To recount the development of the propaganda analysis movement before and since World War I, this paper reviews the precursors of the movement, traces the propaganda consciousness produced by wartime campaigns and subsequent domestic campaigns, and looks at major obstacles to propaganda analysis produced by social and academic conditions after 1940. The earliest efforts the paper summarizes are those of the "muckrakers," writers such as Upton Sinclair and Ida Tarbell, who exposed abuses in business and government for popular The document then reviews the progenitors of the "concept of crowd psychology," Gustav LeBon and Edward L. Bernays, and then covers wartime persuasion, beginning with the earliest pamphleteering efforts of Great Britain and Germany, and moving through President Wilson's Committee on Public Information (CPI). The paper next covers the postwar and disillusionment and propaganda consciousness that occurred due to the opening of secret diplomatic archives and the discrediting of the CPI. It then explains the successful move into private business by workers formerly of the CPI. The final two sections of the paper recount the history of propaganda analysis as a theme of popular and academic writers, and explains the vicissitudes of propaganda analysis as a field of study. (CRH)
The Propaganda Analysis Movement Since World War I

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When critics of communication express concerns about the manipulative society described in George Orwell's futuristic 1984, it is well to remember that propaganda analysis antedates Orwell by a generation. Propaganda analysis, or the critical study of communication's social impact, was a significant topic for academic and popular writing in the period between World Wars I and II. Begun in reaction to controls on public opinion during the Great War, the cause of propaganda analysis enlisted journalists, academicians, and popular writers, whose articles and books probed efforts by domestic and foreign persuaders to channel public opinion for the benefit of special interests. Encouraged in the 1920s by worries over the growing power of the communication industry, and nurtured by the widespread questioning of American institutions during the Depression, propaganda analysis amounted to an intellectual and social movement involving millions. Patriotic tides accompanying the Second World War and the subsequent Cold War caused propaganda analysis to retreat to the periphery, losing its prewar status as a major focus for academic and general interest writers. Concern for manipulation through communication continued, however, and remains today a vital interest for writers in many quarters. Until relatively recently, nevertheless, the social and academic climates since 1940 have tended to submerge the critical, consumer-oriented analysis of communication's ethics and validity, and elevate statistical studies of the effects of messages, the latter being inquiries more useful to governmental and industrial persuaders.
This paper is a survey of the propaganda analysis movement, from its inception after World War I to the vicissitudes of its less prominent progress since World War II. Beginning with a review of certain precursors of propaganda analysis in turn-of-the-century realistic critiques of society, this paper investigates the propaganda consciousness that was produced by both wartime propaganda and subsequent domestic persuasive campaigns, and looks at major obstacles to propaganda analysis produced by social and academic conditions after 1940.

Precursors of Propaganda Analysis

Early in the twentieth century, writers, known collectively as the muckrakers, were laying bare for popular audiences abuses in business, government, and other institutions. Narrative accounts, such as Ida Tarbell's history of Standard Oil, and literary exposes, such as Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, an indictment of the meat packing industry, all produced a general interest in realistic critiques of America's institutions. Not yet prominent, but clearly in evidence, were critical studies of the agents and agencies of mass communication. Typical is an anonymous report in Bookman in 1906 that put forth "honesty of the newspapers" as a vital issue of the day. The writer cited methods of "creating public thought and feeling" by such subtle influences as industrial press agents who produced copy favorable to their masters and arranged for its publication as "news." This theme of "tainted news" was given passing attention in Sinclair's Jungle when he described how biased reports of labor disputes contributed to the power of the Beef Trust. Of all the early critiques of modern communication practices, journalist Will Irwin's series of articles for Collier's magazine probably was the most influential.
Besides the advent of muckraking studies of the mass media, another development served to set a foundation for the post World War I concern about propaganda in society. The publication in 1895 of Frenchman Gustav Le Bon's work, The Crowd, set the tone for studies of irrational elements in the formation of public opinion in a democracy. Le Bon wrote of the "collective mind" which develops around social questions. Indicating that such a psychological crowd is impulsive and irrational, he noted its great suggestibility and instinctive need to obey a leader. The psychology of the irrational crowd was born of Le Bon's frustrations with the picture of a rational public painted by traditional democratic theory—a view which seemed negated by the failings of the French Republic. Crowd psychology gained attention in the United States, exerting great influence on young American social scholars such as Chicago's Robert Park who wrote of opposing social tendencies toward rational public discussion of issues and irrational crowd demands. Edward L. Bernays, a father of the public relations field, notes that with the advent of crowd psychology, "now the whole subject of public opinion was being more and more widely discussed in serious circles."

About the same time as crowd psychology was establishing itself as a vantagepoint for social analysis, the writings of Bernays' uncle, Sigmund Freud, were receiving their hearing in the United States. A review by Walter Lippmann for The New Republic in 1916 celebrates the work of Freud (and that of a crowd psychologist, William Trotter) as having interesting, though as yet unfulfilled, applications to modern education and politics. In contrast to this hesitant endorsement of Freudian psychology, Edward Bernays reports that by the early 1920s even New York's cab drivers were likely to be tossing his uncle's psychoanalytic vocabulary into the conversation. With its emphasis on unconscious motivations, Freudian psychology would soon be seen as quite consistent with wartime manias about
the Great War as a struggle of good versus evil.

Wartime Persuasion

Realistic critiques of newspapers and psychological studies of nonrational elements of public opinion supplied the groundwork for the propaganda consciousness that emerged during and after World War I. The war years, with their competing propagandas of intervention and neutrality, with the rampant spy mania, and with the eventual monopoly of the public communication channels by the U.S. Committee on Public Information, moved propaganda to the forefront of popular concern.

In the opening months of World War I, as the armies of Britain, France, and Russia confronted those of Germany and Austria, opinion in the United States was strongly supportive of President Woodrow Wilson's policy of neutrality. While traditional ties of ancestry and language created a climate of greater sympathy for Britain and France, relatively few persons favored U.S. participation in the conflict. This state of public opinion established the goals for the propagandists of the Allies and the Central Powers. Germany and Austria worked to cultivate neutral sentiments, whereas Britain and France sought to identify their cause with the vital interests of America.

The earliest propaganda effort was a contest of pamphleteering waged between supporters of Britain and those of Germany. The British effort was by far the more successful in both its mass of material and its sense of how to appeal to the American public. The British quickly seized upon the David versus Goliath image of Germany's invasion of neutral Belgium and portrayed the Teutonic giant as a worker of atrocities against women and children. As William G. McAdoo, Wilson's Treasury Secretary noted, the impetus of British propaganda was "to create an impression that the Germans
were barbarians." Efforts by Britain's main propaganda competitor, Germany, were hampered by what Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador in Washington, described as an inability of Berlin to adapt its case to the values and sentiments of the American audience. A train of subsequent events gradually discredited Germany's advocates, most notably the sinking of the passenger liner, Lusitania, and the publicity given Germany's secret efforts to buy American newspapers and sabotage American plants producing war materials for the Allies. These latter developments led to a popular fear that Germany possessed a vast secret propaganda machine of spies and agents.

Ironically, it was not Germany that possessed the effective propaganda machine, it was Britain. In the United States, Sir Gilbert Parker coordinated an effort to win over America's opinion leaders through pamphlets, personal correspondence, articles, and speeches. At the same time, Britain's control of the Atlantic cables and her coordinated program of censorship and courtship of America's war correspondents produced a marked pro-Allied cast to the war news printed in U.S. newspapers. These British efforts, coupled with public fears of German submarines, sabotage, and spies, resulted in a gradual tendency to view the war as a contest of "we" (the Allies and America) versus "them" (the Central Powers). When Germany supplied two immediate causes for war--resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare and an inquiry to Mexico about an anti-American alliance--the Wilson Administration decided to cast America's lot with the Allies.

While Wilson's war message elicited enthusiasm in many quarters, other Americans felt puzzlement about America's place in the World War. Within weeks, rooms full of letters were being received in Washington asking for clarification of the U.S. stake in the conflict. Worried by this and other
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signs of public apathy about the war, President Wilson created a Committee on Public Information, headed by journalist George Creel, to promote the cause. By the time the Committee got out its first pamphlets stating the official view of the war, public opinion had already begun spontaneously to rally around the flag. The CPI took none of this for granted, however, and began a promotional campaign that has yet to be rivaled in the United States.

The Committee began by issuing pamphlets and by centralizing news of the war through the novel, though now commonplace, devices of official press spokesmen and news handouts. Branching out, the Committee developed many promotional schemes, including the distributing of posters and films, coordinating donated advertising space, staging war expositions in many states, and establishing "Americanization" committees for most of the nation's ethnic groups. The CPI sent out 75,000 "Four Minute Men" speakers who delivered short speeches on nationally-determined themes between the features shown in America's movie houses. The Committee became a vast publishing house, producing, in addition to its pamphlet series, bulletins for teachers, cartoonists, and other opinion leaders whose support for the war was deemed vital.

Through the work of the CPI, the official view of the war as a struggle of good versus evil reached out at every point to the public. Voices that dared suggest the war was less than a struggle to end war and make the world safe for democracy were drowned out by the productions of the CPI or shouted down by super-patriotic groups loosely allied to the government's propaganda efforts. While the CPI's message featured documented interpretations and elevated moral appeals by qualified historians, the CPI's promotions also had a darker side. Many of its posters and magazine
advertisements painted lurid pictures of the "Hun" working his atrocities. A news feature by Harvey O'Higgins, associate chairman of the Committee, gave a weekly report entitled "The Daily German Lie" that catalogued popular rumors described by O'Higgins as originating in the machinations of Germany's network of spies. This official catering to atrocity-mongering and spy paranoia was popular at the time, but led to a postwar tendency to view the CPI as a spreader of lies. At the heart of this change in public assessment of the CPI was a rise in the nation's consciousness of propaganda.

Postwar Disillusion and Propaganda Consciousness

In 1919, "propaganda" meant Germany's "spies and lies," whereas, by 1930, propaganda was understood to include efforts by just about anyone to influence public opinion—especially the U.S. government and big business. The change in notions about propaganda came with the postwar disillusionment with the Great War, and the realization that wartime techniques of opinion manipulation were being ever more widely practiced by domestic special interest groups.

At the time of Germany's capitulation to the Allies in late 1918, the United States had been at war for a year and a half. Lacking now a foreign enemy to unify the nation and legitimize extraordinary measures, the nation was set for division. Joy over the surprisingly quick victory over the Central Powers soon was replaced by dismay over worsening economic conditions as the nation's economy adjusted to the peace. Coupled with economic deprivations was the psychological shock of reports casting doubt on the earlier official view of the war as a contest of right versus wrong. Soon after the war, the post-Monarchist governments of Germany and Austria and the Bolshevik regime in Russia opened their nations' secret diplomatic
archives relating to the Great War. In contrast to the prevailing view that Germany and Austria were solely responsible for the outbreak of the war, the documents showed that France and Russia shared considerable guilt. As the contents of the war archives gradually reached the public, many began to question the accuracy of Allied publications on the war and, in particular, the work of the Committee on War Information. For many, this feeling was reinforced by the contrast between President Wilson's visionary war to end war and the actual terms of the Versailles peace treaty which imposed a harsh sentence on Germany and rewarded Britain and France with additional colonial possessions. The popular view was still quite removed from Nation magazine's later assessment of Allied publications as being a propaganda of lies, but the idea that the Allies and the U.S. government jointly had used a misleading, one-sided campaign to manipulate public opinion had entered public consciousness.

Alerted to the reality of propaganda by postwar reassessments of the pro-war campaigns of the Allied governments, in general, and the CPI in particular, perceptive writers began to look about and measure similar efforts by special interest groups to control public opinion. Augmenting this increased sensitivity to opinion manipulation was the rise of the communications industry in the postwar years. After the Armistice, thousands who had worked for the CPI now diffused into the business world, spreading the promotional philosophy of the Creel organization. Representative of these individuals was Edward L. Bernays, the man who coined the term "counselor in public relations." Impressed by how the CPI had made Woodrow Wilson a hero even to Italian peasants in remote locations, Bernays saw that his wartime experiences had peacetime applications and founded his own firm.

At the same time the public relations field was experiencing new
growth, the advertising industry advanced. Advertisers, who gained visibility and prestige from their work for the CPI, now won greater opportunity to work their magic for domestic causes. Both advertising agencies and business organizations were now founding or augmenting their market research staffs, and communications research for business became commonplace. Private market and audience research companies were founded by Archibald Crossley, George Gallup, and others. As they had peopled the offices of the CPI, academicians too enlisted in the growing enterprise of business communications research. A large group of psychologists founded the Psychological Corporation on the premise that psychology had practical applications and its practitioners were professionals who deserved pay for their advice. 17

In the 1920s, perceptive writers began to see that the wartime precedent of mass persuasion—now applied to domestic matters by public relations counsels, press agents, market researchers, and advertisers—meant changes for American society. A spokesman for the optimistic view of the new conditions was Edward L. Bernays. In a variety of books, articles, and speeches, Bernays held that the communications industry would be socially beneficial within the American framework of a marketplace of ideas. He advocated the additional safeguard of high standards of ethics for communications professionals. 18 Still another strain of thought was represented by Harold D. Lasswell. Lasswell, a political scientist whose Ph.D. dissertation was a study of World War I propaganda, viewed propaganda as inevitable in modern society and as desirable in view of the need for society's leaders to coordinate the actions of the masses in an era when traditional anchors of social cohesion were dissolving. 19 Sharing Bernays' faith that irresponsible propaganda would be corrected by competition, Lasswell promoted the objective academic study of propaganda. The results
of his labor was Lasswell's leadership in the field of content analysis, a branch of communications research that eschewed judgments about the ethics and validity of communication, focusing instead on its objective meaning.

While Bernays, the practitioner, and Lasswell, the scientist, pursued their communications work in the marketplace and in the laboratory, other writers began a tradition of critical studies of communication. This approach to an age of mass persuasion came to be known as propaganda analysis.

The Propaganda Analysis Movement

The earliest propaganda analysts were writers who saw dangers to democratic life posed by the wartime and postwar climates of opinion manipulation. One month after the Armistice, John Dewey, a war supporter, noted that while there were many calls for an end to wartime controls on business organizations, there were no such pressures to reduce the war's paternalistic strictures on public opinion. Everett Dean Martin, director of the Cooper Union Forum, wrote of how the "crowd propaganda" of World War I's bond campaigns and "Americanization" drives caused people to fall into line as "true believers." His 1920 book on The Behavior of Crowds contains one of the first calls for education as a solution to this threat to democratic self-government.

Once set in motion, the idea of propaganda analysis became a major theme of academic and popular writers. Applying propaganda to higher education, historian F. H. Hodder write of how propaganda tales found their way into historical narratives. His main example was the tendency for historians to take up a propaganda theme begun by Revolutionary War leaders and present an insignificant "street brawl between common
soldiers and town roughs" as The Boston Massacre. Awareness of how propaganda operated in high schools and elementary schools was stimulated by a 1929 report of the National Education Association. Contending that "the propagandist is knocking at the school door," a NEA committee reported on ways that outside influences sought entrance into the curriculum, including the use of exhibits, films, free book covers, pamphlets, study materials for teachers, projects, and essay contests.

While educators were discovering propaganda in their own sphere, journalists were beginning critically to examine the propagandas of newsreporting. According to George Seldes, leading media critic of the 1930s, Upton Sinclair's book The Brass Check first focused attention of pressmen to abuses in the newspapers. It was not that journalists had been unaware of distortions in the news, it was that Sinclair provided the first comprehensive analysis of distorted news and its causes, advertising pressures and occasional outright bribery. Two other studies, appearing at almost the same time, gave impetus to concerns about propaganda in the news. The first was Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz's analysis of how hopes by the New York Times' leadership for the collapse of the Bolshevik regime led that paper to print reports on the Russian situation that suffered from unreliability and inaccuracy but did have the virtue of supporting the desires of the Times' leaders. The second study was a careful analysis, by a religious group, of newsreporting in the 1919 steel strike, showing that Pittsburgh papers deliberately distorted their stories on the strike to favor the interests of the steel industry. The theme of propaganda in the news became commonplace in popular books by such journalists as Will Irwin and George Seldes, Seldes alone producing seven titles on the subject between 1929 and 1942.

Analysis of biased and distorted communication practices in education
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and newreporting set the stage for rhetorical studies of many facets of American society. The topic was picked up by consumer-oriented writers such as Stuart Chase and Ernest Gruening who, respectively, looked at distortions in advertising and in the campaign by private power companies against publicly-owned municipal power. Academic writers contributed articles and books on such topics as the propaganda of political parties, promotional efforts for and against the New Deal, the work of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the machinations of extremist groups such as the Communist Party and Father Coughlin's organization. Matters of foreign relations were grist for the anti-propaganda writers, and books probed such topics as pro-war propagandas of arms makers and efforts by foreign powers to influence U.S. foreign policy.

The propaganda consciousness of the 1920s and 1930s had two significant institutional outcomes, one desirable and the other undesirable. The socially productive result of the propaganda analysis movement was the establishment of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, an educational association founded by journalist educator Clyde R. Miller, supported by a grant from Edward A. Filene's Good Will Fund, and involving such illustrious academicians as Charles A. Beard, Edgar Dale, Leonard Doob, Paul Douglas, Alfred McClung Lee, and Robert S. Lynd. The Institute published a monthly bulletin, prepared and sold educational materials to thousands of schools, and sponsored two book-length studies. One of the Institute's books was The Fine Art of Propaganda, a study of Father Coughlin's radio addresses, written by Alfred McC. and Elizabeth B. Lee; the other book, by journalists Harold Lavine and James Wechsler, focused on efforts by Britain and Germany to win propaganda points in the U.S. during the early months of World War II. In contrast to the careful research and judgment of the Institute's work was the propaganda analysis of the House Un-American Activities Committee.
Responding to fears of propaganda by domestic extremists and foreign provocateurs, the House of Representatives created a committee in 1934 and again in 1938 to investigate "un-American propaganda activities." Initially focusing on right-wing activities, the committee came under the leadership of Martin Dies who turned it into a forum for vague and often unsupported attacks on left-wing politics. The committee's tactics of innuendo and guilt by association were turned against the Institute for Propaganda Analysis soon after the Institute's bulletin published a critical review of Dies' HUAC organization.

By the early 1940s, social currents were working against propaganda analysis. Born of 1920s disillusion and stimulated by Depression-era questioning of social structures, propaganda analysis fell out of favor in the less socially critical atmosphere of 1940. The social trends operating against propaganda analysis were several. First, organizations such as HUAC began to erect barriers against social criticism. Second, with the onset of World War II, messages promoting social cohesion enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the mass media. Third, academicians were perfecting and promoting new value-free statistical and experimental methods of social research. These trends, begun in the late 1930s and which all worked against critical analysis of communication, were enhanced by the postwar prosperity, lack of revisionist sentiment, and Cold War.

Institutional propaganda analysis was the first victim of the anti-critical trends that preceded the Second World War. The earliest obstacle faced by the Institute was unease about its philosophical assumptions. The Institute represented the critical, humanistic approach to communication, as opposed to the enlightened practitioner's view, advanced by Edward L. Bernays, and the value-free analytical perspective, espoused by Harold D. Lasswell.
The Institute's work united scholarly and journalistic analysis of contemporary events and was directed toward educating the general public. This marriage of academic and journalistic writing styles and the effort to have wide, popular influence posed a problem for some of the Institute's academic participants. Since most of the faculty members on the Institute's board were from disciplines then in the process of defining themselves as social sciences, the variance between the Institute's bulletins and new trends in social science research became problematic. Criticisms were raised that the Institute's analyses were neither truly objective nor were distinguishable from magazine pieces. At the same time, the Institute's tendency to focus on social structures that controlled communication was potentially embarrassing to its academic cohorts. Hadley Cantril, then president of the Institute, wrote Clyde Miller concerning his (Cantril's) unease about having his name associated with an issue of the bulletin critical of the structure of broadcast radio since Cantril was "trying to get another $67,000 out of the Rockefeller Foundation for radio research" and also serving on "a technical committee working under the F.C.C." Initially worried about the probably inherent variance between social science's newest definitions of objectivity-through-proper-methodology and the tone of humanistic criticism, it was not until later that academicians began to drift en masse from the ethos of the Institute. As the war approached, several of the Institute's academic board members signed off to participate in various agencies of government. Further, as red baiting became more strident, faculty members affiliated with the Institute were concerned about having their names connected to an institution that produced critical studies of America's business and social establishment. When the Institute's editor, Clyde Beals, came under fire for the alleged adherence to "the communist line" of a journal he previously edited, a crisis ensued.
after which a number of board members departed. The Institute finally suspended operations "for the duration of the war crisis" shortly before Pearl Harbor.

**The Vicissitudes of Propaganda Analysis Since 1940**

By the late 1930s, propaganda analysis was a familiar enough term that it served as a subject heading in indexes of *Psychological Abstracts* and *The New York Times*. However, after the war, the term virtually disappeared as a rubric for critical studies of communication. Given the lack of widespread postwar disillusionment, the prewar trends operating against propaganda analysis maintained a social climate that elevated both the practitioners' and the value-free analytic approaches to communication, relegating critical studies to the periphery.

The major obstacle to renewed 1930s-style propaganda analysis was that academic social scientists found it more attractive to pursue statistically-based studies of the effects of communication rather than to make critical inquiries about its ethics and validity. This trend, which began in the 1930s with Lasswell's content analysis and with experimental studies of attitude change, was magnified by the war years. In the Library of Congress, Harold Lasswell headed a group, supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, that used content analysis to interpret enemy propaganda. The U.S. Army established a Research Branch that used survey and experimental methods to analyze how the attitudes and behavior of soldiers could be controlled. Coming out of the work of the Research Branch were Carl Hovland's advances in experimental studies of mass communication. To academicians after World War II, "propaganda analysis" was, often as not, a term for Lasswell-type content studies and "communication research" was synonymous with experimental or survey methodology. Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton's
assessment that "impressionistic" critical studies were being replaced by statistical analysis of propaganda accurately described the shift in thinking among most leading social scientists.35

Whereas in the 1930s leading academicians would often take a broad view of communication research that included critical analysis of the social structure, by the 1940s, the number taking such an approach had dwindled.36 The statistically based survey methods of Lazarsfeld and the experimental work of Hovland were held out as models and acted to redefine communication studies in narrow fashion. This abrupt shift in academe is not surprising given that just about everything operated to favor the new communication research. The modern methods had an aura of prestige owing to their similarities to work in the "hard sciences" and easily took center stage. Chronicled in such postwar works as The American Soldier series, statistical-empirical methods gained legitimacy from imprimatures issued by leading academicians, the U.S. government, and private foundations. Furthermore, the new methods posed few political risks for their authors in contrast to the frequent attachment of the "red" label to persons active in propaganda analysis.37 Finally, producer-oriented results of postwar communication research offered rewards for researchers who could function as advisers to the nation's persuaders individually or through research institutes.38

Still, prewar propaganda analysis had its conservators. In higher education, a number of social scientists kept up the work, most notably Alfred McClung Lee, whose book How to Understand Propaganda (1952) reveals the continuing interest. In the speech communication field there is evidence of a postwar interest in propaganda analysis, although the field's humanistic, critical studies generally focused on historical subjects and individual speakers rather than current situations and institutions.
While propaganda studies retained various bastions in higher education, most of the limited 1940s and 1950s propaganda work was done by journalists and popular writers. Gilbert Seldes' study (The Great Audience, 1951) of the broadcast industry's attempts to cater to advertising by creating a mass audience and Vance Packard's study of The Hidden Persuaders (1957) are representative. While relatively dormant in the late 1940s and during the 1950s, interest in the ethics and validity of communication picked up during the Vietnam War era. Academic teach-ins and popular inquiries into the war created an atmosphere in which the substance of propaganda analysis reemerged, though not under that particular title. Works such as Joe McGinniss' The Selling of the President 1968 and Timothy Crouse's The Boys on the Bus (1972) show the return of popular writers and journalists to old propaganda themes of news manipulation and influences on the press. The era of Vietnam and Watergate credibility gaps rekindled propaganda consciousness among academicians as evidenced by textbooks such as Howard Kahane's Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric (1971), by the Public Doublespeak program of the National Council of Teachers of English, by contemporary rhetorical criticism in the speech communication field, and by Noam Chomsky's critical series on propagandistic tendencies in communications by government and the mass media. The mass media, too, have become more propaganda conscious as revealed in contemporary journalism reviews and in such efforts as Project Censored, a listing of each year's most important overlooked and underplayed stories.

Given the post World War II vicissitudes of propaganda analysis, one wonders what the future holds for critical studies of communication. Clearly, the trends that dampened post World War II propaganda analysis have abated. Red baiting has lost much of its sting in the aftermath of
McCarthy-era excesses. Statistical and experimental research methods today enjoy less of a god-like aura in social science. Social thought is less homogeneous than before Vietnam, and dissenting views of American social structure hold more sway than twenty years ago. All in all, there is reason to believe that the tradition of critical analysis begun by turn of the century writers and perfected by propaganda analysts in the interwar period is an enduring enterprise. Wherever people wonder about the messages they receive and the opinions they hold, critical communication analysis will prosper.
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1 "Tainted News as Seen in the Making," Bookman, 24 (December 1906), 396-403.


6 Robert A. Park, The Crowd and the Public and Other Essays, ed. by Henry Elsner, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972). Park's monograph on The Crowd and the Public was originally published in 1904 in German.


12 Parker's own modest account gives but the outline of his work. See Gilbert Parker, "The United States and the War," Harper's Monthly Magazine, 136 (March 1918), 522.


14 Folder CPI C1, Container CPI C1, C2: A-F, Papers of The Committee on Public Information, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

15 Editorial, Nation, 131 (1930), 114.

16 Interview with Edward L. Bernays.

Bernays' view of the marketplace of ideas as a control on propaganda is most succinctly presented in his remarks during a Town Hall radio program on propaganda, "Propaganda--Asset or Liability in a Democracy," *America's Town Meeting of the Air* (Series 2, No. 22), April 15, 1937), p. 13. Bernays' view of practitioners' ethical standards as a check on dishonest propaganda is well summarized in Edward L. Bernays, *Propaganda* (N.Y.: Liveright, 1928), pp. 44-45.


Interview with George Seldes, Heartland-4-Corners, Vermont, May 12-13, 1984. The Brass Check was first published in 1919 by its author, Upton Sinclair.


Seldes' You Can't Print That! (N.Y.: Payson and Clarke, 1929) and Lords of the Press (N.Y.: Julian Messner, 1938) were among the most influential.


Illustrative of academic interest in propaganda analysis was the May 1935 issue of Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science which focused entirely on this subject.

31 Alfred McC. and Elizabeth B. Lee, The Fine Art of Propaganda
(San Francisco: International Society for General Semantics, 1979) [this
is a reprint of the 1939 edition] and Harold Lavine and James Wechsler,

32 Propaganda Analysis, 4, No. 5 (March 27, 1941), 11.

33 In a letter to Clyde R. Miller of February 2, 1939, Hadley Cantril
cited George Gallup's criticism of the Institute for allegedly focusing
only on right-wing propagandas. A letter of Leonard Doob to Miller,
September 17, 1940 contains the criticism that an article in the Propaganda
Analysis bulletin was "excellent journalism" but not propaganda analysis.
Letters from Papers of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, privately
held by Alfred McClung Lee, Madison, New Jersey.

34 Letter of Hadley Cantril to Clyde R. Miller, February 1, 1938 in
Papers of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis.

35 Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, "Studies in Radio and Film
Propaganda," Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, 6 (1943),
53-79.

36 This shift is clearly revealed in contrasts between 1930s and
1940s academic bibliographic work on propaganda. Compare, on the one hand, both
the Social Science Research Council's 1935 bibliography (Propaganda and
Promotional Activities [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press], ed.
by Harold Laswell, et al.) and 1930s entries under "propaganda" in
Psychological Abstracts to, on the other hand, postwar entries under
"propaganda" in Psychological Abstracts.
Among those whose analytic, critical work prompted the "red" epithet were Violet Edwards, educational director of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, Clyde R. Miller, its founder, Clyde Beals, its editor, and Robert S. Lynd, a board member. Further, George Seldes, the media critic, was hauled before the McCarthy committee—though he was pronounced as cleared—and even Harold D. Lasswell’s security clearance was held up for a time due to an anonymous and unsubstantiated charge.

Carl Hovland, Harold Lasswell, and Paul Lazarsfeld all produced work for government and/or business.