemed as if to many students that higher-stage reasoners had "right" on their side. Related to this is what he refers to as a "halo effect," in that students and teachers may see some students as lower stage and of little potential.

There can be little question that many students find satisfying expanded control over their lives in school and the more open relationships developed in such an experience. In this regard, the just-community approach seems to be consistent with student needs. The moral discussion approach, however, seems to pose a serious problem in that it creates distinctions and distances between students and the perception that some are better than others. Developmental moral education may
involve its own Catch 22. It appears that complete openness concerning stage hierarchy and more adequate ways of resolving moral dilemmas may have negative effects on students' feelings and resultant moral growth. On the other hand, failure to share the nature of the educational goals with students likewise may create feelings of suspicion. Moral educators require openness from students, but can they defend not also being open with their students? The paradoxical possibility is raised that in order for teachers to be effective moral educators they must be dishonest or, at the very least, not completely open with their students.

In addition to the possibility of feelings of intimidation and manipulation on the part of students, there is reason to question how much freedom students really desire. Metzger and Barr's (1978) description of alternative school students' reluctance to assume control of school governance and Serow and Strike's (1978) finding that teenagers see school administration as being the proper arbiter of peer relations suggest that many youth may be at best reluctant participatory citizens within a democratic school context. Further support for this perspective comes from Richard and DeCecco (1975). They collected written interviews from 6,783 high school students who were asked to write out dilemma incidents in which there were two or more ways of acting and the "democratic thing to do" was not clear. They found that many students defined "problem in democracy" in terms of conflicts decided by unilateral decisions of authority.

Evidence from teachers also raises questions regarding the future acceptance of the moral discussion approach in schools. The findings from the Danforth Project (Colby and others 1977) that one year after the study only 1 of 20 teachers was still using dilemmas in the classroom, and Silver's (1982) fascinating account of the stillbirth of a district-sponsored attempt at Kohlbergian programs suggest that the moral discussion approach may not be compatible with the needs of many social studies teachers. The reason for this reaction on the part of teachers is not clear. One possible interpretation is that the moral questions (dilemmas) have not been well-integrated into existing curricula. Thus, the discussion of moral dilemmas does not appear to have curricular relevance.
III. Additional Research Areas

Influence of Standard Curriculum

Standard social studies curriculum has no discernable impact on the socio-moral development of youth. This generalization, most recently drawn to our attention by Torney, Oppenheim, and Farnen (1975), and Ehman (1980a, 1980b), received substantial support from the data in this review. The comparison groups for the community involvement/social action studies reported above were largely drawn from standard social studies classrooms. In almost all of the studies the standard social studies curriculum students showed no change in political attitudes over the period of time of the study. A similar pattern was found with the comparison groups used in the controversial issues studies.

Hepburn and Napier (1982) report the results of the Improving Citizenship Education Project which, in part, was based on the assumption that student attitudes toward political institutions and participation could be changed through the introduction of new, innovative curriculum that would result in increased student political knowledge and skills. The study involved ten secondary and seven elementary social studies teachers from five secondary and five elementary schools. The final sample consisted of 265 project students and 184 control students. The dependent variables were measured by two researcher-constructed instruments, the Citizenship Knowledge Test (CKT) and the Opinionnaire on Political Institutions and Participation (OPIP). The OPIP was designed to measure student attitudes toward political participation and toward political institutions. The CKT was designed to measure student knowledge about eight different dimensions of citizen life. The treatment consisted of a six-week unit. At the elementary level it was found that the political knowledge and attitudes of students were not significantly affected. At the secondary level it was reported that political knowledge showed a marked jump, but with regard to political attitudes, a significant but negligible positive change was found only on the public political participation subscale and not on attitudes toward political institutions or toward participation in school (Hepburn 1980).

In a similar study Sherry (1976) examined the impact of lessons in political science on political knowledge and attitudes of fifth-grade students. The intervention consisted of 13 lessons emphasizing electoral
behavior and politicians and political parties. The treatment group scored significantly higher on the political knowledge test; however, no significant difference was found between control group and experimental group on measures of political efficacy and preference for political activities. Also it was found that treatment students were no different from other students in voting percentage in a school mock election.

Both the Hepburn/Napier and Sherry studies, and the research summarized by Ehman (1980a) suggest that standard social studies curricula can effectively increase student content mastery; however, it would appear this increased knowledge is unrelated to shifts in attitude. Knight (1982) conducted an international study that reaffirms this observation. He assessed the relationship between geographic knowledge of students and their attitudes toward other nationalities. His sample consisted of 50 secondary school classes in 13 different countries. He found no relationship between variations in students' geographic knowledge and the attitudes of those students toward the nations and peoples of the Americas.

One study was identified that did find a relationship between knowledge and attitudes. Jackstadt (1981) collected data regarding economic knowledge and economic attitudes from 19 Hawaiian public high schools. He concluded that high school courses are effective in increasing student economic understanding and that student attitudes toward the American economic system are favorably affected by increased economic understanding.

In addition to the findings on political attitudes there is also reason to believe that moral development is similarly unaffected by the standard social studies curriculum. A majority of the studies reported in table 2 on the effects of the moral dilemma discussion approach used traditional social studies classrooms as comparison groups. In none of the studies was growth in stage of moral reasoning for the comparison group observed. This indicates that the standard social studies curriculum, with its emphasis on mastery of subject matter content through memorization, makes no significant contribution to moral development.
Bias in Social Studies Materials and Classrooms

In this section I review the recent research on textbook biases toward women and ethnic minorities, as well as the presence of ideological biases in texts and social studies classroom. Overall, there is reason to believe that textbook publishers in the last decade have been responsive to charges of bias and have attempted to produce textbooks that are fair and recognize, in a non-sexist, non-racist manner, the contributions of women and minorities to social life.

The picture on sexism in texts is somewhat mixed. Bulger (1983) and Julian (1979) note recent improvements in the treatment of women in social studies texts. Bulger analyzed third-grade social studies texts for change in sex-role stereotyping over the 1970-1980 period. She found much improvement overall; however, she noted that males are still found dominant in primary roles. Julian, in an analysis of selected junior and senior high U. S. history textbooks found that when women were the focus treatment was fair; however, omissions of women's role in history were still occurring.

In a content analysis of 22 recent secondary economics textbooks, Hahn and Blankenship (1983) found less sex bias than books in earlier studies. Generally, the texts included women's issues, presented nontraditional female role models, and avoided sexist language; however, it was noted that women are still underrepresented in most of the textbooks and the economic realities faced by women are not given sufficient attention. Collins and others (1984), in an analysis of 16 Caldecott Medal and runners-up books from 1979-1982, found that compared with the results of an earlier study of Caldecott winners (Weitzman and others 1972), male and female differences in the books due to sex-role stereotyping have decreased substantially.

Less positive results are reported by Smith (1977), Sager (1979), and Boneparth (1980). Smith analyzed changes in treatment of females in 16 U. S. history textbooks published during three time periods: 1959-1964, 1965-1970, and 1971-1976. He found little substantive change over time, with females generally less represented than males. When women were represented he found they were presented in stereotypical, nonsignificant, passive roles. Boneparth found little change in the image of women in American government textbooks over the past decade. Sager, in
an analysis of sex-role stereotypes in sixth-, seventh-, and eighth-grade social studies texts, found persisting omissions and sex-role dichotomies. She did, however, find texts with a problems emphasis less biased than traditional history texts.

The results of recent content analyses for bias against American Indians and blacks is very positive. Baloch (1981) analyzed U. S. history textbooks for bias against Indians. The analysis involved 10 texts from the 1960-1969 period and 13 texts from the post-1969 era. Baloch found the newer texts more factually accurate, reliable, and balanced in their portrayal of the American Indian. Clemmer (1979) analyzed 19 U. S. history textbooks approved by the Utah State Board of Education between 1950 and 1977. She reports noticeable attempts to minimize stereotyping of the American Indian in texts published in the 1970s. This trend in the late 1960s and early 1970s indicate fairer, but still brief, treatment of American Indians. Only one study was identified in the time period of this review that analyzed texts for bias against blacks. Bouldin (1980) analyzed how black Americans were treated in four 11th-grade U. S. history texts used by Pittsburgh schools in 1929, 1950, 1959, and 1968. He notes considerable improvement in the 1968 text in that blacks are presented in a fair manner and their contributions duly noted.

Another type of bias found in social studies textbooks is ideological. Anyon (1979) analyzed 17 widely used secondary U. S. history textbooks focusing on economic and labor history from the Civil War to World War I. She reports that the textbooks are written in such a manner as to reflect an ideology that favors the interests of the wealthy and powerful. She notes that this perspective "provides ideological justification for the activities and prerogatives of these groups and do not legitimize points of view and priorities of groups that compete with these established interests for social acceptance and support" (p. 379).

Saltonstall (1978) analyzed selected U. S. history books concerning the explanation of poverty. She concluded that U. S. history textbooks are chauvinistic regarding the interpretation of poverty; they fail to recognize the United State's role in the world economic order and thereby strengthen Western capitalistic ideology. Harrington (1980), in a study less ideologically motivated than that of Anyon or Saltonstall, examined the issue of political bias in New York State textbooks. He examined...
130 texts in use in schools (K-12) that contained content related to American government and politics. It was found that authority figures were conveyed as overwhelmingly benevolent, approachable, and accountable. This positive picture was found to lessen somewhat in the upper grades. Harrington also reports that the total material analyzed favors a conflict rather than a consensual model of political life, with textbook material in the later grades being the most conflict-oriented. Generally, it was noted that it was not until the eighth grade that a balanced view of political life was finally presented. It was also found that middle-class school texts were less biased than lower-class school texts. More realistic views of authority figures in textbooks occurred later in the school curriculum for children attending school in lower socio-economic neighborhoods compared with texts from middle-class schools.

Two additional studies were identified that analyzed the political content of children's literature. Hurst (1979) analyzed the Caldecott Medal picture books and an equal number of non-Caldecott winning books from the time period 1958-1978. Hurst's conclusions were that the children's picture books sampled provide a bland, passive view of American society and its political and economic system. Hurst could find virtually no role models of political activity, personal and social decision making, or political competencies. Political life was reduced to rules in other lands and policemen, and the only cases of citizen action involved the arrest of a law breaker. Cook (1982) examined the hypothesis that children's literature may renew the shared meanings of political culture by analyzing the political content of the Newbery Medal award-winning books from 1922-1981. He found that in American books the theme of political individualism was consistent over time, but its implications appear to have been modified somewhat in recent award-winning books by its placement within new, more benevolent contexts.

In my judgment, by far the most insidious form of bias in classrooms is that occurring in lower socio-economic classrooms. Anyon (1980) and Wilcox (1982) have documented the phenomena of differential socialization for working-class and middle-class youth. Anyon, in an ethnographic study of fifth-grade classrooms, documents how, as a result of teacher behaviors and curriculum, working-class and middle-class children develop
different potential relationships to capital, authority, and work. She finds that as the socio-economic level of the community increased between the five elementary schools studies, the attitudes fostered among students became more consistent with the requirements of successful middle-class life. Working-class students were treated as if a working-class life were all that was possible and such dispositions as creativity and critical thought were not a part of the regular curriculum. Wilcox studied teacher behavior in two classrooms, one in a working-class neighborhood and the other in a professional executive area. Her findings parallel those of Anyon. It was found that students from a professional, executive neighborhood were taught in such a manner as to develop internal motivation, anticipation of future success, and skills in self-presentation. By contrast, students from the working-class neighborhood were taught in a manner preparing them for working-class jobs. They were treated in such a way that they looked to others for motivation and rewards. The emphasis was placed on the here and now, not the future, and not on skills in self-presentation.

Finally, I would like to comment on the question of the impact of biased materials on learners' attitudes. The research suggests that children are not "open vessels" whose youthful and eventually adult biases and prejudices are absorbed directly from children's literature and public school textbooks. Tibbetts (1978), in a review of studies on the effects of sexist reading material on youth, concludes that the effects are "extremely individual, personal, varied, and unpredictable" (p. 167). Guthrie (1983), in reviewing the literature on learning values from textbooks, finds that the tone surrounding the theme and the mindset of the reader are the determinants of value formation. How the theme is handled by the author, how the values of the learners relate to the theme of the text, and the teaching strategies of educators, all operate together to determine student evaluations of the reading materials and eventually whether that material will reinforce or change an individual's values. Grueneich (1982) likewise avoids simple claims for the effect of biased material on children's attitudes or values. In the review of the literature she observed that, "Children virtually never form an internal representation of the story which is identical to the explicit content of the story, and furthermore, children of different ages may form different
story interpretations" (p. 41). I could find no research to suggest that biased reading materials lead directly to biased students. One study was identified that attempted to address this question. Scott and Feldman-Summers (1979) examined the question of whether exposure to female characters presented in positive, nontraditional roles will alter children's perceptions of the roles of males and females in our society. Third- and fourth-grade students were required to read a set of eight short stories during a four-week period. One version of each story had females as the main character in a traditionally male role. It was found that students (both boys and girls) who read stories that involved females in nontraditional roles increased in their perception of the appropriateness of girls participating in the same activity. However, reading these stories did not affect perceptions of other sex-role activities not presented in the story. The findings of this study are suggestive with regard to the potential impact of nonsexist materials in schools; however, the fact that there was no follow-up to see if the influence was persistent and the failure of the effect to generalize to other role activities suggest that a degree of caution is warranted concerning the potential of nonsexist literature to influence positively sex-role perceptions of youth. Nevertheless, this is an interesting study worthy of careful extension and replication.

I do not wish to imply by the above analysis that biased materials in schools should not be a matter of concern. Clearly, there are a variety of reasons, such as historical accuracy and equity, to work to remove bias from textbooks. Rather, I would suggest that the relationship between students' experience of biased materials and their formation of attitudes is an area in need of empirical exploration. Simple questions such as those listed below could be researched easily and add valuable knowledge to our understanding of the influence of textbooks on students: Do children detect the same bias in materials that academics do? Do children from homes where bias is present react differently to biased materials than children from homes where bias is not present? Do classes that read biased materials develop different attitudes than children who read unbiased materials?

The research on the differential socialization of working class youth appears potentially much more disturbing in that the differential
treatment of students by teachers over the long run would inevitably have a stifling impact on student aspirations and sense of dignity. To engage in teaching practices that rob the future from students is unconscionable and should be of concern to all educators. Simple cause and effect conclusions, however, are also unwarranted here as Willis (1977) has pointed out in his probing analysis of how working class children in fact reproduce themselves in schools that ostensibly hold out the potential for escape from working class life.

**Attitudes Toward Values Education**

What are teachers' attitudes toward values education? If values education is to gain acceptance and become a regular part of school curriculum, teachers must be favorably disposed toward its inclusion within their classrooms. As was discussed above, there is reason to suspect that the cognitive/developmental dilemma discussion approach is not seen by teachers as of sufficient value to warrant its continuing use (Colby and others 1977, Silver 1982). Silver reports cases where teachers were using moral dilemmas only when situations arose in the classroom and the teacher wanted to make a particular moral point. Paradoxically, moral dilemmas had become the vehicle for indoctrination.

It is generally accepted that there is public support for some kind of values education. The 13th annual Gallup Poll on education (Gallup 1981) found that 70 percent of the public favored the teaching of moral/values education. Evans and Weible (1983) surveyed 263 parents of fifth- and sixth-grade children in urban and rural areas of the midwest. They found that 90 percent of the parents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "Students should have an opportunity to study and discuss values that may be different from their own in social studies."

A number of studies also confirm the perception that there is general concern among teachers about values education; however, the interpretation of the proper focus of values education varies widely. Blase (1981) discussed with 35 high school teachers in upstate New York what it means to be a teacher. He found that teaching values was seen as a central dimension of what it means to be a teacher and a primary source of job-related rewards and satisfaction. Teachers saw the need for teaching values such as honesty and respect primarily because students
show a need for it in their behavior. In the main, Blase found teachers use indoctrination, modeling, lecturing, and reward and punishment as their methodology. Tallman (1978) in a survey of 82 fifth-grade teachers responsible for social studies, found teacher attitudes most favorable toward indoctrination. Schulte (1982) found that in the Toledo Public Schools teachers and parents favored the teaching of "right actions" rather than a moral ideals interpretation of moral education. The above studies suggest that many in the teaching profession interpret values education as directive, using indoctrination with an emphasis on behavior. Other studies present a more eclectic view regarding teacher orientations to values education.

Rose (1980), in a study of the current practices of 211 Ohio social studies teachers engaged in values education, found the most commonly used approaches to be values clarification (42 percent), values analysis (36 percent), dilemma discussion (12 percent), and inculcation (11 percent). Wallace (1980) surveyed the attitudes of 334 high school teachers on Long Island, New York. He found that the teachers surveyed agreed that moral education should have a role in the public schools and that it should be integrated into the entire school program. Teachers saw a wide variety of possible approaches as appropriate, with the exception of teachers telling students what is right or wrong.

There is reason to believe that social studies teachers see the teaching of values as an important responsibility, but they differ in views of appropriate methods. However, there does seem to be among many teachers a disposition toward more directive approaches designed to change student behavior. The concern and apparent confusion among teachers regarding values education can be approached from a variety of perspectives. One possible interpretation of the general endorsement of values education is that it represents a naive realization concerning the importance of the area, but remains an area in which they recognize their own lack of preparation for adequately addressing the issue and the very real problems posed by taking it seriously. Stanley (1983), in an analysis of social studies methods textbooks, points out the eclectic, incomplete, and occasionally inaccurate presentation of approaches to teaching values. It is not surprising, given society's muddled mandate to schools regarding the teaching of values, the nature of teacher prep-
aration, competition for time in the classroom, and the complexity of the issues and approaches, that the teaching profession appears to lack a genuine sense of focus and commitment to values education.

There does appear to be a great awareness of the values education movement and one would be hard pressed to find a school district or state department of education that didn't endorse values education. Hobbs (1981) analyzed the extent to which California public high school officials have responded to a legislative mandate for moral education. He found in 250 school districts the mandate had been ignored by 50 percent, with 80 percent reporting minimal or no response. It is my impression that values education is not an important factor in the planning and practice of the vast majority of social studies teachers. Legislative mandates or inservice workshops are unlikely to change this picture. Teaching content is likely to continue to be the overwhelming preoccupation of teachers and, while values education may occasionally be given lip service, in all probability it will continue to lose out in the competition for classroom time. It will be interesting to see if new, innovative curricula that integrate an approach to value reasoning within the study of U. S. history has appeal to classroom teachers (Lockwood and Harris 1985).

The Political Beliefs and Attitudes of Youth

Everyday, students bring with them into social studies classrooms a set of beliefs, attitudes, and values that provide their frame of reference for interpreting and reacting to the social studies curriculum. An understanding of youths' political perspectives is essential for developing effective social studies programs. In this section I review the research on recent shifts in the political orientations of youth and attempts to summarize current findings. This review will be hampered by the fact that much of the information published in the late 1970s and early 1980s reports data collected only from the early 1970s. Only a few studies were identified that reported data on the youth of the 1980s.

One important question concerns the understanding youth have of our democratic system and its basic principles and values. One generalization that appears warranted is that adolescents, while offering general lip service in support of democratic values, are unwilling to apply those
abstract values to specific relevant cases. Jones (1980), in a secondary analysis of a national sample of 1,800 nine-, thirteen-, and seventeen-year-olds (National Assessment of Educational Progress 1978), reports that while youth support the right to vote in general, only 41 percent of the nine-year-olds felt that a white middle-aged atheist should be allowed to vote. Generally, as youth mature their willingness to extend the franchise increases. For example, in the same sample analyzed by Jones, 87 percent of the 17-year-olds would allow the female atheist to vote. One explanation for the phenomena may be that younger students have only a vague understanding of democratic principles and as a result, their reactions are largely affective. Sigel (1979) reports from a study of 1,000 high school seniors, that students have great difficulty articulating what they understand by the word "democracy." When asked to explain to a foreign student what it is that makes any country a democracy, 48 percent cited individual freedom and 37 percent, voice in government. Only 17 percent of the sample possessed what Sigel was willing to call a sophisticated level of comprehension.

Three studies document the shifts that have taken place in the political orientations of youth since the tumultuous era of the late 1960s. Travers (1982) collected data from a middle-class urban New England high school in 1970 and again in 1979. Her sample consisted of 250 juniors both years. She addressed student attitudes toward school, socio-political attitudes, and level of political participation. The 1970 sample was found to be more critical of the school than the 1979 sample. The 1979 students were consistently more satisfied with school staff and felt more efficacious within the school. On the socio-moral measures, Travers' impression was that both sets of students were fairly similar on such measures as trust and political efficacy. The level of participation on each index was significantly greater for the 1970 sample. The 1970 cohorts also held political events to be of more importance.

Jones (1979) compared two sets of data (1969, 1975) on the political knowledge and orientations of youth (National Assessment of Educational Progress 1969, 1978). It was found nationwide that political knowledge about democratic principles and inclinations to participate in political activity decreased from 1969 to 1975. She also noted little shift in tolerance. A more recent study covering the period 1976-1982 (National
Assessment of Educational Progress 1983) reports improvements concerning student knowledge of the structure and function of the U. S. government and political process; however, on items measuring respect for the rights of others, performance remained at the 1976 level. Jennings and Niemi (1981) compared the responses of a 1965 and a 1973 sample of 17- and 18-year-olds. A definite period effect was noted in that there were marked decreases in party identification, political and interpersonal trust, and interest in politics and political activities. Thus, it would appear that growing up during the Vietnam/Watergate era lessened youths' desires for political participation. The evidence is less clear, and only suggestive that political trust, efficacy, and interest were also adversely affected by experiencing this era.

There is evidence that today's youth are a fairly contented, conservative lot. The recent survey, "Mood of American Youth" (National Association of Secondary School Principals 1984), found that with the youth of 1984, in comparison with the youth of 1974, the generation gap had all but disappeared. Over 75 percent said they agreed with their parents' political views and reported no serious problems getting along with any family member. The 1984 sample also reported that they read more and were very interested in politics. Sigel and Hoskin (1981) likewise find that youth today are contented with their lives. In their sample of 1,000 high school seniors, they found 76 percent placed themselves from 7 to 10 on a 10-point scale regarding satisfaction with life. Generally, most students (89 percent) expressed positive attitudes toward the United States, but only 22 percent were favorable to the Nixon government. Only 23 percent expressed a higher than moderate trust in government. On a test of political knowledge where students were asked to identify prominent political events, 55 percent missed seven or more on a 15-item questionnaire. Low levels of political participation were also noted in the sample with students only willing to become active if their own values and interests were threatened. Generally, students were satisfied with their lives and acceptant, without much thought, of the political system.

Recent data on the political attitudes of elementary and junior high school students come from a Weekly Reader survey (Johnson and Hess 1984). In 1983, a survey was included in an issue of the Weekly Reader
and in four junior high school periodicals. In each case a tally sheet appeared in the Teacher's Edition. Roughly 25,000 teachers tallied the student responses and returned the tally sheet to Weekly Reader. The responses of over 600,000 students were obtained. A random sample of 143,750 students was analyzed and reported. The findings indicate that students have a positive but realistic view of government. That is, in the primary grades, about 70 percent of the students agree that people in government can be trusted and care about what citizens think. Generally, as the sample included higher grades, the positive results declined and students began to view government with a more skeptical and critical eye. Citizenship was interpreted as primarily personal/interpersonal responsibility (helping others) and conventional obligation (obeying the law), rather than political activity. Students also enthusiastically agreed that the United States is a great country, with freedom its most positive characteristic.

A final study of interest is a 1984 replication of the much earlier, but highly significant, Anti-democratic Attitudes in American Schools (Remmers 1963). Elam (1984) prepared an updated version of the same questionnaire administered in 1952 and compared, with a much smaller sample, the two classes for the presence of anti-democratic attitudes. He reports that, in some instances, the class of 1984 was more anti-democratic and, in some cases, less so than the class of 1952. The class of 1984 endorsed freedom of speech and assembly more so than the class of 1952; however, they were more willing to allow a police search without a warrant, to deny legal counsel to criminals, and to accept restrictions on religious freedoms. His conclusion is that youth understand and appreciate constitutional freedoms somewhat better than they did in 1952, but that they still fall short in extending that understanding impartially to all citizens in all situations.

II. Summary, Conclusions, and Needed Research

The research on the specific curricular approaches to moral/values education was found to range from excellent to poor to non-existent. The values clarification approach received considerable attention, but the results of the research indicate that the approach is ineffective in achieving its stated goals. The major reason for this, from a research
point of view, are the amorphous nature of treatment, thoughtless and random instrument selection, and the short treatment time. Additionally, it is entirely possible that the approach itself is ill-suited to achieve the psychological change anticipated by researchers. The moral discussion approach appears to be a successful educational intervention. It is well-grounded psychologically and, in contrast to values clarification, the treatments follow a consistent and similar pattern. The outcome measure is theory-based and standardized. The strengths of the research program, however, are also its weaknesses. One looks in vain for evidence on the broader impact of the approach in such areas as political attitudes, social behavior, and academic achievement. In light of the less than enthusiastic response of teachers to the approach, this sort of information might provide additional warrant for its acceptance. Evidence on the value analysis and directive approaches are almost nonexistent. These approaches are in need of systematic inquiry.

The community involvement/social action approach contains a promising body of preliminary inquiries; however, the results of the early research are clearly limited. That is, the relationship between involvement in such programs and the propensity for future political participation does not appear in the research. Given the evidence from political socialization research regarding the relationship between early political participation and adult political involvement, 8 it would appear that the existing research is not sensitive to changes that should follow from such programs. One possibility is that there may be a delayed effect. This possibility would suggest that immediate post-intervention evaluations of such programs need to be replaced with more delayed follow-up evaluations. Another possibility is that early participation experiences provided by schools are somehow significantly different from those experiences upon which the political socialization literature is based.

Cooperative learning is a promising new educational approach. The research on its success in changing student social attitudes and behaviors warrants serious consideration by the social studies profession. With regard to directive moral education, research is almost non-existent concerning nonrational factors in the social studies classroom. The conditions under which teacher modeling and teacher advocacy are effec-
tive and ineffective, as well as the nature and incidence of such phenomena, are a rich area for ethnographic and empirical inquiry.

The research on democratic content and practices in the social studies classroom is consistent and encouraging. There is a need to replicate the few existing studies with special attention to the extent and nature of the experiences. The finding of decreasing political efficacy among students within democratic classrooms would warrant inquiry into the factors within the experience that are responsible. Also, a sociological research perspective, such as that developed by Power (1981), can add valuable insights not obtainable through traditional research methods into the social dynamics of schools. Additional research on democracy in schools can make a valuable contribution to future attempts at the democratization of American schooling.

It is clear that bias in textbooks and classrooms exists. The differential socialization of minorities, poor, and women needs to be documented and brought forcefully to the attention of the educational profession and the general public. An area largely unexplored is the effect that biased curriculum materials have on the attitudes of youth. It is a research area begging for attention of the sort provided by Scott and Feldman-Summers (1979).

The research into the outcomes of the standard social studies curriculum raise a host of future topics for researchers. The knowledge/attitude dichotomy needs sophisticated inquiry. The research on attitude change suggests that some kinds of knowledge may affect attitudes. The knowledge presented in social studies classrooms, probably because it does not induce dissonance, generally has no such effect. Further inquiry into the relationships between the knowledge base of students, the content of the social studies, and student attitudes could help explain one of the major failings of social education. There is also a need for continuous and current data regarding the political and moral orientations of youth to be made available to the profession. Such up-to-date information is essential for the planning of educational experiences.

I do not share the familiar litany that research in social studies education is in disarray. It appears to me that, within a narrow range of variables, adequate research exists to warrant tentative generalizations about some of the important questions regarding the impact of so-
cial studies curricula. However, there can be no question that there is a trivial quality to much of the research, in that the dependent variables selected by researchers yield only the most fragmentary view of the overall goals of social education. This problem is compounded in that the reported movement on these variables in the research is exceedingly small--usually less than 10 percent of a given scale's range. A case in point is the presence of the variable political efficacy in many of the studies. What is the relationship of political efficacy to the goals of social studies? Do we really want to make all students score five on a five-point political efficacy scale? Does the small shift on political efficacy achieved in a given study have any lasting influence on the political development of youth? Shouldn't the development of political realism in youth be a goal of social studies? If so, how is it related to programs designed to enhance political efficacy? These sorts of questions suggest a need for further conceptual work regarding the proper research questions needed to evaluate adequately social studies education. The ability of research to yield useful information is largely a function of the theoretical perspective from which the questions are posed. Currently, a broad, carefully elaborated theoretical perspective that permits a substantive empirical investigation of the goals of social studies education does not exist. If the research on social studies education is to advance beyond its current status, a more comprehensive conceptualization of the goals of social studies is needed. These new perspectives will require that the profession adopt a broad, integrative interdisciplinary perspective, drawing upon political science, sociology, psychology, and other relevant disciplines, to frame our inquiries into the nature of social studies education and its potential for facilitating student civic development.

It is disappointing that research into outcomes in the socio-moral domain has not received more attention from the profession. In Hepburn's and Dahler's (1984) compilation of social studies dissertations, completed between 1977 and 1982, only 6 percent of the 394 works cited addressed questions covered in this review. If I am correct in my assumption that the subject of this review is at the heart of social studies education, it would seem that social studies researchers should see inquiry into such questions as significant and important. Apparently either my assump-
tion is wrong or it is not perceived that way by the advisors of doctoral research in social studies education.

Finally, let me offer a few suggestions for future research in addition to those presented above. First, there is a need for development of valid research instruments that address central issues in social studies education and can be shared among researchers. One finds almost as many measures of political efficacy as studies reviewed. Generalization from one study to another is seriously compromised by the variety of interpretations of variables and large number of different instruments used. Second, given the apparent overall stability of the outcomes assessed in the research, it would appear the brief treatments and immediate posttest instrument administration pose a genuine threat to the potential for detecting other than trivial gains. Researchers need to think in terms of extended treatment periods and delayed posttests to assess fairly the impact of programs in the socio-moral domain. Third, although the social studies student is frequently tested in the research, his/her reaction is seldom obtained. Valuable information may be obtained by supplementing quantitative data with student perceptions of the experience.

In conclusion, it is generally true both in educational research and in life that the kinds of answers one gets are in great part a function of the questions asked. At present, the research questions in social studies education are largely limited to inquiries into the impact of semester-long interventions on a few selected variables. A major limitation of this approach to research is that the connection between the outcomes measured and the broader goals of social education are frequently tenuous or non-existent. As a result, answers to important questions (e.g., what is the lasting contribution of social studies education to the development of civic competence?) are difficult if not impossible to glean from the available research. A perspective on research that attempts to assess the contribution of social studies instruction within a broader developmental perspective would offer more fruitful means for interpreting the social value of the social studies. Demonstrating that the small incremental changes frequently found in social studies research are integral and necessary factors in the development of civic competence would legitimize the field in a manner that currently is not warranted.
Such a perspective, with the exception of the development of moral reasoning, is not currently a part of the literature on social studies education.

NOTES

1. I wish to acknowledge the helpful editorial and substantive reactions of Lee Ehman, Carole Hahn, Alan Lockwood, Fred Newmann, and Bill Stanley to an earlier version of this paper.


3. See Newmann (1975) for a detailed presentation of rationale and program.

4. Representative writing advocating the directive approach comes from such authors as Oldenquist (1980, 1981), Gow (1980), and Bennett and Delattre (1979). Over the past five years Edward Wynne, at the University of Illinois-Chicago, has published a newsletter entitled Character. The articles and commentary, although focusing on character education, share the concerns expressed by the writings on directive moral education. Wynne (1982) has collected many of these writings into a single volume that makes for interesting and challenging reading in that the collected papers question many of the current practices of social and moral education. These authors all share the perspective that there exists a core of culturally derived values that are essential for social cohesion, and, by implication, cultural survival. They advocate that the schools have a responsibility to insure that students acquire a commitment to these values and develop the appropriate ways of behaving.

5. See Goble and Brooks (1983) for a collection of testimonials concerning the effectiveness of the program in schools.

6. For a complete discussion of recent revisions in cognitive developmental theory the reader is referred to Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer (1983).

7. Differences between SWS students and regular school curriculum students are discussed above (p. 169).

8. See Beck and Jennings (1982) for a recent study supporting this relationship.
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Chapter 5

WHAT WORKS FOR TEACHERS:
A REVIEW OF ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH STUDIES AS THEY INFORM ISSUES
OF SOCIAL STUDIES CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTION

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I. Introduction to Ethnographic Research

Dropped off on a South Sea island in 1915 by a mail boat that would not return for over a year, Bronislaw Malinowski revolutionized field research when he waded ashore, pitched his tent on the beach in the village of Omarakana, and began his study of the Trobriand Island people. In 1922 with the publication of his monograph, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Malinowski revolutionized ethnographic research because of the scope and depth of his participant observations of the daily life of the Trobriand Islanders. Never again could researchers write monographs based on diverse accounts of different peoples while ensconced comfortably in the safety of their armchairs. Never again could researchers stay on the fringes of a society, using interpreters and viewing events only as an outsider. Malinowski lived with the Trobriand Islanders for several years, systematically recording his observations of mundane daily events.

As I went on my morning walk through the village, I could see intimate details of family life, of toilet, cooking, taking of meals; I could see the arrangements for the day’s work, people starting on their errands, or groups of men and women busy at some manufacturing tasks. Quarrels, jokes, family scenes, events, usually trivial, sometimes dramatic but always significant, formed the atmosphere of my daily life, as well as of theirs (1966, 7).

At the time that Malinowski studied them, most Europeans believed that "the native in New Guinea was lawless, inhuman and savage!...Guided in his conduct by nothing but his instincts and propensities, and governed by his unchecked passions" (1966, 10). Based on lurid accounts sent back by missionaries and traders, most Europeans accounted for the vast differences between their way of life and that of "natives" by
characterizing the "native" way of life as grossly deficient. Europeans believed that without the benefits of Christianity, education, and civilization these primitive peoples must live an unrestrained, self-indulgent life based on the satisfaction of their animal appetites. However, as an anthropologist, Malinowski believed that there was order, regularity, and meaning underneath the chaotic and elusive complexities of daily interactions. However, rather than life without social restraint, Malinowski argued that "modern science" had shown that, "on the contrary, ...their social institutions have a very definite organization, that they are governed by authority, law and order in their public and personal relations....Indeed, we see them entangled in a mesh of duties, functions, and privileges which correspond to an elaborate tribal, communal, and kinship organization" (p. 10).

To study the way of life of these people, Malinowski systematically kept field notes to identify the normal range of local occurrences: "If in making a daily round of the village, certain small incidents, characteristic forms of taking food, of conversing, of doing work are found occurring over and over again, they should be noted down at once" (p. 20). He then organized accounts of specific incidents on charts and inferred a system of rules and beliefs underlying the recurring events.

Using a holistic approach to study the internal dynamics of the Trobriand culture, Malinowski claimed that the study of any specific system such as land usage or leadership, if followed out, would lead to the study of other cultural systems. For example to be able to describe what was happening in the kula (the complex trading system of the Trobriand Islanders with traditional trading partners on different islands), Malinowski studied their economic activities, technology (canoe making), their systems of leadership, status and rank, and their religious and belief systems (the magic and sorcery connected with the long ocean voyages). The intensive immersion in the daily life of the culture, the inductive analysis of cultural patterns, the interpretation and integration of the patterns into a description of the culture as a whole—all this established a new scientific tradition of how anthropologists, and now educators, can study groups of people and what they know and do.
The purpose of this chapter is to review ethnographic research studies that elaborate or explain problems that social studies practitioners are trying to solve in their daily quest for what works. This chapter analyzes how ethnographic researchers use the metaphor of culture as a new way of thinking about and framing what is happening in social studies classrooms. Educational ethnographic research studies are reviewed as they inform three seemingly perpetual problems found in social studies curriculum-in-use: (1) how to account for unexpected stability of the textbook-and-discussion method in social studies classrooms while simultaneously accounting for schools where there has been curricular change and innovation; (2) how to control students and get them to work; and (3) how to account for success and failure in the classroom. In the conclusion, the nature of the knowledge generated by ethnographic research and the strengths and limitations of its use by social studies practitioners, policy makers, and researchers are analyzed.

There are many analogies between the practice and theory of the ethnographic researcher and that of the social studies practitioner. Social studies teachers walking into their classrooms on the first day of the semester may feel that they are in a position highly reminiscent of Malinowski's wading onto the beach. Aware of lurid accounts from the teachers' room, having access to test score data, and familiar with labels such as the "basic" students, they may wonder what ways of life they are going to find as they greet these new groups of students. Although social studies teachers may vary as to whether they feel their role is to discover an underlying order or impose it, they, in common with ethnographic researchers, are concerned with observing and analyzing the meaning of patterns of ordinary daily events. They too must attend to "all the innumerable small acts and attentions in which are expressed the affection, the mutual interest, the little preferences, and little antipathies" (Malinowski 1966, 19). They too must attend to the characteristic forms of conversing, of doing work, the quarrels and jokes, and the alarming events of the day. From this empirical data, social studies teachers infer patterns and make professional decisions based on their understanding of teacher/student social relationships and their awareness of what types of power and leadership are likely to work within each group. As they inductively "track" the meaning of daily events, profes-
sional decisions are made about what types of information will be seen as useful and relevant by each class, and professional decisions are made about what types of teaching/learning will be most likely to succeed.

Stenhouse (1981) contrasts the "veneer of certainty" that is present during instruction with the "element of uncertainty" that lurks underneath (p. 212). Although appearing in control and knowledgeable during a lesson, social studies teachers may afterwards informally reflect on what is happening in their classroom and why and what is going well, as contrasted to what needs to be thought through again and adjusted. They inductively develop hypotheses and understandings of the contexts in which they work (Bloster 1983, Elbaz 1981), and through intuitive natural experiments constantly adapt and adjust their practices to achieve their goals. Thus, teachers as reflective problem solvers may find some of these descriptions of problematic situations useful to their theory and practice.

Framing the Complex Program of What Works for Teachers

Shaver, Davis, and Helburn (1979) describe the "generally discordant relationship" between classroom social studies teachers and university researchers and instructors. In "An Interpretative Report on the Status of Precollege Social Studies Education Based on Three NSF-Funded Studies," Shaver, Davis, and Helburn confirm that social studies teachers have concerns that are substantially different from those of the traditional social studies researcher. Shaver and others argue that the two groups' "views of what is important in social studies education are often so dissimilar that it is as if teachers and university social studies educators were dealing with two different worlds of schooling" (1979, 10). It seems to me that much of the often bitter dissonance may occur because the two groups are solving two different problems. While both groups are concerned with the content of the social studies curriculum, university researchers are interested in advancing critical scholarship as defined by the canons of their academic discipline (Johnson 1984, 10).

The university perspective can be contrasted with social studies practitioners who are interested in continually advancing their professional knowledge of "what works" in their classrooms. We already know
that organization of content knowledge that is deemed superior by disciplinary specialists may not be unappealing to teachers, but it is not the key determinant of what is teachable for them. Smith's (1978) final paragraph of the case study of Falls River, Colorado, eloquently describes the priorities:

Teachers must juggle the expectations of the invisible, distant, and mostly impersonal profession of science education and the local, powerful, and relentless demands of teaching. The two roles do not necessarily conflict; but the latter usually overpowers and preemptsthe former (1978, 23).

Shaver, Davis, and Helburn report that "elementary and secondary school teachers are not much aware of educational research. Nor are they much influenced by research findings, largely because the findings usually have little practical importance for the classroom" (1979, 13). Earlier, Malinowski had taken particular umbrage at members of his profession who picked out sensational, quaint traits for description and distorted them by not showing how these beliefs or practices functioned within the context of the entire culture. So too do social studies teachers have little patience for careful narrow findings with most variables held constant when they must deal with everything at once.

Unfortunately, too often have the answers that teachers have developed in response to the shaping factors in their environment been mistaken as the answers for the problems which curriculum specialists and academicians are trying to solve. In scornful voices, (nonparticipant) curriculum specialists and observers of teachers castigate teachers for reducing their actions to the lowest common denominator by a plebeian concern for "what works."

Does it work to solve the immediate problem at hand? It may be but footnoting the obvious to point out that what works in the short run is sometimes the worst thing a teacher can do with pupils in the long run (Iannaccone 1963, 80).

However, when interviewed, social studies practitioners had a very different perspective on what was happening in their classrooms. One of the primary goals in the NSF studies (Stake and Easley 1978) was for the investigators to listen to what the teachers at the different sites said about what they were doing. However, even with this objective, the observers report that initially they had negative reactions to their first observations of teachers' practices and beliefs.
In analyzing various kinds of information from our sites, we took those remarks (about what will work and not work in their classrooms) seriously. We attempted to search out what it was that goes on between teachers and their students that convinced teachers of these widely held beliefs (that their students needed certain types of materials, certain ways of being handled if they were to get to work, etc.). This quest frequently involved taking a sympathetic approach to practices most scholars of the discipline and education specialists regard as serious distortions or misuses of the subject matter and to purposes they thought the subject matter should not be asked to serve (p. 2).

There are three persistently problematic areas in social studies curriculum and instruction that traditional educational research has been unable to account for. These areas of inquiry are interconnected; each is a crucial piece within this larger complex study of the whole issue of "what works." These issues are found in Shaver, Davis, and Helburn's (1979) summary of the NSF studies on the status of social studies education.

1. The first is the problem of which materials and instructional techniques to use. Textbooks have been and still are overwhelmingly the instructional method of choice by teachers. Within the profession as large, curriculum specialists and researchers are now viewing this problem as a lack of change and reform in social studies education. Shaver and others report that "a sense of stability emerges from the three status studies—a lack of change in social studies instruction over the years that was unexpected by us" (p. 7). Engle (1985) noted that social studies has demonstrated a "stubborn resistance to change" over the past 50 years (p. 3). Even though there have been nationally funded curricula, massive reform efforts in the 1960s and early 1970s, and a great variety of teaching techniques presented in the professional journals and inservice workshops, the textbook and the traditional recitation and discussion still remain the dominant form of social studies instruction. Does this mean that the reform efforts suffered an overwhelming defeat, or are there other ways of accounting for 50 years of stability in social studies classrooms? How can we simultaneously account for schools where there has been curricular change and innovation?

2. The second problem for teachers has to do with how to get students to work. Shaver and others describe this as the issue of sociali-
zation. They noted that "much of this socialization has a work-ethic, success-oriented, 'middle-class' flavor. Teachers see it as more appropriate to train students to be hard working, busy, polite, competitive, independent workers" (p. 9). Thus, the second problem addressed by this review of the ethnographic literature is that of the problem of socialization to work, also known as the informal or hidden curriculum. What type or types of work are seen as appropriate in social studies classrooms? How are teachers' assumptions regarding the definition of what work is (as opposed to what play is) transmitted within the daily routine of classrooms? Are there out-of-awareness messages working at cross purposes to teachers' declared instructional goals.

3. The third theme has to do with teachers' perceptions of success and failure. How do they explain which students are successful and which are not? How are successful lessons achieved, and, in addition, how can failure to learn be explained? Of course, different explanations for failure will result in different policy implications on how to handle or "fix" it.

In the last fifteen years, educational anthropology has emerged as a competing new paradigm in its own right (Kuhn 1962). Rather than being a mere "alternative" research strategy (Shaver and Larkins 1973, 1259) or an atheoretical collection of new research techniques, educational ethnography has reframed how educational research problems are perceived and set up. Ethnographic research also generates a different order of explanation from that of traditional educational research. Smith (1983) argues that qualitative research is not an alternative or even a necessarily complementary approach to quantitative research. He contrasts how interpretive as opposed to positivist research paradigms differ on (1) the relationship of the investigator to what is investigated, (2) on what counts as knowledge, and (3) on the goals of the investigation. Educational ethnography fits into the interpretative framework because it is concerned with understanding "the meaning that others give to their own situations" within their own contexts (1983, 12).

The educational ethnographic research germane to these three problems of (1) unexpected stability in the face of change, (2) the nature of the work ethic, and (3) the nature of success and failure that are
reviewed in this chapter have been taken primarily from papers presented at the Council of Anthropology and Education, American Anthropological Association annual meetings, and the University of Pennsylvania Ethnography in Education forums; from journals, such as the *Anthropology & Education Quarterly* and *Theory and Research in Social Education*; and from recent anthologies of educational ethnographic research studies, such as *Doing the Ethnography of Schooling* (1982). Educational ethnographic research written since 1974 is the subject of this review.¹

The studies which are reviewed here are organized from a macro to a micro level. Ethnographers apply the metaphor of culture to the unit that they are studying, but the size of the unit and the length of the time it is studied may vary greatly. For example, the ethnographic study of cultural change and stability, "Schooling in Schonhausen," by Spindler (1974, 1982), analyzes cultural patterns of change within a local region in Germany and compares these community patterns to what is happening within the local elementary school over a nine-year period. In Popkewitz, Tabachnick and Wehlege (1982), curricular change is studied within six different schools in different communities in the United States and then compared.

Questions about the nature of the informal curriculum are addressed in studies such as Wilcox (1982), in which cultural patterns at the classroom level of analysis are described and then contrasted across neighborhoods. A review of research dealing with the third issue of success and failure begins with studies in which very detailed, fine-grained cultural patterns produced within morning circles and reading groups in kindergarten/first-grade classrooms are analyzed (Bremme and Erickson 1977, McDermott 1974). The review comes full circle as studies of the success and failure of initial socialization to school are compared to studies of success and failure in schooling in diverse cultural groups in larger communities.

This chapter concludes with an analysis of the structure and scope of the knowledge generated by educational ethnographic research for social studies practitioners. The potential, limitations, and dangers of its use by social studies teachers, researchers, and policy makers for reflection, intervention, or evaluation will be discussed.
The studies reviewed in this chapter have been chosen because of their ability to shed light on the problem of lack of educational change, the informal definition of "school work," and the definitions of success and failure. There are other central concerns in educational ethnography that will not be addressed due to lack or space.

Also not reviewed are a voluminous number of articles which have been written about the methodology, epistemology, and philosophy of this approach. In fact, one could even argue that more articles have been written about how to do ethnography than articles reporting actual ethnographic case studies. Several wonderously snide or outraged articles have also been written by gatekeepers whose functions are to mark off the boundaries of this emerging paradigm and keep out the "ignorant" and "improper" applications of this science. See for example, Rist's "Blitzkreig Ethnography: On the Transportation of a Method into a Movement" (1980) and Wolcott's "How to Look Like an Anthropologist Without Really Being One" (1980). It should also be noted that there are other traditions of interpretative research that study the meanings to the participants of the educational process in which they are involved that are relevant to these issues in social studies education that have not been included (van Manen 1975, Egan 1979, Thornton 1984).

This review of ethnographic studies will not provide instant solutions or prescriptions for change in the three problematic areas in curriculum and instruction mentioned earlier. The purpose of this chapter is to acquaint social studies educators with the power found in ethnographic explanations of what is happening. Ethnographers conceptualize interactions in classrooms, schools, and communities in ways that can help social studies practitioners have a richer set of images. These ethnographic studies are reviewed so that insights embedded within them can be used by teachers to explore and reformulate problems specific to their own situations.

Using the Metaphor of Culture

Ethnographies of schooling have much to say to social studies teachers as they work and live with students. For years we have understood in a general way that our classrooms and schools are miniature social systems: that the behaviors and knowledge we display as teachers
and students are culturally organized (Waller, 1932). Prior to 1972, the metaphor of culture had not been widely used by educational researchers to explain what is happening in classrooms or to begin to explain some of the heretofore unaccountable problems of education. Flower and Hays (1980, 31) note that "many 'creative' breakthroughs in science and the arts are not the result of finding a better technical solution to an old problem (e.g., the disease-producing influence of evil spirits), but of seeing a new problem (e.g., the existence of germs)." Social studies practitioners and ethnographers face the same problem in that they are both trying to make sense out of groups of people whose practices or beliefs frequently seem puzzling, irrational, or nonsensical to others. The metaphor of culture can be used to frame a new problem.

As Miner (1978) notes, "The business of science is making something out of nothing....It is the scientists, themselves, who create the unknown, which, quite naturally, they alone are able to explain" (210). Prior to Malinowski, early anthropologists had been trying to make sense out of an overwhelming, confusing accumulation of reports of strange practices of strange people by focusing on variables: cultural traits taken out of context and then placed on a continuum so that the trait complexes were ordered over time and/or over space (Young, Becker, and Pike, 1970). So too have traditional educational researchers been trying to make sense out of social studies classrooms through the "measurement of static chunks of behavior sliced off prior to, during, and after treatment" (Shaver and Larkins, 1973, 1256).

Minor goes on to say that scientists "describe, categorize, and theorize about their field" through the use of mental constructs which he calls "fictions" (p. 212). When ethnographers of schooling use the construct of culture, they are describing "the organized system of knowledge and belief whereby a people structure their experience and perceptions, formulate acts, and choose between alternatives" (Keesing and Keesing, 1971, 20).

Thus, Malinowski's work can be seen as a critical reformulation of the unknown in which he proposes that an individual culture is a closed system of relationships. Rather than being celebrated as the developer of a new set of research techniques, the feat for which he is usually cited, the significance of Malinowski's concept of culture is that it
allows for a holistic approach to the study of a group's practices and beliefs with the focus on a specific context, beginning at the particular and moving toward the more general. Each culture is seen as analogous to a self-contained field which must be studied in terms of itself. Using this holistic approach, ethnographers avoid treating systems of beliefs or practices as if they had meanings apart from the group of people who generate them.

Malinowski exhorted researchers to "grasp the native's point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world" (1961, 25). Ethnographers try to discover the participants' categories of meaning. This inside, as opposed to outside, perspective is a critical feature of ethnography, now referred to emic analysis. It is based on an internal analysis, undertaken to understand the internal distinctions and definitions within the participants' system of thought and language. It can be contrasted with the etic perspective, an external analysis in which the purpose is to seek patterns of behavior as defined by the observer (Pelto and Pelto 1978, 62). The final narrative should describe how the way of life makes sense to the participants so that others on the outside can comprehend their social logic.

In order to be able to describe on-going events from an emic perspective, no a priori definitions or coding schemas are imposed on the data from the outside. What have been traditionally operationalized as "objective" variables such as motivation or attitude are now not taken out of context and unnaturally treated as if they existed on their own. Ethnographers do not recognize traditional educational dichotomies and bifurcations. Researchers do not break down an event into component parts, such as its cognitive, affective, or psychomotor aspects. Indeed, it is taken as established that "cultural knowledge is displayed in people's interactions" (Mehan 1982, 64). Therefore intentionality, beliefs, reactions, and feelings about an event can be studied as well as the event itself. The need of social studies teachers to find means simultaneously to control the class, present academic knowledge, and maintain a positive classroom climate can be studied as a whole.

What have been traditionally operationalized as "objective" variables are now studied as products of social interactions. Thus, rather than femininity and masculinity being perceived as innate variables and
studied as dependent variables in process/product studies, ethnographers ask, for example, how femininity is socially produced and how it has meaning within social studies classrooms and in social studies curricular materials on occupational opportunities (Dippo 1984).

Using the metaphor of culture as a framework for research encourages the inductive finding of patterns of practices and beliefs, allows for interplay between intentions of individuals and social institutions, and encourages the explanation of social behavior at all levels from the particular to the general. Although educational ethnographic research in the last 15 years has not been directly focused on social studies curriculum and instruction, many of the case studies and descriptions have much to say about how values and beliefs affect curricular stability. There are convincing descriptions of how and within which contexts students informally acquire systematically varied definitions of what work is and what play is, and there are powerful stories about what varied perceptions of success and failure look like in the classroom.

II. The Problem of Educational Stability and Change

Research on curricular innovation is not encouraging or kind to would-be change agents. Hahn (1977) reports that "studies of the diffusion of 'new social studies' products indicate that these innovations—developed by experts with vast resources, with input from research, with field testing, and with effectiveness demonstrated in summative evaluations—have not been widely adopted" (p. 139). Using three models of educational change to review research (i.e.; the development, diffusion, and adoption perspective; the problem-solver model; and the social interaction perspective), Hahn summarized numerous findings and explanations for lack of adoption of new social studies materials, including:

Inservice training is a necessary but not sufficient condition for adoption (p. 141).

Situational constraints in their districts were of greater importance for adoption than were the intrinsic characteristics of the innovation or the process of demonstration. It is also possible that, in spite of the recognized merit of the innovations, gifted education was not a high priority of the school districts (p. 141).
The competition for resources was not taken into account: classroom time, personnel, and public money (p. 145).

Insufficient attention has been given to the needs and values of the adopting unit, as the adopters themselves perceive them (p. 145).

Thus, substantial and worthwhile curricular projects that social studies educators are made aware of, have access to, and have even been given inservice training in, by themselves are necessary but not sufficient conditions for educational change. What is going on in schools that encourages these patterns of stability?

In the Case Studies in Education, Stake and Easley (1978) tried to understand the "detailed mechanisms which lead teachers in one case to adopt an idea or a set of materials enthusiastically, and in another to reject such proposals as 'unworkable in their situation'" (16, 1). They found that teachers had been telling anyone who would listen that they know what will work in their classrooms, and what will not, and they know that most of the heralded innovations will only work in exceptional situations. What it is that will work appeared to be largely an unarticulated knowledge, somewhat but not highly idiosyncratic to the teachers themselves. It involved basic goals and responsibilities teachers assume which most curriculum authorities and instructional technologists do not consider primary. It involved a style of teaching and set of beliefs about what good teaching is which are acquired early and contribute to the functioning of a social system that is--even in many of the most liberal communities--conservative and resistant to change (16, 1-2).

Ethnographic research can add to our knowledge of why and how curricular change occurs or does not by describing in detail what is happening on sites where social studies curriculum reforms are introduced. There is a common pattern of discovery among these ethnographic studies of change. In each case the ethnographers go into the field to record and describe what happens as participants on the site incorporate directives from the central government or office and begin to use the new curriculum guides, rationale, and materials such as textbooks. However, often late in the study or when a follow-up study is done, a different cultural pattern emerges: the ethnographers discover that the beliefs, values, and teaching/learning modes have stayed pretty much the same despite the overt, documented changes in the curricular materials.
Cultural Transmission in Schonhausen

In 1968, Spindler studied the role that the elementary school played in maintaining cultural stability in the face of rapid change in Schonhausen, a village in southern Germany. Prior to World War II, the inhabitants of Schonhausen had a rural way of life based on the growing of grapes and subsistence farming. At the time of the study there was evidence of rapid urbanization, with more than 20 small towns and villages in the area in the process of coalescing into a more or less continuous urban complex. Since 1950, there had been continuous influx of varied inhabitants with different religious backgrounds who spoke dialects other than the local Schwabisch dialect and who worked in factories in the nearby city so that only half of the inhabitants were native-born (Spindler 1974, 231).

Spindler was surprised to find that at a time of rapid urbanization, the great influx of diverse populations was being assimilated without any of the standard social and economic disturbances. After administering the Instrumental Activities Inventory at the local elementary school (with 150 children, 6 teachers, and a rector), Spindler found that the elementary school children, older students, parents, and teachers identified with a configuration of values based on the land, the village, and nature. Yet this rather idealized orientation did not restrain older children and adults from also making pragmatic choices about the conveniences of modern houses and the values of a regular income and regular hours. Spindler concluded that the maintenance of the cultural preferences for a rural village lifestyle, which included a preference for village activities, person-to-person contact, quiet, fresh air, sunshine, love of nature, and fresh natural foods was due in a large part to the way in which the social studies curricula was taught in the local elementary school.

In his study of what was happening in the local elementary school, Spindler found that the teachers were committed to what he calls "integrated learning." A core of values about the village, land, and nature were being transmitted in the way the Heimatkunde (study of the homeland) and Naturakunde (study of nature) classes were conducted. He saw as crucial the "emphasis on excursions and visits to local historical sites and the attention to the local environment and geographical area" that
took place within these courses of study. It was these simultaneous learning experiences that provided a common identity for children of diverse origins and thus enabled the school to function as an "agent of continuity" (1982, 33).

A passage from Spindler's field notes captures the spirit of the curriculum-in-use:

The Wanderung

Today I went on a Wanderung with Herr Steinhardt's fourth-grade class. We left at 8:05 a.m. and returned at 2:35 p.m., having walked in a circle route from Schonhausen, along the ridge of the valley and back. We walked almost entirely on small paths through forest, Weinberg, and meadow, for nearly 18 kilometers (about 12 miles). The purpose of this expedition as described to the class was very general—to observe firsthand the geography, plants, animals, and economy of the area and to see some local historical sites, in short—anything of interest.

The children had a high degree of freedom. They walked in their own groups, sometimes at a considerable distance from the main body, or alone (a few did)....The freedom extended to personal relations among the children, and in certain ways, to their relations to the teacher. He was constantly called from every side, usually in a contraction of his name to something like "Herrhardt." Children, especially girls, walked in twos and threes with him and frequently with one on each side holding his hand. The handholders took turns. I was offered the same treatment after a while, and found it very touching.

The instructional values of the walk were obtained without explicit effort. When we came across a small pond with frogs and salamanders in various stages of metamorphosis, specimens were caught and retained in bottles for later observation, and the teacher reviewed their growth cycle, which had been gone over in detail in the classroom. Several species of trees were identified, and reference made to their growth characteristics, their distribution, and their economic uses. This material was also familiar to the children from classroom work and reading. When we climbed the tower overlooking the Remstal the teacher pointed out each of the communities in the valley below, their relation to the waterways, and to the city visible in the distance. He commented on the very apparent zones of forest, Weinberg, and flat garden land, and the new apartment buildings and industries plainly identifiable in the valley. In Erdbunde lessons the children had examined in detail a map of the area and had learned in the class all of the things the teacher talked about. Their interest, as they peered about from and on the crest of the ridge above the valley, was acute.
One had the feeling that the images of map and actuality were vividly superimposed. They asked many excited questions about things they could see spread out below them. For most of the children this was the first visit to the tower. Herr Steinhardt said that parents rarely took their children on local expeditions, though many went fairly far afield on annual vacations (to Spain, Italy, the North Sea). In families that did not take trips, free time was usually spent visiting relatives. He felt that the real value of the Wanderung was to "just explore the local area, and to do something interesting together" (1974, 237-238).

However, the central ministries of education later officially eliminated the Heimatkunde and Naturakunde programs. Heimatkunde had been scathingly criticized by curriculum specialists because the readings presented to the children contained "'false' sentimentality and distorted romanticism" (1982, 37). The centralized curricular reform was focused on modernization and urbanization. Village and land-oriented texts were replaced by texts with urban orientations. A new social studies course of study, Sachskunde, was developed to emphasize "urban life, civic affairs, Germany and Europe, governmental processes, and an objective view of social life" in a "quite specific" curriculum (1982, 37).

The Spindlers returned to Germany in 1977 to study how these changes in social studies curriculum affected the cultural transmission of values about urbanization. The Spindlers found that the 1977 children, teachers, and parents made significantly more tradition-oriented, land-village choices than did the 1968 children, parents, and teachers (1982, 34). These findings of persistent, perhaps even more conservative, homogeneous values oriented towards a small community lifestyle were surprising, given the change in curricula, the access to television, and the turn-over of the majority of the teachers.

In 1968, the Spindlers had studied patterns of change in the larger community. They had found that technological innovations actually were forces for conservatism. "Tractors were substituted for drayage animals, electric power was substituted for human muscle to turn turnip and hay choppers, rototillers were substituted for the hoe" (1982, 37). This pattern, which they called substitute change (as opposed to change in principle) meant that the technological innovations functioned to keep
the traditional patterns of land use economically viable and allowed traditional patterns of life to remain.

Accordingly, the Spindlers found the same principle of substitute change at work inside the school. Sachskunde, although organized around a different academic context, was being used for the same ends as Heimatkunde. In this substitute change, the Sachskunde activities, such as local excursions and children role playing the presentation of a petition for a public playground and park to the Burgermeister and Town Council, were still emphasizing the local community. The Spindlers noted that much of the earlier curriculum content had been lost but that the curricular goals and values remained the same for the teachers. "As one teacher said when we asked her what had happened to Heimatkunde, 'Oh, we do most of that now, but we call it Sachskunde!'" (1982, 38).

The Spindlers found the role of the elementary school problematic in the transmission of these enduring conservative values. Some central institution had to be shaping and homogenizing the cultural values since the Schonhausen families had such diverse cultural and religious backgrounds. However, since six of six teachers had been replaced and there was a new curriculum, textbooks, and readings, it could be argued that the role of the school was negligible. Also, the Spindlers were bothered by the fact that the experiences acquired in school would also have to be quite diverse, due to the rather extreme differences in teaching styles of the staff.

Therefore, during the last two weeks of their 1977 visit, the Spindlers filmed selected episodes in classrooms so they could study the variety of teaching styles and their impact on the transmission of values. At first, only striking dissimilarities could be seen between the Rektor, a middle-aged male who was nicknamed "the Conductor" by the researchers, and a quiet young female teacher secretly nicknamed "the Fader." The Rektor conducted his lessons from the front of the room as if his class were an orchestra as he lectured and demonstrated, vigorously pacing and gesturing and urging his students to greater efforts. In contrast, the much more subtle young female teacher would initiate a lesson and then seem to "fade." She taught by turning the class over to the children for group work and for role playing, "her favorite device for getting the children involved and teaching them to think through the workings of
everyday situations—working in a newspaper office, learning etiquette, petitioning the mayor, reenacting history, and so forth" (1982, 38).

It was only after the Spindlers returned home and continued replaying these films that they were able to recognize patterns of similarities that overrode the obvious differences in teaching styles. All lessons were characterized by strong task orientation and had uniform, rather than individualistic, use of materials. There was a "clear definition of limits of tolerable behavior at all times," as well as constant orientation to teacher authority as contrasted with peer approval (1982, 39-40).

Thus, the Spindlers finally concluded that, despite centralized bureaucratic efforts at educational reform and despite variability in teachers' styles of instruction, the concept of substitute change accounted for the continuing transmission of the overall regional conservative cultural orientation. Explicit differences in the subject matter content between the old and the new curricula were not significant. For example, substitution of a play about the village political process for a romantic folktale from the older curriculum still transmitted core meanings of what the regional culture was all about to the students. Striking differences in teaching styles were not significant.

As Stake and Easley (1978) noted in Case Studies in Science Education, a set of beliefs embedded in notions of what "good" teaching is almost unconsciously shapes what is going on. At the surface level there is curricular change but at a deeper level, it does not seem to matter what the instructional technique or instrumentality is. Whatever is at hand will be used through a process of substitute change to further the underlying goals and ends. In Schonhausen, warm feeling tones, students participating in group experiences together that embodied the regional values, and a stable set of relationships based on the respected authority of the teacher framed a context of core cultural values, which were acquired by diverse peoples immigrating into the area through a lengthy period of intense urbanization.

The "Can-Do Mentality," Useful Knowledge, and Politeness

From 1976-1979, White gathered data on what was happening in social studies lessons about culturally different people in a white, working-
class elementary school. While she was there, the central office of the school system instituted a system-wide change in the social studies curriculum. White found that although the teachers cheerfully and diligently followed the administrative guidelines and memoranda, went to grade level meetings, wrote up new social studies goals and behavioral objectives, ordered new textbooks, and changed the units and topics of the lessons that they taught in their classrooms, nothing really changed. Like Spindler's concept of substitute change, White (1980) found that a core of traditional values, including a positive regard for their own culture as well as for the ways of others, persisted in the face of overt curricular change. From historical and interview data, White found these particular values had remained stable through previous changes in social studies curricula in 1959, 1966, and 1973, as well as in 1977.

White attributes this stability of meaning in the face of overt curricular change to at least three cultural patterns. The first is what she calls the teachers' "can-do" mentality: their view that it was proper, appropriate, and even helpful for "experts" and administrative superiors to redesign the curriculum about every seven years to "help keep the teachers and this country up-to-date." Rather than being invested in the designing of new curriculum and in the specific academic context and substance of the units, the teachers' sense of worth was tied up in the notion that "the county can give me anything and I can teach it!" The teachers perceived themselves as experienced professionals who successfully "interject their own ideas, are creative, and meet the needs of their students" (1980, 200-207).

Secondly, the can-do philosophy meant teaching "useful" social studies knowledge that met the needs of the children. The teachers knew that it did not matter if unit topics and activities were changed because they would transmit social studies knowledge that was useful to the students in any event (although some curricula were seen as easier to do this with than others). Ideas that were deemed useful for students had to do with common sense and conventional wisdom as opposed to "specialized" academic subject matter. One teacher explained:

I do not think that social studies is that hard because I think that the average person generally knows everything. I would have to do a lot of homework to teach science. In social studies you have to look up the details, but you basically know everything you have to teach (1980, 146).
Social studies knowledge was also deemed useful in meeting the needs of the children if it taught values about being good Americans. The teachers preferred social studies activities that involved the students, such as a unit on pioneers and Indians in which they constructed horn-books, made a pioneer village, and painted a mural. It was important for the lessons to teach the students historical facts and feelings of patriotism for their own country. "The children have to get into these feelings of the pioneers who fought and gave their lives for this country. Today there is so much disrespect by young people" (1980, 143). No matter what curricular topics were specified, essentially these same cultural values would be transmitted.

White's third and unexpected finding is how a pervasive sense of "niceness" and politeness is a powerful value that structures both the form and content of social studies lessons. For example, teachers generally avoid asking questions in which the answers are not known by the students so as not to put them in a publicly embarrassing situation. Thus few open-ended or speculative questions were asked by either teacher or student.

Exploring differences between other cultures and ours was seen as vaguely distressing because it was impolite to the other culture. Lessons about other cultures were structured to display the similarities between other ways of life and our own. For example, Athens was presented in terms of the divisions of its government into the executive, legislative, and judicial branches which we use in our political structure today. Social studies units about other cultures in the primary grades often became vehicles for teaching about our values and our society's conceptualization of our own way of life. Middle-class American family organization complete with a mommy, a daddy, a boy, a girl, and a dog was presented to young children under the guise of cutting out paper dolls that represented members of an Iroquois family. As the first-grade teacher told a story about modern day travelers in the Saudi Arabian desert, she got across the message that children should always go to the bathroom before they go on a long bus trip. In a discussion of the black plague that the Athenians suffered while under attack by the Spartans, the virtues of cleanliness in the continuing war against germs was extolled. A sixth-grade discussion of an Athenian jury brought
out the responsibilities of being good citizens. No matter what "others" they studied, it seemed the students were learning the norms of their own society.

Again, as Spindler found, changing the topic of the social studies unit or the instructional activities did not appear to be significant because the social studies goals and values remained the same for the teachers. The underlying coherent message transmitted in this school was the importance of and how to be a "good" American.

Schools as Self-Perpetuating Cultural Systems

Rather than studying curricular change within just one elementary school, in the Myth of Educational Reform (1982), Popkewitz and others describe the variability that emerged as six different elementary schools adopted the same curriculum reform program. They found that each school revised both the technology and the goals of the reform curriculum based on a set of ongoing cultural values that it wished to maintain. This study is significant because (1) it supports Spindler's notion of substitute change, and (2) it goes beyond it by describing how the same curriculum reform package was socially transformed by three different types of self-perpetuating cultural systems.

Popkewitz and others did their field research in six elementary schools where program disseminators had already judged the implementation of the Individually Guided Education (IGE) Program as exemplary. Originally developed at the federally-funded Wisconsin Center for Educational Research as a response to criticisms that conventional school practices "had rendered instruction routine trivial and ineffective" (p. 3), this systems approach was based on fine-tuning objectives, evaluation, and instructional programs so that individual students would continually progress by mastering the objectives.

Popkewitz and others found that the adaptations of IGE that each school made functioned to conserve the set of core values towards technical, constructivist, or illusory schooling that existed at each site prior to the implementation of the curricular reform. Their descriptions of each type of cultural system are based on frequently out-of-awareness assumptions and values regarding how the teachers perceive the students, the teachers' conceptualizations of what academic knowledge
is, their assumptions about school work, and the structure of the social relationships between the teachers and students.

However and others did not assume that the goals and format of the Individually Guided Education program, as developed at the Wisconsin Research and Development Center, constituted the ideal model and that the purpose of their study was to evaluate what happened to it at each elementary school. Thus, rather than documenting the enhancement of, deviation from, or misuse of the original program by each school, the authors instead described the implementation from the perspective of each school. Rather than working from a position that the reform curriculum was the norm so that any modifications were deviations from the norm (and assumed to be made by insensitive, unscholarly administrators or teachers), Popkewitz and others assumed that each school was already a cultural system in its own right and asked how the new curricular package affected what was happening. Not only does the research fully describe each ongoing culture in terms of itself, as Malinowski advocated, but the explanation successfully illustrates the central theme expressed by Kurkheim that all doctrines and schemes are transformed when they enter the domain of practice (Bellack 1982).

Popkewitz and others found that the adaptations of IGE that each school made functioned to conserve the set of core values towards technical, constructivist, or illusory schooling that existed at each site prior to the implementation of the curricular reform (1982, 4).

Three of the six schools studied were described as having a technical schooling culture. The IGE program was used to sustain a social logic that believed in rational planning, efficiency, routinization, standardization, and the "creation of a warm supportive psychological environment that makes it pleasant for pupils to participate in the routines of school life" (p. 61).

Popkewitz describes how the children are seen as instructionally deficient. Teachers work to diagnose the specific skills for which remediation is needed. On a pretest, the mastery level is "usually less than 80 percent correct" (p. 67). Students are grouped and they work on skill worksheets until the deficiencies are remediated. Popkewitz reports an esprit de corps among the teachers at these schools because the faculties and the communities value working with the latest educational tech-
nology. The students are secure, there is a pleasant climate, and hard continuous work is valued more than its products.

One school was characterized as generating "constructive schooling." Its guiding value is located in the slogan, "Kennedy Is a Kid's Place." The teachers work hard to make learning enjoyable. Rather than "fun" activities being separated and given as a reward for hard work (as at the technical schools), at Kennedy it is assumed that powerful, authentic learning experiences are enjoyable. Complex intellectual experiences that are not too teacher-directed, dull, or repetitious are valued, and the integrated, interdisciplinary problematic aspects of knowledge are emphasized.

At the two schools described as generating illusory schooling, Popkewitz and others discussed the "series of anomalies, discontinuities, and contradictions" (p. 121) that they found between what was said and believed at one level, but done (or not done) on another. Although the words, ceremonies, and overt routines of a rational, controlled, and productive enterprise were in evidence at these two schools, many of the students did not "make it." The authors found evidence that although teachers worked diligently preparing lesson plans and grading papers, at an ideological level they did not believe that some children could succeed.

The teachers accounted for the students' failure in terms of factors outside the schools which they, as teachers, were helpless to overcome. In informal conversations, broken homes and irresponsible parents were frequently cited as explanations for why students couldn't succeed in school. The authors describe this world view as a "teacher ideology of pathology and cultural inadequacy" (1982, 127). For example, the researchers watched two girls fill out worksheet forms unrelated to the filmstrip they were watching because of mixed-up packets. The girls commented on the mix-up but also noted that it didn't make any difference which forms they filled out. The work of the teachers and the students did not appear to make sense or have meaning to either group of participants.

Thus, the IGE program was utilized in the technical and constructivist schools as a way to achieve more productively their own ends. At the illusory schools, the very problems that the IGE program were intended
to overcome, such as mechanical meaningless work, instead overwhelmed the IGE curriculum.

**Doing It for the Children's Sake**

Popkewitz, Tabachnick, and Wehlege's description of how the schools varied in their transformation of curricular reform programs sounds somewhat similar to patterns unexpectedly perceived by Metz (1984) in her sociological, organizational study of how three middle schools in Heartland responded to a rather quick imposition of a curricular reform. In response to a court-ordered desegregation plan, the school system administration decreed in June that by September the three middle schools would function as magnet schools. They were to provide innovative curricular programs so as to draw a variety of gifted students from the entire school district. In one of the schools, the faculty, constrained by a history of low morale and failure, reacted to becoming a magnet school by not believing that the students were gifted or that they could handle an innovative, academically up-graded curriculum. This cultural stance seems similar to the set of values held by the faculties described in Popkewitz's illusory schools.

The faculty at another school was quite dissident and had a litany of serious criticisms about the principal, whom they virulently resented for such quick, heavy-handed imposition of a new program on them. However, they ultimately worked together to develop a new curriculum appropriate for a magnet school. The teachers perceived a common fundamental value: that much as they might disagree, they and the principal were both committed to "doing it for the children's sake." Belief in a central cultural value helped to maintain stability among otherwise disagreeing members of a society. Thus, two schools, both under court and administrative orders, changed at the formal level of becoming magnet schools and implanting new official curricula. However, they varied at a deeper level of meaning in that one school faculty, although screaming all the way, accepted a new mission for schooling and the other did not.

**Patterns of Mutual Meaninglessness**

In an ethnographic study by a critical theorist, McNeil (1984) also describes a situation in which the social studies instruction sounds
"illusory." McNeil set out to study how economic information was taught in secondary school social studies units. However, she found students who were not interested in the social studies lessons because the information presented in class seemed so superficial, fragmented, and not in accordance with their own notions about "how things happened in the real world." The students adapted by negotiating for the lessening of the academic work because of their heavy involvement in part-time work outside of school.

McNeil's unexpected finding was that teachers coped with this situation by "de-skilling," an adaptation by which they routinely taught non-rigorous social studies units that contradicted their own personal and disciplinary knowledge of the subject matter. McNeil describes how these patterns of mutual meaninglessness are adaptive behaviors for survival in light of an overall disfunctioning of the educational system.

**Explanations of Stability and Change**

These descriptions of how different schools react to external schemes for curriculum reform reveal similar processes. What seems similar in all these accounts of different schools is that each faculty possesses a stable central core of values about what the students are or are not capable of doing, notions about how they should relate to the students and the students to them, and notions about what types of knowledge should be transmitted to the students and how. These core values persist over time, and shape incoming, new curricula, substituting them for what was formerly there, but transforming them so that they become just another means to serve the same overarching cultural ends. When there is strife about change among the faculty and administration, resolution of whether or how to change still seems to rest, in the final analysis, on perpetuation of the most deeply held core values, such as "doing it for the children's sake."

Descriptions of three different types of schooling appear to recur in the research literature. Schooling in Schonhausen (Spindler 1974, 1982), where tacit preference was for the students to engage in integrated learning activities such as field trips and role playing in which they inquire into the nature of the local community, seems quite similar to constructivist schooling at Kennedy School (Popkewitz, Tabachnick,
and Wehlege 1982). In the latter, the participants value creative learning experiences in which students use basic skills to solve problems. Differences between constructivist and technical modes of schooling can be seen in how teachers define the nature of school work. However, technical and constructivist educational cultures can be seen to be similar, in that positive feeling tones and accounts of self-worth and satisfaction with their way of life are expressed by participants in both types of cultures.

The technical and constructivist modes of schooling can be seen to be similar in that they are both in what Wallace (1956, 1961) has characterized as the "steady state" phase of the life cycle of a culture. Out-of-awareness actions by their members function to select activities by which the members can continue to transmit and reconstruct a way of life that is basically satisfying to them. Substitute changes are essential for survival as the participants must continually reformulate their cultural code to adapt to new situations that are constantly arising. Schools may spectacularly but pragmatically abandon cultural objects such as textbooks and curriculum guides as they adopt new ones, which of course are then discarded themselves in a predictable five to seven years (White 1980). However, these cycles of fads, innovations, and then abandonment contribute to keeping the cultural system stable. Each set of curricular changes is always transformed so that the appropriate configurations of social relationships and core values are realized within them.

The phenomenon called illusory schooling by Popkewitz and others (1982) appears similar to the complex of social relationships and values described by Metz (1984) in her analysis of the first Heartland middle school, and to the teaching/learning of the secondary social studies units described by McNeil (1984). The participants do not display energy, satisfaction, and commitment to the system in which they are involved. Rather, there seems to be a growing sense of distance, e.g., impersonality, anomie, mechanization, fragmentation of social relationships, and powerlessness for all within the system. The continuation of the cultural system becomes problematic: the participants may continue to drift helplessly, trapped by their cultural history and buffeted by external cultural forces. Or there may be a major shift or total transformation.
of core values and social relationships so that the participants again can work within an educational system which makes sense and which is personally satisfying.

Implications for Would-Be Social Studies Change Agents

But what can social studies practitioners learn from these ethnographic accounts of cultural stability and curricular reform? If one is a would-be social studies curriculum advocate or change agent, then this review may be initially daunting and overwhelming, leaving feelings that the conclusions that are drawn are only useless cliches, such as "the more things change, the more they stay the same."

However, if one strongly feels that practical action and intervention should result from understanding, there is much that can be inferred from these rich ethnographic descriptions. At least one implication could be that one would not want to be a change agent armed only with the rational, bureaucratic model for change (such as the development, dissemination, diffusion, and adoption model) so popular with leaders high in educational hierarchies. One can see that although new curricula are diffused according to a top-down hierarchical model (Spindler 1974, White 1980, Popkewitz and others 1982, Metz 1984), this model is insufficient as the sole explanatory device for accounting for how the actual curricular and instructional changes did or did not take place. One would want to take the cultural values and processes found within each school system into account and to consider how the educators within different schools might perceive and mediate a proposed curriculum's technologies and goals. White (1984) describes teachers (and administrators) as "cultural brokers," acting as hinges to let congruent, culture-enhancing ideas and technologies into their culturally-bound classrooms or schools, but also shutting out aspects of the external innovation that are seen as discordant or possibly disruptive to the internally successful ongoing way of life.

In her review of diffusions of social studies innovations, Hahn (1977) notes that certain social studies programs were adopted because a few individuals thought they had merit. Innovations are not accepted merely because of the findings of a needs assessment survey. Perhaps social studies teachers can realize their potential empowerment as
advocates inside the system: they are in a position to be able to
transform and transmit a social studies curriculum through informal as
well as formal networks, based on their ability to try it out, actively
advocate it, and coach its utilization at the classroom level (Joyce and
Showers 1982).

Of course, since attempts at change always seem to have unexpected
ramifications somewhere in a system, one can muse about whether or how
specific individuals can charismatically or bureaucratically affect a
holistic cultural system generally devoted to self-maintenance. A grasp
of and commitment to keeping shared organizing beliefs, values, and sym-
bols appear essential. Advocates of a specific change would want to
consider how their program permits a reinstatement or intensification of
basic values that are already present and meaningful both to the advo-
cates and the community.

III. The Problem of the Informal Curriculum:
How Definitions of Work and Play Are Transmitted in Classrooms

Technical, constructivist, and illusory cultures of schooling (Pop-
kewitz and others 1982) are based in large part on teacher-held, fre-
quently out-of-awareness assumptions regarding the types of academic
work seen as appropriate by teachers vis-a-vis the potentialities of the
students in their classrooms. Throughout the summaries of the Case
Studies in Science Education (1978), Stake and Easley contrasted inquiry
teaching with didactic recitations centered around the use of workbooks
and textbooks. Although Stake and Easley were advocates of the inquiry
method, they worked to keep their biases from blocking their understand-
ing of what was happening. They conclude that, "inquiry does not appear
to work" (Chapter 12, p. 7). In a section entitled "Work or Play," they
argue that since teachers place so much value on the necessity of learn-
ing to do hard work, the aesthetic and playful dimensions so necessary
for hands-on "messing around" in science are not valued, and indeed are
seen as potentially destructive of the control needed to keep the stu-
dents working steadily on task. "We found that many teachers feel that
higher level study is hard work, life is full of hard work, the children
need to learn that learning is hard work" (Chapter 12, p. 7). Stake and
Easley argue that teachers use subject matter knowledge and materials as
a means to what they call "socialization." The more stern socializers are described as "promoting subordination, discipline, a 'protestant work ethic,' cheerfulness, competitiveness, and a heavy investment in getting students 'prepared'" (Chapter 16, pp. 24-25).

Given this priority in beliefs and values, however, we now need to know what this looks like at a more specific level. How do teachers transmit these values and get a group of students to accept and live by them? Are the same basic set of middle class values about work and play transmitted (if not acquired) everywhere? If not, how do they vary? A recent body of educational ethnographic research has been developed, based on the study of how the differing meanings of work and play are transmitted or acquired in a variety of schools.

How Teachers "Get" Students to Work

LeCompte (1978) studies four fourth-grade classrooms in two schools in Albuquerque, New Mexico. One of the schools was in a Mexican-American, semi-rural, lower-income neighborhood and the two fourth-grade female teachers in the school were Anglo-American. The other school was in a white, middle-class neighborhood, and one of the fourth-grade female teachers in that school was Anglo-American and one was Mexican-American. LeCompte studied how the teachers got the children to work. After classroom observations were made, a coding system was developed and teacher management behavior was categorized.

LeCompte found a common set of teacher behaviors that she called "Management Core Behavior," and a further set of management behaviors that varied among the teachers, which she called "Discretionary Behavior." The cultural norms that the management core behaviors revolved around included "acceptance of authority, orderliness, task orientation, and time orientation" (p. 28). LeCompte gives percentages of occurrence and concludes:

A 'hidden curriculum' existed, then, consisting of certain rules that were embodied in management type behavior. Children were expected to internalize these rules in every classroom:

1. Do what the teacher says.
2. Live up to teacher expectations for proper behavior.
4. Keep quiet and don't move too much.
5. Stick to the schedule. (p. 29)
Areas of management behavior that varied from teacher to teacher (the discretionary area) included differences in emphasizing student autonomy and setting up or negating opportunities for student initiative. Teacher practices varied regarding student achievement. For example, some teachers encouraged competition and posted grades, while others did not.

LeCompte's study can be considered ethnographic in that the coding system developed for categorizing the management practices of teachers was inductively developed, based on classroom observations and field notes, and not imposed in an *a priori* manner. However, this study does not satisfy a more Malinowskian approach in that the teacher/student interactions involving management are not described within the cultural context in which they were generated. And we have no way of knowing what the strategies for control and good work behaviors looked like to the various teachers and students; no sense of "authenticity" is transmitted.

From the brief descriptions displayed in LeCompte's tables, we can infer that there may have been two types of cultural systems functioning: one that could be characterized as "teacher-centered and authoritarian," as contrasted to one that was identified as "student-centered and therapeutic" (pp. 22-27). If this is so, then the subsequent comparison made by LeCompte is significant: even though there are contrasting cultural systems, perhaps not unlike technical and constructivist schooling with regard to how, when, and why teachers "get" students to do their school work, there is still a core of teacher behavior and values about teacher authority and use of time that are found in all systems. This makes intuitive sense. Even though Spindler's account of the instruction in Schonhausen (1974) and Popkewitz and others' account of instruction at Kennedy was classified as constructivist, there were no indications that the teaching/learning was disorderly, a free-for-all. In fact, Spindler even found that this integrated approach to learning experiences existed within a framework of strong teacher authority. What can be seen to vary between technical and constructivist schooling is not lack of authority but discretion with regard to student autonomy as found by LeCompte. In the next study, reviewed precise descriptions are given of
the minute mundane processes involved in two different patterns of work socialization.

Two Different Patterns of Learning What Work Means

When Wilcox (1982) compared the differential socialization in a first-grade class in a working-class neighborhood to that in a first-grade class in a professional, executive class neighborhood (both were in California), the initial descriptions of what was happening differed from traditional assumptions of what types of schooling would be found in working- and middle-class neighborhoods. Typically schooling in working-class neighborhoods are assumed to have stricter discipline and more low-level work (Anido 1980) than those found in classrooms located in upperclass neighborhoods.

Wilcox describes Mrs. Jones' first grade, located in Smith School in a lower-middle-class area of Valley City, as:

freeform, comfortable, and, at times, frenetic. The children were often spread out all over the room, engaged in different kinds of activities, some academically oriented, some not. Frequent movement of children between activities was accompanied by a rather high level of noise within the classroom (1982, 284).

The organization of the classroom was based on group activities. Students sometimes worked under an individual contract system. The children were able to move freely from doing their academic work to playing with each other, with blocks, or with "one of the very popular rats who lived in a cage in the corner of the classroom" (pp. 284-285).

This open classroom found in a working class school can be contrasted with a more traditional first grade taught by Mrs. Newman at Huntington, located in an upper-middle-class neighborhood:

During the school day the Huntington classroom was orderly, quiet, and productive. Desks were aligned in traditional rows and children worked by themselves, poring over assignments, moving quietly from their desks to resource materials that lined the room....It was a classroom where everything had its place....Movement was clearly restricted....Mrs. Newman allowed very little to interfere with her objective of promoting independent work, calling interaction between children, "bothering your friends" (pp. 285-286).

Mrs. Newman had clear priorities about good study habits and high academic standards.
Thus, given formal classroom structure, which may not be predicted according to the social class of the community, Wilcox studied how children were socialized towards work roles in a "series of actions woven throughout the fabric of day-to-day life in the classroom" (p. 272). Assuming children are not neutrally sorted by parents and teachers, Wilcox selected three general dimensions to study with regard to how values about work were transmitted in interactions in the classrooms. She describes the transmission of external as compared to internal forms of control over work; the transmission of expectations of future work images; and the transmission of self-presentation skills.

The most common strategies used by Mrs. Jones at Smith School in the working class neighborhood were external teacher commands and rule repetition: "You cannot get a rat out until you've finished your work." "Use quiet voices." "Here's a star for everybody who finished" (p. 288).

In comparison, Mrs. Newman also had strong external standards but they were exercised with an additional internalizing component. Mrs. Newman's behavioral standards were just as strict as Mrs. Jones', if not more so, but she constantly reasoned about the academic implications for behavior. Mrs. Newman expected children to internalize these standards and think and take responsibility for their own behavior. She constantly told the children to "Use time wisely." "Play fair with yourself." "Will this misbehavior help you become a better reader?" It is also significant that children in the top half of the reading groups in both classrooms received more internal academic messages than did children in the lower half in each classroom (1982, 290).

The two teachers presented very differentiated images of the child with regard to future expectations. At Smith School there was an emphasis on the present. Mrs. Jones "essentially tried to create a positive, present-oriented atmosphere with a 'let kids be kids' attitude" (1982, 294). The children were allowed to play with each other and play with the animals (rather than basing a science lesson on them). There were "fun" activities such as breaking pinatas and sharing birthday cake and ice cream. While Mrs. Jones praised the progress the children made in first grade, she rarely connected it with the second grade or the future.

This can be contrasted with Huntington School in which the children learned that they had positive futures in front of them. Mrs. Newman
would say: "Good thinking. See, you're really thinking like a mathematician." or "I want you to take your time, Joanne. You were content to get words wrong before. Read to yourself and enjoy it. Say to yourself, 'I'm a good reader because this is a second-grade book'" (1982, 293). The rewards and pressures of the future were constantly linked to the consequences of present actions. For example, Mrs. Newman discussed being a good listener in terms of "This is important for taking tests, and you'll have them from now on, even if you get to Harvard" (1982, 294).

The analysis by Wilcox of the differences between "show and tell" in the two classrooms is most significant, because again we can make the generalization that it is not the instructional strategy per se that is important. Rather it is how it is used that transmits very different meaning about what students will be doing in the outside world in the future. At Smith, show-and-tell only took place about once every three days, often when the students requested it, and at different times of the day. Mrs. Jones perceived the activity as a time for "kids to be kids" and to share their treasures however they wished. She was not obtrusive and only responded to student presentations about half the time with comments such as "That's nice," or by asking a factual question that required a specific answer, such as "What color is it?" Mrs. Jones acted as if there were a sharp dichotomy between work and play with a few shared or overlapping characteristics.

However, at Huntington, the first ten minutes of every day was religiously devoted to show-and-tell. Mrs. Newman responded to the presentations, sometimes relating the child's object or experience to subject matter taught the day before, or by using it for class discussion that day. She frequently gave specific feedback about the process of speaking before a group: "What nice sentences you made. You told us so many things. We know exactly when and where and what" (1982, 292). In contrast, we can see that Mrs. Newman "uses" show-and-tell as an opportunity to encourage personal displays of experience and knowledge by the students. She then elaborates on and transforms the students' personal knowledge into public knowledge by her continued integration of their experiences into the daily curriculum.
Mrs. Newman also integrates work and play so that academic work is perceived to be enjoyable. Activities that might be labeled as "fun" in Mrs. Jones' room and valued as a break from work are seen as another source of learning in Mrs. Newman's room. For example, when pets are brought in, there are questions in an academically-elaborated discussion so that students may learn about observing animals.

Thus, the mere presence or absence of an instructional strategy is not sufficient to establish what type of academic work may be occurring in a classroom. Whether students learn that the doing of academic work is externally or internally controlled; whether students learn that displays of their personal knowledge are for fun and reward for hard work or for furthering class learning; or whether they gain positive or negative visions of what will be required of them in second grade or at Harvard—the meaning of a classroom procedure as simple as show-and-tell must be inferred from an analysis of the actual classroom interactions and the timing, intonation, and exact working of the teacher's reactions.

Ethnographic Studies on the Nature of Play

We can better understand about the culturally valued notion of work by considering it in terms of its relationship to play. In Wilcox's study (1982), a key distinction between the two classrooms was whether the teacher used and incorporated play in the service of work, whether the work could be playful, or whether play was a reward granted to the students after performing their work. The notion of work as enjoyable and integrated learning in which students learn from activities that incorporate play is a pattern that characterizes the constructivist set of values while play as distinct from work and as reward for work is a pattern seen in technical schooling.

King (1979, 1982) conducted research on how children in four middle-class white kindergartens were socialized into how to "do" play as well as how "to work." She studied the cultural dilemma inherent in the socialization of children to kindergarten: schools are considered work places, yet play is considered educationally important and "necessary for the healthy growth and development of children" (1982, 19).

King found that children had specific definitions of what play was that did not correspond with adult perceptions. For example, activities
that are often seen as fun or traditionally labeled as play by adults, such as painting a picture, are not always seen as play by children. In King's case studies, the children labeled an activity as play only when it was not assigned by an adult and they were permitted to choose their playmates, the activity, and the materials. In other words, no matter how much fun it was, an activity was perceived as play by the participants only if it was free from the external control of adults.

King studied how children used materials associated with play at school. Her study is significant for its attention to insider, emic definitions because she limited her collection of data to "times when the children defined their interactions as play." King found that during the first few weeks of school, the play materials were used to provide continuity between home and school, and to entice the children into moving into more formal learning settings. The use of the play materials served to teach students about teacher authority and teach them to defer their interactions with each other until their school work was finished. For example, King found that children learned that play did not occur during periods of teacher-led instruction. Play was done with restraint and "indoor voices" only after the worksheets were done (1982, 21-25). Thus children begin to be socialized into adult distinctions made by the adults around them. They learn that play is separate from and constrained by the patterns of work. Their play at school becomes differentiated from their spontaneous play.

Finnan (1982) conducted two ethnographic studies of children's spontaneous play. In the first study, conducted within a children's folklore project of the Southwest Education Development Laboratory, she studied white girls' self-structured chase games. An entry from her field notes on third graders on the playground describes the study. One girl made a mock lunge at another girl. The second girl ran a few feet and stopped, taunting the chaser to try to catch her. The chaser responded with another lunge, and the other player again ran only a few feet....The players ducked and circled around the woman, laughing as they played. They eventually worked their way back to the building, darting and teasing. Finally, the chasee sat down near a group of girls and refused to continue playing (1982, 358).
In spontaneous play, children overturn and even mock the rules from the adult, non-play world. Play is initiated by signals that "anything goes."

Finnan found that there were differences that characterized how different groups of children structure and participate in spontaneous play. The key component in boy's chase games is aggression: they make claims about cremating, killing, and destroying each other. There is a great deal of contact with bodies pressed together, the roles of chaser/chasee can be switched at any moment, and there are not safety zones. In contrast, girls have a "teasing, halting style of chasing" (1982, 370). The object is to tease rather than to overpower the opponent; physical strength is not crucial. Girls have safety zones, more permanent roles, and the roles often involve fantasy play such as being a witch, fairy, or slave.

Finnan found that white girls often try to involve boys in their games. Finnan argues that girls may want boys involved in their games because of the impact on their play. When boys play, the games take on aspects of both types of games, but, most importantly, rules of the girls' games are ignored. Finnan notes that then, "All players, both boys and girls, must use aggression to protect themselves since they are no longer protected by the rules. On the other hand, girls as well as boys can assert themselves forcefully, since no rules restrain them" (1982, 371). Finnan discusses other groups at play: black girls' spontaneous play involves more aggression and they do not seek male participation. They also use more group games, such as hand clap.

Finnan also shows how players must know the rules and norms of the adult society in order to overthrow them. In another study she found that Vietnamese refugee children chose play forms with well-defined roles and boundaries because they were still uncertain about how American rules defined their position vis-à-vis the other players. Finnan links the play studies with similar patterns in world play, such as riddling, in which the codes and the rules are "played with."

Finnan also links the patterns found in play to larger cultural patterns. She notes the dilemma with play choice that white girls have as they get older. After age 8 or 9 white girls are not satisfied with games such as jump rope. They are not satisfied with the girls' style.
of play, which is restrictive, because they are still expected to be "nice." However, the girls do not move into sport games at this time, as do boys. Finman notes that they have few alternate models of women to emulate; they want respect and status but don't know what to do to get it. She notes the same dilemma in their future: what models are provided for them to achieve access to respect and status?

Goetz's (1981) study of first graders in the rural South contrasts values that were displayed in spontaneous play on the playground with values that were carefully nurtured in the context of the classroom. Goetz described two first grades in which the female teachers had equalitarian values; groupings for work and various activities within the classroom by the children were not sex-typed. However, Goetz did not expect to find that when the children participated in spontaneous play on the playground, they reverted to sex-grouped play activities with more traditional sex-linked roles. Many questions can be raised about whether the students were overturning the norms of the classroom in their play or whether different patterns of participation emerge when children as opposed to adults are allowed to structure their own activities. Are different values being transmitted/acquired for different contexts?

There is also a rich body of ethnographic studies by folklorists about forms of children's speech play and verbal art. Carefully detailed analysis by Bauman (1982) shows intricate interactional structures and use of complex routines in riddling sessions involving three Chicano children and rhyming speech play among southwestern black children. One of the questions that Bauman (1982) and Cazden (1982) then raise is the question of what do we, as educators, want to do about this growing knowledge of children's forms of spontaneous play in a variety of cultures? Do we want to use it as a way of making the curriculum more meaningful? Forms of indigenous play could be used by teachers as a way of starting with the personal experiences of the students and then transforming them into public academic knowledge. But concerns have been raised about adults co-opting and "colonializing" children's culture to entice children into an adult culture.
Explanations of Work and Play

Just as the exploration of the issue of stability and change shows that a core of beliefs unconsciously shapes whether or how changes will be incorporated into a school's culture, so can we now see how teachers' tacit notions of "hard work" shapes much of what goes on in classrooms during each day. The highest priority of teachers is to have control so that they can "get" the students to "work." LeCompte's (1978) findings suggest that all teachers' practices, whether they are a Mrs. Jones or a Mrs. Newman, whether they are committed to a more technical approach to transmitting knowledge or to a constructivist approach in which students are given autonomy to acquire knowledge, are based on a core of common management behaviors involving acceptance of teacher authority and an orientation to school tasks.

One of the strengths of Wilcox's (1982) and King's (1979, 1982) descriptions is that we are allowed to hear real teachers' voices and we learn how important the exact wording is. A familiar phrase indigenous to primary classrooms, "Let's use our indoor voices please" (King 1982), is so ordinary, and yet it carries a claim that teachers have the right to control and use for school the play that formerly was owned by the children. The statements, "Here's a star for everyone who is finished" and "Use your time wisely" (Wilcox 1982), suddenly become laden with "hidden" meanings as to whether external or internal controls will regulate students' work and define their futures and their successes and failures for them.

We find that work and play are not always simple antonyms. Sometimes work is defined in classrooms for children as the absence of play. When students finish "working hard," they are then rewarded by being allowed to play. In other situations valued work is believed to be enjoyable and playful. Or, play must be used to sweeten, entice, or seduce children into doing work. Children have different definitions of play than adults do, and their spontaneous play on playgrounds and with words often mocks or refutes values of both conservative and "liberated" adults (Finnan 1982, Goetz 1981). Children's spontaneous play varies by age, sex, and ethnic and regional groups, but, even at its most spontaneous, it serves the useful purpose of allowing children to "try out"
without risk roles and practices that will be useful in the adult world someday (Finnan 1982, Dobbert 1984).

**Implications for Social Studies Teachers' Reflection and Intervention:**

**Confronting the Unexpected**

As practitioners begin to reflect on the discretionary management behaviors as defined by LeCompte (1978) and so skillfully described by Wilcox (1982), it can be seen that things are not as they seem. Systematic variations in mundane practices by teachers with differential long-term effects on students become evident. A significant pattern found across the board by Shaver, Davis, and Helburn as they reviewed the *Case Studies in Science Education* (Stake and Easley 1978) was that:

Despite being treated as nonself-starting learners, students are likely to find one common denominator among their social studies teachers, as with mathematics and science teachers: that is a concern for young people. Teachers like their students, and are interested in their well-being, personally and academically. However, secondary school teachers are more likely than elementary ones to be concerned with covering subject matter rather than helping each student do his or her best. Still, they tend to create a comfortable environment for their students, and students often like their teachers, even while lacking interest in the subject matter (1979, 7).

Social studies teachers generally enjoy teaching, have rapport with their students, and their students relate well to them. Although students often let the teachers know when they don't like some of the "calls," the students act as if they know that their teachers are doing what they believe to be in their best interests, i.e., to help them learn how to work hard, stay on task, and use their time wisely. These are necessary, valued behaviors that need to be acquired by students to do well in our society and without them, classroom life as we know it would be impossible.

Therefore, it is a bit disconcerting to read ethnographic studies in which it becomes obvious that despite good-faith efforts, through some of our minute, fine-grained, out-of-awareness routine actions, we may be communicating expectations and meanings that are destructive or counter-productive to all that we are committed to and overtly trying to achieve as teachers.
It is easy to dismiss polemic writing about the hidden curriculum. Writers who document the injustices and the organized conspiracy that establishment teachers are perpetrating against students to "keep them in their place" strike no responsive chords in us. However, in our habitual responses to student answers, are we unknowingly transmitting messages that student work is valuable only in that it pleases us? Do we react to students' social studies essays by displaying them publicly? And for what purposes—to use competition and pacing as an organizing device for generating more work (LeCompte 1978), or because we are symbolically celebrating fine work? And, what do we say about the posted work? How do we react to student accounts of personal experiences in social studies discussions? Do we relax and enjoy the students comments as "a breather" from real work or do we listen intently so as to connect their personal experiences with other academic work that day? Do we teach presentation skills and connect students' current good or poor performances to possible future uses in their lives?

Wilcox (1982) would begin by making educators aware of the differences that exist in the socialization to work roles. She argues that thoughtfulness and understanding are needed to "promote the breaking down of stereotypes and the freeing of students' potential." She claims that no lasting solutions will result unless the dynamics are understood within the context of the cultural whole. She reminds us that we all are enculturated agents rather than neutral judges.

Wilcox concludes that throwing more money at schools or instituting reforms that merely change the appearance of classroom interactions will tend to "leave the substance of what takes place in the classroom largely untouched" (p. 303). Wilcox argues that it is unrealistic to expect schools as institutions to be places where reforms are initiated because "what takes place in schools is likely to be reflective of social and cultural reality" (p. 302).

By reflecting on the descriptions in these ethnographic accounts, teachers can adopt many more tacit processes of teaching. For example, we can set up new or different problems to solve in the classroom based on the type of self-worth, satisfaction, and future expectations that we want our students to internalize.
However, we must consider whether intervention is possible or desirable. What if we decide we want to be more like Mrs. Newman? Is it possible to change our own habitual behavior? What if the students or the community feel stress because of our high future-oriented expectations? What if they are not the expectations that the students have or they do not coincide with messages given by the other teachers or their parents? What if the students only respond to external expressions of authority and ignore internal "Is it best for you?" queries?

Is it legitimate to use a play form, familiar and known, to ease students' entrance into adult distinctions of work, play, responsibility, and organization? Will what was spontaneous about the play survive the journey into contexts bounded by authority? Or will it become devalued or meaningless? Tight-lipped, quiet, grim versions of Seven-Up at indoor recess seem far removed from children larking about a playground.

One of the recurring major themes in these ethnographic accounts is the problematic role of power. Teachers use their power to structure the contexts in which they and their students interact. As teachers, no matter whether we are direct or indirect, authoritarian or student-centered, we are committed to being the authority and to exercising power for the good of the students. But as the authority, how do we or can we use our power to frame instructional events in which the students "play" at having some control, some discretion and autonomy, some power over their own work and play? As social studies teachers, how can we use our power to frame contexts in which students are "empowered" to try out and play at some of our social studies goals for the future, such as being a critical thinker (see Cornbleth, chapter 3), being a good citizen, and being an independent learner? How might students play at being independent learners within the bounds of an acceptable classroom behavior if they later are going to assume identities as successful knowers and "doers" of social studies?

IV. The Problem of Accounting for Pupil Success and Failure

What is happening in the social studies classroom when there is success? What is happening when there is failure? In the Case Studies in Science Education (Stake and Easley 1978), in a section entitled "The
Mystery of Learning and Forgetting," we hear a math teacher talking about what happens when a student learns:

When a light goes on for a kid I ask, "What did I just say? Tell me so I can use it next period." It doesn't work next period of course... So we work on it together and alone. We lost some of them and came back and did some more--then one said, "Oh, I get it!" and then a couple of the others. I don't really know how that happens (Chapter 15, p. 9; also Chapter 1, p. 106).

This is a lovely account of a student "getting it" or "seeing the light" in math class. Are there parallels in social studies education? Is social studies the type of academic venture in which students suddenly understand? If not, how do they achieve success in acquiring social studies knowledge?

Reviewers found that complaints about student motivation were the single most enduring frustration. A high school social studies teacher said:

It's almost as though we have to prove why we're here, why we're functioning. (They as much as say:) "What makes you think that you have anything of value to teach us?" You know, I get the feeling many times that I'm on the defensive as a teacher. It isn't enough that I stand up and say, "This is your assignment." I almost feel as though I have to prove it, to prove that there's value in doing it, other than the fact that I just want them to do it (1978, Chapter 15, p. 25; also Chapter 4, p. 43).

Teachers' explanations for failure may be focused on blaming the victims (the students) for innate deficiencies external to the classroom that prevent learning. Or, teachers may look inward and blame themselves (perhaps another form of victimization). A review of educational anthropological research reveals a wide range of explanations as to what success and failure look like in classrooms and how they are achieved.

Pupil success and pupil failure are not randomly distributed within communities, schools, and classrooms. Since much variation in human behavior is culturally patterned, it is not surprising that at least five explanations using the concept of culture have emerged to account for school failure. Four of the more recent explanations have been developed within the domain of educational ethnographic research (McDermott 1980, Ogbu 1982). These accounts of what is happening (and not happening) in the classrooms are important for social studies practi-
tioners to consider and reflect upon, because each explanation offers a different perspective on how teachers interact with learners and how they diagnose and sort students. Each stance is based on a different version of how learning happens and what success is, and each has a different description of how failure occurs. Thus, there are differing implications in terms of what teachers and administrators should do to address the problems of failure to learn.

Explanation one: students as culturally deficient. The first explanation is that students who do not do well in school, such as minorities and lower-class children, are culturally deficient. Remediation is considered necessary to help these children gain the appropriate language, work habits, cognitive skills, and motivation for success in school. Variations of this explanation have been around for a long time. For example, this was (and still is) the approach taken by the federal government about American Indian children. Since Indians were clearly unfamiliar with a "normal" way of life, Congress authorized an Early Civilization Fund in 1819 "for the purpose of having Christian Missionaries 'Civilize' and 'Christianize' the American Indian population." By 1842 the United States had 37 federal Indian schools (Thompson 1978, 169). Considered primitive but educable, entire populations of Indian youth were sent away to boarding schools to learn the white man's ways. A modern version of this policy is the Headstart program, which was established so that culturally inadequate children could acquire middle-class competencies. However, this position of cultural deficiency has been rejected by anthropologists who argue that all children acquire a cultural system of their own in their home environment. Rather than educating children who are lacking a culture, problem-solving strategies are based on overcoming the differences in cultural knowledge between home and school (Ogbu 1979, 1982).

Explanation two: classroom lessons as interactional accomplishments. A microethnographic research tradition has developed around the study of initial socialization, i.e., how children entering school for the first time learn how to "do" school. Based on the premise that the face-to-face interactional work of the participants generates the social structure of
the lesson (Mehan 1979, 8), ethnographers have studied primary classrooms to find out how the complex collaborative behaviors necessary to "bring off" social occasions, such as morning circle or a reading group lesson, are mutually acquired by these neophyte students and their teacher. Microethnographers study how students and the teacher structure the stream of behavior that is mutually generated (Mehan, Cazden, and others 1976, Erickson and Schultz 1981, McDermott 1974, 1976). They describe clusters of simultaneous verbal and nonverbal behaviors characteristic of students or teachers that form a series of specific contexts within lessons. These contexts shift from moment to moment to form levels of events and occasions within lessons.

To be what is characterized as "socially competent," i.e., successful in classroom interactions, students must be able to "read" the particular combination of teacher and student verbal and nonverbal behavior to know what context they are in (Bremme and Erickson 1977). Students must know how to produce the appropriate behaviors at the right time if they want to get a chance to participate. For example, students traditionally learn how to raise their hand and "bid" in order to get an opportunity to speak in a class discussion. In each lesson there are a finite number of opportunities that students must successfully bid for if they are to display their academic knowledge.

Academic competence is knowing the appropriate academic content matter. Everyone has seen the kindergartner who waves his hand excitedly during a class discussion. However, when called on, the child then retreats in confused silence; he has nothing to say. This is an example of being socially competent. He is able to bid and obtain the floor, although he is not able to make an academic contribution. In contrast, there is the classic example of students' excitedly calling out the answer as soon as the teacher asks a question. They have the academic competence, but socially are not competent because they do not bid for recognition in an acceptable manner. Thus success is produced if students are able to simultaneously produce an academically appropriate product within the tacit social rules of interaction.

However, as part of the Harvard Graduate School of Education Project, Bremme and Erickson (1977) found that the rules for successful bidding change each time the context shifts. Conducted in a kindergarten/first
grade outside of Boston, Bremme and Erickson found that three types of social contexts were generated in morning circle. These contexts, which they identified as Teacher's Time, Students' Time, and Transition, were produced by patterns of more than seven distinctive features of teacher verbal and nonverbal behaviors, and more than ten distinctive features of student verbal and nonverbal behaviors.

In Teachers' Time, the teacher opens her body up towards the student group as a whole, "scans" the cluster of students with her face and eyes, and initiates and does most of the talking while the students sit quietly, their bodies oriented towards her. In Students' Time, the teacher has stopped scanning, has folded her hands in her lap, and she and the other students have their faces and sometimes their shoulders and torsos oriented toward the student who has gained the floor, introduced a topic, and is holding forth. Students occasionally glance away from the student speaker to look at the teacher and then back again. During Transition, "there is increased movement and change, verbally and nonverbally on the part of both students and teacher...the behavior becomes less interdependent, more individuated" (p. 155).

The same student behavior does not achieve the same results in different contexts. Bremme and Erickson found that students who bid by raising their hands and/or calling the teacher's name got the floor during Students' Time, but did not during Teacher's Time. Alternately, simply speaking up and saying what one wanted to say worked in Teacher's Time, but not in Students' Time. There were also tacit rules regarding the appropriateness of topic. In Students' Time, children who were successful followed their bids with personal anecdotes. However, during Teacher's Time, remarks that were judged to be appropriate had to do with organizational matters or academic topics initiated by the teacher.

Glitches and miscuing of contexts were found to occur when the teacher in this study did not display all parts of the characteristic posture or stand in the traditional space on the rug at the front of the room when giving directions. For example, when the teacher once turned out of her "announcement posture" to give directions to two girls behind her, students began to move around, thinking the announcement was over. When the teacher angrily asked "Who told you to move?", the answer could have been "the teacher" because she signaled the students by breaking
out of her posture. Another time, the teacher gave an announcement from the doorway of the classroom as she went out to attend to a visitor. This announcement was not heeded because it was not signaled from the appropriate place (Schultz and Florio 1979). Thus, in this explanatory system, teachers can perceive inappropriate student behavior as a lack of interactional accomplishment, rather than assuming that the students were willfully bad or stupid.

Evaluation of success and failure from an interactional perspective means that rather than judging a student as disruptive, troublesome, or innate (explanations based on innate developmental or personality characteristics), a teacher deals with the notion that the student is not yet socially competent (and therefore must be taught these social skills). During the Schultz and Florio study, one of the investigators, Florio and the cooperating teacher, Martha Walsh, concluded that teachers are decisionmakers and that "teaching is largely a matter of forming and testing hypotheses about children" (p. 9).

During the second year of the Harvard Education Project, Florio began to work as a classroom aide because the Project researchers found they needed to know more than could be learned from videotaping several lessons in the morning. Florio and the teacher began informally to reflect on what was happening and to share hunches and ideas. Florio noted that Walsh wondered aloud several times why Arthur was able to "get to her" in a way that Louise was not.

They took this "real" question and turned it into a research question, reviewing video tapes from a six-month span and trying to describe and analyze the behavior of Arthur, Louise, and for contrast, Lee. Both Arthur and Louise were first graders who were larger, moved and talked frequently, and thus were often noticed by the teacher. However, Arthur was seen as a leader by his peers and was successful at getting the floor during circle time while Louise was not. Lee, another large first grader, differed by being quiet and sitting on the periphery.

Florio and Walsh found that both Arthur and Louise expended energy kneeling and sitting and raising and waving their hands in bids. However, Arthur displayed all four of the behaviors precisely at once: "He presented a united front to the teacher, making it clear that he intended to get the floor," which he did (p. 260). Louise, on the other hand,
moved up and down and her hands went in and out; she was not coordinated and the tapes confirmed the feeling that she would creep up (like a snake) closer to the teacher. Lee, in contrast, was quiet. However, Walsh felt that he was "academic and attending." The tape confirmed that Lee did not move much, but he did move his head in and out slightly whenever the teacher was talking, thus visually demonstrating to her that he was listening.

Therefore, there seem to be readily documented behavioral patterns that teachers tacitly respond to when they develop differential feelings and expectations about students. However, as teachers, we need to know more about how and why specific children, through their varied use of talk and movement, achieve such widely differing rankings as socially successful or unsuccessful, or academic and attentive or not attentive in the over-all "social map" in our classroom.

In an earlier study, Byers and Byers (1972) describe students' success or lack of it in terms of whether they are able to obtain the teacher's attention. Byers and Byers videotaped and analyzed a white, experienced early childhood teacher interacting for 33 minutes with four girls, age 4, who were members of a nursery school class. Two of the girls were from white middle-class backgrounds, and two were black children from Harlem. The children sat around a small table, cutting, pasting, and drawing, and the teacher moved smoothly around the table, gesturing, smiling, and often bending at the waist or crouching beside a child for a while as she talked. However, in the first ten minutes the more active black child looks or glances at the teacher 35 times and 'catches her eye' and exchanges facial expressions with the teacher four or five times. Each of these exchanges lasts from one to three seconds. The more active white girl looks or glances at the teacher 14 times and 'catches her eye' and exchanges expressions eight of those times (p. 23).

Byers and Byers explain that when the more active white child wanted to communicate with the teacher, she either waited for pauses or looked at the person to whom the teacher was talking. This move functions in middle-cl interactions as a politeness gesture to attend to the person who has the floor. It also helps the girl wait and find the moment in which she can initiate her own communication.
In contrast, the teacher appeared to be trying to communicate equally with all students. She looked towards the active black girl more often than she did toward the active white girl. However, the teacher and the black girl were rarely able to achieve eye contact and the exchange of facial expressions that follows.

The same pattern was found in terms of achieving physical contact. "A common sequence is one in which the black girl approaches the teacher, the teacher reaches out tentatively, ... the girl jiggles or twists, and the contact is broken; the teacher tries again, brushes the girl lightly, and the encounter ends with only fleeting physical contact" (p. 24). Thus we can see that although both are trying to interact, out-of-awareness patterns of how to organize and time their interactions are preventing contact necessary for communicating and building a social relationship.

Byers and Byers note that while there will be less interpersonal involvement, there are other levels at which more conscious contact can be made. Towards the end of the 33 minutes, the more active black girl slightly pinched her finger on a toy shopping cart. She became quite still and had an "I'm hurt" expression on her face. The teacher saw her and as she picked her up and sat down in the chair, the black girl embraced her with both arms around her neck and smiled happily as she rested her head on the teacher. Thus, communication break-downs can be repaired on another level. However, for the black girl successfully to engage the teacher's attention, it required an out-of-the-ordinary event and special initiative on the part of the student. For contact to be made, perhaps overt disruptions must occur in the smooth flow of classroom communication.

An underlying assumption of studies of initial socialization is that students and teachers need time and repeated practice in order to "get their act together." For example, in one study of early socialization (Mehan, Cazden, and others 1976), Mehan found that as they interacted throughout the school year, primary students responded "more appropriately (in timing and in form) as well as correctly (in context) to the teacher's questions. As time elapsed, they became more effective in getting the floor with student initiations. In short, they learned to
"speak within the structure," including attention to local cues such as the teacher's posture and intonation" (Cazden in press, 17-18).

One problem, however, that still must be dealt with, is how and why some children become more socially competent over time and other children in the same classroom do not. We have already seen one possible explanation, in Byers and Byers (1972), in that the teacher and some students come into the classroom situation with less congruent patterns of communication.

In another observational field study in two kindergartens, Talbert (1976) tested the hypothesis that teachers and students become more competent at interacting as the school year progresses. Talbert interviewed the two kindergarten teachers, who said that their goals for the year were to work so that "all the children feel that they are part of a cohesive group" (p. 304). The teachers said that they wanted to strengthen social relationships with individuals throughout the year: "I want them to come to me for help, to be close to me" (p. 304).

Therefore, given the teachers' goals for socialization and the assumption that given time and experience the children would successfully adapt to the classroom contexts, Talbert hypothesized that:

1. Over time, the amount of positively toned personal interaction will increase.

2. Centrality (i.e., movement toward the teacher) will increase. Conversely, peripherality (movement away from the teacher, with or without a tendency to form secondary groups) will decrease (p. 305).

However, contrary to her expectations, Talbert found that the absolute number of teacher/student interactions in both kindergartens decreased markedly from September to April, and as the school year went on, teachers gave relatively more negatively-toned responses and fewer positively-toned ones. Even more significantly, there was an increase of activity on the periphery of the classroom over the semester with more students joining in.

Talbert concludes by discussing the gap between the teacher's intentions and what actually happened over the year in classroom transactions. She focuses on the importance of the initial school interactions: "If the child does not interact personally with the teacher in September, it
is fairly certain that he will not be a high interacter the following April" (p. 311).

The kindergarteners fell into three types of interacters.

1. The central group—-the active learners who started out as high interacters and who received much of the teacher's attention, feedback, and reinforcement all year.

2. The passive learners—members who were vicarious learners but who, although attentive, did not interact highly at the beginning of the year and were found to interact less as the year went on.

3. The peripheral group—-who were not in direct contact with the teacher or lessons at the beginning of the year and who remained that way.

This almost immediate breakdown of a class into a group of high interacters with a group of non-involved, peripheral students has been noted in other research also. For example, Rist (1973) traced the "progress" of a class of urban black students from kindergarten through third grade. He found that "peripheral" students who were placed in the "low" groups at the beginning of the year in kindergarten remained in those groups for years. Rist found that the educational experiences for students in the low groups (e.g., cutting and pasting flowers) were significantly different from those in the high groups (e.g., doing arithmetic exercises).

Explanation three: cultural discontinuities as a cause of failure.

In a landmark study, Philips (1972, 1974) developed the concept of participant structure to explain why Warm Springs (Oregon) Indian children show great reluctance to talk in class and why they participate less and less in verbal interactions as they go through school. Philips studied both the participation patterns in the classrooms in the reservation elementary school and the communication patterns in the Indian community. She found that tacit rules governing what is appropriate verbal interaction in the Indian community are discontinuous with the social structure for participation in school.

Philips found that Warm Springs Indian children are socialized into a constellation of norms, rights, and responsibilities based on the notion of the group as the primary unit of interaction. For example,
Warm Springs children grow up spending all their time together in a kinship group composed of a-RELATED siblings and cousins. The older children, ages 8 to 11 in the group, are the leaders, caring for their younger brothers and sisters and cousins. The children spend afternoons and evenings living together as a group without having to account for their whereabouts to adults. A kinship network of parents, aunts, uncles, and grandparents gives instruction and care to these groups of children. The children of ages 8 to 11 are expected to be responsible for themselves; for example, they are able to clean a house without supervision. Children by this age also decide where they want to live, and may spend weeks or months living with one uncle and then a different aunt.

The Warm Spring Indian social structure based on an extended kinship group can be contrasted with the American middle-class social structure, which is based on the nuclear family. Rather than an adult kinship group relating to a group of children, the characteristic pattern of interaction is between a single adult and a child. Middle-class children are expected to be dependent on the authority of their parents for a much longer period of their life cycle. Middle-class parents instruct by giving explicit verbal instructions that are followed by specific questioning to ascertain that the children grasped what they (the parents) just said.

In contrast, learning looks quite different among the Warm Springs Indians. Children are expected to learn by paying patient attention to adult conversation and activities. After observing adults, the children then take the initiative to practice the skill in private. Only when they have mastered tanning a hide will the successful results be displayed for adult comment.

Philips described the participant structure of Warm Springs Indians in community social events and political meetings as again being based on the primacy of the group. There are strong egalitarian values in the Warm Springs community and there is criticism of persons who "act like they think they're better than anyone else" (1974, 200). For example, in social events, everyone is welcome to participate in talk or dance; activities are not focused around solo performances.

In a community meeting of the Warm Springs Indians, people spatially organize themselves as if on the perimeter of a rectangle: there is not
a single individual in front addressing the group. Older people often talk before younger ones because they are considered wiser. People testify and say a few words. Their comments are not dependent upon what was said immediately prior to them. When a question is raised, it will not be addressed until much later in the evening and then usually embedded within a different context or a story. The hearer must remember many utterances of many people if he is to make sense of what is being said.

In the group discussions, the participants are moved by the wisdom of remarks and by the ability of the person talking. Remarks are considered to be more thoughtfully made if they do not emerge immediately; there are longer pauses between speakers than in American middle-class meetings (5-10 second pauses) and people do not interrupt each other. Since everyone stays until everyone has had a chance to reflect and comment on the issues, community meetings may go on until very late at night.

Community participation is structured so that conflict that could be disruptive to group cohesiveness is muted and obscured. Individuals do not address each other directly and voice loudness is not a means of compelling others. Many issues are continually discussed and rediscussed until there is consensus; only then will a vote be called for, and it is usually unanimously for or against the issue.

This participant structure can be contrasted with the norms and roles for participation that are expected in a conventional classroom. Philips (1972) notes that one of the most important and different distinctions is that between the role of teacher and student:

There is the explicit and implicit assumption that the teacher controls all of the activity taking place in the classroom, and the students accept and are obedient to her authority. She determines the sociospatial arrangements of all interactions; she decrees when and where movement takes place within the classroom. And most important...she determines who will talk and when they will talk (p. 375).

Many Warm Springs norms are violated by this classroom regulation of talk: the children are not used to and will not tolerate being directly controlled by a single authoritarian adult. It can be seen that the typical instructional cycle of T: Question, S: Respond, T: React is par...
particularly difficult for the Warm Springs Indian children because embedded in this cycle is the notion of an individual student giving a performance which is then publicly evaluated. If the student responds, he is in a no-win situation. If he answers correctly, he is "getting above himself" and showing off at the expense of the others. If he doesn't know the answer, then he is publicly humiliated in front of the group, also a non-Indian way of learning.

In addition, the community participation structure does not sanction individuals being directly confronted, and time for reflection and wisdom is not valued in the school. Philips notes that in the reservation school children do not remember (and do not learn during the year) to raise their hands to speak. The children are much more interested in getting the attention of each other than the teacher. The Indian children talk to each other, move around the classroom, and even, at the first grade level, act in deliberately organized opposition to the teacher's directions. For example, group solidarity is expressed by all putting their feet on their chair if one student is told not to do so (1972, 376).

Teachers cannot function when the teacher/student communication has "broken down." Teachers need to have order and predictability in their classrooms. Teachers also need a fairly continuous flow of student participation so that they can assess student learning and adjust their instruction accordingly. Philips describes several possible variations in classroom participant structure that might allow teachers to accomplish their needs and that simultaneously could accommodate some of the Indian norms of appropriate communication.

1. In one structure, the teacher addresses the undifferentiated group and they all respond in chorus.

2. Another participant structure consists of all students working independently at their desks and voluntarily and privately approaching the teacher who is not at the front of the room.

3. A third structure consists of dividing students into small groups or perhaps into competing teams to conduct learning activities.

Philips notes that during unsupervised play, Indian children break into games of team competition at a younger age and sustain the play longer than is usual for white middle-class students. Indeed, white
middle-class students opt for games such as "Simon Says" and "Green Light, Red Light," which are characterized by having a leader and followers.

Philips also suggests that the curriculum could include more physical activities and learning by watching rather than telling. She recommends that teachers wait a longer period of time for students to speak and maintain calm and soft voices, restraining themselves from using loudness in disciplining. Also, if necessary, the group as a whole should be disciplined instead of individuals.

One issue that must be considered is the short-term effects of teacher change efforts as opposed to the long-term effects. In the short term, Philips developed participant structures that were not discrepant with those of the community and that functioned to get the work done in the classroom. Thus, the Indian children could gain academic knowledge during the elementary school years, rather than having the entire time being devoted to battles over status, power, and worth. However, in the long run, what purpose is served by intervention and accommodation? As soon as the children are bussed into the district high schools and placed within the participant structure of the dominant culture, they will revert again to being the shy, silent Indian.

Erickson and Mohatt (1982) began their Odawa study by proposing to test a hypothesis drawn from Philips' work: "In everyday life on the reservation, Philips noted an absence of participation structures in which one person overtly controls or attempts to control a great deal of the activity of other people in the interacting group" (p. 140). Erickson and Mohatt were interested in exploring further these features of cultural incongruity between non-Indian adults and Indian adults and children. They specifically were interested in the differences between:

a. The overall tempo of teaching: How fast is the pace of teacher/student interaction? How quickly do classroom scenes change from one activity to the next?

b. The overall directiveness of teaching: how much and what kinds of "control" can the teacher appropriately exercise over student behavior in the classroom? How much "leeway" or "elbow room" is provided for students (p. 382)?

Erickson and Mohatt specifically looked at the teacher's use of "singling out" and the "teacher searchlight phenomena," in which the teacher
calls attention towards what a single child is doing in the presence of an audience of children.

Erickson and Mohatt wanted to find out if Phillips' findings could be generalized to other reservation settings in different Indian cultures in different places. They videotaped two first-grade classrooms with Odawa (Algonkian) children on a reservation in Northern Ontario during the early fall, late fall, winter, and late spring of a school year. Both teachers were very experienced and skilled. They differed in that Teacher 1 was an Indian who was a member of the local reservation community and Teacher 2 was a non-Indian who had just come to the school and was teaching Indian children for the first time.

Erickson and Mohatt noted that "when one first looks at and listens to the tapes of the two classrooms they seem intuitively different" (p. 143). Further analysis reveals that the classrooms were similar in that both teachers spent the largest percentage of their time circulating among students and giving them individual attention rather than working at the blackboard in front of the entire group. However, Classroom 1 had a quality of being much more smooth, slow, and deliberate with a sense of shared authority, while in Classroom 2 there was a faster pace and relatively irregular quality of interaction.

Some of the major differences in tempo include:

Classroom 1: The Indian teacher in Classroom 1 spends more time waiting for students to finish their work (an average of 15 minutes per activity as compared to 5 in Classroom 2).

Classroom 2: The non-Indian teacher in Classroom 2 takes longer to get the students out the door (5-6 minutes as compared to 2.7 minutes in Classroom 1)

Some of the major differences in directiveness include:

Classroom 1: In Classroom 1 social control is distributed between teacher and students rather than being compartmentalized. The teacher achieves this by "paying much attention to the rhythms of student activity and judging when the students are ready for things to change" (p. 144).

Teacher 1 moves much more slowly around the room and spends less time with each person as she talks with them. Teacher 1 gives few "public announcements" but makes personal "off the record" comments privately. For example, she makes her way across the room in a clear path to the reading table. She waits with her hands on her hips until the correct reading
group is assembled. In three words and one gesture, she indicates that the oral reading should begin, "OK, this list." Teacher 1 is in face-to-face contact with the children she is addressing.

Classroom 2: Teacher 2 assumes that there is a dichotomy between work and free play. Teacher 2 assumes that during work time, the time "belongs" to the teacher who gives directives about it.

Teacher 2 initiates a work session by calling across the room and naming individuals to come to him. Most of his direct commands are repeated. He gives three times as many directives as Teacher 1 and issues them twice as fast: he beings to work with a reading group by first telling the whole group, "Remember, no noise while I am talking...reading here." "Sash, Julia, work to do." He then says, "Look up here," twice and frames the task with an explanation. "In order to read the first story there are some new words you have to know. Here they are up here." He repeats "Look up here" again and elaborates "There are the boys' names up here" (p. 151).

Erickson and Mohatt found that one of the major differences in the social ecology of the two classrooms was that Teacher 1 goes from one transition to the next without stopping and waits for children to catch up. This can be contrasted with Teacher 2, who exercises control by assuming that everyone must be "ready," as focused by his directives, before he can move on. The result is a much more jerky stop-and-go question-and-answer session that becomes arrhythmic and confusing at times.

Erickson and Mohatt noted that during the year, Teacher 2 moved the desks from straight rows into tables, began to slow down, and began making other adaptations that intuitively "made sense." Thus, both teachers had made adaptations over time so that the participant structures within the classrooms were more congruent with those found in the community.

In another key research project, Heath (1982b) studied Trackton, a southern Appalachian community of black mill workers. Due to a court desegregation order, the Trackton children had just begun to be bussed into a formerly all-white elementary school in a southeastern city. Older Trackton residents were disturbed by the children's hatred of the school and asked Heath to analyze the situation explaining, "My kid, he too scared to talk, 'cause nobody play by rules he know. At home, I
can't shut 'im up." and "Miss Davis, she complain, 'bout Ned not answerin' back. He said she ask dumb questions she already know 'bout" (1982b, 107).

The white teachers at the local elementary school were also concerned. They were frustrated by the almost total lack of communication with the Trackton students that seemed to exist in some classrooms. The teachers said:

They don't seem to be able to answer even the simplest questions.

The simplest questions are the ones they can't answer in the classroom; yet on the playground, they can explain a rule for ball game or describe a particular kind of bait with no problem. Therefore, I know they aren't as dumb as they seem in my class (1982b, 108).

Heath spent more than five years working in Trackton, in the white community, and in the school. Like Philips, she also found participant structures in the local community that differed from the participant structure in the school.

In Trackton, adults talked to other adults. Children listened as they sat at the feet of the adults, sat in their laps, or played on the nearby porch. Kin and familiar adult visitors to the black community greeted the children by teasing or issuing challenges to them, and the children learned not to answer questions asked by strangers who came into the community.

People in Trackton often got together after work and spent time telling stories about what was happening. They embedded ideas within a known context. There was frequent use of metaphors in conversations. If a question was asked, it usually involved similarities (in which there was no one right answer), i.e., "What's that like?" or as story starters, "You know that old car?...Well, the other day...." Comparisons were made between the event, object, or person being described and others known to the audience. Few questions were addressed to children as they did not hold high positions as information givers. If questions were asked of children, they were often accusatory in nature, i.e., "What's that all over your face?" (1982b, 116).

In the white middle-class homes, Heath studied teachers who were mothers and how they talked to their infants. She found, in contrast to
Trackton, that here questions were used for language socialization, "for training, and for directing their attention to what it is they should learn" (1982b, 109). Mothers even held pseudo-conversations with their very young infants, modeling both the questioning and the answering roles "Do you want your teddy bear? Yes, you want your teddy bear." Adults asked questions that they already knew the answers to. They were training their children to be responsible for owning knowledge about the world. Children were expected to know attributes, labels, and characteristics of things, such as name, color, shape, and number. These questions were about parts abstracted from the whole.

Thus, when the Trackton children were routinely asked a barrage of short-answer questions to which the adult teacher already knew the answer, they were insulted and/or not accustomed to responding to these direct questions. Heath reports that when the white adult teachers asked "common and seemingly harmless questions such as, "What color's this?" and "Can you find the apple in the picture?" to "become acquainted with the students and assess their knowledge of the world, the Trackton children did not respond except minimally (1982b, 122). The Trackton students also did not respond to the hidden directives embedded in "polite" questions from the teacher such as "Why don't you hang up your coat?"

The teachers worked with Heath to study the differences in questioning styles because they were dissatisfied with the lack of involvement and lack of progress made by the Trackton students. They found that several types of questions used in Trackton had excellent credentials for pedagogical use. For example, they found that they could use open-ended questions similar to those used in Trackton as "probing questions" in social studies units about the community. For example, the teachers used photographs of different buildings and sections of the community and asked questions such as: What's happening here? Have you ever been here? Tell me what you did when you were there? What's this like? (pointing to a scene, or an item in a scene) (1982b, 124).

Heath reported that "responses of children were far different from those given in usual social studies lessons. Trackton children talked, actively and aggressively, became involved in the lesson, and offered useful information about their past experiences" (1982b, 124).
Heath returns again and again to her theme that intervention is a two-way street and must involve structural accommodations by both cultures. Heath notes that this intervention in Trackton was successful only because the classroom teachers were active inquirers willing to help obtain and learn from data from both their own and the other students' communities. She describes how the successful responses of the Trackton children were taped and then questions were added by the teachers about the labels and attributes of things that they saw. The Trackton children were less threatened by learning this new set of question-and-answer strategies from tapes because they could work individually and privately. They were not overwhelmed by the other children who were so much faster and better at answering them in class discussions.

A body of educational ethnographic studies has been developed in the last 15 years that describes participant structures among different groups of Native American children: Hawaiian (Boggs 1972, Au and Jordan 1979), Sioux and Cherokee (Dumont 1972), Tahitian (Levin 1981), as well as Odawa and Warm Springs Indian Children.

Au (1981) argues that although teachers may adapt their methods to resemble more closely those of minority children's participant structures in the early years of school, to maintain these special forms may permanently handicap them. Au maintains that ultimately the minority children must also learn how to adapt to the forms and structures of the mainstream culture. Au argues that "the ultimate goal, then, is to be able to create culturally appropriate instructional events for minority children" (p. 93). To be appropriate, the lessons would have to be comfortable and make cultural sense to both the teacher and the children. They would have to promote acquisition of types of learning valued in the mainstream culture.

Such an instructional strategy may be found in the reading lesson structure intuitively developed by teachers in the laboratory school of the Kamehameha Early Education Program in Honolulu, Hawaii, in which certain features resemble a "talk story," a major speech event in Hawaiian culture. Following the introduction of the new program, the students' reading scores dramatically improved from the second stanine on reading achievement tests to reading levels near and slightly above
the 50th percentile. The major difference between the old and new reading programs is that the old program emphasized phonics while the new program emphasis was devoted largely to the teaching of comprehension.

In the videotaped reading lessons, groups of five second-grade children meet for about 20 minutes with the Hawaiian teacher. The lesson uses the story from a basal reader, and has three components: E for relating experiences; T for asking and answering questions about the text; and R for drawing relationships between the children's experiences and the text.

Thus lessons are introduced by the teacher with references to the experiences (E component) of the children which are related to the topic of the story. For example, in the lesson analyzed here, the story to be read is entitled "Freddy Finds a Frog," and the teacher begins by asking the children what they would do with a frog. The teacher then assigns the children a page or two of the story, which they are to read silently in order to answer questions. Following these periods of silent reading, of which there are usually several in a single lesson, the teacher asks questions which assess the children's understanding of the information in the text (T component). Finally, the teacher attempts to draw relationships (R component) between the material in the text and the children's own experiences (1980, 94).

In this reading lesson, the purpose is to constantly cycle and make connections: from the students' private knowledge as represented in their stories about their experiences, to public knowledge as represented in the basal text, back to private knowledge in the form of implications and meanings that can be drawn from the students' lives. Within this constant interweaving of types of content is a structure in which the levels of the questions move from eliciting concrete and familiar answers towards eliciting more abstract, thought-provoking answers. The interweaving of the text material and the children's experiences is culturally congruent because it satisfies both the teacher's and the students' different perceptions of what is meaningful knowledge within the bounds of one lesson.

The need for congruence between school and community participant structures is satisfied by the incorporation of "talk story" procedures within the reading lesson format. These basically involve adjustments of the way the adult teacher exercises authority. Au argues that it seems to be important that she give the children "breathing room," which
means that she does not correct or publicly judge responses that are being produced by the students to her questions. Instead, she plays the role of a receptive listener.

Another pattern of interaction that Au finds necessary is that of "equal time" so that anyone and everyone can speak. The majority of the student productions are joint productions in which one student is the dominant speaker and one or several children supply an almost changing, perhaps joking, contrapuntal commentary. The equal time provision also applies to the narration by the teacher as contrasted with the students. Au videotaped lessons in which the longest narration came from a student and not the teacher.

Au argues that the beauty of this hybrid form is that although the teacher and students may be making sense out of the lesson in different ways, it is a satisfactory and comfortable production for both of them. It is sufficiently similar to a formal reading lesson for the teacher and it is sufficiently similar to an informal out-of-school speech event for the students. Au found that when the students who had been taught by this approach entered fourth grades with conventional programs their reading scores on standardized tests at the end of the year were better than those of the controls. We can begin to ask if other participant structures for lessons can be crafted in situations of cultural divergences so that different ways of meaning making can be mutually satisfied and accommodated within one common learning event.

Explanation four: cultural conflict at the daily interactional level as an explanation for failure. McDermott (1976) describes how children, even those perceived as disorderly, make sense and accomplish order. He argues that pupils do not act illogically or randomly, and shows through an analysis of turn-taking economies how the low-reading group's disruptive behavior can be seen as adaptive and intelligent in the short run. We then also see how the same cumulative behavior can be devastating in the long run.

In an analysis of a first-grade classroom in a middle-class suburban school on Long Island, McDermott found that "members of both the top and bottom groups demonstrate order and regularity in their behavior while sitting at the reading table (1976, 11)." In the top reading group where
the students have already mastered the basics of reading, the teacher establishes a sequence and they go around the table, each reading a page. McDermott describes the postural shifts at each change of turn to read as all heads coming up simultaneously like a flower opening and then gracefully bending back down as they focus on the next page.

In the bottom reading group, which tends to be disorderly and where the children have more reading problems, the teacher allows less freedom in allocating turns by calling on whoever bids each time. However, this more tightly controlled instructional strategy has the structural disadvantage of leaving the group without a procedure whenever the teacher is interrupted and distracted. McDermott found that when the teacher worked with the low group she was also in a position to see the members of the high group. "The bottom group is interrupted almost 40 times in its 30 minutes at the reading table as compared to only two interruptions for the top group in its 23 minutes at the table" (p. 41). The bottom group is interrupted by members of the top group seeking teacher help.

McDermott goes on to document how squabbles and fights in the low group which initially appear disruptive can be seen to have the effect of making the teacher come back to them. However, what is an effective method for getting the teacher's attention in the short run is self-defeating in the long run because fighting takes away from the work of learning to read.

McDermott argues that many children may actually learn many of the academic skills, such as reading, elsewhere, and then come to school where they continue to practice and display them. If they do not already have the skills, it is difficult to acquire them in school. These children will not be able to display academic competence when they are initially given the opportunity, and will thus be sorted into the low groups. Children in this position spend so much of their time hiding that they cannot read or perform as required.

McDermott (1974) also presents the notion that failure as well as success may be initially functional for both teacher and student. He argues that sometimes, nonsuccess is adaptive. McDermott (1977) looks at how Rosa, a student who doesn't read, and the teacher both avoid eye contact during reading group. Rosa calls out a bid to read, "I can, I can" after another student has been selected and they avoid eye contact
at other bid times. Neither the teacher nor Rosa have to suffer through a public display of her lack of skills—perhaps a sensible understanding in the short term. However, in the long term, given the lack of time on task, when is Rosa ever going to learn to read?

McDermott and Hood (1982) have become increasingly pessimistic about the sorting of students that is done by teachers in the dominant culture. Rather than searching out and using what the students do know, the researchers think that American teachers may have a "fetish" for seeking out and documenting what students don't know. Labeling a child as a non-achiever or failure has several effects. It can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Many minority children adapt to relational messages that they are non-achievers or failures by internalizing this message of low worth. Others feel that a teacher who is sending such degrading messages doesn't make sense and therefore anything she is teaching couldn't make sense. To participate in the reading lesson, one would have to accept her assessment of low status along with the academic message. Therefore, school learning is shunned and school failure becomes a peer group goal.

Labov (1982) reviews a series of linguistic and ethnographic studies that explain the negative correlation of "full participants in the vernacular culture" (i.e., members of street groups in southcentral Harlem) with grade and reading achievement in school in terms of competing value systems. Labov shows how the more an individual was a full member of the Thunderbirds, Aces, Cobras, or Jets, the more likely he was to be in direct competition with the school culture, and thus the less likely he was able to be engaged on the path of upward mobility. Only the marginal members of the youth societies, those who were kept out by their parents or those who were not allowed in (or were kicked out by) the street groups were available to be picked up and taught by the teachers in the school.

This pattern of culture conflict is very similar to reports from missionaries in the field in the 1900s who often were only able to convert the marginal, weaker members of a culture. They were able to reach only the people isolated from the society who were seeking an alternative way of life (Williams 1923). However, the stronger, more vigorous, members of the culture were not interested in abandoning their successful way of life for another culture.
Labov believes that it is not laziness or ignorance that keeps gang members from learning in school. Rather, the gang members' inability to accept the school's values is attributed to an unwillingness to accept the school's structure of power and authority: "Children must sit up straight, be quiet [and] listen in order to learn" (p. 158).

Labov argues that teachers should not see the vernacular cultures as destructive forces that are totally opposed to learning. He maintains instead that the vernacular culture must be studied to see how the group forces can be adapted to the school situation. His conclusion is positive:

It is my belief that the kinds of school values that are rejected are the most trivial ones, external patterns of behavior that have nothing to do with the essentials of the learning process. These are the major sources of conflict. Once we have identified them, we can proceed to the constructive job of engineering, to bring the forces of social cooperation and energy into the classroom, and use them to help the majority of our youth to move forward (1982, 170).

Within the confines of the classroom, can ways be found for two opposing cultures to stop rejecting each other? Labov believes that a common core of values or a set of common goals can be found. As we shall see in the next section, other ethnographers (Wolcott 1974b, Ogbu 1981) are not so positive. These writers perceive conflict within the classroom as merely an expression of larger, longer-lasting, and permanent cultural conflict that has its root causes in societal sources outside of the school.

Explanation five: school failure as a by-product of larger cultural antagonisms and competing value systems. Wolcott (1974b) describes a situation in which there is firmly entrenched pupil hostility towards the teacher because of the way of life that he represents. After a year of teaching at a Kwakiutl Indian village school in British Columbia, Wolcott suggests that a teacher might more effectively deal with continual conflict if he realizes that one "alternative for him is to try to do less harm rather than more good" (p. 412).

Wolcott described students whose entire orientation to school was that of patient endurance at best: "What my pupils wanted most to get out of school was to get out of school" (p. 413). Since they could only...
do that by reaching a certain age, Wolcott's efforts to try to get the students "caught up" or to praise and reward them for good work only worked against the group egalitarian mores and resulted in intense teasing and bullying of those who were conforming with the teacher's wishes. Wolcott argues that this is analogous to encouraging students to defect to the enemy's way of life, to be traitors.

Wolcott found that his students held certain specific limited definitions of school and they worked very hard (and effectively) to socialize him to their version of school:

Antagonistic as they were toward so many aspects of school, my pupils nevertheless held very rigid expectations about the activities they considered appropriate for school work. Insistence on attention to the three R's constituted the only legitimate kind of demand which the pupils both expected and accepted on the part of their teacher. Their notion of an ideal classroom was one in which pupils were busily engaged in highly repetitive but relatively easy assignments for long periods of time, uninterrupted by the teacher. Their notion of an ideal teacher, consistent with this, was of a person who meted out assignments but not explanations, a person who had an infinite supply of worksheets and tasks but who never asked a pupil to engage in an exercise he could not perform. The only favors or rewards expected of a teacher were in the distribution of coveted materials (crayons, watercolors, compasses, scissors, puzzles, athletic equipment), the allocation of prestige positions (attendance monitor, bell ringer), and the rationing of school "fun" (free time, art periods, extended recess, classroom parties) (p. 415).

Unfortunately, Wolcott tried to be progressive and make school meaningful on his terms. He read out loud to his students. He tried to relate social studies to their own lives--which they perceived as "prying." He tried to have students write in journals. Wolcott characterized his pupils as excellent teachers: any of his attempts to deviate from going page-by-page through the textbooks were sternly dealt with by the students as blatantly inappropriate.

Wolcott argues that he probably could have been a much more effective teacher if he had considered himself as the enemy and had asked himself, "Just what is it that a prisoner would ever want to learn from an enemy?" (p. 421). This would have saved him the pain and suffering of thinking that a creative, ingenious new teaching strategy might be the thing that made the difference to "get through to them."
Instead, Wolcott offers a new analogy based on vital differences rather than underlying similarities. Perceiving students as prisoners of war may result in better treatment for both teacher and students rather than the teachers' viewing students as incompetent allies. Few demands are made on enemy prisoners; there is no belittling of language or ways of life. Instead, explicit minimal demands are made for manageable maintenance of an orderly classroom.

Wolcott argues that teachers should make their ways of life appear manageable and be willing to give instruction on those aspects that have survival value for those who want to move successfully in the dominant society. However, the teacher "does not have to insist that such skills are necessary steps on the road to nirvana" (p. 422). According to Wolcott, the role of the teacher would be to offer help to those people who want it, rather than to bemoan the lack of defection by the prisoner generation of today. Teachers should not ask the students perfunctorily to discard their own way of life and to adopt new ways because they are "good for them." Wolcott also argues that teachers do not have to reject their own good way of life.

Explaining the Explanation of Success and Failure

As we can see from the foregoing studies, one of the most significant determinants of success or failure in the classroom is based upon the type of social relationships that exist between the teacher and the students. These social relationships form the context for and frame "all the subsequent organizational work for learning what goes on in the classroom" (McDermott 1977, 1979). We can see that there are at least three types of social relationships that are established between teachers and their students.

Arranged on a continuum of trust, good faith, and ease of communication, the first type might be the initial socialization situations described by Mehan and others (1976) in the primary classroom in California, and by the Harvard Graduate School of Education Project in the primary classroom near Boston (Bremme and Erickson 1977, Schultz and Florio 1979). In both cases, there was not total congruence between the participant structures used in the community and those used in school. For example, in the Mehan study a white teacher was working with white,
black, and Mexican-American students and in the Erickson studies, a white middle-class teacher was working with children from a working-class Italian neighborhood. However, the researchers in both studies reported that over time and given reflection on communicative "glitches," the teacher and students were learning how to "work within the structure." Many of the descriptions of different lessons in both classrooms portrayed them as orderly predictable places that made sense to both the children and teachers. For example, in the Mehan study, the students demonstrated their comprehension of the tacit rules and pacing of the shifting contexts of classroom interactions by being able to work within them to play and accomplish their off-task agendas (passing notes, meeting with their friends) so as not to catch the teacher's eye and get caught.

This type of underlying social relationships is similar to Ogbu's category of universal cultural discontinuities. Ogbu (1982) argues that all children have discontinuities between home and school when they first go to school. For example, the home has been a place of a primarily oral culture and they must make the transition to a literate culture. Ogbu argues that it is not the cultural differences per se that make the difference; it is the type of culture differences between the home and the school that must be distinguished. He also argues that we need to account for the variability within classes. As we have seen, some children are able to overcome the inherent discontinuities to become successful and others are not. We need to know why.

The second type of social relationships is that found in the Byers and Byers' account of the middle-class nursery school teacher and the black girl trying to catch each other's eye (1972); Philips' study of the Warm Spring Indian classrooms (1972, 1974); Erickson and Mohatt's study of the Indian and non-Indian teachers in the Odawa reservation school (1982); Heath's study of Trackton children and white middle class teachers adapting to each other's style of questioning and answering (1982b); and the Au study of the talk story in the Kamehameha Laboratory School (1980). These situations are characterized by incongruity between the participant structures indigenous to the community and to the school. However, in each case efforts are made by both the teacher and the students to learn about and adapt to each other's ways.
Heath (1982) maintains that it is always a two-way street to establish congruence between dissonant cultures. In the Byers and Byers (1982) description of a single event, there are extraordinary and heroic efforts by both the teacher and the black girls to make contact with each other, although they are initially "out of synch" and are frustrated by not knowing what to do to be able to communicate. For example, H. Byers, the teacher, looks over at the more active black girl more than she looks over at the more active white girl and, although the more active black girl looks at the teacher 35 times, both are able to exchange facial expressions only four times. However, at a more overt level, a pinched finger and subsequent stopping of the normal routine results in contact and interaction. Au's (1980) and Heath's (1982b) research was focused on more deliberate attempts on the part of teachers and researchers to create new forms of participant structures that accommodate the functions necessary for an instructional event in school, but which also incorporate significant features of the children's indigenous ways of interacting.

How do participant structures vary between school and minority communities? Both the Byers and Byers (1972) and the Florio and Walsh (1981) studies investigated the set of nonverbal behaviors that children had to display in order to be able to "get through to the teacher."

Variations also appeared in the nature of the preferred learning style: whether it is observational and indirect or verbal and direct. For example, among the Warm Springs Indian community (Philips 1972, 1974) and in Trackton (Heath 1982b), children learned by observing what groups of related adults were doing on a day-to-day basis. Children imitated these forms of talk or skills in private and only displayed them publicly when they were mastered. This can be contrasted with Heath's (1982b) account of middle-class mothers and teachers who verbally question children to train them to notice and be able to recount discrete attributes about the world.

Erickson and Mohatt (1982) call this dimension directiveness. The teachers in Philips' study and Teacher 2, a non-Indian in the Odawa classroom, began their instruction with the participant structure traditional to American schooling:

--The teacher is the authority.
The teacher stands in front of the room and calls on individuals by name ("spotlighting," "signaling out").

The teacher determines who will talk and when.

The teacher gives direct verbal commands to initiate an activity or to draw an activity to a close, and then waits for students to comply.

The teacher determines when and where movement will take place.

The teacher determines the pace of interactions.

This structure can be contrasted to the participant structure used by Teacher 1, an Indian, in Erickson and Mohatt's study.

The teacher shares authority and responsibility with the class.

The teacher moves around the room from individual to individual with many private interactions.

The teacher allows more time per instructional activity. She pays attention to the rhythms of the students and judges when they are ready to change.

The teacher moves more slowly, speaks more slowly, and uses fewer words.

Students are allowed "equal time" for initiating comments in the group discussion and for holding the floor (Au 1983).

Students are allowed to set the rhythms of interactions such as the contrapuntal chiming in (Au 1983). Both Erickson and Mohatt (1982) and Au (1980) use expressions such as "giving the students breathing room" and giving the students "leeway" to describe the shared authority.

The determining factor does not seem to be whether there is direct or shared authority. For example, we saw in Wolcott's study that he wanted to share authority and responsibility for learning and that his students insisted on his assuming a very rigid, direct authority role. Rather, what seems to matter is the match of expectations about what is going to happen between teacher and students.

We have begun this review of ethnographic research to get a sense of the very particular types of interaction that must be congruent for lessons to work, such as timing and pacing of the pauses. We have read
descriptions of the "smoothness" of lessons when they are working and of the jerkiness, confusion, and extra work required on the part of the teacher and student when they do not. For example, Teacher 2 gave three times as many directives, twice as fast, trying to coordinate the lessons (Erickson and Mohatt 1982). The 4-year-old black girl tried 35 times to catch her teacher's eye (Byers and Byers 1972).

This review of research has also included accounts of a third alternative—descriptions of what it looks like when lessons do not work. For example in Talbert’s (1976) study, a group of peripheral students were noted who did not interact either at the beginning or subsequently throughout the year in kindergarten. McDermott (1974, 1976) described how it made sense in the short term for students in the low reading group to be disruptive in order to regain the teacher's attention. He described how it made sense for Rosa to "hide out" when she couldn't read, but how these social maneuvers in the long run never allowed her a time and place to learn to read. Labov (1982) studied the street gangs who could not afford to surrender their authority and definitions of who they were to the authority of the school in order to gain academic skills. Wolcott (1974) eloquently described how he, as a well-meaning teacher, was faced with firmly entrenched pupil hostility basically opposed to the entire way of life that he represented. In this type of situation, no amount of good will, good faith, or "motivating" instructional techniques will suffice.

The last two types of underlying social relationships are similar to what Ogbu (1982) calls secondary cultural discontinuities. Ogbu argues that

Secondary cultural discontinuities develop after members of two populations have been in contact....secondary cultural differences usually develop as a response to a contact situation, especially a contact situation involving stratified domination (p. 298).

Ogbu maintains that the subordinate group, because of racial stratification or a caste-like structure in the society, through prolonged contact become characterized by not only distinctiveness but also opposition to the dominant culture.

Ogbu notes (1981) that "while the classroom is the 'scene of the battle,'...the causes of the battle may well lie elsewhere" (p. 13).
1974, Ogbu studied a black community in Stockton, California, in which he found that a "disproportionate number of black children do poorly in school and as adults may end up with menial jobs while some remain casually employed or unemployed" (1981, 17). Ogbu studied economic links between the school, the community, and the larger society. He developed an ecological framework of economic adaptation based on (a) using schooling as a channel to get ahead, as combined with (b) the native theory of "making it," as combined with (c) alternative survival strategies. He found that rather than lack of learning at school causing minority members to have poor economic positions, the obverse is true. It is because economic and social opportunities are lacking that minority groups adapt by not doing well in school.

Ogbu argues for macroethnographies of schooling based on a cultural ecological point of view, i.e., a multilevel approach to the study of the process of education. He argues that there has been a bias towards microethnography and thus a neglect of broader cultural forces which have important implications for schooling. Ogbu critiques the microethnographic studies of Philips (1982, 1984) and Heath (1982b) by saying that structural questions as well as transactional questions must be asked. Ogbu is concerned that teachers and policymakers will institute changes that will bring only superficial and temporary results unless they are made in the social and economic opportunity structures for the "caste-like" minorities. On the other hand, Ogbu's models of cultural discontinuities have been criticized because he does not account for the variability of the success and failure of minority students. As we have seen, some children from minority groups are able to overcome severe discontinuities to become successful and others are not. Some teachers are able to overcome cultural discontinuities and others are not. We need to know why.

Implications for Social Studies Teachers: Intervention, Accommodation, Acceptance, Resignation?

Explanations of failure in terms of cultural conflict and competing value systems are probably the most distressing to social studies teachers. For example, Wolcott's account of the "Teacher as Enemy" (1974) is distressing but powerful in terms of its explanatory poten-
tial. There is an authentic sense of what happens when a teacher enters into a truly regressive situation. Wolcott shows, as others have argued, that one person alone cannot change a long-term, hostile dissonance between competing cultures. No amount of good will, good faith, and good instructional procedures on the part of the teacher can lead to a structural change. Wolcott shows how teachers should not and indeed cannot be traitors to their own knowledge, values, and beliefs about teaching. Wolcott's worst case study gives legitimacy to the quiet but ever-present fears of teachers that they may someday walk into a situation where "nothing works."

Ogbu's (1982) argument that structural changes are needed simultaneously with changes within the classroom are quite difficult for practitioners to deal with. Singlehandedly we cannot and probably do not want to effect large-scale changes in the status quo. Based on the review of ethnographic research about cultural change and stability in the first section of this chapter, we know full well that cultural systems do not readily change their core value systems. Wilcox (1982) argues that none of us are neutral judges and that we are thoroughly enculturated within our own social and cultural 'whole.' Given a feeling of general satisfaction with our core set of cultural values as teachers, and given, as the National Science Foundation studies (1978) have found, that as teachers we are genuinely concerned about our students, then what can we take away from these studies to enhance our students' potential?

A review of these ethnographic accounts of success and failure allows us to make overt many formerly out-of-awareness dimensions of teaching.

1. Rather than either the teacher or the students or both being seen as inherently stupid or lazy, many microethnographic studies show how glitches in teacher/student communication are interactional problems. These problems can be studied and perhaps remediated. The level of description in these studies is such that social studies teachers can reflect on students in their own classrooms who do not seem to be able to "get the floor" or who seem "out of synch." Vaguely irritating students can be watched so that specific complexes of behavior more appropriate to specific contexts can overtly be worked out (Florio and Walsh 1981).
2. Also, if teachers have lessons or events that do not go well, they can more carefully try to coordinate how they signal with their bodies, where they stand, how and when they move through space, and what exact directions they give (Schultz and Florio 1979). After reading about participant structures, teachers may want to consider how they open and close their lessons; how they judge the time necessary for the completion of student work; how transitions are initiated; whether they censure individuals or the group; and the effect of their patterns of voice loudness and softness. Teachers can also consider whether they want a slower- or faster-paced flow to their lessons (Philips 1972, Erickson and Mohatt 1982).

3. Heath's (1982b), Philips' (1972), and Au's (1980) accounts of teacher intervention utilize principles of cultural accommodation. Similar to the structural overlapping of two Venn diagrams, lessons are designed so that each set of participants can make sense of the learning event through the presence of familiar forms of communication. In Heath's research (1982b), the teachers do not have to give up the question asking that they see as necessary and useful, but they learn how to expand it in a pedagogically valued way so that the Trackton children can also be involved. In Erickson and Mohatt's study (1982) and Au's research (1980), we notice that the teachers are able to "cut deals" in which they satisfy their needs for academic content, but they are also able to adapt to different speech rhythms. Similarities can be seen between features of the talk story, changing, and choral recitation common in the "old fashioned" traditional reading circles in which everyone reads aloud at once.

However, teachers face the dilemma of working within classrooms affected by cultural conflicts where the origins of the problems lie outside the classroom. Knowing full well that cultural systems do not readily change their core value systems, we still persist in mundane interventions, because of our concern that withholding a technique that might facilitate even one student's realization his potential is unthinkable. However, teachers are frustrated operating in a world with so many unknowns. Research is not available that explains the variability of why some students succeed in classrooms where others do not, how some students from oppressed cultures still "make it" while others do not.
Insufficient studies have been made of heroic or extraordinary teachers who succeed even when they shouldn't. In a final case study, we see a "story" of a teacher who is able to accomplish teaching/learning in a situation in which it is theoretically predictable she will fail.

A Final Case Study

Edelsky, Draper, and Smith '1983) describe a teacher who accomplishes trusting, working social relations in a Phoenix, Arizona, inner city sixth-grade class, where, according to some of our models of cultural dissonance and competing value systems, we would not expect much transmission or acquisition of academic knowledge and skills to take place. Edelsky and others conducted this study to find out how an unusual teacher, KS, started her school year and "coerced" students into following her cues so as to build what was known as a "whole language" classroom. Laurel School in Phoenix has a student population of "approximately 75 percent Mexican-Americans, 10 percent blacks, and 15 percent caucasians" (p. 260). The standardized reading scores were more than one and one-half years below grade level and by sixth grade, one-third of the students had failed at least one grade in school. Yet KS and the students were succeeding:

Absentee rates were low; in some months there were no absences. "visitors frequently commented that students were almost always engaged in appropriate tasks. Parents reported a sudden and dramatic turn to book reading and story writing as at-home activities. Students whose September journals had entries such as "I don't got nuthin to write" were writing full pages by October. Previous "nonreaders" read award-winning children's literature and revised and edited multiple drafts of long, involved stories. By spring, children spontaneously discussed the literary merits of their own writing and of books they read, commenting on style, point of view, plot structure, and other literary elements (p. 260).

The authors describe how this particular teacher violated most of the research literature findings on what effective teachers are supposed to do. For example, the effective teacher states clear expectations for behavior; KS stated a few ambiguous rules requiring judgment. Effective teachers carefully monitor and followup on inappropriate behavior; KS largely ignored inappropriate behavior. Effective teachers break a routine down into small steps and carefully teach it prior to the event,
"KS often gave minimal directions after many children were already engaged in the activity" (p. 274).

Edelsky and others found that KS had strongly-held specific goals that were really values about social relationships among people and values about relationships between people and knowledge. For example, KS said she wanted "(1) to get students to see opportunities everywhere for learning (2) to get students to think and take pleasure in using their intellects, and (3) to help students learn to get along with and appreciate others" (p. 263). The researchers asked the vital question of how KS got students to go along with her. They organized her behavior in terms of characteristic leadership roles she displayed in specific contexts at specific times and in response to certain types of events. For example, they found that KS acted as a "lesson leader, information dispenser, scout leader, consultant/coach, neutral recorder, and preacher" (p. 268).

The unexpected finding in this study was how fast the students adapted to KS's structure. The authors found that:

During the first three hours of school, children's timing seemed to be slightly 'out of synch' as they looked around the room and to each other for guidance. Few answered questions, none ventured opinions. Nevertheless, during the first hour, when KS (behaving as if they could) gave them a copy of the same complicated schedule she gave us, with the time blocks filled in for each day of the week, and told them to change the Tuesday 9:45-10:30 block from Directed Writing Activity to Writing Process, they rose to the occasion. Some of these poor readers glanced around quickly but then "got hold of themselves"; all made at least some kind of mark somewhere on their copy of the schedule. Three hours later they were having conversations with the teacher, cleaning up materials unasked, wondering aloud about scientific principles, and generally making themselves 'at home' in the room (p. 275).

Edelsky and others conclude that KS's version of classroom reality, although divergent to what the students might have known before, worked because KS offered the students "a deal" that they couldn't refuse. What KS offered these students on the first day was purposeful assignments and genuine literary activity in a setting that acknowledged all the participants "ownership" of tasks, texts, and contexts. Moreover, she preferred relationships based on respect and interdependence" (p. 276). Once the complex of values she valued was established on the first day through a combination of preaching, dispensing information,
and "acting as if," KS could move more slowly during the next three weeks to model how the students could specifically accomplish the values and goals.

What is so intriguing about this narrative is that it confounds and makes even more problematic notions that we have just developed in the research literature, notions in which an immediate acquisition of a new participant structure was not one of the expected options in situations of cultural diversity.

V. Conclusion

What Works for Social Studies Practitioners

Trying to inquire into the problem of "what works" for teachers is rather like opening a set of Russian dolls: each investigation of a specific problem leads to the realization that a related problem is at its core. The question of why social studies instruction has remained unchanged for 50 years leads to a study of how teachers socialize students to work. Questions about how teachers "get" their students to work leads to a study of teachers' values about what is successful learning. All these issues and questions are interrelated and affect each other.

The purpose of this chapter has been to review educational ethnographic research studies that elaborate or explain problems that social studies practitioners are trying to solve in their daily quest for what works. The nature of the knowledge generated in these studies has been seen to be descriptive and holistic.

These studies were not reviewed in order to develop specific solutions for the problems that social studies practitioners face in their daily quest for what works. Rather the objective of this chapter has been to review these research studies so that social studies practitioners could use them as a knowledge base with which to perceive and reflect on their own situations. Acquiring new metaphors and stories of teaching may lead to teachers' framing the problems they face differently. Through inductive comparison, practitioners may see the familiar within these descriptive accounts and may construct more elaborate and interesting problem structures for their own practice and theory. Only by cross-
cultural comparisons, by finding out other people's theory and practice, is one able to articulate and make overt one's own beliefs and strategies. Planning and trying out solutions can be relatively straightforward (Flower and Hays 1980). Creating solutions is not a difficult technical feat. It is the act of perceiving the situation differently and reorganizing old and new knowledge in the construction of a new problem that is the challenge.

The conventional American wisdom is that the public schools and their teachers are all the same and offer equal educational opportunities to each child regardless of race, sex, color, or religion. Yet, intuitively the American public and its educators are also aware that all American schools do not function in the same ways.

Hymes (1980) has called for the development of a comparative ethnology of education based on the ethnographic work being done in the schools. Asking the deliberately naive but fundamental question, "What types of schools are there?" and assessing the state of current knowledge of schooling in the United States, Hymes contends that our knowledge of schooling "is about one hundred years behind that of the American Indian kinship system" (p. 40). Hymes argues that a comparative "map" of types of schools in the United States needs to be developed as a basis for an analysis of structure and change in American schools. Rather than a concern with the development of an elaborate typology of labels, Hymes focuses on the need for precise identification of significant processes and structures, with particular attention paid to the processes of change.

One type of schooling that has emerged from the review of this research, the constructivist approach, is based on a shared type of authority, has a problem-solving approach to the construction of knowledge, and values work that is creative, enjoyable, and playful. Another type of configuration, technical schooling, is based on the direct authority of the teacher, values basic skills and molecular public information as knowledge, and perceives hard work as distinct and separate from play. However, both cultures of schooling are similar in that both can provide satisfaction and a sense of self-worth to their practitioners and both are based on the use of some type of power and authority by the teacher, whether it is indirect or direct (LeCompte 1978).
Stake and Easley (1978) asked, "Why... was so little use made of hands-on materials after the first two grades, even though they are there in a corridor or closet nearby, or even displayed on a shelf in the classroom?" (Chapter 16, p. 16). We can now see that practitioners are using content knowledge and instructional strategies to accomplish multiple goals simultaneously. The use or non-use of a specific technology has to do with what practitioners perceive as their needs and values. For example, teachers might ask if the information is presented in a format that is easily accessible to large groups of students with varying abilities. Can it be used to advance societal core values such as respect and knowledge of the heritage of our country? Can the content be transmitted/acquired within a short period of time? Teachers might feel that it cannot be used to get the students' attention and to maintain control and/or interest. New content knowledge and new instructional methods will be used only if they can further, enhance, update, or augment core values that are already in place. As we saw with Spindler's concept of substitute change and Popkewitz, Tabachnick, and Wehlege's study of educational reform, new technologies are used in the service of stable ends.

After reviewing these ethnographic studies we can also begin to understand how teachers transmit their values and priorities. We can begin to understand what it looks like on a daily basis as teachers work to get students to acquire and internalize these values. For example, in Wilcox's (1979, 1982) studies of kindergartens, and in Edelsky, Draper, and Smith's (1983) sixth-grade study, all the teachers studied use rule repetition and direct and external commands: "Use indoor voices." "If I say 'floor,' I don't want chairs." and "Don't bother your friends." However, there are also patterns in which some teachers such as Mrs. Newman and KS also include indirect, deliberately implicit statements to be internalized by the students. For example, in these classrooms we heard: "Use your time wisely." "Make good use of your time. You know what to do. You're on your own." In all the classrooms studied, external rules and the need for control and order are present, but through the "mix" and sequencing of external and internal commands, some teachers share the responsibility for maintaining order with their students.
From this review of the research studies it can be seen that it is not the type of authority structure alone, nor the type of instructional strategy, nor the type of academic knowledge generated that is the key determinant of "what works" in any classroom. The key determinant is whether there is a core of shared values and a steady state of social relationships that are accepted by all participants as being in their best interests. If not, then the classroom may be a battleground, with energy and time being devoted to constant skirmishes over self-worth, status, and power with the casualties consisting of little involvement in academic and educational processes.

Strengths and Limitations of the Use of Ethnographic Research by Social Studies Practitioners

What are the strengths and limitations of the use of ethnographic research by social studies education practitioners, policymakers, and researchers? From this set of research studies we can see that the role of the teacher frequently has been to be the co-investigator, the key informant, and the asker of questions as well as the explainer of events. Many of the researchers gathered data by jointly viewing videotapes with the teachers and asking about what took place (Florio and Walsh 1981, Mehan and others 1974). In Heath's Trackton study (1982b), the teachers were active inquirers into the patterns of questioning in homes and at school. And in Heath's (1982b), Au's (1980) and Erickson and Mohatt's (1982) studies, the teachers adapted and created the mutually accommodating and successful new participant structures for lessons that were described.

Recently, there has been concern that many social studies dissertation efforts have not been particularly productive of either scientific theory or of knowledge that is useful for practitioners or policymakers (Shaver 1982). Nothing is more legitimate for teachers and researchers who are considering investing their time and energy in either doing or reading research to want to locate research that is not divorced from what they already know and that will empower them in their efforts to accomplish their goals. Mere acquisition of research knowledge, if purchased by alienation from their own occupational and philosophical context, is too costly (Hymes 1980). One of the strengths of
ethnographic research is the similarities between the units of study, methods of data gathering, and forms of nonjudgmental analyses used by both ethnographic researchers and reflective, complex problem-solving teachers. Both prefer explanations which are particularistic, social, and situational (Bolster 1983).

Another one of the strengths of this type of research is the accessibility of its findings for practitioners. Indeed, Hymes argues that the structure and forms of knowledge developed about schooling through ethnographic research have "implications for a democratic way of life":

A mode of research that focuses on experimental design, quantitative techniques, and the impersonality of the investigator has its place; but, carried to its perfection, as the exclusive mode, it would tend to divide society into those who know and those who are known. The anthropological recognition of the contribution of the practitioner as one who also knows counteracts that tendency. So does the legitimacy, indeed necessity, in ethnographic research of narrative. Good narrative accounting is not easy, and may be harder sometimes than quantitative analysis; but it is more accessible to citizens of society (p.7).

However, the very strengths of ethnographic research are also its weaknesses. Descriptive and accessible, the narratives are often lengthy and, of course, filled with the ordinary, mundane details of daily life. If one does not have a specific purpose for reading them, they are often time-consuming and boring. Much more contrastive analysis needs to be done and mid-level theory developed. Contrastive interpretations need to be written that delineate the contexts in which an explanation such as substitute change or cultural dissonance holds true and the boundaries of where they do not.

Also, ethnographic research is not prescriptive. This is a strength because it describes life as it really happens rather than suggesting idealized, normative diatribes of what should be happening. Yet Wolcott found that when he held up an ethnographic mirror to school administrators to let them see what they were doing, they were not interested.

In a delightful article written nine years after the publication of his definitive ethnography, The Man in the Principal's Office (1973, Wolcott (1982) discussed what he hoped would happen and what actually
happened as a result of his monograph. As he describes it:

As he describes it:

It was my second book.... That is not so many books that I did not feel a keen sense of accomplishment in seeing years of work finally come to fruition. Though I doubted that I had written a best seller or that the movie mogules would be beating at my door for film rights, I was satisfied that the book was "solid." I waited eagerly to watch its impact on educational practice, particularly among school administrators (p. 70).

Wolcott's intent was to have provided a mirror to administrators, an invitation to turn their attention to "what actually goes on, rather than "to be so singularly preoccupied with what ought to go on" (1982, 81). Wolcott felt that his study was rich with insights into the paradoxes of the profession. Although he did not want to prescribe, Wolcott began collecting pithy statements and suggestions for action that seem warranted in the light of his findings, preparing for the time when he would almost certainly be asked to address associations of administrators.

The calls never came. Although the reviews of his book were very good, the audience of administrators for whom the book was intended never materialized. His purpose in providing a framework for reflection about their actual practices as principals was never realized. Wolcott hypothesizes that the "educators who looked in our mirrors saw things all too familiar. A quick glance satisfied them that close inspection would not reveal what they felt they most needed to find-- a clear image of what they should do about problems and shortcomings" (1982, 81).

What is the image of social studies practitioners as reflected from the review of these studies? It can be seen that most of all, teachers are managers of meaning. In their most mundane, routine actions, from the polite cheery morning greeting to their enthusiastic reaction to what is being displayed in show-and-tell, to hand-holding on a Wanderung in Schonhausen, to the social organization of turn-taking, they shape contexts in which they and their students display and transmit cultural values, beliefs, and norms.

From the review of these ethnographic studies, teachers can be seen to be connectors of knowledge. From the talk-story lessons that begin with questions about the students' own experience, to questions about the comprehension of the text, back to questions about the meaning of
the text in their own lives, teachers display and link ideas so that they make sense to the consumers of those ideas.

In these ethnographic studies that span a mere 15 years are embedded hints that certain notions about ownership of work, peer audiences, and shared uses of power and authority are powerful enhancers or constraints of different types of academic knowledge. We can begin to ask ourselves, What does social studies knowledge generated in our classrooms look like: constructivist, technical, or illusory? What kinds of "deals" or social relationships are we offering our students and what types of social studies knowledge are resulting?

NOTES

1. However, within the subfield of educational anthropology, there are diverse approaches taken to the study of schooling. For example, some of the research studies cited in this chapter are written by:
   --ethnomethodologists (Mehan 1984)
   --systems analysts (Lobbert 1984)
   --microethnographers (Erickson and Schultz 1981)
   --macroethnographers (Ogbu 1981)
   --symbolic anthropologists (Varenne 1982)
   --rebels from any organized tradition (McDermott 1980)

   There is research from the ethnography of speaking (Hymes 1972, Cazden, Johns, and Hymes 1972). Sociologists (Metz 1984) and critical theorists (McNeil 1984) also engage in ethnographic research about educational change. It should also be noted that one set of microethnographic studies reviewed is drawn from a tradition of American ethnographers who began their field work by studying kindergarten/first grades to find out how initial socialization to school occurs. This can be contrasted with the British anthropologists and sociologists who have developed a separate tradition of studying issues of culture transmission in high schools where class structure can more clearly be seen.

2. A fourth issue mentioned in Shaver, Davis, and Helburn's (1979) summary of the state of social studies education will not be discussed. Shaver and others raise the question of how students are experiencing

REFERENCES

Some of the items listed below are followed by an ED number. This identifies the item as an ERIC document. ERIC documents are indexed and abstracted in the monthly index, *Resources in Education* (RIE). For ordering information, readers should check the ED number in RIE.


Chapter 6

RECENT RESEARCH IN THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL EDUCATION: 1976-1983

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Research in the foundations of social education is a complex and diverse process. Some would even question whether most of the work in this area is truly research (Babbie 1979). But such criticism reflects a rather narrow, positivist view of research which underestimates the limits of empiricism and the substantive arguments for other approaches to research (Popkewitz 1984). In this chapter, research is defined more broadly as purposeful, systematic inquiry or investigation. The definition includes qualitative as well as quantitative studies. It also includes philosophic, historic, and linguistic analysis. Furthermore, since much of the work in social education is historical and/or philosophic, to ignore this area of investigation is to ignore a major area of study in the field.

Thus, although most of the research reviewed is philosophical, conceptual, or historical, other types are reviewed when appropriate. The primary focus is on the period from 1976 to 1983; however, a number of earlier works are discussed to provide background necessary for analysis, a necessary condition since the last review of research in social studies education did not consider foundations research (Hunkins and others 1977).

Given the diversity of approaches and issues in this area, I have restricted the discussion to efforts to develop, defend, and criticize rationales for social education. This is a complex process in its own right, and given space limitations, only the most significant trends can be discussed in some depth. Thus, this review focuses on the competing views of the nature and purpose of social education. Indeed, one could argue that these normative debates orient the direction and evaluation of all other research in the field.

The following review is divided into four sections. The first section provides a summary of the significant social education rationales developed in the period from 1960 to 1975. These rationales represent
the best efforts of "mainstream" social educators of the period. The second section examines the evolution of "mainstream" efforts to build and criticize rationales from 1976 to 1983. The third part of the review analyzes an emerging body of revisionist scholarship in social education. This area of research raises significant criticisms and questions regarding mainstream rationales. Finally, some conclusions are discussed concerning the current state of the field and implications for the future.

A few comments are in order to qualify the terms "mainstream" and "revisionist" social educators. Neither term should be taken as a definitive description of the persons and works described. However, there are certain tendencies within the field in terms of issues discussed, approaches, etc. Those called mainstream have, in general, tended to deal with rationale building and criticism from within the parameters of a dialogue that has prevailed for more than half of this century. Conversely, the revisionist critics have challenged the very nature of that dialogue and the prevailing methods of investigation. Thus, although neither term should be taken as absolute and some dispute exists regarding who might fit into each category, the terms do point toward two rather different approaches to rationale building, criticism, and research.

I. Social Education Rationales in 1976

In 1976, social education was a field of numerous competing definitions and rationales. In one sense, this condition provided a rich source of ideas, but it also created a serious problem for researchers in the field. The scope of the problem was well defined by Shaver and Larkins in 1973. In their view a difficulty "arises because research studies on teaching social studies...tend to lack a clear conception of what is meant by 'social studies education.' Careful attention to defining the scope of the field...would help to sharpen the focus of research" (p. 1245). The basic problem is a general failure to build an adequate theory base to guide research. Such theory would include systematic "attempts to define and build a rationale for social education" (pp. 1246-47). One might add that efforts to build rationales are fundamentally axiological. This is acknowledged and encouraged by Shaver and
Strong (1982), who note the importance of philosophical analysis in the process of rationale building.

The failure to reach a consensus on how to define and rationalize social education has characterized most of the last century (Hertzberg 1981). This lack of consensus was clearly evident in 1976 as a number of different rationales as well as various combinations of them and other partial rationales competed for the attention of social educators. There have been several attempts to categorize alternative rationales for social education, and the most significant are summarized below.

Shirley Engle (1960) described the following rationales for social education. First, there was a narrow approach which conceives of social studies as the social sciences "simplified for pedagogical purposes" (Wesley and Wronski 1958). A second approach views social studies as mainly concerned with developing good citizens. This citizenship rationale in turn is divided into three separate schools of thought.

One would unify, synthesize, and apply the content of the social sciences and bring it "to bear on the broad social problems of the society" (Engle 1960, 46). A second on the decision-making process (often called problem solving or the reflective method) as it applies to the "practical circumstances" faced by citizens. This would restrict content to "the data which is relevant to the problems which citizens confront and to the exercise of the process by which information (and perchance values) is brought to bear on these problems" (p. 46). The third school of thought described by Engle is the unreflective inculcation or imposition of certain content and values. This rationale focuses on the "content (including myths as well as fact) by which budding young citizens may be indoctrinated with the 'right' beliefs and attitudes believed to be necessary for the unity of the nation and the loyalty of her citizens" (p. 46). Inculcation assumes we know what knowledge and values are essential, and there is little or no attempt to teach the skills necessary to make effective choices among competing values.

Engle (1964) favored developing decision-making abilities as the basic rationale for social education. He proposed a general reflective approach to the curriculum which seeks to "maximize the opportunities for students to make intelligent and thoughtful decisions with respect
to what to hold valuable, what to believe, what guiding ideas or principles to accept, and what courses of action to follow" (p. 41).

Barth and Shermis (1970) view social studies as a set of goals to orient how content is selected, organized, and taught. This definition implies a concept of citizenship. In their view, definitions that view the social studies as specific courses or a specific curriculum sequence or content are invalid. Over time, three basic and competitive traditions have grown within the social studies field. Each is conceptually distinct and "prescribes three different models of selecting and organizing content and teaching" (p. 744). These three approaches are termed citizenship transmission, social science, and reflective inquiry, and are referred to as the "three traditions."

The citizenship transmission (CT) rationale seems similar to Engle's description of the indoctrination approach. The basic assumption is that social educators have an obligation to inculcate certain "basic" or "self-evident values" that are the "hallmarks" of a democratic society. "But, upon examination, this seems either one value position or a confusion of the normative with democracy" (p. 744).

The social science (SS) tradition is an extension of the Wesley and Wronski position noted earlier. This rationale received a tremendous amount of support in the work of Bruner (1960) and the "new social studies" movement and projects (Hertzberg 1981). In this approach to citizenship education, the focus was on the structure, methodology, and knowledge of the social sciences. Proponents of this rationale are divided in terms of which social science disciplines would receive most attention or if they should be synthesized in one rationale (Schwab 1962, Scriven 1964, Morrissett and Stevens 1971). Others have debated the role history should play in relation to the social science disciplines (Fenton 1967, Krug 1967, Palmer 1963, and Anderson 1964).

Barth and Shermis (1970) appear to support the reflective inquiry (RI) tradition. This approach can be traced to the work of Dewey and has been expanded and refined over the years. Supports of this rationale perceive citizenship as a process of social-political decision making based on two key assumptions. The first is the socio-political framework of democracy "which rests upon a belief that all are called upon either to make the rules which govern them or...to select someone to do so."
The second assumption involves a unique definition of decision making. 

[It] is assumed to take place in ambiguous situations and any given choice is not between good and evil but between what is perceived to be good and what is taken to be better (or what is thought to be bad and what might be worse).

Thus citizenship education can be defined as a process in which students learn to make decisions regarding significant social problems currently affecting or likely to affect them. The social educator's function is to develop students who are able to identify social problems and evaluate data to make decisions related to them. This is the key to defining the "good citizen" (p. 749).

The rationale models developed by Engle (1960) and Barth, and Sherman (1977) describe only a portion of the approaches to social education developed prior to 1976. Several social educators emphasized approaches focused on social action (e.g., Raths, Harmin, and Simmons 1978, Newmann 1975). Newmann (1975) developed the most comprehensive rationale of this type. He believed that most education programs were incomplete because they failed to provide students with adequate skills to take effective social action. Newmann sees "environmental competence" as a major goal of social education, i.e., the skills and knowledge necessary for a student to feel efficacious and have the ability to effect his/her environment. Such an ability will never be achieved totally but is an ideal toward which we should aspire. Newmann contends this approach will help meet a basic psychological need of students and further strengthen the democratic consent ideal.

In many ways, Newmann's (1975) approach is an extension of the "jurisprudential" rationale developed by Oliver and Shaver (1966, 1974). This approach emphasized teaching critical thinking skills for dealing with public policy issues. Unlike other proponents of decision-making rationales, Oliver and Shaver make a strong case for inculcating the core values of the "American Creed," e.g., human dignity, basic freedoms, and rational consent. However, they would not impose specific interpretations of these values to concrete situations. Newmann (1975) agrees, and contends it is never correct to try to convince students to endorse specific policies such as welfare. This is educationally indefensible because it is seldom clear which policies would best achieve our ends.
There are other variants of the reflective inquiry/decision-making approaches to social education. Hunt and Metcalf (1968) proposed that we have students inquire into the "closed" areas of our society (e.g., economics, sex, religion, race relations, morality, etc.), because these are the most controversial areas and most in need of examination. Indeed, closed areas are more typical of authoritarian societies and we should struggle to open such areas in a democratic culture.

Massialas and Cox (1966) emphasized inquiry, but they would have students examine a wide spectrum of issues beyond closed areas, including some with predetermined conclusions. These latter types would be used to help students develop the skills necessary to conduct inquiry. They have rejected the argument that the only true problems were those felt by students. It should be noted that the rationales described above (Oliver and Shaver 1966, Massialas and Cox 1966, Hunt and Metcalf 1968, and Newmann 1975) are not easily fit within any one of the three traditions described by Barth and Shermis (1970).

Kohlberg's (1973, 1975) limited approach to social education was based on his research on the moral development of children. He contends that moral development is primarily reflected by the growth of the individual's cognitive abilities. Each person passes through a series of invariant stages and each successive stage is more complex and complete. There are, according to Kohlberg, six stages (although his recent articles combine stages five and six), but most people do not reach the highest stages. Social education can facilitate moral development by involving students in structured discussions of moral dilemmas during which they are exposed to moral reasoning at one stage above theirs.

Kohlberg's rationale is only partial, because social education has a number of other goals. However, he sees moral development as a central concern of social education in a democratic society, especially since our basic democratic principles and theory require stage-five moral reasoning. Kohlberg's approach has some unique aspects and also does not fit neatly into the models described by Engle (1964) or Barth and Shermis (1970).

Finally, other social educators who support values clarification contend that teachers have no right to inculcate or impose their values (other than information processing values) on the young (Simon 1971).
These arguments reject the need to inculcate core values or others about which society has reached a high level of consensus. However, critics suggest that a number of substantive values are implicitly endorsed by values clarification supporters (Lockwood 1977).

In sum, the state of mainstream social studies in 1976 indicated a wide range of views and rationales, many of where were diametrically opposed.

II. Developments in Mainstream Social Education: 1976-1983

The time from 1960 to 1975 was a period of considerable reform and development in social education (Haas 1979, Hertzberg 1981). In comparison, 1976 to 1983 seems like a time of relative stagnation to some. As Newmann (1984) puts it, "the recent period has been quiet, some would say virtually dead" (p. 12). This is an overstatement, but certainly the level of activity (and funding) has slowed in the recent period. Nevertheless, change has continued and there have been numerous significant developments in the foundations of social education.

In 1977, Brubaker, Simon, and Williams reexamined the classification of social education rationales and posited five separate ideological camps. Three of the positions, i.e., social studies as (1) knowledge of the past and guide to good citizenship; (2) reflective inquiry; and (3) the structure of the social sciences, were similar to those discussed by Barth and Shermis (1970). However, they added two additional positions--(4) social studies as a concern with students' problems and natural growth, and (5) social studies as socio-political involvement.

Brubaker, Simon, and Williams (1977) believe that earlier attempts to describe social education rationales had been inadequate. Indeed, progressive educators had long ago split into two basic camps, the child-centered as opposed to those favoring a social or social problem orientation. Barth and Shermis (1970) appeared to be trying to include both schools within the reflective inquiry approach. Brubaker, Simon, and Williams also recognized the efforts of those like Sidney Simon (1971) and Newmann (1975, 1977) who had developed rationales based on social action and environmental competence.

In a comprehensive expansion of their earlier work, Barth and Shermis, along with Robert D. Barr (1977) once again attempted to define
social education. They lamented the lack of consensus in the field and believed that it rendered social education especially vulnerable to the pressures of special interest groups and contributed to the relative lack of support for the field. It also provided no clear guidelines for classroom teachers.

There is some evidence that this was the case (e.g., Kirkendall 1975, and Gross 1977). These surveys indicated a decline in the number of course requirements and the amount of classroom time spent on social studies (especially at the elementary level) and an increased fragmentation of the curriculum. Kirkendall's main concern was the decline of history instruction in the schools, but Gross saw a general decline in social education as well. Enrollments were off in most social education courses and there were fewer traditional courses (e.g., history, "Problems of Democracy," and civics). Other studies supported some of these conclusions (see Osternhorf and Horn 1976). Interestingly, Gross noted an apparent widespread influence of the "new social studies" reforms, but this impact seemed partial and unreflective.

The Three Traditions: Development and Critical Reaction

As we shall see, the influence of the three traditions model of Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977) has been widespread and pervasive. The model has also provoked a great deal of critical reaction. Given the strength of this model's influence and the dialogue it has generated, somewhat more attention is given to reviewing the development of the three traditions position and the related critical commentary.

Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977) agreed with those like Gross (1977) who believed we must find unity and purpose in the field. In spite of the apparent contradictions and fragmentation, they contend "there is a logic and order to the field and ...sufficient areas of agreement at least to attempt a generic definition (p. 10).

Barr and others maintained the basic positions developed by Barth and Shermis in 1970, that is, that one could distinguish three separate philosophical positions (citizenship transmission, social science, and reflective inquiry) in terms of how each dealt with purpose, goals, methodology, and content. Although each tradition is described as distinct, "a careful theoretical description of the customs, traditions and
usage in the field...illustrates a definite trend toward areas of agree-
ment between each" (Barr, Barth, and Shermis 1977, 67). These areas of
agreement provide the basis for a "historical definition" of the social
studies.

The widest agreement exists regarding the purpose of the social
studies, i.e., citizenship education. Agreement is not universal, but
Barr, Barth, and Shermis see the emergence of a clear trend. In addi-
tion, there is general agreement on the objectives necessary to the
development of good citizens. These are:

1. Knowledge about what is called in the liberal arts tradition
   "the human condition," including knowledge about the past,
   present, and future.
2. Skills necessary to process information.
3. Development of values and beliefs.
4. Some way of applying what has been learned in active social
   participation. (pp. 68-69.)

They recognize that the areas of agreement are somewhat vague as
illustrated in the conflicts over defining the good citizen, the best
methodology, and selecting content. But by analyzing both the agreements
and disagreements among the three traditions, the authors derive a new
definition of the social studies: "The social studies is an integration
of experience and knowledge concerning human relations for the purpose
of citizenship education" (p. 69).

Five reactors were asked to comment on the content of the Barr,
Barth, and Shermis monograph. Shirley Engle (1977) felt that "the
authors ... have failed to demonstrate that the unity they sought is
either feasible or desirable" (p. 103). The suggested existence of "a
thread of unity," in this case citizenship education, is a myth. Fur-
thermore, had they succeeded in coming up with one definition of social
education, they might have done "irreparable harm," by making "oversim-
ple, and therefore deceiving, what is complex and diverse" (p. 105).

Engle (1977) is also concerned with the omission of two other tra-
ditions not covered by Barr and others. One is the tradition of "social
criticism." This approach is "less tradition-bound than the citizenship
transmitters and more humanistic and freewheeling than those who take
the social science position" (p. 104). A second unexamined rationale
discussed by Engle is "policy studies," currently promoted by dissident members of the social science community, among others. These dissenters "insist that social science is so enslaved by its positivistic and behavioristic stance that it serves no useful purpose in advancement of human causes and human welfare" (p. 104). Policy studies attempt "to bring the social sciences into the arena of public policy and private living, where issues over values and emerging human purposes must be dealt with as reasonably as possible" (p. 104).

Engle notes further that the traditions of "transmission" and "social science positivism" are essentially conservative and supportive of the status quo. Of the three traditions, only "inquiry theory" is dynamic. So, too, are "social criticism" and "policy studies" which, like inquiry theory, assume "change and reform as being the natural proclivity of human kind. They also assume that freedom of thought and democratic governance are the desirable milieu of men and women" (p. 104).

Another critic, Suzanne W. Helburn (1977), believes that the social science and reflective inquiry positions are not discrete and irreconcilable; in fact, they are actually complementary. After careful analysis "it seems very clear that the split is based more on limited perceptions of the contributions or potential contributions to social studies education of rivals in the other camp, possibly fed by prejudices, certainly by different experiences and values" (p. 110).

James Shaver (1977d) also finds much wanting in the three traditions. He suggests that the definitions in the model are too vague. In addition, the model does not represent what actually goes on in most social studies classrooms and "seems visionary and prescriptive" rather than descriptive (p. 115). Shaver contends that the categories represented by the three traditions are "too forced and arbitrary" (p. 116). At best the categories analyze. They do not, in Shaver's view, truly organize the field. Finally, the traditions are not mutually exclusive and this weakens their effectiveness as an analytic device.

Jean Fair (1977) agrees with Shaver's contention that the three traditions are not discrete. She also recommends that another tradition based on "individual self fulfillment" be considered as a possible framework for social studies education (p. 106).
As the serious critical reactions included in the Barr, Barth, and Shermis publication, Defining the Social Studies (1977), make clear, there are reasons to questions the three traditions model. The authors did not make a direct response to these initial criticisms. They have never said the three traditions was the only model for interpreting or classifying social education rationales. What they have said is that there are at least three traditions (Barr, Barth, and Shermis 1978) and that these are "only one way of organizing the field..." (1977, 95). But they do make clear that they have great confidence in their position, which is based on extensive investigation. In fact, the three traditions "seem so basic and so evident that after careful study, they seem to leap out at you" (p. 95). And despite numerous criticisms by other social educators, the authors have maintained their basic approach with relatively little modification since 1970. Thus it is reasonable to assume that they have not found any of the critics' alternatives to have sufficient merit.

One cannot fail to notice that, despite years of negative critical reaction, the three traditions have had a profound influence on the field. Indeed Defining the Social Studies (1977) might be the most frequently (and favorably) cited contemporary works in social education. Even some of the critical comment has the effect of promoting the value of the three traditions (see Cherryholmes 1981, 1983, White 1982). For example, in one generally critical study, the author referred to Defining the Social Studies as "a meticulous analysis of social studies documents spanning nearly a century" (White 1982, 1).

I have noted both the initial critical reaction to the Three Traditions and some of the other rationales and rationale classification models which do not fit within the three traditions (e.g., Engle 1964, Oliver and Shaver 1966, Newmann 1975, and Brubaker, Simon, and Williams 1977). Such critical comment has continued since 1977 (e.g., Stanley 1979, 1981b, Haas 1979, Clements 1981, White 1982, Morrissett and Haas 1982, and Cherryholmes 1981, 1983a, 1983b). Much of the reaction has been fueled by Barth and Shermis who have continued to refine their position and challenge their critics.

In The Nature of the Social Studies (1978) Barr, Barth, and Shermis reaffirmed their views and cited research conducted via a "Social Studies
Preference Scale." They contend that this line of research confirms the existence of the three traditions as manifested in teacher's behaviors (see Barth and Norris 1976, Bonar 1977, and Bennett 1980). Barth and Shermis (1981) contend that "preservice teachers as well as experienced teachers prefer the reflective inquiry tradition. However, our research suggests that most...do not necessarily practice that tradition in class" (p. 97). They also acknowledge that a significant number of teachers subscribe simultaneously to two or more of the three traditions. They maintain that such teachers exhibit confused and inconsistent thinking.

Charles White (1982) investigated the reliability and validity of the Barth/Shermis Social Studies Preference Scale as well as several assumptions underlying their research. Specifically, he wanted to assess their claim that

[they] have identified at least three separate and distinct social studies traditions and have argued that teachers tend to each in predictable ways; that these predictable ways form patterns; and that these patterns can be understood and interpreted. (Barth and Shermis 1978, 18.)

As White (1982) notes, our "confidence in the three-traditions thesis is highly dependent on" the statistical reliability and validity of the Social Studies Preference Scale (p. 3). Although the instrument had been used for at least five years prior to White's study, he reported that no reliability or validity data were available. His study used a variety of statistical methods to assess content and construct validity as well as reliability. The results of the study were mixed.

The content validity findings generally support "the claim that the Barth/Shermis scale does delineate three distinct conceptions within the field" (White 1982, 16). These positive findings also carry over to the results of factor analysis regarding construct validity. The citizenship transmission approach was the most distinct tradition.

However, the "purpose/method/content dimensions of the instrument seem decidedly inadequate" (p. 16). In addition, of the sample, the inservice teachers did not view the social science and reflective inquiry traditions as distinct, as do Barr, Barth, and Shermis, or the panel of experts used in this study to sort the scale items into the tradition categories. "Further, factor analysis demonstrated considerable mixing of these traditions' items, leading one to suspect that a two-tradition
view of social studies is more relevant to teachers in the classroom" (p. 16).

Finally, White's results regarding the respondents' attachments to the various traditions were significantly different from those reported by Barr, Barth, and Shermis. Because the content of the Barth/Shermis scale was determined to represent the three traditions, the expected results of the study would have included "three strong dimensions to emerge in factor analysis and three distinctive respondent groupings to form around each of the traditions," that is, if one assumes the traditions describe practice (p. 17). Yet two significantly different patterns emerged.

One linked the reflective inquiry and social science traditions in a manner reflecting Helburn's proposal in her critical reaction to Defining the Social Studies (1977, 110-113). White notes correctly, however, that this study "does not prove that teachers recognize an RI/SS amalgam" or "that Helburn's model is...more theoretically powerful" (p. 17).

The second contrary pattern to emerge was that the vast majority of subjects "adhered to all these positions simultaneously" (White 1982, 17). This is consistent with the position taken by Shaver (1977c) in his reaction to Defining the Social Studies (p. 114). Barr and others (1978) have argued that teachers who simultaneously subscribe to the three traditions are "inconsistent" and exhibit "confused teaching" (p. 52). But as White argues, "if this group comprised only 30-40 percent of the social studies teachers" [as Barr and others suggest] "the confusion might be plausible. It becomes somewhat less believable when 81 percent of practicing teachers...fall into this category" (p. 17).

In earlier works, Barr and others (1977) contended that most respondents "clustered with some overlap around the three traditions, with a fourth group reflecting an eclectic, though inconsistent position" (p. 95). But an examination of the studies cited indicates this conclusion "is more true of one source in particular, that is, The Nature of the Social Studies (1978)...a summary of previous but uncited studies" (White 1982, 15). Barr and others (1978) report the following results for respondents' approximate adherence to traditions: CT - 10%; SS - 10%; RI - 20%; CT/RI - 10%; SS/RI - 20%; and CI/SS/RI - 30%. Other
researchers have found results more similar to White's, with most respondents endorsing all three traditions (Bonar 1977, Bennett 1980). Of the 90 respondents in White's (1982) study there was only one distinct SS, two CT/RI combinations, and 73 CT/SS/RI. The second largest group, RI/SS, was 14.4 percent of the total.

In correspondence with White, Barth and Shermis indicated they were not surprised by his results because only those teachers (or students) trained in the three traditions would be able to interpret accurately the scale and identify with a philosophical position (White 1982). If so, "it would appear that Barth and Shermis have retreated considerably from their stance in The Nature of the Social Studies (p. 17)."

Although the Barth/Shermis scale seems to have serious limitations as a descriptive instrument, White suggests it might still be a valuable prescriptive model. Yet even this suggestion is still being debated and clearly this "study does cast a shadow...over efforts to extract a unified definition for the social studies from these somewhat muddled positions" (p. 18).

Shermis (1982) responded to these criticisms, and the response illustrates, in part, how his continued research with Barth has shaped and extended their original position. Curiously, Shermis chose not to respond to any of the statistical criticisms of the Barth/Shermis scale. Instead, he focused exclusively on the distinction between the social science and reflective inquiry traditions. "While there are indeed similarities between the social science and reflective inquiry traditions, there are also important differences which are not clearly discernable" (p. 46). The probable key to understanding the distinction is the way the two groups define problem and the problem-solving process (p. 46).

The nature of the Shermis response must be understood within the context of various recent historical investigations (especially Lybarger 1980, Barth and Shermis 1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1981, Shermis and Barth 1982, 1983). The bulk of these have focused on the origins and development of the concepts "problem" and "social problems" as they have been used in social education. It is in this area that Barth and Shermis appear to have modified some of their original positions.
Shermis and Barth owe a special debt to the research of Michael Lybarger (1980), who contends that the origins of the social studies was significantly influenced by sociologists who embraced the positivist views dominating European sociology from 1900 to 1916. This is quite different from more traditional interpretations. For example, Hertzberg (1981) notes the influence of historians on the 1916 NEA report on the social studies. For Hertzberg, the key emphasis in the report is on social efficiency and "cultivation of good citizenship" (p. 27). The report recommended that topics for study be chosen on the basis of how they could be related to the life interests of students and suited to their current processes of development. According to Hertzberg, the report combined the "new history" of James Harvey Robinson with the pedagogy of Dewey, both of whom it quoted liberally. It also rejected the social control views of David Snedden.

In contrast, Shermis and Barth (1983) believe that between 1910 and 1930 the old reliance on transmitting a few core values was no longer deemed sufficient, and there was a gradual shift to include the transmission of a mode of problem analysis in social education. Although Deweyan terminology was often applied, the definition of problems and problem solving that informed the social studies in this period had little in common with Dewey's ideas. Thus, contrary to common belief, "the model used by most social studies educators in the twentieth century derived not from Dewey but rather from nineteenth-century sociologists who were themselves tutored in the assumptions of Comtean positivism" (Shermis and Barth 1983, 77). Consequently, "under the guise of problem solving or even simply transmitting a neutral body of facts, social studies tend most often to be concerned with inculcation, indoctrination, or persuasion" (Shermis and Barth 1979, 2).

The positivist contributions to social science are complex, but for the purpose of this discussion certain points are clear. First the positivists rejected metaphysics and values analysis, and emphasized instead an objective, empirical, and scientific approach to learning about reality. They also assumed such an approach could reveal the nature or laws of society, much as such laws have been found in the physical sciences. Thus we could know, in a scientific sense, what was normal for society. Finally, social scientists should use this knowl-

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edge to change society and its institutions for the better. Shermis and Barth (1980) "argue that such positivist views of social science and its proper use seem to have found their way into the thinking of the fathers of social studies" (p. 12).

The concept of problem espoused by the positivist-oriented sociologists had no clear theoretical definition. In practice, social problems were defined as those elements (e.g., crime, poverty, urbanization) which threatened the norms of the social order. This view of problems became a central part of the content and process of social education (Shermis and Barth 1979, 1983).

Given this definition of problems and the positivist influence of the sociologists, social educators were encouraged to teach problems preselected by social scientists, including all the relevant data and an asserted or implied conclusion (Shermis and Barth 1983, 79-80). Unfortunately, too many social educators have followed this approach. Thus, even though the study of problems and problem solving has been a major concern of social education in this century, in practice most social educators have short-circuited the inquiry process with a pseudo problem-solving approach.

In contrast, the roots of the reflective inquiry approach can be traced to Dewey's concept of a problem; that is, a true problem must arise "out of an individual's perception of emotional conflict, inconsistency or lack of insight [and]...when a previously settled state of affairs becomes disrupted and the resulting tension requires the individual to 'clear things up'" (Shermis and Barth 1983b, 77). More critically, "a problem exists only when an individual internalizes a sense of puzzlement or wonderment." Put another way, if one does not internalize, feel, or "own" a problem "a problem does not exist" (p. 75).

By combining much of Dewey's language with the positivistic definition and approach to problems, social educators were able to translate social science knowledge into something "appropriate while at the same time leaving the essential structure of society unchanged..." (Barth and Shermis 1980a, 46). A comparative study of the content of texts used in social studies classes in the 1920s and 1970s reveals that "with but very little change it was possible to superimpose the language and assumptions of 19th-century social science on 20th-century textbooks to
create a basically unaltered textbook" (p. 46). Another effect of this was to give the blessing of social science support to what had henceforth been an exercise in cultural transmission and indoctrination. This is significant, because this approach to problem definition and analysis tends to merge the cultural transmission and social science traditions identified by Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977). Shermis and Barth (1980) agree, but note that while past generations of social educators "accepted the 19th-century social scientists' definition of social problems and their solutions," the contemporary focus is on the structure and processes of the social science disciplines (p. 47).

More recently, Shermis and Barth (1983a) have applied their analysis of problems to what they see as an essential debate between two factions of progressive social educators during the 1930s. On one side were those like Hullfish and Bode who accepted Dewey's definition of problem as applied to social education. On the other were social reconstructionists--for example, John Childs, Jesse Newlon, and George Counts--who used a quite different definition of problems.

Both sides would use the schools to help remove the poverty and other negative effects of the great depression. Furthermore, both sides also seemed to accept that "indoctrination is morally reprehensible; and the only viable alternative to indoctrination is the serious study of social problems" (Shermis and Barth 1983, 1). But the reconstructionists reflect the positivist view of problems especially in terms of their assumption that "teachers have a blueprint for the new and desirable social order" (p. 5).

Ironically, in an earlier article, Shermis and Barth (1980) cite Harold Rugg, a leading reconstructionist, as an exception to the positivist orientation in social education. Some recent research suggests that Shermis and Barth have misconstrued both the nature of social reconstructionism and Rugg's role in social education (Stanley 1981a, 1982, Stanley and Maxcy 1984a, 1984b). The important point is that reconstructionism has elements that oppose positivism and emphasize the importance of social criticism.

In some ways, the recent Barth and Shermis analysis of problems gives more credibility to the many criticisms of the three traditions. First, they acknowledge the convergence of the citizenship transmission
and social science traditions in terms of how each conceives of problems (Shermis and Barth 1980, 28-29). They also accept that there are similarities between the social science and reflective inquiry traditions (Shermis 1982, 46). In fact, they acknowledge that the "important differences" between these two traditions "are not clearly described" (p. 46). The key difference they posit is the positivist versus Doweyan notion of problems discussed above. But by narrowing the differences among the three traditions and then (if the definition of problem is the key) collapsing them into two basic approaches, Shermis and Barth seem even more vulnerable to their critics.

III. Other Mainstream Approaches to Rationale Building: 1976-1983

If there is a trend in the area of rationale-building, it is the continued focus on citizenship education (e.g., Barr and others 1977, Shaver 1977a, Remy 1977, Foshay and Burton 1976, Butts 1980). The National Council for the Social Studies reaffirmed its commitment to citizenship education in the "Revision of Social Studies Curriculum Guidelines" (1979) and Essentials of the Social Studies (1980). The NCSS emphasized the development of citizens who are able to make rational decisions and participate actively in a democratic political system.

But, as in the past, there is still no consensus on the definition or application of the concept "citizenship" (Barr and others 1977, Meyer 1979). Butts (1980) is concerned that we give citizenship so little attention that we fail to make explicit its meaning, the roles planned, or the essential knowledge required. Perhaps most important, Butts could "find no hint as to what kind of society or government it is that this citizen is being prepared to participate in" (pp. 85-86). This concern with defining citizenship is important, because the kind of citizen we seek can reflect radically different conceptions of society. Shermis and Barth (1982) note how we can teach for passive citizenship, which tends to perpetuate the status quo and thwart individual, autonomous decision making. Nelson (1980b) observes that the various competing conceptions of citizenship range from "nationalistic loyalty" to "reconstructionism," two diametrically opposed views. Given such a wide range of positions, conflict is inevitable, and simplistic pleas for citizen-
ship as the goal of social education are of little practical value. Thus, we must focus on the specific proposals of those advocating citizenship education as a central concern of social education.

Shaver (1977c) has argued that we need a Deweyan rationale for social education. This would be a child-centered approach based on reflective thinking processes and dealing with problems perceived by the student which arise from direct experience. This would help "students learn to function fully in democratic society, including learning to participate intelligently in ethical decision making" (p. 350).

Jarnlimek (1981) believes that a focus on citizenship education is necessary to ensure the survival of social education. There are three areas that should receive particular attention; those are law-related education, economic and career education, and international or global education. These areas address the primary problems facing our society: lawlessness, adjustment to the realities of life, and the interrelatedness of human needs and values.

Dougan (1983) argues that the "majority position" in contemporary social education literature is "citizenship education through rational inquiry" (p. 134). However, Shaver (1977a) has noted that this often conflicts with the views of parents and the needs of the school. Others have observed that, in practice, most teachers seem to support the unreflective transmission of the culture (Barr, Barth, and Shermis 1977, Haas 1979, Haas and Morrissett 1982). Stanley (1981c) contends that even the rationales which are committed to reflective inquiry tend to explicitly or implicitly endorse cultural transmission. Morrissett (1981) believes that the focus on citizenship is generally too narrow and that social education has many other important goals.

In any event, the conflict over how to approach citizenship education remained a constant aspect of the rationale building efforts from 1976 to 1983. We turn now to some of the other significant examples of rationale development in this period. Ironically, the first rationale is one which deemphasizes the centrality of citizenship.

Perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to develop a new mainstream rationale is the social roles approach (Superka and Hawke 1982). The basic assumption underlying this approach is that social education should contribute to the development of students who will become knowledgeable
and effective social participants. One way to do this "would be to focus content and instructions more directly on how most people participate in...society--how they spend their time and where they put their energy" (p. 69).

Normally, we spend most of our time in seven basic roles: as citizens, workers, consumers, family members, friends, members of other various social groups, and as ourselves. Superka and Hawke believe we can design a social education program to "help young people understand, value, and function creatively and competently in these social roles--thereby helping them become effective individuals and effective participants in our society" (p. 69). The nature of each role along with knowledge about child development would be used to guide content selection. Superka and Hawke see their social roles orientation as similar to the Seven Cardinal Principles of the 1918 NEA Report and the Joyce and Alleman-Brooks (1979) emphasis on "lifelong roles" for elementary education.

Superka and Hawke acknowledge that citizenship has been the central focus of social education. In addition, most social educators accept that responsible, participating citizens are essential to the preservation and improvement of a democratic society. Superka and Hawke agree, but note that there is considerable disagreement in the field regarding the meaning and application of the concept of citizenship. Furthermore, the social roles rationale extends beyond the narrow limits of citizenship and focuses on "relationships between individuals and political entities...and organizing efforts to influence public policy" (p. 72).

Currently, we give lip service to citizenship, but, in reality, much of social education does not deal with it (Superka and Hawke 1982). Under the social roles approach, citizenship would receive less emphasis. Nevertheless, "citizenship could and probably should remain the single most important role in social studies" (p. 88).

The social roles approach was developed as part of Project SPAN (Morrissett 1980). This research project assessed the current status of social education and made recommendations for the future. The project identified six basic problems in the field (Superka, Hawke, and Morrissett 1980, 362-369). First, many students fail to learn about important social knowledge, skills, and values or to value social education. Second, there is also a lack of a sufficient variety of instructional
methods and inattention to the implications of research. Third, the
structure of the social studies curriculum does not ensure adequate stu-
dent learning or civic participation. Fourth, there is division within
the social studies profession and confusion regarding the role of social
education. Fifth, the cultures of the school divert teacher energies to
problems of administration and control. Finally, there is insufficient
public awareness and support for social education.

According to Superka and Hawke (1982), the social roles rationale
provides a better way to deal with the six major problems racing social
education. In short, it should be more relevant and thus motivate stu-
dents. It also provides a basis for content selection and a way to
enhance instructional practices. Finally, it provides a coherent way of
organizing the curriculum by synthesizing the best of extant rationales
in a way that is consistent with the culture of the school. This syn-
thesis should provide the basis for more public support, because it
appeals to both liberals and conservatives.

The social roles rationale has drawn mixed reaction. Ratliff (1980)
saw the rationale as a successful attempt at greater relevance.

What the social roles paradigm does to is to afford recogni-
tion of the limitations of responsibility and accountability
in social studies and adumbrate a scope and sequence which has
largely been nonexistent (p. 599).

Patrick (1980) sees the social roles proposal as "a laudable attempt to
blend various curriculum orientations into a fresh conception of educa-
tion in the social studies" (p. 588). However, the eclecticism of the
proposal presents a challenge to curriculum developers who must balance
its various emphases.

Other social educators were not so sanguine. Engle (1980) noted
that the SPAN report "ignores the problem of definition in the social
studies" (p. 587). When one definition of social education is as good
as another, the problems identified in the SPAN report "are in reality
pseudo-problems" (p. 587). Without clear aims, how are we to decide
which reforms are warranted? Should our conceptions of roles be open or
closed? "Is socialization of the individual or the development of his/
her intellectual capabilities to be the goal of the social studies?"
(p. 587). Until the aims and definition of social education are clari-
fied, such answers cannot be resolved.
Shaver (1980) was very disappointed with the social roles proposal, which he felt was regressive in two ways. First, it was not truly original but only a restatement of the "life adjustment" curricula of the 1950s. Second, it further diffused the conception of citizenship education at a time "when many are concerned that the citizenship education role of social studies has not yet been adequately conceptualized or implemented in the schools" (p. 591). Furthermore, this was suggested without providing adequate justification. Shaver agreed that the K-12 curriculum organization was dysfunctional, but the social roles proposal was "undiscerning and simplistic" (p. 591). Finally, he maintained that the proposal overemphasizes the personal at the expense of the social orientation.

Perhaps Helburn (1980) has raised the most serious questions regarding the social roles rationale. She notes the failure of the model to correspond to reality. The seven social roles are not universal categories. They are typical of the organization of an industrial society and "do not describe subsistence level economies...[which] still exist today in pre-industrial societies or pre-industrial enclaves within industrialized nations" (p. 652). Furthermore, given their historical determination, such roles may not exist in the future.

Helburn suggests that the seven roles also reflect "a particular ideology or world view," which is not the only perspective one might take (p. 625). For example, "rather than relegating class to the catch-all category six, in the Marxist perspective we would use a class analysis as a basic organizer in the curriculum" (p. 652). A different basic view would also be presented by a feminist perspective. In other words, "the seven roles, as named, reinforce certain status-quo attitudes about social participation, or at least they lend themselves to such conservative use" (p. 652).

It is also incorrect, in Helburn's view, to present the roles as distinct categories of study. In practice, they are functionally integrated. Finally, "it is wrong to consider the self as a role" (p. 625). Superka and Hawke recognize this, but are attempting to emphasize both social roles and the individual in society. Unfortunately, the result is a confusion of the meaning of both role and self. The former refers to "a relationship between one person and others who occupy correspond-
ing roles" (Helburn 1980, 652). Each role is a social position, and as such, will change as social institutions evolve.

Conversely, the self is personality and composed of the sum of the roles a person occupies as well as one's unique genetic endowment and psychic and social development (Helburn 1980, 652). To develop the self is to occupy effectively the roles one takes. Children must develop a sense of themselves as social beings "to understand that they cannot exist without others--and the importance of these others in creating their self-esteem" (p. 653). But the confused use of the self as a role in the social roles approach could create a serious problem in this regard. In fact, "it is quite dangerous to think of roles within oneself. It can exaggerate the quest for uniqueness and the notion that somehow one can make it on one's own" (p. 653).

Given the general failure of social studies reform over the last decades (Haas 1979, Hertzberg 1981, Morrissett and Haas 1982), it does not seem likely that the social roles rationale will have any major impact on the field in the immediate future. Still it remains as the most recent attempt to design a comprehensive social education rationale for curriculum construction.

While other attempts at mainstream rationale building have not been as comprehensive, several recent contributions to the field are worth examining. Pearl Oliner (1983) has criticized mainstream approaches to social education, because they generally fail to focus on the development of prosocial behavior. Oliner laments the decline of a sense of community and suggests that social educators could help to remedy this situation by integrating the "concept of 'community' into their citizenship education programs" (p. 65). Current approaches are inadequate because they focus almost exclusively on our relation to the nation state. Oliner acknowledges that this is a critical relationship helping to create "a sense of national cohesion among a heterogeneous population." This traditional focus does not, however, function to sufficiently develop relationships among people. "Indeed, in several critical ways, current approaches encourage feelings of alienation from the community" (p. 66). An increased focus on prosociality could help to begin the process of "community" building.
More specifically, the excessive focus on a citizen's relationship with government can have the following effects. First, it may "encourage feelings of impotence and alienation" as it is too remote and complex from most citizen's experience. It also "tends to externalize the locus of responsibility with minimizing personal accountability" (p. 69). This leaves relatively little for the average citizen to do other than vote and follow the laws. Finally, it "fails to direct students towards those citizen behaviors which build emotionally satisfying relationships and integrative community linkages" (p. 70).

Thus, the missing element in all contemporary approaches to citizenship education "is that the relationships of students to each other are not of primary importance," especially personal relationships (Oliner 1983, 73). We do emphasize cooperation and reciprocal relationships. But the former is focused on a goal, rather than individuals, and the latter is most concerned with "the commodity or behavior being exchanged."

These relationships, too, can result in alienation and exclusion. Thus:

An integrated society also requires social interactions in which the basic relationship is persons to each other, and which are characterized at least some of the time by "self-transcendence" (p. 73).

Prosocial education is, at its heart, concerned with transcendence and direct relationships. It encourages students to act on behalf of others without expecting reciprocation or reward. The focus is on helping, sharing, giving, care, concern, and altruism. The behaviors go beyond "cooperation which is based on mutual benefit and beyond interdependence, which is based on reciprocal satisfaction of need or exchange" (p. 73).

Such an approach would not neglect the growth of cognitive competence, because cognitive skills are critical to making competent decisions regarding prosocial behavior and avoiding misguided efforts. Oliner sees such decisions in terms of both a cost/benefit type of analysis, (i.e., the ability to determine if a situation exists that requires prosocial behavior) and of identification of the best contacts to help solve such problems.

These goals could be achieved, in part, by adding prosocial standards "to the normative criteria by which the behaviors of national and global 'heroes' are measured" (p. 75). We need to provide students with opportunities for face-to-face participation and teach them that (like
greed and ambition) altruism and care are also roots of political behavior. We could help facilitate this by "personalizing" the study of government, which normally is portrayed as abstract and impersonal to students. In addition, we can make students "aware of the prosocial activities of ordinary people" to give them models for acting (p. 76). Finally, students must learn the skills required for prosocial activity.

Oliner contends that somehow we have lost this prosocial focus which seems more true of our agrarian rural past. Consequently, "it may be essential to introduce the concept of 'transcendence' into the marketplace of democratic ideas, and into the concept of citizenship education in schools" (p. 78). For while many behaviors can help integrate a society, only relationships dealing with love, status, and identity integrate by increasing the total amount of benevolence.

In an interesting and complex argument Leming (1981) has also expressed a concern with the lack of emphasis on prosocial behavior in social education. Like Oliner (1983), Leming is interested in teaching students the value of prosocial behaviors such as caring and altruism, but he goes beyond this to argue that we should teach students to commit to specific moral injunctions or norms "e.g., not stealing, honoring contracts," and so forth (p. 24).

Although Leming's primary focus is on moral education, his views bear directly on the concept of citizenship education. In reality, one can't speak of moral and citizenship education as if they were separate entities. As Leming notes, programs "hiding moral education under more appealing labels (e.g., citizenship education) do not establish a firm foundation for" long-term success (p. 24). He also agrees with Aristotle's view that "moral education is fundamentally political education, and moral and civil law represents a systematic and concrete expression of the moral idea; that is, a tested conception of the good life" (p. 30).

Leming's main complaint is that, to date, there is little evidence to support the effect of contemporary approaches to moral education. In particular, research regarding approaches such as values clarification, values analysis, and cognitive development "suggests that student growth which occurs as a result of these programs is unrelated to social behavior." In short, they have failed "to yield socially significant results" (pp. 7-8).
One major cause for this lack of effect is the overly narrow focus by social educators on individual choice and rational decision making. Most current approaches to moral education (e.g., Raths, Harmin, and Reimer 1979, Newmann 1970, Fraenkel 1977, Nelson 1974, and Metcalf 1971) share the following features.

1. The development of decision-making skills applied to problematic content.

2. The assumption that reason plays the key role in motivating one to act morally.

3. The morally educated person is perceived as independent and autonomous, "subordinate only to the dictates of ... reason and ... decision making principles."

4. Advocacy of specific moral content is avoided. Certain forms of deliberation are preferred but not specific moral injunctions.

5. The teacher functions primarily as a facilitator in an open, nonjudgmental environment and should use great "caution before advocating any specific moral content."

6. It generally takes place in discrete lessons within the overall curriculum.

7. Students should not be evaluated in terms of the outcome of their moral decisions. (Leming 1981, 12-13.)

In sum, the prevailing rationales eschew moralizing or a moralization approach. This is consistent with the ethos of our political culture, but it has placed social educators in a position that severely limits their potential effectiveness. Leming relies on current research on prosocial behavior and the work of Durkheim to contend "that the child is not initially led to moral behavior through training in decision-making processes." The challenge, therefore, is to find a means to "initiate children into life in society governed by moral rules while at the same time...not [closing] the door on the development of independent rational moral judgment at a latter point in the child's development."

The point is that our current emphasis on rationality can be dangerous to the child and his/her society "to the extent that it develops in the child the expectation that he/she exists independent of society with no restraints on his/her behavior other than what his/her reason dictates". (pp. 18-19).
For Leming, moral education must, at its foundation, reflect a commitment to the "rules of collective life within a given society" (p. 19). We must go beyond the emphasis on decision-making skills and consider the role of nonrational processes and the climate of the school to facilitate moral education. While research indicates that reasoning has little impact on the development of prosocial behavior, modeling, empathy, or sharing emotional responses seems to have a significant influence on the development of such behavior. In addition, there is reason to believe that moralization, properly practiced, could also be effective.

Unlike the prevailing approaches to moral education, moralization could provide specific examples of moral behavior to be "learned in naturally occurring social contexts. Reinforcement is generally immediate and derived from individuals perceived as significant" (Leming 1981, 13). Furthermore, thought often follows action; that is, reasoning "frequently arises out of behavior to explain, interpret, or rationalize experience" (p. 14). Thus, giving reasons for moral injunctions can also have an important influence on behavior. The point is that while changes in thought can influence behavior, the reverse is also true and too often ignored in current approaches to moral education.

Leming relies on the work of Durkheim to make a theoretical case for changing our approach to moral education. Durkheim was a structural functionalist who promoted the view that, in general, "existing forms of society serve an essential role in the maintenance of that society's equilibrium and continuing survival" (p. 15). Morality, therefore, consists of systems of specific rules that have been "justified by their efficacy in maintaining a stable environment in which the individual can live with dignity and freedom" (p. 15).

To effect moral development, the school and the teacher must set out to reinforce and model specific moral behavior, especially in the early years. Here the school can play a unique role "because it represents an intermediary step between the affective morality of the family and the more impartial morality of the society" (p. 17). It is critical to the child's full development to function as a morally responsible member of the society.

Leming recognizes that some current approaches to moral education (e.g., Oliver and Shaver 1966) do accept teaching a commitment to higher
order principles such as justice, freedom, and human dignity, but these "are stated so generally that they do not suggest specific actions for specific situations." What we lack is a willingness to teach students to commit to "specific first order principles--principles containing the content of moral beliefs, e.g.,...always tell the truth, never take what doesn't belong to you, etc." (p. 18). The latter smacks of moralizing, and has been eschewed by most social educators, thus depriving us of a "necessary and essential dimension in the moralization of youth" (p. 19).

Leming understands that it is not possible to remove all moral ambiguity and that consensus regarding specific moral perscriptions will be difficult. Nevertheless, it is possible to reach consensus in terms of what the community holds as morally correct behavior. Indeed the community and school should work this out jointly. Those areas where agreement can't be reached should be pointed out and discussed with the students. Some ambiguity notwithstanding, "it is socially preferable to have individuals approach social life deeply committed to specific norms and reluctant to break norms...than to have a citizen capable of reaching elegant and refined decisions in situations of moral uncertainty but lacking any allegiance to a socially-based morality" (p. 24). Of course there are some limits on what the community can promote as moral behavior. For instance, specific injunctions must not violate basic values embedded in our American creed, for example, teaching students racism.

Leming rejects the charge that this would be indoctrination, which "refers to attempts to influence others which distort, through oversimplification, misrepresentation, and/or one-sided presentation..." (p. 25). He uses the term "directive moral education" to describe his approach. We must never distort information or refuse to consider alternative viewpoints, but one can "forcefully assert in a reasoned manner what the right behavior may be for students in a specific moral context" (p. 25). This requires that social educators consistently expand the role of rationality in moral education as it relates to the child's development.

One might argue that while current approaches to moral development based on decision making have had little effect, neither have attempts at direct moral instruction been effective. Leming agrees and notes four reasons for this condition. First, these approaches have gone to the extreme and neglected the necessary shift to moral reasoning where
appropriate. Second, not enough attention has been devoted to the specific behaviors that enable a teacher to have an impact on the development of moral behavior. Third is the constant flux in our value systems in this country. Finally, "the societal demand for self-chosen identify as the cultural task of adolescence necessarily involves a degree of moral redefinition with the emerging identity" (p. 28). We have little control over the last two, but the others can be addressed by social studies educators to make direct instruction more effective.

Finally, Leming rejects suggestions that a structural functionalist approach to moral education entails either "uncritical transmission of all existing contemporary moral standards," or students with a "slavish and unreflective acceptance of current moral norms" (p. 28-29). The end of moral education must be "enlightened allegiance" to the moral system. But this must be a just system, and changes will need to be made to the extent it is not consistent with the higher principles of mankind. Teachers can teach the moral order and also point out examples of violations of our normative structure.

One further note: Leming rejects "the social reconstructionist view that schools should play a central role in the social and moral transformation of society" (p. 29). He accepts that history demonstrates their clear lack of effect in this area. Furthermore, he concurs with Oliver and Shaver (1966) that a teacher must operate from the ideals of society and not subvert them in the classroom. Clearly Leming presents an interesting approach to social education which does not fit neatly into the three traditions of Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977, 1978).

From another vantage point, Shaver (1977a) has criticized social education for its frequent "mindlessness." Specifically, he referred to the failure to develop rational justifications for practice. More recently, Shaver and Strong (1982) have continued to explore the process of rationale building in an effort to help social educators develop justified rationales. They make clear that the philosophical analysis required for building social education rationales is a necessary effort if we are to avoid the mindless selection and application of content and methods. One of the more important functions of a good rationale is "to avoid the unthinking imposition of your beliefs on your students." Of equal pragmatic concern "is the need for a systematic, well-grounded
basis from which to explain, even defend, your instructional behavior to administrators and parents" (pp. 10-11).

Shaver and Strong recognize that no curriculum is truly value-free, and the values held by social educators will, consciously or unconsciously, shape the way they approach their work. Most importantly, American social educators function in a culture oriented to a basic value set or ethos, for example, the American creed. Social educators need to have a commitment to this creed. Yet they must also recognize that these basic values "conflict with one another by their very nature." Because of this inherent conflict "we cannot fully attain all of the basic values at any one time" (p. 50). Thus, a commitment to pluralism is an essential ingredient of our democratic culture. Pluralism ensures that those decisions we need to make to apply the creed to specific situations will be conducted with a full consideration of all information and options. Unfortunately, research indicates that the value of expressing unpopular opinions is the least understood and valued constitutional right.

Some argue that a commitment to pluralism in fact indicates that Americans do not hold any single set of values, and, in part, this is correct. However, in a vital sense this is also wrong, because "at the affective, emotional level there is a commonality of commitment to a set of values that allows us to speak of an American Creed" (Shaver and Strong 1982, 57). As Gunnar Myrdal (1944) concluded, "It is difficult to avoid the judgment that this 'American Creed' is the cement in the structure of this great and disparate nation" (p. 3). R. Freeman Butts has made a similar case (1979, 1980). The creed is in a process of continual flux and any fixed view of it would be dogmatic and maladaptive in a democratic culture. Still, "the Creed with its cognitive vagueness and emotive solidarity, does provide a viable context for confrontations over fundamental issues as we adapt to tomorrow's realities" (Shaver and Strong 1982, 62).

For Shaver and Strong this has certain clear implications for rationale-building and, ultimately, the professional behavior of social educators. Social education must be related to developing citizens who have internalized the creed and developed the knowledge and competencies to apply it in decision making. Social educators, therefore, must clearly understand and support the creed. In addition, they have "an
obligation to try to shape the expectations of... the students, parents and, more broadly, the community—to help ensure that schooling does take place in a context of democratic commitment" (p. 79).

A social educator who is not committed to the ethos of the creed should not agree to work in public schools.

The school is not a legitimate place for subversion in the sense of encouraging or advocating the destruction of the values and basic governmental forms set up—with all their theoretical and practical limitations—to protect our evolving conception of human dignity. (Shaver and Strong 1982, 79.)

But the notion of subversion requires clarification. For example, one might legitimately examine the relevance of violent methods for social change as an issue. "But to advocate violence as a form of political action clearly falls outside the proper role of a public school responsible to a democratic society, and would be legitimate grounds for dismissal." Nor should one use the classroom to advocate other political positions, as "teachers are not hired to carry out partisan political indoctrination" (p. 80). This does not proscribe the teachers' right to express personal views, identified as such, in the classroom. In fact, to do otherwise would seem inauthentic to students.

Shaver and Strong note that members of the community "often fail to distinguish between what is subversive in their eyes and what is subversive to a democratic society." Thus, teachers have a professional "right and obligation to act in a context broader than that of the local community." This does not negate the value of local control, but it does mean that "decisions about what the schools should teach ought to be made in the light of the school's role as an institution of a democratic society" (pp. 82-83).

Questions related to the use of imposition have been a major issue in social education throughout this century. As Shaver and Strong make clear, a reasonable case can be made for the imposition of certain core values and knowledge within a democratic society. Leming (1981), as noted earlier, went somewhat further than Shaver and Strong and supported the imposition of a number of specific behaviors. Stanley (1981b, 1981c) has argued that imposition is both an inevitable and desirable part of social education. We must make rational decisions regarding what to
impose and simultaneously use critical methods to block the reification of current knowledge and values.

This is a complex issue. For Berlak (1977), consciousness, social criticism, and civic education should be the primary goals of social education. He cites the dilemma of continuity and change as the central question for social educators. If we do not teach students the skills and values necessary to be thoughtful social critics, it won't really matter what content we select or approach to values education we employ. One approach may be more effective than another, but the point is to encourage "students to examine the relationship of social/political/economic arrangements past and present to the ways in which people live their everyday lives..." (p. 35).

Berlak rejects simplistic Marxist or socialist revisionist critiques as too extreme in their suggestion that schools will reproduce society. Perhaps their warnings (e.g., Bowles and Gintis 1976) were "a useful corrective to the naivete' revealed by liberal school reformers" in the 1960s (Berlak 1977, 36). This is no longer necessary, and, in fact, both radicals and conservatives have been naive in assuming we could easily accomplish social change. The point is that "any conception of political education rests upon an assumption that experience...is capable of altering the way a person views the world." Berlak assumes that by raising student's consciousness "they may be capable of acting differently" (p. 36). Most recent reform in social education has not been directed toward this end. Ironically, and contrary to suspicions that such an approach is seditious, the call for social criticism is consistent with our constitutional ideals. Shaver (1977b) believes that "Berlak provides a radical critique of the purposes of citizenship education in a democratic society" (p. vii).

Nelson (1980a) agrees that social criticism should be the major focus on social education, but he takes a different position than Berlak. Nelson believes that our schools tend to reify the status quo and he is skeptical of any attempts to impose knowledge on students. Recent research (Nelson 1977, Palonsky and Nelson 1980) indicates that a great deal of censorship goes on in our schools. This occurs despite claims by school officials and teachers that there should be freedom to discuss controversial issues.
Although the student teachers in one study felt more restraint than did the administrators, the apparent differences between them faded in the reality of their mutual commitments to ideology and classroom practice. Though both accept the right to discuss controversy and present personal views, most would not because they see it as inappropriate and unprofessional. Their main concern was that all sides of an issue must be represented. They seemed unaware that certain specific dominant viewpoints were continuously being transmitted uncritically to students (Nelson 1982).

The problem, as Nelson (1981) sees it, is the dominant functionalist ideology that rationalizes schooling in general and social education in particular. Instead of merely describing institutions, functionalism holds that they have evolved because they are the most effective, and thus it rationalizes "what is" as "what ought to be." This tends to stifle creativity, autonomy, and criticism as well as to reproduce existing social inequalities.

Nelson (1980a) argues that change is an inevitable part of social life. Therefore, a functionalist-oriented social education program with its class-based, nation-specific, past-oriented, passive, conformist, and static dimensions is dysfunctional. We require instead an approach related to the problems inherent in social change. Some (e.g., Newmann 1975) have suggested an increased emphasis on social activism as a possible solution. But this is an inadequate approach because activism has no necessary rationale and can be used for a variety of conflicting purposes (Nelson 1980a).

There are a number of models to orient social criticism, including a Deweyan model, critical theory, and reconstructionism. Nelson (1980) discusses each model in brief, but does not take a clear stand in favor of any particular approach. The point is to emphasize social criticism which can be justified because it (1) deals with change; (2) contributes to informed decision making in a democratic system; and (3) facilitates basic learning and skills.

Newmann (1981b) takes a different position. He believes that a fundamental problem in social education is "the absence of adequate ideology on the nature of citizenship in a modern, pluralistic culture, nested within an ecosphere, with a presumed mandate to work toward demo-
ocratic forms" (p. 1). Thus we are attempting to construct social education programs without any means of resolving the fundamental conflicts related to different group loyalties, attempts to balance individual liberty and group needs, and the need to develop a substantive conception of justice and to balance social criticism against the need for some nonrational social attachment.

An area of particular concern to Newmann (1981a) is the development of "collective identity." Newmann argues that this should be pursued as an educational goal largely to counteract the American preoccupation with individual choice, liberty, rights, consumption, skills, development, and fulfillment that is destructive to culture and to individuals" (p. 11).

Newmann (1981a) agrees that our concern for individualism is important, but believes that it has been overemphasized. Our failure to promote adequately the importance of collective attachment conveys a distorted view of individual dignity to students. Dignity is critical to the full development of every person, but individual dignity requires situations "where individuals contribute to and receive from others, i.e., contexts of productive group life" (p. 11). The same can be said of justice, for while it is defined in terms of how we treat individuals, "the point is to recognize that constructive forms of group life are necessary for justice to be done" (p. 13). Thus, collective identity is also important because it helps us achieve so many other worthwhile goals.

Although students spend a great deal of time in groups, there is doubt that this develops a strong sense of collective identity, especially given the tendency of the norms of social education "to undermine the promotion of group life" (Newmann 1981a, 14). In particular, current approaches to social studies promote the following assumptions: (1) our history is the story of the progressive development of individual freedom; (2) our political system provides the means to express and reconcile conflicting individual interests; (3) the American economic system ensures the delivery of important goods and services along with providing incentives for individuals to acquire more; and (4) our legal system "protects the individual from abuse by the state and offers fair mechanisms for resolving private disputes among individual parties" (p. 15). For Newmann, this represents a general obsession with individual inter-
ests. Indeed, many critics of social education "tend to sanctify individual liberation as an ultimate end" (p. 15). In part, such critics are overreacting to the view that knowledge is socially constructed.

Newmann (1981a) also has reservations about the general efficacy of social criticism. "Collective identity can be strengthened through critical rationality, but it cannot be sustained if all beliefs...are subject to continuous critical questioning." Thus there are times when criticism must be restrained to "avoid weakening the nonrational basis of social cohesion" (p. 16). Most social educators fail to address these issues, and social education tends to remain a process of socialization in conformity to adult norms. If we are to make progress in this area we need to develop a new ideology to help resolve the inherent conflicts related to individual liberty, social control, and multiple group membership (Newmann 1981a).

Newmann (1981a) has also reviewed the research on adolescent development as it relates to developing group identity. He found "no conception of growth or adaptation which recognizes collective identity as a central issue." In fact, most see it as "dangerous to psychological health because of its potential threat to individual autonomy" (p. 29). What is important is that there is no research to indicate that adolescents have any psychological limitations on their capacity to develop a strong sense of collective identity. Therefore, Newmann concludes that it must be the social structure and culture which block this development. Social education has the potential and responsibility to help correct this condition. Some social educators appear to have made efforts in this area (Oliver 1976, Butts 1980, Leming 1981a, 1981b, Nelson 1981c, Shaver and Strong 1982). As we shall discuss in the next section, the critical theorists are also concerned with group identity.

The confusion and conflict over specific rationales are matched by recent attempts to classify approaches to social education. Morrissett and Haas (1982) document the current disagreements among social educators regarding the nature of the social studies and even the meaning of the concept "rationale." A true rationale would include the reason for something; that is, a philosophical position regarding the nature of the individual and society and how each are related. Perhaps Newmann (1977) has offered the most comprehensive description of what a curriculum
rationale should include. Using his standards as guidelines, Morrissett and Haas (1982) argue that there are very few true rationales for social education. It is too difficult a task for most, and confusion exists regarding the nature of rationales and the extent to which they are relevant.

A number of social educators have noted the failure to establish a consensus on an adequate rationale for social education (Barr and others 1977, 1978, Wiley 1977, Stanley 1981c, Joyce and Alleman-Brooks 1980, Morrissett and Haas 1982). For some, this is probably the most serious problem facing the field. However, not all social educators agree that the lack of consensus on a rationale or definition is a serious problem.

For example, Morrissett (1979) does not see defining the field as an urgent problem for the social studies. He contends that "there is some optimum degree of fuzziness in the definition of social studies or any other subject area. Some boundaries are needed, but they must be open and flexible" (pp. 12-13). Morrissett and Haas (1982) agree that the "concern about defining the social studies may have been exaggerated" (p. 16). One possibility is that much of the concern really represents a reaction to criticism of the field. Furthermore, contrary to the concerns raised by Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977) and other researchers, there is evidence to indicate that the disputes over rationales and failure to agree on a definition of the field are of little or no concern to social studies teachers (Morrissett and Haas 1982, Mehlinger 1981).

The more recent attempts to categorize approaches to social education illustrate the subtle complexities involved in the process. Morrissett and Haas (1982) discuss a three-approach model derived from earlier work by Haas (1979). The three approaches are (1) Conservative Cultural Continuity, (2) the Process of Thinking Reflectively, and (3) Intellectual Aspects of History and the Social Sciences. Let us consider each in more detail.

Conservative cultural continuity (CCC) has been the dominant, mainstream approach to social education. The "socialization" function of the school is taken as a given; the school should transmit the core values, norms, and mores of the society. This process often includes
the "hidden curriculum," embedded in the structure and social system of the school.

According to Morrissett and Haas (1982), critics of the negative effects of the hidden curriculum have failed to acknowledge that precisely because education and socialization are united in the social studies, the dominant approach tends to be a conserving and preserving one, designed to socialize the young to the current status quo and to educate students via an extremely restricted and romanticized interpretation of history, politics, and economics. (p. 20)

The conservative cultural continuity approach is suited to transmitting a view of history as a natural process of growth and progress. It perpetuates social myths regarding celebrations of our political, social, and economic status quo, that is, "the current concepts of growth and progress and an extreme gradualism as the preferred mode of social change." This is analogous to the Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977) citizenship transmission tradition, but their description "is rather vague, failing to portray its full power" (Morrissett and Haas 1982, 21).

The second approach, the process of thinking reflectively (PTR), is one of two reform movements to challenge the CCC position in this century. This approach refers to those thinking processes such as decision making and problem solving "by which knowledge is created, appraised, and acted upon" (p. 22). It can be traced to the work of John Dewey and is similar to the reflective inquiry tradition of Barr and others (1977), but the PTR approach is more complex.

According to Haas (1979), the PTR approach has two distinct variants that are different from but directly related to the general PTR approach. One is the analysis of public issues (API) approach, which has its own sub-variant, that is, education for citizen action (ECA). The API variant originated in the work of Donald Oliver, and was articulated by Oliver and Shaver (1966).

The API variant is committed to a process of reflective inquiry to analyze public issues, especially those involving controversy. However, this approach also advocates the transmission of the core values of our culture, although it does not specify how such core values will be applied in specific situations. Still the approach both advocates trans-
mission and inquiry and thus does not fit within the Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977) three traditions model.

Newmann (1975) has pointed out a basic weakness in the PTR approach—its failure to develop the environmental competence of students. He argued, as noted earlier, that students will not develop necessary skills and a sense of political efficacy unless they are trained and given the opportunity to be involved in community activities. This is the education for citizen action (ECA) sub-variant of PTR.

Finally, there is the modes of inquiry (MOI) variant of PTR. In this approach the focus is on the process of inquiry, rather than core values or specific social issues. In practice, the MOI approach is seldom "advocated separately from its broader and logical relative, the 'intellectual aspects of history and the social sciences' (IHSS) approach" (Morrissett and Haas 1982, 26). Since the focus is on the process of creating knowledge, MOI is a variant of the PTR approach. However, because the inquiry models are drawn from history and the social science disciplines, there is a clear natural link between this variant of PTR and IHSS.

Morrissett and Haas (1982) see the IHSS approach as the other reform challenge to conservative cultural continuity and the main force behind the "new social studies" movement. The focus is on upgrading the quality of instruction and knowledge related to teaching history and the social sciences. The approach involves an emphasis on key concepts and generalizations as well as on the "nature of the structure of disciplines of knowledge and on discovery learning" (p. 27).

Neither of the reform movements (PTR or IHSS) have had much impact on social education in this century, and the conservative cultural continuity approach has remained dominant with little change. Morrissett and Haas agree that the three traditions model of Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977) has been the most popular in the field since 1971. Haas' three-approach model can be viewed as an extension and elaboration of the three traditions model. However, a number of Haas' (1979) elaborations seem significantly different from the three traditions framework and better able to accommodate the wide variety of rationales in the field.
In another analysis of social education rationales, Stanley (1979, 1981c) found that contemporary rationales paid little or no attention to the social reconstructionist rationale developed in the 1930s. Yet reconstructionism raises important questions and provides a relevant alternative perspective for social educators. The general failure to incorporate reconstructionist ideas has stripped social educational theory of much of its explanatory power and reduced the level of significant social criticism in the field.

Furthermore, there is no adequate way to reconcile or fit the reconstructionists' rationale within the various rationale classification schema developed in the field (e.g., Barr and others 1977, Brubaker and others 1977, Haas 1979). Unlike the other major rationale approaches, reconstructionism supports both the importance of reflective inquiry and the need to impose a "tentative" view of the good society and how that would apply in specific situations. In others words, the reconstructionists believed that inquiry and imposition could be reconciled philosophically (Stanley 1981a). Failure to consider the reconstructionist rationale denies social educators a valuable alternative for rationale building and program development.

The Development of Mainstream Social Education: Concluding Thoughts

What can we conclude regarding the efforts of mainstream social educators to build and classify rationales over the past eight years? In some respects the period ended as it began, that is, with no consensus regarding the purpose of social education. Many of the concerns raised by Engle (1964) and Barr and others (1977) were echoed by Morrissett and Haas in 1982. On the other hand, a great deal of useful information has been developed by researchers in this area. Although many issues remain unresolved, perhaps they are better understood.

A number of reasons have been offered to explain the failure to reach consensus on how to define the field or develop an adequate rationale. Morrissett and Haas (1982) emphasize that the schools are social agencies and as such represent the basic interests of the society and culture. There are occasions where the schools are used to promote change or ameliorate social problems, but there seems to be little support for this position among teachers (Stake and Easley 1978). Even
among academics, the support that does exist is mainly limited to reforms within the limits of existing cultural and institutional arrangements (Stanley 1981c, Giroux 1983b).

The "hidden curriculum" of the school appears to reinforce the conservative socialization function (Fielding 1981, Giroux 1981). As Fielding (1981) asserts, the hidden curriculum is very powerful and operates to emphasize "passive acceptance" as opposed to "active criticism." In sum, "the voice of authority is to be trusted and valued more than independent judgement" (p. 118).

Given the prevalence of the conservative socialization goal, it is quite possible that most parents and teachers see the main purpose of social education as socialization, the overt and covert indoctrination to our society's norms and values. In fact, a number of studies indicate that this is the most popular perception or justification for social education (e.g., Stake and Easley 1978, Haas 1979, Stanley 1979, Feteko 1979, and Shaver, Davis, and Helburn 1979). Thus, there may be a de facto consensus on a rationale for social education, as conservative cultural transmission to reify and reproduce the status quo of society and institutional arrangements. If so, this would help explain the resistance to various social education reform movements, and it would also account for much of the indifference toward the rationale-building process. After all, if there is a de facto consensus on the purpose of social education, why continue to examine other rationales?

There is evidence to support this last contention. As studies by Stake and Easley (1978) and Shaver and others (1979) reveal, rationale building is an intellectual activity mainly confined to the academic community. As Morrissett and Haas (1982) note, "few social studies educators...are concerned about such seemingly esoteric issues" (p. 63). Mehlinger (1981) and Shaver and others (1979) have pointed to the gulf that separates social studies academics from classroom teachers. Haas (1981) agrees and believes that much of the debate over rationales is unrelated to the goals of effective classroom practice. Shaver (1979) believes that teachers willingly accept the schools' function to socialize youth and that socialization is "an inevitable part of the school's role" (p. 43). Yet the social studies intelligentsia "ignore or reject teachers' socialization goals." Their bias is "toward critical thinking
and inquiry—an orientation which, of course, implies another socialization agenda" (p. 43). This discrepancy in views has limited social studies academics' abilities to help teachers improve their instruction. Indeed, "a utopian view of social studies that does not take into account the legitimate nonrational citizenship education duties of the school has provided a dysfunctional basis for research aimed at influencing practice in social studies education" (p. 44).

The concerns of Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977) aside, defining the social studies appears to be a nonproblem for most teachers. In practice, social studies teachers seem to exhibit a great deal of autonomy and tend to be practical and eclectic rather than to hold consistent rationale positions (Wiley 1977, White 1982, Morrissett 1979).

Finally, one could consider Shaver's (1977a) explanation that much of what goes on in social education reflects a "mindlessness," that is, a failure to think about purpose and to link it to practice. This could help explain the current lack of consensus regarding rationales. For instance, Morrissett (1979) believes that many approaches to citizenship education are unrealistic. They expect high levels of altruistic behavior as well as large commitments of time and energy as a good citizen. In addition, it is not realistic to pretend that democracy can be practiced in classrooms that are typically authoritarian in nature. "Finally, citizenship education is typically authoritarian in nature. 'Finally, citizenship education is typically unrealistic in its presentation of how democracy works, ignoring or glossing over the nature of social conflict, special interest groups, political survival, and 'rational voter ignorance'" (Morrissett and Haas 1982, 33).

Despite numerous reasons for pessimism, Morrissett and Haas remain optimistic and encourage social educators to continue to use and work on rationales. The important thing is that rationales must be related to objectives, planning, materials, and classroom activities.

Revisionist Criticism and Social Education 1976-1983

A revisionist challenge to mainstream social education has emerged over the past decade. This challenge has been informed by a variety of sources, especially critical theory, neo-Marxism, linguistic analysis, and the sociology of knowledge. Given the different orientations and personalities involved, the revisionist "movement" is quite multidimen-
sional and represents a number of critical approaches. What they appear to have in common is a rejection or criticism of one or more of the fundamental assumptions underlying mainstream social education.

Despite the development of a large body of critical literature and research, the revisionists seem to have had little impact on the field. As Giroux (1980a) has noted, "Revisionists in general and neo-Marxists in particular represent a distinct minority in the profession of social studies educators. As such, their writings have been largely ignored by reformers interested in educational change" (p. 61). However, the persistence of the critical revisionists has increased the visibility of their ideas in journals and at professional conferences. Recently, Newmann (1984) argued that the relevance of the revisionist perspective to "social studies demands that we consider it in some detail" (p. 13).

A few social educators have tended to dominate the area of revisionist scholarship as applied to the social studies, especially Cherryholmes (1978, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983a, 1983b) and Giroux (1980a, 1980b, 1981, 1983a, 1980b, 1984). However, a number of others have made important contributions, such as social educators Popkewitz (1977, 1978, 1984) and Anyon (1978, 1979a, 1979b) and a variety of curriculum theorists, educational sociologists, and others (Apple, Pinar, Foucault, Bernstein, Bowles and Gintis, Gramsci, Bordieu, and Young).

From the revisionist's perspective, mainstream social educators' efforts to analyze the schools and effect reforms have been misguided. Mainstream reformers have tended to emphasize poor teacher training, curriculum design, and "mindlessness" as fundamental problems in the field. They assume that if only we design better curriculum materials and deal with "the cognitive needs and capabilities of students,...the failure of the recent reform movements will be overcome" (Giroux and Penna 1979, 21).

In contrast, the revisionists believe that the schools work all too well to accomplish their mission, that is, the reproduction of the existing society. It is not possible to understand how this process functions unless we analyze schools (and social education) within a social, economic, and historical context. The revisionists have attempted to provide new analytic tools and theoretical insights to help us understand how schools function in relation to the wider society. This approach
contrasts sharply with mainstream views, which tend to describe schools as neutral institutions (or advocate that they should be) and emphasize the role of "teacher intentionality" as the best means of progressive change.

The schools cannot be neutral, and we must move beyond the point of studying how we acquire knowledge to examine the way aspects of our culture are represented as objective by the educational process. If we focus on the relation of the school to political, economic, and historical contexts we could "begin to focus on the tacit teaching that goes on in schools and help to uncover the ideological messages embedded in both the content of the formal curriculum and the social relations of the classroom encounter" (Giroux and Penna 1979, 22).

This approach to research is a rather recent phenomenon (Apple 1975, Young 1976, Bernstein 1977, Bordieu and Passeron 1977). In the words of Giroux and Penna (1979), we want social educators to "shift their attention from a technical, a historical view of schooling to a socio-political perspective which focuses on the relationship between schooling and the idea of justice" (p. 23). The goal of an ethical and just educational program would be the emancipation of all students.

The Revisionist Position of Henry Giroux

A major influence on the work of Giroux and other revisionists is the "critical theory" developed by the Frankfurt School (Giroux 1982). Critical theory represents a school of thought, but it also "refers to the nature of self-conscious critique and to the need to develop a discourse of social transformation and emancipation that does not cling dramatically to its own doctrinal assumptions" (p. 20). Thus, critical theory is both a theoretical orientation and a process of critique.

A central concern of critical theory was to find ways to penetrate and expose the reified aspects of social relationships that have taken "on the status of things or objects." The objective was to examine the historical context of knowledge and how it is constructed and shaped "by relationships of domination and subordination" (p. 20). Critical theory objected to both the dominant positivist forms of rationality and orthodox forms of Marxism which suppressed the historic role of the human subject. Specifically, critical theory rejected the following orthodox
Marxist assumptions: (a) "historical inevitability, (b) the primacy of
the mode of production in shaping history, and (c) the notion that class
struggle as well as the mechanisms of domination take place primarily
within the confines of the labor process" (p. 23).

The major flaw in the Marxist ideology was to ignore or underesti-
mate the role of the human subject by not developing a theory of con-
sciousness. Thus, it never took into account the full value of how one's
subjective view developed or "how the spheres of culture and everyday
life represented a new terrain of domination" (p. 23). By raising seri-
ous objections to both positivism and orthodox Marxism, critical theory
provides an alternative perspective for examining the process of social
education.

Another contribution of the Frankfurt School was its attempt to
restore the critical faculty of rationality. This had been excluded by
the positivist view of rationality in which it was restricted to describ-
ing, characterizing, explaining, and affirming facts, thus stripping
knowledge of its critical potential. By limiting the role of knowledge
to description, classification, and generalization, no importance is
attached to distinguishing what is unimportant or essential.

This positivist view does not constitute an indictment of science
but points to the triumph of scientific methodology over science itself.
Thus science is separated from questions related to ends or ethics. By
suppressing ethics, "positivist rationality precludes self-critique, or,
more specifically, the questioning of its own normative structure. Facts
become separated from values, objectivity undermines critique, and the
notion that essence and appearance may not coincide is lost in the posi-
tivist view of the world." Put another way, the value freedom of posi-
tivism functions to promote a universal form of knowledge and yet blocks
any inquiry into "its own socio-ideological development and functions in
society" (p. 26). Theory and knowledge appear to become rational "on
the grounds of whether they are efficient, economic, or correct" (p. 27).
In short, the emphasis on methodology has eliminated the role of histor-
ical context and intentionality. For the Frankfurt School therefore,
the fetishism of facts and the belief in value neutrality repre-

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This is not meant to imply intentional support of the status quo. It may, at times be conscious political support, but that varies according to the situation. The point is that "relationship (of positivist rationality) to the status quo is a conservative one" even if this is not recognized "by those who help reproduce it" (p. 28).

Another major contribution of critical theory is the focus on penetrating and unmasking social reality. The purpose is to reveal imperfections and distortions in apparently "finished" systems of thought. Critical theory emphasizes that knowledge is socially constructed and this process is normally shaped by dominant forces in the culture. Thus, the process of penetration and unmasking goes beyond the mere assertion that meaning is created by people and posits a "link between knowledge, power, and domination" (p. 29).

Critical theory uses critique to bring about social change. It avoids relativism by insisting that change be in the interest of developing a just society. Thus "critical thought becomes a precondition for human freedom and openly takes sides in the interest of struggling for a better world" (p. 30). Theory, therefore, must never be subservient to practice. It provides the possibility of critical reflexive thought and practice and has direct value for "the human agents who use it to give meaning to their lives" (p. 32).

The Frankfurt School also took a view of culture different from traditional sociology and orthodox Marxism. The former failed to note the role of ideology in social conflicts and abstracted culture from political and economic institutions in society. Orthodox Marxism reduced culture to a mere reflex of the economic realm" (p. 33). Given changes in socio-economic conditions and the emergence of a repressive positivist rationality, neither of these approaches to culture are appropriate.

In fact, in the view of the Frankfurt School, culture "now constituted a central place in the production and transformation of historical experience." Today, the mode of domination has shifted from physical coercion to reproduction of the ruling classes' power via ideological hegemony; that is, "it was established primarily throughout the rule of consent, and mediated via cultural institutions such as schools, the family, mass media, the churches, etc....The colonization of the work-
place was not supplemented by the colonization of all other cultural spheres" (p. 34).

Capitalist society had resulted in the objectification of culture and purged it of the "elements of critique and opposition...inherent in traditional culture" (p. 34). The effect went beyond the removal of critical thought itself. What is left is what Marcuse (1964) described as a "one-dimensional" society. In such a society there is a monopoly on established reality, and critical aspects are systemically excluded or discredited. Even art, which normally has the potential to expose the contrast between reality and the possible, is reduced to reflection of the established reality. The dominant cultural message is conformity, the elimination of the need for critical thought, and the triumph of style over substance.

Another contribution of the Frankfurt School was the concept of "depth psychology." This was derived from the work of Reich and Freud and helped to explain how the socialization process can create "personality structures receptive to authoritarian ideologies and movements" (Giroux 1982, 40). Freud presented a pessimistic view of this process, noting the inevitability and necessity of repression to maintain social order. But Marcuse reinterpreted Freud's work as revolutionary and utopian (Marcuse 1955, 1968, 1970). He agreed with Freud that repression was necessary. "What he objected to was the unnecessary repression that was embodied in the ethos and social practices that characterized social institutions such as the school, workplace, and family" (Giroux 1982, 45). In this regard, the inner history of individuals reveals the deepest penetration of domination. Here, false values and needs are produced and then reinforced by everyday social patterns. Needs become habit and are removed from their historical context.

Marcuse supports the value of negative thinking because it can function as a form of critique within the context of socio-economic conditions that can be changed. Giroux notes the relevance of Marcuse to more recent critical approaches to educational theory. For example, Bourdieu (1977a, 1977b) argues "that the school and other social institutions legitimate and reinforce through specific sets of practices and discourses class-based systems of behavior and dispositions that function to reproduce the existing dominant society" (Giroux 1982, 46).
Bourdieu presents a very pessimistic picture, Marcuse is optimistic regarding the possibilities for changing those "historically conditioned needs that function in the interests of domination" (Giroux 1982, 46). To be effective, this will require a new form of political education which emphasizes people's sense of freedom and the development of their full potential.

The Frankfurt School theory has a number of limitations, and it will be difficult to apply its principles to a new theory for analysis of the conflicts and contradictions found in various cultural spheres. It also failed to account for dual consciousness, that is, "the contradictory modes of thinking that characterize the way most people view the world" (p. 49). This is important because such modes of thinking have potential for developing ways of resisting the forces of domination.

Giroux (1982) also fears that the application of such a radical approach to social education will involve considerable resistance and risk for the individual. Yet, this should not deter the effort, for although schools are not the only source of social change, they do provide an important site for the development of "new ways of thinking about the building of a more just society" (p. 50).

Giroux (1980a) has also drawn on the Frankfurt School's perspective to examine the forms of rationality that dominate social education. He outlines three major modes of rationality--technical, hermeneutic, and emancipatory. Each is defined by a specific set of assumptions and practices that influence how individuals and groups relate to the general society. "The knowledge, beliefs, expectations, and biases that define a given rationality both condition, and are conditioned by, the experiences into which we enter" (p. 332). But such experiences only make sense within a form of rationality that explains them.

Each mode of rationality, is based on a specific problematic, that is, "a conceptual structure that can be identified both by the questions that it raises and the questions that it is capable of raising" (p. 332). For social educators, therefore, the value of a mode of rationality must be judged by the questions raised and ignored as they relate to which knowledge is taught, in whose interests, what is excluded, and how such forms of knowledge relate to one's access to power.
The first mode of rationality discussed by Giroux (1980a) is technical rationality, which is modeled on the principles of the natural sciences. The emphasis is on prediction, control, and value-free inquiry. This mode of rationality is embedded in the citizenship transmission and social science traditions elaborated by Barr, Barth, and Shermis in 1977.

In Giroux's view, both traditions exhibit a flawed epistemology. Proponents of citizenship transmission tend to objectify knowledge and ignore how knowledge is legitimized and by whom. In this instance, knowledge is mainly limited to technical decisions concerning preconceived ends. Built on functionalist assumptions, this tradition reifies status quo knowledge and aims for consensus in socialization. Students are socialized into a passive form of citizenship which ignores the contradictions and conflicts that exist in the social order.

The social science tradition appears to address some of the limits in the citizenship transmission approach. However, it also clings to assumptions about knowledge that undermine its effectiveness. While this model does celebrate inquiry and discovery, the emphasis is not on producing new meaning but rather on the consumption of meanings which are objectified via various pedagogical methods and have been depoliticized. Students are limited, therefore, in their ability to raise questions concerning the social construction of knowledge, that is, those constraints that bias and distort knowledge and mask its connections with power and social control.

Hermeneutic rationality is the second mode discussed by Giroux. Unlike technocratic rationality, this mode does not seek the production of monological, objectified knowledge as its starting point. Instead, it is oriented toward "understanding how the forms, categories, and assumptions beneath the texture of everyday life contribute to our understanding of each other and the world around us" (p. 34). Hermeneutic rationality is sensitive to the dynamics of the social construction of knowledge. In other words, truth, objectivity, and reality are human products. Giroux cites Whitty (1974) who explains that in the hermeneutic mode, "any attempt to appeal to an external reality in order to support one way of seeing over another is dismissed as ideological" (p. 120). Knowledge and ways of knowing are linked and attempts to separate them are false.
The importance of hermeneutic rationality to social educators lies in its critical challenge to the assumptions of technocratic rationality, an emphasis on the normative dimensions of education, and the clarification of the relationships between epistemology and intentionality and between learning and classroom relationships. Hermeneutic rationality has strongly influenced the reflective inquiry tradition, which seeks to involve students in decision making within our socio-political context. Knowledge is not imposed on students; rather, they are encouraged to participate in the social process of constructing knowledge. The goal is to have students study problems they perceive as their own and understand them as they relate "to the day-to-day texture of their lives" (p. 343).

Hermeneutic rationality is a significant advance over the technocratic model for citizenship education, but it does not deal with the way social meanings are maintained or function to interpret or distort reality. In addition, "such a posture tends to overlook how ideological or structural constraints in the larger society are reproduced in schools so as to mediate against the possibility of critical thinking and constructive dialogue." Consequently, the reflective inquiry analysis is abstracted from such troublesome concepts as ideology, power, struggle, and oppression. As a result, the basic nature of existing social arrangements in the wider society go unquestioned or are questioned in relatively narrow terms (p. 343).

The third approach to rationality is emancipatory and is focused on critique and action. The aim is to criticize those things that are restrictive and oppressive while acting to increase individual freedom and well-being. Emancipatory rationality can be explained as using critical thought to reflect on the origins of thinking itself. The point is to break through the ideology that masks current forms of knowledge and present a critique of our culture and institutions. The emphasis on self-reflection should be augmented by "social actions designed to create the ideological and material conditions in which nonalienating and non-exploitive relationships exist" (p. 347).

Giroux discusses two radical modes of pedagogy based on emancipatory rationality: the political economist and the culturalist position.
Neither mode alone is sufficient as a theoretical foundation for citizenship education, but a combination of the two might make such a project possible (p. 348).

Bowles and Gintis (1976) best represent the political economist position. This view is valuable because it analyzes the school in the context of the socio-political system, thereby stripping it of its neutrality. This helps us understand how structural forces can influence our behavior even though such influences are not obvious within our day-to-day consciousness. However, the political economist position is flawed, because it treats schools as "black boxes" and ignores the role people play in negotiating and shaping their activities (Giroux 1980, 348-349). In short, this perspective fails to explain how domination and cultural reproduction operate in the routines of the classroom and the ways they are resisted.

The second approach to emancipatory, radical pedagogy is the culturalist position (e.g., the work of Sharp and Green 1975, Young 1976, and Keddie 1976) and it has developed within the framework of the new sociology of education. According to Giroux (1980), the culturalist position does focus on the areas neglected by the political economists, that is, how "consciousness, ideology, and power enter into the way human beings constitute their day-to-day realities" (p. 349). Thus, culturalists have helped to explain how human action can function to resist and escape structural influences and even help transform them.

Combining both emancipatory perspectives, Giroux discusses three areas to help provide the basis for a more complete emancipatory approach to citizenship education. The first question we must resolve relates to the process of social change. The issue is whether our society should be changed and, if so, in which way. Such a decision is fundamentally normative and political. It also deals with assumptions related to the aims of education, such as who will be educated and "what kind of knowledge, values, and societal relationships are going to be deemed legitimate as educational concerns" (p. 349).

Second, "teachers rather than students should represent a starting point for any theory of citizenship education" (p. 350). This is necessary, because students have little power or influence on the educational process. Teachers can exercise significant power; therefore, we must
start with them, but also seek to raise student's consciousness regarding critical theory and the need to build a better society. "In short, a reform of citizenship education involves a reform of educators as well; this is a political task whose purpose is to make educators better informed citizens and more effective agents for transforming the wider society" (p. 351).

In this regard, we must help teachers understand the need to politicize the concept of culture. Culture is not merely a people's way of life and should be defined "in terms of its functional relationship to the dominant social formations and power relations in a given society" (p. 352). In every society the dominant culture represents the interests of the ruling classes. Thus, culture is a political phenomenon wherein the dominant variant of the culture attempts to universalize its version of meaning and make it appear self-evident.

It is not enough to recognize that there are many cultures, for they are not equivalent. We need to understand how the dominant culture functions to invalidate other forms of culture and the roles schools play in the process. Apple (1979) has noted that advanced industrial societies "inequitably distribute not only goods and services" but certain forms of "cultural capital," that is, a "system of meanings, abilities, language forms, and tastes that are directly defined by dominant groups as socially legitimate" (p. 496). The way such cultural capital is distributed is related to the role of "hegemonic ideology" in society. The concept of hegemony is employed to denote "an ideology that defines the limits of discourse in a society by positing specific ideas and social relationships as natural, permanent, rational, and universal" (Giroux 1983b, 148). In other words, it is a form of ideology institutionalized by the State. It should be clear that social education, at present, functions to help reproduce the dominant ideology and social institutions.

For Giroux (1980a), therefore, emancipatory citizenship education should recognize that its major aim is not to get students to conform to the status quo. Students must be educated to develop and display "civic courage" and to critique the existing society "against its own claims." This requires the will to act as if one lived in a democratic society. While Giroux accepts that schools do function to reproduce the social
order, his uniqueness is found in his emphasis on the counter hegemonic, emancipatory possibilities of social education (Aronowitz 1981, 3).

In a recent article, Giroux (1983a) discusses the work of resistance theorists (e.g., Willis 1977, Bates 1980, Whitty 1981, Connell and others 1982, Apple 1982a, 1982b) who "have attempted to demonstrate that the mechanisms of social and cultural reproduction are never complete and always meet with the partially realized elements of opposition." Such theorists have helped to develop a theoretical framework "that restores the critical notion of agency." From this vantage point schools "represent contested terrains marked not only by structural and ideological contradictions but also by collectively informed student resistance." The problem is that at times their oppositional behavior results in their active participation "in a logic that very often consigns them to a position of class subordination." Resistance theorists view schools as "relatively" autonomous institutions that provide space for opposition. Thus, they are a continual "source of contradictions...dysfunctional to the material and ideological interests of the dominant society." This view does not ignore the power of the dominant culture, but questions its effect (pp. 259-260).

According to Giroux (1983a), resistance theory has provided a necessary counter view to pessimistic one-sided views of reproduction or correspondence (political economist) theory. However, it also has a number of theoretical flaws. He summarizes four weaknesses in contemporary resistance theory. First, these theorists "do not adequately conceptualize the historical development of the conditions that promote and reinforce contradictory modes of resistance and struggle" (p. 285). Thus, they often fail to explain that not all oppositional behavior has "radical significance" nor is it all a clear cut response to domination. In fact, some oppositional behavior may even be an "expression of power that is fueled by and reproduces the most powerful grammar of domination" (p. 285). For example, the violation of school rules might only reflect racist or sexist values learned in other contexts.

Second, resistance theorists rarely take into account issues of gender and race. By overemphasizing class issues, they neglect the analysis of gender or race as modes of domination.
The third weakness is a tendency to focus primarily on overt acts of rebellious student behavior and ignore less obvious forms of resistance, such as reduced participation, humor, digressions, collective pressure, and so on. These actions could be perceived as resistance if they emerge "out of a latent or overt ideological condemnation of underlying repressive ideologies that characterize schools in general (p. 288). Given present school conditions, some students will not see overt rebellion as a reasonable response.

Finally, resistance theory does not give "enough attention to the issue of how domination reaches into the structure of personality itself" (p. 288). A critical psychology is needed to explore how socially developed needs are produced in the psyches of individuals to tie them "to larger structures of domination" (p. 288). This was noted above in the discussion of depth psychology.

In sum, such weaknesses fail to give sufficient credit to the insights of reproduction theory and understate the power of resistance theory to offer an adequate critique. Still, if these weaknesses can be addressed, we might construct an adequate theory of resistance to orient radical pedagogy. Resistance theory has helped restore the role of human agency and holds out "hope for radical transformation, an element of transcendence that seems to be missing in radical theories of education which appear trapped in the theoretical cemetery of Orwellian pessimism" (p. 290).

This will require a rigorous definition of "resistance" as an analytic concept. Given such an analytic framework, we can begin to explore ways to draw on the limited potential of students to resist domination and reaffirm their own cultures and histories. As Giroux concludes:

Schools will not change society, but we can create in them pockets of resistance that provide pedagogical models for new forms of learning and social relations--forms which can be used in other spheres more directly involved in the struggle for a new morality and view of social justice (p. 293).

We turn now to Cherryholmes' contributions to the revisionist critique of social education.
The Revisionist Position of Cleo Cherryholmes

Cherryholmes has also been strongly influenced by critical theory (1980, 1981, 1982, 1983a, 1983b). But unlike Giroux, he places more emphasis on the work of Habermas (1973, 1979). In addition, his work incorporates the views of linguistic philosophers (e.g., Austin 1968, Searle 1969, and Wolin 1968), as well as the work of Popper (1963, 1965, 1976) and Foucault (1972a, 1972b, 1980). Although his views are similar to Giroux's on a number of points, Cherryholmes makes several unique contributions to recent revisionist work in social education.

Cherryholmes (1980) has examined the assumptions underlying the prevailing view of social education as citizenship education. His first focus is on a particular definition of citizenship education as "a set of learning experiences that promotes effective and responsible individual decision making and behavior within the constraints of democratic values and processes" (p. 116). This version of citizenship education as decision making has wide academic support in the field and is similar to a variety of other approaches: reflective inquiry, values analysis, and the social science tradition.

This decision-making model is based on a number of assumptions. First, students are perceived to act purposively by processing normative and empirical information to make decisions. Second, they tend to choose decision solutions which they think will yield the best outcome. Thus, to become effective citizens, we must give students the necessary knowledge and skills (including valuing skills) to make effective decisions in a democratic society. Finally, students must be given the opportunity to use their knowledge and skills to participate in social and political situations. Without action, one merely contemplates, discusses, and intellectualizes. These simplified assumptions provide a model for citizenship education which can be analyzed critically.

For Cherryholmes (1980), the decision-making model for citizenship education is misconceived in several ways. First, an essential assumption of the model is the existence of a fact/value distinction; that is, that "knowledge claims can be made independently of substantive value commitments." This is related to the view that knowledge is "grounded in an objective given reality," and that the acquisition of social knowledge is an inductive process "in which scientific description leads to
Finally, the model assumes a distinction between observational and theoretical terms and a "unity of the scientific method" and thus unity of the social sciences (pp. 123-134).

These assumptions, and others, are characteristic of a positivist view of science. This view is reflected in a classical view of language which divides statements into three basic categories: (1) synthetic—those in which the truth of the statement is based on correspondence with reality; (2) analytic—statements whose truth is based on correct form (e.g., logic and math statements); (3) all other kinds, including opinions, values, and nonsense statements. This classification system is one source of the fact/value distinction fundamental to the decision-making model for citizenship education. But linguistic philosophers have challenged this analysis.

Austin (1968) pointed to an important kind of utterance that does not fit in any of the classical language categories: performance utterances. Examples would include "I do" or "I promise." Such statements are not true, false, or nonsensical. They can only be judged as to whether or not they are successful or felicitous.

A related concern is the distinction between "brute" facts (e.g., this table is made of wood) and "institutional" facts (e.g., she was breaking the speed limit). Cherryholmes (1980) cites Searle (1969) who described institutional facts as existing "within systems of constitutive rules that define the content" (p. 52). Constitutive rules define institutions, and institutional facts are to be accounted for by the classical view of language. Furthermore there are times when a "felicitous performance utterance successively involves the conventions of a background institution by allowing one to derive an "ought" from an "is" (Cherryholmes 1980, 125). This would not be possible if a fact/value distinction held. In other words, it is normally assumed one cannot "derive an evaluative conclusion from a factual premise, since in a valid deductive argument the consequent cannot contain anything not included in the premise" (p. 125). To do so is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. But, as Cherryholmes explains, performance utterances are different. For example, if Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars, he undertook an obligation to pay Smith. Therefore, he ought to pay Smith the five dollars.
Wolin (1968) has extended the implications of Austin's and Searle's views. Cherryholmes explains Wolin's position.

If...institutional meanings and norms are embedded in language and not just in the minds of the actors themselves (as portrayed in the decision-making model), then social behavior is not just a series of separate actions but a patterned series of actions constrained by those meanings, norms, and values (p. 126).

The result is a set of practices and beliefs that forms a model "in the sense that society tries to carry on its political life in accordance with them" (Wolin 1968, 149). Therefore, political science is a moral paradigm.

Cherryholmes (1980) uses the arguments of linguistic philosophy to critique the positivist assumptions of citizenship education as decision making. First, the fact/value distinction does not hold. Second, the claim that knowledge can be grounded in objective reality is questionable. If social institutions are created by people in accordance with their values, then it is possible "that they could have been created differently." Thus, existing institutions and knowledge are not fixed or given. They reflect the "historical, cultural, and idiosyncratic elements that influenced their constitutions" (p. 126). Consequently, the meaning of our observation of reality is not objective or obvious but must be interpreted.

The assumption that science proceeds inductively is also questionable. Cherryholmes (1980) cites Popper's (1959) view that inductive logic really does not exist. What does exist is "only the tautological transformations of deductive logic whose validity is not in dispute" (p. 42). If we must give up our notion of an objective given reality, where would the inductive process start? Consequently, the assumption that science progresses from description to explanation is also undermined by the preceding arguments. In other words, if there is no given objective reality or inductive logic, "then it is not possible to move simply from description to explanation" (Cherryholmes 1980, 127). In short, the validity of any description is questionable and no given valid connection exists between what is described and the explanation made of it. Facts do not speak for themselves; they are created, and therefore must be interpreted as well as explained (p. 127).
Finally, the positivist assumption regarding the unity of the scientific method is flawed, because social science facts are "fundamentally different from the brute facts of the natural sciences." The social construction of the former requires "a need for interpretation that is missing in the natural sciences" (p. 127). Most traditional citizenship education models treat knowledge as unproblematic. But this is not a reasonable view, given foregoing analysis. Consequently, a model of "citizenship education as decision making, where values and attitudes are separate from information and knowledge, is no longer plausible" (p. 127).

Another concern related to the process of building a rationale for citizenship education is the meaning of truth. Cherryholmes (1980) has discussed two major approaches to this issue. The first, the correspondence theory of truth, is contained in the statement "Y is true if, and only if, P is true." Tarski (1952) believed this is only fully true for artificial languages and approximately true for natural languages. However, Popper (1965) discounted Tarski's reservation and claimed that the correspondence theory applied to "any consistent and--more or less--'natural' language" (p. 223). If this view of truth is correct, it should be consistent with science and social criticism.

Since science can only proceed via falsification of theory, we must adopt a critical perspective. As Cherryholmes (1980) explains, Popper viewed criticism as a social process regulated by certain norms and requiring certain conditions. The norms include freedom of thought, impartiality, egalitarianism, responsibility, and clarity of communication. Thus, it is important that a society provides the conditions and institutions to ensure the freedom of thought necessary for criticism.

But we also need to regulate criticism with some objective conception of truth. As Cherryholmes (1980) explains, Popper (1976) believed the correspondence theory provided an absolute condition of truth necessary to redress the relativistic ideologies of our time. Some beliefs about the social world are less corroborated than others. All social knowledge is not equally problematic, because scientific criticism is regulated by a conception of truth. Without such regulations, as provided by the correspondence theory, we could not learn from our mistakes
or determine (even tentatively) which theories are more adequate (Cherryholmes 1980, 129).

A second very different consensus theory of truth is posited by Habermas (1979), a member of the Frankfurt School. In this theory there is no way to separate knowledge from human interests, work, and interaction. Therefore, a "critical perspective is needed because these interests bias the search for knowledge" (Cherryholmes 1980, 130-131). Consequently, we can only define facts as what a statement reports (if true) and not what it is really about. We logically assume that a hypothesis would be tested by how it corresponded to reality—that is, by means of experience. But, in fact, one's experience and perceptions are not statements. They can at best be expressed by statements about the experience. Observations can only be reported symbolically, because a statement's correspondence "with its referent phenomena is always problematic" (p. 131). Thus, theoretical statements cannot be tested by experience but only by other statements.

For Habermas (1973a), truth claims can only be justified discursively, by argumentative corroboration. A discourse is used to test truth claims which are no longer taken for granted. The purpose is to search for truth and the force of argument is the only way to achieve this end. The process involves rendering truth claims problematic and either rejecting or redeeming them.

Cherryholmes (1980) explains that nothing absolute or objective anchors a discourse. It is constantly threatened by distortions induced by a variety of asymmetries. Therefore, a number of conditions are necessary for a free discourse to exist. First, there must be unlimited interchangeability of dialogue roles. Second, discussion should be unrestricted. Third, self-representation must be unimpaired. Finally, no unilateral constraining norms are permitted. These conditions represent a conception of truth, freedom, and justice. Thus, what might be out of bounds for "consideration in "opper's incremental view of criticism may be so only because of ideologically frozen beliefs and social structures" (p. 133). Consensus theory is used to choose among alternative interpretations of social phenomena. Conversely, the correspondence theory maintains that an absolute objective view of truth should regulate criticism (p. 134).
Cherryholmes (1980) explains that no decision rules exist, only procedural rules to specify norms for a symmetrical discourse. To ensure such discourse requires a certain kind of social structure and a vision of the good society. These conditions are similar to those Popper required for the correspondence theory of truth to fiction. In both theories, approaching truth is related to the maintenance of appropriate social norms and institutions. However, while these conditions are necessary for both theories, they are not sufficient for emancipatory social criticism to eliminate forms of domination or asymmetry which could restrain or destroy discourse.

Cherryholmes draws a number of conclusions from his analysis. The main point is that the citizenship education as a decision-making model is fundamentally flawed in terms of its positivist assumptions. In addition, criticism is required to create and transmit the knowledge "necessary for citizenship education" (p. 134). Popper and Habermas present two very different views of truth, each consonant with a separate view of criticism. The choice is both political and ethical.

To help illuminate the process of contemporary citizenship education, Cherryholmes (1980) applies his analysis to the three traditions posed by Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977). The citizenship transmission approach seeks to have students accept and believe a particular conception of citizenship. Certain assumptions of this approach are consistent with the views of the linguistic philosophers (Austin, Searle, and Wolin) discussed earlier. For instance, proponents of the citizenship transmission model appear to assume it is possible to transmit a world view and that such a view consists of "norms, meanings, and values of the social institutions described and explained" (Cherryholmes 1980, 135).

The problem is that proponents of the citizenship transmission model reject a critique of the knowledge transmitted, even though they seem to realize it is historically and culturally conditioned. They do not accept that the social structures and processes they prize "could represent a false consciousness about how things are or should be" (p. 135). In this instance they do commit the naturalistic fallacy, deriving "oughts" from the way things are.

Thus we have a peculiar combination of insight into the knowledge/values relationship and a bias against a critique of
either knowledge or values. We are left with an incomplete and truncated, epistemological and ethical view of social and citizenship education (p. 135).

Cherryholmes concludes that the social science tradition is, in some ways, even more naive epistemologically and meta-ethically than citizenship transmission. The naivete is rooted in a number of misconceptions, especially the positivistic assumptions regarding the existence of a fact/value distinction and objective conception of social reality, and the view that "science proceeds inductively from description to explanation" (pp. 135-136). Cherryholmes has raised serious questions regarding these assumptions; he believes the social science tradition "perpetrates an inaccurate picture of social science and society" (p. 136).

In Cherryholmes' view, knowledge cannot be rationalized without relating it to extrascientific interests. While citizenship transmission proponents reject social criticism on ideological grounds, "positivistic social scientists reject it for epistemological reasons in the name of science." It is also more difficult to critique the social science model, "because considerable knowledge and expertise is required to identify and explicate the issues" (p. 136). Thus, this approach makes it easier to mask ideological considerations beneath a veil of facts, explanations, and theory.

The reflective inquiry approach is very similar to the decision-making model criticized above by Cherryholmes (1980), and, like the latter, this tradition has also failed to treat criticism adequately. Part of the problem is the failure to examine critically the epistemological foundations of reflective inquiry. This approach has, in the main, derived from Dewey's (1966) pragmatism. This philosophical position "itself is susceptible to a critical rationalist or critical theoretical interpretation, depending on one's situation and purposes." Thus, without a clear epistemological position, "reflective inquiry advocates may adopt a variety or combination of perspectives, such as positivism, falsificationism, pragmatism, the phenomenological, or critical theoretical with equal facility" (p. 136).

Citizenship education would be quite different depending on the choice made. Given the inadequate development of the reflective inquiry
approach, "it is not clear what knowledge claims count for when they are assembled to solve a problem" (p. 136). Without a clear philosophical basis or methodology, it is impossible to gain an adequate critical perspective.

Cherryholmes (1980) believes that Barr, Barth, and Shermis "performed a useful service in distinguishing and describing three major traditions in social and citizenship education" (p. 136). However, they have also argued that teachers should choose a position and act consistently in accordance with it. Consistency is relevant, but their position is "epistemologically flawed and ethically ambiguous." They ignore the political and ethical dimensions of citizenship education and tend to describe it as a "technical problem for social studies educators.

But social studies educators are not simply technicians. Barr, Barth, and Shermis must have been led to this position because, in trying to organize a disparate field, they overly emphasized consistency and avoided criticism, thus offering a description and not a critique (p. 137).

Cherryholmes (1980) has drawn the following conclusions to guide citizenship education in the future. First, our assumptions regarding knowledge has significant consequences; therefore criticism must be part of any valid treatment of knowledge. Criticism is not merely "an ideological corollary of democratic systems, because criticism is necessary to any systematic study of society" (p. 137).

Second, we need to analyze the content and limits of criticism in citizenship education. Popper's liberal and bounded view of criticism provides for an incremental, theoretical, and methodological critique of knowledge claims and piecemeal changes in the social structure. Conversely, Habermas posits a radical, comprehensive view of criticism with far-reaching implications for knowledge and society. For Cherryholmes (1980), consensus theory seems more persuasive than the correspondence theory, because the latter "cannot adequately control scientific activity even on its own term" (p. 138). Thus, the validity of statements is more likely to be determined via discourse.

However, the consensus theory has no external grounds to govern the conclusions of discourse. "One consequence is that radical criticism may be used to justify arbitrary actions and decisions." But Popper's critical rationalism raises a different problem; that is, the "social
structures that govern social scientific and social criticism may themselves be represented and biased" (p. 138). While we need a form of criticism that avoids chaos and authoritarianism, it must still be open enough to allow a radical critique of knowledge. Yet, there is no way to permit the latter without some risk of scientific and social disarray. We are stuck with the problem of balancing the needs of freedom and order.

Finally, if we were to incorporate Popper's liberal view into the decision-making model of citizenship education, it might be possible to retain it. Although this would allow criticism of individual parts of the model, the overall system, "including values and preferences, information and knowledge, alternatives, decision criteria, and choices, would remain relatively constant" (p. 138).

Conversely, if we follow Habermas' position, the theory will determine the perspective taken. The use of Popper's linear model would tend to further the objectification of reality and other positivist assumptions. A critical theoretical model would be more holistic, political, and interpretive. It would not be fragmented or preplanned, as there would be no way to predetermine the order or outcome of the discourse.

As Cherryholmes concludes:

Decision making can be the "heart of the social studies" (Engle 1960) only in a liberal view of citizenship education; ongoing, unconstrained, discourse is the "heart of the social studies," in a critical view of citizenship education (p. 139).

For Cherryholmes (1982), most of current social studies practice amounts to a passive approach to citizenship education. In some respects, he echoes the view of Barth and Shermis (1982). However, Cherryholmes (1982) posits a different analysis and explanation. He believes an interaction of three variables produces the passive approach to citizenship: (1) the positivist assumptions of mainstream social education epistemology; (2) a dormant ideology which reinforces the status quo; and (3) the utilization of certain educational technologies--for example, behavioral objectives which both reflect and encourage the objectification of knowledge. In Cherryholmes' view, only a critical approach can penetrate this system and provide the possibilities for progressive change. Like Giroux, Cherryholmes believes the Frankfurt School,
especially the work of Habermas, provides the theory for such an approach.

Cherryholmes (1982) claims that the quest for "truth cannot be separated from an appropriate social structure and social values" (p. 65). If such norms and values are absent or distorted, the pursuit of truth will be biased. This is certainly not a unique idea. Even in empirical investigations, the rejection of null hypotheses cannot be decided without criteria (norms), but such technical norms treat error and bias in an objectified way as separate from researchers. Epistemology should not be reduced to a philosophy of science, because research and ideology are intertwined (Cherryholmes 1982, 66). If the dominant passive approach to social education is related to a commitment to a flawed epistemology, then Habermas' approach provides a strong case for revising the social education program.

One major problem to overcome is the basic asymmetry of the traditional (and still typical) classroom interaction. The teacher is the central authority by virtue of position and greater education. To have a successful discourse and its required norms, teacher authority must support it as a first necessary condition.

A second necessary condition for a successful discourse is the teacher's commitment to students. The teacher must show students how to do critical analysis and (especially for young students) use norms of discourse to guide discussions with fair enforcement. This would be a "radical departure from inquiry activities that are mainly cognitive activities focusing on a much narrower range of concern" (p. 67).

All that goes on in social studies classrooms is not, and should not be, discourse. Discourse should be reserved for situations when normal communication breaks down. Furthermore, students cannot engage in a discourse without some knowledge. Thus, a certain amount of non-dialectical knowledge (including basic skills) is another necessary condition for discourse. Given such knowledge, the validity of truth claims can be checked. But students should not objectify this social knowledge; they need to study "the values and norms embedded in these empirical regularities" (pp. 67-68). Study of the underlying ideology of knowledge is the bridge to discourse and the basis for criticism, the link between nondialectical and dialectical knowledge.
Therefore, to develop a new social education program, one must first decide what needs to be known about social phenomena. Following this, normal interaction and discourse can take place. Behavioral objectives are appropriate at this stage, because it is here that necessary conditions need to be stated (Cherryholmes 1978, 1982). However, when knowledge becomes problematic and requires interpretation, "learning becomes dialectical and learning objectives become inappropriate because sufficient conditions for critical interpretation cannot be stated" (1982, 68).

A normal classroom would move to critical discourse if a truth claim were questioned and rendered problematic. Thus, a student's questioning of interpretations should be encouraged, along with giving students help with expressing views and gathering evidence. This requires that students develop the skills for making and evaluating arguments. The dialectical component of discourse includes the ability and freedom "to challenge on successively deeper levels what is claimed to be empirically the case and which normatively should be the case." (p. 69).

Finally, the interactions of classroom discourse cannot be competitive or conflictive. Strategic behavior designed to gain advantage is not permitted; the aim is to find the generalized interest of the group. Therefore, we can see the importance of careful preparation of students. It would also be desirable (but not necessary) to have heterogeneous classrooms to help reduce susceptibility to institutionalized interpretations and provide more varied interpretations. Of course it would also make reaching consensus more difficult (Cherryholmes 1982).

Recently, a number of social educators have sought to describe how social phenomena influence social studies education and discourse (Popkewitz 1979, Cherryholmes 1980, 1982, Anyon 1978, 1979a, 1979b, 1980, and Giroux 1982b, 1983). In this tradition, Cherryholmes (1983a) has sought to "illuminate further how what is said about social education is a function and product of the materiality of other social practices and discourses" (p. 347). In this instance, Cherryholmes refers to a different use of the term discourse. He relies on the work of Foucault (1972a) who describes discursive practice as "a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or lin-
guistic area, the conditions of the enunciative formation" (p. 117).
The utterances of discourse are not random as they are shaped by a dis-
cursive practice. To understand "where knowledge and power fit in social
studies education, it is necessary to gain insight into its discursive
practice" (Cherryholmes 1983a, 341-342).

For Foucault, discourse occurs with a system of rules that are anon-
ymous and historically conditioned. These rules determine who can speak
with authority, create possibilities for what can be said, and dictate
what remains unsaid. Cherryholmes (1983a) believes we must modify
Foucault's condition of anonymity when analyzing social education, as
some rules of discourse are explicitly set by boards of education,
legislation, and so on. The professional norms and commitments of the
field can be found in methods texts and professional journals. "In the
broadest sense, knowing the rules of a discourse, whether one is able to
state them or not, is knowing who may contribute to it and what is an
appropriate contribution." The important point is to determine how the
structure of practice and discourse "shape, both through constraint and
through the creation of opportunity, statements about social studies
education" (p. 342).

Cherryholmes (1983a) links his earlier discussion of the philosophy
of language to Foucault's work. As noted above, language is not trans-
parent and neutral. Speech acts take place "in the context of integrated
and well-defined social institutions." They acquire their meaning and
"force from background conventions, circumstances, and procedures" (pp.
343-344). At times, the institutional background and the speech act are
clear, but not always, and then knowledge becomes problematic to the
hearer.

Foucault's focus is on structural characteristics of discourse, and
his analysis gives insight into the "background conditions that give
meaning and force to speech acts" (Cherryholmes 1983a, 344). Thus, an
adequate account of discourse will also help explain what passes for
truth and knowledge. For Foucault (1980), truth is a social product
produced by multiple forms of constraint and "it induces regular effects
of power" (p. 344). Every society has what Foucault calls a "regime" or
"general politics" of truth. This refers to which specific discourses
are accepted, sanctioned, and enabled to function as true. This includes
all the mechanisms for distinguishing true and false statements, the techniques valued for acquiring truth, and "the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true" (Cherryholmes 1983a, 131).

The rules of discourse emanate from underlying power relations in society. Power can be defined as the "social, political, and/or material asymmetries by which people are differentially rewarded and indulged for performing certain acts and sanctioned and deprived for performing other acts" (p. 345). Thus, the rules for discourse are not mere guidelines for linguistic usage but the reflection of social and material conditions. Knowledge claims and power relations are "interrelated and inter-penetrate, since knowledge claims are products of discourse and discourse is structured by rules and power relations" (p. 345). Our knowledge claims are employed to legitimize or contest power relations. Thus, power does not merely constrain and limit; it also creates opportunities.

Foucault (1980) believes power is effective and accepted, because it does not simply restrict but has the capacity to produce things, including pleasure, knowledge, and discourse. We should consider power as "a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than a negative instance whose function is repression" (p. 199).

In social education, power resides in the state and its text adoption procedure which controls much of the content selection. Social studies methods instructors also have some power in establishing what counts as knowledge.

Power relations are complicated by the fact that participants in a discourse tend to believe in the validity of the process. This is the ideological dimension of discourse. Ideologies contribute to the way people interpret reality and their behavior. They are based on beliefs and interpretations thought to be valid. Although ideology is a mental process, its effects are ultimately merged with the material culture (Cherryholmes 1983a). In social education, there is a widespread acceptance of social science methods of research, and authority to speak on such matters is generally restricted to "experts."

It is clear that power relations shape discourse, that is, what is said and not said. Yet "these factors have been largely excluded from discussion about social studies education." There is much discussion regarding how things are or should be, but little "about how the way
things are determine what is said and can't be said." What we say are acts and material. If we fail to examine how they are produced via "social processes and power relations, then we cannot claim to be deeply reflective about or in control of what we do." We must recognize that, in a sense, statements make persons, and power puts words in our mouths. "Discoursive practices antedate speakers; they outlast speakers" (p. 346).

However, we should not be overly deterministic regarding this process, as some utterances are more determined by discursive practices than others. There are a number of reasons for this. First "not all discursive practices are equally well integrated" (pp. 346-347). For example, classroom discussion is less structured than a judicial hearing. Second, there are a wide variety of discourses and one must choose among them at their boundaries. Third, some people are not completely socialized and thus challenge and violate "anonymous historical rules" governing discourse. Finally, the institutions that embody and enforce rules will not police all utterances with the same level of attention. Consequently, across a discourse one sees a variation of utterances offered as well as those indulged, tolerated, or taken seriously.

Cherryholmes claims that Foucault's analysis is correct at the general level of social discourse. "But speech act theory at the level of specific utterances points to some discursive looseness and slack... [and]...the lack of social and linguistic integration provides an opportunity to break out of ongoing discursive practices" (p. 347). This possibility is analogous to the opportunities to act against the dominant culture described by resistance theorists (see Giroux 1983a).

Cherryholmes (1983a) again analyzes the three traditions of Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977) to illustrate the lack of full discursive analysis in social education. For citizenship transmission proponents, knowledge is generally treated as self-evident truths and little controversy is included. The status quo is either implicitly or explicitly promoted and valued. "Because of the largely implicit nature of this evaluation, the discussion of social knowledge and issues is hardly open to interpretation, let alone criticism" (p.350). The focus is on reproducing the existing culture and society.

The power relations supporting this discourse include the market situation for producing textbooks. Texts require a high level of invest-
ment and must be sold in a market where large sections are controlled by conservative state textbook selection committees. Given our economic system, a profit-maximizing strategy is the dominant approach; therefore texts must avoid offending conservative sensibilities. It is interesting to note that the content of this discourse is largely anonymous. Textbook advertisements in Social Education almost never list the authors. Cherryholmes hypothesizes that the more powerful the power relations shaping the discourse are, the more anonymous the discourse becomes as fewer degrees of freedom exist for variation.

For supporters of the social science tradition, the emphasis is on value-free social science. The rule for including or excluding knowledge from the discourse is not the marketplace, but derives from social science methodologies and activities. Still, it is a "fundamentally conservative position, because social and political structures are accepted as given" (p. 351). As the positivist orientation of the social sciences, they have little or no role in changing society. The social scientists determine what counts as knowledge and much is excluded, for example, the critical analysis of the causes of inequality.

Social educators pay much deference to social scientists and this reinforces their authority in the field. Although the social science tradition emphasizes rational social calculation, in practice it has an effect similar to citizenship transmission. "Things are to be apprehended as they appear, and fundamental questions about the nature of society are not to be posed" (p. 352). In essence, both discourses include and exclude similar content.

Supporters of the reflective inquiry tradition emphasize decision making in a socio-political context. The guidelines for this discourse do not distinguish between method and content as do social science advocates. Rather, "the method of identifying and solving problems is assumed to interact explicitly with the content that defines the problem and its solution" (p. 352). It also goes beyond the social science rationale and emphasizes the rational analysis of values. Unfortunately, the "structures within which action is taken are sometimes taken for granted" (p. 352).

The power relations supporting reflective inquiry are weak when compared to those for the citizenship transmission and social science
approaches, especially the former. The force of the reflective inquiry position derives in the main "from the related academic base of philosophical pragmatism...[the] authority of educational philosophers and social studies methods teachers who adopt it" (p. 353). But with few exceptions it is not included in most social studies texts. Too many powerful interests oppose it as it would potentially admit discovery of topics excluded from other approaches.

Cherryholmes (1983a) reaches several conclusions related to discourse and social education. First, no one coherent discourse defines the field and a wide variety of discursive practices exist. Second, relations with other discursive areas are important in shaping the field of social education. This is especially true in the case of the citizenship transmission model's relation to the marketplace and the social science model's relation to the social science disciplines and experts. Third, the ideological commitment to different discursive practices ranges from support of the status quo to critical orientations.

However, the supporting power relations for the various discourses vary greatly, and those supporting conservatism are strongest by far. What is unsaid in the discourses tells much about the field of social education, especially the tendency to avoid analysis of inequality, injustice, oppression, and social conflict (Cherryholmes 1983a, 355).

Critical Reactions to Revisionist Thought

The reaction to the revisionist critique and proposals has been mixed. In most cases, revisionist thought seems to be ignored by mainstream social educators. One exception to this is Theory and Research in Social Education, which has maintained a policy open to a wide range of ideological and research orientations. Still, the bulk of the revisionist work has appeared in journals in other areas or in books.

Those who have reacted to the revisionists have often been critical. Much of this criticism has been directed toward Giroux, which is not surprising given his productivity and consequent visibility among social education revisionists. Cornbleth (1980) has raised several concerns regarding an article by Giroux and Penna (1980) which analyzes the hidden curriculum and social education. Cornbleth argues that the nature of
the preferred society discussed by Giroux and Penna is too sketchy. "They do not specify toward what ends change should be directed, who is to decide, for whom, or on what basis" (1980, 58). She is skeptical of proposals for imposed egalitarianism rooted in an undefined concept of justice.

Another weaknesses in the Giroux and Penna position is their failure to give sufficient attention to the value of pluralism in a democratic society. Furthermore, "their recommendations do not directly address the socio-political milieu in which schools and school personnel exist or the present socialization aims of schooling" (Cornbleth 1980, 60). This latter criticism illustrates the different analytical framework employed by Cornbleth. Giroux and Penna claim that they do examine the socio-political milieu of schooling, but that it cannot be studied effectively in isolation from the wider society and culture (Giroux and Penna 1980).

A very different criticism of Giroux's analysis is raised by C. A. Bowers (1982). He praises Giroux's grasp and application of Marxist theory to criticize the positivist influence on education. But Giroux fails to "go beyond these positions to uncover elements of the Enlightenment episteme that forms the common bedrock he shares with positivistic and instrumental thinkers," he criticizes. Specifically, this shared tradition includes:

- the anthropocentric university, the efficacy of reason in controlling man's future, a view of time and change as essentially progressive, a privileged position assigned to intellectuals and experts, and the absence of any real insight into the psychological and sense of the tragic (p. 420).

Giroux has expressed concern that education is often based on a form of radical pluralism; that is, an unreflective toleration which amounts to a way of banalizing the truth. For Bowers, this seems to reflect Giroux's "commitment to restricting the phenomenological world to fit the interpretive framework of his Marxist ideology and vision" (p. 421). More important, however, is Giroux's inability to understand that his analysis is limited to categories derived from the Enlightenment.

Giroux's emphasis is on making explicit the origin and purpose of taken-for-granted knowledge and using critical theory to free individ-
uals from the domination of history. But this analysis neglects how "culture, as a symbolic schemata, is reproduced through communication and lived as a tacit form of knowledge." As a result, "Giroux overestimates the power of rational thought...while underestimating how people are psychologically and linguistically rooted in their unconscious history" (Bowers 1982, 421-422).

Although Giroux is opposed to any dialectic that would impose a formula, he does as much when he "assumes that acts of resistance are always progressive, that substituting explicit forms of rational thought for the tacit knowledge rooted in tradition is more enlightened, and that people want to make their own history." It is on such issues that the Enlightenment ideology misunderstands the nature and power of culture. Holding these views prevents Giroux from "recognizing the way teachers and students are embedded in the language environments that make up culture...." In short, Giroux is not truly radical, because he fails to examine critically "the basic categories of Western thought that appear to be increasingly problematic" (Bowers 1982, 422).

Reitz and Martin (1984) believe that flaws in Giroux's work probably help "to serve political interests opposed to that for which it was originally intended" (pp. 163-164). For example, Giroux has substituted amorphous notions of resistance and "civic courage" for the traditional "rigorous doctrines" of class struggle, party activism, and revolutionary socialism. In addition, Reitz and Martin see Giroux's analysis and critique as often shallow, superficial, or incorrect. A case in point is his criticism of Bowles and Gintis (and classical Marxism) as too mechanical and materialistic. A careful reading of Schooling in Capitalist America (1976) does not sustain Giroux's claim that the book neglects the subjective capacities for change. Half of the book deals with the question of change, and Bowles and Gintis make clear that "simple mechanistic relationships between economic structure and educational development" are not likely to correspond to the available evidence (Reitz and Martin 1984, 167). Furthermore, Bowles and Gintis clearly emphasize revolutionary optimism and activism.

Reitz and Martin also claim that Giroux has misunderstood and incorrectly applied the views of Althusser and Marcuse. In the former instance, he misunderstands Althusser's concept of "overdetermination."
In the case of Marcuse, he fails to note critical weaknesses in his theory. Because Giroux relies so heavily on Marcuse, this misunderstanding undermines his own theory and recommendations. For example, Giroux posits "civic courage" (i.e., acting as if one lived in a democracy) as having emancipatory power. However, he has not developed an adequate theoretical base for this claim. The philosophy of "as if" or utopian fiction is derived from the work of Hans Vaihinger (Reitz and Martin 1982, 170-171). Giroux seems unaware of this or the non- and anti-Marxist aspects of such theory. In sum, Giroux's views are closer to "a radical neo-liberalism than they are to a radical Marxian call for praxis to struggle against the oppression of an underclass" (p. 171).

Finally, Giroux's radical individualism is expressed in terms so vague that they do not amount to a concrete proposal of any kind. He neglects the critical need to develop in students a collectivist character oriented toward altruism, cooperation, and social concern for others' welfare. Anything short of this will aid the educational reactionaries of the 1980s (p. 173). In short, Giroux is thought to be too Marxist by some and not sufficiently Marxist by others.

Newmann (1984) has made a more general critique of the revisionists which relates to the views of Cherryholmes as well as Giroux. First, he notes the considerable resistance to the revisionist position. "Personal experience and other evidence confirm, for many people, a sanguine view of the U.S. economic-political system." Therefore, the widespread commitment to status quo values and institutions "cannot be dismissed as false consciousness." Part of this resistance also derives from weaknesses in the revisionist perspective. In particular, the revisionist position suffers from a lack of "ideological substance, its neglect of organizational constraints on teaching and its relative silence about pedagogy for dealing with ambiguity, contradiction, and criticism" (p. 23).

Newmann also believes that the revisionists do not acknowledge that some relations of domination are necessary in any society. They posit the implementation of democratic socialism as an alternative to the present system, but it is vaguely defined and no specific policy proposals are offered. Newmann argues that existing constraints on teachers would make implementing revisionist pedagogy a logistic nightmare and
entail a great deal of risk. There is also a limit to the amount of human tolerance for ambiguity, contradiction, and criticism. Newmann wonders how much of this is constructive and how long such high levels of criticism could be sustained.

The revisionist position must be made more coherent if they expect to have a significant impact on mainstream social educators. This would include well-grounded specific proposals with an analysis of the costs and benefits involved. They must also resolve contradictions within their own theory and clarify analytical concepts such as emancipation and socialist democracy. Some attention must be given to how we would change the structure of the schools and pedagogical practice to facilitate the revisionist program. Finally, we will need proposals for political organization and action to counteract the resistance to the revisionist program. Newmann (1984) reminds us that "a substantial portion of resistance comes...from persons who actually subscribe to general radical positions" (p. 32). This highlights the importance of clarifying revisionist theory and proposals.

Not all the reaction of the revisionist position has been negative. Brosio (1982) claims that "Giroux's special accomplishment is to connect radical Marxist thought to the problems of persons concerned with schools and education" (p. 429). And despite his critical comments, Newmann (1984) finds much in the revisionist position to provide "a persistent intellectual challenge, a constant invitation to discover and demystify" (p. 19). The revisionist themes of human agency, autonomy, and resistance are powerful. They represent "a fundamental human aspiration and requirement for social justice" (p. 19). This view also recognizes the relationship between knowledge and values which results in the social construction of reality. This has great potential for an active program of learning in which both teachers and students are engaged in a search for the truth (p. 21).

The contributions of the revisionists should not be underestimated. Their emphasis on the social origins of knowledge and the need to study schooling within its social-historical context has great potential explanatory power. The revisionists raise questions and provide analytical tools rarely considered in the field. They not only represent a
different social education rationale, but also provide an alternative research paradigm (Popkewitz 1984).

An emerging body of research tends to support some claims made by the revisionists. For example, numerous studies of textbook content indicate that our students have been confronted with distorted knowledge which stereotypes various groups on the basis of sex, race, or ethnicity (Anyon 1978, Racism and Sexism Resource Center for Education 1977, Hahn and Blankenship 1983, Sigler 1979, Fitzgerald 1979).

Other studies have revealed ideological bias in student texts and classroom materials. Taxel (1980) found that the general depiction of the American Revolution in children's fiction legitimated a mythical view which portrayed the revolution as a divinely inspired struggle for independence. Saltonstall (1979) concluded that the explanations for poverty presented in secondary social studies texts generally reinforced Western capitalist ideology and avoided controversial viewpoints. Such ideological bias seems especially true regarding how texts deal with our economic system, the labor movement, social class, equality, and social justice (Anyon 1979a, 1979b, McNeil 1977, Nelson and Carlson 1981, Romanish 1983). The general focus is to reinforce the status quo and exclude discussion of radical alternatives and critique.

Some studies have focused on the classroom processes and their impact on reproduction of the dominant culture (Anyon 1980, Willis 1977, Kickbush 1981, Popkewitz, Tabachnick, and Wehlege 1982). There is some evidence that the kinds of knowledge and methods of teaching vary in relation to the student's social class. In general, the knowledge forms transmitted to students tends to reflect the status quo culture and institutions.

Finally, mainstream social educators have called our attention to the pervasiveness of social education as the transmission of the dominant culture and how this encourages a passive view of citizenship (Haas 1979, Morrissett and Haas 1982, Barr, Barth and Shermis 1977, 1978, Shermis and Barth 1982). Stanley (1979, 1981c) has noted that the emphasis on transmitting the status quo and excluding radical views is a general characteristic of the major rationales for social education. Consequently, one can argue that the revisionist perspective represents, at least in part, an accurate critique of the field and a valuable
alternative rationale. Still, the revisionist must take seriously the criticisms of mainstream social educators if they hope to increase their influence.

IV. Conclusions

Although the pace of reform in social education may have slowed over the last decade, significant debate and development has continued. At the very least, the recent work in the foundations of social education represents a more complex reinterpretation and extension of mainstream thought and the development of revisionist counter proposals. Despite these efforts, the field remains divided regarding the rationale and definition of social education.

Mainstream social educators have continued to criticize the prevailing approach to social education; that is, the imposition of dominant cultural knowledge and values as expressed in the citizenship transmission or conservative cultural continuity rationales. However, the critique has become more sophisticated, and there is a greater appreciation for the power, attraction, and functional aspects of such rationales. In addition, others have called our attention to the need to consider the legitimate interests of local communities or the teacher’s classroom environment in the process of building rationales.

There does seem to be a continuing consensus that "citizenship" is the central focus of social education. But some see this as an overly narrow focus or not the exclusive concern of social educators. More significantly, others have noted the failure to agree on the definition of a "good citizen." Thus, even a relative consensus concerning the centrality of the citizenship education has not resulted in a corresponding convergence of views regarding a rationale for the field. Some believe that this lack of consensus helps explain the continuing domination of classroom practices which encourage a passive approach to citizenship. This could be a factor, but we must also consider the general failure of most social education reformers to gain widespread support among teachers. This review indicates that both mainstream and revisionist reformers are aware that future reform efforts face formidable resistance.
We should also note the potential problems caused by the tendency to reify the three traditions model of Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977). Despite over a decade of criticism pointing to serious weaknesses in the model, it continues to pervade the literature of the field. Even revisionists like Giroux and Cherryholmes use the three traditions as a major focus of their critique of mainstream social education. But there is good reason to believe that the three traditions model cannot adequately incorporate many of the major mainstream rationales. Thus, a critique that centers on the three traditions can distort the process of analysis by deflecting it toward artificial categories. As a consequence, the revisionists tend to ignore rationales which do not fit within the three traditions model (Oliver and Shaver 1966, Leming 1981, Stanley 1981c). The work of Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977) has made a valuable contribution to the general analysis of the field, but it has not resolved the issues it raised. Therefore, it is a serious mistake to confuse their analysis with a definitive, accurate description of social education.

The revisionists have raised a number of other serious concerns. Like the mainstream reformers, they have criticized the dominant passive approach to social education. But they have also called into question the theoretical basis of the reform rationales as well as the paradigms which have oriented research in the field. In addition, the revisionists have constructed the outlines of a new rationale based on the goals of emancipation and social justice. This amounts, in many instances, to a fundamental or radical rejection of many of our cultural values and institutions.

One important aspect of the revisionist position is rejection of the assumed dichotomy between reflective inquiry and imposition. This was an issue raised by the social reconstructionists a half century earlier. The revisionists have expanded this analysis and made a persuasive case that the two positions are not necessarily incompatible. In this particular, they are joined by a number of others (Oliver and Shaver 1966, Newmann 1975, Leming 1981, and Stanley 1981c). The basic contention is that some combination of imposition and reflective inquiry represents the basis for an improved rationale for social education. As Giroux (1983b) argues, students must "learn the distinction between
authority which dictates meaning and authority which fosters a critical search for meaning" (p. 84).

This review indicates that the rationales that orient our field can (and apparently do) have an important impact on the practice of social education. Every social studies educator operates on the basis of some rationale or combination of rationales. We may or may not be conscious of this process, but, in effect, our day-to-day practice serves the interests of some rationale and hence certain groups in our society. There is no way to avoid this, and it would seem preferable that the process be conscious and reflective. Somehow, we need to find better ways to convey this to classroom teachers.

I would conclude by agreeing with social educators like Nelson and Engle that diversity and dispute in the field are not signs of weakness but of strength, especially in a democratic society. The danger lies in our tendency to place unnecessary restrictions on the parameters of the debate. Shaver and Leming are also correct to call our attention to the importance of considering the needs of the community and the fundamental socialization functions of the school as we strive for reform. However, if we do not keep the dialogue open to radical critique and orient our discourse around the quest for social justice, we run the risk of encouraging authoritarianism or relativism. In fact, in many instances, the latter serves the interests of the former. It is hoped that this review will stimulate further reflective dialogue on these issues.

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This chapter is devoted to an examination of the status and potential of scholarship in social studies as a subject taught in schools, and social education as a field of study that goes beyond classroom activities. We begin with a few definitions to make clear how some common terms are used in the chapters; we then consider an apparent paradox suggested in William Stanley's introductory chapter to this book; review the other five chapters; offer divergent views about where we are and where we might go in social education scholarship; and discuss some implications for instructional and curricular practice.

Our use of some common terms in the chapter may be confusing without an explanation. We refer here to "field" and to "social education" and "social studies." The term "field" is used to include both professional practice and scholarly study. It encompasses teaching, curriculum development, and scholarly examination. We use social education as a term inclusive of the broad concerns of social knowledge, social relations, social development, and social improvement, which are among the goals of social studies but go beyond schooling practices in their intentions, activities, and research implications (Nelson and Michaelis 1980, Ch. 1).

Social studies, then, is used to identify the schooling part of social education—the part that receives the most attention in publications. But we suggest that the larger context of social education is of considerable import. Each of the chapters in this book has some social education perspective. Cognitive learning and critical thinking represent concerns much broader than classroom practice; similarly, children's social knowledge is heavily influenced by more than early childhood or elementary educational institutions; values education research is important to the field whether conducted in schools or outside; ethnography is particularly well suited to the careful examination of broader social
education interests; and the foundations chapter addresses directly ques-
tions of knowledge and society beyond the school.

The systematic study of education, schooling, and subjects taught
in schools has occupied the attention of scholars since the early 1900s.
Social studies research, however, does not go back so far, and this
volume is only the second National Council for Social Studies publication
to review recent research in social studies. We are limited here to
consideration of research since 1976. The field of social education,
however, could be considered to be much older. There is evidence, of
course, that scholarly examination of the purposes and practices of edu-
cation in and for society reaches back beyond the ancient classical per-
iod. Philosophical discourse focused on bringing up young children, the
role of the state and of parents, and related educational concerns
(Jowett 1901, Marrou 1956, Ulich 1954, Cubberley 1920). Certainly the
practical problems of education, schooling, and teaching have long occu-
pied the attention of educators. Some separation of research, or
scholarship, from practice has occurred in education, as in virtually
every field in the social sciences (Handy and Harwood 1973), despite
Dewey's admonitions against it (Dewey 1933, 1938). Nevertheless, both
practice and scholarship are part of the field of social studies educa-
tion.

I. The Paradox

This volume began with an introductory chapter setting out a paradox.
While social studies education might be in a cocoon state, "virtually
dead" (Newmann 1984, 12), Stanley's introduction says, "research and
development in social education have continued with many significant
results." That seems an unlikely combination: an area of schooling that
is comatose, while scholars in the field are very active. Yet, that
paradox may be an apt description of our current status. The reviews of
scholarship contained in this book show considerable activity in some
areas, while reports indicate that little obvious change is taking place
in social studies in schools (Shaver, Davis, and Helburn 1980, Goodlad
1984). The research activity may be distant from schooling realities;
there may be considerable vitality in practice unrecognized by scholars;
scholarly work may be ignored in practice; or it could be that scholarship and practice in social education are by their nature distinct endeavors with little interrelationship. Thoughtful practitioners and scholars should be concerned about this paradox and its possible explanations.

The possibility that research is conducted largely without regard to practice and that practitioners disregard or ignore research does not speak well of a field, especially a professional field. It is not a healthy state of affairs to have practice and research dissociated without reason. There may be good reason, as discussed later, to maintain the separation for some situations, but a general condition of separation needs to be addressed.

One approach would be to convince researchers to undertake studies much more directly concerned with applied problems in social studies instruction and curriculum. Such studies would be devoted to providing a basis in sound and reasoned scholarship for maintaining or changing practice. The research agenda could be established jointly by practitioners and researchers, by practitioners primarily, or by researchers sensitive to the realities of practitioners' needs. This approach would require an investment in applied research specifically committed to identifying what teachers and schools are doing well, what factors account for success, what the likely consequences of different courses of action might be, and how current problems in instruction and teaching might be resolved. With such a shift in research orientation, practitioners might be convinced to modify practice, if supported by good research. For that to happen, practitioners would have to become much more aware of, involved in, and critical of research. And researchers would have to provide much clearer translations of their work from more esoteric reports into potential schooling activities. A great deal of effort at developing improved communication and cooperation would be necessary.

Another approach, not entirely opposite the previous one, would be to train teachers as researchers. This would stimulate the development of research reports, and perhaps bridge the gap between what is found by scholars and what is practiced. Teachers are expected to take on the role of scholars as they deal with their students and their subjects; the role of researcher may require increased specific training in research
theory and practice, but follows from the same orientation to inquiry and study.

There are many problems with both of the approaches noted above. First, there is a danger in applied research that the most significant research topics will not be undertaken because they are not identified as current or important to practice. Basic studies of social knowledge, learning, development, and highly complex problems might not be perceived as practical and do not seem to lend themselves easily to applied research tools. Second, an underlying ideology of research to be applied to practice is unlikely to result in critical examination of the root causes of that practice, leading to minor modifications to make practice more efficient or more conforming rather than to make it more liberating or productive of knowledge (Popkewitz 1984). Third, research aimed at producing findings about teaching or curricular practices that can be used prescriptively—for example, how teachers should introduce films or use texts—may be too narrow, too temporary, and too superficial to be of real use. And fourth, for a field to remain viable, some practitioners must remain skeptical of research products and willing to challenge the fashionable research mo jus, and some scholars need to examine topics which are so fundamental or comprehensive that direct applications cannot be inferred at any particular point in time.

To pursue only research that is targeted to today's practice may condemn the field to an intellectually sterile climate and an early demise. There is a need for skeptical practitioners, and for scholars to look beyond the narrow limits of current practice to propose potential future directions. The maintenance of both perspectives may require some separation between scholarship and practice. Yet, there is also a need to bridge an apparent gap between the general conditions of research and practice in social studies.

II. The State of Moribundity

The first chapter noted that "the field is far from being moribund." This statement raises an issue of great concern for scholarship and practice. Being moribund in practice could represent an appropriate and reflective pause between periods of activity, degeneration of interest
and involvement in social education, or practitioners who are merely
tired, content, complacent, or frustrated. If we are in the midst of a
necessary pause between active periods of development of practice, compe-
tent observers should be able to discern the outlines of the last period
and comment on its dimensions. Prescient observers should be able to
sense the outlines of the next period of activity. These observations
suggest a role for scholars who can stand away from practice for their
assessments. Skeptical practitioners, too, may become early advocates
or critics of potential new activity.

In scholarship, it may be difficult to determine whether a field is
becoming moribund. Obviously, any research field could be considered
moribund if there was virtually no activity, so quantity is important.
A field could also be considered moribund if the quality of work was so
low as to make little or no contribution. Large quantity with low qual-
ity would represent activity of a sort, but that activity would be
limited to the most simplistic notions of scholarship. If quantity were
taken as the only indicator of level of moribundity, it could be highly
misleading because it could hide a significant problem of intellectual
stagnation.

Questions of quality in scholarship raise subtle concerns. Quality
measures are determined usually by those who hold positions of authority
in scholarship in the field. Research quality is judged typically by
reference to the current research paradigms and orientations. This would
be presumed since one would want authorities to make those qualitative
judgments. It poses a problem when the paradigms and orientations are
held so rigidly that new, radical, or innovative scholarship is
restricted, disdained, or ignored because of mainstream domination of
research (Apple 1982, Bredo and Feinberg 1982, Giroux 1979, Stanley 1979,
this condition could also be considered moribund even if some leading
authorities pointed to high quality. This is particularly significant
since standard canons of scholarship cannot be overthrown each time there
is a claim of a new revelation, nor can a field remain vital if it im-
poses an intellectual straightjacket on all scholars.

Another dimension of an assessment of scholarship for evidence of
moribundity would be an examination of the topics studied, the advances
in knowledge, and the research methods and strategies used. This examination would be done to ascertain the overall level of scholarly progress, regardless of the quantity of studies or the quality of individual studies. If there is little evidence of accumulated knowledge, new topics under study, more valid research designs and approaches, or important revisions in theory or practice the scholarship may be moving toward moribundity. Reviews of recent research are important indicators of these dimensions of moribundity and activity.

III. Review of the Reviews

The several chapters of this book present a mix of categories of the field, topics under study, and research methods utilized in social education. The chapter topics include some categories of perennial concern, such as critical thinking, as well as areas that have suffered neglect in previous research reviews, such as foundations. As the introduction indicates, it is impossible to provide, in one slim volume, reviews of research in all areas or categories recognized in social education, but the present volume presents a significant and popular sampling of them.

Critical thinking is among the most advocated of purposes for social education, and research in cognitive processes is a topic of current vogue in psychology that is of import to any subject taught in the schools. Unfortunately, there appears to be little substantial research on critical thinking because it is a construct that is difficult to assess. Although cognitive processes are now very popular subjects of research, researchers have often reduced the construct to relatively simplistic and misleading behavioral measures. Cornbleth's perceptive analysis of myths and problems in this important area suggests valuable perspectives for further research of value to social education.

The chapter on early childhood and elementary education represents a category of social education interest different from the chapter on critical thinking and cognitive processes. This category relates more to school structure and to levels of developmental learning. Historically, social studies concerns have been heavily influenced by interests
at the secondary school level. Over a period of time this influence has changed, as chapter 3 illustrates, and there is increasing awareness of the developmental characteristics of social learning that extend to the elementary school. Jantz and Klawitter discuss the modest amount of scholarship centered on social studies at these levels. Their self-imposed definition of social studies as the "integration of knowledge from the social science disciplines" unnecessarily restricted the scope of the review, but their selection of studies shows that "social science" scholars have made limited contributions to our understanding of early education. That leaves much for scholars to undertake in this area.

The vast amount of discussion in the social education literature about values and attitudes signals this category as another important research area of social education. For that reason, one might have expected to find considerable research. Yet, as Leming's thoughtful examination demonstrates, there have been few sustained, systematic, or comprehensive research programs on values or attitude development. Of the nine or more different types of values education identified, a quantity of research has been conducted on only two, and that research appears to have problems of both methodology and continuity. Research into political attitudes was prominent over a decade ago, but that interest has abated, and there has not been much progress in methodological sophistication or theory development. Much remains to be done in this area.

Ethnography has been discovered by social education scholars. White's chapter, on a methodology rather than a topic, represents a surge of interest in the field. A major difficulty, as White notes, is that the ethnographic approach is variously defined and subject to manipulation, which threatens its users' claims to scholarship. It is a label easily appropriated to cover multitudes of activities. Further, there is a significant debate among scholars about the use of structural functionalism, the framework which White emphasizes, as a basis for knowledge. Structural functionalism, for many, is a conservative, socially protective framework that does not account adequately for change and ignores basic conflict (Fisher 1980, Gouldner 1970). There are major opportunities for important further research here.

Ethnography, done well, offers rich material for understanding social
education; the debate over functionalism and other frameworks needs continued elaboration by scholars.

Stanley's chapter on foundations examines a newly emerging category of interest in social education. The term "foundations" may not have a precise definition, and may be confused with the general area of foundations of education (Lucas 1984), but Stanley's chapter pulls together scholarship of importance to social education. This body of literature includes work done on competing definitions of the field, arguments over the nature and operation of social studies and social education, and philosophic and historiographic interpretations of social education. This chapter presents a fundamental divergence between traditional and critical views in the abundant recent scholarship in foundations. Much of the current scholarship, however, is a further exploration of fine points arising out of earlier basic work or essentially negative criticism of schooling without a self-evident theoretical framework. There is a great need for new scholarship that brings fresh insights and innovative frameworks to social education; that effort would fall into the category of foundations. What is needed is a positive impetus for the reconsideration of definitions and directions, and an openness that will stimulate debate.

IV. Some Other Topics in Need of Research

In the previous section some topics were identified from each of the chapters in this volume in which further research is needed. There is, for example, a significant need for improved research on critical thinking, since it is among the most widely advocated purposes of social studies, but we know very little about it. Similarly, there is a need for more research with presecondary school students. Better conceived research in values and attitudes of concern in social education is also needed. And we need further examination of the tangled web of definitions, rationales, and theories in social education.

The above summary, of course, does not exhaust the needs in social education for research. Each chapter includes a large number of topics on which scholarly work is needed, and there are topics deserving of study which are not touched upon in the chapters of this book. There
is, for example, no chapter on secondary social education, collegiate
and adult social education research, or research on out-of-school social
education. This last area would include research on such programs as
Outward Bound, AFS and other international education, extra-curricular
and after school activities, Peace Corps, museum or library education,
and others. The following list of other research topics is not meant to
be exhaustive, only illustrative.

Additional Topics on Which Research is Needed in Local, State, Regional,
National, and Global Settings.

1. The education of social studies teachers, to include the study
of characteristics of those preparing to teach, programs of preparation,
the climates of the classrooms and schools in which preparation and pro-
fessional socialization take place, career patterns, and censorship and
academic freedom conditions.

2. The identification and study of factors related to effective
social studies teaching, to include the experimental study of their rela-
tive effects.

3. The relative value of differing curricula, sequencing of content,
and organization of concepts and information in student learning.

4. Analysis of the nature of knowledge and knowledge claims in
what is taught in the social studies.

5. The impact of microcomputers, other high technology, behavioral
objectives, and statewide or other mandatory testing on teaching, learn-
ing, and curriculum in social studies.

6. The control of or dominating influences on social studies
instruction and curriculum over its history.

7. Gender, race, age, social class, and nationalistic biases in
social studies teaching, teaching materials, curriculum, the school, and
the societal environment of the school.

8. Integration of research in reading, writing, and information
processing with social studies instruction.

9. Social theory, social policy, and the politics of education as
they interact with curriculum and instruction in social studies, to
include competing ideas, practical politics, and policy implications of
social education research.
10. Emerging areas of knowledge in the sciences and humanities as they might be used in social education scholarship, for example, semiotics, biochemistry, zetetics.

V. The Methodological Status

What impressions of the methodological status of research in social studies education might one have gained from reading the preceding chapters? In particular, is one likely to sense methodological improvements since the prior five-year review of research (Hunkins and others 1977)? In fact, the litany of methodological shortcomings is much the same as for the prior review. Following are some comments on some of the more obvious problems.

An area of methodology—perhaps one might better say, research strategy—that continues to go begging is the replication of findings (Shaver and Norton 1980). Although commonly accepted as a *sine qua non* of scientific research, which educational and psychological researchers often claim to emulate, there is little sign in the preceding chapters that replication has become a standard procedure in research in social studies education. Indeed, in their respective chapters, Jantz and Klawitter and Leming lament its absence.

Leming suggests that the problem is more fundamental and far-reaching than a lack of replication. It involves a failure in many instances, strikingly in the area of research into the values clarification approach, to relate a piece of research to previous studies in any sort of programmatic way. The consequences are, on the one hand, the repetition of unproductive prior research and, on the other, a disconnectedness of studies on similar topics. Both are counterproductive to knowledge building. Stanley notes a similar difficulty in foundations research—a tendency to ignore the works of others, rather using their ideas, or critiques of them, as a basis for discussion of the nature of social studies and its societal base. Whether naturalistic researchers will fall into the same trap of rootlessness and disconnectedness of individual studies remains to be seen.

Ironically, then, research in social studies education tends to be largely ahistorical in approach, neither replicating research results
systematically to establish their reliability and generalizability, nor using past research as a basis for designing studies to correct methodological errors and build on past findings. This ahistoricism is a recurrent criticism of educational research in general (e.g., Clifford 1973), as well as research in social studies education in particular. It may be due in part to the lack of well-funded and staffed research laboratories as are common in the biological and physical sciences. Would it behoove those concerned with research in social studies education to consider that possibility and potential ameliorations of it? For example, a large proportion of research in our field continues to be done through doctoral dissertations. Might not a research consortium, perhaps NCSS-sponsored, of university faculty who supervise the bulk of dissertation research in social studies education be a productive substitute for science research laboratories. Periodically, perhaps every five to ten years, consortium members could meet (perhaps as part of an NCSS annual meeting) to identify a major research problem area and the thrusts that each would encourage his or her students to attack within that area in the next five to ten years. The continuing informal exchange of findings, along with papers, dissertations, and publications, would be an essential ingredient of such a consortium. A focus could be the identification of studies worthy of replication in dissertations.

The outcome of such an organized research effort might be the building of a body of interrelated research results, in contrast to the ahistorical and scattershot approach that is now evident in social studies dissertations (see, e.g., Larkins and McKinney 1983).

Another methodological concern is that researchers in social studies education have not yet begun to address seriously the investigation of the aptitude-treatment interactions to which Martorella (1977), for example, referred in his chapter in the 1970-1975 Review of Research in Social Studies Education, and to which Leming and Cornbleth allude in their current chapters. Potentially, a number of factors may interact with instructional methods to affect learning—including teacher characteristics and contextual factors such as school environment, community environment, and historical period (Cronbach 1975). In fact, the chapter by White can be read as a plea to consider contextual, including cul-
tural, factors as they interact with instructional variables to affect learning.

Two other methodological shortcomings that persist in educational group design-statistical research generally, as well as in that research in social studies education, were mentioned by Leming. These are the tendencies to utilize brief treatments that do not reflect the reality of classroom instruction and to use immediate posttests so that the durability of changes is not assessed and any latency effects are obscured (see, e.g., Eisner 1983).

Criticism of brief treatments and immediate posttests, however, only scratches the surface of a fundamental issue. As we have noted above, if research is to speak to the needs of classroom teachers, then it must be more frequently based on the problems those practitioners view as real, rather than on those of interest to university researchers. For example, Leming notes, as Wiley (1977) did in her earlier review, that despite the central place of textbooks in instruction in social studies, researchers have focused on content analyses, but have paid little attention to the effects that textbook content—for instance, gender or ethnic biases—actually has on students or to ways in which teachers might use textbooks more productively.

Along the same line, White reminds us in her chapter that researchers have paid little attention to the social structure of the school, as well as to the needs and expectations of the community (Boyd 1979), both of which condition what teachers can reasonably do and the outcomes that they are likely to obtain. For instance, it appears to be difficult, from the rationalistic perspective of the university professor (e.g., Shermis and Barth in press), to appreciate that nonrational, indoctrinative methods might have a place in social studies education in a democratic society (Shaver in press). This has meant, as Leming notes in his chapter, that researchers in social studies education have rarely studied processes in the school through which commitments to democratic values might be developed. Such a study might, for example, reveal that the school in general and social studies teachers in particular are making positive contributions to the societal cohesion aspect of citizenship education, despite the common lamenting of the likely negative aspects of teachers' emphases on textbook recitation (e.g., Shaver, Davis, and
Teachers' views of schooling are not frequently taken into account in designing research, not only because teachers are too often functional participants in the research process, but also because researchers tend to focus on ways to improve classroom practice, from their perspectives, rather than trying to find out what teachers might now be doing well (Jackson and Kieslar 1977).

Not only are teachers' opinions about fruitful lines of research, the design of studies, and the interpretation of outcomes not often sought, but also, as Leming and White note, the meanings of classroom experiences for students are often ignored. Yet, students' reactions to curricula that depart from their conventional expectations may be the most important factor in curricular success or failure (Shaver 1979a).

Most of the research reviewed in this volume falls within the traditional group design-statistical approach, to which Stanley refers in his chapters of this volume as the "empirical-analytic model." That tradition has been dominated by an inferential statistics zeitgeist, and references to the "significance" of results continue in large part to mean "statistical significance." Despite serious challenges to their usefulness (e.g., Carver 1978, Shaver 1979b), inferential statistics continue to have a hold on the thinking of most educational researchers. Until findings from group designs are reported and discussed in terms of statistics which are not relative to sample size, as tests of statistical significance are (Shaver 1980), thus giving comparable estimates of the magnitude of findings, claims of "significance" in primary reports of students and in reviews are likely to lack meaning and/or be misleading.

A readily available alternative is to report effect sizes, rather than, or in addition to, tests of significance. For example, the standardized mean differences (in the simplest of terms, the experimental group mean minus the control group mean divided by the control group standard deviation) is a metric now commonly used in systematic, quantitative reviews of the literature (e.g., Glass, McGaw, and Smith 1981, Rosenthal 1984). Correlations (such as the point biserial, with two treatment groups, and the correlation ratio, also called Eta², with two or more treatment groups) that indicate the proportion of variance in scores on the dependent variable that is associated with treatment group membership provide another excellent measure of effect size. Such approaches are gaining
currency (e.g., Gage 1984), but that shift in approach was not apparent in the reviews of research in social studies education for this volume.

Stanley raises another concern about the analytic-empirical approach to research in social studies education in his chapter on the foundations of social studies education. As he observes, there is a tendency among those who do analytic-empirical research to assume that their studies are value-free, although research models have complex underlying assumptions. On the other hand, as Stanley notes, those operating from what he terms the "critical research model" reject the assumption that research can be value-neutral, and attempt to be explicit about the values that structure their studies. Smith (1983) has suggested that this difference in orientation between quantitative (or analytic-empirical) and interpretive (e.g., critical) researchers reflects a serious epistemological schism. He labels the quantitative researchers as "realists," persons who believe in a correspondence theory of truth—that is, what is true is what corresponds to an independent reality. The interpretive researchers, he labels "idealists," persons who reject the correspondence theory of truth because reality is shaped by the mind, with truth a matter of "socially and historically conditioned agreement" (p. 10), to which values are central.

The need to be more reflective about the value and epistemological assumptions underlying research approaches may be particularly crucial in social studies education, concerned as it is with the value-laden areas of social relationships and, in particular, citizenship education. Cornbleth, for example, makes the point in her chapter that researchers of cognitive learning have tended to ignore the normative beliefs and values that shape textbooks and provide the context within which students are taught to interpret social problems and engage in critical thinking. Moreover, she notes the contrast between critical thinking frameworks which assume that thinking should take place within the context of the core values of the society and those which assume that the value framework itself should be questioned.

Some years ago, Shaver and Larkins (1973) argued that careful definition of social studies was a crucial need as a base for research in the field, so that the philosophical and empirical assumptions underlying the particular approaches being investigated would be clear and so
that a context for integrating findings could be provided. On a practical level, Buchmann (1984) has pointed out that the basic problems of teaching are not a function of deficiencies in knowledge, but "arise instead because of tensions or deficiencies in the moral framework in which professional practice is embedded" (p. 422). Yet, Buchmann notes, researchers have a tendency to skip over such questions and go directly to the issue of how to apply research knowledge to practice, although not necessarily to the questions of practice in which teachers are interested. Hopefully, Stanley's chapter on foundations will help to focus more attention on the important and unanswered philosophical problems underlying social studies education, and draw increased attention to the extent to which the structuring of research and the interpretation of findings are dependent upon not only epistemological assumptions but also the definition of social studies which shapes the researchers' orientation.

VI. The Future of Research in Social Studies Education:

Two Views

Editor's note: The following view is offered by one of the authors of this chapter, James P. Shaver; another view of the future of research in social studies education is offered by Jack L. Nelson in the next section. It became clear as we worked on the chapter that, in regard to this section, our views were discrepant in some significant ways. Rather than attempting to resolve the differences into a homogenized presentation, we decided it would be worthwhile to take a two-track approach to this section, letting readers contemplate the differences in point of view.

View One: James P. Shaver

Methodological problems such as those mentioned in the prior section cast a pall over the future of research in social studies education. That is not to say that there are no well-designed studies in the field, or that no researchers are paying attention to the need for better methodologies and strategies. An example of the latter is the efforts of Larkins and his colleagues to carry out programmatic research, including replications, on the effects of teacher enthusiasm (McKinney and others in press). The fact of the matter is, however, that research in social
studies education is such a loosely coupled endeavor, conducted and supervised in large part by persons (doctoral candidates and their advisors) whose commitments lie elsewhere, that there is little likelihood of striking improvements in methodology before the next five-year review of research is published—or for that matter, by the time the fourth or fifth one down the line is published. This pessimistic assessment includes the likelihood that, in regard to Stanley’s chapter on the importance of thought about the nature of social studies and its role in a democratic society, we will have more adequate conceptualizations or research framed using them.

But what if, through some miracle, research in the field were to become in large part methodologically sound? Would we begin to see a burgeoning of integrated knowledge, even theory, such as we see in the hard, that is, the biological and physical, sciences? As I have argued elsewhere (Shaver 1982), such is not likely to be the case.

One integral limitation is the basis on which research problems are selected in service-oriented fields. As Kuhn (1970) has noted, those in science can generally concentrate their attention on problems that they have good reason to believe can be solved. But when problems are based on external social needs, chosen “because they urgently need solution without regard for the tools available to solve them” (p. 164), the prospects for advancing knowledge are diminished. Bachmann (1984) has emphasized the same point, that is, that researchers concerned with the practical, as contrasted with the theoretical, not only find it difficult to maintain scientific mores, but “tethered to practical problems,... [they] cannot do the job of seeking after new experiences in which knowledge is deliberately organized to lead the way into the unknown” (p. 434).

Beyond the likelihood that social purposes contradict scientific purposes, there are serious epistemological questions to be faced by those doing research in social studies education, as by those in education generally. We have already alluded to the serious challenge, by those engaged in critical research, to the assumption that educational researchers can discover and report a reality that is independent of the values and conceptualizations that they bring to their studies. A parallel concern is the tendency of those in the mainstream of educa-
tional research to strive for objectivity, through separating themselves from the phenomena under study, in part through the use of "objective" instrumentation. That approach is criticized on the ground that focus on the objectively accessible and, consequently, on the physical properties, or seemingly physical properties, of that which is being studied, leads to a disposition toward "equating the underlying meaning and intention of human learning with test scores, rating scales, and preconceived observation categories" (Bussis 1980, 4). This reductionism, Bussis argues, produces data that do not speak to "everyday teaching and learning as it occurs in schools." Eisner (1983) has argued along the same line that such data yield only "gross indicators" of the qualities of classrooms; they do not "capture nuance—and in teaching as in human relationships [generally], nuance is everything" (p. 19).

Stanley's chapter should heighten awareness of such problems, and White's chapter on ethnography speaks directly to concerns such as those raised by Bussis and Eisner. Naturalistic research, such as the ethno-graphic approach, promises to be not just an alternative means of collecting data, but the basis for new, hopefully more meaningful, views of teachers and students interacting in classrooms within schools. But, if not implemented thoughtfully, naturalistic educational research will also have its crucial shortcomings (e.g., Rist 1980).

Other ontological and related epistemological questions remain. Gergen (1973) has, for example, argued that researchers of human behavior are deceived by their assumption that they are studying a reality in which the facts are stable, rather than constantly in flux. He maintains that generalizations from social science research must change over time (as opposed to those in the "hard" sciences, which are basically time-less), because people are thoughtful, reactive elements of their environments, which include research findings that are diffused into the culture.

Cronbach (1975) has taken Gergen's position one step further by noting the complex interactions between variables related to human behavior that make the accumulation of findings difficult. In instructional research, for example, there may be interactions between teaching methods, type of materials, content, teacher characteristics, student characteristics, school conditions, community conditions, and historical
conditions, to name a few possibilities. Cronbach concluded that "once we attend to interactions, we enter a hall of mirrors that extends to infinity" (p. 119).

Neither Gergen or Cronbach argues that human behavior is not lawful, but that, because of the nature of humans, generalizations about behavior cannot be stored up for ultimate assembly into substantiated, timeless generalizations, that is, scientific theory. Such reservations about the potential of human behavior research have, of course, serious implications for the future of research in social studies education.

Charles Perrow (1981) has added another dimension to the consideration of ontological epistemological issues in educational research. He faults social science researchers for "desperately trying to make sense" out of a reality that is in many regards "quite senseless" and unpredictable. In their drive to be rational, he contends, social science researchers "convey the impression of lawful, even rational behavior because of research techniques that are largely self-serving," including the construction of "fictions such as the idea of personality...to hide the disorder of our everyday existence and the unpredictable nature of human history" (p. 2). Perrow contrasts this drive for certainty with "the traditional historian's reluctance to generalize and theorize."

That tendency, "roundly criticized by us in the other social sciences and by the 'progressive' historians, now appears to have been a sound virtue, accepting of the complexity of the data and our inability to reconstruct a past world in such a way as to match the constructions of those who resided in it" (p. 8). That observation has poignant implications for social studies education as well as for research in the field.

Perrow relates his argument to the past in another way:

This desire for orderly explanations is a contemporary phenomenon. The ancients tried to make sense out of things also, of course, but they had greater tolerance for happenstance, accidents, mysteries, illogicalities, and above all, for fate. Count no life happy, the chorus repeats over and over in the Greek tragedies, until it is over; one can never know what the unpredictable gods have in store. For us, the theology of the ancients is full of contradictions--"messy," a systems theorist would say. The ancients did not give very sensible accounts, and failed, often, even to attempt to do so. This puzzles modern social scientists who make a living at giving sensible accounts, whose training and examinations rest on this assumption (pp. 3-4).
Perrow's commentary is consistent with Buchmann's (1984) observation that those whose lives are basically committed to the building of knowledge are not only likely to commit the fallacy of misplaced certainty, but to overlook the complexities of actual classroom practice, and, oftentimes, simply the humor and common wisdom necessary to cope with the demands of teaching.

The above views of the ontological and epistemological constraints within which much social science and educational research is conducted suggests that researchers should not pursue knowledge building in the scientific sense of timeless generalizations and nomothetic theories. Although we should not give up trying to make sense out of education, we must acknowledge the limits of our endeavor, and not aim at the development of systems of propositions to explain and predict human behavior. An alternate, attainable, and more reasonable goal would be the sensitization of educators to the range of factors that may influence behavior in different situations and to the relative importance of those factors in particular settings and at particular times (Gergen 1973, 317) -- or, as Cronbach (1975) put it, the development of explanatory concepts "which will help people use their heads" (p. 126). If such a view is correct, one implication is that, in the future, researchers in social studies education should spend more time trying to identify what does work in schools and then conducting studies to understand why, rather than carrying out research with the aim of producing findings to be translated into technology and practices for social studies educators to adopt. That there is, on any large scale, such a future in research in social studies education seems unlikely.

View Two: Jack L. Nelson

The past decade, according to the introductory chapter, has been difficult in social education, because the heady curriculum development activities of the 1960s have all but disappeared and the current rhetoric of reform is actually backward-looking. These are important points, and there is considerable support for them. Social studies curriculum development under large federal support has nearly ended and contemporary social studies literature is filled with renewed interest in citizenship.
education, that most traditional concern, rather than new rationales for the field.

The curriculum projects of the 1960s, however, brought considerable talent, interest, and excitement to social studies, but produced little in the way of scholarship. The main thrust in most projects was to restructure scholarly work already in place in certain disciplines to make it more teachable or teacher-proof. The emphasis was on delivering materials with improved content. Most projects included substantial evaluation components, but they produced relatively little research that had meaning beyond the project itself. Thus, while the vitality evident during the 1960s was important to practitioners and evoked the interest of teachers, supervisors, and the public, it was of more limited significance to scholarly development of the field.

Examination of social education research in such internal and immediate environs may, however, be misleading. There is a larger context within which that examination should take place.

Research in social education has been the subject of activity and scrutiny for over half a century. In terms of the utilization of research for the development of theory, we have little evidence of progress. The theoretical basis for the field is shaky and uneven; some might even protest that there is no theoretical basis. As measured by the impact of social education research on school practice, there is a great void. Practice seems virtually undisturbed by research. As a solid base for policy development, researchers in social studies have made no remarkably achievements; educational and social policy is apparently uninformed by research and remains bound to moralism and prior practice. As a condition for enlarging the web of knowledge, or for breakthroughs into new research frameworks, social education research has serious weaknesses. This pessimistic analysis, however, hides a more optimistic appraisal of the research potential of social education. We could argue that things cannot get much worse, thus we can look forward to improvement, but that is more cynical than one needs to be. It is important to consider the contexts within which social education research takes place, and the criteria against which such research ought to be measured.

A review of research in a field is necessarily self-limiting, and seldom is the larger context discussed. The chapters in this volume
speak well of the quantity and quality of work within that more narrow context. It is appropriate that research be examined at intervals to sense directions of intellectual activity. Rather than provide only a summary or critique of the several chapters herein, however, I propose to address a larger context and to suggest some dimensions of thinking about social education research on which literature reviews of prior work rarely deal.

In terms of scientific study, research in social education is in its infancy (Nelson and Scandura 1965). Fifty years is an inconsequential period in civilized history and a minor time span in scientific inquiry. Some historians won't consider research on anything that isn't at least that old. Advocates of the Great Books program set a similar minimum time to assure that its selections have withstood shorter mood changes. The short span of time during which there has been research on social studies education may have yielded much more than is apparent at this time. There are possibilities of latent effects, or undiscovered strands of scholarship.

Further, the types of research and scientific endeavor that have characterized social education have been drawn not from natural science but from history and the social sciences. Historians have an intellectual acquaintance with science, but have often had an almost adversial relationship with it (Nietzsche 1957). Despite Von Ranke and a few of the new cliometricians, few self-respecting historians would use criteria from science to measure their scholarship (Walsh 1951, Gardiner 1952, Nagel 1960). Since social education has long been dominated by history and historians, it may be improper to use standards from science as criteria here also.

In regard to the second major framework for social education research, the social sciences, emulation of scientific paradigms has not been dramatically successful. The social sciences have not produced the principles or laws that early positivistic social scientists expected (Kaplan 1964, Weber 1949, Weiner 1953). For almost every social science principle announced, a contradictory or confounding principle appears. We have yet to demonstrate law-like knowledge in such fields as economics, political science, sociology, psychology, and anthropology. There is an abundance of fascinating data and propositions, but little that
meets the stricter standards set by science. Descriptive and/or ideologically grounded studies flood the social sciences; predictive quality is not much better than that of weathermen or educators; and theory development is often more discussed than practiced. Schools of thought are more the standard in social sciences than are paradigms of scientific consistency (Myrdal 1944, Kuhn 1970). If social education research is in an infant state, social science research can be considered in its adolescence. In both stages there are serious weaknesses in developed theory, in basic research, and in solid grounds for policy or practice.

The primary paradigm used to inform research and theory in the social sciences and in history has been functionalism in various forms, with behaviorism as one of its more recent limiting structures. Acceptance of this paradigm has reduced the intellectual vitality of these fields because it imposes ideological barricades to the open search for truth. Contrary views and contradictory evidence are considered illegitimate, un-American, or dysfunctional. Mainstream social science and history in America reproduce generally held views of the social order, raising questions on specifics of detail, but not challenging the standard paradigm (Gouldner 1970, Fisher 1980, Adorno 1978, Lynd 1970, Horkheimer 1941, Marcuse 1941).

Similarly, social education research has usually followed functionalist and behaviorist reasoning, with little critical assessment. It is probably social education's self-conscious immaturity and strong ideological binders that cause much work in education to follow a moralist rather than the scholarly tradition, and the literature of the field to rarely veer from the most traditional or functionalist perspectives (Besag and Nelson 1984, Gilbert in press).

This overriding paradigm has influenced social science, history, and social education in such important areas as the selection of topics for study, the determination of research problems and hypotheses; the identification of appropriate research designs and techniques, the picking of subjects and instruments, and decisions on which analytic or synthetic frameworks should be used in interpreting results and drawing conclusions. This would not be in itself be unfortunate, if the paradigm were sufficiently sophisticated and comprehensive to accommodate the variety of evidence and perspectives available. As Gouldner (1970) and
others note, however, functionalism has serious defects in its orienta-
tion, sophistication, and comprehensiveness.

Kuhn's (1970) term, normal science, connotes the stricture a para-
digm can produce:

That enterprise seems an attempt to force nature into the pre-
formed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm sup-
plies. No part of the aim of normal science is to call forth
new sorts of phenomena; indeed those that will not fit the box
are often not seen at all. Nor do scientists normally aim to
invent new theories, and they are often intolerant of those
invented by others (p. 24).

Kuhn was, of course, discussing natural science and we are concerned
here with fields even further removed from the basic tenets of science.
But there is much to be learned from Kuhn's analysis of the history of
science. He examines the idea of anomaly as the basis for discovery,
citing the examples of the finding of oxygen to disprove the phlogiston
theory in the 1770s; X-rays at the end of the 19th century which led to
20th-century physics; and the Leyden jar as a basis for new theory on
electricity. Further, he argues that these events, as anomalies, might
have been insufficient in themselves to provide a basis for paradigm
shift; there also had to develop a "crisis" in the field as a precondi-
tion for the emergence of new theories. Scientific revolutions, refer-
red to in the title of Kuhn's book, are brought about by the inability
to handle with existing scientific world views the disparities posed by
significant anomalies, the result of which is a crisis. This process
takes time and intellectual energy. It is interesting that Kuhn expli-
citly moves to a metaphor drawn from the social fields, revolution, to
describe this large-scale movement in scientific knowledge. There are
also interesting parallels in thought with some of the more radical views
of revolution in social literature (Servan-Schreiber 1971, Revel 1971,

There is, I think, considerable significance for social education
in Kuhn's ideas. If history, social science, and social knowledge can
be used to understand and interpret scientific revolutions, can they not
also be subject to it? Are there some parallels for social education
scholarship that the concepts of anomaly, crisis, revolution, and para-
digm shift present? Kuhn and his critics are examined by Phillips (1981)
to determine the educational research issues raised. Phillips summarizes recent developments in the philosophy of science that illustrate debate and inconsistency, and notes that:

It would not be entirely reckless to assert that contemporary philosophy of science does emphasize the importance of research programs progressively opening up new phenomena, the exposing of assumptions (including ones that are difficult to give up as well as the ones that are expendable), and the giving and receiving of strong criticism (and especially valuable here is "external" criticism, criticism from outside one's own theoretical frame).... The main focus of attention in all this obviously is the process of scientific change (p. 255).

Perhaps social education research has not been around long enough to have accumulated its own paradigm, much less to consider anomalies and the early stages of crisis. But scientific revolutions, like other revolutions, seem to be invisible to those in the midst of them. There are always some who proclaim revolution, regardless of the triviality of the change proposed, but a revolution of the type described by Kuhn is not an instantaneous and obvious affair. It is the aggregation of anomalies and the sense of chaos (crisis) that knowledgeable experts begin to develop.

Adept practitioners of the existing paradigm try to absorb or ignore anomalies. They create a sense that current world views are adequate, but do not resolve the basic disparity. In the social studies education literature, this may be exemplified by the rebirth of the idea of citizenship as the overarching purpose of the field. There is an unsettled dispute in the field about citizenship (Nelson 1980) and its role in social education. The lack of agreement on a definition of citizenship, and of its centrality, given the obvious incompatibility of some of the definitions with others, suggests that the historic claim of a "citizenship" basis for the field is insufficient to satisfy someone practicing critical thinking. Is this merely a surface dispute, an anomaly, or the early stage of a crisis?

A crisis would seem to be in existence in a field when it has become moribund, hidebound, or unwilling to contemplate contradictory evidence. This is suggested in economics (Davidson 1980), sociology (Gouldner 1970, Hansen 1976), social psychology (Wexler 1983), and other fields. A crisis could be posed in regard to social education. Rather than a defect,
however, a crisis should be seen as an opportunity. It provides a chance for new ideas, new scholars, new research problems, and new methodologies, new paradigms. It is in this new context that social education researchers have the opportunity to consider different topics of study, different research problems and designs, different techniques, and different analytic models. A review of research requires an examination of the past record; it should also stimulate a consideration of future directions. This optimistic appraisal presents a challenge to the field.

VII. Implications for Practitioners

It is fitting that the final section in a volume on research in social education be devoted to the question of implications for practitioners—teachers, state and local curriculum specialists and supervisors, and other curriculum developers. One might ask, however, whether the somewhat melancholy discussions in this chapter of the status of research, including that in foundations, in social education negates the need for such a section. That would be true if one were to adopt the position that the only way in which research, including foundations thinking, can be helpful to practitioners is by providing them with prescriptions to follow in their work. However, the pessimism that may seem implicit in a view of research which denies the possibility of scientific certainty in the study of human behavior takes on an optimistic hue when cast in terms of a role for research in enlightening and sensitizing practitioners' decisions. Clearly, the implication is that practitioners will not find research reports, even were researchers to deal more often with problems of interest to teachers, a place to turn for unequivocal answers. Instead, research reports will continue to be a source of perspectives, rather than of prescriptions, for curriculum development and teaching. By the same token, foundations writings will not provide clear, unequivocal statements in regard to social education and the role of social studies education. They will, however, suggest significant issues and possible answers to the question practitioners ought to address so as to be clear about the assumptions from which they teach, supervise, and/or do curriculum work. Whether the question has to do with what or how to teach today, or with overall scope and sequence, the literature can be suggestive but not definitive.
This view of the role of research is not new. John Dewey (1929), himself a believer in the scientific study of education, nevertheless cautioned educators that no research finding could be "converted into an immediate rule of educational art" (p. 19). Findings, such as the differing rates of maturation in boys and girls at certain ages, he noted, are of some worth because they will affect teachers' attitudes toward children, and make teachers more aware of considerations which might otherwise escape them and more able to interpret facts which might otherwise have seemed confusing. But such shifts in attitudes, accompanied by greater awareness and sensitivity, are quite different from "the transformation of scientific findings into rules of action" (p. 19). The constraints on rule making are in large part due to the enormous number of variables that are relevant to teaching decisions made in situations which never repeat themselves. The quantification of decision-making rules for such circumstances is simply not possible (p. 65).

Dewey's view that research can inform curricular and teaching decisions, but never substitute for the decision making of practitioners, has been echoed recently by Gage (1984), an advocate of the position that research can provide a scientific basis for teaching. Gage recognizes that "teaching is an art" and, as such, "requires improvisation, spontaneity, the handling of a vast array of considerations of form, style, pace, rhythm, and appropriateness in ways so complex that even computers might lose the way" (p. 88). In response to the question of whether educational research can provide a scientific basis for the art of teaching, his answer is "deliberately modest," accepting that a "scientific basis" might consist only of "scientifically developed knowledge about relationships between variables" (pp. 88-89). Although Gage does not deal explicitly with how practitioners, including supervisors and teachers, would use the knowledge he sees as developing from educational research, he does acknowledge that teachers need autonomy and freedom to use their judgment, within the constraints of their "obligations to the society, with moral imperatives relating to the welfare of students and the body politic" (p. 91).

Buchmann (1984), too, reminds us that while practicing professionals should be reasonable and thoughtful in their teaching decisions, teaching as art involves "responding to urgency when there is want of perfect
certainty and outcomes are unpredictable" (p. 430). In that sense, as most practitioners know, there are a number of valid bases for teaching decisions—including common sense, personal experience, well-examined personal commitments, and the policies of the school and community as found in curriculum guides and legal mandates (p. 422). Research findings are only one source of information about teaching, not a sole or incontrovertible set of guidelines. Indeed, what is implied by a research finding is not an answer to the research question, not a teaching act, because such applications of research findings are "neither deducible nor logically implied; they depend instead on moral frameworks and networks of power and authority that affect the work of practitioners, as well as on legal and political knowledge and (importantly) know-how" (pp. 428-29).

The above qualifications take on particular importance when one recognizes that they would be true even if the research were always sound. Given the fallibility of research in social studies, the need to see research findings as informative, but not dictating, becomes particularly compelling—especially in light of Buchmann's warning that there is a danger in drawing specific implications for teaching from research, for the rhetoric of such statements implies that the implications should be binding.

Even with sound research and with what might appear to the researcher to be clear implications, there would still be reason to be perplexed in making decisions about curriculum and about specific teaching acts in carrying out curriculum. In part, this is because in teaching, as in everyday life, most of our decisions involve value conflicts, that is, competing obligations, that pose dilemmas for thoughtful teachers. Paying more attention to individual studies, for example, may decrease the amount of attention paid to the total class. Moreover, what Buchmann refers to as "faith" may often override the facts. Indeed, as Dewey also implied, a person who feels obligated to the "facts" may ignore commitments. But "honoring commitments can create new facts," such as learning by students whom the research evidence suggests cannot learn. "Belief in children's capacity to learn" may in the long run be a more empirically and ethically valid guiding principle for teachers and for curriculum developers considering issues of scope and sequence than any...
research evidence about the restrictions of cognitive stages on learning (as Cornbleth noted in her chapter) or the constraints on learning of socioeconomic, ethnic, or other sorts of backgrounds. Often, it is important to act contrary to the evidence, inspired by ideals that one knows can never be attained in full (Buchmann 1984, 426-27).

In short, then, what is significant for practitioners in this volume reviewing research in social studies education is not the specific dictates for curriculum and teaching that one might attempt to draw from the various chapters, but the sense that the various reviews provide another source of ideas to be drawn upon, carefully and tentatively, in making curriculum and teaching decisions. It may seem that, in this chapter, we have been particularly negative toward research findings as a basis for practitioners' decisions. We close with the reminder, though, that while "research knowledge cannot deliver guarantees on good practice,...neither can any other form of knowledge--personal, practical, scientific--nor insights, commitments, and norms by themselves." Each, however, can make important contributions to teaching decisions if, in addition, we use "humor and common sense to advance [our] practical wisdom about teaching" (Buchmann 1984, 436).

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