Black Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research. 

The focus of the study is divided between the old "Negro" leadership literature (1930-66) and the new "Black" leadership literature (1966-82), and factors affecting the transformation in the 1960s from "Negro" to "Black" leadership are specified and analyzed. The survey is organized around the following major categories of analysis: (1) the structure of power in the black community; (2) the social background characteristics of black leaders; (3) black political organizations; and (4) black leadership ideologies and strategies. In addition, basic research and theory problems are discussed, and a prescriptive statement on the continuing struggle for racial justice is presented. An extensive bibliography is included. (KH)
BLACK LEADERSHIP: A SURVEY
OF THEORY AND RESEARCH

by

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SUMMARY

Studies in Black Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research is a comprehensive survey and analysis of the extant social science research on leadership in Black America. The study -- divided into the old "Negro" leadership literature (1930-1966) and the new "Black" leadership literature (1966-1982) -- is organized around the following major categories of analysis:

1. The Structure of Power in the Black Community,
2. The Social Background Characteristics of Black Leaders,
3. Black Political Organizations, and

Factors affecting the transformation in the 1960s from "Negro" to "Black" leadership are specified, and analyzed, and in a concluding non-technical chapter a prescriptive statement on the tasks and responsibilities of Black leadership in the continuing struggle for racial justice is presented. As a concise overview of the extant knowledge with comprehensive bibliographic citations, the volume should serve as a handy guide and reference for students and professionals doing research, and as a convenient means for the interested lay person to become acquainted with the social science research on Black leadership in the United States.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Robert C. Smith, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Black Politics Program Committee at Howard University. His articles and essays on Black politics and leadership have appeared in a number of scholarly and lay journals, including Black World, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Political Science Quarterly, Western Political Quarterly, and the Journal of Negro Education. He is the author of Equal Employment Opportunity: A Comparative Micro-Analysis of Houston and Boston, and with John R. Howard he edited Urban Black Politics. Professor Smith is currently editing (with Alex Willingham) a collection of critical papers on Black conservatism, and writing a book on ethnic and racial politics in New York City.
PREFACE

The most magnificent drama in the last thousand years of human history is the transportation of ten million human beings out of the dark beauty of their mother continent into the new-found Eldorado of the West. They descended into Hell; and in the third century they arose from the dead, in the finest effort to achieve democracy for the working millions which this world had ever seen. It was a tragedy that beggared the Greek; it was an upheaval of humanity like the Reformation and the French Revolution. Yet we are blind and led by the blind. We discern in it no part of our labor movement; no part of our industrial triumph; no part of our religious experience. Before the dumb eyes of ten generations of ten million children, it is made mockery of and spit upon; a degradation of the eternal mother; a sneer at human effort; with aspiration and art deliberately and elaborately distorted. And why? Because in a day when the human mind aspired to a science of human action, a history and psychology of the mighty effort of the mightiest century, we fell under the leadership of those who would compromise with truth in the past in order to make peace in the present and guide policy in the future.

-- W.E.B. DuBois, Black Reconstruction

What is a Black leader? What part have Black leaders played in the changing status of the Black Community in the United States? What objectives have they sought? What ideologies have they embraced? What are their methods and styles? Their organizations and offices? What is their relationship to the Black masses? To whites? What is the role of the preacher and the church? The politician and the vote? How has Black leadership changed in the last 50 years? What are the factors that account for this change? And what is the role of Black leadership in the last quarter of the twentieth century? To raise these questions and provide some answers based on the available research is the purpose of this monograph. To the extent that the research literature does not provide answers to these questions,
then a second purpose of this study is to provide an informed basis for speculation and to suggest areas where further research is necessary.

Of course, to ask questions about Black leadership is to ask larger questions -- to ask questions about the basic subjects of Black politics, the status and fate of Blacks in American society, the adaptability of the system, and about the possibility of racial justice. The requirements of scholarship make the answers to these basic questions tentative and limited. However, if on the basis of the literature I can supply a basis for informed debate and intelligent prescription, then perhaps this study can make a contribution to the practical problems faced by the leaders of Black America. In any event, I attempt to do this in the final chapter.

I am grateful to the students in my Black politics classes at Howard University, and to Dr. Lawrence Gary and the staff of the Institute for Urban Affairs and Research, for their contributions to the development of this study. Dianne Pinderhughes rendered a detailed critique of the manuscript, and Matthew Holden, Jr. was extremely generous with his time and criticisms. Mack Jones, Ronald Walters, John Howard, and Milton Morris read the manuscript in whole or part and made suggestions that led to improvements. I should also like to thank my neighbor, Lorraine Huffaker, for her assistance in the preparation of the manuscript, and I am grateful to my wife Scottie for her suggestions and for typing several drafts of the manuscript.
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Most of the serious works dealing with the Black political experience in the United States are studies in leadership (Jones, 1972:10; Morris, 1975:9). Ladd (1966:114) writes that to ask questions about "Negro leadership" is to ask some basic questions not only about the nature of that leadership but also about the larger subject of Negro politics. Jones (1972) also argues that much of the research on Black leadership in America "proceeds in an atheoretical manner." Consequently, what is needed is the development of some fundamental categories of a theory of Black leadership and politics in America. While there are various meanings of theory (Stinchcombe, 1968; Rapoport, 1958), in general, empirical social science theory has three major functions. First, it should serve as an aid to the inventory and codification of the existing knowledge of phenomena. Second, it should serve as a guide to areas where further research is required. And finally, it should contribute to the development of the capacity to invent explanations of phenomena in a series of interrelated verifiable and verified propositions.

This study, of course, cannot purport to fulfill these functions adequately. Rather, it is an effort to formulate the categories which are fundamental to analysis and theory construction in Black leadership research. The procedure is to dichotomize the extant social science research -- representing more than 100 published and unpublished studies going back nearly 50 years -- into the old "Negro" leadership literature, which
dates roughly from 1930 to 1966, and the new "Black" leadership literature, dating roughly from 1966 to the present. This dichotomy is based on the assumption, fundamental to this study, that a transformation in Black leadership occurred in the 1960s.

Given this dichotomy, in Chapter Two, I inventory and codify the old literature of the Negro leadership group organized around the following major analytic categories: power structure, social background (including class, color and ethnic origins), organization, leadership types, and whatever theoretical fragments may be gleaned from these categories. In addition to these basic categories of analysis, I also review the literature for facts and insights on the role of whites, the masses, preachers and politicians in understanding Negro leadership. After this review of the old Negro leadership literature, in Chapter Three, I specify and analyze the factors affecting the transformation from "Negro" to "Black" leadership in the 1960s. Chapter Four contains a review of the literature about the new "Black" leadership, organized around the categories used in the review of the old literature in Chapter Two. In Chapter Five, I attempt to pull together the existing knowledge, draw out the interconnections between the old and new leadership, and suggest directions for theory and research. Finally, in Chapter Six, substantive, non-technical conclusions that emerge from the study are presented in the form of a prescriptive statement on the tasks of Black leadership in the continuing struggle for racial justice in the United States.
CHAPTER TWO

The Negro Leadership Literature

In the scientific study of politics in the United States, the concept of leadership, despite its obvious centrality, has not been sharply defined. Indeed, in the major review of the political science literature on the concept, the author concludes that there is a lack of explicit focus on leadership as a core concept in the discipline's major journals and paradigms (Paige, 1977:11-40). Indeed, Paige (1977:43) notes that Seligman's 1950 article titled "The Study of Political Leadership" was the first such article specifically devoted to the general subject of political leadership in the then 44 year history of the American Political Science Review. In the general social science literature, the concept has been used in such diverse ways to characterize the varied phenomena that there is a lack of agreement regarding even the basic properties of leadership (Gibbs, 1950:91).

This ambiguity in the general concept of leadership is reflected specifically in the Negro leadership literature where there is a wide variety of definitions, implicit and explicit. Myrdal, for example, writes, "We should not start from an attempt on a priori grounds to define the principal concept... We have only to settle that we are discussing the role and importance of individual persons in the sphere of social action" (1944, 1962:113). Similarly, Ladd (1966:4) writes that little effort was made at the outset to develop any full and precise definition of Negro leadership because "the study as a whole is centrally
concerned with defining it. However, in general, Ladd (1964) notes that Negro leaders are considered to be "persons able to make decisions affecting the choice of race objectives and/or the means utilized to attain them." Matthews and Prothro (1966:178) use what they call an "operational definition" for Negro leaders, that is, "those persons most often thought of as Negro leaders by Negroes." Wilson (1960:10) understands Negro leaders to be "civic leaders -- persons who acted as if the interests of the race or community were their goal." Thompson (1963:5) uses what he calls a "functional approach to leadership," designating the individual actor as a leader who for some period of time overtly identifies with the Negro's effort to achieve stated social goals. In the most parsimonious definition, Burgess (1962:77) defines a leader as an individual whose behavior affects the patterning of behavior within the Negro community at a given time.

While one might wish that the conceptual and terminological confusion in the literature about what constitutes leadership were less and that the theoretical basis for conceptualizing the term in a particular way were clearer, the varied definitions of the term are comprehensible and empirically relevant. And, while agreement on the meaning of Negro leadership is far from universal, a tendency can be discerned among the authors to agree that: (a) leadership involves affecting the attitudes and behavior of Negroes insofar as social and political goals and/or methods are concerned; and (b) Negro leadership is not limited to Negroes but may and indeed does include whites. Perhaps Cox (1965), in his neo-Marxist historical analysis of the development of Negro leadership, makes this point most effectively. He
writes, "But the common cause of Negroes in the United States is not fundamentally limited to Negroes. It is in fact an aspect of the wider phenomenon of political-class antagonism inseparably associated with capitalist culture. A principle involved in the process of democratic development is at the basis of the Negroes' cause, and for this reason leadership among Negroes is likely to be as effectively white as Black" (1965:229). Given this understanding of the principal concept, I turn now to an inventory of the social science research on leadership among Negroes.

**Power Structure: Schism and Realignment**

Historical analysis of the development of Negro leadership in the United States records the emergence of the phenomenon during slavery and its coming to maturity roughly in the period 1890-1930 (Cox, 1965; Huggins, 1978; & Meier, 1960). To the extent that these historical studies are correct, we can date the development and consolidation of the modern Negro leadership group at about 1930. This is also an appropriate point of departure for a review of the social science literature on Negro leadership, because the first significant study of the phenomenon by a political scientist, Gosnell's *Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago*, was published in 1935, and Myrdal's monumental classic appeared several years later. Thus, historical and methodological research fortunately converge; fortunate because, as Kerlinger (1964:700-01) points out, all too often methodological or scientific research proceeds in a vacuum, without adequate historiography, and consequently it lacks perspective.
The available research on leadership in local Negro communities in both the north and south during this early period (circa 1930-50) indicates that there existed reasonably well developed power structures and status hierarchies. In the south, the local power structures were usually constituted by a relatively small group of preachers, teachers, undertakers, lodge leaders and those with light skins (Myrdal, 1944, 1962:667-736; & Dollard, 1957:85-96). In the north, the leadership group was constituted by a handful of politicians, a smattering of business and professional men, gamblers and other underworld figures, and a larger group of teachers, postal workers and other lower level government employees (Gosnell, 1935, 1967; & Myrdal, 1944, 1962:689-736). Nationally, the leadership was comprised of persons with a more pronounced middle class character -- that is, with considerable educational and professional achievements -- and was disproportionately composed of what Myrdal called "Negro glamour personalities," for example, prominent athletes, entertainers, and others accorded status by the white community (Myrdal, 1944, 1962:722-34; Huggins, 1978:92; Bennett, 1965:26; & Bunche, 1939).

The leadership of this period, especially in the south but in the north and on the national scene as well, tended to be "accommodationists" in Myrdal's classic formulation, unable or unwilling to challenge the system of caste-segregation. The evidence in this regard is clear insofar as the south is concerned (Bunche, 1973; Myrdal, 1944, 1962:720-22; & Dollard, 1957:211, 230). However, in the north and on the national scene, there is evidence at this time of a "rising spirit of protest" (Myrdal,
1944, 1962:744). A number of observers also characterize the northern wing of the leadership as "conservative" and "accommodationist" (Bunche, 1939; & Bennett, 1965). Go'snell (1935, 1967), for example, in his description of Chicago politics in the 1930s, did not observe significant civil rights protest during that time.

The final phase of the civil rights movement -- the mobilization of protest in the form of boycotts, sit-ins and mass demonstrations -- beginning roughly with the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955, was to have profound effects upon these traditional structures of power in Negro communities. Indeed, there is evidence that the civil rights movements of the fifties and early sixties occasioned an important transformation, and in some cases displacement, of the traditional status hierarchies and power structures of Negro America.

The research on power structures in the Negro subcommunity has largely been the province of sociologists, beginning with Hunter's (1953) formulation of the problem. Political scientists have taken theoretical, methodological and substantive exception to Hunter's "reputational" approach to the problem of locating power in the American community, preferring instead the "issue areas" approach developed by Dahl and his colleagues in the New Haven Study (Dahl, 1961; Wolfinger, 1976; & Polsby, 1963). It is beyond the scope of this study to review the merits of the tangle of issues raised by these two research approaches. However, to the extent that the issue areas approach seeks to "frame explanations that would identify participants in policy making and describe what they did" (Polsby, 1963:70), then it was probably
inappropriate to the study of power in the Negro subcommunity. This is true because by and large that community was, until the late 1960s, excluded from participation in the urban policy-making process through a variety of devices (Kilson, 1971; Smith, 1978a; & Katznelson, 1973). While students of power in the Negro subcommunity might have sought to identify and describe the behavior of participants in the issue areas internal to the subcommunity, none did. Thus, what little we know about structures of power in these communities derives from the reputational approach.

The following major studies of the power structure in Negro subcommunities are available: Hunter's (1953) study of Atlanta, Pfautz's (1962) study of Providence, Rhode Island, and Barth and Abu-Laban's (1959) study of Seattle. In Atlanta's Negro community, Hunter found a power structure of middle aged, middle class professional men operating through a relatively well defined and stable structure of civil rights, religious, fraternal, business and welfare organizations. Although the NAACP was rated the "top" organization in the subcommunity (followed by the YMCA), the Organized Voters Association was rated number three and apparently exercised some influence, especially in the larger community. The leadership of Negro Atlanta tended toward "closure;" 90 percent of the persons comprising this group knew each other "well" or "socially," often getting together in an exclusive social club.

The leadership was characterized generally as conservative in its approach to issues, engaged in what Hunter, quoting Cox, called "protest within the status quo" (Hunter, 153:128).
Generally, leaders of the subcommunity never rated formal inclusion in the upper levels of Atlanta's decision-making process, but rather were approached informally to get their opinions. However, an important exception to this relatively fixed pattern was found in the realm of partisan politics "where top Negro leaders work with top white leaders" (Hunter, 1953:132).

Although in terms of social background, organizational structure and closure, Barth and Abu-Laban found certain common characteristics of the Negro leadership groups of Seattle and those of Atlanta, the most basic conclusion of their study is that the well organized, stable structure of power discovered in Atlanta was missing in Seattle. This omission is attributed to the relatively small size of the subcommunity, which made it difficult to support large scale, separate institutions; the rapid expansion of the Negro population, which disrupted the traditional leadership pattern; and the leadership's success in getting liberal civil rights legislation enacted, a position which it did not wish to jeopardize by supporting separate institutions (Barth & Abu-Laban, 1959:75-76). Thus, while the leadership of Atlanta was to some extent inclined to maintain separate subcommunity institutions of power, in Seattle the leaders emphasized the larger community and did not seek to wield power within the subcommunity. Nevertheless, the Negro leaders of Seattle held few positions of importance in the larger institutional structure of the community, and their decisions had little impact on the city as a whole (Barth & Abu-Laban, 1959:75).

By contrast, the power structure observed in the Negro subcommunity of Providence was remarkably similar to that in
Atlanta. The leaders were male, middle aged, and middle class in their educational and occupational backgrounds, tended toward closure, and operated through a relatively stable organizational structure, although unlike Atlanta, the Urban League in Providence, rather than the NAACP, was rated the most influential local organization (Pfautz, 1962:156-66). Pfautz also found, in a pattern similar to that in Atlanta, that Negro leadership was oriented more toward segregation than integration and tended to support "protest within the status quo" of Providence, a status quo characterized by residential segregation, economic deprivation, and considerable discrimination. Yet, Pfautz observed an age-generation cleavage in the subcommunity between the younger integrationist-oriented leaders and the older segregationist-oriented leaders, and concluded that the Negro structure of power in Providence, like that of most Negro America, was in the process of "schism and realignment" under the impact of the civil rights movement (1962:166).

I return to this problem of "schism and realignment" later, but first to summarize the outcome of our review of the power structure research, the power structures of the Negro subcommunities of America varied, depending on the size and demography of the community, and the attitudes and values of the leaders. In each of the communities noted above, a middle class leadership was observed, and in two of the three communities, this leadership operated through fairly stable and institutionalized structures of power, characterized by a relatively high degree of closure. In all three communities the leadership was relatively conservative in its approach to issues regarding the status of...
Negroes, and it generally had little impact on the decision-making processes of the larger community.

In its final phase -- the phase of direct action -- the civil rights movement confronted not only an entrenched, conservative white power structure, but also in many communities an entrenched, relatively conservative Negro structure of power. Bennett (1965:26) reports that the national structure of Negro power -- institutionalized in the executive boards and administrative offices of the leading civil rights organizations, and including the bishops and pastors of the largest and most influential churches; the editors and publishers of major Negro newspapers and periodicals; leading educators, businessmen, and professionals; and important white liberal, labor, religious and philanthropic allies -- was also subject to challenge by the young activists of the civil rights movement because "down through the years, the Negro power structure has been more active in accommodating the masses to misery than in organizing them for an attack on the forces responsible for the misery" (Bennett, 1965:36).

Kilian and Smith (1960) document this challenge to the Negro power structure of a single city in their study of the Tallahassee bus boycott of the 1950s, which led to a displacement of the established accommodating leadership by one which was protest-oriented. The bus boycott was initiated and supported by a group of young Negro ministers affiliated with the late Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and opposed by both the Negro and white power structures. Eventually, by creating new organizations (such as the SCLC) and replacing the leadership of the old (such as the NAACP), these new
leaders were able to secure mass support, obtain the recognition of the white power structure, and displace the established leadership. Killan and Smith suggested that the pattern observed in Tallahassee was becoming the trend for Negroes throughout the country (1960:257). Meier, in an historical essay on the significance of the late Dr. King, wrote that in the late 1950s and early 1960s "the leaders of SCLC affiliates became the race leaders in their communities, displacing the established local conservative leadership of teachers, old-line ministers and businessmen" (1965:58). Thus, the Negro leadership described and analyzed in the political science literature below is to some extent a leadership in a state of "schism and realignment."

Color, Class, and Social Background

In his description and analysis of leadership among Negroes in the United States, Forsythe (1972:18) points out that the most "common and persistent" method of classification is in terms of the militancy construct, followed by color, ethnic origin, and class. In this section, the focus is on class, color, ethnic origins, and social background.

Except for the Myrdal (1944, 1962) study, there is little in the standard social science literature regarding class, color, and ethnic origins of Negro leaders. Rather, most of the analysis is in terms of standard social background variables such as sex, age, education, occupation, etc. Thus, much of what we know about the nexus between class, color and leadership in the Negro community results from Myrdal's inquiry.
The actual quantitative correlation between class and color is not known; however, it is probable that historically the Negro upper class was disproportionately mulatto. At the time of emancipation, Myrdal writes, "What there was in the Negro people of family background, tradition of freedom, education and property ownership was mostly in the hands of mulattos.... They became the political leaders of the freedmen during Reconstruction, as well as their teachers, professionals and business people" (Myrdal, 1944: 1962:697). Specifically, Forsythe (1972:19) notes "of the 20 Congressmen and 2 Senators who represented Blacks during Reconstruction, all but 3 were mulattos." Furthermore, about 32 of the 39 leaders noted for their protest against slavery between 1831-1865 are usually described as persons of mixed blood (Forsythe, 1972:19). Bennett (1965:40) describes the Negro leadership of the 1950s as the "Black Puritan Class," that is, the lineal and spiritual descendants of the antebellum and Reconstruction mulatto upper class.

Thus, leaders in the Black community have historically been disproportionately from the Negro upper class and, given the correlation between class and color in the community, these leaders have also tended to have a light skin color. However, Myrdal contends that color, independent of its relevance to class, is a minor factor for Negro leadership. In his analysis of the relationship between social class and leadership, color is relegated to a footnote because most upper class Negroes are leaders by definition; because of the close correlation between class and color; because there is more lower class leadership in
the Negro community than there is in the white community; and in part because of the strong tradition of leadership activity by the lower class preacher and lodge leader. Therefore, color is a tenuous basis for leadership analysis because "while it is plausible that a light skin color is often an asset to a Negro leader in his dealing with both whites and Negroes, it is also certain that a dark skin color is sometimes advantageous for a Negro leader. The two tendencies do not cancel each other since they occur in different types of leadership" (Myrdal, 1944, 1966:1390). This may explain why much of the recent analysis of the concept of leadership ignores color as a variable.

Regarding ethnic origin, again there is little in the standard literature; however, Glazer and Moynihan (1963:35), and Cruse (1967:115-46), have noted the disproportionate influence of West Indians on leadership and politics in New York City. For example, Glazer and Moynihan (1963:35) quote Claude McKay, himself a Jamaican, on the fact that the "first Negro presidential elector in New York state, the first elected Negro Democratic leader and one of the first two Negro municipal judges were West Indians." It is also often noted that Marcus Garvey was of West Indian origin, as are Stokely Carmichael, Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm and Congressman Mervyn Dymally.

The research findings of this study are limited to New York. However, given the facts that New York City serves as the headquarters for the major civil rights organizations and that Harlem has a central influence on Black thought (Cruse, 1967:11-63), one might speculate that the West Indian influence extends beyond the boundaries of New York to impact on national
Negro leadership. But this is speculation; what we know is that in New York -- the nation's most ethnically diverse city -- Negro leadership has been constituted to some extent by persons of West Indian background.

The social background and career patterns of political elites have long been of interest to political scientists and sociologists. Since political leaders are not randomly selected from the population at large, but rather are recruited from identifiable economic and social strata, students of politics are interested in the background characteristics of leaders for essentially two reasons. The first reason is that it is thought that these characteristics in some measure provide insight into the nature of the community from which the leaders emerge. Second, these characteristics are thought to influence the goals and resources that the leaders bring to the political process and thereby to influence the success or failure, in a broad sense, of the community's efforts to attain its goals (Matthews, 1954).

In the discussion in the previous section on power structure in the Negro subcommunity, the sociological studies reviewed showed a leadership group that was disproportionately male, middle aged, and middle class in terms of the educational and occupation backgrounds of the group's members. Basically, the political science literature reveals a leadership of similar background, with some variation depending on the degree of militancy. For example, in Durham, North Carolina, Burgess (1962:79-81) found a leadership of largely male, middle aged, well educated professionals and businessmen, although the "radicals" tended to be younger than were the moderate or conservative leaders.
Thompson (1963:25-57) found a similar pattern in New Orleans, as did Ladd (1966:223-27) in Winston-Salem, North Carolina and Greenville, South Carolina, and Matthews and Protho (1966:188) in the four southern communities they studied. Wilson (1960:11-13) found that the leadership of Chicago was also largely male, middle aged, and middle class. Finally, in terms of religion, there appears to be a basic congruence between leadership and mass, although in Chicago, Wilson (1960:12) found that the so-called "upper class" faiths (i.e., Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Congregational, and so forth) were disproportionately represented among the leadership, and in New Orleans, Thompson (1963:31-32) found that Catholics were underrepresented among the leadership, given their proportion of that city's population.

In summary, in terms of social background the studies reveal essentially a middle aged, middle class leadership of men, although the "radical" or "militant" leaders have tended to be younger and less middle class in terms of their education and occupations. Generally, in the south preachers, undertakers, and other businessmen have been better represented in the leadership group than, for example, teachers have been. This is explained by Matthews and Protho (1966:185) in terms of the "vulnerability concept"—that is, leadership in the south has required that Blacks have relative economic independence from or invulnerability to whites. Teachers who, because of their education, might have been natural leaders in southern communities have been relatively unrepresented in leadership groups because of their vulnerability to the imposition of sanctions by whites, while the relatively
economically independent preachers and businessmen have been disproportionately represented.

Finally, although men have been disproportionately represented in the Negro leadership strata, Negro women have nevertheless played a larger leadership role in the subcommunity than have white women in the larger community (Monohan & Monohan, 1956:590-91). With this exception, Monohan and Monohan (1956) conclude their comparative analysis of the backgrounds of national Negro and white leaders with the judgment that the characteristics of Negro leaders in America do not differ significantly from those of the leaders in the larger community. Given the relative economic disadvantage of the Negro community in comparison to the white community, this is a significant finding. For it indicates that, in spite of its poverty, the subcommunity has been able to produce a leadership of "competence," which has been comparable to that of the more economically affluent larger community.

Organization

Organization is indispensable to successful, sustained political leadership, especially in the interest group process of bargaining and compromise which is characteristic of aspects of politics in the United States (Truman, 1951; & Wilson, 1973). Although the Negro community has historically been characterized by a high proportion of charismatic and what Myrdal (1944, 1962:734) calls "glamour personality" type leadership, there is also evidence that Negroes, both lower and middle class, exhibit a tendency to form and participate in organizations at a greater rate than does even the organizations-prone American in general.
Although the political role of the church and its leadership will be considered later, it is clear that the church (and its spin-off organizations, such as lodges, burial associations, charitable clubs, and so forth) has historically been at the foundation of Black community life, bridging the transition from slavery to freedom and thereby providing "a feeling of continuity and stability to Black society" (Hamilton, 1972:18).

Apart from the church and the fraternal lodges, Negro leadership was exercised through a variety of "civic associations" including but not limited to the YWCA, YMCA, the Pullman Car Porters, and especially the NAACP and the Urban League (Myrdal, 1944, 1962:919-42; Hunter, 1953:126; Pfautz, 1962; Barth & Abu-Laban, 1959). Toward the end of the 1950s and into the 1960s, Martin Luther King's SCLC began to emerge as an important leadership forum in the Black community, especially among younger activist ministers and professionals (Burgess, 1962:185; Matthews & Protho, 1966:185; & Ladd, 1966:192). Also in the 1960s, SNCC and CORE (Zinn, 1964; Carson, 1981; Meier & Rudwick, 1973) were important organizations in the civil rights movement. However, the evidence suggests that, of the organizations devoted to "improvement and protest" in the Negro community, the NAACP and the Urban League were clearly the most influential, ranking either first or second in each of the local power structure studies.

The National Council of Negro Women, the Negro professional associations (bankers, doctors, lawyers, and so forth), and the Greek letter organizations have also engaged in lobbying and
petitioning at both the national and local levels, and have generally worked to improve the status not only of their particular group but also the status of the race as a whole. However, Myrdal concluded that at the national level, as at the local level, the NAACP and the Urban League were "without question" the most important organizations in the Negro struggle against caste (1944, 1962:819).

There is little in the literature on organizations devoted to electoral politics, or about nationalist or leftist organizations among Negroes. Gosnell (1935, 1967:93-114) presents an essentially descriptive analysis of "parts of the Negro machine in Chicago," while Wilson (1960:49) found that the Negro community of Chicago was most thoroughly organized by the Negro political machine. In the 1920s, the Citizens Liberty League was organized in order to mobilize the Black vote to gain elective and appointive office in St. Louis (Patterson, 1974:44-45). Also, Huhler (1953:126) found that the Organized Voters Association of Atlanta was among the most influential organizations in that community. But, in general, electoral type organizations are not frequently observed in the subcommunity, except as part of the urban political machines (Walton, 1972:56-69).

Regarding leftist and nationalist organizations, Myrdal (1944, 1962) discusses in passing some remnants of the Garvey movement, a back-to-Africa group called "The Peace Movement of Ethiopia," and the National Movement for the Establishment of a Forty-Ninth State, a group seeking a territorial state for Negroes in the United States. However, he dismisses these groups as "paper organizations" or as having "never amounted to much"
Thompson (1963:59) excluded the Black Muslims from his study of New Orleans because "they are small and uninfluential," while Burgess (1962:177) concluded that the recently established Black Muslim chapter in Durham, North Carolina was only potentially influential. In a reference to leftist groups, Hunter (1953:127) found that in Atlanta the Negro leadership sought to undermine quietly the influence of the leftist Progressive Party in the Negro subcommunity. Thus, the research literature leads one to conclude that effective political organization in the Negro community has tended to be non-electoral and non-radical (that is, not leftist or nationalist) in character.

Of the politically active organizations in the community, when they are studied one by one and measured by their limited accomplishments, Myrdal (1944, 1962:816-17) writes, "It is possible to view (them) all... as futile and inconsequential"; however, he concludes that taken together they "mean Negroes are becoming increasingly organized for concerted social action and when seen in perspective this represents a basis for attempts at broader organization." This still seems to be the most sensible conclusion from the available research, one that is confirmed by the developments of the 1960s.

**Leadership Types**

As pointed out earlier, the most persistent and common basis of classifying Negro leaders has been in terms of some variation of the militancy concept. Yet this method of classification has also been the source of the most common and persistent criticisms of the literature. These criticisms are considered in Chapter Five. But first, it should be noted that as far back as 1944, [Image 0x0 to 680x918]
Myrdal typed Negro leaders in terms of accommodation and protest. This basic typology has persisted through the years in one form or another in studies of Negro leadership. Higham (1978:3-6) argues that in one way or another the choice between a leadership of protest and a leadership of accommodation has also been characteristic of nearly all other ethnic groups in the United States.

While the number of types of leaders has varied from Myrdal's (1944, 1962) basic two-fold construct to Burgess's (1962) and Thompson's (1963) four-fold ones, the variables used in categorizing leaders have basically been structured in terms of acceptance or rejection of the extant race system, style or method of opposition to the race system, or style or method of race advancement activity.

Myrdal's classic formulation is based on the "extreme policies of behavior on behalf of the Negro as a subordinate caste: accommodation or protest" (1944, 1962:720). That is, because of their subordinate caste position, Negroes find all their power relations confined to the narrow orbit of accommodation or protest, or to some compromise between accommodation and protest" (1944, 1962:1133). Thus, the typology is based on observed empirical regularities in the behavior of Negro leaders rather than on some abstract preconception.

Accommodation is described by Myrdal as historically the "natural," "normal," or "realistic" pattern of leadership behavior among Negroes, especially in the south. Accommodation requires acceptance of the caste system; thus, leaders "lead" only in that context. That is, they seek modifications in the life conditions
of Negroes that do not affect the caste structure. Protest involves a rejection of the caste system. Behaviorally, the pattern consists of lobbying, litigation, and non-violent protest in deference to law; the American creed, and the tenets of Christianity. The protest leader is most often observed in the north because the less rigid system of racial oppression in many northern communities provides the opportunity for protest to exist. This variable -- the nature of the localized system of racial oppression -- is often central to the classification of leaders in this literature.

Examining briefly the other typologies, Burgess (1962:181-86) developed a four-fold typological schema in her study of Durham: (1) the conservatives are defined as those persons who are least likely to voice opposition to caste, conforming closely to Myrdal's accommodation pattern of "pleading to whites"; (2) the liberals, the largest of the types, are distinguished by their use of conventional political methods (for example, voting, lobbying, and litigating) to protest caste; (3) moderates are characterized as functional leaders who subordinate their role as race leaders to their role as leaders in the community generally; and (4) radicals, who are distinguished on the basis of their identification with the masses, mass demonstrations, and the approach of Martin Luther King. Thompson (1963:62-70) also identified four types of leaders in New Orleans: (1) Uncle Toms, who accept the caste system; (2) race men, who militantly reject the caste system and engage in overt forms of non-violent protest; (3) liberals, who also reject the caste system, but who rely on moral suasion and appeals to the national government; and (4) the
race diplomats, who strike a middle ground between race men and Uncle Toms through reliance on education and persuasion to incrementally change the system. Matthews and Protho (1966:186-90) in their study of four southern communities identified three types of leaders: (1) traditionalists, that is, those persons who engage in meliorative action within the context of caste; (2) moderates, who are defined as those persons who favor "welfare goals" and gradual change in the system through the use of conventional political methods; and (3) militants, who are characterized as those persons who favor "status goals"—that is, the immediate abolition of caste through direct action and mass protest. Ladd (1966:150-92) identified these types of leaders in Winston-Salem, North Carolina and Greenville, South Carolina: (1) conservatives, functional equivalents of Myrdal's accommodating leader, depending for success on access and acceptability to whites; (2) militants, who are followers of Martin Luther King's approach of seeking "status goals" (that is, the immediate abolition of caste) through mass protest; and (3) moderates, who are considered to be those persons who seek the middle ground between "status" and "welfare" goals, relying upon negative inducements effected through conventional political methods. Finally, Wilson (1960:214-54) labeled Negro leaders in Chicago as moderates or militants in terms of whether they sought "status" or "welfare" goals, whether they tended to seek racial explanations for apparent anti-Negro acts, whether they tended to agglomerate or disaggregate issues, and whether they relied upon mass protest and politico-legal remedies or persuasion, education, and behind-the-scenes bargaining. In general, the moderates, the most
numerous group in Chicago, preferred "welfare" to "status" goals (that is, immediate, tangible benefits rather than the more abstract goal of integration), tended to seek non-racial explanations for apparently anti-Negro acts, to disaggregate issues, and to have less confidence in mass protests or legal-political solutions.2

The foregoing brief sketch of the principal leadership typologies obviously cannot do justice to their subtleties and nuances. In trying here to summarize the various approaches, one should be aware that the typologies reviewed above were developed by scholars with different purposes and approaches. Thus, selecting commonalities among these typologies may do violence to the authors' original intents. Wilson, for example, is particularly adamant on this point. He writes that the labels militant and moderate were used "with the greatest misgiving," because of the tendency to "read substantive content into these words apart from the specific substantive material for which they are mere rubrics." However, in using them, he stresses that they "have no normative implications" and have "no connection with the kinds of leaders mentioned by other authors writing on Negro leadership..." (1960:214).

However, Wilson protests too much. There is a connection between his work and that of others writing on Negro leadership. This connection is, perhaps, clearest in Ladd's work, the last and most sophisticated of the Negro leadership studies. Fundamentally, the Negro leadership typologies appear to be based on a composite of goals, methods, and rhetoric. These variables are the explicit constituent elements of Ladd's leadership
typology. The factor that determines the location of a particular type on what Ladd properly views as a leadership continuum is the degree of its acceptability to whites (Ladd, 1966:151). In other words, Ladd is saying that the goals, methods, and rhetoric of militants are less acceptable to the dominant group of whites than are those of moderates. Consequently, the goals and so forth of moderates are less acceptable than are those of the conservatives. Or, put another way, in the literature leaders are more or less militant to the extent that their goals, methods, and rhetoric diverge from the conventional goals, methods, and rhetoric deemed appropriate by dominant class whites.

Ladd's leadership continuum thus allows us to see continuity in the literature because it enables one to compare the content of different styles in different times and places. As Ladd (1966:151) writes, "The limits and contents of the styles are determined by prevailing patterns of race relations which vary with time and place." The advantages and disadvantages of this approach to classifying Black leaders, then and now, are considered in Chapter Five. Suffice it to say here that Ladd (1966:198) himself argued that the time-bound character of his construct might in a decade or so make it inadequate as an analytic tool.

Preachers, Politicians, Whites, and the Masses

Because of their historical, structural, and synchronic importance to understanding Negro politics and leadership, I will briefly inventory the literature for data and insights on the roles of preachers, politicians, whites, and the masses.
It is agreed that the Negro church and its leader, the preacher, play an important role in community leadership. Many leaders during slavery and Reconstruction were ministers. "In practically all rural, areas, and in many of the urban ones, the preacher stood out as the acknowledged local leader of the Negroes" (Myrdal, 1944, 1962:861). Yet there is also general agreement that the Negro cleric -- given the relatively extensive resources of the church -- has failed to realize his potential as a race leader. For example, in the south, Myrdal found that the preacher was "the typical accommodating leader." While the preacher in the north was more politically and socially active, Myrdal concluded that "on the whole even the northern Negro church has remained a conservative institution with its interests directed upon worldly matters, and has largely ignored the practical problems of the Negroes' fate in the world" (1944, 1962:861-63).

One finds in all the Negro leadership studies that, because of their mass following, the status of their profession, the facilities of the church, and the spiritualism of the race, a larger number of preachers in the subcommunity exercise leadership than do those in the larger community. However, in urban areas, only in Thompson's New Orleans did clerics "constitute the largest segment of the leadership class" (1963:34). Even in New Orleans "the vast majority of ministers are primarily interested in their pastoral role rather than political action" (Thompson, 1963:35). There is evidence that Martin Luther King inspired a larger number of younger ministers to become involved in political action (Burgess, 1962:185; & Ladd, 1966:192), but in general, ministers
are typically classified in the literature as moderates, traditionalists, or conservatives.

Thus, while the evidence is clear that the Negro minister has been more politically active than his white counterpart -- Matthews and Protho (1966:332-34), for example, report that 35 percent of the Negro respondents, compared to 18 percent of the white respondent's, reported their ministers discussed elections, and 18 percent, compared to 5 percent, respectively, said their ministers endorsed candidates. The evidence also showed that ministers have not been the dominant or most militant category of subcommunity leadership.

Politicians -- elected or appointed -- are conspicuous by their absence in the Negro leadership group. After the exclusion of Negroes from southern politics in the aftermath of the Compromise of 1877, a significant Negro politician group disappeared as an important segment of Negro leadership in the United States. Indeed, the reemergence of a significant Black politician class in the 1960s is one of the important transformations in Negro leadership examined below. But prior to that time, only in Gosnell (1935, 1967) and Wilson's (1960) Chicago did politicians play a significant leadership role. Twenty percent of Wilson's sample of Negro leaders, for example, were either elected or appointed government officials (1960:11).

The handful of Negro politicians has tended to be less middle class in background than the other types of leaders (Myrdal, 1944, 1962:733) who were moderate or conservative in their ideology. In terms of ideology, Reconstruction era politicians, whether in or out of office, "expressed a conservative viewpoint," according to
Meier (1968:248). In Chicago, the machine politicians observed by Gosnell (1935, 1967) and Wilson (1960) were generally cautious and conservative in their approach to racial issues. Ladd (1966) also found that politicians tended to be moderate. However, in an important generalization, he notes that politicians are more heterogeneous in social background and more difficult to type than are other leaders, because "the politician can be militant, moderate or conservative. The point is that he can do this in a way consonant with the demands of his leadership position and the expectations of his constituents (over the objection of whites)." (Ladd, 1966:315). In spite of this capacity for greater ideological flexibility, Ladd nevertheless concludes that politicians tend to be moderate, because: (a) the performance of their work requires compromise and bargaining; (b) the stuff of politics is "welfare"; (c) a number of political positions require the votes and money of whites; and (d) organizational constraints on politicians lead to moderation. There is also evidence (Ladd, 1966:315; & Hunter, 1953:140-41) that Negro politicians are more integrated into the dominant structures of power than are other categories of Negro leaders.

Finally, regarding the effectiveness of Negro politicians, Gosnell (1935, 1967:373) concludes, "under the existing political system, the Negroes secured about as many concrete benefits from the government as most other minority groups. However, because their needs were greater, these benefits were not sufficient. Inadequate as they were, these services came nearer to meeting their needs than in areas where the Negroes have not developed some political power."
In discussing the concept of leadership, it was concluded that leadership among Negroes which is provided by whites may be as effective as that provided by Blacks. Several studies provide empirical support for this approach to defining the phenomenon. For example, Myrdal (1944; 1962:725) discussed the role of "white interracialists," generally upper status white persons who "specialize in becoming fixers and pleaders for Negroes." Bennett (1965:26) noting that "The Black establishment is not all Black," identified important whites in liberal, labor, religious, and philanthropic groups as part of the national structure of power in the Negro community. Thompson (1963:32) developed the category of functional Negroes," that is, white persons "who identify so completely with Negroes that they are generally regarded as "Negro spokesmen."

And Wilson (1960:100) suggested that success in attaining Negro goals was related to the extent to which there existed powerful white liberal groups, the existence of which "means that it is possible to obtain action on behalf of Negro interests without having to organize Negroes."

But the role of whites in Negro leadership has occasioned as much controversy as has the role of preachers, especially among the Black intelligentsia. Perhaps the most effective critique of the role of whites in the Negro leadership group was rendered by Bunche in one of his memoranda for the Myrdal study. Bunche (1939) criticized the whole philosophy of interracial liberalism, arguing that white men exercised disproportionate influence in the selection of Negro leaders, and that Negro leaders in their quest for respectability showed too much concern for the opinion of whites and as a result too little concern for the plight of the
masses. The issue of the role of whites is another factor in the leadership transformation of the 1960s and, as Bunche indicates, is related to the final topic of this section, the role of the masses.

The distance between the relatively small, active, middle class Negro leadership stratum and the relatively inactive, desperately poor Negro lower class has been variously described as simply "class envy" (Myrdal, 1944, 1962:731) or as Wilson (1960:299) argued "a fundamental class antagonism" between the two groups. The relationship probably does not constitute a "fundamental class antagonism," but rather class-cultural suspiciousness and envy. The problem is two-pronged. First, as Bunche (1939:550) and Myrdal (1944, 1962:731) pointed out, there is the lack of knowledge of and empathy with the mass of lower class Negroes among some upper class elements of the established leadership group. And, more importantly, there is a "more or less conscious repugnance on the part of the Negro lower classes to follow them" (Myrdal, 1944, 1962:731). This latter factor is related to the failure of the leadership, in a proximate period of time, to meliorate the condition of the masses which, in turn, leads to suspicions of "sell-out" or what Drake and Cayton (1945:720-22) call "the ritualistic condemnation of Negro leaders." This failure is probably due to a lack of leadership power, rather than a lack of leadership interest or empathy. The result is an often sad and ironic relationship between Negro leaders and their mass followers, a relationship aptly summarized by Hunter (1953:140) as follows:
...Negro leaders maintain themselves in semi-power positions in some instances, by appealing to the fears of the general community concerning the unrest of their community, while on the other hand they appeal to their people on the basis that they are actively working out the problems which may be defined as causing the unrest they say they would assuage. They are apparently sincere in most instances, but it is also evident that the Negro leaders work under certain structural handicaps in attaining their goals.

The literature provides insight into another relationship between the masses and certain types of Negro leaders, namely, those variously described as race men, militants, or radicals. Burgess (1962:185), Wilson (1960:224), and Ladd (1966:189) identify a younger, more activist leadership that is impatient with the pace of change and prefers direct action by the masses as a means to rapidly and radically change the racial status quo. Ladd (1966:188-189) provides a summary of the type: "Mass involvement is supported not only because it is seen as efficacious in advancing the race, but also because the militant finds continuous involvement with the masses in the political struggle desirable... It increases political consciousness and serves to mobilize them. While conservative 'Haves' fear the 'Have-nots,' the militant does not for he considers himself one."

This type, emergent in the 1950s and early 1960s, came to maturity in the mid-1960s and, coincided with the ghetto revolts, exerted a major influence on the transformation of Negro leadership that occurred in this period. We will turn to factors constituting this transformation after a brief discussion of theoretical formulations in the Negro leadership literature.

Theoretical Fragments

Although Jones (1972) has characterized much of the work on the Negro leadership group as atheoretical, some fragments of
theory exist in the literature. The initial fragment was given classic formulation by Myrdal (1944, 1962). Simply stated, this theoretical fragment contends that Negro politics (and leadership) is a function of white politics and power. In a section of the first chapter of volume one titled "A White Man's Problem," Myrdal writes, "The more important fact, however, is that practically all the economic, social and political power is held by whites.... It is thus the white majority group that naturally determines the Negro's place... The Negro's entire life, and consequently also his opinions on the Negro problem are, in the main, to be considered as secondary reactions to more primary pressures from the side of the dominant white majority" (1944, 1962:IXXV). On the basis of their observation of empirical regularities in Negro leadership behavior, Burgess (1962:186), Thompson (1963:58-59), and Ladd (1966:151) provide explicit support to the Myrdal formulation that the pattern of Negro leadership behavior is determined by the prevailing pattern of race relations.

Wilson (1960) and the power structure scholars, to some extent, extend and specify the Myrdal formulation. Hunter (1953), Barth and Abu-Laban (1959), and Pfuatz (1962) emphasize the importance of the general community context in understanding power relations in the Negro subcommunity. They call attention to the fact that in varying degrees the patterns of race relations and race leadership vary by locality. Wilson (1960) goes further. He accepts Myrdal's formulation that Black politics and leadership are a function of white dominance; however, he asserts that it is not an invariant nor the sole determinant. Wilson writes, "Segregation is a great determinant of Negro life in the city but
It is not an invariable determinant" (1960:6). Rather, he suggests that consistent with the power structure, "the structure and style of Negro politics reflect the politics of the city as a whole" (1960:22). Finally, in a distinct contribution, Wilson contends that Negro leadership and civic action are a function of "constraints" inside the Negro community (1960:6). In his chapter titled "The Negroes" in Banfield and Wilson's City Politics, Wilson identified the fundamental internal constraints on Negro politics as: (a) the existence of a large, economically depressed lower class and a small, isolated, underemployed middle class; and (b) the relative inability or unwillingness of the middle class to identify with the lower class and provide leadership for it (Banfield & Wilson, 1963:297-98). In Wilson's view, Myrdal's formulation may be the "ultimate cause" of Negro politics; however, proximate explanations (or middle range theory) require attention to local political structures and factors internal to the Negro community.

Thus, while the Negro leadership literature is certainly not theoretically robust, neither is it accurately described as atheoretical. Rather, three fragments of theory can be identified in explaining observed regularities in Negro leadership behavior: (1) the ideology of white supremacy and the structure of white superordination and Black subordination in power relations, (2) the differential local patterns of white supremacy and dominance, and (3) the factors internal to the Black community which are fundamentally class in character.
NOTES

1. In addition to this leadership typology, Myrdal (1944, 1962:781) also developed a classification of Negro ideologies or what he calls "Negro popular theories." The following Negro "thought types" were identified: (1) Courting the "Best People" Among the Whites, (2) The Doctrine of Labor Solidarity, (3) Equity Within Segregation, (4) Boosting Negro Business (Black Capitalism), (5) Back-to-Africa, and (6) Miscellaneous ideologies such as the Forty-Ninth State advocates and the movement for self-determination in the southern Black belt.

2. Wilson also identified three "functional" leadership types: the prestige leader, the token leader, and the organizer (1960:256). He also notes that some logically possible types appear to have no counterpart in Chicago -- for instance, the mass agitator or a counterpart to New York's Adam Clayton Powell.

3. E. Franklin Frazier in his brief treatise on the Black church writes that "As a result of the elimination of Negroes from the political life of the American community, the Negro church became the arena of their political activities. The Church was the main area of social life in which Negroes could aspire to become leaders of men. It was the area of social life where ambitious individuals could achieve distinction and the symbols of status. The church was the arena in which the struggle for power and thirst for power could be satisfied" (1964:43).
CHAPTER THREE

Factors Affecting the Transformation from Negro to Black Leadership

It is obvious even to the casual observer that there has been an important transformation in Negro Politics and leadership since 1966, based on the data from the last publication of the Negro leadership studies reviewed in Chapter Two. Scoble (1968:329) has written that the events of the 1960s "essentially make obsolete all that political scientists thought they knew concerning Negro political leadership, politics and power prior to that time." This seems to be an overstatement, in that "one can observe important continuities with the past -- as well as discontinuities" (Scoble, 1968:330). Nevertheless, it is critical to understand that in some important respects there is today a new "Black" leadership formation. Factors constituting this transformation from "Negro" to "Black" leadership are the focus of this Chapter.

Seven factors may be identified: Population changes, changes in the Negro class structure, the civil rights revolution, the community action program, the ghetto revolts, the Black power movement, and changes in white attitudes toward Black people. In this Chapter, the structural impact of these factors on the development of the new Black leadership are sketched.

The first factor is the migration of Negroes from the rural south to the cities. Between 1940 and 1970, the percentage of Negroes residing in urban areas increased from 49 percent to 81 percent. Between 1960 and 1970, the number of Negroes in central
cities increased by 3.3 million, from 9.9 million to 13.2 million, while the number of whites (48.9 million) remained the same. As a result, by 1974, 58 percent of the total Black population of the United States lived in the central cities (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1971, 1974). The general consequence of these changes was to increase the salience of Blacks in big city politics. Specifically, the larger percentage of Blacks in the cities expanded the local electoral base for Black elected officials.

The most basic change in the Black class structure relates to the growth and diversification of the Black-middle class. As pointed out in the last Chapter, in the 1960s Wilson identified as an important weakness in Black politics the existence of a large, impoverished lower class and a small, underemployed middle class. While a large, impoverished lower class (variously estimated at one-fourth to one-third of the Black population) still exists, and the argument of Scammon and Wattenberg (1973) that more than half the Black population can be classified as middle class has been discredited, the evidence is nevertheless unmistakable that in the last decade or so there has been substantial upward mobility among Blacks in the United States (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1978:24, 42, 57, 83, 92; Wilson, 1978; & Freeman, 1977). The growth and the development of a larger, more prosperous, educationally and occupationally diversified middle class means the Black community is able to recruit its leadership from a larger pool of skilled persons than was the case previously.

There is also evidence that today's Black middle class is more predisposed to align itself politically with the Black lower class than was the case earlier. Aside from the problems posed by
the very existence of a large lower class and small middle class, Myrdal (1944, 1962), Wilson (1960) and others also argued that the Negro middle class exhibited a relative inability or unwillingness to identify with the Negro lower class and to provide leadership for it. Banfield and Wilson (1963:298), for example, saw the Negro middle and lower classes separated by "difference of ethos and interests. But contrary to the recent findings of Bolce and Gray (1979), Hamilton reports that this divergence in interests between the classes has attenuated with the growth and development of the "new middle class." Hamilton argues that the pre-1960s Black middle class was largely based in the private sector and consequently it could develop "class interests antagonistic to those of the Black lower class." However, he argues that the new Black middle class is basically salaried from the public sector and "this circumstance largely determines the sort of hard, self-interest positions this class will take on certain public policy questions" (Quoted in Poinsett, 1973). While Hamilton's argument regarding the historical basis of the antagonistic class interests of the pre-1960s Black middle and lower classes may be disputed, since both the Black middle and lower classes today depend heavily upon the public sector, each has an objective interest, apart from considerations of ideology or race solidarity, in seeing the public sector expand. The interest of the Black middle class in the expansion of the public sector relates to the availability of employment opportunities (for example, the Urban League estimates that in 1980 more than half of all Black college graduates were employed in the public sector), while the interest of the Black lower class is due to the
expansion of public assistance and various kinds of community services. Hamilton's research in Detroit, Atlanta, and Chicago shows that middle-class Blacks tend to support progressive issues and candidates and vote for the perceived conservative candidate less often than do Blacks of the lower socioeconomic classes (1976:244). Thus, there is emergent in the new Black politics what I call a kind of "structural liberalism" that operates to bridge ethos and status differences between the Black lower and middle classes, and creates considerable cohesion in electoral choice and in public policy preference.

The civil rights revolution -- which included the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 -- has, of course, had a profound impact upon Negro politics and leadership in the United States. The most basic consequence of these laws was to remove the legal basis for racial dominance by whites and thereby increase the range of maneuverability of Blacks in the polity. More directly, in terms of political leadership, as a result of the Voting Rights Act, the percentage of eligible Black voters registered in the south increased from 28 percent in 1960 to 59 percent by 1973 (Campbell and Feagin, 1975:133), and although proportionally the number of Black elected officials in the south and the nation remains small, there has been a substantial increase in their numbers as a result of the passage of the Voting Rights Act. For example, in 1966, there were approximately 60 Black elected officials in the south. By 1974, this number had increased to 1,314 (Campbell and Feagin, 1975:141).
Thus, the civil rights revolution directly contributed to an increase in the size of the Black politician segment of the Black leadership group. Hamilton also suggests that the "status-welfare" cleavage observed by a number of students of Negro leadership and politics was "muted by the 1960s civil rights revolution which brought new status-granting legislation" (Quoted in Poinsett, 1973). That is, by removing the legal basis for the status inferiority of Blacks in this country, the civil rights revolution contributed to a decline in status concerns and an increase in interest in welfare goals.

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 included a variety of programs (for example, education, income support, health, and legal services) to combat the complex problems related to poverty in the United States, including "political poverty" or powerlessness. The legal basis for this attack on political powerlessness was the Community Action Program (CAP) with its call for the "maximum feasible participation" of the poor in community-based anti-poverty programs. Although there is considerable dispute among specialists as to the origins of the phrase, there is general agreement with the "central thesis" of Peterson and Greenstone (1979:242) that, whatever its origins of purposes, in its evolution "community action was primarily an attack on the political exclusion of "Black Americans" and that it proved "a far better mechanism for incorporating minority groups politically than for improving their economic and social position" (See also Fox Piven, 1970; & Moynihan, 1969).
As a result of CAP and the coincident emergence of community control, and the "(B)lack demand for participation in large American cities" (Altshuler, 1970), Blacks began to take part in a wide variety of community based boards, agencies, and organizations. These organizations -- which in many instances were created through funding by the government -- added an important new organizational structure to Black politics. In addition, the process of election to and service on the CAP boards probably provided a useful leadership socializing experience for a cadre of Blacks in both urban and rural politics. There is also evidence that the CAP experience served the leadership development function of identification, training, and recruitment. For example, in a nationwide sample of Black elected officials, Eisinger (1978a:6) reports that 20 percent of the respondents indicated that they had been involved in some capacity at a CAP agency.

According to Scoble (1968:330), the Watts "riot" and the several summers of ghetto revolt that followed in every large American city with a significant Black population (except the south) led to "an accelerated completion of an age-generational revolution peacefully initiated against 'traditional' Negro leadership during 1962-63... in the form of a nationwide revolt of the lower class against middle class political leadership, superimposed upon the earlier age revolution." In addition, Scoble suggests the revolts led to an increase in militancy in the ghettos, a greater stress on welfare goals, an emphasis on exclusively Negro decision-making, and a rise in the influence of
elected Negro leaders at the expense of the Negro business and civic leaders (1968:331-33).

The ghetto revolts had two other important effects on Negro leadership. First, they led to a marked increase in and intensification of the repression of Negro leaders by police, intelligence, and military authorities (U.S. Senate, 1976; & Button, 1980). But they also probably increased the leverage of the established leadership in the policy process, because what the riots did was to make manifest the leadership's often raised spectre of mass violence. As a result, there was an element of stark reality in the leadership's frequently voiced alarms that "if you do not deal with us, there will be another long hot summer" or "the militants will take over."

To some extent the militants did take over or, as Allen (1969) argues, they were co-opted into the established Negro leadership. In the situation of uncertainty, tension, and disorder created by the revolts, the young militant wing of the leadership group erupted as a force in national Black politics with the articulation of the Black power symbol during the 1966 James Meredith march in Mississippi (Carson, 1981:215-28). Coming one year after Watts, the propagandistic symbol gave added impetus to the incipient mass rebellion, and altered in important ways the symbolism and structure of Black leadership (Stone, 1968:3-26; Killan, 1968:125-46; McCormack, 1973; & Peterson, 1979).

First, the Black power symbol operated to further bridge the gap in interest and ethos between the middle and lower classes, and thereby to increase Black community solidarity. Aberbach and Walker (1970) present evidence that in the late 1960s a Black
political culture emerged in urban Black communities. This culture cut across class lines to include Blacks "who have broken free from traditional moorings to become part of a Black community which includes persons from all social classes" (1970:379). Second, there is evidence that the Black power concept led to a more positive self-perception and a greater sense of psychological security and personal efficacy among a stratum of the Black population (MacDonald, 1975; Shingles, 1981; Hall, Cross, & Freedle, 1972; and Hraba & Grant, 1970). Finally, the Black power concept stimulated the formation of a new structure of independent Black organizations and caucuses and, in conjunction with the ghetto revolts, facilitated the incipient incorporation of Blacks as constituent elements of the national regime (Smith, 1981a). In sum, with respect to leadership, what Black power represented was the emergence of what Wilson (1960:278-79) called the "new Negro," militant and outspoken on racial issues. The new Negro, however, prefers to be called Black.

The final factor affecting the transformation of Black leadership is a change in the attitudes of the white elite and the masses toward race, racism, and the status of Blacks. In the post-World War II period, the liberal wing of the national white power structure committed itself to dismantling the legal basis of white supremacy (Myrdal, 1944, 1962:III-XXXIII; Martin, 1979; & Ellison, 1973). This elite liberal consensus was symbolized by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Brown vs. Board of Education, 1954 (Kluger, 1975), and was given concrete expression in the civil rights legislation of the 1950s and 1960s. However, the liberal establishment was able to secure enactment of this
legislation only as a result of the civil rights movement's mass protests and the accompanying violence and disorders (Wilson, 1972; & Rogers, 1981). In addition, there is evidence (Dye, 1972:39-67) that, on the issue of civil rights, the opinion of the white masses followed that of the white elite. But, in spite of mass passivity and, in some instances, resistance to the demand of Blacks for civil rights, the data (Pettigrew, 1971, National Conference of Christians and Jews, 1978:13-21; & Campbell, 1971) are conclusive that the postwar opinion of whites is less anti-Black and more racially accommodative than it was previously. This fact, of course, facilitates the participation of Blacks in the social system.

Given this identification and analysis of the factors affecting the transformation from Negro to Black leadership, and before reviewing the literature about the new Black leadership, it is possible to delineate, empirically the structural impact of these factors through analysis of the changing composition of Ebony's periodic listing of the "100 Most Influential Black Persons" in the United States. Since 1963, Ebony, the most influential of the mass circulation Black periodicals, has published such a list annually.

According to the editors of Ebony (May, 1975:46), each person on the list meets the following criteria: "The individual affects, in a decisive way, the lives, thinking and actions of large segments of the nation's (B)lack population. The individual commands widespread national influence among (B)blacks and/or is unusually influential with those whites whose policies and practices significantly affect large numbers of (B)blacks." These
criteria (except for the racial exclusivity in terms of who is eligible for inclusion on the list) fit closely the definition of Negro leadership employed in the literature. However, the method of identification and selection of persons for the list is not manifestly scientific; thus, it is necessary to rely on the subjective judgment of the magazine's editors. Notwithstanding this fact, Ebony's influential place in the nation's Black community -- and especially the participation of Ebony senior editor Lerone Bennett, the distinguished historian, in the identification and selection process -- gives credibility to the validity and reliability of the lists.

In Table 1 (page 49), the organizational or institutional affiliation of Ebony's most influential Black persons is presented for the years 1963, 1971, 1975, and 1980. Clearly, the most striking change in the composition of Black leadership revealed by the Table is the relative decline between 1963 and 1980 in the percentage of leaders of civil rights organizations and glamour personalities (that is, prominent athletes and entertainers), and a sharp increase in the percentage of persons who are elected or appointed government officials. In 1963, 18 percent of the Ebony leadership group were leaders of local or national civil rights organizations, and 10 percent were glamour personalities, but by 1980, these percentages were 7 to 2, respectively. In 1963, only 9 percent of the Ebony leaders were elected officials. By 1980, that figure had increased to 25 percent, after reaching a high of 31 percent in 1975. In addition, the number of appointed officials (including judges) increased from 15 to 20 percent between 1963 and 1980. Thus, the most basic change in the
The structure of Black leadership occasioned by the events of the 1960s is the decline in civil rights and personality type leaders, and the emergence of a leadership of elected officials. In 1975 elected officials constituted nearly a third of the Black leadership, compared to only 9 percent in 1963. This evidence of the often spoken of transformation from protest to politics is even more compelling if one combines the elected and appointed officials, because it shows that nearly half (41 percent) of Black leadership today is part of the official structure of government. This represents a major transformation in Negro Leadership. For example, Huggins (1978:92) reports that in two surveys of "leading Negroes" in 1944 politicians were "conspicuous by their absence." This transformation in the Negro leadership group is reflected in the literature on the new Black leadership which is largely a literature of Black elected officials, although Black appointed officials and judges are neglected.

Before examining this literature, further study of Table 1 shows that the number of other types of leaders -- for example, church, business, labor and publishers -- fluctuated during the period. However, the number of leaders who were affiliated with professional associations increased modestly from zero to 4 percent, and the number of leaders affiliated with fraternal organizations increased dramatically, from 1 percent in 1963 to 12 percent in 1980.

Finally, the Table reveals that leaders of a nationalist or Marxist persuasion are relatively insignificant during the period, with their greatest number appearing in 1971 -- 8 percent. However, by 1980, such persons disappear completely as influential
persons in the Black community. The inescapable conclusion of the Ebony data, then, is that the transformation from Negro to Black leadership in the 1960s did not lead to marked radicalization of the Black establishment. The review of the new Black leadership literature in the next Chapter further documents this conclusion.

However, before turning to this documentation, the structural consequences of the events of the 1960s for Black leadership are summarized below.

First, as a result of the civil rights revolution, racial domination in the polity has declined. This declining significance of race in the political system increases the range of maneuverability of Black leaders, because their thoughts and behaviors on behalf of Blacks are no longer limited to what Myrdal called the "narrow orbit of accommodation or protest." Rather, Black leaders are now free to involve themselves in a variety of issues and problems beyond the traditional concerns of the civil rights leadership.

Second, the structure of Black organizations and decision-making is relatively more independent of whites.

Third, Black leadership today is more integrated into dominant systems of governance and influence, including not only leading Blacks who are elected and appointed government officials but also persons in the prestigious media, corporate, and trade union hierarchies, the elite universities, and the philanthropic community.
### TABLE 1


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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elected Officials</td>
<td>9%*</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed Officials</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judges</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Associations</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publishers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights Organizations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalists</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Glamour&quot; Personalities</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Othera</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
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*The numbers represent percentage distributions for each year.

*aIncludes writers, journalists, educators and military officers."
The classification of persons who are nationalist or Marxist in ideological rather than positional terms is a methodological device designed to display the presence/absence of these ideologies in the leadership stratum. Of course, nationalists and Marxists are also writers, publishers, preachers, and so forth, and they theoretically could be elected officials and leaders of civil rights organizations, although empirically they tend not to be. Specifically, in 1963 and 1975 the nationalists in the Ebony leadership group were ministers. In 1975, the nationalists included a minister, a writer, the Director of CORE; the Marxists included an educator and two officials of the Black Panther Party. Persons are classified as nationalist or Marxist on the basis of their self-designation and analysis of their speeches and writings.
CHAPTER FOUR

The Black Leadership Literature

We begin our review of the Black leadership literature with consideration of how students have defined the concept. Most have not. Holden (1973:4), following the Negro leadership scholars, first understands Black leadership generally to mean "those who seek (or claim to seek) the interests of the whole Black population." However, in a departure from the literature about the old Negro leadership, he adds that such persons purport to lead by "defining for Blacks how they should relate to whites" (1973:4). More specifically, Holden suggests that it is appropriate to regard as a leader anyone who holds a key position in any of the "major Black socioeconomic institutions" (1973:4). Thus, the leadership concept as developed by Holden concerns persons (Black or white) seeking or claiming to seek the interests of Blacks as a whole in their relationship to whites. This latter notion is a departure from the traditional use of the concept in the literature. The rationale for this departure is not developed by Holden. Consequently, Holden's rationale is dubious, for it ignores the fact that in Higham's view (1978:8), a large part -- perhaps the greater part -- of ethnic leadership has to do with internal processes of community development and symbolic expression.

Aside from Holden, the remainder of the new Black leadership literature largely ignores the problems of the leadership concept, probably because it is basically literature about Black elected officials who are implicitly assumed to be leaders by virtue of
their holding office. However, Hamilton (1981:8) points out that this implicit assumption regarding the Black leadership role of Black elected officials may be misleading. Defining a Black leader as "one who is racially Black in a leadership role and who speaks and acts on matters of specific (but not necessarily exclusive) concern to Black people as a direct purpose of occupying that role," he argues "...if one were racially Black and, say, mayor of an all-white town who never spoke or acted on issues of specific concern to Blacks as such, it would not be proper to designate such a mayor as a 'Black leader'." Similarly, regarding Black appointed officials, Smith (1981a:33) has raised the question of under what conditions and circumstances Black presidential appointees are to be viewed as leaders of the race. The important point here is that the race leadership of officials of the government (or other major American institutions, for example, the Ford Foundation) is a matter to be explicitly demonstrated rather than implicitly assumed.

Power Structure: Schism and Realignment

Since the early 1960s, there has been no systematic research on power structures as such in the Black community, either locally or nationally. However, nearly 30 years after his classic 1953 study, Floyd Hunter in *Community Power Succession: Atlanta's Policy Makers Revisited* (1980) reexamines Atlanta's power structure. The first thing to note about the power structure in Atlanta is that, despite the civil rights movement, the election of a Black governing coalition, and significant integration of the professional occupational structure, there still existed in 1980 a distinct superordinate white "community" power structure and a
subordinate Black "subcommunity" power structure. The dominant power structure in Atlanta in 1980, as in 1950, was constituted by the major financial, industrial, and business leaders of that city, although a smattering of professionals and politicians existed at the periphery of the structure (Hunter, 1980:43-49). Hunter writes that "...a few (B)lacks would also be included in Atlanta's overall power structure, particularly at the corporate board level...." However, he adds that fundamentally the Atlanta power structure is white, and "...the weight of the whole scheme veers unerringly toward the goals of business and the business-dominated technology" (1980:47, 49).

Atlanta's Black power structure in 1980, again as in 1950, was disproportionately male, middle class, and middle aged. Of the 25 top leaders identified by Hunter, only 2 were women. Businessmen remained at the top of the leadership structure, but by 1980 politicians had displaced preachers and professionals as the influential members of the "subcommunity" (1980:70-71). Finally, Hunter writes, "The (B)lack power structure is still powerful, in a real sense, only so far as its members are granted power, credit and social recognition by the white overlords of urban power in Atlanta" (1980:72-73).

Holden, in his wide-ranging inquiry, interprets Black politics as occurring at both the local and national levels through a fairly well defined and stable set of relationships which he calls the Black "quasi-government." Specifically, he argues that there is a "constant interplay" or interaction among the elites of the "major socioeconomic institutions" or organizations of the community that produces "a central tendency
which becomes the judgment of the "Black community" (1973:3-4). Such a judgment, he writes, has "substantial moral and political influence over some opinions available to anybody. Black living in the territorial ghetto and beyond." Thus, the structure of power in the Black community is held together by the "interdependent elites of the major Black socioeconomic institutions" and by a fairly stable leadership recruitment process that allows for the incorporation into the Black political world of such diverse personalities as Roy Wilkins and Stokely Carmichael. Specifically on the point of leadership schism and realignment, Holden contends that "there is a certain stability in the continuation of persons in leadership roles over very long times while -- over the same times -- new leadership personnel are constantly added as competitors, but seldom merely replace or displace their predecessors" (1973:7). As a result, there is a certain stability in the symbolism and ideological cleavages of Black politics.

In a partial test of the Holden thesis, Smith (1978b) found that among the Black political elites in Washington, D.C. (interest group executives, members of Congress, presidential appointees, and journalists), there was empirical evidence of that "constant interplay" among the various leaders and anecdotal evidence that this interaction eventuates in a consensus as to the judgment of the Black community, at least insofar as issues in the federal policy-making process are concerned.

Regarding the leadership recruitment process, Salamon (1973) studied the impact on the traditional Black leadership structure in Mississippi of the opening of that state's political-electoral system to Blacks. He argued that the availability of elective
offices to Blacks in Mississippi created the possibility of a host of new leadership roles which were relatively independent of whites, and thus opened the possibility of a basic restructuring of the traditional leadership hierarchies.

Based on a questionnaire administered to the 336 Black candidates for elective office in Mississippi in 1970, Salamon concluded that by and large the persons who sought and won elective office in Mississippi resembled the traditional Black elite in terms of social background (1973:628). However, he also observed that while the traditional leaders were dominant, a new non-establishment leadership also emerged to take advantage of the expanding political opportunities and to compete with the old leaders for influence among Mississippi Blacks.

But perhaps, Salamon's most important conclusion in terms of leadership recruitment/displacement is that "even the (B)lacks with traditional backgrounds... evidence a change-oriented set of attitudes that distinguishes them markedly from the leaders of even a decade ago. In other words, while drawing substantially on existing (B)lack elites, the movement has changed the character of (B)lack political leadership infusing the old elite with fresh blood and new ideas" (1973:643). At the national level, Smith (1976:327-34) found a similar pattern. The old-line leadership of Black civil rights, professional, and elected officials in the late 1960s incorporated the younger, more militant (in terms of rhetoric and orientation to the masses) advocates of Black power and "caucus separatism" into the established leadership structure. Further, some established leaders also adapted the rhetoric and ideas of the young Black power rebels. Thus, the available
research supports Holden's argument regarding the stability, continuity, and adaptability of the Black power structure.

**Class, Color, and Social Background**

Holden divides the Black community into two major classes -- the Bourgeois and The Folk -- each of whom is divided into subclasses. The Bourgeois class is divided into the "Gentry," that is, the color conscious descendants of the free Negroes and mulattoes who exercised leadership during the Civil War and Reconstruction era, and the "Solid Middle Class" (estimated at 25 percent of the Black population) -- people whose middle class status is defined in the same terms as the middle class status of their white counterparts (1973:27-28). The Folk are divided into the "Working Class Respectables," estimated at 30 percent of the Black population; the "Striving Poor," persons who work full-time but at poverty level wages; and, the "Immobile Poor," the long-term unemployed and the welfare dependent (1973:29-30).

Historically, the gentry provided leadership for the Black community. However, Holden argues that because of its relatively small size and its "color snobbery" (1973:28, 31), leadership in the Black community has passed to the solid middle class. This tendency of disadvantaged ethnic groups (which has been observed throughout American history) to develop leaders who are marginal to the group -- that is, persons of advanced economic and professional attainment -- results in distrust of the Black bourgeoisie by the folk, and in class tensions which undermine the capacity for effective action (Holden, 1973:31). Although Holden writes that the bourgeoisie has remained the prime source of Black leadership, "...it has not been able to redeem the promises which
-- as a leadership group -- it has overtly and implicitly made to produce racial change on a scale, and in a form, suitable to most of the (B)lack population" (1973:36). As a result, there exists in the Black community a process Holden calls "centrifugalism" -- a tendency toward severe internal conflict (1973:36). This tendency has been reported in the literature about the Negro leadership group. Thus, it appears that the transformation in leadership that occurred in the 1960s, while perhaps diminishing this phenomenon, did not eliminate it as a factor in subcommunity leadership.

The new literature provides no additional data on the ethnic origins of Black leaders. While there are, as Holden (1973) and Bennett (1965:42) suggest, some indications that the Black establishment is losing its caste-color flavor as a result of the events of the 1960s, there are no data available to establish this as conclusive fact.

A social background profile of the new Black leadership closely resembles the old Negro leadership of largely middle aged, middle class men. Salamon's (1973) description of Black candidates and office holders in Mississippi is an apt summary of the findings on the social background of Black elected officials nationally (Conyers & Wallace, 1976:55-68; Cavanagh & Stockton, 1982:10), and in two northern states, New Jersey (Cole, 1976:37-55) and Michigan (Stone, 1978:284-404). Salamon (1973:629) writes, "The typical candidate was male, well over 40 years old, at least a high school graduate, a white-collar "professional" or land-owning farmer, a home owner and the recipient of a substantial middle class income by Mississippi
standards. He was, therefore, hardly representative of Mississippi (B)lacks."

Thus, in spite of the fact that today's Black leadership is disproportionately constituted by elected officials in comparison to the old Negro leadership, one does not observe significant differences in their social backgrounds. This is surprising since Myrdal (1944, 1962), Ladd (1966), and others have suggested that politicians were more likely to be representative of their communities (in terms of social background) than were non-elective leaders. However, this appears not to be the case. Indeed, Smith (1976:304-07) found that elected officials were more advantaged on most measures of social background than were their appointed counterparts in the national administration or the executives of the Washington offices of Black interest organizations.

Organization

The data from the Ebony survey reported in Chapter Three show that, in the last two decades or so, there has been a decline in individualistic "glamour personality" type leadership and a rise in organizationally-based leaders, especially leaders who are affiliated with fraternal and professional organizations. In addition, as a result of the Black power movement, a whole range of independent or caucus type Black organizations have emerged. Smith (1981a:436-38) reports that between 1967 and 1969 (the peak period of Black power), 73 new national Black organizations were formed. These new organizations cover a range of Black community concerns and interests -- for example, business/economic, educational, professional/occupational, and the explicitly political. In addition, as a result of the Community Action
Program's doctrine of "maximum feasible participation," the availability of federal funds and organizers, and the effect of the ideologies of Black power and community control, a variety of grass-roots, community-based organizations of the poor and lower middle class were formed in urban and rural Black communities (Peterson & Greenstone, 1979; & Bailis, 1974). While a number of these organizations -- notably the National Welfare Rights Organization -- have withered away as a result of cutbacks in federal and philanthropic support, many persist as evidenced by the formation in 1980 of a national organization of community-based groups.

Thus, contrary to the often heard lament that Blacks are unorganized, the evidence indicates that they may be overly organized and that the resultant intense competition over limited resources may contribute to a major problem in leadership effectiveness (Holden, 1973:35).

This plethora of organizations in the Black community notwithstanding, Myrdal's conclusion of 1944 still appears to be valid. At the national and local levels, the NAACP and the Urban League are "without question" the most important organizations in the Black struggle for racial justice. As Wilson observes, numerous organizations have been formed in this century to advance Black interests; however, the NAACP and the Urban League have "almost alone among scores of organizational attempts succeeded in institutionalizing a concern over race relations" (1973:7).
Recent research on Black organizations focuses on their effectiveness in the policy-making process. Wolman and Thomas (1970) found in the middle 1960s that Blacks lacked effective access to centers of decision-making in housing and education, not because the system was closed to them, but because they lacked effective organization, and the limited organizational resources available were too narrowly focused on civil rights. More recently, Smith (1976:337-39), and Pinderhughes (1980) found that Black organizations have developed nominal access to most major federal policy areas, and have enlarged their focus to include the full range of domestic and foreign policy. However, they also found that this multiplicity of issues which are arenas of concern to Black groups and the resource difficulties of the subordinate, dependent Black community "weaken their likelihood of being taken seriously within any of these arenas" (Pinderhughes, 1980:36).

Indeed, Pinderhughes (1980) and Bailey (1968) both conclude that the "middle class" strategy of lobbying, litigating, and electioneering alone cannot be effective in meliorating the multiple problems of the Black community. Yet, in his study of more than 20 Washington-based Black organizations, Smith (1976:327) found that all except the welfare rights group and the nationalist-Marxist groups were committed to this middle class model of political action.

Insofar as nationalist and leftist organizations are concerned, Smith (1976:65, 85) found that such groups as the All African Peoples' Revolutionary Party, the African Liberation Support Committee, and CORE were small and insignificant, and exercised little influence in the policy-making process. This
lack of influence was due to the fact that these groups did not seek to play a policy-making role. Regarding this latter point, until the death of Elijah Muhammad, the Nation of Islam, the largest and most influential of the Black nationalist organizations, took what might be regarded as the ultimate nationalist position relative to efforts to influence government policy. Smith (1976:85) quotes Dr. Lonnie Shabazz, the Minister of Washington Mosque #4, as saying, "We do not and will not lobby in any shape, form, or fashion because it would be attempting to advance our interests through the devil's system; it would be mixing two systems (ours and theirs) and there would be inevitable conflict." Since Mr. Muhammad's death, the Nation of Islam has split into an orthodox faction under Minister Louis Farrakhan, and a revisionist faction (called variously the World Community of Islam in the West or The American Muslim Mission) under Minister Wallace Muhammad. The revisionist faction is integrationist in its goals and practices (Muhammad, 1980). However, because of the split, the revisionist and the orthodox factions are now only shadows of the organization the Nation of Islam was at the peak of its influence in the 1960s (Lincoln, 1968).

In general, then, the evidence supports the conclusion that the nationalist and Marxist organizations in the Black community face nearly insurmountable difficulties in developing long-term viable organizations capable of sustained political activity (Geschwender, 1977; Parenti, 1964).

Since a significant proportion of the new Black leadership is constituted by elected officials, it is necessary to consider briefly their organizational base. Although the conventional
wisdom is that the church is a principal, if not the principal, organizational base of Black electoral office seekers, the research indicates this is not the case. Rather, civil rights organizations (especially the NAACP) are as important as, if not more important than, the church. Salamon (1973:641) reports that 70 percent of the candidates seeking elective office in Mississippi in 1970 were recruited by church or civil rights organizations. Cole (1976:46) reports that civil rights organizations were the principal base for elected officials in New Jersey. Eisinger (1978:9) reports that 74 percent of the elected officials in his national sample were drawn from civil rights organizations. The literature also indicates that party organizations play a minor role in Black electoral politics (Hadden, Massotti, & Thiessen, 1968; & Cole, 1976:49). Further, Black elected officials are reluctant to build permanent community-wide electoral organizations. Instead, they prefer the freedom of personalized, entrepreneurial campaigns, using the traditional organizational structure of the community for the purpose of voter mobilization (Nelson, 1978:65-67; Nelson, 1979; Nelson, 1972; Nelson & Meranze, 1977; Murray & Vedlitz, 1974).

Yet another emergent organizational form in Black politics is the convention movement. Efforts are currently being made to create a national Black political party, or what Holden (1973:172) calls a "mechanism of collective judgment, a regular conclave, so structured as to represent the widest possible range of opinions and circumstances -- a kind of Afro-American general council." In essence, the leadership is seeking to develop a structure in Black politics to perform the interest aggregation function (Almond &
This effort is not new in Negro politics. Historically, there have been a number of Black political parties at the local, state, and national levels (Walton, 1969; & Walton, 1972:121-31). As early as 1830, a National Negro Convention was launched as a permanent organization to discuss common problems and develop an overall national strategy to eliminate the problems then facing Blacks (Walton, 1972:145). The national political parties in general have "disappeared almost as quickly as they have appeared" (Walton, 1972-131). Although the Negro convention movement had a somewhat longer life (operating roughly from 1830-1850) than the national political parties have had, it too eventually disappeared, largely as a result of ideological conflict and internal strife (Walton, 1972;145). Again, in the 1930s a National Negro Congress embracing all of the major Negro socioeconomic, civic, and fraternal organizations was established. However, it also soon collapsed as a result of communist penetration and inadequate staff and financial resources (Myrdal, 1944, 1962:817-19).

In 1972, yet another effort to develop such a structure of collective expression took shape at the National Black Political Convention in Gary, Indiana (Walters, 1972; Strickland, 1972; Clay, 1972; & Baraka, 1972). The Convention, which was broadly representative of the national Black community, was unable to successfully aggregate the various conflicting ideologies represented. As a result, the liberal integrationists eventually withdrew, leaving the Convention a conclave of nationalists and Marxists. Although the Convention continues as a movement, it has lost much of its support from other major Black organizations and
from Black elected officials, the groups which were the original basis of its strength.

The effort to develop a Black political party continues, however. The Gary Convention in 1972 voted not to set up a party, but rather to work to create the machinery for such a party. A conference of Black elected officials and national civil rights leaders meeting in Richmond, Virginia in early 1980 issued a call for the establishment of a "task force" to study the feasibility of developing a Black party. However, at the National Black Political Convention held in Philadelphia in the Fall of 1980, the National Black Independent Political Party was formally established. Ronald Walters, a leading academic advocate of a Black party and an activist in the Convention movement, makes the case for such a party as a mechanism by which to: (1) organize and mobilize the Black community -- in electoral and non-electoral politics -- around an agenda "commensurate with the needs" of the Black community; (2) hold Black elected officials accountable to the Black community; and (3) increase the leverage of the Black vote in presidential politics (Walters, 1975; & Walters, 1980).

Walters, as he might say, makes a good case, in Aristotelian fashion, for the party. However, the historical evidence and the experience at Gary and subsequent conventions indicate that, given the present level of organizational and ideological conflict in Black politics, the current effort at party building is likely to fail. The dominant integrationist wing of the leadership has already withdrawn from the effort. Given the factional and doctrinal splits between the various nationalist and Marxist ideologues observed at Philadelphia, it is safe to conclude that
the new National Independent Black Political Party, like its historical forerunners, will founder on the rocks of ideological diversity and factionalism. Put simply, the Black community is too ideologically and organizationally diverse to function, even operationally (except in times of manifest crisis), as a united front, in a single, coherent political structure. The efforts of Blacks to create an all-encompassing party recalls the struggle of New York Jewry in the second decade of this century to establish a "Kehillah," a comprehensive communal structure which would unite the city's multifarious Jewish population. For nearly a decade the structure worked reasonably well. However, it too then foundered on the rocks of ideological, national, and religious diversity before its ultimate demise, thereby pointing to both the limits and possibilities of ethnic group life in the United States (Goren, 1970:24-41).

In addition to the foregoing, Hamilton (1973b:88) argues that an independent Black party is "not advisable" because: (1) the resources in terms of manpower and money are simply not available on a broad enough scale to make an impact; (2) Blacks have invested considerable energy in gaining potential leverage and positions in the Democratic Party; and (3) an independent party, while it may permit isolated Black candidates to win offices, does not permit "gaining an effective base of sustained power within the decision-making structure" of ongoing institutions of governance. It also should be noted that a successful independent Black party might stimulate the formation of racist "white" parties of the right. This, in turn, would probably increase the rancorous debate on public policy with respect to race and deflect
whatever leverage independent Black political action might have in legislative and executive elections, at least at the state and national levels where Blacks do not constitute a political majority. As Frye (1980:164) concludes in his case study of the National Democratic Party of Alabama, "...third parties as an operationalization of the concept of 'black power'...are likely to be limited in success to miniscule areas of the American political arena."

Finally, a Black political party denies the fundamental exigency of the Black predicament in the United States. There can be no basic alteration in the political economy of Black America without structural change in the American economy, and structural change in the economy is not possible without an interdependent coalition of Black and white progressives.

Given the difficulties in creating a structure that would encompass the range of ideologies in the Black community, the dominant liberal integrationist leadership has sought to develop alternative mechanisms. There is first, the National Black Leadership Forum, a coalition of the executives of 16 leading civil rights, civic, and political organizations. The Forum meets regularly in an effort to develop a common Black agenda and strategy, and to share responsibilities in the articulation of Black interests in the federal policy-making process.

Second, there is the Congressional Black Caucus (Barnett, 1977; Barnett, 1974; Barnett, in press; Henry, 1977; Levy & Stoudinger, 1976; Levy & Stoudinger, 1978; Robeck, 1974; Sheppard, 1973; Smith, 1981c; & Smith, 1981d). Over the years, the Caucus has, in the words of its current chair, Congressman Walter
Fauntroy, argued that "27 million Blacks in this country view the members of the CBC as the elected government of the (B)lack nation." This is political hyperbole. However, there is evidence that in the development of its policy statements and legislative agendas, the Caucus does explicitly seek to aggregate the broadest range of opinion in the Black community (excluding the nationalists and Marxists), and that it has had considerable success in this effort (Smith, 1981c). Although the Caucus is not descriptively representative of the national Black community, and a number of its members are dependent upon white money and votes to retain their seats in Congress, the group is substantively representative of Blacks in that its voting record and official pronouncements closely reflect the extreme liberalism of the Black community (Smith, 1981d:220). As such, it is the organization that most nearly approximates a mechanism of collective judgment for the national Black community. As an extension of its aggregation capacity, the Caucus has also created the Black Leadership Roundtable. Constituted by about 125 national Black organizations, this structure serves both as a source of Black community input to the Caucus and as a mobilization-community action network (Congressional Black Caucus, 1982).

Finally, it should be noted that while organizational leaders have to some extent displaced charismatic ones, there is still in Black politics a place for the charismatic-individualistic leader. In some measure, the Rev. Jesse Jackson's leadership is based upon his personality (rather than his organization, as is the case with Benjamin Hooks, for example), and his ability to project an image as a leader who is able to communicate in the language of the
masses. However, Jackson is only the best known of such charismatic leaders; they can also be observed at the local level among both establishment and nationalist/leftist leaders. Given the significance of oratorical skills in Black culture (Holden, 1973:21; & Hannerz, 1968), such persons will probably continue to be a prominent feature of Black leadership.

Leadership: Rhetoric, Goals, and Methods

None of the new Black leadership studies develop leadership typologies. Either the problem of typology is ignored (Salamon, 1973; Conyers & Wallace, 1976), or it is concluded that the typologies typically employed in the Negro leadership literature distort more than they illuminate about leadership beliefs, ideology, or style (Holden, 1973:15-16; Smith, 1976:332-33; Hamilton, 1973a:XV-XVI; & Cole, 1976:81-82). However, if the standard typologies of Negro leadership are divided into their constituent elements — goals, methods, and rhetoric — then there are data in the Black leadership studies that permit the classification of leaders along these dimensions.

The attempt to classify the goals or beliefs of Blacks along the classical left-liberal, right-conservative abstraction is a mistake because:

...(B)lacks have been the have-nots of the system. Abstract ideologies for "all mankind" mean less to them than filling voids created by oppression. How does one philosophically label Marcus Garvey who in the 1920s urged a "central nation" in Africa for all (B)lacks? Was his movement as he alternately suggested, liberal...or conservative? Further neither (B)lack nationalism nor integration perch comfortably on a left-right spectrum. In much of the north (B)lack separatism is equated with radicalism; in the south the reverse (Cole, 1976:93).
Two other characteristics of Black thought are worthy of note. First, "...in comparison with other groups in American society, Black communities produce inordinately large numbers of talented individuals and organized groups concerned with fundamental systemic change" (Barnett, 1976:23). Second, the political thought of Black Americans has been largely problem-solving and action-oriented; therefore, "one finds much of the thought produced by "activists" rather than by relatively unengaged observers" (Hamilton, 1971:XIII).

An examination of contemporary expressions of Black political thought shows the salience of the foregoing factors: Black thought bridges the left-right dichotomy, it evinces a concern for fundamental change, and it is largely the product of political activists.

**Leadership Beliefs**

We begin our consideration of leadership beliefs and goals with a discussion of Black nationalism. There are a variety of Black nationalist goals or beliefs. The range of definitions of Black nationalism varies from simple racial solidarity to the complex ideologies of Pan-Africanism and territorial separatism (Bracey, Meier, & Rudwick, 1970:XXVI). While there may be some value as Walter (1973), among others, suggests, in terms of ideological unity in defining nationalism simply as racial solidarity, such a definition has little scientific value because it is too broad to discriminate among the variety of thought extant in the Black community. Thus, for purposes of scientific analysis the concept of nationalism should be restricted to a
belief in some form of racial separateness, whether psychic or physical.

Using this more restrictive definition, one finds a variety of nationalist belief "systems." There are the cultural nationalists who seek to develop and consolidate a separate and distinct Black culture or way of life (Karenga, 1977; & Baraka, 1969). There are the revolutionary nationalists who seek, ultimately through a "people's war," to force the United States government to negotiate the establishment of a separate Black state -- the Republic of New Africa -- in five deep south states (Obadele, 1971). There are the religious nationalists who seek ultimately through the intervention of divine providence, the establishment of a separate homeland for Blacks (Farrakhan, 1980). And finally there are the Pan Africanists who seek, in unspecified ways, the ultimate liberation and unification of Afrika under scientific socialism (Carmichael, 1969). A number of these nationalist expressions are linked to Marxist or "communist" ideologies (Baraka, 1975; & Marable, 1980). However, there are orthodox expressions of Marxist-Leninist thought as the "key to (Bl)ack liberation" (Ofari, 1972; & Davis, 1974).

Finally, there is the integrationist approach which also bridges the left-right continuum. First, there are the traditional liberal integrationists (Congressional Black Caucus, 1971; & the National Urban League, 1973). Second, there is the tradition of democratic socialism (Rustin, 1971). Finally, in the aftermath of the election of Ronald Reagan, a small group of persons who describe themselves as conservatives have emerged, at

Before examining the research on leadership beliefs, it is perhaps appropriate first to examine what we know about mass attitudes toward these ideologies as a means by which to place leadership beliefs in some context. First, all the available survey data indicate that the majority of Blacks, whatever their sex, age, education, or place of residence, reject the separatist goal (Ebony, 1972:12-13; Marx, 1967:28-29; Brink & Harris, 1963:119-20; & Campbell, 1970:15-17). Indeed, at the peak of nationalist agitation in the late 1960s, support for the ultimate nationalist goal of a separate Black state found support among only 7 percent of the national Black population, with the very young and the very old providing the highest levels of support at 10 percent (Campbell, 1970:16, 18). No data are available regarding mass support for cultural nationalism, although there is reason to believe that support for it may be more widespread than is that for separatism, and is possibly growing (Holden, 1973:64).4

Although there is a paucity of data on mass attitudes toward Marxism, what little we know suggests that Blacks support the major values and institutions of the society, including capitalism. Devine (1972:281), for example, found that, of those Blacks with an opinion, 6 out of 10 believed that things like electric power and housing should be run by private business. Yankelovitch, in a 1974 survey of American college students, found that Black students were just as "capitalistic" in their value structure as were white students, manifesting strong beliefs in
the sacredness of private property (72 percent), and that business should make a profit (86 percent).

Finally, on liberalism-conservatism, the evidence is unambiguous. In their landmark study of American voting behavior and opinion, Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1976:253-55) wrote:

...(B)lacks held predominantly liberal attitudes on the issues in the 1950s. Twenty-five (25) percent were in the most extreme liberal decile, and a full sixty-five (65) percent were to be found in the three most liberal deciles. Moreover, the remainder of the (B)lack population was moderately liberal, with less than seven (7) percent of all (B)lacks giving responses which placed them in any decile on the conservative side of the line. However, even with a predominantly liberal profile in the 1950s, the degree of change in political attitudes is greater for (B)lacks than for any other group in the population. The extreme and homogeneous liberal opinion profile of (B)lacks in the early 1970s is striking. Where we found twenty-five (25) percent of all (B)lacks in the most liberal decile, we now find sixty-two (62) percent of all (B)lacks at this point. What is more, eighty-five (85) percent of all (B)lack Americans now respond to the issues in a way which places them in the three most liberal deciles... (And) the leftward movement of the (B)lack population has occurred not only on the issues of central importance to (B)lacks -- school integration and increased attention to (B)lack problems -- but on issues of foreign policy and scope of government as well.

What is even more remarkable is that, while Blacks were becoming more liberal during this period, all other population groups except Jews were becoming increasingly conservative. Thus, the data are clear: the so-called new Black conservative leadership finds less support among the masses than do even the nationalists and Marxists. 5

Turning now to leadership beliefs, the studies show that Black leadership, like Black followership, is liberal and integrationist but committed also to the idea of racial solidarity. Salamon (1973:636) found that more than 95 percent of the Black candidates for office in Mississippi expressed strong
support for such liberal policies as guaranteed jobs, national health insurance, and reductions in military spending; 90 percent expressed a strong sense of racial solidarity; and 60 percent supported the Black power principle of independent Black organization and political action. In New Jersey, Cole (1976:94), using a self-placement ideology scale, found that 16 percent of the Black elected officials described themselves as radical, 52 percent as liberal, 7 percent as middle-of-the-road, and none as conservative (the remaining 25 percent responded as "other" or "none"). In comparison, none of the white elected officials in Cole's sample described themselves as liberal, 42 percent as middle-of-the-road, and 14 percent as conservative (the remaining 10 percent were classified as "other" or "none"). Cole also found that 61 percent of the Black elected officials supported Black power as a slogan to bring Black people together and as a means to achieve the group's "fair share of society's benefits" (1976:101).

Conyers and Wallace, in their study involving a national sample of Black and white elected officials, found a "consistently stronger liberal tendency on the part of (B)lack officials than on the part of white officials" (1976:30). For example, 76 percent of the Black officials but only 30 percent of the white officials, believed it was the responsibility of the "entire society" to guarantee "adequate housing, income and leisure" (1976:31). Although there was majority support among the Black officials for independent Black businesses and universities, only a minority (24 percent) favored an independent all-Black party. In general, then, the Conyers and Wallace data show that Black elected
officials who are liberal integrationists favor racial solidarity and independent Black institutions in business and education but not in politics, where "working through the established party structure" is preferred to an independent Black party (1976:27).

Smith (1976) -- on the basis of a series of loosely structured interviews with Blacks who were members of Congress, executives of Black interest organizations, presidential appointees, journalists, and staff members of congressional representatives -- classified the Black leadership in Washington as both conservative and integrationist. The former classification was based upon their "acceptance of, or more precisely, accommodation to the capitalist, free market, welfare state characteristics of the present day U.S. political economy" (Smith, 1976:313). Their classification as integrationists was based upon their goal of seeking, incrementally, equal access for Blacks to societal economic and political opportunities (Smith, 1976: 318, 332). There were Black nationalists and Marxists present among Washington's Black elites and groups, but they were small or insignificant in number.

Although Smith labels the dominant ideology of the members of the Washington Black establishment as conservative, he points out that they nevertheless are probably the most progressive of all organized lobbies in the federal policy-making process (Smith, 1976:316). They are labeled conservative because they reject in principle or as "unrealistic" socialist alternatives to the present organization of the economy. But several members of the Congressional Black Caucus were labeled by members of their staffs as "closet socialists." That is, they were considered to be
persons who support socialist principles as requisite to resolving the problems of the ghetto poor but, because of the perceived limitations of American politics are unwilling "to go public" with proposals based upon explicit socialist principles. Recently, however, Ronald Dellums of California reportedly publicly announced his membership in the Socialist Party (Pinderhughes, 1979:21). Further, Congressman Parren Mitchell of Maryland has called for the nationalization of certain basic U.S. industries (specifically petroleum) as a means by which to resolve the problem of ghetto joblessness (Dorfman, 1980). Thus, within the Black establishment, the socialists may be "coming out of the closet."8

In his revisit to Atlanta, Hunter also describes the ideology of the members of that city's Black establishment as conservative for several reasons. First, he states, "As the top leaders have prospered, their values resemble more and more the prevailing values of the city and nation." Second, Hunter considers Atlanta's Black leaders to be conservative because they seek "systematic integration, not separatism," and "the general maintenance of the larger American system." Finally, he notes that "they can keep order in the ethnic quarter" (1980:71; 77). Hunter also notes that there are underlying policy differences between the Black and white leadership in Atlanta. These differences reflect the liberalism-conservatism axis in American politics and policy. For example, the white leadership in Atlanta "wanted more and more building -- of huge central city projects, rapid transit, airport improvement, Omni-International and expanded higher income housing in outlying areas," while Blacks
sought solutions to problems of ghetto housing, unemployment, crime, and drug addiction (1980:151-52). Because Black leadership, in seeking solutions to these problems, fails to take account of the "oligarchical" management of the economy and proposes a "democratic" alternative, Hunter believes it plays a basically conservative role in the city's politics.

Holden classifies Black leadership beliefs as clientage, opposition, and withdrawal. **Clientage**, which is akin to Myrdal's accommodation type, rejects direct challenges to white supremacy, relying instead on powerful whites to effect change. **Opposition**, which is akin to Myrdal's protest type, relies on appeals to the universalistic norms of democracy and protest within the framework of constitutionalism to change the behavior of whites. **Withdrawal**, which is akin to Black nationalism, rejects the norms and values of white society and calls for physical and/or psychological withdrawal from American society (Holden, 1973:42-43). Holden argues that, while the opposition type is dominant in the Black leadership group, all types can be found, and that the advocates of withdrawal increased in influence between 1966-67 (1973:43).

If one includes as forms of withdrawal the organizational consequences of the Black power ideology and the movement of community control in the ghetto as Holden does, labeling them respectively "caucus separatism" and "street level populism" (1973:70-73), then it is true that the advocates of withdrawal have increased in influence in the Black leadership group. However, to include Black power organizations such as the Congressional Black Caucus and the variety of community-based
organizations in the category of withdrawal is an analytical error. These groups have not "withdrawn" from the confrontation with white supremacy, as to some extent have the various nationalist ideologies reviewed above. Rather, they represent an important effort to construct an ideological and organizational base for a more effective challenge to the system of white supremacy.

Holden's book is more than description and analysis; it also involves prescription. Indeed, the book may be viewed as an academic manifesto of the integrationist wing of the Black leadership group in the United States. As such, it is probably the most systematic and cogent defense of integration extant. Holden argues that there is an "inescapable interdependence" between Blacks and whites in the United States. As a result, he argues that integration is the only realistic objective for Blacks in the United States, because the nationalist goal of territorial separatism and the Marxist goal of armed rebellion and revolution are "nothing short of romanticism" (1973:96-130).

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Holden defines integration as the "result which exists when two or more diverse parties are brought together in what is a common political enterprise and a common structure of respect, even though each of the parties may also have certain additional structures (self-development) peculiar to itself" (1973:137). In the context of contemporary Black politics, this coming together of the two diverse parties, one Black and the other white, in a common enterprise, could easily be interpreted as a loss of "Black identity" in order to fit into the larger American structure. Consequently, Holden adds that integration is desirable even
though each of the parties may also have additional enterprises peculiar to itself. By this careful modification, he cuts at the core of the argument of the opponents of integration; he argues for integration without the loss of Black identity.

Specifically, Holden argues that the goal is an integrated society where there would be "substantial evidence that race would not predict the distribution of either material benefits or psychic esteem in any significant degree" (1973:137). The fact that race substantially predicts the distribution of material benefits in the United States is amply documented (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1978). Also, in spite of the progress occasioned by the civil rights and Black power movements, there is still substantial evidence that race predicts the distribution of psychic esteem as well. That is, Blacks continue to suffer from negative racial stereotypes and have lower self-esteem than do whites (Sussman & Denton, 1981; and Clark & Clark, 1980). Nevertheless, it is the core belief and dream of the integrationist belief "system" that a society without these racial differentials in material and psychic well-being is both desirable and possible.

In sum, the evidence is clear that the dominant belief or ideology among Black leaders is liberal integrationist, and that they are representative of the broad masses of Blacks in holding this belief. The findings regarding leadership methods and rhetoric which follow complete our discussion of the constituent elements of the leadership typology.
Goals and Methods

In their nationwide survey of Black elected officials, Conyers and Wallace (1976:20) found that 90 percent of the respondents indicated that conventional political methods (including litigation and petitioning) were "very important" or "fairly important" in achieving progress for Blacks in America; 55 percent gave these responses for mass demonstrations and protests, and 21 percent said that they subscribed to violence, when peaceful methods failed to achieve progress. Smith (1976:324-27) classified leadership political methods as moderate (voting, litigation, and lobbying) and militant (mass demonstrations and protest), and found that moderate methods clearly predominated among Black elites and groups in Washington. In fact, Smith writes that the "data suggest an even higher degree of convergence among (B)lack elites and groups in terms of political style than political beliefs such that even nationalist groups like CORE...pursue their goals through moderate methods" (1976:327). Of the 20 Black groups surveyed by Smith, all save 2 -- the African Liberation Support Committee and the National Welfare Rights Organization -- indicated that moderate methods were the preferred means of gaining access to and influencing policy makers.

Thus, the preferred political style of the Black leadership group today emphasizes moderate or conventional methods at the expense of militant or unconventional methods. This preference is in spite of the fact that there is a considerable body of evidence and argument that a racially stigmatized and historically poor and oppressed minority cannot rely on such methods alone to achieve...
economic and social progress (Pinderhughes, 1980; Wilson, 1966; Keech, 1968; Hechter, 1972; & Bailey, 1968). This preference is also in spite of the fact that there exists a kind of "protest ethos" in the Black community (Eisinger, 1974), predisposing the masses to favor the use by the leadership of more militant political methods. In a poll by Louis Harris for the National Conference of Christians and Jews (1978:98), a sample of the Black public and the national Black leadership was asked to agree or disagree with the following statement, "The only time (B)lacks make real progress is when they hold protests and non-violent demonstrations." Forty-nine percent of the mass sample agreed, but only 29 percent of the leadership sample agreed with that statement. Harris writes, "...it is fair to conclude that the (B)lack public is seeking a leadership which will more forcefully implement a strategy for (B)lack equality" (National Conference of Christians and Jews, 1978:98).

Harris explains the leadership's reluctance to endorse militant political methods in terms of its fear of a "severe backlash by whites in the event of such overt street activity." While the fear of white backlash may be a factor, it is also probable that the leadership fears failure in the effort to mobilize a substantial protest movement in terms of meaningful pay-offs (that is, policy outputs), even if a successful mass protest movement could be revitalized.

The leadership is in all likelihood correct. The success of the protest movement in the 1960s can probably be accounted for in terms of a peculiar set of circumstances: the issues were localized and clear (discrimination in public places, denial of...
the right to vote, and so forth); protest techniques were relatively new and newsworthy; and important white groups (for example, the church, labor, and Jews) formed a part of the civil rights coalition. The issues today (such as affirmative action, welfare, and full employment) are murkier, and national rather than regional; former allies are now rivals; there are fewer Bull Connors or Jim Clarks; the media are less attentive; and the kind of young Black who provided cadre leadership in the 1960s is now more likely to be on the executive ladder in government or corporate bureaucracies. Stokely Carmichael starting out today, for example, would probably wind up with a law degree from Yale and a GS16 at the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Thus, there appears to be a mass-elite cleavage on appropriate political methods to achieve the goal of integration. Fundamentally, the argument of the dominant leadership group is that protest is a limited resource in the post-civil rights era and that, while it is not clear that conventional methods produce dramatic policy benefits, it is probably nevertheless true that the lack of conventional participation (especially voting and lobbying) is associated with a systematic exclusion of Blacks from public goods, for example, appointed office, food stamps, regular garbage collection, or less police harassment.

In terms of the final element of the leadership typology, Smith (1976:26-32) found that associated with moderate political methods is moderate or conciliatory rhetoric (with an emphasis on law, morality, and the American democratic, constitutional ethos of equality, freedom, and justice), while the rhetoric of the militant tends toward confrontation with an emphasis on
liberation, the Third World, anti-imperialism, corruption, and decadence of the American society and polity.

Preachers, Politicians, Whites, and the Masses

It is not the church as an institution per se, but rather a certain number and type of individual ministers that have provided leadership for Black America (Holden, 1973:17). Based upon a review of local leadership patterns, Hamilton (1972:127-29) classifies the political activism of the Black preacher into three role types: Church-Based, where the minister's influence is due to his leadership of a large congregation, and he is active in the community in the sense that he is consulted on local issues by public and private decision makers; Community-Based, where the minister is active in both electoral and pressure group politics, although an effort is made to keep separate the political and church activities; and Church-Based Programmatic, which is a combination of the two where the minister uses his church power base to attain economic and political goals for his followers.

Hamilton provides classification but no data on the frequency of occurrence of each type on their empirical correlates. In general, despite their presumptive importance, there is a lack of systematic, empirical research on the political behavior of the Black clergy. An exception is the work of Berenson, Elifson, and Tollerson (1976) on the correlates of political activism among the Black ministry. On the basis of a 1970 questionnaire administered to a non-probability sample of 154 Black ministers from a universe of 184 in Nashville, Tennessee, it was found that political activism among the Black clergy was correlated with age, education, monetary strength of the church, and Black
identification. Specifically, the study concludes that young, highly educated preachers with a strong sense of Black identification and from financially secure organizations are the most politically active (Berenson, Elifson, & Tollerson, 1976:338). Thus, it appears that political activism among the Black church and clergy is not as widespread as is often thought. Indeed, it is probable that a majority of preachers and churches are a conservative force in Black politics "working against the widespread radicalization of the Negro" (Marx, 1967-105).12

The data available on the extent to which Black preachers hold elective office indicate that, compared to whites, they are more active but not markedly so. Cole (1976:43) found that 7 percent of the Black elected officials in New Jersey were preachers, compared to none of the whites. Smith (1981d:210) found that 12 percent of the Black congressional delegation were clerics, compared to only 1 percent of their white colleagues.

The literature on the new Black leadership is almost wholly a literature about elected officials, with a few exceptions. These exceptions include Jackson's work on Black judges; as well as that of Smith (1981b) and Mock (1981 & 1982) on Black presidential appointees; and Henderson (1978 & 1978b) on Black urban administrators. Regarding presidential appointees, the research evidence indicates that in the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations Blacks constituted approximately 2 percent of the senior level appointees, while they comprised 4 percent of such appointees in the Nixon-Ford Administrations, and 12 percent in the Carter Administration;13 They tend to be from middle class backgrounds. Other characteristics are: they tend to be selected on a partisan
basis; they tend to come from the fields of law and business in Republican Administrations and from education, civil rights, and community service in Democratic Administrations; they tend to exhibit racial solidarity in terms of intercommunications and policy focus; and, their impact on public policy depends heavily upon the electoral support Blacks give to the candidacy of the president who appoints them (Mock, 1982 & Smith, 1981b).

Henderson (1978a) concludes that urban Black administrators tend to be: relatively young compared to their white counterparts; well educated (although they are less educated than are their white colleagues); likely to have worked for community, non-profit, or educational institutions prior to their government career, while their white colleagues were more likely to have come from the business or corporate sector; and, they are more likely to advocate community, civic, and professional interests than are white administrators, although the majority of both Black and white administrators were generally not advocacy prone. Finally, Jackson (1977) shows that the "typical" Black judge is similar to his white counterpart in terms of age, religious affiliation, place of birth, and education, but is dissimilar in that the typical Black judge grew up in less comfortable circumstances than did his white colleagues, was more politically active prior to his appointment, and came to the bench with more prior judicial experience than did his white colleagues.

Insofar as Black elected officials are concerned, there has been a dramatic increase in their number since the middle sixties. It was only recently that the Joint Center for Political Studies reported for the first time that Blacks now constitute 1 percent
of the 490,200 elected officials in the United States (Williams, in press). The vast majority of these Black officials are elected at the local level; approximately 90 percent are either municipal, county, or local educational or law enforcement officials.

The research evidence shows that the electoral process tends to act as a screening mechanism which systemically filters out non-establishment type Black candidates (Salamon, 1973:644); that Black candidates tend to be elected by majority or near majority Black constituencies (Hadden, Massotti, & Thiessen, 1968; Bullock, 1975; & Smith, 1981d); that equitable representation depends upon the level of Black resources, for example, educational and income levels, and on the method by which local governing bodies are elected (Latimer, 1979; Karnig, 1976; Karnig & Welch, 1981; and Engstrom & McDonald, 1981); that Black officeholders tend to aspire to offices beyond the local and congressional levels (Stone, 1980); and that the electorates tend to be racially polarized (Murray & Vedlitz, 1978; McCormick, 1979; Hadden, Massotti, & Thiessen, 1968). While it is probably true that Blacks in cities where there are Black mayors receive more equitable urban service delivery, have a more equitable share of city employment and contracts, and are less victimized by the police than are Blacks in other cities, the research indicates that Black mayors have had little success in reordering urban priorities or changing city expenditure patterns (Keller, 1978; Hamilton, 1978; Levine, 1974; Levine, 1976; Jones, 1978; Preston, 1976; & Watson, 1980). Black elected officials on rural southern governing boards have had "at best a negligible impact" in reordering government priorities and local government policies.
generally with respect to Black interests (Jones, 1976). Yet Black elected officials win reelection fairly consistently.

In a "pilot study" exploring the conditions of the electoral success of Black incumbents, Keller (1979) focused on the tenure of Mayor Richard Hatcher in Gary, Indiana. He found that despite rapidly increasing crime, rising unemployment, and the deterioration of business, Hatcher, although he lost some support from his Black constituency, nevertheless was able to win a third term. Keller (1979:61) suggests that Hatcher won because of his superior political organization and his satisfactory policy performance in the eyes of the majority of the Black electorate. Apparently, the Black citizens of Gary accepted Hatcher's explanation that the problems of the city were beyond his control and that he had done the best job possible, given the circumstances. Thus, it appears that the increasing demands and expectations occasioned by the initial election of Black mayors can be accommodated with fundamental shifts in urban priorities and policies that objectively meliorate mass misery.

As a result of the developments of the sixties, there has been increased participation by the masses (lower middle class and lower class persons) in Black community leadership (Holden, 1973:71). However, there is disagreement in the literature regarding the efficacy of the participation of the lower classes in Black leadership. Ellis (1969) argues that the participation of such persons represents the emergence of a more authentic leadership. On the other hand, Holden (1973:115) argues that, although such persons certainly can contribute to Black leadership, in a "modern complex society" middle class leadership...
must play the dominant role. This scholarly dispute is also reflected in the leadership stratum, where there is a debate between the moderate integrationists, the militant leftists, and nationalists as to the possibility and efficacy of mass involvement in leadership. And, as we noted in the previous section, there is a leadership-mass cleavage regarding the extent to which mass protest and demonstrations are an effective political method. While the dominant leadership is reluctant to attempt to organize mass action, it nevertheless continues to raise the spectre of spontaneous mass violence in the form of "summer blow-ups" in major U.S. cities as a means to gain leverage in the policy-making process.

The role of whites in Black leadership has probably declined in recent years as a result of the emergence of Black power with its emphasis on "caucus separatism," and independent Black organization and decision-making. Whites, however, still play a role in Black leadership. The two principal civil rights organizations -- the NAACP and the Urban League -- remain interracial in governance, and the Urban League remains peculiarly dependent upon the "holders and managers of white capital" (Holden, 1973:5). The NAACP Legal Defense Fund is headed by a white man; the Black congressional delegation is to some degree dependent upon white institutions and individuals for campaign support (Smith, 1981d:209). Smith (1976:55) found that half of the Washington-based Black interest organizations were dependent upon white corporations, foundations, labor unions, or federal government for a "major source of their support." Thus, much of the leadership of Black America is to some degree dependent upon
white America. In his development of the clientage concept, Holden (1973) seems to suggest that such dependence -- or as he prefers "interdependence" -- is an invariant characteristic of Black leadership. He writes, "...the fact is that there are almost no institutions within the (B)lack population which have the objective capacity to operate free of some form of clientage, whatever their moral preferences.... Many varieties of overtly militant politics -- from (B)lack caucuses in white churches to the (Black) Panthers -- find their effectiveness depends on being able to secure and retain white allies" (Holden, 1973:15. On clientage in Black politics, see also Kilson, 1971).

Theoretical Fragments

If the literature on the old Negro leadership is not theoretically robust, then the new Black leadership literature is by design unconcerned with formulating generalizations of a theoretical nature. Most of the studies of Black elected officials are exploratory and/or descriptive in design and purpose. Three exceptions may be identified. Jones, in his case study of the emergence of the first governing group of Black elected officials in Atlanta, argues that "it is theoretically useful to conceptualize (B)lack politics as a power struggle between whites bent on maintaining their position of dominance and (B)lacks struggling to escape this dominance" (1978:92). Salamon (1973:619-22) applies the "modernization perspective" to his study of the transformation of elite recruitment patterns in Mississippi which resulted from the opening of the electoral system to Blacks, arguing that transformation of elite recruitment patterns is the central feature of the modernization process. Holden (1973)
argues that the distinguishing and determinative feature of Black politics is white supremacy. However, two other variables internal to the Black community are also considered by Holden to be of theoretical significance: (1) certain aspects of Afro-American culture that inhibit the leadership coordination required by scarce resources (1973:16-26); and (2) "class tensions" between the Black middle class and the masses which hinder leadership effectiveness (1973:30-34).

Except for Salamon's (1973) modernization perspectives and Holden's (1973) culture construct, the theoretical approaches of the new literature are wholly consistent with the fragments of theory gleaned from the old literature. This suggests continuity in the Negro-to-Black leadership transformation, and forms a basis for a coherent effort at theory building in the subfield.
NOTES

1 It should be noted that Hunter's 1980 study, unlike his 1953 work, is much less systematic and methodologically rigorous. Rather, it is more anecdotal and belletristic, and some of the findings lack technical reliability and may lack validity.

2 I was an observer-participant in the 1980 Philadelphia Convention.

3 Walters in his writings and activities has been flexible in discussing the Party's ideology and constituency base. He argues only that it should be "nationalist," by which he means "all people or groups which can be said to have adopted a serious program to better the material and spiritual conditions of Black life" (1973:16). But Manning Marable, another leading academic-activist in the Party, is much more sectarian. He argues that the Party should be "...a genuine, anti-capitalist party, which rejects fundamental compromise and class collaboration with the Democratic Party" (1978:318), and that the established liberal integrationist Black leaders should be excluded from the Party because they "express tendencies toward class collaboration with the State" (1978:373). This divergence in view between two leading members of the Party's intelligentsia on the basic questions of Party ideology and constituency is illustrative of the historic sectarian factionalism that has bedeviled all previous efforts at building a unified Black community political structure.

4 The question of cultural nationalism is inextricably bound to the question of the status of Black culture, an extraordinarily difficult and complex phenomenon for the political scientist. The basic problem in terms of the question of Black culture is whether Blacks in the United States constitute a separate and distinct culture grouping (in terms of patterns in symbols and action) or whether they basically share the symbolic and action patterns of the "American" culture. The research evidence here is problematic, but I am persuaded that Afro-Americans in the United States do not constitute a distinct cultural grouping. If anything, in my view, Blacks tend to be culturally "exaggerated Americans," in Myrdal's language. However, to some extent one's position on this question of the status of Black culture depends upon: (1) one's definition of culture (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952 were able to list 164 distinct definitions of the concept by authorities in the field); and (2) what attributes of Black people's behavior and symbols are distinguishable from the behavior and symbols of other Americans. But as Huggins (1971:18-19) writes, "Even those who support the idea of separate culture most strongly are hard pressed to suggest its character or dimensions. It is impossible to give serious academic study to something so vague. Perhaps after considerable scholarship on the Black experience, we will discover that there is a definable Black culture. But we cannot simply make this assumption. Cultures (whatever they are) either exist or they don't; they are
never successfully manufactured or promoted. For analysis and research on this problem, see Hannerz, 1969; Baraka, 1969; Valentine, 1968; Rainwater, 1973; Cruse, 1968; Levine 1978; & Patterson, 1972).

5 In this contribution to the National Urban League’s 1982 annual State of Black America report “Measuring Black Conservatism,” Hamilton indicates that the pertinent data show that Blacks agree with conservative thought only on homosexuality, legalization of drugs, pre- and extramarital sex, and stricter law enforcement.

Cole (1976) also compared the ideological self-placement of this political elite with the self-placement of a random sample of population, finding that the elites -- but especially Blacks -- were to the left of their respective mass. For example, while 16 percent of the Black elected officials labeled themselves radical and non-conservative, only 5 percent of the Black population described itself as radical but 26 percent as conservative (1979:94). The non-restrictive, open-ended nature of the self-placement scale makes this finding difficult to interpret precisely, given the Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1976) findings regarding the absence of conservatism in the Black population. But it is likely, here that the Black masses express a conservatism on crime and cultural issues -- such as sex and drugs -- that may not be shared by the Black leadership.

6 In informal conversation I have heard the same evaluation from local and national officials of the NAACP and the Urban League.

Conyers and Wallace (1976:31) report the following data on the attitudes of Black and white elected officials toward aspects of socialism and capitalism (percentage Agreement):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Black Elected Officials</th>
<th>White Elected Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Country is moving dangerously close to Socialism</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Country is moving dangerously close to Fascism</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True Democracy is limited by Business Privilege</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The first Responsibility of Society is to Protect Property Rights</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data suggest support for capitalism among Black elected officials, but considerably less support than among their white counterparts.
On the limitations of protest, see also Fox, Piven and Cloward, 1977; Garrow, 1978; Lipsky, 1968; and Wilson, 1961.

Walters (1961:85-86) argues that these limitations might be overcome if, as a result of worsening economic conditions, the masses develop some perspective on the limitations of system-oriented electoral politics. Walters argues further that these limitations might be overcome if the leadership, having the "honesty and integrity" to admit "openly that it cannot effect the necessary social change for Blacks totally from within American institutions, and again support system challenging strategies as a balanced plan of attack for the long run." The result of one or both of these developments would be the emergence of a system challenging Black leadership based upon a "balanced strategy" involving electoral politics and protest. Walters notes, however, that such a balanced system challenging strategy is only viable if the "pragmatic new (Bl)ack middle class" is willing to operate on such non-rational ingredients as "belief" and "faith."

Hamilton (1972:71-77) estimates that there are more than 57,000 Black churches in the United States with a membership in excess of 16 million and a clergy constituted by more than 50,000 persons.

Marx (1967:100-101) reports findings from national opinion survey data that show "irrespective of the dimension of religiosity considered, the greater the religiosity, the lower percentage militant. Militancy increases consistently from a low of 22 percent among those who said religion was 'extremely important' to a high of 62 percent for those who indicated that religion was 'not important at all' to them. For those high in orthodoxy (having no doubt about the existence of God, the devil or an after life), only 20 percent were militant, while for those totally rejecting these ideas 57 percent indicated concern over civil rights." Militancy also was found to be inversely related to church attendance.

It should be clear that, while the church may not have realized its potential as a political force in the Black community, it probably effectively serves the spiritual needs of the community, facilitates its cultural continuity, and contributes to its moral uplift. The clergy are also leaders of their congregations and communities in terms of other matters that focus on intracommunity issues that are not explicitly political (Nelsen, Yokley & Nelsen, 1971).

At the end of the first year of the Reagan Administration, indications are that the number of senior level Black appointees will at least equal and probably exceed that of the Nixon-Ford record of 4 percent.

An exception to this generalization and others regarding Blacks in city politics is Los Angeles. See Halley, Acock, and Greene, 1976; Hahn, Klingman, and Pachon, 1976; and Pettigrew, 1972.
15 Academics have noted the limitations of Black mayoral power. Kenneth Gibson (1978) has written of the dependency of Newark and other cities upon federal and state policies if the fundamental problems of the city, especially its poor, are to be resolved. Carl Stokes (1973) described his tenure as mayor of Cleveland as the "promise of power" rather than its reality.
CHAPTER FIVE

Leadership in Negro and Black: Problems in Theory and Research

The purpose of this monograph is to contribute to the knowledge and understanding of Black leadership in America. This is accomplished by a review of the literature on Black leadership in order to inventory and codify existing knowledge, identify gaps in the literature as a means of suggesting research problems and hypotheses, and facilitate the development and use of theoretical references appropriate to research in the subfield.

In the foregoing parts of this study, what we know about leadership in Negro and Black America was codified under five categories of analysis: A recapitulation or summary of what has been learned will not be attempted here. Rather, I shall discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of the two bodies of knowledge as a means by which to evaluate their reliability and validity.

Perhaps the most basic weakness of the old literature on Negro leadership is its reliance on the case method. In a day of systematic quantitative research, the case study approach in the discipline is less favored as a tool of inquiry. The major shortcomings of the case study are its limited and static character (Froman, 1948 & Kaufman, 1958). First, under the canons of modern science, one cannot make reliable generalization on the basis of a single case or even several cases. Logical inference requires information from a random sample of all cases. Second, case studies are almost always static, dealing with only a single
point in time. Finally, the case method makes it difficult to check the reliability of the findings, because it is extremely problematic and time-consuming to replicate a case study precisely.

Thus, the initial limitation of the Negro leadership literature is its reliance on the case method, and its essentially descriptive use of the case materials. Although the studies are not atheoretical, as Jones (1972) contends, the fragments of theory discernible are not generally systematically used by the authors to develop hypotheses or to formulate empirical regularities.

The most frequent criticism of the Negro leadership literature, however, is in terms of its use of the militancy construct. In one variation or another, this concept has been basic to discussions of the leadership phenomenon among Negroes. In one way or another, critics (Cole, 1976:181; Scoble, 1968:345; Smith, 1976:332; Holden, 1973:15; Hamilton, 1973a:XV; & Forsythe, 1972:18) have contended that the concept is so characterized by ambiguities that it is rendered invalid as a tool of inquiry. In an empirical study investigating the utility of militancy as an "analytic concept and as a practical way to react to (B)lack politicians," Harrigan (1971:5) found in an examination of community leaders in Washington, D.C., in 1968-69 that it was extraordinarily difficult to apply the concept consistently. This was due to the fact that the definition is dependent upon one's frame of reference; that is, one can not be militant in isolation. Rather, one has to be militant in relation to something. Because of these conceptual problems and its often value-laden
characteristics, Harrigan concluded that militancy as an analytic concept was almost useless.

Such limitations do not mean, however, that these studies do not constitute a useful body of knowledge. First, they provide historical material on past patterns of Negro leadership. As pointed out earlier, all too often modern behavioral research proceeds in an historical vacuum (in some cases because adequate historiography is not available) without a sufficient appreciation of the influence of history on today's "measurable behavior." These studies, going back nearly 50 years, thus provide scientific data which are useful to an appreciation of the proximate historical context of the new Black leadership.

Although the studies are limited by their narrow data bases—only one was national in scope and just two were based upon research in a northern city, Chicago—they do provide detailed analysis of the leadership groups and are useful for purposes of hypothesis formation, if nothing else. In addition, the studies use fundamentally the same types of methods and data sources, and reach essentially the same conclusions concerning the nature and types of Negro leaders. Thus, the reliability, validity, and generality of the findings are enhanced. In some small degree, the bias inherent in a single case study is to some extent avoided because each study in a sense is a replication (although not a precise replication) of the other.

Finally, for purposes of analysis, it is possible to preserve the militancy concept by disaggregating its constituent elements. The major problem with the concept is its "focus on means rather than ends" (Forsythe, 1972:18) or its failure to capture the
reality that leadership types can "best be understood only when their stated goals are examined" (Hamilton, 1973a: XVI). Of course, to a considerable extent the militancy concept was more often tied to means or methods rather than goals or beliefs, because much of the cleavage observed in the Negro leadership stratum (1935-65) revolved around methods rather than goals. That is, the basic belief or goal of Negro leadership -- elimination of the system of caste-segregation -- was by and large accepted by all leadership types. Thus, leaders were empirically distinguishable, not in terms of their goals, but in terms of their means, methods, or styles of pursuing the generally accepted goal of eliminating caste. Militants, moderates, conservatives, Uncle Toms, race men, and so forth were thus typed on the basis of their methods and styles of opposition to the caste system because this generally was the observed empirical regularity.

However, the critics make an important point when they argue that, in classifying leaders, means should be subordinate to ends. Unless political methods determine political beliefs (which to some extent may be the case for Black leadership), then in political praxis as in political science a preoccupation with methods narrows rather than enlarges our understanding of the political world. For political scientists and political leaders, methods should be the tools of one's work and should not be substituted for substantive goals. Thus, to be a viable concept the ends-means components of militancy must be specified.

This was done in the review of the Black leadership literature. The leadership typology was disaggregated into its three constituent elements -- beliefs, methods, and rhetoric --
and applied fruitfully to the available data on Black leaders, thereby permitting the distinguishing of leadership militancy on the basis of each of the elements. Leaders are classifiable as militant or moderate in terms of their goals, methods, and rhetoric, or some combination thereof. Militancy is defined as the extent to which leader's beliefs, methods, or rhetoric depart, at any given time or place, from the beliefs, methods, and rhetoric of dominant whites.

Looking at what can be learned from the new literature on Black leadership compared with the old Negro leadership, one is disappointed. While the case study approach is generally avoided, there are really few studies of the new Black leadership which are of the depth and sophistication of studies pertaining to the old Negro leadership. Rather, there is almost an exclusive preoccupation with descriptive research on various phenomena associated with Black elected officials to the exclusion of Black appointed officials, community-based leaders, preachers, Black caucus type organizations, and especially nationalist and leftist leadership. There is also little effort to develop formal leadership typologies or to put the research findings in even the most elementary of theoretical constructs. Thus, one learns relatively more from the old Negro leadership studies in spite of their limitations than one does from the most recent research on Black leaders.

Putting these bodies of research together, one notes the emergence of a sizeable number of Black elected officials (and leading Blacks in the executive branch, the judiciary, and other societal control institutions such as corporations, universities,
and foundations); a decline in glamour personality type leadership, and the emergence of new caucus and community-based organizations. However, aside from — and perhaps in spite of — these important changes of the 1960s, there appears to be more continuity than discontinuity in Negro to Black leadership in terms of social background, organization, power structure, ideology, and the roles of preachers, whites, and the masses. For example, the evidence shows continuity in terms of the militancy-moderate cleavage. Contemporary moderates tend to adhere to liberal, integrationist beliefs, conventional methods and rhetoric, while militants tend toward socialist or nationalist beliefs, and unconventional methods and rhetoric. Militants also tend to be more predisposed toward involvement with and support of mass action than do moderates. There is, of course, some overlap. Some leaders who are moderate in their beliefs favor militant methods and mass action, and some leaders who are militant in their beliefs are moderate in their methods if not also in their rhetoric. However, these are exceptions. In general, the pattern is one of consistency along all three dimensions of the typology, and a profile of the leadership types today resembles in many ways the profile drawn by Myrdal nearly 40 years ago. Looking back on the important transformations of the 1960s, one might say that in Black leadership the more things change the more they seem to remain the same.

Directions for Future Research

A number of gaps in the knowledge about Black leaders and directions for future research have emerged. First, students of Black leadership need to go beyond research on Black elected
officials and civil rights organizations. While there is a small and growing body of research on Black persons in elective offices, we know next to nothing about Blacks in appointive positions at the local, state, and federal levels nor has there been much research on the increasing number of Black leaders, or more precisely, leading Blacks in official positions. Additional study is needed on the leadership role of Blacks in fraternal, professional, and the new caucus organizations, and especially the "mechanisms of collective judgment," and the leftist and nationalist organizations. For example, what accounts for the apparent increasing influence of fraternal organizations in Black politics, or what are the social backgrounds and political organizing behaviors of Black nationalist and Marxist leaders and organizations? What has been their impact on mass thought and behavior? On each of these questions, we do not know enough to engage even in intelligent speculation.

Further research on the role of the church and clergy in Black politics is also in order. According to the conventional wisdom, the church is the important organizational base in Black electoral politics. However, the available research shows that the church may not play as important a role in the mobilization of the Black electorate as do civil rights organizations. The research of Berenson, Elifson, and Tollerson (1976) offers some suggestive lines of inquiry, and Hamilton's (1972) typology of church roles in Black politics is potentially useful in organizing field research on the subject.
Research on the power structure of the Black community -- both nationally and locally -- should be undertaken. This research should use both the reputational and decision-making approaches to identify both the external and internal dynamics of the distribution of power in the Black community. Regarding the internal dynamics of community power, we need studies of the sanctions (if any) that various leadership elements are able to use vis-a-vis their followers, and of the influences that followers exert over leaders. Finally, an important question here is the relationship of the emerging Black elected officials stratum to the more traditional institutions and bases of power in Black America.

The ethnicity, class origins (including pigmentation), and the structure of leadership beliefs and their relationship to mass attitudes also ought to be investigated. Regarding the latter, scattered survey data are available on Black elite and mass attitudes toward integration, nationalism, and socialism. But what is needed is a systematically developed schedule to identify the core values, beliefs, attitudes, and policy preferences of each ideology; a specification of their internal consistency (or lack thereof); and their relationship to each other, to leadership, and to mass behavior. Students should also investigate the extent to which available or feasible political methods shape, constrain, or even determine leadership beliefs.

Finally, research on leadership at the grassroots level -- or what Higham (1978) calls the "small community" level -- is needed. Above the visible structure of "large community" leadership, organization and external relations, there is an infrastructure of
churches, bars, street corners cliques, barber shops, and small group associations that together constitute the community. The characteristics of leadership at this level are not well understood. But as Higham (1978:18) writes, "...it is clear that the large community ordinarily handles the external relations of the group... The small community, on the other hand, creates and sustains the web of daily life." The small community deserves attention in its own right, but we also need to know the relationship between the two leadership types (small and large) in the setting of the external agenda of the community. An example of the former kind of research that might be interesting is what Holden (1973) calls "church politics," the often-talked-of but never researched struggle for positions of leadership in the church hierarchy (bishops and pastors, deacons, members of boards of trustees, and so forth). One would want to know, for example, the impact of this internal church politics on the role of the church and clergy in external relations. Finally, closely related to the phenomenon of small community leadership are those sometimes competitive campaigns for leadership in local NAACP chapters, or the processes by which local Urban League executives are selected.

There are other items for a Black leadership research agenda that might be derived from this study. The foregoing, however, constitute areas requiring immediate attention if the subfield is to move rapidly toward the advancement of a series of interrelated verifiable propositions about the leadership phenomenon in Black America.
Theory

The consensus that clearly emerges from the literature reviewed here, both the old and new but especially the old, is that the most appropriate general theory for the study of Black politics and leadership is some variant of the race dominance-power approach. In one form or another, nearly all the students who sought to explain Black leadership theoretically did so in terms of the subordinate power position of Blacks relative to whites.

Salamon (1973) satisfactorily demonstrated the utility of the "modernization perspective" in his study of the emergence of a Black politician stratum in Mississippi. But, in general, the modernization approach lacks the grounded specificity of the race dominance framework, and isomorphism with the political experience of the peoples of the Black world (Jones, 1972:7). And "although the process of modernization, particularly industrialization, has implications for race relations, the evidence suggests that its role is at best indirect. It creates some conditions that are conducive to securing changes in race relations, but does not independently alter highly developed patterns of race relations" (Morris, 1975:19). Thus, the modernization approach is probably less appropriate as a general theory than is the race dominance framework.

Jones (1972) made the most clear-cut contribution toward developing the basic concepts and hypotheses of the power-race dominance approach as a systematic framework to order inquiry on Black leadership. His most basic assumption is that "a frame of reference for (B)lack politics should not begin with superficial..."
comparison of (B)lacks and other ethnic minorities... (but rather) it should begin by searching for those factors which are unique to the (B)lack political experience, for this is the information which will facilitate our understanding of (B)lacks in the American political system" (Jones, 1972:7-8).

Given this assumption, Jones, building on the earlier work of Roucek (1956), argues that Black politics should be conceptualized as "essentially a power struggle between (B)lacks and whites, with the latter trying to maintain their superordinate position vis-a-vis the former" (1972:9). But in order to clearly distinguish "Black political phenomena" from other extensions of the universal power struggle," the stipulation that the "ideological justification for the superordination of whites is the institutionalized belief in the inherent superiority of that group" (Jones, 1972:9) is added as a necessary specifying condition. Finally, Jones presents five Black "goal directed patterns" of activity (integration, accommodation, Black consciousness, Black nationalism, and revolution) that can, with modifications, be usefully applied to "advance explanatory propositions" regarding Black leadership (Jones, 1972:12-17). Although Jones in this initial formulation develops only the basic concepts of the framework, in a subsequent case study he applies it with modest success to an analysis of the emergence of the first Black-led governing coalition in Atlanta (Jones, 1978).

In addition to Jones, Katznelson (1971) has also argued that power must be the central construct in the reformulation of race relations research in the discipline. More recently, Greenberg (1980) in a cross-cultural study case uses the concept "racial
domination" to order, his research findings on "race politics in the
United States and three other advanced capitalist societies.
Thus, from the Negro leadership literature and from the more
recent work of students of race politics, the racial domination
approach emerges as the most basic -- but not the sole -- frame of
reference for the study of leadership and politics in racially
stratified societies.

A number of students of Negro leadership have argued that, in
addition to racial domination, a secondary factor in explaining
patterns of leadership in Black politics in the United States is
the structure of particular racial environments. Walton
(1972:11-12) has, perhaps, been clearest on the theoretical import
of this factor:

Basically speaking, (B)lack politics springs from the
particular brand of segregation practices found in different
environments in which (B)lack people find themselves. In
other words, the nature of segregation and the manner in
which it differs not only in different localities but within
a locality have caused (B)lack people to employ political
activities, methods, devices and techniques that would
advance their policy preferences. In short, (B)lack politics
is a function of the particular brand of segregation found in
different environments in which (B)lack people find them-
selves. And the politics of (B)lacks differs significantly
from locality to locality. Although there are many striking
similarities between the political activities of (B)lack
Americans in different localities, there are differences far
greater than geography can explain. Basically, the
differences lie in the variety of forms that segregation and
discrimination have taken in this country (emphasis in text).

It should be clear that Walton does not deny the central
theoretical importance of racial domination. Instead, Walton
suggests that racial domination in the United States has been
particularized, and that this particularity has to be taken into
consideration in understanding and explaining Black politics and leadership.

The foregoing factors, which are essentially exogenous, suggest that fundamentally Black leadership behavior is a function of factors external to the community. Two endogenous factors -- class and culture -- are also theoretically suggestive.

Class is thought to be theoretically significant because of two factors. The first pertains to the Black class structure itself -- the relatively lower class, or as it is appropriately called today, the underclass, a stratum increasingly isolated from the opportunities of modern society (Glasgow, 1980; and Wilson, 1978). The second factor is the largely middle class leadership's unwillingness or inability to make rapid and sustained progress toward melioration of the terrible problems of the underprivileged. These two factors give rise to what are variously referred to in the literature as class "tensions," "conflicts," or even "antagonisms" between the Black leadership and masses.

Evidence and arguments were presented earlier in this review showing that class conflict in the Black community declined in the 1960s as a result of the civil rights revolution, the growth and diversification of the middle class, and the Black power movement. Yet, one reads today in both the popular and scholarly media of an unprecedented class conflict between the relatively secure new Black middle class and the marginal Black underclass (Bolce & Gary, 1979; & Delaney, 1978). However, when viewed in the light of the pertinent data, such assertions appear to be without scientific foundation. There is some evidence of a
leadership-mass cleavage, on political methods, with the masses favoring more militant actions. But in terms of basic beliefs and policy preferences, one finds fundamental unity in the Black community at all class levels, and between the leadership and the masses in support of the ideology and policies of liberal integration.

Thus, the theoretical significance of class in Black politics is limited. This is not to deny that there are differences of sentiment, ethos, and opinion in Black America between the leadership and the masses. Rather, it is to suggest that these differences do not constitute class "antagonisms." Indeed, the class factor in studies of Black leadership may be best construed as an aspect of culture. While specialists disagree as to whether the Black community constitutes a separate and distinct subculture (Morris, 1975:119-23), the data are unmistakable that there are significant differences between Black and white Americans in terms of their level of support for the system, their level of trust in the system, and political knowledge and efficacy (Morris, 1975:123-34). These aspects of the Black "subculture," together with the reality of continued racial oppression, powerlessness, and economic deprivation, give rise to a series of characteristics identified by Holden (1973:17-26) as creating a culture adverse to effective leadership because it results in very high demands on the leadership but relatively low support.

These cultural characteristics take the form of class tensions manifested in the ritualistic condemnation of Negro leaders as "Uncle Toms" or "sell-outs" who have lost touch with the masses. These rituals of Black culture have always been and,
in the nature of the Black person's lot in this country, probably always will be an aspect of the relationship between Black leadership and followership. This is in spite of the fact that "it would be difficult to document a belief that any major (B)lack leadership group purposefully sought to retard the advance of the race as a whole" (Hamilton, 1981:8-9). Yet, because the masses are understandably disappointed with the pace of improvement in their life chances, there is extant in the community a relatively low level of trust in the leadership, and a tendency to blame the leadership for the society's failure to respond to demands for racial justice. This is a cultural rather than a class phenomenon.

To conclude, contrary to the often stated allegation, the literature on Black leadership is not atheoretical. Rather, a basic frame of reference and two useful subconstructs of theoretical value are present in the literature. At this point, these fragments of theory cannot be regarded as a coherent set of propositions from which hypotheses for empirical research can be deduced. Yet the recent research on Black elected officials has tended to ignore even these fragments in favor of descriptive and/or exploratory research. While exploratory research is appropriate in an emergent subfield as a means by which to lay the groundwork for theoretical exegesis, we now have enough historical and scientific research about the Black leadership phenomenon to begin to translate available theoretical schema into testable propositions to guide and structure inquiry in the subfield. To encourage students to do so has been a principal aim of this monograph.
NOTES

1. In an important insight into the Negro movement, Walker (1963:36) argued that "as long as broad agreement exists on ultimate goals of equality and an end to racial discrimination, some disunity over proper methods of social action may be positively desirable."

2. It may be of some interest to students of the sociology of knowledge to note that most of the studies in Negro leadership were conducted by whites, while most of the Black leadership research has been conducted by Blacks.

3. On the theoretical limitations of the ethnic analogy, see McLemore; 1972. The ethnic analogy has been discredited for purposes of theory in Black politics, most scholars agreeing with Pettigrew (1970:30) that it is "dangerously misleading." But the ethnic analogy is still primarily applied by at least one prominent student (Eisinger, 1980; & Eisinger, 1978) in his study of the transition to Black governance in the American city. The ethnic analogy is also employed by Sowell (1975 & 1981) in his popular studies.

4. While Jones' race dominance framework is adequate to explain developments in Atlanta's Black politics prior to the advent of the administration of former Mayor Maynard Jackson, the framework is less satisfactory in accounting for Black politics in Atlanta since Jackson's election. Thus is so because, in cities where Blacks are in power, the research evidence indicates that their limited impact on the life chances of their Black constituents, especially the poor, is as much a function of the limitations on the authority of municipal governments and the oligarchical organization of the economy as it is of racial domination. On this latter point, Hustler's Atlanta case study (1980) is more theoretically relevant, suggesting that in the present era, race analysis must be joined with class analysis if satisfactory explanatory propositions are to be advanced.
CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the election of Ronald Reagan, the defeat of several important liberal congressional representatives, and the emergence of a Republican Senate majority, the dominant liberal integrationist leadership of Black America has been under increasing attack from both the left and the right in the community. The rituals of condemnation include such phrases as the "utter bankruptcy of Black leadership," "the increasing irrelevancy of Black leadership," "the crisis of Black leadership," "the failure of Black leadership," and "Blacks don't need Black leaders." The leadership has been described as "a bourgeoisie, light-skinned clique" that is out of touch with the masses and committed to an outdated liberalism that fails to address the central dilemmas of the Black condition. The leadership has been labeled "sell-outs," and "traitors to the race." One prominent nationalist ideologue has even suggested that it may become necessary at some point to physically eliminate the group.

This, of course, is not new. Rather, it is in the genre of the ritualistic condemnation of Negro leaders that has been an aspect of Black culture at least since the period of Frederick Douglass' leadership. The election of Reagan has given a new sense of urgency to the rhetoric, especially from the so-called Black conservatives, but the characterizations, if not the characters, are familiar.
The criticisms of Black leadership by the so-called Black right need not be taken seriously. For the scientific evidence is unambiguous: the conservative ideology lacks support not only among the leadership stratrum, but among the masses as well. The emergence in the media of Black conservatism is probably an epiphenomenon of the Reagan victory that is likely to disappear as quickly as it has appeared. This is true because, if nothing else, the historical experience of Blacks in the United States predisposes all strata to look to a strong, activist central government as requisite to dismantling race privilege and securing social and economic justice. Similarly, the criticisms of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries and all save perhaps the cultural variety of nationalists can be dismissed as utopian in the Mannheim (1936:40) sense:

The concept of utopian thinking reflects the opposite discovery of the political struggle, namely, that certain oppressed groups are intellectually so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of society that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it. Their thinking is incapable of correctly diagnosing an existing condition of society. They are not at all concerned with what really exists; rather in their thinking they already seek to change the situation that exists. Their thought is never a diagnosis of the situation; it can be used only as a direction for action. In the utopian mentality, the collective unconscious, guided by wishful representation and the will to action, hides certain aspects of reality. It turns its back on everything which would shake its belief or paralyze its desire to change things (emphasis added).

What is left then is the criticism of what might be described as the sensible left, persons who doubt probably correctly that the fundamental problems of Blacks, especially the underclass, can be resolved within the capitalist framework, but who also know there is little likelihood of a successful armed Marxist
revolution in the United States. The sensible left critique of liberal integrationist leadership was given classic formulation by Bunche (1939) in one of his memoranda for the Myrdal (1944, 1962) study, and more recently it was restated by Jones (1981) in a paper read at the National Conference of Black Political Scientists.

Bunche (1939) developed an eight point critique of the philosophy of the liberal integrationist leadership that he summarized in the following way:

It (the liberal integrationist leadership) appears unable to realize that there is an economic system, as well as a race problem in America and that when a Negro is unemployed, it is not just because he is a Negro, but more seriously, because of the defective operation of the economy under which we live -- an economy that finds it impossible to provide adequate numbers of jobs and economic security for the population. More seriously still, this movement tends to widen the menacing gap between white and Black workers, by insisting that jobs be distributed on a racial basis (1939:542-43).

Thus, Bunche's major criticism of the Negro leadership of the 1940s was its failure to see the relationship between capitalism and the Black condition and its consequent narrow "racially chauvinistic" approach to the problem of the Negro. Bunche proposed as an alternative the "Doctrine of Labor Solidarity" whereby Blacks would emphasize class rather than race and seek to develop a broad organization and strategy uniting the Black and white masses in a common struggle against capitalism. In essence, Bunche argued that Black and white workers should put aside their "traditional prejudices" and concentrate on their objective economic interests.

This "Doctrine of Labor Solidarity" is, of course, the enduring hope of progressives in all racist, capitalist states.
However, as Myrdal (1944, 1962:793) observed, the doctrine is probably "escapist in nature" because "it becomes painfully obvious to every member of the school as soon as he leaves abstract reasoning—and goes down to the labor market, because there he meets caste and even racial solidarity." The graveyard of this doctrine in the United States, then and now, is the racism and conservatism of the white working class (Lane, 1962; Bostch, 1981), and the absence in the working class of even a link between unemployment-economic deprivation and class consciousness-opposition to capitalism (Schlozman and Verba, 1979). Recent comparative historical (Fredrickson, 1981:199-238) and social science (Greenberg, 1980:273-380) research show that racial solidarity and discriminatory attitudes and behavior toward non-whites are characteristic of the white working class in all racially stratified advanced capitalist societies. Thus, to criticize Blacks as "racial chauvinists" because they support race-conscious policies is almost equivalent to blaming the victim. Then and now, race-conscious policies are necessary to enforce anti-discrimination laws, to remedy violations of statutory and constitutional rights, and to overcome past patterns and practices of discrimination. Thus, Bunche's doctrine, while admirable, is contradicted by the reality of racism.

Jones, in his paper "The Increasing Irrelevance of Black Leadership" (1981), argues that until the present period, cross racial discrimination and segregation were major impediments to Black advancement, and that the essential thrust of Black leadership strategies from the 1870s through the 1960s were relevant, because those strategies were grounded in the objective
circumstances of obvious and odorous racism. However, Jones argues now that the obvious forms of racial discrimination have been removed, and that any program or strategy short of a systemic definition of the Black predicament and the necessary corollary of Black opposition to rather than opposition within, the system, is irrelevant. He then renders a critique similar to that by Bunche (1939), arguing that the leadership group is inextricably integrated into the liberal wing of the dominant power structure, and that it adheres to an outmoded ideology of liberalism. Jones (1981) argues further that the leadership group fails to recognize the systemic nature of Black oppression, as well as the limitations of conventional political methods, and that it fears mass violence. Jones does not develop or specify what opposition to the system entails in terms of leadership ideology and strategy, but the implicit burden of the analysis is that more militant political methods should be employed in a struggle against "monopoly capitalism" and that such methods should be oriented toward non-integrationist, neo-nationalist goals.

The fact that Black leadership is "inextricably integrated" into the liberal establishment is not remarkable given its liberal ideology. Indeed, as Holden (1973) argues in his development of the "patron-client" concept, all Blacks (whether conservative, liberal, nationalist, or Marxist) are linked in some way to whites, and this linkage appears to be inherent in the Black predicament, given the status of Blacks as an oppressed minority. Thus, as Jones (1981) understands, the central issue is not the dominance of Black leadership by white liberals, but rather the liberal ideology itself.
Jones (1981) argues that the white liberal establishment over the years has provided some support to the cause of eliminating race privilege in the United States, presumably because it was in its interests to do so. However, he implies that today this establishment is unwilling to continue its support, for the cause of racial justice because to do so threatens its interest in the preservation of monopoly capitalism. Yet, he fails to specify how race privilege is "systemic," that is, how race privilege is necessary to the preservation of monopoly capitalism. A plausible argument can be made (see, for example, Baran & Sweezy, 1966) that racism is not necessary to the preservation of monopoly capitalism; instead, racism may be a fetter. It could also be argued that race privilege in 1980 is more a function of white mass attitudes (exploited, to be sure, by the right) -- attitudes which are so anti-Black that the liberal establishment is unable, rather than unwilling, to impose effective meliorative race policies (for example, a humane social welfare system or rigorous enforcement of affirmative action laws).

Whether liberalism as an ideology is "outmoded" or a failure is also open to doubt. The first wave of contemporary liberalism (The New Deal) was aborted by the war and the rise of reaction. (It should be noted that the conservative coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans came to maturity during this period.) Johnson's Great Society was aborted by the same twin evils. Thus, a case can be made that, if the liberal agenda had been fully implemented and funded in either the New Deal or Great Society periods, further transformation in the health and economic security of Blacks might have been possible.2 The problem,
therefore, is not outmoded ideas; but rather power, that is, the relative absence of power among Black and progressive forces in the post-war period.

This relative absence of power is the real source of the "crisis of relevancy" of Black leadership. However, this is not a crisis of the leadership, but rather a crisis of the Black community which is manifested in its leadership. The leadership strategies of voting, lobbying, and litigation are not irrelevant, but there is general agreement among competent students -- and probably within the leadership itself -- that these strategies alone will not prove to be sufficient to fundamentally change the Black condition. Protest is also a limited resource in the post-civil rights era, and organized violence is viewed as marginal by all save the utopian fringe of the leadership. Thus, what remains is the capacity of the leadership to raise -- most often subtly but occasionally not so subtly -- the fear of mass violence. (Witness the comments of leading Blacks regarding the possibility of ghetto riots in the aftermath of the proposed Reagan cuts in social expenditures.)

These considerations of the critiques of Black leadership by the sensible left lead to a more refined understanding of the tasks of Black leadership today. The real problem is how, if at all, can a historically poor, oppressed, and racially stigmatized minority amass sufficient power to achieve a condition that may reasonably be called "liberated." Thought and research on this problem are more useful than are escapist doctrines of labor solidarity or ritualistic condemnations of the "bankruptcy" or "irrelevancy" of the leadership. In an effort to contribute to a
dialogue on this problem, I devote the remainder of this chapter to discussion of the tasks of Black leadership during Reagan's period of reaction and beyond.

Since the research evidence indicates that Black elected officials have not been able to use their offices to reshape policies and priorities that fundamentally meliorate the conditions of the Black underclass, some scholars and activists urge that Blacks in elected office use their positions as platforms or forums to articulate a radical alternative or challenge to the "system," especially the oligarchical ownership and management of the economy. While there is some merit to this argument, I believe as a matter of strategic efficacy the tasks of Black leadership today are more modest, namely, to continue the struggle for integration and to continue to pursue the unfinished agenda of American liberalism.

The first task -- to continue the struggle for integration -- is necessary because, as Holden (1973:138) writes, "The objective of 'integration,' as it has been presented, is superior to many objectives stated in more 'radical' terms, because most of what is represented as 'radical' would, if pursued to its essentials, settle for much more limited results than any here discussed." In addition, integration is the most effective strategy to resolve the central problem of Black politics -- that is, its relative powerlessness. What I am suggesting here is that integration might be fruitfully viewed not as an ideology or as an ultimate goal, but rather as a strategy of community empowerment (for example, integrating or incorporating Blacks into important societal bases of power in education, the economy, and the
polity). This strategy would be directed toward no goal necessarily, but would instead operate as a means by which to achieve any eventual goal, whether it is some form of nationalism or socialism.3

The second task, which is intimately related to the first, is to enact and fully fund the liberal agenda of the New Deal-Great Society. In the present period, the first part of this task is to subject the extant complement of social programs to a most severe cost/benefit analysis. The result of such an analysis would be the elimination of those social programs that are of marginal benefit and the full funding of programs that are demonstrably meliorative. This is not the place to develop fully the unfinished agenda of American liberalism, but clearly such an agenda would include a comprehensive educational system (assuring the availability of the widest range of child care and educational opportunities to all citizens), a uniform national welfare system, an effort to limit military expenditures to purposes of defense rather than war, and a constructive contribution to the north-south dialogue in world politics. In terms of the ghetto specifically, the domestic "Marshall Plan" developed in the late 1960s by the Urban League and the A. Phillip Randolph Institute needs to be reexamined. This plan for ghetto reconstruction was sidetracked by the war and the rise of reaction. However, as the nation moves toward some kind of policy to "reindustrialize" the northeast and midwest, Black leadership should have a specific plan to incorporate the depressed ghettos into the "reindustrialization" process.
But the central item on this agenda is the development of a comprehensive set of policies designed to achieve full employment in a relatively short period of time. Unemployment has been a long-standing problem in the Black community. Only three times between 1949 and 1974 did the official unemployment rate fall below 6 percent. (The last year this occurred was 1954.) During the same period, the jobless rate for whites rose above 6 percent only twice (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1978:69). This long-term, persistently high unemployment rate is the major causal factor in the development of the Black underclass and the "tangle of pathologies" described by Clark (1967) in Dark Ghetto.

The Black leadership has long recognized the centrality of unemployment and subemployment in the Black predicament in the United States. It is often not recalled that the 1963 March on Washington was a march for "jobs and freedom." It is also often forgotten that, when Martin Luther King was murdered, he was preparing to lead a "poor people's" march in Washington where full employment was to be a central demand. And at a 1973 conference of scholars called by the National Urban League to consider post-civil rights issues, Professor Charles Hamilton presented a paper arguing that "there should be a combined effort to initiate and vigorously push for a Full Employment Bill. This goal could become the new major focus of the human rights struggle in the early 1970s" (1973b:90). Finally, the centerpiece of the Congressional Black Caucus' first legislative agenda was "The Equal Opportunity and Full Employment" bill (Congressional Black Caucus, 1975).
This full employment bill, as originally introduced by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey and Congressman Augustus Hawkins, proposed that the United States establish for each of its citizens a legal entitlement to a job which would be enforceable through the courts, require the federal government to serve as the employer of last resort, and reduce unemployment to 3 percent within 18 months after its passage. The revised version, which was signed by President Carter, deleted all of these provisions and substituted a vague promise to reduce unemployment to 4 percent within 5 years of enactment of the bill. The radical revisions of the bill were in part extracted by the President in negotiations with the Congressional Black Caucus in exchange for his support. As a result of these revisions, the nation's second employment act of the post-war period was, in the words of The Washington Post, and The New York Times, rendered a "cruel hoax" and a "hollow promise."

As inadequate as the final Act is, it does, as Congressman John Conyers argues, provide "a framework for full employment planning." Among the elements of a program to implement the Act, Congressman Conyers proposes: a massive, targeted job training and employment program focusing on the revitalization of cities; a community-worker ownership program for the purchase of abandoned industries; work sharing; and, an anti-inflation program that deals with administered pricing, excessive military spending, and contains some form of wage and price controls (Conyers, 1978:16). A serious and potentially effective national full employment policy would entail integrating Conyers' proposals into a comprehensive program to achieve price stabilization and economic
revitalization. This progressive program requires a party and candidates willing to commit themselves to a long-term effort to reinvestigate the liberal agenda, through well reasoned and symbolically attractive political campaigns capable of unifying the nation's disparate constituencies. The second task of Black leadership, then, is to contribute to the development of this as the new path for the Democratic Party in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Liberalism today is under attack as a failure. Coming from the privileged business class and reactionary forces represented by President Reagan, these attacks are understandable. To them it is not the failure of liberalism that is at issue, but rather its success in securing a network, albeit an inadequate one, of economic and social security programs that ameliorate to some extent the abuses of unbridled capitalism. However, it is an error (maybe of historic proportions) for progressives, especially Blacks, to join in this chorus of criticism, because liberalism has not failed. Rather, it has not been carried to its logical policy conclusions or adequately funded. This is not to say that it may not be necessary to move toward an explicit social democratic agenda in the United States. This agenda would take the form of systematic national economic planning; nationalization of some industries, especially energy and armaments; a permanent system of restraint on monopoly sector wages, prices, and credit controls; and a more progressive and effectively administered inheritance tax. Rather, it is to say that the task today is more modest: the maintenance of the liberal hour in a time of conservative reaction.
The Democratic Party is under pressure to abandon its progressive heritage and the unfinished liberal agenda in an effort to secure short-term partisan advantage. The Black leadership -- the most progressive organized interest group in the United States -- has a special responsibility to ensure that this does not happen. Blacks, constituting an oppressed people at the urban centers of the world's most advanced European power, have a unique contribution, humane and enlightened, to make in the formulation of United States domestic and international policy. As James Baldwin has remarked, the American Negro is a wholly unique phenomenon in the world. It is the ultimate task of those who would lead us to give voice to this uniqueness so that, in the words of Martin Luther King's sermon for his own funeral, "We can make of this old world a new world."
NOTES

1 As Orlando Patterson writes in his sometimes brilliant analysis of the problem, "To be morally consistent, one must deplore such ethnic salience in the behavior and attitudes of (B)lacks. One would hope, too, that they would explore non-ethnic means of reaction, since such non-ethnic responses are not only likely to be morally less deplorable in their internal consequences but in the long run educationally more effective. Even so, extenuating circumstance, in the cases of (B)lacks, must weigh heavily in any judgment on the group. Quite the opposite is true in our assessment of the aggressor community which stimulated the ethnic response in the outgroup by its infrequent but devastating acts of ethnic viciousness" (1977:154).

2 On the aborting of liberal reform in the New Deal period, see Leuchtenberg (1963:252-74). On the origins of the conservative coalition in Congress, see Patterson (1967). For an analysis of the collapse of New Deal liberalism, post-war liberalism's perceived failure, and the radical right's rise to presidential power in 1980, see Wolfe (1981).

3 To put this argument another way, the task of Black leadership today is not to seek the fundamental transformation of society on nation or socialist principles. Rather, it is to seek, insofar as possible, the integration of Blacks into the society as it is constituted. To the extent this is possible, then, it is likely that a substantial majority of the Black community would seek nothing more (although I would guess that a minority would favor socialism or nationalism in principle). To the extent that integration is not possible in liberal society, then the case for socialism (or nationalism) becomes through the "politics of exposure" a matter of practical necessity rather than abstract principle. What must be remembered is that Black people want neither socialism nor nationalism. What they want is equal access: equal access to education, employment, income, and capital. It is the absence of this equal access that for the last one hundred years has been the historical imperative of the Black condition in the United States and the theoretical basis for a Black politics. That is, if integration is achieved, the historical, theoretical, and ideological basis of a race-specific Black politics is transcended.

4 When conservative politicians and ideologues talk about the demoralizing and debilitating effects of welfare, they are, of course, correct. A job, at wages adequate to sustain oneself and one's family, is indispensable to individual self-esteem, and to family and community stability and development. By focusing on the "right to welfare" rather than the "right to work," the American left has allowed the right to take the high road intellectually and politically. A renewed focus on full employment should emphasize that Black leadership seeks to eliminate, rather than merely reduce, welfare dependency and that full employment is a means to substantially reduce non-productive
social welfare expenditures. In a properly managed economy, welfare (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) would be restored to its original purpose under the Social Security Act, a temporary, emergency expedient. This approach to the issue is also more politically palatable to the American electorate.

Blacks constitute approximately 20 percent of the Democratic Party vote in presidential elections (Axelrod, 1972; Axelrod, 1982). If they are cohesive, they can play a critical role in the choice of the party nominee. Certainly, they should be able to exercise a veto, and the party ought not to choose a candidate who is considered to be unacceptable to the leadership.

For further consideration of the possibilities and elements of social democracy in the United States, see Katznelson, 1978; and Katznelson, in press.

It is not likely that the Reagan economic recovery program of tax relief for business and the wealthy, limited regulatory activity, excessive military spending, and an austere social welfare budget will lead to reindustrialization of the nation if, as is likely, more profit can be made in the Third World or in speculative ventures in real estate, commodities, or currencies. And, while the definitive report is not yet published, the emerging findings of the authoritative American National Election Study at the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research show that the 1980 election was not a mandate for the conservative economic and social policies of the Reagan Administration. Rather, the 1980 vote was essentially an expression of a generalized, nearly universal malaise about economic stagnation at home and fading military strength and prestige abroad (Miller, 1981). In his first year in office, the President has not succeeded in creating a mandate or popular consensus for his policies. Rather, as Lipset (1982) writes, poll after poll shows that most Americans oppose reductions in most social programs and remain committed to the basic assumptions of the welfare state. Thus, assuming war can be avoided, the shambles that 4 to 8 years of Reagan-Bush rule are likely to make of the economy and social comity require the Democratic Party and leftist forces to have a well reasoned and symbolically attractive program of action. Otherwise, the failures of the right may be, rather than being an opening to the left, an opportunity for the right to seek to impose an even more ironclad reactionary rule in the form of a friendly or not so friendly fascism (Gross, 1980; Dolbeare, 1976; and Wolfe, 1973).
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