
Goldwyn Emerson urges those in educational administration to borrow knowledge and methods from related fields and suggests that administrators may gain more by applying concepts and theories rather than skills gained through experience. James T. Sanders suggests that the concerns facing administrators might be divided into two groups—soluble problems and insoluble, permanent difficulties. He adds that misdiagnosis of these problems and difficulties might impede recognition of the appropriate ways to study educational administration. John E. McPeck observes that principals are required to exercise leadership but are usually selected for exhibiting conformity or followership. He finds a tendency in the literature to assume, mistakenly, that the application of theory eliminates the need to make value judgments. He argues that decision-making cannot occur without the application of values and urges the exposure of administrators to educational philosophy as an important aspect of their leadership training. A bibliography of articles read and discussed in preparing for the symposium is appended, including citations on state-of-the-art surveys, historical reviews, and major statements in the developing debate over epistemology in the field. (PGD)
THINKING CRITICALLY ABOUT EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION:
A MARTIAN VIEW

by
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Although the first doctorates in educational administration were awarded in 1905 this sphere of action did not begin to emerge as a recognized field of enquiry until the latter half of this century\(^1\). The post war expansion of public schooling structures, the challenge of progressive educational philosophies and the eternal public and corporate concern with efficiency and effectiveness in tax supported activities generated new interest in the administration of schools. Not only was there an increased demand for educational administrators, there was a desire that they should be better prepared for the demands of their job. Proficiency in the mechanics of school management could no longer be a sufficient qualification. In addition, principals and superintendents were to be knowledgeable about the nature of administration. They were to have a sound understanding of structure of formal organizations, the dynamics of human relations, the intricacies of rational decision making, the profundities of public sector economics and so forth. In an attempt to satisfy this new demand for "real" knowledge, those that taught the new graduate programs and wrote the new text books had little choice but to plunder the more extensive literature of management and organizational science, which was itself of relatively recent vintage. Along with the ideas and images transplanted from these so-called "parent disciplines" came a set of assumptions about the nature of what constituted useful knowledge\(^2\). These assumptions championed the utility of the scientific method, emphasized the value of theory and stressed the pursuit of universalistic explanations of administrative action and organizational phenomena. There could be little doubt about the veracity
of enquiry conducted along these lines, sanctioned as it was by the magic name of science. Moreover, educational psychology, the most eminent of the educational sub-fields, had long preached and practised the sanctity of this way to truth. Thus encouraged, the new students and scholars began to explore the newly defined field of educational administration, borrowing freely from those that laboured in a selected number of neighbouring fields and placing their faith in the production and dissemination of theory erected on a firm foundation of well-crunch numbers.

After a while this faith began to falter. Even before Greenfield began to question the quality of the clothes worn by the Emperor called science, the theoretical crown and empirical sceptre had begun to tarnish. The quest for grand theory was gradually transmuted into a search for theories of the "middle range". Attention began to focus on theoretical "perspectives" and "sensitizing concepts" rather than explanatory schema à la Fiegl. "Hard" research had never really flourished but as time passed inquiry in the field began to look more and more like poorly co-ordinated attempts to reconnoiter little known territory: some of the expeditions were well founded, but the reports of the explorers rarely complemented each other and there seemed to be an inordinate number of trees blocking the view of the forest. Then Greenfield began to question the assumptions that had remained virtually sacrosanct since the beginning of the new era. Although some branded his claims heretical and his conclusions seditious, his arguments for an alternative road to truth prompted a serious debate over the means and ends of enquiry in educational administration. In the course of this continuing debate, both speakers and spectators were forced to re-examine their own conscious and unconscious beliefs about the nature of the field and what may constitute valid (or valuable) knowledge.
As is usually the case during periods of academic self-doubt, the disagreements were kept within the family. But now that the heat associated with the initial stages of the debate has dissipated, and the field has begun to restabilize in an altered but newly strengthened form, it might be illuminating if some outside observers were asked for their views. Erwin Miklos proposed this idea during his reflective comments on last year's annual CASEA meeting. Intrigued by the suggestion, I began asking a number of colleagues at the University of Western Ontario if they would be willing to participate in such an exercise. The basic idea was to try and organize a kind of Man-from-Mars view of study in educational administration. The mythical man from Mars is a respectable academic character who appears in all kinds of unlikely places with his dispassionate, but seminal, observations on situations about which he had little prior knowledge. As I soon discovered, however, Martians are not easily found nor motivated. If you should ever need to find one, you must be prepared to look in all the darkest and little explored areas of the Faculty lounge, paying particular attention to the lunch tables.

When I finally found my Martians, it was necessary to introduce them to the problems and possibilities embedded in the study and practice of educational administration. To do this we all read and discussed the selection of articles listed in the attached bibliography. These included recent state-of-the-art surveys, historical reviews and a number of the major statements in the epistemological debate. The material was limited to what one of my Martians calls the "wisdom" literature in educational administration, no attention being given to research reports and the like. Our discussions took the form of both formal seminars and less dignified lunch room encounters, and at this point I must note that my Martians were impressed with what they found in the readings. One of my philosophical Martians, for example, remarked, with some amazement,
that there were some very real and interesting issues in the literature. In our discussions we identified a score of more of such issues, all of which could have been addressed in this symposium. We could not deal with them all and for a while we were uncertain as to the appropriate focus for this afternoon's activity. In the end, each of my Martians went their own way and concentrated on topics which they found particularly interesting. Consequently, the views offered in the following papers represent an undoubtedly unbalanced treatment of the possibilities and problems of thinking about educational administration but, after all, when one asks Martians to lunch one must be prepared to listen to their views.

In the order in which their reports are presented, the external commentators are Professors Emerson, Sanders and McPeck. Actually Dr. Emerson is something of a fence-sitter: he has one leg in his own field of educational philosophy and the other in the field of educational administration, where he has taught an introductory survey course for the past few years. Also, he presently holds an active administrative position in the Faculty of Education at Western. Dr. Sanders is a member of our educational psychology department and he is also the current editor of the Canadian Journal of Education. Dr. McPeck has both of his feet planted firmly in the field of educational philosophy where he has a particular interest in the use and abuse of critical thinking techniques.

WILL IT EVER FLY?

Goldwin J. Emerson

My comments on Educational Administration will be prefaced by the recognition that it is difficult for a newcomer, if not an outsider, to make useful observations about a field of inquiry as complex as administration.
The fact that scholars who have been involved with administration for many years experience a similar difficulty does nothing to assuage my concern. In his recent book on critical thinking, my colleague, John McPeck, correctly notes how difficult it is to apply general critical thinking to areas that lie outside one's own expertise. Keeping this in mind, I shall be content to simply share first impressions arising out of my review of the literature.

The first of these is that scholars, writers, and researchers in administration would very much like to move the field of administrative inquiry along in the direction of a full-fledged discipline with all that this implies in terms of a solid body of knowledge and its attendant respectability within a university community. In the literature, writers often convey a humble if not embarrassed and apologetic demeanor concerning the state of administrative study. There are frequent suggestions that if administrators were doing their job properly, then surely after all these years of study there ought to be significant breakthroughs in knowledge and procedures.

What does it take to become a full-fledged discipline? Paul Hirst or Joseph Schwab can instruct us here. Schwab notes that "if data are to be collected, we must have some sort of guide to relevance and irrelevance, importance and unimportance, which raises the problem of determining the membership and organization of the disciplines, of identifying the significantly different disciplines, and of locating their relations to one another. On these points Schwab observes:

First there is the problem of the organization of the disciplines: how many there is; what they are; and how they relate to one another. Second, there is the problem of the substantive conceptual structures used by each discipline. Third, there is the problem of the syntax of each discipline: what its canons of evidence and proof are and how well they can be applied."
Similarly, on Hirst's analysis the various disciplines or "forms of understanding are distinguishable from each other only by their distinctive concepts and expressions and their criteria for distinguishing the true and the false, the good and the bad." He concludes that there are "distinct disciplines or forms of knowledge" among which he includes mathematics, physical and human sciences, history, religion and philosophy. There are also fields of knowledge in which he includes theoretical, practical and perhaps moral knowledge. It is characteristic, and indeed respectable, for a field of knowledge to borrow from established disciplines.

If we are to apply the Hirst and Schwab analyses of disciplines versus fields of knowledge to the study of administration we are likely to conclude that administration is more appropriately regarded as a field of inquiry than as a discipline per se. The question is, "does it really matter?" ... and the answer to my rhetorical question is "no, it does not."

Concern for the status of one's field of inquiry is understandable, particularly if the area of study is comparatively new. Hoy and Miskel refer to this phenomenon as "a skepticism that plagued all social sciences in their gestation". In this context it is important to note that borrowing ideas from various disciplines is a strength and not a weakness. For example, sociology has increased its academic knowledge by relying heavily on related disciplines such as psychology and anthropology. Psychology in turn has many of its roots in the discipline of philosophy, that respected and ancient discipline, the origins of which can be traced back to some questionable ancestry, namely rhetoric, sophistry, oratory and theology.

Nothing is so dangerous to the pursuit of knowledge as an isolated or closed system of thought.
If, therefore, administrators can learn about group behaviour and
group typologies from the discipline of sociology, then they should so so.
If psychology can teach administrators about individual needs and personal
motivation, administrators should listen. Where philosophers can be helpful
in clarifying concepts, then administrative knowledge and administrative syntax
and methods can be improved. For example, for most philosophers, arguments
over "theory versus practice" formulate discussions in such a way as to make
it difficult to escape from incorrect assumptions about the nature of these
things. On the other hand, expressions such as "leadership training" or
"Ministry of Education guidelines" may deserve close philosophical analysis
to determine whether or not each is an antithetical or self-contradictory
expression. Such easy sounding phrases as "democratic decision making" cry
out for analysis in order to explore how the democratic process relates to
concepts such as collegiality, expertise, and professionalism in decision
making. In any case, if the aim of administrators is to move in the direction
of academic respectability and towards increased knowledge, administrators
should borrow unabashedly from other disciplines.

Borrowing from other disciplines also includes the adoption of the
methods of rigor and exactness found in respected disciplines. Emile Durkheim
gave good advice to his colleagues in the early development of sociology when
he insisted that "sociology conform to the rules of empirical evidence ex-
hibited by the physical sciences and be subject to the same procedures for
verification"15. In the field of administration, Greenfield exhorted his
colleagues in 1975 to embark upon a new path when he stated that "research
into organizational problems should consider and begin to use the phenomenological
perspective"16. Greenfield could perhaps have benefited by some advice from
the contemporary philosopher, Paul Hirst.
To acquire knowledge is to learn to see, to experience the world in a way otherwise unknown, and thereby come to have a mind in a fuller sense. It is not that the mind is some kind of organ or muscle with its own in-built forms of operation, which if somehow developed, naturally lead to different kinds of knowledge. It is not that the mind has predetermined patterns of functioning. Nor is it that the mind is an entity which suitably directed by knowledge comes to take on the pattern of, is conformed to, some external reality. It is rather that to have a mind basically involves coming to have an experience articulated by means of various conceptual schemata. It is only because man has over millennia objectified and progressively developed these that he has achieved the forms of human knowledge, and the possibility of the development of mind as we know it is open to us today.

The point at hand, is that a phenomenological approach, if it is to be adopted at all, ought not to run counter to a publicly testable objective approach.

I have stated earlier that administrators can, and should, borrow from other disciplines. A question also arises as to what administrators may profitably learn from practitioners in the field of administration. No doubt the study of administration has been enhanced by research done in practical settings in industry, business, military organizations and in political, religious and governmental institutions apart from schools. But in addition, individual practitioners are often willing to share their personal experiences about which techniques have worked for them. Groups of school principals may have networking systems developed for the sharing of just such ideas. While such systems can be beneficial, it is important to keep in mind that practical first hand experiences are usually workable only within the limits of the particular situations accompanying the experiences. That is, there is danger in generalizing from specific and limited experiences. Benjamin Disraeli, a first-hand administrator of some note, cautioned us that "the practical man (that paragon of common sense) is one who repeats the errors of his forefathers."
My last first impression in reviewing the literature is that writers in administration, like thinkers in many disciplines, have succumbed to an academic presumption. The presumption is that what is written actually precedes the stages of administrative development. If Halpin, or Hills or Gulbertson or others make statements about ideas in administration at various times, it is often presumed that these statements actually represent trends in the practice of administration. It would be flattering to think that writers and scholars including myself are trend setters but I suspect that such writings are more often the productive results of the writer's attempting to clarify his or her own thinking.

Finally, the criteria for effective and efficient administration are difficult to establish. Concomitantly, progress is difficult to measure. Searching to become a full-fledged discipline is an allusive pursuit. Like the pursuit of happiness, it may come about as the by-product of a search for other things. In the case of administration, I suspect that the route to success involves the on-going striving for better theory, careful research and continued hard work. In similar vein, Peter Drucker suggests that the route to success in administrative study lies in the search for "reality" or the systematic acquisition of knowledge which must supplement experience as the foundation for increasing productive capacity and improving performance. Hoy and Miskel also support the view that "increasingly, performance will depend on the ability to use concepts, ideas and theories rather than skills acquired through experience." Of course the theory movement in administrative study is not a new idea. In fact, it is an old idea that has the kind of proven track record among established disciplines that ought to commend its use to practitioners and scholars alike in the field of administration.
EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE DIFFICULTIES
OF HAVING ONLY PROBLEMS

James T. Sanders

Jacques Barzun's book _Teacher in America_, first published in 1945, has recently been reissued with a new preface written by the author. In the new preface, Barzun asks himself a question that is also likely to occur to the new reader (and surely must have occurred to the new publisher!), namely, what is the point of reading a book about teachers and schooling that was written almost 40 years ago? Barzun's answer is...

...because it deals with the difficulties of schooling, which do not change. Please note: the difficulties, not the problems. Problems are solved or disappear with revolving times. Difficulties remain.

Barzun does not go on to elaborate nor defend the distinction between problems and difficulties, but it carries the clear implication that problems can somehow be solved, resolved or otherwise fixed, whereas difficulties persist and can only be appreciated, understood or coped with.

In an essay entitled, "Are Social Problems Problems that Social Science Can Solve?", Herbert A. Simon has recently made a similar distinction between ordinary problems and the "Big Problems", such as war, poverty or disease. Like Barzun's Difficulties, Simon's Big Problems remain. They have not been solved by social science, and more importantly, perhaps they cannot.

The distinction having been made, it is still far from clear just how or even whether problems (with a small 'p') differ generically from Difficulties or Big Problems. It may be, as liberal-minded social science has tended to maintain, that Big Problems are just that -- big problems calling for big or bold or long term solutions, but solutions nonetheless. But it is precisely this pervasive, liberal assumption that both Barzun, and especially Simon, challenge. Both are making a distinction that refers to a difference in kind,
rather than in degree, and it is this categorical distinction that is likely to prove the more useful in recasting and rethinking certain persistent, big problems in the field of educational administration. By "big problems", I have in mind those broad, enduring topics of discussion that are at the core of and, indeed, define what might be called the "wisdom literature" of educational administration.

The point of "trying on" the distinction is not simply to sort the topics and issues that make up this literature into two, tidy piles -- soluble problems and insoluble Difficulties. Rather, the purpose is to see what further insights and implications such a descriptive (or perhaps, diagnostic) classification might afford. At the least, the distinction implies two important kinds of misconceptions that are likely to sustain spurious argument and debate within the field: (1) difficulties that are assumed to be problems and (2) problems that are assumed to be difficulties. It is, of course, the first circumstance, that is, difficulties masquerading as soluble problems, that the distinction primarily calls to our attention. But there is also the other intriguing possibility that a discipline or a field may "write off" certain problems as insoluble difficulties.

The most important prima facie evidence that a problem may be masking an underlying Difficulty is simply the problem's unusual persistence; the problem despite all good efforts just refuses to go away. Take, for example, the "theory-into-practice" problem. Its tiresome persistence within your field and elsewhere in education has reduced it to a kind of problematic cliche. As the issue wears on and on, it begins to seem more and more like an endemic condition to be accommodated than it does a problem to be solved. In fact, I find it hard to imagine what a solution to the "theory-into-practice" problem in educational administration might look like. Supposing that theory
in educational administration were to be successfully translated into clinical practice, how would we know? Would schools then have unfailing leadership, error-free decision-making, unsinkable faculty morale? In any case, to return to the general point, it is the apparent perpetuity of such problems as the "theory-into-practice" problem that suggests the presence of a real Difficulty.

In addition to sheer persistence, there is perhaps another sign that a problem may more likely be a Difficulty, and that is its pervasiveness; often the same problem, in only slightly altered form, reappears within and across any number of allied disciplines and fields. In this regard, while preparing for this symposium, the readings often evoked a sense of déjà vu -- of having encountered more or less the same problem or issue somewhere before. Take, for example, the problem of whether theory in educational administration should be primarily about education or about administration. What has been called the "adjectival" approach argues for the preeminence of the educational context as a source of theory. The opposing ("nounal"?) position regards the proper goal of theory to be the general principles of administration, per se, with educational administration representing but a special instance or interpretation of these subsuming principles. What is symptomatic of a Difficulty in this case is that essentially the same problem recurr and continues to fuel debate in educational psychology, in the sociology of education, and in the philosophy of education to name only three different locales.

It is not enough, however, to show that a problem is both persistent and pervasive in order to re-classify it as a Difficulty. Small pox and tuberculosis, for example, were once both persistent and pervasive but now they have all but disappeared. For a problem to qualify as an endemic Difficulty, it must also be shown that the problem is inescapable. This presumably requires finding some non-obvious property of either the problem itself, or the way
the problem has been defined, that contradicts its solution. Simon provides an example when he argues that the problem of poverty contains just such a self-defeating property. The conventional wisdom has assumed that poverty, although very persistent and very pervasive, is amenable to long term solution. Even more optimistically, United States' domestic policy once simply declared poverty an "enemy" to be "defeated" in an all-out "war on poverty". Why then has poverty endured despite enormous advances in agricultural and industrial productivity? Simon's explanation is that "we have learned that beyond the manifest problem of poverty there lurks the latent problem of unanchored aspiration levels, and envious comparison". Elsewhere, he concludes that ".... by defining economic progress as a zero-sum game we guarantee that the problem of poverty will have no solution -- neither a social solution nor a technological fix". Simon's analysis of poverty shows how a problem, as part of its nature or definition, can contain a kind of "tragic flaw" that precludes its own solution, and why, therefore, a problem is sometimes a Difficulty. Closer to home, the familiar theoretical analysis of the role of the educational administrator and the accompanying notion of role conflict or role strain is suggestive of just such a problem-cum-difficulty. This role-theoretic account emphasizes the conflicting, even contradictory, behavioral expectations with which educational administrators are confronted and the inevitable role strain that opposing expectations engender. From this theoretical perspective, the practice of educational administration itself is portrayed as a zero-sum game better understood by its endemic difficulties than by its soluble problems. A recent overview of the field of educational administration concludes with the fundamental question that serves to organize theoretical discussion and debate within the field, namely, "How shall we think about the administration of educational organizations so as to be able to study them in ways which will permit us to be of help to those who have to administer them?"
I am suggesting that one potentially useful way we might think about "the administration of educational organizations" is to think of the task as posing both soluble problems and inescapable difficulties. This double perspective may even go some way toward reconciling the two opposing views about how "those who have to administer" should be prepared for the task. On the one hand, there is the training view, closely allied with social science, that urges the development of instrumental skills to solve administrative problems. On the other hand, there is the educational view, tilted towards the humanities, that seeks to develop sensitivity to and understanding of problems. Where there are both problems and difficulties, there is plenty of work to go around. The preparation of educational administrators is doubtlessly enhanced by both training for the solution of problems as well as an education for understanding the inescapable difficulties.

EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AS A SPECTATOR'S SPORT

John E. McPeck

I would like to make it clear at the outset that even as a spectator of educational administration, I have attended very few events, and have always had a rather poor seat in the back. Most of the names and the positions of the important players are still new to me. Indeed, not until Derek Allison began usurping our lunch-time conversations did several of us become interested in your sport at all. It was a case of either becoming interested or going without lunch. And, since it is painfully visible that I did not forego my lunches, you might be interested in the observations of a philosopher just recently introduced to your literature.

Before discussing some of the issues that emerge from the literature itself, however, I'd like to advance a quasi-sociological hypothesis about school administrators as people which is not prominent in the literature.
but if true, would have important consequences for both theory and practice in educational administration. And even if this hypothesis is not true, it is a common public perception about school administrators. For example, consider the question "what kind of person in the school system is most likely to be promoted to Principal?" The answer is not far to find. Clearly, principals are not going to be the rabble-rousers -- they are not promotion material. Indeed, given the inertial nature of most school systems, it will seldom be any kind of non-conformist who is promoted. In short, whatever other qualities a school principal is likely to have (and there are many), being outspoken or stridently independent is unlikely to be one of them. In school systems, as in the military, conformity to rules and regulations is the major virtue. Small wonder, then, that there is so much interest in so-called educational "leadership skills", for most of them have been selected out from the clientele most in need of them. Indeed, the exercise of true "leadership skills" is anathema to the process of selecting educational leaders. Unobtrusive followership is more the requirement of the office. My hypothesis, then, is that as a group, principals much prefer to take and to give orders than to create them. In fairness however, the reasons for this are not all their fault. While the system "theoretically" supports autonomous decisions by principals (thus exercising "leadership") the de facto reward system does not encourage it. Delay of promotion, and transfers, are well known forms of reprobation in the principal ranks. And one thing principals do know is how to stay out of trouble.

If this hypothesis is true, I am not sure whether it would qualify as a permanent "Difficulty", to use Jim Sanders' phrase, or merely a solvable "problem" for educational administration. But if autonomous decisions are part of a principal's job, and the job selection criteria remain couched in
conservative terms, I am inclined to believe this is a permanent "Difficulty". The major import of this phenomenon, however, is the serious implications it holds for the role of values in educational administration generally. As I shall argue, the making of autonomous value judgments is an essential part of an educational administrator's job, yet this is precisely the kind of judgment they are likely to feel least comfortable making. Moreover, the professional training of educational administration ill-equips them to be comfortable making value-judgments. On this point the literature in educational administration contains some serious misconceptions about what theories can and cannot do, particularly in relation value judgments. Let us now turn to this problem.

Since the beginning of the so-called "theory movement", and apparently up to the present, there is a widely held opinion in the educational administration literature that one of the great virtues of a theory is that it enables one to get on with the job at hand without making value judgments. Indeed, the distinct impression is given that the whole point in having a theory is to remove us from the untoward and woolly arena of values. Witness, for example, Andrew Halpin saying in 1977:

> Values, or "oughts" cannot serve as a basis for decision making. Churchman has stated the issue well: "Agreement always has its opposite side and often becomes disagreement in the next generation, especially in healthy societies where social change is bound to occur. A rational mind will want a far better basis for the judgement of excellence."33.

Also, Graham Kelsey and John Long describe Daniel Griffiths' influential contribution to the 1964 Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education as conveying a sense of "emancipation", as though value judgments are no longer part of our business, if they ever were.34 Kelsey and Long also paraphrase Eric Hoyle's characterization of the theory movement as:
...an approach which sought to make the study of educational administration value-free by avoiding moral judgments in theory construction and by treating values as variables.35.

This general view, that theory displaces the need for value judgments in educational administration is prevasive through much of the literature. It is also broadly known that Tom Greenfield has attacked this dichotomization of theory and values along lines similar to Thomas Kuhn. And I think at least this part of Greenfield's thesis is correct. However, I wish to criticize the so-called theory movement about the relation of theory to value from an entirely different perspective. Namely, from the perspective that it rests on a misconception about what theories can do.

One of the major contributions left to us from the philosopher David Hume, is his perceptive argument that you can never derive an ought statement from an is statement, nor indeed from any collection of is statements. That is, no matter how many incontestable facts about the world one may have, these facts will not sanction any inference about what one ought to do. One can never derive what one ought to do, either morally or prudentially, until one has injected at least one value judgment into the equation; and this value judgment, perforce, cannot come from the facts. Among other things, what this means is that a theory (which has to do with what the facts are) could never by itself prescribe intelligent action. Intelligent action also requires a choice to be made, which is none other than our old friend the value judgment!

These logical connections between values and intelligent, or rational, action hold several implications for educational administration. Perhaps the first is that even if we should ever achieve a complete "science of administration", it would still not absolve administrators from having to make educational value judgments. No more so than a science of sailing, say,
would remove the need to choose destinations and the like. When Halpin says "Values, or 'oughts' cannot serve as a basis for decision making", we are forced to point out that this cannot be true: values and oughts are logically required for decision making. And no theory, no matter how rich, will ever change this. Thus, to some extent the "theory movement" confusedly held out false expectations to administrators, making promises that cannot be kept.

A second implication stemming from the connection between theory and values in decision making is that training programs for administrators should not play-down or suppress the role of values but should feature them. There seems to be some fear that if value judgments are an integral part of administration, then any kind of preparation is arguably as good as any other since values differ from person to person, and are arbitrary anyway. But this fear is unfounded. Values can be argued about, studied, defended, attacked, and generally prepared for and our administrators would be well advised to know the arguments supporting the various policies and choices available. Not all choices, after all, are equally wise or beneficial for our schools. Indeed, this kind of knowledge would not only provide the basis for taking initiatives (thus true leadership), but also for defending oneself from arbitrary and unreasonable pressures and complaints. At present school administrators too often rely upon trends or slogans, and sometimes just raw authority, to support various policies and decisions. Making decisions on this basis is enough to make anyone nervous, let alone ineffective. As a first step in the preparation of administrators I would suggest, as they do in England, a substantial grounding in the philosophy of education. Philosophy of education is, after all, the study of arguments supporting various normative choices and policies in education. This leads me to my next and final point.
The dominance of the theory movement in educational administration has had another down-side effect both in its own research literature, and in the preparation of administrators. In its preoccupation with creating and exploiting a "science of organization" it has focussed attention on what is common to all organizations at the expense of what is unique and peculiar about educational administration per se. As Halpin has observed:

> Obviously, business administration, hospital administration, public administration and educational administration have many characteristics in common, and to the extent that we can identify a g (or general) factor, a theory of administration is meaningful. But there are s (or specific) factors too, that distinguish educational administration from other forms of administration.

I would suggest that what is unique about educational administration is precisely those normative value judgments fleetingly referred to a moment ago. For example, do most school administrators know the arguments for compulsory schooling, a policy which they enforce daily? Do they understand the differences between 'training' and 'educating', and what are the arguments for using a school to do one of these rather than another? Should vocational preparation take precedence over liberally educating our students? If not, why not? A rich and interesting literature exists on these and similar questions, particularly in the philosophy of education. A school administrator's views on these and other such questions will have many and profound effects on the way a school is run. And once it is fully appreciated that no administrative theory will decide such questions for us, then these questions might find a more permanent place in the preparation of educational administrators.

I would not find it strange to see such central concepts as 'role', 'bureaucracy' and 'organizational structure' replaced with concepts like 'training', 'indoctrinating', 'educating' and the like. Indeed, I think such a displacement would have more interesting effects for the research literature, and more immediate practical consequences for administrators in the field.
FOOTNOTES

1. Jack Culbertson, "Educational Administration: Where we are and where we are going", in R.H. Farquhar and I.E. Housego (eds.). Canadian and Comparative Education (Vancouver: Centre for Continuing Education, University of British Columbia, 1980), pp. 322-351.

2. Griffiths, for example, cites the field of organizational theory as a "parent discipline" of educational administration - D.E. Griffiths "Intellectual Turmoil in Educational Administration". Educational Administrative Quarterly 15, 3 (Fall, 1979) p. 43. The set of epistemological assumptions referred to came to define the paradigm commonly referred to as the "Theory Movement". For a review and a retrospective appraisal see Andrew W. Halpin and Andrew E. Hayes, 'The Boken Ikon: Or, What Ever Happened to Theory?' in L.L. Cunningham, W.L. Hack, and R.O. Nystrand (eds.). Educational Administration: The Developing Decades (Berkeley, Calif.: McCutcheon, 1977), 261-297.

3. Halpin, one of the founders of the Theory Movement, was originally trained as a psychologist.

4. Fiegl's definition of theory as "a set of assumptions from which can be derived by purely logico-mathematical procedures a larger set of empirical laws" was often presented as an exemplar definition by promoters of the Theory Movement. H. Fiegl, "Principles and Problems of Theory Construction in Psychology" in Current Trends in Psychological Theory. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1951) p. 182.


(among others) the following particularly notable articles:

D.E. Griffiths "The Individual in Organization: A Theoretical Perspective", Educational Administration Quarterly 13, 2 (Spring, 1977),
D.J. Willower "Contemporary Issues in Theory in Educational Administration", Educational Administration Quarterly 16, 3 (Fall, 1980),
T.B. Greenfield "The Man Who Came Back Through The Door in the Wall: Discovering Truth, Discovering Self, Discovering Organizations", Educational Administration Quarterly 16, 3 (Fall, 1980),

8. Oral remarks, delivered during the closing session at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Association for the Study of Educational Administration, Ottawa, 1982.


17. Hirst, op. cit., p. 40


22. Ibid, p. 36


27. Simon, op. cit., p. 12.

28. Ibid., p. 9.


35. Ibid, p. 419.

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