These conference proceedings consider the major lines of evidence on the nature and locus of the alcohol-disinhibition link. The first day's papers, commentaries and discussions are centered on physiological and behavioral links; social-psychological research; historical ideas on alcohol, crime, and accidents; and anthropological perspectives on cultural differences. The proceedings from the second day of the conference focus on perspectives on disinhibition in American society. Presentations address general population views on the effects of alcohol, alcohol as an explanation for failure, aggression in subcultures, and drinking and disinhibition in popular culture. The third day's presentations focus on disinhibition and social control. Attention is given to alcohol's role in power relationships and criminal behavior. The proceedings conclude with a discussion of the implications of the presentations for future research and action. General discussion references are appended. (BL)
Research Monograph No. 12

ALCOHOL AND DISINHIBITION: NATURE AND MEANING OF THE LINK

Proceedings of a Conference
February 11-13, 1981
Berkeley/Oakland, California

Sponsored by:
National Research Centers Branch, NIAAA; and
Social Research Group, School of Public Health,
University of California, Berkeley

Edited by:
Robin Room and Gary Collins
of the Social Research Group, Berkeley
This publication is the product of a conference on alcohol and disinhibition held in Berkeley/Oakland, California, February 11-13, 1981, cosponsored by the Social Research Group, School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley, and the National Alcohol Research Centers program of the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, under grant number AA-03524. The presentations herein are those of the listed authors and may not necessarily reflect the opinions, official policy, or position of the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism; the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration; the Public Health Service; or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

The National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism has obtained permission from the copyright holders to reproduce previously published figures and tables as noted in the text. Further reproduction of these materials is prohibited without specific permission of the copyright holder. Adapted tables of copyrighted materials may be copyrighted; thus, before reprinting, readers are advised to determine the copyright status or to secure permission of the copyright holder. All other material contained in the manual, except quoted passages from copyrighted sources, is in the public domain and may be used and reprinted without permission. Citation of the source is appreciated.

The U.S. Government does not endorse or favor any specific commercial product or commodity. Trade or proprietary names appearing in this publication are used only because they are considered essential in the context of the studies reported herein.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 82-600616

DHHS Publication No. (ADM) 83-1246
Printed 1983

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is another in the Research Monograph Series published by the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA). The series sets forth current information on a number of topics relevant to alcohol abuse and alcoholism as reported through conferences and workshops on research treatment and prevention, as well as through state-of-the-art reviews on selected topics.

This monograph reports the proceedings of a research conference co-sponsored by the Alcohol Research Center of the University of California at Berkeley and NIAAA. The Alcohol Research Center is one of nine National Alcohol Research Centers funded by NIAAA. Although each Center's research program has a specific focus on a central theme of importance to alcohol abuse and alcoholism, the Centers program as a whole covers a broad spectrum of problems associated with alcohol use and misuse. Areas under investigation range from the neurophysiological effects of alcohol consumption to the various factors that influence drinking practices and attitudes toward drinking alcoholic beverages. In addition to their primary mission of developing new knowledge by conducting original research in their chosen area, the Centers have the additional responsibility of disseminating this knowledge broadly across the scientific and lay communities. In this connection, the Centers have joined NIAAA in organizing and holding workshops and conferences on topics close to their specialty areas. The proceedings reported in this volume represent another in the series of such collaborative activities.

The purpose of the conference was to bring together researchers active in this area of study to review the current state of knowledge about the relation between alcohol consumption and the disinhibition of behavior. The first part of the conference focused on pharmacologic effects of alcohol especially as related to aggression and violent behavior. Subsequently, the discussions expanded to the social, psychological, and cultural factors associated with disinhibitory behaviors. Approximately 50 persons participated in the conference by presenting their research findings and by contributing to discussions of the scientific papers. It is hoped that
reporting these proceedings in this monograph will be of value to others working in this area and to those planning to do so in the future. In addition, it is hoped that the proceedings will be generally informative to anyone interested in the effects of alcohol on human behavior.

Albert A. Pawlowski, Ph.D.
Chief,
National Research Centers Branch
Division of Extramural Research
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
Introduction

Robin Room

It is a commonplace in our culture that alcohol is a disinhibitor—that drunkenness not only makes one clumsy, but also removes social constraints, making us, for instance, aggressive or affectionate, maudlin or mean, in a way that we would not be if we were sober. Often a pseudo-scientific explanation is given: “Alcohol depresses the higher centers of the brain.” Such “explanations” reflect the wide popular and professional belief that disinhibition is a pharmacological property of alcohol. In everyday language and life, this presumed pharmacological action is often used to excuse or account for otherwise inexcusable behavior; for instance, “It was just the alcohol in her talking, she didn’t mean anything by it,” or, as an Abscam bribery defendant explained himself, “I was drinking FBI bourbon, big glasses of it.”

Often disinhibited behavior after drinking is overlooked or treated as a joke. But some aspects of disinhibition are taken very seriously by our society. At a minimum, disinhibited behavior is worrisome because it is unpredictable. Beyond this, alcohol’s powers as a disinhibitor are seen as making people aggressive, violent and vicious. Alcohol is widely believed to be responsible for a large part of the violence in our society. In line with this belief, in the courts drunkenness is often a partial excuse for homicidal crimes. The disinhibitory effects of alcohol are thus often taken for granted in social policy.

In recent years, evidence has been building up from a number of disciplinary areas to suggest that the link between alcohol and disinhibition is a matter of cultural belief rather than of pharmacological action. Alcohol is certainly a psychoactive drug: we feel different when drunk than when sober. But how we interpret those feelings, and in particular how we act on them, is largely determined by culture and circumstance: thus what is pharmacologically the same drug can make us aggressive or passive, ebullient or morose, frenetic or immobile. In this view, psychoactivity does not determine whether behavior is disinhibited
or controlled: it simply provides an empty vessel of altered consciousness for culture, circumstance and personality to load with meanings and explanations.

The conference is built around this emergent perspective of the cultural locus of the link between alcohol and disinhibition. It has three main aims: (1) to collate and assess the available evidence on the nature and locus of the alcohol-disinhibition link; (2) to explore the nature and distribution of beliefs about alcohol and disinhibition, and particularly about alcohol and violence, in American society; and (3) to consider how beliefs about alcohol and disinhibition relate to the operation of social controls in the culture. While discussion of each of these topics will undoubtedly continue throughout the meeting, each topic is the major focus of a day of the conference. An additional concern, particularly on the third day, is a consideration of what are the options for policy and social change implied by the work of the conference.

The first day of the conference considers the major lines of evidence on the nature and locus of the alcohol-disinhibition link. First, attention is given to the state of research on biological links between alcohol and aggression or other disinhibitory behaviors. Next, the evidence is laid out from the social-psychological “balanced placebo design” experiments by Lang, Marlatt, Wilson and others, pointing to the dominance of belief that one is ingesting alcohol over the fact of ingestion in determining behavior. Consideration is then given to historical evidence that, while Americans in the eighteenth century saw alcohol as causing clumsiness, the belief that it made one vicious or violent was a nineteenth-century addition. Lastly, the rich anthropological data on cultural differences in drunken comportment, dramatized in work by MacAndrew and Edgerton and others, are assessed for their evidence on the nature of the alcohol-disinhibition link.

The second day of the conference endeavors to forward our understanding of the beliefs about alcohol’s disinhibitory effects in American society, drawing on a variety of data sources and perspectives. The discussion on this day ventures into largely new territory, since there has been remarkably little systematic consideration of the powers ascribed to alcohol and how these ascriptions affect others’ behavior. The first paper of the day draws on previously unanalyzed data from surveys of the general population on the structure of popular beliefs about the effects of alcohol. This is followed by a consideration of how drinking functions as an excuse or explanation for behavior in everyday interactions. It is expected that this discussion will bring to bear two separate, burgeoning social science literatures which have so
far not taken alcohol into serious consideration. One tradition, represented by the presenter, is the sociological “accounts” literature, focusing on how people account to others for their deviant acts. The other tradition, represented by the commentator, is the psychological “attribution” literature, which has emphasized attention to the motives to which people attributed their behavior. The third topic seeks to draw together scattered evidence from a wide variety of studies on how the norms of subcultures and social worlds and the understandings of informal groups operate with respect to drinking and disinhibition and particularly violence. Relevant literatures here include studies of subcultures of violence, of violent and rowdy gangs and groups, and of youth and ethnic subcultures. Relevant questions include: is the drinking-violence connection reserved for particular roles and statuses, as Marshall found on Truk Island; does the American South differ from the rest of the country in cultural understandings about the connection; are there special functions of the drinking-disinhibition connection for particular subcultures? Last, consideration is given to the presentation of alcohol and disinhibition in what might be called “prepared communication” — in the mass media, in serious literature, in popular songs, etc. This area is seen as important in terms both of the teaching function of the assumptions made in such communications, and of the reflection it offers of societal beliefs about what drinking does and what it justifies.

The third day of the conference considers broader issues of social control as affected by the alcohol-disinhibition link. The first presentation focuses on how the link is used both by the dominant and the subordinate party in power relationships, particularly emphasizing culturally sanctioned intimate relationships such as marriage. The second topic considers the role the link plays in American jurisprudence — where and under what circumstances drunkenness functions to excuse or convict and where to determine who is at fault. The legal system is seen as particularly relevant to the issues of the conference as a locus where the society settles many hard questions about the individual’s responsibility to society and to others. Last, there is consideration of the implications of the work of the conference for research and in terms of alternative scenarios for social and policy change in the light of its findings.

The above prospectus for the conference was precirculated to those invited to write papers and give prepared commentaries at the conference. The prospectus reflects the work of the conference’s planning committee, which included Walter Clark, Lorraine Midanik, Patricia Morgan, Ron Roizen and Robin Room of the
INTRODUCTION

As the precirculated statement went on to add, its "description of the trajectory of the conference" reflected "the discussions which went into its planning but not, of course, the rethinking and reorientation which is likely to occur in the course of the preparation of the working papers for the conference and the proceedings of the conference itself."

In the following pages can be found the record of those actual proceedings. To describe how the record was produced may help the reader interpret the results. The ten prepared papers for the conference were precirculated, and authors were asked to introduce their paper rather than read it. We have reproduced below the papers essentially as written, and have followed them with the authors' introductory remarks at the conference commenting or expanding on the written paper. An invited discussant gave a prepared commentary on each paper, after which there was general discussion. An extemporaneous summary paper was given by Herbert Fingarette. The editors of this volume then went through this transcript, cutting out some of the false starts and repetitions and smoothing some of the jagged syntax inherent in oral discourse. In a few places, where several lines of discussion had been interwoven, we reordered the comments into topical clusters. But we kept the editorial touch light, aiming to preserve the vigor and colloquial style of the actual dialogue. Speakers were then sent this edited transcript of their remarks, to check it for accuracy, and to provide references for authors and studies they had cited. (These references will be found collected in one place at the end of this volume.) In their emendations, conference participants adhered to our request to preserve the spirit and substance of the conference as a spontaneous dialogue.

What was at the time of the conference the Social Research Group continues as a National Alcohol Research Center with the same staff and street address, but with a new grant number (AA-05595) and name and aegis: the Alcohol Research Group, Institute of Epidemiology and Behavioral Medicine, Medical Research Institute of San Francisco, 1816 Scenic Avenue, Berkeley, California 94709. The Group's research training functions continue as part of the School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley.
Conference Participants

Susanna Barrows  
Department of History  
University of California  
Berkeley, California 94720

Raul Caetano  
Social Research Group  
School of Public Health  
University of California  
1816 Scenic Avenue  
Berkeley, California 94709

Don Cahalan  
Social Research Group  
School of Public Health  
University of California  
1816 Scenic Avenue  
Berkeley, California 94709

Troy Duster  
Professor of Sociology  
Department of Sociology  
University of California  
Berkeley, California 94720

Cindy Ehlers  
Alcohol Research Center  
Salk Institute  
P.O. Box 85800  
San Diego, California 92138

Herbert Fingarette  
Department of Philosophy  
University of California  
Santa Barbara, California 93106

Carol Ghinger  
Social Research Group  
School of Public Health  
University of California  
1816 Scenic Avenue  
Berkeley, California 94709

Marcus Grant  
Alcohol Education Center  
Maudsley Hospital  
99 Denmark Hill  
London, U.K. SE5 8A2

Denise Herd  
Social Research Group  
School of Public Health  
University of California  
1816 Scenic Avenue  
Berkeley, California 94709

Dorie Klein  
Social Research Group  
School of Public Health  
University of California  
1816 Scenic Avenue  
Berkeley, California 94709

Alan Lang  
Department of Psychology  
Psychology Building 314  
Florida State University  
Tallahassee, Florida 32306

Joy Leland  
Acting Director, Social Science Center  
Desert Research Institute  
7010 El Rancho Drive  
Sparks, Nevada 89431

Edwin Lemert  
Professor Emeritus  
Department of Sociology  
University of California  
Davis, California 95616

Harry Levine  
Department of Sociology  
Queens College  
Flushing, New York 11367
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David Levinson</td>
<td>755 Prospect Street, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monty Lindstrom</td>
<td>Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. K. Linton</td>
<td>Fort Lewis College, Durango, Colorado 81301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennis Lum</td>
<td>Fort Lewis College, Durango, Colorado 81301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craig MacAndrew</td>
<td>School of Social Services, University of California, Irvine, California 92717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margaret MacKenzie</td>
<td>Social Research Group, School of Public Health, University of California, 1816 Scenic Avenue, Berkeley, California 94709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Guy Mansfield</td>
<td>University of Illinois Medical Center, Department of Physiology and Biophysics, College of Medicine, P.O. Box 6998, Chicago, Illinois 60680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Marlatt</td>
<td>Department of Psychology, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mac Marshall</td>
<td>Department of Anthropology, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Moore</td>
<td>Harvard University, JFK School of Government, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia Morgan</td>
<td>Social Research Group, School of Public Health, University of California, 1816 Scenic Avenue, Berkeley, California 94709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Morrissey</td>
<td>Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Science, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Mosher</td>
<td>Social Research Group, School of Public Health, University of California, 1816 Scenic Avenue, Berkeley, California 94709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juha Partanen</td>
<td>The State Alcohol Monopoly, Social Research Institute of Alcohol Studies, Kalevankatu 12, 00100 Helsinki 10, Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kai Pernanen</td>
<td>Research Institute on Alcoholism, 1021 Main Street, Buffalo, New York 14203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madelon Powers</td>
<td>Social Research Group, School of Public Health, University of California, 1816 Scenic Avenue, Berkeley, California 94709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron Roizen</td>
<td>Social Research Group, School of Public Health, University of California, 1816 Scenic Avenue, Berkeley, California 94709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robin Room</td>
<td>Social Research Group, School of Public Health, University of California, 1816 Scenic Avenue, Berkeley, California 94709</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PARTICIPANTS

Joan Silverman
Department of History
New York University
New York, New York 10003

Richard Speiglman
Social Research Group
School of Public Health
University of California
1816 Scenic Avenue
Berkeley, California 94709

Philip Tetlock
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Department of Psychology
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720

Lawrence Wallack
Social Research Group
School of Public Health
University of California
1816 Scenic Avenue
Berkeley, California 94709

Connie Weisner
Social Research Group
School of Public Health
University of California
1816 Scenic Avenue
Berkeley, California 94709

Charles Winick
Department of Sociology
City College of New York
New York, New York 10031

Stephen C. Woods
Department of Psychology
121 Guthrie Hall - N1-25
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington 98195
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robin Room</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference Participants</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DAY 1: THE NATURE AND LOCUS OF DISINHIBITION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robin Room</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethanol and Disinhibition: Physiological and Behavioral Links</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen C. Woods and James Guy Mansfield</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presenter's Comments</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary by Juha Partanen</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking and Disinhibition: Contributions From Psychological Research</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan R. Lang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presenter's Comments</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary by Kai Pernanen</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Good Creature of God and the Demon Rum: Colonial American and 19th Century Ideas About Alcohol, Crime, and Accidents</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Gene Levine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presenter's Comments</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary by Joan Silverman</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Four Hundred Rabbits”: An Anthropological View of Ethanol as a Disinhibitor</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mac Marshall</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presenter's Comments</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Commentary by *Craig MacAndrew* ........................................ 212  
Discussion ........................................................................ 215

## DAY 2: PERSPECTIVES ON DISINHIBITION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

**Introduction**  
*Robin Room* ................................................................ 234

**Loosening Up: General-Population Views of the Effects of Alcohol**  
*Ron Roizen* ................................................................. 236

Presenter's Comments ......................................................... 258  
Commentary by *Joy Leland* .................................................. 261  
Discussion .......................................................................... 269

**Accounting for Failure**  
*N.K. Linton and Dennis W. Lum* ........................................... 276

Presenters’ Comments ............................................................ 289  
Commentary by *Philip Tetlock* ............................................. 293  
Discussion ........................................................................ 298

**Alcohol Use and Aggression in American Subcultures**  
*David Levinson* ............................................................... 306

Presenter's Comments ............................................................ 322  
Commentary by *Troy Duster* .................................................. 326  
Commentary by *Denise Herd* ............................................... 331  
Discussion ........................................................................ 338

**Drinking and Disinhibition in Popular Culture**  
*Charles Winick* ................................................................. 347

Presenter's Comments ............................................................ 374  
Commentary by *Edwin Lemert* ............................................. 383  
Discussion ........................................................................ 387

## DAY 3: DISINHIBITION AND SOCIAL CONTROL

**Introduction**  
*Robin Room* ................................................................ 404

**Alcohol, Disinhibition, and Domination: A Conceptual Analysis**  
*Patricia Morgan* ............................................................... 405
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presenter's Comments</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary by Elizabeth Morrissey</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol: Both Blame and Excuse for Criminal Behavior</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James F. Mosher</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presenter's Comments</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary by Mark Moore</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for Research and Action</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Fingarette</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Discussion References</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DAY 1: THE NATURE AND LOCUS OF DISINHIBITION
Introduction

Robin Room

When Al Pawlowski of NIAAA first asked us to organize a workshop relevant to the work of our National Alcohol Research Center, we spent a good deal of internal discussion time on what was the most appropriate topic. There are a number of reasons why the present topic was chosen; one was that it seemed to be an area in which there are a number of different disciplines that had been doing work which was often independent and yet was convergent. A second reason was that we would perhaps be able with this conference to make a larger point, which is that social science studies, just as much as biomedical studies, can be a basic science. Too often, I think, social science work is viewed, both from the point of view of the policy makers and from the point of view of the general public, in terms only of its “news” value. When you’re working with rats in the laboratory, it’s obvious that the interest is not in the news value of how the rats behave; the interest is in the model that they offer for understanding some conceptualizations and for developing theories. But when it comes to studying people, the inherent news value often obscures this second level of interest.

We have to recognize that the impetus for a conference like this comes from a long-standing concern of our society about the link of alcohol and violence; and Harry Levine’s paper underlines that this belief about the linkage of alcohol and violence has a substantial history. As Kai Pernanen’s article in 1976 beautifully laid out, the linkage of alcohol and disinhibition has functioned as a very powerful cultural explanation of violence in our society.

The Social Research Group’s involvement in this area stems in considerable part from the large scale review of the literature on the role of alcohol in casualties and crime that we undertook for NIAAA in 1976 and 1977 (Aarens et al. 1978). One of the matters that was really re-emphasized for us by that undertaking was the importance of distinguishing between different aspects of alcohol. One particular division underlined by that study was the distinction between the long-term and short-term effects of alcohol.
the era of the alcoholism movement of the last forty years, the primary emphasis in the literature on alcohol has been on the long-term effects of alcohol. When we're talking about the role of alcohol in violence, and, more generally, when we're talking about the role of alcohol with respect to disinhibition, our primary focus, rather, is on the short-term effects of alcohol, on the episode of drunkenness.

Given the societal concerns about alcohol's role in violence, one alternative would have been to hold a conference on alcohol and violence, but this would have tended to swamp the theoretical agenda with methodological considerations about measures of violence and about the difficulties of studies in clinical populations and criminal populations. We wanted instead to zero in on the theoretical issues involved, which in our view included but also reached beyond alcohol and violence.

Without further ado we're going to proceed now into the business of the conference, and the first order of business will be a presentation by Steve Woods, from the University of Washington, Seattle, concerning the evidence on the alcohol-disinhibition link from a pharmacological and physiological point of view.
Ethanol and Disinhibition:
Physiological and Behavioral Links*

Stephen C. Woods and James Guy Mansfield

Disinhibition is a term commonly used to refer to activation of behaviors normally suppressed by various controlling influences. Of great concern to many in the social, legal, and medical professions is the possibility that certain drugs (such as ethanol) have disinhibitory properties, and may open the social and cultural floodgates that usually hold back acts of aggression, deviant sexual expression, and other aberrant behaviors. Our intent here is to review selectively the literature dealing with the mechanism of action of ethanol. We shall not favor any particular approach, explanation, or theory concerning the putative disinhibitory effects of ethanol; rather, we hope merely to provide conceptual bridges between what is known of the physiology and pharmacology of ethanol on the one hand and the behavioral, social, and anthropological information on the other. Much of the material has been reviewed competently and in more detail elsewhere (Institute of Medicine 1980; Kalant 1971, 1975; Myers 1978); we differ here in our focus on disinhibition.

Ethanol

Ethanol, like other recreational drugs, is taken by humans for its pharmacological properties, and any attempt to link its intake and specific behavioral consequences with underlying mechanisms must take these properties into account. Within the body, ethanol is initially metabolized or altered biochemically by being converted

*The authors would like to thank their colleagues Dr. G.A. Marlatt and Dr. H.H. Samson for their discussions and contribution to this review.
Preparation of this review was subsidized partially by National Institutes of Health Grant AA 04658 and by the Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Institute of the University of Washington.
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND BEHAVIORAL LINKS

to the compound acetaldehyde. Much of this metabolism occurs within the liver, but many other tissues contribute to a greater or lesser extent. In many tissues, but especially in the blood, acetaldehyde in turn is eventually converted to inert compounds. Ethanol and/or acetaldehyde are generally thought to be responsible for the important consequences of drinking alcoholic beverages, but there is considerable controversy as to the relative roles of the two. While many investigators feel that it is the ethanol molecule itself which exerts important pharmacological actions, others have suggested that acetaldehyde, acting directly or indirectly, produces many of the significant behavioral consequences of drinking.

The controversy revolves around whether acetaldehyde ever exists in biologically meaningful amounts in the brain. For although acetaldehyde in the blood has been implicated in certain indices of physical arousal such as face-flushing and increased pulse rate (Mizoi et al. 1979, 1980), it is not thought to be able to penetrate easily into the brain (Eriksson and Sippel 1977; Hillbom et al. 1980). However, some researchers believe that sufficient acetaldehyde is formed within the brain itself to account for many consequences of ethanol consumption. One speculative theory is that acetaldehyde interacts chemically with neurotransmitters in the brain to form products called tetrahydroisoquinolines (TIQs). These in turn are thought to interfere with normal neuronal functioning (Cohen 1977; Institute of Medicine 1980). While there is some evidence that acetaldehyde, perhaps via TIQs, may play a role in the development of tolerance and dependence (Brown et al. 1979, in press; Davis and Walsh 1970), there is less compelling research on possible direct disinhibitory effects of acetaldehyde itself. One recent report, however, suggests that when the metabolism of acetaldehyde is prevented by use of certain drugs, such that acetaldehyde is allowed to accumulate in the body, there is elevated mood or euphoria in humans (Amit et al. 1980). The interested reader is urged to read any of the more comprehensive reviews of the possible role of acetaldehyde (Amit et al. 1980; Hillbom et al. 1980; Lindros 1978). The important point for the present discussion is that when considering how a drug might act, one must take into account not only its metabolites, but also the possibility of complex interactions with various metabolic pathways.

Drugs can interact with the nervous system in both specific and nonspecific ways. A nonspecific effect occurs when a drug interacts with many tissues because of some general biochemical property. For example, the drug formaldehyde nonspecifically destroys all cells it contacts by denaturing cellular protein. One theory of how
ethanol works is based upon a nonspecific interaction of ethanol molecules with the structure of cell membranes. Since every cell has a membrane, any actions of ethanol would be manifest in every cell or tissue exposed to the drug. By contrast, a specific action would occur when certain cells or parts of cells contain areas which recognize ethanol as a discrete molecule and which interact with it such that a specific, predetermined biological response is triggered. In this instance, only those cells containing these unique responsive areas or “receptors” are affected by the drug.

As with many interpretations concerning drugs and behavior, the issue of specificity is not easily settled. Much of the available evidence points to a nonspecific mode of action for ethanol (as well as other general depressants of the nervous system such as ether and nitrous oxide). We shall begin with a consideration of this type of nonspecific action at the cellular level, followed by a selective summary of the effects of ethanol on the functioning nervous system. It is conceivable, though, that both specific and nonspecific mechanisms occur with ethanol, and this possibility and its implications for an understanding of disinhibitory actions of ethanol will also be examined.

**Ethanol as a Nonspecific Drug**

Ethanol (ethyl alcohol) is a simple molecule containing two carbon atoms with a hydroxyl group (-OH, biochemically speaking) attached to one of the carbons. The molecule is very soluble in water and diffuses easily through biological membranes. These properties account for ethanol’s rapid and wide dispersion within the body and form the basis of the breath analysis test, since ethanol rapidly equilibrates across the membranes in the lung that separate inspired air from the blood. Of particular importance to any analysis of the effects of ethanol on behavior are its effects upon the brain. The “blood-brain barrier” is an anatomical alteration of blood capillaries within the brain which retards the passage of many toxic compounds into the brain and thereby helps maintain a constancy of the brain’s internal environment. As indicated above, this barrier effectively prevents acetaldehyde from gaining access to the brain (Hillbom et al. 1980). However, entry rates of as high as 90 percent have been found for ethanol (Anthonisen and Crone 1956; Crone 1965), meaning that when ethanol has been injected into the blood, 90 percent of it crosses the blood-brain barrier on one passage through a brain capillary. The implication is that there is no functional barrier to the penetration of ethanol, and most
estimates have placed the equilibration time for ethanol from blood to brain within a very few minutes (Chroscielewski and Pfeiffer 1966; Fischer and Waligren 1957; Hulpien and Cole 1946; Payne et al. 1966).

Ethanol is relatively insoluble in lipids (fats), the major components of cell membranes. Its concentration and distribution in any tissue are therefore proportional only to the water content of that tissue. However, the presence of the attached hydroxyl group causes the ethanol molecule to become positioned at the surface of cell membranes such that one end of the molecule is in association with the fluid which bathes the membrane and the other is in association with the lipids which comprise most of the membrane (see Kalant 1971). In addition to two layers of lipid, membranes contain clusters of protein molecules. These protein molecules are said to be "fluid" in that both their biochemical properties and their relative positions within the lipid part of the membrane are not constant. Changes in these proteins are the major determinants of cellular functioning, and any change of their fluidity would therefore be expected to alter how a cell behaves. As reviewed recently by a panel for the Institute of Medicine (1980), a number of sophisticated techniques have now been used to demonstrate that ethanol "fluidizes" membranes, i.e., increases the potential mobility of some of the proteins (Chin and Goldstein 1977; Jain and Wu 1977; Johnson et al. 1979). Other experiments have shown that this fluidization procedure does in fact alter cellular functioning (Cooper et al. 1978; Hirata et al. 1979; Kalant et al. 1979; Leventhal and Tabakoff in press). The current concept is that the ethanol molecules nonspecifically enter the membrane and become "packed" into its surface, causing the altered functioning (Kwant et al. 1969; Seeman 1966, 1972).

Although the details are not well understood, changes of membrane proteins are thought to enable certain molecules to pass through cell membranes more or less easily at different times and under different circumstances. Such a model assumes that there are variable "pores" in the membrane through which molecules can pass when proteins are in the correct configuration, and the packing of ethanol into the membrane is thought to alter the ease with which these molecules pass through. There are thought to be a finite number of potential packing sites for ethanol in a membrane, such that a sufficiently high concentration of ethanol can cause more permanent disruption of membrane functioning as the saturation point for ethanol is passed (Kalant 1971; Kwant et al. 1969).

To summarize what is known of the nonspecific interaction of ethanol and cell membranes, it is thought that ethanol molecules
enter the surface structure of membranes and thereby change overall membrane fluidity. This in turn is manifest as a change in the properties of certain proteins responsible for the ease of passage of various compounds through the membrane. These changes are thought to cause major alterations of neuronal functioning. Such a model must either assume that all cells are equally affected by ethanol or else that differences in the precise chemical makeup of membranes between cells account for specific effects of the drug upon some tissues.

Behavior can ultimately be analyzed in terms of nerve impulses or action potentials directing the activity of muscles. Nerve impulses occur when nerve cell membranes lower their normal resistance to the passage of certain molecules. Fluidization of the membranes by ethanol presumably interferes with this process. Specifically, nerve action potentials have been reported to have lower amplitude and to be shorter in duration in the presence of ethanol (Armstrong and Binstock 1956; Kalant 1971, 1975; Moore 1966; Moore et al. 1964; Posternak and Mangold 1949; Wright 1947). Likewise the firing rate of individual nerve cells changes under the influence of ethanol (Grupp 1980; Grupp and Perlanski 1979; Kalant 1971, 1975; Newlin et al. 1979; Rogers et al. 1979; Wayner et al. 1975). These alterations of neuronal functioning have been demonstrated in many different species and with many different preparations, and the reader interested in changes in specific brain regions should consult reviews of this topic (e.g., Institute of Medicine 1980; Kalant 1971, 1975).

Neurons communicate with one another at synaptic junctions by releasing stored chemicals or neurotransmitters when nerve impulses occur. If the nerve impulse reaching a synapse has been diminished in amplitude (by ethanol or by any other means), less neurotransmitter is released and the resulting change in the receiving cell is reduced (Eccles 1964). Such a reduced release of specific transmitters by neurons in the brain is in fact one reported action of ethanol (Charmichael and Israel 1975; Erickson and Graham 1973; Kalant and Grose 1967).

While it is clear that ethanol interferes with normal neuronal functioning in a number of ways, the relationship between such interference and consequent changes of behavior is still not well understood. Activation or "disinhibition" of neuronal activity does not necessarily have a direct and parallel influence on an organism's behavior. If the (presumably nonspecific) actions of ethanol outlined above account for disinhibition, other drugs which cause comparable cellular changes would be expected to influence behavior in a similar manner. This is true of the barbiturates and of
various anesthetic drugs such as ether and nitrous oxide (see Institute of Medicine 1980; Kalant 1971, 1975; Myers 1978; Pernanen 1976; Wilson 1977).

It is generally felt that cognitive influences on behavior originate in the cerebral cortex. Disinhibition has been postulated to result from the removal of negative or inhibitory cortical influences, with a consequent release or facilitation of specific behaviors. In this regard, it is pertinent to ask how the cortex might be especially susceptible to the actions of ethanol. Preferential access to the cortex when ethanol is ingested is an unlikely possibility since ethanol is rapidly distributed throughout all of the brain. And, while it is the case that many of the cellular changes associated with ethanol administration have been reported for cortical neurons, virtually every area of the brain has been shown to have altered neuronal functioning of some type or other when ethanol is applied. It is of course possible that the cell membranes of certain cortical neurons are importantly different than those in other brain areas such that these neurons are more or less sensitive to ethanol, but there is no evidence for this at present.

Another potential explanation of disinhibition is based upon a network of nerve cells in the core of the lower brainstem. This network, the reticular activating system or RAS, is thought to be preferentially sensitive to ethanol and other depressants (Himwich and Callison 1972; Kalant 1970, 1975), and it has direct anatomical connections with many areas of the cerebral cortex. One important feature of the RAS is that it is comprised of numerous very short neurons with many synaptic interconnections. Such multisynaptic networks are thought to be particularly susceptible to depressant drugs, perhaps due to a cumulative effect at many individual synapses. There may well be doses of ethanol which therefore exert an effect only at networks such as the RAS.

Because of the nature of its anatomical connections and the results of numerous physiological experiments, the RAS is generally considered to have a major influence over brain and behavioral arousal. Therefore, any drug which selectively influences the RAS might be expected to influence cortical functioning in general and behaviors related to arousal in particular. A number of experiments have shown that ethanol does indeed influence neuronal functioning in the RAS (e.g., Dolce and Decker 1972, 1973). Perhaps more relevant are studies showing that specific RAS input to the cortex is changed under the influence of ethanol (Ciganek 1967; Gross et al. 1966; Lewis et al. 1970; Perrin et al. 1974; Salamy and Williams 1973). Finally, when one uses the electroencephalogram (EEG) as an index of arousal, it is well documented that ethanol has
a biphasic effect, with increased arousal at lower doses and less arousal as the dose is increased (Kalant 1975; Murphree 1973; Pohorecky 1977). Therefore, ethanol-induced changes at the RAS certainly contribute to and may be the major component of cortical changes which account for disinhibition.

**Ethanol as a Specific Drug**

When a compound is recognized by a specific site on a membrane such that a reversible binding occurs, the site is defined as a receptor. Every cell in the body is thought to contain receptors for many different hormones and neurotransmitters and probably to have thousands of each receptor-type over its surface. Such compounds and their receptors comprise the complex system by which information is transferred among the various cells and tissues of the body. The system is complicated by the fact that receptors are constantly changing both in number and in the affinity (or avidity) with which they interact with the specific compound. Compounds which interact with a receptor and trigger a specific reaction within the cell are called agonists. A common example is the neurotransmitter acetylcholine, which is an agonist for receptors on muscle cells. When acetylcholine interacts with "cholinergic" receptors on the surface of the muscle cell, a series of biochemical events begins and the cell ultimately contracts. Compounds which are recognized by and occupy the receptor, but which do not trigger this reaction, are called antagonists because their presence prevents the agonist from being effective. To continue with the same example, the drug curare is an antagonist of the receptor for acetylcholine on muscles. The presence of large amounts of curare therefore prevents acetylcholine from eliciting muscle contraction, and the muscle is paralyzed in its presence.

The concept and theory of receptors were developed to explain the interactions of endogenous compounds (those normally found within the body) with specific cells. Exogenous drugs (those administered to an animal or person) have traditionally been thought to exert their effects via nonspecific mechanisms since it was deemed unlikely that specific receptors would evolve for compounds not occurring naturally in the body. However, a revolution of sorts was initiated in 1975 when it was determined that exogenous opiates (morphine, heroin) interact with a receptor for which there are endogenous opiates or endorphins (Guillemin 1980). One might speculate that any drug which has become widely used socially for its behavioral effects actually interacts with some specific receptor-
type. Such drugs, acting as either agonists or antagonists, could mimic the effects of endogenous compounds, and would be expected to have major effects on the body and behavior. As an example, there is now considerable evidence that mild tranquilizers in the benzodiazepine group interact with specific receptors (Mahler and Okada 1977; Marangor et al. 1978).

If ethanol could be shown to interact specifically with one or more receptor-types, the task of explaining particular behavioral changes due to its administration would become conceptually easier. For example, behavioral differences among different human populations or cultures could be not only explained but predicted, since different genetic pools are known to have differences in the numbers of some receptors (Catt and Dufan 1977; Kahn 1976). Individual differences might also be explained since experiential factors such as prior drug-taking history can have profound effects upon receptor number and affinity (Catt and Dufan 1977; Kahn 1976).

Research on ethanol and receptors has lagged somewhat, perhaps due to prevailing thought and evidence for nonspecific mechanisms. However, several recent reports suggest that ethanol may in fact be an antagonist of the receptor for dopamine (Hruska and Silbergeld 1980; Lai et al. 1979, 1980). Dopamine is one of many neurotransmitters in the brain, and it is found in pathways which are involved with both locomotor activity and emotional behavior (Murphy and Redmond 1975). Further, many pathways coursing through the RAS contain dopamine as their transmitter (Ungerstedt 1971). If these recent reports are replicated and verified, perhaps some of ethanol’s effects will be explainable in terms of reduced dopamine effectiveness. In this regard, it is noteworthy that drugs which mimic dopamine prevent the stimulating effects of low doses of ethanol on locomotion (Carlsson et al. 1974).

If future research supports a role of TIQs in ethanol’s mode of action, this may well be mediated through specific receptors. It is significant that TIQs are currently thought to interact with the ability of normal brain neurotransmitters to act at synapses (Cohen 1977; Institute of Medicine 1980).

**Specificity Versus Nonspecificity**

The issue of specificity of action may be particularly important to an understanding of disinhibition and other selective actions proposed for ethanol. Any model must explain a variety of important characteristics of the drug’s actions, and nonspecific and specific
models of action require alternate accounts of these effects. Any complete description of the influence of ethanol on behavior must specify not only why the drug appears to influence neural systems selectively, but also why individuals and populations react differently to ethanol when it is ingested in similar amounts and situations. If ethanol's effects are based only on nonspecific interaction with neuronal membranes, one must appeal to differences in membrane composition or neural sensitivity, and to social and cultural learning differences, to account for selective effects. By contrast, if ethanol's actions are to be attributed to a receptor-mediated process, then one must rely on receptor population differences among neural systems and individuals to explain the same effects of the drug.

Although reports of an interaction between ethanol and the dopamine receptor are tantalizing and deserve careful attention, several characteristics of the actions of ethanol favor a nonspecific interpretation. First, the observation that other simple molecules (ether, nitrous oxide) cause neural and behavioral changes similar to those induced by ethanol implies a common mechanism, the most likely candidate being nonspecific interaction with cell membranes. Second, the potency of ethanol as a pharmacological agent is much weaker than that of other drugs (e.g., opiates), which are known to have receptor-mediated actions. If some of the effects of ethanol were in fact mediated by receptors, one might expect the dose-response curve for such effects to be displaced to the left (indicating that less drug at the site of action is required to produce biologically significant effects).

**Ethanol and Behavioral Disinhibition**

In our overview of the actions of ethanol, we began at the level of the cell membrane and then progressed to an analysis of neuronal and finally nervous system functioning. We shall now expand this consideration to include evidence for a disinhibitory action of the drug at the behavioral level. While it is clear that much has been learned of the interaction of ethanol with the nervous system, it must be pointed out that we cannot, as yet, bridge the gaps between the aforementioned levels of analysis. By and large, it is still not possible to understand behavior in terms of underlying neuronal activity, and this handicap fetters our attempts to comprehend drug effects. The translation between neural functioning and behavior is much more complex than a simple turning on or off of discrete behavioral or emotional systems; for example, drug-
induced activation or "disinhibition" at the level of the nerve cell cannot be related directly to changes in an organism's behavior.

Considerable research using laboratory animals has produced substantial information and insight relevant to the possible disinhibitory effects of ethanol. While it is clear that at high enough doses ethanol depresses any and all behaviors, it has also become evident that for some behaviors, ethanol has a biphasic effect, enhancing behavior at low doses and degrading performance at higher doses (Pohorecky 1977). In this instance the practical advantage of using large numbers of animal subjects has made scientists acutely aware of the need to assess the effects of ethanol (and other drugs) at a range of doses or blood levels. Studies which show an activating effect of low doses of ethanol (Goldman and Docter 1966; Holloway and Wansley 1973) or a biphasic action of the drug (Edwards and Eckerman 1979; Friedman et al. 1980; Holloway and Wansley 1973; Mason et al. 1979; Weitz 1974) do not directly support the disinhibition hypothesis, but rather serve as warning that a general activation caused by ethanol could be misinterpreted as disinhibition. Here again it is important to note a parallel between ethanol and other CNS depressants, such as the gaseous anesthetics, which also may produce some degree of behavioral excitation at low blood levels.

With regard to the possible stimulating effects of low levels of such agents, it should be noted that ethanol administration elicits an increase in the blood of cortisol (Noble 1973; Ylikahri et al. 1978), an arousal or stress hormone. Epinephrine (adrenalin) (Perman 1958a) and norepinephrine (Davis et al. 1967), other arousal hormones, are probably also elevated in the blood (Perman 1958a), perhaps due to increases in plasma acetaldehyde (Akabane et al. 1964; Perman 1958b). It is noteworthy that Schachter (Schachter and Singer 1962) found that when he injected epinephrine into humans, there was an increased likelihood of inducing heightened emotional responses; and he was among the first to show that the probability of obtaining these emotional responses depended heavily upon the cognitive and environmental setting of the individual (Schachter 1964; Schachter and Singer 1962). To summarize several points, low doses of ethanol induce changes in the brain associated with a more aroused state, cause nonspecific enhancement of a number of behaviors, and are associated with elevations of arousal hormones.

It is possible that ethanol might have both general arousing actions and a specific disinhibitory effect on behavior, and there is some evidence that this is indeed the case. To support the hypothesis that ethanol selectively disinhibits certain forms of behavior, the
burden on investigators is to show that the drug can increase the frequency or intensity of such behaviors, and that this increase is specific, i.e., not merely resulting from a general activation of all behavior. Animals studies which support the disinhibition hypothesis may be loosely classified into two types, conflict studies and studies of aggressive behavior. Under the rubric of conflict studies, one may include any paradigm in which competing response tendencies are aroused and presumed to control behavior. Such paradigms include avoidance-avoidance, and approach-avoidance conflicts, passive avoidance tasks, shuttle-avoidance tasks, and certain discrimination procedures. In all of these situations, behavior is governed by the interaction of opposing tendencies to respond and to withhold responding. In such studies (Chesher 1974; Holloway 1972; Holloway and Vardiman 1971; Holloway and Wansley 1973; Mansfield 1979; Mansfield et al. 1977) ethanol has been reported to produce changes in behavior consistent with a weakening of inhibitory tendencies. Importantly, these effects have been demonstrated in situations where the same dose of ethanol has little or no effect on behaviors that do not involve conflicting tendencies.

Studies of aggressive behavior in animals have provided important contributions to our understanding of the actions of ethanol. One particularly pertinent set of data comes from experiments reporting that increased aggression (attacking and biting other animals) occurs only in certain situations, such as in novel environments, where such behavior is normally suppressed (Lagerspetz and Ekqvist 1978; Miczek and O'Donnell 1980). Here enhanced aggression appears to be a selective effect of the drug rather than due to general arousal. An additional benefit of these studies is that they have allowed careful analysis of the effect of ethanol when separately administered to the aggressor or the victim. At least one study has indicated that, when given low doses of ethanol, subordinate rodents are more likely to be attacked or injured by dominant animals (Miczek and Barry 1977); a finding which may have important implications for human aggressive situations.

Ethanol and Disinhibition of Human Behaviors

Of ultimate concern to many is the possibility that ethanol specifically disinhibits otherwise restrained behavior in humans. Elevations of the frequency or magnitude of certain forms of aggressive or sexual activities would be a major result of such disinhibition,
and we shall briefly consider each of these, beginning with sexual behavior. The interested reader is referred to an excellent critical review of this area by Wilson (1977).

There is no doubt that the incidence of rape, sexual assault, and certain kinds of deviant sexual behaviors is correlated with ethanol consumption. While it has been pointed out previously, it bears repeating that the problem of assessing causality in such situations is difficult indeed. For obvious reasons, one cannot observe the influence of ethanol on such human behaviors in a controlled experimental situation; further, appropriate animal models are not available. The closest experimental approach to this problem is one in which ethanol is administered to humans, accompanied by measurement of variables thought to correlate with sexual arousal and behavior. Various forms of verbal report of sexual arousal have been used in the past; however, there is much current interest in the physiological measures of change of penile diameter for men (Abel and Blanchard 1976), and changes of vaginal blood volume or pressure pulse for women (Hoon et al. 1976). While it is apparent that ethanol influences these physiological measures, an important and unresolved issue is whether these measures of arousal are linked with tendencies to behave in an assaultive or deviant manner.

In typical studies involving these measures, ethanol has been administered prior to the presentation of erotic stimuli (generally short films involving heterotypic or homotypic partners). With few exceptions, the results of such studies are in agreement in showing that sexual arousal (measured physiologically) is inversely related to blood-ethanol levels (Briddell and Wilson 1976; Farkas and Rosen 1976; Wilson and Lawson 1976a,b). Consistent with these findings is the observation that reproductive hormones are also decreased by ethanol. This is true both of luteinizing hormone (LH), a gonadotropin from the pituitary, and of the gonadal steroid, testosterone (Cicero et al. 1979; Ellingboe and Varanelli 1979; Mendelson et al. 1977, 1978). One might conclude that whatever changes of behavior occur that are labelled as disinhibited, do so in spite of these physical indices that sexual arousal is lessened by the drug. An intriguing possibility is that ethanol may cause a primary reduction of testosterone from the gonads, a deficit which then feeds back to the brain to cause a surge of LH (Mendelson and Mello 1979). A sudden buildup of LH is thought to cause an increase of sexual arousal (LaFerla et al. 1978). On the other hand, when subjective reports of arousal are simultaneously obtained, they do not always correlate well with measured physiological changes, so the significance of these studies is still not clear. A further compli-
cation, as reviewed briefly in the next section, is that cognitive expectancies have been found to be at least as important as the actual consumption of ethanol in some of the studies measuring sexual arousal (Briddell et al. 1978; Wilson and Lawson 1976a; Wilson et al. 1978).

Regarding aggressive behaviors, there are also studies indicating a significant correlation between incidence and ethanol consumption, and similar problems of measurement and determination of causality exist. Although indices of human aggressive behavior in experimental situations have been found to be elevated after ethanol in some of these studies (e.g., Lang et al. 1975), expectancies appear also to contribute importantly to this variable. Marlatt (1979; Marlatt and Rohsenow 1980) has outlined three mechanisms that have been offered to account for the effects of ethanol on aggressive tendencies: (1) a general physiological arousal induced by the drug, (2) a specific disinhibitory action on socially restrained aggressive behaviors, and (3) cognitive processes, involving expectancies or attribution. In light of the available physiological, behavioral, and social data, it may be an error to attempt to direct our attentions solely to one of the above mechanisms.

**Expectancies and Disinhibition**

An interesting dimension has been added to research on ethanol by the development of the anticipation or expectancy contingency by Marlatt and his colleagues (Marlatt and Rohsenow 1980). Several studies have now indicated that when humans expect to receive ethanol, they are likely to have elevated indices of aggression and sexual arousal, even if they do not actually receive the drug (Briddell et al. 1978; Lang et al. 1975; Wilson and Lawson 1976a; Wilson et al. 1978). Individuals who ingest ethanol when believing it to be a placebo solution may fail to show such behavioral changes. The implication is that under certain conditions, cognitive anticipation accounts for more of the variance of behavior than does the drug itself. Clearly more research should be focused on these cognitive variables and their interaction with the pharmacological properties of ethanol.

One potential drawback to experiments which involve active manipulation of expectancies concerning the ingestion of ethanol is that relatively small amounts of the drug are employed (in order to maintain the deception). While it has been argued that the blood-ethanol levels attained are typical of social drinking situations, it is
not clear whether these levels are typical of situations which result in violence or sexual assault, nor do we yet know how such cognitive factors influence behavior at higher blood-drug levels.

Expectancy effects have been interpreted in terms of a conditioning or learning model. The implication is that when ethanol is initially consumed, there are (unconditioned) pharmacological effects which might actually disinhibit behavior. Additional experience with ethanol nurtures a conditioned response, or an anticipation of these behavioral effects, and during subsequent episodes of drinking these expectancies may combine or interact with the actual pharmacological effects of the drug. Attempts to demonstrate these expectancy effects in ethanol-naive subjects would shed light on this issue. There is evidence that expectancy effects are greatest for those behaviors which are under the greatest degree of cognitive influence (Marlatt and Rohsenow 1980). Accordingly, simple reflexes and locomotor tasks would be relatively uninfluenced by expectation of ethanol, whereas, learned, or aggressive, or sexually related tasks are profoundly influenced. Therefore it would not appear reasonable at present to abandon the search for an underlying pharmacological effect of ethanol; rather, we should proceed with the realization that an interaction with cognitive variables may confound the results.

We have found it useful to imagine a continuum along which behaviors are placed according to the degree to which they are influenced by cognitive variables. It seems likely that the variability of these behaviors (in terms of the form taken as well as the amplitude) would increase in proportion to the degree of cognitive influence; i.e., whereas the knee-jerk reflex varies little in either form or amplitude, responses to threatening or erotic stimuli presumably usually vary a great deal. For those behaviors which are socially undesirable, the cognitive influence is predominantly inhibitory, and the effect of such inhibition is to reduce normal variability by eliminating or suppressing certain responses.

One can now speculate freely as to how ethanol interacts with this model. For one thing, it is known that at low doses ethanol may induce generalized activation and that at higher doses it depresses most behavior. Average levels of behavior may therefore increase slightly in the presence of low amounts of ethanol and decrease as blood-drug levels rise; however, the variability associated with different behaviors may remain unchanged. The net result of such an effect would be an increase in the frequency or intensity of deviant behaviors, resulting from generalized activation associated with low to moderate doses. Conversely, it may be that responses that are normally inhibited are the first to be enhanced. If so,
perhaps the effect of ethanol is merely to replace previously suppressed responses into the repertoire, thus producing a specific disinhibiting effect. Certainly the interactions of behavior, ethanol, and cognitive influences can be easily conceptualized with such a model. It may also serve some value in directing and interpreting research, as the pharmacological and cognitive influences attending consumption of ethanol would be expected to have disparate contributions, depending upon the behavior observed.

References


Brown, Z.W.; Amit, Z.; and Smith, B. Behavioral and Neural Biology, in press.


PHYSIOLOGICAL AND BEHAVIORAL LINKS


Grupp, L. Biphasic action of ethanol on single units of the dorsal hippocampus and the relationship to the cortical EEG. Psychopharmacology, 70: 95-103, 1980.


Mendelson, J.H.; Mello, N.K.; and Ellingboe, J. Effects of acute alcohol intake on


STEPHEN WOODS: One of the key questions I tried to address is how can we account for disinhibition or any other behavior that occurs when we drink. Is it simply the result of the whole brain becoming marinated in alcohol and none of the nerve cells functioning correctly? The very term "disinhibition" implies a mechanism based somehow on the cerebral cortex — this fantastic part of our brain which is supposed to control all of our higher mental functioning; it's thought somehow to be inhibiting certain tendencies that we might have, and perhaps alcohol somehow releases this inhibition. That's what the term disinhibition implies. The problem is that alcohol is not known to interfere selectively with the cerebral cortex. If nerve cells in the cerebral cortex were particularly sensitive to alcohol, then you might have a good model for understanding a behavior such as disinhibition. So even though it might be desirable if you were studying disinhibition to find that the cerebral cortex was particularly sensitive, it turns out that it isn't. On the other hand, there is a part of the brain called the Reticular Activating System, which is known to be especially sensitive to alcohol. When alcohol levels are going up, this part of the brain is one of the first to be affected. There's something different or unique about the nerve cells in this Reticular Activating System, which forms a core deep inside the brain. The Reticular Activating System communicates directly with all areas of the cerebral cortex, and in fact is known to be the major influence on the state of arousal of the cortex.

In this system, then, we have an area of the brain which is uniquely sensitive to alcohol; which does directly communicate with the cerebral cortex; and which, in fact, controls it, at least as regards arousal.

Finally, I want to say a few words about animal research and some of the lessons which we've learned from that with regard to disinhibition. Most of the research has been done on rats and mice. Some research has been done on monkeys. As in humans, when you do studies carefully, you can find a biphasic effect of alcohol on level of arousal. Low doses of alcohol increase arousal; high doses of alcohol decrease arousal. You can show this in a number of ways. For example, you can show it behaviorally, or you can show it by
measuring levels of arousal hormones in the blood. All of these things are changed in the presence of alcohol.

Animal research has yielded a surprising result which may be very important for this conference on disinhibition: Suppose you take animals and train them not to make certain responses; i.e., you put them in an avoidance situation where they're punished if they make these responses; you then put them in a discrimination situation where they have a choice of making the formerly punished (now inhibited) response or some other response. Now you give them alcohol. Studies have shown that those responses which are already inhibited in some way are the first to be affected or influenced by alcohol. All behaviors are influenced, but there's a lot of evidence for selective influence on responses which animals have learned not to make. This may be the closest to an animal model of human disinhibition we have. I don't know, but it's certainly worth contemplating.

Finally, in mice, if you give them alcohol, there's an increased tendency for one mouse to attack and bite another mouse. It's been shown in several experiments. This certainly would seem to be an animal analog of something akin to disinhibition. The one thing which I find most interesting about this research has to do with the subordinate mouse, the mouse which is attacked. The research in which this has been done has found that if you give alcohol to the subordinate mouse, this has at least as much effect in causing aggression as when you give it to the dominant mouse. An inebriated subordinate mouse is far more likely to be attacked than a sober subordinate mouse. And it doesn't matter whether the attacking mouse is drunk or not. So, I expect that has implications for human behavior. I haven't worked it all out in my mind, but I'm sure it will provide some kind of food for discussion later in the conference.

Finally, let's summarize what's known of the effects of ethanol on reproductive physiology, since aberrant sexual behavior is often considered to be a part of disinhibition. In animals and in people, if you measure the levels of reproductive-related hormones, they go down in the presence of alcohol in a linear kind of fashion. This is true of hormones from the pituitary, and it's true of testosterone, a hormone from the testes. If you measure physiological indices of sexual arousal, these are also reduced in the presence of alcohol. So, any theory based upon some release of reproductive activity based on alcohol has got to take this into account, and you have to say that it's occurring in spite of physiological indices, that the system is suppressed, not excited.
I don't think that there are any easy answers in relating any of this to human disinhibition, but I hope that I may have sparked some interest or at least some areas for discussion throughout the conference. Thank you.

ROBIN ROOM: Thanks very much, Dr. Woods.

The commentator, Juha Partanen, is from the Social Research Institute of Alcohol Studies in Helsinki, which operates in association with the Finnish Foundation of Alcohol Studies.

Juha is, I think, unusual in really stretching between several of the worlds that are here. He's known in the alcohol literature, among other things, for a twin study done a number of years ago on possible genetic factors in alcohol problems (Partanen et al. 1966). He's taken a strong interest in areas beyond social studies while maintaining his basis in social studies.
Commentary

Juha Partanen

Toward a Theory of Intoxication

First, I must say that I am not a physiologist but a social scientist. In commenting on Professor Wood’s paper, I shall have very little to say about alcohol’s pharmacological effects on single cells, neural activity, or the functioning of the neural system. Some of the problems have been quite unequivocally presented to us by Professor Woods. It is certainly noteworthy that there is, as yet, no way to bridge the gaps between different levels of analysis, and that “it is still not possible to understand behavior in terms of underlying neuronal activity.” Some of us may wonder whether this ever will be possible. To employ a simple analogy, understanding the way airplane engines work can tell very little about my trip to this conference.

Professor Woods has drawn our attention, in particular, to the cognitive context, to the role of expectancies which may, under certain conditions, affect human behavior under the influence of alcohol more than the drug itself. Thus it seems that there is really no reason to start arguing in the present occasion about the relative merits of various disciplines. The crucial problem of bridging the gaps not only between the physiological and psychological theories, but also between individual-centered and sociological theories, however, remains. The present occasion appears to be most propitious to turn to the basic conceptual issues about the determination of alcohol’s psychological and behavioral effects.

Existing literature on alcohol effects provides a bewildering array of viewpoints, findings, and conflicting results. Although there has been some cumulation of research effort, the prevailing picture is still one of fragmentation across disciplines, research traditions, and methodological approaches. The essential problem, in my opinion, is not as much the discrepancy or contradictoriness of findings—it seems in fact that quite cordial relationships exist between different disciplines in alcohol research—as the multiplicit-
ity of and the lack of conceptual interfaces. This is testimony to the theoretical poverty of research which is carried out in terms of applied notions borrowed from most diverse theoretical traditions (cf. Everett et al. 1976, pp.8-9). What seems to be missing is a theoretically articulated view on the object of research, alcohol intoxication.

Most of the research on the effects of alcohol has been traditionally carried out within the "toxicological paradigm," striving for the maximal control of experimental conditions. A dose of alcohol is conceived as a stimulus causing specific responses in the nervous system, which in turn lead to changes in overt behavior. In order to account for variations in individual responses, the conditioning effects of set and setting have to be invoked. This paradigm has been adopted not only in physiological research but in the behavioral sciences as well. And when a few common-sense psychological postulates about human behavior are appended—individual striving toward pleasurable states or trying to avoid unpleasant states—psychological theories about the reasons and motivations for drinking are obtained, eventually purporting to explain observed variations in alcohol use.

The second main alternative is the standard anthropological view on drinking as a culturally defined and normatively controlled social phenomenon. Starting from Bunzel's classical account (1940), anthropologists working in alcohol research have been able to show how drinking practices and "drunken comportment," even down to seemingly insignificant details, follow culturally prescribed patterns; they have made efforts to show how this behavior corresponds to the nature of basic social relationships in a given society.

My uneasiness with the anthropological approach stems partly from its difficulties in dealing with individual variations of behavior, deviance, and transgressions of norms. It would also seem that the specific features of drinking as a social phenomenon are usually lost sight of; the arguments are such as to be applicable to any social practice. Furthermore, I have the impression (but here I may be wrong) that the anthropological approach is somewhat inadequate to deal with the very actual situations in our world, where new patterns are emerging, traditional norms are losing their binding force upon people, and where society is groping for new ways to cope with alcohol.

My dissatisfaction with the toxicological model is more profound. It arises not only from the quite extreme observed individual and cultural variation in alcohol's effects, from the difficulty of obtain-
ing stable, generalizable results, nor from the frequent discrepancy between the physiological measures and subjective reports on intoxication. Of course, it can never be proved that it is a false model since it is always possible to appeal to the modifying influences of set and setting. One may argue, however, that it is a conceptually inadequate model, concentrating solely on alcohol's effects upon the individual. The basic, most fundamental effect of alcohol or any other psychoactive drug, it may be claimed, is to modify the relationship between an individual and his external environment. Alcohol transforms the way a person looks at the world, the way he relates to it through his activities, the way others perceive him, and relate to him. Therefore, in order to understand what takes place in intoxication, we have to deal with some basic notions about the relationship between an individual and his environment.

Two Levels of Man's Psychic Activity

When considering man's relationship to the external world in its most general terms, I can see no feasible alternative to the materialistic position that this relationship is ultimately based on work, that is, material transformation of the environment in cooperation with other persons. Man's life does not, of course, consist of work only; yet it may be claimed that all the specifically human forms of life bear its mark: conscious, goal-oriented action, conceptual thought, human language as a means of communication within and between generations, emergence of societies, and the development of individual personality. Continuing differentiation of all these aspects has taken place under the conditions created by the developing division of labor.

For the analysis of how this fundamental dependence on work is reflected in the structure and development of human psychic life, the conceptual framework of the "psychology of activity," as presented by Leontyev (1973, 1975), seems most appropriate. Human activities are conceived as hierarchically organized wholes. An activity consists of inner motives (needs), of acts with their specific external goals, obtaining their psychological significance from the motives they realize, and of operations through which the acts are performed. The relationships between these three levels are not fixed. An act, for example, may become tied to a new motive, so that its psychological significance changes. An external goal may acquire independent motivational force, or an act may become routinized into an operation, or conversely, under unfamiliar circumstances a conscious act may be needed for the performance of a
previously routine operation. The essential advantage of this scheme, compared with stimulus-response explanations of human behavior, is that it permits the analysis of the relationships between the external and internal aspects of human activity. Inner motives find their realization in external acts. Conversely, in the course of socialization social values are interiorized and transformed into the motives of individual activity. External determinants and functional necessities of social life are thus transformed into psychological forces which constitute the structure of individual personality, characterized by its specific hierarchy of motives. All these processes take place through human activity. In modifying their environment, humans also modify themselves.

The above notions focus on the specifically human forms of conscious goal-oriented action. This perspective does not make explicit the role of unconscious mental processes, nor does it deal with the phylogenetic links between human and animal mental life. Emphasis on consciousness has dominated Western psychology ever since Descartes; those recesses of the mind not reached by conscious introspection have most often been relegated to the realm of purely material, physiological processes. Yet, this theoretically fateful dualism notwithstanding, lingering suspicions that consciousness is not all there is in the human mind have persisted. Philosophical and psychological notions about unconscious psychological processes possess in fact a respectable pedigree in Western intellectual history. They range from Leibnitz's "petites perceptions" and Kant's "dunkle Vorstellungen" to the 19th century German philosophy and emerging psychology (Herbart, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, von Hartman, von Helmholtz). They figure importantly in Piaget's work on the inner mechanisms of cognitive development. And, of course, there was Freud.

In order to characterize very briefly the role of unconscious psychic processes, I shall refer to the notions presented by Uznadze (1966). According to him, the prerequisite for all psychological phenomena is the active relationship of a living organism to its environment. This relationship consists of both the organism's needs and the external determinants of the situation. In its most primitive form, psychic activity assumes the shape of a psychological set, in which the need and the situation meet. A primary set creates in the organism an unconscious psychic preparation for activity. If similar experiences are repeated, a primary set is converted into a relatively stable fixed set, consisting of a predisposition to a specific behavior. These processes, based on the immediate experience, take place without the mediation of consciousness, in animals as well as in the human mind.
In the human mind, there is a constant interplay between conscious and unconscious levels of psychic activity. In the first place, unconscious set-controlled activities may give rise to conscious activity through objectivization, through which the relevant aspects of the situation obtain their representation in consciousness and the need is transformed into the will to act. This is bound to happen in those situations where the regular flow of activity on the basis of a fixed set is interrupted by a change of environment, and the set no more adequately corresponds to the circumstances. Objectivization is a genuinely human phenomenon, the genetic origin of human consciousness.

Second, recurrent activities give rise to specific sets; these accompany all human activity, stabilizing it and regulating its course. In accordance with a three-level hierarchical structure of activities it makes sense to distinguish between motive sets, goal sets, and operational sets, each conceived as activity dispositions or schemas which facilitate the realization of the corresponding components of activity (Asmolov 1979).

Third, we have to take into account the facts established by Freud about the capability of the human mind to repress from the sphere of consciousness painful experiences and its own unresolved contradictions, and to push them into the unconscious niches of the mind, yet to be unable thereby to get rid of their motivating force. Early socialization experiences undoubtedly possess a strategic significance in molding the motive structure of an individual; on the other hand, there seems to be no reason to deny the reality of contradictions which stem from the repressiveness of everyday adult life. The repressed motives are often seen as stemming directly from the biological nature of man. Without denying the physiological reality of our existence, it can be said, though, that our biological constitution normally seems highly capable of accommodating most various social determinations of motives, providing the necessary material support for their realization in action, but not determining their systemic properties. All in all, unconscious psychic activities would seem to play quite a significant part in human psychology, either preceding conscious processes, coexisting with them, or resulting from their repression. And the forms in which they become revealed in overt activity are truly multifarious.

**Intoxication as a Psychological State**

Employing the concepts presented above, I shall now propose a definition of intoxication as a particular psychological state: It is a
state in which psychic activities are governed by unconscious sets; a state resulting from the weakening of objectivization as a consequence of alcohol's pharmacological actions on the human brain. This means that those psychological processes and behaviors whose activation depends on consciously perceived goals assume a subordinated position under intoxication. The behavior of an intoxicated individual, which is based on unconscious sets, is activated by either external or internal impulses, producing patterns of impulsive and habitual behavior.

Let us briefly review some of the evidence supporting this definition (for a fuller treatment, cf. Määtänan and Koski-Jannes 1981). In the first place, there is some, albeit still inconclusive, experimental data obtained by the classical technique of Uznadze. In this experimental setup, an operational set is first fixed when a subject repeats 10 to 20 times a simple task, say, of weighing two balls of unequal weight. The existence of the set is then revealed by the presence of perceptual illusions, when two balls of equal weight are presented to the subject, until the effect gradually wears off and the set is extinguished. We have shown that small doses of alcohol (approximately .05 percent BAC) significantly increase the durability of a fixed set in comparison with the placebo condition for the same subject, and the results also seem to indicate that the fixation of a new set becomes more difficult under the influence of alcohol (Vahvelainen 1979).

Further evidence may be obtained by reconsidering and occasionally rethinking published results on alcohol's psychological effects. Ever since the early review by Jellinek and McFarland (1940), there seems to have been a consensus that simple and habitual tasks are less affected by alcohol than complex or unfamiliar ones. Deteriorating effects of alcohol on performance can be partly compensated for by practice and experience with alcohol use. In the light of our hypothesis, and habitual tasks are precisely those which are performed on the basis of fixed unconscious sets, whereas the complexity or the unfamiliarity of a task calls for the objectivization of the situation. Especially suggestive are the results about alcohol's deteriorating effects on performances requiring selective attention and the strengthening of repetitive and perseverative tendencies in cognition under its influence. As to alcohol's effects on memory, available data seem to indicate that the recognition of familiar stimuli, associated with the fixed sets of an individual, does not deteriorate or deteriorates less than recall of memorized material. Immediate (iconic) memory appears to be less affected by alcohol than short-term memory.
The social-psychological experiments, in which the effects of modeling on drinking behavior have been studied by Marlatt and other researchers, would seem to present yet another aspect that is characteristic of behavior controlled by unconscious sets, viz., its dependence on external impulses. According to a number of studies, an individual using alcohol in social drinking contexts reacts in a highly sensitive manner to the cues provided by the drinking company. Modeling influences may both increase and decrease consumption, although there seems to be an asymmetry in favor of a consumption increase. Other factors, such as the individual's drinking history and the majority behavior, may modify these relationships.

All these indications of the weakening of objectivization and the dominance of unconscious set-controlled processes under the influence of alcohol would obviously call for an examination of the results of neurophysiological research as well. Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to carry out this task. In passing, though, it may be noted that what Professor Woods said about the sensitivity of the reticular activating system (RAS) to the actions of alcohol fits nicely with the above psychological considerations, bearing in mind the role of the RAS in arousal and its connections with the regulatory systems in the frontal lobe (cf. Luria 1973, p. 86).

But there are other questions that come to mind: for example, taking cognizance of the functional lateralization of the human brain, whether alcohol has differential effects upon the neural processes carried out by the two hemispheres of the brain.

Finally, it would seem that some of the ambiguities and inconsistencies that are attached to the several well-known theories on drinking motives might be resolved by assuming that intoxication makes room for the subjective experience and symbolic projection of central life motives of people living in a given society. These motives, ultimately determined by the structural conditions of social life, find their expression not only in people's material activities but also become constitutive elements of their unconscious psychic life. Intoxication may be regarded as one possible way to apprehend these motives in direct subjective experience and project them into symbolic form. There is ample anthropological and historical data to show that motivational structures vary between societies and historical epochs. Thus, although Horton's hypothesis on anxiety reduction by drinking; Barry's, Bacon's, and Child's views of drinking as a means to alleviate dependency conflicts; the complacent seeking of sociability by Cambas, which Heath suggested to be the secret of their peculiar drinking customs; or the personal power motive stressed by McClelland, as well as a host of
other postulated motives, point to at least partly divergent motivational bases for drinking, all these explanations can be encompassed by our general hypothesis. The contrasting explanations of male and female drinking motivations presented, respectively, by McClelland and Wilsnack, provide a particularly clear-cut case. For both sexes, intoxication appears to signify a reversion toward the more traditional, often interiorized in childhood, role stereotypes. This would seem to exclude the possibility of establishing any substantive general theories about the motives of drinking.

In summary, it is perhaps not too much to state that our hypothesis about the weakening of objectivization and the dominance of set-controlled psychic activities in the state of alcohol intoxication possesses some plausibility, and it provides a basis for an integration of findings about alcohol's effects. But on the other hand, the theoretical implications of the hypothesis certainly require a further look.

The first implication, to put it somewhat paradoxically, is that there are no specific motives for seeking intoxication. Although I shall argue later on that drinking as a human activity is associated with the most diverse social practices, which thereby leave their mark on the activity structure of drinking, here it is important to stress that what people are basically seeking when intoxicating themselves is what they are seeking in life generally. Intoxication gives them direct access to the experience, to the illusory realization of their own life motives, without the clumsy interference of external goal-oriented action. This "transparency of intoxication" illuminates a certain creative aspect of intoxication, a feeling of liberation, which is not alien to artistic experience, or which allows intoxication to serve as the substitute of the latter, as "a poor man's opera."

Speaking of motives the way I have is of course highly ambiguous, and it is bound to create misunderstandings. The term itself, unfortunately, is hopelessly laden theoretically, but there seems to be no feasible alternative to its use. One ambiguity deserving comment is this: Motives possess, as it were, a double character. On the one hand, they exist socially, being related to the structural determinants of the society's life. In the spirit of Lacan's notions about the unconscious, we may say that they resemble language, even though it seems that they can be expressed in words and concepts only with great trouble, resorting to artistic and philosophical efforts which try to grasp their semiotic content and value through the symbolic projections in which the motives reveal themselves. On the other hand, motives belong to individuals. These, in the course of their socialization, cannot help appropriating social meanings and
values, furnishing them with a "personal significance," transforming them into the components of their personality and realizing them in their action.

Now it is a plausible hypothesis that a shift toward the communality of motives occurs under intoxication. The weakening of objectivization also means the weakening of an individual's control over his psychic life. That which is common and stereotypic in a culture moves to the foreground. One is even tempted to speculate about the presence of certain near-universal motives finding their expression in intoxication. Although societies differ from each other, certain profound affinities exist among them. Most of mankind has always lived under the vagaries of nature and under oppressive power relationships. Overcoming scarcity and separation from fellow men, as well as striving to establish oneself as a free subject, could be postulated as near-universal motives of human life, thus giving some credence to universalizing theories about drinking motives.

From all this two general inferences may be made. Our view on the nature of intoxication is not alcohol-specific at all, and it focuses solely on human intoxication. Some may object to this. Admittedly, there are good reasons to bring in aspects that specifically relate to the use of alcohol as a source of intoxication, such as the well-known biphasic effect of alcohol. On the other hand, I am not worried about the lack of contact with the so-called animal models. The whole approach is far too much based on pharmacological determinism, and the ideology of generalizing from it into human behavior is dubious. Experimentation with animals, of course, clarifies the role of various neural mechanisms through which the psychological state of intoxication becomes realized, but this approach is incapable of grasping the essence of human intoxication.

In order to overcome the tendency to ascribe to a drug effects which in fact belong to set and setting, or "the fetishism of drugs" as it has been called, concepts are needed in terms of which drug affects can be linked to other, related social phenomena. In earlier following this line of thought I have made efforts to link alcohol intoxication to the effects of psychoactive drugs in general, to religious experiences, and to the peculiar way in which people enjoy mass entertainment (Partanen 1973, 1977, 1979). The common core in all of this is deformation of human activity. The structure of activity was discussed above in terms of three levels, viz., motives, acts with their external goals, and operations. The weakening of objectivization means, generally speaking, that the 'middle' level of acts, oriented toward external goals, recedes to a secondary position in the structure of activity. What remains are inner motives, turn-
ing into objects of direct experience or contemplation, and operations which, when divorced from connections to acts, turn into rituals. Those psychological states which are characterized by lessened objectivization and the dominance of unconscious psychic sets thus consist of contemplation and symbolic projection of inner motives and of ritual behavior patterns. There are instances in which the negation of goal-oriented action becomes quite explicit, such as mystical experiences. Their salient phenomenological features, the achievement of total unity, the disappearance of the barriers between self and object, intense feeling of communitas as "a seamless, skinless continuity," transcendence of time and space, coincidentia oppositorum and the vanishing of the rules of normal logic, the ineffability of the mystic vision, the "perceptual innocence" and the "stunning immediacy of sense data," as these features have been summarized by Myerhoff (1975), may all be conceived of as direct negations of the various aspects of goal-oriented action.

Drinking as a Human Activity and a Social Practice

Up to now I have been dealing with intoxication as a psychological state. It would seem that this is indeed the focal aspect when we examine the effects of a drug which is ingested primarily because of its mind-altering properties. But this aspect alone by no means exhausts our topic. Analyzing intoxication as a psychological state reveals, it may be hoped, the essence of what lies hidden behind the diverse phenomena of observable drinking behavior. At the same time, intoxication is always related to and results from certain human activities and social practices, which also leave their mark upon the effects of alcohol. In order to understand these we have to study drinking as a human activity and social practice.

The first thing to be noted is that drinking and the behavior associated with it are everywhere under social control, in one form or another. Exceptions which might come to mind are really only apparent. Social control is to be understood here in a wide sense, encompassing far more than official norms and sanctions (cf. Zinberg and Harding 1979). Sheer limitations of availability, technological or economic, may restrict drinking. As Maloff et al. (1979) have recently shown, various informal controls, such as cultural recipes, sumptuary rules, sanctions enforcing conventions and norms of alcohol use, as well as the very shaping of everyday social relations and the spacing of drinking occasions, exert their influ-
ence on the individual, often in subtle and unobtrusive ways. Certain controls have been truly interiorized by most people. All these mechanisms of control are firmly embedded into the substance of drinking practices. In linguistics a distinction between regulative and constitutive rules has been made; the latter are such that performance outside the rules becomes unintelligible, just as the game of chess does not exist without its rules. It would seem that much of the control of drinking is constitutive in this sense.

It can be argued that the ubiquity of drinking controls has deep functional significance for the life of society. Overindulgence in drink might endanger the production of the material conditions of life. As a psychological state intoxication turns away from a practical relationship with the world. Drinking thus necessarily remains a marginal activity in the life of the individual and society, having social control as its necessary counterpart. Drinking marks "time out" periods and breaks in activity, as MacAndrew and Edgerton have stressed in their well-known book (1969); it becomes anchored to leisure and passage rites. It can assume a major role only in the lives of marginal individuals, or in marginal societies which have lost their mainstays for a full existence.

Referring again to the three levels of human activity, it can be said that the essential tension between intoxication and its social control is managed at the level of acts and goals, by the shaping of drinking practices. The motivational base of intoxication is generated, as we have claimed, by the main motives in individual and social life, but these materialize into action in the most diverse ways. Drinking becomes attached to social relationships, it acquires various social meanings and use values, and it is operationalized by rituals. Briefly, drinking is a part of a way of life. As such, it is interiorized by individuals through their social learning.

The divergence of different levels accounts for certain persisting difficulties that have been met when analyzing drinking behavior. It seems to be accepted wisdom that the effects of alcohol are unpredictable and highly variable. Expectancies may explain them equally or even better than the amount of alcohol actually ingested, since they are equally capable of yielding access to the direct experience of motives. The so-called pseudointoxication, observed by many anthropologists, is an eloquent testimony to this, and conversely, interiorized normative controls may spoil all the delights of drinking, as it has been noted in a number of experimental situations (cf. Lindman 1980, p. 89). The relationships between motives and conscious goals remain vague, giving no firm foothold for a theoretically consistent analysis of survey data. The explana-
tions people are able to furnish for the reasons for their drinking are usually vapid and somehow unconvincing.

Facing these difficulties, social alcohol research, it seems, has stopped short in its theoretical analysis of drinking, producing endless descriptive accounts and piles of sociological data, resorting to the tenets of theoretically vacuous cultural relativism. This is not an adequate response to pharmacological determinism. Mere reference to variable cultural patterns does not explain certain general aspects of drinking practices.

Consider, in particular, the inherent normativity of drinking. This does not refer only to social control of drinking and its consequence, which we just discussed. Norms and sanctions seem to work in favor of intoxication, too, keeping up the rhythm of drinking by reciprocity, excluding outsiders, requiring that behavior transgress its normal limits, often lending group drinking a quality of compulsiveness. The ritualism of intoxication and the sensitivity of intoxicated behavior to interpersonal cues, as noted above, serve as partial explanations. But it would seem that, in addition, out of the tension between intoxication and its social control emerge "mechanisms of defense" which protect the experience of intoxication. This resembles the way in which, within the sphere of religion, sacred things are separated from the profane world. Drinking deals, after all, with humanly important things, its incapability of changing the world notwithstanding.

Nowhere is the tension between intoxication and control more evident than in addiction. I shall here only touch upon the concept of addiction, leaving its applicability to real world open. On this ideal plane, addiction can be defined as an individual effort to overcome control of drinking by drinking. This leads to a process in which the whole motivational structure of the addict gradually changes (cf. Bratus' 1964). The concept of addiction reflects, as Levine has shown (1979), the new historical dimensions of interiorized social control and individual freedom emerging in the era of industrial capitalism.

The most fundamental aspect of drinking has not yet been mentioned, that is, its inherent sociality. It is certainly striking that, as Marshall puts it, "solitary, addictive, pathological drinking behavior does not occur to any significant extent in small-scale, traditional, pre-industrial societies" (Marshall 1979, p. 451). Even in our present-day world, where people are supposedly imprisoned within their separate, atomized private lives, they very seldom drink alone, most preferring the company of relatives and friends. This is shown by survey results from several countries. At the institutional
level, the sociality of drinking is revealed by the ubiquity of drinking institutions and their role as centers of community life.

The inherent sociality of drinking can be elucidated in terms of its various aspects which have been delineated above. We have referred to the existence of the social control of intoxication, carried out through rituals and enhanced by the sensitivity of intoxicated behavior to interpersonal influences. We have also suggested that a shift toward more communal motives takes place in intoxication. But perhaps this is not yet all. Group behavior is a very basic aspect of man's existence, and there is definitely something forced in the efforts to explain collective action and group behavior solely in terms of individual motives or utilities. In philosophical anthropology there is a recognition of a diffuse, primordial sociability of man, variously referred to as a capability of empathy to other person's feelings and intentions, and of adopting the other person's perspective. This kind of shared unconscious set would appear to be a basic prerequisite for human cooperation and communication. Consequently, it would also bring its motivational force into the experience of intoxication.

The Link Between Alcohol and Disinhibition

Relying on the foregoing considerations, I will now sketch some answers to the question about the possible link between alcohol and disinhibition. Is there something in the effects of alcohol which is bound to lead to behavior not governed by its normal restraints? In our world, this is usually taken to mean behavior giving expression to aggression and sexual impulses. Since the foregoing analysis primarily dealt with the conceptual elucidation of intoxication and drinking, the answers here can only point to logical possibilities.

It would seem, in fact, that the effects of alcohol do in fact imply the possibility of disinhibited behavior, even though this would by no means be a universal feature of drunken comportment. There are four remarks to be made:

1. The sociality of drinking, its character as a group activity, tends to bring people together. This adds to the risk of confrontations between individuals. Accepted wisdom in police work suggests that judicious patrolling of public places may have an effect on the prevalence of crime (Makela, oral communication).

2. The sensitivity of intoxicated behavior to situational cues and the yielding of the conscious control of behavior to the regulation by unconscious psychic sets carries the risk of less predictable relationships with the environment. Cues may be misinterpreted, intentions misunderstood, and this, through an escalative process, may lead to violent behavior (cf. Pernanen 1976, p. 416).
3. The weakening of the conscious control of behavior suggests that interiorized normative controls of drinking behaviors may give way to the pressures of group drinking. Coming from a historically transitional country where there still exist inner-directed personalities alongside the newer tendencies toward narcissist, anchorless personality development, I do feel that this is not an empty possibility. Accepted wisdom in alcohol studies seems to indicate that internal controls for drinking behavior are never quite as solid as external controls, deriving their compulsion from everyday social relationships.

4. The most decisive determinants of intoxicated behavior, however, would appear to be related to the motivational base of intoxication. Access to the direct experience of central life motives is, in my view, the essence of intoxication as a psychological state. The personal significance of intoxication depends on what these motives are. In our world, unfortunately, these motives are shaped by insecurity and competition between individuals. There are ample grounds for pent-up frustrations, for needs of personal power, as well as for the search of intimacy. These socially determined motives cannot but leave their mark on drinking behavior.

References

Bunzel, R. The role of alcoholism in two Central American cultures. *Psychiatry, 3*: 361-387, 1940.


Discussion

ROOM: The floor's open for discussion.

CINDY EHLERS: I wanted to congratulate the speakers on their clear talks, particularly Steve Woods on making a large topic very concise, and I wanted to muddy the waters just a little bit for discussion purposes.

One of the things you mentioned was that everywhere we look in the different levels of organization of the nervous system, you can see alcohol causing disruption in nervous processes. And coming from a neurobiology center, I want to say, for the people who aren't working in neural sciences, that it's really not as easy to look at the effects of alcohol on the different levels of the nervous system as it is to look at drugs that have very specific effects, such as phenobarbital or barbiturates or anesthetics. For instance, you give people phenobarbital and people go to sleep. With alcohol, you see a much wider spectrum of physiological and behavioral activities in response to the drug, which obviously this conference is interested in looking at, particularly as it relates to disinhibition.

In fact, one of the actions of alcohol on the central nervous system may be to increase the variance instead of the mean. Also, the differences in doses administered to animals may predict very different effects. So, I just wanted to say that on the neurophysiological level, you have the same kind of difficulty in measuring consistent effects as you do on the behavioral level. And in that sense, I think there is a commonality between what we see on the level of brain function and what we see in terms of behavior.

WOODS: I agree wholeheartedly with what you say. I think it would be a mistake to think that somehow studying things neurophysiologically would lead to cleaner results or a better understanding. The same problems exist there, but at different levels.

CHARLES WINICK: I don't know that it is really true that alcohol has a much less predictable range of effects than other substances. If you take an analogous situation — the opiates, which have probably been studied more extensively than other mood-modifying substances — in fact, there's an enormous range of effects; there's a great difficulty in predictability; there's an enormous impact of social setting; degree of use; length of use; age and so

57
forth. You might have two surgeons, both of whom took opiates regularly, one of whom is able to do three or four operations a day with no effect on his ability to perform, another of whom would collapse after taking the same amount of opiates. So it may be misleading to assume that alcohol necessarily has a much lesser degree of predictability than other related substances.

ALAN MARLATT: Just a question about the biphasic response itself. Do you have any ideas about the physiological underpinnings of the possible compensatory responses like Siegel (1981) has outlined for opiates for some other mechanisms?

WOODS: I don't. It seems there are a lot of theories in the literature as to what might account for the biphasic activities of alcohol. It may be that certain species of neurons become affected first, and that these neurons are those which tend to be suppressing behavior or certain forms of behavior.

I think it's universally accepted that even small amounts of alcohol cause the release of arousal hormones. And studies that have nothing to do with alcohol show that if you cause an elevation of arousal hormones experimentally, you're going to get arousal in the animal, and it may be some kind of an artifact where you've got a period where arousal hormones are high but the brain has not yet become depressed.

RON ROIZEN: I wanted to ask Steve Woods if it's the case that the pharmacologists think alcohol causes disinhibition, or do we just think the pharmacologists think alcohol causes disinhibition?

WOODS: Not being a pharmacologist, I can't answer specifically. I read a lot of papers in reviewing for this talk, and I don't think I've read any author or interpreted any author to believe that alcohol causes disinhibition. I think that the closest some of them would come would be to say that it's a vehicle which lends itself to the expression of certain kinds of behavior. I really don't think anybody believes that alcohol causes the behavior in that sense or elicits the behavior.

ALAN LANG: I think many people believe that, but most aren't pharmacologists. They are people who use that explanation because it makes sense to them, not because it's based on any knowledge of the underlying processes.

HERBERT FINGARETTE: I've been thinking about your very tentative suggestions to the effect that there is some evidence that alcohol tends to reduce the strength of the avoidance pattern, at least in animals, and there are some remarks in your paper, too, that finally suggest, very tentatively and speculatively, that maybe this somehow bears on the disinhibition idea that maybe our avoidance of bad things, or somehow our capacity to do so or our will to do so, is weakened as a result.
But, I wonder, would you agree that this is one of those cases where as soon as you take into account the different levels that we're talking about, these suggestions lose most of their former plausibility. What I'm thinking of specifically is that an animal's learned avoidance of a particular action pattern is so enormously different from my avoidance of doing something. My avoidance has grown out of who knows how many innumerable learnings of avoidance, of attraction, of cognitively mediated situations of learning; so that when we use the word "avoidance" on the human level we're talking in moral terms about the moral scheme: the will or the conscience. It is so distant and so complicatedly connected to avoidance in the neurophysiological sense or even the learned conditioned sense, that perhaps even as speculation it loses its plausibility.

WOODS: I think that you've brought up a point which is central to much of experimental psychology. I think that anybody who studies learning, for example, at any level, and wants to model it with animals, immediately comes into this problem of simplicity in the animal situation versus complexity in the human situation. And there's no easy answer to it.

You're absolutely right. The problem of translation from one level to the other is obvious. I think that all that one can do is either to assume that one is simply a subset of the other; that the simple animal learning situation somehow is analogous but at a much smaller level or a much different level from complex human learning; or perhaps, we could experiment with humans, teaching them simple responses in the laboratory, looking at the effect of alcohol on these, seeing if you get comparable results — perhaps trying to build a continuum in that way. But, you're right that this is a major problem in trying to step from animal research to human behavior.

FINGARETTE: In a way, what I'm suggesting is that it's not only a matter of complication; the word may be the same word, but it may have quite a different meaning.

WOODS: I agree.

HARRY LEVINE: I think one of the great unsung heroes of alcohol research was a graduate student named Eugene Stainbrook, who came to the Social Research Group a few years ago. Years before, he had begun what he thought would be an easy doctoral dissertation, replicating an experiment about the effects of alcohol on rats, to have them be disinhibited. Gene worked for two years trying to get his rats to be disinhibited, but no matter what he did, he could never get the rats to be disinhibited. He kept going back and trying until he finally decided that he was just a failure and gave up on it and went on to do some other things. I always tried
to get him to write it up, but I don't think he ever did. There are probably dozens of experiments like that. I wanted to ask about the current state of the rat and animal-model literature on disinhibition. Is there substantial literature, in fact, on it?

WOODS: I think it isn't substantial. The co-author of my paper, Dr. Guy Mansfield, is one of the contributors to that literature, who has done work on disinhibition and alcohol research. Maybe he'd like to comment.

GUY MANSFIELD: The literature that I'm most familiar with is concerned with the effect of alcohol on conflict behavior. A number of years ago there was a great deal of interest in the what's been called the "tension reduction model" of the effects of alcohol: How alcohol reduces one's fears or tensions or anxieties — which in many ways comes very close to the idea of disinhibition we've been talking about.

In a review of many studies of that area, Cappell and Herman (1972) concluded that there was in fact relatively little support for a tension reduction model of the effects of alcohol except in a limited area, and that was in conflict studies and in those types of paradigms which, I think, Steve Woods already described: You have an animal such as a rat who has been trained, for example, both to avoid and to approach a goal area. We get a general impression from looking at conflict studies that, in fact, alcohol does result in a tendency for animals to perform responses which, under what's called "controlled conditions," they would not do. The animals would approach more closely to a feared area. These conflict studies are not without their problems, but the general impression I get is that they do in fact support what might loosely be described as a "disinhibitory effect" of the drug. That's the area that I'm familiar with.

I wanted to make a further comment on the difficulty in translating between animal work in the laboratory and human studies. I think an exact parallel can be made between our interest in human behavior in the external environment and our studies of human behavior in the lab. To call one behavior aggression in the laboratory environment and one behavior aggression in talking about human behavior in the outside environment, we have just as many conceptual problems as in bridging the gap between animal and human behavior.

CRAIG MACANDREW: I believe that to say that the problem of generalizing from a rat to the human is roughly equivalent to that of generalizing from the human in the laboratory to the human in the world misses Fingarette's point, which is that what is at issue in the animal-to-human generalization is a qualitative difference rather than a quantitative one.
MAC MARSHALL: I'd like to come back to the subordinate mouse that you talked about. I wanted to find out whether I was correct in my understanding that the subordinate mouse, on becoming drunk, was more likely to be bitten by the dominant mouse, regardless of the inebriated state or lack thereof in the dominant mouse? If so, doesn't that just tell us something about dominance hierarchies rather than disinhibition or anything like that? Unless, of course, the drunk subordinate was baiting the dominant mouse or something.

WOODS: You did understand it correctly, and it may be that this is more a statement of dominant/subordinate hierarchies. But I believe that in Kai Pernanen's review (1976) a few years ago, he pointed out that in instances of violence and disinhibition among humans outside the lab there's a high probability that both individuals had been consuming alcohol. There may be a link.

MARSHALL: But, the point that's basic here is that the aggression is coming from the potentially non-drunk mouse in this instance.

WOODS: Not the aggression, necessarily. There's some difference between a mouse which has had alcohol and a mouse which hasn't which makes it more likely that another mouse will attack it.

LANG: Well, it doesn't seem too remarkable. I mean, drunks get rolled more frequently than —

MARSHALL: Good point.

EHLERS: There's also evidence from use of other drugs. Particularly, Sassenrath (Chapman et al. 1979) has a study on the effects of THC or marijuana in monkey social groups, where animals that were given the THC rose in the social dominance hierarchy and appeared to show more aggression. In fact when it was analyzed, they were putting out inappropriate social cues which were looked at by the other monkeys as representing aggression. So maybe the drunk mouse shows an inappropriate social cue and thus allows the other to attack it.

WOODS: I think that's a better explanation.

DENNIS LUM: There is another theoretical or conceptual problem raised both by the commentary and by the paper, and that is the extent to which both of you feel that the studies on disinhibition really enhance our perception of the validity of the Freudian theoretical model. Have we now turned full circle and come back to the id? That is to say, we're not going to study adaptation any more; we're going to study the id? Just take a drink and lo and behold the gorilla appears?

ROOM: Juha, do you want to tackle that?
PARTANEN: Well, one thing to be said is that, at least in my view, the unconscious is a wider concept than what Freud had in mind. This is really essential. And, of course, this whole disinhibition/alcohol link approach would require ideological analysis. There are very strong ideological underpinnings.

KAI PERNANEN: I was also intrigued by the possibility that intoxication somehow induces the projection, I think Freud would call it, of the unconscious or subconscious motives — life motives, I think he calls them. I think this ties in with the disinhibition concept as it is used in psychoanalysis. I wonder, are there any studies, empirical studies, which would be relevant to this concept? It seems like a researchable question.

PARTANEN: It is possible to study experimentally very simple forms of unconscious psychic activity, but there seems to be no way to get into the real motivations of the people. That's always a problem in laboratory, too. There's no guarantee that people are really possessed by those motives that the experimenter assumes his subjects have.
Drinking and Disinhibition: Contributions From Psychological Research*

Alan R. Lang

Introduction

There can be little doubt that acute alcohol consumption by humans often is accompanied by behavioral changes in the consumers. This is a matter of simple observation. Research directed at a descriptive and explanatory analysis of the association, however, is quite another matter. Here one must struggle with issues of reliability, prediction, causation, generality, etc. Suddenly, the problem becomes enormously complex, and nowhere is this complexity more apparent than in the specific connection between drinking and disinhibition. “Drinking,” as used here, refers to the act of consuming beverages believed by the consumer and those around him to contain alcohol. This distinction between drinking and the actual imbibing of alcohol is made to highlight the importance of beliefs, as opposed to pharmacologic action, in determining the effects of drinking on behavior in general, and on disinhibition in particular. The reader also should be apprised that in the context of this paper the word “disinhibition” is used only in the descriptive sense, i.e., in reference to individuals' exhibition of behaviors which are at variance with the norms and values ordinarily governing their actions. This restriction is employed to avoid ambiguities inevitably associated with the term's multiple meanings.

Considering that alcohol is unquestionably a powerful drug, one approach to uncovering its relation to behavior is through exploration of its physiological effects. This, of course, is the tradition of biomedical science, whose contributions seem essential to a complete understanding of the problem. However, excessive reliance on

---

*The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Paul Barnes in assembling and critically evaluating materials for this presentation.
this model can impede our understanding of drinking-related phenomena by fostering a neglect of other important variables. It can be argued, e.g., that behavior is the primary concern in the drinking-behavior nexus, not only because we are most interested in behavioral consequences of drinking, but also because drinking itself is a behavior. This suggests that constructive alternatives to the biological model should be sought in the psychological and social sciences. A perusal of the alcohol literature of the past several decades makes it evident that such approaches have indeed come of age. Historically, psychologists have stressed characteristics of the person as determinants of behavior, whereas the social science emphasis has been on group influence. Social psychology has accommodated both by studying interactions. Certainly, these features of the drinking-behavior relation are on a par with those of physiology. The time appears right for a profitable wedding of the bio-psycho-social models into a multidisciplinary approach to human problems. This has increasingly become the case in modern medicine (cf. Engel 1977), and the present conference is an indication that the trend is spreading.

While acknowledging that a comprehensive theory of drinking and disinhibition requires consideration of agent (alcohol), host (man), and environment (social-situational context), few individuals or disciplines can claim expertise in all these areas. Most must be content to supply some pieces of the puzzle. The object of this paper is to outline some contributions from psychology. Partly because psychology is a discipline heavily invested in controlled experimentation, one of the things it has to offer is methodology for the precise specification of drinking as the independent variable in drinking-disinhibition research. Thus, ways of determining whether alcohol per se is causally related to the behavior of drinkers are discussed. The major thrust is a review of studies employing a “balanced-placebo” design (Marlatt and Rohsenow 1980) to permit both separate and interactive examination of psychological and pharmacological effects of drinking on behavior. While the emphasis is on disinhibited expression of aggressive, sexual, and other behavior with direct and important social implications, an accounting of the effects of drinking on other behaviors is given when it may be of some explanatory value. Another area in which psychology can make a major contribution is in determining how certain nonpathological individual differences might influence both beliefs about drinking and its actual effects. In this arena such variables as gender and drinking experience figure most prominently. Finally, an effort at integrating the findings of psy-
chological research into the broad theories of drinking and disinhibition is made.

Before proceeding, it is perhaps appropriate to issue some caveats about possible weaknesses of the psychological approach. First, and probably foremost, one should be reminded that experiments are inevitably artificial by virtue of their control of many factors which are free to vary in the natural environment. This may limit generalizability and lead to faulty conclusions if one excludes variables which are conditional to or interactive with drinking in determining behavior. Of particular interest in this regard are many aspects of the situation which are seldom systematically varied in experiments, but are often called upon to explain null or counterintuitive results. Of course, the experiment itself also constitutes a powerful situation whose influences are difficult to determine. Finally, the relevance and generalizability of operationalizations of dependent variables in experiments are often suspect. It is unclear, e.g., how willingness to deliver more intense electric shocks or to view certain photographic slides longer relate to the aggression or sexual interest they are intended to measure. At best they represent only indicators of the construct under investigation, and should be weighted as such. Despite these limitations, however, it appears that experimental social and clinical psychology have a contribution to make. Let us examine it.

Drinking: The Independent Variable

At first glance, manipulation of the drinking variable in drinking-behavior experiments seems straightforward: One just administers the alcohol and observes the behavior of interest. However, closer analysis reveals that it is not such a simple matter. At least two sets of factors must be carefully attended to if relatively unambiguous conclusions are to be drawn. These are the exact nature (including quantitative and qualitative aspects) of alcohol administration, and the subjects' beliefs or expectancies about the nature of what they are receiving. These issues are discussed briefly below. For a more comprehensive coverage of methodological considerations, see Rohsenow and Marlatt (in press).

Alcohol Administration

A number of factors related to alcohol administration have been shown to mediate its effect on human behavior. Probably the most crucial of these is blood alcohol level (BAL), an index of the number of grams of absolute alcohol in each 100 ml of whole blood,
expressed as a percentage. Different doses of alcohol, of course, result in different BALs which, in turn, are considered responsible for the physiological and simple behavioral effects (and perhaps consequently some of the psychological and social effects) of the drug. Besides the dosage factor, BAL also varies as a function of the body weight and percent body fat in a subject, the presence or absence of impediments to alcohol absorption (e.g., food in the stomach), the individual's metabolism rate, etc. These variables must be considered in studies of alcohol's effect, particularly if they are likely to vary systematically across subjects. Obviously, a direct assessment of BAL is essential for adequate control.

Assuming that one can arrive at a specific BAL in the experimental subjects, the question then becomes at what level will the effects on behavior be tested. It often is assumed that BAL is linearly related to physiological and behavioral responses to alcohol. However, there is considerable evidence (see Mello [1968] for a review) that the pharmacological action of alcohol is biphasic. Specifically, it acts as a stimulant at low BALs (up to about 0.04 percent, or about two drinks in an hour for an average-sized person), with its depressant effects evident only at higher concentrations. This means that one must be concerned with the "phase" a given BAL is likely to place a subject in, since physiologic arousal may have different implications for the behavior under study than would depression of nervous system activity. One also must attend to the practical significance of the alcohol level studied. If, for example, one is exploring the effects of a 0.02 percent BAL on aggression when crime statistics show a 0.15 percent BAL or above is common in most crimes of violence, then extrapolation of the results could be compromised. Moreover, extremely high BALs would be expected to produce a decrease in all behavior, disinhibited or otherwise, because of a simple lack of physical capacity. The point is that BALs should be carefully selected for their relevance and measured directly to ensure proper control. Ideally, the effects of several BALs would be tested in the same experiment.

While specific BAL is always critical to the study of drinking-behavior effects, it is also important how that level was reached and how long it has been maintained. Rapid ascent to a particular BAL has been shown to result in greater behavioral impairment than slower rises to the same level (Jones and Vega 1973). In a similar vein, Jones and Vega (1972) have demonstrated that cognitive performance suffers more on the ascending than on the descending limb of the BAL curve, even at exactly the same concentrations. Factors of time also are important modifiers of BAL effects on behavior. Jones (1974) showed that the same BAL resulted in
greater impairment in subjects tested early in the day, compared to those studied at night. Furthermore, prolonged maintenance of certain BALs could be responsible for many of the behavioral effects of alcohol in the natural environment, though this factor is seldom studied in the laboratory. One exception is the "experimental drinking study" (see Mello [1972] for a review) in which alcoholics' behavior while intoxicated is observed over a period of days or even weeks. Several such studies suggest that adverse effects of alcohol on affective states, e.g., do not begin immediately upon drinking, but instead may take a considerable time to develop. The implication is that the duration of intoxication experienced by nonalcoholic experimental subjects (or at least how long they are in the lab) prior to testing the behavior of interest could be extended.

A final methodological point pertinent to actual alcohol administration is the type of preparation used. Obviously, if one is concerned exclusively with the specific effect of alcohol, then pure ethanol should be given. More often, however, investigators have attempted to establish a general effect of common alcoholic beverages on behavior. Consequently, there is a problem of selecting the beverage for use. Beer, wine, and distilled spirits differ not only in alcoholic content, but also in their congener content (presence of substances or "impurities" other than alcohol). Even among subtypes of the general categories of beverage (e.g., vodka vs. bourbon), congener levels differ. This introduces the possibility that studies of the behavioral effects of one type of beverage might reveal effects due to congeners rather than, or in addition to, those of alcohol. Some research which has systematically varied congener content (e.g., work by Teger and Associates [1969] on risk-taking; or by Taylor and Gammon [1975] on aggression) suggests just that. In addition, however, it should be noted that a systematic difference in user preferences for the beverages or in the sociocultural meanings users associate with the beverages could also account for the effects which the investigators chose to assign to congener content. In any event, the importance of beverage selection and the limits it may place on generalization should not be ignored.

Expectancy

While the "active" ingredients in alcohol administrations undoubtedly have effects on human behavior, it is clear that their role is not so all-important as once was thought. Indeed, reviews of the contemporary literature on alcohol and human behavior (e.g., Mello and Mendelson 1978) are illustrative of the growing awareness that a multiplicity of variables might influence how drinking
affects the way people act. Besides situational factors, perhaps the single most important determinant of the behavioral consequences of drinking is what subjects believe or expect its effects to be. These often are referred to as expectancies and are considered to be responsible for “self-fulfilling prophecies” and other nonpharmacological effects observed in studies of psychoactive substances.

Alcohol and other drug researchers have long been cognizant of the potential power of people's beliefs to confound pharmacological evaluations, and consequently they have taken steps to control for expectancy effects. One such method is the “single-blind” procedure in which some subjects are given a placebo (an inert or inactive substance) while others receive the active substance whose effects are actually under investigation. The expectations of subjects in both conditions are held constant by providing them with the same information about what they have taken. Most often the information given has been that all received the active substance, although some researchers (e.g., Carpenter 1968) have suggested that the alternative instruction that all substances are inert might be better. He argued for this “anti-placebo” set to ensure that drug effects could be observed independent of the belief that drugs were being taken. Instructions also could be given that one might receive either a placebo or an active substance. This last method has ethical advantages (it reflects reality), but may lead subjects to engage in a guessing game which in itself could confound results. In any case, the single-blind method represents an advance over the simple observation of changes in people given a particular drug.

More sophisticated researchers have refined the single-blind procedure by incorporating it into a “double-blind.” This method keeps both the subjects and the experimenters unaware of the actual treatment being applied to each individual until all the data are in. The object is to prevent experimenters from exerting any intended or unintended influence which might bias the study's outcome (cf. Rosenthal 1969). The ultimate result of the well-implemented blind procedure is as follows: It permits the researcher to attribute any difference in the behavior of active condition and placebo condition subjects to the effects of the substance, at least as these effects combined with whatever uniform instructional set was applied. The problems are obvious. Substance effects have not been isolated from expectancies, but only associated with a particular one. Moreover, the possibility that expectancies alone might exert a powerful influence on behavior has been left unexplored. What is needed for a complete analysis is a design which orthogonally manipulates both actual substances and expectancies in the same experiment. Fortunately, a “balanced placebo” design has been developed which can do just that.
Original credit for the balanced placebo design, although they did not label it as such, probably belongs to Ross and his colleagues (Ross et al. 1962), who applied the method in drug research. They realized that a clear separation of expectancy or psychological effects from substance or pharmacological effects requires the independent manipulation of instructions given to subjects (expect either active substance or placebo) and the actual substance administered (receive either active substance or placebo). The result was a 2 x 2 factorial design in which the four possible combinations of expectation and substance were represented: expect drug/receive drug (active condition), expect drug/receive no drug (placebo), expect no drug/receive no drug (control), and expect no drug/receive drug (anti-placebo). A problem encountered when one tries to apply this method to alcohol and behavior research is in finding a way to maintain the face validity of the drinking while adequately disguising the taste of alcohol so that the critical “expect no alcohol/receive alcohol” condition does not fail. Through extensive pilot testing, Marlatt and Associates (1973) discovered that subjects

Figure 1. The Balanced Placebo Design

### ACTUAL BEVERAGE CONTENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alcohol</th>
<th>No Alcohol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTIVE</strong> (Vodka and Tonic)</td>
<td><strong>PLACEBO</strong> (Tonic only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANTI-PLACEBO</strong> (Vodka and Tonic)</td>
<td><strong>CONTROL</strong> (Tonic only)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mix = 1 part vodka to 6 parts tonic water
tasting a one-to-five mix of vodka and tonic could not distinguish it from tonic alone at a better than chance rate. The substance seemed ideal for balanced placebo studies of how drinking influences behavior. In fact, although “near beer” and beer and some other combinations of placebo and active substances have been used, the tonic and vodka-tonic drinks are still employed in most studies. (See figure 1)

Marlatt et al. (1973) initially applied a variate of the balanced placebo design to investigate “loss of control” drinking in alcoholics. They presented subjects with a bogus taste-rating task and then instructed them that the beverages they sampled were either vodka and tonic or tonic only. Actual beverage contents were systematically varied to be either congruent or discrepant with the instructional set. The dramatic finding was the alcoholics drank far more when they thought their beverage contained alcohol, regardless of its actual contents. This seriously challenged disease model conceptualizations of alcoholism which hold that alcoholics' difficulties in controlling their drinking stem from a physiologically mediated loss of control “triggered” by the introduction of alcohol into the body. Clearly, the study’s results were at variance with such an interpretation because it was subjects’ expectancies that seemed to be the crucial determinant of their drinking. Realizing the implications of this expectancy effect, it was not long before investigators began to apply the balanced placebo design as an independent variable to see whether claims of alcohol’s physiologic effects on the disinhibited behaviors of nonalcoholic drinkers might also have been in error, or at least exaggerated. Before turning to a review of the critical studies in this area, it might be instructive to describe exactly how the balanced placebo design is applied to alcohol-behavior research.

Introduction and informed consent. Having been previously instructed to abstain from food or drugs for at least 4 hours before reporting to the lab, subjects are given a detailed consent form upon their arrival. It outlines the experimental procedures and indicates that, by signing, they are volunteering for a study of the effects of drinking on behavior. The form states that as part of their participation subjects will be consuming some beverages which may contain alcohol. Exclusionary criteria such as medical problems, drinking-related problems (e.g., DWI arrests), and minimal drinking experience are part of the consent form. Identifications are checked to ensure that subjects are of legal drinking age. The expectancy of each subject at this point is that he or she may receive an alcoholic beverage.

Expectancy and alcohol manipulation. An assistant responsible
for the drinking phase of the experiment is then introduced. This individual emphasizes the importance of keeping the experimenter "blind" as to whether or not the particular subject receives alcoholic drinks (to prevent experimenter's biasing or influencing the subject based on this knowledge). The assistant further explains that to maintain strict experimental control, condition assignments (alcoholic or nonalcoholic drinks) are made on a random basis. To create the illusion of a chance assignment, the assistant introduces a "rigged" binary outcome choice procedure (e.g., a coin toss). Although it is alleged that the outcome of this procedure determines the treatment applied, actually these decisions all have been made in advance according to standard randomization methods. In any case, the subject now has a specific expectancy about the type of beverage he or she will receive.

After an initial BAL test (to be sure that all subjects begin with a zero reading), actual beverage preparation and administration take place. A typical procedure using tonic and vodka-tonic drinks might be carried out as follows. The assistant consults a previously prepared and pretested dosage chart to determine what volume of 1:5 mix of vodka and tonic would be required for a person of the subject's weight to reach the desired BAL in about 1 hour. Then, the assistant takes a tray containing commercial vodka bottles, tonic bottles, graduated beakers, and tumblers from a refrigerator. All beverage preparation occurs in full view of the subject to enhance the expectancy already created by the condition assignment procedure. In expect-alcohol conditions, the assistant pours one-sixth of the total volume required from the vodka bottle into the graduated beaker, appearing to measure it carefully, and then distributes it in equal proportions in the tumblers. An analogous procedure is followed in pouring and distributing five-sixths of the total required volume from the tonic bottles. A squirt of lime juice may be added to each tumbler to further mask the taste. In the expect-tonic conditions, the same method is employed except that the total volume used is poured from tonic bottles only. Thus, expectancies about beverage contents are maintained.

In order to incorporate actual alcohol (vodka into some drinks but not others) independent of the expectancy manipulation, premixing is used. In other words, for the subjects who actually receive alcohol, all the bottles they see already contain the appropriate mixture of vodka and tonic. For receive-tonic subjects, both the tonic and the vodka bottles they see contain only tonic. In all cases, tonic used in the vodka bottles is decarbonated to make it appear more like vodka. This premixing of liquids according to actual beverage condition, but pouring from "legitimate" bottles accord-
ing to expected beverage condition, not only enhances deceptions where necessary, but helps to ensure precise control of beverage contents. In any event, the beverage mixing is followed by a consumption period and then a waiting period which permits time for the desired BAL to be reached. The length of time allowed for each of these periods will vary depending on the volume being consumed and the researcher's specific interest in the effects of rapid versus slow rising BALs, ascending versus descending BALs, etc. Whatever the interest, it is usually best to focus the subject's attention externally (watch TV, read paper, converse, etc.) to minimize introspection and possible sensitization to internal cues. BAL measures at several points in the experiment also are recommended to ensure proper control. Some investigators have used BAL tests as opportunities to bolster expectancies by offering feedback to subjects consistent with their expectancy condition.

Manipulation checks and debriefing. Because the procedure outlined above necessarily involves some deception of subjects, it is essential to examine the efficacy of the drinking manipulations. This is ordinarily carried out after the behaviors of interest have been measured to avoid possible reactive effects on the dependent variables. Questionnaires and/or interviews can be used to ask subjects how intoxicated they felt and how many ounces of beverage alcohol they thought they had consumed. A general assessment of awareness of any deceptions in the experiment may also be included. Thorough debriefing follows and includes explanation of the experiment's purpose, the need for the particular procedures used, and the revelation of any deceptions employed in the case of the particular subject. Those individuals actually receiving some alcohol are detained until their BALs have declined to the point where safety is in no way compromised.

Drinking and Human Behavior: Balanced Placebo Studies of Disinhibition

As suggested in the introduction, acute alcohol consumption is commonly believed to affect a wide range of human responses and behaviors. At the micro-level, there are physiological reactions to alcohol which represent unconditioned responses, including efforts of the body to combat the drug's disruption of homeostatic levels of functioning. Other changes include largely quantitative fluctuations (usually decrements) in the performance of mundane sensor-
imotor and cognitive tasks such as walking and remembering. Like physiological symptoms, these alterations in performance generally are reliable across equally experienced (alcohol tolerant) individuals in any context, given a specific BAL. More “socially significant” correlates of drinking (cf. Orcutt 1975), however, can be highly variable both across and within individuals and contexts. These can include internal or experiential changes (e.g., altered mood) and more external or interpersonal changes (e.g., altered sociability). Such socially significant changes might be expected to be less dependent on the direct pharmacologic action of alcohol, and their lack of consistency supports this prediction. Instead, cognitive expectancies developed through social learning experiences (associative learning, differential reinforcement, and limitation) should play a greater role in determining these drinking-related behaviors. In addition to psychological factors, the physical and social-situational contexts of drinking could have powerful independent, conditional, or interactive effects on the relation of drinking to socially significant outcomes.

In recent years, the balanced placebo design has been applied to research on the drinking-behavior nexus in an effort to separate the physiologic effects of alcohol from the host of other factors which might help to determine why drinking is so often associated with many important human behaviors. The review that follows, although far from exhaustive, highlights the critical studies published in this area. Special consideration is given to the topics of aggression, sexuality, and sociability since these are the behaviors which first come to mind when one thinks of disinhibition. Coverage of other behaviors having less direct social impact is not as comprehensive. To date, there has been a relative neglect of contextual variables in even the best experiments on drinking and behavior. Instead, the focus has been on simple expectancy effects, with occasional attempts to elucidate the role of individual differences and of processes underlying the effects. It is hoped that the future will bring a broader perspective.

Aggression

Introduction. Geen (1976) has defined aggression as “the delivery of a noxious stimulus by one organism to another with the intent thereby to harm and with some expectation that the stimulus will reach its target and have its intended effect.” The convolutions and qualifications of such a definition should help explain the semantic nightmares of aggression researchers. Perhaps most problematic is the concept of “intent” which Buss (1961) and other early authori-
ties had rejected for its lack of adequate behavioral referents. Nevertheless, the inference of intent often seems necessary if one wishes to distinguish crimes from accidents, e.g., since both may involve the delivery of noxious stimuli by one person to another (cf. Aarens et al. 1977). Thus, for the present purpose, Geen's definition will be accepted. It implies that aggression may take many forms: verbal and physical, direct and indirect, and so on. Excluded, however, are behaviors and experiences which could facilitate aggression or have other connections with it, but do not in themselves qualify as aggressive. These might include certain moods, fantasies, or behaviors with aggressive connotations. Only brief mention will be made of them.

One form of aggression is criminal violence of the sort one sees in assaults and homicides, and many (e.g., Shupe 1954; Wolfgang and Strohm 1956) have noted that these behavioral events are often associated with alcohol. This observation has raised the question of a possible causal link between drinking and disinhibited displays of aggression, and since psychological experimentation is an important means of investigating causation in human behavior, it should not be surprising that a number of studies have been carried out. Pernanen (1976) has provided an extensive review of this research for the period up to 1975. Clearly, the principal theoretical bias guiding the studies he cited, as well as most conducted since then, has been a physiological one. The common assumption is that alcohol facilitates aggression through its direct pharmacological action. One theory is that it "energizes" or "triggers" aggressive organisms through brain biochemistry (cf. Mark and Ervin 1970). Other approaches argue that drinking "releases" presumably innate or provoked aggressive impulses ordinarily under the control of higher brain centers by anesthetizing those centers. The latter explanation has been more widely espoused (see, e.g., Chafetz and Demone 1962), but both approaches are dependent on direct, though largely unverified, physiological effects of alcohol.

Less popular theoretical positions favor a social learning interpretation of the drinking and aggression relation. They argue that the cultural norms regarding the behaviors to be exhibited by inebriates are learned and may be specific to one's personal characteristics (e.g., sex, race, SES, etc.) as well as vary with context (e.g., physical setting or social situation). A particularly important aspect of social learning might be that drinking provides a "time out" from the rules normally governing social behavior (MacAndrew and Edgerton 1969). Moreover, an especially reinforcing aspect of this freedom from restraint is that alcohol provides an excuse for extraordinary actions taken while drunk—a means of
“deviance disavowal” (McCaghy 1968). Let us examine some of the pertinent evidence.

**Experiments.** Boyatzis (1974, 1975) is a proponent of alcohol’s energizing effect on aggression, a theory developed partly from the observations of McClelland et al. (1972) that drinking led men to experience increased needs (as measured by TAT responses) for expression of power and dominance over others. Boyatzis analyzed videotapes of nonalcoholic men drinking either alcoholic beverages or soft drinks at separate 4-hour “experimental parties” he set up. Ratings of these tapes suggested that men at the alcohol parties exhibited more aggression (mostly verbal) than those at the nonalcohol parties, and that aggression in the alcohol consumers seemed to increase as a function of how much they drank. Moreover, it was found that a prior history of aggressiveness and heavy drinking, coupled with personality test scores showing “inadequate social integration,” seemed to predispose certain individuals to aggress when receiving alcohol, although not when getting only soft drinks, in the study. Boyatzis explained these results by suggesting that the behavior of individuals predisposed to aggress was especially sensitive to physiologic arousal provided by alcohol.

In another set of studies, Taylor and his colleagues used a laboratory rather than a party setting and integrated provocation into their experiments. Like Boyatzis (1975), Taylor and Gammon (1975) also reported greater aggression in subjects receiving more alcohol, but they used physical aggression measures and tried to exercise greater control over dosages given. Four groups of 10 male subjects each received one of four beverage treatments on a random basis: bourbon or vodka at high (predicted 0.09 percent BAL) or low (predicted 0.03 percent BAL) doses. They then engaged in a reaction time task, allegedly involving competition with an opponent in the next room. It was explained that to increase motivation they would be receiving shocks determined by their opponent each time they lost, and that they could choose the shock levels to be given to their opponent whenever he lost. Shock levels received were systematically varied across all subjects and constituted a provocation, while the shock intensities selected by subjects for delivery to their opponents were viewed as indicators of aggression. Results showed that high alcohol doses produced greater aggression in subjects than the shocks they received would warrant, while low doses yielded shock level selections below those of the “provocateur.” This effect was more pronounced in the bourbon drinkers, although the absence of actual BAL measurement makes this finding difficult to interpret. These results partially replicated and extended earlier work (Schuntich and Taylor 1972), suggesting a positive linear
relation between alcohol dose and aggression when a placebo condition also was included in a similar experimental paradigm. The investigators interpreted their studies as indicating that alcohol releases aggression, presumably through a physiological mechanism.

Lang and his colleagues (1975) argued that the findings of the Boyatzis and the Taylor studies failed to demonstrate a physiologically mediated relation between alcohol and aggression because they did not adequately control for expectancy factors. These proponents of a social learning approach suggested that cultural tolerance of disinhibited aggression in people presumed to be drinking produced the alcohol-aggression link by virtue of its psychological utility rather than any pharmacologic effects of the drug. They examined this hypothesis by applying the balanced placebo design to drinking and disinhibition research for the first time.

Ninety-six “heavy” social drinkers (classified according to Cahalan et al., 1969), male subjects, were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions in a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design. To fully control for expectancy effects, half the subjects were led to believe they were drinking alcohol (vodka and tonic), while half believed they were drinking only tonic water. Within each of these groups, half the subjects actually received alcohol (measured BAL of 0.10 percent), but the other half did not. Following the beverage administration, half the subjects were provoked by exposing them to an insulting confederate, whereas control subjects experienced a neutral interaction. Aggression was assessed by the intensity and duration of shocks subjects believed they were delivering to the confederate via a modified Buss “aggression-machine” (Geen and Stonner, 1971) during a bogus teaching task. The results of these measures clearly showed that aggression was related to drinking only as a function of expectancy. Those subjects who thought they had received alcohol were more aggressive than those who thought they had drunk only tonic water, regardless of the actual contents of their drinks. Provocation to aggress also had a significant main effect on aggression (increasing it), but did not interact with any beverage conditions. The results of the shock intensity measure are illustrated in figure 2.

In a companion study (Marlatt et al., 1975), an investigation of the effects of provocation and retaliation on subsequent drinking was made. Here it was shown that the “taste test” (see Marlatt et al., 1973) alcohol consumption of both male and female heavy social drinkers could be increased by provoking anger in them, but only if they had no intervening opportunity to aggress against the insulting confederate. Subjects who gave shocks to the confederate before
Figure 2. Mean Shock Intensities Delivered Across Trials

Expect Alcohol / Receive Alcohol
Expect Alcohol / Receive Tonic
Expect Tonic / Receive Alcohol
Expect Tonic / Receive Tonic

PROVOKED

NOT PROVOKED

Source: Lang et al. (1975). Copyright 1975 by American Psychological Association, Inc.
drinking consumed significantly less alcohol. One might hypothesize that people sometimes turn to drinking when no alternative method of dealing with anger is readily available. This raises the possibility that if a later opportunity to aggress arises, they may take it, but will only coincidentally be intoxicated at the time. Taken together, these two studies suggest that the drinking-disinhibition link as it applies to aggression may be more a matter of psychology and circumstances than of physiology.

Several additional and very recent experiments will be mentioned because they illustrate the direction of theorizing on the drinking-aggression link, although they fail to consider expectancy factors in a satisfactory manner. These are studies by Pihl and his coworkers, who have attempted to demonstrate that alcohol-induced information processing deficits or biases could account for the increased aggressiveness of intoxicated subjects. In one experiment (Zeichner and Pihl 1979), the investigators applied one of three beverage conditions (ethanol-orange juice to measured BAL = 0.09 percent, orange juice placebo, and no beverage) to 72 randomly assigned male social drinkers. Aggression was assessed by the intensity and duration of shocks subjects intended to administer to a bogus partner. Half the subjects were intermittently exposed to aversive contingencies (loud tones) correlated with the strength of their own aggressive responses; half received the same aversive contingencies according to a random schedule. Results showed the inebriated subjects were more aggressive than either of the sober groups. In addition, those receiving alcohol were equally aggressive under both correlated and random contingencies, while placebo and control subjects displayed differential responding (more aggression when the pattern was random). The authors argued that their results indicated that intoxicated subjects may be "stimulus-bound," responding only to tone aversiveness, not the correlation of tone intensity to the shock intensity they delivered. They speculated that this tendency reflected an alcohol-induced deficit in the processing of complex information.

In a second study along similar lines (Zeichner and Pihl 1980), all aspects of the procedure were the same except that instead of varying the pattern of aversive tones (correlated vs. random), subjects were told that tone intensity was either selected by their bogus partner (malicious intent) or not under his control (neutral intent). Again, subjects who drank alcohol displayed more aggression than the sober subjects. Inebriated individuals also failed to respond differentially on the basis of intent for the shock duration measure, though not the shock intensity measure. Both placebo and non-drinking groups were more aggressive (both measures) when they
perceived malicious rather than neutral intent. The researchers again attributed these group differences to an alcohol-related information processing deficit. They argued that, if given more alcohol, the intensity as well as the duration of drinkers' shocks would become independent of instigator intent. It is interesting to note that in this study, placebo subjects in the neutral intent condition were more aggressive than the nondrinking subjects, suggesting that the belief that one had received alcohol may have been reason enough for increased aggression. In any case, the failure of these studies to include a condition in which alcohol is given under a no-alcohol expectation makes statements about alcohol-induced information processing deficits purely speculative. One would have to demonstrate that such deficits occur independently of expectation and that they correspond to disinhibited changes in behavior before the theory could be promoted for its explanatory power. As will be shown later, research on drinking and sexual disinhibition has failed to support such a model.

Surveys. Although surveys are not the main emphasis of this paper, a few should be mentioned because they reflect the pervasiveness of beliefs about the effect of alcohol on aggression in U. S. culture. Such beliefs, of course, probably play a central role in the expectancy effects observed in drinking-disinhibition experiments. Four types of populations typically have been surveyed: adults (general), college students, offenders, and alcoholics. Some surveys inquire about different dose effects, but most do not. Although physical and social-situational context usually are not systematically varied, occasionally certain aspects of the situation are altered in questions to test for opinion consistency. Few studies ask about the desirability or the strength and certainty of drinking-disinhibition effects from the subjects' point of view. Differences as a function of gender and drinking exposure are frequently reported, although these factors are usually confounded.

In a very recent survey (Brown et al. 1980), a sample of metropolitan Detroit residents of widely divergent drinking backgrounds were queried about the domain of their alcohol expectancies that might reinforce drinking. It was found that, among other things, many people believed that drinking specifically increased their power and aggression, and that this expectation was stronger among heavier drinkers and males. Sobell and Sobell (1975) also surveyed a sample of adults about the extent to which they felt drinking diminished responsibility and accountability for violent crime. A significant minority of the sample (30 percent) felt responsibility was reduced by drinking, although only 7 percent believed accountability should be lessened. Females showed a much more
lenient pattern of judgment on these issues, suggesting they will tolerate greater drunken aggression than men. This fits with Gelles' (1974) observation that when both drinking and violence (usually against women) occur in a family, the drinking is often regarded as the major problem.

A much earlier study of college students (Straus and Bacon 1953) showed that males believed drinking increased aggression in men, but not in women. In a similar vein, Richardson and Campbell (1980) tried to determine the effects of husband and wife intoxication on attributions of blame in a wife abuse incident presented as a case history or newspaper account. The researchers varied only the alleged intoxication of the husband, the wife, or both spouses. In all cases, most of the blame was assigned to the husband (aggressor), but if he was represented as drunk, situational factors were given more weight. If, on the other hand, the wife was described as drunk, she received more personal blame than if she was sober. A more general survey of college students' expectations of drinking (Southwick et al. 1980) included dose level variations, asking for separate reports of effects when drinking "moderate" amounts of alcohol as compared to "too much." Here heavy drinkers had stronger expectations of "stimulation/personal dominance" feelings at both low and high dosages, while others said this effect occurred only during moderate drinking. Of course, the possibility of a tolerance effect confound cannot be ruled out. Finally, Isaacs (1979) found that college students expected heavy drinkers ("alcoholics") to get "meaner" when drinking, while similarly intoxicated social drinkers were seen as "kinder."

Surveys of offender populations have focused mainly on the role individuals said alcohol played in their crimes. A representative study (Mayfield 1976) found that 58 percent of assaultive offenders were drinking at the time of their offense (so were 40 percent of victims), but less than half tried to use intoxication as an excuse to explain or justify their crime. This is surprising, considering the possible psychological advantages (or even legal benefits; see Epstein 1978) of a drinking attribution. However, it is unclear how many of these men had any remorse about their crime that they wished to relieve. It is also possible that they had a previous record of assaults without alcohol involvement, making their excuse less credible. Roebuck and Johnson (1962) have presented some correlational evidence pertinent to these arguments. They noted that rigid fundamentalist religious backgrounds, possibly giving rise to high levels of guilt about hostility and violence, were found frequently in black offenders with repeated patterns of simultaneous "drunk and assault" charges. Other black offenders, having more varied back-
grounds, showed arrest patterns without consistent alcohol involvement. This latter group apparently needed no excuse for its behavior. In any event, a significant minority of offenders in the Mayfield study did indicate that drinking was responsible for their crime and/or claimed amnesia for the event.

Finally, a study of discrepancies among alcoholics’ expectancies, actual behaviors, and subsequent event recollections connecting alcohol and aggression (Tamerin et al. 1970) revealed that, although few men expected to become aggressive while drinking, many did. These subjects usually remembered the majority of aggressive episodes, except for those in which they actually became violent. Such discrepancies would seem to be important for their possible psychosocial utility in maintaining the drinking-aggression relation.

Overall, the survey data demonstrated the generality of expectancies about a causal relation between alcohol and aggression. People seem especially certain that heavy drinking males will be aggressive and tend to excuse drunken aggression more in them than in others. Possible social implications of this pattern of culture beliefs and behaviors have been outlined by Room (1980).

**Conclusions.** It should be evident without an examination of scientific literature that alcohol can never be the sole cause of any instance of a behavior as complex as human aggression. A good deal of aggression goes on without the aid of drinking, and much drinking is not accompanied by aggression. Thus, we are left with the possibility that alcohol modifies aggressive responding through an interaction with a person and his or her situation. So far, experimental psychology has developed the potential for reasonable precision in dealing with the drinking variable, but control of predispositional and situational factors has lagged behind. This is unfortunate since, particularly where an unstable socially significant behavior like aggression is concerned, it is unlikely that specific alcohol (or other drug) effects are of much significance. The demonstrated power of simple expectancy to influence the aggression of a restricted sample of persons in the unnatural context of a psychology laboratory should drive this point home. But, while such a finding supports the contention that alcohol and aggression are related only by cultural belief, not all the data are in yet. And even if this hypothesis were true, the task of discovering how, why, where, when, and with whom this belief operates would still remain. We know very little, e.g., about drinking and aggression in women or other “special” populations. Dosage effects are often ignored. Few studies have varied even the simplest of situational variables which could dramatically change drinking effects (see Pliner and Cappell
Whether one adheres to a biological, psychological, or social model, much remains to be done.

Sexuality

Introduction. The literature on alcohol and human sexuality is, if nothing else, a bit more colorful than that dealing with aggression and other behaviors correlated with drinking. Ogden Nash, for example, commented on the action of spirits to break down sexual inhibitions by observing that, in the approaching of women, "Candy is dandy, but liquor is quicker." Shakespeare's porter in Macbeth, on the other hand, focused on stimulating aspects of alcohol, noting that "...it provokes the desire [for lechery], but it takes away the performance." These quips suggest a conventional folk wisdom that drinking can lead to a greater inclination toward, if not greater participation in, sexual interaction. Unfortunately, until recently, beliefs about such a relation have not been the object of much empirical investigation. One possible explanation for the paucity of studies was offered by Carpenter and Armenti (1972) who maintained that many—including numerous "scientists, professionals, and authorities"—have simply reified the popular beliefs, assuming they know a priori that alcohol consumption "causes" impulsive human sexual (and aggressive) behavior. This, of course, obviated the need for further research and needed armchair philosophers to speculate about what processes might underlie the alleged relation. As in the case of aggression, physiological explanations have predominated, including a "chemical trigger" hypothesis (Rada 1975) and the idea that alcohol anesthetizes higher neural control centers to "release" sexual impulses (e.g., Harger 1959). These largely direct cause theories have been put forth despite an extensive anthropological and sociological literature which reveals weaknesses in the folk wisdom position. Such research (e.g., MacAndrew and Edgerton 1969) argues for learned and situational factors by documenting the existence of cultures in which drinking bears either a negative, or no, relation to sexual expression.

Complex ethical and methodological problems also have retarded research on the alcohol-sexuality link. Moral and legal issues abound, particularly if one wishes to study sexuality as an interpersonal process. These restrictions have effectively stymied most work on human sexual interactions. Even at the individual level, however, difficulties with the operationalization of the sexual response variable have been considerable. Fortunately, the development of penile and vaginal plethysmography seems to have resolved the problem of inadequate dependent measures (Abel and
Blanchard 1976; Geer et al. 1974). Balanced placebo designs have helped refined the drinking variable. Mainly studies using these methods will be addressed here. For a comprehensive review of pre-1977 research on alcohol and sexuality, see Wilson (1977).

**Experiments.** Before consideration of expectancy effects became much of a concern in alcohol research, several teams of investigators studied the impact of different dose levels of alcohol on penile tumescence in men viewing erotic films. Farkas and Rosen (1976) used social drinker subjects, while Wilson and colleagues (1978) looked at alcoholics. These experiments tended to show a linear decrease in physiological sexual arousal as a function in increasing BALs, although at very low doses (0.025 percent BAL) the results were mixed. Also revealed was one complication in alcohol and sex research, namely, that subjective expectations and reports of sexual arousal/enjoyment while drinking did not necessarily correspond with, nor could they be altered by confrontation with, discrepant objective physiologic measures of arousal. Apparently the fact that alcohol raised the threshold for penile erection and/or ejaculation in these men was sometimes viewed as an asset in sexual performance and a benefit for the enjoyment of both the individual and his potential partner. Such a finding underscored the need for multiple outcome measures in alcohol and sexual response studies.

Briddell and Wilson (1976) first sought to disentangle the effects of alcohol and cognitions on sexual response by a direct attempt to manipulate male social drinkers' beliefs about alcohol and sexual arousal. Their factorial design used alcohol doses resulting in four average BAL levels (.00, .03, .07, and .10 percent) with half the subjects at each level being told that drinking would increase their sexual arousal while the other half were led to believe that sexual responses to the erotic film viewed by all participants should be diminished by alcohol. The results were generally consistent with those of strictly physiologic studies. There was a significant negative linear relation between BAL and penile tumescence, although no low dose increase or biphasic effect was observed. This time, subjective reports of sexual arousal were more positively correlated with the physiological measure. Most striking, however, was the failure of the manipulated belief variable to exert any significant influence on sexual response.

A similar study with female subjects (Wilson and Lawson 1976a) yielded an almost identical pattern of physiological results, using vaginal pressure pulse measures obtained by a photoplethysmograph, and again found no effect due to the manipulated belief variable. Interestingly, the subjective data of these women showed no differences for alcohol dosage or belief. A paradoxical trend
toward reporting enhanced sexual arousal at higher levels of intoxication was found, however, suggesting possible gender differences in the effects of drinking. In any case, one might be tempted to conclude on the basis of these two studies that alcohol generally reduces sexual responsiveness and that beliefs about its effects are of little or no consequence. Such a conclusion, however, neglects the distinct possibility that the manipulated beliefs were not powerful enough to overcome subjects' own preconceived beliefs about how alcohol affects their own sexual expression and responsiveness. Moreover, the need to completely separate expectancy factors from the physiological effects of alcohol per se was not addressed in this research.

In a subsequent investigation, Wilson and Lawson (1976b) abandoned attempts to influence subjects' beliefs about the effects of alcohol on sexual response, and instead manipulated their expectations about the contents of the beverages consumed and then observed the behaviors in question. Their approach made use of the balanced placebo design. Male social drinkers were randomly assigned to one of two beverage expectancy conditions (expect vodka and tonic, or expect tonic only), and they then consumed beverages which were either consistent with or contrary to their expectations. Those subjects actually receiving alcohol reached a mean BAL of 0.04 percent. Measures of penile tumescence were recorded during the viewing of both heterosexual and homosexual erotic films by each participant. Results showed that actual alcohol failed to affect penile tumescence significantly. However, there were significant effects of the beverage expectancy manipulation on tumescence during both films. Subjects who believed they had consumed alcohol manifested significantly greater sexual arousal than those who believed they had received only tonic water. Again, as in the earlier Briddell and Wilson (1976) study, there was a significant positive correlation between the physiological measures of sexual arousal and subjective ratings of arousal.

In 1978, Wilson and Lawson decided to replicate their balanced placebo study of alcohol and sexual arousal, but this time with women social drinkers as subjects. The procedure was very similar to that used previously with men (Wilson and Lawson 1976b), but the results were markedly different. Here, expectancy did not affect the physiological sexual arousal of the women. There was instead a significant decrease in sexual response as a function of actual alcohol just as there had been in the earlier study with women. However, a significant positive correlation between subjects' estimates of their intoxication and their subjective sexual sensations was observed. The authors tried to reconcile these differ-
ences between male and female sexual responses, under identically controlled alcohol and expectancy conditions, by noting that the two sexes may differ systematically in a variety of relevant ways. Among the possibilities cited were that women could have weaker expectancy beliefs, lower awareness and control of early signs of physical arousal in sex, less drinking experience, and greater (potentially disruptive) feelings of sexual vulnerability while drinking. Such speculations have not been adequately verified, but one consequence of the lack of consistent expectancy effects in women has been that it reinforced the tendency of alcohol-sexuality research to use only male subjects.

Partially reflecting their concern with the connection between alcohol use and sex offenses, Briddell and Associates (1978) conceptually replicated and extended earlier balanced placebo research with men. They used beer and "near beer" beverages and assessed changes in sexual arousal in social drinkers responding to either audiotaped or self-generated heterosexual stimuli. The tape portrayed separate instances of normal intercourse, forcible rape, and sadistic aggression. Results showed that an alcohol expectancy, but not actual alcohol (measured BAL = 0.03 percent), yielded greater physiologically measured and self-reported sexual arousal in the subjects. Moreover, the expectancy effect was most pronounced in connection with the more deviant (rape, aggression) stimuli. Combined with the Wilson and Lawson (1976b) study, this research severely challenged the role of alcohol's pharmacological action in producing disinhibited sexual behavior in men. The data instead suggested that social learning factors play a central part. An exploration of how these factors might operate seemed in order.

Lang and Associates (1980) hypothesized that the probability that an alcohol expectancy set will disinhibit sexuality or other socially significant behaviors is not fixed. Instead, it is a function of the utility or reinforcement value that making an alcohol attribution about one's behavior has for that particular individual, given the situation and the specific behavior in question. To test this prediction, male social drinkers were surveyed and were classified as high, moderate, or low in "sex guilt" (according to the Forced Choice Guilt Inventory; Mosher 1966). Equal numbers from each group were then randomly assigned to one of the four possible conditions in the balanced placebo design. After drinking vodka and tonic (to measured BAL = 0.04 percent) or tonic only, all subjects viewed and evaluated photographic slides of varying erotic content and then reported on their sexual arousal. The time individuals spent looking at each slide was unobtrusively measured and was considered to reflect interest in that slide. Overall, greater
sexual arousal was indicated by subjects who thought they had received alcoholic beverages, regardless of actual drink content. As figure 3 shows, however, sex guilt mediated the effect of an alcohol expectancy on the measure of viewing time as a function of rated "pornographic" content of the slides. For the most part, everyone indulged his prurient interests and viewed the more sexually

**Figure 3. Slide Viewing Time as a Function of Pornography Ratings**

explicit slides longer, with or without an alcohol expectancy. However, among the high sex guilt individuals only, viewing erotic slides was apparently a restrained behavior which one could not engage in without an excuse. Thus, only those who believed they had been drinking (and therefore could make an alcohol attribution) looked at the more “pornographic” slides longer. Again, these findings supported a socially learned rather than a physiologically dependent relation between drinking and disinhibition, while also showing that individual psychological factors can predispose one to act in accordance with the relation.

In a final, very recent experiment on drinking and sexual disinhibition (Lansky and Wilson 1980), an information processing analysis of the phenomenon was carried out. These investigators used vodka and tonic (average measured BAL = 0.04 percent among drinkers) in a balanced placebo design involving male social drinkers. They then presented subjects with erotic (heterosexual and homosexual) and nonerotic photographic slides and auditory stimuli, while monitoring viewing times for the slides and penile tumescence during the tapes. Measures of selective attention and recognition memory also were taken in both visual and auditory modalities. An alcohol expectancy increased sexual arousal, but only among higher sex guilt subjects. Again, though the viewing time measures were not significant as in Lang et al. (1980), the alcohol attribution excuse may have had utility or reinforcing value only for them, because of their restrained predisposition. Actual alcohol had no effect on sexual responding, although it impaired visual memory independent of expectancy. Paradoxically, an alcohol expectancy improved auditory memory while alcohol per se had no effect. Attentional measures were not affected by the beverage manipulation, but reaction times when the competing stimulus was erotic were longer than those when it was not. Extensive correlational analyses attempting to relate the information processing measures to sexual arousal failed to support the hypothesis that any changes in them mediate the role of expectancy (or alcohol) in disinhibition.

Surveys. Again, only a sampling of surveys is offered to illustrate general beliefs about drinking and sexuality. Most, however, seem to indicate a public consensus that alcohol leads to sexual disinhibition. Gender differences are apparent as was the case with alcohol-aggression surveys. Equally applicable are the earlier comments about the lack of completeness of existing survey data.

Brown et al. (1980) in their general population survey found a strong tendency of subjects to endorse items indicative of an expectation that alcohol enhances sexual performance and pleasure,
especially in males and heavy drinkers. Johnson (1974) reported data on male executives showing they believed in a linear positive relation between alcohol (up to 6 oz.) and sexual desire. In more clinical populations, Beckman (1979) found that female alcoholics were more inclined than social drinkers to state that they desired, engaged in, and enjoyed intercourse more when drunk. Among male alcoholics (Tamerin et al. 1970), increased sexual feelings were not self-predicted, but were evident during intoxication. Finally, McCaghy (1968) reported that 32 percent of incarcerated male pedophiles maintained that alcohol was responsible for their behavior. Thus, the pattern of beliefs about drinking and disinhibited sexuality seemed to parallel that of the alcohol-aggression relation in our culture.

Conclusions. More studies of expectancy effects in the drinking and sexual disinhibition area have been conducted, and correspondingly more evidence supporting a social learning theory has accumulated. While high doses of alcohol probably depress sexual responding regardless of beliefs, the physiological effect of alcohol at low doses is negligible compared to the overwhelming power of expectations. This is evidenced even by highly objective physiological measurements. The probable validity of a cultural learning explanation is bolstered further by gender and nonphysiologic individual difference influences on the expectancy effects. Some suggestion of drinking history as an important variable is also available. Nevertheless, further specification of predispositional and situational variables is still needed. Particularly important would be the study of sexual interactions as opposed to individual responsiveness. In such interactions, as Carpenter and Armenti (1972) pointed out, alcohol may be co-identically present so that drinking becomes associated with sexual opportunity and provocation rather than being a cause of them. Naturally, this could increase the sexual cue value of alcohol if drinking also provides a socially acceptable excuse for risque behavior.

Sociability

Introduction. Sociability, by virtue of its name, must be considered a socially significant behavior and, as such, is likely to be influenced by situational and predispositional factors (including expectancy) more than by any specific pharmacologic action of alcohol. Yet, alcohol is typically viewed as a social lubricant. Moreover, by far the most popular hypothesis about how drinking might increase sociability emphasizes the central role of physiology. This is the tension-reduction hypothesis (TRH), formally out-
lined by Conger (1956). The TRH holds that alcohol acts to reduce tension or anxiety, probably through its depressant or tranquilizing effect on cortical control of behavior. This, in turn, should relax the person and consequently might produce greater comfort and activity in the social arena. It is important to note that the logic underlying this sequence of events requires that alcohol act to reduce tension or anxiety. This relation has been the one most extensively studied, but reviews of the voluminous literature on it (e.g., Cappell 1975; Higgins 1976) revealed a maze of equivocal, contradictory, and negative findings.

Among the likely contributors to confusion surrounding empirical investigations of the TRH are conceptual and methodological problems. "Anxiety" is an extremely complex construct because, like other affective states, it is often regarded primarily as a subjective (internal) mood and only secondarily as a socially relevant behavior. This has led many researchers to focus on self-reports as the sole measure of anxiety. However, Lang (1978), among others, has argued convincingly for the necessity of using multiple measures (self-report, physiological, and overt behavioral) if one ever intends to operationalize hypothetical emotional constructs in a satisfactory manner. This is because the various aspects of anxiety and other emotions may be differentially responsive to change as a function of time, stimulus conditions, etc. Another major problem plaguing interpretation of TRH research is the common failure to employ adequate controls for expectancy effects. Only those experiments incorporating reasonable multidimensional measurement of anxiety and balanced placebo methodology will be addressed in any detail below.

Before proceeding, it should be acknowledged that most studies pertinent to drinking and sociability do not, in fact, look at social interactions as they are normally understood. Instead, the typical procedure, if dyads are examined at all, is to control the behavior of one of the participants while examining the effects of drinking on the behavior of the other. In addition, anxiety responses are the major concern of the dependent measures. This state of affairs severely limits our understanding of how drinking affects social interactions. A few studies have dealt with drinking and social interaction per se, and a sampling of them will be discussed regardless of their methodological flaws.

Experiments. Smith and colleagues (1975a) made the initial attempt to analyze how alcohol might influence the formal properties of verbal social interaction. They used the Mishler and Waxler (1968) coding system to analyze differences in verbal communication patterns of well-acquainted male-female dyads who received
placebo, low dose (avg. measured BAL = 0.05 percent), or high dose (avg. BAL = 0.09 percent) alcoholic beverages in 2-hour sessions. Their main finding was that interruptions or overlaps in conversation increased as a linear function of BAL. The volume of communications and number of interchanges (initiations) showed a curvilinear dose effect, increasing at low BALs, but decreasing at higher ones. People also seemed to exhibit fewer acknowledgments of their partners in the alcohol conditions. The authors hypothesized that the more "disorganized" speech of drinkers could reflect alcohol's action to decrease competence in aspects of information processing relevant to conversation. On the other hand, the more egocentric speech patterns also could be the result of an alcohol expectancy which offered an excuse for inattention to the rules normally governing verbal communications. In either case, the findings do not necessarily indicate greater sociability among drinkers, but instead a pattern of communication which might lead to an escalation of aggression (cf. Pernanen 1976). The potential of this type of analysis remains largely untapped.

Rohrberg and Sousa-Poza (1976) examined the effects of alcohol (est. BAL = .07 percent) or placebo on the "self-disclosure" behavior of equal numbers of dyads matched for either field dependence or field independence. They found that the total amount of self-disclosure (time spent in conversation) was not affected by drinking, but "depth" of personal disclosure (rated by blind judges) was significantly greater among drinkers. This result paralleled Smith's group's (1975) independent report of a drinking-related increase in the total affective content of interactions of their dyads, although this occurred most at the lower dose. Again, these studies showed some interesting effects of drinking on sociability, but did not adequately control for possible expectancy effects.

Wilson and Abrams (1977) introduced the balanced placebo methodology into research on social interactions. Equal numbers of male social drinkers received alcoholic (avg. measured BAL = 0.04 percent) or nonalcoholic beverages, consistent or inconsistent with their expectations, and then engaged in a brief social interaction with a female confederate who was trained to remain neutral. The subject's task was to try to make a good impression on the woman. Before, during, and after this interaction, multiple measures of social anxiety were obtained using self-report, physiologic (heart rate), and behavioral observation (videotapes rated blindly) indicators. Results showed that on all measures, those individuals who thought they had been drinking (alcohol expectancy) were less socially anxious than those who believed they had received only nonalcoholic drinks — regardless of actual beverage content. This
again was a demonstration of the preeminence of cognitive, psychological factors over more direct physiological factors in determining how drinking influences social behavior.

In an almost identical followup study, using female subjects interacting with male confederates, an expectancy effect also was found (Abrams and Wilson 1979). This time, however, the physiologic measures (heart rate and GSR) and the observers' ratings showed a reverse pattern. In other words, women who thought they had received alcohol showed greater evidence of autonomic arousal and were seen as more anxious than those with a no-alcohol expectancy. Actual beverage content had no effect. All subjects reported greater anxiety after the interaction than before, but this measure yielded no significant differences as a function of either expectation or actual alcohol. Thus, as was the case in the drinking and sexuality experiments, a gender difference interacted with the expectancy effect, although here alcohol itself had little impact. Perhaps a part of this similarity could be accounted for by the fact that the social situation examined in the anxiety studies had sexual connotations. The researchers speculated that in some cases a sense of sexual vulnerability may accompany drinking for women, especially if they encounter unfamiliar men in strange settings while intoxicated. Thus, although feelings of diminished control while intoxicated might occasionally reduce social anxiety by offering an attractive excuse for less restrained social-sexual behavior with a desirable intimate, they increased anxiety in this study because the women did not necessarily "want" greater vulnerability. Of course, other explanations are possible, but all necessarily involve culturally mediated differences in the drinking experiences and expectations of men and women, since the studies showed no actual alcohol effect.

One final experiment which did not actually involve sociability, but raised some important issues, should be mentioned in this context. Levenson and associates (1980) sought to investigate the TRH while controlling for expectancy and varying the nature of stressors used to induce tension. They also gave a higher alcohol dose (measured BAL = 0.09 percent) than most studies of drinking and anxiety. Multiple (seven) physiologic measures were employed in addition to self-reports by the male social drinkers who were threatened with either electric shock or, alternatively, an interpersonal evaluation of their speech and physical characteristics. The prestress effects of actual alcohol produced a mixed pattern of aroused and depressed physiologic activity which, however, subjects interpreted as experiences of "cheerfulness" and lowered "anxiety." This illustrated why earlier research using only one or
two measures in trying to draw a simple relation between alcohol and tension reduction often produced contradictory results. More important, however, was the effect of alcohol in reducing the magnitude of both physiologic and subjective responses to the kinds of stressors used. This "stress response dampening" could account for the interaction of drinking and a number of socially significant behaviors. It may, for example, explain a greater tendency to approach aggressive, sexual, or social situations when intoxicated because the stress associated with them is not as intense.

It is noteworthy that expectancy effects were not found in this experiment, whereas they had been in the two social anxiety studies of Wilson and Abrams just cited. One possible explanation for this finding is that actual alcohol effects become prepotent at higher dosage levels. While certainly this is a plausible argument, it is probably also the case that deceptions in the beverage treatment conditions of the balanced placebo design are more difficult to maintain when higher doses are used. Levenson et al. (1980) acknowledged this in contrasting their results with the findings of others, and an examination of their manipulation check data supported this criticism. However, it should be recalled that Lang et al. showed a strong expectancy effect in the drinking and aggression relation using an even higher BAL than Levenson et al. (1980) employed. In this connection, the possible importance of subject characteristics is evident since Lang et al. did select "heavy" drinkers in the earlier study. This could account for the greater success of their drink manipulations as well as the occurrence of expectancy effects. Of course, the nature of these specific behaviors under investigation also varied.

Surveys. One hardly needs a review of surveys to know that most people in this culture believe alcohol facilitates sociability. Its ubiquity at social get-togethers should be evidence enough. Nevertheless, it can be mentioned that Brown et al. (1980) showed normal adults expected drinking to enhance social pleasure, increase social assertiveness, and reduce tension. In college students, Southwick et al. (1980) found beliefs in the power of alcohol to make them more relaxed, happy, and talkative. Finally, alcoholics (Tamerin et al. 1970) expected to become more "sociable" when intoxicated, although this often was not the case.

Conclusions. The research on drinking and sociability underscores the complexity of their connection and the inadequacy of the simplistic drive reduction notion of the TRH. It appears that when drinking reduces social anxiety the effect is cognitively rather than pharmacologically mediated, at least at low to moderate BALs. The gender differences in the expectancy effect again suggest that
personal predispositions and the related potential psychological utility/value of lowering one's personal responsibility for behavior play a role in drinking and sociability. The paucity of experiments on actual social interaction is, however, a problem mitigating against definitive conclusions. Once again the call for further exploration of different dosage effects across a variety of individual predispositions and physical-social circumstances must be reiterated.

Other Disinhibited Behaviors

Two other behaviors sometimes viewed as being facilitated or disinhibited by alcohol are mirth and eating. These have been subjected to tests using the balanced placebo design, or a modification of it, and so will be discussed briefly. Vuchinich and associates (1973) orthogonally manipulated alcoholic contents (BAL = .05 percent or .00 percent) and instructions (alcohol, no alcohol) about drinks male subjects consumed. They also informed half the men of the specific physiologic sensations they could expect from the alcohol doses given in the study to see if having a ready explanation for the reactions of one's nervous system would modify the occurrence of expectancy effects. Subjects then listened to humorous audiocassettes while observers, blind to treatment condition, unobtrusively rated their amusement. Subjects' laughter was also monitored, and later they reported on their own affect. Only the expectation of receiving alcohol increased the behavioral measure of laughter. Mixed results were obtained for self-reported mood, with both actual alcohol and an alcohol expectancy yielding improvement. Informing subjects of the exact nature of physical sensations the alcohol doses caused did not influence expectancy effects on laughter or mood. This latter set of findings failed to support explanations of expectancy effects stressing a mislabeling of ambiguous internal arousal according to available environmental cues (cf. Schachter 1964). Instead, it appeared that drinking was simply an acceptable reason to disregard normal restraint.

Along similar lines, Polivy and Herman (1976) examined the eating behavior of restrained (diet conscious) eaters and unrestrained (normal) eaters on a bogus ice cream tasting task in which total consumption was the operative measure. First, however, equal numbers of the female subjects received either alcoholic (est. BAL = .05 percent) or nonalcoholic preparations labeled as either alcohol or vitamin C. Results showed that among restrained eaters ice cream consumption was greatest in the accurately labeled alcohol condition, while this same condition yielded the least consump-
tion among unrestrained eaters. The investigators interpreted their findings as suggesting that individually useful external attributions of responsibility would facilitate disinhibited behavior, but only when accompanied by congruent physiologic sensations. Unfortunately, checks of the effectiveness of the expectancy manipulations were not included. The results appear significant, however, in demonstrating how individual predispositions can contribute to the disinhibiting effects of drinking. Like the work of Lang et al. (1980) and Lansky and Wilson (1980) on sexuality, they showed that only those people inclined to want an excuse for their behavior will become less restrained when they think they are intoxicated.

Drinking and Cognitive and Motor Performance

Most authorities agree that cognitive and motor performance is adversely affected by alcohol consumption (cf. Moskowitz et al. 1974; Birnbaum and Parker 1977). However, none of the studies conducted prior to 1975 included adequate control for expectancy effects. Still, since cognitive and motor performance are relatively stable behaviors, and few would have much incentive or motivation to do poorly on them even while intoxicated, one would anticipate minimal expectancy effects. In general, that is what the data show.

In the Lang et al. (1975) alcohol and aggression study a simple reaction time task was included as a secondary measure to rule out a demand characteristics explanation of the predicted expectancy effects (cf. Orne 1969). These investigators reasoned that subjects would be as aware of alcohol's relation to poor reaction time as they were of the drinking-aggression link, so if their behavior was guided by a desire to please the experimenter it should be consistent across both measures. However, as figure 4 shows, this was not the case. On the reaction time task subjects showed no expectancy effect, but only an action of alcohol to increase response latency. This contrasted sharply with the unique main effect of expectancy on the aggression measure (refer back to figure 2). Evidently, an alcohol cognition had no function with regard to the nonsocial reaction time task, whereas it was quite relevant to the socially significant behavior of aggression.

Cognitive functioning, specifically memory measures of word list recall, was the object of the next balanced placebo investigation of alcohol and performance (Miller et al. 1978). Again actual alcohol (BAL = 0.07 percent) produced information processing deficits, while expectancies had no effect. A later study by Williams et al. (1980) showed a somewhat more complicated pattern of results.
Figure 4. Mean Response Latencies on Reaction Time Task

Source: Lang et al. (1975) Copyright 1975 by American Psychological Association, Inc.
using zero, 0.03 percent, and 0.06 percent BALs crossed with alcohol and no alcohol instructional sets. No main effects were observed, but subjects expecting alcohol performed better on the cognitive tasks (letter cancellation, digit span, Raven's matrices) as alcohol dose increased, while those expecting no alcohol did more poorly as a function of dosage increment. The authors speculated that subjects aware of their alcohol-induced impairment could compensate for it, while those left uninformed took no remedial action. Such an argument was supported by the work of Young and Pihl (1980) who showed that subjects, even at a measured BAL of 0.09 percent, could improve their memory and hand coordination performance when given the simple instruction “try to stay sober.” Thus, awareness and motivation can play a role in overcoming the adverse effects of alcohol on cognitive and motor performance.

Finally, Vuchinich and Sobell (1978) tested subjects on a pursuit rotor and a reaction time task combined to result in a divided attention task. Under conditions of alcohol (BAL = 0.04 percent) or no alcohol, manipulated independently of alcohol and no alcohol instructions, they found a significant performance deficit due to actual alcohol. No main effect for expectancy was noted, but it interacted with alcohol to produce greater disruption when an alcohol expectancy was present. A later similar experiment in the same laboratory (Connors and Maisto 1980), however, failed to replicate the interaction effect, although actual alcohol again resulted in a performance decrement.

Taken together, the studies of drinking and cognitive/motor behaviors in humans show a direct pharmacological action of alcohol to impede performance. Expectancy effects are rarely observed. This may be because subjects are unfamiliar with standard laboratory tests of these behaviors and hence have little basis for formulating an expectancy. More likely, however, there is no incentive for disrupted performance given the circumstances, so none occurs.

Summary, Interpretation and Implications

Summary

This review clearly indicates that a connection between drinking and disinhibition can be demonstrated empirically. Drinking has been causally implicated in increased aggression, sexual response, sociability, and even laughter and eating. The importance of direct
pharmacological actions of alcohol on these behaviors, however, has been severely challenged, at least when considering the low to moderate acute doses used in the majority of experiments. Instead, the principal finding has been that especially for males, the disinhibition of significant aggressive, sexual, and social behaviors is a product of the expectancy that one has consumed alcoholic beverages — regardless of the actual contents of the drinks. The limited research on women's reactions to drinking, on the other hand, has yielded a mixed pattern of alcohol (decreases sexual response) and expectancy (increases social anxiety) effects. Perhaps these gender differences reflect the lesser drinking experience of females and/or divergent cultural beliefs about the acceptability and implications of drinking by women. Clarification of the underlying factors will have to await future research. In the meantime, there is some evidence that psychological predispositions (e.g., sex guilt) can interact with expectancies to help predict disinhibition in certain individuals. The role of such variables will be considered in connection with a discussion confined mainly to the more consistent influences of drinking on the behavior of males.

Standing in stark contrast with the powerful expectancy effects observed to disinhibit socially significant behaviors, is their almost total lack of impact on the performance of cognitive and motor tasks. This is especially puzzling since the public is undoubtedly just as aware of the behavioral impairment (cf. Southwick et al. 1980) accompanying intoxication as they are of the drinking-disinhibition link. In any event, where cognitive and motor tasks are concerned, experiments show that alcohol alone acts to impede performance. Obviously, a satisfactory theory of drinking and behavior must accommodate both the expectancy-disinhibition findings (including individual differences) and the alcohol-impaired performance data.

**Interpretation**

*Specific biologic theories.* As has been illustrated throughout this review, hypotheses dependent on the direct pharmacologic action of alcohol to disinhibit socially significant behaviors have been embarrassed by the available evidence. Except where cognitive-motor performance is concerned, proponents of these approaches have evidently confused correlation with causation. It is possible that higher doses of alcohol, or alcohol interacting with a particular physiologic predisposition (e.g., brain abnormality), could precipitate disinhibited behavior in some individuals, but this does not account for the data reported here.
Biologic-psychologic combination theories. Approaches which combine physical effects of drinking with psychologic processes are of two types: those stressing cognitive deficits and those emphasizing cognitive factors in emotion. The first approach posits that alcohol impairs information processing, reducing perception of important cues and diminishing powers of abstraction and conceptualization. This, in turn, can lead to a narrow focus on salient cues in the immediate situation and a reduction in (complex) coping skills. Then, if available stimuli are, e.g., sexual or aggressive in nature (or could be naively interpreted as such), there should be a greater likelihood that these behaviors will become disinhibited. This theory has a number of advantages. It makes use of the demonstrated action of alcohol to impair cognitive ability and it considers the impact of variations in the social situation. Individual differences are not specifically addressed, but could be incorporated with little difficulty. The problem with the theory is that it cannot accommodate expectancy effects because it depends on the assumption that alcohol induces deficits in information processing, yet expectancy effects occur independently of alcohol’s presence. Nevertheless, it represents a considerable advance over specific biologic theories and probably explains some instances of drinking and disinhibition.

Another biologic-psychologic approach is based on attribution theory in the tradition of Valins’ (1966) revision and extension of Schachter’s (1964) classic work on emotions. These investigators have shown that individuals can become physiologically aroused by simple induction of a cognitive set (e.g., expect alcohol). They have also demonstrated that once in an ambiguous state of physiologic arousal, people will seek to interpret that arousal in terms of available cues that permit cognitive labeling of it as a specific emotion. Then, of course, they may act on the emotion experienced. Applying this to drinking and disinhibition, one might argue that persons who drink (or think they are drinking) alcoholic beverages become aroused, scan the situation for explanatory cues, and if cues suggestive of aggression or sex or sociability are present (as they often are in drinking situations), persons might misattribute the arousal of drinking to other more salient cues in the environment and act accordingly. Thus, the probability of disinhibited aggression, sex, or sociability should be increased. The particular behavior selected would depend on individual predispositions and on the specific cues present in the drinking context.

Again, this theory has several strengths. It capitalizes on the fact that emotional states often precede disinhibited behaviors and it shows how drinkers’ expectancies could lead to such emotions. It
also integrates some situational factors. However, its fit with findings from balanced placebo research is not a perfect one. First, one has some difficulty explaining the differential operation of expectancy effects as a function of individual differences (e.g., sex guilt). Second, individuals given an “expect alcohol” cognition should not experience ambiguous arousal because they already have the drinking explanation for how they feel. Finally, in balanced placebo studies subjects expecting no alcohol, but actually receiving some, should experience arousal (without a ready explanation for it) and therefore should also respond to environmental cues for disinhibited behavior. This, however, typically is not the case (cf. Vuchinich and Tucker in press). Perhaps in some instances the attribution theory of emotions explains drinking and disinhibition, but is there a better, more parsimonious approach?

Psychologic social learning theories. The strategy of cognitive-behavioral psychology is to examine the function of behavior on the assumption that organisms will not persist in behaviors that do not have a useful function for them. Typically, this means behavior is analyzed in terms of its antecedents and consequences, with cognitions playing a mediational role. An effort is made to tie all three of these aspects of behavior to directly observable events. So what is the function of drinking as it relates to expectancy-disinhibition and alcohol-impairment effects observed in balanced placebo studies?

One potentially reinforcing aspect of drinking in this culture is that it alters the reactions of others to one’s behavior. In particular, others tend to be more tolerant of deviance in the inebriate, reasoning that all behavioral competence and control may be disrupted in the same way that sensorimotor and cognitive processes inevitably are. The practical consequence of this state of affairs is that while in a drunken state an individual is not assigned as much personal responsibility for his actions. In effect, one becomes “freer” when drinking because the environment is more willing to forgive any transgressions he may commit by attributing their cause to the liquor, not the man. Hence, considering that most of the disinhibited behaviors discussed here have at least some intrinsic pleasure involved in them (sexuality comes to mind most immediately), an explanation for the expectancy effects observed in connection with drinking emerges. The individual expects that his self-indulgent behavior will be excused because of his drinking, so restraints are washed away.

Arguing along similar lines, Jones and Berglas (1978) have speculated that people may sometimes drink because they are apprehensive about their ability to perform or about the appropriateness of
their engaging in certain socially relevant behaviors. This "self-handicapping" strategy enables them to attribute any unsatisfactory outcomes to alcohol, but to enjoy even greater than normal satisfaction in any positive outcomes since they can argue that they were accomplished while performing at less than 100 percent capacity! The potential benefits of these reinforcing aspects of drinking are considerable. So why aren't people drunk all the time, and why are there individual differences in the alcohol-disinhibition link?

People are not drunk all the time for at least two reasons. First, ours is a highly pluralistic society in which one can never be sure of the extent to which those people in any given context will subscribe to the "he was drunk" excuse, so there is a risk involved. Moreover, alcohol actually does impair competency on many dimensions of behavioral performance that could be relevant to socially significant outcomes. Thus, an overreliance on drinking could result in a rather lean reinforcement schedule, especially since the tolerance of others does have limits. This helps explain why no expectancy effects occur on cognitive-motor performances. They would have no utility or value for the person. He is going to try his best regardless of expectancy. As for interindividual differences in expectancy-disinhibition effects, one need only consider the wide variability in the moral backgrounds and coping skills of people to see how a drinking-attribution excuse might be differentially useful/desirable across particular individuals. Intraindividual differences, on the other hand, are probably more a product of contextual factors.

Several things which might be inferred erroneously from the preceding discussion should be clarified. One is that there was no intention of suggesting that the drinking and disinhibition link is primarily a case of what Carpenter and Armenti (1972) called the "planned consequences of alcohol use." Certainly there is that potential, and no doubt people sometimes engage in drinking for such specific purposes. However, what is more likely is that the conditions (models, reinforcers, associations) simply are right for learning a certain set of disinhibited drunken behaviors, so they tend to be acquired and to occur in a conditioned fashion. In this connection, it should be emphasized that the learned reactions to drinking can be every bit as "real" and automatic as the alleged physiologic reactions so often the exclusive target of alcohol-behavior researchers. This is not to ignore or minimize the role of physiology in the effects of drinking (or other drug use), but it would seem reasonable in light of the evidence to suggest that pharmacological actions of substances simply alter states of consciousness. The meaning assigned to these changes is primarily a
matter of learned expectancies and other individual predispositions coupled with the physical and situational context. Thus, we return to a biopsychosocial perspective.

Implications

Since the above psychological conceptualization is in essential agreement with MacAndrew and Edgerton's (1969) broader notion of drinking as "time out," there is no need to repeat their theory of the societal function of such rule suspensions. Likewise, the more recent ideas of Room (1980) about the possible role of drinking and disinhibition in maintaining certain aspects of social structure should be familiar. The question is, How should we proceed when the negatives, particularly the violent aspects, of "time outs" appear to be too great?

The obvious first step is to inform people of the prepotent role of cultural beliefs in the drinking-disinhibition link. Research subjects and the general public alike always seem astounded to learn of the expectancy effect or to hear about cultures where consuming alcohol does not lead to greater expressions of aggression or sexuality. Next, our laws as well as our informal reactions to the deviant behavior of drinkers need to reflect a new intolerance of undesirable disinhibitions, and hence enforce individual responsibility for those actions we disdain. Finally, and this appears to be an underutilized option, there could be a general encouragement and acceptance of alternative ways of gaining psychological "time out." These might include yoga, running, or other "positive addictions." There also may be a value in permitting wider use of consciousness altering drugs other than alcohol (e.g., marijuana), drugs which do not have the legacy of connections to violence but instead may disinhibit more benign behaviors.

References


Geen, R. *Personality, the Skein of Behavior*. St. Louis: Mosby, 1976.


Rohsenow, D., and Marlatt, G. The balanced placebo design: Methodological considerations. Addictive Behaviors, in press.


Smith, R.; Parker, E.; and Noble, E. Alcohol's effect on some formal aspects of verbal social communication. Archives of General Psychiatry, 32: 1394-1398, 1975a.

Smith, R.; Parker, E.; and Noble, E. Alcohol and affect in dyadic social interaction. Psychosomatic Medicine, 37: 25-40, 1975b.


Presenter's Comments

LANG: I want to start by making a kind of introduction about how I got into the area of drinking and disinhibition as a research interest in the first place. And I feel like this is a good opportunity to give credit where credit is due. Actually, part of my interest comes from my interest in American blues, and I'd like to play an excerpt from a blues album by B.B. King, which tells us a little about drinking and disinhibition and how it is popularly thought of in American culture.

In this recording he's not really singing; it's one of those talking segments. Prior to this point where we're going to pick up on the album, he's been telling a little bit about how men and women mistreat each other and how they really ought not to do that, and what the causes for it might be, and how one should address it. And he's talked a little bit to the ladies about how they should be more tolerant of their men, and now he's about to tell us a little bit about the fellas and what they should do and the problems that they may get into if they fail to adhere to moral standards ordinarily governing behavior. So he says to the fellas (recording paraphrased here): Don't beat when she doesn't do as you think she should. That's not something that's advisable to do; it can get you into trouble with the judge as well as with your wife. But in the event that you should do it, there may be some ways in which you can explain the behavior.

The song continues, saying that when he goofed last week he was high. That was his explanation for his behavior at that time.

Next, he goes on to elaborate that if she lets him get by with that excuse, then he looks at her “real pitiful like” and says that she knows that when she's high it doesn’t count.

I think that summarizes the point that I want to make here, that drinking offers some explanation for certain behaviors that people might engage in. It offers an excuse for behavior that tends to exonerate the person of responsibility for whatever action took place. Moreover, as B.B. King suggested, social acceptance of such drinking attributions is critical to the maintenance of their use.

Now, I prefer to look at the area of drinking and disinhibition in terms of three interactive processes, a kind of biopsychosocial perspective. I don’t think that it's solely a psychological phenomenon.
certainly. There are biologic and physiologic effects of alcohol per se that are important in leading to the drinking and disinhibition link that we've observed in many aspects of human behavior. As Steve Woods has recounted, it has a direct stimulating effect at low doses; but it has a depressing effect at high doses. So alcohol increases arousal or decreases arousal depending on the dosage level; we might talk of a "biphasic symptomatology" of alcohol. And it also tends to enhance or impair the functioning of people in significant areas: in sensorimotor functioning and in cognitive performance, in particular. In those areas usually we would say that alcohol causes impaired performance, although there's some evidence to suggest that at low levels the stimulating effect might actually enhance sensorimotor or cognitive performance. I think what's important about that impairment of functioning or these physical symptoms, as I refer to them, is that they facilitate our experience of a change in our state of consciousness; that is, we feel different than we do otherwise as a function of these physiologic aspects of the effects of alcohol.

Now, these "feeling different" experiences are susceptible to conditioning, so that it may not actually be so important that we receive substantial quantities of the drug in order to experience those feelings, because with repeated exposures we become more sensitized to the physiologic effects of the drug, so it might just take a little dose — or we might even be able to manufacture those altered states of consciousness of our own volition, particularly if the stimulus situation or circumstances are right. So, while the biological action facilitates changes in states of consciousness, the extent, direction, and meaning we ascribe to those changes in states of consciousness might be quite a different matter.

In the psychological realm, I think what's important is that those changes in states of consciousness — and the behavior that is consequent of them — have utility. If the person experiences a change in state of consciousness, his behavior subsequently will change if it is useful for him to have that behavior change — that is, if there's some value associated with it for that particular individual: if it makes him feel better; if it lets him do things he wouldn't otherwise do, but might like to do, etc. This utility aspect can occur at the interpersonal level, where other people in the environment may, for example, be more tolerant of a person's comportment when he's intoxicated; and it can also occur at the intrapersonal level, where the intoxicated person himself becomes more tolerant of differences in his own behavior.

This tolerance for drinking-related behaviors can be learned, based on cultural beliefs about the effects of alcohol. It may also be
reinforced at the individual level as a self-serving aspect of drinking attributions; that is, attributing one's behavior to the beverages that he or she has imbibed can have psychological benefits. By this I mean that through drinking the person has an explanation for whatever consequences might befall him. This has been referred to by Jones and Berglas (1978) and others as a "self-handicapping" strategy associated with drinking. What happens is the person takes a drink before he engages in a particular behavior that might have some uncertain outcome for him; for example, if I were to want to ask a woman for a date, it might be useful for me to get drunk before I did that because in the event that she turned me down, I could say, "Well, I was drunk at the time; I wasn't operating at my best, and that's the reason she refused me and I don't need to feel so bad about it." If, on the other hand, she accepts me in my request for a date, then I have a bonus there because I can say, "Gee, she accepted me and I wasn't operating at a hundred percent efficiency. Imagine how great I would have been had I been completely sober at the time." The point is that drinking may be psychologically useful or reinforcing because it permits one to defend/enhance one's self-concept.

At the social level, beyond particular social interactions, what is most important about the beliefs that people have about drinking is the certainty with which those beliefs are held. If there is a widespread consensus about how drinking affects a behavior, then that behavior is much more likely to occur when drinking has preceded it. If, however, there are uncertainties about whether drinking leads to aggression or whether drinking leads to sexual disinhibition or whatever, then there may be an unevenness in the relationship between drinking and disinhibition with respect to those particular kinds of behaviors. This certainty factor will influence the consistency of the drinking-disinhibition link across contexts.

You have these three areas, then: the physical symptoms that give rise to altered states of consciousness; the interpretation of these changes based on the utility they have as explanations of behavior; and the certainty with which these beliefs apply culturally.

In my paper I've defined drinking in terms of the act of consuming beverages which the person and those around him think contain alcohol. I've defined that rather than alcohol as the variable of interest in the disinhibition phenomena because I think that what I've demonstrated in the paper is that people's beliefs about what they've been drinking may, in certain instances, be more important than what they actually have been drinking. As far as disinhibition is concerned, Dr. Pernanen (1976) has, in his chapter on drinking and aggression, really eloquently demonstrated the multiple defi-
nitions of disinhibition. So, I've chosen in this talk and in my paper to focus on disinhibition in the strictly descriptive sense; that is, the disinhibited person is one who is engaging in behaviors that are ordinarily under some kind of restraint because of social norms, because of the values of the individual or perhaps because of some internal state of the individual. For example, an evaluation apprehension or an anxiety about engaging in social interactions might be disinhibited if the person were drinking. I think what experimental social psychology has done to enhance this understanding of drinking and disinhibition is largely a methodologic contribution; that is, we know a lot about how to control the independent variable, drinking, and that helps us to understand better what the causal link is between drinking and these behaviors that are of interest to us.

I've chosen to focus in the paper on aggressive behavior, sociability, and sexual disinhibition because I think those are things that come to mind most rapidly when we think of drinking and disinhibition. They are the most important socially significant interactions that are associated with drinking, although one might also include casualties or accidents as a significant aspect. However, casualties are not so amenable to the approach I am taking today.

The methodology for control of the independent variable in alcohol and behavior research has come a long way in the last twenty years. But I think what has been neglected prior to the last five years or so has been the influence or the importance of cognitive factors; that is, people's beliefs about what they have been drinking and how those beliefs might affect behavior. About seven or eight years ago, alcohol researchers began to utilize a design which has come to be called the "balanced placebo design" for control of the cognitive or psychologic aspects of drinking, to separate them from the physiologic aspects of drinking.

Let me try to describe this balanced placebo design for you. Early on in alcohol and drug research, frequently a drug or other substance was administered as the active treatment, and a placebo administration also was made. This was done in consideration of the fact that people's beliefs or cognitions about what they were receiving may in some way influence their behavior subsequent to taking the drug. The problem with this kind of design or its alternative — where persons all have the same expectations that they will be receiving no active substance and then they may or may not in fact actually receive an active substance — is that the effects of expectations are not investigated. They are simply made uniform, since the way in which they are controlled for is that they are held constant.

What we'd like to do in order to expand this perspective is to
separate the psychologic from the physiologic influences on subsequent behavior. To do this we need to utilize a completely crossed or orthogonal design which enables us to manipulate not only the actual beverage content — that is, whether alcohol is present or absent — but also people's expectations or beliefs about what they have been receiving; that is, whether they think they're receiving alcohol or they think they are not receiving alcohol.

That, basically, is the balanced placebo design that has now been applied to an increasing number of the social phenomena that are usually referred to in the disinhibition literature. I've chosen to include not only the aggression and sexuality aspects but also the sociability aspects of disinhibition because I think that they offer some explanation for why, at a broader social level, drinking is tolerated at all. If drinking were only associated with increased aggression, or sexual violence, or the like, I think there would probably be an outcry and Prohibition might have worked. But most of us have the belief that when we are drinking we'll be more sociable, more pleasant, that we'll enjoy the celebration more, so on and so forth; and those aspects of disinhibition, in a sense, also are important and need to be explored in connection with this disinhibition hypothesis.

Now, in the area of aggression, the theories of the effects of alcohol or drinking on behavior have generally fallen into two categories. One is that there is a physiologic explanation; alcohol itself operates through some pharmacologic mechanism to trigger aggressive behavior or energize aggressive behavior in a more or less specific way; or it tends to release aggressive behavior if we assume that aggression is somehow part of our natural desire — naturally desired behavior. Those physiologic explanations can be contrasted with more psychologic or social learning explanations that have been put forth by MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969), among others. The social learning explanation focuses on the psychological utility, and perhaps social utility, of a belief that alcohol leads to disinhibition.

A number of studies have been conducted to try to separate these factors. For the most part, what has been found is that when the expectancy factor that I've described has not been controlled for, there has been a general increase in aggressive behavior as a consequence of receiving alcohol. In other words, when people were administered alcohol they tended to behave more aggressively in the laboratory experimental situation than when they had not received alcohol, provided that their expectations were the same; that is, all of them thought that they had received alcohol.

Subsequent research which has employed the balanced placebo
design, however, has presented a somewhat different picture. In a laboratory study, some of my colleagues and myself decided that what we would do is to apply the balanced placebo design in a situation that involved an opportunity for aggressive behavior on the part of the subject. These were male subjects who were all heavy drinkers, by their own self-report. We selected that subject population because we felt it appropriate to choose people who had some experience with drinking rather than select people who only drank occasionally — because the cognitive effects of alcohol or drinking on behavior were seen as being less likely in this latter group.

We had the subjects drink alcoholic beverages or nonalcoholic beverages when they either expected to be drinking alcoholic beverages or nonalcoholic beverages. That is, we had the four cells of the balanced placebo design. Then, they had a verbal interaction with a confederate in our experiment. In one case, the experimental confederate was very critical of their performance on a difficult visual motor task; in other words, he was insulting to them, provoked them, criticized them. In the other case, they had a neutral or actually mildly positive interaction with the confederate, who commiserated with them about how difficult the task had been.

I wanted to look at this provocation difference because there is some suggestion from the animal literature on conflict, that maybe one of the reasons that drinking facilitates aggression is that there is a reduced sensitivity to the restraints on behavior, so when intoxicated organisms are provoked, they tend to focus on that provocation. They respond primarily to that particular stimulus, neglecting cues that might lead to avoidance of conflict. Thus, they may be more easily provoked and more aggressive under those circumstances.

Well, what we found was that subjects who expected to receive alcohol, regardless of what they had actually received, behaved in a more aggressive manner. They were more willing to give high intensity shocks to their partner in an experimental learning paradigm; they gave longer duration shocks; they were more verbally abusive in the interactions with that subject than they were if they expected to receive only tonic — that is, if they thought they had been drinking only tonic water. Provocation had an overall main effect; that is, people who were provoked behaved somewhat more aggressively than people who were not. But that did not interact in any way with either the alcohol manipulation or the expectancy manipulation. So, provocation, when manipulated systematically in this study, did not account for much of the presumed effect of disinhibition in altering aggression levels. Basically, aggression
was promoted by the belief that one had consumed alcohol, independent of whether or not one actually had.

**EHLERS:** Is the confederate blind to the paradigm?

**LANG:** Yes. As a matter of fact, everyone is blind as to the contents of the beverages and to the condition of the particular subject, except an assistant who mixed and served the drinks.

Well, that experiment touched off an interest in the exploration of expectancy effects or psychological effects of drinking on a variety of other behaviors that have usually been associated with disinhibition including sexuality and sociability.

The principal finding in the sexuality literature parallels the finding that we had here in the aggression literature; that is, that persons, particularly male subjects, who believe they have been drinking will become more sexually aroused in response to erotic stimuli than males who think they have not been drinking, regardless of the actual contents of their beverages.

Now, given what Steve Woods just pointed out, this is a rather remarkable finding since the physiologic effect of alcohol on sexual response is to lower responsivity. You should have just the reverse occurring, but it appears that cognitive expectancy exerts an overwhelming effect and seems to counteract those physiologic actions of alcohol, which are to reduce sexual responsivity. So, people who believe that they have been drinking are more responsive than people who believe they have not been drinking.

**PHILIP TETLOCK:** You're measuring arousal through self-reports?

**LANG:** Actually, several studies have been done using subjective self-reports, and using direct physiologic measures, penile plethysmography, for example, and the results have been parallel, at least for males; both physiologic measures and subjective reports of sexual arousal are enhanced by the belief that one has been drinking, whereas the actual pharmacologic action was not significantly determinative of the response, at least where low to moderate doses of alcohol were involved.

The findings are somewhat different in the literature on female sexual responsivity. There is a mixed pattern of results when one is examining the effects of expectations on sexual response in women, such that in females the expectancy that one has been drinking increases subjective reports of arousal but decreases physiologic effects of drinking on arousal. There are some papers on possible explanations for that phenomenon, but I won't go into them at this point.

I think what's important is that there are differences between males and females which provide us with some information about
what the cultural expectations are or what the expectations of the individual subjects are regarding alcohol's effects, and about how they might influence the behavior that is subsequently observed. Women, apparently, don't have as strong a belief that alcohol will enhance their sexual responsivity as males do, and, consequently, it seems to exert a less significant influence in situations where that expectation has been manipulated. The effects of alcohol and expectations on social anxiety also reveal a similar gender difference.

Now I'll just make a few summary statements. First, I think what the balanced placebo or expectancy literature demonstrates is that in some instances, particularly where low to moderate doses of alcohol are concerned, the expectation or belief that one has been drinking leads to changes in behavior that have ordinarily been labeled as disinhibition, whereas the actual imbibing of the beverage does not seem to exert an important effect. Gender differences and individual differences data support the notion that the strength of beliefs or the certainty of beliefs in different groups mediates that expectancy effect.

Second, I don't think it's too important whether we attribute to the persons who are drinking the motive that they are trying to gain access to this kind of freer or less disinhibited behavioral set, or whether we view it as a kind of conditioning phenomenon— that is, that they have learned that people are more tolerant of them when they're engaging in this behavior, and consequently resort to it almost as an automatic response. I think either of those hypotheses has some viability. I don't think we have the data at the present time to determine to what extent people engage in drinking intentionally to gain access to this freer set of social constraints, or to what extent this is simply a learned response to these cues associated with drinking.

Third, I think the implication from this research for what we ought to do, if we think there are untoward consequences of drinking, is to inform people about the extent to which drinking actually affects these behaviors, at least as we are best able to ascertain. This may alter the contingencies associated with behavior following drinking, so that, for example, we may become less tolerant of aggressive behavior in drinkers, and, consequently, reduce that connection.

And, finally, I think we ought to generate alternative ways that people can gain access to pleasant, altered states of consciousness that don't carry with them all this excess baggage of aggression or negative behavior toward other people. Thank you.

ROIZEN: You talked about belief being variable both in the sense of expectations and in the sense of the subject's actual beliefs
about what effects alcohol has. The sex difference you mentioned between men and women in regard to sexual arousal seems in a sense to go back to the implicit theory that there might be two cultures, one for men and one for women, about what expectations surround their drinking; and perhaps, when they interact with each other, there are two sets of beliefs. But your designs don’t include measures concerning the level of belief and intensity of belief, as distinguished from the expectation of getting alcohol or not getting alcohol. Is it proper to read that as a kind of tacit statement that, after all, the belief intensity is not that important?

LANG: Well, no, I think not. I think that the intensity is probably quite important, as I implied, though perhaps did not state directly. I think it’s a weakness in the research to date, for the most part, that belief intensity has not been taken into consideration. We have some survey data that suggests that there are differences between men and women, for example, in the extent to which they believe alcohol will lead to aggression or the extent to which they believe it will lead to increased sexual responsivity.

But, for the most part, while subjects might have been asked about this as part of the study, it has not been systematically varied. It might have been inquired of them prior to participation in the experiment: “What do you think the effects of drinking will be on you?” But, for the most part, that has not been controlled in any kind of systematic way. But I think there’s some potential there to look at the different kinds of beliefs, as I think I suggested in the paper in some detail in the discussion about surveys. I think they’re important.

ROIZEN: In the survey analysis, it appears, for example, that not only is there a variation in the belief that’s quite substantial, but also that people’s beliefs about alcohol in general may be quite different from their beliefs about alcohol’s effects on themselves. The question of exactly which belief we’re referring to in these kinds of experiments seems very important, and yet, virtually not present in the designs.

LANG: I think the survey research does point to a difference in beliefs between what it does to me and what it does to other people. But I think for the most part, those differences don’t make too much of a difference when respondents get into an actual situation. While the belief is something like: “This affects other people and makes them less inhibited, but that doesn’t happen to me,” when you put them in a study it does happen to them.

ROOM: This is a point I think we’ll be picking up again.
Commentary

Kai Pernanen

ROOM: Kai Pernanen is giving the commentary on this area. Kai's work relevant to this conference includes a landmark review and conceptual analysis on the relation of alcohol and violence (Pernanen 1976).

PERNANEN: In trying to explain the link between alcohol use and so-called "disinhibited" behavior, we're dealing with at least two very broad and central areas of research on alcohol. First of all, of course, we are dealing with the effects of alcohol use. Here the concept of alcohol use should be taken very broadly as including the social definitions or social circumstances surrounding the consumption of alcohol.

On the other hand, we are also in the midst of questions regarding causes of alcohol use, why do people drink, and the functions of alcohol use in our society. Both these aspects come out well in Dr. Lang’s paper, and the relatedness of these two questions is underscored by his own and other researchers’ studies on the effects of expectancies and beliefs regarding alcohol and alcohol-related behavior.

I am a firm believer in the idea that cultural and situational factors are very central in determining behavior in drinking events. Still, when I read Alan Lang’s paper, I had the feeling that I had gotten more than I had bargained for. Here we have extremely well-designed experimental research which points toward a link between alcohol use and disinhibited behavior, not through the main effects of alcohol, through physiological and/or psychological processes — and this I think we can easily live with — and not through any interactive effects of alcohol use and situational or cultural factors, but only through the main effects of cultural and situational determinants.

In my own armchair theorizing, I have sought to bring together cultural and situational factors with some fairly well-established effects of alcohol on cognition in order to arrive at explanations which would incorporate these effects and at the same time bring in an indeterminate number of cultural/situational determinants into
a model in which some of alcohol's cognitive effects interact with these cultural/situational determinants and then lead to quite varied types of behavior in connection with drinking. This was done partly in an effort to get away from too simplistic disinhibition explanations, which seemed to act as effective dampers on research in the field.

Yet, here we are. There's no question that the results obtained through the balanced placebo design by Alan Lang, Marlatt, Wilson, and other researchers in respect to the exclusive effects of expectancies regarding alcohol are valid, replicable, and very important for an accounting of disinhibited behavior in alcohol use events.

I will discuss some of the questions that arise from these findings, but first I feel called upon to discuss some logical and linguistic properties of the concept of disinhibition, since it already has been used in at least three different and important ways in the first two papers summarized here this morning and since it is highly relevant to the theme of this conference: "Alcohol and Disinhibition: The Nature and Meaning of the Link."

First of all, the most deceptive property of disinhibition is probably the fact that it is essentially formal in nature as a concept. It can describe any number of causal processes. This can be seen, for example, from the fact that a number of different substantive processes in different fields of inquiry have been used as theoretical substantiation of a disinhibition process. In the first place, it is illuminating, regarding the formal nature of the concept, that (if I read the paper by Dr. Woods correctly) disinhibited behavior can perhaps come about through what could be called alcohol's "inhibiting" effect on the transmission of neural signals. In other words, we may speak of an "inhibition" process which explains disinhibited behavior and make perfectly good sense. This circumstance may help us in avoiding the tendency to assume a single referent of the term and a single type of use of the concept.

Secondly, the other widely accepted use of the term is as a description of behavior as being disinhibited. Largely, this is a synonym for behavior which is contrary to the norms of the individual and/or society or deviant in one way or another. This extension from the first formal explanatory use which refers to a process of disinhibition is easily understood if we compare it to the other concepts which work in the same way. When we talk of "alienation" as a sociological concept, we may refer to the end product of a process of alienation, or a state of being alienated, or we may refer to the process through which one ends up being alienated. These two, the end result and the process, may not have very much in common, just
as a process of disinhibition may not have much in common with the end result of being disinhibited.

Thirdly, we have the use of the concept of disinhibition where the stress, in a sense, is on inhibition; that is, for the concept to be applied something has to be inhibited and released from this condition so as to become disinhibition: the process we can then call "disinhibition." This is a concept which is probably, at least historically, connected with psychoanalytic theory of inhibitions, and the whole structure perhaps of id, superego, and ego. The use of the concept in explaining behavior under the influence of alcohol may well have its roots in this type of theorizing. In Dr. Lang's own research, there is at least one finding which could be incorporated in such a use of the concept: subjects who exhibit more feelings of sex guilt show higher disinhibition. Similarly, Hetherington and Wray (1964), in a study which was carried out in the 1960's, found that socially inhibited subjects show more disinhibited behavior after alcohol use than do other subjects.

I have to commend Dr. Lang for setting out in the beginning of the paper that he is concerned purely with the descriptive aspect of the concept as it refers to a type of behavior which is against the usual norms and values of the individual.

I hope that this is not seen as lengthy nitpicking. It is important that we keep these references apart in order to avoid some of the pitfalls of the past. As I said, we have already at least touched on these three aspects of the concept in the first two papers summarized here this morning and also in the discussion.

Now, let me get into some substantive issues raised by Dr. Lang's paper. First of all, we must be ever aware of the different dimensions and values of dimensions for what we in a shorthand fashion refer to as drinking or alcohol use, etc. Several of these may be relevant in explaining behavior in alcohol use events, including disinhibited behavior. In specifying the nature of the alcohol variable, social research has not used nearly all the means available to aid in disentangling the associations between alcohol use and disinhibited behavior. This is especially true of the most common form of disinhibition studied by social research methods: violent crimes. No good data exist on the associational share in these violent events of different types of beverage consumed with different congener contents, amounts consumed, drinking patterns — such as binge drinking — and some situational, contextual, and even predisposing factors of potential or known relevance.

In explicating the influences of expectancies as compared to pharmacological effects of alcohol, the experimenters using the balanced placebo design have concentrated on the most central
indicator of alcohol use, the one which has been most widely studied by experimental methods: the blood alcohol level, and this is, of course, a good choice. We need, perhaps, not complicate things at this stage by bringing in other dimensions of alcohol use, which at least on the surface seem less likely to be of causal significance for a presumed relationship between alcohol use and disinhibited behavior, but we should keep them in mind as well as the limitations on blood alcohol levels in the expectancy studies carried out to date. And this is something that Dr. Lang has pointed out himself. Perhaps it would seem of more immediate concern to specify the nature of the expectancies regarding alcohol and to relate these specifications to social beliefs. Thus, one could ask, as just an example, is there more of an expectancy effect on aggressiveness connected with distilled spirits than with wine or beer — because, perhaps, they are consumed in different circumstances and have different types of social beliefs surrounding them, and, perhaps, there will even be differences between different types of distilled spirits — and this should also be related to independent social research studies on beliefs about the different types of alcoholic beverages. Is wine drinking, for example, more strongly related, through expectancies, to sociability and intimacy or even sexuality than liquor and especially beer? Perhaps at least in certain subpopulations.

In short, qualitative specification of expectancies in experimental research as related to social beliefs in the population from which subjects are drawn would solidify the more speculative connection drawn in expectancy studies to its social basis in beliefs and reinforcements of behavior. The findings on expectancy effects make even more desirable than before an integrated research strategy using social research methods — such as surveys and ethnographic observations — and, ideally, using the same population base in psychological experimental studies.

Despite the clear methodological advantages of the balanced placebo design, I think we should not disregard findings from studies which have not used this experimental design. At least it seems that we should take into consideration findings which have been reached in double-blind designs with the “unbalanced” placebo design, as someone might call it. The reason for this is simply that, although expectations as to the contents of the beverage consumed are not systematically varied, this design is completely congruent, with two of the cells in the two-by-two table of alcohol expectancy and alcohol content of the drink the subjects consumed. Thus, although studies by Zeichner and Pihl and Taylor and Gammon did not have a no-alcohol expectancy condition, unless we assume block effects or other sequential effects or some other
such effects, this does not impair the validity of their results for the two cells of the alcohol-expectancy condition. And here we find interesting discrepancies in the results, and we should ask what differences in the experimental set-up these could arise from. For example, Zeichner and Pihl (1979, 1980) and Taylor and Gammon (1975) find both main effects and interactive effects of actual alcohol consumption on measures of aggressiveness, whereas in the balanced placebo studies under the same conditions no differences were found.

The fact that there is an expectancy effect of this magnitude does not mean — and Dr. Lang has been very careful to point this out — that there are no real effects of alcohol which are relevant in explaining social behavior; in fact, he outlined a social learning theory to explain these expectancy effects.

There are some intriguing questions about how the expectancies arise. If there should be no actual physiological effects which are relevant to disinhibited behavior, I think this would be an important area for study. Is it just that we extrapolate from, for example, the real extreme reactions to alcohol by biologically or psychologically atypical individuals with perhaps atypical consumption patterns? Or, is it a generalization from the effects of alcohol on psychomotor abilities? Or, to borrow MacAndrew and Edgerton's term, on physical comportment? Anyway, we need to think this through.

As I mentioned, I personally do not think that alcohol is totally inactive in determining behavior and social interaction in alcohol use events, and the whole discussion by Dr. Lang points to the necessity of taking into account the whole range of dimensions and values of dimensions — such as different blood alcohol levels — in assessing the potentially causal role of alcohol in disinhibited behavior. And so does his brief discussion of the two theories which are based on alcohol's possible effects on cognition, but which do not seem to take into account the explanatory significance of expectancies regarding alcohol and its effects.

Culture, pharmacology and psychology are all relevant, and probably relevant to different degrees in different subpopulations with different drinking patterns and beliefs about drinking. The task of those who want to advance the field is to try to disentangle these influences and work out the pharmacological aspects, the cultural aspects, the expectancy aspects — the symbolic and rhetorical, the social utility or voluntaristic, if you will — aspects of the link. All these things are important. And as I heard Robin Room say: We should note that the cultural factors should not be viewed as being less real than the pharmacological ones.
It seems to me that we are on the threshold of some exciting developments in the field of explanation of behavior connected with alcohol use and also of reasons why people drink. After a long period of what seems like narrow, causalistic thinking on alcohol effects, on the one hand, and insightful and valid but somewhat disparate voluntaristic descriptions of alcohol effects — including the lost wisdoms of anthropology — we seem to be on the verge of consolidating the knowledge gained from these traditions and, hopefully, also integrating research approaches which would grow out of such a consolidation. The experimental findings on the powerful effects of expectancies on drunken comportment are extremely important. But, as Dr. Lang correctly points out, we are merely beginning at the beginning of a theoretical and hopefully methodologically integrated effort which should prove very fruitful.
Discussion

JOY LELAND: I want to ask Dr. Lang a question. I was interested in what you saw in the way of policy implications from your findings and your suggestion that we might just tell people about these expectancy effects and see what this did. Could you use that in an experiment?

I was looking through your paper. I think you mentioned that someone else had done that in a way — either telling people that behavior was going to be altered in a certain way or it wasn't going to be — just providing information about expectancy effects and what we know about them and filtering that into the experiment. Wouldn't that be sort of fun?

LANG: Well, aside from possibly being fun, the findings from efforts to manipulate people's expectations about what the effects will be rather than their expectations about what they're receiving suggest that that's not a very powerful manipulation; that is, if you tell people that alcohol is going to make you do something that you don't think it's going to make you do, you tend not to believe it and behave accordingly. So, that has not proven to be a very fruitful way of exploring this connection.

As for looking at whether or not manipulating or telling people what the actual expectation effect is and showing them how that might subsequently influence their behavior, I expect that, since most of the subjects in these experiments were undergraduates who weren't particularly enamored with participating in the experiments in the first place, their inclination would be to disprove whatever your theory was if they had a chance to do it. And I see that there would be considerable difficulties associated with trying to implement that kind of design; in other words, it might be fun for them but not for the experimenter.

MARLATT: We've done some work with problem drinkers who have very strong belief systems about the role of alcohol and their need for it; for example, somebody who really believes that drinking does make them feel really relaxed after a hard day at the office and so forth. I've actually brought people like that in at the end of a hard day and had them have a drink which is actually devoid of any alcoholic content — in this one particular case I have in mind, a man
who customarily drank a couple of beers very quickly right after work, we gave him near beer, which doesn't contain any alcohol to speak of, instead of the real beer, and we had him talk about how it felt. Yes, it does feel very relaxing and so forth — and then told him that in fact this was not due to the alcohol itself. In many cases, that has a real impact on the person's own belief system about how much they think they need alcohol to produce certain kinds of effects. And it seems that with people who depend on alcohol or have strong belief systems about the effects of alcohol on their own behavior that this procedure can alter attributional systems in such a way as to at least get your foot in the door when you're working with them.

LELAND: It sounds as if it might be kind of dangerous to the experimenter, too, if the guy gets mad enough.

LANG: They're usually delighted to have free alcohol, or what they think is free alcohol.

JAMES MOSHER: This morning we had a short discussion on the difficulties of going from animal behavior to human behavior and from laboratory behavior to outside behavior. Do you want to comment on your experiments in that light? What are the difficulties in translating your results into more complex settings, such as in bars.

LANG: I think it's certainly a significant problem, as I pointed out in the paper, and I think the direction that we need to go even in laboratory studies is toward looking more at actual interactions. The studies that have been described here, even those that involved more than one person, for the most part haven't been interactions; they've been one person behaving in the presence of another person. The other person either has some programmed way of behaving, or is not behaving at all, or is maybe not even there but the subject thinks that they're there, that sort of thing. I think that really minimizes the knowledge that we might gain from laboratory studies. We might look, for example, at conversational patterns and verbal communication in the laboratory as a function of expectancy manipulation as being one possible aspect that has really not been explored to date.

LUM: I want to ask Alan and Kai whether or not there have been any studies that try to look at expectancies from a social class standpoint. I was thinking about videotaping a whole bunch of typical scenes, such as well-dressed people in England drinking, and then stage a fight after, and then having people in the lab look at that and a whole series of such tableaux, and sit and talk about their expectancies with regard to these typical scenes.

LANG: No. As a matter of fact though, one of the things that a colleague of mine in the Sociology Department at the Florida State
University is currently planning is something very similar to what you've described: staging a variety of interactions between people and then giving the observers information, different information about whether or not they've been drinking and what explanations they give for their behavior under those circumstances. But, you've suggested a new idea, which might be to vary the dress or other characteristics of the individuals in the settings to see how that might affect their behavior also.

**EHLERS:** I thought it was interesting in the beginning of your paper, Dr. Lang, that you chose subjects who considered themselves to be heavy social drinkers versus subjects without much drinking experience. And there's been a common point made that I think is important, and that is that the ritualization or behavioral tolerance to alcohol may be an important preceding factor in the response that the person would have in the experiment, especially on a single trial basis.

**LANG:** Well, I think if people have a lot of experience with drinking, building up their pharmacologic and behavioral tolerance, they also have lots of experience with what the consequences of drinking are for themselves and with what the attitudes of the persons around them regarding their behavior while inebriated might be. And, in fact, it appears that fooling subjects, if you will, in these balanced placebo designs is much simpler with persons who are heavy drinkers because they have built up an anticipation of what reactions the cues will set off for them, and that includes both physiological cues and the social implications of those cues.

So, I think it's a point well taken, and as Dr. Pernanen has mentioned in trying to contrast the findings of Taylor and his colleagues and Pihl and his colleagues, one of the differences between those studies and the studies that I've described was that we exclusively selected people who were heavy drinkers, who might have systematically different expectations than those who were used in the other research, and this could at least partially account for the fact that we did not get an actual alcohol effect, whereas they did in the other studies.

**EHLERS:** I just want to say one other thing, and that is that in some classic studies in the early development of the brain opiate system it was found, in an analgesia study where the person was expecting an analgesic or placebo and where the drug had an analgesic effect or a painkiller effect, that it was, in fact, related to brain endorphin levels in response to the placebo. This indicates that there may be a physiological response to taking the placebo, which may be correlated to the same effect that the drug itself produces (Levine et al. 1978). So, there still may be a physiological
link even though it's disassociated, particularly with someone having an expectation or ritualized response set different from the pharmacological response.

**LANG:** The work of Siegel and his colleagues (Hinson and Siegel 1980), though, suggests that actually the reverse should happen. He's demonstrated that there is a drug compensatory reaction that is developed, presumably through a classical conditioning phenomenon, such that that person's physiologic reactions, when the drug cues are present, are counteractive to the actual effects of the drug. So, what we should anticipate if a placebo were given is that those counteractive effects would occur rather than a facilitative effect.

**EHLERS:** That depends on whether they've had prior experiences with the drug or not.

**LANG:** It might be difficult for us to find subjects who have not had prior experiences with alcohol.

**MARSHALL:** I wanted to come back to a point that Dr. Pernanen raised in his definitions of disinhibition, because one of the definitions you gave bothered me a lot, and that is you defined disinhibition as being behaviors that are in violation of or contravene social norms; I think we have to rethink that idea, because disinhibition, as you're using it there, may be, in fact, quite in keeping with social norms in the drinking context; certain kinds of disinhibited behaviors might be viewed as normal rather than deviant behavior in certain contexts where people are drinking. The word "deviant" always bothers me, and it came up in that definition, so I just wanted to get this out on the table as something we might kick around.

**PERNANEN:** Yes.

**PARTANEN:** I have a very trivial question concerning those really, truly shocking results you showed us about the inefficiency of alcohol. Have there been any balanced placebo experiments with blood alcohol levels well above the .1% level? In real-life situations one could expect that it would be far beyond that.

**LANG:** Well, I don't know whether one would expect that it would be far beyond that, but in answer to your question, no, there haven't been.

**PARTANEN:** You mentioned this as a reservation in the differences.

**LANG:** Well, it's difficult to tell to what extent alcohol might affect behavior at levels of .20, for example. In part, the difficulty — from an experimental point of view — is maintaining the deception at that level. When people are falling down drunk, you know, it's difficult for you to tell them they haven't received anything. That attempt would defy a man's credulity.

---

124
MOSHER: Perhaps the link between alcohol and violence is actually performing a function in the society. Alcohol provides an explanation and is in some sense an excuse for such violence.

LANG: Yes, I agree. The point was made in MacAndrew and Edgerton's book, and Robin Room's (Room 1980) paper says that there's a kind of a structural maintenance of the current social structure that is facilitated by these expectations. And I think that there is a broader social function rather than just the individual level that I focused on.

JOAN SILVERMAN: I'm an historian, not a social scientist, but in the Nineteenth Century, especially towards the end, alcohol was an explanation for everything that was wrong in the country. This was Eden and alcohol was the serpent, and it explained all the problems that existed: the paupers, and then the divorce, and the high accident rate, and everything was heaped on that. And that, apparently, is an American attitude. Hofstadter (1955) has addressed himself to this. It's looking for a scapegoat, and alcohol is certainly — at least in the literature of the Nineteenth Century — "the" scapegoat for everything that was wrong in the society.

ROOM: I think this is a good introduction to this afternoon. Herb Fingarette gets the last word.

FINGARETTE: My last word is that I find the scapegoat theory and the excuse theory, as an explanation of why people drink or how people view drinkers who get into trouble, a very "provocative" kind of explanation. It seems entirely plausible that something of this kind operates, but it is an explanation which leaves more questions than it answers; if you know that something is going to make you irresponsible, then what is the psychology or the moral reasoning — whichever way you want — of drinking alcohol while knowing this? That is, how could you view yourself as excusable for your future irresponsible conduct if, as we are assuming, you believed even at the time you took the alcohol that it would make you irresponsible, disinhibited? How can that possibly make sense psychologically — or logically? It seems to me that question is generally not addressed, and the more you think about it, the more puzzling and basic it becomes.

MARSHALL: That assumes human behavior to be sensible.

ROOM: Well, we'll have time for more discussion of that.
The Good Creature of God and the Demon Rum: Colonial American and 19th Century Ideas About Alcohol, Crime, and Accidents*

Harry Gene Levine

Preface†

This paper was first drafted several years ago in conjunction with the "Alcohol, Casualties, and Crime" study conducted by the Social Research Group, University of California, Berkeley. The casualty project was a large-scale review of the literature on the relationship of alcohol to what were termed "serious events," essentially crimes and accidents. I was commissioned to prepare a short report on historical aspects of the question, along the lines of a paper I had written tracing ideas about alcohol addiction. I had done quite a bit of research and thinking about the Temperance movement and the history of the liquor problem in America, but the question of "casualties" was not one I had ever considered. The assignment was a sort of exercise for me: Given what I knew, and what I could learn quickly, what could I say about the question?

My personal agenda involved broadening my understanding of the ways Americans have interpreted the relationship of alcohol to

*References and footnotes are combined for this paper and appear as endnotes.
the individual and to society I had become convinced that many of the ways the "alcohol problem" is defined today were first articulated in their essential forms at the beginning of the 19th century when physicians and laymen associated with the Temperance movement argued for a new view of alcohol as a dangerous and destructive substance. The new view of alcohol and its effects quickly became part of scientific and popular understanding and continues to shape thought today. My earlier paper had traced the birth of the contemporary idea of addiction, suggesting that the condition and experience of the habitual drunkard was fundamentally reinterpreted or reconstructed at the end of the 18th century. I now wanted to use the casualty project paper as a way of looking at how ideas about an incident of drunkenness differed from one period to the next. I was sure there had been significant changes, though I was not at all sure what they were.

The paper was to have been a fast and easy once-over, but I became fascinated and overwhelmed by the data and the conceptual questions, and it grew far longer and more detailed than ever imagined. I also became involved in the intellectual questions of the casualty project and my focus was developed in regular conversations with the directors of the study, Robin Room and Ron Roizen. Ultimately, I never really wrote the paper they wanted, nor what I had hoped to do. As a way of arranging evidence and argument, I grafted the conceptual division suggested by the work of MacAndrew and Edgerton onto my historical schema in order to set up a discussion of what to me was the really interesting question: the 200-year medical and popular obsession with self-control and self-restraint. However, the paper directly addresses that point only in the final 10 pages of the text. Much of the paper sorts through and arrays the differing ideas about alcohol as a cause of crime or accidents in the colonial period and the 19th century. Finally, because no one had ever done anything like this, I was encouraged to include lots of evidence and examples that could be used by others. My paper became, therefore, something of an archive for the casualty project and for further work on the question.

I have presented the paper at sociology meetings, and it has been circulated within the alcohol field, but I have never published it in a journal. Partly I always thought I would find time to cut and rewrite it; partly I was never satisfied with the focus on causality, and some generalizations about it and other issues. When I first wrote this paper I included ideas about both alcohol and drunkenness as a cause. I have revised the paper for this conference focusing exclusively as possible on ideas only about alcohol as a cause of crime and accidents. There is clearly a major difference between
viewing alcohol or drunkenness as a cause of something; I hope one topic of this conference will be exploring the different implications and assumptions involved in making alcohol or drunkenness (or other things) the independent variable in causal statements.

Introduction

The history of ideas or sociology of knowledge about alcohol problems does not exist as a field or body of literature. There is only one monograph on American drinking practices and attitudes before the 20th century, and it covers only the 50 years between 1790 and 1840 (Rorabaugh 1979). Outside of a handful of studies on the Temperance movement, there is almost nothing systematic written on 17th, 18th, or 19th century American attitudes about drinking or drunkenness.

This paper attempts to chart colonial and 19th century American thought about the relationship of alcohol to crime and accidents. It should be frankly noted at the outset that this report is tentative and somewhat speculative. It is covering almost 300 years of American history, discussing a question which has never been treated before. Thus it only attempts to outline broad features of American thought on the topic, suggesting certain fundamental continuities, as well as discontinuities and shifts. This paper, then, is just a beginning; it is hoped that further work will refine and add to the points made here.

We are concerned here with short-term incidents—as opposed to chronic conditions; such incidents or “serious events” can be divided into two types:

- Accidents in which individuals inadvertently harm themselves or others (falls, drownings, transportation, industrial, and fire accidents); and
- Crimes or acts of violence and aggression against people or property (rape, fights, brawls, family beatings, murder, robbery, theft, muggings, arson, and suicide).

The focus here is on how Americans have perceived the relationship between alcohol and these events, and particularly whether alcohol was thought to cause them. Like the few other students of the history of American attitudes toward drink (Gusfield, Krout, Rorabaugh), I have found significant differences between the colonial period and the 19th century. Indeed, one aim of this paper is to clarify and extend what is known about those differences.

To analyze how Americans have perceived the effects of alcohol on behavior, I have adapted the two broad categories described by MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969). I call these deviant physical comportment and deviant social comportment.
By deviant physical comportment I mean things like stumbling, falling, mispronouncing words, and passing out. MacAndrew and Edgerton argue that all cultures and societies which have regularly used alcoholic beverages have believed that alcohol consumed in sufficient quantities causes some physical incapacity. Given enough alcohol, individuals lose some coordination and balance; they become dizzy, and even lose consciousness. Alcohol affects sensorimotor capacities, and drunkenness is a state of being temporarily physically handicapped. Thus alcohol or drunkenness might be said to cause accidents, as in the case of a drunken individual who falls into a well or drives into a tree.

By deviant social comportment I mean illegal, immoral, unethical, sinful, or just bad behavior—behavior which violates norms, values, or laws about proper conduct. MacAndrew and Edgerton point out that while in all societies drunken persons manifest deviant physical comportment (staggering, etc.), in only some cultures and societies do they manifest deviant social comportment. In societies where individuals do act immorally or criminally when drunk, there are a number of themes employed to explain how alcohol causes such behavior. It is said that alcohol heightens passions, animal impulses, and desires; that it weakens moral controls, the conscience, or super-ego; that it affects higher portions of the brain; and that drinking alcohol involves possession by spirits, demons, or the devil. Many Americans in the 19th century believed at least some of the above. On the other hand, people in other cultures and societies, including colonial America, observed that drinking or drunkenness accompanied or preceded deviant social behavior, but they did not believe alcohol was the cause of the deviant behavior. In this paper, therefore, I am expanding on MacAndrew and Edgerton's thesis. I am suggesting that in some of the cultures and historical periods in which there is a considerable amount of deviant social comportment while drunk, people do not explain that deviant behavior with reference to the effect of alcohol.

In the following pages, first for the colonial period, and then for the 19th century, I briefly review important drinking patterns and examine thought about the relationship of liquor to deviant social and physical comportment (crime and accidents). Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss some of the social and ideological underpinnings of the idea of alcohol as disinhibitor (1).
Colonial America

Colonial America has a "reputation for earthiness and lustiness" and even Puritan New England manifested a spirit we, today, identify as "Elizabethan" (2). Called the "Good Creature of God" even by Puritans, liquor, and especially rum, was an unequivocal good and an essential part of life. According to Rorabaugh, doctors prescribed rum for "colds, fever, snakebites, frosted toes, and broken legs. As a medication it was both a pain reliever and a stimulant. It would cure depression by raising spirits, relieve tension by creating mirth."(3) John Allen Krout, the foremost historian of the early Temperance movement, summed up colonial attitudes about alcohol thusly:

Parents gave it to children for many of the minor ills of childhood, and its wholesomeness for those in health, it appeared, was only surpassed by its healing properties in case of disease. No other element seemed capable of satisfying so many human needs. It contributed to the success of any festive occasion and instilled those in sorrow and distress. It gave courage to the soldier, endurance to the traveller, foresight to the statesman, and inspiration to the preacher. It sustained the sailor and the plowman, the trader and the trapper. By it were lighted the fires of revelry and of devotion. Few doubted that it was a great boon to mankind.(4)

The predominant drinking pattern in the 17th century was the regular, daily, use of alcohol in moderate quantities, with some incidence of drunkenness. The tavern was a key institution, the center of social and political life. Frequently located near the meeting house, it provided the main source of secular recreation and entertainment. Wedding parties, funerals, and even church services were held in the tavern. Running a tavern was regarded as important and responsible business and, like every other aspect of life, taverns were carefully regulated by the ruling class; in New England, for example, tavern owners were supposed to make sure that their patrons did not get drunk. Drunkenness did, of course, occur with considerable frequency, and the stocks, whipings, fines, and wearing the red letter "D" were among the punishments meted out, especially to lower class individuals (5).

The degree of drinking and drunkenness at all levels of society was considerable. One writer suggested the drinking at ministers' funerals could be taken as an indication of larger drinking patterns. For example, in 1685 at the funeral of Reverend Thomas Cobbett, the mourners consumed a barrel of wine and two barrels of rum.
cider (6). Outside of New England, things were not at all restrained; according to Edmund Morgan, the tobacco boom in 17th-century Virginia produced an enormous demand for alcoholic beverages. The thirst of Virginians became notorious in England, and the ships that sailed up the James River were heavily freighted with sack and strong waters, even if they neglected to bring more solid fare.... The ships that anchored in Virginia’s great rivers every summer were, as one settler observed, moving taverns.... The Virginians crowded aboard and drank away their promises and their profits. Anything that smelled of alcohol would sell.(7)

By the early 1700s, drinking and drunkenness had increased, and they continued to do so throughout the 18th century. Rum manufacture began around 1700 and, mixed with juices, rum became a favored drink. The general pattern for the 18th century was for men and women to drink alcohol everyday, at all times throughout the day, and in large quantities on almost every special occasion.

The respectable elements of society, especially the upper and upper middle classes, set a prodigious drinking standard. Ministers’ ordinations are often mentioned as occasions of heavy drinking. According to one visitor, Captain Francis Goelet, the upper classes of Boston, especially the prospering mercantilists, had a “very merry” social life, which included parties, tavern hopping, and drinking until dawn(8). At a dinner honoring the French Ambassador, New York Governor George Clinton and his 120 dinner guests consumed “135 bottles of Madeira, 36 of port, 60 of English beer, and 30 bowls of rum punch.” In the Southern colonies things were no different. According to William Byrd, during Virginia’s Quarter Session “people ‘came to court and got drunk.’ On election days, he ‘walked to the courthouse, where the people were most of them drunk’.... Even the gatherings of the colony’s most important men were accompanied by liquor. When the Council of State convened, they were furnished regularly with a brandy punch. At many of these meetings Byrd and his colleagues ‘were merry and almost drunk.’ "(9)

The lower class at least equaled, and probably exceeded, the standards set by the upper class. Over the course of the 18th century taverns multiplied in number, became centers for working class social life, and were less and less under the direct control of the elite groups(10). Workers received a daily allotment of rum, and certain days were set aside for drunken bouts; in some cases employers paid for the liquor. For example, George Washington’s agreement with his gardener included “four dollars at Christmas with which he
may be drunk for four days and nights; two dollars at Easter to
effect the same purpose; two dollars at Whitsuntide to be drunk for
two days."(11) Heavy drinking was also part of special occasions
like corn huskings, barn raising, court and meeting days, and
especially training days. Even by the beginning of the 18th century,
Cotton Mather was complaining that "Training Days become little
other than Drinking Days."
(12) And in Virginia, after one militia
drill, William Byrd provided a punch which, he observed, "enter-
tained all the people and made them drunk."(13)
The universality of alcoholic beverages for much of the 18th
century, and for the early 19th century as well, has been aptly
described by William Rorabaugh, who writes:
The drinking of alcohol was pervasive in American cul-
ture; it crossed regional, sexual, racial, and class lines. Americans drank at home and abroad, alone and
together, at work and at play, in fun and in earnest. They drank from the crack of dawn to the crack of dawn. At
night taverns were crowded with boisterous, uproarious,
mirthmaking tipplers. Americans drank before meals,
with meals, and after meals. They drank while working
in the fields, and while travelling across half a continent.
They drank at formal events such as weddings, ministeri-

tial ordinations, and wakes, and on informal occasions—
by the fireside, or on a hot day when the mood called.(14)
In short, colonial Americans drank and drank and drank and they
got drunk.

Physical Comportment and Accidents

Colonials were well aware that alcohol consumed in sufficient
quantities affected physical or sensorimotor capacities. Connecti-
cut law described a drunk person as someone "bereaved or disabled
in his use of his understanding, appearing in his speech or gesture."
And in Plymouth, Massachusetts, the colonial government defined
a drunken individual as a person "that lisps or falters in his speech
by reason of drink, or that staggers in his going or that vomits or
cannot follow his calling."(15) On the more everyday level, one
historian of early America suggested that some colonials, at least,
subscribed to the following definition of drunkenness:
Not drunk is he who from the floor,
Can rise again and still drink more,
But drunk is he who prostrate lies.
Without the power to drink or rise.(16)
In a similar vein, Ebenezer Cook reported in the original *Sot-Weed Factor* that on a Maryland court day, "A Herd of Planters on the ground, O'er-whelmed with Punch, dead drunk we found."(17)

Colonials also believed accidents resulted from people being physically affected by alcohol. Carl Bridenbaugh found that notices of deaths from drunkenness "appeared frequently in the newspapers." For example, a New York newspaper reported in 1764 that Margaret Jones "drank too freely of spirituous liquor, fell from the Main Deck into the hold of the Coventry man of war . . . and was killed." And in 1728, a Benjamin Douglass of Newport was killed while relieving himself: "being in drink and going into a little house he fell down from ye seat and broke his neck."(18) One Puritan minister suggested that some people, "by their being drowned first in Drink, have been exposed to a second drowning in the Water."(19) Finally, there may have been cases where some persons literally drank themselves to death. In 1741 Philadelphia newspapers reported a girl "about 4 or 5 years of Age, died by drinking a large quantity of Rum."(20)

A poem, "The Danger of Excessive Drinking," captured well, if in somewhat exaggerated form, the casualties thought to result from drinking too much alcohol.

How many fall down by the way,
Are killed in the dark.
And so their lives are swept away,
This often we may remark.

Liable to fall into the fire,
And there to burn to death.
Then suddenly they must expire,
To flame must yield their breath.

Seamen their spirits to inflame,
Scarce able for to steer.
So thousands perish in the main,
Large numbers every year.

Some almost perish with the cold,
And others freeze to death.
So many die before they're old,
So they lose their breath.

The problem addressed by this last verse, that people got so drunk they did not realize how cold it was, was probably not unusual given
the drinking habits and the northern winters. Another point made in the poem, and also made by Cotton Mather (1708) in a sermon, was that soldiers might be injured or killed in battle because they were drunk. The colonial period was marked by a number of wars, and although drink was an essential part of the soldiers' ration, excessive drinking could make one incapable of fighting very well.

Some generals upon the land,
Their armies are made small.
By this we sometimes understand,
Many of them do fall. (21)

The types of accidents discussed in the poem, and also in newspaper accounts and sermons, were ones in which the only injury was sustained by the drinker; intoxicated individuals fell, froze, drowned, and got beaten up. Colonials did not seem to worry much about drunken people inadvertently injuring others. Probably the best example was the case of fire. Fire was a terribly serious problem for colonials, and throughout the period they constantly sought means of controlling it. Though they were ever on the lookout for the causes of accidental fires, it seems not to have occurred to colonials to blame drinking alcohol. They did, however, find another common habit to blame. Massachusetts lawmakers forbid smoking “out of doors” because, as they put it, “fires have been often occasioned by taking tobacco.” Similarly, Pennsylvania officials ordered fines for anyone who “shall presume to smoke tobacco in the streets of Philadelphia either by day or night.” The comparison with alcohol is striking: In Charlestown, for example, the night watch, whose major duties included watching for fires, were given permits to sell liquor. Indeed, alcoholic beverages played an important role vis-a-vis fires, but not the one we might expect, as Bridenbaugh has pointed out.

Panic stricken Bostonians prayed fervently to Jehovah, and bravely sought to arrest the progress of each fire when it broke out, but with the methods then known there was little they could do beyond saving their movable property. On such occasions, to revive their flagging courage, they depended upon other than heavenly stimulants, as in 1672 when Nathaniel Bishop, innkeeper, supplied 3.6 worth of “beer” at Mrs. Oliver's fire, “by Order of the Deputy Governor and some of the select men.” Contemporary opinion clearly endorsed the theory that, “There's naught no doubt so much the spirit calms, As rum and true religion.” (22)
Social Comportment and Crime

In general, colonial Americans thought the effects of alcohol on the mind and body were overwhelmingly positive. However, colonials made two particular complaints about the effects of a bout of heavy drinking on social behavior.

For some members of the colonial elite, and especially Puritan ministers, the first order of complaint about drunkenness was simply with the state itself—drunkenness was sinful. "Now Drunkenness is a Vice which the Lord both in the Law and the Gospel hath strictly prohibited." Lawmakers defined drunkenness as judged by physical comportment as an offense, and in New England, at least, punished people for it. In religious and secular terms, drunkenness was a disorderly state(23).

Second, the colonial elite condemned the idleness they found intimately connected with drunkenness. Drinking to the point of drunkenness often meant that one was not working or following one's calling; further, if one drank enough one was unable to work—physically incapable of it. For Protestants generally, and Puritans especially, work was required and demanded by God. Moreover, idleness concerned the masters and supervisors of indentured servants, apprentices, laborers, and slaves. The relationship of drunkenness to labor discipline was explained well by Ernest Cherrington, the Prohibition movement's own historian.

Early efforts in the Massachusetts Colony to prevent the sale of intoxicating liquors to servants and apprentices were due to economic rather than to humanitarian motives ... and were not championed by the early colonists for any other reasons than that which grew out of class distinction, which was strongly marked in the early days of American history. The time and services of servants and apprentices were supposed to belong absolutely to their masters and principals. Consequently any time spent in loitering, drunkenness, or even in idling around public inns, was so much lost time; hence the early regulations against the sale to servants and apprentices were purely conservation measures from the view point of the master and employer.

As in England, employers believed that more money for workers "would only mean more time lost in drunkenness." In the Southern colonies masters were convinced their laborers were "shiftless, irresponsible, unfaithful, ungrateful, dishonest; and that they got drunk whenever possible." Employers tried to prevent their laborers from getting drunk in order to keep them working(24). In short,
colonials believed that alcohol in sufficient quantities caused two particular deviant social behaviors — the physical state of drunkenness, and idleness(25).

Except with regard to Indians, and perhaps habitual drunkards, both of which we will discuss later, colonial Americans did not in general believe that the effect of alcohol on the mind or body caused people to act wild, rowdy, or immorally. They did not believe alcohol caused people to fight, brawl, attack, mug, rob, or beat each other up; they did not think it caused men to rape women, or parents to beat their children. In short, colonials did not believe alcohol caused people to be physically aggressive or violent; they did not believe alcohol caused crime.

There is no doubt that colonials recognized that drinking and drunkenness preceded and often accompanied violent and criminal behavior. Rioters, brawlers, robbers, muggers, and murderers were often drunk. Although colonists noticed that lawbreakers were drunk, they did not believe alcohol caused lawbreaking, and they usually explained the association between drunkenness and crime without referring to the effect of alcohol on the mind or body.

Often they focused on the tavern. During the 18th century, taverns increasingly moved out from under elite control and became autonomous centers of lower class social and political life. Workers spent evenings and free time there, as did prostitutes, criminals, and the unemployed. People met their friends and neighbors in the tavern, gambled, and plotted various activities. Wealthy and powerful colonials believed taverns were seedbeds of disorder. John Adams tried unsuccessfully to reduce the number, and Benjamin Franklin labelled them a pest. In fact, probably the main drinking- and drunkenness-related complaint made during the period was about taverns. Drunkenness was associated with crime and violence, it was thought, because the main place where one would get drunk was also the place where one would be encouraged to engage in all sorts of illegal or immoral activities. Thus while alcoholic beverages were not seen as a cause of crime and violence, the lower class tavern was(26).

Colonial Americans had a number of explanations for why drunken individuals engaged in violent or criminal behavior. Besides blaming the tavern, colonials blamed the lack of police or military force, the irresponsibility of the night watch, various political and economic factors, a lack of religiosity among people, and the natural depravity of human beings. And perhaps the most common explanation was simply that people who committed crimes, drunk or not, were bad people—the “rabble”(27).

In general, drunkenness was not so much seen as the cause of
deviant social behavior—in particular crime and violence—as it was construed as a sign that an individual was willing to engage in such behavior. Ministers, especially Puritans, believed that drunkenness opened one to the devil: by getting drunk, or by frequently getting drunk, a person was in essence admitting a willingness to do the Devil’s work. A more secularized version of this identified drunkenness as a sinful, “unclean,” or disorderly act, and allowed that after having committed one such act a person would be more willing to commit others—a variation on “well now that I’ve gotten my hands dirty, I might as well keep going.” In colonial society, the act of getting drunk was interpreted by both participant and observer as an indication that the drinker was willing to take “time out.” By getting drunk one was, in effect, saying “I choose not to act according to strict morality,” and depending upon the case the observer might reasonably conclude that other immoral, illegal, or deviant acts would follow.

Habitual Drunkards

Puritan ministers were the only group to imply that alcohol caused colonists to behave illegally or immorally, and they almost always did so only in relation to drunkards or habitual drunkards. Given the ubiquity of alcoholic beverages, even the most righteous might occasionally or accidentally become, as Increase Mather put it, “merely drunken.” The ministers, therefore, directed their attacks against repeated drunkenness and against the drunkard. For Puritans, an incident of drunkenness was a disorderly state. Regular or habitual drunkenness, therefore, was a kind of permanent disorder of both behavior and personality. As Samuel Danforth explained, such a condition could incline people to commit “all those Sins to which they are either by nature or Custom inclined.” Making a similar point, Cotton Mather called drunkenness “this Engine of the Devil” (28).

Puritan ministers implied that liquor caused crime, but they were bound by the logic of their theology which always made the individual responsible for moral choices. To have said that alcohol caused crime would have been to say that under certain conditions people are unable to do God’s will. In *Freedom of the Will* (1754), Jonathan Edwards offered one of the best summations of the Puritan position. He wrote:

> It cannot be truly said, according to the ordinary use of language that a malicious man, let him be never so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his neighbor kindness; or that a drunkard,
let his appetite be never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power if he has it in his choice or at his election. . . . Therefore, in these things, to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability, is not just.(29)

Thus ministers chose their words carefully and did not claim that alcoholic beverages caused sin. Alcohol was a "creature of God" and could no more cause sin than, say, a piece of wood; thus even when describing the consequences of habitual drunkenness, Puritans avoided causal language(30).

Indians

As noted earlier, the only times colonials routinely considered alcohol a cause of crime or violence was with regard to Indians. All the colonies had laws forbidding the sale of liquor to Indians. The laws, however, were only erratically enforced—there was profitable trade with Indians. The restrictions, based on the settlers' fears and fantasies about Indian violence, appeared to have some basis in reality. Europeans introduced Indians to alcohol, and the natives seemed to respond to it explosively; Indians sometimes did exhibit significant degrees of aggressive and violent behavior while drunk.

In Drunken Comportment (1969), MacAndrew and Edgerton review a number of first-hand accounts of Indian drinking and report that both Europeans and Indians explained the aggressive, violent, and sexual behavior of Indians by referring to alcohol. One observer in Nova Scotia in 1693 said: "The brandy that they drink without moderation, carries them to obscenities and extremities of fury and cruelty which are unimaginable. They slaughter one another, they murder one another like ferocious beasts; being drunk they disfigure their faces." Another anonymous report in 1705 claimed: "Everyone knows the passion of the savages for this liquor, and the fatal effects that it produces on them....The village or cabin in which the savages drink brandy is an image of hell." In 1750, a French priest noted: "The savages—especially the Illinois, who are the gentlest and most tractable of men—become when intoxicated, madmen and wild beasts. They fall upon one another, stab with their knives, and tear one another."(31)

These sorts of statements about the effects of liquor on Indians were made early in the 17th century, and commonly repeated throughout the colonial period; but such statements were rarely made about whites. Further, Indians themselves regularly explained their own behavior while drunk by referring to the
effects of alcohol. In the 1630s, after one Indian had killed a member of his own tribe, a Father LeJune was told: "It was brandy and not the Savage who had committed this murder....'Put thy wine and thy brandy in prison,' they say: 'It is thy drinks that do all the evil, and not we.'"(32) In his autobiography, Benjamin Franklin told of being sent, around 1750, to negotiate a treaty with the "Indians at Carlisle." He refused to sell them any liquor while they were doing business "as those people are extremely apt to get drunk and when so are very quarrelsome and disorderly." After the treaty was settled, however, Franklin supplied them with enough for a big party. "They were all drunk," he wrote, "men and women, quarreling and fighting... running after and beating one another with firebrands." The next day the Indians "sent three of their old counsellors to make apology. The orator acknowledged the fault, but laid it upon the rum."(33)

Like whites, Indians sometimes engaged in a variety of aggressive, violent, and "out of bounds" behaviors while drunk. And, like whites, sometimes they did not. MacAndrew and Edgerton document many cases where Indians got drunk and simply sat around, talked, prayed, or fell asleep. The authors' aim in amassing a range of examples of different types of drunken comportment, from a variety of cultures around the world, is to utterly discredit the contemporary idea that alcohol as a drug or chemical affects the brain or body so as to produce deviant social behavior. They suggest, instead, that drunken comportment is learned and normatively regulated behavior. In many cultures, drinking to the point of drunkenness is part of something they call "time out"—a socially "sanctioned time and place for doing many things that would be categorically inexcusable under normal circumstances."(34) Thus one learns how to act when drunk, including the kinds of situations which are time out and those which are not. Indians, they argue, introduced to alcohol by whites, learned how to act when drunk from watching whites.

MacAndrew and Edgerton's brilliant reformulation of the question of drunken behavior is essentially correct(35). Indeed, one aim of this paper is to extend and locate their insights in historical terms. I am suggesting that the ideological horse they ferociously try to beat to death—the idea that alcohol dissolves super-egos—has a history, at least with regard to crime and violence. Only at the end of the 18th century do European-Americans begin to talk seriously about alcohol as a cause of their own criminal and violent behavior. And not until the 19th century did large numbers of whites believe that alcohol affected their behavior in the same way as it did Indians.
To sum up: Colonial Americans drank a great deal of alcohol often to drunkenness. They noticed its effects on physical comportment, and they believed it affected the body in such a way as to cause accidents. Colonials also believed that liquor consumed in sufficient quantities caused idleness and drunken comportment, and both were judged by some people as sinful or illegal. In the overwhelming majority of cases, colonial Americans did not believe alcohol affected the mind or body so as to cause violence or crime. They noticed that drunkenness frequently accompanied violent and criminal behavior, and they had theological, political, economic, and other explanations for that association. Moreover, there were two apparent contradictions in colonial thought about the relationship of alcohol and drunkenness to crime and violence.

A handful of Puritan ministers, the one group of all colonials most concerned with issues of self-control and self-discipline, came closest to describing drunkenness as a condition in which violent impulses were beyond control. Drunkenness was clearly a disorderly state, and the ministers believed that people who regularly consume intoxicating amounts of alcohol were more likely to commit crimes, but to have said that alcohol caused crime would have taken responsibility away from the individual and made alcohol a force or power beyond the control of the will. As Perry Miller has pointed out, for Puritans, other than God’s will, “there can be no compulsion upon man”; the individual always had the freedom to choose to sin or not(36). The Devil or God could be held responsible for human events, but a physical object like alcohol could not. In short, drunkenness was viewed as a sign or indicator of depravity and not as a cause of it.

Second, although colonials were not willing to blame their own deviant social behavior on liquor, they were quite willing to say that alcohol caused Indians to act violently. A full discussion of why colonials believed liquor caused Indians to be violent and criminal is not possible here, but a few things should be noted. For the European settlers, Indians were radically different creatures from whites; they were savages, almost a different species. Indians did not live like or conduct themselves like Europeans. Colonials believed that Indians were naturally violent and bloodthirsty and that they were compelled by their natures in ways that whites were not. That liquor might also compel Indians to act violently was not difficult for colonials to accept. Further, Indians blamed alcohol for their own deviant behavior while drunk. Indians said that liquor made them violent and in the absence of other explanations for the behavior, and knowing very little about the natives, colonists were willing to take Indians at their word(37).
In short, colonials had little difficulty maintaining two different assumptions about the effects of liquor: one for Indians, and one for whites. However, in the 19th century—when whites came to regard the effects of liquor on themselves in much the same way as colonials had described liquor's effects on Indians—the two images came together. In a sense, only during the 19th century, when whites came to recognize and fear the "Indian" in themselves—the uncontrolled savage within—did alcohol as a substance become problematic.

Nineteenth Century

The 50-year period from roughly 1776 to 1826 marked a transition in American thought about the problematic consequences of drinking and drunkenness. At the beginning of the period alcohol was the good creature of God for virtually everyone; by the end a significant and rapidly growing minority had concluded that distilled liquor was a demon, and within another 20 years millions of Americans had pledged to give up use of alcoholic beverages entirely. The new view of alcohol was part of a larger social and economic transformation; changes in drinking patterns were part of that transformation, and they, in turn, provided fuel and evidence for the new image of alcohol as a demon.

Drinking Patterns

According to Rorabaugh, during the first 3½ decades of the 19th century, per capita consumption rose among most people, especially the working classes. However, he suggests that a decline began to appear among the upper and upper middle classes. The new abstemious pattern, or at least the much less frequent use of alcohol, quickly spread after 1830 to a broad cross section of the middle class, and even certain sections of the working class. For the rest of the 19th century (and the 20th century as well), consumption remained significantly below the 18th and early 19th century levels.

The strongest support for total abstinence came from native born, middle and upper middle class Protestants. In the 19th century, for the middle class and middle class aspiring, alcoholic beverages were tabooed. Abstinence was part of the middle class lifestyle, justified in terms of a whole system of values and ideals. The lower classes, on the other hand, retained well into the century the older traditional view of alcohol as a "good creature" and the
tendency toward frequent and heavy use. The only study bearing on drinking in the general population during the period implies that regardless of sex and ethnicity, the poor and working class drank more than the middle class and wealthy(38).

One of the most significant differences between colonial times and the 19th century was the status accorded the tavern—the main drinking-related social institution. In the colonial period the tavern had been an important part of social and community life; in the 19th century, the tavern was stigmatized, identified with the lower classes and immigrants, and an essentially male preserve. In the 19th century the saloon was where middle class men went slumming, and where all men went to get away from their families. Further, while some colonials had complained about people who spent too much time in taverns, the 19th century featured the full flowering of a heavy-drinking subculture, isolated and stigmatized by the more respectable elements of the community(39).

For our purposes, the most important change in drinking patterns was the development among the middle class of a pattern which William Rorabaugh has called "individual binge drinking"(40). As drinking alcohol became excluded from more and more parts of everyday life and associated with nonfamily and nonwork activities, it became increasingly disreputable to have even one drink. Further, as the pace of rapidly developing capitalist society came to demand a high degree of organization and discipline in one's daily life, "drinking time" came also to be a time to let go of the impulses and desires ordinarily kept in check. For men especially, when the pressures of maintaining control in work or family life built up, to get really drunk was one of the only outlets available—it was "time out." Thus if a respectable man was ever to go to a prostitute, beat his wife, get in a fight, or do anything he would not ordinarily do, he would very likely drink before doing it—or would do it when drunk. To get drunk was to abandon both respectability and self-control. Further, the middle and upper class domination of political and economic life restricted drinking times for the working classes as well. For factory workers on 12-hour schedules, for miners, railroad workers, and lumberjacks, one or two nights a week were set aside for play—which in many cases meant getting drunk. Drunkenness was socially structured as a time for letting go and forgetting the hard labor of the rest of the week. For both middle and working classes, then, to get drunk was to enter a time and space in which one did not worry about self-control and self-discipline.
The Quaker reformer Anthony Benezet, today most noted for his antislavery efforts, wrote what one Temperance writer called the first American Temperance pamphlet. Benezet’s attack on ardent spirits, entitled “The Mighty Destroyer Displayed,” concentrated on liquor’s detrimental effect on health, religiosity, and worker efficiency. Benezet did not describe specific immoral or illegal acts which result from consuming spirits, but he did make a general statement about the effects of spirits on passions, morality, and religiosity.

The most afflictive and dreadful effect of the common use of distilled spirituous liquors is that it not only heightens the passions of men and depraves their morals, but what is infinitely worse, and ought to be an awakening consideration, they become prophane and abandoned, and to the last degree regardless of their duty to God and man; the feelings of the mind are gradually benumbed, and an insensibility to the healing influence of religion ensues.(41)

Benezet was not the first American to say such things; ministers had occasionally made similar statements about the excessive use of alcohol, and about habitual drunkenness, and many colonists had said such things about Indians. Benezet’s statement was unique, however, because it was couched in the general framework of a case against all use of distilled liquors. For the first time someone was unambiguously claiming that liquor caused bad behavior.

Dr. Benjamin Rush, prominent American physician and a disciple of Benezet’s, played the key role in launching the antispirits crusade, and eventually the total-abstinence movement. In “An Inquiry into the Effects of Ardent Spirits,” first published in 1784 and revised a number of times, Rush, like Benezet, focused on issues of health and disease, but he also listed specific immoral, illegal, and violent acts which he thought were directly caused by consuming spirits. According to Rush, distilled spirits:

- impair the memory, debilitate the understanding, and pervert the moral faculties... They produce not only falsehood, but fraud, theft, uncleanness, and murder.

Like the demoniac mentioned in the New Testament, their name is “legion,” for they convey into the soul a host of vices and crimes.(42)

Rush’s case against distilled liquor provided fuel for a growing concern about drinking and drunkenness as increasing numbers of wealthy and powerful Americans became concerned with the
effects of liquor on morality, order, and worker discipline. Major Protestant denominations issued statements discouraging their members from using spirits, and some churches prohibited it entirely. Temperance societies were formed in many parts of the country, but before 1826 Temperance societies were primarily elite organizations, split on the question of whether they should encourage moderation in all drinks, or abstinence from spirits and moderation in beer and wine. By 1826, with the formation of the American Temperance Union, "Temperance" meant abstinence from distilled liquor, and by 1836 the Temperance crusade had become a mass movement committed to total abstinence from all alcoholic beverages. A new medical and popular understanding of the effects of alcohol on the mind and body had arrived.

The following discussion of 19th century thought about alcohol will concentrate on the ideology of the Temperance movement, for several reasons.

First of all, Temperance ideology was in part a product of changes in popular thought about alcohol, and the Temperance movement in turn shaped and changed popular opinion. The belief that liquor was the Good Creature did not die out, of course, and it was continually reinforced by the perspectives of immigrants from different cultural traditions. But the image of liquor as the merry-maker and cure-all tonic existed under the shadow of the Demon Rum. Nineteenth century Americans, especially middle class Protestants, lived in a society in which a whole series of assumptions and images about alcohol as a powerful and destructive substance made sense. People had at their disposal, in everyday terms, a symbol system in which alcohol was pernicious and evil. When contemporary writers talk about American ambivalence about alcohol, what they are groping to describe is the coexistence of two different gestalts of the relationship of alcohol to social life. In one picture, alcohol is medicine; in the other, it is poison. Both are plausible and both at times fit the facts. In one gestalt, alcohol makes people merry and sociable; in the other, it brings out destructive impulses and destroys moral sensibilities. Since the early 19th century both images have been part of the popular culture and imagination of the American people. The Temperance movement developed the most articulate and elaborate version of the image of alcohol as destroyer. And Temperance ideology offered the fullest use of alcohol as an explanation for social problems — in particular crime and violence.

Second, throughout the century the total abstinence position was extremely popular, and Temperance forces were very well organized. The Temperance movement was the largest enduring, secular
mass movement in 19th century America: doctors, lawyers, ministers, presidents, judges, Congressmen, and Senators, and a legion of elected officials, businessmen, merchants, laborers, farmers, and their wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters, supported the campaign to rid the Nation of alcohol. Temperance forces combined the pressure of their own formidable organizations with the weight of all the major Protestant denominations, a sizable contingent of Catholics, labor groups, farm groups, and numerous civic and professional associations. Temperance supporters turned out an enormous quantity of literature including pamphlets, articles, books, novels, short stories, plays, poetry, and songs, and major newspapers and magazines lent editorial support to the Temperance line. The power and impact of Temperance ideology is, perhaps, best illustrated by the fruit of the efforts of Edward C. Delavan, a wealthy merchant from Albany, New York. To a statement condemning the use of distilled liquor, Delavan secured the signatures of the following Presidents of the United States: Madison, Adams, Jackson, Van Buren, Tyler, Polk, Taylor, Fillmore, Pierce, Lincoln, and Johnson (44). Temperance ideology was respectable, respected, and not to be taken lightly.

Finally, for much of the century there was little ongoing organized opposition to Temperance. In local political conflicts, anti-Temperance support came from the alcohol beverage industry, immigrants groups—especially Germans, some merchants, and various ad hoc groupings. Outside of the liquor industry, there was no one interested in spending a great deal of time and energy refuting the argument that alcohol was a terrible evil and the cause of so many social problems. Further, because the campaign against alcoholic beverages began with the everyday observation that drunken individuals engaged in "time out" behavior—that people did things when drunk they would not do when sober—much of the Temperance argument appeared to be common sense. Anti-Temperance forces, therefore, were in the defensive position of trying to minimize the number of problems caused by liquor. In the major campaigns against prohibition, anti-Temperance groups tended to avoid taking on Prohibitionist arguments directly. It must be remembered that the Temperance movement flourished during laissez-faire capitalism when the political ideal (though not the reality) was of little or no State intervention in people's lives. Thus anti-Temperance writers and speakers focused on the issue of freedom: freedom to do whatever one wants, and freedom from government interference in private affairs and business. Hence, while a massive literature of Temperance arguments and facts was developed, until the 20th century there was no systematic body of
Good Creature of God and Demon Rum

anti-Temperance facts and positions. And even when they did write, anti-Temperance advocates did not, for obvious reasons, make detailed arguments about the social problems resulting from alcohol use.

In short, because it was so popular, well organized, respectable, and credible, the Temperance movement defined the terms of what became known as "the alcohol problem" in America. No one doubted that alcohol caused some problems; the only issue was which ones and to what extent.

Physical Comportment and Accidents

Like colonials, 19th century Americans believed that sufficient quantities of alcohol made people lose balance, stumble, fall down, and even pass out. Newspapers reported in some detail various accidents and injuries which resulted from drink. For example, in Main Street on the Middle Border, Lewis Atherton noted that small town newspapers were filled with stories of alcohol-induced accidents.

Newspapers and diarists constantly referred to tragedies resulting from intoxication. John E. Young of the little town of Athens, Illinois, recorded the death of a local physician in 1893 from an overdose of morphine following a drunken spree; the serious injury to a local citizen, who fell off the railroad car while on a "tare" in Springfield on the fourth of July, 1894; the loss of an arm by "old man Hess," who fell under a train at the local depot while on a Christmas drunk in 1895.

Such incidents were part of the regular life experience of most Americans. Nearly everybody knew or heard of someone who was injured or almost injured while drunk. Henry Conklin, in his memoirs about his "hard-scrapple" boyhood in New York, told of his father's almost freezing to death because he was too drunk to walk home to their farm. One time, after dragging his father in from the snow, Conklin was so upset that he swore that liquor would never touch his lips. Given the widespread apprehension about the effects of liquor, reactions like young Henry's were probably not uncommon.

Those people most concerned with showing any unfortunate consequence of drink, including accidents, were Temperance oriented. Accidents were not a major theme of Temperance speeches and literature, mainly because there were much more dramatic and awful things to talk about, but they were sometimes mentioned. A
pamphlet titled “Who Killed the Man,” issued around 1875 by the National Temperance Society, focused on the question of accidental deaths. After explaining that a drunken man was run over by a train, the pamphlet went through an entire cast of characters from the engineer of the train to the bartender, the distiller, the doctor, the minister, the victim’s wife, and so on, trying to determine who was responsible for the man’s death. The point, of course, was that his death was not really an accident, but was caused by liquor and an environment which sanctioned and encouraged drinking. Another tract published about the same time was about a woman who mistakenly drank poison and died, the moral being the dangers of drinking anything but water. One of the more bizarre accidents, which some Temperance writers described, occurred when a drinker’s breath ignited and the injuries. One study of sentimental fiction in the 19th century considered, in a somewhat humorous vein, the question of alcohol-related deaths, and cataloged an amazing variety of alcohol-related fatalities(48).

For Temperance supporters, and for many middle class Americans, the single most important negative effect of alcohol was that it weakened or destroyed self-control. The facts that drunken individuals did not walk well, talk well, think well, or act morally were all manifestations of alcohol’s effects on the system of inner controls. Thus Americans at the time did not divide the effects of alcohol between physical comportment and social comportment. If someone raised it as a question, a Temperance speaker would have claimed it to be a legitimate but not very useful way of separating problems. He or she would have suggested instead categories based on alcohol’s effects on religious behavior and sentiment, on intellectual capacities, on moral fibre, on political judgment, on work performance, on social responsibility, and so on. The liquor problem, as it came to be defined in the 19th century, centered on grand social issues: crime, poverty, violence, family problems, health, business productivity, individual mobility, and financial success and failure. That drunken individuals sometimes inadvertently injured themselves or others ranked relatively low on the list of problems(49). Accidents were regarded as but one instance of the fundamental and truly important effect of alcohol: that it weakened or destroyed individual self-control(50).

Social Comportment and Crime

The principal arguments made in behalf of the idea that liquor caused crime and violence centered on alcohol’s powers to loosen moral restraints and free destructive impulses. One physician writ-
ing in the 1870s explained the effects of “one small glass” of liquor on the drinker.

He is a changed man, and will say and do things he would not say or do if he was unaffected by liquor....He has lost some of his reason. While his passions are more readily provoked, he has become weakened in the power of self-control. He is not only more inclined to do wrong, but is less liable to restrain himself from wrong-doing. He has, therefore, undergone a very serious transformation.(51)

John Marsh, writing in the 1830s, put it more forcefully: “the natural effect of alcohol,” he said, was that it, makes every man that drinks it a villain. It breaks down the conscience, quickens the circulation, increases the courage, makes man flout at law and right, and hurries him to the perpetuation of every abomination and crime. Excite a man by this fluid, and he is bad enough for anything. He can lie, and steal, and fight, and swear, and plunge the dagger into the bosom of his nearest friend.(52)

People unhappy with the total abstinence line argued that alcohol did not have such effects most of the time, or on most people; but virtually no one suggested liquor did not, on some occasions at least, cause violent or criminal behavior. As the famous Temperance lecturer John B. Gough pointed out, some types of crimes were committed only when drunk.

I know when we hear of wife-beating and all that kind of thing, we say, “Men are brutes.” They are not brutes. I have worked among them for forty years, and have never found a brute among them. Yet I have found “hard cases.” But I attribute most of it to the influence of drink. A man will not beat his wife if he is sober.

Concerning a similar problem, Gough told of once being approached by “a lady of aristocratic bearing” with a question:

“You have had great experience,” she said, “but have you ever known or heard of a son striking his mother?” “More than once,” I said, “but never unless that son was influenced by drink; indeed, I cannot believe that any young man, in his sober senses, would strike his mother.” She seemed relieved to know that hers was not a solitary case.(53)

Alcohol, one writer observed, made the drinker commit “actions which, when sober, he would have shuddered to have thought of.” It also enabled people to do things they could not do when sober. In a pamphlet entitled “The Physiological Action of Alcohol,” Dr. Henry
Munroe explained how when John Wilkes Booth saw President Lincoln in his theatre box, Booth did not have the courage or "the cruelty to strike the blow."

His better feeling over came him, and trembling with suppressed agony at the thought of becoming an assassin, he rushed into the nearest restaurant, crying out, "Brandy! brandy! brandy!" Then, gulping down the hellish draught, it instantly poisoned his blood, fired up his brain, transformed his whole nature into that of a raging fiend; and, in this remorseless condition shot down that noble-hearted President....What killed the President of the United States? I answer, "Brandy! brandy! brandy!"(54)

The first half of the Temperance case was based on a particular, and historically new, view of the effect of alcohol. In the language of psychoanalysis, alcohol was perceived as a super-ego dissolver, an unlocker of the id. Or, in more familiar terms, alcohol was thought to disinhibit people. From Benezet and Rush on, the Temperance movement developed and promulgated this view of alcohol, and the contribution has been a lasting one. It is still taken as scientific and medical truth today that alcohol, as one Temperance writer put it, "weaken the power of the motives to do right, and increases the power of the motives to do wrong." Or, as Chafetz and Demone explained in 1962:

The apparent "stimulation" from alcohol is the result of the lower brain centers being released from higher brain controls. This reduces inhibitions, and behavior which is untoward when the individual is sober becomes acceptable. For example... an always proper, ladylike woman may become obscene and promiscuous when intoxicated.(55)

Since the late 18th and early 19th century, the notion that alcohol is a disinhibitor has been, as MacAndrew and Edgerton put it, "the conventional wisdom."

The second half of the Temperance case was, again, based on a particular, and historically new, view of the long-term consequences of drink. Just as an incident of drunkenness temporarily incapacitated one's moral system, the long-term effect of even moderate amounts of alcohol was to weaken and eventually destroy the capacity for self-discipline and moral action. From Rush on, Temperance supporters argued that drinkers tended to increase use of alcohol in both quantity and frequency and eventually became addicted. They believed that alcohol was inherently addicting, just as people today believe that heroin is, and they were convinced that
the moderate drinker ran a terrible risk of becoming hooked. The ultimate result of the process was the complete degradation of the individual, but any of the stages from soon after the first drink to the drunkard's grave could rightly be called intemperance. Thus it was sufficient for Temperance people to describe someone as "intemperate" without having to specify precisely what they meant. Moreover, even many people who did not subscribe totally to the Temperance line believed, beyond doubt, that heavy drinking or spree drinking deleteriously affected one's entire moral system. As Frances Willard observed in her 1889 Presidential speech to the Women's Christian Temperance Union:

It is through the degradation of high ideals that alcohol exerts its mightiest forces against the moral progress of mankind. The voice of conscience is smothered in drink, and whenever a kind of higher joy may be given, it is swept away in the resistless current of appetite. This pitiful loss soon makes itself manifest outwardly — the thought-life of a man is seen in his face. One has but to glance at the great company of drinkers to see how, little by little, the nobler traits of countenance disappear and only a brutal expression remains.(56)

Because they believed that frequent consumption of alcohol destroyed morals, Temperance supporters did not believe it was necessary for alcohol to be in someone's blood stream for it to cause that person to be violent or criminal. Simply knowing that the individual in question drank a lot, or was frequently drunk, was sufficient explanation. Furthermore, some crimes, like robbery or muggings and even suicide, might occur because the drunkard did not have anything to drink. The main character in Walt Whitman's Temperance novel pointed out that drunkards robbed people in order to get money to satisfy their craving for liquor. Similarly, Currier and Ives's famous lithograph, "The Drunkards Progress," showed a young man who, after having become a confirmed drunkard, commits armed robbery and suicide. It was not necessary for the illustrator to put a bottle in the drunkard's hand, or liquor in the blood stream, to show that alcohol had caused the ruin and death of the man(57).

Armed with their twin concepts of intoxication and addiction (what they usually called drunkenness and intemperance), supporters of total abstinence believed they could show that an enormous portion of American social problems were caused, in one way or another, by consumption of alcohol. As a way of getting across the size of the problem, writers and speakers frequently suggested that liquor caused a specific percentage of events and conditions. Justin
Edwards, one of the most important Temperance organizers in the 1830s, reported that in England "the best authorities attribute one-half the madness, three-fourths of the pauperism, and four-fifths of the crimes and wretchedness...to the use of strong drink." Kitteredge suggested that liquor is "the parent of one half the diseases that prevail, and one half the crimes that are committed," Another writer in the 1830s said "It is ascertained to be the source of nine-tenths of all the pauperism, and nine-tenths of all the crimes in the land." The Reverend John Marsh quoted the warden of the New York State Prison, Captain Pillsbury:

Nine-tenths of all the prisoners under my care...are decidedly intemperate men, and were brought to their present condition, directly or indirectly, through intoxicating liquor. Many have confessed to me with tears, that they never felt tempted to the commission of crime...but when under the influence of strong drink.

Marsh also noted that the Prison Discipline report stated "that of 125,000 criminals committed to our prisons in a single year, 93,750 were excited to their commission by spirituous liquors." Shortly before the Civil War, one group concerned with Sunday liquor sales claimed that the combination of alcohol and sabbath-breaking was the "cause for nine-tenths, if not nineteen-twentieths, of the grosser forms of crime which imperil and disgrace our crime-cursed city." One writer in 1867 reported that "the late eminent Judge Cady" had declared "that the greater portion of the trials for murder and assaults and batteries that were brought into court...originated in drunkenness." A prison agent in Philadelphia noted in his annual report that of his inmates that year "three fourths were cases of disorder arising solely from the use of intoxicating liquors." A New York grand jury around 1870 reported that "nearly all the cases for murder and batteries which have been investigated have been found to spring from the sale and use of intoxicating liquors." And the New York State Board of Charities stated that "probably more than eighty-percent" of the criminals in the State are intemperate, "intemperance being the chief occasion of crime." After detailed study, the Chief of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor for Massachusetts found that in 1881 more than 84 percent "of all criminal cases were due directly or indirectly to the influence of liquor." Finally, in 1899, the prestigious Committee of Fifty, after its exhaustive examination of the liquor problem, concluded that nearly 50 percent of crime was caused directly or indirectly by alcohol(58).

While Temperance sympathizers used a number of estimates of the percentage of total problems caused by alcohol, probably the most common figure was three-fourths. For example, a circular
GOOD CREATURE OF GOD AND DEMON RUM

sent out by the New York State Temperance Society in 1831 made the following claims:

That ardent spirit makes three-fourths of our criminals, is the united testimony of judges and lawyers in this country and in England. The most shocking cases have occurred under the influence of alcohol. Almost all cases of murder have occurred under the influence of alcohol. Almost all the cases of assault and battery likewise. Those guilty of burglary, larceny, counterfeiting, riots, etc. are almost uniformly ascertained to have destroyed their moral sensibilities and emboldened themselves for the violation of their country's laws, by the inebriating cup.(59)

Another writer from about the same time made a similar statement.

Recent examination has developed a number of appalling facts, which few, if any pretend to question... It is admitted that three-fourths of all the crimes of the land result from the use of intoxicating liquor. It is admitted that at least three-fourths of all the sufferings of poverty arise from the same source.(60)

In a Temperance tract written about mid-century, famed showman P.T. Barnum also used the figure of three-quarters.

It is confessed that three-fourths of all the crime and pauperism existing in our land are traceable to the use of intoxicating liquors.(61)

As late as 1910, the figure was still being used by Charles N. Haskell, Governor of Oklahoma.

I find by careful observation that three-fourths of the crime in the personal violence class are the result of a mind made mad by intoxication. I find that even a greater per cent of the crimes of burglary, larceny and the like are the result of destitution and distress occasioned by personally spending their sustenance for whiskey and kindred evils, thereby being reduced to the necessity of stealing for bread.(62)

The original source for the figure of three-fourths was probably the study of Samuel Chipman, first published in 1834, and excerpted and quoted many times over the century. Chipman visited the keepers of jails, asylums, and poor houses of every county in New York State, and some neighboring States as well. In each case he received a signed statement from the superintendent of the institution classifying each individual inmate as "temperate," "intemperate," or "doubtful." In addition, many of the supervisors signed
short statements describing unusual cases or patterns. Finally, Chipman calculated, as best he could, the total county tax, and the cost of running the poor house, and the entire criminal justice system. After presenting the data and reports for each county, Chipman gave his conclusion:

I have shown beyond the power of contradiction, that more than three-fourths of the ordinary tax is absorbed by the support of the poor and the administration of criminal justice — and that more than three-fourths of the pauperism is occasioned by intemperance, and more than five-sixths of those committed on criminal charges are intemperate.(63)

Like Temperance supporters throughout the 19th century, Chipman believed alcohol caused people to be violent and even murderous. Temperance novels frequently featured beatings and murders, and writers and speakers often told a story or two to make the evil consequences of drink more personal. Chipman’s report, however, was unique in that it covered such a large number of incidents. Part of the reason Chipman was so often quoted and cited was because he provided documentation that even moderate drinkers acted violently, especially to members of their own families. Consider the following excerpts from some of the county reports:

From Allegany County: “Of the intemperate, three for whipping their wives — one charged with poisoning his wife — two for arson — one for abuse to his parents.”

Jefferson County: “Of the intemperate, twenty-six were intoxicated when committed. One was committed on charge of arson, and nine for whipping their wives, or for other abuse of their families.”

Niagara County: “One man has lain in jail two-thirds of the time for three years past, for abuse to his family when intoxicated; when sober, is a kind husband and father.”

Oneida County: “Of the intemperate, one was charged with murder; eleven were females; and three men for abuse of their families.”

Orange County: “Of the intemperate, thirteen for riots — one, a man, for assault and battery on a female — four for whipping their wives, one of them whipped his wife with a dog. One under sentence of death for killing his wife when drunk — most of them were brought here while intoxicated.”

Oswego County: “Of the intemperate, three were committed for whipping their wives.”
Schenectady County: "Of the intemperate, one was a woman for abuse to her husband, and sixteen men for abuse to their wives."

Suffolk County: "Of the intemperate, one has been convicted of killing his wife; another is in jail, charged with shooting his wife."

Columbus, Ohio: "Of the intemperate, two for burglary, one for whipping his wife, and one for rape — one for murder committed at a house of ill-fame, kept by his mother."

Ross County, Ohio: "Of the intemperate, one was a colored man, for killing his child — two for assault and battery on females — one for whipping his wife — one drowned himself when intoxicated."

Chester County, Pennsylvania: "Of the intemperate, one for horse stealing. He was deranged, and his derangement caused by intemperance. One for arson — two for murder. In one case the murderer and the murdered man were both drunk. Seven for assault and battery — three for whipping their wives, and one sober woman for whipping her drunken husband."

For Temperance supporters, and for many 19th century Americans, alcohol caused crime. Or, to put it another way, they believed that if people did not drink, a substantial percentage of crime (and other social problems) would be eliminated (64).

Conclusion

John Allen Krout, author of the still classic study of the early Temperance movement, titled his chapter on colonial complaints about liquor and drunkenness, "Voices in the Wilderness," and he began it thusly:

The half-century following the achievement of American independence was marked by a gradual change in the popular attitude toward the use, manufacture and sale of intoxicants. There is a temptation to find the genesis of this movement for social reform in the isolated protests of the seventeenth century, but no continuing element seems to run through the early denunciation of intemperance. Condemnation of excessive drinking came from various sources, and the underlying motives were as different as the individuals and groups who voiced the
warning. An exception might well be made, however, in the case of the Puritan clergy, for the sombre background of Calvinism gave unity and continuity to numerous attempts to restrain individual excesses. (65)

Unfortunately, Krout only briefly surveyed those "isolated protests" without systematically examining their content or social origin. One aim of this paper has been to test and supplement Krout's conclusions.

He suggested several overlapping points. First, it is erroneous to find the "genesis" of the Temperance movement and of 19th century popular attitudes in colonial complaints about drunkenness and excessive drinking. There was a qualitative difference between the two periods. "On the eve of the Revolution," he wrote, "... nothing short of a revolution in public opinion could remove it—spirituous liquor—from its important place in American life." One implication of Krout's position is that 19th century ideas about alcohol arose out of new social and intellectual conditions, and that changes in thought about alcohol were part of a broader social and intellectual transformation. While he did not really examine the revolution of social and intellectual life, this suggestion is provocative. Second, Krout claimed that there was no common element running through the early condemnations of drinking and drunkenness: Complaints tended to be ad hoc. Finally, he noted that Puritan ministers may have been an exception; there was some continuity of theme among Puritans, and between them and 19th century Americans.

I have one major disagreement with Krout. As noted earlier, there were two complaints often made by elite colonials about the effects of alcohol: that it caused the disorderly physical state of drunkenness, and that it led to idleness. Further, both complaints were made in the 19th century. For the Temperance movement, and for middle class Americans in general, drunkenness as disorder was bad or sinful, and drunkenness was also condemned because it caused idleness. On these points, then, Krout was not correct: there was coherence to certain early complaints, and colonials did in some ways provide the "genesis" of 19th century ideas. The two evils colonials identified formed parts of the 19th century attack on liquor: Alcohol consumption undermined worker discipline and productivity, and it was antithetical to the controlled, disciplined character of middle class ideals.

But if Krout was in error about the lack of continuity of theme, he was correct in another sense: There was some fundamental difference between the two periods with regard to perception of the effects of alcohol. Colonials thought alcohol caused primarily good things: health, sociability, and most especially merriment; alcohol
gave pleasure and made people happy. In general they did not believe alcohol caused Europeans to be physically aggressive, violent, or criminal. However, they did think alcohol made Indians violent, and there may have been occasional statements, "voices in the wilderness," about liquor causing fights or crime. But such statements were rare. The view of alcohol as a destroyer of morals and stimulant of crime and violence was not part of everyday thought and discourse; it was not common for people to say that liquor caused someone to fight or rob. It was not common or typical for colonials to think, for example, that a man who beat up his wife did so because he drank alcohol, or a lot of alcohol, or that a man who raped a woman, or who mugged or killed someone, did so because he was under the influence of liquor.

Alcohol as Disinhibitor: The Social Context for an Idea

One of the central questions raised here is why, toward the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century, Americans began to believe that alcohol reduces individual moral control, and why, after roughly 1830, that idea became deeply embedded in American popular thought, as a credible and reasonable way to interpret everyday events. At this point I would like to begin a tentative analysis of the social context in which the idea of alcohol as a disinhibitor was rooted.

Since the late 18th and early 19th century and continuing up to the present, all explanations of the role of alcohol in causing criminal, immoral, or violent behavior have rested on a particular view of the powers of alcohol, as well as a theory of social order. Kessel and Walton (1967) give an adequate summary of the contemporary form of the argument. After pointing out that alcohol "depresses activity in the nervous system," they write:

The first thing to be depressed is the power of restraint. The inhibition of our actions or our wishes which we all of us adopt in order to get on with our fellows is the product of the highest mental processes and it is these that are impaired first. When the curb we normally place on our instinctual urges goes, unguarded behavior comes to the fore and these released impulses are forcefully expressed, giving the impression of stimulation. . . . At first the increased press of talk and activity sets up smiles, gaiety, even boisterousness. Generally we retain enough self-control to keep these within bounds. . . . But sometimes the drinking facilitates a group mood of dejection or of anger, and people have had their passions so
inflamed by alcohol that they carried out cruel, senseless, irreovable actions from which, if the highest mental processes were functioning intact, each individual would recall with disgust. (66)

Implicit and explicit in this formulation is a theory of deviance and social order. The theory assumes that people ordinarily conform, and that socially disruptive passions and desires—the animal impulses within the civilized being—are inhibited or restrained. However, the theory is not concerned with external restraints, it does not necessarily assume the need for any power or authority outside the individual; fear of punishment and public humiliation are not the main mechanisms of control. Rather, the theory assumes that people usually control themselves, and that people desire to conform because they view it as a moral obligation and responsibility. In short, the theory posits a system of controls, restraints, or inhibitions within the body and mind of each individual. In contemporary psychological and sociological terms, this process of developing and maintaining inner controls is called socialization or internalization of norms, and the restraining agency is called the super-ego. In the 19th century the process was called moral education, or sometimes, moral treatment, and the agency was called the moral faculties or the conscience. The theory assumes that conformity is the normal or natural or healthy behavior of most people, and that deviation, rule breaking, and crime are the products of the weakening or breakdown of the inner controls.

This theory of social order, based on individual inhibition, is historically recent; it first developed as part of the world view or ideology of emerging capitalist society. While there were anticipations and early developments of it in 18th century thought, especially among Enlightenment thinkers, it became popular ideology only when the middle class—the bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie—assumed both political and economic power, and when the market came to dominate social and economic life. It derived its power, both as an explanatory device and as a political and social ideal, in the conditions created by the breakdown of traditional society—especially the increasing freedom from superstition and coercion, and the belief in the possibility of rationally ordering social and economic life for the good of all. In America, the ideology was also nourished by the hopes engendered by the rich land of a relatively unpopulated continent.

By and large, colonial Americans, like Europeans of the same period, did not have an inhibition theory of social order; they did not believe most people refrained from doing immoral or illegal things because of internalized moral restraints. Rather they believed that
social order was maintained externally. People lived their lives in a web of human relationships, and it was thought to be the pressure and demands of other people (especially of family, church, and community relations) which shaped and controlled human behavior. It was hoped that people might conform out of a sense of individual responsibility, but such voluntary compliance was certainly not assumed to be the basis of a social order.

Of all colonials, the Puritans put the most stress on the importance of self-regulation. Yet despite this attention to the cultivation of inner discipline, they regarded with utter disdain the notion that most people could or would voluntarily control their own behavior most of the time. Summing up the "Puritan theory of the State," Perry Miller writes:

Puritans did not think the state was merely an umpire, standing on the sidelines of a contest, limited to checking egregious fouls, but otherwise allowing men free play according to their abilities and the breaks of the game. They would have expected the rule of "laissez-faire" to result in a reign of rapine and horror. The state to them was an active instrument of leadership, discipline, and wherever necessary, of coercion; it legislated over any and all aspects of human behavior, it not merely regulated misconduct but understood to inspire and direct all conduct... The Bible said — and experience proved — that since the fall, without the policeman, the judge, the jail, the law, and the magistrate, men will rob, murder, and fight among themselves; without a coercive state to restrain evil impulses and administer punishments, no life will be safe, no property secure, no honor observed.(67)

Punishing wrongdoing, and maintaining an atmosphere of fear of punishment, was a central part of the State's method for keeping order. As David J. Rothman has observed:

Eighteenth-century punishments were harsh and even cruel. . . . Punishments could serve to intimidate the offender, thereby discouraging him from further depravities. When ministers occasionally spoke of "reforming" the deviant, they meant only that severe correction might terrorize him into obedience. Whippings, they believed, were apt punishments for the first offender; he "ought to look on them as warning of more severe punishments to be expected if he refused to be reformed."(68)

In addition, stocks, brandings, and other forms of public degrada-
tion served to mark out rule breakers. Finally, execution eliminated those incorrigibles whose behavior and example threatened order and community security.

The ruling class of colonial society believed that order was maintained by getting people to obey the demands of family, church and community and the rules and regulations of government. They hoped that people might accept and believe in the legitimacy of their rule, but they had no doubt that conformity required the prudent use of force, while maintaining fear of punishment and fear of humiliation. Deviance was not surprising and for most of the period the dominant image of human beings was of creatures who naturally turned to sin and crime. As one minister said: "The natural man defiles every step he takes and the filth thereof rebounds to himself."(69)

Over the course of the 18th century, some Americans began to accept a new and radically different theory of social order. Farmers and businessmen, it was said, property-owning individuals who had a stake in maintaining order, could be trusted to conduct their personal, public, and political lives with care and responsibility. In its more idealistic form, the theory became part of a belief that America's unique mission was to show that the good society could be organized around the power and ability of individuals to control their own behavior. This was to be accomplished, as Winthrop Hudson has put it, by means of an "inner check."

Jefferson and Jackson believed in the perfectability of man and looked forward to the day when the need for laws would have disappeared. The laws would then be replaced within each individual by an "inner check" so that there would be no need of external restraint. The basic conviction was stated by Andrew Jackson in his inaugural address of 1829, when he said: "I believe man can be elevated; man can become more and more endowed with divinity; and as he does, he becomes more God-like in his character and capable of governing himself." The whole thrust of civilization, according to this type of thinking, was to render men more and more capable of governing themselves. The civilized man was the virtuous man, and the virtuous man had no need for the restraint of man-made laws.(70)

Even after the Revolution, however, wealthy and powerful Americans did not trust the judgment and discipline of the average citizen. The new Constitution, for example, was carefully constructed to keep the influence of "the mob" out of government. States retained property qualifications for voting, and Senators and the
President were to be selected by electors, not by the voters. The Constitution was essentially a conservative document, designed to maintain power and authority in the hands of the "well born and able."

In the 50 years from the ratification of the Constitution to the end of the presidency of Andrew Jackson, the United States was transformed from a backwater, mercantile society, to a dynamic, rapidly expanding capitalist Nation. The democratic and individualistic heresies of the 18th century had become popular ideology. Laissez-faire was as much fantasy as fact, but the image of a people controlling themselves and their Nation, pursuing their self-interest in the marketplace while creating themselves as "self-made" men, had become part of the definition of American national identity. For example, as Eric Foner has skillfully demonstrated, the ideology of the Republican Party was based on a coherent middle class "model of the good society." The Republican critique of the South was that it "enslaved" men to fixed social positions. The North, on the other hand, organized around the market, was the land of free men and free labor. This belief in northern freedom was not without foundation in reality. W.A. Williams points out that for a time "the majority of Americans were probably blessed with more liberty than any men in the modern age have known. In a spectacle that was at once terrifying and ennobling they came unbelievably close to shaping themselves and their world in their own image."(71)

Such freedom did have its costs, and it did entail responsibilities. Foremost among these was that, for a decentralized, democratic society of small entrepreneurs to function, the individual had to maintain control over his or her own behavior. Individual freedom required individual responsibility for the maintenance of order. Nineteenth century middle class Americans were intensely aware of the social-psychological prerequisites for the kind of society they were trying to create. For them, the question of individual "morality" was central to virtually any discussion about the structure of American life. School lessons, church sermons, advice to young men and women, childrearing literature for mothers, fiction, and medical theories all focused on the importance of individual moral responsibility for the control of impulses and desires. Indeed, it is fair to say that Americans were obsessed with the issue of self-control. Physicians and scientists drew diagrams of the brain showing that the uppermost sections were the seat of morality and self-control. Educators, like Horace Mann, argued that "there are but two methods of curbing or subduing the unlawful propensities of men; either by an external or by an internal power." Mann felt the United States would stand or fall as a republic insofar as its
citizens acted on an internalized moral system. Even treatment of
the deviant involved the restoration of a moral sensibility. Ameri-
cans extended the idea of “moral treatment” for the insane to all
forms of deviation. Penitentiaries, almshouses, reformatories, and
orphan asylums were supposed to develop the dormant or decayed
powers of self-restraint within the individual. Nineteenth century
America was indeed the hey-day of the inner-directed man and
woman(72).

Middle class Americans were, by and large, unable to view their
society in structural terms; the focus was always on the individual.
Americans were concerned with environment, but chiefly in terms
of creating situations conducive to the development of individual
character. In effect, this meant the development less of a strong ego
than of a strong super-ego—a set of internalized moral standards. A
favorite literary device involved characters discussing moral prob-
lems with their consciences—and what their super-egos told them
was that a good person resisted temptation and restrained desire.
People were to solve social problems by controlling the evil within
themselves(73).

I am suggesting that colonial and 19th century Americans held
radically different assumptions about the nature of social order,
and about the relationship of the individual to society. Colonials did
not find deviance especially problematic; they did not believe that
people ordinarily desired to conform, nor that the seat of social
control was a moral faculty within the individual. When drunken
people acted wild, rowdy, or violent they did not look to an injured
or poisoned conscience for an explanation. Nineteenth century
Americans, on the contrary, did find deviance problematic and
they did believe that social control rested with the individual. When
drunken individuals acted wild, violent, or rowdy, middle class
Americans looked for things which had affected the individual’s
system of inner control. Ordinarily well-behaved people became,
when drunk, radically transformed, and they frequently acted in
ways which were both out of the ordinary and extremely threaten-
ing to social order. It was not hard to conclude that alcohol caused
the changes: The story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde magnificently
captured the 19th century fear of and fascinations with a liquid
which could transform repressed civilized men and women into
uninhibited monsters.

Colonial Americans believed alcohol was a sacred and powerful
substance. They believed it relaxed people and stimulated them —
it freed up the mind, the memory, and the tongue; it stimulated
physical activity, and it provided pleasure. For colonials all those
effects were beneficial. However, 19th century Americans, work-
ing from the same assumptions about the effects of alcohol, reinterpreted the consequences of drink in terms of the new social conditions confronting them. For a man trying to follow the maxims of Benjamin Franklin and rationally organize his life and personality around the disciplined pursuit of money and success; for the businessman trying to compete in a cut-throat business world; for the men and women inspired by Ralph Waldo Emerson to greater and greater heights of "self-reliance"—for the whole pantheon of character types created by and self-created in response to the structure and organization of developing capitalist society—for all these people relaxation, stimulation, and pleasure were threatening and dangerous. There was always the possibility that one might relax the tightly held inner controls too much, be too stimulated, find pleasure too attractive and tempting. With only the self to rely on for control one had to guard and protect one's inner restraints with every ounce of energy that could be mustered.

In short, it was not so much that middle class Americans invented completely new ideas about the effects of alcohol, but rather that they redefined its effects as stimulant and relaxant in terms of a new view or gestalt of the relationship of the individual to the self and to society. The old effects took on new meaning when viewed from a perspective shaped by the social conditions and ideological concerns of the 19th century. Thus liquor, while still powerful and sacred, was besides being part of God's world now also part of the Devil's—it was a Demon. And as a Demon, a destroyer of self-control, it was blamable for many of the ills of American society—in particular crime and violence.

Notes


21. This anonymously authored poem, published in 1793, was not strictly speaking a product of the period we have been discussing; it was part of the rising anti-drunkenness sentiment of the end of the century, and I have quoted a few of its verses which relate to accidents and which are indicative of earlier concerns. While the period following the War for Independence manifested a significant rise in concern with drunkenness among the upper and upper-middle classes, and the beginnings of an anti-spirits campaign, those sentiments had been forming throughout the 18th century. Eventually they would coalesce around a set of principles and beliefs about the effects of liquor on the body and mind and become the ideology of the Temperance movement and a major strand of American popular thought about alcohol. The poem, however, was not a Temperance document in the 19th century meaning of the word, for it was a polemic only against excessive drinking and not against spirits or alcohol.
22. Quoted in Bridenbaugh, *Cities in the Wilderness*, pp. 56, 60, 209; also see Bridenbaugh, *Cities in Revolt*, p. 299.
25. It is important to note one other way colonials believed alcohol’s effect on the body and mind could lead to deviant behavior, because it shows the limits of thought on the question. Like people in many cultures, colonials believed
alcohol stimulated speech, conversation, memory, and imagination. The young Benjamin Rush, for example, proclaimed that wine "is another name for philosophy" ("Sermons to Gentlemen upon Temperance." Philadelphia, 44 pp., 1774, p. 19). However, alcohol's effects on speech and imagination could sometimes cause problems. On a trip through Massachusetts in 1704, Sarah Kemble Knight wrote in her diary of staying over one night in a tavern. She was unable to sleep "because of the Clamor of some of the Town toperers in the next Room," who were arguing vociferously about the origin of the name of their town. As they argued they drank, which, as Knight explained, "like Oyle to fire increased the flame." Unable to sleep because of the noise, she composed a poem.

I ask thy Aid, O Potent Rum! to Charm these wrangling Topers Dum. Thou hast their Giddy Brains possesst— The man confounded with the Beast— And I, poor I can get no rest. Intoxicate them with thy fumes: O still their Tongues till morning comes.

For Knight, the rum which caused the men to be so noisy could also silence them. And she reported she got her wish, for after another drink her tormenters were silent (Knight quoted in Miller and Johnson, The Puritans, pp. 430-431). One of the best illustrations of an extreme concern with the negative effects of liquor on speech was in Benjamin Rush's "An Inquiry into the Effects of Ardent Spirits" (Eighth edition, 1814. reprinted in: Yandell Henderson, A New Deal in Liquor. New York: Doubleday, 1934). While Rush's pamphlet was written after the period we are discussing here and, in fact, was the central document of the new view of alcohol developing at the end of the 18th century and beginning of the 19th century, the pamphlet also reflected some of the earlier ideas about the effects of liquor. Rush listed 11 symptoms of a "fit of drunkenness," and most of them were acts of speech including the following: Unusual garrulity, ... Unusual silence, ... Captiousness, and a disposition to quarrel, ... Uncommon good humour, and an insipid simpering, or laugh, ... Profane swearing, and cursing, ... A rude disposition to tell those persons in company whom they know, their faults, ... A clipping of words, ... Singing, hallooing, roaring, imitating the noises of brute animals.


Disorder and mob violence were characteristic of the populations in the five towns (Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Newport, and Charleston). Boston acquired such a bad reputation for mob activities that the General Court passed a riot act in 1721... The town was hardl-
vindicated by the action of "some wicked and evil minded... Persons" in 1725, who broke into Governor Dummer's coach house and "maliciously broke to Pieces the Front Glass of his Chariot" or by the mobs which rose in July 1729 to "prevent ye landing of Irish, and to hinder the merchants from sending away ye corn as they attempted." On October 13, 1741 "Late at Night," Justice Anthony Stoddard and Sheriff Winslow were knocked down and stoned while attempting to disperse a large group of townsmen "being assembled in a riotous manner in King Street... and committing great Disorders."

A similar disposition to mob violence developed in Philadelphia. "Some vile Miscreants" broke into Mayor Clement Plumstead's garden in March, 1729, tearing up plants and cutting down fruit trees. The riotous propensities of the lower classes manifested themselves in the latter part of 1726, when the pillory, and stocks in the market place were burned by some who "had no good opinion of the law"...1741 and 1742 were years of tumult. In January, 1741, a group of sailors were indicted by the Grand Jury for taking up the public pumps and carrying them off, thereby inciting a riot, and a few weeks later a mob rose because the bakers had refused to make bread during the controversy over the use of the English halfpence in trade. In August the Common Council decided that in order "Speedily and Effectually" to prevent future riots, the members should immediately "repair to the Mayor's house with all the inhabitants they can raise in event of an outbreak." Their opportunity came on October 1, 1742, when the famous "Bloody Election" took place. Party feeling was running high, and two violent encounters occurred between country people and about thirty sailors, "mostly strangers" on one side, and townsmen on the other. Many citizens were badly hurt, several seamen jailed, and everyone blamed everyone else in the fracas (Bridenbaugh, Cities in the Wilderness, pp. 382-384).

Given the high esteem which alcoholic beverages were accorded by all classes, and the frequency with which they were drunk, it was extraordinarily likely that people drank before, during, and if possible after many of the events described above, and countless similar ones. Bridenbaugh was well aware of the degree of drinking and drunkenness in the colonies, and he suggested the people in mobs were often drunk (Cities in Revolt, p. 117). He appeared to expect his readers to understand that the "Bloody Election" brawl, for example, featured townsmen drunk on election day, as was the custom, and sailors drunk as usual, which was their custom. In this case, as Bridenbaugh put it, "everyone blamed everyone else." For our purposes it is important to note that nobody blamed liquor. Bridenbaugh only made a point to mention drinking in connection with riots when it appeared in some way out of the ordinary — as for example when the mob happened upon something to drink during the riot.

Caleb Heathcote informed the Board of Trade in 1719 of the disposition of the Newport "rabble" to mob the customs officers. In one case the collectors had seized some illegal claret, "yet the town's people had the insolence to rise upon them, and insult both them and the civil officers" by staving in the casks, drinking their fill, and pouring the remainder into the streets (1971a: p. 224).

One riot in 1765, had begun in a protest against taxes, including looting the houses of William Story of the Admiralty Court and Benjamin...
Hallowell of the Customs. . . Filled with the latter's good Madeira, the rioters followed Mackintosh onto the Hutchinson mansion in Garden Street, forced its way in as the owner fled, and for two hours vented its spleen upon the first gentlemen of New England by carrying off or destroying everything within and without the beautiful establishment (Cities in Revolt, p. 307).

It is probably fair to say that all colonials, including the colonial elite, noticed an association between riots and alcohol. However, the relationship as they saw it was not a causal one — alcohol use was not responsible for riots. Indeed, in some cases, like the last two mentioned above, they probably noticed that riots caused drunkenness — meaning that people were able to get drunk because they were rioting. Of course not all rioters were drunk or even had anything to drink at all, and there may well have been completely sober riots. It is also true that the vast majority of drunken individuals did not riot. Drinking to the point of drunkenness was one of the things people did during riots, along with other activities like shouting, walking, and throwing objects.

While colonial society featured much less disorder than Europe of the same period, crime, including violent crime, was a significant fact of life especially in the 18th century.

The prevailing offense against society was theft. Boston suffered most from this crime, both because of its size and wealth, and because hundreds of people flocked there during the wars to increase the number of what Seawall called the "disorderly poor." A wave of petty robberies occurred in the years 1704-1707. The thieves made a speciality of articles readily convertible into cash, such as silver, linen and silks. . . A similar epidemic broke out in 1712. A series of housebreaks occurred in 1715.

Not only was dishonesty on the increase, but townspeople tended to greater violence in their behavior toward one another. The Mayor's Court at New York had continually to deal with cases of assault and battery. May Wilson accused Hugh Grow in 1704 of attacking her "with double fist". . . In a fishwife's scuffle in 1706 Jean Atkins, "with staves, swords, clubs and other weapons, did beat, wound and evil treat" Isabelle Maynard, but no indictment was brought. Citizens of Philadelphia seem to have been continually running afoul of drunken sailors and getting themselves beaten up. In 1713 John Hoffin and John Buckley preferred charges of this nature against John Barfield and Daniel Moody (Citizens in the Wilderness, pp. 220-225).

For a slightly later period, Bridenbaugh notes the increase in crimes of violence.

Footpads appeared in each town rendering the streets dangerous at night — even for the watch. . . Killings were not frequent, but the nature of the few committed would easily have gained them headlines in a modern tabloid. The number of bastard children murdered increased greatly in these years. . . More assaults and robberies occurred at Philadelphia than in the other towns, and the mounting violence there explains the ordering of severe penalties that have so frequently been criticized as unbecoming a Quaker society (Cities in the Wilderness, p. 582).

After the middle of the century the pattern continued.

In the wake of the French and Indian War came not a diminution but an increase in crimes of all sorts: counterfeiting, petty thievery,
housebreaking, burglaries of every description, highway robbery, 
rape, assaults and murder. Worse still, the cities had no police to curb 
them. It seemed to many law-abiding persons that the age of violence 
had arrived (Cities of the Wilderness, pp. 299-300).

Once again, it was extremely likely that someone had a drink, or two or 
three, or more, before committing a crime, and that many brawls occurred 
between intoxicated individuals. Members of the colonial elite noted that 
drinking was associated with such activity — meaning that it occurred before 
or during it. But they did not issue statements claiming that the effect of alcohol 
on the body or mind caused people to rob, rape, or attack.

28. Increase Mather, "Wo to Drunkards: Two Sermons Testifying Against the Sin 
of Drunkenness: Wherein the Wofulness of the Evil, and the Misery of All 
that are Addicted to It. Is Discovred from the Word of God." Cambridge, 
22; Cotton Mather, "Sober Considerations on a Growing Flood of Iniquity." 
Boston, 1708, p. 7.

Edwards, Basic Writings. New York: New American Library, 1966, pp. 218-
219.

30. There was a phenomenological, and not causal, focus of colonial and Puritan 
remarks. It was what in contemporary jargon is called a "stepping-stone" 
notion. Drunkenness was seen leading to other sins. For example, as with other 
types of sinful behavior, murder was the one crime Puritan ministers 
frequently discussed as consequence of habitual drunkenness (see Rothman, 
The Discovery of the Asylum, pp. 15-16). And the favored occasion for delivering 
warnings was the execution of someone who murdered while drunk. Thus 
Danforth's sermon, "The Woeful Effects of Drunkenness," was delivered at the 
execution of two Indians who, while drunk, had murdered two other Indians, 
also drunk. The preacher concluded that all four deaths were "Instance of 
Divine Vengeance manifested against this Sin" (p. 41). We learn from the Bible, 
he said, "That it is no new thing for the Sin of Drunkenness to be followed with 
Murder; or at least with the ruin and Destruction of the Drunkards themselves" 
(p. 23). He pointed out that drunkards "have unquiet and uneasy lives"; nothing 
pleases them, and as a consequence "the husband is exposed to Murder the wife 
of his Bosom and the Neighbor left to rise up and kill his friend or Neighbor in 
the Field" (pp. 11-12).

Similarly in 1686 an habitual drunkard named Morgan was executed for 
murder, and three ministers preached sermons. In addition, the condemned 
man read a statement (probably prepared for him) from the gallows to the 
crowd of spectators.

I warn you to have a Care of the Sin of Drunkenness, for that is a Sin that 
leads to all manner of Sins and Wickedness.... For when a Man is in 
drink, he is ready to commit all manner of Sin, till he fill up the Cup of 
the Wrath of God, as I have done, by committing that Sin of Murder.... 
Have a Care of Drunkenness and ill Company, and mind all good 
Instruction, and don't turn your back upon the Word of God, as I have 
done. (Quoted in Miller and Johnson, The Puritans, p. 420).

However close this sounds to Temperance formulations, it is far apart from 
the idea that alcohol causes murder. In these cases alcohol is not demonic, 
people are.

31. Quoted in MacAndrew and Edgerton, Drunken Comportment, pp. 101-103.
32. Quoted in MacAndrew and Edgerton, Drunken Comportment, pp. 149-150.

34. MacAndrew and Edgerton, *Drunken Comportment*, p. 94.

35. I have said that MacAndrew and Edgerton are "essentially correct" because I differ with them on one point. They offer two explanations for why in some cases Indians excused deviant behavior while drunk. First they point out it was consistent with Indian ideas about the way the world worked.

The Indians' precontact cultures already contained an ample array of time out ceremonies and supernatural agents (e.g., witchcraft, dreams, spirit possession, etc.) under whose "influence" a man became less than strictly responsible for his actions. The Indian observed the dramatic transformation that alcohol seemed to produce in the white man; and, reaching into his repertoire of available explanations, he concluded, as the historian A.G. Bailey put it, that "Brandy was the embodiment, or was the medium through which an evil supernatural agent worked." Thus it was that the Indian came to see that at such times the drinker was temporarily inhabited by an evil supernatural agent (pp. 148-149).

I think this is a workable beginning explanation of why Indians excused drunken behavior. MacAndrew and Edgerton also suggest another reason why Indians used drunkenness as an excuse — they learned to do so from whites.

What is more, the notion that the state of drunkenness was excusing of those transgressions committed while 'under the influence' was entirely consonant with his own drunken transgressions, and those of his fellows, the white man, too, ignored much and forgave still more on the grounds that when drunk, one is 'under the influence' (p. 149).

I have not found evidence to suggest that whites excused their own deviance while drunk because one was "under the influence." I think, rather, that insofar as they excused behavior while drunk it was because drunkenness — having large amounts of alcohol in the body — was acknowledged as part of time out. Drunkenness was viewed as a form of time out behavior; drinking alcohol was seen as initiating and accompanying time out behavior, not as causing it.

Much of MacAndrew and Edgerton's evidence came from 19th century reports about drinking. However, 19th century attitudes are not indicative of colonial concerns. The authors appear to have looked hard for examples, and had they been able to find English colonial statements about alcohol causing drunken behavior, they probably would have quoted them. Further, while this paper is concerned primarily with ideas about alcohol as a cause of deviance, and not as an excuse for it, those two ideas go logically and historically together: When wealthy and powerful people worry about drinking and drunkenness as a cause of deviant behavior, the lower classes use it as an excuse. Once again, there is no evidence to suggest that alcohol functioned among the lower classes as an excuse. For example, *A Classical Dictionary of the Vulgar Tongue* (edited by Robert Cromie, 1971), first published in 1785, contained thousands of phrases and expressions used by the English working and lower classes. With perhaps a hundred expressions for ways to con people, including police, gentlemen, wives and husbands, and dozens of expressions for drinking and drunkenness (including, for example, "Mellow" for almost drunk, "Mauled" for extremely drunk, and "Maudlin Drunk" for someone who cried when drunk) there was no hint of any use of drunkenness as an excuse. While there were many words for nasty or ornery individuals, there was no equivalent for the contemporary expression, "mean
drunk." Further, had the lower class attempted to use alcohol consumption as an excuse on any scale for various crimes (as they did in the 19th century), it seems likely there would have been upper class reactions. Some people would have used those “excuses” in arguments that drinkers themselves testified that liquor caused disorder or crime (as in the 19th century). While the Classical Dictionary contained the expression “Cat’s Sleep” for counterfeit sleep, pretending to be asleep, pretending to be asleep in order to spring on someone or fool somebody, there was no expression for counterfeit or faked drunkenness, which is one of the things MacAndrew and Edgerton suggest Indians learned from whites. Counterfeit drunkenness may have been an independent invention by Indians, perhaps in part to fool whites. In addition to 19th century sources, the authors also used colonial French reports. There may, in fact, have been a tendency among the French to excuse drunken comportment — drinking norms do vary considerably from culture to culture. However, I suspect that there was not a significant French tradition for explaining crime or violence with reference to the effect of alcohol on the mind or body — at least until the later part of the 18th century. It may also be that French fur traders learned drunkenness as an excuse from Indians, or perhaps considerably elaborated upon a mild French tradition in order to exploit Indians. Obviously, this is all fertile ground for further research.


Despite the fact that colonials in some ways tended to lump Indians and blacks together, they also made radical distinctions between them. Among the distinctions made between the two peoples was on the question of the effect of liquor on them: colonials did not by and large believe that alcohol made blacks wild or violent. Blacks lived and worked alongside whites, and were governed by whites, and in 17th-century Virginia, at least, masters made few distinctions between the traits and natural propensities of whites and blacks (Morgan, *American Slavery. American Freedom. *) Indians, however, lived mainly under their own rule, and colonials differentiated between Indians and blacks on the issue of their governability. According to Winthrop Jordan "Americans came to impute to the braves of the Indian 'nations' an ungovernable individuality... and at the same time to impart to Negroes all the qualities of an eminently governable sub-nation" (p. 90). In the colonial period the “savagery” on the Indian was more important for whites, than that of blacks. In the 19th century, however, black “savagery” became a prominent theme and included the idea that alcohol quickly made blacks wild and violent. Such assumptions were built into the Committee of Fifty Report (John Koren, *Economic Aspects of the Liquor Problem. An Investigation Made for the Committee of Fifty*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1899). Interestingly, while the Committee concluded that blacks were more likely than whites to go out of control under the immediate influence of alcohol, they noted that blacks were less likely to become addicted to it. Presumably those people most capable of compulsive conformity (whites) are most prone to compulsive deviation (addiction).
GOOD CREATURE OF GOD AND DEMON RUM


44. The statement signed by the various Presidents read:

Being satisfied from observation and experience, as well as from medical testimony, that ardent spirits, as a drink, is not only needless but hurtful, and that entire disuse of it would tend to promote the health, the virtue and the happiness of the community, we hereby express our conviction that should the citizens of the United States, and especially the young men, discontinue entirely the use of it they would not only promote their own personal comfort but the good of our country and the world. (Quoted in Ernest Cherrington, The Evolution of Prohibition, Westerville, Ohio: The American Issue Press, 1920, pp. 114-115).

45. A good example of the tendency of anti-Temperance advocates to accept much of the Temperance argument regarding the effects of alcohol was the speech of former Governor John A. Andrew (1867) to the General Court of Massachusetts urging rejection of a prohibition law. Still does not poverty owe its own origin oftentimes to drunkenness? Undoubtedly, yes. So also is it due often to luxury and idleness originating in bad moral training, the sudden acquisition of unearned wealth, leading to habits of self-indulgence to degenerating into drunkenness and other vices. But, drunkenness in our own modern society, ending in either pauperism or crime, in one of good training, grounded in reasonable intelligence, with the means of comfort, and supported by the inspirations of hope, is a rare and exceptional phenomenon. Drunkenness is, however, one of several causes immediately generating crime and pauperism — the reduction of which to the minimum, is one of the studies and aims of civilization. Yet, the effort to reduce them by a war on the material abused to produce drunkenness, is scarcely less philosophical, than would be an attempt to prevent idleness and luxury, by abolishing property and imitating the legislation of Sparta...
When you charge crime to drunkenness, as one of the frequent proximate causes of crime; and when you charge the sinking of many a man into deeper degradation, by abandoning hope, and abandoning himself to drinking as one of the seductive forms of sensuality, you are right. But much of that I hear leads me to dread the return to our Christian community, of that pharisaic morality which substitutes a ritual conformity, in matters not essential in nature nor by the divine law, for the heart of love and the embrace of charity (John A. Andrew, "The Errors of Prohibition, An Argument Delivered in the Representative's Hall, Boston, April 3, 1867, Before a Joint Special Committee of the General Court of Massachusetts." Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1967, pp. 91-93).

A good example of the way representatives of the liquor industry treated the claim that alcohol caused crime was H.E.O. Heineman's column for the American Brewers Review titled "Intemperance in Food Causes more Distress than Intemperance In Drink."

The advocates of moderation...have devoted much time to efforts to controvert or minimize the charge that intoxicating drink not only contributes to those evils, but is the chief cause of them. Estimates of the share of crime, pauperism and insanity caused by liquor run as high as seventy-five percent...For my own part, I do not believe that twenty-five percent is even approximately a true figure. Certain investigations abroad go as low as two percent for poverty....It is not liquor that makes the drunkard, it is the man. It is not the fine cooking that makes the glutton, it is the man, and of course, his environment, consisting of a thousand influences.

But, be the percentage large or small, let us admit for the sake of the present argument, that an appreciable amount of poverty and crime is due to the intemperate use of liquor. What does it prove? What conclusions as to the use of fermented beverages does it justify?

I should like to see a Committee of Fifty send out a few hundred skilled observers to gather statistics showing the percentage of crime, poverty, insanity, etc. that ought to be charged up to dyspepsia, indigestion, overeating, gluttony, or whatever they might wish to call the protean forms of that constant abuse of the alimentary canal to which nearly all people are subjecting themselves...

Let us grant, for the sake of this argument only, that liquor causes some crime, poverty, etc. But I must insist that food causes many times as much. ...

It may cause a chronic false thirst or appetite and lead from bad to worse. For another thing, if irrational and excessive eating — I do not speak only of over-eating — causes many bodily evils, it is by that fact alone a fertile source of crime, for it is bodily evils that largely generate the mental and moral conditions in which crime is hatched. It is the general state of mental unrest, of moral depression, the pessimistic or narrowly brutal view of life, the abnormal stimulation of sexual passion — the latter being one of the most important of all sources of crime — that bring in their train that revival of primitive humanity, the expressions of which a civilized society stigmatizes as crime.

Heinemann sent copies of his column to members of the Committee of Fifty, and, incredibly enough, received responses, including one from Charles W. Eliot,
president of Harvard University. Eliot responded from his own set of interests and prejudices.

I agree that "The main question is not what we eat, but how we eat," and also that over-eating causes quite as many bodily evils as over-drinking. It does not, however, cause as much crime. Further, I agree with you that it is better to drink beer than whiskey; but then it is easy to drink too much beer, as the experience of the German nation abundantly proves. A cheap and good provision of beer and light wine will not prevent Teutonic peoples from drinking distilled liquor to excess. On this point see the experience of California. Drunkenness is a vice that goes by race. The Latin races are not addicted to it; the Russian and Teutonic races are (H.E.O. Heinemann, The Rule of "Not Too Much". Chicago: American Brewers Review, 1909, pp. 15-23).


46. Atherton, Main Street on the Middle Border, p. 84.

The inevitable learned monograph on "Deaths Resulting From Acute Alcoholism in American Fiction from the Beginnings to the Present Day" will undoubtedly be given us in the fullness of time. In it, deaths by freezing will have prominent place, for temperance novelists seem to have been fascinated by scenes in which the body, "still as buckram," was chopped from the ice with a jug clutched firmly in the dead man's hand. Deaths by cremation will also bulk large. How easy for a reeling mother to drop her babe in an open fireplace, or as did Mrs. Wild in The Cider Merchant, fall into the flames herself and be burned, as Porter described it, "almost to a cinder." The incineration differed only in degree in The Mysterious Parchment, where the author preferred to have his victim done "to a crisp." The variety of the catastrophes is almost as amazing as their number. Drunken captains ran their heavily freighted barks upon the rocks to prove that lemonade was more wholesome than grog for sailors; intoxicated stagecoach drivers cascaded their passengers over steep embankments; bad bartenders heaved beermugs at the skulls of tiny tots who entered the swinging doors in quest of errant papas; while insane alcoholics used crowbars, knives, poison, guns, and pitchforks to work their fatal mischief. The curious reader who is not sated by deaths caused by "internal fires" or by excessive draughts of eau-de-Cologne, may find more to his taste the fate of ex-Congressman Hargrave, who awoke from a stupor to find himself more than half devoured by a big, bad and very hungry wolf; or the unfortunate error of Messrs. Robbins and Simmons, who drained to the last drop a bottle of what they fondly believed to be rum, but proved instead to be a concoction not untruthfully advertised as "Dead Shot for
49. It should also be noted that there was some limited attention given to industrial accidents and, especially toward the end of the 19th century, Temperance groups focused on train wrecks as a consequence of worker drinking.

50. While this paper has focused on events rather than on long-term or chronic conditions like disease, it is important to note that one common argument for total abstinence was that alcohol made one sick. Anthony Benezet and Rush discussed disease and ill-health, and Temperance writers continued to do so throughout the century. The argument that alcohol was a disease-producing poison was one of the central appeals to the self-interest of the moderate drinker. Col. Jacob L. Green, President of Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, explained the many diseases caused or aggravated by moderate drinking.

The degree to which many diseases commonly referred to as malaria, over-work, and other vague, general, scapegoat causes, are actually grounded in what would almost invariably be called a temperate use of drink by persons of reputed temperate habits, would be incredible to the mass of people unaccustomed to careful observation and comparison of related cases. That habitual sottish drunkenness should issue in disease and death, most people can understand; but that moderate, orderly, decorous indulgence should issue in congested brains, insanity, suicide, paralysis, diseases of kidneys, liver, stomach, pneumonia, rheumatism, and in general in those diseases which at bottom mean a poison imparted into the blood, most persons do not know, and are slow to believe; but the reason is simple, and worth noting. (Dorchester, The Liquor Problem in All Ages).


56. Frances Elizabeth Willard, Glimpses of Fifty Years: The Autobiography of An American Woman. Chicago: Woman's Temperance Publication Association, 1889, p. 118. While many contemporary students of alcoholism might wince at Willard's language, or her choice of symptoms, they would agree with the thrust of her argument: alcohol weakens the alcoholic's moral system.


63. Samuel Chipman, "The Temperance Lecturer: Being Facts Gathered from a Personal Examination of All the Jails and Poor-Houses of the State of New York... Showing the Effects of Intoxicating Drinks in Producing Taxes, Pauperism and Crime." Albany, 1845, p. 30.

64. Since the repeal of prohibition the idea that alcohol consumption is a major cause of crime has not had a broad base of popular support. Further, while the theoretical underpinning of that idea — the notion that the short and long term effect of alcohol use reduces moral controls — has not disappeared, and is probably as respectable and credible as it was in the 19th century, it is rarely linked to social policy recommendations anymore. It is mostly used in very general ways (as in alcohol education programs), or in very specific ones (as in alcoholism treatment). Occasionally, however, someone in the health or legal professions, or the alcoholism field uses the notion to suggest that drinking causes social deviance. For example, in 1942 Dr. Ralph Banay, Chief Psychiatrist at Sing Sing Prison, reported the results of his study of alcoholism as a cause of crime among the inmates. Like Samuel Chipman, over a hundred years earlier, Banay was also interested in isolating the "intemperate." Banay determined that for 1938-39, of the 1,576 admissions to the Prison, 43 percent were imtemperate. Of that group only 19 percent were, as Banay put it, "alcoholic criminals"—that is, those men whose "alcoholism led to the commission of the crime." The other 25 percent were only criminals who are "alcoholic," and their drinking habits did not lead them to commit a crime. The "alcoholic criminals" committed 22 percent of sex crimes, 23 percent of homicides, 31 percent of grand larcenies, and only 6 percent of all other crimes. A more recent example is from an article entitled "Alcohol and Crime" in a 1976 issue of the British publication The Journal of Alcoholism:

Gayford's study of battered wives showed that 74 percent of the husbands were heavy drinkers. Murder studies have revealed that a high proportion of both offenders and victims have been drinking heavily immediately before the attack. Football violence appears to be very much linked with alcohol consumption amongst young supporters.
Recent studies carried out by the Luton police suggest that alcohol plays a significant part in a number of crimes, especially amongst 16 and 17 year old boys. To my mind, the association between alcohol and crime is strong enough to make it a matter of urgency to look to ways of coping with the alcohol problem as the most likely way of reducing crime, especially violent crime. (Douglas I. Acres, “Alcohol and Crime.”)*


Very recently, this sort of argument has begun appearing with greater frequency. We still live within the definition of the alcohol problem as it was first worked out in the beginning of the 19th century. (Douglas I. Acres, “Alcohol and Crime.”)*

For a discussion of literary portraits of efforts to maintain self-control and conform see: Henry Nash Smith, “The Scribbling Women and the Cosmic Success Story,” Critical Inquiry (September, 1974) Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 47-69. My personal favorite is Mark Twain’s conversation and confrontation with his conscience who has suddenly materialized. Twain spends the story plotting ways to kill the now corporeal conscience, and in the end he succeeded. The result is revealed in the title of the story—“The Facts Concerning the Recent Carnival of Crime in Connecticut” (1876). Though Twain hates his conscience, and all consciences, he regards them as essential to social order. To kill the individual conscience is to begin a reign of violence and mayhem: “I killed thirty-eight persons during the first two weeks—all of them on account of ancient grudges. I burned a dwelling that interrupted my view...I also committed scores of crimes of various kinds and have enjoyed my work...”

*References:
68. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum, p. 18.
69. Quoted in Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum, p. 18.
exceedingly. For Twain, like other 19th century middle class men and women, the conscience was the seat of social order because it said "No" to the destructive and antisocial desires. The story is in Mark Twain, *The Mysterious Stranger and Other Stories*, New York: New American Library, 1966.
Presenter’s Comments

ROOM: Harry Levine, who is a faculty member at Queens College at the City University of New York, also has a long-time association with the Social Research Group.

LEVINE: I want to mention a couple of disclaimers concerning my paper. I’m not an historian but a sociologist, though I’ve worked for quite a while in historical materials — and I also don’t think it makes all that much difference. However, there is a way in which my concerns are especially sociological: I am concerned with what I take to be the grand questions of sociology, in some sense the difference between tradition and modernity, between the world that was once and the world that we have been living in for the last couple of hundred years or so. I understand that to be what de Tocqueville, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and so on were struggling with and puzzling with, and that’s really what interests me above all; I approach the alcohol materials with that problematic and with that question.

The second disclaimer is that although I fundamentally agree with the paper I presented, I have always felt somewhat uncomfortable with it, and I’ve never quite been able to figure out why. It was first written under a particular set of circumstances, which I describe in the “Preface.” I’ve revised it, updated it and changed it, but it still fundamentally is shaped by those circumstances. Though it wasn’t written by a committee, there is a way in which it was responding to the demands and needs of a committee; that it’s so huge, sprawling, and covers so many things has always been aesthetically uncomfortable to me as well. The one or two times I’ve ever tried to talk on the topic or about the paper in a brief period of time, I’ve always been overwhelmed by exactly what to talk about and what exactly to focus on.

Finally, I’m unhappy about the paper’s focus on causality. It is difficult enough to talk about inhibition, disinhibition, and morality in different historical periods; it is much harder to talk about changing meanings of “cause,” and I know far less about it. Perhaps one of the agenda items for this conference is to figure out what it means to talk about “cause,” or what are all the different things meant by the phrase “alcohol causes.” My sense is that there are not
clear distinctions to any of these things and that the whole language of cause, which sometimes seems to be very concrete, is in fact very flimsy and airy.

After struggling for several days, trying to figure out exactly what to say, I finally decided not to talk about the paper very much at all, but rather to talk about some additional things which extend the argument and findings of the paper, including some things I only learned in the last few weeks.

The idea of alcohol as a disinhibitor assumes that alcohol is a substance that diminishes the powers of the moral portions of the brain or mind. This doctrine claims that alcohol as a chemical acts to weaken, undermine, or destroy moral feelings and sensibilities, and that it consequently releases from higher brain controls more primitive and animalistic impulses and desires. As a result, people disinhibited by alcohol, it is said, are more physically and sexually aggressive and violent. I would like to try to briefly locate historically the general concern with disinhibition and to outline the beginnings of a critique of its biological underpinnings.

The key distinction I would like to make is reflected in two phrases: "The Good Creature of God" and "The Demon Rum." They refer to two fundamentally different ways of picturing the place of alcohol in society and the effect of it on the individual. The first view was the dominant one during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries in America. The second image, of alcohol as a demon, was the new view articulated during the Nineteenth Century.

This shift in the perception of alcohol from good creature to demonic substance should be understood, I believe, in terms of a large shift in ideas about the sources of social order and control from outside the individual to inside the individual. Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century religious and political authorities thought that most people have very little capacity for self-regulation. They viewed social order and social control as primarily external to the individual. In the Nineteenth Century, however, a great many people came to believe that men and women could regulate and control their own behavior. In a free and democratic society, it was said, social order depends upon self-control. The primary mechanism for the preservation of order was the "inner-check" within each individual.

This new concern with individual self-control and self-restraint produced language and concepts with which to talk about these kinds of control. One of the changes has been the addition of meaning to the word "inhibition." The word "inhibition" has always meant things like "hold back," "curb," "prohibit," "forbid," "restrain," and so on. However, until roughly the end of the Eighteenth
Century and beginning of the Nineteenth Century it was used only for processes external to the individual—one subject, group, person, law inhibits another. This is still common in such phrases as “This seat belt inhibits my movements,” or “Fortunately, stop signs and traffic lights inhibit his driving style.” Both refer to people being restrained by things outside of themselves. In the Nineteenth Century, however, the word came to be used to describe internal processes as well—a person could now be said to inhibit him or herself. This now seems so common-sensical that the “in” of “inhibition” almost acts as a cue for us to think about something going on inside of the person.

I am suggesting that widespread acceptance of the idea that there is a special moral faculty in the mind which inhibits behavior is less than 200 years old. The idea was first systematically developed by a group of thinkers in the Eighteenth Century, sometimes referred to as the Scottish Moralists or the Scottish Enlightenment. Contrary to much Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century philosophical and scientific thought, they argued that reason was not the only faculty that people used to determine right from wrong and good from bad. They believed that there was an innate moral sense which reacted automatically to perceptions of good and evil.

The idea of the moral sense—of the conscience as it is popularly called—became part of conventional wisdom in the Nineteenth Century. I see the rise of concern with individual self-control as part of a much larger transformation—the emergence of modern, capitalist society. Many historians and sociologists have pointed out that one central characteristic of the culture of the middle or business class in the Nineteenth Century was the obsession with self-restraint. In the Nineteenth Century the notion of the conscience—of a particular moral faculty of the mind—became central to the common sense understanding of how people function. We are still so much inside of that idea that it seems hard to imagine what it would mean not to think it.

All this is well illustrated by a story of Mark Twain in which Twain tells of the day that his conscience materialized before him. Twain discovered to his horror that his conscience was a three foot dwarf covered in green fuzz. Throughout the story Twain and his conscience have a long conversation about consciences in general and how they make people feel guilty no matter how good the people are. Twain spends the story plotting how to kill his now visible conscience, and finally he succeeds. He beats, pummels, and rips his conscience into bits. The title of the story is “The Facts Concerning the Recent Carnival of Crime”—a title which makes no sense until the very end. In the last paragraph, Twain explains that since he
eliminated his conscience, he has been perfectly happy: he has killed a couple dozen people that bothered him and swindled others out of everything they owned. All of these things he could do without the slightest pang of guilt because he had no conscience. Despite the black humor tone of the piece, Twain's story is a moral tale. Without the conscience, he says, there would be nothing but chaos, anarchy, and destruction.

In short, underlying the whole supposed idea that alcohol "disinhibits" is a Nineteenth Century, middle-class view of people as ordinarily "inhibited" by an internal mechanism. This supposed natural inhibition is said to be weakened or destroyed by alcohol. Throughout the Nineteenth Century this idea had widespread religious, political, medical, and scientific support. Further, as MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969) demonstrate, despite the vast anthropological evidence to the contrary, it is still widely believed today that alcohol, as a chemical, physiologically weakens this "natural inhibition."

One of the Nineteenth Century elaborations on this view suggested that the nervous system consisted of more and less recently evolved layers, and that it was the more recent and higher additions to the brain that constituted the seat of moral authority and control. This idea is still widely cited in discussions of the effect of alcohol on the nervous system.

It did not seem likely to me that there were "moral centers" to the brain which were more recently evolved, but I had never encountered a critique of that model. Over the past several years, I'd looked informally for relevant physiological evidence, but all I found essentially supported the idea that the higher and more recently evolved portion of the brain is the seat of moral feelings, and that one or another signal — stress, for example — can disrupt it and bring out the more primitive, lower nervous system behaviors. Three weeks ago I finally stumbled upon the beginnings of the critique I had been looking for, and also the alternative biological model. Since then I have been trying to learn as much as I can, and I want to report to you on what I have discovered.

Most of what I have learned comes from Jonathan Miller, who produced a series of BBC television shows called "The Body in Question" and then put out a book (Miller 1979) with the same name. Miller is, among other things, a physician who has done original research in the history of medicine. He points out that the body is conceived of differently in different historical periods, and that the body is always conceived of in terms of something else — ultimately, any symbol system is a metaphor. For instance, one can't describe the body in terms of electricity if there is no concep-
tion of electricity. Miller suggests that the image of the nervous system as a stratified system with a recently evolved moral faculty on top was the product of a particular social and economic context: Victorian upper class or upper middle class culture.

Miller reports that in the mid-Nineteenth Century the English clinical neurologist John Hughlings Jackson, who spent most of his life observing and cataloging the behavior of patients suffering from strokes and epilepsy, "was one of the first scientists to systematize the notion of the nervous system as hierarchical and layered." According to Jackson, the most primitive layer appeared first, and then on top of that a more recent system appeared, and then on top of it again, in human beings. is the ultimate nervous apparatus. Jackson believed that nervous disease showed the reverse of this process — "that the illness had stripped away higher levels of nervous-system development — that is to say, those most recently acquired — leaving the older ones exposed." For example, Jackson wrote:

I have long thought that we should be very much helped in our investigation of diseases of the nervous system by considering them as reverses of evolution. By evolution I mean a passage from the most complex, as passage from the most automatic to the most voluntary. The highest centers, which are the climax of nervous evolution, are the most complex and the most voluntary. So much for the positive process by which the nervous system is put together. Now for the negative process. Dissolution is a process of undevelopment; it is a taking to pieces in order from the most complex and most voluntary towards the most simple and most automatic. (Miller 1979)

Jackson made an additional set of observations and conclusions relevant to the question of "disinhibition." He believed that disease did not reveal lower functions, but it "somehow released them as well, allowing them to express themselves with unprecedented vigor." Jackson concluded that the higher nervous system "appeared to exert a civilizing influence on the more primitive part" (emphasis added). For example, Jackson found "that patients who had lost most of the power of speech were sometimes left with an exaggerated tendency to utter oaths and swear words; patients with brain damage sometimes became energetically uncouth. This led him to believe that evolution was not simply the successive addition of more and more sophisticated skills, but the concomitant repression of the more ancient ones." In other words, the evolution of the nervous system was a succession of restraints — as Miller puts it — "pressing down the lid on the jack in the box of all previous evolun-
tionary stages. Illness or injury brought about a recapitulation of the patient's evolutionary history."

The similarities between Jackson's ideas and contemporary notions about alcohol as a disinhibitor are striking. For example, consider the following passage from the widely cited Alcoholism and Society by Chafetz and Demone (1962):

The apparent "stimulation" from alcohol is the result of the lower brain centers being released from higher brain controls. This reduces inhibitions, and behavior which is untoward when the individual is sober becomes acceptable. For example... an always proper, ladylike woman may become obscene and promiscuous when intoxicated.

The authors' ideas about alcohol are little more than a gloss on Jackson's views. In both cases, something — a disease or alcohol — weakens the recently evolved higher brain controls, releasing the primitive impulses. As a result, one curses, fights, or makes sexual advances. In 1903, two other English scientists, the anthropologist W.H. Rivers and the clinical neurologist Henry Head, conducted an unusual experiment testing Jackson's ideas. Henry Head had a surgeon cut a small sensory nerve in his forearm. "The wound was closed, the limb splinted, and the hand left free for testing." While Rivers administered a regular series of pin pricks, hair pullings, and other tests, Head carefully recorded the gradual return of feelings in his hand. Head reported that the first feelings to return had a "coarse, primitive roughness." Only later did greater sensitivity and discrimination in feeling return.

According to Head and Rivers, this little experiment brought about a brief replay of nervous evolution. In the first phase of recovery, the primitive, coarse, ancient nervous system was revealed in its true colours — released from the inhibition of the more sophisticated stages, it expressed itself with unrestrained vulgarity; as the nerve was restored to full function, the dog beneath the skin was restrained and put back on its leash. (Miller 1979)

The experiments have been repeated several times but "no one since has been able to get the same results." Leaving aside the obvious built-in unreliability of the experiment, Miller points out that Head and Rivers' conclusions "do not really make sense. It seems highly unlikely that the ancestral nervous system was as crude as Head and Rivers maintained — only a sea anemone could hope to prosper with such sensitivity."

Miller suggests that Head and Rivers had, in fact, started out strongly favoring Jackson's evolutionary theory of the nervous sys-
tern. Head "unconsciously reshaped his own feelings until they confirmed the theory which had moved him to embark on the experiment in the first place." First Jackson, then Head, Rivers, and many others, had interpreted nervous disease and dysfunction using a Darwinian metaphor. Indeed, Jackson's theory was so popular and persuasive "partly because it seemed to follow so nearly from Darwin's" — the exemplary and hegemonic scientific theory of the Nineteenth Century. When disease (or in our case alcohol) strips away the thin and recent layer of civilization, the primitive animal is revealed.

However, Miller's argument does not stop here. In an excellent piece on the sociology of knowledge, he argues that the ideas reflected in Jackson's work derived from larger social and economic sources. "When Jackson summarised his doctrine of release, he expressed himself in revealing political terms: 'If the governing body of this country were destroyed suddenly, we should have two causes of lamentation: 1. the loss of services of eminent men; 2. the anarchy of the now uncontrolled people.'" In short, Jackson's ideas were extensions of European, upper class anxieties about their control over the lower classes. Jackson's theory was so persuasive because it mapped these more general social and political concerns onto human physiology. "Long before Darwin, Thomas Hobbes had insisted that the aggressive appetites of individuals could be reconciled only if everyone submitted to the restraints of a single sovereign authority. Left to itself, nature was in a state of war, and man unregulated by society would eke out an existence which was 'nasty, brutish and short.'" The revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848 had struck fear into the European upper classes, who believed "Hobbes' theory had been dismally confirmed by the events of the previous 100 years."

Given this ideological and political background, "the idea of regression must have seemed just as captivating as the biological theory of evolution. By demonstrating that man was genetically related to the lower orders and that he retained active residues of his own primitive ancestry, Darwin made it easy to believe that the tendency to regress was not an accidental misfortune but was written into the very constitution of man." These same ideas also found expression in political thought, as in the ideas of the political economist Bagehot, who coined the term "atavism." Working at the same time as Hughlings Jackson, Bagehot wrote:

Lastly we now understand why order and civilization are so unstable even within progressive communities. We see frequently in states what physiologists call atavism. The return in fact to the unstable nature of their barbarous
ancestors. Such scenes of cruelty and horror as happened in the French Revolution and as happened more or less in any great riot, have always been said to bring out a secret and repressed side of human nature. And we now see that they were the outbreak of inherited passions long repressed by fixed custom but starting into life as soon as that repression was catastrophically removed. (Miller 1979).

Miller concludes that the doctrine of regression owed its popularity not simply to Darwinism, but also to the general pessimism and political anxiety of bourgeois intellectuals.

The only addition I would make to Miller's analysis would be to locate the doctrine of regression in terms of concern with internal moral authority and control. The difference between Eighteenth Century Hobbesianism and Nineteenth Century bourgeois thought was that Nineteenth Century political, religious, medical, and scientific thought placed much of the responsibility of Leviathan within each man and woman. It was no longer external authority as much as internal authority which was regarded as key. Schools, moral improvement programs, and reforms like temperance, were supported so strongly by the middle class as well as the upper class because it was believed by all that social order depended upon the civilized (or moral) portion of the person controlling the animal within.

Locating an idea in terms of class-based fears and prejudices does not necessarily mean that it is wrong. Therefore, the final question is: What is biologically or neurologically wrong with the theory of regression. On this point as well, Miller has something important to add: a critique of the idea of the layered nervous system.

The point is that the results [of Head's experiment] were unrepeatable, biologically implausible, and suggested an entirely unrealistic relationship between one part of the nervous system and another. The damaged nervous system is bound to be less efficient than the intact one: both action and sensation will inevitably deteriorate when their physical foundation is injured. But there is no justification for saying that the repertoire of the damaged nervous system is a replica of any one of the previous healthy states.

By the same token, the fact that the brain is a more recent acquisition than the spinal cord does not mean that when it is damaged the functions that are set in action express those of the spinal cord as it was in the days of yore. The nervous system does not evolve by a successive addition of
parts which leaves all the rest in a state of arrested
development. The acquisition of something new is accom-
panied by a progressive modification of everything that
was there in the first place. The spinal cord did not stop
evolving because more sophisticated apparatus was
being screwed onto the front end: it was becoming more
sophisticated itself at the same time, so that damage to
the more recently acquired parts of the nervous system
would not automatically re-create a picture of some pre-
vious stage of evolution. In any given creature, man or
dog, brain and spinal cord are contemporaries. . . .

It was just two weeks ago that I read Miller's book. I immediately
tried to find someone else who knew about this. A friend of a friend
located Robert Schear, a recent Ph.D. in neurophysiology. He con-
firmed Miller's statement that the nervous system is an integrated
unit and that of course anyone doing work in neurology knows that.
He said that the idea that a primitive nervous system is overlaid by
a more recent system is "nonsense." He also suggested that it was
completely unfounded to make neurological connections between
alcohol and complex human behavior like drunken comportment.
He had worked for three years on the eye, and he said that they
could not explain how the iris or retina worked, or even very simple
reactions like why colors look different in different color contexts —
despite the fact that things can be quantified and described very
precisely. Unfortunately he didn't know anything about the history
of the idea of the layered nervous system or its critique. Finally,
though he didn't know him, he suggested I try calling the Harvard
biologist and historian of science Stephen Jay Gould.

On Sunday, in the name of science, I got Gould's number from
Cambridge information and called him up. Stephen Gould said that
of course the nervous system evolved as a unit, and the idea that
human beings have a primitive system lurking under a civilized
one is silly. However, according to Gould, the idea is still fairly
common. He said that the most prominent present day advocate is
P.D. MacLean (1973) and that Carl Sagan repeated it in Dragons of
Eden (1977). Unfortunately, Gould didn't know much about the
history of the idea or its critique, and he suggested I call Ralph
Holloway, a physical anthropologist at Columbia.

I spoke with Holloway on Monday and explained to him the
conventional wisdom that alcohol acts as a disinhibitor, affecting
the higher, moral centers of the brain, and that drunken behavior
reveals the lower animal impulses and desires. Holloway thought
about it for a moment and said: "Well, if it was true that we reverted
to a more primitive or earlier nervous system, that would mean that
when we were drunk we would feel reptilian." We agreed that neither of us felt reptilian when drunk. Holloway also observed that the theory of regression was unfortunately still cited and used, despite the fact that it wasn't true. He mentioned that he himself had recently written a review of *Dragons of Eden* (Holloway 1979) critiquing Sagan's use of MacLean's idea of a "triune" brain. I explained that it seemed to me that the contemporary proponents of the idea of a stratified nervous system were working within a Nineteenth Century tradition which extended from moral philosophy to religious ideas to scientific conceptions — that present day versions were articulations of these older ideas. "Where is the counter tradition to the three level model?" I asked. "Where's the sophisticated biological understanding laid out for social scientists to use?" Holloway said. "I don't think it exists, or at least as far as I know it doesn't exist."

So, to come to the end of my story, I have several conclusions to offer. First, the idea that there is a higher portion of the brain which when weakened by disease or alcohol releases lower animal impulses and behavior is just plain wrong. It is false biology and neurophysiology. Second, this incorrect biological model derives, in part, from Darwinism — it is a form of social Darwinism. It also derives from Nineteenth Century upper class fears of revolution by the "animalistic" lower classes, and from broader bourgeois beliefs about the importance of self-control and the conscience in the maintenance of social order. Third, this incorrect biological model is still used and accepted, despite the fact that scientists who study the nervous system know that it is not true. The biological counterargument and critique of the doctrine of regression has not yet been fully developed. Those knowledgeable enough to make the full case have not needed to do so for their own work, and apparently, other than Jonathan Miller, no one recently has attempted the historical and biological critique.

Finally, there is absolutely nothing standing in the way of a radically social analysis of drinking behavior and especially of drunken comportment. Social scientists should proceed with the serious scientific questions of what people do and how they feel when they drink, get drunk, or are in the vicinity of alcohol. This involves understanding the different meanings people have attached to drinking and drunkenness, the ways these meanings and understandings have been learned, invented, and changed, and how these activities and meanings relate to other social, cultural, economic and political processes, institutions, and beliefs. Drinking behavior and drunken comportment are truly social phenomena.
Commentary

Joan Silverman

ROOM: The most recent issue of the International Journal of Addictions that came into our library had an article with a classic statement explaining the experimental results precisely in terms of the layers of the brain and the disinhibition that resulted from extinguishing the higher levels of the brain (Natale et al. 1980). So, it's still very much alive in the literature.

Now, to comment on the paper and presentation, Joan Silverman, who is an historian in American studies. Dr. Silverman recently completed a major work (1979) on the temperance fiction up to and including the films of D. W. Griffith.

SILVERMAN: I'm going to comment on Harry's paper even though he didn't, and I'm going to comment on his model of the differences between Colonial and Nineteenth Century attitudes toward drink. I'm going to emphasize some of the points that he glossed over and amplify some that he made and then disagree with some others, and in the course of this I'm going to deal with topics as diverse as different kinds of Protestants, the relationship of women and drink, and the attitudes toward the saloon, which became a focus and was the reason, probably, why we got national Prohibition.

Robin mentioned my dissertation, which was called "I'll Never Touch Another Drop: Images of Alcoholism and Temperance in American Popular Culture" — it's one of those long-winded titles — "1874 to 1919." Those dates were taken to indicate the founding of the WCTU and the passage of the 18th Amendment.

What I did was study temperance fiction, temperance plays, and temperance movies — that's where Griffith comes in — and also what are called "mainstream" plays, mainstream novels, and not too many mainstream movies but a few. And showed that the negative images of alcoholism overwhelmed the positive ones. The positive images were in full flower, but there were more negative images. And that's a factor influencing popular attitudes towards trying Prohibition.
What started me on this is the quote from the philosopher Ciorin (1976), who wrote, “If you want to know a nation, frequent its second order writers; they alone reflect its true nature.” Some of the writers that I studied, of course, were not second order — Mark Twain among them — but a great many of them were hacks. They ground out a lot of this material. Another source which is invaluable is a book that was published in 1916 by the Methodist Publishing Concern, called *The Cyclopedia of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals*. In the course of what I’m going to say in the next few minutes, I’m going to quote from them very liberally.

Well, the first thing I want to discuss is something that Harry Levine mentioned, that “while alcoholic beverages were not seen as a cause of crime and violence, the lower class tavern was.” This was in the Colonial period.

What happened in the early years of the Twentieth Century, actually starting from 1893 when the Anti-Saloon League was founded, was that in order to enlist the support of a large section of the population in getting a national amendment added to the Constitution, rather than focusing on individual drinking habits — which some people would say was a violation of their civil liberties — the League focused on the urban saloon. So, this attitude that the Colonials had was in full flower in the early Twentieth Century.

I have a quotation here from one of the numerous publications of the Anti-Saloon League which I think describes their attitude very well: “The saloon is a storm center of crime, the devil’s headquarters on earth, schoolmaster of a broken decalogue, defiler of youth, enemy of the home, foe of peace, deceiver of nations, beast of sensuality, pastmaster of intrigue, vagabond of poverty, social vulture, rendezvous with demagogues, enlist office of sin, serpent of Eden, and second edition of Hell, revised, enlarged and illuminated.” They, of course, lumped together a large number of people who were associated with the saloons, and these people were opposed to decent government, and you find there: anarchists, low-class foreigners, corrupt politicians, etc., vote-sellers and buyers.

This theme about democracy being endangered by drink got started with Lyman Beecher, who wrote six sermons for young men in the 1820’s, and then it was carried on by his son, the archhypocrite, Henry Ward Beecher, who wrote, I think, twelve sermons. He improved on his daddy. He was very worried about what drinking would do to democracy because, as Harry Levine mentioned, of the idea that these masses, these hordes, would get drunk and then there goes the republic. And so it was very necessary to curb their appetite. Whereas Harry discusses social classes in relation to attitudes, I think that you also have to take into account ethnicity and
an anti-urban bias that affects this country, as threads that go through a lot of this literature. I have a quote here from the Reverend Josiah Strong, who wrote a best seller in 1885 called Our Country; he sees the United States as being in peril from "Romanism, intemperance, socialism and wealth, all enhanced in the city and all concentrated there."

I might also mention here that there was a great deal of antagonism towards beer and beer being manufactured by Germans, particularly. This is in the period just before the United States entered the First World War. In these plays and novels that I read, the saloon keepers tend to have German or Irish names. They never have good old, Anglo-Saxon names. And there are a number of comments about what beer will do to you and about these German brewers who are fomenting the "maggots of treason," and they keep citing the names of these brewers — Pabst and Schlitz and Anheuser-Busch. The message is that this is an unAmerican drink, and that there are all sorts of negative outcomes to drinking beer.

The Cyclopedia of Morals points out, for example, that in Baltimore most of the saloon keepers are of German origin or born of German parents, and that the vice of beer-drinking is particularly a city vice in the United States: "probably nine-tenths of the beer is consumed by the adult male population in urban communities." Nobody in the United States drank beer, according to them, before the Germans came here and introduced it to the public. There is a play called "No King in America" which is an outright attack on German brewers, and also on Irish politicians, for wrecking the society. So that all through this material you have negative images of drink, but you also have strong ethnic biases.

Something else that you have to bear in mind when you're dealing with this type of material is that it's not enough to say that the Protestants were interested in Prohibition or were interested in the Temperance Movement in general, because not all Protestants felt the same way about drink. I relied on the distinction that Paul Kleppner (1970) made in his book called The Cross of Culture, which had to do with Middle-Western political attitudes in the Nineteenth Century. He posits two kinds of religious beliefs, the ritualistic and the pietistic. The ritualist, according to this view, accepts the world as a sinful place but has no plans to change it; he eschews emotionalism and favors tradition, ritual and symbols in his religious observance; his relationship with the deity is mediated by a member of the church hierarchy; morality and salvation are the province of the church, not the government; he emphasizes "right belief" or "right faith": and he tends to be a Roman Catholic, a Protestant Episcopalian, a German Lutheran or in some cases a Russian Jew. Now, few ritualists endorse prohibition.
On the other hand, you have the pietists; they agree that the world is a sinful place, but, in contrast to the ritualists, they feel that they have a responsibility to save people from themselves, to save people from their life of sin, and that the sinner must be taught the ways of the righteous and made to conform to the moral imperatives of society. The pietists' religious observances are marked by a lack of ceremony, with an emphasis on preaching, relative informality, revivalism and personal experience of the spirit, and their prime emphasis is on "right behavior." A pietist is usually a Methodist, a Congregationalist, a Baptist or a Presbyterian. And those are the people who are the spearheads of the movement against alcohol, the people who led prohibition and who were the chief supporters of the Anti-Saloon League, which organized this national movement and put it over the top, helped, of course, by the First World War.

Now, Harry mentioned ambivalence about alcohol, the coexistence of two different attitudes. I think one of the more interesting things that we might mention is that sometimes these attitudes coexisted in one person. Jack London wrote a sort of alcoholic memoir called *John Barleycorn* somewhere around 1912. This book is credited by a number of people with preparing the public for prohibition because he was, at the time he wrote it, one of the most popular writers in the country. Upton Sinclair says that "Jack London won more fame and infamy with *John Barleycorn* than with any of the other books that he published in his seventeen year literary career." This book was supposed to be an attack on alcohol, and the Prohibition Movement took it up and reprinted it. But if you read it carefully — and it's not clear that the public did — it's very contradictory. It illustrates the love/hate relationship that Americans have with drink. London writes about the effects of alcohol and the charms of saloon life, and then he abruptly reminds himself that he's writing a prohibitionist book, and so he repeats a lot of the negative properties of alcohol that temperance authors have detailed over the years. For example, John Barleycorn "shortens life," "habitual drunkards die of trifling afflictions ordinary men could survive." And then he says: "An absolute statistic of the percentage of suicides due to John Barleycorn would be appalling... Alcohol poisons the brain, the soul and the body, causing the sickness of pessimism and emptiness." And it incites men to crime: "Men did drunk what they would never dream of doing sober." And then he says of John Barleycorn: "He coarsens and soddens those he does not turn into maniacs... He destroys the best we breed. He stands in every highway and byway, accessible, law-protected, saluted by the policemen on the beat, speaking to them, leading
them by the hand to the places where the good fellows and daring ones foregather and drink deep. With John Barleycorn out of the way, these daring ones would still be born and they would do things instead of perishing."

London says that the women, whom he calls the "true conservators of the race," will save their men, they will drive the nails into John Barleycorn's coffin by voting for prohibition; and when you get prohibition, life will be more abundant for the young girls born and growing up to share the lives of the young men.

But at the same time that he's raving against drink, he's getting very nostalgic over these saloons, which are about to be eliminated — he grew up in Oakland — and he says, "the saloons were the brightest spots"; and that the "saloon keepers were his ideal of good, kind men. Wherever life ran free and great, there men drank. Romance and adventure seemed always to go down the street, locked arm-in-arm with John Barleycorn." The men that he met in saloons were "good fellows, easy and genial, daring and on occasion mad, generous-hearted and -handed and not rabbit-hearted." And he doesn't like people who don't drink or go to saloons or smoke or fear to do much of anything brave: "they are too busy keeping their feet dry, conserving their heartbeats and making unlovely life-successes of their spirit mediocrity." This is in a book supposedly supporting Prohibition. And then he goes on, and, thinking about all the places that he's seen in the course of his life, he says he has no desire to see them again except "with glass in hand."

Often writers played both sides. William Dean Howells had a Squire Putney, who is an incorrigible drunk, but Howells is very kind to him and very indulgent; however, he has him carrying around most of the time in two novels his son who became crippled when the father got drunk and dropped him accidentally.

The idea of the lovable sot played a very important role in the popular culture. The longest running play before "Abie's Irish Rose" is a play called "Lightnin'." It features a lovable sot who is a literary descendant of Rip Van Winkle. Charles Hoyt had characters in his farces who go around hiccuping and burping and acting, in general, very merry and very jolly. These are popular presentations in the Nineteenth Century along with the dire effects of alcohol and the dire effects of the urban saloon. Charlie Chaplin, who is, of course, English, but who is the most popular actor in the history of the American movies, certainly had, in his silent films, the lovable sot, the drunk, but with a wrinkle, and that is the idea of the hangover later. You have this adorable person who goes to sleep in the bathtub and gets into all sorts of interesting scrapes but suffers remorse afterwards. Again, there was a musical celebrating the
joys of drink but also with a song that became a national hit in its
day called “The Morning After,” which spelled out the word
remorse as part of the jingle. All this would give you the idea that
we love all these drunks, but that they must suffer some ill effects
from boozing at the same time we embrace them.

As far as the women are concerned, there were some great comed-
dies which Griffith directed, called “The Jones Comedies,” where
he makes fun of the temperance women. Jones slips alcohol into the
coffee cups of his wife’s sisterhood — who were temperance ladies —
but they don’t realize it, and they start putting plates on their
heads and dancing with each other and having the most marvelous
time. The underlying story is: “Well, maybe now they’ll realize
what we boys are up to.” So, the idea of the woman as the lawgiver is
very important. She’s a long sufferer as a result of the man’s drink-
ing, but she’s also the lawgiver and, according to Jack London, she’s
going to save people from themselves by voting for Prohibition.

There are, of course, numerous episodes in all of this literature
about physical comportment and accidents relating to drink, and
there are always people lurching and falling in these stories, and
hiccuping and acting what they call in the idiom of the Nineteenth
Century “half seas over.” The women are the people who are the
primary sufferers here, the ones who have to endure all of this
drunkenness.

Apropos of Harry’s argument about levels of the brain, this is a
quote from the New York Health Department bulletin: “Civilized
man equals the brute animal plus the brain development. Alcohol
blocks out the high brain development and leaves the brute
animal.” Even a very little alcohol has a damaging effect on the
brain. Man, when he becomes intoxicated, loses first his sense of
decency, his ability to think clearly and accurately and to associate
ideas, and then the Health Department goes on to say he begins to
see double, etc. And the man who becomes dead drunk within the
space of a few hours undergoes very much the same change as the
man who becomes gradually insane. And he who keeps his associa-
tion and motor senses slightly drugged all the time by moderate
drinking is not entirely a sane man. He is constantly drunk to a
slight degree and, is therefore, constantly insane to a slight degree.
SUSANNA BARROWS: I'd like to ask Joan Silverman if she could comment for us on the layers of meanings in her own descriptions of those quotations. I'm almost totally ignorant about American history, but as I listened to that rich material, I thought to myself, it sounds just like another chapter of John Higham's *Strangers in the Land* (1972); that is to say, the focus on the saloon and so on and associating it with foreigners was in some way just another case study in the general fear of ethnic groups and immigrants. To what degree do you think these very upset reformers were in some way simply reshaping facts about ethnic groups running saloons and Irish people or Germans drinking more and in different ways and more "viciously" than other sectors of American society?

SILVERMAN: Well, I think that you have this Gusfield (1966) model of "moral suasion" versus "legal coercion": you try to persuade the immigrant groups who come to adopt your value system and then when that fails, you have to turn to the law. You turn to "legal coercion" because they just wouldn't buy the Presbyterian, Methodist, Congregationalist model of right behavior. They had their own traditions.

I mentioned this morning the idea of scapegoating. They used the saloon as a hotbed of everything that they disliked about the country. The saloons were in the cities, and they felt the cities were a threat to the old-line values; the cities were a threat to the earlier America that they had imagined — the idea of chastity and religious observance and the family circle and all of those things which they held dear. The saloon was the evil monster there in the city, and that had to be eliminated. They neglected the fact that there was already a very high degree of alcoholism in the country. They just forgot about that altogether.

NORMAN LINTON: We have a problem I think, with the historical material. Most of it is not about America; it's about Massachusetts. And until last year when Michael Hindus (1980) published a piece on South Carolina, we had very little of anything archival on any other state than Massachusetts. And Massachusetts is exceptional: the focus on drinking in South Carolina is much
different from that in Massachusetts; that is to say, they were not concerned about such things as public drunkenness, they were concerned about licensing, and the legal system was preoccupied with violence rather than property offenses. We don't even have studies on New York and Pennsylvania.

LEVINE: I don't think that's so. The Temperance Movement was strongest in the early period in New York, and the New York State Temperance Society was a very powerful mover and shaker. While the original group was in Boston, it quickly moved to New York, and by the 1830's, for example, the New York State Temperance Society had published the most developed arguments, keeping all the statistics and so on. Activity was especially heavy in what is called the "burnt over district" of New York, where the waves of religious revivals were in upstate New York, but there were also sizable Temperance groups in Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maine, Pennsylvania, and even in parts of the South.

LINTON: I suppose I need to limit my remarks to the law's regard for drunkenness, and for violence, and for crime. That's where we're really limited.

EDWIN LEMERT: The first temperance publication actually was started in Honolulu, Hawaii, namely the Seaman's Friend and Temperance Advocate. Also, there's pretty good archival material there in the Missionary's Children Society library. True, it's kind of an offshoot to Massachusetts' Temperance development, but still, there's considerable data there.

MARCUS GRANT: I'd like to bring a European note to this bit of American history. Grammatically I'm not sure if the verb "to disinhibit" is often used transitively, but one thing that both of those presentations suggested is that one can actually look to disinhibit not only individuals, but also aggregations. If one considers Nineteenth Century Europe and mid-Twentieth Century America, one sees a curious similarity in one particular regard. In the beginning of the Nineteenth Century in Europe — in France and in England — with the Romantic Movement, you had poets who were using drugs — largely opiates — in order to do something to their consciousness, to disinhibit themselves, which they saw as relating directly to the plays and poems and so on that they were writing. But they also used drugs to enable them to disinhibit society, to criticize it, to present alternative notions, to create a disinhibited form of social view, if you like (Hayter 1968).

Now, during the Twentieth Century in America, you have novelists doing the same thing with alcohol; that is to say that they're using the alcohol on one level to influence the way in which they seek their inspiration, but perhaps at a more important level to create a
lifestyle for themselves which works as a metaphor for a disinhibited society. I think that that comes out from the historical presentations we've heard. And I think there are roots for the Twentieth Century American phenomenon, not just in Nineteenth Century America but in Nineteenth Century Europe as well.

PARTANEN: If I could add another European viewpoint: in the context of looking at historical character types in the Nineteenth Century as responses to the emerging urbanized working class, there are curious differences between various countries. I know of at least one French treatise (Cottereau 1980) where the development in France and England has been contrasted, and the basic argument is that what was achieved in England through religion was achieved in France through the family and the role of women. After all, France also became an industrialized country with internal controls.

And then I have a question for Harry Levine. I've been thinking of all the complexity of this process of modernization. How far would you be willing to go in sorting out the different kinds of determinants? You could resort to structuralist explanations, in terms of the inner structure of capitalist society, you could invoke, as Foucault (1975) does, the role of the state. There might even be other alternatives, perhaps more idealistically formulated alternatives. It's rather easy and quite suggestive to point out these oppositions, but much harder to go into the explanations of how they were shaped.

LEVINE: I agree. I think in any particular empirical case, depending upon what it is that you're studying, you get some answers based on what is in fact going on in that particular situation.

PARTANEN: So your answer is, through concrete analysis?

LEVINE: Yes, very concrete — not a highfaluting theoretical answer, just good, solid, grounded, empirical history or analysis of a particular situation.

ROOM: I'd like to pose a question I've asked Harry before, and I'm wondering if he has a better answer for it now. To me, it seems that you're making a very powerful argument that there was change in consciousness at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, and that it was related to larger things but that alcohol became very much mixed up in that change in consciousness.

And, implicitly, one could get from your paper the argument that we are living today with a set of understandings about alcohol with respect to its disinhibitory effects that are derived from the Nineteenth Century. And, certainly, I think, you've given us some more strong evidence for that in what you had to say about the layers of
the brain model coming straight from the middle of the Nineteenth Century, and about it still being fallen into as a rhetoric to talk about the brain by a lot of folk — not just social scientists.

A lot of history has happened since then. We had Prohibition, we had Repeal, we had the Alcoholism Movement. Is it really true that this set of ideas came through unchanged, and how could that have happened?

LEVINE: I think that's one of the big questions in talking about the modern era. There's one long tradition which has talked about the difference between the Nineteenth Century and the Twentieth Century, which is captured in a variety of contrasts: the shift from old middle class to new middle class in C. Wright Mills' (1951) work — in David Riesman's (1953) shift from inner directed to outer directed, or the difference between laissez-faire, entrepreneurial or market capitalism, on the one hand, and corporate capitalism on the other. You can talk about religious changes, changes in family life, and so on. Clearly, Christopher Lasch (1979) in the narcissism book is trying to talk about a different sort of character structure that appears in the Twentieth Century. My sense is that at least until recently that has been the dominant way in which intellectual discourse has been carried on concerning these broad issues of modern social life.

I think there's another tradition which has tended, perhaps in response, to emphasize the continuity between the Nineteenth Century and Twentieth Century. A thing that seemed overwhelming to me when I first got into the Nineteenth Century alcohol sources was how contemporary so much of this was. I was attending and observing AA meetings at the same time I was reading temperance material, and the parallels and similarities were striking. I think this is true for many other facets of social life.

Why is it so — I'm enough of a sociologist to believe that ultimately there is some kind of structural condition for it. Certain fundamental organizational aspects of everyday life make the world appear in a certain kind of way, and I think we still share quite a lot with the Nineteenth Century. To say we are still "of that world" is my shorthand way of talking about that. But I see the question of what is different and what is the same as one of the big questions in alcohol research, as in much modern social history.

EHLERS: There is an interesting analogy to the history of theories of the levels of the brain in the earlier beliefs about mental illness in terms of an outside view of inhibition versus a later inside view meaning an internal inhibition. At the time of Hughlings Jackson, neurology and psychiatry were the same discipline, and Hughlings Jackson, in looking at epileptic patients going into fits,
perceived this phenomenon in terms of an exterior loss of inhibition and talked about it in terms of a reptilian brain because the deeper brain sites were more common in lower vertebrates.

However, when the Freudian viewpoint came in, the idea of inhibition became internalized, and disinhibition would be viewed not in terms of reverting to a reptilian brain, but rather in terms of reverting to a primitive drive or a more child-like state. This was, then, an internalized definition of disinhibition, instead of an externalized view, based upon the development of our concepts of behavior.

LEVINE: Internalized and externalized? You mean physiological versus psychological?

EHLERS: I don't know. I was just drawing it out as a concept.

LEVINE: There's a recent book about Freud called *The Biologist of the Mind* (Sulloway 1979), and there's been substantial critical response to it, but one argument it makes about Freud is that he was translating the biological concepts of his time into psychology.

EHLERS: Exactly.

ROIZEN: I was just wondering this, Harry. Alan Lang comes here and tells us about the experimental assessment of two kinds of expectations: expecting alcohol and expecting no alcohol, and we get a nice new conclusion out of it, something we can sink our teeth into: expectations and not just chemistry matter.

But can we view history as providing the same thing? Can we look at one historical time where the expectation was that alcohol would create disinhibition and lots of untoward behaviors afterward, and at another historical time when alcohol didn't carry the same cultural expectations? You've told us that such variation exists in American history, so we can try to run Alan Lang's table on your data, so to speak.

I've been trying to do that in my mind, and I don't find myself able to come out with a conclusion. But if you were to try to compress the historical account into my framework, what would be your estimate of the verdict of history on the relation between biology and belief in disinhibition?

LEVINE: I don't know if this is the answer to your question, but it's something I wanted to say. My sense is that very often scientific and medical understandings and definitions simplify and vulgarize, falsify what is in fact the more complicated, rich experience of most people. I don't have a clear way of expressing it, but I have a sense that there is this widely accepted and generally understood definition of drunken behavior as "time out," very much along the lines that MacAndrew and Edgerton suggest: we are taught to understand, and we do understand drunkenness as "time out," and
we don’t, in fact, routinely think that alcohol affects our moral senses or our brain or disinhibits us. We use that language—especially if we’re socialized into it—but we actually have a more complicated, difficult-to-verbalize understanding of it as time in which you’re allowed to do certain sorts of things; drinking is part of the ritual signs that allow you to do these certain things.

In the Seventeenth and the Eighteenth Centuries, it’s clear that people understood that when they got drunk they did all sorts of things they didn’t ordinarily do, but they didn’t need to say that “alcohol made me do it.” I have a feeling that even today, when people say “Alcohol made me do it,” they don’t mean the same thing in the everyday sense that is meant in scientific language. When somebody says, “I expect alcohol to make me happy or merry,” what it evokes is the stock image. In fact, what is felt, understood, and perceived is “When I drink alcohol, I am in a time and space in which I get to do things I don’t ordinarily get to do.”

I don’t know if that answers your question or not.

ROOM: Let me make sure if I understand. You’re saying that in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries those complicated understandings would also have been different?

LEVINE: I’m not sure. I don’t have a picture of them fully, but I think that they were definitely there.

FINGARETTE: Just continuing with this same theme, it seems to me that it is enormously important to go into this kind of intellectual history as a background, because while it’s all very well to collect data and to be empirical—as has been quite appropriately suggested—unless you know what you’re being empirical about, what you’re trying to explain, it doesn’t get you very far. There is always this problem which can’t be divorced from the empirical explanatory aspect: the problem of understanding the concept in terms of which you are describing or understanding behavior, which you then want to explain on chemical or other grounds. Therefore, I think that the kind of inquiry that you suggest, going into the history of the concept of conscience, the concept of the moral sense, is very important because those Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century, and, indeed, even Seventeenth Century ideas are very much a part of our thinking today.

The question has been raised how could this have persisted through time? Well, the answer is that a great deal of our thinking in the world that we are familiar with is straight John Locke from the Seventeenth Century. All one needs to do is examine the presuppositions of everyday common sense, and you’re reading John Locke’s essay. So, in terms of intellectual history there’s nothing surprising about it, but then I think we have to go into it
more fully to see what people have in mind, in turn, when they talk about disinhibition. And I don't think we can get around this by saying we're going to use a neutral description of it, such as "violating a norm," because then we lose our hold on the very thing we were trying to explain.

Let me add one substantive point, if I may. The notion of the inner moral sense which you mentioned is important, but the moral sense idea, as I understand it, was more a matter of perception: being able to perceive what is right and wrong. The idea was that we have this inner faculty, and just like seeing space and colors, we can see the moral values. But it hasn't yet quite gotten in touch with the disinhibition idea, because there the point is that while you may see what is right, the task is to do it. The problem that seems to me to be more at the center of this loss of inhibition idea is the idea of giving way to temptation, of knowing what is right; but, nevertheless, for some reason, giving into or indulging in what is wrong, to put it very crudely. So, I think we have to trace the idea back to conscience in the sense of a restraint on the will, which is a peculiar notion because it divides the will in two, you have a twofold will.

You also have to take into account the various fundamental paradigms of how we control our conduct in our own Western European thinking. One of the fundamental paradigms is that we do so by the use of reason, as someone mentioned. We do it by knowing — to know the good is to do the good. That goes back as far as Plato.

Including this paradigm, we have three models of control of conduct, at least. One is: to know the good is to do the good; but if doing good depends on one's use of reasoning powers to discover what is good, you may not know the good because you are mentally confused — the rational faculty is confused — which may result from alcohol. The second is that we perceive — we "see" — the good by direct insight as intuition. Here alcohol may be taken to confuse our moral perception. The third possibility is that even if we "see" the good, we don't will to do it — the will itself is corrupt.

And my final comment is that at the same time that these new ideas you're discussing come into play, there's also a tremendous surge of faith in the materialist interpretation of human psychology: the idea of Benjamin Rush and many others of this period that we can understand human behavior in terms of material causes acting on the brain. They have a very naive faith in that. When you put this faith, the thought "We're going to look for the material cause, and that's where progress lies," together with the philosophical, moral, religious conceptions of a will which is somehow restrained by a conscience, you begin to build up a picture that's important to the disinhibition idea. It's important to examine this
level of assumptions before too hastily connecting up the empirical data with something.

**LANG:** I have some appreciation of what you're saying, but I'm afraid that we're getting bogged down again in the moral aspects of disinhibition. And I think the way to draw together the Colonial historical period and the Temperance Movement period is not so much in terms of whether or not alcohol causes evil behavior; what's in common between the two periods is that drinking seems to be related simply to different behavior. People feel and act differently when they're intoxicated. And whether that behavior is seen as better by them or better by those around them or worse by them or worse by those around them is a function of the beliefs of the contemporary culture rather than a direct effect of the substance — or rather than having anything to do with conscience, for that matter. People may become more altruistic when they've been drinking; and this may be different from the way they were when they were sober. That's in a sense a disinhibition as well.

**BARROWS:** To add just a point, what fascinated me in Mr. Levine's talk was the matter-of-fact tone with which people in Colonial times described violence in taverns, in a state of drunkenness. When we look beyond the world of drink and ask ourselves "What's the inhibited behavior?", we might understand disinhibition somewhat better. Violence, at least in Europe in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries, was far more prevalent than it is today. And so, not surprisingly, observers who looked to the world of drink and its locale and the activities it engendered described them not necessarily as caused by intoxication, but rather, almost as a normal state of affairs. While in the course of the Nineteenth Century, if we look at Britain and France, it's precisely when murder, violence, and serious kinds of physical assaults are on the decline that the association of violence with liquor is on the increase.

As a social historian, I'm saying that, in order to get that double vision that Isaiah Berlin suggests when he defines leisure as "freedom from" as well as "freedom to" you may have to look at the world of inhibited behavior and see how common was the behavior with the kinds of attributions that are described subsequently in the world of drink.
“Four Hundred Rabbits”: An Anthropological View of Ethanol as a Disinhibitor

Mac Marshall

Sahagún reports that the Aztecs called pulque centzonto-tochtli, or “four hundred rabbits,” because of its almost infinite variety of effects on the behavior of those who drank it (Taylor 1979, p. 34).

While the sheer occurrence of changes between one’s “sober” and one’s “drunken” comportment is beyond question, it is an equally incontestable fact that these changes are of a most incredible diversity (MacAndrew and Edgerton 1969, p. 14).

Introduction

It is a shame that much of social science consists in rediscovering the wheel. The Aztecs appreciated over four centuries ago that consumption of beverage alcohol produced “an almost infinite variety of effects on those who drank it” and, presumably, they understood at least one of those effects to be what we call “disinhibition.” More recently, in an effort to cure the hangover of conventional wisdom that has troubled Westerners since at least the time of ancient Greece¹, MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969, pp. 13-14) have reiterated what the Aztecs knew: that behavioral changes following consumption of alcohol by human beings “are of a most incredible diversity.”

It was necessary for MacAndrew and Edgerton to repeat and document this ancient lore because the conventional wisdom among Westerners concerning the disinhibitory consequences of ethanol as a drug has continued in spite of a mass of evidence to the con-

¹Notes appear at end of paper.
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL VIEW

.. trary. That a similar sort of “wisdom” affects the way we view many other drugs has been noted by Weil: “Observers (even highly trained observers) tend to fall into the trap of trying...to make the drug a causal variable when it is not. The tendency to make drugs causes of things we see associated with them is strong in proportion to our emotional involvement, to our unconscious biases. Often it is so strong that it blinds us to obvious factors that are much more directly causative of the phenomena we observe...”(1972, pp. 8-9).2

Perhaps the most useful contribution an anthropologist can make to an interdisciplinary conference on alcohol and disinhibition is to try to expose the unconscious cultural biases and preconceived notions about alcoholic beverages and their effects on behavior that continue to be part of the conventional wisdom of Western civilization and of at least some practitioners of Western science. To do so is to build upon the work of MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969) by further documenting the “four hundred rabbits.” Before turning to this task, however, we must ask ourselves just what is meant by “disinhibition.”

What Is Disinhibition?

The very notion of “disinhibition” harbors a number of assumptions about human behavior and the organization of the central nervous system that do not appear to be entirely warranted. For instance, it is assumed that alcohol “releases” mankind’s “innate aggressive instinct” which is held in check only by the thin mantle of culture acquired in early childhood socialization (cf. Wilson 1977, p. 249). But it has yet to be shown that human beings possess an innate instinct to aggression — Robert Ardrey, Desmond Morris and company notwithstanding — and it has been demonstrated, time and again, that aggression, and that which triggers it, is very much a set of learned behavioral responses.

The notion that the drug ethanol “releases” behaviors that otherwise are held in check by socialization of “the human animal” is based on ideas inherited from Freud (that the superego controls the ego and the id) which are increasingly in disfavor among many psychologists. The conventional wisdom’s model of human behavior seems to assume that people are filled with a seething cauldron of negative social impulses (that everyone is secretly a mugger and a sex fiend) and that these are repressed during the socialization process so that normally they are controlled. Only when the pharmacological action of some drug (like ethanol) “strips away” these inhibitions, or when the brain is damaged somehow, do a person’s
ugly and baser "instincts" emerge. There are others at this conference more qualified than I to address these psychological assumptions. I do, however, think it worth questioning not only the assumed pharmacological effects of alcohol on behavior but also the assumed model of human behavior and central nervous system organization that underlies the conventional wisdom.

Finally, it must be pointed out that "disinhibition" is not necessarily the same thing from one culture to another, within one culture at different times and settings, or even from one individual to another within a common cultural tradition. The disinhibition against which MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969) argue encompasses mainly acts of physical violence and overt sex, yet in some cultures one can act "disinhibited" merely by violating avoidance patterns, ignoring speech taboos in the presence of certain others, or engaging in improper joking with prohibited kin. The point is that what is viewed as "disinhibited" by members of one culture may not be so in another. We cannot assume disinhibition to be the same thing(s) for all people.

The presumed link between drinking and disinhibition ultimately addresses the age-old nature-nurture controversy: Is disinhibited drunken comportment a consequence of alcohol's toxic pharmacological effects on our biological selves (nature) or is such comportment a result of what we have learned to do when we drink (nurture)? This is, of course, the underlying question we have gathered to discuss at this conference, but we must avoid falling into the trap of assuming drunken behavior to be only the result of pharmacological action or only the result of learning. It is clearly a bit of both and the challenge is to unravel the relative contribution of each.3

The Rise of the Sociocultural Learning Hypothesis in Anthropology

Although it was left to MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969) to pull together the scattered cross-cultural literature in support of a clearly stated argument, the ideas that lie behind the sociocultural learning hypothesis of drunken comportment (as opposed to the physiological-pharmacological hypothesis) had been around in anthropology for some time.

As early as 1961, Washburne discussed the "inhibition hypothesis" based on physiology as against the "social norms hypothesis" based on social psychology and concluded: "It seems likely that both factors work in combination, although the idea of a change in social
norms [in the drinking context] has been neglected in most work" (1961, p. xviii). At approximately the same time, MacAndrew and Garfinkel presented the crux of MacAndrew's later book with Edgerton, contrasting "the toxic-agent approach"; with "the social-system approach": like Washburne, they concluded that "Neither formulation is complete in itself" (1962, p. 266). A great leap forward was taken in 1965 with publication of Mandelbaum's survey paper entitled simply "Alcohol and Culture." Mandelbaum summarized much of the anthropological knowledge about drunkenness and pointed the way to a number of fruitful lines of research. Harkening back to Washburne's book, he noted that "The chemical and physiological properties of alcohol obviously provide a necessary base for drinking behavior....But the behavioral consequences of drinking alcohol depend as much on a people's idea of what alcohol does to a person as they do on the physiological processes that take place" (Mandelbaum 1979, p. 17). Soon thereafter, Washburne published a short paper in which he argued that "Alcohol should not be looked at purely physiologically, or as if its physiological effect had a definite primacy" (1968, p. 98). These books and papers seem to have had relatively slight impact outside of anthropology itself; it remained for someone to come forward with a synthesis of the anthropological evidence regarding alcohol and drunken comportment — someone who could command a wider audience. This task was fulfilled admirably with publication of MacAndrew and Edgerton's book in 1969. Not only has that volume proved a benchmark in the anthropological study of alcohol and culture but it has also exercised influence far beyond the narrow disciplinary bounds of anthropology.

Drunken Comportment as Learned Behavior: Further Evidence in Support of the "Four Hundred Rabbits"

Following publication of MacAndrew and Edgerton's book there has been a substantial increase in both the quantity and the quality of anthropological literature on alcohol and culture (Marshall 1980). This growth continues a pattern over the years of increasing anthropological attention to the subject of alcohol use and abuse. Nowhere in this rapidly accumulating literature do we find any convincing evidence to contradict MacAndrew and Edgerton's argument that drunken comportment is primarily a matter of sociocultural learning; instead, data from field studies around the world have added further support to their position. Taken by itself,
however, the anthropological literature does not allow us to assess precisely what the relative contributions of pharmacological action and learning are to the drunken comportment puzzle.

One striking theme that emerges from the anthropological literature — particularly that for Oceania and Native North America — is the matter of pseudointoxication or feigned drunkenness. These data come both from statements by ethnographers to the effect that they suspected people of pretending to be physiologically inebriated when they were not and from observations on the rapidity with which persons can “sober up” in response to some changed circumstance after acting very drunk.

Describing a Tahitian drinker, Levy comments:

On several occasions after having looked dramatically and unco-ordinatedly drunk he would, in response to some development of interest “pull himself together,” and act in a relatively co-ordinated way. For the few drinkers who showed unco-ordinated drunken behaviour there seemed to be a dramatic, exaggerated quality to it, which was beyond the actual neurological dysfunction as indicated by the amount of alcohol which they had apparently taken, and by their frequent ability to recover quickly (1966, p. 312).

Of the culturally closely related Rarotongans of the Cook Islands, Mackenzie states, “Several times I noticed that people who had been drinking and were staggering stopped staggering immediately some event suddenly required attentiveness” (1974, p. 6). Likewise, the young men of Truk in Micronesia have been described as often pretending to be drunk by staggering, whooping, and carrying a can or bottle to publicly demonstrate their drunken role (Marshall 1979a).

Pseudointoxication also is widely reported in the literature for North American Indians; VanStone (1980, p. 39), in fact, uses precisely this term in reference to the Snowdrift Chipewyans. Among the Chippewa of Minnesota, Westermeyer describes two different styles of drinking which he labels “white drinking” and “Indian drinking.” The former is characterized by restraint, and the individual behaves pretty much as he does when not drinking; the latter is marked by the early appearance of drunken behavior: “After only one or two drinks, loud talking and staggered gait may appear. Great hilarity, warmth, euphoria, flirtatiousness [sic] can be noted” (Westermeyer 1972, p. 400). This subsequently progresses to depression, anger, crying, arguments and fights, suicide gestures, sleep, stupor, or blackout. Westermeyer claims that “virtually all” Chippewa people engage in white drinking at certain
times and places, e.g., among their white friends or at a white bar. Significantly, however, "One can observe the same person drinking in this manner at a white bar, and in the same evening observe him drinking "Indian style" at an Indian bar. Chippewa acquaintances, unexpectedly meeting the author in an Indian bar, have dropped Indian drinking behavior and assumed white drinking for the course of the conversation" (Westermeyer 1972, p. 400).

Several different researchers report the Sioux Indians to feign drunkenness. Among the Dakota (Yankton Sioux), "at least in a social situation, it is more important to appear intoxicated than it is to actually get drunk. Thus a person will pretend to be drunk even though he has imbibed only a small quantity of diluted alcohol" (Hurt and Brown 1965, p. 229). The Pine Ridge Sioux "become animated and convivial before they have had anything to drink" at parties and when a bottle is opened, signaling the beginning of party behavior, "a noticeable change in affect pervades the room before all have had a drink" (Kemnitzer 1972, pp. 139-140). Likewise, Mohatt (1972, p. 266) discusses cases of feigned drunkenness among the Teton Sioux.

Indians of the North seem particularly prone to engage in pseudointoxication, which is not to suggest that they don't also become truly inebriated on many occasions. The Hare are said to be able to "turn their drunken behavior on and off at certain social cues" unless they are exceedingly inebriated (Savishinsky 1977, p. 45), and a similar situation is reported by Robbins (1979) for the Naskapi. Of the Aleuts, Berreman holds, "It often appears that these people are pretending to be more intoxicated than they really are" (1956, p. 507). Like the Tahitians and Rarotongans, Salishan drinkers undergo "a distinct 'sobering effect' in their drunkenness. This refers to quick transitions from drunken to sober behavior and back again, depending upon the situation, particularly when a necessary task must be carried out, such as starting a motor or navigating a boat through dangerous waters" (Lemert 1980, p. 58). Lemert also comments that younger Salish "give the impression of feigning intoxication" and he mentions stories of Indians acting drunk after taking soft drink from a whisky bottle given them by whites (Lemert 1980, pp. 58, 60). The Tununermiut Inuit of northern Baffin Island are reported to engage in "apparent drunken behavior [that] was often more a posturing than the consequence of high intake of alcohol" (Matthiasson 1980, p. 86), and Hamer claims that "Potawatomi individuals often appeared highly intoxicated after only a few bottles of beer" (1980, p. 117). Summarizing data from their edited collection of reports on drinking among native peoples of the North, Hamer and Steinbring comment that "The
various authors agree that the presence of alcohol and drinking companions is sufficient to induce the simulation of drunken comportment" (1980, p. 292).

Finally, in a Mexican village, Dennis informs us that " ‘social drunkenness’ really defines the drunk’s role, and not physiological inebriation. Amilpas drunks are often suspected of not really being as drunk as they seem, in order to perform otherwise unacceptable acts with impunity” (1979, p. 63).

The relevance of feigned drunkenness to the disinhibition issue should be clear. If drinkers (and sometimes even those who have not drunk) can evince all the classic signs of inebriation without having consumed sufficient alcohol to produce such symptoms physiologically, then drunken behavior cannot be assumed to be caused only by ethanol’s pharmacological action on the nervous system. Moreover, if drinkers can demonstrate a full range of culturally appropriate drunken behaviors and then “sober up” on a moment’s notice in response to certain social cues, then the disinhibiting effects of ethanol on human beings are further called into question.

MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969, pp. 37-60) clearly demonstrate “the sway of time and circumstance” (or what Weil [1972, p. 29] calls “the importance of set and setting”) on drunken comportment. *How* a drinker behaves after ingesting alcohol has much to do with *where* he is drinking, with *whom* he is drinking, *what* the occasion is that prompted the drinking, and *why* he is drinking (e.g., to “get drunk,” to relax, to be sociable, etc.; cf. Mandelbaum 1979). Weil observes that “the combined effects of set and setting can easily overshadow the pharmacological effects of a drug as stated in a pharmacology text” (Weil 1972, p. 29). Here I will simply add a few more examples of “the sway of time and circumstance” in support of MacAndrew and Edgerton.

Bunzel’s (1940) data on the Chamula were used by MacAndrew and Edgerton, but they ignored her equally interesting material on Chichicastenango in Guatemala. Of these latter people, Bunzel notes that the same men behave in radically different ways according to the setting in which they are drinking: “Men drinking ceremonially retain their dignity. They may have to be assisted when their ceremonial duties take them from place to place. But they continue to discharge their duties apparently unimpaired” (Bunzel 1940, p. 367). On the other hand, “Secular drinking in the *zarabandas* and the *estancos* is apt to be more abandoned and disruptive” (Bunzel 1940, p. 367), involving such things as dancing, weeping, a great deal of erotic behavior, promiscuity, and quarrels (cf. Marshall 1979b, p. 454).

In Truk, the life cycle of drinking finds the same men behaving in
strikingly different ways when drinking, according to their age
and to social expectations about what their appropriate behavior at
that age ought to be. Young men, out to build public reputations for
'bravery' and 'strong thought,' engage in brawls and other displays
of bravado; by their mid-thirties, as they leave the 'young man'
category, they give up this arresting style of drunken comportment
even though they continue to drink as much as before. As they move
into the 'mature man' age category, they are expected to demon-
strate more responsibility and are publicly ridiculed if they con-
tinue to behave as 'young men' when drinking: "The
same
beverages are consumed by the same
persons in approximately the
same amounts at different times in their lives. The superegos of
these men do not change. Their inhibitions do not tighten up with
advancing years. What has changed is the set of public expectations
surrounding appropriate behavior for men at different stations in
life" (Marshall 1979a, p. 116).

A third example of the critical importance of set and setting in
controlling the manner of drunken comportment already has been
mentioned above for the Chippewa who engage in "white drinking"
and "Indian drinking" according to appropriate circumstances.?

Finally, Taylor offers a nice example of the importance of context
in structuring the nature of drunken comportment. He notes that in
central Mexico and Oaxaca drunken violence rarely occurred dur-
ing the heavy drinking that accompanied community fiestas, har-
vest rites, christening of a new house, reciprocal labor, and other
group rituals that reinforced community bonds. On the other hand,
in the colonial era,

Drunken violence seems to have been much more com-
mon in unstructured situations in which alcohol did not
signify social responsibility. This was especially true in
towns that had formal taverns (as opposed to the many
peasant homes with a jug of pulque) or pulquerías. Pul-
quería behavior, whether in Mexico City or a rural vil-
lage, approached classic disinhibition, in which a
person's characteristic behavior changed, often dramati-
cally (Taylor 1979, p. 66; cf. Madsen and Madsen 1979).

Clearly, when the same drug produces widely varying behavioral
outcomes in the same individuals according to set, setting, age,
status, and the like, it becomes very difficult to argue that that drug
automatically leads to disinhibited behavior, however we may
define such behavior.

In the decade since MacAndrew and Edgerton's book appeared, a
number of scholars have specifically addressed the question of how
drunken comportment is learned. These examples are informative
and provide still further support for the sociocultural learning hypothesis.

One of Mohatt's young Teton Sioux informants described his initial drinking experience this way:

I had my first bottle of beer when I was 14 years old. I drank and drank. When I was going home I threw my hat away, because I had seen drunks do this and others talk about this. So I went home without a hat. A lot of people have this idea, to act drunk (1972, p. 273).

Of this description Mohatt observes: "the only way he knew how to act was the way he had seen others act" (Mohatt 1972, p. 273).

According to Savishinsky, Hare Indian "children are exposed to brewing and partying from infancy, and thus learn about the realities of drinking in the same unstructured way that they become socialized to other aspects of community life" (1977, p. 51). Through this process,

By continued observation and experience at drinking parties...and by learning what others are capable of, they gain the capacity to anticipate such events, and so, eventually, to accept or tolerate them. They thereby indirectly learn what they themselves are capable of, and can, within personal limits, develop the ability to control and channel their own actions as well. It is in this way that they learn to perceive and ultimately utilize drinking as an appropriate cultural outlet (Savishinsky 1977, p. 51).

In a section entitled "Learning to be a Drunk," Marshall discusses in some detail how young boys observe and copy the public drunkenness of Trukese young men.

The most exciting and colorful daily events in Peniyesene are the drunken antics of young men. These events inevitably attract a horde of small children who hang around the perimeter of the audience. From early childhood on, Trukese children carefully and frequently observe drunken performances. By the time boys reach 8 or 10, they begin to imitate the swaggering style of young men. Boys approaching their teens become attentive to the finest details of young male drunken comportment. Kung fu routines are practiced diligently, war cries are tried out, and special gaits characteristic of drunks are affected. But imitative learning does not stop here. Boys 8 to 10 years old will ferret empty booze bottles out of the thickets to sniff them and get high. Having done so, they will stagger about with bottle in hand, occasionally uttering the Trukese war cry and falling down as drunks do.
The difference is that when the boys collapse they collapse in giggles (Marshall 1979a, p. 116).

These explicit accounts of how people learn to be proper drunks in their own cultural settings provide a solid foundation in support of the sociocultural learning hypothesis of drunken comportment.

Closely akin to the issues of pseudointoxication, the importance of the drinking context, and learning to be a drunk is the matter of "time out" — of drunkenness providing an excuse for behavior that is normally disapproved. This may range from comparatively mild things like flirtation to serious matters like homicide. Once again, this idea finds widespread favor among North American Indians and Pacific Islanders, although it is by no means restricted to them.

In Truk, Micronesia, taking on the public role of a drunk allows "week-end warriors" to engage in all sorts of antisocial activities that absolutely are not tolerated in those who are sober (Marshall 1979a). Drunks are referred to as "crazy" and are likened to animals who cannot understand what is said to them: "No matter how obnoxious and offensive a person's behavior when drunk, no matter what sort of mayhem a drunken berserker commits, he can always attempt to 'plead the fifth' in order not to incriminate himself by pointing out that, after all, he was drunk, irresponsible, and did not know what he was doing" (Marshall 1979a, p. 54). A similar use of real or feigned drunkenness as an excuse for "what he could not do if he did not look as if he had been drinking" (Mackenzie 1974, p. 6) is reported for Rarotonga and is widespread in contemporary Papua New Guinea (Marshall, field notes).

Alcohol as a culturally acceptable excuse for behaviors not otherwise tolerated is widespread in the drinking patterns of North American Indians and the indigenous inhabitants of Mesoamerica. Describing the Hare Indians, Savishinsky says that "drinking situations provide a special license for affective release. Underlying this is the fact that drunken individuals are not considered responsible for their actions....Drinking thus defines...a 'time out' occasion during which otherwise unacceptable behavior is excused" (1977, p. 46). Berreman refers to drinking occasions among the Aleut as socially sanctioned "moral holidays" during which "unsanctioned behavior is not strongly disapproved if effected under the influence of alcohol, so that drunkenness has value as an opportunity for release of pent-up feelings" (1956, pp. 507, 508). Westermeyer lists one of the functions of the "Indian drinking" style in Chippewa society to be that "It acts as a social license to behave in ways that are unacceptable (i.e., un-Chippewayan) in the sober state" (1972, p. 401). Kupferer describes Cree drunkenness as "time out" and as permitting "behavior that
would otherwise be disapproved" (1979, p. 202). Potawatomi
"Women were often observed to make amorous advances, particu-
larly toward white men, after imbibing a small amount of liquor....
one had the impression that the relatively small amount of alcohol
consumed was an excuse, rather than a cause, for the reduction of
sexual inhibitions" (Hamer 1980, p. 118). The Yankton Sioux share
this idea: "Drunkenness is accepted as an excuse for aggressive and
antisocial behavior by the men and for sexual license by the women"
(Hurt and Brown 1965, p. 229). Since heavy drinking was a symbol
of masculinity among the Sioux, "women were not permitted to
drink except on rare occasions when they needed an excuse to
commit adultery" (Hunt and Brown 1965, p. 229). Among the Teton
Sioux, "there are cases of feigning drunkenness as an excuse for
some act, such as assault or stealing, which formerly would have
been boasted about. With assertive behavior now not for the nation
but against it, they were ashamed and had to excuse their behavior
by claiming to be drunk and therefore not accountable for their
acts..." (Mohatt 1972, p. 266). Like these other tribes, Navajo are
reported to foster "the notion that a man is not himself when in his
cups [and] it follows that he is not responsible for his actions when
drinking" (Levy and Kunitz 1974, p. 187). These authors further
suggest "that Navajo men do not beat up their wives because they
are drunk but that they get drunk so that they may beat up their
wives" (1974, p. 188; cf. Gelles 1972, cited in Room 1980,
p. 3).
Finally, Hays asserts that "Apache group drinking has always been
an institutionalized setting which provided the individual with a
release from the rules imposed on him under all other circum-
stances and, at the same time, an acceptable excuse for him once he
has taken advantage of this opportunity" (1970, p. 18, emphasis in
original).

The same notion of drunkenness offering a legitimate excuse for
otherwise forbidden acts is found in many parts of Mesoamerica as
well. Concerning Amilpas, a village in the Valley of Oaxaca, Dennis
writes, "Amilpenos, like people in many other societies, believe that
inebriation is the immediate cause of the drunk's behavior" (1979,
p. 62). His paper describes in rich detail "the role of the drunk" and
the sorts of things a drunk can get away with saying and doing. The
Chamula of Chiapas believe that "A person who is drunk is not
responsible and his offenses are condoned" (Bunzel 1940, p. 378).
Taylor produces evidence to suggest that the excuse value of drun-
kenness was not part of pre-Hispanic culture in Mexico but rather
that it was an idea borrowed from the Spaniards in the postcon-
quest period. He notes that "admissions of drunkenness usually
were sympathetically received by the colonial courts" and that the
Spaniards frequently accepted drunkenness "as a mitigating consideration in sentencing the offender" (Taylor 1979, p. 64). The value of this stratagem was not lost on the Indians:

The legal advantage of claiming drunkenness and the obvious prompting of counsel suggest that some Indian offenders who blamed alcohol were mouthing words that they did not believe. That Indians could use alcohol to advantage as an excuse for premeditated attacks was clear to one judge, who remarked that Indians often drank before they committed crimes, counting on "the security of not being punished" (Taylor 1979, p. 65).

To summarize, then, the belief that alcohol ingestion produces "an altered state of conscience" in which drinkers may legitimately transgress the norms of everyday proper social conduct, and get away with it, provides a powerful incentive for drinkers to behave in a "disinhibited" manner. Indeed, it is imperative that drinkers who wish to do this "advertise" that they are "drunk" and socially irresponsible so that others will know how to interpret their words and deeds (Dennis 1979; Gorad et al. 1971; Marshall 1979a). The implications of such a belief for the disinhibition hypothesis are obvious: If it is to people's social advantage to behave in a drunken manner, and if such behavior is culturally excused, then many drunks will behave this way regardless of whether they are physiologically inebriated. Indeed, it is often to their clear advantage not to be too physiologically drunk, as Marshall (1979a) has shown for the "weekend warriors" of Truk and as Wilson (1977) shows for sexual arousal.

I suggest that the widespread belief in the excuse value of drunkenness ("time out") in Oceania, North America, and Mesoamerica reinforces MacAndrew and Edgerton's (1969, pp. 100-164) suggestion that those peoples who lacked alcoholic beverages aboriginally, and were introduced to them by Europeans, used European patterns of drunken comportment as a model of behavior. But from the available evidence it seems that not only the behaviors involved in drunkenness were copied, but also the beliefs about the drunken state as one of mindless disinhibition. For example, Taylor observes that by the late colonial period "Indians, especially in central Mexico, were beginning to adopt the Spanish view that alcohol could dissolve one's natural judgment and good sense and could, alone, cause crime" (1979, p. 65, emphasis added).

There is other evidence to support this hypothesis. Citing Thomas Nash, "a contemporary of Shakespeare and a friend of Marlowe," who wrote in the late 16th century, MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969, pp. 8-9) quote a lengthy passage in which Nash lists eight
kinds of drunkards: ape drunk, lion drunk, swine drunk, sheep drunk, maudlin drunk, martin drunk, goat drunk, and fox drunk, each with its own special characteristics and each following on the other. Writing almost four centuries later, Simmons (1960, p. 1020) describes Peruvian villagers' beliefs that a drunker passes through four stages or "bloods": blood of the turkey (when cold sober), blood of the monkey, blood of the lion, and blood of the pig. In identical fashion, Kearney (1970, p. 134) records for the Zapotec-mestizo town of Ixtepeji, Oaxaca, that "According to folk belief, a person undergoes changes in personality while drinking because of the effects of the alcohol on the blood." These stages are: blood of the monkey, blood of the lion, and blood of the pig.

European colonial expansion began not too long before Nash described his eight kinds of drunkards and it is striking to find some of the exact same kinds of drunkards fully incorporated into the folk beliefs of Mesoamerican and Latin American societies following 400 years of Spanish influence. Since Nash was an Englishman, and since ideas similar to his diffused to the Spanish colonies in the New World, it would seem that these ideas were widespread in Europe and that the colonial process had a profound influence on colonized people's beliefs about drunkenness as well as their behaviors. Certainly, the Japanese colonial presence in Micronesia had an important influence on Trukese beliefs about drunkenness as "time out" (Marshall 1979a, pp. 44-46). In sum, it seems that the major colonial powers exported to those areas of the globe that fell under their control not only models of drunken behavior but also a host of beliefs about the effects of alcohol on human beings. It may be that the widespread belief in alcohol as a disinhibitor is nothing but an ethnocentric European folk belief foisted on subject peoples around the world during the heyday of colonialism.

The Problem of Possible Differences in Biological Sensitivity to Ethanol

I would not be true to anthropology if I did not raise an issue which troubles the sociocultural learning camp, though it by no means negates the main tenets of this position. This is the whole lively — and at times highly emotional — matter of possible differences in biological sensitivity to ethanol among human breeding populations, ethnic groups, and the like.

Spurred on by a controversial paper by Fenna et al. (1972), a growing number of human geneticists, biological anthropologists.
and physiologists have conducted studies over the past 7 or 8 years in an effort to determine whether "the firewater myth" and related ideas have any basis in biological fact. My understanding of the literature is that the results to date remain equivocal, with no clear pattern having emerged from the various investigations that have been published. Those wishing a brief introduction to the pertinent literature are referred to Hanna (1976, 1977), Heath (1974b), Wolff (1972, 1973), Zeiner (1978), Zeiner and Paredes (1978), and Zeiner et al. (1976, 1977).

The relevance of this ongoing debate for the issue at hand has to do with certain assumptions that underlie MacAndrew and Edgerton's (1969) review of the cross-cultural evidence against disinhibition; namely, they assume alcohol and its metabolites to have the same pharmacological and biophysiological effects on all human beings. For example, they state that "if alcohol were a 'superego solvent' for one group of people due to its toxic action, then this same disinhibiting effect ought to be evident in all people" (1969, p. 36, emphasis in original). Furthermore, their effort (1969, p. 87) to dismiss the genetic differences argument by depicting Ifaluk drinking as atypical of other Carolinian atoll communities cannot be sustained on closer inspection of the relevant historical and ethnographic evidence (see, e.g., Marshall 1976, p. 115, fn. 12; Marshall and Marshall 1975, pp. 449-450).

Ultimately, it seems to me, the sociocultural learning hypothesis will have to be brought into accord with any general patterns that derive from studies on ethnic differences in sensitivity to beverage alcohol before we will be in a position to understand the relative contributions of nature and nurture to this fascinating conundrum.8

Conclusions

MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969) documented that drunken comportment varied from one culture to another around the world and within particular cultures through time. The anthropological literature that has reached print since their book was published reinforces this and underscores the importance of set and setting, learning the drunk role, the excuse value of alcohol, and the effects of such variables as age, sex, and social status on differences in drunken comportment.

While ethanol's pharmacological effects cannot be denied, they seem to be the least interesting aspect of the human process of getting drunk. The anthropological material suggests that drink-
ing booze is much like having sex, in that the following factors figure prominently in whether the undertaking will prove “successful”: presuppositions about what will happen; mood; an appropriate physical and social setting; and the previous experiences of the active participants.

The received wisdom at present seems to be that beverage alcohol cannot be viewed as the cause of specific drunken behaviors, other than the well-known sensorimotor disturbances discussed by MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969, pp. 1-5). Rather, the pharmacological effects of alcohol on human beings make people feel different than when they haven’t imbibed. The meanings given to this experience, i.e., how one interprets these feelings and orders his experience, are provided by the culture in which one is a participant. If the culture holds that imbibing alcohol produces warm feelings of community solidarity, harmony, and camaraderie, then violence and sexual advances will have no place (e.g., Brandes 1979). If, on the other hand, the cultural tradition suggests that the drinker will feel aggressive and sexually aroused and, furthermore, will not be held accountable if he acts upon these impulses, then aggression and overt sexual advances are likely to result from drinking (e.g., Hamer 1980). Thus, alcohol as a drug can be viewed as an enabler or a facilitator of certain culturally given inebriate states, but it cannot be seen as producing a specific response pattern among all human beings who ingest it.

Notes

1. 'To wit, “that alcohol depresses the activity of 'the higher centers of the brain,' thereby producing a state of affairs in which neither man's reason nor his conscience is any longer capable of performing its customary directive and inhibitory functions” (MacAndrew and Edgerton 1969, pp. 13-14).

2. Weil, himself trained in medicine and pharmacology, further comments that "investments in preconceived notions are most damaging in groups that regard themselves to be free of such notions, such as physicians and pharmacologists" (1972, p. 4).

3. Whether this will prove possible in fact remains to be seen. Nevertheless, one can hope that we might progress beyond the current state of affairs where the following kinds of estimates are all we have: “Drunken behavior is patterned to such a degree that it appears to be, in large part, the resultant of a learning process” (Heath 1974b, p. 56, emphasis added); “This may be due, in part, to the physiologically disinhibiting effect of alcohol. In large measure, however, the behavior is also the result of the cultural definition of the drinking situation itself” (Savishinsky 1977, p. 46, emphasis added).


MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969, pp. 37-60) discuss this under the heading of "now you see it now you don't."
"Let one be tempted to smile condescendingly at the Indians' gullibility, compare Marlatt and Rohsenow (1979, cited in Room 1980, p. 2) "that the belief one is drinking alcohol, and not the actual fact of consumption of alcohol, produces aggression and male sexual arousal in college students." See also Wilson (1977, p. 247) who argues "that the individual's belief system is the major determinant of the effect of alcohol on sexual arousal" and that double-blind experiments have shown that thinking one is consuming alcohol is sufficient to engender culturally expected drunken behaviors.

"Trukese make a somewhat similar discrimination (see Marshall 1979a, p. 117; Nason 1979, p. 246).

"It may be that the biological sensitivity issue is a red herring here since the strikingly different drunken behaviors of the same individual according to the sway of time and circumstance, within a homogeneous cultural tradition, provide strong evidence that differential reactivity to ethanol is of minor importance to external behaviors.

References

Bunzel, R. The role of alcoholism in two Central American cultures. Psychiatry, 3: 361-388, 1940.
Heath, D.B. A critical review of ethnographic studies of alcohol use. In: Gibbins,


Zeiner, A.R.; Paredes, A.; Musicant, R.; and Cowden, L. Racial differences in
Presenter's Comments

ROOM: Someone this morning referred to the “lost wisdoms of anthropology,” and I’m not sure how lost they were, but they certainly are fully present at this conference.

The presenter and the commentator in the anthropological area are, I think, very crucial participants in the discussion. There’s a way in which this conference might be viewed as a festschrift for MacAndrew and Edgerton’s book on Drunken Comportment (1969). This book, published twelve years ago, has, in my view, grown in importance in the literature as time has gone on.

Mac Marshall is the editor of a new compilation of anthropological work on drinking (1979), and he also published two years ago a book, Weekend Warriors (1979), about drinking in Truk, which is an island in the South Pacific. I think he may make some mention of the behavior of Trukese in his presentation, since their behavior is highly relevant to the area of alcohol and disinhibition.

Mac Marshall in other years might be found at the University of Iowa. At the moment, he can be found in Boroko in Papua New Guinea.

MARSHALL: Well, thank you, Robin. In some sense you stole my thunder here at the beginning with your comments about MacAndrew and Edgerton’s book.

In his comments this morning, Kai Pernanen mentioned the “lost wisdoms of anthropology.” which sounded like a book title for one of these pop anthropology books, but in fact I think it fell upon MacAndrew and Edgerton to resurrect or find the lost wisdoms of anthropology with respect to anthropological information about disinhibition and alcohol. And the paper that I prepared for the conference is, in a sense, not really a creative work at all but simply a further documentation of material in the tradition they began twelve years ago.

We talked this morning and now this afternoon at a number of different levels of discourse, and I think it’s interesting that anthropology at least likes to think of itself as perhaps the most general discipline in the social sciences, if not in the whole scientific and/or humanistic community generally. If you sit down and talk with anthropologists, within a few minutes you find out that we all have a kind of identity crisis; we don’t quite know what we are except that we’re anthropologists and we’re interested in everything.
We've talked about cells and synapses and membranes; we've talked about the nervous system and the assorted other biological systems and actions on those systems; then we've talked about individuals, either as entities or interacting with other individual people; and then we've also talked about society and society in process or history; and the anthropologist, of course, at least in the American tradition, has to introduce the notion of culture. In fact, the idea, or some of the ideas, of culture have already been mentioned but under different guises, sort of in drag, you might say. I'm particularly struck by how Lang's paper and Levine's paper and my paper, in a way, fit together. I'm struck by that because none of us knew each other before coming here; in fact, a couple of us haven't had a chance to talk yet, and still we all seem to converge on some very common ground.

So, in many respects anthropology is the most general discipline here. It's interested in biology, human biology; it's interested in linguistics and human prehistory and human society and culture. I'm a cultural anthropologist, and I'm not going to talk about linguistics or archeology, and I'm only going to touch on biological anthropology in passing. That's not because I'm not interested in biological anthropology; it's because I don't know enough about it to do more than touch on it.

We also talked a lot today about experimental work versus the real world, and that reminds me of a saying that one of my professors had at graduate school, which is, "what's real is hardly apparent, and what's apparent is hardly real." And to some extent, I think the whole issue of what alcohol does to people can be summed up in that phrase.

Anthropologists are interested in naturally occurring social interactions. We don't engage in experimental research, at least in the normal meaning of that term. And moreover, we're interested in naturally occurring social situations imbedded in a cultural tradition, in a cultural context as that social situation or social system and culture are moving through time. So, in this sense, we have rather strong linkages with history; we're interested in individuals as they are the components of social systems. We've also got our links with psychology and certainly with sociology, with whom we share a common theoretical basis. So, there are some very strong links among anthropology and other disciplines represented here.

I think the major contribution that an anthropologist can make to a conference like this is to present a view across cultures. We tend, or we have tended, to talk largely today about our own society or European societies, and we have not ventured much beyond that.
And while anthropologists are often accused of studying exotica and erotica, nonetheless, I think there is much to be gained by pulling other social systems and other cultural traditions into our view of what alcohol does to humanity, since most of humanity, in fact, lives in those other traditions.

I think the other contribution anthropology can make is in helping us focus on our own presuppositions and biases about alcohol. And by "us" I'm referring to those of us who consider ourselves to be students of alcohol, because we have our own conventional wisdom, just as much as there is a popular conventional wisdom.

In the paper, I examine five major topics, which are addressed in one way or another in MacAndrew and Edgerton's book, and try to update the literature since 1969 by way of demonstrating that nothing in the increasing anthropological literature which has accumulated over the last decade contradicts in any way the main tenets of MacAndrew and Edgerton's argument; in fact, it just lends greater support for the cultural learning hypothesis.

The five topics which I examine in the paper are first of all what I refer to as "pseudointoxication," or feigned drunkenness — pretending, if you want to call it that; next what MacAndrew and Edgerton called the "sway of time and circumstance," or set and setting, as it's been referred to by at least one other person here today; third, how drunken comportment is learned, the matter of expectancies; fourth, "time out"; and, finally, how beliefs as well as behaviors of people in what have become dominant colonizing societies around the world have diffused out to many Third World societies, particularly in areas that did not have their own traditional alcoholic beverages. So, let me say a couple of things about each of these five topics, mention briefly the matter of the biology of alcohol looked at from an anthropological or human genetics point of view, and then make some summary remarks.

The matter of pseudointoxication or feigned drunkenness is of interest because it is directly relevant to the disinhibition issue. If drinkers, and sometimes even people who have not drunk anything, can demonstrate all the classic signs of inebriation without having consumed sufficient alcohol to produce those symptoms physiologically, then drunken behavior cannot be assumed to be caused only by ethanol's pharmacological action on the nervous system; moreover, if drinkers can demonstrate a full range of culturally appropriate drunken behaviors and then sober up on a moment's notice — and there are numerous examples of this in the anthropological literature — then the disinhibiting effects of alcohol on human beings are further called into question.

There's a connection here between the anthropological literature
and the sobering-up effect mentioned in the cognitive and sensorimotor tasks section of Lang's paper, where people, when administered a certain amount of alcohol and then confronted with a task, seem to be able to pull themselves together and concentrate on the task. That same effect has been observed by many different anthropologists.

This matter of the sway of time and circumstance, set and setting, the context in which people are drinking and the people with whom they are drinking, the reason why they're drinking — whether it's in a religious ritual or ceremonial context; whether (as is currently the case in Papua New Guinea) to go out and get drunk is the explicit purpose — that, of course, has a great deal to do with how people behave. We find an incredible range and variation of behavioral outcomes in the same individual, according to set, setting, age, as that individual moves through his own life history, social status, and the like. It becomes very difficult, then, to argue that alcohol automatically leads to disinhibited behavior, however we may define such behavior.

The matter of the learning of drunken comportment, it seems to me, is particularly interesting and there are a few examples in the anthropological literature where people have addressed this issue. Robin said that I was going to mention my research in Truk. This matter of how people learn to be drunks was something that was very, very straightforward in Truk, very clear in the community in which I lived, named Peniyesene:

The most exciting and colorful daily events in Peniyesene are the drunken antics of young men. These events inevitably attract a horde of small children who hang around the perimeter of the audience. These kids would be from approximately age four up to about age twelve or thirteen.

From early childhood on, Trukese children carefully and frequently observe drunken performances. By the time boys reach eight or ten, they begin to imitate the swaggering style of young men.

There's this very conscious, imitative process which goes on, and by the time those eight or ten year olds become sixteen to eighteen years old, all of these behaviors transfer into the actual drinking context.

The fourth of the issues raised in MacAndrew and Edgerton's book, and which I try to bring up to 1980 in my paper, is the concept of "time out," which we've already talked about a bit today. And I think one way of connecting the concept of "time out" with an issue that has come up several times this morning, the matter of moral
sense or conscience, is to think in terms of an altered state of conscience, which goes along with the altered state of consciousness. To summarize then, the notion of “time out” — the belief that alcohol produces this altered state of conscience in which drinkers may legitimately transgress the norms of everyday proper social conduct and get away with it — provides a powerful incentive for people to drink and behave in a disinhibited manner. And this is a point that Alan Lang made earlier this morning. Indeed, it’s imperative that drinkers who wish to do this advertise the fact that they’re drunk: they have to give off cues that they have been drinking. This can be slurred speech — whether or not they’re drunk enough to cause that — staggering gait, carrying a beer can or beer bottle about, or at a cocktail party spilling your martini on the person you’re talking with.

By advertising that you’re drunk and socially irresponsible, others will know how to interpret your words and deeds. It doesn’t do you any good to be drunk and try to get away with things if other people don’t know you’re drunk. You have to make that message clear. The implications of such a belief for the disinhibition hypothesis are obvious. If it is to people’s advantage to behave in a drunken manner, and if such behavior is culturally excused, then many drunks will behave this way regardless of whether they are physiologically inebriated. Indeed, it’s often to their clear advantage not to be too drunk physiologically — as Wilson has shown for sexual arousal, and as my book on Weekend Warriors documents for what we could call aggressive behavior — if you’re too drunk, you get beat up; if you’re not too drunk, then you’ll probably win the fight.

The fifth point has to do with the modeling effects of the drunken behavior of (in most cases) Euroamerican society in societies that lacked alcoholic beverages at the time of contact with the West. This includes nearly all of the societies of North America — with the exception of one small pocket of peoples down in the Southwest — and all of the societies of the Pacific. In those places, Europeans and Americans provided both the beverage and the models for how one behaves after one has imbibed.

I’m interested in the fact that not only the behavioral norms surrounding how one should act when drunk have diffused, but apparently the set of beliefs that alcohol is a disinhibitor diffused as well, particularly in Oceania, where colonization was largely a Nineteenth Century phenomenon. I think many of the issues that Harry Levine talked about just a while ago transferred out there as well. Moreover, in the Nineteenth Century in the Pacific there was what you might view as a war of influence between missionaries,
many of whom were from the varied Protestant groups that Joan Silverman talked about a little earlier, and the beachcomber/wahaler community which represented the lower class foreigners that she referred to, the saloon habitues.

In the paper, I've got some information which suggests — what is at this point speculative but nonetheless intriguing — that models of belief about alcohol also transferred directly from Europe to Mesoamerica and Latin America. This material is taken from a historian, Taylor, who's recently written a book on *Drinking, Homicide and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages* (1979). In that book, he comments on how the Spanish model of disinhibition and alcohol was taken up by the Indians in Mexico. There are other bits and snippets in the anthropological literature indicating that this same model was taken up by other people in Latin America. And I make a rather grandiose conclusion from all that, which may not be warranted, which is that the widespread belief in alcohol as a disinhibitor — at least in those areas that did not have traditional alcoholic beverages of their own — is nothing but an ethnocentric European folk belief that was foisted on subject peoples around the world during the heyday of colonialism. The historians probably winced when they read that. But, nonetheless, I think there's something to be made of this borrowing of ideas about alcohol, and, to the extent that we're interested in beliefs about disinhibition in other societies, we have to keep in mind the historical context in which those people were exposed to alcohol.

The matter of biological sensitivity to alcohol is really not restricted to anthropology, but, rather, involves human geneticists, biological anthropologists, and some physiologists, including Art Zeiner (Zeiner and Paredes 1977). These people, over about the last seven or eight years, have been doing a lot of studies in the experimental tradition, but many of these experimental studies have been done in field situations with different populations, trying to establish whether different breeding populations of human beings have differential sensitivity to ethanol as a drug or to the metabolism of ethanol in the body; and, while I've been out in Papua New Guinea for the last year and somewhat cut off from the literature, my understanding is that the jury is still out on this issue. There are some studies which would seem to indicate there are ethnic differences in reactivity; there are others which contradict those results. And so, the matter remains unresolved at this time.

The reason this is relevant to our concerns here is that we cannot necessarily assume that the pharmacological effects of ethanol are going to be the same on all human populations. We know there are individual differences based on body fat and weight and a variety of
metabolic processes that vary among individuals. Insofar as differences among breeding populations can be shown to exist in the next few years, then we'll have to take that into account in any final model that we come up with to describe the relationship between social-cultural learning and alcohol.

By way of summing it up, my view of the matter is that at present beverage alcohol cannot be viewed as the cause of specific drunken behaviors in societies around the world, other than the well-known and well-documented sensorimotor disturbances that MacAndrew and Edgerton discuss and that we've discussed earlier today. Instead, it seems that while the pharmacological effects of alcohol on human beings make people feel different — that sounds very much like Alan Lang — than when they haven't imbibed, the meanings given to this experience — in other words, how you interpret these feelings and order the experience — are provided by the cultural tradition in which one is a participant. If the culture holds that imbibing alcohol produces warm feelings of solidarity, camaraderie, harmony and so on, then aggression and sexual advances will have no place. There's a very interesting paper by Brandes (1979) recently documenting this to be the case in a Spanish community. If, on the other hand, the cultural tradition suggests that the drinker will feel aggressive and sexually aroused, and furthermore will not be held accountable if he acts on these impulses, then these kinds of behaviors are likely to result from drinking. And there are numerous instances of this in the anthropological literature. Thus, it seems that alcohol as a drug can be viewed as an enabler or a facilitator of certain culturally given inebriate states, but it cannot be seen as producing a specific response pattern among all human beings who ingest it.
Commentary

Craig MacAndrew

Since Marshall’s paper is so consistently supportive of the general argument contained in *Drunken Comportment*, and since I still subscribe to the general outlines of that argument, I find myself with nothing whatsoever to be contentious about. Let me, then, simply praise Marshall’s neatly assembled review of the anthropological materials that have appeared in the past decade, recommend to any who have not yet read it his elegant monograph, *Weekend Warriors*, and briefly address a couple of features of the original argument which I believe deserve more extended treatment than they have received at this point in time.

The concern of *Drunken Comportment* was to develop a radically social explanation of drunken changes-for-the-worse—a phrase I prefer to disinhibition-type talk because it’s somehow less theory-impregnated—to develop a social learning, cognitive expectational perspective for such phenomena, as the contemporary vernacular would now have it. In brief, we argued that in certain cultures—our own amongst them—under certain conditions, the social status of being-in-the-world-drunk affords the drinker the negotiably sanctionable option to remove himself for a time and to a degree from the otherwise operative demands of the accountability nexus. This option we termed “time out.”

The two points I want to touch upon concerning this option are the following: First, it’s a bounded option; it’s relevant only within negotiably sanctionable limits in the broadest possible rendering of that phrase. Second, since it is an option, neither its utilization nor its honoring are in any sense inevitable. Taken together, these two considerations dictate that in every given instance of actual usage, the option is irremediably both socially and psychologically situated.

It is a consequence of its social situatedness that the acceptance or rejection of the option’s excusing character—which, of course, is its “cash value”—is always and everywhere the product of a social agreement—albeit, in the typical instance, of a tacit social agreement—between the parties involved. And, as is the case with all
social agreements, sometimes hitches develop and sometimes the ensuing negotiation process comes to naught. Here, in a conversation recently overheard in a university cafeteria, is an example in which the option failed to come off:

She: "O.K., you want to talk. What got into you last night?"
He: "I guess I got pretty smashed."
She: "Is that the best you can do?"
He: "Hey, you're really in a great mood today."
She: (Silence)
He: "Wow! You're really something else, you know that?"
She: (Silence)
He: "Hey, really, I mean ..."
She: "If that's all you've got to say, let's forget it!"
He: "All right!"

Realize, then, that the world is a marriage and that the drinker is not the only one with options; for example, "But you weren't that drunk."

It's a recurrent ethnomethodological theme that we, all of us, are continuously engaged in doing maintenance work on the social structures within and on the basis of which we live our lives; that were it not for these unceasing, and for the most part, unreflectively practiced efforts on our parts, these structures soon would crumble away. I want here simply to suggest that the sundry activities whereby drunken "time out" is or is not accomplished — and it is a social accomplishment from start to finish — provide particularly luscious and variegated displays of such efforts. More importantly, I want to suggest that detailed analyses of such social accomplishments and failures are a sure way to rouse ourselves, at least now and again, from the slumber-inducing level of the programmatic, which is the social scientists' equivalent of Newton's sleep.

My second point — that the "time out" option is an option — directly implicates the relevance to the solution, at least for certain components of what we loosely call "the alcohol problem," of an area of psychology which, though flourishing in Europe, is now quite out of vogue on this continent. I refer to the area of individual differences, and particularly to the manifestation of such differences at the level of character orientation.

My own work has centered recently on the relationship between problem-engendering alcohol consumption and such characterological differences, and is now finally to the point, I believe, where their tie-in with the nature of exhibited drunken changes-for-the-worse is about ready to be made. I mention this because as far as at least some of the "four hundred rabbits" are concerned, I'm hopeful
that such a tie-in will allow us to reclaim an important hunk of variance which now resides in the error category.

Finally, let me say a quick word about social policy. The policy implications of the argument contained in *Drunken Comportment* are perhaps most succinctly stated, albeit indirectly, in that book's final line. The line reads as follows: "Since societies, like individuals, get the sorts of drunken comportment that they allow, they deserve what they get." It appears that the evidence both from anthropology and from experimental psychology that has accumulated over the past decade has not diluted, but, rather, has appreciably strengthened the empirical warrant for this summary proposition. However, I see no evidence among policymakers of the necessary strength of purpose to put the policy implications which are resident in this proposition into effect. Rather, it would seem that at the level of policy we continue the forlorn attempt to change things without really altering them. That this should be so is itself, I submit, a ripe topic for research and reflection. But, all things in the fullness of time.
LELAND: I wanted to comment on Mac's notions about anthropology's contributions to studies of this kind. Despite Craig MacAndrew's protestations, I'm claiming him as an anthropologist. The recognition we're giving here to his demonstration of the differences among cultures as the main basis for the inference that drinking behavior is shaped more by learning than by physiology is a well-deserved tribute to him. But it seems to me, on the other hand, that this may be about the only contribution that anthropology can make to this study. I just want to throw this idea to Mac. Maybe this exhausts our discipline's possible contributions.

In your paper, you've accumulated additional evidence confirming Craig's previous evidence, but it seems to me if the conference is going to be anything more than a kind of exquisite "overkill," and a MacAndrew festschrift, that we have to go beyond this demonstration that disinhibition must be less nature and more nurture, and explore more carefully how it happens and why it happens.

And here I get into trouble with the point about diffusion. MacAndrew and Edgerton proposed that drunken comportment among Native Americans was learned from the frontiersmen, who introduced it, and you were saying a similar thing only on a much broader scale — that Europe brought conceptions of drunken comportment to the Third World and left this bomb behind. But, I've never been thoroughly satisfied with that explanation. For one thing, it begs the question a bit because it then demands an explanation for how those who brought the conception got it themselves. But, mainly — and here I get to Robin's point earlier — it fails to account for the fact that this behavior has continued long after the original models and whatever conditions created them have disappeared. So, it seems that we still have a lot of work to do, but I'm not too sure that anthropology is going to be the one that does it. I just wondered what you thought about that.

MARSHALL: I think anthropology has never been at the forefront of alcohol studies for a variety of reasons, and I don't think that's going to change. On the other hand, I think those of us in anthropology who are interested in alcohol studies have something more to offer than what has already been offered. I think a lot of the
experimental work, some of the ideas that have been tested out in our own society need to be checked out in other places too before we start making claims that this is the relationship between alcohol and human beings.

LELAND: Yes.

MARSHALL: And to give you but one example that we were toying around with at lunch, it was mentioned this morning in Alan's paper that there are differences between males and females with respect to sexual disinhibition, or whatever you want to call it, that show up in the experimental studies. There are also, of course, differences between males and females in regular social and cultural settings. And there are a number of societies in Papua New Guinea, where I'm living now, where females are the sexual predators, if you will, instead of males. It would be most intriguing to run that design on such peoples to see whether there was a reversal of response to expectations about what alcohol is going to do to them; in other words, whether the women would get sexually aroused more than the men. But in an instance like that, I think it would be very difficult for an experimental psychologist with no cross-cultural experience whatsoever to go plunk in somewhere and try to do this in a short time.

LELAND: Right.

MARSHALL: The answer to this may be team research — in which the anthropologist, using field research skills and so on, links up with other people who have the experimental skills that we lack. Then, I think, we do have a contribution to make, even if it's more as cultural mediator than anything else. I think there is definitely a place for anthropology in the future of all of this, but probably not center stage.

ROOM: One other dimension of variation that struck me very much from Weekend Warriors — if I could simplify a bit, and if I understand it right — was that the same young men who were running amok in their twenties, drinking on the street corner in front of Mac's house, in their thirties were pillars of the community, had gotten government jobs, and were drinking in a relatively sober fashion in town. The notion that there's an age specificity as well as a sex specificity about disinhibitory effects of alcohol is, I think, quite evocative for American society. It's something that I would certainly see as having been suggested out of the anthropological literature.

Another person who's fished in the waters of Oceania is Margaret MacKenzie, who had a comment.

MARGARET MACKENZIE: My comment was if we stick only to what seems to be a very ethnocentric focus — that is on
disinhibition — which seems to be the synonym for a Freudian word like “control,” that we’re bound to say that these are Nineteenth Century models. Certainly, at least in some societies, disinhibition is a minor part of what the image of alcohol and drinking is about, and there are meanings that are quite different. And I think it is much too limiting to see anthropology as restricted only to following out commitments to an American ethnocentric view concerning inhibition and disinhibition based on our historical individualism. In fact what we’re interested in is what drinking and alcohol mean to people, what are the sorts of contexts in which those meanings change — not merely specific changes to do with age and sex, but certainly including them — and the various differences according to the society and the social setting. So I disagree that the role for anthropology is limited.

LEVINE: I wanted to answer Joy’s question as well. I think if we try to talk only about disinhibition, then after a certain point there’s not much that almost anybody has to say. We need to talk instead about the real topic, which is something like alcohol-related behavior and experience which has been called “disinhibited” but which can be called lots of other things — among them drunken comportment, or drunken and feigned drunken behavior, and alcohol-related “out-of-bounds” behavior. I think that’s the real topic of this conference. I suspect that that’s what Robin had in mind, or at least what he should have had in mind for this conference. I think that the answer to your question is: anthropology has a great deal to say about what it means to be drunk, about people’s understanding of what “drunk” is, about the various ways in which that is interpreted, experienced, handled — even about policy implications, social control, individual responsibility, treatment, and punishment — all that’s the stuff that I understand anthropology can deal with. And I think that anthropology in fact has a bright future in alcohol research, if it avoids biological and chemical reductionism and does real social analysis.

ROIZEN: Oftentimes great monuments in a field serve the function of declaring that field’s jurisdiction over that particular phenomenal territory. So, perhaps we could imagine the anthropological works being discussed here as staking out a territorial claim, and saying, “Look, this obviously varies so much from person to person: this is anthropology, this isn’t pharmacology.” And, in a sense, I get the same feeling Joy was expressing; that after you’ve said that, so what? It marks it out. It may be a heroic document in the discipline, but it would be at the same time a big flop to someone who is outside that discipline, who then wants to know, “Well, yes; then what does that discipline have to tell us about it?”
If it is an anthropological phenomenon, in what sense do we learn about the structure of society or culture or the character of drinking behavior by this means? In other words, in what sense does anthropology not only lay the territorial claim but start bringing out the gold from this territory? And I think that that’s a more important goal in a way than the goal of trying to figure out just exactly how much room at the table we should be allotting each of the representatives of the different disciplines.

MARSHALL: Well, to some extent, this has been the emphasis of anthropological research in alcohol studies — well, Horton (1943) has technically a sociologist, but he used an anthropological methodology — certainly beginning with his work and beginning with Bunzel’s work in 1940 up until the present. There has been this concern to connect the use of alcohol and the way people behave after they’ve been drinking and so on with various and sundry characteristics of the social system, of the cultural belief system of people and so forth. So, that is an ongoing interest.

ROIZEN: Of course, Horton would take us right back to psychology.

MARSHALL: Well, yes, but hopefully we’ve come somewhere beyond that at this point.

DORIE KLEIN: I share some of the dissatisfactions that have been voiced. Whatever the pharmacological basis of arousal through alcohol, the specific behavioral consequences are indeed socially determined. But apart from establishing that and the diversity of the cultures, that still leaves us at the descriptive level, and in terms of the analytical level I feel very impatient to talk about how people learn these behavioral responses and why, and to look at some of the structural factors. As a criminologist, the situation seems to me analogous to differential association models of criminal behavior — which is a very elegant way of saying that people learn it from others. That doesn’t get us very far even though, of course, it’s hard to dispute that that’s true.

ROOM: Ed Lemert, another Oceanic fisher.

LEMERT: Recently I had to write a paper on drinking of American Indians, so I was compelled to give quite a bit of thought to MacAndrew and Edgerton’s work. If you read their book carefully, I think you’ll find quite a few provocative ideas there. I’ll mention one or two which seem to have received a lot of attention.

One of them, of course, is that drunken behavior is not the result of physiological processes or factors or causes. Well, I don’t have that much trouble with that, although I don’t think it’s a very new idea. I think Ruth Bunzel (1940) made that point pretty well quite a few years ago. Criminologists long have taken the position that
crime cannot be regarded as being caused by drunkenness even though a high percentage of criminals have a high blood alcohol content when they commit their offenses.

The other two ideas which I think bear close examination are the notions of "time out" and of the "suspension of accountability." I won't try to generalize about these concepts, but rather talk about them in relation to a couple of primitive groups with which I'm familiar.

I have some trouble with the "time out" concept in light of the historical material in regard to drinking in Rarotonga and in Tahiti. In the case of Tahiti, you can make a pretty good case that there was a period when the natives were drinking spirituous liquors in which some kind of "time out" pattern prevailed. But, later, after a rather short period of time this changed, and there was a tendency of the Tahitians to confine drunkenness and prostitution to a few selected port towns where the sailors came in. If you look at the history of drinking by the Tahitians in the interior of the island, it became a kind of a "bush beer" drinking of home brew of a rather low alcoholic content. Control was very much in evidence due to the illegality of such drinking and fear of native police.

In the case of Rarotonga, again, there's a period when they had very large home brew parties in which both men and women drank, but within a fairly short period of time this changed and women were excluded from the drinking. And, again, they developed a pattern of male drinking of home brew out in the bush, in small groups with fairly good control over intoxicated behavior and the expulsion of the deviants.

Use of the "time out" concept may have some descriptive value, but I don't think it tells you very much about how drinking patterns change. Why did the Tahitians change their pattern? Why did the pattern change in Rarotonga? A number of Rarotongans, the old ones I interviewed, said the reason they changed from allowing women to drink in the group was that there was too much adultery, illegitimate children and so forth. They didn't like it. So, one man in one particular village took the lead and changed the whole pattern.

Now, if I may move a couple thousand miles over to the Northwest coast, to the Salish Indians, with whom I'm also somewhat familiar, I'd like to raise a question about the idea of "suspension of accountability." I'm wondering whether it tells the whole story to say that disinhibition is simply a learned pattern of behavior, or that individuals are culturally indoctrinated so that they do not hold other individuals accountable for their drunken aggressions and unsought sexual advances. I question whether this doesn't ignore the processes of social control, whether one of the reasons why many
Indian groups haven't done much about drunken aggression is that they are unable to exercise social control; their social structure is such that it does not make it possible. For me it is very questionable whether this means that internally and in a sociopsychological sense there is a suspension of accountability. Again, I'll just stick to the Salish Indians, and if I may be a little pedantic here, I'll just read from this paper that I smuggled in:

I found that the Salish Indians with whose drinking I became most familiar had long memories of wrongs done them by others, drunk or sober: an eye lost in a drunken brawl; a baby knocked out of its crib by a drunken father and burned on contact with the stove; a boy blinded by denatured alcohol given him by older men; a mother believed to have been pushed overboard from a boat at night by drunken companions and lost in tidal rapids. It was when they were themselves intoxicated that the Salish were most likely to confront those who had aggressed against them and to seek their revenge.

In other words, what I'm suggesting is that some of these aggressions that they may not have reacted to in the immediate situation were not forgotten, and in subsequent drunken interludes, at least among the Salish, there was a kind of extended or hyphenated accountability operating.

MACANDREW: Let me speak for a moment to at least some of what you said. I would hold that there is nothing wrong with generalization ("theorizing") so long as you allow loopholes to cover the real world, and I thought that we had made such allowances. We did have a chapter titled "Now you see it, now you don't" which incorporated your Rarotonga example. And, as far as the Salish data go, there was a chapter on the "Within Limits" clause, which I think talked at least reasonably well to that.

EHLERS: I wanted to play the devil's advocate and say that I disagree with using this idea of drunken comportment as a catchall for the idea that disinhibition is totally social ritualization. I certainly believe that there's a lot of ritualization around drinking practices, and that drunken comportment can be very highly ritualized in learned behavior, but that may be different from what disinhibition is, and I think it gets back to the definition of what is disinhibition. Alcohol has very similar properties pharmacologically to some of the minor tranquilizers like Valium or Librium, which also cause disinhibition as defined psychiatrically. If you take a person who exhibits pathological intoxication and has committed criminal acts during alcohol intoxication for which the person is amnestic — a person considered possibly to be an "epileps-
toid” dyscontrol type and who has never taken Valium or Librium, you can give those drugs to the person and they will have a similar kind of drunken reaction. There's quite a bit of data in the psychiatric literature to suggest that.

So, I think that there is a basis for the idea of disinhibition having a pharmacological component. Now, it's a question how small that is, and how much the actual behavior that you see is ritualized in drunken comportment. But I think you can't dismiss the idea that the drug itself may have some disinhibiting properties, although how little or large these may be is not known.

MARSHALL: Absolutely. I'm in one hundred percent agreement. I tried to make that point in the paper, although I didn't say it up at the podium. And one thing that I was hopeful we might begin to address at the conference was, roughly, what is the proportion between social learning and biophysiological effects in this whole issue of how people behave. I'm not sure we're far enough along that we can sort that out yet. Instead we all talk in these very loose terms like “It is mostly this” or “It is somewhat that.” But I think when we fall into an either/or category with respect to it, then we're missing the whole point.

ROOM: I am quite comfortable with your characterization. Alcohol certainly makes you feel different when you get beyond a couple of drinks, and then we stuff meaning into that “feeling different.” If another drug has a similar effect in making you feel somewhat the same, then you may apply the interpretations to that drug, or may have a pattern of learned behavior that goes along with that feeling, even though it's another drug.

EHLERS: Right. But while you can say that the benzodiazepines or Librium and Valium look like alcohol in certain paradigms, when you look at morphine, it makes you feel very different, but there's no culture where it has been described as having a particularly disinhibiting effect.

ROOM: Yes.

EHLERS: Yet it has a very ritualized comportment associated with it, particularly in the Oriental culture. So I think there's evidence that there may be differences between classes of drugs, that it's not just a matter of feeling different, but that there's a specific quality of feeling different for a particular drug. And is that disinhibition?

MACKENZIE: I was the one who said that disinhibition was the idea that should be centrally focused on, and I should clarify what I meant by that. I think that as a social scientist or as a member of any form of Euroamerican discipline we tend to ask questions about inhibition — What is inhibition or control or self-
control? — because our concept is that the individual is the basic unit of society to be studied. Our concept of the individual is as a person who, to be fully a person, in order to be rational or competent, fully functioning, has to be inhibited or controlled in some way. Other societies don't always have this focus. The basic unit may be the relationship, and the individual may not be the focus at all. When you start to ask questions about drinking and how people behave when they've been drinking in another society, you probably will find that there are some meanings you can get when you keep asking questions about disinhibition: "Yes, drinking is having fun," or "going out at night," that sort of thing. But these meanings may be very peripheral to them. In those societies, what matters to them about effects of alcohol may have much more to do with serious talk, which is a rather common example. It may have much more to do with environment and time of men talking together than it has to do with the meaning of disinhibition or being irresponsible, whereas the latter are the meanings that matter to us. That's the sense in which I say it's an ethnocentric focus: those questions and answers tend to dominate our reports, but if you try to get an authentic view of other people's priorities and meanings and activities, that may not be what you get.

WINICK: It seems to me the discussion of the extent to which there's a substantial physiological dimension versus the sociocultural dimension has an echo in the debate over the nature of narcotic addiction. Over forty years ago, Lindesmith (1938) proposed that in order to be a narcotic addict one has to interiorize the norms of being a "dope fiend" and to know what a "dope fiend" was. And that was the accepted notion until Spragg (1940), a psychologist, proved that she could addict chimpanzees with narcotics, chimpanzees who didn't know what a dope fiend was. The debate on cultural versus physiological factors in addiction continued for some time (Winick 1979).

The next phase of the debate was also analogous to some of the discussion here. It was argued that the young narcotic addicts who were studied in the 1950's were essentially all responding the same way to the substance. It turned out that in Chicago the seventeen-and eighteen-year old black narcotic addicts studied by Finestone (1957) were alive, alert, "cool cats" on the go. At the very same time, a similar ethnic and age group studied in New York by Chein (1964) were semi-comatose and sleepy and not "cool cats" at all. Even within the same subgroup, the same substance taken by comparable subgroups may have very different kinds of visible effects.

The debate over the addicted chimpanzees ended in favor of the cultural contribution, more or less. But the analysis of the contribu-
LANG: Just a quick question about the pseudointoxication you referred to at some length: to what extent do you regard that — just based on your observations — to be a volitional decision on the part of the person to gain access to a different set of norms or rules? Was this a planned consequence of intoxication or were other underlying motives associated with it?

MARSHALL: I'll just talk about my own research experiences. In Truk; it is definitely volitional. When young men drink, a cup is passed around and everyone takes a slug of whatever it is, whether it's straight gin or home brew or whatever. Whatever people are drinking, it's passed around in a circle and each person drinks in turn. Several times when I went drinking with people, one of the drinkers would hold back from the drinking circle. This person would sit out and then come in and maybe have one drink, and then, "Wham!", that person would attack someone else or go back down to the village and raise hell. And it struck me that what was necessary was the excuse, "I have been seen drinking; I am now drunk." The Trukese definition of being drunk is one drink. I mean, at that point this gets into their own categories of the notion of drunkenness. You are then considered drunk; you're considered crazy; the same word that's applied to someone who's what we would call, I suppose, "mentally ill" is applied to drunks. People are viewed as utterly bereft of their senses at one level so that you cannot predict anything that they're going to do; they're dangerous. And so by opting into that through having had one drink, one can take advantage of the situation for all sorts of personal social purposes. Now, not everyone who drinks does that. But this is one option that's taken advantage of.

In Chimbu, in the highlands of Papua New Guinea where I've been doing some research this past year, a very similar kind of thing seems to operate. There's a lot of traditional warfare still going on in the Papua New Guinea highlands. And the trigger for a lot of warfare — the actual cause of tribal fights or clan fights, really — is usually that somebody's driving down the road and has an auto accident, and one of the guys that's in the back end of the pickup truck or whatever and who's thrown out and killed is a member of a clan other than the clan of the driver. During the negotiations for compensation, some of the young bucks will have some drinks but not really get drunk, and will come and say bad things to the elders of the other clan who are negotiating, which then triggers things. So the alcohol is not really the cause of the disagreement between the clans, but it acts as a kind of excuse or
trigger to go ahead and pick a fight in a situation where you've been spoiling for one for a while anyway.

LANG: It seems to be it's a bit less ritualized in this society. Many of the alleged effects of drinking on violence, for example, might well be more a matter of conditioning in either the classical or the operant sense, in that people have a certain learning history which says that when you're drinking, you can be aggressive or violent, and if people will tolerate that, you can do it with relative impunity. They may begin drinking for some other reason, but a situation arises in which they can avail themselves of this excuse. And it becomes a kind of an automatic process.

I think it's important for us to consider the extent to which these things are understood by the drinker as the direct reasons that he's drinking in the first place, as against the extent to which the real connection between drinking and violence — via the pharmacologic action of drink or something else — is a kind of a conditioned phenomenon based on experience, occurring without intention or volition on his part. Much in the same way that if I were to cut open a lemon and begin sucking on it, you might begin salivating. Well, that saliva in your mouth would be very real, but it wouldn't be caused by the lemon being there.

ROOM: The counter argument to that would be the "Now you see it, now you don't" notion. This is really getting into tomorrow's material, but Tom Burns' piece on getting rowdy with the boys (1980) would strongly suggest that among young men in South Boston sometimes drinking acts one way and then they get in a situation where suddenly it isn't acting that way.

MACANDREW: That's right. In passing, a specification of an underlying physiological basis for psychological theories of drunkenness has, I believe, two not unreasonable avenues open to it. First, there's Eysenck's (1967) theory as to the relevance of the reticular activating system to the bipolar psychological dimension of introversion-extroversion and the extroverting consequence of alcohol consumption. Second, and in important ways derivative of Eysenck's (1967) formulation of the more general problem, Jeffrey Gray (1976) has come up with a very sophisticated system, a system that underlies the behavioral inhibition system and that he has called the "septohippocampal stop system." The hippocampal theta rhythm definitely seems to be influenced by the presence of alcohol in the body in ways that a person of a physiological bent should find very delectable indeed. Needless to say, I don't find either formulation entirely convincing.

ROIZEN: I'm wondering again about this question that Herb Fingarette raised earlier, about how can we have cultures in which
the alcohol is both an excuse and not an excuse? How can we have a culture that believes in both *in vino veritas* and also that the alcohol sometimes causes me to do it? I'm aware of only one place — a little monograph published by a woman named Joan May out of Salisbury, Rhodesia (1973) — where there are data on a community in which alcohol is not regarded as an excuse for violent behavior.

MARSHALL: Well, I don't have the references in my head, but I think there are probably other examples of societies besides the Shona that would fall into the particular cell you put them into. When you consider the number of societies that there are in the world and the small proportion of those that have been studied by social scientists, you also have to realize that we have by no means exhausted the range of variation. And when you further consider the kinds of things raised by the historians, which is that these attitudes are constantly in flux through time — which I think is the point that Ed Lemert was making as well — that what exists in one decade may not exist in the next with respect to disinhibition or excuse value or whether or not you're held accountable for your behaviors, then it seems to me that it's sufficient to show a connection if we find that there's at least one example in the ethnographic record. I know I've encountered other instances. I'm sorry I don't have the references in my head. They very well may even be in *Drunken Comportment*. But I know they exist.

ROIZEN: Just to add another thing, I remember once Harry and I in the middle of the night were working in the office, and there was this argument over what does it mean about a culture to be able to say *in vino veritas* and "I'm sorry I did it; I was drunk." And one possible solution is, of course, that the contradiction can be resolved by saying cultures subsist in a tacit understanding that the truth is not the basis of social relations, which is to say, *veritas* is not the desired condition of a cultural situation, so that you can resolve that contradiction by saying, "Don't bother me with the truth," essentially. Harry didn't like that answer, as I recall, and proposed alternatively that the cultures don't believe than an individual is necessarily one person, which is an interesting idea that goes back a little bit to something that Margaret MacKenzie was saying.

Maybe these are overly pristine and idealist efforts to resolve the question of disinhibition. I just wonder, because it seems so fundamental an issue, if there are other insights we can get from their anthropological experience.

MACKENZIE: Well, there are some other cultures that definitely don't believe an individual is one person. An individual is really a collection of roles, and it's been written up by an anthropologist called Bradd Shore, who describes in a rather direct transla-
tion that the individual is like the facets of a ring that has many
ds, and people change their names from context to context;
however, they would always have the same name in a similar
context.

The immediate example I can think of — because I made an error
— is that one night I was at a dance where the headmaster of a local
junior high school was there, drunk, and his wife was definitely not
in sight; and he was behaving in a fairly flirtatious manner with
me. I was due to see him the next morning to get his school children
to write essays on the idea of “mother,” and I said, “Will I be seeing
you tomorrow morning?” And he said, “Don’t talk to me about that
here. I’m not that person here.” He used his title name as the
headmaster. “I’m somebody quite different, and you can’t discuss
that here.” And, really, he was not the same person, and it also
happened that he was very drunk, and, certainly, by the next
morning he would be sober.

I’ve seen it happen in Rarotonga that should something happen
when somebody’s drunk that would demand a change of context,
they would switch right back into the context demanded, and
accordingly the name would change by which they would be
addressed and by which they would refer to themselves.

I think it’s perfectly true that we don’t always regard ourselves as
the same individual in every context, either, but certainly there are
societies that are very explicit about that.

MARLATT: One of the questions that comes to mind in review-
ing the anthropological evidence and the “time out” hypothesis is
that the extent to which different groups make use of alcohol as a
vehicle for having “time out” should vary as a function of other ways
of having “time out” in that society, or with the number of controls
over behaviors that we associate with intoxication — and certainly
societies differ with regard to the extent to which they have those
controls. I’m just asking whether that kind of cross-culture compar-
ison has been made, and, if so, what does it show.

MACANDREW: Unfortunately, the relation isn’t clean at all.
Some of the most pervasively repressive societies provide only min-
imal or nonexistent “time out” availabilities. On the other hand, in
some societies members’ transgressions are widespread during
sobriety and become absolutely rampant under conditions of pub-
licly recognized drunkenness. The world just isn’t tidy in this
regard.

ROOM: ... To further confuse us.

MARLATT: We were talking a few minutes ago about whether
there are no pharmacological effects at all, or what is the interac-
tion between the two, and one thing that was brought up in Steve
Woods' paper keeps coming back to mind — the biphasic nature of the reactions to alcohol; that there is, in fact, an initial increase in arousal that's later followed by a more depressive effect. That increase in arousal looks to me to be the disinhibition phase, or at least it seems to me that there's a parallel there, because the person is feeling a kind of initial rush in energy, and that energizes lots of different behaviors. It makes a person feel high; McClelland's work (1972) shows that heavy drinkers experience increased perceptions of control and personal power during that phase. I'm just wondering whether that does provide a basis for the disinhibition phenomena and some linkage to a pharmacological effect. We also know that the arousal is probably very easily conditioned; in some of the work in the balanced placebo design, when people are expecting alcohol and not receiving it, they may be in fact having a conditioned arousal — high state — because it was all associated with the arousal response in the past, and whether that does maybe provide some linkage to the pharmacological effect.

MARSHALL: What kind of time period are we talking about in that initial arousal phase before things begin to taper off?

WOODS: I can't answer that specifically. Maybe Dr. Mansfield can. But my understanding, at least as far as concerns the effects of ethanol on some physiological systems, is that as long as the levels of alcohol are rising in the blood you get one effect, and once they're stable and/or decreasing you get a different effect. So, it becomes somewhat dose-dependent and somewhat dependent upon the interval over which you're drinking. I expect that the arousal state is a function of time during which the levels are still rising in the blood.

FINGARETTE: If there's a general rise in the level of activation at the lower stage, and if I'm a decent, law-abiding citizen, why wouldn't it be just as plausible to suppose that I would simply commit more law-abiding, decent acts more intensively or enthusiastically? How do we jump that gap from "activation" to "activation-to-do-what-violates a norm"?

WOODS: It's not easy. I'm impressed with all that I've heard today, and I think that the idea that alcohol somehow sanctions extra degrees of freedom in your behavior, coupled with perhaps an increased arousal, is a very intriguing idea — it's easy to account for it that way. I think that there may be people who, when they have a drink, become more law-abiding. I don't know.

FINGARETTE: Then what you're really doing is building in the sociocultural belief background as the specific shaper of the conduct, the arousal only activates whatever the person is inclined to do with that set, in that setting, and so on.
WOODS: That's right.
FINGARETTE: So, it would be misleading to think that the mere fact of a higher level of activation would somehow give any kind of specific causal understanding of the nonconforming behavior.
WOODS: I agree.
MARSHALL: Might we not agree that this heightened level of activation or this arousal phase is what we were calling "feeling different"?
WOODS: Sure.
MARSHALL: And then what you're saying, again, is you've got to figure out what to do with those different feelings, how to interpret them.
WOODS: Right.
LANG: It's clear that while there may be some commonality among people, different individuals drink for different purposes at different times — maybe to enhance their sociability, for example.
MARSHALL: And the same individual drinks for different purposes.
LANG: That's right.
MACKENZIE: Rather than a synthesis across cultures, I want to try a synthesis across substances, considering a substance to which no pharmacological properties are attributed. You know I'm studying fatness, and these days I'm studying eating as part of fatness, though it's not all of it. And I have got a hypothesis about when people go on eating binges; I think that when people give accounts of the conditions under which they go on binges — that is people who are in the upper middle class in our society — there is an association between the extent to which they think they ought to be controlled and the circumstances in which they become disinhibited. And I think that's really important because nobody attributes any pharmacological properties to the food, although, of course, there are some images about blood sugar, but far more is involved than high-sugar foods.
ROOM: Could you give us a concrete example of what you're talking about?
MACKENZIE: When people tell me, "I had a binge last night," they say I had a binge because such-and-such. The most recent anecdote is a woman who is going to an energy physician who's in the Holistic Health Center in Berkeley, and this particular energy physician requires that you go on one of his diets in which you systematically eliminate a whole lot of foods and then reintroduce foods one by one. And for quite a long period of time you're on a restricted diet that's determined by hypotheses of allergies.
There is a leader in Tacontas who gave a talk last week in which she gave an account of the first binge she'd been on in ten years. She started dieting ten years ago. And she went on a binge when the energy therapist told her that she would have to go on this restricted diet. She said, "I found myself eating six still half-frozen cream cakes from the Co-op." This anecdote accords with every other binge report that I've ever heard, that binging is associated with dieting. The fat-consciousness movement is actually stopping people from dieting; they may get weight stability, but it's associated with the images of what control they ought to have.

WOODS: With regard to the point that there can be a disinhibition-like behavior with regards to binge eating, we were talking about arousal and disinhibition. I think it's interesting that several research groups have now shown that one of the most potent ways to increase arousal hormones is to eat, particularly when you've been dieting. It's sort of counter-intuitive, but in fact, eating is a very stressful situation in terms of arousal and stress hormones. It would be perfectly consistent.

MARLATT: We've been studying relapses across a variety of different behavior problems, including overeating and alcoholism and cigarette smoking and compulsive gambling, where in all cases the person's either trying to abstain or just putting tight controls over their behavior, like the dieter. And it seems that binging, or behaviors that seem to be associated with loss of control or the person's perception of loss of control are somehow relevant to this whole question of disinhibition; that is, to the extent to which the person feels that they have control, all is well. But if they have one slip or mistake and they perceive that the cause of that is lack of control — lack of willpower or lack of some sort of internal process to be able to re-exert self-control — their behavior seems to go to the other end of the extreme, something that we call "oscillation of control."

So I think that a lot of the see-saw kinds of behaviors that you find where a person's in control, out of control, in control, out of control are in some part based on their perception of control and what alcohol and other drugs do to that control. If we think that one drink knocks out our control center — the little superego in the head gets intoxicated and can't control our behavior any more — then, almost as a self-fulfilling prophecy, the behavior goes out of control. There's a lot of secondary gain through that, of course, too, but it seems to me the whole paradox of control, self-control and loss of control is something that underlies or parallels the discussion that we've been having on disinhibition.

ROOM: I take it that historical folk would not disagree with that
statement. The invention of the notion of addiction is part of the same historical shift, if I understand your work, Harry, that also produced disinhibition.

LEVINE: Yes.

LEMERT: I'm wondering if we don't need to investigate more the comparative effects of different kinds of intoxicating substances. In Tonga, for example, when I was there in the early '60s, they were drinking both kava and home brew. And in one hundred percent of the cases — I must have asked at least two hundred informants — they agreed that when you get drunk on kava, it extinguishes the sexual desire. Not so in the case of getting drunk with alcohol. There's a very sharp distinction here. Now, are we dealing entirely here with the learned interpretation of these physiological things — maybe we all ought to drink kava sometime and try some of this out? We ought to have some more experimental work. Tongans told me time after time, "When drunk on kava, you don't want women like you do when you're drunk on home brew." Possibly we could test this idea.

SILVERMAN: Was that desirable or undesirable?

LEMERT: The wives of the ones that got drunk on kava didn't like it.

MARSHALL: There are a couple of experts on the subject lurking in the back of the room. Monty, did you want to say anything in response to that?

MONTY LINDSTROM: Well, I haven't really looked that much into kava, but it seems that kava comportment has also been learned, and in fact, the connection between kava and disinterest in sex also may be a learned behavior. I'm not sure.

LANG: One explanation for the differences between kava and home brew, in addition to a possible difference based on learning, is that these substances contain things other than alcohol — congeners, that may in themselves have independent effects, and that issue has not been raised here to any great extent.

LEMERT: There's a whole question of toxic congeners that needs to be considered in this issue, particularly in regard to primitive drinking.

MADEOLON POWERS: I'd just like to add one remark. In the '60s, when marijuana was still a felony in the eyes of law and a sin in the eyes of parents, a friend who was versed in such things cautioned me that if ever I should do this, I should also drink a couple of beers to remind myself of what it was like and what a drunken experience was like — so that if I screwed up in some way, it could be excused as "Oh, well, I've been drinking," and no one would
know. So you have two different kinds of behaviors associated, but one of them was acceptable and one was not.

**ROOM:** ... notes from another tribe.

**LEVINE:** I'd like to just use a moment or two to throw out a question and a bit of data on this topic. This summer I discovered that according to the *Dictionary of American Slang*, there were more slang synonyms for “drunk” than for any other word in the English language. Then I discovered a few other collections of terms for “drunk,” including one that Benjamin Franklin compiled in 1737 which included 228 terms; the most recent *Dictionary of American Slang* has 353 terms, and there were a number of other sources. I collected all these and put them together (Levine 1981) simply as a way of having them all in one place so as to ask: “What are all these words talking about?”

One striking thing about the words is how many suggest some kind of power, force or violence often used to describe “good times.” For example: “Crashed, clobbered, bombed, busted, swacked, boxed, carted, buried, canned, gassed, plastered, shellacked, wiped out, tanked, ossified, looped, packaged, paralyzed, shot, damaged, whipped, battered and screwed.” All are commonly used words to describe being drunk. And they’re often used not simply for a bad time but in anticipation of a good time or in remembrance of a good time: “Boy, I had a great time — I was really smashed Saturday night,” and so on.

I would like to ask what exactly is good about being drunk? What is good about being “stoned” or “smashed”? Why would someone look forward to being “bombed,” or recall with pleasure when they or some part of themselves was “clobbered” or “buried”? Why do people keep finding new terms to describe the experience, terms which use other powerful or violent or forceful metaphors? In the appendix to the *Dictionary of American Slang* there’s a bunch of new words: “Bagged, bombed, crashed, kicked in the guts, plowed, shitfaced, tore down, tore up, twisted, and wiped out.”

All I have to offer in the way of interpretation is that it’s a way of talking about the breaking down of ordinary consciousness — that what is being “smashed” is our ordinary, everyday way of experiencing and feeling things, and that is hard to do and we experience it as a real destruction of something. It is a movement, I think, into a different realm, into a different kind of experience. But this is just a beginning interpretation.

My last bit of data is this little “show-and-tell” thing that I saw in the airport and couldn’t resist buying for this conference. It’s a very dented white mug that says, “I got smashed in New York City.” It’s a representation in some way of the experience of being drunk. I
don't know exactly what it's saying, and what it's showing I don't know, but I hoped somebody would be able to interpret it.

**MARSHALL:** Are those one's cells or one's neurons or what have you?

**ROOM:** Well, I'm glad we got to the end of this eventful week.

**LUM:** Just to pick up on Harry Levine's cup and link it with Ed's comment — that is, being smashed and the image of the smashed cup — what's being smashed are norms and cakes of custom over which most people have no personal control. So that perhaps what we're demonstrating when we get smashed is a sense of personal efficacy in light of our inability to transform norms and values and so on that might be oppressive.

**ROOM:** I think that what's emerging from this line of discussion is really a new interpretation of McClelland's (1972) kind of perception, that the need for power has to be interpreted at a cultural as well as individual level.

**WINICK:** Much of the same kinds of terminology used to describe drinking are also slang terms for sex and gambling activity, and all three of these, obviously, share a certain number of commonalities in terms of social acceptance, a certain cycle of activity and being viewed ambivalently by the society.

**FINGARETTE:** It seems to me that one thing that perhaps needs to be kept in mind — and it's connected with the question of what is the concept of disinhibition — is that sometimes we are talking here about loss of control, and other times we're talking about specific kinds of behavior which are purportedly caused by alcohol, such as being more aggressive or more active sexually. It seems to me, for example, that in Alan Lang's paper most of the evidence has to do not with the general loss of control concept but with specific kinds of behavior. With the anthropological evidence, I'm not yet clear as to which it bears on, whether we're dealing with the concept of loss of control in some form, or, rather, with a specific form of behavior such as being aggressive, being rash, or whatever. I think that those are by no means identical and the distinction needs to be kept clearly in mind as we think about this.
DAY 2: PERSPECTIVES ON DISINHIBITION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
Introduction

Robin Room

Welcome back. Yesterday, we spent the day with papers reviewing the available evidence concerning the nature of the link between alcohol and disinhibition. The papers yesterday were reviewing evidence which was not brand new for this conference, although, in fact, Harry was presenting new evidence that has been lying around in working paper form for two or three years.

Today we turn to territory which is more developmental. We turn away from an organization in terms of disciplines and towards an organization in terms of what windows we have to look into American society and see what we can say about the disinhibition/alcohol link in that society. And as you read in the prospectus for the meeting, we actually ended up with five open windows, and were in a bit of a quandary about what to do with that. So, we are considering jointly two of the windows, which are the fact that there is a substantial literature in sociology around accounts of behavior and another substantial literature in psychology around the attribution of behavior. Both of these literatures have been growing by leaps and bounds in recent years, but neither of them, to our knowledge, has really seriously tackled the question of alcohol as an account or as an attribution of behavior. So we asked people from the accounts literature to make a presentation, and someone who might be described as being an attribution scholar to make the commentary.

The first paper this morning derives from our history of having done research on drinking patterns and drinking problems in the general population for a number of years. We went through the available data and asked ourselves: in all the questions we’ve asked over the years, what is there that is relevant to a conference on alcohol and disinhibition? Ron Roizen, who is making the presentation, has long had an interest in this area and took the occasion to do an analysis of the set of questions which he’s now going to tell us about.

Ron has been with the Social Research Group for eight or nine years, had a previous incarnation as a sociologist of space and architecture, and has been involved in a number of analyses of
drinking studies, including a study of the literature of the outcomes of treatment and what the meaning of that literature is; and a study of spontaneous remission in general populations: how often do people get better from having had alcohol problems with disinhibition.
Loosening Up: General-Population Views of the Effects of Alcohol*

Ron Roizen

Introduction

This paper examines alcohol's mood-altering or psychotropic effects as they are seen through the medium of survey research data — specifically, through questionnaire data drawn from a national sample of adult males in the United States. As it happens, the subject of alcohol's effects has not provided a central focus of study for survey researchers interested in drinking behavior. Perhaps this lack of interest derives from a generally felt sense that alcohol's psychotropic effects are too well known already in everyone's commonsense knowledge to require further description. Or, perhaps the study of such effects, to be interesting or useful, would seem to demand the close controls of an experimental situation, rather than the relatively crude instruments of survey research. This is not to say, however, that survey-research data on alcohol's mood-altering effects have not been collected; they have. But for the most part such data have been gathered because the matter of alcohol's psychotropic effects sometimes crosscut other survey research focuses. For example, ever since their modern beginnings in the mid-1940s, survey studies of drinking have questioned respondents about their "reasons for drinking" using interrogatives about whether the drinker drank in order to relax, to quiet down anxieties and tensions, to let go, or to forget cares and worries, and so on (Riley and Marden 1948). Here, then, the survey researcher employs alcohol's putative psychotropic effects as potential motivations for drinking.

Sometimes similar items on psychotropic motivations for drinking have been called upon to wear a quite different conceptual hat,
performing as indicators of one variety of drinking-related problems. In fact, there is a long standing tradition in U.S. alcohological studies which holds that it is not necessarily one's drinking behavior per se but rather one's intentions about drinking that best define the frontier between normal and problem drinking. The proper use of alcohol, to cite Haggard and Jellinek's (1942) powdery phrase, should be confined to that of a condiment for sociability and, at most, a source of the substance's milder physiological and psychological effects. This same tradition was carried on in Cahalan's (1970) use of "escape drinking" as one of his operationalizations of problem drinking; escape drinking conjoined together both indications of a heavy drinking pattern and escapist motivations for drinking.

Alcohol's psychotropic effects crop up in survey measures of drinking problems in another way, too. Respondents have been asked if they experienced feelings of belligerence or happened to get into fights after (and presumably because of) drinking. This sort of question, then, tacitly attributes the untoward mood-effect and its behavioral consequences to alcohol, without at the same time (as in the measures discussed above) making the assumption that the drinker intended to alter his state of mind in this way or bring about the events that followed in the drinking's train.

Yet another sort of data on effects can be found in survey inquiries into "global" estimates of alcohol's powers, which is a brand of inquiry more closely akin to public opinion research on drinking. As it happens, it is a relatively easy matter to show from these sorts of data that there is a widely held presumption in the United States that alcohol can make havoc with the proper personal management of human behavior. In a recent survey of the adult population of a neighboring county, for example, 62 percent of the sample reported they tended to agree that "drink can often bring out the worst in people."

But however much these sorts of global estimates may suggest that American public opinion has embraced the notion that alcohol often can disinhibit or disrupt the drinker's behavior, it is well to remember that the respondent to these questions often has somebody else's, and not his own, drinking in mind. Perhaps this is illustrated in the same sample I just mentioned: Although almost two-thirds of the population thought alcohol often brought out the worst in people, only about one in eight respondents reported being ashamed of something he himself did while drinking in the past year.

In the main, then, alcohol's effects have entered into survey studies of drinking behavior mostly as tacit elements in the description
and analysis of other things: as motivational explanations of drinking behavior, as indicators of at least a couple of sorts of drinking problems, or as measures of public attitudes toward alcohol. Speaking for the Social Research Group experience, to my knowledge we did not introduce an item specifically addressing alcohol's effects until 1973, and even then the item was introduced for a special reason rather than as a means for investigating alcohol's effects per se, as we will see.

The 1973 Series of Effects Questions
The series that appeared in our 1973 questionnaire was as follows:

What effect does alcohol have on you?
(CIRCLE ONE CODE FOR EACH)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Usually</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. It makes me sleepy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. It makes me talkative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. It makes me sad or depressed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. I get aggressive</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. I get romantic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. It makes me feel sick</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. I get friendly</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. It makes me unpleasantly dizzy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. It makes it hard for me to think straight (i.e., irrational)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. I get argumentative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. I find it tastes bad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. I get mean</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let me say a word now about how this series came to be included in our survey. As you can see, a dozen different would-be effects were inquired about. In fact, there was no carefully worked-out conceptual structure lying beneath this particular series of 12 effects. As it happened, the series grew out of a chance comment Lee Robins made in 1972, when she was consultant to our survey studies. She said that she occasionally met people who drank very little or did not drink at all because one or two drinks put them straight to sleep, made them unpleasantly dizzy, or made them sick.
to the stomach. This sort of reaction to alcohol, then, obviously might act as a sort of protection against heavy drinking. Robins' idea seemed plausible enough, and the series above was written to test it. In particular, we tilted the series toward measuring alcohol's powers to make one sleepy, dizzy, sad or depressed, sick-feeling, irrational, and, finally, alcohol's potential to taste bad to the respondent. This last reaction, of course, was not in the same sense an effect of alcohol at all, but since our minds were firmly fixed on Robins' suggestion, an item on unpalatability fit in quite well. The remaining items on alcohol's mood effects, as I recall, were just thrown in for cover.

I should also say a word about the sample from which these data were drawn. To date, six surveys based on the U.S. national population have been conducted by the Social Research Group, and each is referred to around the group by the nickname N1, N2, N3... N6, in order of the survey's sequence in time. The first (N1) was accomplished in late 1964 and early 1965, the most recent was done in 1979. The data I will be examining in this paper were drawn from the N4 survey. The N4 survey, though, did not involve a freshly drawn national sample but rather was a followup study of respondents to an earlier study, N3, conducted in 1969. Both the N3 survey and the N4 followup survey, as mentioned, were done only on men. Also, because this was a followup study, as a whole the N4 sample's range of ages was a little higher than usual: in 1969 respondents were drawn from the adult population aged 21-59; by 1973, of course, the group had progressed to ages 25-63. Another consequence was the inevitable damage done by two waves of nonresponse. In 1969, about 75 percent of all invitations to the sample produced completed interviews. Only persons who had completed interviews in 1969 were invited again in 1973, and in 1973 the response rate was again about 75 percent. Therefore, when it is used as a means for describing the population's distributions on, say, attitudes toward drinking or actual drinking practices, the N4 survey covers only about 50 percent of the original population given invitations. That original sampling universe is also pretty old, 4 years out of date by 1973, and more than a decade out of date by 1981. This analysis, then, must be regarded as a pilot venture.

Reported Frequencies of These Effects

Nevertheless, the findings are interesting. Let us begin with the "marginals" — which is to say, the raw frequencies of responses to these various effects questions.
Table 1 shows the proportions of the sample of current drinkers (N=605) reporting that they experienced each of these 12 effects at least sometimes (that is to say, the total proportion checking responses sometimes, usually, or always for an effect item).¹

### Table 1. Frequencies of Positive Reports of Effects
(Base: 605 Current Drinkers who responded to at least one of the effects questions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>&quot;At Least&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;At Least&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;At Least&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Always&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Never&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Sometimes&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Usually&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talkative</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleepy</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romantic</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrational</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dizzy</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentative</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tastes bad</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹This table reports the frequencies of four levels of response to the effects questions: the never column simply shows the frequency of never responses; the at least sometimes column reports the combined frequency of sometimes, usually, and always responses; the at least usually column reports the combined frequency of usually and always responses; and, finally, the always column shows the frequencies of respondents choosing the always response.

²Only the "never" and "at least sometimes" columns of this table, reading across, will total 100 percent, give or take the consequences of rounding, because of cumulated responses.

The table suggests that there are roughly three classes of effects according to the frequency of response: (1) commonly reported effects (friendly, talkative, sleepy, and romantic), (2) less commonly reported effects (sick, irrational, tastes bad, aggressive, dizzy, and argumentative), and (3) uncommonly reported effects (sad and mean).

The first group of effects, the commonly reported, seem rather more positive, pleasant, and socially desirable than the others. It would seem then that alcohol is widely thought to contribute the beneficial side of loosening up, but as the psychotropic effects grow

¹Notes appear at end of paper.
darker and darker — toward becoming sad or mean because of drinking, say — the proportion of the sample attributing this effect to alcohol drops off dramatically. All of the more or less physiological-reaction items in this series (sick, tastes bad, dizzy) fell into the less common group — though, frankly, I was at first surprised a little at how frequent these reports were. It should be kept in mind that these frequencies report only that a respondent “ever” experienced a particular effect — that report may concern in the limiting case only a single event, or just enough such experience to make the respondent feel shy about indicating such an effect “never” happened to him.

The importance of this point is brought home by looking at the likelihood that respondents said they experienced a particular effect more than sometimes, that is to say, the proportion checking the usually or always responses. When we look at this at least usually distribution (usually and always responses combined) we can see that the reported rates of positive responses are considerably lower than the at least sometimes rates. Among the most frequently reported effects (friendly, talkative, sleepy, romantic) an average of only 35 percent reported each effect at least usually (down from an average of 77 percent who reported these effects at least sometimes). In the less common group (sick, irrational, tastes bad, aggressive, dizzy, argumentative) an average of only 6 percent reported each effect at least usually. And finally in the uncommon group (sad and mean), an average of only 2 percent reported these effects at least usually.

It is also striking how infrequently respondents employed the always response. Even for effects that roughly three-quarters of the sample reported experiencing at least sometimes, only 10 percent or fewer reported experiencing that effect every time they drank. In this observation would seem a nice demonstration that alcohol is not linked to its various effects in lockstep fashion in popular opinion but is instead regarded very much as a matter of the particularities of the drinking event. That most of us might agree that alcohol may help us to feel friendly does not, then, imply about common opinion that alcohol always or even usually will have this effect. In the case of the more negative consequences of drinking (say, becoming aggressive, argumentative, or mean), the proportion indicating the always response drops to almost vanishing smallness. From this fact, too, we might draw the inference that as the effect in question is more and more a disagreeable one, then more and more the unleashing of that effect will be seen as produced situationally rather than produced directly as a result of alcohol’s ingestion.
Drinking Behavior, Age, and Experiencing Alcohol's Effects

Buckley and Milkes (1978) looked at the bivariate relationships between these same effects reports and a number of demographic and behavioral variables. I shall draw attention to two demographic variables: actual drinking behavior and age.

Drinking Behavior. Table 2 shows the relationship between the effects responses and the quantities of alcohol respondents reported drinking: The hi-max column shows the effects responses of respondents who occasionally drink as many as five drinks or more per sitting; the low-max column refers to drinkers who drink four drinks or fewer. This table is notable on a couple of accounts. First of all, notice that in general hi-max drinkers are more likely, rather than less likely, to report some of the negative bodily alcohol effects that, according to Robins' original suggestion, might protect lighter drinkers from greater consumption. Thus, though negative

Table 2. Frequencies of Positive Reports of Effects by Quantity of Consumption
(Base: 605 Current Drinkers who responded to at least one of the effects questions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Frequencies of Reported Effects¹</th>
<th>Frequencies of Reported Effects²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Low-Maximum&quot;¹</td>
<td>&quot;High-Maximum&quot;²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=273)</td>
<td>(332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talkative</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleepy</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romantic</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrational</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dizzy</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentative</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tastes bad</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹At the at least sometimes level.
²Respondent reports never drinking as many as five drinks at a sitting.
³Respondent reports drinking five or more drinks per sitting at least sometimes.
bodily effects may afford some drinkers protection from heavier alcohol consumption, in general reports of these sorts of effects are the province of heavier drinkers, very likely those who drink enough actually to experience them now and then.³

Age. Age (table 3) was also fairly strongly associated with these effects reports, with younger respondents reporting such effects much more frequently than older respondents. As it happens, though, younger age also is associated with heavier drinking, and so we might suspect that this relationship between age and effects is merely another manifestation of the relationship between quantity of drinking and effects. On checking, age and quantity of drinking did show independent influences on these alcohol effects reports: Controlling for quantity of drinking, younger respondents reported more effects than older respondents did; and controlling for age, heavier drinking respondents reported more effects than lighter drinking ones.

And because both variables made independent contributions to the alcohol effects reports, their combined effect is greater than the independent contributions of either. In table 4, I have shown the spread of response distributions across the outer borders of the age-consumption variables. As you can see, except for the response

Table 3. Frequencies of Effects¹ by Age Groups
(Base: 605 Current Drinkers who responded to at least one of the effects questions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Youngest, 25-34 (N=250)</th>
<th>Younger Middle, 35-44 (156)</th>
<th>Older Middle, 45-54 (142)</th>
<th>Older, 55+ (57)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talkative</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleepy</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romantic</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrational</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dizzy</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentative</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tastes bad</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹At the at least sometimes level.
that alcohol often tastes bad, age and consumption conspire to produce a good deal of the variation in effects responses.

The Concentration of Effects

Table 5 shows the distribution of the total number of effects reported at least sometimes by currently drinking respondents (N=605). It is a very flat distribution, with only a modest peak value at 6, and a standard deviation of about 3 points. Thus, one falls within the two-thirds of the sample closest to the mean by himself scoring between 3 and 9 points inclusively. It would seem that

Table 4. Frequencies of Effects\(^1\) by Quantity of Consumption by Age Groups
(Base: 605 Current Drinkers who responded to at least one of the effects questions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Youngest (25-34)</th>
<th>Young-Middle (35-44)</th>
<th>Older-Middle (45-54)</th>
<th>Older (55+)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lo-Hi Max</td>
<td>Lo-Hi Max</td>
<td>Lo-Hi Max</td>
<td>Lo-Hi Max</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(88) (162)</td>
<td>(67) (89)</td>
<td>(81) (61)</td>
<td>(37) (20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friendly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talkative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleepy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dizzy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tastes bad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Reported at the at least sometimes level.
\(^2\)"Lo-Max" refers to respondents reporting they never drink as many as five drinks at a sitting. "Hi-Max" respondents drink five or more drinks per sitting at least sometimes.
\(^3\)Note that the N is small here, and therefore, rates should be interpreted with caution.
notions of alcohol's effects are very little subject to a central tendency or peaked around a particular sum-of-effects consensus among U.S. males.

We can take an interesting look at the total number of effects scores in table 6. Here I have shown the patterns of response to the 12 effects items for three subgroups: those with low sum scores on the effects (total scores of 0-4), those with medium sum scores (5-7), and those with high scores (8-12). The results suggest something of a tiered or Guttman-like relationship among the alcohol effects: Low-scoring respondents, for example, hardly ever reported sadness, aggressiveness, dizziness, argumentativeness, or meanness as a result of drinking, preferring instead to report the more favorable effects of sleepiness, talkativeness, and friendliness. Among medium scoring respondents, these three favorable effects become nearly universal while sadness and meanness were reported by only very small fractions. Only among high scoring respondents did reports of the more negative effects become more common, though still far from universal.

Table 5. Distribution of Total Scores on Effects
(Base: 605 Current Drinkers who responded to at least one of the effects questions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Score</th>
<th>Proportion of the Sample (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Scorers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Scorers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Scorers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1At the at least sometimes level.
Table 7 reports the zero-order product-moment correlations of the twelve effects items. As one can see, the correlations are all positive, ranging from a low of .103 (for the tastes bad-talkative pair) to highs in the 500s (friendly-talkative, .588; mean-argumnentative, .537; friendly-romantic, .535; and argumentative-aggressive, .516).

It is noteworthy that even among seemingly opposing mood effects — the best example of which being the friendly-mean pair — correlations nevertheless do not become negative. This finding seems to give the lie to the old notion that some of us get mean when we get drunk, and others get happy, and one is either one sort of drunk or the other. Based on these correlation statistics, it seems a “happy” drunk is at least as likely as an “unhappy” one also to be a mean drunk now and then (though, in fact, we will have to revise this assertion a bit in a moment).

Factor analysis provides a convenient way to summarize a matrix of correlation statistics. Table 8 reports the varimax factor pattern. Notice that if we assign each variable to the factor on which it got the highest loading (boldface numbers), then three neat factors of four variables apiece are produced: The first factor collects together a set of more pleasant and perhaps more socially desirable effects (friendly, talkative, and romantic) along with sleepy; the second factor is comprised of the darker mood effects (mean, argumentative, aggressive, and sad); and finally the third factor is comprised of negative bodily effects (dizzy, sick, irrational, and tastes bad).

Perhaps the clearest sense of the relation between the first two mood factors can be gotten by examining table 9, which presents a cross tabulation of two variables called gregariousness and nastiness. To explain, these are summary variables each constructed from three effects items as follows: Any respondent who checked that he ever felt friendly, talkative, or romantic was scored positive on gregariousness; any respondent who checked that he ever felt mean, aggressive, or argumentative was scored positive on nastiness. I have corner-percentaged the cross-tabulation.

Table 9 shows an intriguing pattern: We see that the great majority of drinkers (87 percent) reported at least one or more of the more gregarious effects of alcohol. On the other hand, by comparison only 47 percent reported at least one of the nasty effects, as we have termed them. Another 12 percent reported none of these effects at
Table 6. Frequencies of Positive Reports of Effects Among Low, Medium, and High Total-Scorers on Effects Overall
(Base: 605 Current Drinkers who responded to at least one of the effects questions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Low Overall Scorers (0-4)</th>
<th>Medium Overall Scorers (5-7)</th>
<th>High Overall Scorers (8-12)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talkative</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleepy</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romantic</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrational</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dizzy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentative</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tastes bad</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1At the at least sometimes level.

Table 7. Zero-order Correlations for the Twelve Effects Among Current Drinkers (N=605)
(Collapsed to Dichotomous Form, “At Least Sometimes” and “Never”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Sleepy</td>
<td>415</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Talkative</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>192</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sad</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>226</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Aggressive</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>372</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Romantic</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>201</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sick</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>215</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Friendly</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>222</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Dizzy</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>368</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Irrational</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>406</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Argumentative</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>154</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Tastes bad</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

262
all. But nasty and gregarious effects, far from being substitutes for each other, appear to be associated in a necessary-condition logical relation: Only respondents positive on gregariousness also reported being positive on nastiness, too. And if one reports himself negative on gregariousness, then most probably he will report negatively on nastiness, too. Nasty respondents, then, are almost always gregarious, whereas gregarious respondents may or may not report being nasty.

In order to take a closer look at the pattern of relations among the more favorable and the less favorable effects, I "took apart" the

Table 8. Varimax Factor Pattern Among 12 Effects
(Collapsed to Dichotomies, N=605)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Factor I</th>
<th>Factor II</th>
<th>Factor III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Friendly</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Talkative</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sleepy</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>057</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Romantic</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sick</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Irrational</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Aggressive</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Dizzy</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>098</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Argumentative</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Sad</td>
<td>050</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Mean</td>
<td>-005</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Tastes bad</td>
<td>060</td>
<td>080</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proportion of Total Communality Accounted for by Factor:
.213 .189 .161
Initial Criterion = 11.541

Table 9. Gregariousness by Nastiness
(Among Current Drinkers, who responded to at least one of the effects questions; Corner Percentaging)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nastiness</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gregariousness</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=605)

*Less than one-half percent.
gregarious variable, dividing it again into its three constituent parts, friendly, talkative, and romantic. The nastiness variable was left intact, because of its lower frequency in the population. So, let us now consider the interrelations of four variables: friendly, talkative, romantic, and nasty. There are 16 possible combinations of these variables, running from cases who reported positively on all four to cases who reported negatively on all four. Because we know the frequency of occurrence of each of these effects in our sample, it is an easy matter to compute the probability of occurrence of each of the combinations of effects: Each combination's probability of occurrence is simply the product of the individual probabilities of the effects that make it up. It is also an easy matter to compare these expected probabilities with the actual proportions of respondents found in each combinatorial group. This comparison is presented in table 10.

Let us take a look at it. According to the marginal frequencies for these four variables (and assuming no systematic relationship among the effects variables) we ought to expect the most frequent pattern to be Fr, T, R, -N (which is to say, positive on friendly, talkative, and romantic, and negative on nasty). Next most frequent should be Fr, T, R, N (or positive on all four effects).

Table 10. Expected Probabilities and Observed Frequencies of Combinations of Four Mood Effects — Friendly, Talkative, Romantic, and Nasty
(Current Drinkers. N=605)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mood Effects</th>
<th>Expected Frequency</th>
<th>Observed Frequency</th>
<th>Ratio O/E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fr, Tk, Em, -Na</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fr, Tk, Rm, Na</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Fr, Tk, -Rm, -Na</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fr, Tk, -Rm, Na</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Fr, -Tk, Rm, -Na</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fr, -Tk, Rm, Na</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Fr, -Tk, -Rm, -Na</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Fr, -Tk, -Rm, Na</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. -Fr, Tk, Rm, -Na</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. -Fr, Tk, Rm, Na</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. -Fr, Tk, -Rm, -Na</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. -Fr, Tk, -Rm, Na</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. -Fr, -Tk, Rm, -Na</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. -Fr, -Tk, Rm, Na</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. -Fr, -Tk, -Rm, -Na</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>17.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. -Fr, -Tk, -Rm, Na</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fr=friendly, Tk=talkative, Rm=romantic, Na=nasty
Together, both these patterns should account for 44 percent of the sample. As you can see, though, the actual proportion of the sample falling in the second pattern — Fr, T, R, N — is much higher than the expected frequency. As a result, roughly 60 percent of the sample distributes itself into the first two groups: 21.5 percent experience all positive effects but not nasty and 39.3 percent experience all four effects.

Glancing down the "observed" column, the next most frequent category of response is no effects (-F, -T, -R, -N). This concentration of respondents is all the more surprising because, on purely statistical grounds, we ought to expect less than 1 percent of the sample to be found in this group.  

The remaining thirteen combinations of effects accounted for only 27 percent of the sample. This pattern of natural clumping among the response possibilities, then, led me to construct a typology in which the following four groups were separated out.

**A Typology of Effects Reported**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allers</td>
<td>Respondents reporting positively on all four effects</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Nasties</td>
<td>Respondents reporting one or more favorable effects but not nasty</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes Nasties</td>
<td>Respondents reporting positively on nasty, without being alters.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noners</td>
<td>Respondents reporting negatively on all four effects</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This typology has the advantage of reflecting the fact that respondents who reported being nasty almost invariably reported such effects "after" having reported some, and often all, of the positive effects — friendly, romantic, and talkative. What then is associated with membership in one or another of these typology categories?

**Typology of Effects**

In table 11, I have collected together three sorts of measures: consumption patterns, measures of dryness-wetness of the drinker's environment and attitudes, and measures of the respondent's tolerance of deviance. Even a quick look at this collection suggests that Allers drink the most, come from the wettest environ-
Table 11. Typology of Effects by Several Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consumption Patterns</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Some-times</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Allers</th>
<th>Nasties</th>
<th>Nasties</th>
<th>Noners</th>
<th>Noners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Never &quot;High or Tight&quot; in Past Year</td>
<td>11 27 39 92</td>
<td>-81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent High Maximum Quantity (5+ drinks, ever)</td>
<td>77 63 47 6 71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangible Consequences (High)</td>
<td>31 35 10 0 31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Consequences (High)</td>
<td>23 29 7 0 23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dry-Wet Environment/Attitudes</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Some-times</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Allers</th>
<th>Nasties</th>
<th>Nasties</th>
<th>Noners</th>
<th>Noners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drinking Norms (Percent in &quot;Dryest&quot; Quartile)</td>
<td>13 17 21 53 40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinker Self-Description (Percent Nondrinker or Very Light Drinker)</td>
<td>30 43 46 78 48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tolerance of Deviance</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Some-times</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Allers</th>
<th>Nasties</th>
<th>Nasties</th>
<th>Noners</th>
<th>Noners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If a man gets drunk every week or so</td>
<td>48 81 63 89 -41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a family man goes out drinking with his men friends a couple of times a week</td>
<td>23 26 32 58 -35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A man who drives his car home after he's had six beers</td>
<td>20 28 37 53 -33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a man drinks a lot</td>
<td>44 60 58 75 -31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a man fools around with other women after he's married</td>
<td>54 78 61 80 -26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person getting into fights</td>
<td>44 63 57 64 -20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a man risks his neck at a dangerous sport</td>
<td>21 38 29 41 -20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving over the speed limit</td>
<td>21 36 25 40 -19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a person gets insulting and sarcastic when he's been drinking</td>
<td>61 79 72 78 -17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A man having sex relations with several women when he is single</td>
<td>99 17 14 24 -15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a person often misses work on Monday because of a hangover</td>
<td>68 77 70 82 -14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a man spends money buying drinks rather than things the family could use</td>
<td>86 89 89 92 -6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a person doesn't work steadily when he could</td>
<td>56 66 54 60 -4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ments, and are in general most tolerant of deviance. Noners, on the other hand, drink the least, show the driest of attitudes and environment, and are the least tolerant of deviance.

Let me draw attention to illustrative findings: Notice, first, that 92 percent of the Noners reported "never" getting "high or tight" in the past year; only 11 percent of the Allers made the same report. Noners appear to be free of drinking-related problems as these are measured by our "tangible consequences" and "social consequences" scales, whereas the rates of such problems among Allers (and Sometimes Nasties) are relatively high. More than half of Noners fell into the driest quartile of the drinker subsample in terms of reported drinking norms, whereas among Allers only 13 percent fell into that quartile. Measures of tolerance of deviance consistently show Allers more tolerant than Noners though in varying degrees depending on the behavior. Notice, though, that both groups seem equally to ill-regard defaults in family responsibilities because of drinking and failure to work steadily, whether or not drinking is involved.

**Conclusion**

What, then, might we conclude from all this? Let me first of all review the central findings.

1. Positive and sociable effects are more commonly reported than negative or antisocial effects.

2. By and large, reports of effects are a "sometimes" thing. Respondents avoid the "always" response, and the largest proportion of responders falls into the lowest or "sometimes" response.

3. Being young and being a high quantity drinker go along with higher levels of reported effects. Youth also is associated with higher consumption, but the two variables have independent associations with effects reports and do not explain each other away.

4. The total number of effects reported is a variable that produces a very flat distribution; there is not a great deal of central tendency or consensus on this dimension.

5. Effects range from being mildly-positively to strongly-positively correlated with each other and are not alternatives or substitutes for one another.

6. The "gregarious" and "nasty" effects of alcohol form a Guttman-like pattern of association: Some respondents reported neither "gregariousness" nor "nastiness"; some reported "gregariousness" but not "nastiness"; and, lastly, some respondents reported both. But one does not find respondents who reported "nastiness" but not "gregariousness."
7. This pattern of association suggested a typology of effects that separated out Noners, Never·Nasties, Allers, and Sometimes Nasties. By and large, we saw that Noners restrict their own drinking to light consumption and also evidence attitudes and norms much dryer than the other groups.

On the whole the findings of this analysis may seem more or less unexceptional. I think it was Lazarsfeld who once observed that survey research findings have a way of seeming commonplace once they have been reported. Perhaps we have a duty, then, to try to keep a sense of mystery alive about these findings, to try to see them not as commonplace but as extraordinary and as rich in explanatory possibilities. Stepping back from the seven points that summarize our findings, what do we see?

It seems, first of all, that survey research data provide an interesting vantagepoint for the study of alcohol's effects, one generating data and impressions rather different from those of pharmacology or anthropology. We saw first that there may be an important distinction to be drawn between what respondents see as alcohol's effects in general and alcohol's effects on oneself. Moreover these two sets of beliefs may actually have a sort of inverse relationship with each other. Respondents who harbor the most negative general attitudes toward alcohol seem also to limit their drinking to such an extent that they experience few or none of alcohol's mood-altering effects, or at the most only alcohol's pleasant and more sociable effects. Thus, it may well be that those with the strongest commitment to the notion that alcohol can cause havoc with one's moods are themselves those with the least actual experience or inclination to experience those effects.

These data alert us, I think, to the reflexive quality of human behavior that is so often missed in quantitative social science research. In the laboratory, alcohol's effects are studied by administering varying doses of alcohol to experimental subjects. But in the world outside the laboratory door it seems that the amount of alcohol consumed may be precisely the "variable" the drinker controls for himself. Wary attitudes toward alcohol seem to go together with more restrictive consumption practices. On the other hand, those who view alcohol as generally more benign tend not to restrict consumption so much, and in the end expose themselves to more varied psychotropic effects.

Perhaps we can also detect beneath these findings the dim structures of two quite different cultural logics for the control of drinking behavior. The first, call it a "dry logic," invests alcohol with powerful and dangerous effects and directs its control efforts,
therefore, at the actual drinking practices of the population; the second logic, a "wetter" one, invests alcohol with milder powers. Here, drinkers now and then seem to encounter alcohol's untoward effects, but only infrequently. More often alcohol's more positive effects prevail, and, more importantly, responsibility for behavior while under alcohol's influence may stay with the drinker in this system.

Whatever else these data suggest, they certainly call for a good deal of caution in the way we speak about U.S. beliefs about alcohol's psychotropic powers. Beyond the fact that our beliefs about alcohol's effects on ourselves may be different from our beliefs about its effects on others, we have also seen that alcohol's effects are regarded as "sometimes" things by the great majority of respondents. Even those beliefs researchers may feel comfortable attributing to their subjects do not imply — for the subject, at least — that alcohol is always expected to behave that way. We have seen a good deal of diversity in reports of alcohol's effects, too. This suggests to me that experimental researchers may want in the future to inventory the specific beliefs and experiences of their experimental subjects. In other words, that one is a member of American culture does not determine precisely the set of beliefs or experiences one may have in relation to alcohol. Anthropologists might take note of this fact, too, for it suggests that in the United States, at least, though there is a general pattern to our results, one cannot describe this culture in terms of a fixed and uniform set of beliefs. Nevertheless, reports on alcohol's effects are associated with the respondents' attitudes on alcohol and actual drinking practices. Certainly these various strands suggest the merit in building into upcoming survey research studies a more careful look at alcohol's mood-altering effects.

Notes

'A little more description of the subsample upon which this analysis was conducted is necessary. All respondents (that is to say, both drinkers and nondrinkers) were asked this series of questions about alcohol's effects, on the theory that even lifelong abstainers may have had enough experience with alcohol to provide meaningful answers. Thus, the analysis was begun on the full N4 sample, the N equalling 725 cases. As it happened, though, this full-sample group yielded quite high nonresponse rates to the effects questions. A closer look at the data revealed that among the 725 respondents some 43 (6 percent of the sample) had skipped the entire series of questions. Moreover, 39 of these 43 skippers turned out to be abstainers. For this reason, I decided to exclude abstainers from the analysis. There were 111 nondrinkers in the sample, plus another five cases whose drinking practices were unknown. These two subgroups excluded, 609 cases remained. Within this group (as
I mentioned), four currently drinking respondents skipped the series. They were excluded as well, leaving 605 "current drinkers who did not skip this series of questions" for this analysis.

Another analytical decision remained, however: Among the 605 respondents remaining in the analysis group, 572 (about 95 percent of the 605) answered every one of the effects questions; the remaining 33 respondents left at least one (but not all) of the individual items blank. In order to retain these 33 cases for the analysis, I equated a skipped-over item as equivalent to a "never" response. Thus, if a respondent answered any of the effects items but left one or more items blank, the blanks were converted to "never" responses.

I mean to include in the notion of "situation" such things as the quantity of alcohol consumed, the nature of the drinking occasion, the time of day, day of the week, co-present parties, and so on. The concept, then, should not be restricted to, say, the presence or absence of a provocative event — as this text may tend otherwise to suggest.

Then again, it could be argued that the essence of Robins' suggestion is that some drinkers always or at least nearly always experience unpleasant bodily effects when they drink — thus avoiding drinking because it never brings favorable effects. Perhaps a truer test of Robins' suggestion, then, is to examine the subgroup of respondents who did report that they always or usually experienced these unpleasant effects. Looking to see whether nondrinkers or very light drinkers might be overrepresented therein. As it turned out, examined in this way, Robins' hypothesis did gather some support.

Abstainers and "infrequent" drinkers (drinks less frequently than once a month) constituted 23 percent of those respondents answering the series of effects questions. Table A, below, shows the proportions of abstainers/infrequent drinkers found among those reporting each unpleasant effect always and at least usually.

We can see in the table that abstainers and infrequent drinkers are indeed overrepresented among respondents reporting alcohol regularly makes them sick, dizzy, irrational, and "tastes bad," although this group seems relatively underre-

Table A. The frequency of abstainers and infrequent drinkers among respondents who reported a given effect "always" or "at least usually"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents Reporting:</th>
<th>The Proportion of Abstainers and Infrequent Drinkers Found Among Them: (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sleepy &quot;always&quot; (base=49)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sick &quot;always&quot; (24)</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dizzy &quot;always&quot; (8)</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sad &quot;always&quot; (4)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>irrational &quot;always&quot; (20)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tastes bad &quot;always&quot; (32)</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sleepy &quot;at least usually&quot; (192)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sick &quot;at least usually&quot; (53)</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dizzy &quot;at least usually&quot; (30)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sad &quot;at least usually&quot; (10)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>irrational &quot;at least usually&quot; (58)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tastes bad &quot;at least usually&quot; (77)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
presented among respondents reporting alcohol regularly makes them sleepy or sad. Thus, it seems that among respondents who report that alcohol regularly makes them sick, dizzy, or irrational, or among respondents for whom alcohol regularly tastes bad, these effects may indeed act to deter drinking among a proportion. Based on these data, though, it seems that alcohol's powers regularly to make one sleepy or sad do not suggest the same consequence on drinking behavior.

'Taken together, respondents reporting all four of the effects variables (call them *allers*) and respondents reporting none of the effects (call them *noners*) should have accounted for 21.4 percent of the sample — but, in fact, these two categories accounted for 51.5 percent of the sample, almost two-and-a-half times the expected rate. Interpreted substantively, this finding suggests that there are indeed fairly strong associations among the various effects. One member of the conference audience suggested to me at a coffee break that perhaps these unexpected concentrations of *allers* and *noners* simply were the result of a "response set" — in other words, perhaps many respondents more or less ignored the series of questions, answering them with a single stroke of the pencil, so to speak.

In the case of *allers* we can check for the presence of a response set in two ways: First, remember that one was regarded as positive on each of the effects by checking any one of the effects variables (sometimes, usually, or always). Thus, if in fact a response set were at work in these data, then we ought to find that many of the *allers* will have reported exactly the same responses to all six of the items incorporated in the typology. On examination, though, it turned out that among the 238 *allers* only 12 (or 5 percent) responded thus.

Second, remember too, that the six items making up this analysis were drawn from a series of 12 items. Thus, it is possible also to see how many respondents who were positive on the four variables making up the scale (these variables, in turn, made up of six items) in fact gave exactly the same responses to all 12 items in the series. Answer: only three cases (or 1.3 percent of the *allers*). For the *allers* group as a whole, then, it seems that it was not a response set that produced their disproportionately great representation in the sample.

A bit more troublesome is the response set question when we turn our attentions to the *noners*. First of all, reporting the absence of an effect involved only one answer category, "never." Therefore, we know that *noners* employed the never response — the same response — for all six items used in the typology. We can, however, look at *noners*' responses to the six items not in the typology. But in order to do that, it is necessary first that we reconsider the way missing data were handled in this analysis (see note 1, above).

Respondents with missing data on one or more, but not all, of the effects items had their responses recoded to "never" responses, on the theory that passing over a given item was equivalent to saying one never had this particular response. For a part of the *noners* group, then, it is possible that an apparent response set was created by the way the data were recoded. In all, 33 (or 5 percent of the 605 cases used in this analysis) reported some missing data on the effects series. A total of 74 respondents (or 12 percent) were classified as *noners*. Of this subgroup, ten respondents (13.5 percent of the *noners*) reported missing data on one or more of the items in the full effects series (that is, over all twelve of the items). Thus, at least 64 respondents (86 percent of *noners*) did not become *noners* by virtue of any missing data.

Leaving aside the ten cases of respondents with missing data, it is interesting to look at the responses to the six effects items not in the typology among the 64 *noners* with no missing data. Here, 29 respondents (39 percent of *noners*) answered "never" to the six items not used in the typology, meaning that they gave the "never" response to all twelve items. The remaining 35 cases gave at least a sometimes response to one of the six items not used in the typology.
Perhaps these results are not too disheartening. The friendly, talkative, and romantic items employed in the typology were the effects most commonly reported in our sample, and therefore it is not altogether surprising that a respondent who reported "never" to these effects would go on to report "never" to the less frequently reported effects in the series. It can also be argued that the 35 respondents for whom the response set hypothesis can be safely rejected constitute 5.8 percent of the full sample of 605 cases — this is by itself more than eight times the expected proportion of the sample to fall in this noners category. Finally, there is no way to know with certainty that those who reported all 12 effects with the "never" response were not, after all, telling us how it is with them. (I'm grateful to the gentleman in the audience for suggesting that the response set hypothesis should be examined.)

References


Presenter's Comments

ROIZEN: I had a sense yesterday that there was a set of issues larger than we can possibly get our minds around being discussed, and we were seeing little chunks being dropped as we went along, in hope that a larger mind than mine, anyway, would be able to hold it together and make sense of it all. This presentation today concerns another piece of the elephant, which is what we can see from survey-research data on effects of alcohol. And I'm frankly not sure whether the survey research piece of the elephant is merely notable or instructive, or whether it actually has some significant lessons to tell us.

Survey research is a crude instrument. One of the things that happens when you go out and merely ask people what effect alcohol has on them — which is pretty much exactly what we asked them — is you don't know whether it's belief or biology that's doing the work; you don't know whether it's their belief in the psychotropic effects or whether it's the psychotropic effects themselves being reported.

It's also true that any science throws away a great deal of information. And survey research seems to throw away all sorts of interesting bits of information about people's lives. It seems to have a kind of stigmatized status, and it's probably well-deserved, since somehow one's age and sex and various things that go along with the survey researcher's kit of questions don't seem to be the most interesting things to learn about somebody.

Another dilemma of survey research is that, although it's fascinating before you see it, after you've seen the findings, they frequently seem very unexceptional; they always seem to be the way you would have expected them to come out anyway. It's a curious thing when you're doing this kind of research; you have to keep in mind that it might have come out another way, and if you made a note of your expectations before you actually looked at the data, it does indeed come out differently from your expectations. So it's a good idea to keep alive a sense of surprise when looking at survey data.

To reflect on my paper a bit, you can see from table 1 that the
"friendly, talkative, sleepy, romantic" positive mood-altering effects are the most commonly reported. And as you get to the more unpleasant effects — the bodily effects items in the middle, and then "sad" and "mean" at the bottom — the response frequency drops off quite dramatically.

To follow my own prescription, I'll try to make this not quite as unexceptional as it may seem. You can look at that and say, "Well, alcohol's not really that bad a thing. After all, people's responses are pretty much in the positive end of the psychotropic effects, and the ones that create all the social concern are experienced by a quite small group of the population, perhaps even a group that could be isolated and persuaded that drinking is not such a hot idea, or perhaps a group that already is not drinking very much." One certainly gets a sense that when one is reporting on one's own drinking behavior, the darker side of alcohol is much less frequently mentioned than the positive side.

We looked at a lot of demographic tables, and I was struck yesterday with how many people had mentioned that they thought maybe race or maybe social class or maybe a region of the country or you name it might have an effect on these perceptions of effects, and actually, many such variables had milder effects in this kind of reporting than we had expected. Age does have quite a substantial impact, with young people much more frequently reporting these effects over older people, but many demographic variables had only mild impact (Buckley and Milkes 1978).

As mentioned in my paper, I made a four-way typology among the "Noners," the "Allers," the "Never Nasties" and "others." Actually, it emerged that it was the "Noners" who had the lowest drinking practices, who came from the driest environment, and who had the most strongly negative attitudes towards drinking behavior. So, in a sense, one's global attitude toward alcohol seemed the opposite of one's personal experience with alcohol; one's personal experience of minimal emotional effects with alcohol would seem to go together with very light drinking. I won't make any guesses about the possible time-order.

But the comment made by Alan Lang yesterday might deserve a caution as a result of this finding. Try to imagine in what kind of world these findings could fit together; namely, that the lightest drinkers report the lightest experiences of the effects. Remember that Robins in the very beginning expected exactly the opposite relationship, that it would be the light drinkers who would report the heavy negative effects from alcohol.

Maybe it's the case that there's a kind of exchange going on when an ABSCAM Congressman stands up and says that he didn't mean
it, he was drinking. Maybe what's going on is a kind of validation of the dry drinking norms of a large part of the community that will both not drink very much (in order not to experience bad effects) and believes at the same time that those effects are there; what the exchange consists of is a validation of light drinking norms traded for an acceptable, honor-worthy account of the deviance that the heavier drinker has presented. There may be two logics of the social control of alcohol present at once, and they have the potential of an exchange arising between the two.

Let me just close by saying how this relates to Lang's comment. When we were doing our casualty study in 1977, as Robin mentioned, there was a great fight over the relationship between murder—as it happened—and drinking behavior. One camp thought that, if we think that alcohol disinhibits and creates aggression, we can say to the world, “Be careful around a drinking person” or “Be careful in violent situations where there's a lot of alcohol. The alcohol can create the violence.” But, on the other hand, if we believe that it's a cultural definition of alcohol that is actually doing the work in the relationship between consumption and the outcome of behavior, then the pronouncement from our study group did little more than further bless with academic legitimacy the very thing that was creating the relationship in the first place between the drinking and the murderous outcome. So, there was a real dilemma. Now, if you take the second position—that we should say there's the potential of a good deal of cultural contribution to this—the obvious solution might be, “Look, this is an ascription that society chooses to make; it's not true in other cultures but it's true in some.” And that would seem to me the most obvious policy recommendation, as Alan Lang was suggesting.

Looking at this data suggests to me that there may be a disadvantage to that type of suggestion. And that is that if we were to imagine that light drinking behavior goes along with a high belief in these effects, then perhaps to remove the cultural belief in the effects—were it possible for us to do that, which I doubt on other grounds—might break down that dry logic and break apart the cohesion of the world. We may be eroding a belief system that serves to keep many light drinkers light drinkers.

These data are, I think, very suggestive. And I personally would like to see how the historian, the anthropologist, how a person who looks at experimental work responds to this—what meaning this kind of data has with respect to their territories. Thank you.
Commentary

Joy Leland

ROOM: Well, Ron is going to get his wish, at least from an anthropologist. Joy Leland, who has worked a great deal in the field of American Indian drinking and has a strong quantitative bent along with her qualitative side, is going to comment.

LELAND: Well, first I'm going to mull over some of the findings Ron reported which interested me the most, and eventually I'll get around to some remarks about the potential role of general population studies in our efforts to understand disinhibition.

I am sure we were all struck by the fact he reported that more people by far say that positive effects are experienced than negative ones, from which he concluded that the majority of us do not perceive alcohol as a deadly substance for ourselves. The preponderance of reported positive effects over negative ones is even greater among the respondents who report the highest frequency of effects, the "Usually" and "Always" categories. Positive effects of alcohol are not only reported by more people but are reported to occur more frequently than the negative ones. And among the effects reported to occur "Usually" the most frequent one is "friendly"; "mean" is rarely reported at the "Usually" level, and even at the "Sometimes" level, it is reported only by a few people. We were also probably struck by the fact that the total number of effects reported by single individuals seemed very low, and that the mix of effects is highly variable but distinctly patterned. Ron's data show that most people report very few effects — from 1 to 4 — and these are preponderately positive. Fewer people report more effects — from 5 to 7 — and these, too, lean heavily towards the positive effects, with the addition of a few negative ones. And there are very few people who report many effects — from 8 to 12 — and these, again, include the positive core, with the addition of a fuller range of the negative effects.

So, we are immediately struck by the discrepancy between the rareness of the "mean-sad" reports and the frequency of such behaviors in association with drinking in case reports and other
investigations, and in our own informal observation of ourselves and our companions. More than anything else, these data seem to add more evidence that self-reports tend to be tinted by the respondents' rose-colored glasses. And the preponderance of reported positive effects is all the more noteworthy since only four of the twelve choices offered are interpreted by Roizen as being positive: "friendly, romantic," with "talkative" and "sleepy" less obviously so to me, but, anyway, relatively speaking, positive. The basis for this positive/negative dichotomy and how items are classified therein is unspecified — it may tell us more about Ron's values than those which are out there in the heads of the populace — but he is, after all, a native, and his folk "taxonomy" probably does fit most of ours. The negative effects are about evenly divided between a set consisting of negative physical effects — "sick, dizzy, tastes bad, and hard to think straight" — and a second set which seems more clearly related overall to our focus here on disinhibition: "aggressive, argumentative, mean," and, less obviously so: "sad, depressed."

We immediately note that many possible positive effects have not been included in the choices. Among bodily effects, for example, we particularly note the absence of "warmth," which figures prominently in Sharon Wilsnack's (1974) inference that young female social drinkers report alcohol makes them feel more womanly. Other candidates might have been "tastes good, relaxes, alert, strong." Other possible positive effects with less direct physical manifestations include "kind, gentle, thoughtful, attractive, tolerant, amusing, expressive, articulate, less apprehensive, happy, lovable" and the remainder of Wilsnack's womanly set: "loving" — not necessarily the equivalent of Ron's "romantic" — "open, affectionate, feminine, sexy, and pretty."

This list underscores the desirability of investigating the alcohol effects reported by females as well as males, as Ron acknowledged; however, much as we might like to have had some information about these and other additional possible positive effects, even if only for males, their omission from the choices makes the preponderance of reports of positive effects only the more noteworthy. On the other hand, this extension of the list obviously does not begin to exhaust the possibilities either; we could expand the negative side as well. And this raises the question of what would be excluded when we talk about items which might fit under the general heading of disinhibited, particularly if we consider this across cultures; and in light of that we begin to wonder whether such a broad and amorphous concept can really hold much promise for illuminating drinking behavior.
But before we leave the subject of the particular effects respondents were offered, it is interesting to relate each more closely to our focus on disinhibition. The twelve items can be arranged according to their apparent relationship to activity; that is, whether they represent arousal or inhibition of activity, regardless of whether negative or positive, in accordance with the biphasic model of alcohol effects presented. I'll give you my own folk taxonomy. Under "arousal," I have — perhaps in ascending order of intensity — "friendly, talkative, romantic, argumentative, aggressive and mean." Then, under the "inhibition" column: "sad - depressed, hard to think straight, sleepy, dizzy, sick"; and I didn't know where to put "tastes bad."

Ron's paper talks about a Guttman effect, but it doesn't quite follow my folk "taxonomy" of what might represent a level of arousal. Obviously, Ron didn't deliberately classify alcohol effects on this activity dimension in his factor analysis; however, in his factor analysis where he drops the negative bodily effects, he is, in fact, restricting his consideration to the items which seem to represent arousal of activity. His "Gregarious" scale is based on "friendly, romantic, talkative"; his "Nasty" scale on the "argumentative, aggressive" axis, which is exactly my arousal column.

As mentioned earlier, there was a striking progression of reported effects from none through positive to positive plus a few negative to positive plus many or all of the negative effects. Drinkers become gregarious before they become nasty, they say. Thus, Ron's progression from positive to negative could be viewed alternatively as representing a progression through intensity of arousal. From this point of view, we would like to know if this progression continued through these two levels of activation to increasing levels of inhibition as well. And from that point of view — we are sad that he dropped what I regard as the "inhibition" items from that part of the analysis.

I was interested in Woods and Mansfield's warning that biphasic action does not directly support the disinhibition hypothesis, and I discussed the matter a little bit with Woods after his talk. Their distinction between these terms, apparently, is based on that between alcohol creating an effect versus alcohol releasing one already lurking there. Yet this, too — that it's arousal, not disinhibition — really is an assumption. And according to the evidence presented here so far, it remains an assumption: we haven't figured out a way to test this, and really this is the heart of the matter if we're going to stick to the concept of disinhibition. Ron's intercorrelation paradoxes — that people who are mean are just as apt to be friendly — certainly seem to support the arousal versus the disinhibition interpretation.
The results of the analysis of the effects reported according to drinking intensity verge on the banal. People who drink the least experience the fewest effects, and hence — given the reported progression — the fewest ill effects; people who drink the most experience the most effects, and hence, the most ill effects. However, when attitudes toward drinking are added to drinking intensity, the findings become more interesting and seem to go beyond platitudes. People who experience the fewest ill effects are those who like and approve of alcohol the least. People who experience the most ill effects like and approve of alcohol the most.

Ron’s paradox is that negative effects are not an inhibitor to drinking. One thing this brings to mind is the logical bind that students of a “flushing response” got themselves into when they made the opposite assumption: that negative effects would inhibit drinking. They found that some populations — they were dealing with Orientals — which experienced the unpleasant flushing effects of alcohol were those which experienced low rates of heavy drinking and problems, from which they inferred that unpleasant effects might be protective. However, they had to face the fact that Indians, who are accepted to be closely related to Orientals, also experienced the unpleasant flushing effects, but, far from being repelled by alcohol as a result, are commonly thought to find it uncommonly attractive. The strenuous rationalization gymnastics that they went through did not successfully extricate them from that dilemma.

Now, there are two ways of looking at the finding that negative effects do not inhibit drinking. First, the respondents may be irrational or at least masochistic. We considered that possibility yesterday, and, certainly, we can’t rule it out. And, in fact, lately we have seen evidence reported that it may be the negative effects of alcohol which are the reinforcing ones. I’m talking about Nancy Mello’s review in the 1980 Research Advances.

Alternatively, the respondents like the things they are familiar with, whether these appear to be objectively pleasant or not. Now, anthropology delights in supporting this proposition by documenting that substances regarded with disgust in one culture are prized as delicacies in another. My own casual observations of children suggest to me that kids must be introduced to the foods you want them to eat before they are old enough to distinguish very well or at least before they’re old enough to forcefully express their preferences. After that, it’s too late, at least for a long while. Anything unfamiliar is OUT.

So people’s preferences for the things they know goes far beyond
psychoactive substances. It is, after all, the basis for ethnocentrism in general and for racism in particular. A thing that is unfamiliar is dangerous and distasteful. This human propensity has no doubt been adaptive over the ages. Substances not already institutionalized into a culture's diet, for example, are likely to have been excluded for a good reason, such as having taken off Great Grandma. Probably it is indeed better to be safe than sorry by avoiding the unfamiliar, or at least treating it with great caution. There is more to lose by assuming something to be benign than by assuming it to be dangerous.

On the other hand, we have now reached the point on this planet where we may be reaping more disadvantages than advantages from this formerly protective attitude — as our recent experience in Iran certainly seems to underscore. Nevertheless, it is probably fair to assume that humans continue to find the familiar attractive and the unfamiliar unattractive. From the perspective of human preference for things familiar, Ron's finding — that people who are most familiar with alcohol like it the best regardless of any negative effects, while those who are least familiar with it, including its negative effects, like it least — no longer strikes us as particularly paradoxical. Note also that human preference for things familiar could be interpreted as support for a very mechanistic view of addiction: if you swallow enough alcohol, you will want to swallow more regardless of any ill effects.

I agree with Ron's suggestion that students of alcohol should specify whose drinking is in question when opinions and behaviors are solicited and summarized. And with exactly that problem in mind, I've just finished a set of 170 two-hour interviews with female Indian respondents which included, parallel sets of questions about alcohol behavior, beliefs, and coping for three different persons: first of all, she goes through the whole set for herself, then for her spouse or other male significant other — friend, brother, father — and then again for one other person whose drinking has caused her the most trouble over the years. Most of this last category turned out to be males, but some turned out to be females: mothers, sisters, friends. Although the formal analysis is not completed, eyeballing suggests that respondents hold norms and attitudes for their own drinking that are very different from the norms and attitudes they hold for the drinking of others, in terms of viewing effects as positive versus negative, relative permissiveness of standards, etc. — although in the case of these females, they seem to be much more strict with themselves than they are with their male significant others. So, I have a feeling that out of that is going to come something that will be of interest in terms of your observations that
reporting for yourself is quite a different matter from reporting for other people. We'll have the same people reporting on all three, and it should be fun to see what comes out of it.

In line with this, there's a growing effort among many anthropologists to go beyond reporting global norms synthesized by the all-seeing God-like anthropologist, without indicating as a basis for these generalizations the range of variability or its distribution across subgroups of the population. Despite any fragile or missing statistical foundation, I think anthropological approaches have been very successful at unearthing dimensions and relationships and providing the important perspective of context, including personal interaction, and generally putting meat on the bones of pictures of societies. Most importantly, anthropology is good at discovering what to look for. It probably is most useful, in my view, as pilot work to shape more intensive subsequent studies to establish relative prevalences by means of general population surveys.

And this leads me back to the general population studies: Can they pick up where anthropology leaves off? It seems clear that Ron's one questionnaire item, which was not even designed to investigate disinhibition in the first place, or even the other scattered items from general population studies, more directly focused on disinhibition, cited in other papers such as Lang's, have barely scratched the surface for investigating disinhibition by this approach.

It's my own thought that future attempts might try approaching the pertinent issues more directly. It would be interesting and refreshing to see what would happen if you simply ask people, for example, "Do you drink to get away with things you don't believe would be tolerated otherwise?" Or, shifting to the control side of what we talked about yesterday, ask them if they believe they can't control their behavior after drinking; or, alternatively, if they believe that after drinking they simply don't control it. An anthropologist might be helpful in formulating these questions and related ones optimally for a particular target group. Asking people why they behave as they do, as Ron pointed out, is loaded with well-known pitfalls, but it would certainly be worth a try; and when you consider the pitfalls involved in all the other approaches, we all have to struggle with those, so why not give it a whirl?

Now, regardless of whether we decide as a result that people really believe alcohol disinhibits them, or that alternatively they believe it has a high probability of succeeding as an excuse for behavior they couldn't otherwise pull off, it remains astonishing
how such ideas, which, as Ron points out, exist side by side, can become so very widespread as these. I think a Machiavelli who wanted to promote such a set of ideas would not be able to succeed nearly as well, thank Heaven, or we would be brainwashed zombies, every one. Certainly, the advertisers aspire to do it, but they have fallen far short of such a record of success.

The following statement by Linton and Lum (this volume) seems to me to hold great promise for bridging the gap between, for example, saying that Indians learned their drunken comportment from the frontiersmen, and the subsequent institutionalization and perpetuation of that pattern over the intervening centuries. To jump ahead on our agenda, they say:

The more we adopt a deterministic connection between drink and bad outcomes, the more usable drinking becomes as a sign of weak commitment to the order, the more easily drinking can be used to display deliberate lack of concern for cultural priorities.

And expanding on Linton and Lum's discussion of drinking as a symbol, I see alcohol used by Indians, again for an example, to symbolize their separateness not only in a negative sense, as not belonging in the majority social order, but in a positive sense that they belong to an alternative order called "Indian."

To leap even further ahead, and anticipate Levinson's paper, I'm just going to mention my lack of enthusiasm for anomie explanations of Indian drinking, stemming mainly from my conviction that its central assumption — that subgroups, such as native Americans, are eager to become like white men — is unwarranted. I think Nancy Lurie (1974) has hit the nail on this head better than anybody else. She says:

It is pertinent to ask in the case of Indian drinking whether we know which success goals are being thwarted....As Indian people struggle for a workable cultural and social pluralism, adapting contemporary American economic necessities and some of the amenities to their own systems of values, their strivings seem to be frequently misunderstood. Although at the present time Indian spokesmen are gaining wider hearing, their insistence that they want to be Indians still tends either to be dismissed by "practical" whites as being unrealistic as trying to bring back the buffalo or encouraged by "sympathetic" whites as envisioning an actual return to the kind of Indian life depicted in museums. When Indian people begin to bring off what they evidently have in mind, improvement of their material welfare on their
own terms, their success is interpreted as fulfilling the highly individualistic aspirations of middle class white society and as a stepping stone to total absorption into it.

Now, I see the same limitation applying to the views that Linton and Lum are going to talk about: the assumption that everybody in this country shares the same goals. This does not mean that I don't believe the social order is a central influence on drinking behavior. But that, in itself, is a rather discouraging prospect when you think of the implications for prevention and treatment. Hard as it is to alter individual and even group behavior, surely it is even harder to alter the social order.
Discussion

ROOM: I wanted to sound one note of caution, and that is that when we’re talking about these results it’s very easy to fall into looking at the points on the graph as a progression — it’s very easy to say first they get the good effects and then they move on to having the bad effects as well. We should keep in mind that we’re dealing here with cross-sectional data; it may very well be, for instance, that people who were experiencing only the good effects tried the bad effects and didn’t like them. We should not see the response of different individuals cross-sectionally as necessarily implying any kind of progress in one direction or the other.

MARK MOORE: I was intrigued by the explanation of why the occurrence of bad effects didn’t discourage drinking. But, there’s a more economical explanation as well, economical in the sense both that it’s easy to state and that it’s based completely on economics. The idea is: sure, there are some bad effects, but everybody when drinking gets good effects and bad effects; and the quantity of good effects summed over time in drinking are much bigger, as we know from the quantitative data, than the bad effects; and so, even though there are bad effects, it’s a good bargain to keep drinking. That would be a simple account of why the mere existence of a couple of bad effects wouldn’t necessarily dissuade people from drinking.

ROOM: One thing that’s worth emphasizing in the general population data is the very stark contrast between what people report of their own effects and what they say when they’re asked about the effects of alcohol on society in general. If you ask people, as Don Cahalan and his colleagues did (1969), would you say overall there’s more good about drinking or more bad about drinking, you get a very high preponderance of people saying drinking is more bad than good. They’re obviously not answering specifically to their own effects — if we can judge that against Ron’s paper.

ROIZEN: Let me just add one little point that I forgot to mention, which is that, if you try to connect this kind of data with the other kinds of data available in the works of people around the table, one interesting disjunction between survey data and experimental data is that the experimentalist in doing his work controls the amount of alcohol being drunk, but amount of consumption is...
something the survey researcher is doing nothing about except reporting. The perception of these effects may loop back and create a kind of overarching cultural set of go-togethers or causal connections. The perception of effect does seem to loop back strongly to control drinking behavior. So the experimental situation suddenly takes on a new “unreality,” if you will. It may still be quite valid for what it does, but the survey data deals with this loop that exists, and to take it into consideration in policy may mean that the protection of the norms that are involved in light drinking may be an important consideration.

**LANG:** Could you clarify that a little? I was having trouble with what you were saying about the counter indications, that one shouldn’t inform people about the effects or lack of effects of drinking directly on behavior.

**ROIZEN:** I don’t think I’m saying it very well. Let me try this: permitting the account that drinking is responsible for bad consequences is in a way reinforcing a set of dry drinking norms in the society that do, indeed, go along with a lot of very light drinking on the part of a lot of people who in turn, then, have very few effects. So the diffusion of the idea that there is no account available in drinking has the potential to disrupt the logic of a dry culture’s arrangements for the social control of drinking behavior.

**LANG:** But deviant drinking is really a statistical matter; there’s nothing wrong with drinking per se. It’s the consequences that are of interest to us. So, if the implication of this policy statement I suggested is simply to say that people can drink more, so what?

**ROIZEN:** Let me say I feel so “iffy” about this conclusion anyway that I’d just as soon drop it and move along. I was curious to try to find the paradoxes in this data and see if there are any connections that you can make because of those paradoxes, but I don’t want to stick more of a neck out drawing conclusions than I’ve already done.

**ROOM:** Well, I have a suspicion that Mark Moore is about to offer his neck instead.

**MOORE:** This will come up tomorrow when we discuss Jim Mosher’s paper, because of the peculiarity that he observes in the way that drinking and disinhibition is treated in the law, namely, that there are prohibitions governing drinking that are quite harsh; so that it looks as if we’re treating drinking as bad in itself. And yet when we see drinking in the context of acts, we’re inclined not to attribute any importance to it. What this difference may mean is that we’re holding drunk people accountable for willfully putting themselves in a situation where they will be irresponsible.
Drunkenness is an important deviant act in our society, to some extent partly because it's going to produce bad effects, and partly because it's a willful denial of authorship of one's actions and responsibility. But we can get into that at greater length tomorrow.

I was also going to comment that it seems to me that there was an opportunity in this data that could be exploited, and I wonder whether it could be. I am assuming that associated with this data is some evidence on the frequency with which these people experience certain kinds of problems as well.

One of the central questions of this meeting seems to me to be, to what extent do attitudes and expectations about drinking actually affect the behavior that results, including the occurrence of problems but also the occurrence of benefits as well? It would be possible with Ron's data to have a very simple model that said: What's the probability of certain kinds of problems emerging? — to have that be the dependent variable with two independent variables, perhaps, in a regression model, which would be quantity consumed and attitudes towards drinking measured in some particular way. We could get a separate estimate of the coefficient on attitudes plus consumption shaping the probability of certain kinds of conduct. Then we can test the hypothesis. If you think it makes you aggressive and mean; do you end up fighting more often? It seems like a fairly straightforward test.

ROIZEN: It's already been done, really. The high alcohol problems group was surprisingly concentrated in the "Allers," and so there is definitely a statistical connection. I'm not sure whether there's an admission involved. The finding raises a number of problems.

It was mentioned in the paper that we also have measured effects in the past as motivations; that is that we drink to loosen up and so forth. But the motivational statements are really quite different from the statements of effects; that is to say, to state that you have an effect is quite a different matter from saying that you drink in order to achieve that effect. So using motivational statements that involve effects as surrogates for effects measured in survey analysis wouldn't seem to be a terrific idea.

There is a great deal of subtlety and complexity in this data, given that the item itself is such a crude statement.

DAVID LEVINSON: Concerning what people expect to get out of drinking, it seems to me, after ten years of talking to people about drinking and watching them drink, there are two kinds of alcohol, or at least two kinds of alcohol/disinhibition behavior: one we might call instrumental, and one we might call expressive.

In instrumental uses, people drink very little but with a clear
purpose in mind. I think back a couple of years, of a woman who was
telling me how she wanted to go out drinking with her boss who was
married. So, she had two glasses of wine, and that would permit her
to do it. And it was fine after she had the two glasses of wine. That
was her explanation. That sort of drinking is instrumental drink-
ing. They don’t drink very much. There’s a clear goal in mind. And
it’s usually not what would be considered a deviant act.

Expressive alcohol/disinhibition drinking is something else,
where there might be a general goal — for example in Tom Burns’
stuff that I’ll talk about this afternoon — to feel like a man. In this
variety, there’s a lot more drinking that goes on for longer periods of
time, and it tends to get out of control.

EHLERS: Well, in terms of looking at the self-report data ver-
sus outside-looking-in data, I think the idea was mentioned that
respondents rationalize their own behavior in self-report data.
What about the idea of drinking as kind of outlaw behavior, that on
certain levels it’s something that’s a “no-no,” and it’s something that
you want to get away with, almost in a childlike way? That would
explain the discrepancy between what someone thinks you ought to
do versus what you yourself think happens or think it’s okay for you
to do.

ROIZEN: Let me just say that when you do survey research
analysis for a while, one of the things that’s very striking is how
many one-liners fail to explain much of the variance. And in a way,
the notion of sorting people into two types — which was used here as
something of a device to explore the data a bit further — is almost
always just a device for showing how little we really know about the
whole of the population and the whole of the variance you’re trying
to understand. So that survey analysis is a very humbling activity,
and it means that you end up convincing yourself you really don’t
know very much about what’s going on. It’s not much of an answer,
but it’s the best I’ve got.

MARSHALL: I want to make three comments about Joy’s com-
mentary. I was struck when you gave your folk taxonomy based
upon Ron’s data: I was struck by how that mirrored or mimicked
the taxonomy (mentioned in my paper) that’s widespread in Latin
America — going from monkey drunk to lion drunk to pigdrunk —
and I wondered whether it represented some old European folk
wisdom about biphasic drinking.

The second thing I wanted to mention had to do with the negative
versus the positive effects of drinking, and how the negative might
be seen as reinforcing our drinking behavior. I think that may vary
according to context and situation, and it certainly varies cross-
culturally. There was a very interesting paper given at the 1979
American Anthropological Association meetings by Michael Dove, who's working with a group of people called Kantu in Borneo. Drinking there is explicitly a competitive act, in which I invite you to come to my long house for the express purpose of aggressing against you with alcohol. And as the guest you must drink everything I offer you. I just keep plying you with rice wine, and you get more and more drunk, and then you get sick, and as soon as you get sick and have gotten rid of that wine, then I give you more wine. There's this very aggressive element to it, which has all got to do with the competitive exchange which has superseded warfare among longhouse groups. You get back at me later by inviting me over. So, the drinking itself is a very negative experience for the drinker, and yet the system is self-perpetuating because of all of these other considerations. I think we have to be careful when we're talking about positive or negative reinforcers in drinking and keep in mind the cultural context and all these other variables.

My final comment is on Joy's notion that humans prefer things that they know. I would agree with that with respect to food. I'm not so sure it applies to drugs, though. I think in the case of drugs there's a great curiosity and a great deal of wondering about the unknown. In a way, that's folk wisdom, but I've also seen it played out in Papua New Guinea right now, where there are still many groups of people in the country who have not yet experienced alcohol and are just now coming into contact with it; the desire and curiosity to experience alcohol is a very powerful motivator.

LELAND: Is it sex-linked?

MARSHALL: I don't know. There is also betel-nut chewing, which has spread from coastal Papua New Guinea now up into the highlands; that is, highlanders who come down to work on coastal plantations have taken it back. So, the way drug substances are adopted I think may be different from food. I'm concerned that we not treat them in quite the same way.

LANG: Along the lines of what you're saying, Mac, one of the attractive things about drugs — regardless of the rationality — is they increase the range of behavior available, they increase the options. Those options can be positively or negatively valued by the individual. But in general the freedom that's associated with drug use is reinforcing even if sometimes it has untoward consequences. You find that people who have lots of drinking experience naturally have a wider range of expectations about what might happen. And that can be simply because they've been drunk more of the time in their lives, so that more events could have happened to them while they were drinking — independently of whether the drinking had anything to do with that.
LEVINE: One thing that's striking about the effects is the arbitrariness of dividing things into good and bad. Consider something like running, where people run five, eight, ten, twelve miles and then experience all kinds of aches and pains while they're doing it, or as a result, but it's not necessarily interpreted as bad even though it hurts. Or the experience of doing heavy physical labor and afterwards saying, "Oh, my aching bones." But it's also feeling very good in some ways. So, you know, there are lots of ways of understanding different kinds of bodily experiences which in one context might be understood as being bad, unpleasant, negative, but which in different contexts can also have all kinds of other positive meanings and understandings. Thus, "feeling different" sometimes feels good even if it feels bad. One thing about drinking is that it brings a lot of different kinds of feelings, and the diversity is interpreted as good even if some of the effects, in other contexts would be judged as bad.

LUM: When you talked about paradoxes, the ambivalences that people harbor with regard to drink — that is to say that I have a need on the one hand but I have different expectations and perceptions about what happens to others when they drink alcohol — I was thinking about some kind of research endeavor involving people going to alcohol treatment clinics where they ingest stuff that makes them vomit when they drink — but what we know is that they drink anyway. One could do an ethnographic study of that, very much like an important work that Liebow (1967) did in Washington, D.C. He didn't study alcoholism; he studied black men. But the analogy, it seems to me, is very clear. One of the things I liked about Liebow's ethnography was that the black men want families. So Liebow said: Why do they leave them when they want them? They're just like white folks: they want families, but they leave them. He gives us a beautiful understanding of why they leave: because the children and wife are symbols of their failure, of their inability to make it because of inadequate income and economic and political/social circumstances. They leave home because the home is a symbol for their own failure. It's a reminder, and it's very painful.

Thus one of the ways to start to get at that paradox is to link together ethnographic research and survey research. You get yourself, perhaps, into a setting in which you have people drinking in spite of the fact they're going to throw up and get violently sick. Follow them around, talk to them, see their circumstances, go back to their apartments with them; then we're into meaning and not just mere attitude. The problem of survey research, it seems to me, is that it hovers at the level of attitudes but provides no context. What we do as researchers is to create the context for the data itself, and
therein lies the problem. It's done all the time, but it leaves you thirsty.

DENISE HERD: Maybe I'm going to quench a little of your thirst with another anthropological example. Ron's paradox was a reality in the ethnographic work I did with blacks. What I saw was a Catholic and Protestant subgroup difference, the Protestant blacks were much more likely both to drink very little and to report negative feelings — not necessarily bad effects, but bad attitudes: ambivalence. Although the Catholic women were very heavy drinkers and reported worse effects — lashing out and so forth — they seemed to have a lot less ambivalence about drinking. The interesting thing was that the Catholics and other non-Protestant blacks were the "time outers." While attending a Mardi Gras or West Indian dance, you would see a lot more "time out" behavior than occurs in Afro-American parties, which tend to be highly structured and ritualized. The Protestants were also the people that would substitute the bad effects of alcohol with the good effects of marijuana; although they drink very lightly they smoke to get high and avoid bad effects from over-drinking.
Accounting for Failure

N. K. Linton and Dennis W. Lum

Introduction

We all recognize the frequency with which “disinhibition theory” is invoked as an explanatory scheme in instances of questionable or untoward conduct. These attempts to use the theory as either a commonsense everyday account or a more lofty scientific explanation are, in our judgment, a confounding of resource and topic.* Recent attempts to validate the disinhibition paradigm, particularly the more empirical and positivistic ones, unwittingly conspire in their refusal to clarify the root suppositions of the theory itself. This unreflexive invocation of disinhibition theory and its linkages to violent behavior is the kind of footwork that deserves retracking.

This paper, then, with its historical emphasis, is a departure from that bulk of literature dealing with drink and comportment in that we treat sociocultural understandings as a topic for discussion rather than as a resource upon which to rely. Our aim is not to improve, refine, or embellish scientific explanation but to display disinhibition theory as a relatively small part of an emerging social order much broader and deeper than the theory itself. It is our contention that the conceptual underpinnings of disinhibition theory are intimately linked to the political and social upheaval of the 19th century, to the shifting criteria for social membership, and, ultimately, to the development of an ideology of failure.

To begin with, it is both remarkable and noteworthy that Americans, prior to the early part of the 19th century, were not preoccupied with accounting for or explaining crime, violence, poverty, and other exceptions to the social order (Rothman 1971). Yet in Jacksonian America, the “era of reform,” the Nation seemed to make an enormous collective effort to account for all manner of deviance (Hindus 1980) and, from the 1820s on into the century,

---

*Further discussion of this issue is taken up in Aaron Cicourel’s “Interpretive Procedures and Normative Rules in the Negotiation of Status and Role,” in Cognitive Sociology.
drink stood at the center of these accounting efforts if we include “explanations” in the general category of accounts (Lyman and Scott 1970).

Thus, we pose two closely related questions. Why did Americans become preoccupied with accounting for deviance and social ills and why did they so quickly utilize drink as a central feature in those accounts? Our general answer is that drink came to aptly “symbolize” the more basic contradictions and insecurities in the emerging cultural hegemony of the 19th century. In schematic form: America (a) was in the process of developing a relatively modern class-stratification system with (b) limited cultural means to either understand or legitimize the obvious disparities between culture and structure. (c) The specifics of the new cultural order, emphasizing “universalistic,” abstract criteria for social membership, coupled with the fact that social position in the new order was becoming increasingly tenuous, (d) created the peculiar cultural niche that drink came to occupy and (e) the grounding for the scientific study of alcohol as it related to other social mishaps, misadventures, and downright ugliness.

As we see it, disinhibition theory is noteworthy because it tries to connect one realm of discourse to another; e.g., chemical-neurological to “conduct.” The theory is not content to remain concerned with explaining how a substance affects neurological functioning but expands to discussions of crime, violence, and so forth. If the theory stayed closer to home, it wouldn’t be nearly so interesting nor so closely related to our sociocultural history. But it doesn’t stay close to home, and much of the theoretical straying is related to 19th century social life in ways we will try to clarify.

Master and Servant

The history of American law in the 18th and 19th centuries stands as testimony to the changing context within which deviance was seen and interpreted. The law rather swiftly shifted away from the earlier colonial emphasis on positional obligations to a more contemporary emphasis on abstract, universal criteria relatively unmediated by social context. This movement within the law expresses the broader, underlying change from a society based on “preexisting relations” to one composed of legal strangers (Horwitz 1977).

Master-servant law is a major illustration of premodern American law and society. It is a law predicated on social relations dominated by rights and obligations defined for specific social positions.
As the following points out, deviance is seen within this context of relationships and not as an abstract violation of universalistic criteria. In 1820 Nathan Dane could still say that "...one hired in my family or other business as my apprentice, factor, bailiff, master of my vessel, my steward, or even my wife, is my servant." The image of the household, the positions in it, is clearly more extensive than we grew accustomed to in a later period. A good bit of law, including that regarding criminal deviance, dealt with respective rights and obligations within this matrix of household positions. For example: "...if a parent or master be provoked to a degree of passion by some improper behavior of a child or servant, [if] to correct him with a moderate weapon, and unluckily kills him, it is but a misadventure; but if with an improper weapon, and the child or servant is killed, it is murder; ...but manslaughter if only a cudgel or other weapon not likely to kill or maim." The law had, also, to consider other potentially deviant acts. Thus, who is responsible if a servant commits (possible) crime on a third party, such as fraud or the violent defense of a master? In other words, much everyday violence, chicanery, and unpleasant conduct gathered its social meaning by being seen through the prism of "preexisting relationships." Deviance was not seen in the abstract, interpreted as improper conduct by one human against another, but as conduct improper given one's positional relationships. (The reforms of the "classical jurisprudence" must be seen in this light as well as the steady decline of "strict liability" law in the late colonial and early national period. Also, neither Dane nor Blackstone has much to say about the law of contract, which is the classical way to form relationships.)

Dane's treatise is one of the final statements, largely condensed from Blackstone, of American law as it existed during the late colonial period. The same form of law described the rights and obligations of other positions vis-a-vis one another. Thus, law described conduct appropriate to different occupations, municipal offices, church-community members, and the like. The point is that conduct and misconduct were interpreted almost completely within a context of specific, understood social positions.

The kind of social order illustrated by master-servant law doesn't fare well in early national America. That social order, its form of law, and its form of deviance suffer the shocks of "modernization" and are transformed out of recognition. We shall maintain that the contemporary account of drink as a problem grows out of the wreckage of the old order. The idea that drink disinhibits, impugns character, or is linked to crime and untoward behavior is a gift to us from the 19th century and forms the basis for the inherent "reasonableness" of contemporary concern with the substance. The old
order, it is equally clear, held no such conception of or concern for drink (Rorabaugh 1979).

**Drink and the Old Order**

It is hardly a secret that colonial Americans drank. Some say they set high, if not world, standards for consumption. It is no longer a secret that colonial Americans didn’t regard drink as a problem. (The early Temperance movement associated with Rush [d. 1815] didn’t become a major movement until the 1820s.) In the old order drinking could not have been seen and interpreted apart from the social context of stable preexisting relationships. It could not, in brief, be abstracted from the web of persons (positions) doing the drinking. Drinking as a practice was simply embedded in the social order to the point that neither it nor the drinker was problematic in any conceptual way. Likewise, the doctrine of the old order proceeded on the assumption that we are all, at least, potentially sinners and, from this point, it makes little sense to try to articulate derelict populations (Rothman 1971). This perspective of the old order was nicely underscored by the egalitarian distribution of individuals who were prosecuted in pre-Revolutionary America (Nelson 1975). Although colonial legal controls apparently had some very distinctive features, they were not terribly harsh. All, regardless of position, were subservient to such controls. Laws and rules of conduct and comportment were essentially part of the social covenant. Rich and poor alike were sanctioned (Nelson 1975). Violations of the legal covenant emphasized fine, reprimand, and, in many cases, relatively mild forms of corporal abuse (Nelson 1975; Rothman 1971). Most important, punishment was administered with instrumental purpose, that is, to shore up the timbers of fractured sociation. Punishment was of a positive character. It sought to reinstate the estrada:ed back into the social fabric, to reimplicate the offender into defined positional obligations and responsibilities. Thus, the offending wife would once again be a proper wife, and a disobedient and lawless officeholder would again seriously play out his responsibilities and obligations. In short, punishment in the older order was designed with mis- or nonfeasance in mind.

Whereas, drink and its consequences were mediated by extended family, kin, mutual biography, and community in pre-Revolutionary America, the advent of the 19th century bore witness to something quite different. The 18th century practice of drink, not unlike the older conception of freedom, was articulated within a
framework of kin and community, obligational conduct, and positional responsibility. In this case, social structure and belief afforded cooperation and mutualism. Motive and conduct were, in short, relational. In this context, membership was assured as long as the individual was directly implicated in the social order.

If the 18th century emphasized preexisting social relationships, the 19th century stressed the prominence of the individual. The order of things was moving away from the more local criteria of a society predicated on a web of positional rights and obligations. By the end of the first third of the 19th century, the criteria by which persons established membership in the social order had shifted to a system of “general standards.” The legal system reflected this concern by erecting membership criteria predicated on more universal and abstract standards (Horwitz 1977). Politically, this meant that membership would be increasingly conceived in terms of “citizenship” rather than on different forms of participation built on relative position in the society. Socially, if one were to agree with de Tocqueville, membership came to revolve around the more obvious outward manifestations of propriety and success. Put in another way, 19th century America stood Calvin on his head. It is certain that Calvinism was rapidly becoming less spiritual and collective in sentiment and increasingly secular and rational in character. Nineteenth century industrialization along with philosophic utilitarianism eventually provided the impetus for the application of the tenets of Calvinism to practical situations. The secularization of other-worldly belief into a disciplined earthly existence was closely compatible with the emerging mode of existence in the 19th century. The signs of secularized grace, grace shorn of specifically spiritual meaning, became criteria for proper membership in the social order rather than the basis for other-worldly election.

Now membership, and the lack of it, became visible to the eye, a spectacle (Boyer 1978). The wayward serving girl is transformed into the painted woman of city streets, and the hard-drinking master into the city drunk. This secularization of other-worldly belief extracts the individual from the social fabric, leaving the person without the softening background of social relationships. The individual in the 19th century stands starkly separated from his 18th century counterpart, alone and preoccupied with collecting outward signs of success. Competition with one’s fellow humans takes precedence over concern for other-worldly salvation; social antagonism becomes more obvious as the new order gives credibility to the concepts of the mass and class. The marginal and the dissociated along with the more hopeful immigrant are abandoned by the specificity of the older order, and left to the abstraction of a newer one.
As more of the population became marginal and dissociated from the earlier social order, the more insistent became the demand for a theory of deviance (Boyer 1978). In the 19th century, it became increasingly clear that the emerging political economy was fashioning a modern class system and radically extending the range in the distribution of goods and resources. It is in this context, we contend, that the modern concern for drink was created. The social order associated with Jacksonian America served as the frame that makes the modern concern and understanding possible.

It must be remembered that social order in pre-Revolutionary America was predicated on the general acceptance of positional roles and reciprocal obligations, articulated in a framework of moral and religious values (Williams 1966). By the time of Jackson, it is clear that the older social controls are seriously limited. The old order made sense when persons had ties of position to which they might return. The new order could not fulfill the same promise. The movement toward urban life and European immigration changed the terms upon which Americans would deal with each other. The uprooted consisted not only of the new arrivals from Europe but rural Americans who, in increasing numbers, sought to make a life in the city. These new people, ever more numerous, were in an important sense strangers and as such had no position in the older social order (Hoerder 1971, Rothman 1971). They simply could not be dealt with inside the control mechanism of preurban America.

The immediate fear was very clearly connected to a perceived loss of social and political control as representatives of the old order saw their kind of society slipping away, perhaps into “anarchy” (Williams 1966). Even Jefferson discovered that disorderly populations were something different when no longer exercising their patriotic zeal against the British. In early national America, a considerable part of the concern over drinking reflected this unease over new and potentially disruptive populations. In the North, for example, attention was paid to the public house around which it was possible to conceptually arrange a wide array of social ills. In a Pennsylvania case (1815) on appeal (Stewart 1815), the court represents the theory that “tippling houses” bring together people “young and old, male and female, black and white,” who frequent it both “by day and night,” engaging in “dishonest conversation.” Briefly, public houses collect “men and women of evil name and fame.” While agitation had already started on the evils of drink, the central imagery was the public house, and although implicitly political in overtone, it had yet to abstract drink as a primary focus. The image of the saloon proved to be a durable one, lasting far into the period.
when deplorable outcomes were seen as the consequence of drink per se. Nineteenth century concern over the public house, then, largely stemmed from economic and social differences, conflicts that issued from questions of membership. This antagonism and consequent animosity were in large measure translated into political terms, culminating in the Temperance movement and, later, prohibition.

The 19th century was the period in which our modern conceptions of egalitarianism and the abstract individual were formed. In hindsight, it was clear that the new order would require a new set of ideas more compatible with the emerging economic order. Industry would eventually rival commerce, urban life would supplant rural existence, and a new form of ideology claiming moral hegemony would be developed to fit the emerging class system.

Drink in a Society of Strangers

The number of people disconnected from the older order grew rapidly in the 19th century — even prior to industrialization. Americans began to talk of “masses” and “classes” with a contemporary understanding of those terms. The significance of the new, emerging population is both obvious and significant. Its members are not part of the web of “preexisting social relationships” within which membership and deviance were defined in the old order. In the legal sense, they were strangers and much of modern law was created to regulate relations among them. For example, the law of tort, negligence, and employment grew in response to the newly created predicament. This newer form of relationship became dominant as the older communities were transformed and their version of social life scaled away. As brief legal illustrations: What were we to do if two carriages collide and there is no preexisting relationship between the drivers? What are we to do with the modern form of employment ushered in by the great canal projects, a form of relationship that simply was not “household” or governable in terms of master-servant? The answer is: We create a new kind of standard that is general, applying to persons qua persons, which disregards the positions these persons occupy in the social order.

The older order expected, indeed demanded, differences among people. Such differences were built into the pattern of preexisting relationships and were supported by socially subsidized accoutrements of position to ensure that appearance would be maintained. For example, a colonial community might support a craftsman by limiting the number of possible competitors in the craft or provide
government sinecures to the “better sorts” allowing them to outwardly display their social position (Hoerder 1977).

The new order found differences problematic, requiring explanation. The principal reason for this, we think, is found in the shift to a more “egalitarian,” universalistic, and achievement-oriented set of values. America became a land of opportunity, with great emphasis placed on the possibility for individual achievement and social mobility. Jacksonian social commentators, in fact, regarded this sort of belief, coupled with the impossibility of the dream’s ever working out on the large scale, as a prime causative mover in producing insanity (Rothman 1971). Americans became concerned with “appearances” of position, since the obvious and overt were the signs of membership that were both universalistic and egalitarian (in the sense of being open to all). Appearances no longer followed in the train of social position. The new standards are public in being for all to succeed or fail at, and in requiring no special license or position to observe. Proper comportment, demeanor, and the trappings of economic success are such standards in our society. Americans no longer live with an easy assurance of the relationships between membership and its outward signs.

Such universalistic, egalitarian standards must, as Robert Merton would have said, confront structural conditions. Both the old and the new orders were, after all, stratified societies. Few Americans were actually successful in the new order but all Americans are held to a universal standard of success. Interpreting failure to maintain the public standards of the new order became a national preoccupation that has endured to the present day. We have created criteria that apply to all but can be met by only a few, meaning that Americans en masse must “explain” and come to terms with failure to meet the terms of proper membership. Failure becomes the topic in American social commentary, including attempts to “account” for it, personally rationalize it, explain it, and provide proposals for doing something about it, etc.

Failure, itself, takes on a different dimension when we mean failure to meet universalistic criteria. The standards apply to all (within limits) and they also apply to all of the person. Failure is no longer distributed, contained, and mediated within the localized, positive obligations of position. Now the entire person can be contaminated by specific failures. In polar-type we have the “total failure” and a way of construing deviance that shows little patience with shades of gray — a cultural grid that moves toward evaluation in all-or-nothing, either/or terms. Americans are able, from this point, to begin creating stereotypes of the drunk, the criminal, and the mad. It is also, if contemporary characterizations are true, a
system that makes it very difficult to move from the status of deviant back within the circle of respectable membership.

Drink Amongst Strangers

Since we are pursuing the general view that everyday understanding of deviance is mediated by social context and, seeing “relations among strangers” as the most significant context ushered in by the 19th century, we will try to interpret the 19th century concern with drink. First, drink becomes an explanation of failure on both the macro and micro levels. It was used to explain the failure of large subpopulations to attain proper membership. As an illustration, the Irish would be proper Americans if they wouldn’t drink so much. The Irish were an intransigent population, particularly in resisting the discipline of the emerging industrial order. Their unruliness, lack of compliance, demanded explanation which was provided in terms of drink. This form of explanation is durable, figuring into discussions of other populations that don’t quite make it into mainstream life. It is even possible to use it on statistical categories such as “the poor.”

In more intimate, micro scale, drink was used also to explain individual failure, a theme that was popular in the penny press, pamphlets, and eventually film. Drink has provided a much needed explanation (and imagery) for a social order that requires something to fill the gap between expectations and performance.

It is obvious that, while drink wasn’t the only topic in the “era of reform,” it was a major and enduring one. This is partly because drink is a very flexible symbol, adaptable to a variety of uses. For example, with an emerging social order that makes an individual’s social position more tenuous than ever, drink can stand for one’s fragile connection to social position. In the midst of serene enjoyment of membership, drink can disrupt complacency and show that loss of attachment is just a drink or two away. Drink can show wives and employers how feeble our commitments are, how easily the promises of a lifetime are broken. Drink has been one of the primary symbols expressing the tension between the apparent stability of possession-position and the instability that lies just under the appearance. This symbolic use arose as the new society arose, a society that emphasized positional mobility and change. If the 19th century is the temporal birthplace of the con games, a symbol is required to show the social conditions which ground con games. A host of possibilities rest beneath the most settled appearance and, for the respectable, these possibilities are mostly unpleasant.
Drink can be used also as a sign of loose attachment to the social order in another way. To the extent that we accept the view that drinking causes untoward events, drinking is a demonstration of our willingness to risk such consequences. It becomes an almost deliberate flirting with calamity and a display of weak commitment to the order’s membership rules. The irony is: The more we adopt a deterministic connection between drink and bad outcomes, the more usable drinking becomes as a sign of weak commitment to the order, the more easily drinking can be used to display deliberate lack of concern for cultural priorities.

Last, drink can act as icon. It can be an integral point on a social roadmap with the power to meaningfully connect a host of social ills into one coherent package. One way, for example, to connect one ill to another (say, loss of job and loss of family) is to put drink in the center. Instead of being left with discrete, disconnected evils, we use drink to generate a coherent connection between them. A critique of the naivete of 19th century social criticism has pointed to its simple-minded, monicausal reasoning — with drink’s causing virtually every social ill in the society (Hindus 1980). This critique might be misguided if drink wasn’t actually being used as a scientific cause but as an iconic way to represent the unity of social ills.

Our discussion of the uses of drink as symbol and icon is too brief but leads to the point we are reaching for. The meaning of drink, its “uses” in discourse, is built upon the tensions and contradictions emerging in the social and cultural life of 19th century America. It plays upon the public appearance of stable position in a society rapidly losing real stability of position; on the tension between the promise and reality of social structure and culture and, ultimately, on the new urgency to find account for failure. Drink can be used in a variety of commonsense ways. It can be seen as negating “conventionality” if we play the addiction demon rum theme, as negating “theoreticity” if we play on drink’s capacity to cloud men’s minds (Blum 1970). These are options, different ways of placing emphasis, and, eventually, guiding scientific research. In either event, though, the moves in the game depend on their being a game in the first place, a board upon which to play, and some background rules making moves sensible as moves. The newly emerged cultural forms and the tensions generated by these forms provide the playing board.

Conclusion

The historical backdrop against which disinhibition theory is an
outgrowth provides us with a kind of etiological baseline for explicating the suppositions of modern approaches to drink. Generally, disinhibition theory has been seen as an account, part of a vocabulary that relieves the drinker of his or her responsibility in instances of questionable conduct. The ordinary practice of employing disinhibition as an excuse is an attempt to transform the irrational and unexpected into something rational and accounted for. Its efficacy hinges on what everyone knows. As a matter of fact, most of us find the disinhibition account to be “reasonable,” at least at one level. Thus, for example, a friend might proffer the notion of “one too many” as an excuse for his or her bizarre actions the previous evening, an account which in most cases we honor by replying with a legitimating laugh. Yet the laugh which expresses a reciprocity of perspectives between friends is, at another level, fragile and precarious. To be sure, the acceptance of disinhibition as an ordinary account, like all linguistic accounts, is mediated by “the character of the social circle in which it is introduced” (Lyman and Scott 1970). Accounts in the form of excuses are of a different order when they occur between kin and friends and, conversely, when it is a performance between strangers, particularly between unequal ones. In short, accounts are an artifact of everyday life and an omnipresent feature of ordinary discourse. As easily as they are announced, they are as likely to be denied as honored.

Disinhibition theory often argues that drink functions as a release mechanism that provides freedom for persons to engage in conduct they would eschew without alcohol (Pernanen 1976). This pharmacological premise is the perspectival equivalent to social control theories so popular in sociology, which argue that freedom from cultural restraints, however arrived at, allows persons the license to engage in deviance. The connective tissue in both instances is not of the sort X then Y, but X, then the increased possibility of Y, since there is no compelling impetus for everyone so released to actually engage in the conduct in question. Social control theories of this sort leave us with probabilistic statements in principle rather than as a reflection of the imperfect state of the researchers’ craft.

Additionally, major differences between pharmacological conceptions of deviance and sociological ones are, at the same time, the major difficulty. Principally, the customary conduct that is underscored in contemporary studies of alcohol reflects the same cultural categories used in everyday parlance to describe an everyday social world. It is, it seems to us, quite understandable and reasonable to maintain, scientifically, that X amount of drink leads to a modification of motor response (given a,b,c,...). It is quite another to scientifically argue that X amount of drink leads to crime, since we are in
the process of attempting to relate items from two quite distinct realms of discourse. In the present instance, crime is not a motor response measurable by any physiochemical device but distinctly a social judgment.

If some of the suppositions of disinhibition theory are often used as a resource routinely employed in conversational rounds, to what extent do we want to unreflectively use "conventional wisdom" as capital for some version of a causal model? To be sure, much of what passes for scientific understanding is often predicated on conventional wisdom. The problem is, however, that causal models, like the disinhibition paradigm, direct and shape future actions. In other words, they create a framework of possible moves (e.g., Room 1980). The historically rooted assumptions that characterize disinhibition point to a host of interests that we have alluded to earlier. These interests can be viewed as vocabulary of collective motives, a kind of conceptual roadmap from which specific actions are possible. Given the seriousness with which we view violent crime, to reconstitute the ways we presently respond would require not only a quite different conception of what the problem is, but also clarification of our model of the deviant actor.

The efficacy of the disinhibition paradigm is unquestioned. It has proved to be an effective instrument in dealing with a narrow range of untoward conduct within a thin line of reasoning about the nature of social problems in general and deviancy in particular. Disinhibition theory is largely effective because it focuses on the individual as the problem. It shifts the ground of responsibility from a larger historic sociopolitical context to a bureaucratically manageable activity. Current usage of disinhibition theory is compatible with both the conceptual frame within which we view questioned conduct of a serious sort and the consequent institutional arrangement that presumably deals with it. Disinhibition theory, then, might be characterized as a psychology of the deviant individual, and the bureaucratically organized human service agency, its institutional parallel. In this context, drink is the social icon around which more serious and untoward conduct can be rationalized and, in the end, attributed to the deviant individual.

In summary, it has been our argument that disinhibition theory is rooted in the sociopolitical upheaval of the 19th century, that it is the outcome of struggles over issues of American membership and nonmembership, success and failure. It was in the most general sense a political conflict. The decision to continue to employ disinhibition theory as a way of understanding unfortunate events, in our opinion, hinges on affirming or denying the legitimacy of those earlier historical interests that informed disinhibition theory in the first place.
References


Stewart v. Commonwealth, 1 Serg. & R., 1815.

LINTON: This paper started off being an "accounts" version of life. It could be grandiosely put as an accounts theory, I suppose, except there isn't an accounts theory. There is probably an implicit theory that's behind accounts, as presented by Scott and Lyman (1968) and others, but it's not in sociology or psychology, it's in language philosophy. There's a real tension in that kind of philosophy. On the one hand, there's an empiricism that gets reflected — I'm anticipating tomorrow — in papers on dominance in domestic circumstance and that sort of thing. And then there's the much more hardnosed conceptual side, which really hasn't been talked about here at all, presented by folks like Alan Blum.

I think what Harry was after in his paper, and surely what I'm after, is something more like the latter, conceptual side; that is to say, I'm not terribly interested either in ethnography or historical empiricism. I think what I'm after, with all this fooling around with historical material, is characterization of the paradigm within which the disinhibition theory makes sense or can be seen as sensible. And, playing with the historical material, I, too, am impressed with the shocking kind of change that happened in about thirty years in the New Republic.

This is the kind of thing that fascinates me: "One hired in my family or other business as my apprentice, factor, bailiff, master of my vessel, my steward or even my wife is my servant." And then the law: "if the parent or master be provoked to a degree of passion by some improper behavior of a child or servant. [if] to correct him with a moderate weapon, and unluckily kill him, it is but a misadventure; but if with an improper weapon, and the child or servant is killed, it is murder, . . . but manslaughter if only a cudgel or other weapon not likely to kill or maim."

I have trouble getting into the frame of mind that makes that immediately understandable. I suspect that that is like understanding social relations in Samoa. This is what I call socially embedded deviance, where you have to see the act reflected through social position, where it is not abstract. If, as a parent or as a master, I kill you with the wrong weapon or you happen to be the wrong person for me to kill, the law reacts to that; it does not react to some universal abstraction: maiming, killing, violence, carnage or whatever.
What happens, it appears to me, is that within fifteen or twenty years after this was written as part of a legal text, our imagery of deviance generally changes. The new master paradigm was set by about 1840-50. Generally, talking about deviance and talking about the use of alcohol and related deviant acts, we've been operating within a paradigm put together, say, by 1850. We switch over from talking about kinds of positional deviance to a relatively abstract, universal, and Jacksonian ideology: very democratic. It's not so much that we get into an account of deviance in Lyman's sense of it, as a justification or an excuse — explanation is not quite the same thing as an account — but we get into a national preoccupation with explaining how it is that so many rotten things happen in the world.

We have an ideological hegemony that is extremely egalitarian coupled with a social stratification system that even commentators of the time recognized was expanding — the tails were spreading out. Departures from the terms of that ideological hegemony have to be explained somehow or another, and, following laissez-faire reasoning, we decided that we would account for them in terms that didn't reflect on the social structure. We began to individualize deviance. We began to explain failure and departures from acceptable kinds of conduct in very individual-level terms. If you're going to explain deviance in the new order — Watergate and the rest of it aside — you don't want to talk about the root causes of deviance as somehow the misuse of position. Explanations of deviance have to be seen to be relatively accessible to all. I think that's where drinking fits in. We all can, if we like, drink.

It becomes a democratic account or explanation of deviance in a society that is emphasizing an egalitarian ideology. The emphasis in talking about deviance at all moves toward a discussion of public displays of misconduct. Pursuant to drinking, public drunkenness becomes one of the most highly prosecuted offenses in the first part of the Nineteenth Century.

In any event, that is the sort of structural interpretation that I'm after, and I think Harry was after, too. And the modern form of deviance, it appears to me, surrounds failure: failure to live up to certain kinds of abstract standards. Not the failures of being a bad wife, but failure to meet the public standards of decorum and demeanor. We set up standards that, as a matter of fact, hardly anyone can meet. Erving Goffman (1963), in one of his pieces, has got a paragraph or two about who can be perfect, and the answer to that question is something like white, Anglo-Saxon male, handsome, thirty-one years old, stockbroker. Anybody else is lacking somehow or another, and all those lacks have to be accounted for.
somehow or other. We begin in this country to use drink to explain why it is, for example, that large immigrant populations don't seem to "assimilate." Why is it that the Irish are so unrepentant and don't appreciate us? Drink is used as a way to account for their intransigence, their political intractability, their resistance to industrial discipline, their participation in draft riots; and, on the other hand, we use it as an icon of personal failure as a way of trying to explain why it is that many, many people can't maintain the outward appearance of respectability in the new order.

Now, someone yesterday asked Harry a very fine question: Given that we're playing around with a paradox put together in 1840, how has it continued so long — or has it changed? And it has, I think. In the last several decades we have pretty well shucked the political overtones of drink as an explanation. We've even dropped talking about the saloon. We had a whole theory of saloons well into this century; it's the excitation that's found in that circumstance that drives men mad. It's entirely too stimulating an environment and leads all men to political turmoil, crime, and things like that. What we do is we focus more and more tightly on ethanol. We begin to shed it of context as much as possible, and focus attention directly on the chemical substance. And that is precisely the focus of disinhibition theory.

Otherwise, it would appear that the modern interest in alcohol is mediated by bureaucratic agencies; that is to say, it is not so much any more a civilian concern as it was, say, 75 or 100 years ago. Interest in booze has been adopted and mediated by governmental agencies. And our conceptualization of drinking as a problem is going to be mediated by the political and social possibilities that are available to us as public agencies, political but different from the earlier citizen's political discourse when talking about drink. To give credit where credit is due, I think that Lemert invented that whole position a long time before anyone else was talking about it.

I think those are the structural changes in talking about drinking in 1980 as compared to the year 1900. We've developed professionals, we've developed agencies, and we've conceived of the issues through the eyes of those agencies rather than as the broad kind of political and social concerns Gusfield (1966) talked about. We don't want to talk any more about those damned Irish politicians and their hard drinking ways. It's uncouth. But we're quite capable of talking about problem drinkers, problem individuals, and sometimes maybe problem populations.

LUM: I think the accounts stuff is rich if we take it beyond Lyman and Scott and draw from some other people who are trying to move to an arena within which we can start to look at ordinary
language use, the meanings inherent in that and its linkages to historical epochs and contexts. That's what we tried to do in our paper. I think the disinhibition theory has presuppositions which most papers don't deal with, and to make claims to knowledge without taking that into account is to fly in the face of the evidence.
Commentary

Philip Tetlock

ROOM: When we were setting up the conference, in some areas we didn’t have to do much searching. Craig MacAndrew was fairly obviously going to be involved, if he would accept. In some areas, we really had to do a kind of network search, where we did a lot of calling around to find out who was the most appropriate person to ask in a particular area that we wanted to have represented at the conference. In the case of the attribution literature, our search throughout the country ended up about 400 yards from our office in the Psychology Department at Berkeley. So to comment, Philip Tetlock.

PHILIP TETLOCK: I should make clear at the outset the perspective from which I approach the topic of this segment of the conference. I’m neither an historian nor a sociologist, I’m a social psychologist whose own research focuses on the accounts people construct for a wide range of behavior, not specifically focusing on alcohol-related behavior. Whereas Linton and Lum in their paper examined the relationships between macrosocial changes and changes in perceptions of alcohol in early Nineteenth Century America, my inclination is to adopt a more individualistic or micro level of analysis. I shall focus, therefore, primarily on psychological and interpersonal causes and consequences of changing American perceptions of alcohol in the Nineteenth Century. I believe that these two approaches — the micro and the macro — are largely complementary, although on occasion some contradictory emphases do emerge.

Linton and Lum are primarily concerned with explaining why a marked shift in attitudes occurred in early Nineteenth Century America toward alcohol and its effects on behavior. Why did Americans embrace the notion that alcohol is responsible for a broad range of social ills? Why did Americans cease to view alcohol as the “Good Creature of God” and come to view it instead as a “dark force” in their lives, capable of creating great personal and social destruction? In short, why did disinhibition theory become an integral part
of the prevailing American "vocabulary of motives" (Mills 1940). As I understand it, the authors propose that the alcohol account for misconduct and for failure served a critical social system maintenance function. America in the early Nineteenth Century was undergoing massive and complex socioeconomic changes. These included increasing urbanization, industrialization, and emphasis on the capitalistic ideals of individual achievement and upward mobility.

I shall focus on one quite specific aspect of Linton and Lum's argument, the claim that alcohol provided a convenient explanation for the discrepancies that ultimately arose between the ideology of achievement and opportunity and socioeconomic reality. Put simply, far from all Americans were actually successful in the new emerging economic order, and it became necessary to explain why large segments of the population were not successful, why they failed to meet the general criteria for social success. The failure of individuals and even large groups, such as the Irish, could be ascribed to drink. In social psychological terms, defenders of the social system could protect their belief in the ideology of achievement and opportunity by attributing widespread failure to the causal powers and properties of alcohol.

Although I find plausible and provocative the general thesis that social structural changes influenced Nineteenth Century American perceptions of alcohol, I have some reservations. I shall briefly express some of my principal concerns. My first concern: alcohol is obviously not the only possible explanation for failure. A complete structural-functionalist interpretation should account for why alternative explanations were not adequate for bridging the discrepancies between ideological expectations and reality. For example, why would it not have been adequate for defenders of the social system to have attributed the poor economic performance of certain individuals or groups to laziness or to lack of ability? Or would such attributions to seemingly stable human dispositions have threatened other central ideological assumptions of the time, such as the perfectability of human nature? Were there other psychological, social or religious factors that predisposed widespread acceptance of the alcohol account? I think these kinds of questions need to be answered if we are to develop a complete structural/functionalist interpretation of the shift in American attitudes.

A second concern: Linton and Lum maintain that there was an urgent need to find accounts for failure in early Nineteenth Century America. One interesting question is, for whom was the need more urgent: for those who failed, or for those who had a strong interest in resolving the growing inconsistencies between
socioeconomic realities and ideological promises — presumably the upper and middle classes? Was the alcohol account an invention of the ruling class, as a Marxist analysis might suggest? The elite origins of the Temperance Movement seem consistent with this view. Or were the unsuccessful often themselves forceful advocates of the alcohol account? I think that many unsuccessful individuals may have found the alcohol account attractive. By attributing their failures to drink, people could protect their images of themselves as basically competent individuals. This is an example of what social psychologists — in particular, those social psychologists known as attribution theorists — call the “discounting principle,” a principle that people frequently use in everyday life in explaining behavior. According to this principle people discount the role of a given cause in producing an effect to the degree other plausible causes for the effect exist (Kelly 1971). In this case, individuals need not attribute their failure to character flaws, such as laziness, or to lack of ability, to the degree they can attribute their failure to alcohol.

A third concern: I cannot help but wonder whether changes in patterns of alcohol consumption and alcohol-related behavior were partly responsible for changes in the perceptions of alcohol. The historical evidence apparently indicates that in the first 35 years of the Nineteenth Century per capita consumption of alcohol rose among the working classes but not among the upper middle class and upper class. A number of possible explanations come to mind for this pattern. One possibility is that many individuals in this period used alcohol as a self-handicapping strategy designed to protect their perceptions of their own self-esteem or personal worth. By drinking, people could create a potential excuse (a salient external cause) for failure. Recent experiments in social psychology underscore the plausibility of this point of view. People who doubt their ability to perform well on an experimental task appear more willing to take performance-inhibiting substances, such as drugs or alcohol, than do people who are confident in their ability to succeed in the task (Jones and Berglas 1978). I find it intriguing to speculate whether many Americans in the early Nineteenth Century doubted their ability to succeed in the new emerging economic system and turned to alcohol as a means of protecting their self-images as worthwhile people.

There are, of course, other explanations. One alternative is in terms of anomie theories of deviance. These theories predict that people are more likely to engage in deviant forms of conduct when they lack legitimate means of attaining culturally valued goals, such as high status positions in society or wealth. Excessive drinking may have provided a means for many early Nineteenth
Century Americans to escape unpleasant socioeconomic realities, and served as a convenient excuse for expressing feelings of bitterness and frustration, a badly needed "time out" from the system.

Robbins' (1979) analysis of drinking behavior among the Naspaki Indians in Northern Canada is especially interesting in this connection. Robbins' findings suggest that individuals who are unsuccessful by conventional criteria frequently compensate by becoming aggressive drinkers and by projecting tough social images or identities. In contrast, more successful individuals tended to be relatively placid while they were drinking.

All this suggests a testable hypothesis. Did many early Nineteenth Century Americans become aggressive drinkers to compensate for their lack of social success? Was alcohol consumption increasingly associated with violence in the Nineteenth Century?

I'd also like to comment on the social implications of the view that alcohol "causes" poor conduct. As Linton and Lum note in their paper, if one accepts disinhibition theory, the act of drinking becomes a demonstration of one's willingness to risk engaging in deviant behavior. Drinking itself becomes an antisocial act requiring an explanation.

From the perspective of the attribution theory in social psychology, the key question is whether drinking is perceived as being under volitional control. Can people decide whether or not they will drink? And, is it reasonable to hold people responsible for the original decision to drink? If the answer is "yes," some of the power of alcohol as an account is seriously undercut, since one freely chose to put oneself in the drunken (disinhibited) state. If the answer is "no," the alcohol account becomes too powerful: it's possible to excuse virtually any conduct on the grounds of intoxication, raising serious problems of legal responsibility and social control.

What emerges is a classic actor/observer disagreement requiring the negotiation of accounts (Scott and Lyman 1968). The actor, who is in the informal role of defendant, argues forcefully that he or she was somehow compelled to behave in a particular way. Other affected individuals, who are in the informal role of prosecution, argue equally forcefully that the actor failed to exercise proper control over his or her behavior. I think that the curious coexistence noted by Jim Mosher of two alcohol ideologies in the criminal law, one of disease excuse and one of moral culpability, can be viewed as the formal institutionalization of this account negotiation process.
Finally, I shall discuss one set of issues that I as a social psychologist find especially interesting: the degree to which and the conditions under which alcohol is a socially effective excuse for misconduct or failure. Note I say a socially effective excuse, not a legally effective excuse. An account or excuse is socially effective to the degree which it repairs damage done to the actor's social image or identity by the behavior being explained. Thus, a student who fails an exam might offer the account that he'd been drinking prior to the exam. An interesting question is: are people who learn of this student's account for failure more or less likely to view the student as competent than people who do not learn of this account? Or to take another example: a man beats his wife and offers the account that he has been drinking. Are people exposed to this account more or less likely to form a negative impression of the man than they would have been if they'd only been given information about the behavior? In other words, what is the persuasive impact of the account that has been offered?

I have used the term "impression management value" to refer to the power of an account to protect an individual's social image or identity (Tetlock in press). An account has positive impression management value to the degree it improves the actor's social image; it has negative impression management value to the degree it hurts the actor's social image. The conditions under which the alcohol account has positive impression management value is largely an open question. Social psychology theories suggest the answer depends on a variety of factors. It depends on the severity of the consequences of the behavior; it depends on the foreseeability of the consequences of the behavior; it depends on the actor's previous record of behavior; and, of course, it depends on the beliefs and motives of the individuals to whom the account is offered. For example, victims of alcohol-related behavior should in general be less receptive to the alcohol account than less directly affected individuals. Victims should be motivated to hold norm violators strictly accountable.

Thresholds for accepting the alcohol account also undoubtedly vary across cultures and across historical periods within cultures. I think that the study of factors that influence the acceptability of the alcohol account represents a promising area of inquiry in which experimental, cross-cultural and historical evidence can all fruitfully be brought to bear.
Discussion

SILVERMAN: I'd just like to raise two points. In terms of alcohol imbibing in the Nineteenth Century, nobody has brought up the idea of inadequacy of the water supply. I think there is some correlation. I think it just wasn't safe to drink the water. That sounds trivial, but...

Mr. Linton mentioned the basic ideology of this country from its very beginning that this was going to be the Commonwealth, the city upon the hill, the beacon to the world, the ideal paradise, the seat where the millenium would take place. In fact, well into the Nineteenth Century they expected the Second Coming, and the Millerites thought the world was going to end on a certain day in 1844-1845. So, this was part of the ideology of the time. How could you explain all the bad things that were going on in the society in the light of the idea that this was a utopia, that this was a paradise? You have to have a scapegoat and an excuse, and alcohol was a convenient one because of the widespread imbibing.

There's a very famous play and novel, Ten Nights in a Barroom, which has the idea of Cedarville, a town in some unnamed New England state, as an Eden, and then the Sickle and Sheath, a local tavern, is put in there, and from that stems murder and fratricide and patricide and all kinds of mayhem, and the flowers don't grow any more, and weeds grow in the street, and everything is dilapidated. Greenbluff is another book of this same type — what happened when the Irish workers came to town and the whole town just disintegrated.

So they had this ideology, which they absorbed with their mother's milk, that this would be a model to the world, and an Eden, and then they looked around them and saw that it wasn't coming to pass. Well, alcohol was a very nearby convenient excuse.

LEVINE: My reading of the history is that the idea of the utopian city on the hill does not become generalized until after Independence. I've just begun learning recently about other places where there is this utopian vision for the society — societies which define themselves as having broken with the past, and where all is possible in the future. One such society is the Soviet Union and another one is Israel. In both places, there is the idea of creating the New World and a new kind of human being. However, when the
discrepancy between reality and the ideology becomes rather severe after a while, the problem becomes how to account for the discrepancy?

Paul Roman (Roman and Gebert 1979) has recently written, on the Soviet Union essentially, suggesting that the longer this contradiction goes on, the more the USSR is going to become willing—especially among the upper bureaucratic levels—to talk about alcohol problems. It becomes a convenient way to explain the continued presence of patterns that, according to the ideology, should have been dropped long ago. In such a situation alcohol becomes a convenient scapegoat and excuse. That is true in Israel as well; they have very few alcohol and drug problems and yet there's a great deal of concern about them, because they explain what's not supposed to be there.

PATRICIA MORGAN: I would like to suggest that perhaps utopia or the belief in a particular kind of utopia changed character with the coming of industrialization. To add to the stewpot of what was going on in the Jacksonian era, I would like to suggest that the notion of equality became very important. In the Colonial period, social structure was based on a very pervasive, common notion of hierarchy that had been brought over from Europe, and in most cases was based on the notion of religious order. Along with the change from external controls to internal controls that Harry mentioned yesterday, this new notion of equality was very important with the coming of industrialization, and it meant that the natural order of things no longer applied. Equality made possible the idea that everyone was capable of achieving upward mobility, which was a necessary belief for the whole changing economic/demographic social structures.

Along with this came the appearance of objective controls, controls outside of the traditional ones that were present in a hierarchical structure, and the shift meant that there was a necessity for the entrance of the state or government to manage equality. And I think it is also in that period that we see the emergence of a whole new governance of laws governing drinking behavior and behavior in general.

WINICK: With the frequent references to the central role of drinking, drinking heavily, and drinking improperly in the Nineteenth Century, it's possible to perhaps forget that there was at least one other problem that by many Americans was regarded as much more important; namely, prostitution. Between 1840 and shortly after the turn of the century, there were five different books called *The Social Evil* published. It was widely understood that the "social evil" was prostitution. One of those books was written by
E.R.A. Seligman (1903), a famous Columbia University economist who was the first editor-in-chief of *The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, and a very important intellectual. There was an alignment of intellectuals, wealthy people like the early robber barons, many of whom also were opposed to drinking, who got together to oppose prostitution, and who saw a strong connection between the circumstances in which prostitution occurred, the availability of liquor and the extent to which men who were drunk would seek out prostitutes.

**ROOM:** If I could retell briefly the lecture Susanna Barrows was giving last week, in France you had a shift from the definition of the alcohol problem as located in the industrial worker and alcohol as a problem of labor discipline toward a definition that saw drinking in the 1890's as associated with women and prostitution. Am I reading that fairly?

**BARROWS:** Yes, very much so. In very simple terms, there was an evolution away from the association of drink as basically the scourge of the working class and, in particular, the scourge of the revolutionary working class — so, the association there forms a kind of triangle of assumptions — with a shift by the 1900's toward an association of drinking with sexuality and with prostitution, seen fundamentally as an assault on the moralizing structure of the family.

**SILVERMAN:** I just want to add a footnote to what we were saying about prostitution. One of the reasons — according to Brian Harrison (1971), who wrote a book called *Drink and the Victorians* — that women, particularly, spent so much energy trying to wipe out drink is because they couldn’t, because of the mores of the time, deal with the subject of prostitution; and so they focused all their energy on something that was not a taboo topic.

**ROIZEN:** So drink is actually a scapegoat for prostitution.

Along with a basically materialist analysis of changes in the Nineteenth Century and before, we can imagine that there were also important things going on in the idea systems of our culture. One of the most important, I think, was the rise of science — in a sense, the rise of the materialist image of the world and of the notion that, after all, if Darwin could stick man back into the natural universe and we could see with our own eyes that drinking made people stumble around and so on, then, perhaps, it would also affect their moral sensibilities. There was no reason to suspect that their moral sensibilities should be left out of that materialistic framework.

So I'd like to suggest that there is a strong possibility of an interesting idealist analysis of this period that would much more
strongly reflect the emergent value placed on and belief in sciences as a way to knowledge. It was a pretty hip thing, after all, for some of these churches in the Temperance era, for example, to be running around in the early part of the Nineteenth Century saying, "I think it's alcohol that's causing this sort of bad behavior." It's a remarkable concession to a materialist world view, if you think about it, and they must have felt themselves very much a part of the modern world to be thinking in those terms around 1830, 1835.

MACANDREW: I once did a piece on the notion of alcoholism (1969) in which I argued that "alcoholism" was introduced into the world as a solution and that as far as origins were concerned, the important question was: What was the problem which its introduction was intended to solve? I think the same general kind of analysis holds for "being in the world drunk." It's definitely a solution to something within the domain of accounting and of accountability. The question is: What is this something? Since I view drunkenness as very, very open in this regard, I have to argue against the notion that there was or is some single problem or discrete set of problems for which drunkenness stands as a solution; rather, at least from very early on, and certainly today, "drunkenness" is open to any number of diverse applications not all of which, by the way, are excusing in nature.

ROOM: I think that comment fits very well with the very wide variety of things that are being offered in the discussion right now and previously.

It seems to me there's a big difference between alcohol as an account or explanation of conditions and alcohol as an explanation of events. Several speakers have talked about the notion that alcohol in the Nineteenth Century was seen as an explanation at a structural level as well as an explanation of failing at a personal level; but both of those levels are seen more in terms of conditions than events — as in the town in Ten Nights in a Barroom: the weeds are growing in the streets. It's the condition of the town in accumulated fashion that the tavern is seen as affecting. Likewise, in the perspective of the modern alcoholism movement, alcohol's effects are seen in terms of long-term conditions, in terms of the effect of the alcohol cumulatively on the man, usually, on the family structure or on his work performance. And what is meant by alcoholism usually has a large element to it of the default of these major social roles cumulatively over time, this being ascribed in the end to his loss of control over his drinking behavior.

There is the other side of disinhibition, which is the side of alcohol as a disinhibitory account of behavior in a specific event, which is the side that I think Kai Pernanen in his review article (1976) was
focusing on. Now obviously, events and conditions are connected: a pattern of events becomes a condition. But it's also true that you often have to offer accounts and attributions in everyday life which concern single occasions, often to strangers that you will never see again or to people that you don't have a pattern of interaction with. If I step on your toe, then I will offer an excuse for stepping on your toe that shows that I didn't mean it, even if I've never seen you before. And I think that we need to not lose sight of the nature of alcohol as an account for the specific event, as well as being an explanation and account of conditions.

MARLATT: I think this is a related point. It seems that one of the things that's becoming clear in the attributional analysis is that we have to make a distinction between attributions of responsibility for taking a drink in the first place, for starting to drink, and the subsequent effects of alcohol. It's easy to absolve yourself of the responsibility for the effects once you've taken the drug, to say the drug took over and all these things happened as a result. But whether you should then be held responsible for taking the initial drink as a volitional act is often compounded with that. In terms of problemdrinkers or alcoholics, the attribution of responsibility or lack of responsibility has moved back to the question of whether the person is responsible for taking the first drink. In fact, if the first drink is mediated by internal physiological craving or genetic predisposition and so forth, the person can then, in a sense, be absolved of the responsibility of both the first drink and the subsequent effects.

I mention this because I was involved as a witness at a murder trial recently where these points all came up. Very briefly, a person started drinking very early in the morning under very neutral circumstances and later that day was in a bar situation where somebody provoked him to anger. He went out back of the bar with this other person, got into an altercation, and shot the person who had insulted him, killing him. Then the question is: What's the degree of responsibility for that act? When he started drinking, he didn't know that he was going to be provoked later — which is different from the case where first you get provoked, then you're feeling angry, then you have a bunch of drinks, then you go out and hurt somebody, then you say it's because of the drinking. And the other point that came up was whether he was a social drinker or an alcoholic. If he was an alcoholic, he was not responsible for drinking in the morning, whereas, if he was a social drinker, he was. So, attributing responsibility really starts to be very complicated.

MARSHALL: I wanted to come back to the historical discussion on the second paper this morning, which was also connected with
Harry's paper yesterday. Both of those papers attempt to account for changes in attitudes toward personal responsibility for being drunk and attitudes toward what alcohol does to you, in terms of specific features of American history. But one thing that we have to take into account is the fact that the paradigm that you were talking about is so widespread—it's not limited to the U.S. of A. Why is it so widespread? I don't think the concept of diffusion accounts for its occurrence in as many places as it occurs, though it may account for it in a few places. What is it about alcohol as a substance, as a pharmacological agent that leads people in a number of different cultural traditions to come up with a somewhat similar paradigm? Is there something special about alcohol? Why doesn't kava provide an excuse? Or betel? Or opium? These other drugs don't seem to.

LEVINE: One value of a very clear statement of this Nineteenth Century position is to understand: is this really different from something else? One of the nice things that Linton and Lum pointed out was the continuation of the position into the Twentieth Century, the professionalization of it in the alcoholism movement, in the scientific literature, and also in policy concerns. I see the temperance concerns with alcohol "as a cause of" problems continuing into the alcoholism movement and into the current professional literature.

However, that is only one discourse about alcohol. The other one is an everyday one. The first kind of statement suggests alcohol causes somebody to act wild: "Alcohol caused me to do this," or "alcohol causes crime"; the other quite different statement says, "He did it because he was drunk," or "I did it because I was drunk." Those are, it seems to me, epistemologically two very different kinds of statements. One is a rather precise kind of cause and effect statement. But in everyday talk when people say "I did it because I was drunk," they are saying—along the lines of Drunken Comportment—"I did it because I was in a time and place in which I'm allowed to do things I don't ordinarily do." There are really two quite different discourses going on here, two different sets of meanings, two different kinds of systems of explanation.

FINGARETTE: Following the same theme but from a slightly different angle, it seems to me that it is important to distinguish two different logical roles that the historical/sociological kind of analysis can perform. In one way, such analysis may be aimed at providing historical/sociological explanations, causal explanations of how it came about that alcohol is seen as a disinhibitor or whatever. Historical/causal explanations on the level that we are dealing with them, it seems to me, are enormously complicated; and while they're very interesting and very important for us to work at,
personally I'm pessimistic about getting anything terribly definitive. I think these things are so complex that we can keep generating new forms of historical/social explanations of these great movements, but it's important to try.

The other role has a more direct and substantive value connected with what, I take it, Norman Linton was stressing when he spoke of conceptual analysis. If we want to understand the concepts that we are trying to study empirically in the psychology laboratory, and in the neurophysiology lab, and in certain kinds of anthropological work, if we want to get empirical data which will give us some understanding of the effects of these components of human existence on disinhibition or whatever, then we have to have a sense of what the phenomenon is we are trying to relate the data to. And one of the important ways of understanding the content of the concept is to go back to historical/sociological analysis, which gives us many clues about the ideological and philosophical roots of our present ideas. It's a way of getting to understand our present concepts: by going back to the roots where we're a little more distant from it and can see more clearly. Then we get insight into what we mean now — or in Linton's terms — what would establish now that I am a drunkard. What is the content of the concept "drunkard"? What is the meaning of the concept "disinhibited"? Then, as we get a better understanding of the concept, we understand better which of the empirical data that's collected bears on the concept, and which — although it looked like maybe it did — doesn't. And we begin to connect up the scientific relationships much better.

LEMERT: I've been sitting here speculating as to what Joe Gusfield would say if he were here. I think the structural analysis of needs for accounts is certainly valid as far as it goes, but I'm struck by the idea that the problem is that the ethnic groups are marginal, and the need for accounts goes beyond the fact that they were not drawn into the system. If you look at Gusfield-type analysis (1966) and an older analysis by Alfred McClung Lee (1944) of the Prohibition Movement, it wasn't so much the fact that these groups were not assimilating as it was that they actually became a threat in different ways; it was the specific nature of their drunken comportment which became a threat to the values of the power groups; namely the Irish drank as if they had a right to get drunk and beat each other up, the Germans drank as if they had a right to pound their beer steins on the table and sing German songs that Americans couldn't understand, the blacks had a right to drink in the cellars of New Orleans and plot against their hated masters. I think from Gusfield's point of view you have to look more to
collective movements as elements in the structural strains and tensions which Linton and McClung Lee described very well.

**ROOM:** Gusfield, unfortunately, is in India at the moment. But Harry, when he started doing his work on the Temperance Movement, to some extent sat in the same chair, reading large amounts of Nineteenth Century material. And, Harry, my understanding of what you came to was that Gusfield was right with respect to a particular historical period around the very end of the century. Gusfield had done his original dissertation on the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, which was one of the lead organizations in that period. This is where he had picked up the nativist, anti-foreign tone of the Temperance Movement, but if you look earlier at the Temperance Movement, that tone was not nearly so evident.

**LEVINE:** Yes, I think that.

**ROOM:** And, in fact, temperance novels in the earlier period were very much oriented around middle class folk and that there was a very large part of the Temperance Movement, partly hidden to us, which was the fraternal associations that were self-help, middle class groups.

**LEVINE:** Well, I’m not sure how immediately relevant some of this is. I love talking about the history stuff, but I’m also anxious for us to talk about disinhibition, drunken comportment, out-of-bounds behavior, deviance and so on.

My sense is the Temperance Movement was concerned with explaining the behavior of proper middle class Americans as much as it was concerned with explaining the behavior of aliens and immigrants, and I think that that continues in AA and in the NIAAA today. The total American discourse about alcohol has been a whole lot about “us,” at least as much as it’s been about “them.”

**MACANDREW:** Another way to think about drunkenness within an accounts framework is to take it as problematic how it is that “drunkenness” is recognized — and, in fact, we can and do recognize it, all of us, at a glance. Indeed, this capability is a good index of the competence of our societal membership. It turns out that by the age of six or seven, kids have pretty good notions of what it is to be drunk, and they are also pretty good at recognizing drunkenness when they see it. One potentially powerful way, then, to examine the nature of the array of puzzles for which drunkenness stands as a solution is to examine “from up close” how it is that in this respect too kids come to know what everybody knows.
Alcohol Use and Aggression in American Subcultures

David Levinson

Introduction

This paper has two main purposes. Its first is to describe patterns of alcohol-related aggression in subcultural groups in the United States. Special attention is given to recent research on alcohol-related aggression in the South, ethnic groups, and among youth. The paper's second purpose is to list and discuss a number of hypotheses about drinking behavior that may help us explain subcultural patterns of alcohol-related aggression.

Four factors suggest that subcultural patterns of alcohol-related aggression represent a topic of interest within the general alcohol-disinhibition framework. First, MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969) demonstrated that alcohol use does not lead to aggressive behavior in all cultures. Rather, MacAndrew and Edgerton showed that aggressive behavior accompanies alcohol use in some cultures but not in others, and individuals may be aggressive in some but not in other drinking settings. MacAndrew and Edgerton's basic contention — that alcohol use and aggressive behavior are not always linked — has been confirmed by subsequent holocultural research. Schaefer (1973) examined ethnographic reports about drinking behavior for a probability sample of 60 small-scale and folk societies. He found that men get drunk either occasionally or often in 46 of these 60 societies. But, he found men involved in drunken brawls in only 24 of the societies. So, in a worldwide sense, it seems that alcohol-related aggressive behavior — as measured by male involvement in drunken brawls — is about as likely to be present as it is to be absent.

Second, national surveys of adult drinking patterns indicate important subcultural differences in the relationship between alcohol use and associated aggressive behavior. Findings reported by Cahalan and Room (1974) point to regional, age, and social class differences which merit further study.
Third, review articles published in recent years suggest a strong relationship between alcohol use and violent crime (Aarens et al. 1977; John 1977-78; Pernanen 1976; Tinklenberg 1973). Pernanen, especially, has commented on the potential causal role of sociocultural factors in the shaping of subcultural patterns of alcohol-related aggression.

Fourth, social scientists have shown a longstanding interest in describing and explaining cross- and subcultural drinking patterns. This tradition extends back to the Glad and Bales studies of the 1940s, but, until recently, focused primarily on the drinking behavior of Irish, Italian, and Jewish men.

In this paper I address a number of issues concerning subcultural patterns of alcohol-related aggression suggested by these four bodies of literature. In the following three sections, I describe regional, ethnic, and age group patterns of aggressive drinking and discuss some theories that may explain these patterns. In the fourth section, I summarize the paper and discuss additional theories.

Alcohol Use and Aggression in the South

Evidence that the Southern region of the United States has a higher rate of alcohol-related aggression than other regions comes from three sources. First, national surveys of drinking practices suggest a "Southern" or "dry area" drinking pattern characterized by a high percentage of nondrinkers, low per capita consumption, high social consequences associated with drinking, more alcohol-related arrests, and "infrequent binges accompanied by belligerence and guilt feelings" (Cahalan and Room 1974, p. 61; Room 1970). Belligerence is operationally defined as the "respondent's report of feeling aggressive or cross or getting into fights or heated arguments after drinking" (Cahalan and Room 1974, p. 23). Second, a comparison of studies of alcohol-related crime statistics shows that alcohol use and criminal behavior tend to co-occur more often in Southern than in other States. Aarens et al. (1977) list and discuss many of these studies. For example, Hollis (1974) reports 80 percent alcohol use among either victims or offenders in homicide cases in Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee; Globetti and colleagues (1974) report that in a sample of 242 men involved in violent crimes in Mississippi, 60 percent were drinking at the time of the crime; and Mayfield (1976) reports that 58 percent of men imprisoned in North Carolina for the commission of violent crimes were drinking at the time of the crime. These percentages are generally higher than those reported in
comparable studies conducted in other States such as California, New York, or Missouri. Alcohol-related crime rates in other States are generally below 50 percent. The third piece of evidence supporting the Southern drinking pattern is less direct. It concerns the social setting in which drinking occurs. Room (1970) notes that rural drinking (and, thus, much of Southern drinking) usually involves men drinking with other men in bars. Some recent research on bar behavior (Gordon in press) suggests that men drinking with other men in bars is one drinking environment frequently associated with belligerent drinking behavior.

How can this Southern pattern of belligerent drinking be explained? Two hypotheses seem especially relevant: the Southern subculture of lethal violence hypothesis, and the Finnish belligerent drinking hypothesis. The Southern subculture of lethal violence or Gastil-Hackney hypothesis attributes the high Southern homicide rate, as compared with homicide rates for other regions of the Nation, to a Southern tradition that either indirectly or directly encourages lethal violence in a variety of interpersonal settings (Gastil 1971; Hackney 1969; Reed 1971). This hypothesis has its genesis in a number of studies showing a 40-year or longer pattern of higher homicide rates in the South than in other regions (Doerner 1975; Hackney 1969; Lottier 1938; Shannon 1954). Although Gastil proposed the hypothesis only as an explanation for Southern patterns of lethal violence, it seems plausible to assume that the hypothesis might apply also to Southern patterns of violence in general, including belligerent drinking behavior. However, recent tests indicate that the hypothesis is not true at all.

Erlanger (1976) and Doerner (1978), using NORC and Roper survey data, report that Southerners are no more likely to be involved in criminal homicide than non-Southerners. O'Conner and Lizotte (1978) find that Southerners (people born in the South) are no more likely to own a gun than people from other regions. Loftin and Hill's (1974) reanalysis of Gastil's data, using more careful controls for noncultural variables, shows the Southern born homicide relationship to be nonsignificant when the effect of structural poverty is controlled. And, Smith and Parker (1980) report that Loftin and Hill's Structural-Poverty Index (infant mortality rate, percentage of population illiterate, percentage of families with income less than $1,000, Armed Forces Mental Test Failures 1958-1965, and percentage of children living with one parent) is the most powerful predictor of primary homicide, although not nearly as powerful a predictor of nonprimary homicide.

In a general sense, the Gastil-Hackney hypothesis can be viewed
as a variation of the broader Wolfgang-Ferracuti (1967) subculture of violence hypothesis. Wolfgang and Ferracuti suggest that some subcultural systems are characterized by norms, values, and attitudes which legitimize the use of violence in a wide range of social situations. But, since the studies cited above indicate that the South differs little from other regions in gun ownership and homicide rates, approval of violence, or frequency of involvement in fights, it seems unlikely that the South constitutes a subculture of violence.

A different explanation for the Southern belligerent drinking pattern is brought to our attention by Room (1970) who notes that the Southern pattern is much like the pattern reported for Finland as compared with other European nations. In terms of drinking behavior, Finland is the "South" of Europe. Room suggests that we consider Achte et al.'s (1969) explanation for Finnish drinking. The Achte team argues that (1) Finns have ambivalent feelings about alcohol use, which (2) result in guilt feelings about drinking. In addition, (3) Finnish culture is authoritarian and patriarchal, which (4) leads to tension, anxiety, and difficulty venting aggressive feelings, which (5) leads to belligerent drinking as an outlet for pent-up aggressive feelings. While this specific hypothesis awaits formal testing, the theoretical model on which it is partly based has been tested and found to be largely a "myth" (Straus 1977). I refer here to the drive discharge or catharsis model of human aggression. The drive discharge model states in part that aggressive drives in both individuals and groups must be discharged; if not in one way, then in another. Recent reviews of intracultural tests (Berkowitz 1973; Hokanson 1970; Straus 1974) and cross-cultural studies (Russell 1972; Sipes 1973) provide little support for drive discharge theory. In fact, tests of the drive discharge model more often support the alternative culture pattern model which suggests that "...all forms of aggression tend to be strongly related to each other" (Russell 1972). Some support for the cultural pattern model as applied to alcohol-related aggression comes from Graham et al.'s (1980) study of bar behavior in Vancouver. They report that situational variables that predict physical aggression also predict nonphysical aggression in bars. Thus, while the Finnish drinking hypothesis merits further testing, we need to remain skeptical because of a lack of empirical support for one of the main theoretical models on which it is based.
Alcohol and Aggression in Ethnic Groups

The study of ethnic drinking patterns has a long history in alcohol studies (Bales 1946; Glad 1947; Knupfer and Room 1967; McCord and McCord 1960; Snyder 1958; Strauss and Bacon 1951; Wechsler et al. 1970 among others). Many of these early studies focused on the drinking behavior of Irish, Jewish, and Italian men in the United States. The consensus of these studies is that Irish men tend to have high rates of alcoholism and more alcohol-related problems than Jewish or Italian men. More recent research has examined the drinking patterns of Anglos, Mexican Americans, and Native Americans in Colorado (Jessor et al. 1968); Americans of British, Irish, German, Italian, Latin American, Jewish, African, and Eastern European descent (Cahalan and Room 1974); blacks and whites (Grigsby 1963); blacks (Harper 1976); Irish, Portuguese, and Cape Verdean immigrants (Thomas 1978); Americans of Irish, Italian, Jewish, German, Scandinavian, Slavic, and British descent (Greeley et al. 1980); Dominican, Guatemalan, and Puerto Rican immigrants (Gordon 1978, in press); and a fair number of Native American groups (see Leland 1981 for a comprehensive, up-to-date review of these studies).

Many of the early studies listed above are well known, and require no further discussion here, partly because they are well known and partly because they deal more often with drinking behavior in general than with aggressive drinking behavior. In terms of the present discussion, the key point about these early studies is that they tend to explain ethnic differences in drinking patterns in terms of the extent to which cultural factors integrate alcohol use into the subcultural system. The general claim of these studies is that where alcohol use is well integrated, alcoholism and related problems are rare, as with Jewish and Italian men. But, where alcohol use is poorly integrated, alcoholism and related problems are more common, as with Irish men. More recent studies discussed below differ from these early studies in that external economic factors rather than cultural factors are more often viewed as the basic cause of ethnic drinking patterns. In fact, some scholars argue that ethnicity is irrelevant as a causal variable (Graves 1970, 1971; Patterson 1977). And, Thomas (1978) suggests that while ethnicity determines who may drink with whom, the actual behaviors and customs associated with drinking among the Irish, Cape Verdians, and Portuguese he studied in a small New England industrial city are quite alike.

The major theoretical framework for some recent work on ethnic patterns of drinking behavior is Merton's (1957) anomie theory of
deviance. Merton suggests that deviant behavior — drunken aggressiveness, for example — will more likely occur in a situation where individuals lack access to legitimate means to achieve their economic goals. Graves (1967, 1970) expands upon and relates anomie theory to alcohol use:

When goals are strongly held for which society provides inadequate means of attainment, the resulting means-goals “disjunction” produces pressures for engaging in alternative often disapproved adaptations, of which excessive drinking is one common form (1970; p. 42).

Anomie theory may be a viable explanation for aggressive drinking as well. Three studies support this interpretation. Robbins (1979) reports on the drinking behavior of Naspaki men in a small village in northern Canada. He interprets their drinking behavior (he calls them drinking interactions) as “identity-resolving forums.” Identity-resolving forums, like initiation ceremonies, or ceremonial exchanges, or drinking interactions, exist to enable people to maintain, attain, or protect valued social identities. Drinking interactions among Naspaki men come in two forms. Some men are “friendly drunks.” Others are assertive, aggressive, boastful drunks. These men, unlike the friendly drunks, often get into fights while drinking. Robbins attributes these different drinking interactions to differences in economic circumstances and resulting differences in access to status-conferring goods between the two groups. The friendly drinkers are men who make a decent wage as iron miners at the local iron mine. Their drinking behavior is meant to maintain and reinforce their increased social status. The aggressive drinkers are men who have not been able for various reasons to succeed as iron miners. Their drinking behavior is meant to maintain an old identity now threatened by new economic realities. Thus, Robbins suggests that it is economic change and resulting changes in the relative status of Naspaki men which causes drinking interactions to be used as identity-resolving forums.

Gordon (1978) reports on the drinking patterns of recent Dominican immigrants to the Northeastern United States. In the Dominican Republic male drinking was macho drinking. Men were expected to drink, drink often, drink heavily, and to fight when drunk. It was part of the male macho image. But all of that changed, and changed rapidly, following migration to the United States. The male image became one of hombre servo rather than of macho. An hombre servo is one who proves himself through hard work, sacrifice, and dedication to his family; not through heavy drinking and fighting. Why this dramatic, sudden change from macho to
hombre servo? Gordon suggests a number of reasons. For one, the status and influence of Dominican women increased. In the United States, Dominican women often work outside the home at well-paying jobs. Second, a change in the Dominican economic worldview now called for order, discipline, steady work, and saving money. And, third, fewer opportunities for socialization with other men were now available, as more time is spent now at home than in bars with male drinking companions. Thus, Gordon suggests that economic opportunity for both Dominican men and women is one factor leading to a reduction in drunken aggressiveness. As a footnote, it is instructive to mention Gordon's (in press) findings concerning Guatemalan immigrants. Guatemalan men do not give up the macho image. Unlike Dominican men, 33 percent of Guatemalan men drink heavily. For Guatemalan men, weekends are a timeout for heavy drinking and carousing. Why this difference between Dominican and Guatemalan men? A number of factors strike Gordon as relevant. Guatemalan men come alone to the United States. They hope to bring their families later. And, they drink mostly in bars with other men. Thus, it may well be that the desire or need for economic security among Guatemalan men is not as great as among the Dominican men and women who have families to support.

These studies (Gordon 1978, in press; Robbins 1979) indicate that anomie theory constitutes one viable explanation for ethnic patterns of drunken aggressiveness. However, anomie theory is not without its critics, especially in regard to Native American drinking patterns (Leland 1981; Levy and Kunitz 1974; Lurie 1971). In regard to these critiques, it is important to note that anomie theory in no way precludes the likely possibility that cultural variables influence the nature and context of alcohol-related aggressive behavior (see Heath 1980 for a review of the sociocultural model). For example, Jessor et al. (1970) contrast American with Italian youth and show that cultural meanings associated with alcohol use mediate the relationship between personality variables and drinking patterns.

Alcohol Use and Aggression Among Youth

Perhaps no topic in alcohol studies has drawn as much interest as drinking among youth. In their comprehensive review of the literature for 1960 to 1975, Blane and Hewitt (1977) cite more than 1,000 studies and discussions about alcohol use among youth. Most of these studies pertain to youth in the United States. What is meant
by "youth" varies from study to study, with most investigators setting a maximum of 24 years of age or younger as the upper limit for the youth category. Within this age framework, researchers have reported on the drinking patterns of high school and college students, youth in military service, juvenile delinquents, youth gangs, school dropouts, and employed youth.

With regard to the relationship between alcohol use and aggressive behavior, these studies provide fairly consistent results. Aggressive behavior in a variety of forms and directed at a variety of targets is often associated with alcohol use by all categories of male youth. Although there are social class, regional, ethnic, religious, and community variations (Marden and Kolodner n.d.), it appears that youth exhibit more alcohol-related aggression than do older people. Cahalan and Cisin (1976) use national survey data to compare rates of alcohol-related aggression in American men aged from 21 to 59 years. They find the highest rates of belligerence following drinking among 21- to 24-year-olds. Fifteen percent of these men report belligerent behavior following drinking, as compared to 12 percent of the 25- to 29-year-olds, 10 percent of the 30- to 34-year-olds, and less than 10 percent for the 35- to 59-year-olds. Similar findings are reported for Army and Navy personnel (Cahalan and Cisin 1975; Cahalan et al. 1972). These survey data show the drinking patterns of these younger men to be characterized by binge drinking, a drinking pattern often associated with aggressive behavior.

This general pattern reported by Cahalan and Cisin is supported by other sample survey research with youth populations. In an often-cited study, Globetti (1978) surveyed the drinking behavior of 275 high school students in a small Mississippi community. He found that 75 percent of the drinkers, as compared to 25 percent of the nondrinkers, rated high on a deviant behavior index which includes measures of fighting, damaging property, and speeding. Wechsler (1979) and his associates surveyed the drinking practices of 10,500 male and female undergraduates at 34 colleges in five New England States. Twenty and one-half percent of the males but only about 2 percent of the females reported fighting after drinking. Mandell and Ginzberg's (1976) survey of student drinking in New York State shows that both occasional and regular drinkers were more often involved in fights, property destruction, and auto accidents than nondrinkers. And, Jessor and Jessor's (1973) longitudinal study of high school drinking also shows more deviant behavior by drinkers than nondrinkers. As regards drinking behavior in youth gangs, there is some evidence that aggressive behavior is often linked with alcohol use (Miller et al. 1968; Tinklenberg and Woodrow 1974).
Blane (1979) provides additional, indirect evidence for the alcohol-aggression linkage among youth. He presents data for the incidence of a number of social problem behaviors that are linked with alcohol use and reports that men and women aged 18 to 24 are more often involved in these problem areas than those aged 35 to 54. Younger people have higher rates of disorderly conduct, vandalism, serious crimes against persons, assault, rape, sex offenses, accident mortality, and motor accident fatalities than older people. This evidence is indirect because, as Blane (1979) notes, no evidence is presented linking these higher rates to alcohol use.

Studies of alcohol-related aggression among youth classified as juvenile delinquents provide equally striking results. These studies regularly show high rates of alcohol-related aggression (30 to 50 or more percent of all incidents), and more alcohol-related violence among delinquents than among nondelinquents (Cockerham 1975; Demone 1966; MacKay et al. 1967; Pearce and Garrett 1970; Schonfield 1966/67; Widseth and Mayer 1971; among others). In regard to these findings, and those cited above related to nondelinquents, it is important to note that youth who are often aggressive or deviant while drinking tend also to be aggressive or deviant when not drinking (Jessor and Jessor 1973; Mandell and Ginzberg 1976).

A different approach to youth drinking is provided by Burns (1980) in his ethnographic account of an evening spent drinking and carousing with four young men from the Charlestown section of Boston. Burns' account is especially illuminating for three reasons. First, it details the variety of aggressive behaviors which may be associated with alcohol use. In about 6 hours of drinking in bars, Burns lists 17 aggressive acts he and his companions were involved in: loud conversation, good-natured wrestling, piling into a car, speeding, verbal boasting, verbal threatening, raucous comments, verbal disparagement, being rowdy, yelling, screaming, arguing, putting a fist through a store window, fighting, bottle crashing, threatening with a gun, and sexual aggressiveness.

Second, Burns shows how the drinking setting influences the behaviors associated with drinking. In the "Mom and Pop" community bar, the men were quiet and deferential in their dealings with older members of the Charlestown community. But, in Boston's downtown "combat zone" — an area designated for "adult entertainment," they exhibited their rowdiest behavior, getting involved in a loud argument, a fight involving a gun, and a run-in with the police. Burns suggests that one of the major
purposes of drinking that evening was to give the young Charlestown men an excuse to get rowdy and to prove their masculinity. However, since rowdiness was unacceptable behavior within the community, the men went to the “combat zone,” where rowdiness and other deviant behaviors are more acceptable.

Third, Burns’ account suggests that the level of violence associated with alcohol use is related to the amount of alcohol consumed. The Charlestown men were most rowdy and aggressive at the end of the evening, after each man had drunk at least a dozen beers. Evidence from other studies also suggests that the amount of alcohol consumed is related to the level of aggressive behavior during and after drinking. Graham and her team (1980) spent 3 months observing the behavior of patrons in drinking establishments in Vancouver, British Columbia. They found a strong relationship between level of aggression (physical and verbal) and degree of sobriety. They report correlations between sobriety and aggression of -.41, between slight insobriety and aggression of .28, and between extreme insobriety and aggression of .42. And, Gerson and Preston (1979) report a significant positive relationship between the incidence of violent crime and the amount of alcohol purchased at drinking establishments in a section of Ontario. Thus, there seems to be some general relationship between amount consumed and level of aggressiveness.

Although these three studies show an association between amount consumed and level of aggression, they say nothing about causal direction. Two interpretations are possible. First, that alcohol has the physiological effect of causing aggressive behavior — the more one consumes, the more aggressive one acts. Second, some people, like Burns’ Charlestown companions, consume alcohol in order to be aggressive, and the more they consume the more aggressive they act.

There is no shortage of explanations for youth drinking patterns. Among the better known are Jessor’s deviant behavior model (Jessor et al. 1968). Zucker’s family relations theory (Zucker and Devoe 1975), peer pressure theory, the parental emulation model (Mandell et al. 1962), the anticipatory socialization model (Maddox and McCall 1964), and power-motivation theory (Boyatzis 1976; McClelland et al. 1972). In terms of subcultural patterns of alcohol-related aggression, McClelland’s power-motivation theory is the most significant theory, as it claims to account for all of male drinking behavior. Power-motivation theory suggests that men drink to feel more powerful. McClelland distinguishes between social power and personal power. Social power is power used to achieve legitimate social goals. Personal power is individual
aggression to achieve individual needs. Problem drinking, social consequences associated with drinking, and aggressive drinking occur when men see themselves as lacking power in cultures where personal power is valued. Men in these cultures drink excessively or become aggressive while drinking to feel more powerful. McClelland and his associates have presented an impressive body of experimental and psychometric research results in support of power-motivation theory. However, the results of their cross-cultural research are less convincing, especially in regard to their use of questionable folktale theme measures. Schaefer (1973), whose doctoral dissertation is the most rigorous cross-cultural test of a number of alcoholism theories, suggests that power-motivation theory can be viewed as a restatement of anxiety-reduction theory. Men drink to reduce anxiety, perhaps resulting from feeling powerless, but also resulting from other factors such as loose social structure, or unmet dependency needs.

Conclusions

This paper had two main purposes: (1) to review research on subcultural patterns of alcohol-related aggressive behavior; and (2) to discuss theories relevant to these subcultural patterns of alcohol-related aggression. Recent research reports reviewed here indicate clearly identifiable subcultural patterns of alcohol-related aggression within the United States. Youth exhibit more alcohol-related aggression than older people, Southerners exhibit more than people from other regions, and some ethnic groups exhibit more than other ethnic groups or the general American population. Although not discussed here, some of these studies also suggest social class and sex differences in the relationship between alcohol use and aggressive behavior.

A large number of theories, theoretical models, and hypotheses seem potentially relevant to the question of why high rates of aggressive behavior are associated with some subcultural groups but not with other groups. Among the better known are the drive discharge model, the Finnish drinking hypothesis, the Southern subculture of lethal violence hypothesis, the subculture of violence model, anomie theory, power-motivation theory, and a variety of explanations for drinking among youth. Also relevant are the masculine protest hypothesis (Straus 1977) and the frustration-aggression model. None of these theories have been tested in terms of their applicability to subcultural patterns of aggressive drinking behavior, although there is some indirect evidence for anomie the-
ory, at least in relation to subcultural groups who have recently migrated in search of economic gain. Tests without the alcohol-aggression linkage in mind question the trustworthiness of the drive discharge and Southern subculture of violence theories.

What all of this suggests is that there is a pressing need for more research on alcohol-related aggression in American subcultures. First, we need more studies of subcultures both with and without alcohol-related aggression in order to provide a broader comparative framework. We also need a better understanding of the perception of and role of alcohol-related aggression in American society in general. For example, do office Christmas parties represent an institutionalized, ritualized interaction that requires the use of alcohol to allow the venting of aggressive feelings? Third, we need more research on how members of subcultures that stress alcohol-related aggression behave in different social contexts. Burns (1980) suggests that social context is a key determinant of how and when alcohol use is associated with aggressive behavior. Fourth, we need a consideration of cross-subcultural patterns of alcohol-related aggression. There is some evidence, for example, of an interaction between age and regional effects on alcohol-related aggression. Fifth, we need more ethnographic accounts that describe the dynamics and processes of alcohol-related aggression. And, last, we need more accounts that describe alcohol use and aggressive behavior in terms of what it means to drink or to be drunk or to be aggressive in the culture being studied.

It seems appropriate to close with a brief story which brings the matter of subcultural variations in alcohol-related aggression closer to home. A few years ago the New York Times printed a story on a hotel manager's experiences with members of scholarly associations whose annual meetings had convened at his hotel. He thought the anthropologists were just fine. They drank heavily in the hotel bars, went to their rooms, and went to sleep. The psychologists, however, could take their business elsewhere. They also drank heavily, but rather than going quietly to sleep, they became loud, argumentative, and rowdy.

References


ALCOHOL AND AGGRESSION IN SUBCULTURES


Presenter's Comments

ROOM: One of our searches, when we were prospecting the parts of the territory that we didn't know how to handle for the conference, was for someone who could take on a very diverse set of literatures which seemed to us to have some relevance in the discussion of drinking and disinhibition. This is the set of literatures that very often talk about drinking only incidentally in the course of discussing a lot of other matters, but which are dealing in one way or another with subcultural groups within American society. Our focus is on the variation within American society, what we can find out from existing literatures about the variation among subgroups in American society. The choice that we arrived at from a couple of different directions was David Levinson, who is currently associated with Yale University, with the Human Relations Area Files.

LEVINSON: In pulling this paper together, I did a number of things. First, I tried to look at a variety of materials representing a variety of disciplines; and, second, I glossed over a number of important methodological/conceptual issues. I didn't worry about what a subculture is or even what a culture is. I took that for granted, just to have some sort of generalization and go with that.

Then what I did was look at the literature that was there. I found that in general the literature on the relationship between alcohol and disinhibition tended to focus mostly on aggressive behavior, so I limited my search to aggressive behavior. I didn't look at sociability or such other things.

Then I further limited my focus to three subgroups or subcultural groups in the United States: the South as compared to the rest of the country; ethnic groups, the idea that certain ethnic groups show stronger patterns of alcohol-related aggression than others; and youth, that is, generally, men under the age of twenty-four as compared to people over the age of twenty-four. I reviewed the evidence there was suggesting that there is a link between alcohol use and aggressive behavior in these groups, evidence which comes from a number of sources. The evidence was sufficient to suggest that there is some sort of alcohol/aggression pattern in these three particular groups. I didn't look at social class differences, although there's some evidence that alcohol and aggression are tied together differently in different social classes.
I also made an effort to throw out some theories and hypotheses that would account for differences among subgroups apropos the relationship between alcohol use and aggressive behavior. I looked at two kinds of hypotheses, the first being one that would apply to a specific group. For example, for the South, I focused on the Southern subculture of lethal violence hypothesis, which is an idea that has some popularity in sociology, although it’s probably close to entirely incorrect.

That’s an example of an hypothesis that applies to one culture or one subcultural pattern. I also looked at some more general hypotheses; for example, I mentioned McClelland’s (1972) power motivation theory, the idea that men especially drink and perhaps drink aggressively to feel more powerful, which could plausibly be argued as the explanation for aggression being tied to alcohol use in a wide range of cultures or subcultures.

And finally, Robin Room wrote me a letter and mentioned an article by a Tom Burns (1980), called “Getting Rowdy with the Boys,” which struck me as probably the most important piece of literature that I looked at, and it’s important not for its theoretical or conceptual analysis but for a three- or four-page account of a night out drinking with four or six young men in Boston. They were drinking beer. That’s all they drank at night. All of the men except Burns were aged 18-21. And he just went out drinking with them for a night and told what happened. I found it especially important in terms of c’s inhibition for three reasons. First, it shows the variety of aggressive behaviors that can accompany alcohol use. I went through his account and found seventeen different acts that could be considered aggressive behavior, ranging from boasting in a bar to getting into a fight which involved a gun— a tremendous variety of aggressive acts is associated with alcohol use.

Second, I was struck by what Burns seemed to be suggesting: the influence of social setting on the kind of aggressive behaviors tied to the drinking. For example, they started the evening after a baseball or softball game drinking at a “Mom and Pop” tavern. Somehow they wound up in the wrong part of the bar, in the family section, and they were clearly out of place and uncomfortable. They talked quietly; they were deferential to the woman who ran the place and to other people from the community; and they also seemed to want to get out of there as quickly as they could. By the end of the evening, at the other extreme, they decided to move down to what’s called the “Combat Zone” in Boston, the red light district, an area where all kinds of deviant acts are allowed to go on. There they got into a number of fights, the last one involving a gun in a bar and the police. The contrast between these two different settings was
dramatic, the one setting at the "Mom and Pop" bar where they knew to control their behavior — they couldn't become violent or get out of control; as a matter of fact, they became inhibited in their behavior — and the other in the "Combat Zone," where they were out of control.

And the third thing that struck me from Burns' account was that he suggested a kind of escalation pattern: as the evening went on, things got more violent, more aggressive, more out of control. He's not the only one to suggest that. It's supported by some recent studies of bar behavior, some of them published and some I've heard about that aren't published, which suggest a strong relationship between the amount one drinks and the amount of violence that occurs. Now, I'm not saying there's a direct causal link, but the two do seem to go together.

I do want to say a word about one of the theories I talked about, which is what I called the anomie theory and which has been mentioned two or three times here. It's the idea that certain subcultural groups or ethnic groups, when they don't have access to certain economic goals which they seek, tend to act in deviant ways. I was struck by a study by Gordon in New England (1978) which speaks to one of the problems in explaining ethnic differences in drunken comportment. He found that the behavior of male Dominican immigrants in Rhode Island was very different from that in the Dominican Republic. I understand he gathered the Dominican Republic data by asking people how they drank there — I don't think he was actually there. In-the Dominican Republic, male drinking was what he called "macho" drinking: part of the male definition was to go out and get drunk and get rowdy, and beat people up, and get beat up and so forth. But all that changed when they moved to Rhode Island — the whole male image shifted over. It no longer was considered the male role to go out and get drunk and get in fights and become rowdy every weekend. Instead, the male role was to get a job, earn money, save money, support the family, put the money in the bank, buy a house. Accompanying that was a total change in male drinking behavior. Gordon also cited some other factors that seemed to have an effect, but I think the basic point is that, especially in terms of ethnic patterns, while drinking behaviors change very easily from setting to setting, they also change over time.

To sum up, there's an awful lot of stuff on subcultural drinking patterns. Most of it doesn't look very clearly at the disinhibition idea, and I had to work awfully hard to get even just the aggressive stuff out. But there's an awful lot of room for more research, although I think part of the problem with doing more research is
where I started my talk: What are the boundaries of a subculture in a pluralistic society? I started out as an urban anthropologist, but no one ever answered that question for me.
Commentary

Troy Duster

Several years ago, I did some work that I thought was on the sociology of law, and when I finished it, I had a friend, Howie Becker, read it, and he said, "Welcome to the drug circuit." And I said, "But, Howie, just because I used heroin to illuminate social power and connections, there's no reason to call me a drug specialist." He said, "Welcome to the drug circuit."

Now, Robin Room knows I'm on the drug circuit, so I was surprised when he asked me to come to the alcohol circuit, and my comments may indicate the nature of my lack of expertise. I'm happy to report, however, that in conversation about Nineteenth Century drug use, we have the same kind of wide ranging, variegated discussions about soothing syrups and morphine as you had in the last session this morning; and that is, lots of accounts of what people were using from about ten different perspectives. There is no consensus in the literature among colleagues in the history of drugs about how powerful an influence these soothing syrups were on people's behavior. But, interestingly enough, a great contrast with alcohol is with this notion of accounts: you rarely get accounts of morphine and soothing syrups explaining behavior in the last part of the Nineteenth Century.

Now, Robin Room knows I'm on the drug circuit, so I was surprised when he asked me to come to the alcohol circuit, and my comments may indicate the nature of my lack of expertise. I'm happy to report, however, that in conversation about Nineteenth Century drug use, we have the same kind of wide ranging, variegated discussions about soothing syrups and morphine as you had in the last session this morning; and that is, lots of accounts of what people were using from about ten different perspectives. There is no consensus in the literature among colleagues in the history of drugs about how powerful an influence these soothing syrups were on people's behavior. But, interestingly enough, a great contrast with alcohol is with this notion of accounts: you rarely get accounts of morphine and soothing syrups explaining behavior in the last part of the Nineteenth Century.

Now, in Robin's opening remarks yesterday morning, he indicated that the group had decided disinhibition was a better way to go instead of violence because it widens theoretical discussion; and in keeping with that and because I don't know that much about alcohol research, I'm going to contrast two approaches to this general subject matter and argue in favor of one approach. And the one I want to champion is perhaps best captured by the following phrase: "Alcohol is to social science what dye is to microscopy." That is, the notion of using colored dye to illuminate cell life in microscopy. The argument is that what this dye does is to show up certain kinds of fundamental features of the structures of the cell, and I propose that we can probably use alcohol the same way to penetrate the structure of social life. Imagine for a moment a giant slide of the American class structure. Now imagine that alcohol is a...
blue dye that penetrates different groups at different speeds and with different effects, that other dyes can be constructed: say red for marijuana, green for heroin, and so forth. That is, you can conceptualize a slide with a little bit of imagination, which would represent different colorations of the American class structure, different ethnic/racial groups, different age groups, and it would be a multi-colored many-splendored thing. At different points in our history, that slide would shift its contours, its coloration; as Harry Levine was pointing out yesterday, the location of the dyes would be different from group to group and time to time.

Now, from a pharmacological or physiological perspective, the penetration of alcohol into the cell life of an individual and its effects upon behavior are extremely interesting — that was demonstrated again yesterday morning. Likewise, from an anthropological perspective, or the perspective of the social analyst trying to come up with interesting theoretical formulations about features of alcohol use, it seems to me one could argue persuasively that this alcohol, this blue dye, illuminates certain features of social life as it moves throughout the structure. While not denying the importance of physiological/pharmacological effects of alcohol, I'm arguing [instead] from a perspective on utility of studies of alcohol as a social analyst.

Mr. Levinson's paper is a very well-crafted survey of what we know about alcoholism and aggression. As he indicated, he took region of the country, age grouping, and ethnicity. He examines alternative behavioral theories on consumption patterns and aggression among youth, Southerners, and ethnic groups. On this matter I have very little to add. There's an extraordinarily wide range of studies that he cites, and I think the summaries are well done.

However, I do want to raise some complementary study questions. emphasizing a different approach to these studies. In order to bring some greater conceptual clarity to the point I want to make, I want to draw a parallel to some other areas. The first would be the distribution of homicides in the social structure. Now, blacks are only about 12 percent of the population of the country, but they commit about 60 percent of the murders known to police and reported. We could, then, probably raise the question: Why do blacks commit so many murders? Is there something in black culture which inclines blacks to aggression? Something about poverty or economic circumstance? By the way, with reference to Mr. Levinson's paper, homicide, of course, is unevenly distributed by region of the country, and the South is where most homicides have occurred historically — and, indeed blacks account for the
greatest bulk of that, if you read the definition of homicide the way it's done by the police and crime reports.

Just to give you a sharp contrast, then, with the notion of homicide being distributed within the structure of social life, the homicide rate for black males is approximately 40 per 100,000, while for black females it is 1 per 100,000. So, I want to try to demonstrate what I mean when I say it matters very much when you ask the question: Why does one category kill more than another? Why does the category called black males kill more? Why is it black females kill so little?

That's occupied people in the literature for some time. Indeed, there were chemical and genetic theories of black homicide. And the anthropologist Paul Bohannon went to Africa and did some studies of sub-Saharan tribes included in a book called *African Homicide and Suicide* (1967), concluding that there was neither a genetic nor an easy cultural explanation for rates of homicides in this country among blacks. There were some tribes in sub-Saharan Africa where it was virtually nonexistent.

But if we leave now the question of "Why do blacks commit so much homicide?" and raise a question of different order, that is, if we leave now the question of the actual explanation of why the act's committed and move to the distribution that it illuminates, we may get a different picture of the nature of the social relationships in society.

Let's take the simple question of: Who kills who? Ninety-four percent of all murders are of the same race as the victim. That is, when blacks kill, they kill other blacks, typically; when whites kill, they kill other whites; Hispanics kill Hispanics and so forth. Sixty-four percent of all murders are of the same sex as the victim. And now the interesting illumination about relationships: eighty-seven percent of all female victims are slain by men; eighty-four percent of all female murderers kill males. That is, while the women don't kill very much, when they do, they kill men. And further, in almost half the cases where there is a woman who kills a man, it is her husband. Suddenly, the illumination of social relationships comes from the account of the nature of the act and its location (in the social order) as opposed to the account which would be given of "Why do people kill each other?"

My next example comes from the area of the distribution of mental illness, and my ethnic variation here focuses on Chinese-Americans. Chinese-Americans have one of the lowest reported rates of mental illness, and the literature is replete with accounts of possible explanations of why this is the case. Why are there so few

Let us ask instead the type of question: What does the distribution of mental illness tell us about the relationship between Chinese-Americans and European-Americans or internally among themselves? It leads someone like Ben Tong (1971) to conclude that there's something deeply resonant in much of Chinese culture called "taking care of one's own," and that one would never want to reveal (if one were part of the family) that one couldn't handle a problem. The problem is not conceptualized as mental illness, and if it is seen as a disturbance, the last thing you do is go to an agency of the state.

Let me give you another example from my own work with heroin. As you know, for many years now, people of color have dominated the heroin scene — who uses, who gets addicted — this is especially true for blacks in the northeast, and in many cities in the midwest, and in Southern California for Hispanics or Chicanos. And the theories in sociology journals seem to address the question of: Why do those people get addicted to heroin? The theoretical formulation is to try to give explanations of why people of color began using heroin, let's say, in the middle and late part of the Twentieth Century. And some of the prominent theories, based upon the economic conditions of Hispanics and blacks, were that it had to do with the culture of poverty, the natural depression of people who are in these circumstances, and so forth. Living in Harlem and Los Angeles in poverty is tough, the desire for escape is great, and, so the theory goes, therefore heroin abuse.

In the mid '70s I was asked to consult the German government on the question of why heroin addiction was such a big problem in Germany and to give the current prevailing American theories some application. However, it turns out that those who were addicted to heroin in Germany in the early '70s and in the middle '70s were the children of middle class, successful Germans. They were not the guest workers from Turkey, Yugoslavia, Italy; they were not the few unemployed in Germany; they were not the working class; they were the children of the middle class. So, an attempt to give an account, a theoretical formulation of why people take heroin in this country has little application when you take it over to Germany. That doesn't mean that you can't explain it; but it does mean that — as we said yesterday in several of the comments — you can't go very far with it across cultures, across classes, and possibly across groups.

Mr. Levinson's paper quotes Blane and Hewitt to the effect that there have been over a thousand studies of drinking and youth. And
my guess is that this literature is dominated by the question: Why do youth drink the way they drink and why are they so aggressive? And that's fair enough. But there are other questions which get raised if we ask: When you drink and get aggressive, what elements of social life are thereby illuminated?

When people drink or give accounts, they do it for infinite numbers of reasons. As you look from group to group, culture to culture, or subculture to subculture, you will probably find an extraordinary variation in what people say are their reasons for consuming alcohol. Many years ago, Martin Nicolaus (1969) gave a talk at the American Sociological Association — this was back in the '60s, and it was angry language — and what he said was sociologists and anthropologists spend a lot of their time looking with their eyes down and their hands up; that is, they spend a lot of their time looking at people at the base of the structure, observing their behavior, giving an account, and their hands are up; that is, the hands are out, taking from the coffers of either the federal government — even though that might be closed soon — or the foundation. And he enjoined people, he said, "Well, why don't you take your eyes up and put your hands down; that is, why don't you spend most of your time looking at those groups, at those persons with positions of power in the culture, seeing what their subcultural pattern variations are, and then explaining to the base of the structure what's going on?

Now, quite seriously, it may be worthwhile to take a look at the drinking patterns of well-established, well-to-do people, and see what the combination of behaviors are, and what kinds of illumination of the social order emerge. When does this subculture or upper culture, whatever the term would be, consume alcohol? This is not a plea that we abandon research on groups at the base of the structure, but that studies of alcoholism and other areas of deviance might well allow us to illuminate the structure better if we see what happens when powerful, privileged bankers at Chase Manhattan consume, and then talk about their configuration of activity as they go through this process of disinhibition.
Commentary

Denise Herd

ROOM: I asked Denise Herd to talk a little about some ethnographic work sometime in the course of this discussion.

DENISE HERD: True to form, as an anthropologist, my eyes are down, but as a graduate student, my hands are down, too. However, I think one of the values of anthropology is that it does bring in a sense of what the everyday reality is like, which adds an important dimension to some of the things we've been talking about in a very abstract manner. Anthropology can tell you a little bit about how everyday people see their reality. Related to this is the role of anthropology in exploring and exposing the cultural interiors of various groups and showing their reality as they see it. In the kind of society that we live in today, a multi-ethnic society, one often runs the risk of having one group's stereotypes of another group's behavior being interpreted as the actuality or reality of the latter's experience.

I think the issue of black drinking is a particularly illuminating example of this phenomenon. On the one hand, blacks are perceived by other sectors of the society to be very vulnerable to the powers of alcohol and to have difficulty controlling their responses to liquor. Historically, the stereotypes of blacks suggested that while sober they were docile, obedient, and industrious people, but as soon as they drank, they became violent, aggressive, and sexually crazed. Our modern images may not be this blunt, but they also suggest that blacks and alcohol are a very explosive combination.

In contrast to the kinds of images the dominant culture has of black culture, you get a very different perspective when you talk to blacks themselves — not only about how they regard their own behavior but also about how they regard behavior of non-blacks, particularly of whites.

In the study that I was involved in, we explored informants' perceptions of the differences between all black social settings where drinking was going on and their experience in interracial or predominantly white social settings. As the black informants that we talked to compared these kinds of drinking settings, they stated...
overwhelmingly — in two-thirds of the cases — that in their belief whites were heavier drinkers, and that when whites started drinking they were inclined to be a lot more obnoxious and sexually looser than blacks expected in comparable black events. It's important to note that I'm not talking about middle class blacks who might visit a lower class white bar. More typically, middle class blacks described their experiences at middle class white parties. So, there is some kind of comparability in class position.

Here are a couple of examples of those kinds of perceptions. The following statement was made by a young woman regarding how whites behave when drinking.

They act the fool, they get drunk, and they just get outrageous, they just get obnoxious, and they drink and drink and drink. They drink basic gin, bourbon, scotch, whatever, but they drink and they always have plenty of alcohol. They don't run out.

Then, she further elaborates on the differences in drinking styles between white and black social occasions:

You go to a black party, oftentimes they run out. Black people don't tend to change as much when they drink as I've seen white people change. I've seen white people carry it to the extreme. The type of parties I go to with white people, like a Christmas office party, they just go all out. They just get out there, I mean, they got smashed and they just started acting crazier and crazier.

Here's another example:

At non-black parties, or if it were at an all white party, they drink more than black parties. At black parties you do find drinking, but you find people drinking and controlling themselves in a more friendly manner; whereas my sister went to the Oakland Hills: people were getting drunk and taking their clothes off and jumping into the pool. This was a mostly white party. There were some blacks there; there were several couples. And they were just shocked because you're thinking, 'Well, I'm going to go to this party that's up in the hills, it's going to be really nice, it's got a nice layout and the best liquor that you can get.' But people were going overboard with the liquor in the sense that they were doing it. I think there is a difference between a black party and various other racial parties.

A closely related assumption that was held by blacks suggested that whites are generally inhibited and restrained when they aren't drinking, and then alcohol is needed to relax and loosen them up to
what blacks perceive is a normal level of sociability. Blacks felt that whites change very dramatically from the non-drinking to the drinking state. Another woman said:

I think both groups drink to relieve pressure or as a result of pressure, but I think white people will drink more to alter their personality and make them feel relaxed in social settings than black people will. I think black people can be... in a social setting. [and] it's obvious most of the time that you're there because you want to be; you don't really have to force yourself into a positive frame of mind. But whites don't really feel at home with themselves or around a lot of their friends, so they have to get loosened up at parties.

In general, blacks saw themselves as being more down-to-earth, more expressive, and more at ease socially than white persons across both drinking and non-drinking states. Some blacks felt that because of these tendencies, they were apt to interact more in settings when they were drinking. Although liquor was recognized and valued as an asset in sociability, blacks felt that drinking should not negatively alter social behavior and the rules of social decorum. A lot of people talked about the pressures that they felt to remain cool and in control while at a party because these are viewed as an important aspect of positive self-presentation, particularly in male/female interaction. So, a lot of value is attached to being able to handle one's liquor and not show very many signs of physical or behavioral disturbance from drinking.

In contrast to their perceptions of white parties as being loose and wild occasions where anything goes, blacks describe their own social events as incorporating a lot of expressive behavior, such as dance and music, but still as being highly controlled and highly patterned, to the point of being ritualistic and predictable. In fact, that was the occasion for some informants to criticize black parties as being too routine and uptight, while they saw whites as being more open to experimentation in allowing "time out" behavior. The following sentiments are expressed in the response of a male informant and reveal what seem to be differences between males and females, in that men preferred interracial or non-black parties because they provided a broader arena for sexual exploration.

While at black parties, people are more into the fashion world, being cool, and everything has to be just right: whereas at white parties they're loose, anything goes, I mean, reach out and they're loose. Whereas at a black party you can't do that because people are too tense.

Say like at a white party, you see three or four women,
you go and try to talk to them, they accept it; it's all right. But you try that at a black party, and there's no way it's going to get over: you're tacky, you're low class, low key. So, there's quite a difference.

Some of the other differences that people talked about with respect to white and black parties were that there were favorable socioeconomic differences between the two. They saw whites as being classier, as more often having catered affairs, and having better food, better alcohol, and oftentimes providing an opportunity for mixing with different kinds of people in different social strata.

Another major theme that emerged from people's discussions of social events was the importance of the environment. In discussing the behavior of one group in another racial setting, people were very sensitive to the fact that if a black person was in a white setting it would affect the quality of social interaction, and he was likely to be more inhibited and restrained than when in an all black environment. Similarly, respondents felt that whites would act more naturally in their own social settings than in interracial or predominantly black environments.

Informants also talked about how they modulated their own behavior with respect to particular social contexts. An intimate social setting, where one is drinking with relatives at home, is an occasion where one is likely to drink much more than at a semi-private dance or party. People were very conscious of how much to drink and how much they were going to let their hair down. Here's one guy that spoke pretty cogently to that. He says:

I like to drink at parties where I know everybody else. I don't like to drink at a really big party.

In response to my question, "Why is that?" he said:

I like to be in more control. When I drink, I think I'm under less control and less in tune with what's happening around me. When you drink your senses are dull, at least mine are when I drink. So, I like to be more in touch with what's happening when I'm at a big party or in a big crowd of people. And I hardly ever smoke at a big party.

"Smoking" refers to using marijuana.

I smoke in small crowds or at home, and I try not to smoke when I go out and stuff like that, when I'm on the street, because I like to feel — I feel it definitely hinders my sense of control to a certain extent.

The whole emphasis on control came up over and over again; respondents continually talked about how they deliberately drink very little in a bar or at a public kind of event. One gets the feeling that a drink is used as a prop to signal a certain level of social
ambience, but not necessarily to get high or drunk. You go to a dance; you're going to go to talk to a woman; you're going to go to play a game; you're going to go to show off your new clothes; you're not going to go to get smashed to the gills and lose your sense of cool.

I think the emphasis on restraint and the very conscious manner in which people talked about shifting their drinking styles and comportment are tied into a cultural complex in which individuals attributed a lot more importance to the psychological state of the drinker and to the social dimensions of drinking than they did to the inherent powers of alcohol as a substance. This belief came out in several different ways. First of all, informants recognized that alcohol has variable properties, that it has both medicinal and healing as well as destructive characteristics. Because of that, respondents tended to believe that the effects of alcohol are highly variable according to the mood of the drinker before he starts drinking and even according to the type of beverage that's drunk.

Here's a really good example of this. This guy is talking about how he feels when he drinks different alcoholic beverages:

I get different reactions. I've noticed that really fine brandy, such as, like most people say expensive cognac — I kind of take on a personality like the price says. It kind of puts me into a different class where I'm just, oh, real moderate, real calm, cool, low-keyed, everything is all right, and I have an answer to everything; whereas if I was drinking gin, I kind of get overly sexy, more aggressive, more outgoing, and I do things sometimes that I might be embarrassed the next day. Sometimes when I drink wine — well, it's mostly like playing games: dominoes, backgammon and chess — it's more or less a conversational drink I can talk with. And if I'm drinking beer, more or less it's just something to do out of boredom, plain boredom, just something to do.

He goes on to say how he chooses his drink according to his mood for the day. Although most people I talked with were not this elaborate in discussing the relationship between their moods and drinking, others referred to the concept of drinking "well." Drinking "well" means being able to maintain a positive social disposition while under the influence — not to become a crying, neurotic or obnoxious drunk. Hence, it is inadvisable to drink with people that already have problems before they start drinking because these problems are likely to worsen as they drink.

In terms of the different kinds of effects that alcohol can impart, individuals recognize the physical changes that occur in motor behavior, such as loud or slurred speech and loss of coordination.
They also described the positive effects that Ron mentioned and the functions that alcohol fills: to liven up a social setting or relax people or signal festive social behavior. And they talked about getting drunk: while drunkenness wasn't seen as an abnormal state, it was viewed pretty unfavorably because it was associated with a lack of social control that would lead to disruptive and problematic social behavior as well as to sickness and hangovers.

Although informants recognized that drinking affects physical capacity and emotional disposition, the feeling that comes out of the interview data is that blacks appear to show little tolerance for extreme personality changes or antisocial behavior in the drinker. People are believed to be able to be in control and responsible for their own behavior while they're drinking. Social norms permit persons to drink as much as they can handle, and either one controls oneself while drinking a lot of alcohol, or it's a person's responsibility not to drink to the point of losing self-control. I think there's a bridge here between recognizing that alcohol does have certain pharmacological properties, but on the other hand, feeling it's the responsibility of the drinker to monitor his drinking so that he does not get out of control.

On the same note, the only times I got descriptions of really severe kinds of personality changes or of alcohol as a very powerful disinhibitor by itself was from individuals who had a problem-drinking history. They were the kind of people who talked about a Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde kind of transformation, or felt that alcohol will ruin and kill a person. Other people didn't talk about this kind of thing at all, or they just described much milder side effects of drinking.

On an interpretive note, this kind of cultural complex which emphasizes a lot of restraint and gives a lot more consideration to the social factors involving alcohol effects is tied into prevailing norms which emphasize external social control of one's behavior and the willfulness of the drinker in being able to do either one of two things: either buffer the pharmacological effects of alcohol, or control the amount of liquor that's consumed.

This kind of difference is even carried over into the treatment personnel. Part of the study (Borker 1980) involved interviewing black and white treatment providers, and the following section I'm going to read is taken from the report. In general, black and white providers saw loss of control quite differently. The white treatment providers defined loss of control in terms of addiction, whereas the black treatment providers defined it in terms of social control and control of the person over his own behavior.

Black providers tend to reject, as do residents, the view
that drinking makes one act in ways in which one would not act when sober or, more exactly, that drinking somehow makes the behavior acceptable or less problematic. The focus by black observers is on maintaining control, drinking only what one can handle; drinking more than that is regarded as a problem.

Here is one black male counselor, in talking about drinkers, saying they don't know how to act when drunk, and so weren't, in a sense, responsible:

They were out of control, but they were in control 'cause they were acting the way they really wanted to. Alcohol doesn't put anything in you. Some people may become more aggressive; they may get into fights or arguments, or those kinds of things. Let me state something at this point: alcohol, you know, the guy says, "I did it because I was drunk." Bull. Alcohol doesn't make anybody do anything.
Discussion

**MOORE**: I'm beginning to get a little confused by what we mean to imply by the idea of disinhibition. Let me suggest the dimensions of my confusion or try to structure my confusion a little bit and see which concept we mean to imply.

When we use words like “out of control,” “time out,” “uninhibited,” and other sets of words like that, a question arises: How do we know or how do we think we know when somebody is in that state: out of control, disinhibited, “time out?” This is a little bit like the accounts question, I guess. There are two answers to that question. One is that we look at the objective character of their act and we decide whether they’re well within or well outside some normative standard for conduct in that particular situation. And the other is that we essentially look at the question of whether they would claim authorship for their acts or not; that is, whether or not they would say that the actions that they were taking were characteristic of them or the things that they wanted to show us about themselves.

It seems to me that it matters very much that we realize that those are two quite different ideas. In one case, being out of control means, “Whatever my acts are, they aren’t mine,” “Whatever it is that I’m doing it’s not me that’s doing it.” And there’s a different notion, which is: “The acts that I’m doing are quite unusual or exotic against some standard.” The relevant standard there could refer to the person’s views about how exotic it is; it could refer to the dominant views of people in that situation; it could refer to some objective conditions — for instance, how hazardous the conduct is in that particular situation. Do we mean by disinhibition a loss of authorship of acts, or do we mean a violation of norms; and if it’s a violation of norms, which norms?

**DUSTER**: I'm simply going to defer on the question of disinhibition. Robin's going to have to take that one. But in your account, you seem to assume a lot of consensus, and part of Mr. Levinson's paper was to reveal an extraordinary amount of variation within and between subcultures in the accounts given about why one was drinking, a wide variation. I spent about two and a half years in Sweden, and the reason why people say that they're drinking there is in order to become less inhibited; that is, that's the explicit
account that's given on Friday and Saturday evenings among males: "I drink in order to come outside of what I ordinarily do. I'm too inhibited ordinarily." And that's almost a culturally validated, affirmed notion of why one is drinking.

**MOORE:** But it seems to me that the significance of that statement is that the way I get the license to behave other than either I expect myself to behave or other people around me expect me to behave is by disclaiming, by saying that the acts that I'm about to engage in are no longer characteristic of me. They're temporary. They occur only when I do this thing called drinking. And since I have voluntary control over whether I drink or not, or do that in a predictable pattern, nobody need be alarmed that this conduct is really characteristic of me.

**DUSTER:** Well, it's not that clear because what they do with it is say, "That's what we Swedes do"; that is, "inside of the normative bounds, we get to this state on Friday and Saturday evenings."

**MOORE:** Okay. Which would say that if I was the only one who held the view that I could disclaim authorship from my acts, it wouldn't do me any good.

**DUSTER:** Right.

**MOORE:** So everybody else has to share that understanding that by drinking I disclaim authorship. But that's quite a different idea, and I can disclaim authorship either generally or with respect to particular kinds of substantive behavior; that is, I suspect it would be true that it would turn out that I would disclaim authorship for some acts, but not for others. And as the acts got more and more serious, the willingness of the society to indulge me by allowing me to disclaim authorship of them would diminish.

**DUSTER:** Not only is that true, it's true for Swedes with a vengeance, but it's not true in this country. For example, in Sweden, drunken driving is taken across the class structure to be a very felonious act. So that you can be a businessman of extreme wealth and —

**MOORE:** And you go to jail.

**DUSTER:** If you drink and are caught driving, there is no way to simply have your bail drawn.

**EHLERS:** From my conceptual framework, in that when I came in here with an idea of disinhibition, I didn't think of it at all in terms of accountability as being the issue. I was thinking more about the effects of alcohol, that somehow behavior is different or that some kind of constraints are lifted in order to uncover certain behavior. As Denise mentioned, the behavior could be defined by ethnic groups or it could be defined by culture, or it could be defined by individual psychological patterns, but it doesn't have to do with
how culture views what that is. I saw disinhibition as having to do rather just with the uncovering process, not the accountability for it.

I want to add another level of analysis in looking at disinhibition. I think that there is a physiological basis for it in terms of alcohol in a small percentage of people, in the sense that people have this disorder called "pathological intoxication." Some people call this disinhibition, but in fact it's a subgroup of people who actually become extremely violent following drinking alcohol, and there's a very high incidence of head injuries in these populations. This disorder is an example of the idea that a premorbid personality or premorbid physiological state can affect how disinhibition is expressed.

ROOM: Kai Pernanen, can I persuade you to comment on this? I suppose of all of us you're the one who's most responsible for there being something called "disinhibition theory."

PERNANEN: First of all, I think we're discussing two separate issues: Is there more disinhibition connected with alcohol use in this society or in this culture than in other cultures? And: What are the possible explanations?

I must say I'm as confused as Mark Moore, maybe more so, on how to approach this. I think there are many different explanations, assuming that there is disinhibited behavior. I think there are some pharmacological, physiological, biological factors which, in some people, lead to behavior described as disinhibited. Let's talk about aggression; the temporal lobe dysfunction pattern has been shown in experimental and in clinical work as related to aggressive behavior and to abnormal brain patterns which also have been related to aggressive behavior.

It's hard, also, to parcel out the potential effects of different drinking patterns that occur in different cultures. It would seem that there is a link between binge drinking that occurs over two or three days — perhaps connected with sleep deprivation, and increased stress — and a greater probability of aggression. This would explain only part, maybe the most severe part of disinhibited behavior in connection with alcohol use.

Then we have the whole, more normal range of alcohol use, where, I think, the influence of cultural beliefs is very strong. And I think these occur on many different levels. If one wants to try to analyze the different levels, there is, of course, the expectancy effect. There is the situational context of different cultures: What are the modal patterns, the modal contexts of drinking? I think all these things are relevant — I just don't know how they go together.

Not just beliefs about alcohol, as such, but also expectancies as to
alcohol are relevant. Maybe other factors in the hidden structure of beliefs are important. Maybe certain belief structures interact with the undeniable pharmacological/psychological effects of alcohol to increase disinhibited behavior in certain cultures. I'm thinking now of the stereotype of Finnish drinking, and to some extent I think it's true that Finns tend to become aggressive when they drink. We have evidence from statistics on violent crimes which show that the alcohol involvement is maybe ten percent higher, on the average, than, for example, in the United States. Of course, the Finns are very well-known for having good statistics, and also the strong temperance sentiments in Finland make it a bit hazardous to make these comparisons because Finns would tend to report alcohol use much more often and be more sensitive to alcohol use.

Well, I don't know, really. I'm aware of the complexity of these things. I think there are many different explanations in which certain factors are more relevant in certain types of behaviors than in others.

LANG: I wanted to try to draw a parallel, and maybe have people comment on it, particularly Ms. Herd. It's concerning the tendency of blacks to demonstrate less disinhibition or have less of a belief in disinhibiting effects of alcohol than whites. It's parallel to the tendency — at least in the experimental literature — for there to be less consistent belief on the part of women that alcohol serves as a disinhibitor than on the part of males. It's in line with Robin's paper on intimate dominance, in that one of the things that happens to people when they're drinking if they believe in disinhibition is that the latitude of their behavior expands somewhat; they're free to do things that they otherwise are not able to do. And for both women and blacks in this culture, one of the consequences of expanding the latitude of behavior for whatever reason is that they may become considerably more vulnerable than they are under other circumstances. That that may be part of the reason why there's not as great a disinhibiting effect in either females or blacks, because the society in general is not going to let them get away with it to the extent that they do the dominant members of the culture or the dominant groups of the culture.

Does that make any sense?

HERD: Yes.

ROOM: There's a strong theme in the literature on Jewish drinking that there were very good reasons, historically, for the Jews to control their behavior while drinking. I've always been a little suspicious of that theme. It seems that Jewish drinking patterns are really over-explained by the literature; there are so many explanations offered, all of which can't possibly be true at
DISCUSSION

Once. But it is certainly a theme that would fit the notion that you're putting forward.

LANG: Yes.

MACANDREW: One of the ways one can think about control is in terms of the sort of imagery people might apply to themselves or have applied to them — imagery based on standards of excellence, of sophistication, of propriety, of "style," or what have you. And in this regard, Denise's reference to "cool" is apt. I got interested in the etymology of the word some years ago, and I think I was correct in tracing it back to black argot and specifically black jazz argot, and more specifically still to the characterization of the sort of music that came out of Lester Young's horn. If you compare Lester Young with other major jazz tenormen of the '30s and early '40s — Chu Berry, Hershel Evans, Coleman Hawkins, people of that sort — there is a kind of controlled understatement that is absolutely and unfailingly recognizable. I would only add that it's one of the more cruel ironies that Lester Young drank himself to death.

ROOM: I can't resist calling on Charlie Winick at this point, who's written in this general area. Do you have anything to add?

WINICK: Well, you're absolutely right in the derivation of the word and the concept and the music — in fact we were talking earlier at lunch about the relationship between the quality of different kinds of popular music, the substances that were used by the musicians, and the degree of acceptance by the society of the musician and the music. I think they're all related, and one can trace this from the beginning of the Twentieth Century right down to the present and see a very clear and positive parallel among all three dimensions.

HERD: I'm just going to respond to Mr. Lang's comment about a kind of social stratification hypothesis. I think that may be one contributing factor, but I think there are other interesting things to explore. One is just the fact that blacks come from a culture where there's a long tradition of indigenous use of alcohol, and possibly there has been some continuity in terms of related mechanisms of social control. Another possibility is a structural hypothesis that, since black culture has a very communalistic and familialistic social structure, there's a stronger emphasis on external social control of one's behavior.

There are other things that might be added to the pot. For example, there is the contrast between Joy Leland's account of what happened during contact with the Indians and what happened with blacks. Their experiences seem totally different, even though you have two peoples that are in a similar position in the social structure. Blacks had a big temperance movement at the same time
there is evidence of a lot of disorganized social behavior around Indian drinking.

LANG: Yes. That hypothesis certainly doesn't explain the Indian phenomenon very well. I'm sure the anthropologists will shudder at this because I know virtually nothing about Indians, but it would seem that one possibility would be that Indians did not perceive themselves to be under the control of white men, whereas blacks may have; and that may have been an important factor in determining whether there was a disinhibiting effect of alcohol.

ROIZEN: This business of what we drink for is a little bit confusing. To give you the picture of two separate cultural complexes in a cross-national analysis I'm doing, we see on the one hand a country — Scotland — where drinking for relaxation is denied, at least in questionnaire data; people say they drink for sociability, not for the psychotropic effects. In Zambia, on the other hand, people seem to drink for psychotropic motivations, and the social control of drinking that goes along with those psychotropic motivations seems to be based on statuses, which is to say middle-aged men get to drink and young women don't get to drink and so on. So you have a social control based much more on social status, much less on the Scottish notion that there should be a universal moderation norm.

So, as the drinking moves away from being based on traditional status relationships and moves toward a more universalistic model in the Scottish data — and I leave myself open here to accusations of all forms of cultural evolutionary mayhem and anachronism — we see a movement away from traditional statuses defining social control as a question of access — who gets to drink versus who does not get to drink — and move toward a situation where a universal moderation norm replaces those questions of access, so that access to drinking is much greater across the statuses in Scotland. In line with this, it is no longer appropriate to report a motivation like, “I drink to relax,” “I drink to loosen up,” or “I drink to forget my worries,” for most people responding to a Scottish questionnaire.

In thinking about the particular patterns in those two cultural sets, I wonder if it doesn’t provide the beginnings of an answer to this issue of: If you're going to drink to loosen up, how can you use the loosening up you did as an account for what you did while you were loosened up?

EHLERS: Exactly.

ROIZEN: It may be, then, that as a result of the movement from old culture to new culture, the break: apart of the cake of culture and the rise of universalist drinking norms, we find the equivalent rise of a norm of moderation, which then, in turn implies getting rid
of drinking for psychotropic effects as a legitimate motivation for drinking — motivation not in the personal or psychological sense of motivation, but motivation in the sense of reflecting an appropriate normative framework in which to locate the act. The rise of universalism imposes on us as a logical necessity that we can no longer say that we drink for relaxation. Now, I realize that's very pristine and very neat, I wonder if you would have any comments on it, Mac Marshall.

MARSHALL: My only comment is that my Scottish-born grandfather always told me that Scots drank Scotch whiskey because haggis was so horrible.

PERNANEN: I already brought up Finnish drinking here. When Ron brings up the question of drinking for physiological reasons, for relaxation, this connects in with the existing ideas about Finnish drinking as drinking for the purpose of becoming disinhibited. I have some results from an interview study which was carried out in Thunder Bay, Ontario. We had an over-sampling of people of Finnish origin in our interview sample. We asked them the standard questions about why they drink, and there are some remarkable differences among the people born in Canada who are not of Finnish origin — we left out the immigrants from other countries — the Finnish people who were born in Canada, and Finnish people who were born in Finland. Drinking for relaxation, for the assumed pharmacological effects such as “because it helps me sleep,” “because it helps me forget my problems for a while,” “because it perks me up when I’m tired or in a bad mood,” are much more prevalent in the Finnish sample and are especially high among the Finns who had immigrated to Canada. As an example, perhaps I should quote some percentages: “Because it helps me relax when I’m tense or restless,” 50 percent among the non-Finnish who were born in Canada, 65 percent among the Finns who were born in Canada and 74 percent among Finns who were born in Finland. This is perhaps the most extreme example, but the pattern is clear. But when we ask if they drink “because of the taste,” the pattern is completely reversed: of non-Finnish people born in Canada, 59 percent said that this was important to them, of Finnish people born in Canada, 45 percent, and of Finnish people who were born in Finland, 33 percent. So it's quite a reversal, and I think it points to the importance of this type of factor.

MARLATT: One of the things that I got out of the three presentations in this session was a realization of the importance of the influence of the situational, environmental or setting factors on drinking. And also what Troy Duster said about looking at the policymakers and their expectations and set made me think of an
example where these two sets of factors were, in fact, interacting in a way that increased not only drinking but aggression. This example comes from my own first drinking experiences in my home town of Vancouver, B.C.

When I was there, beer parlors were set up so that women and escorts were on one side of the beer parlor and men in the other. And the laws at the same time said, "There shall be no music, there shall be no food, there shall be no walking around except to go to the toilet." If you were a man alone, there was no way that you could get over to the other side of the beer parlor. On the men's side, the floors were basically cement covered with sawdust; the tables were round, steel tables because it was suspected that not only did men drink a lot but they would get sick, throw up on the floor, and break furniture. And lots of fights did start breaking out around eleven, or twelve o'clock — mostly, I think, through the frustration of the men not being able to get on the other side of the barrier. Then everybody was let out at the same time at twelve o'clock, and thousands and thousands of men were all dumped on Main Street in Vancouver — because all the beer parlors were together — and numerous brawls would break out. And the more they tried to control the behavior by controlling the setting, the more the behavior went out of control. In the '60s, when they finally took down the barriers between the two parts of the beer parlor, there was all this concern that the new rugs on the floor and the new furniture would be immediately destroyed. But violent behavior and so forth did not occur. Overnight, total situational control.

And I contrast that with my current observations in Seattle: Two different liquor control boards, two different ideas about human behavior, creating two different kinds of settings which have very big impacts on behavior. So it seems that there really are interactions in lots of different ways.

MOORE: I'm less confused now. Or at least I had a moment of clarity. I don't want to lose it. It seems to me that there's one question which we want to answer — and I take it the discussion of Day One sought to answer — and that was: Does the distribution of views about the meaning of drinking matter in the production of the behavior that we see among drinkers generally throughout the society, and the consequences that they and the society as a whole take as a result of the drinking. I don't think it takes very long at all to get to the stage where you're prepared to say, "I think it matters" — the fact that we have views about drinking and what it means matters in terms of the behavior that we support as a result, either as individuals or collectively.

Now, then, having established that, what we've said is: There's an
opportunity for understanding and maybe even shaping the nature of the alcohol problem, whatever it is, in the society, an opportunity that comes from understanding what those views are and conceivably shaping them as well. So we've got a new independent variable in our understanding of what's going on with respect to drinking and its consequences generally in the population, and that's called "views about the meaning of drinking."

It seems to me a lot of the discussion we've been having today involves first, what are the possible contents of those views; that is, in what dimensions could we array or how should we describe the sets of views that are held, and how do they relate to the drinking and its consequences? Second, what produces and sustains either individual or collectively shared views of drinking. And third, what is the distribution of views about these things in the society? Does that sound to everybody else like what's been going on, or not? Because if it is viewed that way, then it seems to me we're making some progress with respect to understanding our agenda.

LEVINE: We're definitely making progress.
Drinking and Disinhibition in Popular Culture

Charles Winick

What kind of a connection is there between alcohol-related disinhibition and "prepared communication," or the content of drama, fiction, biography, newspapers and magazines, advertising, popular music, movies, jokes, and television, in America and other cultures? To attempt even a partial answer to this question involves examination of a vast amount of material, because Americans not only spend time with today's mass media but may be reading, listening to, and watching earlier materials at school or via reruns or revivals. A conventional content analysis is unable to assess the impact of a particularly powerful or timely publication or work of art, since every book or movie has the same weight as every other book or movie. A more qualitative review, citing appropriate significant content, may be useful.

The discussion that follows is concerned with materials that are relevant today. Thus, the 19th century American play, The Drunkard, is not mentioned, even though it was popular for over half a century, because its message has so little to do with contemporary America and it is no longer revived.

Drama

Disinhibited behavior resulting from drinking appears in the very first drama of Western civilization, The Bacchae. It is the only play to survive of the many dramas by which the votaries of Dionysius honored their god of the vine. In Euripides' play, also called The Bacchae (405 B.C.), King Pentheus of Thebes refuses to welcome Dionysius, the giver of wine, and instead orders Dionysius to be chained and imprisoned. Pentheus, disguising himself as a woman, attempts to spy on the drunken maenads, one of whom is his mother. While drunk, she tears her son limb from limb and impales his head on her staff.
The Elizabethan era had substantial drinking, which Shakespeare used in 36 of his 37 plays (Williams 1969). He dealt with comic, realistic, and moral aspects of drinking but frequently presented alcohol as a precursor of uninhibited and disturbed behavior which can have grave consequences. An example of the awful effects of drinking too much can be found in *Othello* (1604), often said to be Shakespeare's greatest play, performed more often than any other, and essayed by almost every noted actor. The entire denouement derives from Iago, the principle of evil, getting Cassio to drink so much that Cassio gets involved in a street brawl. Cassio's participation in the brawl leads to dismissal from his military assignment. The dismissal leads to a series of events which end with Othello's strangling his wife Desdemona and stabbing himself.

The writer who contributed more than any other to the modern drama, Henrik Ibsen, was a moralist who was keenly aware of the ways in which alcohol often led people to do things they didn't intend. In *Hedda Gabler* (1891), perhaps his best play, the heroine destroys a manuscript of a writer who is competing with her husband. The writer, a former drunkard whom Hedda was lured back to liquor, assumed that he lost the manuscript in a drunken brawl, and kills himself. As in *Othello*, the rest of the play derives from the tragic consequences of his drinking.

Maxim Gorki, the Russian contemporary of Ibsen, achieved the greatest triumph in the history of the Moscow Art Theatre with *The Lower Depths* (1902). Several of the derelicts in the play drink heavily. When the ex-actor Satin gets drunk, he hangs himself. A drunken brawl leads to the lodging house's proprietor's being killed and several other characters going to prison.

A number of Gorki-like characters are to be found in the early plays of Eugene O'Neill, the premier American playwright. Alcohol is presented ambivalently in the plays of O'Neill. *Anna Christie* (1921) drinks in order to adapt to her work as a prostitute, and the habitues of a waterfront saloon, in this and other O'Neill plays, cannot face the world beyond the saloon. There is the implication that Hickey, the hero of *The Iceman Cometh* (1946), has killed his wife while drunk. In *Desire Under the Elms* (1925), drinking leads to infanticide. Many of O'Neill's characters need alcohol to survive, but for some of them, alcohol leads to violence, murder, and suicide.

One of the all-time successes of the American stage, Leon Gordon's *White Cargo* (1923), involves an idealistic Englishman who married the half-caste Tondilayo, in Africa. After he begins drinking, he "goes native," disintegrating completely. In another very successful play of the 1920s, which takes place in an American
speakeasy, an aristocrat who has been drinking heavily seduces a helpless and innocent young woman in Preston Sturges' *Strictly Dishonorable* (1929).

Probably the most distinguished living American playwright, Tennessee Williams, is almost obsessed by the harm that can be done by drinking that removes constraints. In *The Glass Menagerie* (1945), Tom runs away from home after drinking, as his father had done before him. In *A Streetcar Named Desire* (1948), on the night that Stella Kowalski has a baby, her husband Stanley gets drunk and attacks his sister-in-law Blanche. Blanche, a former alcoholic, smashases a whisky bottle and uses the jagged edges against Stanley. The stage directions read, "Blanche has been drinking steadily." She is committed to a mental hospital. In Williams' *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof* (1955), Skipper drinks heavily, behaves in a bizarre way, and dies.

Drinking which leads to similarly uninhibited and destructive behavior is also the theme of Edward Albee's *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?* (1962). The play was sufficiently distasteful to the trustees of the Pulitzer Prize for them to overrule their own committee, which had voted to honor the play. As the two married couples in *Virginia Woolf* drink continuously through the night, they become more and more abusive to each other and Martha commits adultery with Nick. The characters' marathon of drinking has precipitated their saying and doing things which were concealed below the surface and would not otherwise have emerged. The play is often revived and has been made into a film, like other Albee plays.

**Fiction**

A number of the world's greatest novelists reflected and expressed the view that alcohol led to the most frightening and unacceptable kinds of behavior.

In Feodor Dostoevski's *The Brothers Karamazov* (1880), frequently cited as the best novel ever written, alcohol is directly related to violence and destructive behavior. When the father, himself a sot, is found robbed and dead, his oldest son Dimitri is arrested while in a drunken orgy with his mistress Grushenka. Although he is erroneously convicted, Dostoevski raises the possibility that the alcohol could have led Dimitri to kill his father. In other novels, Dostoevski similarly suggests that alcohol can lead to many kinds of ferocity. A related theme runs through much of the fiction of Leo Tolstoi. Dostoevski's compatriot.
How fiction may reflect the changing nature of alcoholism in a society emerges from a study of the appearance of what Jellinek called the gamma alcoholic in early English fiction (McCormick 1969). From 1750 to 1830, heavy and addictive drinking is described in fiction, but it is usually picaresque and does not become tragic and desperate until novels published after 1830. By the time of Dickens' *David Copperfield* (1850), Mr. Wickfield is drinking himself into such a stupor over his evening port that his legal trusts can be seized by Uriah Heep. In Dickens' *Bleak House* (1852), Krook, who is drunk, steals some important papers and kills himself by spontaneous combustion. Similar gamma alcoholics appear in English fiction later in the 19th century when industrialism was beginning to upset the balance of society and because the novel mirrored the society very closely.

The Victorian novelists were likely to be very concerned about the severely disinhibitory effects of alcohol. Thomas Hardy, in *The Mayor of Casterbridge* (1886), has the principal character sell his wife and daughter at a village fair, while in a drunken stupor. His action horrifies and later haunts him, after he becomes sober.

The French novelist Emile Zola had written many novels before *L'Assommoir* (1878), an epic of alcohol, made him the most famous writer of his country. The title, usually translated as *The Dram Shop*, actually communicates Zola's view of the disinhibitory effects of liquor. The verb *assommer* means to hit someone to the point of the victim's becoming severely injured, often dying. What Zola meant by the title was that the cabarets where workers went to get drunk were places where alcohol assaulted them until the drinkers lost their capacity for reasoning. In this and other Zola novels, the miners and factory workers who frequent dram shops often commit crimes of violence and assault their wives while under the influence of drink.

In *La Bête Humaine* (1885), Zola presents a railroad conductor who loses his capacity for judgment while drunk and drives the train into a dreadful crash. Zola was convinced that alcohol led people to be less prepared for the Darwinian struggle for existence which, according to him, characterized France in the late 19th century.

Although another 19th century writer, Arthur Conan Doyle, was not a moralist like Zola, he was quite concerned about alcohol and it frequently figures in the Sherlock Holmes tales. Dr. Watson, companion of the world's greatest detective, loosens his tongue and summons enough courage to reprimand Holmes for taking cocaine only after Watson has some glasses of red burgundy wine after lunch (Blacker 1974).
In Holmes' case of The Illustrious Client, a criminal who becomes drunk foolishly shows a book containing the record of his misdeeds to a woman who tells Holmes what she has seen. In The Sign of Four, an army major "...took to drinking..." and fled with a treasure. Holmes and Watson are moderate drinkers who enjoy a whisky and soda at the end of the day; many of the criminals they pursue, in contrast, drink heavily and their doing so is directly related to their misdeeds, and sometimes to their being apprehended.

Alcohol as a disinhibitor was a focus of the first novel of Swedish novelist Selma Lagerlof, who won the Nobel Prize in 1909. The Saga of Gosta Berling (1898) deals with an intelligent minister who has had too much to drink. Under the influence, he mocks his bishop. Realizing that his career has been ruined by this indiscretion, he becomes a recluse.

American literature has a special relationship to alcohol in that three Nobel Prize winners — Eugene O'Neill, Sinclair Lewis, and William Faulkner — were probably alcoholics, and two others, Ernest Hemingway and John Steinbeck, were hard drinkers (Kazin 1976). Dorothy Parker, John O'Hara, Thomas Wolfe, John Cheever, J. P. Marquand, Dashiell Hammett, and other famous creators of fiction were, at the very least, heavy drinkers. Novelist Upton Sinclair was so disturbed by the number of his writing contemporaries who were alcoholic that he wrote a book about them (Cup of Fury, 1956). He discusses the heavy drinking of Jack London, George Sterling, Edna St. Vincent Millay, Maxwell Bodenheim, "F. Scotch Fitzgerald," H. L. Mencken, William Seabrook, Sherwood Anderson, Theodore Dreiser, Horace Liveright, Hart Crane, Eugene O'Neill, O. Henry, Stephen Crane, and Sinclair Lewis, all of whom were his friends.

There is no other country in which so many writers of both popular and literary fiction were either alcoholics or heavy drinkers. Their relationship to liquor ranged from that of a Raymond Chandler, who could write only while so drunk that he was near death, with 24-hour-a-day nurses to keep him alive, to Ring Lardner, who went on extended benders but wrote only when sober, to Sinclair Lewis, who routinely drank while he wrote. Although these American writers were of course aware of the health consequences of their drinking, O'Hara was the only one who stopped completely, at age 48, after being rushed to a hospital with life-threatening symptoms. Some of the writers died very young because of alcohol-related conditions and others survived longer but also died from conditions exacerbated by liquor.

These writers had varied attitudes toward presenting alcohol as a subject in fiction. Some were like Horatio Alger, the alcoholic...
creator of so much success-oriented fiction in the 19th century, and never alluded to it. Others often wrote about alcohol and yet others sometimes did. In terms of considering alcohol’s relationship to the American writer, William James’ dictum is probably relevant: “Wherever you go your Giant goes with you.” Whether or not a writer is a heavy drinker is likely to affect the content of his work, whereas the alcoholism of a composer like Stephen Foster could have little impact on the content of his music.

William Faulkner’s alcoholism did affect his novels. Faulkner grew up in a South in which it was manly to drink, but he later moved in other circles in which drinking was disapproved, and his ambivalence can be seen in several of his novels. In *Requiem for a Nun* (1951), Nancy Mannigoe is so unaware when drunk that she kills Temple Drake’s child. In this novel, Faulkner presents alcohol not only as the cause of ultimate disinhibited behavior but also as a substance which enables us to transcend ourselves. Nancy is everything that our society despises, but she is also saintlike. The same kind of dichotomy is found in what is undoubtedly the best novel ever written about an alcoholic, Malcolm Lowry’s *Under the Volcano* (1947). Disinhibition is too mild a word to describe the hero’s disintegration, although alcohol enables him to achieve the extraordinary. The hero ultimately is killed by hoodlums but actually dies of drinking. Lowry, whose early death resulted from alcoholism, relates the hero’s drinking to the violence and imminent war of 1939.

Such literary novels are quite different from bestselling novels. A major literary novel like *Under the Volcano* may sell modestly but influence subsequent generations and be studied in schools and colleges. A bestseller could sell millions of copies in a few months and have substantial impact on people who do not read literary novels. In the case of either kind of writer, they are expressing a personal vision, which flows from their experience and world view.

In the post World War II years, fiction about suburban life became a significant part of both bestsellers and serious literature. Short stories by John Cheever (“The Housebreaker of Shady Hill,” 1958) and John Updike (“The Music School,” 1966), originally appearing in *The New Yorker*, have conveyed a detailed picture of life in upper middle class suburbs. In their short stories and novels, Updike and Cheever suggest that there is a lot of drinking among suburbanites, often at parties, and that it is frequently followed by bizarre behavior and adultery. Typically, one spouse drinks heavily, finds someone else’s spouse who is similarly situated, and they go off together, to the discomfiture of the remaining mates.

Cheever and Updike are unusual in being both literary writers
and bestsellers. At the very top of all lists of bestselling novels is Jacqueline Susann's *Valley of the Dolls* (1969). Although the novel is more concerned with psychoactive pills (the "dolls"), there is also considerable drinking. The heroine drinks too much before going to the theatre for what was to be her comeback and passes out in the street. Her understudy takes over and the opportunity for a comeback is gone. Alcohol is presented as a substance which leads people to behave self-destructively, in terms of careers, sex, and interpersonal relations.

Social scientists have suggested some reasons for the widely held belief that drinking among American Jews is culturally conditioned and seldom leads to alcoholism (Snyder 1958). It is reassuring, in terms of the consonance between social science and fiction, that drinking and alcoholism hardly ever figure in the many novels written about American Jews, either older classics like Meyer Levin's *The Old Bunch* (1937) and Henry Roth's *Call It Sleep* (1934), or in the work of contemporary Jewish writers like Bernard Malamud, Philip Roth, and Nobel Prize winner Saul Bellow.

A content study of American bestselling novels from 1900 to 1904 and 1946 to 1950 found alcohol to be a ubiquitous subject, with a tendency for an increase in its dysfunctional effects in the more recent period (Pfautz 1962). The image of the intoxicated person was fairly consistent, affecting the ability to verbalize, sloppy appearance, memory confusion, muscular coordination, and other aspects of loss of control. Overall, there was a widely shared positive image of drinking, and alcohol was treated in increasingly naturalistic terms.

The manner in which alcoholism is described in fiction influences different publics, among which are drinkers and members of the helping professions. The University of Washington School of Nursing uses literary works as one way of exposing students to concepts, theories, and realities of alcoholism (Estes and Madden 1975). Literary works were found to be helpful in the development of empathy and understanding among student nurses. Similar outcomes might be expected from the use of other arts and media materials in the training of professionals working with alcoholics.

**Biography**

A small but important aspect of American literature is the celebrity biography or autobiography that candidly discusses the drinking of its subject. Jack London wrote a whole book about his
life with liquor (John Barleycorn, 1913). Gene Fowler’s biography of actor John Barrymore, Good Night, Sweet Prince (1944), details the actor’s unpredictable behavior after drinking. Barrymore was generally believed to be the inspiration for the character of Norman Maine in the movie A Star Is Born. His daughter Diana wrote of her career as an alcoholic in Too Much, Too Soon (1957). Singer Lillian Roth told a similar story in I’ll Cry Tomorrow (1954).

These books, which were enormously successful, are typical of many such biographies. They uniformly present a picture of the drinker's complete disregard of the proprieties, conventions, and expectations of appearance, behavior, and speech. Friends could not recognize the celebrities after they had been drinking. In every case, the celebrity's career was in ruins.

Newspapers and Magazines

Most Americans read a newspaper every day. If newspapers gave prominence to stories about alcohol’s releasing the drinker’s inhibitions so that he or she committed crimes of violence or used an automobile to kill or injure others, such content could be important. Over half the 31 American newspapers sampled during a representative week in one study carried no reports relating drinking to driving (Breed and DeFoe 1978). The role of alcohol in stories about other crimes was practically nonexistent, although criminologists usually connect drinking with a substantial proportion of murder, assault, and sex offenses.

The relative paucity of newspaper stories linking alcohol to road accidents and crime may reflect many factors: a feeling that such material is not newsworthy, protection of privacy, nonavailability of data from courts and police, a sense that such news has a moral dimension, and the like.

In some spectacular recent newspaper stories, the alcohol-disinhibition connection has been made. Representative John Jenrette’s defense for taking a bribe in the 1980 Abscam trial was that he had been given so much “FBI booze” that he lost his powers to discriminate. His wife noted that while drunk, Jenrette was “...undressed and lying in the arms of a woman who I knew was old enough to be his mother” (Associated Press 1980). The Congress- man was convicted of bribery and conspiracy. Such a widely disseminated story could, of course, have enormous impact.

In 1974, similar newspaper publicity was accorded Representative Wilbur Mills, one of the most staid and respected members of Congress and its chief expert on tax matters. After
heavy drinking in Washington one evening in the company of a striptease dancer, he fell into a water fountain, and couldn't remember who he was when police came to get him out of the fountain. He subsequently appeared on a Boston burlesque stage with Fanne Fox, the dancer.

Newspapers all over America gave very extensive coverage to the details of Mills' postdrinking behavior. Columnists like Jack Anderson regularly carry reports on congressional leaders whose judgment is presumably impaired because they have been drinking heavily. For some years Anderson published columns about congressmen with important national defense committee assignments who would be too drunk to stand up or speak coherently at committee hearings.

Magazines have long carried fiction and articles concerned with alcohol and its effects. One content analysis of magazine articles from 1900 through 1966 concluded that there has been a tendency, in recent decades, to view drinking problems more naturalistically (Linsky 1970-71). However, there is an emergent type of exposé magazine, beginning with Confidential in the 1950s and represented by People, U.S. Star Weekly, and the National Enquirer today. These gossip magazines carry exposés on public figures and a substantial number of the articles, usually containing photographs, deal with the celebrity as alcoholic. Over one-fifth of the stories in Confidential claimed that their subjects were alcoholics or had a severe drinking problem which led to destructive behavior (Winick 1962a). Alcoholic celebrities, mostly actors, were said to be nude in public, falling in the street, assaulting others, and forgetting their lines.

The public seems to enjoy such material, judging from the proliferation of gossip magazines. We presumably feel better, knowing that our betters are engaged in alcoholic acting-out. Celebrities must decide whether to deny the charges, and thus give them further currency, or ignore them. The serious consequences of such stories can be seen from a current lawsuit alleging malicious libel, filed by actress Carol Burnett against the Enquirer, for calling her an alcoholic.

The magazine reports of alcoholic acting-out by celebrities get much more attention than the reports about famous people who were alcoholic but have recovered, such as Wilbur Mills, astronaut Buzz Aldrin, or entertainer Dick Van Dyke. Bad news about the famous is more newsworthy than good news.
Advertising

Over half a billion dollars are spent each year to advertise alcoholic beverages. The amount and effect of this advertising has been questioned by writers (Anderson 1978) and congressional investigators (Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 1976). The advertising of no major industry is scrutinized as carefully as the messages for alcohol, which are examined by Federal agencies, State groups, and voluntary self-regulatory media watchdogs. Advertising for distilled spirits does not appear on radio or television. Less than 2 percent of the total advertising expenditures in the United States are for beer, wine, and spirits.

Because of restrictions on alcohol advertising, it almost never directly discusses properties or effects of the product. A content analysis of alcohol advertisements in national magazines concluded that indirect appeals such as wealth-prestige-success, social approval, relaxation-leisure, pleasure, exotic associations, individualistic behavior, and sex predominate (Breed and DeFoe 1979).

It would be absurd to suggest that alcohol advertising contains material which relates disinhibitory behavior to drinking. However, Key (1976) has argued that alcohol advertising is especially likely to contain covert "embeds" dealing with mutilation, death, and sex. It is possible that these covert letters and shapes appear more frequently in liquor advertising than in any other kind of sales messages. If such material is being communicated subliminally, it might be related to disinhibitory behavior.

Popular Music

Attitudes toward liquor in popular music are especially important because such music is a major vehicle for socialization and communication of ideologies for young people. It provides a vocabulary of emotion and a context for courtship and personal relationships. Prior to the beginning of the modern rock epoch in 1954, popular music appealed to all age groups. When rock became salient, it was of primary interest to those under 25 (Winick 1968). For young people, rock music became the single most important mass medium, in terms of ideology.

Because the new record companies were run by young people, the composers were young, and performers were young, there was an extraordinary ability to identify with the new music. The availability of inexpensive radios and high fidelity sets made the music available even for youths who could not afford to buy records.
Rock music content differed substantially from the operetta-based Tin Pan Alley songs from World War I through the 1950s and from pre-World War I jazz.

During the first 20 years of the century, when jazz was emerging in New Orleans, alcohol figured prominently in its lyrics. It was an upbeat rather than disinhibitory influence, as in the songs of Jelly Roll Morton. Alcohol did not figure significantly in the Tin Pan Alley songs of the 1934-1953 "pop" era. However, throughout the period since World War I, alcohol has been a subject of country music. Such music, which used to be confined to a regional appeal, has recently entered the mainstream with singers like Johnny Cash, Dolly Parton, and Willie Nelson becoming national superstars.

In a content analysis of 275 popular country music songs from 1975, 30 communicated some values concerning alcohol use (Beckley and Chalfant 1979). Although most of the songs suggest that drinking is normal, alcohol is also simultaneously presented as ruinous, leading to disgrace and destruction of family life. Earlier country songs deal with moonshine and drunken drivers who kill people. A recent (1978) Dolly Parton song ("Me and Little Andy"), discusses a child whose drunken mother has run away. An early song ("The Drunken Driver," 1938) deals with a drunk who runs over two youngsters. As they die in his arms, he realizes that they are his own children.

A number of country singers (Bob Wills, Ernest Tubb) see alcohol's contributing to failure. Others (Merle Haggard, Hank Thompson) relate drinking to the disappearance of love (Morgan 1981). The singer drinks because his love has gone, with descriptive titles like "Here I Am Drunk Again" (1960), "Blues Plus Booze" (1966), "From the Bottle to the Bottom" (1969), and "She's Actin' Single, I'm Drink'n Doubles" (1976).

Since much popular music is played in bars and nightclubs where liquor is served, there is a tacit connection between enjoying the music and loosening oneself up by drinking (Winick 1961, 1962b). In popular musicians' folklore, however, liquor is usually considered to be an inadequate substitute for other drugs, as in the lyrics of Andy Kirk's "All the Jive Is Gone" (Decca, 1936). ... Kirk's lyrics, although almost half a century old, accurately express the longstanding dichotomy among musicians between taking liquor and other drugs. Because liquor can lead to aggression, rowdiness, and loss of control, it is considered inferior to other substances by many composers, lyricists, and audiences.

Alcohol's effects in leading to disinhibition are not significant themes in recent rock music, with the exception of singer Janis
Joplin, who appeared on stage with a bottle of Southern Comfort so often that the distiller gave her a gift of cash and a fur coat (Freedman 1973). Joplin, who died in 1970 of a mixture of alcohol and heroin, conveyed the impression that drinking enabled her to unleash enormous energy and feeling in her music. The image of Joplin as a great singer who had to drink to loosen herself up for a performance was more important than the lyrics she sang. She was unusual because so many other famous singers and performers used drugs other than alcohol. Joplin’s unexpected and widely publicized death at 27 at the peak of her fame has served to reinforce the presumed connection between alcohol and the ability of a singer to make contact with, and extend, her talent. Most other rock musicians found that alcohol interfered with their ability to perform.

It is likely that there are substantial individual differences in how alcohol affects the creativity of musicians and other artists (Winick and Nyswander 1961). During the 10 years in which he was drunk almost every night, Maurice Utrillo painted masterpieces. On the other hand, his contemporary Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec lost his vitality after he began drinking heavily. Individual differences, the functions served by the alcohol, its social context, and alcohol’s place in the life cycle of the musician or other artist could contribute to the extent to which alcohol releases or suppresses creativity.

Movies

The movie audience is young. Persons between 12 and 29 represent 39 percent of the population, but 72 percent of movie admissions. The social nature of the moviegoing situation makes it likely that a film will be discussed by the young people who no longer just “go to the movies” but engage in selective exposure. Films may be shown on television for decades after their original release and reach vast audiences over time.

Hollywood has been interested in alcohol since Ten Nights in a Bar Room (1903). By 1909, D. W. Griffith had made two films about drinking. Several scandals involving heavy drinking by movie stars in the 1920s, notably Fatty Arbuckle’s 1921 party at which an actress died, led to great public awareness of drinking in movies, as well as in the private lives of movie stars.

Movies are usually identified in terms of their directors, although the director typically works as a member of a studio team. Since the 1950s and the decline of the studio system, financing is generally
obtained for each film from banks and there is more concern about the themes and subjects of films than was true in the days when studios made products which had assured audiences. There is thus greater sensitivity in recent years to how the audiences will respond to content concerned with alcoholism.

What proportion of feature films deal with disinhibited behavior resulting from alcohol? During the decade of the 1960s, approximately 5 percent of the films released by the American studios contained such content to some significant extent.

Of 231 feature films released in 1971, 3 or 1 percent had such content, to any significant extent. Of 168 feature films released in 1972, 9 or 7 percent included such material. The very low 1971 figure may be quite atypical, because 1971 was the year in which President Nixon announced a major antidrug initiative and the movie studios were concerned about their patriotic duty to assist in the crusade. In general, there is a homeostatic relationship in semiregulated media like movies and television between the representation of alcohol and that of other drugs, so that when one goes up, the other goes down.

In *City Lights* (1931), the rich capitalist, when sober, regards Charlie Chaplin’s Little Tramp as an offensive miscreant and rejects him. When in his cups, he generously welcomes the Tramp and gives him gifts and food. Chaplin seems to be suggesting the conflict within Americans, between the cruelty and callousness of sobriety and the unfettered amiability of drink. A number of the one-reelers that made Chaplin the world’s leading film personality, like *Caught in a Cabaret* (1914) and *The Face on the Barroom Floor* (1915), presented people who drank so much that they lost their bearings, dignity, and inhibitions, engaging in behavior that was completely unimaginable when they were sober.

The Motion Picture Code of self-regulation, which dominated the medium from 1930 through 1968, prohibited the use of liquor “...when not required by the plot for proper characterization....” Since the rating system began in 1968, such restrictions no longer apply. The pre-1968 films probably contain more overt and serious disinhibitory behavior, since it could be balanced by the drinker’s subsequently suffering, going into treatment, or dying. The post-1968 films are under no obligation to present such outcomes and therefore can show a drinker engaging in extraordinary disinhibitory behavior but not suffering any consequences.

Before and after the code, alcoholism has been of more interest to American films than to the films of any other country. For a special September 1978 program in London, dealing with 15 representative films concerned with alcoholism since 1932, 13 were American (Cook and Lewington 1979).
Some Examples of Disinhibition

Several major films deal with the Hollywood celebrity whose career disintegrates because of drinking while his female protege becomes a star. In *What Price Hollywood?* (1932) and the two versions of *A Star Is Born* (1937, 1954), the male drinker becomes sloppy, willful, and insulting. In *A Star Is Born*, one of the most notable scenes presents Norman Maine so drunk that he disrupts an Academy Award presentation, shuffling up to the stage and unable to speak clearly.

Memorable for a different kind of alcohol-induced disinhibition is *The Hucksters* (1947). Advertising agency president Adolph Menjou has been drinking at home, awaiting the arrival of guests Clark Gable and Deborah Kerr. He drinks with them, and has more liquor at the nightclub they visit. Menjou feels so unfettered that he discloses, to the dismay of his wife and guests, how he sent an anonymous tip on his employer's tax evasion activities to the government, sending the employer to jail and ultimate death and permitting Menjou to take over the business. The alcohol has triggered an indiscreet confession which he regrets and which irreparably damages his relationship to his wife and friends.

Perhaps the most famous scenes in the 1945 movie made from Charles Jackson’s 1944 novel *The Lost Weekend* are those involving disinhibited behavior while drinking: the hero's being caught attempting to steal from a woman’s purse, his stealing from his own cleaning woman, or attempting to pawn his typewriter on a religious holiday. The film was considered important enough to be the subject of a special editorial in the *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol* (Current Notes 1945-46). The film won so many awards and was so successful that its images of drinking surely registered with many Americans. One of the ways in which *The Lost Weekend* influenced later treatments is that its hero was an upper middle class writer, so that the behavior that might ordinarily be expected from him contrasted sharply with the amoral and uninhibited nature of his behavior while under the influence.

The alcoholic's thinking the unthinkable is also vividly presented in *Come Fill the Cup* (1951). James Cagney is an important newspaper editor who discusses alcohol thoughtfully and intelligently. Because of his addiction to alcohol, however, he becomes a street drunk, dirty, disheveled, and begging for coins. This film has one feature which is frequently found in other movie treatments of drinking: The drinker is shown reaching rock bottom in terms of appearance, speech, and self-concept, and has absolutely
no restraints while drinking. Such disinhibited behavior can be used to provide a contrast to the later demeanor of the character when he is recovering.

The contrast between the ordinary behavior of public relations executive Jack Lemmon and his conduct while drunk is a theme of the award-winning Days of Wine and Roses (1963), which had previously been a successful television play. Ordinarily urbane, Lemmon when drunk climbs out of a second-story window in a thunderstorm and rips up the flowers in his father-in-law's greenhouse. In another scene, he breaks into a liquor store after its proprietor has refused to admit him.

Embarrassing behavior is more likely to be shown in men, but is sometimes found in women drinkers. In Key Largo (1948), Claire Trevor is the alcoholic showgirl who doesn't hesitate to sing, off-key and embarrassingly badly, when a gangster tells her that "...you'll have to earn a drink if you want it." The other characters in the room are ashamed at what she is doing but she is desperate enough for more liquor to keep singing.

Alcohol and Sex

In American popular culture, liquor is often seen as the catalyst for sex. In Phillip Barry's play The Philadelphia Story (1939), made into a movie with Katharine Hepburn (1940), and a movie musical (High Society, 1956) with Grace Kelly, heroine Tracey Lord gets very drunk, goes for a midnight swim, and spends the night with a reporter. Before she begins drinking, she is so cold that reporter Frank Sinatra in High Society sings "The Darling Miss Frigidaire" to her. After drinking, she has thawed enough for Sinatra to sing "Mind If I Make Love to You?" When Tracey wakes up the next morning, she is sure that her heavy imbibing led her to have sexual intercourse with the reporter.

A European princess whose deep-rooted inhibitions are dissolved in alcohol is played by Audrey Hepburn in Roman Holiday (1953). When she awakens, hung over, in writer Gregory Peck's bed the next morning and finds herself wearing his pajama top, she checks to see if she is also wearing the bottoms, because she is sure that she engaged in sex with Peck while drunk.

In Ask Any Girl (1959), Shirley MacLaine knows that she will not be able to give up her virginity without first drinking a lot of liquor. On the train from New York to Westport to visit her beau at his home, she settles in the club car and not only gulps down drink after drink but also finishes up the liquor left in the glasses of other
passengers in the car. Although each of these three heroines expected to yield her virginity because she was drunk, none of them actually did so, because their men did not wish to exploit the situation.

These heroines are good-bad girls, who give the audience the excitement of their engaging in nonmarital sex but who, by the final reel, are revealed still to be virginal. With the women’s liberation movement emerging in the late 1960s, films began presenting women who actually engaged in unconventional sexual behavior while or after drinking. In The Graduate (1967), the first and most successful of the movies addressed to the new youth market, married heroine Mrs. Robinson is always drinking before and when she engages in sex with her daughter’s boy friend. The film suggests that there is a direct connection between her heavy drinking and her abandonment of commonsense in pursuing young Ben. Other movie women drinkers are increasingly shown to be leaving the conventional passive role in sex situations.

When homosexuality is shown on the screen, it is often related to heavy drinking, which may presumably make the subject more acceptable to audiences. In The Killing of Sister George (1968), drinking is important in the heroine’s lesbian seduction and her terrorizing two nuns. In Cruising (1980), much of the film takes place in homosexual bars, and the characters are shown drinking and then engaging in sadomasochistic and anal sexual activities.

There are many movies which present men otherwise unable or unwilling to engage in sex, but who can do so after drinking heavily. The American myth about the young men who get drunk enough to have their sexual initiation from a prostitute is central to The Rippers (1969). Steve McQueen and two companions begin drinking heavily in the absence of his relatives. They continue drinking during a joy ride in a car, which has its climax when they visit a brothel. In California Suite (1978), Walter Matthau’s brother wants to give his “square” brother a special birthday present, so he gets Matthau drunk and sends a prostitute to his hotel room. Upon awakening the next morning, Matthau is horrified to find the prostitute in bed with him. He cannot recall anything that happened during the night. Such loss of recall is often used in movies by characters whose drinking has led to otherwise unacceptable behavior.

Taboos and Inhibitions

How the drinking of even beer can precede the violation of a deeply rooted taboo is illustrated in The Deer Hunter (1980), which
was highly praised for its realistic presentation of the lives of Pennsylvania steel workers. The Robert De Niro character, after drinking heavily at a wedding, is shown running nude through the town's main street. For such a character, public nudity is an ultimate taboo.

Drinking heavily enables the Army captain played by Martin Sheen to overcome his repulsion at being ordered to kill a renegade superior officer in *Apocalypse Now* (1979). At the opening of the film, Sheen's career is collapsing. He is drinking heavily and is in a drunken stupor, before meeting with the superior officers who order him to terminate the assignment of Colonel Kurtz "with extreme prejudice," i.e., to kill him.

Another kind of unthinkable behavior is represented by the drunken middle-aged physician who tries to stab his wife in *Come Back, Little Sheba* (1952), which was also a successful play (1950). A drinker who succeeds in stabbing a woman whom he has met in a bar figures in *Looking for Mr. Goodbar* (1978), made from a widely discussed novel (1975) by Judith Rossner, which centers on the "action" occurring in singles bars.

Sometimes a film lingers over the details of a drinker's attempt to avoid yielding to the effects of liquor. In *The Best Years of Our Lives* (1946), war hero Fredric March has returned to his bank job but finds himself in disagreement with the bank's conservative lending policies. Prior to going to a dinner in his honor, March has some drinks at home. At the dinner, he continues drinking. When March begins his speech at dinner, he decides to denounce the bank's lending policies, to the horror of its conservative president. He tries to restrain himself, but cannot, and blasts the bank's disregard for common people.

Robert E. Sherwood, the script writer, must have wanted to stress the negative consequences of alcohol, because after an earlier drinking session, March does not recognize his own wife. When he takes his pickup "date" (the wife) to bed, he is so drunk that he cannot perform sexually, and the long-awaited reunion with his wife is a humiliating fiasco.

Drink's ability to cause a man to engage in nonsexual behavior which is humiliating can be seen in the opening scene of *Treasure of Sierra Madre* (1948). Humphrey Bogart, already drunk and begging for quarters to buy more liquor, approaches the same American for the third time in a few minutes. After the American, played by John Huston, reminds Bogart that he has already given him two quarters, Bogart explains that he never looks at people's faces and did not recognize Huston as the person who had previously given him money.
A singer who turns to drinking as one way of dealing with her family difficulties is played by Susan Hayward in Smash-Up (1947). While drunk, Hayward sets fire to her house and almost kills her child. Some contemporary audiences found this film particularly offensive, perhaps because a woman was shown drunk and doing something so frightening while under the influence. A few years later, Hayward as a once famous alcoholic singer completely ignores her appearance and roams the streets in I'll Cry Tomorrow (1956). Her descent into the abyss is attributed to personality factors which she cannot control.

Gangster Films

Of all the film genres, the gangster film is the one with the most direct connection with violence. However, liquor is seldom important in the action of gangster films. In the first and most important of the genre, Little Caesar (1930), the Capone figure played by Edward G. Robinson does not drink. Making a speech at the gangsters' banquet, Robinson says, "The liquor is good, but I don't drink it myself."

In this and many other gangster movies, the mob office is in the back of a bar or nightclub, and many mobsters are bootleggers, so that their not drinking is quite conspicuous. They do not drink because of the need to remain alert and in control at all times, and their fear that liquor will interfere with such goals.

The Godfather (1971) is the fourth highest grossing film ever made, and was adapted from Mario Puzo's (1969) novel, which was the sixth biggest bestseller. It presents the story of two generations of Italian-American gangsters, none of whom drinks, although much of the action occurs in bars. Their not drinking may reflect occupational caution, ethnic constraints, family closeness, ritualistic drinking, or a combination of such factors.

Another kind of nondrinking is represented by Humphrey Bogart, who began his career playing gangsters but who has come to represent integrity and honor to a new generation of moviegoers who regard Bogart as exemplar of the truth. In films like To Have and Have Not (1944) and Casablanca (1943), the Bogart character always seems to have a glass in his hand, but he never loses control. Apart from the opening scene of Treasure of Sierra Madre and some self-pity in Casablanca ("Play it again, Sam: I can take it if she can"), Bogart never indicates that liquor is influencing him. One reason for the appeal of Bogart to today's moviegoers could be his ability to appear to be in control and never show weakness, no matter how much he drinks.
Liquor and Humor

A number of comedians specialized in drinking heavily on the screen. Jack Norton and Arthur Housman played drinkers who became confused, got caught in revolving doors, and lurched around. W. C. Fields' bulbous nose was the trademark of his heavy drinking, which did not seem to affect his behavior.

Sometimes, major stars whose roles had established their seriousness and rectitude were permitted to drink too much, so that the audience could enjoy their shedding inhibitions. Greta Garbo, the exemplar of aloof beauty and first lady of the screen, drank too much in Ninotchka (1939). In Ah, Wilderness (1935), Wallace Beery drank heavily after quarreling with his wife. In both cases, the characters' tipsiness enables them to present an unbuttoned personality, which was amusing and charming.

The most ambiguous example of alcohol's leading to disinhibition in films is to be found in Clint Eastwood's Any Which Way You Can (1980). The orangutan, who is a friend of Eastwood and a key figure in the film, is sitting at a bar drinking beer. He doesn't like a remark that is made by a man sitting nearby and also drinking, so the orangutan punches the man in the jaw and knocks him down. The audience cannot tell if the punch was due to the effect of the beer on the orangutan or to his having learned that aggressive behavior is culturally appropriate for the bar setting.

Westerns

The most consistent content presenting disinhibition resulting from drinking in movies is to be found in Westerns, most of which have a scene in which there is drinking in a bar, which leads to fighting and shooting. The Western is the single most popular film genre. Through 1978, 3,339 Westerns had been released (Adams and Rainey 1978). Of these, over three-fifths have a drinking scene in a saloon, which is followed by a brawl.

From the late 1940s through the early 1970s, the Western series was the most popular television format, and such series often presented saloon brawls. Such brawls represented a relatively acceptable kind of violence because it was so stylized and could be communicated visually by mirrors cracking, glasses breaking, chandeliers falling, chairs smashing, and other images that did not involve direct brutality against a person.

The saloon, in real life as well as in movies dealing with the period of Western exploration, was a social and entertainment center, often the first building put up in a new town. Judge Roy Bean, in
Gary Cooper’s *The Westerner* (1940), even conducted his court in a saloon.

The barroom brawl became a staple of Westerns after the enormous success of *The Spoilers* (1914), in which the two combatants, who have been drinking steadily, fight for a full 10 minutes. An extended fight was also part of the John Wayne talkie version (1942), and of other famous Westerns, such as *Union Pacific* (1939) and *The Gunfighter* (1950).

Indians were often presented in Westerns as quiet and friendly until an unscrupulous trader would “liquor them up.” The “firewater” was given the Indians by villains as one way of inciting them to attack and go on a rampage, thus perpetuating the stereotype. In films like *Fort Apache* (1948), *The Great Sioux Uprising* (1953), and *The Big Sky* (1952), drunken Indians engaged in violence. Most Indians in the 19th century did not drink in actuality, but the reality did not deter moviemakers.

There are several different kinds of Westerns, all of which typically have a hero who is estranged from society but saves it. Critics often mention *Shane* (1953) as the best and most representative example of the classic Western (Wright 1975). The film involves four different saloon brawls. In the first brawl, Alan Ladd (Shane) enters the saloon to get some soda pop for an 8-year-old child. Villain Ben Johnson, who has been drinking heavily, empties a glass of whisky at Ladd, saying, “This way, you’ll smell like a man!” Ladd loses his temper and fights Johnson and the battle between good and evil has begun, as it was similarly joined in so many other Westerns.

**Television**

Practically all (97 percent) American homes have a television set and over half the homes have color and at least one other set. The typical household uses its set 6 hours a day. Children spend more time watching adult programs than they devote to programs specifically for the young. Television content is more sanitized than that of other media, because it goes to audiences which may include young people (Winick 1959). There is no rating system to alert parents to sensitive material.

Television network representations of alcohol include prime time serials, television movies, soap operas, and talk and variety shows. All such programs are critically screened by network broadcast standards officials, before being shown, to insure that their content is acceptable to audiences that may include children. We could
therefore expect television to be the most cautious of the popular media, in terms of its showing disinhibition related to alcohol use. Another reason for caution is that a television program is a group creation. If the program's creator is identified at all, he is usually identified in terms of the producer, who is the general executive concerned with administering the program. Additional constraints are provided by audiences, because the program will not continue if it does not get enough viewers, which is usually at least 30 percent of the possible audience.

Prime Time Programs and Movies on Television

A number of studies have examined the amount of drinking shown in prime time programs (Greenberg et al. 1979; Hanneman and McEwen 1976; Winick 1976b). There appears to have been an increase in the incidence of representations of drinking from the early 1970s to the late 1970s. Drinking is often shown as a way to relax, cope with a problem, or indicate sophistication. Approximately four-fifths of the programs involved some reference to alcoholic beverages, with an average of two acts of alcohol used per hour.

Typical of prime time drama's approach to drinking is "M*A*S*H," which was originally a novel (by surgeon Richard Hooker), then a successful movie (1970), and since 1972 is television's most successful series. There is considerable humorous talk about drinking among the U.S. Army hospital personnel during the Korean War who are the stars of the show. Alcohol is presented as a social facilitator and escape. Heavy drinking tends to be present in a cautionary way. Thus, the lead show of the 1977-78 season, "Fade Out, Fade In," which was also the only full hour program of the year, is entirely concerned with the disinhibiting effects of liquor. When Nurse Margaret Houlihan gets married, surgeon Frank Burns, who had been romantically interested in her, becomes distraught. Dr. Burns goes on a drinking binge, during which he attacks another nurse and goes berserk. Burns is arrested and transferred to another organization. This is a representative episode of heavy drinking in prime time television: There is a reason for it, the character engages in atypical disinhibitory behavior which involves sex and violence, and he is punished for the behavior. In similar "M*A*S*H" episodes, other characters lose their superegos after a few drinks. Different characters seem to have individualized drink thresholds before disinhibition occurs. In the context of surgeons working under pressure during a war, such drinking is viewed as a small but necessary part of daily living.
There have been television movies which have dealt with alcoholics who have completely lost any restraints and engage in lying, stealing, neglect of appearance, driving into accidents, and similar behavior. For example, "A Cry for Love" (NBC) was presented on October 20, 1980, and dealt entirely with the dreadful consequences of a man's abuse of alcohol and his wife's abuse of amphetamines. They lie, do not keep their jobs, look bizarre, and clearly cannot control themselves. A brief epilogue urged similarly afflicted viewers to seek help. This is like other television movies in its treatment of drinking: The characters are both professionals, he an engineer and she a writer. Deep-rooted personality and parental factors seem to be related to the reasons for their drinking. Their decline is frightening but there is the hope that they can recover.

Soap Operas

Television daytime serials or soap operas are seen daily by about 35 million viewers, mostly female. In an analysis of all 14 nationally shown soap operas over 4 weeks, there were 520 incidents of alcohol use (Lowery 1979). In 70 percent of these instances, alcohol use had no negative consequences. A small number of the characters, under the influence of liquor, engage in disinhibitory behavior, such as sexual assault, stealing, making spectacles of themselves, or forgetting to show up for work.

A recent (January 12, 1981) episode of the most popular program, "General Hospital," illustrates how soap operas present the alcohol-disinhibition link. Surgeon Jeff Weber, whose wife Heather is a psychotic in a mental hospital, cannot divorce her because of her illness. Ann, his girl friend, finally gets tired of waiting for Jeff to get a divorce and marry her. She refuses to go to dinner with Jeff. He is very disturbed by her refusal and goes to a disco, where he drowns his sorrow in drink. He laughs loudly and continually, grabs at women, dances in a strange way, giggles, and looks disheveled. The disco proprietor has Jeff removed from the dance floor, refuses to serve him any more liquor, and has him escorted home. The next day, Jeff is so hung over that he misses an important meeting at the hospital, where everybody seems to know about his binge. The episode is consonant with other soap operas in that the drinking occurs in response to an interpersonal disappointment, the disinhibitory behavior is antipodal to the ordinary activities of the drinker, the alcohol is consumed in a social situation, and the drinker subsequently suffers.
Talk and Variety Shows

The personalities who appear on talk and variety programs may be particularly important because the viewer can engage in parasocial interaction with them on a regular basis. They appear under their own names and can become symbolic members of the viewer's family.

There is a long tradition, going back 30 years to the beginning of television, of the comedian who is drunk on camera, experiences memory and other lapses, cannot recall his name, and engages in sexual escapades. In the 1950s, Red Skelton, with a comic commercial for gin, often played this role. From the 1960s to the present, Dean Martin has communicated the notion of heavy drinking leading to daring and sexual awareness. Johnny Carson referred to Ed McMahon's "drinking problem" for years and alluded to resulting unusual behavior on McMahon's part. Television comedian Foster Brooks has a standardized routine in which he seems to lose the ability to speak, insults people, and otherwise conveys the stereotypical amiable lush.

A number of performers communicate the notion that drinking can occur with no significant effect on demeanor or speech. Jackie Gleason used to have an assistant bring him a large tumbler of "water" which he would drink with obvious enthusiasm. He would then go about his business, completely unaffected by what was obviously intended to be the equivalent of several shots of gin or vodka.

Jokes

One clue to the importance of a subject to people is an examination of the jokes that people tell about it (Winick 1963, 1976a). Jokes are usually told in a situation involving friends, so that intimately held attitudes may be communicated in a private context. Jokes concerning drinking represented 6 percent of all jokes during 1955-60 and 8 percent of the jokes reported during 1970-75. Over half the jokes in both periods dealt with bizarre, inappropriate, antisocial, or otherwise disinhibited behavior on the part of people who have had too much to drink.

Other Cultures

It is useful to look at negative cases, or those cultures in which the
arts and media do not offer examples of alcohol-induced disinhibition. If we look at the great plays of the Irish Renaissance, such as J. M. Synge's comedy *The Playboy of the Western World* (1907), S. O'Casey's tragedy *Juno and the Paycock* (1924), or O'Casey's masterpiece *The Plough and the Stars* (1926), we see men drinking in taverns and at home. Drinking is at the center of cultural and social life, as part of the braggadocio, passivity, and talkiness that characterize Irishmen in these plays.

Alcohol is so salient in these plays that it is inconceivable for it to be related to disinhibition. The characters, presumably like the people they represent in real life, are so saturated with alcohol that it has little effect on them. Even in Liam O'Flaherty's novel *The Informer* (1925), made into a famous movie in 1935, although the informer Gypo Nolan drinks steadily before and after betraying his friend for £20, it is clear that the drinking is incidental to the betrayal.

Wolfenstein and Leites (1947) have documented how movies may be used to distinguish and document national character. We could expect that each country's movies and other media would reflect some aspects of its alcoholism problem and the relationship between drinking and disinhibition.

British movies show very little drinking of spirits and almost never show any uninhibited behavior resulting from drinking alcoholic beverages. The prototype of the spirits drinker is James Bond, who has asked for "a vodka martini, shaken, not stirred," in each of the 12 movies which constitute the most successful series ever made. Bond is representative of the upper class gentleman who never loses his cool, no matter how or what he imbibes in the private clubs, homes, and smart restaurants in which he is seen.

An indication of the kind of extraordinary and rare situation that might lead upper class English men and women to drink enough to become disinhibited can be obtained from *The Holly and the Ivy* (1952), with Denham Elliott and Margaret Leighton playing the children of a vicar (Ralph Richardson). They arrive home for a holiday reunion, go to town to see a movie, and return tipsy. When the vicar expresses astonishment that his daughter is drinking and appears to be under the influence, she breaks down and tells him her secret. As the result of a wartime romance, she has a 5-year-old illegitimate child who has been ill continually and just recently died. She began drinking only upon learning of her child's death. However, she can confess her guilty secret to her father only while she is drunk. Because of this very unusual confluence of forces, the character played by Leighton can drink heavily and lose her composure. As in so many British films, the conflict is between the
person and herself. The kind of conflict with the outside world found in so many American films is almost nonexistent in British films concerned with upper class life.

Many British movies show pubs or saloon bars, where working class people drink ale, stout, beer, and shandy. These places are generally decorous and their customers tend to be well-behaved people who are spending time quietly and pleasantly with their friends. Drinking is not shown ambivalently or as a contributor to emotional churning.

There are hardly any British plays or movies in which violence or sexual acting-out results from drinking. When a character who is drunk does something unusual, like "undeserving poor" Mr. Doolittle's offering to sell his daughter Eliza to Professor Higgins for a few pounds in *My Fair Lady* (1964), adapted from Shaw's 1913 play (*Pygmalion*), the audience can accept the offer because it is not quite serious.

It is instructive to note that the films of France, which were so important in the 1930s and 1940s, and those of Italy which have perhaps been more significant than those of any other country since World War II, seldom treat alcoholism and hardly ever present disinhibition resulting from alcohol. In both countries, of course, there is an established cultural tradition of drinking wine. In Italy, a bar is a place where coffee is the most popular drink and in France, it is likely to be part of a restaurant. In both countries, there is no equivalent of the American bar, a place where spirits and beer are consumed.

French and Italian films, reflecting their respective cultures, therefore have little occasion to present people who lose their inhibitions after drinking. The films sometimes reflect the stereotype of the person who has had too much wine, who is likely to fall asleep rather than engage in "acting-out" behavior. Even in films where the characters, usually upper class, engage in serious drinking of spirits, as in some work of Jean Renoir, Federico Fellini, or Michelangelo Antonioni, the characters can handle themselves and seldom engage in disinhibited behavior.

If we were to examine the popular arts and media of any country, we could expect that the connection between the arts and media content, and the realities of social life in the country with respect to the alcohol-disinhibition link, would be very close. In the United States, the nature of the link is very complex and has varied over time. It can be described almost decade by decade, by tracking the arts and media.

There is such an interrelationship among the popular arts that the same theme is likely to be carried by several formats, in a short
time. The novel becomes a television series, the magazine story takes shape as a movie, the movie soundtrack metamorphoses into a record album. *Saturday Night Fever* (1977), one of the 10 largest grossing movies ever made, began as a magazine article. The album made from the movie soundtrack became the biggest seller in history. A novel was written about the movie characters and the movie was first shown on cable television and then by a network.

A propositional inventory could be made of the manner in which the arts and media present the alcohol-disinhibition nexus in this country, as compared with other countries. This kind of effort, which has proved so fruitful in the study of national character, could be undertaken very productively to document the malleability of the relationships between alcohol and disinhibition.

### References


DISINHIBITION IN POPULAR CULTURE


ROOM: We had a lot of trouble with what to title this section, because we wanted to emphasize that we thought that studies of popular culture were relevant, but we didn’t want to exclude high culture. And so we toyed with the notion of calling it, “Prepared Communication,” and decided that was a little precious to put in the title. But I notice that in his paper, Dr. Winick accepted the phrase as a kind of boundary, as a definition of what we’re talking about in this section.

Professor Winick has a very distinguished and varied career that I can’t begin to encompass for you. He invented “spontaneous remission” in the heroin area, roughly speaking, long before it was thought of in the alcoholism area. And he has also been very much involved in studies of popular culture with respect to both drugs and alcohol.

WINICK: Actually we've been talking about popular culture on and off for the last day and a half; we've talked about novels, we've talked about plays, and we've talked about music. Maybe we can make some more specific statements in terms of what the boundaries of popular culture are and what our interest in it might be.

First, we might begin with the reasons for our interest in the term “popular culture” — with which I'm sure many of you, like myself, find a certain amount of discomfort. I think the most important reason for our being interested in it is that popular culture takes more time from people than anything else that they do, including working or sleeping. The average American adult spends about 20 percent more time with the mass media than he or she does working, and spends about half an hour more time with popular culture than he or she does sleeping. Now, whatever a person does that takes up so much time, it seems to me, is worthy of serious attention. This has become particularly important in the last 40 years, beginning with radio, and more recently with television. It's been said, I think accurately, that just as the automobile has changed the way people perceive space, in the same way the electronic media have changed the way in which people perceive time. If you’re giving so much time every day, essentially seven days a week — and it’s a seven-day-a-week activity — to
things that you feel you want to do, then other things must give way to provide that time.

As a new medium has come along — penny newspapers, silent movies, radio, talking pictures, the long-playing record, comic magazines, television, cable television, etc. — what has happened is that people have somehow found the time to give to the new medium, but they have not abandoned the other media. What they do is to take a little time from some of the other media or public arts, and they take some time away from other things. Those other things might be visiting, interacting with the family, reading — if the new media activities don't involve reading — and so forth.

What we're witnessing, therefore, is a kind of revolution. Even at a time when by general agreement the quality of television has been deteriorating for the last five or ten years, and even though people continue to say in national and local surveys that they don't like television, they are continuing to give it more time than they gave it 15 or 20 years ago. There has been a slight decrease because of more women entering the work force, and, therefore, having less time to give television. But if you take that into account, the amount of viewing has remained fairly constant: over six hours a day, seven days a week for the representative family, and a couple of hours for radio, for newspapers, magazines, comics, music, the approximately 500 ads a day that the average person is exposed to, of which he or she can recall about 85 or 90 — you get some sense of the enormous amount of time that we're talking about. Again, we may assume that all of this time devoted to the range of these public arts has consequences for the persons who are spending the time.

Terms like "popular media" and "popular culture" are awkward. They are particularly frowned upon at elite universities which don't know what to do with the subject. Does it belong in the English department? Is it American Studies, Sociology, or Humanities? Because of this conflict over territoriality at elite universities, the subject generally has not been popular; however, at other universities it has caught on, and, in fact, the subject of Popular Culture is the single most rapidly growing subject at undergraduate colleges today. Police Science used to be, but soon after the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration closed up shop last year, there was a sharp decline in police enrollment in colleges. So, the subject, whatever we may think of it, and whatever schools like Berkeley may think of it, is an important subject in terms of colleges.

Robin alluded to the distinction between high art and popular art, and let me just talk about that for a moment. High art, such as the important plays and novels of the heritage of the various
civilizations that we are interested in, is part of what people study at school and is part of a general cultural background. These materials may be transformed into popular movies, or rewritten into popular books. Classical music is frequently rewritten into more popular formats. Much material from high art is thus continually in the background of our consciousness. In addition, there's the enormous flow of current popular material that is continually washing over us and of which we may be more or less aware.

When the study of communications began several decades ago, the usual paradigm for explaining the mass media was Harold Lasswell's (1948), who says what to whom with what effect; that is, a kind of hypodermic syringe model. Media had content that was being dispensed by "communicators," and a kind of general public out there was receiving these materials. More recently, there's been a greater awareness of the fact that there is no large, general public out there; there are a lot of different publics who are segmented by demographic and psychographic and other background characteristics or tendency systems (Winick 1963). There is, in fact, much self-selection of audiences for the different popular media. Even in the case of television, you are always making a choice, even if it's a choice between three programs that are relatively similar to one another. And before that, there is a choice of whether to spend time with newspapers or magazines or television or radio or music or a book of fiction or a book of nonfiction or jokes — which I regard as a form of popular culture — or whatever. So, the individual makes the choice of how to spend the time, and then within the medium there is a choice of which radio station, what television show, movie, and so on.

If people are spending time with material, they are doing so because it is meaningful to them, it fulfills functions for them, it provides gratifications for them. Perhaps the most popular current theory of mass media is "The Uses and Gratifications Approach," since it is concerned with what the audience brings to the perception of the media and the uses and gratifications that the audience gets from the media (Blumler and Katz 1975). We are beginning to study the uses and gratifications people get from the media, which is much more complicated than analyzing content. It's easy to set up coding categories and analyze content of what we see and then have somebody code the same material and establish a reliability with a particular correlation. However, what we coders see in this material may or may not be what the various publics are getting from the material. Although content analysis is relatively easy to do, the more difficult task of studying what people are getting from these materials is more challenging.
It should be noted that with the enormous output of materials — 40,000 books a year; 32,000 records released each year and so forth — the great majority of mass media materials are failures in terms of attracting an audience. The great majority of records, novels, movies, and television shows are failures. About 90 percent of all new television shows are withdrawn before the first cycle of the year. Only a relatively small number of these materials succeed. They succeed because they are meeting some needs of the public, and it is very difficult to manufacture these needs; that is, there's really no way, except possibly in the field of rock music, in which hype by itself — attempting to create media events to call attention to the material — can really cause a movie to be successful or a television series or a book to catch on.

Therefore, in terms of deciding what materials to study, it seems to me that a reasonable criterion might well be whether the materials have succeeded in attracting an audience. Are people willing to give the time and/or money, make the effort to go out in the rain to see a particular film, and so on. The material that people decide to spend time with may be of high quality artistically or it may not be. Sometimes an enormously successful movie, such as "The Godfather," is brilliant and outstanding as an achievement of film art. At other times, a very popular work of public art may not have such attractive aesthetic qualities; for example, the most successful novel ever published in this country is Valley of the Dolls by Jacqueline Susann (1966). Approximately one out of every three homes in this country has the book. By way of contrast, I think it would be fair to say that perhaps three of the best novels of the Twentieth Century would be Proust's Remembrance of Things Past; Mann's The Magic Mountain; and Joyce's Ulysses. Combining the American sales figures for all three of those books since they were issued in the 1920's, all of the copies of those books sold in the United States to people who were not students comes to about one-fifth of one percent of the American homes. I'm not equating the aesthetic qualities of Susann's novel with these three masterpieces, but Valley of the Dolls is apparently meeting the needs of the general public. None of Susann's six books have ever been out of print. So, the criterion of the box office, whatever one may think of its ultimate relevance to aesthetics, is very important.

At any point in time, there are materials appealing to different elements in the population; for example, in Shakespeare's time, the audience at the Globe Theatre was rowdy and tended to be lower class and middle class, and Shakespeare, who includes significant alcohol content in every play but one, was writing for that audience.
On the other side of the Thames River, there were other theaters presenting classical plays that appealed to totally different audiences, plays that we have forgotten. At that time, the classical plays would have been regarded as high art and Shakespeare would have been regarded as vulgar and meretricious. Today, of course, we have changed our view about the relative merits of Shakespeare and the other writers who were considered the classical writers of his time.

One other observation. There is a Shakespeare, there is a Lester Young, there is a Tolstoy, there is a William Faulkner, there is a Eugene O'Neill, there is an individual artist creating a personal vision, expressing his or her sensibility and saying something that he or she had to say or wants desperately to say. More recently, when we talk about corporate forms of public arts, such as movies and television, we have a different kind of situation; we have something that's created by a group, almost by a committee; that is rewritten; where a lot of people participate in the creation; where there's an eye on the market for the material. We have to be aware that the genesis of these different kinds of prepared communications may be very different, and we obviously have to apply different criteria to them.

Sometimes, a person who has been a figure in high art becomes in his own lifetime a figure in popular art — the most recent example is that of William Faulkner. When he won the Nobel Prize in 1949, every single one of his books was out of print in the United States. However, after he won the Nobel Prize, he became a popular figure; his books became popular, and he began to be read by large numbers of Americans for the first time. So people may change their status in terms of how they're perceived as popular artists even in their own lifetime, although sometimes it may take longer than that.

I stress the distinction between the individual artist creating his or her vision and the corporate creation of some mass media today because we often have to distinguish between who did what, particularly in the case of American fiction and drama, where many of the great creators happened themselves to have been persons with very severe drinking problems. In fact, of seven Nobel Prize winners from America, five had severe drinking problems. The only exceptions were Pearl Buck and Saul Bellow.

SILVERMAN: I'm not so sure about Pearl Buck.

WINICK: This matter of who the author is is very important because we're not just receiving the work of art; the work of art was created by somebody. And in terms of understanding it, it is often important to be aware of the background of the creation, how it
came to be, and so forth. So, these general considerations, I think, are relevant when we look at some of the contents of what we might call "public art."

Let me just make a few comments on some forms that we're interested in. In drama, the very first play of which we have any record, namely, The Bacchae, deals with a mother who, drunk at a celebration of Dionysus, the god of the vine, kills her own son and then puts his head on a staff, which she carries around. And many of the great playwrights subsequent to Shakespeare present the disinhibitory effects of drinking in a similarly frightening way.

We might note that there's often an important class linkage between art and audience. During the Restoration period, the time of plays by writers like Congreve and Wycherly, the play and the audience were both oriented to the upper classes. At this time, there was great concern about the great extent of gin drinking on the part of poor people in England, but there is hardly any drinking-related unbuttoned behavior in the Restoration plays. In other words, material by the upper classes, directed to the upper classes, seldom presents this kind of material, at least in the drama.

Let me just comment briefly on fiction. A number of the world's greatest novelists — Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Thomas Hardy — were moralists, and were very concerned about what was right and what was wrong. They felt very keenly that drinking too much is very bad. In at least one novel by just about every important Nineteenth Century novelist, a significant episode deals with murder, infanticide, patricide, or murder and suicide combinations resulting from drinking too much. In the Nineteenth Century, there were three different novels which presented a man dying of spontaneous combustion after drinking too much. Drinking was seen as such a destructive act that people actually burned themselves to death in a manner that could not be explained except by spontaneous combustion.

Yesterday, Joan spoke about the work of a number of the early Twentieth Century writers who were either heavy drinkers or alcoholics, notably, Jack London. There is no country in the world — even in the late middle to the late Nineteenth Century in France, where drinking and drugs were an important part of the beginning of the early symbolist movement — where so many writers drank heavily and/or were alcoholics as in the U.S. — Thomas Wolfe, John Steinbeck, Ernest Hemingway, Sinclair Lewis, Eugene O'Neill, John Marquand, Dashiell Hammett, William Faulkner, Dorothy Parker, John O'Hara, John Cheever, F. "Scotch" Fitzgerald, as he was called, and so on. It isn't clear what this means. Some of these writers dealt with drinking and the effects of drinking on inhibited
behavior and others did not, but overall it certainly is an important contributor to the content of the work.

I might also mention successful current fiction writers like John Cheever and John Updike, who bridge the gap between literary and popular, who regularly deal with disinhibition in suburban life as a result of drinking too much. John Cheever is, himself, a recovering alcoholic.

Newspapers do not carry many reports on consequences of drinking too much, but such reports tend to get enormous attention. Just two weeks ago, for example, Dean Martin's showing up drunk at the Presidential Inaugural festivities was picked up by almost every newspaper in the country. Mr. Martin forgot his lines. He was so drunk that after he appeared at the microphone, Johnny Carson reported that Debbie Boone had gotten a contact high when she approached, and he was not permitted to perform. Newspapers regularly carry such material. Now, one spectacular story like this about Dean Martin or stories about Wilbur Mills in 1974, Representative Jenrette last December, and so forth — even though it may not come along very frequently — has enormous impact. This is one way in which ordinary content analysis would not be very helpful. If we did a content analysis, we would discover few stories, taking a sample of newspapers about, say, drunken driving leading to serious accidents; but, even one story like this a year is remembered because people like to think that their betters are really no better than they should be, and they love this kind of material, which is why Confidential and People and Us magazines are so popular. Quite a lot of the contents of these magazines has to do with drunken comportment on the part of celebrities (Winick 1962).

I spoke earlier about advertising. When we study the content of the media related to disinhibition and alcohol, if people are shown drinking heavily and they are not engaging in disinhibited behavior, that is important too. That's why I think advertising is especially important, because in advertising, as in many kinds of mass media, we see people drinking a lot, but we never see them ruffled; they don't seem to be responding to it in any way. That is a message that people are getting as well as a message they might be getting if they see someone shaking and weeping.

In terms of popular music, we talked earlier about jazz and drinking. We might just mention that alcohol is not a significant theme in rock music, which has been the most popular music of the country since 1954; it is a significant theme in country music, and there the theme has to do with the ubiquitous nature of drinking, but drinking leads to disgrace, killing, harm, things that you don't want to do.
The most fruitful kind of content with which I can illustrate practically month by month how mass media present messages on disinhibition and drinking would be provided by movies. There's an enormous body of movies that are shown on television and that are revived in theaters. And we might just say, oversimplifying, that movies have specialized in presenting drinking middle class and upper class people doing things they would not ordinarily do: the woman engages in sexual activity; the man says something he didn't mean to say or engages in violent behavior. There's usually a tremendous discrepancy between the predinking position and role of the individual and his or her dreadful behavior after drinking.

I would just like to mention for a moment that probably the most important movie content related to alcohol has to do with westerns because the western is the most popular movie form. Well over half the westerns have a barroom brawl scene, and the barroom brawl is presented as occurring subsequent to the drinking that occurs in the bar. On the other hand, in situations like a military movie or a gangster movie, where personal control is very important, where the gangster must be in command of his faculties, and the soldier must be aware of everything happening, drinking is very seldom shown. So, certain occupations, where one might think drinking would occur, are not shown with such content. The Indian frequently found in the western is over-represented as having had too much firewater, as a result of which he will engage in vicious, violent, or socially or personally destructive activity.

Just a few minutes now on how we might use this material. One constructive way of using this kind of material is to conduct comparative studies, comparing our country with other countries, comparing this decade with the previous decade or the decade before, and so on. We know from the early cultural and personality studies — the study of culture at a distance (Mead and Metraux 1953), the World War II Office of Naval Research project studying the fairytales, folklore, movies, and thematic material of other countries — that we can build up an enormously detailed and sensitive picture of the way of life of a country just from its mass media (Gorer 1964; Gorer and Rickman 1962). One of the best books ever written about Japan, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, was written by Ruth Benedict (1967), who had never been to Japan. She based her study on these secondary and tertiary materials. Wolfenstein and Leites (1950) sketched the national character of England, France, and America by comparing one year's production of feature films from each country.

It is possible to take the films of England, France, Italy, Sweden
and demonstrate how the manner in which drinking and disinhibition are presented in those movies is a quite sensitive barometer of the nature of the drinking habits of the society. Just for a quick example, French, Italian, and English movies almost never show anyone who is drunk and disinhibited. If we look at the pattern of drinking in those cultures, we see that it is reflected quite accurately in the movies of that country, almost year by year. Here again we would look at the successful movies, those which were able to establish a market, that somehow met the needs of the audiences.

The movie audience is a very young audience, and that's something particularly important. The audience for movies and for popular music is young and impressionable, still forming images of life, still trying to determine meanings in the world. These materials may represent a kind of a huge group Rorschach by which we can see the meanings that different kinds of drinking and disinhibited behavior are being given by the dominant culture of the time. If we do this on a comparative basis, we can get a very realistic and immediate sense of underlying cultural attitudes toward and perceptions of drinking and disinhibition.
Commentary

Edwin Lemert

ROOM: Ed Lemert has so many possible connections with the subjects of our discussions here that I think it would be superfluous for me to try to go over them. In addition to being claimed by sociology, I believe that anthropologists would put in some claim on him.

LEMERT: My comments are pretty closely geared to Winick's paper. Discussing this paper presents difficulties which I may or may not be able to transcend. First of all, discussion had to be cast in the conceptual format of the disinhibition issue, and it is doubtful indeed whether the materials available from studies of popular culture can shed much, if any, light on the question or questions it raises. Secondly, the term disinhibition has some reductionist, psychoanalytic connotations which for me unduly narrow the focus of discussion, particularly insofar as it bypasses or ignores the influence of social control on drinking behavior — and also the consequences of such control.

In common with other sociologists, I also have some difficulties with the concept of popular culture. In this connection, the author of the paper could have helped by briefly stating his conception of what this large and unwieldy idea means to him. As a result of his omission, I was compelled to review what De Tocqueville, Lowenthal and others had had to say on the topic, and I was reminded that there are some older vintage questions in the area of mass or popular culture that might still be mined with some profit. However, as far as I could determine from examining current writings on popular culture, there is very little in the way of theory that might guide the thoughts of a meandering discussant like myself. For the most part, the study of popular culture seems to be almost exclusively ethnographic, ranging from historical descriptions of the etiquette of blowing one's nose and spitting, to the implications of punk rock for the collective consciousness.

One older idea that qualifies as theory is essentially in a critical mode, namely that popular culture lowers the level of taste and standards of judgment, making people vulnerable to mass
persuasion and endangering democracy. This idea was worth an explicit run-through, at least, by Winick, since he does here and there allude to literary portrayals of alcohol abuse and alcoholism as symptoms of discontinuous social change and the demoralizing consequences of Nineteenth Century industrialism. Specifically, references to books and novels about alcoholism among writers, newspaper men and advertising executives suggest that depictions of associated disinhibition may reflect the special sensitivity such people have to the shallowness, spuriousness, and depersonalization that goes with mass society and popular culture. The book and film *Days of Wine and Roses* seems peculiarly apt in catching these themes in the advertising world and showing how alcoholism may reside among their psychological correlates.

Another theoretical idea gracing the study of popular culture is that it initiates or foreshadows changes in social structure. I must say that this proposition takes me aback considerably when I try to apply it to media, literary, and other popular representations of consequences of alcoholic indulgence. Winick does say that recent novels overall show a positive “naturalistic” image of drinking; also, that women increasingly are shown drinking without gross disinhibiting consequences. If so, we are left to wonder what this may indicate, given the implications of darker statistical indications that alcohol abuse and alcoholism rates may be increasing among women.

Perhaps the most significant change in the image of alcoholism and the alcoholic in the past several decades, coming with the establishment of the Yale Center for Alcohol Studies in the 1940s, is the shift from a moralistic to disease conception of alcoholism and from the alcoholic as a law offender to one who is sick. Yet none of these media representations summarized or paraphrased in Winick’s paper touch on this changing image. Why is this? Is it that our popular culture simply ignores this changing picture of the alcoholic, or did Winick’s directive to talk about disinhibition cause him to selectively omit references to alcoholism as a disease in his review? We might ask at this point whether any novels, plays, TV programs or films have dealt with Alcoholics Anonymous and recovery from the disease of alcoholism. I can think of at least one autobiography that does, an older book by Harold Main, *If Man Be Mad*, but then its high quality may explain why it never made the best seller list and thus qualify as popular culture.

In one short paragraph or two, Winick does say that alcoholism described in fiction influences members of the helping professions by exposing students, such as nurses, to the realities of alcoholism. Literary works are said to be helpful in developing empathy and
understanding. Yet one of the more provocative findings coming to light in recent articles in nursing journals is the resistance to and rejection of the disease concept of alcoholism expressed by the nurses themselves.

Actually, Winick's lack of findings of media representations of alcoholism as a disease may be valid, primarily because Americans don't like to be told that it is a malady that anyone may suffer from and that there really is not a sharp difference between ordinary drinking and abnormal drinking. More important may be the fact that drama, fiction, biography, newspaper stories, motion pictures, TV programs, and popular music typically revolve around moral themes, dramatizing the differences between good and evil. Hence, popular images of disinhibition associated with intoxication tend to reinforce a persistent moral conception of consequences of alcohol abuse.

In this connection, I may be pardoned if I suggest that many media portrayals of alcoholism and the alcoholic may still embody what years ago I called "the folklore of deviance." This consists of largely fallacious imputations of evil, destructiveness, demoralization and tragic denouement associated with the pursuit of deviant ways, best illustrated perhaps by Lindesmith's (1972) older article on dope fiend mythology. In the case of alcoholism, Hogarth's Rake's Progress typifies Nineteenth Century folklore, which is in my estimation a kind of reverse entrepreneurial ideology. The other side of this entrepreneurial theme is, of course, the alcoholic who sinks to the depths but then turns about through moral regeneration and overcomes his problem — a kind of a moral success story. This folklore of alcoholism, as with other deviance, has utility not only for the deviant in the sense of providing material for the "sad tale," which Goffman (1963) has talked about, but it also provides propaganda and justification for reform and social control and the activities of those that Becker (1963) called "moral entrepreneurs."

A final theme or theoretical idea that might have been used to organize and interpret some of Winick's ethnographic descriptions of disinhibition is that the artifacts of popular culture are an index to the social structure of contemporary consciousness. An even grander theory can be drawn from semiotics, namely that images of the consequences of alcohol consumption reflect a deeper, implicit cultural ideology which sets the preconditions of interaction between drinkers and non-drinkers, including those seeking to influence alcohol use by control measures.

Here and there Winick notes that popular portrayals include dual or ambivalent images of the transformation of behavior.
following intoxication. While generalizing about a society as large and varied as the U.S. is hazardous, it may be proposed that ambivalence is most characteristic of the American attitude towards alcohol and the consequences of its use. This seems to be well supported by Winick's contrasting characterization of media and popular arts depictions of drinking in Irish, English, French and Italian cultures, where apparently this ambivalence is absent. It would be nice to say that ambivalence toward drinking is related to the magnitude of associated problems or rates of alcoholism. However, since France's rate of alcoholism is as high or higher than that of the United States, this idea must die aborning.

In conclusion, let me say that I really find no fault with Winick's survey, and a good deal of it was informative. My plaint rather than my complaint is that I would have liked to have been turned on by some efforts on his part at more theoretical or analytical exploration of his materials.
Discussion

POWERS: As a graduate student formerly in folklore, I have a few things to add about the whole debate about the differences between high, popular and folk art, which is discussed ad nauseum in that discipline. It is usually assumed by many people who write about the subject that high art tends to be innovative, whereas folk art tends to be conservative. However, folklorists take quite the opposite view that high art is very much entrenched in tradition, whereas folk art is much more innovative and takes up contemporary opinions; and that popular art falls somewhere in between.

LAWRENCE WALLACK: My comments are based just on Winick's presentation. I was somewhat surprised to hear that alcohol on TV is being "prepared" in a positive sense, in terms of the quality and the nature of alcohol problems in society. Recent reviews of content analysis on TV have shown, in fact, first, that alcohol portrayals on TV are now more numerous than they have been in the past, increasing substantially since the Christian Science Monitor study in the early '70s; and second, that they're more inaccurate than ever. This comes from two recent studies, one by De Foe and Breed (1978) of the Scientific Analysis Corporation, and the other covering the last prime time season, by the people at Michigan State University including Bradley Greenberg (1979). Basically what they found was that consequences of heavy drinking are seldom shown at all except on soap operas in the afternoons — where, in fact, much more realistic perceptions of alcohol problems are shown because the characters are developed over long periods of time.

In terms of disinhibition, one thing, as I recall, that Breed and De Foe found was that intoxication or light intoxication or drinking was often used as a lead-in to some sort of sexual activity, in comedy shows for example: but it was the presence of the drinking which allowed sexual innuendoes or sexual implications to be drawn out.

In terms of advertising on TV, I think there's an issue of the way the context is set; thus we see a substantial amount of beer advertising consistently portraying people driving out to a setting at a beach, for example, with a couple of six-packs or cases of a certain type of beer in the car, and there's a party going on at the
beach, and you're left at the end of the commercial with an image of that as normative. What does that mean in terms of disinhibition? What models are being sent out through these very powerful media? What does it mean, in fact, that not only alcohol but health issues in general are treated very inaccurately on TV?

So the main point I wanted to make — and I guess this follows up on what Professor Lemert was saying — is, given what we see in terms of the way that alcohol is portrayed in popular culture — and now I'm speaking specifically of TV programming and TV advertising — what does it mean to discuss disinhibition? And what does it mean in terms of the way it supports the type of behaviors, which I think we're suggesting are mostly negative, that result from disinhibition related to alcohol beverage use or overuse?

ROOM: If I could put in a note here, I think it's important to keep our eyes focused on the alcohol/disinhibition link in this discussion, because it's very easy to move out from that to simply talking about alcohol in the culture. And I think that if I could interpret between the points that Larry Wallack was raising and what I understood to be in Professor Winick's paper: very often what Breed and De Foe represent as being the lack of consequences is what Winick was describing as the lack of disinhibition; because I think that what Breed and De Foe are looking for in the way of consequences is for bad things to happen — which are some of the things that we are trying to pin down in that very elusive concept called disinhibition. So there may well be a point of contact about the nature of the reality being presented on television, but with a very different rhetoric to describe it. If you want to present alcohol as having bad effects — which in the rhetoric of Breed and De Foe is the realistic way to present alcohol — then you want to see more disinhibition shown and more nasty things happening as a result of disinhibition. So I'm not sure that I really see so much of a conflict.

On the matter of the disease concept of alcoholism, I think the book that Marcus Grant's center was responsible for on Images of Alcoholism (Cook and Lewington 1979) is one source where you can see that there have been a lot of representations of the AA model of alcoholism in popular culture. So that concerning the question that Professor Lemert raised, I would say there is the interesting possibility that the popular culture representations that are focusing on disinhibition may indeed be alternatives to a disease concept presentation or may be a very different segment of media material from the ones that are presenting the disease concept of alcoholism.

MORGAN: Although I somewhat agree with what you said, I think it's important for us — when we're talking about different
interpretations of reality in popular culture — to ask the question, who is presenting that reality? And in whose interest is that reality being presented? It seems to me that there's a particular advertising interest in not showing any disinhibitory results from drinking behavior. While you get the opposite view when listening to certain kinds of popular music, especially the old blues and some of the country music, in which there are negative results portrayed in the culture. In one instance, you have a real popular culture, coming up from the bottom. In the other instance, you have something instead that is presenting, that is being presented to the culture from an organized interest on top. Those are the kinds of questions we have to begin to ask, besides dividing popular culture into various kinds of mass media and fiction and music, etc.

LANG: Along those same lines, Pat, I think one of the aspects of popular culture that can have a significant impact on beliefs about drinking and disinhibition are TV presentations of so-called "news magazines" that make pseudoscientific statements about the nature of relations among various behaviors. One particular instance comes to mind, a recent — I think it was "60 Minutes" — presentation on spouse abuse. As I sat there watching that with my wife, I said, "In a moment, they're going to say something about drinking," and they did. You know, "around that time I started drinking, and then I started beating up on my wife." And the implications of that were not explored at all by the commentators. They subscribed to this notion that alcohol in fact was a causal behavior, when perhaps stress or some third variable caused both behaviors. And those theories, I think, have a powerful impact on what people believe about drinking and disinhibition.

GRANT: I'd just like to make two points. They're not related to each other, but they're both related to some things that came up in the presentations. The first is that I would share Professor Winick's reluctance to accept too readily what one learns from content analysis. Stephen Spender (1967), writing of Under the Volcano, said, "Under the Volcano is no more a novel about drinking than King Lear is a play about senility." And I think that's an important corrective. We mustn't view this simply as facts about particular subject areas in which we have a greater or lesser interest, or we'll end up taking a poem like "My Love Is Like a Red, Red Rose" and classifying it as horticulture.

When I was over here last year working with Carol Ghinger here on literary images of alcoholism in the family, we came across something which was quite interesting and which stood up to analysis, and that was the difference in the forms of the media in which the representation occurred. It wasn't just an issue of
content, but also one to do with form. We found that novels, for example, tended to present the drinking as something that was egocentric: the person looked at their own drinking, they thought about their drinking, they went into long soliloquies about their drinking. In plays, on the other hand, the drinking was within a context of other people, within a context of relationships (Ghinger and Grant 1982).

And that ties us into something that Ron mentioned this morning and which was mentioned two or three times yesterday, that disinhibition has got two aspects: one is how you perceive yourself as being disinhibited; and the other is how other people perceive you as being disinhibited. The two may not be consonant; in fact the two may well be quite different from each other.

Concerning the positive aspects of disinhibition, if one takes even a cataclysmic portrayal like Under the Volcano, although the disinhibition that arises through drinking leads in the end to the self-destruction of the protagonist, it also leads to self-realization and self-revelation; protagonists find themselves through the disinhibition. They also kill themselves through the disinhibition, but they find themselves. Now, that’s a very fundamental ambivalence, but one that’s important because in an ontological way it stresses the importance of the positive aspects of disinhibition.

That’s my first point. The second’s easier. I was very interested in the issue of the number of heavy drinking writers, American novelists in particular, Twentieth Century American male novelists in particular (Grant 1981). It’s not quite such a huge sample in some other fields. I’ve been looking at that again over the last few months, and it occurs to me that it’s convenient to divide these writers into two sorts: one could look at the Bohemians, and one could look at the writers of best sellers, and they both appear to be groups who use alcohol in an extraordinary and very substantial way in order to seek disinhibition. The Bohemian will choose to use alcohol in order to separate himself from the cultural norms about which he’s likely to be writing. That’s not dissimilar to the way that French romantic symbolists used drugs. The best seller writer, on the other hand, appears to alternate between binges of writing and binges of drinking. I’ve been in correspondence recently with writers of best sellers because they seem to be an interesting group of people, people who tend by and large not to have been researched very carefully, who are only too happy to talk about themselves ad nauseam. And certainly there appears to be this peaking of disinhibitory experience related to their drinking. As it falls off they go through the disinhibition of creativity, and they go up and
down like a mountain range. And that, again, is a very positive aspect to do with disinhibition. They will use it in order to give themselves the space, the breathing space before the next bout of creativity, which ends up with yet another identical Frederick Forsyte for-screen novel.

**CAROL GHINGER:** Just to continue with what Marcus is saying about the positive aspects of alcohol that you find in literature. There's another interpretation of *The Bacchae*. You mentioned that it shows the horrid disinhibition that results in the man's head being cut off by his mother because she's drunk and doesn't realize what she's doing. There's another interpretation which says that this play is really about the dangers of not acknowledging the irrational side of life; King Cadmus refused to accept Bacchus as the new god and that's why he was punished at the end: his head was torn off because he refused to accept that the irrational is a part of life. And so *The Bacchae* could really be a play about the dangers of not acknowledging the irrational or the disinhibitory parts of life.

I also wanted to say that you have to be careful when you're talking about art and literature not to confuse literature and life. Very often in literature you'll find alcohol used as a literary device or just as a way of moving the plot along or just as a convention. Very often in literature you'll have something like champagne being used because a literary situation calls for the use of alcohol. We have to be careful not to see that as a reflection of what's actually happening in society. You have to make a distinction between literature and life in that way.

**ROOM:** Well, if Harry's colleague, John O'Brien, was here, he would be regaling us with stories of disinhibition and the ancient Greeks, notably Alexander the Great (O'Brien 1980a, 1980b).

Kai, I think you had a point.

**PERNANEN:** Yes. It relates to the point about pop culture or mass media not reflecting reality and also the point about commercials for alcohol not showing any disinhibited behavior. Somebody has counted the number of homicides that a sixteen-year-old child has seen in his life on TV and come up with a figure of 18,000 or something like that. The proportion of those which are alcohol-related, I would think, is very small. So in that sense it does not at all reflect what reality is. The best estimate, I guess, would be that 50 percent of homicides would be related to alcohol; and, of course, very few TV portrayals are family homicides — homicides that occur in the family — which also doesn't reflect reality at all.

**PARTANEN:** I'd like to comment, if I may, on some of my experiences dealing with this kind of popular culture material. One
DISCUSSION

of these was at a London seminar on film where there were about 20, mostly American, films dealing with alcoholism. I could compel myself to see about two-thirds of them, and that was quite enough because some of them were really pretty lousy for my taste. On the basis of this, I would like to put forward one generalization. Fundamentally, these films really didn't deal with alcoholism. These films needed a hero or an anti-hero, and in some cases it just turns out that an alcoholic's career is a convenient way to present a hero, for dramatic purposes, as a popular hero.

Secondly, I have been intrigued by some material in Finnish classical fiction. There are really some excellent scenes of group drinking and their consequences, and what has struck me most is that they are theoretically so satisfying; they very graphically depict McClelland's (1972) two phases of drinking — increased sociality in the first place, and afterwards come the tendencies towards personal power, drunken quarrels and fights and all that stuff.

Now, on the basis of this, last year we organized another film seminar, using as material scenes from about twelve Finnish films dealing with drinking. They were not whole films but just sequences of from two to twenty minutes. It was a very funny seminar; none of those lousy papers, just films and much talk. We have come out with a seminar report (Partanen 1980). Two of my colleagues made a rather concentrated effort to look at this material as a kind of corpus and perform a semiotic analysis. I'd like to suggest very briefly what were the principal findings, because they were really surprising and didn't at all correspond to our original notions about this.

The first thing is that there emerges a rather clear separation between instrumental and mythical drinking. This is roughly the same thing which David Levinson referred to in the morning, speaking of instrumental versus expressive drinking. We have called it "mythical." Instrumental drinking isn't very interesting; I mean, it's really what people's lives are in general. But this mythical drinking consists of three rather separate stages. The first thing is that practically invariably women are left behind when men drink. There is a very tense polarity between alcohol and women. The way we put it, there are two things in men's lives, but they never go together: it is either woman or alcohol. From this contradiction, men seem to shift to another level, and that's a kind of solidarity between drunken men. There is an element of vacuity, emptiness in these relationships. One should perhaps call it "pseudosolidarity," because there is really very little real comradeship, but still it's a specific solidarity. And then the third...
stage — this is a very pompous way to put it — is the cosmic loneliness of the drunken man. Here, really, primordial mythical themes come into the foreground: there are people who try to fly; there are people climbing into trees or jumping into a well; and there’s a very close relationship with nature. All this brings about very graphic ways of displaying disinhibited behavior.

I guess I’ll stop here, but this was an example to show what kind of analysis can be made. It was an effort to reveal the structure which is portrayed in this corpus, in this sample of examples.

SILVERMAN: Maybe a possible explanation for the alcoholic literary person is this primordial loneliness that you just mentioned, the fact that in the United States most activities are group-oriented, and these people are solitary — they may drink because of the fact that they really aren’t inside the culture, and that this is a way of escape.

MARLATT: One comment about the creative writers and their drinking problems. It is certainly a fascinating topic, and I was very interested to hear the comment earlier about Lowry and his own drinking. Some of the biographies on Lowry have very interesting models of why he was an alcoholic. One of the books, I think by Day (1973), talked about psychoanalytic oral fixation and so forth as what really went on with Lowry. But it seems to me from my reading of that book that he was using alcohol in a different way than we’ve been talking about when we’ve talked about disinhibition so far, which was that it seemed like he wanted to get rid of the normal inhibitions of his ordinary, conscious, day-to-day mind — to invite the muse or to let go of the normal controls over the creative process so that things could start to happen and his consciousness would start to change and he would become in touch with a more spiritual dimension.

Now, I don’t know if there’s any degree of commonality among those groups of writers that we’ve been discussing, but it seemed that at least some of them were trying to use alcohol as a way of getting in touch with creative, unconscious forces, and were very successful, although at the end many of them suffered tremendously.

FINGARETTE: Let me make a remark in the form of a question. We have heard that often what is simply a formula cliche may be taken by persons studying the material as something important, while what is the aesthetic point and what has the real dramatic impact of the work may be missed by the person studying it because of not looking at it in aesthetic terms. I wonder if it wouldn’t be an important supplement to ask the viewers in some forum or other what they saw and why it happened and what they
saw as important. It might turn out often to be significantly different from what the observer thought was important about it.

LUM: I think "Saturday Night Fever," which is one of my favorite films, is a really nice example of that. I thought that "Saturday Night Fever" dealt with what it was to be lower class Italian, and it had all kinds of explanations for that and why "Saturday Night Fever" was indeed "Saturday Night Fever." And yet when "Saturday Night Fever" came out, the year after that everyone started buying John Travolta clothes, and discoing and so on. It should have had the reverse effect. It should have destroyed any kind of commerciability of John Travolta clothing and discoing, but it didn't do that.

MOORE: I was going to ask Professor Winick if he would be prepared to speculate and meet Professor Lemert's challenge. The question I'd put to him would be: based on your reading of the popular culture and its treatment of alcohol, if that were having an important effect on drunken behavior in the current culture, what would those effects be? Or in what direction would it be shaping them? My impression from reading your paper is that in many respects it's teaching people that drinking is not an excuse, that it's an ordinary typical part of daily life, that they might as well go ahead and do it and not expect to use it as an excuse in any particular direction. Would that be a fair reading of the current treatment?

WINICK: It wouldn't be a complete reading of the current situation, I would say, because you have exactly the opposite message coming through, and each of these different formats may be presenting contradictory messages —

MOORE: To the audience?

WINICK: We have every reason to believe they're being perceived differently by different groups; in other words, the people who are already drinking heavily, the people who are drinking moderately, the people who are drinking lightly, the people who are not drinking, all bring something different to what they are ready to accept; they have different expectations.

And do they find confirmation for their expectations? I did a study of a film — "The Man with the Golden Arm," which dealt with drug use — among a large population of ordinary high school students, and went back to them almost a year later (Winick 1963). Some of them had gone to see the film because they cared enough about the subject to buy a ticket; others had not. I compared the differences in their attitudes in terms of population subgroups. The differences in what the different groups got from seeing the film were very substantial. In some cases there was a boomerang effect
DISINHIBITION IN POPULAR CULTURE

from that intended by the producer; in other cases exactly the intended goal had been achieved; and in some cases no message was received. We can’t discuss these impacts without considering the modality, the medium, and how it’s communicated. In the case of that film, Frank Sinatra was the star, and he represented something, then and now, and he is seen in a certain way: his relationships with the two women in the movie were seen differently, depending on the sex and the tendency systems of the persons who saw the movie.

I think it would be really terribly hazardous to answer your question in a simple way. However, we do have excellent information on the audiences for all of these things, since they’re all counted. We know how many people buy books, see movies week by week, etc. We certainly can assess the comparative size of the audience. We know the composition of the audience, and we can attempt to interpret various ways in which the material is being perceived. As several people have pointed out, this is much more difficult than content analysis because, particularly when we’re talking about younger people, we know that perception of these different modalities varies in terms of developmental epochs (Winick 1980). We also know that perception varies in terms of cultural situation and may vary in terms of dimensions like ethnicity. What we adults may think is there may not be there at all to a wide element of the audience. However, I think we know enough now about how young people perceive these materials that we could have a very good shot at coming up with different layers of meaning, and we could estimate who was getting what.

To attempt to say whether people are getting reinforcement through positive representation of drinking on television and so forth would be terribly difficult. There’s evening television, daytime television, there are soap operas, TV movies, theatrical movies that are shown on TV and news shows. All of these things we know are perceived differently. People have different mind-sets for watching news programs and entertainment programs. What we see as violence they may see as playfulness. So that would be a terribly difficult question to try to answer, but we could certainly try it, taking one medium at a time.

WALLACK: I really appreciate what Professor Winick just said because I’m surprised at what we’ve focused on today. Except for these last few comments, the discussion has been centered around such matters as alcoholic writers and the first play that was ever written; when Professor Winick mentioned that American families spend an average of six hours a day in front of their television, we dismissed that and instead we’re talking about all
DISCUSSION

these other things which have a lot less time exposure anyway. If advertising in programs to which American families are subject to six hours a day is suggesting that one of the effects of alcoholic beverages is disinhibition, and it is being shown that disinhibition often has no negative consequences, isn't this something that deserves a lot more discussion and a lot more study?

**GRANT:** I accept what Larry says completely. In England, the amount of time that people spend watching television is only marginally less than it is here. In terms of the number of ounces of alcohol consumed per program hour, I would guess that the difference would not be very great; it would paint a very similar picture.

Now if, as Larry says, a lot of the images of disinhibition that are emerging are ones which do not show negative consequences, or where the negative consequences are balanced by an equally positive consequence, then that is obviously going to be of significance to the whole culture. I think that the question we then need to ask is whether we here are not out of step with our culture in putting such an enormous amount of emphasis on the negative aspects of disinhibition. It may be not that the television programming is wrong but it's we who are wrong.

**MOORE:** In fact it mirrors exactly Ron Roizen's findings of the morning. It's exactly consistent.

**MOSHER:** I was just going to comment on that. I want to tie in where we're going tomorrow and where we've been. Television programming reflects at least in part what people believe, at least according to Ron. Many of my friends think that my studying alcohol problems is rather odd. Everybody likes to drink in my circle, including myself, and it's okay to do so. Some people have problems with alcohol but there's something special about them. This is my sense of the popular view of alcohol, which assumes a disease concept of alcoholism.

This dominant view of alcohol that we're finding on television also happens to reflect the drinking beliefs and styles of the dominant classes in this culture. I've recently done a study of corporate drinking. Corporate drinking is so ingrained into the lifestyle of the corporate executive that it's considered necessary for business, and in the business world, alcohol's disinhibitory effects are considered good. Alcohol makes you relax, talk business, compromise, and generally helps a business run smoothly. If somebody gets in trouble with alcohol in the corporate world and starts making bad decisions, alcohol is not blamed; the disease, alcoholism, is the problem. Television reflects this kind of portrayal of alcohol. Although television does have to be successful in the ratings in
order to make money, we have to recognize that what gets on that medium is very heavily controlled, and controlled by issues of domination, I would argue. It's not an accident that the dominant portrayal of alcohol in the popular culture — especially television and film — reflects the attitudes of the upper classes of the society.

LELAND: Your corporate people — I'm assuming they're all men?

MOSHER: Virtually.

LELAND: How did they feel about aggression? Is that positive or negative? I have a feeling they think "aggressive" is a great thing to be.

MOSHER: I'm not sure. I didn't find in the corporate images that alcohol would lead to aggressive behavior. It was believed it led to just the opposite. It was used for relaxing purposes. This is the justification for making it a business expense; it helps aggressive corporate executives relax and get into a mood to compromise so that they can actually reach agreements. If you think of the salesman, the reason why the salesman needs two drinks with his potential customer is to make everything more genial. It doesn't make you aggressive, it moderates those aggressive instincts a bit, which is good for business relationships.

MOORE: That depends whether you regard seduction as aggressive or not.

ROOM: One thing that I think we need to keep clearly in mind is that, as Lang and a number of others have laid out, disinhibition as a concept really covers the whole spectrum — when we talk about violence and aggression we're talking about only one of the potential cultural strands in this big box, which is labeled disinhibition. When I use the word disinhibition, I simply mean the cultural loading that's attached to feeling different when drinking.

RAUL CAETANO: A lot of people have voiced dissatisfaction with the concept of disinhibition, and it seems to me a very, very small umbrella to cover all the facts that we're talking about. We seem to concentrate on sexuality and aggression, and we leave the 398 other rabbits outside. So maybe we should begin to talk about the effects of alcohol and set aside the term disinhibition. Then we could also include the 70 percent of people who feel romantic when they drink, or the 79 percent who feel sleepy, or the 78 percent who feel friendly, and maybe we'll get a more accurate picture of what's going on when people drink and get drunk.

ROOM: Mac Marshall has another rabbit to pull.

MARSHALL: I wanted to second that motion and say that I think a lot of our discussion today has been very culture-bound. I've kept my mouth shut because we're talking about American culture,
but if we're going to deal with the whole issue of alcohol and human behavior — not just American human behavior — then we've got to get beyond these two issues which seem to be major issues in our own society and cast a wider net.

POWERS: I would like to remark that so far we've been talking about popular culture representations of drinking, but we haven't spoken at all about the popular culture of drinkers, which seems to be another aspect which deserves looking at. At the turn of the century — I'm doing a study of saloon behavior at that time — the songs sung by all the guys in the saloon never had to do with drinking; they were always about mother, about romance, about labor, almost never about drinking. That was something that was not a part of the repertoire of lower class popular culture.

FINGARETTE: I've just been going over a tally of things that have been said here, and I wonder if it's significant that among the effects that we expect characteristically are: that you feel lonely or that you feel sociable, that you're gregarious or you're aggressive, that you're sleepy or aroused, that you're mean or you're kind, that you're sick or you feel great, that you socialize or you commit crimes, or that you're inspired to creation or you actually break down, that you feel friendly or you feel animosity, that you're sad or you're happy, that you're talkative or you're quiet, that you feel great physically or that you feel sick physically, that it tastes good or it tastes terrible, that you're kind, or you're unkind and cruel. That's beginning to suggest to me a picture that is familiar in a variety of fields. And possibly it's a way of looking at the role that alcohol plays, at least in our own culture. When you have something that somehow has been able to take on all these possibilities, then you have one of these wonderful instruments of pseudo-explanation and symbolism that will do anything you want, just because it can be used to imply anything at all.

On the other hand — and here's a word in defense of disinhibition, the dirty word of the day — when I think of disinhibition, I'm not so sure that I find it commonly thought that alcohol also inhibits you. And when I think of the related term, responsibility, it's easy to think of the notion of it making you less responsible, but I don't think anyone says it makes you more responsible; that doesn't sound right. So, as far as any definitive meaning goes, the only distinctive terms are those two, which do seem specific to the disinhibition idea.

ROIZEN: That might suggest that we need to talk in Talcott Parsons-like (Parsons 1968) terms again, we have a new pattern variable concerning situations, which divides those in which emotional states are a valid and appropriate part of the situation
from those in which emotional states are not so valid and appropriate parts of the situation. For some reason alcohol may play a role as a kind of door that takes us between the two normative systems: a kind of official and responsible set of normative alternatives, and a kind of unofficial and irresponsible set of normative alternatives. It suggests to me that trying to account for whether it makes us friendly or makes us sad and so on is, after all, misdirected. Which way it goes seems hardly even an interesting question any more — we might need to think instead about a kind of Parsonian variable about emotion.

LEVINE: I want to third or fourth or fifth the canning of disinhibition as this sort of Platonic essential category of what it is we're talking about. I understood that is what MacAndrew and Edgerton did ten years ago. What so excited me about Jonathan Miller's materials and what I learned since then is the fundamental falsehood of the whole biological model upon which it's built. I have this fear that instead of having a funeral here, we're giving life back again to the whole notion. What we should be doing is developing a richer vocabulary for describing that which has been called disinhibition.

I wanted to give it a kick of another sort. Here's a classic statement. There's a bunch of them in the first few pages of MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969).

The inhibitions are our moral brakes. The chief distinction between man and the lower animals is that the former exercises many more inhibitions. Without them he could hardly live a civilized life. Concentrations of alcohol in the brain and blood far below those necessary to produce detectable muscular incoordination will cause a blunting of the sense of caution and normal restraints. The key here is "civilized man" and "lower animals" coexisting in the same body. Presumably the animal desire is the strong one, the human desire is weak, and the animal is kept under chain — except alcohol releases the chain.

I wanted to push that model a little bit and turn it upside down. If I can't kill it, let me play with it and suggest that it makes at least as much sense to construct a model of alcohol as an "inhibitor." Let us take our model of human nature, still keeping it with the human and the animal coexisting, but we say instead that the civilized animal is the stronger one — that both are free and un-restrained, but the civilized one is just stronger and so it ordinarily wins out. Then alcohol becomes an inhibitor; it inhibits the normally civilized impulses of the human, chains the human up, and leaves that weaker animal free to do what it wants. Both models equally lose a sense of reality about what's going on.
RICHARD SPEIGLMAN: To follow up Harry, the other side of the inhibitory is the disinhibitory, and in a sort of dialectical sense you can’t have one without the other. That takes me back to Jim Mosher and his comments on the corporate executives and their behavior and values. I was trying to think: Well, what is their view about, say, the working class? Are they going to think that alcohol is good for the working class because it’s good for executives? Well, not necessarily. It can be a whole other understanding of the effect of alcohol. Consider that in the past it was okay for rich people to drink booze but not for German immigrants to drink beer. As Herb Fingarette gave that whole list, the answer seemed very obvious to me: there’s a great political possibility for deciding whatever you want about alcohol’s effect on anyone you want to. There are all kinds of categories: plus/minus, inhibit/disinhibit, positive/negative. The question is who has the power to enforce their view. The corporate executives get to enforce both what they want to think about themselves — and undoubtedly it will have some effect on what is on television — and also the view of the working class — which may be completely the opposite of their own image of themselves.

LANG: I think it’s important to understand in these lists that are compiled that they’re based on an amalgamation of data from a variety of different people. The point was raised earlier about individual differences. And it seems that one thing that’s gotten lost in this effort to look at disinhibition as a universal phenomenon that pertains to all these different behaviors is that there may be different strokes for different folks. One individual may find that alcohol disinhibits his sexual behavior because he generally has difficulty expressing himself sexually, and that’s the main function that it serves for him. His data are reported on a questionnaire and added up with a bunch of other people who have different personal needs or individual differences or inhibitions, if you will, and the result is you get all these different things. The only thing that unites them is that drinking lets them behave in a little different way, and the particular behaviors in question are more an individual matter than an amalgam of all these things.

MACANDREW: Referring back to the topic of Winick’s paper, insofar as the medium provides the message, it follows that if the message were truly homogenous, there would be only one rabbit.

FINGARETTE: I wasn’t sure whether there was a misunderstanding in connection with what Harry Levine said. In saying that the one thing that was left over that one couldn’t naturally give the opposite for, as implied by disinhibition — namely, responsibility —
and saying I was saying a good word for the disinhibition idea, I'm not sure whether it was clear that I didn't mean to be saying a good word for the truth of the theory that alcohol chemically does this, but rather for the idea that this perhaps may be the only specific content in the belief that we have about alcohol as a disinhibitor. The one constant conceptual element that remains is that alcohol is never usable as a rationalization for inhibition or more responsibility. Thus this would give bona fide meaning to the concept of alcohol as a disinhibitor but of course doesn't tell us whether it's true that alcohol disinhibits.

ROIZEN: I can think of one situation where alcohol does signal you're more responsible. When the businessmen get together to close a deal and have a few drinks, it's sometimes thought that what's happening is people are opening up their true selves — there can be no misdealings, no under-the-table stuff. And so in a sense, the deal closed in an alcohol environment is more responsibly closed than the deal that never had a drink to seal it.

FINGARETTE: It's instrumentally nonresponsible, but in its ultimate outcome, the expectation is that it will be more responsible.

ROOM: Let the record show that Mark Moore shook his head.
DAY 3: DISINHIBITION AND SOCIAL CONTROL
Introduction

Robin Room

Today, we turn to the third main topic of our agenda, which is consideration of the relation between the drinking and disinhibition link and the issue of social control and power in society. In the discussions in the last two days there’s already been a lot of adumbration of this area, and I think that we’re in a good position to take it up in a more formal way. A fourth agenda which is not explicit in the titles of the presentations involves moving towards some kind of conclusion or closure, as much as we can manage, concerning the implications of what we’ve been discussing for social policy and for further research.

The first presentation on “Drinking, Disinhibition and Domination” is by Patricia Morgan from the Social Research Group. Pat has worked in the area of social history of drug policy and also now in the social history of alcohol policy, and has also done some substantial work in the newly burgeoning field of alcohol and family violence, reviewing a large but not uniformly excellent literature.
Alcohol, Disinhibition, and Domination: A Conceptual Analysis*

Patricia Morgan

In any society where there is an unequal distribution of resources and power among its members, systems of domination exist which act symbolically or substantively to reinforce that domination. Generally overlooked, however, are the ways in which alcohol is used as an instrument within these systems of domination. Much as religion was used in the 16th and 17th centuries to foster and legitimate struggles over political and economic power, the effects and characteristics associated with alcoholic beverages are used both symbolically and instrumentally to promote systems of subordination and domination. Gusfield (1963) argues, for instance, that the need of the native-born middle class in the 19th century to symbolically maintain status dominance over the new immigrant working class was an important factor in middle class leadership of the Temperance movement. More recently, Room (1980) suggests that beliefs associated with the effects of alcohol have been used as instruments of intimate domination, thereby reinforcing the inequality between men and women by legitimating or offering an explanation for aggression, violence, or unpredictable behavior aimed at less powerful family members.

What these two pieces of work suggest, and what is explored further here, is the notion that it is a specific aspect of alcohol that reinforces and helps maintain existing systems of domination. That aspect is the tacit belief in the link between alcohol and disinhibition. Because alcohol-related research to date has not been organized around this conceptual area, the nature of belief systems which link alcohol and disinhibition to relationships of domination are examined first. The alcohol-disinhibition-domination link is then

*Preparation of this paper was supported by National Alcohol Research Center Grant AA-03524 from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism to the Social Research Group, School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley.
analyzed through examples of their institutional manifestations. This is followed by a discussion of the social and political implications of the alcohol and disinhibition link in systems of domination.

The Alcohol-Disinhibition Belief System

Ideologies represent belief systems, structured into societies to enhance or promote norms and values of cultures as a whole, or subgroups within those cultures. As such, they possess important instrumental as well as symbolic power. Levine (1979) notes, for instance, that the ideology of self-control, as an important part of middle class values in the 19th century, promoted a range of acceptable behavior for its members, including abstinence from drunken behavior. Self-control and abstinence were not only symbolic representations of middle class power in society, but these values were also translated into organizational strength and legal power through legal prohibitions against alcohol.

The particular importance of alcohol in this example is not the substance itself, but its perceived effects (i.e., lack of control) interpreted within a larger ideological system. Thus, alcohol is more than a substance to be used simply for recreational or nutritional purposes. It represents, according to the specific cultural or historical circumstance, morality or immorality, power or weakness. It is believed to be a key to aggression, happiness, love, depression, or creativity. It is a scapegoat. It is given symbolic powers far in excess of the physiological effects of its ethanol content. The particular beliefs associated with alcohol use are influenced by specific value and power structures within a given culture or society.

The link between these belief systems and alcohol use lies within the agreed upon definitions of the effects of drinking on individuals. These definitions are strongly tied to the place of alcohol in the more general system of societal or subgroup norms and values. The belief that alcohol use promotes social grace, status, or strength tends to make drinking an important part of a subgroup or culture which values such conditions. Conversely, if a culture promotes self-control, and alcohol is seen as destroying that value, then alcohol will be proscribed. Thus, the link between alcohol and disinhibition can have a variety of relationships with social values depending on the specific content of the beliefs about disinhibition and on the nature of the social structure. Whether the perceived disinhibitory effects of alcohol will have either positive or negative values or consequences depends on which segment of society has power to define the disinhibitory function and to impose that definition on
themselves and others. Thus, the alcohol-disinhibition role played within these belief systems operates through a system of domination. This power of a group to impose a particular value on a society represents, in fact, that group's domination over alternative values held by other groups. It represents the power of one group over another.

In today's society, the disinhibitory effects of alcohol are subject to conflicting characteristics. There is a powerful alcohol beverage industry which widely promotes the beneficial aspects of alcohol use: social grace, status, masculinity, and sexuality are all attributes subtly attributed to the effects of drinking through powerful and widespread media presentations (Mosher and Wallack 1979; Sargent 1979). These messages capitalize on values implicitly promoted in today's culture — values which shape individual, interpersonal, and group behavior in many ways, and through many institutional settings. The effects of drinking promoted by the industry are interwoven with, and in some cases enhanced by, preexisting cultural values and beliefs.

We live, however, in a culturally diverse society, a society in which racial, ethnic, social, and class divisions represent many alternative value systems. It is within this framework that the negative consequences of alcohol drinking behavior become identified. Among groups or individuals, at particular times, alcohol use is thus also said to lead to aggression, violence, and immoral or pathological behavior. However, there is no one antialcohol interest presenting those interpretations in contrast to those promoted by the alcohol beverage industry. Instead, these negative characteristics are selectively identified, and their consequences selectively imposed on particular groups at particular times, by interests which have the power to define and impose their values over others. Alternatively, the same behavior can be identified as problematic or not, depending on the group exhibiting the behavior.

The selective identification of negative alcohol-disinhibition characteristics is made possible by an individualistic interpretation for alcohol problems. By locating alcohol problems within individual psychopathology, associations between alcohol problems and other "social ills" can be differentially attributed. For instance, alcoholism can be an explanation for crime in both higher and lower status individuals. It is the higher status individual, however, who is more likely to have this alcohol-related criminal behavior excused as an illness (see Mosher this volume).

In sum, whatever alcohol use represents the representation itself marks a power differential according to who (or what groups) has the power to enforce those definitions. Thus, the alcohol-
disinhibition link can be utilized to reinforce, maintain, symbolically represent, or excuse a system of domination and subordination. Selective attributions of this link can provide the rationale for selective restrictions on individual or group behavior in general, and drinking behavior in particular.

Variation by Social Category of the Actor

Often alcohol is believed to have different disinhibitory effects on different classes of people. For instance, Levine (in this volume) argues that colonial Americans' beliefs about the effects on Indians differed from their beliefs about the effects on themselves. But even when disinhibitory effects are believed to be the same for different statuses, the social meaning of the effects will often be very different. The same disinhibited behavior which is accepted for one group may be viewed as shocking for another. Such differential interpretations of the drinking-disinhibition link reflect the different social positions and relationships to power of the groups being evaluated. One example of this is the different evaluations placed on drunken disinhibition in women and in men in contemporary American society.

These different evaluations can be seen reflected in the research literature. In the post war period, notions of submissiveness, chastity, and nurturing were promoted as the acceptable behavior for women, as were aggressiveness and strength for men. Unlike its effects on men, inebriety was said to release a woman from the moral ties that bound her, leading her to neglect her responsibility to home and husband, and further to reject her very womanness. In 1962 Hirsh argued, for instance, that it was a woman's duty to hold up the moral fabric of society through her duties as wife and mother. Thus, he writes:

...when angels fall, they fall disturbingly far. We would rather have them in their place, which is another way of saying that they define and make our own place possible and even more comfortable. (1962, p. 111)

In 1967, Curlee underscored the importance of this role for women in describing their drunken behavior as particularly problematic. Because the role of woman has been equated with the stabilizing functions of wife and mother, the drunken woman has seemed to be a special threat; no one likes to think that the hand that rocks the cradle might be a shaky one. (1967, p. 115)

Curlee further asserted that women themselves accepted this dif-
ferentiated value system — which labeled their own drunken behavior particularly immoral — as a rejection of the subordinate bonds of womanhood. “According to the stereotype, a woman who has deserted her feminine role sufficiently to be an alcoholic has deserted respectability in all areas, especially in the sexual ones” (Curlee 1967, p. 155).

Conversely, much the same drunken disinhibitory behavior for men was not necessarily seen as problematic, much less as immoral or threatening. In some cultures, as in certain areas of the United States, aggression is acceptable drunken behavior among men; some studies report that rowdiness, or aggression, among male drinkers is a way to reinforce social status, male images, and influence in the home (Sargent 1979). In fact, Tiger (1969) suggests that a “boys' night out” when men can exhibit drunken, masculine behavior is important in modern society in order to reestablish social ties of masculinity and male dominance over women.

MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969) argue that Native Americans' drinking behavior was “taught” to them by their suppliers and absorbed within the context of their particular cultural heritage. Thus, according to Mosher (1975), frontier whites were notoriously heavy drinkers, from whom the natives partially learned their drinking behavior:

...the binges were taught to be an integral part of the drinking experience. Thus, white attitudes reflected a double standard: White binge drinking on the frontier was excused or viewed as individualistic, while Indian drinking, similar to that of the whites, was condemned in toto. (p. 6)

Alcohol and Disinhibition: Relation to Domination

Unequal relations between groups or between individuals can be established or maintained in two basic interrelated ways: by increasing or maintaining the power and effective social control of the dominant, and by increasing or maintaining the subordination of the powerless. Beliefs in alcohol's disinhibitory powers can be used in both these ways to maintain dominance. Belief in a negative disinhibitory effect of alcohol on the subordinate groups often appears in the labeling of deviance, serving as a justification for maintaining inequality or for social control. Alternatively, beliefs about the negative disinhibitory effects of alcohol can be used to deny alcohol to those with less power, as a dramatic symbol of their
subordination. In both these cases, the alcohol disinhibition link is used as a rhetoric of justification for social control: as an often powerful symbolic reinforcement of power relations which have other material bases. The symbolic nature of the relation to domination does not make it any less real in its consequences: the successful establishment of a hegemony of beliefs about alcohol, disinhibition, and the powerless becomes in itself an instrument of power.

Alternatively, the alcohol-disinhibition link can reinforce dominant relationships more directly. Dominant groups can retain the sole right to disinhibitory behavior (Sargent 1979), as well as using it to wield force against subordinates (Room 1980). Conversely, to the extent drinking serves to debilitate the drinker, the powerful can promote drinking among the powerless to reinforce their subjection.

Thus, the implementation of drinking-disinhibition values by dominating groups over subordinate ones can take several forms. They can represent the rationale behind measures of social control, as well as attempts to maintain the means of social control. A few propositions will be offered here with examples to illustrate the ways in which values associated with alcohol and disinhibition support these relations.

Beliefs in the negative disinhibiting effects of alcohol can explain or reinforce notions of deviant values or behavior in subordinate groups. Here, examples from the literature abound. Levine (1979) writes of the attempts of the 19th century middle class to delegitimate working class values and impose their own. Working class drinking behavior was seen simply as another manifestation of the inability of immigrant and lower class groups to maintain the correct moral standards of society. During that time, images of saloon behavior generally underscored the immorality of these and other deviant groups. Sinclair (1964) quotes one Southern leader as arguing:

The saloon is a place of rendezvous for all classes of the low and vulgar, a resort for degraded Whites and their more degraded Negro associates, the lounging place for adulterers, lewd women, the favorite haunt of gamblers, drunkards and criminals. (p. 30)

The perceived deviancy of Mexican farmworkers in California during the 1920s and 1930s was reinforced through explanations of their drinking behavior. Alcohol was said to drive Mexican men to uncontrollable aggression and violent behavior, especially knife fights and barroom brawls (Taylor 1931). This was used as an explanation of the uncivilized nature of the Mexican culture and as a rationale for keeping Mexican farmworkers isolated from urban areas in California (Morgan 1978a).
Other examples can be cited to support this point. Drunken disinhibition in blacks was seen as a particular threat by whites in the pre-Prohibition era. Sinclair (1964) writes that Southern whites saw liquor affecting “Negroes differently from Whites.”

Liquor sometimes gave the Negro the strength to repudiate his inferior status. It also encouraged him to loose his libido on White women, incited, so it was said, by the nudes on the labels of whiskey bottles. (p. 29)

Although whites were subject to the same evil influences of liquor, one Congressman commented, “...the White man being further evolved it takes longer time to reduce him to the same level” (in Sinclair 1964, p. 29).

Even today, Native American drinking behavior is presented as a reflection of weakness, racial inferiority, and inability to become assimilated into white culture. Mosher writes that in place of old racist theories of Indian drinking behavior, newer and more individualistic approaches deny the cultural specificity and diversity of Indian culture which shape drinking behavior today. Thus, current discussions of Indians and alcoholism still reflect the dominant white ideas of the general inferiority of Indian culture (Mosher 1975).

In yet another contemporary example, acceptable drinking behavior among American women remains restrictive. Therefore, a woman who is a victim of assault or aggression and who has been drinking will likely be blamed in some way for her victimization. Because women as a group are still considered subordinate, some drinking behaviors will be viewed as an explanation for whatever may befall those who step outside of traditional female behavior. The woman who is raped on her way home from a bar, for instance, can easily be blamed for her victimization simply because her drinking behavior was seen to give evidence of her unwillingness to abide by the moral code imposed on her by others.

*Belief in the alcohol disinhibition link can also be used to deny or limit the availability of alcohol to subordinate groups.* Limiting alcohol availability also often serves as a symbolic or instrumental tool toward further isolation of a subordinate group, and a reinforcement of dominant values. Blacks, women, and Native Americans are all groups which have been denied access to alcoholic beverages either legally or through intense social pressure reflecting more covert policies of social control.

For instance, in classical Rome drinking was thought to lead to sexual abandonment, a behavior which was acceptable for men but not for women. Thus, the preservation of chastity among Roman
women was partly enforced by prohibiting women to drink. This reflected the relative power of men in Roman society and their ability to determine cultural values. In later years, after women attained more power relative to men in Roman society, they were allowed access to alcoholic beverages (McKinlay 1959).

For another example, Native Americans were subject to Federal prohibition of alcohol availability on reservations until 1953, when the Federal Government gave alcohol control jurisdiction to the States. Mosher (1975) argues that this was part of a general governmental aim to “terminate the Indian tribes as corporate entities” (1975, p. 21). Often, however, liquor availability for subordinate groups was wedged to the need to maintain social control. As such, control figured into the history of subordinate groups in a variety of ways. Mosher argues that the history of liquor legislation illustrated a gradual attempt by the U.S. Government to control the Native American Indian population. He writes, for instance, that “liquor laws provided an ideal means for the federal agents to control individual Indian behavior” (1975, p. 18).

In the South after reconstruction, liquor prohibition provided the rationale for tougher social and political control over blacks. The Prohibition movement in the South, according to Denise Herd (1981), “served as the rationale for the political disenfranchisement of blacks.” Blacks were characterized by rural Protestant middle class prohibitionists as violent and lustful drinkers who, by “selling” their votes, supported the upper class, wet, urban, Yankee interests. (Herd points out, however, that other historical evidence contrasts with this view, suggesting instead that, in reality, black drinking behavior was more moderate than that of whites. She also points to the strong influence of black Temperance groups on the general black population.) The idea that blacks were a major obstacle to statewide prohibition measures, coupled with the inundation of provocative accounts in the press of drunken Negro debauchery, contributed to the total political disenfranchisement of blacks by the 1910s. In a related political development, by 1914, all Southern States but two had passed prohibition laws (Sinclair 1964).

The proscription of alcohol to women in the 19th century offers another interesting example. In the colonial period, characterized by Puritan hierarchal values, women were scarce and a valuable part of the community work force. They not only drank along with men; many were tavern keepers (Lerner 1969). The Jacksonian era, however, not only ushered in the secularization, urbanization, and industrialization of American culture; it also brought in a new middle class with new values which essentially were more egalitarian for men and more restrictive for women. Levine (1979) writes of
the changing notions of womanhood during this period and of the values which brought intense social pressure for absolute abstinence for women.

In contemporary society, belief in the alcohol-disinhibition link has continued to be used as a rationale for limiting access to alcohol as a symbolic cover for social control. The circumstances however are a bit more complex. In a continuing study of alcohol availability in Berkeley, Friedner Wittman (1980) has made some interesting observations concerning “public” and “private” alcohol-related disinhibitory behavior in the community.

In the predominantly black neighborhoods, a concerted effort has been made by organized groups to limit new alcohol beverage outlets in the area. These neighborhoods already have the highest level of alcohol availability, so that limiting new outlets will not necessarily have an effect on overall availability. The issue instead has been identified as an objection to alcohol-related rowdy street corner behavior by homeowners in a part of the city which is becoming rapidly gentrified. The issue then concerning alcohol is largely a symbolic one. Public display of disinhibitory alcohol-drinking behavior, which was allowed to exist for years as part of the neighborhood’s subculture, is no longer acceptable public behavior in an area that is undergoing rapid gentrification. Around the moves to limit outlets is a broader agenda of control, seeking to change street behavior.

Attempts to limit alcohol availability in groups considered subordinate or deviant find expression in modern society in attempts to limit the settings of alcohol availability. For example, a recent zoning ordinance in San Francisco restricted the development of new bars in another neighborhood undergoing gentrification. In this case, new family homeowners were fighting the encroachment of gay homeowners in the same area, and saw the public display of gay lifestyles associated with the scheduled opening of a new gay bar in the neighborhood. In this example, as in the others we have offered, the ability to limit alcohol, the access to alcohol, or the settings of alcohol consumption is the “ability to limit access to the means of disinhibition” (Room 1980).

In sum, the imposition of negative values on the alcohol-disinhibition link has often provided rationales for the maintenance of social control. Dominant values have both symbolically and instrumentally been imposed on subordinate groups, as we have seen, in a number of ways. Generally, however, these values, within which alcohol and disinhibition play a key part, became a part of institutionalized patterns of social control, separate from any interest in drinking behavior itself. Symbolically, the link has been used
to maintain a rhetoric of domination toward subordinate groups. As Himmelstein (1978) has argued, these patterns are most likely to arrive when the relationship between dominant and subordinate groups is in a state of flux.

[It]...is a way of symbolically reasserting the legitimacy of the hierarchial relationship between the groups, the right of the relatively dominant group to its position of dominance. (1978, p.42)

But symbols are in the end also instruments: Symbols which are used as a justification for domination can also reinforce instrumental patterns or policies of social control (cf. Edelman 1977; Gusfield 1981; Morgan 1978b). Further, the fluidity of alcohol disinhibition definitions has often enabled those with power to adjust the rationale for intervention according to particular social control needs.

The second pattern of alcohol and disinhibition value associations is concerned with the maintenance of domination over others. These also can take several forms, a few of which will be outlined here.

Commonly, beliefs in the alcohol-disinhibition link serve as explanations for deviant behavior in place of broader or more problematic associations. Alcohol “as demon rum” has, since the Temperance era, provided the excuse for a wide assortment of deviant behavior exhibited by otherwise nondeviant individuals. Upstanding, responsible husbands and fathers abuse their wives and children supposedly only under the influence of alcohol, and their deviant actions are seen primarily in relation to this. Historically, when physical chastisement against wives was seen as a common prerogative of husbands, an alcohol-related or any other type of disinhibitory “excuse” was not needed (Dobash and Dobash 1979; Morgan 1980; Room 1980). However, in the last half of the 20th century, with relations within the family in flux, husbands attempting to retain dominance can no longer justify acts of violence and aggression as an automatic right. The mediating influence of disinhibitory alcohol behavior then is seen as a much easier association to make. As Room (1980) has argued, it offers husbands a convenient instrument to use in maintaining domination within the family.

Hidden behind the alcohol-as-excuse rhetoric, these relations of domination also serve as facesaving arguments for wives in a subordinate position. Unwilling in today’s society to admit openly that she exists in a subordinate relationship to her husband, the wife often finds that alcohol, as a disinhibiting agent, provides the necessary excuse for her victimization, and for continuing in the relationship (Dobash as quoted in Aarens et al. 1977, p. 554).

The use of alcohol disinhibitory behavior as an excuse for deviant
actions, often termed "deviance-disavowal" by researchers in the field (Gelles 1972; McCaghy 1968), is commonly used for more public crimes as well. Theft, sexual crimes, bribery, and embezzlement are shaded with the alcohol excuse by prominent businessmen, professionals, and politicians (cf. Mosher in this volume). Implicit in these deviance-disavowal explanations is the assumption that these are all fine upstanding citizens whose real crimes lie within their drinking behavior. Thus, they are sick individuals who deserve to be "treated" and not punished.

Consequently, the alcohol-as-excuse explanation offers a rationale for certain types of State intervention. Through unequal application of the law, for example, some criminals who plead alcohol as excuse can be diverted away from the criminal justice system into alcoholism treatment programs. The selective application of these options particularly favors those who enjoy some measure of status, wealth, or power. This selective application, however, is encouraged by current individualistic models of alcohol problems. Thus, the moral dimension involved in particular definitions of alcohol problems is often hidden behind a technological/scientific cover. According to a recent book by Gusfield (1981), this represents a political choice, as well as a moral one. He argues that to wrap a scientific cloak around definitions of drinking problems,

...denies that a moral decision has been taken, that a political choice among alternatives has been made. The ownership and responsibility for social problems and their solution are given as a matter of fact and not of value. (p. 194)

The alcohol-disinhibition link can also help uphold the status or dominance of a group without excuse or apology. When connections are made directly between prerogatives of power and drinking behavior, disinhibitory behavior can be viewed as a right. For dominant groups, power can be reinforced through the right to exhibit disinhibitory drunken behavior, which for other groups would be sanctioned. To return to an earlier example concerning intimate domination, disinhibitory alcohol behavior can represent the power a husband has over his wife (Room 1980). He retains the right to his drunken behavior, as long as power remains unequal in the family. "Power," however, is commonly context- and status-specific. The domineering husband may have the right to exhibit disinhibitory behavior within the private realm of the family, but would be sanctioned for the same behavior when exhibited in situations where he is not dominant, such as public drinking among his peers. Thus, Burns' piece (1980) on young male drinkers in
Charlestown, a section of Boston, shows that their rowdy drinking behavior is acceptable only in certain contexts and neighborhoods where they hold the edge on power and status. This behavior would not be acceptable in other contexts such as the "family bar" or in dignified sections of the city. It might present no problems to harass a lesbian bar downtown, but to violate the decorum of the drinkers in a middle class establishment would bring heavy negative sanctions. In the same light, the street corner behavior exhibited by young black males in Southwest Berkeley might have been tolerated in that neighborhood, but would not be in the middle class white Elmwood or Claremont districts of the city.

In such examples, the "right" of publicly displaying drunken disinhibitory behavior may well involve the symbolic display of relative power or status in an enclosed environment which is not attainable in the larger society. For the young men of Charlestown, the room for public rowdy drunken behavior is symbolic of the passage to manhood and all that that symbolically represents in terms of power and dominance. Similarly, the young weekend warriors in Marshall's study of Truk (1979) have the right to run amok when drunk. The right encompassed in this behavior enables young men to "work toward establishing the culturally valued identities of competence, true bravery and manliness and to express aggression against others in socially permissible ways" (1979, p. 127). Boyatzis (1976) suggests on the basis of societies where power is highly valued, alcohol fills a particularly useful role, by allowing an individual to feel more powerful than warranted in his actual position in society.

In sum, the selective application of values to drunken disinhibitory behavior can be used to support those with power or status. As an excuse for negative disinhibitory behavior, it offers a way out of problematic situations. As a prerogative of power or status, it can be seen as a context-specific manifestation of dominance. Disinhibitory alcohol behavior thus offers a way of displaying power, or a way of supporting images of power, both directly and indirectly, symbolically and instrumentally.

A final option, as we have noted, is that alcohol as a particular disinhibitory drug could be supplied to subordinates as a way of dissipating potential political problems. For the subordinated, alcohol has always been the original and pervasive "opiate of the masses." In many times and places drunkenness served as an anodyne and diversion from potential political action against dominant groups. Historical and anthropological accounts of alcohol's relationship to society have presented evidence that dominant groups have often been quite conscious of this relation:
Alcohol was thus made cheaply available to subordinates to soak up excess purchasing power (as in Poland); to relieve the pressures of autocratic regimes (as in Franco's Spain); or to realize maximum profit in primitive capitalist production (as in the 17th and 18th centuries).

Liquor and beer production flourished in 17th and 18th century Europe when increased grain production forced merchants to turn their products into alcohol which could be more easily shipped and stored (Park 1979). Coupled with the expansion of colonialism "booze," as George Orwell put it, became "the cement of empire" both at home and abroad. Alcohol was used in the exploitation of subject peoples abroad in Latin America under Spain, and in Alaska under the Russians (Bunzel 1940; Lemert 1979; Stauffer 1971). At home, alcohol, when placed under complete government control, as in Russia, not only brought maximum revenues to the State, but, according to one writer, was also an "analgesic to widespread misery" (Wortis 1963, p. 1645).

According to some, alcohol use played an important role in Britain in the transition from feudalism to capitalism (Park 1980), and in the United States in placating immigrant laborers. Stivers (1976) writes of the 19th century Irish worker in the United States.

Under certain circumstances Irish laborers were literally forced to become hard drinkers, if not drunkards. Irish laborers, especially those working on canals and railroads, were often paid a portion of their wages in rotgut whiskey.... The Irish laborer was also encouraged to drink heartily off the job as a means of maintaining a class of indentured servants. Grogshops owned by contractors encouraged hard drinking by providing the laborer with unlimited credit. (p. 140)

Generally, Lemert (1979) found that "the unrestricted delegation of control over liquor supply undoubtedly has been both a political and economic means of maintaining indenture and peonage systems" (p. 46).

Conclusion

This essay has been an attempt, on the one hand, to broaden theoretical inquiry for studies on alcohol and disinhibition and, on the other hand, to contribute to the development of analyses which explicitly focus on the social control aspects of alcohol use in society. Pivotal to this endeavor has been the cultural, social, and economic specificity of values associated with disinhibitory alcohol behavior.
This has allowed us to look at old alcohol studies in new ways. As such, it has been necessary at times to sketch in black and white. Consequently, the propositions offered here are first attempts to pencil in structural relations of power, domination, and social control as they affect values and beliefs about behavior in general, and drinking behavior in particular.

As theoretical assumptions about the complex relations involved in the association between alcohol and disinhibition are broadened, there is a need to ask why certain values and not others get placed on certain behaviors. In this light, following a particular drinking phenomenon through several historical periods, much as Levine has done, becomes especially valuable. Cross-cultural explorations offer the same opportunity to examine the specificity of values which get placed on certain groups and their drinking behaviors.

The second purpose of this paper has been to focus more explicitly on the relationship between alcohol and social control. As Room has written recently, outside of Lemert's early work, the literature in this area has been sparse (1980). This paper examines only one component: how alcohol is used to maintain or reinforce systems of domination. As Room (1980) suggests, there are also other dimensions in alcohol's relation to social control as a potential tool for subordinates, and as a symbolic expression of opposition by the powerless. Moreover, there is need to be aware of another whole area of theoretical development between alcohol and social control — namely, the social handling of those identified as having alcohol-related problems. In short, a whole new terrain needs to be mapped out, adding the "contour lines of the social control dimension to our understanding of drinking practices and problems" (Room 1980, p. 14).

References


Bunzel, R. The role of alcoholism in two Central American cultures. Psychiatry, 3:361-387, 1940.


MORGAN


MORGAN: What I have suggested in the paper is a list of propositions which can be used to explain some of the ways in which beliefs about alcohol and disinhibition become manifest in society. By looking at the relationships of alcohol and disinhibition to domination we are in fact opening up a whole new way of looking at what we’ve been studying in the last three days. But if we study domination, then it is also relevant to look at something else called inhibition. And what I’d like to suggest is that alcohol can actually be used to maintain systems of responsibility, and certain aspects of social control, by inhibiting certain kinds of behaviors.

For instance, in many cultures when one feels aggressive towards one’s neighbor or family member, one does not engage in physical aggression; one goes out to drink as a replacement for that. In another example, Joan Ablon (1980) has found in some recent work she has been doing among second and third generation Irish Americans that these families are generally characterized by sexual repression, that both husbands and wives readily admit that drinking very often is a substitute for expression of sexuality or sexual relations within the family.

In this same vein, very often alcohol can be used as a symbol of responsibility — one has to maintain the inhibition, if you will, or the control to go out and do what is responsible. For instance, I was thinking of the Japanese fighter pilots in World War II who, before they went off to certain death, were reinforced by a symbolic drink of sake. There are a lot of other examples, both historical and contemporary.

So, by way of summing up, this has been an attempt, on the one hand, to broaden the theoretical inquiries of studies on alcohol and disinhibition, and, on the other hand, to contribute to the development of analyses which explicitly focus on certain institutions of social control.

I would also like to note that the theoretical assumptions about complex relations involved in the association between alcohol and disinhibition need to be broadened, and there is a need to ask why certain values and not others get placed on behaviors like drinking. In this light, following a particular drinking phenomenon through historical periods, as Harry Levine has done, becomes especially
valuable. Cross-cultural explorations offer the same opportunity to examine the specificity of values which get placed on groups and their drinking behaviors.
Commentary

Elizabeth Morrissey

ROOM: Elizabeth Morrissey has been at the Alcohol and Drug Institute at the University of Washington in Seattle for a number of years and is causing us to have to revise our notions of the differences between women and men in the natural history of drinking problems. She is currently working on a life history study among juvenile delinquents, a study focusing on drug use.

ELIZABETH MORRISSEY: In discussing Pat's paper, I'd first like to offer a minor critique, that the propositions that she put forth in the paper might be formulated more parsimoniously. For example, explanations of deviant behavior in subordinate groups might more profitably be seen as one of the mechanisms whereby the availability of alcohol is restricted or controlled or denied to deviant groups, so that those two categories could be combined.

I'd like to, first of all, bring to bear some further examples in support of Morgan's propositions primarily from the literature on women and alcohol, partly because that's the literature with which I'm most familiar; and, secondly, I'd like to muddy the waters, bring in the grays that Pat was referring to by taking up where she leaves off the question of how alcohol/disinhibition ideology is manifested in the social organization of social control. I want to come down one level of analysis and look at the ways in which this link shows up in social control of drinking behaviors.

First of all, there are additional considerations which lend support to Morgan's assertions regarding the power relations associated with the beliefs in the alcohol/disinhibition link. As has been evident in numerous contexts over the last two days, women as a subordinate group play multi-faceted roles in the maintenance of the belief system in question. Our concern with disinhibition has continually drawn attention to the relationship at several levels of analysis among alcohol, sex and violence. In fact, before the conference when I was going through the papers, I mentioned to Robin that the title should actually be changed to "Alcohol, Sex and Violence."

Women provide a focus for very strong feelings about all three of
these things. As sexual objects, their presence may interfere with the pleasures of drinking in male drinking groups — there are frequent examples of women being excluded because when they were included in male drinking groups, illegitimacy and adultery ensued. It's the women who are seen as causing those kinds of problems; as long as they're excluded, then drinking behavior will be fun. Women are also, as Pat pointed out, objects of violence, which is excused by an account in terms of alcohol. And women are members of a subordinate group whose access to alcohol is limited by virtue of the power relationships, as observed in Pat's paper.

These aspects are woven together in intricate ways. For example, Marian Sandmaier (1980), in a recent book, describes the prohibition in ancient Greece against a female's use of wine. In that context the intimacy of relationships between women and male relatives was used to determine whether a woman had taken wine. Any time a woman met up with a male relative any time of the day, she was required to greet this person with a kiss on the lips. If alcohol were evident on her breath — and this is probably the first example of a breathalyzer — she was subject to execution on the spot.

Morgan describes interrelationships between alcohol, family violence and the power differentials between the sexes. There's evidence that even when violence is not involved, women accept responsibility for the impact of drinking problems on the family, whether the problems are a result of their drinking or their spouses' drinking. In the mid-'70s, Corrigan (1980) replicated the findings that Curlee (1970) reported in the mid-'60s, and came up again with the notion that alcoholic women find drunkenness in women more distasteful than drunkenness in men, and they are also more likely than other women to have this belief about drunkenness in women.

At other levels in family interaction, a study done by Anne Sundgren in 1978 indicated that female spouses of alcoholic men are more likely than spouses of alcoholic women — who are males — to feel a sense of hopelessness about the spouse's alcoholism and to feel that they were losing their minds. The women were, in a sense, accepting responsibility for the breakdown of the family as a consequence of the repeated drunkenness of the husbands. A similar sort of thing did not happen with the husbands. If a woman is married to an alcoholic, she has driven him to drink. If she is an alcoholic, she is much worse than a man manifesting similar behavior. As Morgan points out, these notions come through in the research literature.

In the late '60s, a study of alcoholic women in France closed with the admonition that "alcoholism is the price that women pay for
their emancipation." Such a statement is a perfect example of Morgan's contention that beliefs in the alcohol/disinhibition link can serve as explanations for deviant behavior, in place of more problematic explanations. If the feminist movement is responsible for increasing the prevalence of deviance among women, it is in some sense discredited as a movement directed towards ending the oppression of women. This sort of emphasis is also evident in American studies of problem drinking among women, my own work included, in which, it is argued that the adoption of nontraditional roles by women will result in heavier female drinking and ultimately in the increased prevalence of alcoholism among women. There are many more examples of the ways in which the power relationships between men and women support the kinds of notions that Morgan is putting forth.

I'd like to turn now to the task of adding some gray to the sketch in black and white that Pat's offered. Her basic argument assumes that a connection can be made between ideology and social structure, between belief systems and interpersonal relations. She argues

...the fluidity of alcohol/disinhibition definitions has often enabled those with power to adjust the rationale for intervention according to particular social control needs.

I think that's a very important notion. And the fluidity of that definition has been demonstrated over the last two days in our struggle to figure out exactly what the dimensions of it are. This fluidity is also reflected in the organization of the social control of alcohol problems in modern society.

Now, I want to present some caveats before I go on. One is that before I came to this conference I was sure I knew what disinhibition was. My definition was the alcohol/disinhibition link involves disinhibition that's undesirable — the undesirable consequences of alcohol use, of heavy alcohol use. Second, the ideas that I'm going to go through involve some fairly complex notions. For purposes of presentation, I'm going to use ideal types just to raise some questions that we can all think about.

The questions I'd like to pose are: (1) How is formal social control organized in light of the fluidity of the connection between alcohol and disinhibition? (2) Given that we've had all this trouble over the last two days trying to pin down what the alcohol/disinhibition link is, how do the representatives of organizations of formal social control recognize alcohol-related behavior as problematic or as requiring action?

I wanted to focus primarily on formal control rather than informal control, but I'll say a couple things about informal control.
Formal control can be based on moral/religious considerations, on legal — by which I mean governmental — considerations, or on medical/scientific considerations. Because drinking problems in contemporary America are most often dealt with by the systems of medical and legal control, I'd like to focus first of all on the similarities and differences between the organization of these two types of control.

The ideas that I'm going to go through very quickly come from Judith Lorber (1967), Elliot Freidson (1965; 1970), Donald Black (1976) and long conversations over many years with Paul Pastor of the University of Washington.

When an individual is subjected to social control — whether it's medical or legal — elements of social definitions of both illness and deviant behavior come into play. Typically, regardless of whether we're talking about illness or deviant behavior, the person subjected to control undergoes, first of all, a change of status: he changes from health to illness or from normal behavior to deviant behavior. The change in status is legitimized in some way by professionals. In the legal system, judges are the professionals; in the medical system, doctors are the professionals. The change of status involves a suspension of regular obligations, a "time out." In this sense, and in the sense that the conditions and limits of this suspension of obligations are negotiated, it parallels the discussion we've been having about drunken "time out."

The change of status also involves limitations of some nature on freedom. If you're sick, you stay in bed or go to the hospital or at least you stay home from work; if you're subject to legal control, the police pick you up and transport you and put you in jail and you may go through the whole court system. Finally, in both cases, attempts are made after the individual's been excluded from some social unit to reintegrate the person back into the community. And as Robin (Room, forthcoming) points out in a recent paper, many of the notions that we see in the literature on the medicalization of deviance involve taking that therapeutic language from a medical setting and applying it in correctional settings. So that we're treating offenders; we're going to rehabilitate them; we're going to make them better.

There are three functions that are necessary in formal social control. The first is prescription, which is the formulation of rules, or a body of knowledge and procedures. The second — and this is where we're going to have the most difficulty dealing with the alcohol/disinhibition link — is mobilization, case-finding, getting those people who are sick and getting those people who are deviant and bringing them into the system. And the third is disposition;
that is, application of rules to cases, processing of clients and offenses. Jim will have more to say about that aspect of legal social control in a minute. In complex systems of law and medicine, law tends to be more differentiated with regard to these three functions. If we're talking about criminal law, we have legislatures making the laws, setting up the prescriptions; we have the police in charge of mobilization, and we have the courts dealing with disposition and processing in correctional facilities.

In medicine, the three functions have not so far been highly differentiated, although there's a movement in that direction. Prescriptions are formulated in medical research. So, ideas about things like the alcohol/disinhibition link are generated in that arena. Generally, it has been true historically that mobilization and disposition occur in the same place and are handled by the same people — although it's increasingly true that with new health practitioners mobilization is being done by professionals other than physicians, and then the physician comes in if the problem is serious enough to require a "professional judgment." So, those are some ways in which the sick role or deviant behavior are similar and in which the organization of medical control and the organization of legal control are similar. Key differences arise when we begin to look at mobilization. That's the problem area.

The differences in the two systems are: first, in dealing with criminals in the legal system, initial contact involves coercive relationships between the agent of control and the individual being controlled. In medicine — and this is ideal-typical now — the relationship is more voluntary or cooperative: The patient goes to the doctor to ask for help.

Second, legal control is more often pro-active, that is, intrusive into the community. A good example of a completely pro-active sort of control is speed traps. If police go into the community to find cases, they're pro-active. Medical mobilization is more often reactive. That doesn't mean that legal mobilization is never reactive. But medical mobilization is more reactive. Members of the community go to the providers to ask for help.

There's a third fundamental way in which the two forms of control are different. The rules about when to exercise control differ. In the criminal justice system we have the premise that if there's any doubt of guilt, control should not be exercised. Turn the person loose. Medical control is the opposite. If there's any doubt about the person's health, control should be initiated. The person should be treated.

Despite these differences, I would argue against a view that's been appearing in the sociological literature more and more
frequently, which is the argument that legal social control is becoming increasingly medicalized. I think, as Robin has argued (Room, forthcoming), that’s too simplistic and too simple-minded an approach. Differences between the organization of medical and legal social control can be viewed as continuous. For example, some medical control is pro-active, as in the control of venereal disease, where public health agencies go out into the community and find the sexual partners of people that they’re treating to provide treatment. And some legal control is reactive, as when police are called into a domestic situation where people are arguing.

Certainly the two systems of control interact and overlap, as in the involuntary commitment of mentally ill patients, when psychiatric testimony is required in court, and as in the decriminalization of public drunkenness, in which the legal system of social control incorporates disease conceptions of alcoholism — those people who are proponents of the disease concept go to the legislature and get the law changed so that alcoholics are then put through a system based on a medical model rather than the legal system. Or, the two systems come together in programs referred to by such terms as “deferred prosecution” or “diversion,” in which DWI offenders are referred to the court by the police and then by the court to alcoholism treatment. In fact, in our state and in many states, the courts are the largest single source of clients for the public alcoholism treatment system. So, even though it’s being defined increasingly as a medical problem, the agents of social control responsible for casefinding for that medical problem are in the legal system of social control.

What I’d like to argue is that the fluidity of the belief in the alcohol/disinhibition link is reflected both in the process and in the organization of the formal systems of social control of alcohol-related behavior. Not only are the boundaries of “time outs” negotiated in face-to-face interaction, the control of events of drunken behavior and of the consequences of repeated intoxication come to be negotiated. Negotiations occur between agents of control and drinkers, as well as between the systems of formal social control, with regard to who has domain over particular cases or problems, so that drunken behavior can be bounced back and forth between the legal and the medical system.

In the process of mobilization and interorganizational relationships, what organizational theorists (Thompson 1967) call “boundary spanning personnel” become extremely important. Those are precisely the police and the new health practitioners and the nurses who first have contact with the community. They make decisions about whether to activate control or not. In the criminal
justice system, the boundary spanning personnel are, as I said, the police, and we know something about the factors that affect police decisions to formally process offenders, whether we’re talking about drunkenness or not. The police don’t like formal processing; we know that. The organizational logic discourages formal processing of offenders; it requires a substantial expenditure of time and resources for apprehension, transportation, booking, and later at the arraignment.

So, decisions in a field situation for officers are based on immediate cues — “how are we going to make this case up?” — available evidence of guilt, testimony of witnesses or complainants who may be on the scene, seriousness of the offense, and the characteristics and behavior of the offender toward the officer. If there are witnesses, if the offender is disrespectful, and if it’s a serious offense, they’re going to take the person in; they’re going to exercise formal control or initiate formal control.

The police, at least, recognize alcohol problems by evidence of intoxicated behavior; and that’s precisely what most statutes prohibit. Most laws refer only to states of intoxication in particular kinds of locations. Some laws — like that in Alabama — apply to individuals who are in addition “loud, boisterous, or profane, or who disrupt public or domestic peace and tranquility.” As a study in Seattle (Pastor 1976, 1978) has shown, police encounters with drunken behavior seldom result in formal processing; it’s not a serious offense in their eyes. And when there is processing, it’s because the police are making the decision on the basis of cues other than the intoxicated state of the offender. The teenagers that we’ve been talking to in our study of adolescent substance abuse careers (Morrissey 1975) generally get in trouble with the police for things beyond drinking per se. In the situation of their being drunk in the park at Anchor Bay, what’s written up is indecent exposure, which means they’re taking a leak somewhere where other people can see them; or verbally assaulting an officer, which means using bad language when the officer comes to talk to them. Normally, what the police would do would be to confiscate the alcohol, maybe take it themselves, or dump it out, and tell the kids to move on and quit causing problems. So the police have a lot of discretion, especially with drunkenness offenders. We all know about the biases that operate in the mobilization of legal social control. The police guess the resources you might have by how you’re dressed, and make decisions on that basis, and on the basis of gender, on the basis of age, on the basis of race.

For medical control in general, mobilization is different. People generally ask for help. And formal social control, as Robins (1975)
argues in her critique of labeling, is generally preceded by informal social control. As the disease concept of alcoholism is pushed, the medical system of social control has to begin to accept it, and they aren't. In fact, in the control of problem drinking or alcoholism, one of the laments of the alcoholism movement is that physicians need to be trained. They don't understand. Denial characterizes problem drinking, and physicians are not sensitive to the cues that need to be attended to. And in Washington State, there are moves to try to get them to pay attention to how to recognize alcoholism or problem drinking. Pushing the notion of disease, together with pushing the notion of the association between problem drinking and denial, is an attempt to get physicians to use the normal medical decision rule, which is "when in doubt, treat," because what they're doing now is using a legal decision rule, which is "when in doubt, set the person loose and wait and see if they get sicker."

What I'd like to suggest is that these two systems of control reflect the ambiguity and the flexibility of the alcohol/disinhibition link, and that we might be able to begin to get some insights into what the conference is interested in by making the negotiation process and the boundaries of the systems of social control into a research problem. We need to look at the police and look at medical practitioners and what they think is evidence of a problem, of a serious alcohol involvement. What we'll find, I think, to start with, is that they use notions very similar to what the rest of the people in our culture use.
MACANDREW: I'd like to applaud Pat's attempts to bring some semblance of order out of the reigning chaos. The problem, if I may state my point of view again, is that drunkenness is an empty bottle which can be filled with anything from the finest of French wines to the basest sort of rotgut.

Let me exemplify this with a word about two revolutionary situations which occurred in Eastern Europe in the past 25 years and how the effect of alcohol on conduct was construed in each of them. In Gdansk rather recently, the Polish working class rebelled and, in order not to allow a situation of provocation to arise, decided (among other things) to set up a temporary prohibition on the consumption of alcohol. This they did; it was self-policing, and it was entirely effective. Now, what was going on in the minds of those who so decided? In all probability it had to do with the still vivid remembrance that approximately a decade earlier there had been a similar outburst of revolutionary ferment in Gdansk during which some of those involved got drunk and attempted to burn the Communist Party headquarters to the ground. The army then moved in and there was a massacre. Here, then, drunkenness was seen as a threat to the maintenance of revolutionary discipline.

The second revolutionary situation: In 1956, the Hungarian populace revolted against the Stalinist regime of Rakosi. Imre Nagy was temporarily placed in power; the Russian tanks moved in; Nagy was killed, and Kadar replaced him. What happened to, e.g., brandy consumption in Hungary in the aftermath of the Russian suppression was that in 1957 it increased several hundred percent. Since Kadar didn't introduce a free market economy, it is evident that for his own purposes he saw fit to greatly increase the citizenry's access to brandy. What was going on in Kadar's mind? Certainly, his decision was not predicated on a desire to rekindle revolutionary sentiments. Rather, with such sentiments forcefully quashed, he could only have viewed his largess as providing a sop for the then-reigning despair of the populace.

Here, then, we have two diametrically opposite decisions based on two diametrically opposite presumptions as to what happens when a disgruntled citizenry ingests alcohol. Our task is not an easy one.
DON CAHALAN: What the two excellent papers suggest, it seems to me, is a need for a great deal more emphasis on studies of organizational behavior as they relate to alcohol. In Carolyn Wiener's book (1981), *The Politics of Alcoholism*, an excellent start was made on studying the extent to which alcohol is utilized by organizations to reinforce their power positions as well as the imagery of activities that they might conduct. Organizational behavior in general is a somewhat underdeveloped area by and large, and particularly because of the rapid changes in treatment and activity related to alcohol where there's a lot of excellent data lying around that could be analyzed.

PARTANEN: I have a question for Pat Morgan.

You hardly mentioned in your paper restrictions of children's and minors' drinking, which are pretty universal, I understand. To what extent would you be willing to look at these restrictions from the point of view of power relationships?

MORGAN: It's a very provocative question.

PARTANEN: It was meant to be.

MORGAN: I have a hunch, and that's all I have right now. Alcohol is not uniformly restricted for children. In many cultures, wine is an important part of everyday life at meals, especially in Italian and French cultures. Significantly, those are cultures which place very high values on children in general, and, especially, very high values on the family. What we may be witnessing in those cultures is a very long-term education of children to drinking, to using alcohol in a certain way, and to experiencing certain kinds of effects: family life, sociability, etc. In other cultures where initiation into alcohol use takes place primarily away from the family, the proscription of alcohol to children takes on a different kind of significance, because the values associated with this alcohol consumption are totally different.

I don't know of anyone who has studied the proscription or the availability of alcohol to children in a way which includes the institutions of the family, which includes values associated with alcohol consumption, and, correspondingly, the legal systems which do or do not proscribe alcohol to older children.

ROOM: One observation that I would feed back to Juha on this is that even where drinking is allowed, I would suspect that in many cultures there will be an absolute prohibition on the children showing disinhibited behavior, that access to the means of disinhibition may be limited, and in some societies that access to the means of disinhibition is defined as going through alcohol and in other societies it isn't. Alcohol as mixed with water and given to
children at mealtime is not defined in those societies as relevant to power.

**PARTANEN:** It's not alcohol.

**ROOM:** Whatever. At least it's not a means of disinhibition.

**MORGAN:** I would argue, however, that children don't seem to have problems being disinhibited in any case. It's the adults that suffer from inhibition, not children. What we're talking about as disinhibition may in fact be just general childish behavior, which adults have somehow repressed. I think it's too bad that adults have forgotten, and that it needs to get reawakened through alcohol.

**ROOM:** Yes, but children have childhood as an excuse for behavior in our society; they don't have alcohol as an excuse for the behavior in our society.

**MOORE:** The interesting effect of that is that when you begin drinking as a child, you give up the status of childhood as an excuse because you're now taking on an adult role. In fact it turns out to be inhibiting, because you're now assuming an adult responsibility.

**ROOM:** I'd like to inject a note from France in this discussion. Susanna Barrows has some material that's relevant both to this and to the question that Craig MacAndrew raised about alcohol and revolutionary situations.

**BARROWS:** I just wanted to say that I've been very much struck by Pat Morgan's fine articulation of some possible working principles concerning the kinds of discriminations we could make, depending upon very different kinds of cultural contexts. As Robin has suggested, I've been working on French history and the shift in drinking patterns and forms of public sociability in Nineteenth Century France. I've been very much struck by some similarities in structures of social control brought about by quite different social and economic and political causes. For instance, the law against public drunkenness in France was not passed until 1873, and then, quite obviously, as a means of policing revolutionary activity; the association of the drunkard in later Nineteenth Century France is not so much with a child beater or a sex maniac, but rather with someone who was manning barricades. So if you look closely at the circumstances of the passage of certain laws which bring new forms of social control, very often you can see differences in the associations they codify, between which it's important to discriminate.

I was also very much impressed with the notion of the fluidity of forms of association of alcohol, disinhibition and control. France never had a teetotaling temperance movement. If you know how important the liquor trade is in the French economy, that explains why in many cases there is a kind of compromise in the public order.
between freedom of the liquor industry, on the one hand, and patrolling of deviant populations on the other. The control has to be perceived as simply against public drunks rather than in the slightest against consumption of alcohol.

France also provides an interesting comparison because, among other things, there's a conflict throughout the Nineteenth Century between the medical profession, which has articulated how dangerous certain varieties of drinks are, and the state's refusal to do anything about that medical model. So you find the scientific community at loggerheads with the state. For instance, not until World War I did the French government outlaw absinthe and that is an example of that sort of difference. I think Pat's caution to mediate our understanding of the way hegemonic structures work is something we ought to underline. I think there are very complicated interactions between different forces of moral order underlying particular kinds of attitudes towards drink and responses to it.

In conclusion, I think that when we talk about power we need to consider not simply drinkers as victims but also drinkers as actors. Rather like Herbert Guttman's (1976) argument about black culture as a subordinate group in a period of slavery, I think you can make an argument for drinkers, and say that people who exhibit disinhibited behavior are sometimes responding in very interesting and sometimes quite creative ways against moral strictures. For instance, increased pro-active interference on the part of the state can escalate the visibility, perhaps even the ritual intensity of the drinker's behavior. I think that only by looking at that kind of complicated interplay between structures of power and the responses of the subordinate groups can you begin to appreciate what the real meaning of disinhibited behavior is. I think we really can't fully understand motivation for what we call "disinhibited behavior" without a history of strictures — in the most general sense, but being very sensitive to moments and times, patterns and cause — and without an understanding of what other opportunities for "time outs" are given to subordinate groups: the length of the workday, the number of other ritual occasions like Mardi Gras or carnivals or whatever. If you suppress carnivals, what other outlets do the actors have to engage in "time out" behaviors? I suppose I'm beginning to realize how lucky I am in my own work in France. The French had a police force which surveyed public establishments for drinking and kept copious records on drunken behavior or allegedly drunken behavior, and so I've looked in the archives and found a lot of this very creative work of drinkers as actors using drunken behavior as a means of symbolic protest against a repressive government.
I have also learned quite a bit — as I suspect Joan Silverman has — from looking at visual sources. If we've learned anything in the last two days, disinhibited behavior is at least somewhat and perhaps entirely learned behavior; but it has complicated layers of meanings. Maybe by looking at some sources like visual illustrations, like movies, like popular fiction, we may discover how people learn to be disinhibited.

DORIE KLEIN: I'd like to follow up on both Dr. Barrows' comments and on Dr. Morgan's presentation, which I find very exciting conceptually. What we're moving toward is seeing disinhibition as, to some extent, a belief system that is fought over rather than strictly imposed. And it seems to take on special importance in ambivalent situations where we have dominant and subordinate groups that are battling over that unequal relationship. I think of the example that Pat raised: now that beating one's wife is no longer acceptable from a legal or moral point of view and attitudes are somewhat ambivalent, disinhibition suddenly has become an excuse of some importance.

And looking at disinhibition on the subordinate group side, your example brought to mind some very suggestive possibilities. One I was thinking of was disinhibited behavior by youth in our society; for example, teenage kids who go out and have beer busts and so on; I'm wondering if that isn't a subtle form of individualistic rebellion against the marginalization of youth in our society.

ROIZEN: One way to look at drinking norms in our society is to think about the structure of U.S. norms as pretty well suggesting drinking is okay as long as the statuses are responsible and the situations are irresponsible. So you have two axes: responsible status and irresponsible situations. That connects back to Herb Fingarette's significant comment yesterday about the effect of alcohol, that the only thing that we couldn't find a polar opposite to was responsibility/irresponsibility. Now, if it's true that drinking is okay when we have responsible statuses and irresponsible situations then, of course, as the statuses become more irresponsible and as the situations become more responsible, drinking per se is less permitted in the society.

I realize this is a little bit too clean, but perhaps that partially explains for us a bit why children are so often under an abstinence norm in our society. They have irresponsible status already — the status of child per se is irresponsible — picking up and giving a slightly different color to what Robin was saying before. If the status of child is irresponsible, then that raises an interesting dilemma concerning the child drinker, which is to say, whose
responsibility is that drinking, and whose responsibility is the behavior of the child after he has begun drinking? In a sense, the social problem of adolescent drinking may well be a shadowy representation of the dilemma: Who's responsible for that child?

This dilemma of power relations has a very real effect in determining who will be allowed to drink and express what disinhibitions when drinking; and in understanding how, indeed, the disinhibited drinker is expressing a social power.

SILVERMAN: Pat spoke about the complexity of studies. I think you also have to broaden your account of the frontier in the paper. It's much more complicated, in that binge drinking was not universally applauded or regarded as an example of individualism, but was condemned — particularly in sermons and in every popular best-selling novel — as an example of "barbarism" or "semi-barbarism." One of the reasons the evangelical circuit riders were sent out to the frontier was to curb this kind of drinking. I think that has to be included in any kind of an analysis of celebration of binge drinking.

LINTON: In the politics of drinking, there might be another option, too. Some years ago, Erving Goffman used an overdramatic phrase in talking about parties as a "status bloodbath." What his phrase implies is that what you may get with certain kinds of "time out" is a kind of democratization of these relationships, a way to manage situationally differences in status, so that the effect of alcohol in that situation is seen as equalizing the participants in the immediate circumstance.

MOORE: And that's why we regard it as both desirable and nondesirable.

LINTON: Yes, at parties especially, I suppose, being ritualized occasions for submerging those kinds of difference.
Alcohol: Both Blame and Excuse for Criminal Behavior*

James F. Mosher

Introduction

Recent political events have served to highlight a question that has intrigued legal scholars for centuries: When should alcohol intake provide a legal excuse for criminal behavior? Last September, Representative John Jenrette testified at his Abscam bribery trial that he was an alcoholic and that his "illness" was the primary cause of his participation in the congressional scandal (San Francisco Chronicle 1980a, b). That participation included a secretly filmed episode in which he discussed introducing special legislation for the benefit of two nonexistent Arab sheiks in exchange for $50,000. During his encounter with the Arabs' "representative" (an FBI agent), Jenrette said: "I have larceny in my blood" (San Francisco Chronicle 1980b). Jenrette claimed he was drunk at the time and contended that this fact both explained and excused his admission of criminal intent. His wife later stated that his drinking problem had reached such an advanced stage that he was drunk repeatedly, even during official House functions (San Francisco Chronicle 1980a). This remarkable "excuse," which one would have expected to have been a damning accusation in most circumstances, did not convince the jury to return an innocent verdict, but it may still provide a basis for lenient punishment.

Two other House of Representatives members blamed alcoholism for serious wrongdoing within days of Jenrette's testimony. On October 2, 1980, Representative Michael "Ozzie" Myers, convicted previously of accepting a $50,000 Abscam bribe, testified before the House that his misdeed was caused by his drinking problem. "I was drinking FBI bourbon, big glasses of it," Myers stated in his defense, and implied that the FBI had used alcohol to help induce
the crime (Herman 1980). The House would not accept this explanation, and Myers was expelled, the first such expulsion in the House's history.

The following day, Representative Robert E. Bauman, a conservative, "family-oriented" member of the "moral majority," was caught soliciting sex from a 16-year-old boy. Alcoholism, he claimed, was to blame for his deviation from the "moral" road which he himself championed (Cohen 1980; Russakoff and Diehl 1980; Shaffer and Weisner 1980). Unlike those of his two colleagues, Bauman's "excuse" has been at least tentatively accepted by the law, as he has been diverted to a treatment program after pleading not guilty to the charge against him. The court permitted criminal diversion despite a public statement by Bauman's physician that, from a medical standpoint, Bauman "is in no way, shape, or form an alcoholic" (Herman 1980).

Jenrette, Myers, and Bauman are not the first Washington celebrities to admit publicly to being alcoholics. Wilbur Mills, Harrison Williams, Herman Talmadge, Wayne Hayes, Betty Ford, and Joan Kennedy have all done so in recent times in a variety of circumstances (Sinclair 1980). Yet the three most recent cases are unique; they seek to excuse criminal behavior within the formal legal structure. The individuals involved claim that they lost their free will because of alcohol, that their alcoholism was so pervasive as to dictate their actions. Moral and criminal punishment, they claim, is therefore inappropriate.

Alcohol has indeed been viewed as the "cause" of criminal behavior for centuries and in a wide variety of cultures (MacAndrew and Edgerton 1969; Perr 1976). Its negative powers are not seen as limited to criminality — alcohol is also blamed for accidents and violence generally. Alcohol, however, has traditionally not relieved the drinker from the legal consequences of his or her actions, at least in the United States. In fact, a more likely scenario has been to attach greater blame to the individual for lack of control of his or her drinking.

The advent of the alcoholism movement has created a serious challenge to this traditional viewpoint. What has been treated as morally reprehensible behavior in the law is increasingly accepted in the society as a medical "disease." This change in social definition is reflected in at least some aspects of modern American jurisprudence. Indeed, many alcoholism treatment programs are filled predominantly with court-referred patients, often as an alternative to incarceration. The referrals, according to a recent study, are becoming increasingly routine for a variety of crimes, often to the frustration of police (Weisner, in press). Bauman, then,
who is likely to avoid any criminal trial or punishment for his solicitation crime, represents a typical case. Washington celebrities who have sought to excuse their misdeeds by blaming alcoholism are both benefitting from and encouraging this trend.

The "alcohol excuse," however, is surprisingly absent in other arenas of the law, including other aspects of criminal procedure. Alcohol is an unlikely ally for a criminal defendant during his trial and on appeal, where traditional legal principles apply. A defendant claiming to have been intoxicated during a criminal episode is generally viewed as responsible for subsequent actions when determining guilt. Jenrette and Myers, then, whose alcohol defenses failed at trial and before Congress, also represent typical cases.

The law's reluctance to embrace an alcohol excuse is not surprising; the potential impact is enormous. Alcohol has a very high association with crime and accidents. Studies estimate that up to one-half of many violent crimes (as well as larceny and burglary) are committed by people with significant amounts of alcohol in their bloodstream (Aarens et al. 1977; Wolfgang and Ferricute 1967). Alcohol's role in accidents is largely uncharted, but what studies do exist also suggest high correlations (Aarens et al. 1977). Permitting alcohol defenses, then, could have major repercussions in the legal system.

Many scholars have grappled with this issue in the last 30 years, attempting to devise reasonable standards for determining when alcohol should be accepted as a legal excuse for undesired behavior (e.g., Fingarette and Hasse 1979; Fingarette 1970; Epstein 1978; Moore 1966; Hall 1944; American Law Institute 1962). The scholars have examined criminal legal principles almost exclusively. They agree that traditional criminal rules are contradictory and fail to reflect current societal explanations of alcoholism, and they seek to remedy the situation by devising "rational" rules within the existing legal structure. A major concern of the proposals is to provide a means for possible excuse without at the same time opening the prison doors to all who might raise an alcohol defense.

The search for legal consistency, however, is ignoring crucial aspects of the problem being addressed. The legal treatment of alcohol-related harmful behavior varies widely, particularly when legal realms outside the criminal trial itself are examined. As the congressional cases illustrate, drinking is sometimes excused, but in other circumstances it can be ignored or even punished. The variations reflect differing social and legal concerns and priorities, often totally unrelated to alcohol use. Alcohol is sometimes made a crucial issue in order to avoid exposing those concerns and
priorities. The need, then, is not merely to determine a "rational" or consistent treatment of alcohol involvement in the criminal law, but also to understand the social forces which shape the legal arena within which drinking occurs.

This article analyzes the role alcohol plays in various criminal proceedings. It first describes the basic legal rule of intoxication at a criminal trial — that alcohol provides no legal excuse for criminal behavior. The second section discusses the "specific intent" exception to the rule, analyzing its limitations and lack of rational foundation. Section three describes various legal rules and crimes which actually punish drinking behavior in certain situations without regard to any disease excuse, most notably public drunkenness and drunk driving.

These first three sections discuss "formal" criminal laws, those which apply at trial and which symbolize the "official" legal approach to alcohol and crime. Section four discusses the role of alcohol in two other criminal proceedings — probation and diversion hearings — in which an entirely different approach to alcoholism is taken, in stark contrast to the approach at trial. This section analyzes the importance of diversion and probation; the factors which determine when probation and diversion are considered appropriate; the role of alcohol problems in those decisions; and the relationship of alcohol treatment programs to the criminal justice system. Finally, a concluding section suggests the importance of these conflicting alcohol ideologies.

Alcohol and Crime: The Basic Legal Rule

A basic precept of the criminal law is that "voluntary" intoxication does not excuse criminal behavior. According to one commentator: "The legal rules governing the question were early settled and may be briefly stated: intoxication, if voluntarily incurred, no matter how gross, is ordinarily no defense to a charge of crime based upon acts committed while intoxicated...." (Annotation 1966, p. 12:39). "Voluntary" intoxication includes virtually all drinking, as the courts have held that compulsive drinking by an alcoholic or problem drinker is voluntary behavior (Hall 1960). Drinking is involuntary only when it is introduced into the accused's system by force or trick. There are few reported cases where this limited exception has been successfully utilized (Annotation 1966).

The courts use several rationales to justify this basic rule. Most

Notes appear at end of paper.
frequently mentioned is the fear that an intoxication defense can be easily simulated, thus making prosecutions too difficult (Annotation 1966). According to one court: "All that the crafty criminal would require for a well-planned crime would be a revolver in one hand to commit the deed, and a quart of intoxicating liquor in the other...." (State v. Arsenault, Maine, 1956, quoted in dissenting opinion, People v. Graves, Pennsylvania, 1975). A second justification arises when courts attempt to distinguish insanity from drunkenness. Alcohol is viewed as a disinhibitor, in some sense an outside "cause" of crime which is or should be well known to everyone; defendants therefore have a moral responsibility and legal duty to control its intake. As one commentator has stated: "Having voluntarily chosen to become drunk, the accused must also be regarded as having voluntarily chosen the consequences of that drunkenness" (Annotation 1966, p. 1246). Insanity, on the other hand, does not involve an outside "culpable" agent, and the question of control or voluntariness is not at issue.  

Many court opinions express outright moral indignation at drunkenness, particularly those from the 19th century (e.g., People v. Rogers, New York, 1858; U.S. v. Cornell, 1820; State v. Noel, New Jersey, 1926). Several early commentators, in fact, argued that crimes committed while the accused was intoxicated should be more, not less, severely punished. Even in modern cases, the defendant may seek to block the admission of evidence of his or her intoxicated state. In a 1980 California Superior Court case (People v. Habecker), for example, the prosecution attempted to question a police officer concerning the defendant's intoxicated state when he was arrested; the defense strongly objected and the evidence was disallowed. The judge admonished the jury to disregard the question. Clearly, the defense was concerned that the jury might interpret intoxication as a symptom of guilt or at least of increased likelihood of unreasoned and irrational behavior.

The "Specific Intent" Exception

As with most "basic" rules, exceptions have been developed for unusual situations. Cases appeared early in both English and American jurisprudence, particularly in murder prosecutions, where courts apparently felt that the punishment — execution — was too harsh, given the accused's extreme drunkenness at the time of the crime (Hall 1960). From these cases arose the distinction of "specific" and "general" intents. In recent years the related doctrine of "diminished capacity" has developed in many jurisdictions.
Many commentators have traced the history of this exception, which will not be repeated here (e.g., Hall 1944, 1960; Fingarette and Hasse 1979; Epstein 1978). The basic precept is that some crimes require a special volition or willfulness. For example, first degree murder requires premeditation, deliberateness, and intent to kill; burglary requires unlawful entry with an intent to commit a felony; larceny requires a taking with an intent to deprive the owner of his rightful possession. "General" intent refers to the "guilty mind" necessary to commit any crime, in legal terms the "mens rea." Drunkenness can never negate the "mens rea" — the basic rule discussed above — but can negate the "specific" intention requirement. If a man is so drunk when he shoots a gun wildly without being aware of the risks to others around him and thereby kills a bystander, the drunkenness can mitigate the crime from first degree to second degree or, in some States, even to manslaughter.

The "specific-general" dichotomy sounds reasonable. Indeed, it is a basic law school lesson. One's suspicion is aroused, however, by the fact that it developed specifically in response to drunken murder cases rather than as an integral part of criminal law theory. There are two basic problems. First, when the exception is applied to nonhomicide cases, it can provide a complete defense rather than mere mitigation, the intent of the rule. For example, in many circumstances, it is not a crime to deprive someone of his or her property unless the offender specifically intends to deprive the owner of possession permanently. Thus, in some cases, drunkenness can be a complete defense to larceny. Second, a careful analysis results in the inevitable conclusion that, in terms of actual behavior, general intent involves essentially the same mental process as "specific" intent. Two examples illustrate these problems of actual application.

Rape is considered a "general" intent crime — one does not need to specifically intend any particular act. In rape prosecutions, then, evidence of a defendant's intoxication is irrelevant and inadmissible. Assault with intent to rape, however, is a "specific intent" crime — one must assault with the specific intent to rape. Rape, of course, is considered the more serious of the two crimes. Suppose a defendant is charged with both crimes; the crucial issue then becomes whether he actually accomplished the rape. The jury would be allowed to consider intoxication evidence to determine whether the defendant formed an intent to rape for the lesser assault charge but would be admonished to ignore the evidence for the rape charge itself. Although possibly logical on an abstract
level, such a result is arbitrary and confusing when applied, particularly for a jury.

A second example stems from comparing two jurisdictions’ definitions of the same crime. In California, for example, prison escape is defined by statute as a “willful failure” to return to the place of confinement when on a work furlough program. The courts have interpreted the law to be one of “general” rather than “specific” intent. In one case (People v. Haskins, 1960), a defendant on a work furlough program was found drunk in a city park after an evening’s drinking bout instead of at the prison by 8:00 a.m. Evidence of his drunken condition was held to be irrelevant to the defendant's intent to “willfully fail” to return to prison. In Colorado, the same crime requires a “specific intent,” defined by the courts as the intent “to avoid the due course of justice” (Gallegos v. People, 1966). Evidence of intoxication was therefore held admissible in a case where a prisoner attempted to leave a prison yard in a drunken condition. There is similar confusion over several other crimes, including child molesting and assault.5

The disarray in the legal community concerning the specific-general intent distinctions is perhaps best illustrated in the opinion in People v. Hood, written by Roger Traynor, formerly the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court and considered one of the greatest judges of the century. As Fingarette and Hasse (1979, p. 96) note, the opinion illustrates the extent to which the law has “missed the mark” in its attempts to determine the criminal responsibility of the intoxicated defendant. The case involved a charge of assault with a deadly weapon, and the defendant sought to introduce evidence that he was drunk during the episode. “Assault” is defined in California as an “attempted battery” and lower courts prior to the Hood case had reached conflicting conclusions concerning whether assault was a specific or general intent crime.

Traynor, after a careful analysis, concluded that an assault is “equally well characterized” as a general or specific intent crime. He concludes:

Since the definitions of both specific intent and general intent cover the requisite intent to commit a battery, the decision whether or not to give effect to evidence of intoxication must rest on other considerations.

A compelling consideration is the effect of alcohol on human behavior. A significant effect of alcohol is to distort judgment and relax impulses. [Citations omitted] Alcohol apparently has less effect on the ability to engage in simple goal-directed behavior, although it may impair the efficiency of that behavior....What the drunk man is
not as capable as the sober man of doing is exercising judgment about the social consequences of his acts or controlling his impulses toward anti-social acts. He is more likely to act rashly and impulsively and to be susceptible to passion and anger. It would therefore be anomalous to allow evidence of intoxication to relieve a man of responsibility for the crimes of assault with a deadly weapon or simple assault, which are so frequently committed in just such a manner. (p. 458)

The two basic problems thus confound Traynor's analysis. First, the dichotomy, so logical in theory, is inapplicable to assault. Second, to permit an intoxication defense in assault cases could result in outright acquittal, which should be avoided as a matter of policy since drinking alcohol increases the risks of just such behavior.

Traynor ignores the fact that his policy analysis is equally applicable to all violent and "antisocial" crimes, many of which include "specific" intents. Why permit diminished responsibility or complete excuse in some but not all such crimes? Traynor also bypasses the central issue: Is the drinker less responsible for violent criminal actions if he or she can show that the behavior was beyond his or her control due to drinking? Traynor instead falls back on the "disinhibitor" justification for the basic criminal rule — there is a moral obligation to control alcohol intake because of its well-known potential for causing harmful events. That one of the century's great legal minds could stumble in such a basic way is dramatic evidence that the specific-general dichotomy is in practice both unworkable and illogical.

This conclusion, however, is not so serious as it might appear; juries are unlikely to rely on intoxication evidence even when the court permits it into the case. Many jury instructions and court case decisions hold that no excuse exists unless the defendant was so drunk that he or she was incapable of even forming the specific intent — i.e., virtually unconscious (Epstein 1978). The "incapacity to form an intent" standard, as Fingarette and Hasse suggest, is a very heavy burden of proof — the defendant must show he or she was "virtually an automaton" at the time of the act (Fingarette and Hasse 1979, p. 98). Evidence of extreme intoxication is necessary whether or not the incapacity rule is adopted. Alcoholism, of itself, does not excuse criminal behavior and, in many States, is inadmissible until the defense first shows that the defendant was extremely intoxicated during the criminal episode (e.g. Commonwealth v. Kielbise, Pa. 1976). Finally, most juries, perhaps responding to these strict rules of evidence, usually reject
intoxication defenses (Annotation 1966; Epstein 1978). This suggests that, at least in a jury setting, the basic criminal law precept that drunkenness is a blame rather than an excuse for criminal behavior reflects a popular sentiment to that effect.

In sum, alcoholism and intoxication normally provide no excuse in the formal criminal law. They do not constitute involuntary behavior and are carefully separated from insanity defenses except in very extreme situations. The law does recognize that intoxication can be so severe that a defendant could not have known what he or she was doing. If so, then intoxication may mitigate or even excuse certain offenses, which are selected based on whether an arbitrary "specific" intent is found to be included in the definition of the crime. In many States, the defendant must show not only that he did not form the required intent because of his intoxication, but also that he was incapable of forming that intent. Evidence of alcoholism is usually not admissible until intoxication is shown, and even then is usually only relevant to the issue of capacity to form a specific intent. Finally, juries are typically skeptical of intoxication defenses, perhaps reflecting these strict rules of evidence. A more limited and unworkable exception would be hard to imagine.

**Alcohol Consumption as Exacerbating Criminal Conduct**

Opposed to the limited specific intent exception is a body of criminal law which actually imposes additional hardships or penalties on the drinking defendant. Rather than recognizing an alcoholism disease as a potential excuse, the law here seeks to deter drinking, whether compulsive or not, by imposing strict criminal rules.

The most obvious examples are public drunkenness and drunk driving statutes. Although there was a strong move toward decriminalization of public drunkenness in the 1960s and 1970s, most States still recognize it to be a crime today (National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors 1980). The Supreme Court, in its famous if inconclusive opinion of *Powell v. Texas*, blocked the move for recognizing a constitutional defense based on a theory of involuntariness due to alcoholism. Since that time, many States have taken legislative action. Even when alcoholism is not treated as a crime, however, States usually provide a means to involuntarily detain public inebriates, in some cases for extended periods (NASADAD 1980). Public drunkenness can lead to involuntary incarceration in a treatment facility, a fate
which many offenders find worse than jail. Thus, whether formally
defined as a crime or not, public drunkenness can lead to serious
deprivations of freedom, even when no other crime has been
committed. Several commentators (e.g., Neier 1975; Klein 1964)
have observed that these laws are selectively enforced against “skid
row” derelicts. Public drunkenness in “respectable” establishments
and neighborhoods is very unlikely to lead to arrest.

The Powell case serves to highlight the fears of the legal
community of formally recognizing an alcohol excuse. The
plurality opinion relied heavily on the fact that there would be no
logical basis for providing the excuse in a public drunkenness case
but excluding it for other criminal conduct. If alcohol addiction
could be the basis for a finding of involuntariness in public
drunkenness, why should the same result not be reached for any
other crime? Although several court opinions and commentators
address and seek to resolve this issue (e.g., Salzman v. U.S.,
concurring opinion, 1968; Kirbens 1968), the criminal law has
resisted any move toward expanding the alcohol excuse. This is
especially ironic in the public drunkenness cases, where a classic
example of the socially defined “alcoholism disease” is being
officially punished and treated as “immoral” or wrongful behavior.

Drunk driving is a second example in which drinking forms a
basic part of the definition of the crime. Unlike public drunkenness,
drunk driving arrests and convictions are becoming more common
(e.g., Bunce et al. 1980). In fact, there are considerable pressures on
the legal system to be increasingly harsh on drunk driver offenders
(Chatfield-Taylor 1980). Legislatures in many States have
responded by enacting a long series of bills which provide special
rules and which narrow potential defenses (California Alcohol and
Drug Report 1979, 1980). The police, meanwhile, have developed
sophisticated methods of detection. A common popular belief is that
drunk drivers are treated too leniently, and there has been an
increasing clamor for mandatory jail sentences (Chatfield-Taylor
1980).

Evidence of intoxication is not only not a defense at a drunk
driving trial: it is a crucial aspect of the crime. A driver commits no
crime if he or she is merely negligent; a drunk driver (or a driver
who is drinking or has an open container in the car) is committing a
crime whether negligent or not. If injury occurs, intoxication can
form the basis for severe criminal punishment which would
otherwise not exist or be greatly lessened. Ironically, drunk driving
might be considered a “specific intent” crime — one must
specifically intend to drive. Logically, then, the opposite result
should occur — extreme intoxication should provide a potential
defense rather than be a part of the criminal act.
The legal treatment of drunk driving as immoral, criminal behavior is actually best expressed in negligence law. Since drunk drivers cause considerable injury and property damage, civil suits commonly occur. In addition to permitting recovery for actual losses, many courts permit victims of drunk driving accidents to recover "punitive damages," a form of quasi-criminal punishment. Punitive damages are permitted only when a defendant has intentionally acted with "wanton disregard" of the rights of others such that he or she is guilty of outrageous conduct evidencing "malice" (Dooley and Mosher 1978). Punitive damages are quasi-criminal because they go beyond compensation for actual damages (the purpose of civil law) and are imposed to punish and deter antisocial behavior.

Normally, a defendant causing damage through the negligent handling of an automobile is not subject to punitive damages. Many courts, however, permit punitive damages when the negligence is associated with intoxication even when there is no proof of undue carelessness or outrageous driving behavior (Dooley and Mosher 1978). Court opinions express moral outrage — drunk driving is "willful and wanton negligence" and "morally culpable" behavior (e.g., Collign v. Fera, New York, 1973). Thus, rather than providing an excuse, excessive drinking provides a basis for quasi-criminal punishment.

Drunk driving and public drunkenness are two of the most prevalent crimes committed in the United States today. In California they constituted approximately 471,000, or 60 percent of all misdemeanor criminal arrests for 1976 (Gusfield in press). Both crimes make drinking and intoxication key elements of the offense, and evidence of intoxication is therefore a crucial part of a prosecutor's case. Evidence of alcoholism or problem drinking, while potentially helpful to the defendant at other stages of the criminal process (discussed below), is either irrelevant or potentially harmful at trial. Thus, the formal criminal law is far more likely to punish than excuse excessive drinking, whether or not it is perceived as disease-related.

There are other, more subtle, examples of criminal punishment for excessive drinking. Courts dealing with crimes that are considered morally repugnant are likely to be particularly skeptical of alcohol excuses despite the likelihood of alcohol involvement. For example, Georgia, Washington, and Connecticut courts (Helton v. State, 1951; State v. Huey, 1942; State v. Dennis, 1963) have held that the crime of "taking indecent liberties with a female child with intent of a ;:sing, appealing to, and justifying}
lust, passion, and sexual desires” (or wording to that effect) is not a specific intent crime despite language which appears to require an opposite result. In the Washington case, the court at first told the jury to consider the intoxication defense and then withdrew the evidence when jury deliberations became protracted. The jury thereupon convicted the defendant, indicating that the intoxication defense was being taken seriously. The appeals court held that no reversible error occurred. In a California case (People v. Oliver, 1961), the same crime was considered a specific intent offense, but the jury found the defendant guilty despite testimony that the defendant was extremely drunk.

An informal review of several other cases appears to show that drunkenness defenses in sex offenses are generally unsuccessful even when permitted. These cases may well involve situations in which the defendant actually attempts to exclude evidence of alcohol consumption, since alcohol is popularly viewed as a disinhibitor of sexual desires. As Mäkelä (1978, p. 331) has stated: “In modern society, most sexual crimes . . . are not based on rational deliberation but on sudden emotional outbursts. . . . This is relevant to alcohol crimes, because drunkenness undoubtedly diminishes a person’s capacity to think rationally.”

The adverse legal consequences of alcohol involvement in sex crimes that go to trial can go beyond questions of evidence admissibility. In California, additional penalties are placed in the form of additional probation and parole restrictions on sex offenders who drink. If the sentencing authority (judge at sentencing or parole) “believes” that the offender was intoxicated or addicted to alcohol at the time of the offense, it must order the defendant to abstain from alcohol during probation or parole. In the case of “mentally disordered sex offenders,” abstinence is an absolute requirement for parole whether or not alcohol is believed to have been related to the crime. These restrictions are applicable to relatively minor offenses, as “sex offenses” include both serious and minor crimes — from rape and child molesting to indecent exposure and (until 1975) oral copulation. Drunkenness is usually not a defense to these crimes, but abstinence from alcohol can be made a condition of parole, a violation of which could lead to further incarceration.

Legal consent provides another arena where alcohol may exacerbate criminal conduct. Confessions or adverse admissions are often obtained by police from criminal defendants. Because of the dangers of permitting unlimited police interrogations, the courts have created numerous safeguards, and a defendant must “knowingly and voluntarily” waive these rights before a confession
is admissible in court (see *Miranda v. Arizona*, United States, 1966).

Drunkenness, although considered relevant, will virtually never form the basis for invalidating consent in these circumstances. The Abscam cases indicate that this may be true even if undercover police (or FBI) ply the defendant with alcohol to obtain statements. A recent California case, *People v. Barrow*, 1979, in fact, appears to hold that a defendant who is capable of talking is capable of understanding and waiving his rights, no matter how intoxicated he is — in that case, with a .19 BAC.

This contrasts sharply with another area of the criminal law — a rape victim's ability to consent to intercourse. Early 20th century cases in particular held that an intoxicated woman was incapable of consent (e.g., *Quinn v. State*, Wisconsin, 1913). Intercourse with an intoxicated woman, then, was rape by definition, even if the defendant showed that the intoxication was purely voluntary. Although there are no reported cases recently, commentators still view this as a valid rule (*American Jurisprudence 2d* 1966). The point here is not to argue that either rule is inadvisable. What is curious, however, is that the legal definitions of consent are virtually synonymous in both situations, yet intoxication is treated as irrelevant to one and crucial to the other.

**The Alcohol Excuse at Probation and Diversion Hearings**

Despite this very strict and moralistic view of alcohol consumption when determining criminal guilt at trial, alcohol involvement does in fact provide a widely accepted excuse for criminal behavior. An entirely different dogma concerning intoxication and alcoholism is applied at certain criminal proceedings — proceedings which, practically speaking, have a much greater impact on most criminal defendants. The coexistence of opposing ideologies is indeed striking.

The alcohol excuse is crucial in at least three criminal proceedings: directly following the arrest, at a diversion hearing, and at sentencing. Depending on when it is applied (which is determined without regard to the general-specific intent dichotomy), alcohol may circumvent all court proceedings, any finding of criminal guilt, or incarceration.

Particularly for drunk driving, juvenile offenses, and public intoxication, the police may sometimes take drunken offenders directly to detoxification facilities (or to their homes) rather than to
police headquarters for booking. As has been noted earlier, when this procedure is applied to public inebriates, it is best viewed as an alternate form of punishment (instead of the drunk tank) since no crime beyond intoxication has been committed. It does, however, avoid any criminal record, and in this sense is an "excuse" for criminal behavior. For drunk driving, a police diversion to a treatment facility can be particularly beneficial to the offender, since potentially serious civil and criminal penalties are avoided. A police officer's decision is discretionary and may be based on the extent of intoxication—a borderline case, where proof of a violation would be difficult to prove, is most likely to be diverted in this manner (Weisner in press). The procedure is unlikely when injury or property damage occurs.

The diversion hearing, in contrast, is a legally constituted procedure that has become increasingly popular. Here, the defendant, who has been formally charged with a crime, is presented an opportunity to argue that further criminal proceedings are unnecessary or inappropriate. The judge's and/or prosecutor's discretion can be nearly absolute. The California Penal Code (section 1001.1), for example, empowers a judge to postpone prosecution "either temporarily or permanently at any point in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is charged until adjudication" without specifying any guidelines whatever.

According to the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals ("NAC") (quoted in McIntyre 1978):

> Diversion is appropriate where there is a substantial likelihood that conviction could be obtained and the benefits to society from channeling any offender into an available noncriminal diversion program outweigh any harm done to society by abandoning criminal prosecution (p. 29).

In practice, diversion is particularly common for first offenders and juveniles and when certain crimes are charged—white collar crimes, offenses stemming from family disputes, and minor offenses such as shoplifting (Brakel 1971).

If the defendant can claim to have alcohol problems, his or her chance for diversion is greatly enhanced, particularly if none of these factors is present. Although legal writers either fail to analyze or ignore the role of alcohol in diversion decisions (see, e.g., Note 1974, 1975; Soder 1973), several writers refer to its importance. Brakel (1971) lists evidence of drug or alcohol abuse as one of three factors important to a judge's decision. Birns (1976), analyzing a nationwide study of diversion programs, lists alcoholics as one of four primary target groups. The NAC (quoted in McIntyre
1978, p. 29) states that "any likelihood that the offender suffers from a ... psychological abnormality which was related to his crime and for which treatment is available" should be an important factor in favor of diversion. Alcoholism is clearly intended to fall within this category. Agopian (1977) states that alcohol detoxification programs are an important component of California's diversion programs.

Probation decisions, which occur after a finding of guilt (either by plea or after a trial) also permit extraordinary discretion on the part of the sentencing judge. His decision is based on a probation department's presentence report. Similar factors to diversion decisions are crucial: the type of offense, the defendant's past criminal record, and his or her social and work status. Judges may handle cases very differently so that a defendant's sentence may hinge to some degree on the identity of the judge. The existence of a drinking problem will influence the decision to incarcerate in many cases.

Many States provide special proceedings for drunk driving cases. Typically, the law attaches serious criminal consequences for the crime, but also permits special treatment and educational services and extensive plea bargaining for most offenders (Gusfield in press). California's statutes are illustrative (Cal. Vehicle Code §§ 11837 et seq.). After a finding of guilt, a court may send a defendant to a treatment center in lieu of criminal penalties, including license suspension or revocation (except for some repeat offenders). The offender must agree to a number of restrictions. He or she must: obey all rules of the treatment program; agree to consent to all subsequent BAC tests if stopped on the highway; begin and complete the program promptly and satisfactorily. The judge's decision is discretionary and is to be based on presentence reports similar to those used in both diversion and probation hearings.

Most drunk driving cases do not reach the probation stage, however, as offenders are regularly permitted to plea to lesser offenses, such as reckless driving (Chatfield-Taylor 1980; Gusfield 1972, in press). Drunk drivers are seldom incarcerated, even if they cause injury or death. As Gusfield notes, drunk driving cases provide the primary interaction between working, middle, and upper classes and the criminal justice system. Since diversion and probation are de-facto designed for these groups, drunk drivers are especially likely to avoid criminal penalties.11

A key element of diversion and probation decisions is often the availability of some sort of treatment outside the penal system relevant to the criminal act. Judges, for example, may require defendants to work for a community service or to undertake
psychiatric counseling (Birns 1976; Note 1975). Probation and diversion rest on the concept of rehabilitation and, particularly for probation where there is a finding of guilt, rehabilitation suggests that some action is needed to show that the cause of the criminal behavior is being corrected. It is here that alcohol and drug programs play an increasingly important role. If a defendant can argue that his or her crime was in some sense “caused” by an alcohol problem, then the appropriate action under the disease concept of alcoholism is treatment rather than criminal punishment. Unlike the trial setting, where the focus is on alcohol’s role in the criminal act, the defendant’s condition — whether he has alcohol problems or is an alcoholic — becomes a potentially key issue. In fact, there may be no reference whatever to the defendant’s use of alcohol at the time of the crime.

Criminal justice referrals to alcohol treatment programs have become increasingly prevalent in recent years despite a concurrent move to discredit the rehabilitation doctrine in penology. Many articles and books have criticized the notion, and some States (including California) have replaced indeterminate sentences with definite sentence terms (e.g., Lipton et al. 1975; Orland 1978; Wilks and Martinson 1976). Alcohol problems appear to be a notable exception to this trend. They provide an officially recognized explanation for crimes and a rationale for diversion and probation (e.g., Soder 1973). The exception is particularly well illustrated in a recent volume of the journal Federal Probation. A lead article in the 1976 volume argued that the rehabilitation doctrine is ineffective and should be radically modified or discarded (Wilks and Martinson 1976). An article in the next issue describes a program which the authors claim “rebuts” this argument (Ziegler et al. 1976); their proof is a prison alcohol treatment program. Later issues in the same volume also included an article on an alcohol-related traffic offenders program (Huss 1976) and an article on the new Federal alcohol abuse confidentiality regulations relevant to probation departments (Weisman 1976).

Thus, as other forms of nonpenal rehabilitation have become disfavored, alcohol treatment programs have become more important. Formal recognition of this trend can be found in court opinions, legislative enactments, and legal commentaries. The purpose of the California drunk driving diversion program, for example, is to assist persons participating “to recognize their problem drinking and to assist them to recover” (Cal. Vehicle Code §11837.4(5)). The cause of drunk driving, according to one commentator, is “abusive use of alcohol” and “commonsense” dictates providing treatment rather than punishment (Spirgen
ALCOHOL: BLAME AND EXCUSE

1978, p. 264). According to Granger and Olson (1978, p. 675), "the traditional punitive approach to drunk driving has failed because of its inability to reach the core of the problem — the disease of alcoholism." Such language contrasts sharply with the moral indignation and blame expressed in drunk driving statutes and punitive damage court decisions. Courts have made the alcohol excuse increasingly prevalent for various crimes and treatment has been initiated in prisons themselves and in parole proceedings (Weisner in press; Ziegler 1976). In virtually all cases, including the prison setting, the programs are viewed as beneficial for the participants — a means to avoid punishment.

The criminal system's increasing reliance on alcoholism treatment is reflected in recent trends in the treatment community. A recent study of alcoholism treatment services in one California county interviewed treatment personnel in 23 specialized programs (Weisner in press). Of these, 10 listed criminal justice referrals, particularly after diversion hearings, as one of their most prominent sources of patients, and for many the referrals accounted for more than one-half of the clientele. Program administrators stated it was "not uncommon" for many of their clients to have court cases pending. Criminal referrals were reported to be a particularly good source of middle class, paying clients, a group in very high demand among the agencies. Some services actually require that the patient be employed (or have a job available after treatment) before he or she can be accepted in the program. Thus, there is a strong correlation between the agency's "ideal" patient and the criteria for eligibility for diversion and treatment status.

Treatment strategies have begun to incorporate the criminal justice system into the treatment methods themselves. Providers view the coercive arm of the law as helpful to their work. The threat of criminal prosecution serves to encourage a breakdown of the "denial" of the problem, generally considered the first step toward successful treatment. The criminal law actually encourages clients to admit to an alcohol problem which needs to be cured, for otherwise they may be found morally responsible for criminal behavior.

In sum, there has been a recent trend toward increased reliance on alcoholism treatment in probation and diversion hearings, which has had a profound effect on treatment services themselves. This trend conflicts with both traditional legal concepts concerning intoxication and recent criticisms of the rehabilitation model of corrections. As Room (1979) has observed:

Recently, alcoholism treatment systems have been
moving...into the area of court diversion for non-alcohol-specific crimes — robbery, assault, etc. Ironically, this latter development occurs just as the winds of neoclassic criminology are eliminating treatment and rehabilitation as an aim of the general penal and probation system, so that it has been said that in California alcohol and drug diversion procedures are the last refuge of a treatment ideology in the criminal law system (p. 220).

The existence of alcohol problems, however, is not the only factor to be considered. As discussed earlier, the decision is discretionary and is based on a judge’s overall determination of the seriousness of the crime and the defendant’s likely “successful” participation. Factors such as occupation, family status, age, past criminal record, and social class are all instrumental in that decision, with middle and upper classes most likely to benefit. Whether alcoholism is permitted as an excuse is not dependent on evidence of pathological drinking behavior; if it were, repeat and violent criminals with alcohol problems might be seen as having a more serious form of the disease and most in need of treatment.

Conclusion

There is, then, a curious coexistence in the criminal law of two alcohol ideologies — one of moral blame and another of disease excuse. The two ideologies focus on different aspects of drinking behavior and are presented to different finders of fact. At trial, usually before a jury, evidence is limited to alcohol involvement in the crime itself and is usually treated as irrelevant to the finding of guilt. The disinhibitory qualities of alcohol are often stressed in justifying such limits, with courts imposing a duty on defendants to control their drinking as a moral imperative. This is particularly relevant to certain crimes, such as drunk driving, public intoxication, and sex offenses, where evidence of drinking actually exacerbates the degree of criminal misconduct. Diversion and probation hearings, on the other hand, focus on the social condition of the defendant with only secondary attention being placed on alcohol in the actual criminal event. The defendant need not show that he or she did not “intend” his criminal conduct. Rather, he or she must demonstrate the existence of a compulsive disease.

Probation and diversion hearings do differ from trial proceedings in one major conceptual respect — the former provides sentencing relief and seeks rehabilitation while the latter determines guilt. Alcoholism, it can be argued, cannot absolve guilt
but can effect sentencing decisions. This explanation, however, is overly simplistic. Probation and diversion decisions are crucial, an escape valve in a system that actually incarcerates a very small proportion of all criminal offenders. The rules regarding the determination of guilt, as Gusfield argues, are significant on a symbolic level, but they tend to mask the actual working of the criminal system.

Alcohol's role in particular criminal cases illustrates this point. The decision to grant or deny treatment-oriented diversion is largely determined by factors unrelated to the actual drinking problems — social class, criminal record, etc. If a judge refuses to grant relief, then the same drinking problems lose their "excuse" character at least until the sentencing hearing. Juries are generally not permitted to evaluate the effects of alcohol problems on criminal behavior, and even if they recommend treatment in their verdicts their recommendations can be ignored. Thus, criminals with identical drinking problems committing identical crimes may be treated entirely differently in the criminal system. One may be diverted to treatment without any finding of guilt and the other may be sent to prison without any opportunity to present his or her alcohol excuse to the jury.

The alcohol ideologies, then, are serving important roles in the criminal law, but ones unrelated to any consistent view of alcohol's relationship to crime. The alcohol excuse ideology forms an important, "impartial" rationale to divert certain offenders from ordinary criminal procedures and punishment — those who are viewed by judges (rather than juries) as not likely to threaten society in the future. Drinking behavior is only one factor to be considered in that decision. The alcohol "blame" ideology serves to maintain the ideal of impartiality of the criminal system's determination of guilt — all defendants are treated equally at trial, and juries are not permitted the discretion routinely exercised by judges.

The ideologies also provide explanations for various antisocial acts, thus at least indirectly absolving other forms of explanation, such as racism and economic injustice. A poor man commits a theft not because he is poor but because he drinks too much. If he continues to steal, even after being given a treatment alternative, it is because of his refusal to confront his drinking problems, thus justifying incarceration. A rich and powerful man such as Robert Bauman commits a sexual crime because of alcohol problems and psychological pressures, not because he is a morally reprehensible person. A poor man who commits the identical crime is likely to be treated as an extremely dangerous and immoral person, particu-
larly if he has a criminal record, regardless of his psychological or drinking explanations. The social status of the two offenders, at the core of the differing criminal treatment, is thereby ignored.

These observations do not negate the relationship between alcohol consumption and criminal misconduct. That relationship clearly exists and must be recognized in the criminal law. There are, however, underlying and largely covert factors which determine when there is criminal guilt and when punishment should be imposed. It will be impossible to implement a fair and just alcohol excuse in the criminal law until these are acknowledged, analyzed, and reformed. This should be one lesson drawn from the recent rash of legislator-criminals seeking legal refuge in their drinking problems.

Notes

1The commentator continues: "The rule that voluntary intoxication is not a general defense to a charge of crime based on acts committed while drunk is so universally accepted as not to require the citation of cases. Apparently no court has ever dissented from the proposition, and it is embodied in statutes in some jurisdictions" (Annotation 1966, p. 1240). See, e.g., State v. French (Ohio, 1961) where the court characterized the rule as a "truism." For additional case citations, see Annotation (1966, pp. 1241-42). See also Hall (1960); Perkins (1969).

2Drunkenness may be so extreme as to be treated as insanity; however, such insanity is viewed as distinct from alcoholism or alcohol addiction. According to one commentator: "It is apparently only when alcoholism produces a permanent and settled insanity distinct from the alcoholism compulsion itself that the law will accept it as an "excuse" (Annotation 1966, p. 1239). As a practical matter, this exception is extremely limited.

3For citations, see Annotation (1966, p. 1240, note 12).

4See Fingarette and Hasse (1979) for a thorough and excellent discussion of the problems of the specific intent doctrine. Epstein (1978) and Hall (1944) also discuss the issues raised here.

5Compare Hットon v. State (Ga., 1951) and State v. Dennis (Conn., 1963) with People v. Oliver (Cal., 1961) and State v. Johnson (Idaho, 1957). Five States (Georgia, Missouri, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia) do not recognize any exception to the general rule (Annotation 1966).

6NASADAD's (National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors) special report provides an excellent overview of the current legal status of drunkenness offenses. A recent California case (Sundaner v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 1978) concerned the criminal treatment of public inebriates in Los Angeles. The Court ordered significant reform in criminal justice procedures. The case illustrates the potential seriousness of drunkenness offenses in terms of deprivation of freedom. See also Neier (1975) and Klein (1964).

The California Supreme Court in Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) recently accepted this doctrine, overruling previous California law and ignoring strong dissenting opinions. The Court held that drunk driving formed the basis for punitive damages regardless of circumstances, stating "drunk drivers are extremely
dangerous people." For a discussion of the moral outrage expressed in these opinions see Gusfield (in press).

*See cases cited in Annotation (1966).

*For a general discussion of police and district attorney discretion prior to and after arrest, see Goldstein (1960); Gusfield (1972, in press). Weisner (in press) found that at least one occasion a drunk driver was taken directly to a detoxification center by the police without booking.

"For discussion of the history, theory, and operation of diversion programs, see Birns (1976); Brakel (1971); and Note (1974, 1975).

This bias is illustrated in the California drunk driver probation program. Initially, only four public treatment centers were established in four counties. For other counties, potential probationers had to locate private, often expensive, treatment facilities to qualify for court probation. A suit was filed on behalf of indigent offenders who lived in counties outside those with State-funded programs, claiming a denial of equal protection. The Court denied the claim, stating that "experimental" programs need not be made equally available to citizens despite discriminations on the basis of income (McGlotten v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 1977). For discussion, see Granger and Olson (1978).

References


### Case and Statute Citations


*Gallegan v. People*, 411 P.2d 356 (Colo. 1966)

*Helton v. State*, 66 S.E. 139 (Ga. Ct. of Appeals 1951)


*People v. Barrow*, 60 C.A.3d 984 (1979)

*People v. Habecker*, No. 101-828 (Superior Ct. of California, City and County of San Francisco, 1980)

*People v. Haskins*, 181 C.A.2d 541 (1960)

*People v. Hood*, 1 Cal.3d 451 (1969)

*People v. Oliver*, 55 Cal.2d 761 (1961)

*People v. Rogers*, 18 N.Y. 9 (1858)

*Quinn v. State*, 142 N.W. 510 (Wisc. 1913)

*Salzman v. United States*, 405 F.2d 358 (concurring opinion of J. Wright) (D.C. Cir. 1968)

*State v. Arsenault*, 152 Me. 121 (1956)

*State v. Dennis*, 188 A.2d 65 (Conn. 1963)


*State v. Huey*, 128 P.2d 314 (Wash. 1942)

*State v. Johnson*, 261 P.2d 638 (Idaho 1957)

*State v. Noel*, 133 A. 274 (1926)

*Sundance v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles*, No. C.A. 000257 (Superior Ct. of California, County of Los Angeles, 1977)
Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.3d 890 (1979)
United States v. Cornell, F.Cas.No. 14868 (CCRI, 1820)
Presenter's Comments

ROOM: Jim Mosher is a lawyer who has worked on a number of issues involving alcohol and the law — although up to the point of this paper, primarily not with matters that involved criminal law.

MOSHER: I woke up very early this morning wondering what I was going to say, and went through my third or fourth version. As we've gone along in the conference, we've had so many exciting ideas coming out, and I've been rethinking many of my own ideas on the topic we've covered. It's been really quite an exciting process, which I'd say is an advantage for me since I am the last formal presenter of a paper. There are a couple of disadvantages, one being that Robin suggested that Pat and I were going to bring some kind of conclusion, and I'm afraid that I cannot even pretend that I'm capable of that. We've really looked at a lot of trees in the forest, and it would be nice to have a look at the forest, but I think I'll turn that over to Mark Moore and Herbert Fingarette. So I will take a look at some more trees.

Actually, I did find my introduction and conclusion this morning when I opened the New Yorker to look at the cartoons, trying to get myself back to sleep, and found two in the most recent issue. The first one summarizes the feeling I had about where we're at right now: it's a man who definitely looks like a professor talking to a policeman in a New York City street and saying, "Excuse me, Officer. I'm an academic; where am I?"

I'd also like to say, having mentioned Herbert Fingarette, that it really is an honor to be here in front of him. For me, he has definitely provided tremendous stimulation in the field of alcohol in the criminal law, and the paper that I wrote is heavily indebted to his thought and the provocative things he's brought up in his writing.

I also want to thank Harry. He made it okay for me to talk about the research ideas I didn't put in my paper, which is what I'd like to do here.

My original idea in writing the paper had to do more with civil law than criminal law. I had an instinctive feeling, having worked in the civil law both as a practitioner and as a researcher, that alcohol intoxication is a mighty explainer of untoward consequences but that it does not permit excuses.

As the conference has moved along. I have found this to be in
contrast to a lot of what we're saying around the table, which is that, in fact, intoxication does provide excuses, that as B.B. King sings, it's a way of explaining things, a way of getting away with something. But the law fundamentally does not permit that, at least in its formal symbolic form. So there's some contrast here with popular attitudes that I'm not quite sure how to conceptualize. What I'd like to do — as is the wont of lawyers — is to bring up several legal cases, some actual situations of drinkers in action.

The first case I'd like to present came to me as a private practitioner and helps explain my gut feeling that drunkenness and alcohol play a role of blame rather than excuse in the law. A fellow came to me and a senior attorney who I was working with at the time. He had been barhopping in San Francisco, and, after having gotten very severely drunk — I think he said six to eight drinks — he decided to call a taxi rather than drive his car, a very responsible decision. He called the taxi and it took him to the next bar, which was about a mile away. The taxi driver then asked him for $20, and he refused to pay so much. Instead he said: "I want you to call the police, and I want someone to arbitrate this dispute because I don't owe you $20." And the cab driver pretended to call the police, instead called four other cabs of the same company, and while the four other cab drivers watched, beat the guy up and stole all his money.

I believed his story; I don't think he was telling a lie. He was very sincere and also very mad. And he wanted to get this cab company, which I fully sympathized with. I was not the main attorney in the case, and I'm not sure what my decision would have been as the only attorney. But the senior attorney told him he didn't have a case. And the reason was that he had been drunk. There would be no way to successfully present his case to the jury because it was going to be one man's word against another. Since he was drunk at the time, he would be at a great disadvantage and the case was therefore not a winner.

This is a subtle way in which drunkenness can come into the law, and I think it's a very important part of the discretion in the legal system that Liz Morrissey talked of. In these discretionary decisions, the fact that a participant in an untoward event, criminal or civil, is drunk, weighs heavily on the type of decision being made.

I'd like to move on now to a couple of negligence cases, another aspect of civil law which involves accidents where people have injured somebody else unintentionally. If you've been negligent, then you are liable for the injuries. As we were also discussing earlier, it's a type of social negotiation between individuals in which the state, through its courts, defines the rules under which people have a duty of protection to each other.
In negligence law, there's a basic standard for determining whether or not someone has been "negligent" — i.e., been careless — called "the reasonable person" standard. This standard involves asking the jury: Did the defendant in this case — say the person driving a car who caused an accident — act as a reasonable person would have acted in like circumstances? The question is not how you would have acted necessarily, but rather how this fictitious "reasonable person" would have acted. The standard is very similar to other legal demands for rationality in determining moral and civil responsibility.

The standard does allow for special excuses involving diseases and mental conditions. When you have an illness — for instance, if you have pneumonia, a handicap, or a serious mental illness — the reasonable person standard is changed to reflect these presumably unintended conditions. Thus the question becomes: Would the reasonable person who has this particular condition have acted differently? My favorite case illustrating this is a woman who was driving along a freeway and saw God, thought she was flying to Heaven and caused an accident. She pleaded temporary insanity. If the jury were to believe that she was temporarily insane, she would have been found not negligent because a reasonable person who had been struck with this temporary insanity would have done exactly the same thing.

Looking at drunkenness and alcoholism in the context of the reasonable person standard, then, gives you an interesting, legal view of just exactly how drunkenness is treated. Drunkenness is not permitted as an excuse in the reasonable person standard. A drunk is considered to have the same requirement of duty to other people as a sober reasonable person. So, legally speaking, drunkenness doesn't make any difference to your duty; it's not an issue in the case; and you cannot plead, "I was drunk."

Alcoholism is also not applied to the reasonable person standard. This is a less clear area. Perhaps some of you know of some cases to the contrary, but I've looked hard for a negligence case in which the defendant would plead something to the effect, "Well, I'm an alcoholic, and, therefore, the reasonable person standard should be someone in like circumstances who is an alcoholic." I could not find a single case that even argued that — and I think the argument would lose.

These are just the basic rules and they suggest that drunkenness is not an excuse for harmful behavior, but rather a blame. What I'd like to do now is look at a couple of negligence cases. Actually, my talk so far is an excuse to look at my drunken sailor cases. These are
situations in which drunkenness isn't officially part of the case, and in principle can't be part of the case, but we'll see that in fact, drunkenness is the crucial issue.

I therefore want to move to maritime law and, again, I'm afraid that I have to give you some legal jargon in order to get started. In maritime law, if a sailor gets injured on or off ship while on his tour of duty, there are two types of recovery: one called "maintenance and cure," the other called "damages." For a sailor to get damages, he must prove negligence-type fault on the part of the shipowner. Maintenance and cure, however, is different. The U.S. Supreme Court has said:

Logically and historically the duty of maintenance and cure derives from a seaman's dependence on his ship, not from his individual deserts, and arises from his disability, not from anyone's fault. We there refuse to look at the personal nature of the seaman's activity at the moment of injury to determine his right to award. Aside from gross misconduct or insubordination, what the seaman is doing and why and how he sustains injury does not affect his right to maintenance and cure, however decisive it may be, as he claims for indemnity or for damages for negligence. (Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 515-16 (1948))

This means that if the sailor is extremely careless in what he's doing, he still gets this type of recovery. Maintenance and cure is thus a type of workmen's compensation recovery. You don't really look to see how careless he was; you don't see whether the shipowner was negligent; if he gets injured, he is entitled to a recovery.

In 1943, the U.S. Supreme Court had the following to say:

So broad is the shipowner's obligation re maintenance and cure that neither negligence nor acts forming culpable misconduct on the seaman's part will relieve him of the responsibility. Only some willful mistake, only some willful misbehavior or deliberate act of indiscretion suffices to deprive the seaman of his defense. The traditional instances are venereal disease and injuries received as a result of intoxication. Though on occasion, the latter has been qualified in recognition of a classic predisposition of sailors ashore. (Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 730-31 (1943))

Cases from lower courts which have implemented this general rule have drawn what I consider an odd distinction. If the shipowner acts to protect the seaman who is drunk, actually recognizes his predisposition to get drunk on shore and takes some
form of protective measure — for example insuring that a sober companion is present to carry the drunk back to the ship — and there is some mishap causing injury to the seaman, then the shipowner is liable for recovery. If the shipowner takes no action — he just lets the sailors off the ship — then he protects himself. So, in effect, the law has devised a rule here which encourages shipowners not to protect the sailors from their predisposition to get intoxicated.

Two cases illustrate this point. The first is called the *Atlass* case, decided in 1965 (*Atlass v. Muth*, 350 F.2d 592 (1965)). I believe it illustrates both the shipowner's dilemma and the way drunkenness acts to shift responsibility to the drinker. The crucial issue concerns the safety of a yacht's two entrances — one which required a three to four foot jump over water and the other which required no special effort. There were about six sailors involved in the case, and one of them was termed the owner's agent. The entire crew left the yacht and two came back extremely drunk. These two went to the wrong entrance, fell into the water, and drowned. The court held that the sailors had committed gross misconduct by being so intoxicated. The shipowner had provided a safe entrance which fulfilled his duty to the seamen. Recovery for both negligence and maintenance and cure was therefore barred. Yet, if the shipowner had taken affirmative actions to protect the sailors and the drownings had still occurred, then the shipowner might have been liable.

The second case, *Reyes v. Vantage Steamship Co, Inc*, (558 F.2d 1438 (1977)) involves a shipowner who kept stacks of 350 beer cases on his boat, which he regularly served to his sailors. The court termed this practice a measure of good will. A sailor on the ship got very intoxicated (.185 BAL), decided to go swimming, jumped into the water, swam too far from the boat and drowned. The boat did not have on board a lifeline, which is required by federal regulations and which could have saved his life. The lower court called the sailor's drunkenness gross misconduct and found his conduct the sole cause of the accident. The appellate court reversed on two bases: first, that the ship was basically a floating dramshop; and second, that given the large supply of liquor, the captain is required to take some affirmative action to protect the sailors. The court thus held that the failure to maintain a lifeline on the ship and the large supply of liquor were the sole causes of the accident. This is a recent case and perhaps suggests some changes in legal thinking — the lower court's opinion is fully supported under previous decisions. What is surprising is that there could have been any doubt in these circumstances, particularly given the breadth of the maintenance and cure rules.
Both cases are interesting because, whether or not drunkenness was found to be the sole cause, both courts held that the event never would have happened if the sailors hadn't been drinking. The focus was on the drinking, and, although the appellate court in the second case shifted responsibility to the captain, the drinking really is the explainer of the events. The opinions themselves are particularly centered on the drinking behavior. What happened here is somebody got drunk — that explains the event. And in most instances — the Reyes case being somewhat of an exception perhaps because of its extraordinary circumstances — once you have that fact, the drinker becomes the person who bears the cost of the event. This parallels what I argue in my paper concerning the criminal law — that the drinker really is taking on the responsibility by getting drunk. In fact, I remember that in an earlier discussion we noted that the responsibility comes when the person decides to get drunk.

Let me briefly describe two more cases that I found absolutely fascinating in my research, which involved insurance law. Again, I have to give a bit of background so the legal issues can be understood. Health, accident and life insurance contracts very commonly contain specific exceptions often called “standard exclusion clauses.” Two common exclusions involve crime and alcohol, our two main topics. This is how a typical exclusion reads: “If a person has put into his body in any manner or nature whatever and whether due to voluntary or involuntary or other act of the insured any intoxicant” coverage is denied. In other words, if the person has any alcohol in his bloodstream when he's injured, the insurance coverage is nullified. A lot of contracts are less onerous, providing that coverage will be denied if the insured is “intoxicated.”

The crime provision is similar. If you're committing a crime when you get injured you are not covered. Indeed, you are usually not covered in drunk driving accidents and other criminal actions taken while drunk. There are two interesting cases out of Tennessee several decades ago that illustrate the extent to which intoxication is viewed as not just an explainer but a blame for events.

The first case involves a fellow who was very intoxicated in the back seat of a car driven by somebody who was sober and who got injured when the car was in an accident. It was unclear from reading the case who was negligent — the driver of his car or of the other car. The court held that there did not have to be any causal connection between the intoxication and the injury. Thus, because the insured was intoxicated in the back seat, even though the intoxication did not lead in any way, shape or form to his injury, he
was not covered. Now, the courts disagree on this, but there are many courts who would maintain the same position today.

The second case involves a bootlegger who was driving his illegal booze to market along a Tennessee highway. His car had a gas leak and the car blew up. The court held that there has to be a causal connection between the crime and the injury. Thus since there was no causal connection between the criminal act of taking the booze to market and the gas leak, recovery was permitted. These results suggest that, from an insurance perspective, being intoxicated is more reprehensible than committing a crime. I found these cases in an old "Harvard Law Review" article (Note 1949); the commentator suggested that there is some anomaly concerning these insurance law cases, a position I heartily support.

Those are the cases I wanted to present. I want in a few words to give a sense of what I think is important about them. First, and I have already mentioned this — drunkenness does provide a tremendous explanation in the law. It's very prevalent, and it's something we've talked about here. Alcohol can explain all kinds of things — it can explain aggression, sleepiness, clumsiness. When drunkenness is involved in an accident or crime, the law looks at the drinking very seriously, as a primary explanatory tool. This doesn't mean, as I said before, that drunkenness excuses the event; in fact, I would argue — and this is why I wanted to bring the civil cases up — that in most instances it is a means for apportioning blame. In the criminal area, as you read in my paper, drunkenness does sometimes provide an excuse, a major excuse. I think it is important to realize, however, that the circumstances in which an excuse is permitted are extremely limited.

What is important about the law taking drunkenness as an explanation? One of the main results is that it takes the onus off the structural level and puts it on the individual. In looking at most of the sailor cases, you don't look at the safety situation of the ship; drunkenness somehow excuses the normal obligation of the shipowner and the ship's master to protect his sailors. Ship safety is a basic duty of shipowners except when a sailor is drunk. Joe Gusfield, in his recent book (1980), powerfully raises this point. In the drunk driving area, the law symbolically puts the blame on the individual, thus taking the emphasis off some of the other structural issues.

There are many cases that illustrate this general point. Recently several former alcoholics have brought various types of suits. They have sued the industry, claiming that the alcohol industry is responsible for their alcoholism. They have also raised safety issues. For example, in one case an alcoholic climbed a telephone pole and
was seriously injured; he argued that the alcohol producer should be held liable for not warning him that using alcohol increases the danger of serious accidents. Now, I'm not arguing that in these instances the alcohol industry should be civilly liable. What I want to note is that the defense to this case is inevitably "this individual did it; it's his fault."

Thus, civil law well illustrates the tendency in legal thought to use drunkenness as a means of putting the blame on an individual level. This may tie into Harry's talk, where he discussed an historical change toward identifying the individual as the primary source of social control.

Now just a few words about criminal law, so I can actually talk about my paper a bit. Since alcohol is such a good explainer, it is not surprising that it takes on such an important role in the criminal law. It is an odd kind of importance, however, because officially the legal position is to ignore drunkenness. The criminal is held to the same standard as a "sober" person.

I want to make a parenthetical point which Professor Fingarette mentioned to me during this meeting, that juries go along with this legal doctrine. It is not only hard to make drunkenness a jury issue but when it is, the jury is unlikely to acquit on that basis. The law is therefore reflecting at least some segment of the population's popular attitude.

Drunkenness takes on a different role in the diversion process, however. Alcoholism treatment has become very important in the diversion and sentencing system, providing an important means for avoiding formal criminal punishment. It is a way of diverting criminal cases into the medical system, as we were talking about this morning. But with diversion we are asking a different question from the issue of guilt. At the trial, we're asking: Is this person morally guilty, morally responsible for his acts? Has he committed a transgression against the state? At a diversion hearing we ask instead: Is this person really someone we want to put through the criminal system? The diversion process is basically an escape valve for certain people, and alcoholism treatment is becoming an important means for triggering that valve. The problem is that alcohol is not the real issue. Diversion decisions rest on such matters as class, race, age, and the number of crimes the accused has committed. You can argue from a treatment perspective that someone who has committed several crimes while drunk is in the most need of alcoholism treatment, but in fact just the opposite happens in the diversion process.

This fits in with some of what Pat said this morning, that drunkenness excuses certain members of society for certain crimes.
And I'll just note in passing that Dan White, the San Francisco supervisor who murdered the mayor and another supervisor and received a very lenient punishment, had an alcoholism-type defense. Only someone in Dan White's position in society could possibly have gotten away with that. Most others would have been laughed out of court.

The tendency in law, then, is to treat drunkenness as a powerful explainer and to apportion blame and excuse based on factors largely divorced from the actual drinking behavior. Although I have questioned this legal treatment of drunkenness, we should not lose track of the fact that indeed alcohol in our society is associated with serious accidents, crime and disease. It really is amazing how often alcohol is involved in legal cases. Quite apart from whether alcohol explains these untoward events, there's an association there that involves incredible human suffering. The fact that alcohol is not an adequate explanation or that the cross-cultural studies show that our society is creating an explanation, does not negate the reality of a serious societal problem that needs to be dealt with for the sake of the individuals in society as well as for the society itself. This raises a number of prevention-type issues that Larry Wallack and I have been moving into. The main implication of my legal research is the need to shift attention from individualized to more structural types of solutions. The intoxicated sailor cases illustrate this point — one can find structural solutions to protect the drinking sailor.

Residential fires illustrate this point still further. A very strong relationship has been shown between smoking, drinking, falling asleep, having a cigarette smolder in the couch, and starting a fire. That's a very common scenario in our society, and a very serious problem. Alcohol and Health IV (U.S. National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 1981) has recently labeled fire accidents as one of the major alcohol-related problems in the country. The solution, however, may not be in the individual. I raised this at the Panel on Alternative Policies Affecting the Prevention of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism of the National Academy of Sciences (Moore and Gerstein 1981). I thought the best solution was to change the structure of the cigarette, and there is considerable literature on how you can design cigarettes so they don't smolder. There were a number of comments, with panel members saying things like, "Well, that's not the real problem; the real problem is the fire codes or the materials in the walls or the couches." If you want to solve that alcohol-related problem, you need to look at all these elements in the structure of the situation. I think that ties into some of the more abstract ideas that Pat brought up about the individual and
the social structure. Within the context of legal problems and accidents and crime, alcohol can and does provide some focus in practical situations, even if it is not an adequate explanation.

I want to close with my other cartoon, which shows three fish — a small one, a middle-sized one and large one. The middle-sized fish is eating the small fish and the large fish is eating the middle-sized fish. The little fish is saying “there is no justice in the world”; the middle-sized fish is saying “there is some justice”; and the big fish is saying, “the world is just.”
Commentary

Mark Moore

ROOM: Mark Moore is Chairperson of that Panel on Alternative Policies Affecting the Prevention of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism — of the National Academy of Sciences — which Jim just mentioned, and is at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. I think Mark has sometimes represented himself as being an expert on hazardous commodities, having worked both on heroin and handguns as well as alcohol.

MOORE: I was a little surprised but happy to be invited to this discussion since I'm neither a lawyer nor a sociologist; in fact, it's hard to characterize what I am. I guess the easiest way to think of it is as an empty vessel, disinhibited by the California climate. And what I've been learning over the last day with a great deal of excitement and enthusiasm is what may be called "sociological comportment," and so for a while, I am going to try to look and sound a little bit like a sociologist, and if I get it wrong, you've only yourselves to blame.

Jim's comments prompted me to preface my specific statement on Jim's paper with a more general statement. Jim was pointing out again that we all understand that causation in the world is quite a complex phenomenon, and that when courts use words like "sole cause" or "only cause" or something like that, we know that they can't be speaking truthfully about the world. It simply doesn't make sense to think about something as a sole cause or an only cause. It seems to me that one of the important areas of tension between people doing social science and people making public policy and legal rules is that when theories of causation are brought into the political and legal world — that is, a world in which the central issue is how to allocate praise and blame to individuals — they carry with them the freight of assigning liability; that is, of indicating where the finger of praise and blame ought to be pointed and where the burden of additional work to ward off the evil ought to be allocated, and who is to take care of whom and how much and to what degree. And while as researchers we might think we have the right way to decide that issue — namely, what the correct theory of
causation is — we discover that the political and legal worlds consider the scientific basis only part of the question to be considered in their analysis of where to fix the liability. There are at least two other things that go into their consideration, it seems to me: one is they make a sort of utilitarian calculation and look forward to the question of: If we were to fix liability in a particular place and in a particular way and in particular dimensions, what would happen to the distribution of work and burdens, on the one hand, and benefits, on the other, as a result of placing the liability in that particular way? And the standard notion would be if we put the liability on somebody who can cheaply and easily do the protection, that that would be better than placing the liability on someone who could only expensively and with difficulty produce the protection. But they would also ask the question: What's the distribution of protecting and protection that's offered as a result of fixing the liability in a particular area? This is a broader area that is now developing in economics and the law that's concerned with that particular subject, and to some degree, the courts worry about that when they confront questions, and I think Jim's drunken seamen cases illustrate wrestling with that.

But, there's a competing consideration that goes into that judgment, which is: To what extent does the assignment of liability conform to ordinary social preferences about where we ought to fix liability? Who's our favorite person to blame? Who's our favorite person to try to protect? And to the extent possible, the courts and the government try to conform to a notion of the kinds of people or the kinds of characters who are going to be ordinarily blameworthy or protectable. That consideration goes into the question of where to fix the liability as well. So when we propose a theory of causation and bring it into a political and legal world where blame, worth, virtue and responsibility are allocated, it's by no means a neutral matter. Great things turn upon people's conceptions of themselves, what they're responsible for doing — their whole ideas of the social order turn on the question of where liability and blame and responsibility are to be fixed.

What I'm going to discuss with regard to Jim's paper are four things. One is how the law regards alcohol abuse, and specifically whether it's consistent or inconsistent in its view. Jim suggests that it's inconsistent. I think it's quite consistent and easy to understand the law's view in this area, and its view is that it's unfailingly hostile to the idea of drunkenness. for a couple of reasons that we will talk about. The second is: What is the implication of whatever views the courts happen to hold for the individually and socially held view of drinking? The third is why the law — as one special instrument of
social control — is developing the particular form that it seems to be developing. And the last question — and this is where I was trying to act most like a sociologist, and, therefore, venturing into an area where a substantial liability may be attached to me — is: What does it imply for our perception of how social control operates; more specifically, what are the instruments of social control? One of the things that I've learned from this conference is that I've substantially broadened my view of how social control operates and through what instruments. Let me take up each of those topics.

My first proposition is that the law has a quite consistent view of alcohol use, and it's quite easy for people to understand. Let me first develop Jim's view as he develops it in his paper. He notices that lots of people charged with crime — specifically aggressive assaults and child molesting — have often offered the excuse of drunkenness. He also notes that the courts have responded to this in two particular ways: one is by constructing a very limited excuse which he describes as the specific versus general intent distinction. It turns out that drunkenness can be relevant in rebutting an assertion of specific intent, but not in general intent.

This turned out to be a very limited excuse for drunkenness for two important reasons which I think are quite interesting. One is that there are only small numbers of specific intent crimes, so it doesn't come up all that often; and the second is that even where there's a specific intent crime, it seems as if the defense lawyers often decide that they would prefer to keep testimony about drunkenness out of the conversation, for the reason that the jury has to find two things in the case: One is whether the person committed the offense, and the second is what their intent was. Because the defense lawyers believe that the jury believes that alcohol is disinhibiting, and therefore more likely to produce the bad effect in question, they prefer to keep alcohol out of the conversation, relying on their first line of defense, which is to refuse to admit that the defendant committed the act. That would be one way of interpreting it, but I've gone beyond Jim's evidence in speculating there. In any case, it's a limited excuse that the courts have developed, strikingly limited. And where they've been more inventive is in changing what Don Black (1976) would call the "style" of social control; that they have changed from a punitive style of social control to a therapeutic style of social control. Whether the quantity of publicly sponsored social control has changed or not, I think is uncertain.

But Jim argues: Notice that to that degree — namely, to the extent that it's constructed a limited excuse and to the extent that it's changed the style of social control — the courts seem to have
reacted to defendants' claims of excuse for their action. And then he goes on to notice that in other areas, specifically those areas where drunkenness is itself part of the definition of the offense — public drunkenness and drunk driving — that the courts have treated drinking very harshly and considered it punitively. He then asks the question: Well, for heaven's sake, where is the court on this issue? Are they considering it an excuse or are they considering it an offense? And that, it seems to me, is a very sharply posed question.

I'm rarely a defender of legal reasoning. I routinely spend a semester fighting with a law professor on a variety of absurdities in legal reasoning. But, still, in this particular case, the courts seem to me to be quite sensible; in fact, maybe more sensible than we are. And the way that I would resolve or dissolve the contradiction that Jim identifies is to say that his first assertion — namely, that the courts have changed and admitted drinking is an excuse — has not really happened. What you see over and over in the courts is a determined resistance to accepting alcohol as an excuse. Every time the question has been raised, they have rejected it. And this limited excuse, arising in a very small number of cases, and the shift in the style of social control does not seem to me to be an important accommodation to the view that alcohol might be part of the problem. The adjusting/accommodating side of the dichotomy really is not particularly adjusting or accommodating. If it hasn't ever been allowed as an excuse in the courts, only as a reason for shifting to a more therapeutic style, then we could propose the alternative hypothesis; namely, that the courts have consistently blamed drinking — and see whether that holds up. And I think that I can construct an argument that says the courts are consistent in blaming drunkenness.

I'm going to speculate for a minute on two different reasons that they might be so determined to keep blaming people for getting drunk, and that has to do with the fact that in getting drunk, the courts see two things going on and want to discourage both of them, but one of them is much more offensive to the courts than the other. The two things that are going on are, first, the fact that the person deliberately puts himself in a position where he can disclaim authorship of his acts — where he can disclaim the responsibility for what's likely to go on in the future because he wasn't himself or he was under the influence of some substance or something like that — and second, the court is worried that having put yourself in that position, some bad conduct will result, that you can do something particularly dangerous.

The first idea is offensive to the court because it denies the duties
of citizenship. The individual says to himself, “I’m going to escape my ordinary duties under the law by getting drunk and pretending that it wasn’t really me that was acting, and I will then be safe.” And the court finds that offensive, since it undermines its authority and control over the citizen’s conduct. The second is offensive for the usual reason that things are offensive; namely, that the risky behavior that results from disclaiming authorship is dangerous for others. For both those reasons, the court has been relatively hostile to the concept of drunkenness. It’s important to note that the courts have not been unlimitedly hostile; that is, they have restricted or focused their greatest hostility on drunkenness in situations where there is some public interest, specifically in the area of public intoxication and in drunk driving. What they’re doing there is saying, “This is not bad in itself, but it’s bad because it’s likely to produce some things that are bad in the same way that driving too fast or carrying a gun in a central city is bad; that is, it increases the conditional probability that a bad act will occur, and, therefore, as a preventive measure, we will discourage the conduct.”

With respect to those offenses, the courts often stay in a punitive style rather than a therapeutic style because the claim is that the person voluntarily puts himself into this dangerous situation and, therefore, is vulnerable to blame and punishment in a punitive style rather than the therapeutic style. It’s easy to think of these as analogous with illegal possession of guns or driving too fast, and to understand that the court is punishing them because they are acts which, although maybe not bad in themselves, are sufficiently conducive to bad acts that they are worth discouraging.

My answer to the question of how to deal with the anomaly of the courts apparently giving some license to action in the case of substantive offenses such as assault and child abuse would be to say the courts are really treating drunkenness in those cases not as an excuse, not even neutrally, but as a crime that is a lesser included offense, just as courts punish people primarily for armed robbery and include carrying a handgun in that as a lesser included offense, and they punish people for burglary and carry under that the possession of burglary tools as a lesser included offense. So, the crime of domestic assault includes the crime of inappropriate drunkenness, but it doesn’t have to be stated because of the magnitude of the offense. The courts would see drunkenness as so small relative to the dominant charge that it’s a matter of indifference whether it’s included in the formal statement of the charge or not. So, I would argue that the courts, with respect to substantive offenses, could be seen as treating the associated drunkenness not only not as an excuse, but as an additional lesser
included offense. I'm masquerading as a lawyer there, and running some substantial risk of error as well.

So, the court is consistently hostile to drinking, and it's consistently hostile to drinking primarily because it believes in the disinhibition theory. That is, what it says, is "We believe that it is true that if a person drinks, he puts himself and others at risk, and he does so voluntarily, and he does it in two ways: One, by disclaiming responsibility; and two, by increasing the probability of certain kinds of inappropriate acts. Because we believe in the disinhibition theory of drinking, we are going to push the point of responsibility in these offenses involving drinking back further than would be the case at the moment of the crime; that is, we're going to push the point back to the moment the person decides to drink." I'm following Larry Wallack's remarks in this area.

That, then, raises the interesting question, which is: How much voluntary control does the individual have over the decision to drink in the first place? And that is the argument that the alcoholism movement has tried to make; namely, since the person has no voluntary control over the decision to take the first drink, fixing responsibility at that point is inappropriate for the court to do. Notice that even if we were to accept that view — namely, that alcoholics do not have control over the decision to drink — that would not mitigate all criminal offenses or traffic accidents, etc., because alcoholics figure in only a small minority of such offenses. And it would still turn out to be true that occasionally drunken people got into trouble, and we would understand that the excuse "I was temporarily drunk" was not tolerable; and only the excuse "I'm a chronic alcoholic, and, therefore, I can't control myself when I'm drunk" would be the excuse. But the courts have said explicitly, when asked about this, that "We do not believe that alcoholism" — that is, the first decision to drink — "is an involuntary act. We believe that that's a voluntary act; and therefore we reject not only the alcohol excuse, but the alcoholism excuse, and, therefore, we're going to continue to hold people who get drunk improperly as liable for their actions."

So, the courts seem to me to be saying the following: One, it's dangerous to drink because of the disinhibition effect. It's not only dangerous to individuals but also of public concern in special areas; namely, public drunkenness and driving. Since it is dangerous to the social order to drink at certain levels and certain places, we will discourage that conduct by punishing people who do that and act as though they're responsible for the decision to drink as well as for what comes after that. They reject the view that people do not have voluntary control over the decision to drink. Still, they will adjust
the quantity and style of social control to accommodate a little bit the concern that a person, even if not being compelled to drink, may have some difficulty controlling drinking. And in any case they make a utilitarian calculation that it might be in the society's interest to handle these people through therapeutic means rather than the ordinary means of the criminal justice system.

What does this say to individuals in the society about disinhibition and drinking? Well, the courts reinforce the widely held public view that drinking is disinhibiting. As such, it makes available to individuals the possibility of capturing excuses from people not in the legal system. There's no particular reason that the legal system has to assign blame or liability in the same way that all the other parts of the society do. And when we see defendants reaching out and saying, "It was the FBI bourbon that did it," they may be not so much asserting a defense against the inevitable outcome in the courts as pleading for understanding among colleagues and other people, who, after all, are also part of the social control system and whose actions and postures toward them they care about.

So, to some extent, the courts reinforce the disinhibition idea and make it available as an excuse to individuals in talking to other private individuals. Now, it's interesting to ask the question: Why is the law developing in this particular way? The most distinctive feature of the posture of the courts in this area seems to me to be that while it's giving way on the question of the style of social control, it is not giving way on the question of moral culpability of actions. A question we can then ask ourselves is why is the court behaving in that particular way? One possible answer that seems to me intuitively less than obvious is that from the point of view of the courts, particularly in our society, they need to know where the moral authorship of acts is; that is, they need to know where to assign liability, as we've pointed out, and need to know that because it is of moral significance as well as analytic and causal significance. They prefer to assign liability to individuals, and they like the idea that individuals are responsible for their acts; they believe that that's a very important ideology in general throughout this society, one that ought to be protected and preserved: That people are responsible for what they do. It makes it possible for them to do their job of judging individuals, and, probably in the view of many people in the courts, it provides one of the fundamental underpinnings of our society. So, they’ll give up an awful lot in terms of the right way to respond to public drunkenness — but they won't give up on the idea of individual responsibility. That's what they want to cling to in all circumstances.
This suggests to me something about social control. Often people think about social control in terms of public agencies punishing or sanctioning people who behave outside the bounds of established roles. That's one kind of social control. We also understand that social control can operate by regularly deciding which position a person is going to be in. That is, I was a high status person once, but I behaved in a particular way, so I get shifted to a lower status position.

The third way that it operates, though — and in many respects this seems to me to be the most interesting but the least obvious — is by defining what are the available positions and statuses in society. So, not only does the social control apparatus take certain status positions and compare acts relevant to the norms in those positions and punish for transgressions; not only does social control move people in and out of certain positions — from high status to low status positions — but it also operates by defining certain social positions. And the question throughout the history of this issue has been: Are the courts prepared to accept and create in the society a new position called that of "alcoholic"; that is, a person who is incapable of controlling his drinking; to accept that he's incapable of controlling his drinking, in a position to do damage, and not be responsible for it?

On this the courts differ from the way they responded to the claim of mental illness. They have said, "We are not going to recognize a special status called 'alcoholic.'" I'm going well beyond what I know to be true. They might be saying something like "We are tired of giving exceptions; we are tired of creating new positions in which people can offer excuses for their conduct."

I sometimes wonder whether the politics of the current day, and to some extent the anger at social scientists, couldn't be understood in terms of whether and how many special statuses involving excuses there are to be within the society. I just would point out that it's analytic theories of causation that cause us to move responsibility away from individuals to other places, and that runs against a very strong ideological trend and long-term ideological feature of the society.
Discussion

MORGAN: What I'd like to do is bring Joe Gusfield into the room for a minute. Even though Joe is in India, for many of us he's been here all along.

The commentary especially reminded me of the dangers involved when we attempt to analyze reality in terms of constructing typologies or models of formal systems of social control. We know that the law and the courts operate on moral grounds based on concepts of equality and reason. However, in Joe's most recent book (Gusfield 1980), he has suggested that some of the dimensions involved in formal definitions, such as those used by the law, are perhaps hidden behind particular kinds of technological covers or scientific cloaks which, in essence, are masking political choices. He says: "...that these, in fact, deny that a moral decision has been taken; that a political choice among alternatives had been made. So, the ownership and responsibility for social problems and their solution are given as a matter of fact and not of value."

I would like to use that to remind people that the recent developments in terms of alcohol-related diversion programs, especially, involve more than just processes within the court. The law is, in fact, much broader than the court process because diversion happens before these decisions reach the court. The purpose of diversion is to keep people from, in fact, entering into the court system and thereby entering into the criminal justice system.

ROIZEN: I'd like to echo one comment made, which is that from the social scientist's side, responding back to the legalistic side, yes, yes, we do not see these theories as bases for moral decisions, and if someone reads this conference as being a conflict between the neomoralistic blamers and the physicodeterminist excusers by means of drinking, my advice is don't do it. It's the citizenry's responsibility to make moral decisions, and the sociological and other sorts of scientific evidence will not free the citizen from that moral responsibility. I think it's a terribly important point much confused on the part of social scientists themselves: To make clear that what we impart to you, you may not be able to escape, because it reflects a part of the knowledge system of our culture — you may not be able to escape those causal ideas. But when you come to use those causal ideas and the authority of the status of scientists who
promote those ideas as a basis for deciding whether somebody's responsible or not, you had better go and read Herb Fingarette's (1974) book because you can't do it.

**DUSTER:** In Mark Moore's comments, he said that the courts were consistently hostile to this conception of alcohol as a way of getting around culpability. That may be theoretically true. I don't know. But at the empirical level, that can hardly be true. The single most important determinant in disposition of criminal cases, whether one has pled guilty or not guilty, is whether one has a private attorney or a public defender. It's consistently the case across all crimes. If that's the case, then the notion of individual culpability is mooted, quite problematic.

**WINICK:** There's been a legal development in the last decade that, it seems to me, has important possible consequences for how people are exposed to drunkenness and how they may view it. That is, in the last decade, the decriminalization of public drunkenness and the elimination in most states of the public inebriate status as an offense has turned loose — at least in some cities like New York — very large numbers of persons who are drunk or who are unable to cope, or weaving and bobbing, or lying in the street and so forth.

In New York City, there are less than 100 beds available at sobering-up stations for the purpose of providing emergency assistance for such persons; and, as it happens, the State, which funds them, has said it will not fund them after next year, and the city has said it will not fund them at all because it doesn't have the money. But I would say that in the five years since New York State decriminalized public inebriate status, the number of persons visibly drunk on the street has increased at least a thousand percent. I would say, though not to as great an extent, the same thing is true in other places wherever decriminalization has occurred, thus providing a new perception of and greater visibility to people who are drunk, perhaps with a variety of consequences for how people growing up will view the drunkenness context.

**ROOM:** I think it's easy to overestimate the amount to which public drunkenness has been decriminalized in the country, despite places like New York City. It's a partial decriminalization in many states. I would, in fact, generalize your point a little to say that I think the decriminalization solution of public drunkenness has always been unstable and is about to break down in the U.S.

**SPEIGLMAN:** One of the questions that obviously keeps coming up is this question of discretion in the courts. I was interested in Mark Moore's characterization of the courts as taking two positions: One that they don't want to allow people to disclaim authorship; and the other that, simply, they don't want to see the
bad conduct resulting. In trying to think about this in some terminology I was more familiar with, I came up with Jim O'Connor's book, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (1973). O'Connor is concerned with the notion that the state has an interest in legitimacy, which seems to tie in with Moore's first category — that individualism really has to be retained as a kind of legitimate function in the state apparatus. Moore's second category fits with O'Connor's notion of the state's concern with accumulation. The state doesn't want people going around ripping apart capital; they don't want people running around destroying things that are needed for productivity, be they buildings, or families that are reproducing workers. From that perspective it's not surprising that people are treated differently in the courts and elsewhere, precisely because some people are not treated as capital or as important to the capitalist system. The huge numbers of people in this society who are marginal members of the political economy can be treated quite differently: they can either be ignored or they can be treated overly repressively, depending on which is the more effective and cheaper response.

**MARLATT**: Just another point to illustrate some of the peculiar paradoxes that we get into when we compare legal concepts of responsibility and the alcoholism movement's concepts of responsibility. In Seattle, we attempted to set up a program for drunk driving offenders that was based on self-control skills, problem-solving, controlled drinking practices and so forth, aimed not so much at the alcoholic offender but at the social drinker, young male drinkers in particular who had a very high risk. As soon as the recovered alcoholics in the community found out about this, they did everything they could to terminate the program and change the funding decision, because the recovered alcoholics handle the drunk offender — which includes the alcoholic and everybody else — through an alcoholism-oriented approach, which means, of course, that the person isn't really responsible and has to accept the fact that he has this disease. So they insisted, for example, that we screen out all alcoholics or we couldn't proceed with the program. As a result we were only getting about two names a month — that's all the people that they didn't think were alcoholics. Finally some of the judges in the area found out about this — they were very sympathetic to what we were doing because we were trying to teach people to have more responsibility, how to increase their self-control — and they did a back-door number and referred people to us without going through the usual alcoholism referral centers. I kept wondering "Why are we getting such friendly allyship from the courts?" I think the papers this morning have really helped me to understand where they're coming from.
LEVINE: I think Pat Morgan is really on the right track in the questions she raises. It seems to me that the issue of domination is central to what we're talking about. It's in the old Nineteenth Century version with the human above the animal. Bringing that back to the social level I think really opens up a whole way of conceptualizing and putting together some of the stuff we've been talking about.

It seems to me that the ideology of inhibition is central to the question of domination — as I think Pat was saying. If you take a number of subordinate groups and dominant groups, the ideology of inhibition is part of the traditional justification for domination. For example, it's claimed that men are more rational, logical, reasonable, self-controlled than women, that Europeans are more so than Indians, whites more so than blacks, adults more so than teenagers or youth, English or WASPs more so than Irish, Anglo-Saxon more so than Mexicans, the upper class more so than the lower class, and bosses more so than workers. In each case some part of the justification for the domination is that the people on top are more self-controlled, more restrained. The interesting thing is that when you plug alcohol into this, you get a real double standard. Those groups which are regarded as normally more inhibited, to some extent either have more access to disinhibition, to out-of-bounds or drunken behavior, or it's excused more often — as in the case of the congressman who takes a bribe versus perhaps the bank teller, when each claims that alcoholism is the reason for doing it. This system of privilege in the access to the power to claim alcohol as an excuse is clearly distributed by racial, class, sexual and age systems of hierarchy or domination.

FINGARETTE: I just wanted to say a couple of things about the basic scheme that Jim Mosher presented in his paper distinguishing between the way in which alcohol is treated in the trial situation and the way it's treated post-trial in terms of sentencing and probation and so on; and pointing out that there is a remarkable difference. One can find similarities in terms of different styles of control, as Morrissey points out, but nevertheless there are obviously differences between the punitive approach in the trial and the therapeutic approach in the medical system.

I think that kind of analysis of the legal structure is very important, and one can't understand and talk about these matters unless one does something like that. I think that it's the right tack to realize that in the trial situation, one is raising the question of individual responsibility, and that calls for a certain kind of method — and we've talked about some of the questions, assumptions
involved in that; a certain procedure; and a certain kind of result — namely, assign guilt, condemnation and so on — for a particular past act. Whereas when you talk about the sentencing situations, the court is explicitly defining a different question; namely, the utilitarian one: What, on the whole, will produce the most benefits for society, including, perhaps, this defendant? What will produce the best benefits, the most benefits, the least cost-on-the-whole future? That’s a radically different question from the question of culpability for a particular past act; consequently, the whole method, the whole approach is different, and the results are very different.

I think that the analytical scheme that Mosher presents is very important. I don’t agree that there is an inconsistency in the pattern, though. I think it’s quite consistent, as we were saying the other day; that, in fact, because there are these two very different questions, the approach in each context is, quite logically, very different also.

The question about whether alcoholism is a disease, and whether that is likely to be used more as another basis for excusing — which Mark Moore particularly discussed — is an interesting one because it raises the question, as he did: Why is it that the courts are so sympathetic to mental disorder as a form of excuse? And why is it that they are resisting, as they are, the idea that alcoholism is a disease and is a form of excuse? And I’d like to just suggest in a few words a possible answer. This answer is in terms of legal reasoning, in terms of doctrine. It is not an answer on the empirical level of what’s going on in the courts at the lower levels — which is another complicated story about which I know very little, and I don’t know that any people do know very much about it.

At the level of doctrine, I think the reason is this: The courts have been very interested in and sympathetic, increasingly, toward accepting and trying to build in the results of science, what they take to be enlightened scientific knowledge. In the early Twentieth and mid-Twentieth Century, and even before that, scientific knowledge seemed to be reporting that there are people who have mental diseases. Medicine discovers this, and these mental diseases affect the brain or something else that is scientifically determinable, and lo and behold, people are crazy. They can’t behave the way we do. That notion that mental disease was a scientific conception led to the acceptance of the mental disorder concept and the insanity defense in the form that we have it.

But increasingly during the mid-Twentieth Century, the courts began to become uneasy — especially at the higher doctrinal levels, the appellate courts. They began to see more and more that while
you could perhaps objectively describe some particular patterns of symptoms or syndromes, it seemed less and less plausible that there was a general medical conception of mental disease. The general concept was hardly used within the psychiatric profession; there were no agreed-on definitions. And the more suspicious the courts became, the more they began to fiddle around with the notion and to say, “Well, mental disease is really a legal conception, not a medical one; and so we’re going to define it.” And, of course, that introduces great confusion, because the whole point of introducing the notion was that it supposedly was a scientific term, a concept applied by means of scientific criteria.

Now, along comes this even more recent “scientific” notion: alcoholism is a disease, too. By now the courts are getting suspicious about this. They’re much more resistant to saying, “Well, if science says it’s a disease, well then, fine, drinking is involuntary in that case.” Once bitten, twice shy. So there’s a much greater resistance.

The main theme of the courts in connection with alcoholism has been very consistent and very pertinent to this conference, as both speakers brought out in a different way. The theme, I think, is this: The courts have been absolutely consistent in accepting what they took to be the scientific view of intoxication; namely, that it’s disinhibiting. And all of their decisions, whether in the trial contexts or whether in the other context, pretrial or sentencing, are based on the assumption that we all know it’s disinhibiting. Moreover, not only do we — that is, the courts — know it, but we know that everybody in the public knows it. For — so goes this line of thought — it’s a well-known scientifically established fact.

So that in regard to intoxication per se the whole thrust of legal doctrine and procedure — whatever the detailed complications and inconsistencies and confusions — the deep movement of it has been toward acceptance of the “disinhibition hypothesis,” whatever that may be. But the “alcoholism is a disease” concept has met with fairly decisive resistance in the criminal law area — though it has been increasingly acceptable of late in the job-disability and insurance areas.

MOSHER: I think you’re absolutely right in terms of the different questions being asked. I want to follow that point up a little bit more, however. When you take a broader look at legal control of behavior, even within that subset there are two different questions, one being what’s best for the society and the other being what is the moral guilt. There are two very distinct processes, in terms of what the law is trying to do. In the trial it’s a very symbolic process, as Gusfield (1980) points out. And concerning what’s best
for society, there really is a shifting and sifting of people who have gotten caught up in the legal system.

The problem I have with the way the courts handle that second question is that the context is really unlike the trial setting, which is tremendously controlled — the defendant has to be shown to have had a fair trial in lots of different ways; the second process is very, very discretionary. There's discretion at all stages of the process. In the second process you find that very different analyses and very different assumptions are being used depending on who the individual is. And that's something I think we need to focus on more in legal analysis — how treatment decisions are being made.
Implications for Research and Action

Herbert Fingarette

ROOM: Let me now introduce Professor Fingarette. I think at this point he really needs no further introduction. We were talking briefly about his role at this moment, and I was saying that maybe he might be thought of as a clean-up hitter in baseball. There are certainly plenty of people on base, plenty of trees on the bases at this point that the clean-up hitter can attempt to assist home. Dr. Fingarette, of course, has written on the insanity defense, but to those in the alcohol field, he's most known for a paper called "The Perils of Powell" (1970), which was specifically a discussion of the split decision in the Supreme Court that did not accept alcoholism as a defense for public drunkenness.

FINGARETTE: The idea that I would present something of a clean-up spot presentation, something of a bringing together or summary of the things that were said and done here at the conference is an interesting one because, it seems to me, on its face it's impossible in any really deep sense. The thought that it is impossible strikes me in several ways; first of all, there's been so much material, and one could look at it from so many angles and must look at it from so many angles. It's so provocative. That's one reason why it's impossible to do anything in the way of a conclusion. Another one is that we've been going at this for two and a half days steadily, including a long and wonderful banquet last night. And so I found that this morning I woke up in a state of altered consciousness from what I'm used to. And the combination of knowing that the task is impossible and that I am also in an altered state of consciousness assures me that you will excuse me for the failing.

There's a Zen Buddhist story that's very commonly told. Some of you who follow that sort of thing probably heard it. The Master, the Roshi, the Enlightened One says, "Before I started studying Zen, I thought that mountains were mountains and forests were forests. Then I began to study Zen and went deeply into meditation and so
on, and then I saw that mountains are not mountains and forests are not forests. But then, at last, I reached Enlightenment, and then I saw that mountains are mountains and forests are forests."

Well, I think we can look at this conference somewhat in this perspective. We started out with the sense that mountains are mountains and forests are forests; and that alcohol disinhibits or that it doesn’t. There is a picture here, and it’s a very important picture which defines initially the scope of the tiling: The idea that alcohol has some kind of chemical effect, probably on the brain, probably on some specific portion of the brain, and this part of the brain is the part that inhibits us, keeps down the more primitive, unruly, unsocial impulses and inclinations. And alcohol affects this part of the brain, depresses it, anesthetizes it, decreases its power, and so, of course, the unsocial, the unusual, the repressed impulses come forward; and, being the kind of creatures that we are, these are often troublesome, trouble-causing, destructive, or at least inappropriately licentious.

That picture or something like it is out there in the world, and one of the very influential portraits of it was finally brought together in an explicit way, in the classic MacAndrew and Edgerton work. That picture has to be kept in mind here. And when we think about it, and see what an important picture it has been in the social life of our society, our culture, then it becomes strikingly interesting to see some of the reports that are coming in from psychological experimentation, from anthropology, from sociological studies. We start with the anthropological materials, surveys and analyses showing that in many cultures the people react differently to drinking. Here we have, then, the first, explicit, systematic development of the disinhibition picture, in Drunken Comportment and the first major, systematic attack on it. That sets the stage.

Then come the psychological experiments, in which it turns out that the question whether the chemical, ethanol, is present in the body has much less influence on whether the subject chose some kind of aggressive response or increased sexual interest than does the subject’s belief as to whether he has received alcohol.

That kind of experimentation is very striking, especially against the background of the previous suspicion about the supposedly uniform chemical-behavioral effects of drinking alcohol. That establishes in a very clear way, though in a very limited context, that whatever the effect of the chemical, far more important from the standpoint of this aggressive and sexual behavior is the person’s belief. Then we say, "Well, isn’t that a very limited context? After all, it’s only these few people; they’re especially selected; they only are drinking at moderate levels, if they’re drinking anything.
because it's in the laboratory; and, after all, the aggression is mild; or it's just a report of increased sexual interest." And one sees that, crucial as it is in refuting some completely universal theory about the uniform chemical effects of alcohol, still it's limited as far as the total practical impact.

But then we look back again to the anthropological study, and that begins to fill out now. We see again and again that people in various cultures indeed do get drunk but they don't engage in aggressive behavior, or they don't seem to violate the norms, or the norms are different from ours. The whole original picture of the disinhibited drunk begins to lose its force. And if we worry about the question whether, perhaps, in these other cultures there are also factors of genetics, so that the differences are due to the fact that these are different breeding populations, then we turn to anthropological and sociological studies of one kind or another that have been reported here. And we see that the very same individual behaves differently with the same amount of ethanol in the body; and that so much of it depends upon the setting in which the individual drinks, or the set of the individual, or the experience of the individual. And this weakens our suspicion of the anthropological evidence against disinhibition — the concern that maybe it has some crucial genetic component.

What's happening then, as I see it, is that as we put together the different facets, the anthropological, sociological, and the psychological, the alcohol as a chemical disinhibitor picture seems less and less plausible. Then we turn to the physiological and pharmacological research because, after all, that was where the original hard information supposedly came from: The scientists were telling us, so we thought that it acts on certain portions of the brain as a disinhibitor of certain kinds of behavior. But now we discover that, far from this picture having been based on hard scientific evidence, it's very difficult even now, with focused attention on the problem, to produce pharmacological, physiological, neurological evidence that anything of the kind is happening. The most that can be shown so far is that certain significant effects occur in the body as a result of ethanol, but these significant effects are highly generalized or highly unspecific with regard to the things we're talking about.

Yes, there can be connections made between the physiological/pharmacological information, and certain kinds of reactions to ethanol. The links can be shown where it's a matter of impaired motor performance, impaired perception, impaired cognition. But what we begin to see is that the disinhibition picture doesn't have so much to do with the impaired execution of a specific performance.
but rather with the selection of what to perform — the selection of intentions, the shaping and forming of intentional conduct, which intentions I choose. And that's a very different matter from whether, having adopted an intention, in trying to execute that intention, I fail in terms of the motor performance, perception and cognition. So that the very general physiological/pharmacological picture, insofar as it tells us anything about behavior, tells us about the wrong kinds of behavior as far as the disinhibition picture is concerned.

Now we find that the scientific basis we supposed was there in physiology is gone; the behavioral descriptions and the psychology are gone or losing their hold, and we begin to wonder: How did people ever get this idea of chemical disinhibition, if, indeed, as seems so obvious when you reflect on it, individuals react differently to alcohol depending on prior psychological set, the social setting of the drinking, the past drinking experiences of the drinker, and the cultural traditions and expectations. Now we have to wonder about how the picture of alcohol as automatic chemical disinhibitor ever made sense to so many of us. But it did — and now this needs explaining.

So we turn to the historical and historical/sociological kinds of explanations. The historical studies give us some sense of changes in attitudes to the reactions that we have to alcohol, and how radically those attitudes have changed. Again the picture of alcohol as disinhibiting becomes localized to a particular time and place; and we see that history tends to support anthropology and sociology here. People didn't always react this way; they didn't picture their reaction this way; no one thought of this kind of reaction.

Then we turn to sociological studies to try still to account for why people should hold these beliefs, and we have interesting and provocative theories about the role that the disinhibition hypothesis can have in maintaining systems of power and of domination, in allowing people to excuse themselves, to account for their failures in life. Thus, in a variety of sociological and psychological ways, we can see important sources of support for the disinhibition idea.

By this point, it seems to me, we're in a position where the mountains and the forests are still with us, but now we think it's a picture that's false. The disinhibition hypothesis, which we start out with, is a picture that still governs as far as I've gone. It's still there, but now we have cumulating evidence from all these dimensions that somehow it's a very false picture. But to think that there's something very wrong with the picture, or false about it, is not yet to be free of it. Wittgenstein said, "a picture holds us captive." And here we are still captive to it even though we're now opposed to it,
perhaps, or think that there's much less truth in it than we thought originally.

Yet, as we examine still more closely the links between the evidence, the data that have been presented, the reports, the theories, and the picture, we begin to find that the picture itself dissolves before our eyes as we ask, "Well, now, what was the view that we had then — what is disinhibition?" And we begin to try to specify it instead of accepting this pseudotechnical term. We find that sometimes the facts have to do with whether a person behaved aggressively. But, of course, aggressive behavior per se is not necessarily disinhibition. Some people perhaps value aggressive behavior, and it may be that what looks norm-violating or disinhibited to one, may be quite norm-conforming to another, very positive and very important. We find there are problems with categorizing these kinds of behaviors as positive or negative; as disinhibited or not. The norm-status of aggression varies widely, even among sub-cultures; and the specific form of aggression is important here. We look at the experiments which deal with sexuality; and, again, the question is whether this has to do with a specific kind of conduct, or whether it has to do with disinhibition — does disinhibition really mean sexuality or increased sexuality? There is a sense that, no, that isn't quite it; that's too narrow. Then we go back again to the anthropological evidence, and we see, well, there are kinds of deviations from social norms which do not necessarily involve sex or aggression. It's been brought out, for example, that it could involve deviations from norms having to do with one's behavior in regard to social relationships of one kind or another — the proper comportment in regard to others in other respects than sex or aggression.

The question then arises in regard to the anthropological evidence: Are we getting an adequately specific account of what this means to the people when they act in what we call a "drunken form"? In terms of our values, they may engage in disinhibited behavior; but do they see it as disinhibited? Do they see it as disinhibited in the sense that it's sexually more licentious or freer, or do they see it as disinhibited in the sense that they have lost control? We need specific anthropological evidence on this. Does any of the psychological evidence bear on disinhibition as "losing control" — as distinguished from being more aggressive, which is simply a specific kind of behavior that's intensified, and is not necessarily a "loss of control" at all? Where does disinhibition lie on this range between losing control, of being less responsible, being excused, and simply being more aggressive, or acting and looking around in a peculiar way and laughing and giving out war cries and so on?
The notion of disinhibition, then, begins to dissolve. The evidence doesn't seem to bear on one thing so centrally, in a focused way, as the picture represented it to us. We see now that the evidence bears on a variety of different questions about quite distinct forms of behavior, and we come to the point, I think, where we sense that mountains are no longer mountains and forests are no longer forests, because the basic concepts in terms of which we drew the picture have now lost their hold over us. We wonder at a certain stage: Where are we? What are we talking about? Is there anything — is there any actual specific topic here, or should we merely talk about the specific effects of alcohol on people and generalize it that way rather than in terms of the disinhibition hypothesis?

Well, what can we then do, in trying to understand, in trying desperately to get back to the picture, to keep that picture before us and ask: What was it that bothered us, that we were arguing pro and con about? Again, I think we turn back to the sociological and historical analyses to see what were the kinds of ideas and ideologies that were in the background of this notion that alcohol disinhibits. Is it a Calvinist tradition that's very important here? Do we have an idea of a conscience and then of a will which is unruly? Do we have some political notion that governments restrain, in a Hobbesian way, naturally unruly and bestial human beings, and civilize them? The historical and sociological analyses, then, perform this other function of giving us another way of focusing on what disinhibition meant to people rather than trying to causally explain how people came to have this idea. But, still, the problem is too complex. To redraw the picture, to find what it was that captured us, now becomes so much more complex as we see the complex variety of the historical and sociological roots.

Why should we worry about a picture that's dissolved? Why shouldn't we just set about trying to find out what the specific ways are in which alcohol affects people? Ethanol, the chemical — how does it affect us and how doesn't it? Well, I think that's a most eminently worthwhile project, but also it can be treacherous, because there must have been reasons why we had that picture, why it so dominated — and still largely does dominate — our views on alcohol, and why we thought that it was worth studying. For one thing, the picture dominates and inspires some of our most important and expensive social institutions: important areas in both commercial and civil law, the whole set of institutions, private and governmental, devoted to treatment of alcohol problems. Furthermore, the picture acts as a kind of thought-stopper in the sense that if once we see alcohol, we don't look further. Often, to see
alcohol was present in a trouble situation is to think that we know what the source of the trouble was, and so we don't analyze the various other components of the situation, which a number of people here have been stressing need to be analyzed. Difficulties at work, domestic problems, traffic injuries, health problems, crime — we think we understand the problems as soon as we see alcohol in the picture: "alcohol disinhibits." Further analysis of the problem stops. Then this picture becomes a driving force in terms of resources used, in terms of capturing public attention and money; it's a thought stopper and a public conscience easer. We feel we are taking care of the problems now as best we can. Perhaps if we could free ourselves of this picture that holds us captive, we could see better into these problems and maybe even do better in handling some of them.

So, I do think that it is really very important to get finally to that stage where we can in a more sophisticated way reconstitute the picture and understand its role. One way of looking at this, I think, is to view it as the attempt to get free of an old paradigm, while still understanding its social and political force, and at the same time to try to construct new paradigms. And we're doing this, I think, in this kind of conference — all at the same time, which complicates things enormously. There are vague suggestions of new paradigms; in the meantime we're struggling to try to get free of, and get to understand the role of the old paradigm in our life. That is a very complicated task; and everyone here, of course, is aware of this. There are so many interweavings of these various threads. Somebody said this morning to me, "You are in a very good spot as final speaker because you have the power to put things together here the way you want." That is certainly true for the moment. And I'm sure I have failed to put some things into the kind of focus that some of you would want them put into. I have certainly omitted vast amounts of material. I know that this is just one way of trying to speak about what has been going on. I have no illusions about its being just the way anyone else would put it. So, I did have the power to say this here and now, but it is just the power to say something here and now; and that isn't very much power. The real power here belongs to the further scientific work and the studies that come forward from this group, and from other people who are working in the area; so. I have no fears about my own having muddied the waters too much.

Thank you.
MARSHALL: Well, I'd like first to congratulate you on what I thought was a rather masterful summary, and perhaps hitch another car to the train that you sent chugging down the track. During our break this morning, I was trying to think in terms of how we might pull things together. I came up with a number of scribbles which I thought I would try to project at least verbally if not visually in front of you.

The title of this conference was "Alcohol and Disinhibition: The Nature and Meaning of the Link." And it seems to me now that we're at this stage in the conference we ought to change the subtitle to "The Natures and Meanings of the Links," or something to that effect. It seems to me that we're talking about a whole lot of different things. But we still come down to the issue of alcohol as drug, on the one hand, and a certain kind of behavior or a certain set of behaviors which we've chosen to label as "disinhibition," even though we haven't always agreed on exactly what that is, at the other end. And, somehow, we're trying to understand how we get from ingestion of the drug to these behaviors.

It seems to me, then, we start with a problem right at the beginning. We start out with the drug ethanol, and not only do we have the problems to which Herb just pointed, but we have to take account of a whole host of things concerning the drug before we even talk about the link with behavior. What kind of beverage are we drinking? Several people have pointed out the possibility of congeners in the beverage also having an influence on behavior. What possible influence might the metabolic by-products of ethanol, rather than ethanol itself, have on our behavior? This remains a fuzzy area; it's somewhat unclear. The amount people drink, the rapidity of intake, the presence or absence of tolerance, all affect that human animal that we're trying to look at behaving in the environment.

We've also got the problem that we're all aware of possible individual biochemical or metabolic differences; that is, that just from person to person, there may be different ways in which we process any drug, ethanol included. We're aware there may be sex differences in the way people react to alcohol, and possibly racial or ethnic differences. All those are possible at this point. We don't know.
So, to assume that we've got humans and that that's a uniform category or single thing which then automatically leads to some changed behaviors, that already is problematic right at the beginning when we introduce the drug. But to get to the behaviors, it seems to me we focused on a series of filters or selective processes between the drug and the behavior. That's where all this scribbling is.

The first filter, it seems to me, that we come up against after any human being has ingested the drug is that of the cultural context in which that individual is operating, or the filter of possible cultural meanings at a particular point in history, since we know that those meanings shift through time, sometimes rather quickly. And this would include all sorts of things like set, setting, context, time and circumstance, the legal system, the laws, values, moral codes, and what have you. Now, in some cultural systems, particularly small social systems such as anthropologists are wont to have studied — in the past, at least — the consensus around a certain set of meanings is usually consistent from person to person. But, as we've seen in this conference, in pluralistic societies like our own, there may be very different sets of cultural meanings operating, so that the filter may not even be the same when we go from the human to this first selective process.

Once we get by that hurdle, then it seems to me we get to the level of individual personality, and — at least the way I'm using it — that incorporates a whole lot of things, both psychological and sociological: namely, idiosyncratic personality characteristics, particular problems or personal experiences that an individual might have had that influence a person's attitude toward anything, including alcohol. Child-rearing, the person's socioeconomic position, age, sex, religion, and a host of other things all enter in here. That's another filter, another selection process affecting what happens after the drug goes into the body — if it even goes into the body before the behavior comes out.

And then we've got this person, who's already been constrained by a set of cultural meanings and further constrained by his or her own set of characteristics and genetic make up and soon, operating generally in some sort of environment in which there are significant other persons present — and this gets us back into the matter of context and the context involving other human beings who also bring their personal problems, social positions, age, sex, religion, and everything else which influences and further constrains the behaving individual. We end up, then, with a person ingesting a drug and all these different sets of what I'm calling filters operating before we even get to the behavioral outcome.
Now, we've been talking about disinhibition, and yet Herb pointed out the possibility, while not losing sight of the picture that's dissolved or dissolving, of just talking about alcohol and behavior. I happen to like that idea better because disinhibition is not one thing; we've already established that; it may or may not be present, we know that; it's merely one subset of the total possible range of behaviors that comes out at the other end and which may or may not be what we would label as "drunken." I mean, a person may ingest a lot of alcohol and behave in a very sober manner; or a person may act drunk and suddenly sober up, as we've noticed.

By way of summing this up, then, it seems to me that we've got all these different levels of analyses that we have to take account of before we can adequately deal with the drug going into the body and the behaviors that come out of the acting organism at the other end. And it clearly points out to me the importance of something which has become very trite in meetings of this sort: Cross-disciplinary research. We need to be doing more of what we're doing here: Talking to each other. And, by the way, I think we've really talked "with" each other. I think there has been a lot of communication here. I've certainly learned a lot about other fields about which I've really felt ignorant before.

ROOM: On that last point — I've given up introducing people in terms of their discipline here, since they have consistently taken the position they're not really that.

MORGAN: I'd like to put in a plug for at least attempting to find the forest and the mountains; that is, not throwing the baby out with the bath water. I was reminded of a couple of years ago, after the labelling theory had been around for a while and people had accepted trying to find out different ways to account for deviancy. It became very popular to debunk the whole term, to throw deviancy away — deviancy only applied to certain groups in the population, and we should be looking at other groups, and that the whole term "deviancy" really should be thrown away.

Well, I didn't like that, even though it appealed to me on some level. I didn't accept it, because deviancy, like disinhibition, is also a social phenomenon, and as a social phenomenon, it holds a lot of importance. I think we have a responsibility, as Professor Fingarette has so eloquently stated, to find out why and how people carry these beliefs and how these beliefs impinge upon and help construct the social relations which result from them.

And so, I think it's too bad. I was hoping that you would tell us that we had reached enlightenment and that we had found the forests and the mountains; but the reality is that we haven't. So it's
important not to give up the voyage just yet, to perhaps spend a little more time and a little more energy in examining the social phenomenon that we’ve been discussing for the last few days.

LINTON: There’s a phenomenon that’s puzzled me over the years about social scientists studying drug use of any kind. There is something that continually gets forgotten, that people get “high” or “down” or something. There might be a way to think about that and in a broader form than disinhibition, for certain.

But I’d be willing to accept the proposition that if I’m snorting cocaine, this alters my relations with the world in some way or another; and it’s different from if I were smoking grass or drinking or whatever. Now, the kind of meaning I might attach to that sort of experience is quite another thing. I may like it, not like it, whatever. But I think to pretend that drugs don’t differ or that drugs don’t alter your relations with yourself and with the world is gross oversight. We need to recognize and describe how a person’s states are altered by the ingestion of certain kinds of drugs. It seems to me plausible that people might become comfortable with an altered relationship, come to like it or not like it, find it more or less comfortable in different kinds of settings.

Some of this you can see in discussions with drug users who might be described as connoisseurs, who take drugs in a very systematic and deliberate manner. They are able to cantilever certain kinds of effects: “I will take this. Now I’ve gone too far. I’ll have to take this to counteract that because I’m a little bit bent out of shape here.” They deliberately play a kind of balancing game as though they had a tremendous cabinet full of different kinds of drugs and were toying with them. I think there’s something instructive in looking at people who are willing to do that, in trying to see not only whatever terrible things might happen, but the kinds of things that the people find beneficial, benign, a good high, a comfortable one, or that sort of thing.

MARLATT: One of the things that I found most fascinating in this conference is the relationship of our topic to our perceptions of internal control mechanisms that have evolved historically over the last couple of hundred years, the idea that there is some sort of control system that keeps another part of us under control, whether it’s the cortex controlling the lower brain, or the left hemisphere dominating the right cerebral hemisphere; whether it’s the superego controlling the id, etc., etc. It’s a very Western way of conceptualizing control.

I was very happy to hear Professor Fingarette start off his very stimulating review with a Zen parable because I think that studies of other cultures — and particularly I’m thinking of Buddhism and
so forth — would show that they have a very different conceptualization of control — from their perspective it's all really a joke; we don't really have it anyway. But in this society, we feel as though we do, and we've also learned that there are certain ways that we can get out from under it and be able to be a little freer in some way, or at least perceive ourselves to be freer, and alcohol has become a really ubiquitous elixir for doing that. You don't really need the ethanol itself, just the whole belief system that alcohol does produce those effects, and that has a large determining effect on our behavior. So, I'd like to ask Professor Fingarette if he would be able to tell us what the Roshi would say about this whole issue of disinhibition?

FINGARETTE: Well, I would agree with the spirit of your remark. The conceptions of human existence, and, therefore, of the human person are very different in Buddhism and in the various lines of Indian thought, and Confucian thought; and it's very difficult for me to see how you would translate the disinhibition idea into some of these. I don't think it translates; if you were going to have some analogous theory about alcohol's deleterious effects, it would be very different from disinhibition.

ROOM: We have about twenty minutes, and so people should keep their comments short. I would like to tilt the discussion slightly toward the future in terms of what people see this implying for the future, both at the level of policy and research.

ROIZEN: There seems to be a kind of reaction and protector of the old picture emerging after Herb's talk, some of the comments telling us what we need to know in order to really know something from the old picture; other comments saying that what we really need to know about that old picture is whether it's true or not; others saying that we need to readdress the issues of the truth and relative contributions of different territories to that picture, and so on.

I'm worried about these attempts to recapture the picture that Herb has dissolved for us, and I don't want it to come back. I think it makes a lot better photography to be concerned with other pictures, and it would be too bad if as a result of this experience we simply turn back to the very same materials and subjects and try to draw our pictures a little better this time — to use a little better film and to use all these critiques as a means of sharpening our ignorance. I think the area needs a much more subtle and high-level analysis from here on in.

MACANDREW: Herb mentioned that a paradigm is somehow hopefully aborning, and I'd like to address that just for a moment. I rather think that what we are seeing is the beginning of the demise of an illusion of some consequence. If this is so, unless at the same
time we (both individually and collectively) bring an end to the sorts of conditions whose maintenance requires illusions, there may be hell to pay.

**LEVINE:** I've always been fond of that particular Zen parable, and I have my own version of the process of the last few days. I came here thinking I understood what the relationship was between alcohol and disinhibition, which is really the relationship between alcohol and inhibition or alcohol and individual inhibition — this is really what we've mainly been talking about. I understood individual inhibition, in the sense that we have been discussing it, to be a theory of social order, and essential to our contemporary understanding of how social order is possible. To some extent it has been the answer given to the question "How is social order possible?" — the Hobbesian question — for the last 200 years or so. A number of different contemporary views and answers to the question of how social order is possible still fundamentally come up with the inhibition model as an answer. A different understanding and different answer to that question is not fully developed, not yet aborn.

Over the course of the last few days, I began to doubt whether that was in fact so and to wonder what I thought. But now at the end I discover that I still think that inhibition is a theory of social order and that alcohol is seen as dissolving that social order, or making more chaos, and sometimes that is labelled good, and sometimes that is labelled bad. So, the mountain is the mountain again, and the valley is the valley.

I always thought of the Zen parable as teaching us to understand the fragility of the image, of the illusion, and to understand, once you've been through that transformation from believing to not believing to understanding again, that there is a sense of reality as a construction: it is a fabrication, and it has a certain fragility to it. And I think that that's the sense in which we have come further.

So I'm left with the question of what would be a different theory of social order, what would that look like, and what would be, therefore, the relationship to alcohol in that different view of social order. What I come up with is understanding social order as being produced, as something which people create. Thus drunken comportment is something which people create, elicit, draw out, require and demand. In this view, the various things that we fit under the category of disinhibited are, in fact, not breakdowns of social order, but rather the production of a different kind of social order. And the answer to Robin's question of where do we go from here is to follow out that set of questions and that set of problems.

**MOORE:** As I've been listening to this, I sympathize enormously
with the great burden that social scientists must carry in trying to construct universal truth. And it seems to me that what we're now doing is standing back in awe of that task, and worrying about our solemn role as keepers and producers of truth. I have a slight temptation to say, "Don't worry so much about your solemn role, and don't worry so much about this crushing burden to create the universal truth, because truth is really a guide to action, both for individuals and for the society." An interesting alternative question to ask, as affected as I have been by our conversations, is "How would I carry the particular set of ideas or changed views, the sense of enlightenment, back into action in a variety of roles?"

I'll describe a couple of roles. One, I'm a drinker. Is this new perspective going to shape my comportment with respect to drinking? Probably not. It seems to me I'm wedded to my particular habits, my particular ideas about it, etc. Second, I'm a purveyor of ideas about what drunken comportment is like. I explain it to my children; I explain it to my colleagues; I act in response to their comportment when I see it. Is this likely to change my particular views about what constitutes normative drinking as opposed to non-normative drinking, wherever they come from? Answer: No, not substantially.

Now, the next question: I'm in the business of recommending to policymakers opportunities that exist in the world for shaping the character of the alcohol problem — where there is some objective reality and some distortion associated with our conceptions of it. Does this importantly shape my activity in that area? The answer is yes, quite importantly; and, in particular, what I've now understood is that it is likely that the conduct that we observe associated with drinking is importantly affected by individually- and collectively-held views of what constitutes appropriate drinking conduct as well as by the drinking itself. Therefore, I am curious about the possibilities of altering that set of views in directions that would mitigate the current damage that is associated with alcohol — again, understanding that the damage has both objective and subjective references. And, having said that, you also all quickly persuaded me that we have really remarkably imperfect and diverse conceptions of what constitutes drunken comportment and relatively little apparatus for homogenizing these. Even if we were to have apparatus for homogenizing them, we would all feel guilty about blotting out the cultural diversity and insisting on the particular view that was "most beneficial" to society, and that would restrain us. So, while I retain the idea that maybe this is an avenue for approaching the problem, I'm pessimistic about its potential efficacy and anxious about using conceptions of "alcohol
as a tool of domination," even if they are well-intentioned and designed, for example, to change the quantity of assaults that emerge from any given pattern of drinking practices in the general population.

It seems to me that there's some clarity that comes to your thought when the task ceases to be: What can I say that is unambiguously and universally true about concepts which are essentially hard to pin down, and one turns to the question of: What do I currently believe to be true about the world, and how does that shape my action? One can dabble at the possibilities of believing something else, just to see whether it would matter. But don't be overwhelmed by the conviction that truth rather than belief has to be a guide to action. That's the liberation of the policy analyst — and he carries, then, the burden of frequently being wrong.

DUSTER: I want to respond to the request that was made that we look a bit toward the future with respect to research agendas. I wanted to reiterate and say rather clearly now, that when Mr. Levinson was preparing his summary of studies, he said that there have been hundreds and hundreds of studies of aggression and youth, the South, and ethnic groups. So, I'm not suggesting that we stop studying youth, ethnic groups, the South, but that when one examines the hundreds of studies on the issue of aggression, we tend actually to have looked empirically at those groups which have less access to power. It would make sense in the future to even up the score, that is, to do a balancing act, where alcohol research consciously invoked the notion of a study of power, with alcohol as a vehicle for the illumination of power and power relationships. On the narcotics side, the studies which are done are usually of heroin use on the streets of New York, and very rarely do we study the pharmaceutical industry in New York. Yet the allocation of resources, the distribution of drugs throughout the society is clearly, on balance, in the direction of the New York pharmaceutical dispensation. I think the issue of alcohol research is no less vivid: scores of studies of ethnic variation but very little on the use of alcohol — again, as this blue dye — at the top of the structure as well as at the base, so that we can illuminate the power relationships.
General Discussion References


Bunzel, R. The role of alcoholism in two Central American cultures. Psychiatry, 3:361-387, 1940.


De Foe, J.R., and Breed, W. *Drinking on television: A comparison of alcohol use to
the use of coffee, tea, soft drinks, water and cigarettes*. *The Bottom Line*, 2:28-
Dove, M. "Pain and Sacrifice in Kantu Drinking: A Mechanism of Socio-Economic
Integration in a Swidden Society." Presented at the Alcohol and Drug Study
Group Section, American Anthropological Association Annual Meetings,
Cincinnati, November 1979.
Fingarette, H. *The perils of Powell: In search of a factual foundation for the "disease
Fingarette, H. *The Meaning of Criminal Insanity*. Berkeley: University of
Foucault, M. *Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison*. Paris: Editions Gallimard,
1975.
Freidson, E. *Disability as social deviance*. In: Sussman, M.B., ed. *Sociology and
Freidson, E. *Professional Dominance: The Social Structure of Medical Care.
Chicago: Celdine, 1970.
Ghinger, C., and Grant, M. *Alcohol and the family in literature*. In: Oxford, J., and
Gordon, A.J. *Hispanic drinking after migration: The case of Dominicans*. *Medical
Grant, M. *Drinking and creativity: A review of the alcoholism literature*. *British
Gray, J.A. *The behavioral inhibition system: A possible substrate for anxiety*. In:
Feldman, M.P., and Broadhurst, A., eds. *Theoretical and Experimental Bases of
Greenberg, B.S. et al. *Trends in the Use of Alcohol and Other Substances on
Television*. East Lansing: Michigan State University, Department of
Gusfield, J. *The Culture of Public Problems*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1980.
Harrison, B. *Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance Question in England 1815-
Hetherington, E.M. and Wray, N.P. *Aggression, need for social approval, and
humor preferences*. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 68:685-689,
1964.
Hindus, M. *Prison and Plantation: Crime, Justice and Authority in Massachusetts
and South Carolina, 1767-1878*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Hinson, R., and Siegel, S. *The contribution of Pavlovian conditioning to ethanol


