The central problem in educational improvement at the state and local level is the tension between school-level autonomy and systemwide uniformity; educational change is limited by three special conditions: (1) inertial autonomy, (2) essential uniformity of public schools, and (3) the fact that effective schools have characteristics that cannot be mandated. Concern for higher educational quality produces concern for standards. The risks involved in setting standards include inhibiting the most effective schools while ineffective schools continue to fail. Nine commandments presented as guidance for policymakers working to achieve stronger educational outcomes without crippling effective schools are: (1) recognize the school as the key organizational unit in public education; (2) establish standards emphasizing broad goals and desired outcomes; (3) encourage school differences except for core standards; (4) develop school leadership with strong principals, and remove weak ones; (5) make selection and deployment of staff a school-level responsibility; (6) treat teachers as individuals who must function collegially; (7) give a good deal of budgetary authority to individual schools; (8) allow flexibility in teaching, learning, and internal organization at each school; and (9) regard school improvement as a dynamic and cyclical process taking place over a long period. (MD)
Toward Strategic Independence:
Policy Considerations for Enhancing School Effectiveness

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The central problem faced by policymakers attempting to derive implications of the "effective schools" research and turn them into improved educational practice at the state or local level is the tension between school-level autonomy and system-wide uniformity.

Putting this as plainly as possible (and thereby risking oversimplification), creating the organizational dynamics and institutional character that are most conspicuously associated with school effectiveness would seem to argue for putting the people who staff the school in charge of it, i.e., empowering them to make a great many important decisions about what will happen within the school and how it will happen.

Yet the very sense of discontent with current educational standards and practices that prompts the policymaker to want to bolster school effectiveness throughout his community or state also impels him to centralize key decisions, to prescribe uniform standards for students and teachers, to give greater specificity and homogeneity to the curriculum, and to demand greater accountability from every school with respect to its success in adhering to those uniform standards and unvarying curriculum.

This is no small conflict, and it is not adequately mediated by the realization that similar tensions can be found in practically every complex organization. Is more to be gained by building morale, cohesiveness and espirit d'corps within units by giving them greater autonomy, authority and discretion, or by centralizing, standardizing, requiring and mandating?

The answer, as honest as it is unhelpful, is "It all depends" or, even more frustrating, simply "Yes." Organizations strike different balances, and not infrequently change them. Large, diversified private corporations, for example, are apt to treat their divisions and subsidiaries as "profit centers" and to leave them pretty much alone to run themselves so long as the "bottom line" remains satisfactory to corporate headquarters. The army, on the other
hand, generally makes everyone wear the same uniforms and eat essentially the same food and organize their days much the same in installations and posts throughout the world; whatever variation may be permitted is just that, "permitted," or approved at headquarters.

Yet searching out illuminating analogies in other domains is a frustrating quest for today's education policymakers, particularly if the other organizations are essentially static, relatively content with their own functioning, their results and their structures. For education policymakers seek wide-ranging and rapid improvements and are therefore more apt to ask what happens when "headquarters"—be it the Pentagon, a corporate board of directors meeting in a modernistic skyscraper on Park Avenue, or the trustees of a multi-campus state college system—finds itself manifestly discontented with the performance of the enterprise as a whole and desirous of making significant changes. The specific steps taken may vary considerably, from simple written edicts to elaborate inter-active planning sessions in which division chiefs are steeped in the new norms and changed expectations that headquarters has developed. But there can be no doubt that system-wide changes are virtually always initiated by headquarters or that it is the new norms, standards and expectations set by headquarters that will induce altered behavior at the branch or divisional level.

But it is also the case that "headquarters" can dictate major changes in overall strategy and can hold all units to new standards of performance without necessarily intruding itself into the inner workings of each branch. When Sears-Roebuck decides to redirect its marketing strategy to appeal to a more "upscale" market, there are system-wide implications for what will be sold, how items will be priced and how they will be advertised, but it is not
necessary for corporate officers in Chicago to tell branches in Nashville or San Diego what kind of tile to put on the floors, which employees should work what shifts, or how to arrange the luggage display. It is possible, in other words, to have system-wide changes in complex organizations without eliminating all vestiges of unit autonomy, and sometimes the most fruitful changes are those that foster increased unit-level responsibility and confer the requisite authority on unit managers.

In schools, however, we have three special (though not unique) conditions.

First, long before the recent spate of "effective schools" research, we had the results of much inquiry into the organizational functioning of schools and school systems that revealed them to be "loosely coupled" enterprises, such that movement at one point in the system did not rapidly or reliably lead to movement elsewhere. The metaphor is apt. Visualize a railroad train in which the cars are connected by elastic bands rather than rigid metal fittings. The engineer might accelerate rapidly, but it would be sometime (if ever) before the rear cars started to move faster. Similarly, teachers tend to be relatively autonomous within their classrooms; schools within their systems; and local school systems within their states. This may yield good or bad practices. Characteristically, it yields plenty of both. But what it especially yields is difficulty for those who might want to make major changes in school or classroom practice. Let us term this condition "inertial autonomy."

Second, public school systems are obliged to be even-handed and homogeneous in many respects. A youngster whose family moves from one district to another is expected to be able to transfer from the third grade of
School A into the third grade of School B without undue difficulty. That means the third grades in both schools must teach approximately the same subjects at roughly the same level of sophistication, which in turn means that their first and second grades must do likewise, and so must their fourth and fifth. Moreover, equity and politics both dictate that resource levels must be approximately the same, certainly within a local school system and often throughout an entire state. It is simply not possible to have third grade classes of fifteen pupils in School A and of 35 students in School B, save in the most extraordinary (and usually temporary) circumstances, any more than it is possible for School A to serve its children lobster in the cafeteria while School B dishes up macaroni. We can call this "essential uniformity."

Third, the "effective schools" research adduces some key attributes of institutional effectiveness that are qualitatively different from those one is apt to find in productive widget factories, smoothly functioning naval units or well-run highway departments. These go beyond matters of efficiency, organization and morale into the domain of what Gerald Grant and others have termed a "shared moral order." Cohen's restatement of this point is excellent:

The norms and values which characterize the school community, and which unite individual members of the organization into a more cohesive identity, pertain both to the academic function of the school, as well as to the nature of the day-to-day interactions and social relations among staff and students. However, community in schools is dependent upon more than shared instrumental goals. It requires the creation of a moral order, which entails respect for authority, genuine and pervasive caring about individuals, respect for their feelings and attitudes, mutual trust, and the consistent enforcement of norms which define and delimit acceptable behavior. The importance of a shared moral order should not be underestimated, for it can be traced to several fundamental properties of schools: the schools cannot rely simply on coercive power to bring about order. Rather,
schools are normative organizations, which must rely on the internalization of goals, the legitimate use of authority, and the manipulation of symbols, as means of controlling and directing the behavior of participants...

The point is subtle but powerful. Effective schools are more akin to secular counterparts of religious communities, than they are like army brigades, bank branches or factory units. They share a belief structure, a value system, a consensual rather than hierarchical governance system, an enormous amount of psychic and emotional "investment" by participants, and a set of common goals and convictions that blur the boundaries between the private and organizational lives of their participants. Schools may not be the only public sector enterprises with these characteristics, but the others are apt to be elite, idiosyncratic and perhaps transitory enterprises—the White House staff, NASA's Apollo team, the military's "special forces"—rather than numerous, permanent, "ordinary" institutions.

To recapitulate the three singular conditions: public education in the United States is normally characterized by inertial autonomy, such that it is very difficult to effect purposeful changes in it; it is obliged to manifest essential uniformity in fundamental aspects of its content and resource allocation; and yet the schools that appear most effective, i.e., those that best achieve the results that policymakers favor, are suffused with an intensity of commitment, character and shared values that cannot be mandated from outside.

Bluntly stated, the existence—but rarity—of such "effective schools" itself tends to confute the doctrine of essential uniformity, for it means that the schools in a given system or state are apt to be similar with respect to relatively superficial matters but dissimilar along dimensions that matter
more; yet the inertial autonomy of schools qua schools also means that efforts to make ineffective schools more closely resemble effective schools in the ways that matter most are certain to be very difficult and quite likely to meet with little success. Moreover, policymakers seeking greater uniformity must be terribly careful lest they "level downward" through well-intentioned efforts that wind up sapping the vitality of the most effective schools rather than invigorating the others.

Standards as a Two-Edged Sword

There can be no doubt that the American public wants higher educational standards to be set and achieved, or that there is widespread—and well-founded—dissatisfaction with the quality of schooling as a whole. This has been well-documented and loudly echoed, most recently by a series of state and national task forces, commissions and study groups. That "policymakers"—governors, legislators, school board members etc.—are themselves calling for higher quality education is itself evidence that the normal processes of the democracy have served to persuade elected officials and those accountable to them that the voters will be kinder to officials who show an interest in educational quality than to those who are oblivious or hostile.

One cannot meaningfully talk of quality without employing implicit or explicit standards, and most serious talk of educational quality today is keyed in the first instance to standards of cognitive achievement: school outcomes. We are well past the era when input standards alone—class size, per pupil expenditures, the number of years a child is required to attend school—were seen as satisfactory proxies for school performance. (The major
reason the public has jettisoned that assumption is that it did not turn out to be true! Hence prescribing actual cognitive achievement levels is one major form of contemporary educational standard-setting. This is most often seen in high school "proficiency" tests with specified passing scores, such that a youngster cannot receive a high school diploma from the public (and sometimes the private) schools of a given city or state until he can demonstrate acquisition of certain cognitive skills and knowledge. This is not, in truth, a new idea; earning a New York State "Regents" Diploma depended for decades on obtaining a passing score on the statewide "Regents" Examinations, and essentially the same practice is found in many other countries. At a lower level, it is to be found in "promotional gates" policies whereby a child does not enter sixth grade until he can show, usually on a test, that he has learned what he was supposed to by the end of fifth grade.

But minimum cognitive achievement levels for students are not the only kind of "standards" being used as indicators of educational quality. Several important instrumental processes in the schools are also being held to new standards. The most important of these are the required elements of the formal curriculum (how many "years" of math, history, science or foreign languages a youngster must take) and teacher qualifications: the levels of intellect, prior education and, sometimes, classroom skills achieved by prospective teachers before they are employed, retained, promoted or given tenure. Somewhat less widespread but still noteworthy are efforts to raise the level of intellectual challenge in school textbooks and to rearrange the school calendar or schedule so that more time will be spent on subjects and skills deemed "basic." All such instrumental measures presuppose that the
enforcement of higher standards with respect to key educational ingredients and processes will yield greater cognitive achievement by students, much as we suppose that the taste of a meal will be improved if better quality ingredients are used, if only well-trained cooks are allowed to prepare them, if the kitchen equipment is "state of the art," and if the recipes being followed can be shown by experience to result in tasty dishes. Still, it is the savor of the meal that ultimately matters, not the goings-on in the restaurant kitchen.

Though sometimes clumsily applied, the higher educational standards that policymakers are developing are nearly always well-intentioned and more often than not are imaginatively conceived. Certainly, the impulse behind them is consonant with some major findings of the "effective schools" research, especially the discovery that effective schools manifest clear curricular objectives, consistent (and high) expectations for student achievement, and systematic concentration of institutional time and energy on the teaching and learning of that which is deemed most important. By establishing and enforcing educational standards of various kinds, policymakers can focus the attention of all the schools within their domain on the skills and knowledge that they want students to acquire, thereby supplying maps and compasses to the destinations that they believe students should reach.

But there are risks associated with standard-setting, as well. We will not dwell here on the most obvious quasi-political risks, such as the backlash that occurs when significant numbers of students fail to attain the standards and are therefore held back from promotions or denied their diplomas, or the resource constraints that may bedevil standard setting, such as an actual shortage of qualified teachers in a given subject, field or geographic region.
Rather, we note two risks hinted at by the "effective schools" research itself.

Both have already been alluded to. The first is the risk that uniform standards will inhibit the schools that are already most effective. Those schools are typically "inner-directed," i.e., they have developed their own distinctive goals, norms and expectations, which can be inhibited by pressure to conform to externally-imposed standards, particularly if those are administered with a heavy hand. Imagine a school that achieves excellent overall results with a laboriously-constructed curricular sequence that teaches nothing but "language arts" in first grade, introduces multiplication in fourth grade, and that teaches the diagramming of sentences in sixth grade, but that does not teach any geography until eighth grade because the ablest geography teacher in the school is neither happy nor effective with younger children. The school has no fully-licensed science teachers, but is fortunate enough to have a pair of veteran instructors who love science and have figured out how to teach it successfully as a team, which they do in intensive modules for all seventh graders. Now suppose that the school board mandates a new system-wide curricular sequence, with standardized tests given according to a rigid timetable, such that basic numeracy is tested at the end of first grade, multiplication at the end of third grade, elementary science at the end of fifth grade, North American geography at the end of sixth, but sentence diagramming not until eighth. Suppose, too, that in the interest of higher teaching quality, and in light of the special national emphasis being given to science, only persons with regular state certificates as science teachers will hereafter be allowed to teach it, and several young science teachers are engaged by the superintendent as "circuit-riders" to spend a day a week in schools lacking licensed full-time science teachers of their own.
The one certain result of these new "standards" for our hypothetical school is widespread confusion and long-lasting disruption of an instructional pattern that had been devised at the school level both to impart essential skills and knowledge in a sequence that those in the school had found workable and productive, and that made good use of the particular interests and strengths of a stable, well-integrated teaching staff. At least two years would be needed to reorganize the school according to the new, centrally-mandated curricular sequence (years in which some youngsters would find themselves needlessly studying something for the second time, while others may miss entire units). The collegial relationships and social structure of the school would be devastated, as individual teachers found themselves handling unfamiliar subjects and age-groups, as experience was wasted and enthusiasm ignored, as newcomers were intruded into the faculty and changes into the weekly schedule, and as able older teachers who had remained in the classroom chiefly because of their satisfaction with the work they were doing came instead to eye the pleasures of retirement or the rewards of selling real-estate. The result might well be that the school's students learned less, were not as well prepared for high school, and in time earned lower scores on college entrance examinations and the like. In short, our hypothetical effective school would likely be rendered markedly less effective as a result of the new "high" standards, norms and expectations that the School Board, with every good intention in the world, had imposed on it. The essential problem lies not with the standards themselves, but with the ensuing devastation of the school's distinctive character and hard-won institutional coherence.
Other schools in the same system would likely benefit from the same new standards, and that, presumably, is the outcome that the policymakers seek. A school that never got around to diagramming sentences, or that had dealt with its lack of qualified science instructions by forcing a cranky gym teacher to give a perfunctory course in health and hygiene, or that never really obliged students to demonstrate their mastery of multiplication—such a school would doubtless become more "effective" if it successfully implemented the new board policies and assimilated the standards on which they are based. But how likely is such success? Here we come to the second "risk" associated with mandatory standards, namely that they cannot take the place—nor in and of themselves cause the creation—of those subtle but necessary organizational attributes of commitment, character and shared values that must be held with near-religious fervor and embodied in the very ethos of the institution. If a school is weakly-led, if its teachers work in virtual isolation from each other, if there is fundamental disagreement within the faculty over educational goals and expectations, and if teachers and students tumble over each other while dashing for the door every day at 2:45 p.m., then the school is not going to become significantly more "effective" just because the school board tells it what should be taught at which grade levels. Even the threat of public humiliation caused by the disclosure of school-wide scores on standardized tests may not make more than the most marginal and fleeting difference.

Thus the second risk associated with establishment of higher standards and their imposition on ineffective schools is not that the schools will become even less effective but, rather, that policymakers will think that by mandating the new curriculum and testing program they have "solved the
problem," that they will cause the public to anticipate much better outcomes from historically ineffective schools, and that the failure of the schools to fulfill these heightened expectations will breed disillusionment and recriminations—while doing very little for the youngsters whose school years were given over to the feckless attempt.

The logicians are fond of a construction that describes one factor or condition as being "necessary but not sufficient" for the existence of another. This, certainly, is true of higher educational standards vis-à-vis improved educational outcomes. But given the difficulty of making any purposeful changes in the workings of schools—what we dubbed inertial autonomy—attempts to elevate cognitive achievement levels by standard-setting alone are likely to accomplish very little; are apt thereby to deligitimize the standards themselves; and may well weaken the organizational foundations of the schools that were already most successful as educational institutions. The truly vexing paradox is that in seeking to overcome inertial autonomy by "tightening the couplings" in school systems—by replacing those elastic bands that allowed some schools to lag behind with steel bars meant to get them all moving at the same speed, as the public seems to demand and as the doctrine of essential uniformity would seem to dictate—policymakers will derail the very cars that had gotten themselves best balanced on the tracks by allocating their loads and resources in proportion to their own capacities.

Searching for a Solution

Can we cut through this paradox? Does the "effective schools" research, in particular, offer guidance to policymakers who want to achieve stronger educational outcomes in their community or state without crippling the students in schools that are already most effective?
The answer, I believe, is a qualified affirmative. Considerable policy guidance can be adduced from the "effective schools" research, from general organizational theories and analyses, from a measure of direct observation and common sense, and from efforts to match the educational objectives being adumbrated by national commissions and task forces with the visible characteristics of schools themselves.

The "nine commandments" that follow are aimed at laymen who make policies for public schools at the state and local level. They are more general than concrete in the hope that they can thereby be applied or adapted according to specific circumstances, needs and resources. They do not strive for one-to-one correspondence with the specific findings of particular research studies, but are broadly faithful to what is rapidly emerging as "the conventional wisdom" about characteristics of effective schools insofar as that wisdom can be translated into policy formulations. That some of these will be quite difficult to put into practice is conceded at the outset, but an initial rejoinder is also in order: such problems arise not from any difficulty in conceptualizing or formulating the necessary policy changes, but from political resistance, organizational inertia and human frailty. To those who will hold up laws, regulations, contracts, court rulings, federal regulations, established custom or any of the other usual impediments as reasons why one or another of these commandments is not "realistic" or "practical," I reply that in a democracy nothing is impossible if a large enough number of people want it badly enough. The good news is that, while some of the following may be politically costly, none of them needs to be expensive in dollar terms—though several would be greatly enhanced by the infusion of some additional resources.
1. Recognize the school as the key organizational unit in public education, hence as the framework within which policymaking and policy implementation should be designed. This may seem self-evident, but in fact it is honored mostly in the breach. Policies are typically developed on a statewide or district-wide basis with little or no attention being paid to their wisdom or practicality at the institutional level. A new set of district-wide graduation requirements may make very little sense within a given high school; a statewide teacher certification policy may result in uneven and sometimes plainly damaging practices at the school level; the city-wide adoption of a new seventh grade history textbook, or a sixth grade testing program, may simply muck up a well-conceived curriculum in a number of schools; district personnel policies and budgetary practices are typically oblivious to the singular circumstances of individual schools; and dozens of state mandates, federal assistance programs and court orders make it harder rather than easier to develop effective schools. Similarly, system-wide policies aimed at altering educational practices at the classroom or teacher level may be no more prudent for the school as a whole than would be a doctor who started medicating a child without consulting his parents, or a police chief who assigned new routes to foot patrolmen without consulting the precinct captains.

That does not mean district-wide or statewide policies and programs are irrelevant, or that they should be oblivious to what goes on in individual classrooms or in the lives of teachers and students. Certain kinds of uniformity are needed across the components of any large organization. But the hundreds of pages in most state education codes and regulation manuals, the myriad policies adopted by local school boards (particularly in large
systems), and certainly the dozens of federal assistance programs and regulations, are generally framed as if schooling were one large undifferentiated enterprise with interchangeable parts that only for reasons of convenience is divided into smaller units called schools, rather than being constructed with full awareness that the school is a complex, rather delicately balanced organization with a style, culture, ethos, norms, customs, rituals, symbols and distinctive inner relationships of its own. Only by honoring that complexity and respecting the delicacy of the balance within the organization we call school can that enterprise provide good—we hope better—education to its particular group of youngsters who are taught by a particular cadre of teachers, who in turn are led by a singular, individual principal.

2. Establish rigorous educational standards for entire states and communities, by all means, but do so by emphasizing broad goals and desired outcomes, not by prescribing procedures, curricula, timetables or school organization charts. Treat the school as a business would treat a "profit center," accountable to headquarters for its "bottom line," not as a bureaucratic unit that must run itself exactly like all similar units. This means that state or system-wide standards for pupil achievement should be constructed around aggregate skill and knowledge levels that students will be expected to reach by certain "checkpoints" in the educational sequence. Policymakers must here tread a careful path, for too many checkpoints will deny good schools the flexibility that they need to make best use of personnel, time and their own views about learning sequences, whereas too few will give inadequate guidance to weak schools, will reduce the amount of information that the policymakers have about interim performance levels,
and may result in a lot of youngsters being abruptly told that they cannot be promoted or graduated without adequate early warnings. But such a path can be laid out. The school system and state might, for example, mandate three or four "checkpoints" in the course of 12 grades for all students, and then set optional interim points (with appropriate tests prepared) for schools that want to use them. Alternatively, a school might be able to gain exemption from some of the interim checkpoints if its overall performance on the key ones is satisfactory.

Educational standards prescribed for all students by state or local policymakers should, in addition, satisfy these three conditions: (a) they should emphasize central skills and essential knowledge, not peripheral topics, elective courses, or cognitive accomplishments of less than universal applicability, or subjects that might legitimately be taught in very different ways or sequences in individual schools (e.g., poetry); (b) the learning objectives to be tested should be specified as precisely as possible, and should be made available to schools well before (such as two years before) any "binding" tests based upon those objectives will be administered to students; (c) fulfillment of standards should be gauged through actual student cognitive performance, not by "process variables" such as time spent.

It is, of course, highly desirable that teachers and principals take part in the development of the learning objectives that will constitute the "standards," and in the design of the entire "accountability" process. They must, of course, also be furnished with the necessary training to understand it. Both research and common sense show that school performance is apt to be strongest if the people running the school are "invested" in the effort, are able to see its logical relationships to what they do in their school, and can
integrate it with their own teaching and learning objectives and tailor their curricula and pedagogy accordingly, rather than resisting the whole endeavor as something inappropriate and ill-conceived that was imposed on them by forces beyond their control.

After fixing the educational destination and the approximate timetable for reaching it, policymakers should step back and allow teams to obtain (or make) their own maps, to decide on their own routes, to order their own supplies for the journey, and to decide what days to travel, what days to rest, and what days to visit landmarks and souvenir shops along the way. The organization of the school, the specific form of the curriculum, the academic schedule for the day, week and year, and the ways in which teachers and students are grouped with one another—all these are as necessary to effective school-level decision-making as the choice of costumes for the seventh grade class play or the sequence of drills that the coach selects for the basketball team. The school system or state education agency may be able to help by providing various forms of information, technical assistance, and advice to individual schools, but that is quite different from mandating detailed procedures. This kind of bureaucratic self-restraint is probably the most difficult challenge that policymakers and central office administrators face. Practically everything pushes them in the other direction, ranging from the platoon of staff members who need to be kept busy to the fear of a lawsuit arising if anything occurring in one school within the system is not exactly identical to counterpart events in all the other schools. But such restraint is indeed needed if the schools are to be effective. (But only so long as they are effective. It would be foolish to leave the same degree of autonomy on a very bad school as on a very good one. The watchful central office may
need the educational counterpart of what the Indian constitution calls 'President's Rule,' in which under certain circumstances—chaos, corruption, political fragmentation, etc.—the national government can temporarily suspend a state government and instead rule with its own representatives until the situation is stabilized and new elections can be held. A central office should probably have a small cadre of highly skilled veteran principals who can be sent—possibly just for a week, a month, but more likely for a year or two—to 'turn around' the situation in a markedly unsuccessful school.

3. Encourage schools to be different, except for the core of cognitive skills and knowledge that all students in a system or state should acquire. American public schools are characterized today by boring sameness of content, atmosphere and routine and one of the reasons people may send their children to private schools is because they are looking for something different, something distinctive, something specifically suited to their children's needs or interests. Although 'magnet school' programs have begun to introduce purposeful diversity into some urban school systems, this is generally the kind of diversity that the policymakers mandate rather than the kind that a motivated school team creates. So long as a transfer or open enrollment policy allows children to change schools (and sufficient transportation can be arranged), there is no reason whatsoever not to allow schools to develop distinctive educational characters; to take pride in these differences; even to advertise them, so that families can select schools according to their special qualities rather than their sameness.

If this evolves into the functional equivalent of a 'public school voucher program,' that is all right, too. Allowing schools to vie with each other for students on the basis of their distinctiveness and their quality
will likely produce more vibrant and enterprising schools than arbitrary—but uniform—assignments. Moreover, so long as sufficient information about the schools is provided to parents and students, the popularity of a school can be one index of its "effectiveness."

Policymakers will, of course, need to specify those educational outcomes that must be achieved by all students—hence by all schools—in a system. And they may even want to suggest some of the dimensions along which schools might wish to differentiate themselves. But these choices should be left largely up to the school team. They may vary by educational philosophy (individual achievement versus non-competitive learning units), by pedagogical organization (self-contained classrooms versus various kinds of "teams" or "open learning" situations), by curricular emphasis (a "science-math" school, a "humanities school," a school for the arts), even by the dominant language of discourse (sidestepping the bilingual education debates, I simply point out that one high school could be a "French school," another "German"). Some schools may have reason to be open during unconventional hours, or even months. One may be affiliated with a particular corporation that "adopts" it, another may collaborate with the community arts center, and another with an urban redevelopment venture. In most cases, the variation will not be so dramatic or visible to the outside world, and will have more to do with a particular synchronization of student needs and staff interests that seem to make sense to a school team. The essential point is that it be developed by the school team—and that the policymakers encourage and applaud this.

4. Develop effective school-level leadership by selecting (and nurturing) first-rate principals and removing weak ones. Here the "effective schools" research is entirely compatible with long-established organization
theory and with common sense. Leadership matters greatly. If policymakers could only do one thing to improve a school, they would be wise to hire the best principal they could lay their hands on to direct that school—and then give him sweeping authority.

An outstanding principal alone does not make for an effective school. But—another of those "necessary but not sufficient" conditions—one almost never encounters a really good school with a weak or ineffectual principal.

School-level leadership is a tricky concept, however. Rare is the principal who does not think of himself as a "leader." But many are the principals who cannot really distinguish between "leader" and "manager," or who are content if their administration yields a tidy schedule, orderly corridors, pacified parents and a moderately successful football team. Without underestimating the confusion that results from a tangled schedule or, the sheer terror that can stalk the halls of a school where discipline is out of control, efficient management should occupy only a small fraction of the principal's day—or should be left almost entirely to a conscientious lieutenant. The attributes of the principal that really influence school effectiveness are prowess in instructional leadership and mastery of purposeful school improvement schemes.

In theory and occasionally in practice, instructional leadership at the school level can be supplied by persons other than the principal: by a cadre of "master teachers," for example, by a team of excellent department heads, or by a superior assistant principal. Having noted that, however, it is still the principal who is ordinarily responsible for whatever instructional leadership there is in the school he runs. That means direct involvement by the principal in the conceptualization and design of the curriculum; the
careful selection, in-service development and knowledgeable supervision of teachers; the use of test scores and other "outcome" data as diagnostic tools for finding the school's educational strengths and weaknesses so as to preserve the former and rectify the latter; the articulation of curriculum and pedagogy; the establishment of sound priorities for the allocation of time, resources and staff energies; and the defense of "academic learning time" against intrusions ranging from disruptive students to meddlesome parents to bureaucratic central office staffs.

The selection of good principals is both art and science: art, because it is imperative to judge the character of the person and of the school and to seek a smooth fit between the two; science, because a number of validated "assessment" schemes make it possible to measure individual performance on various dimensions associated with effective leadership. Yet policymakers are often careless about the process—tending to name the gym teacher because he is male and has a "commanding" personality, or simply to ratify the superintendent's suggestion of someone who may turn out to be his neighbor—and are wont to limit the chances of success, such as by embracing certification standards for principals that rely entirely on number of years in the classroom and the completion of certain courses in graduate school.

Four points about principals must be borne in mind: first, the "job description" must emphasize the instructional leadership rather than building management aspects of the job; second, there is little reliable correlation between good teachers and good principals, and assuming otherwise is apt to take a good teacher out of the classroom, to place an uncertain executive in the principal's office, and to overlook entirely all the people who are not even teachers but who might become superb principals; third, a person with
the necessary character, temperament, energy level and intellect can acquire the knowledge and skills that he needs for effective instructional leadership, though these are more apt to be acquired in one of the new "principals' academies" that are springing up in many states than in routine degree programs offered by university departments of school administration; fourth, inept principals must not be allowed to remain in key positions, and policymakers must therefore steel themselves to resist anything resembling "tenure" for principals and to remove from the principalship anyone whose shortcomings cannot readily be fixed by in-service education. 8

5. Aside from the choice of principals, make the selection and deployment of professional staff a school-level responsibility. That is not quite the same as saying let the principal hire and fire whomever he likes, but it moves a long way in that direction from the usual present-day practice of giving the person in charge of the school practically no direct influence on the selection of members of his teaching team. (To be sure, most good principals exert considerable indirect influence, but only after overcoming enormous procedural and policy obstacles.)

Putting it bluntly, if there were no such things as teacher unions, collective bargaining and "master contracts," I suspect practically everyone involved in education would think the foregoing to be a sound, if perhaps obvious, suggestion. The fundamental paradox in school staffing is that teachers are employed by the system as a whole, yet they teach in particular schools within that system. It simply cannot be assumed that an arrangement that maximizes teachers' ability to "bargain" with the system as a whole and that enhance the mobility of teachers within the system is an arrangement well suited to the development or maintenance of effective schools at the building level.
The composition of the teaching staff as a whole in a school is important to the successful functioning of the institution. Those in a school—the principal, to be sure, but also the veteran teachers, the department heads, and perhaps even the parents' association—have the clearest sense of the school's professional personnel requirements, and they must therefore have very substantial influence over the decisions by which those requirements are satisfied. In one situation, the foremost need may be a teacher with a particularly strong background in a particular subject; in another, top priority may be assigned to engaging a teacher who is especially adept in a particular pedagogical setting (e.g., a teaching "team") or with a particular set of children (e.g., handicapped, disadvantaged, or gifted).

At the very minimum, policymakers should devolve upon the school itself a near-absolute right to reject any teacher who is not well-suited to the school's needs, and to rid itself of any teacher whose performance is unsatisfactory. (I say near-absolute because orderly procedures must be followed—and some sort of oversight and appeals process provided—to guard against whimsy, favoritism, discrimination and capriciousness.) If the school system finds itself, through contractual arrangement or tenure commitments, obliged to pay the salaries of some teachers whom no schools within that system will have, they will either have to be given central office duties or put onto some sort of paid leave. (At the State Department, Foreign Service officers who are entitled to salaries but for whom there is no suitable work are aptly—if sorrowfully—known as "corridor walkers.")

A somewhat more difficult issue is how much authority to give the school to hire whomever it likes. Normal present practice is to confine employment to people who both hold state teaching certificates and have been approved by
the central office of the local school system. Exceptions are only made where no fully-certified person can be found to take a particular position, necessitating a waiver or temporary certificate in order to allow someone to be put into an otherwise-empty classroom.

This paper is not long enough to probe the innumerable issues associated with state licensure, the failings of pre-service teacher education, or the extraordinary complexities created by union "master contracts" that give teachers certain claims on openings that may arise in particular schools. But a good general rule of thumb can easily be stated for policymakers: faculty selection should be substantially a "collegial" process carried out at the school level; hence state and local laws, regulations and procedures should facilitate rather than impede such a process. Individual schools should be able to "make offers" to experienced teachers already employed by the system, and should have some ability to tailor compensation, duties and working conditions to attract those whom they want. It should also be made easier to hire persons outside the system, at least on a temporary basis, with successful on-the-job performance then being sufficient to obtain a regular "license" and an ordinary contract. While it would be wasteful to hire an "outsider" if a suitable teacher already employed elsewhere in the system may be available to fill a given opening, it is at least wasteful—albeit in a different sense—to oblige a school to fill a round hole with a square peg just because the latter is already employed within the school system. Policymakers who want their schools to be effective must recognize that the major educational resource schools have is their teaching staff; that assembling a good teaching staff is like organizing a symphony orchestra or fabricating a complex piece of mechanical equipment: every part must fit
perfectly with every other. Even a single aberration can damage the
educational ethos of a school, just as it can ruin the tone of an orchestra or
halt the operation of a machine. Since it is impossible for anyone outside
the school to have a sufficiently sensitive feel for these relationships,
staffing must be a school-level prerogative, and policymakers must wipe away
the major impediments, leaving only a framework of general standards and
equitable personnel procedures on which the school team can construct—and
periodically reconstruct—its own membership.

Following this precept to its logical second stage, an individual
teacher's "contract"—specifying responsibilities, compensation, working
conditions, etc.—must in an important sense be a contract with the particular
school in which he teaches, and therefore the principal of the school (or his
agent) must be a party to the contract and a participant in its negotiation.

6. Treat teachers as individuals who differ from one another in ability,
interests and experience, but who must function in a collegial manner if their
schools are to be effective. Research again confirms common sense: good
schools nearly always manifest a sense of professional "teamwork" that
includes shared attention to educational goals, curricular content and
organization, student performance, and pedagogy. Yet like any other kind of
team, the players do not all do exactly the same things or do them in the same
way, and should not if the whole is to be greater than the sum of its parts,
which is the essence of "teamness." Therefore policies that ignore
differences among teachers, that pretend they are interchangeable, or that
make it harder for the school team as a whole to gain maximum benefit from its
members' individual strengths and compensate for their weaknesses are policies
apt to diminish school effectiveness.
This has implications for policies affecting school organization, staffing patterns, in-service training and staff development, the daily schedule and annual calendar, the uses of physical space within the building, and compensation systems. It argues for considerable attention to school-wide planning of curriculum and standards. It argues for arrangements that encourage veteran teachers to help novices learn their craft, and for calendars that allow those who are particularly good at curriculum or staff development to have "official" time for such activities. It argues, in short, for flexible, differentiated staffing patterns, not imposed from outside the school but developed by those within. Inevitably, it also argues for flexible resource use; in some systems, that will mean differential pay to compensate "master teachers" for their longer hours and school years (or simply to retain outstanding teachers within the building when other schools and systems will be "bidding" for their services); it will mean salaries for some people who are neither full-time teachers nor full-time administrators but—for a day, a month, even a full year—hybrids or specialists who revamp the chemistry curriculum, develop an institute on the teaching of writing, lead a team of less experienced teachers, or shoulder a set of the principal's mundane management duties so that he can devote himself more fully to instructional leadership. In other schools, "flexible" resources will be needed to send some teachers to summer institutes; to hire outsiders as aides, specialists or clerks; to refurbish a storeroom into a curriculum development center or meeting room for teachers; to acquire new materials or equipment that the school team needs; to underwrite the cost of a faculty "retreat;" or even, alas, to employ a security guard so that teachers willing to work late can feel safe while in the building and en route to their cars.
7. Implicit in the previous two points is the admonition that a good deal of budgetary authority and responsibility must devolve to the school level. While it may not be impossible to run an effective school despite the need to order all books, paper clips and lightbulbs through the "system office," and while the prospect of large amounts of "uncontrolled" money sloshing around in individual schools will send shudders through the budget-makers, accountants and auditors in the central office, in the municipal government, and perhaps even in the state capitol, means must be devised to confer fiscal leeway on the individual schools. With such control must, of course, go the responsibility to account fully for the uses to which the funds are put, but after-the-fact accounting is not inconsistent with budgetary flexibility. I do not suggest that the principal be given a single lump sum to spend however he likes, or that all school-related outlays should be controlled at the school level. (Maintaining, renovating and outfitting the basic physical plant, utilities and the like are probably best handled centrally.) And individual school budgets must be constructed within limits and ranges set for the system as a whole, particularly with regard to salary levels, which are the major item in most school budgets. Since resources are never sufficient and choices must constantly be made, however, it seems altogether fitting to allow those who are responsible for a school's educational effectiveness to establish priorities and "trade-offs" as between new instruments for the band, new lockers for the gym, new eighth grade history texts, new encyclopedias for the library, and attendance at a four week summer institute by members of the math or science departments. Ideally, the resources that the system is able to provide a given school in a particular year will be centrally allocated among several major budget
categories, and general guidelines and ranges will be established for each, but the school team—ultimately "accountable" through the principal—will fix its own priorities within each of those categories and will have some ability to propose limited transfers among them. (One can imagine a school team so preoccupied with strictly educational matters as not to want to be diverted into fiscal matters, and one can also imagine a school where certain categories of budget decisions—especially those pertaining to the direct and indirect compensation of individuals—may be deemed hopelessly divisive, impossibly controversial, or simply too complicated. In all such circumstances, the central office must be willing to keep or resume whichever responsibilities the school does not want. The point, after all, is not to make school leadership harder, only to give those schools that wish it the direct ability to match resources with their educational priorities and organizational needs.)

Though the foregoing appears to be aimed primarily at local policymakers, the implications for state and federal officials are also profound. A major reason that such tight central fiscal control is exercised in most school systems is the need for intricate accounting for categorical monies furnished by state and federal programs, monies that often may not be "commingled" with other resources. Fiscal complexity is only the tip of the iceberg of state and federal intrusion into school management, and cannot, of course, be dealt with in isolation from the program structures, rationales and regulations to which it is attached. The regrettable fact is that many well-intentioned state and federal programs were designed and are even today administered with scant regard for their impact on the overall effectiveness of the school as a complex educational institution. Every such program administrator (and his...
oversight committee in Congress or the legislature, and his agent within the central office of the local school system as well) supposes that the objectives of his particular program are the chief preoccupation of every school in which it operates and accordingly manifests scant interest in whatever else may be taking place in those schools. Though the recent amalgamation of some of the most picayune federal categorical programs into "block grants" and the easing of certain regulations in the Title I (now Chapter I) program have somewhat eased this problem, it persists in a number of federal and state programs, and in myriad procedures and regulations that are not specifically tied to categorical spending programs.

No sword can cut this Gordian knot with a single blow, and it would be naive of policymakers to assume that embracing the general doctrine of enhanced school level budgetary authority will have that effect, as there is a fundamental incompatibility between the kinds of programmatic accountability that policymakers (and special interests outside the school) crave and the "seamless web" that school level educators generally want to weave within their buildings. But policymakers who want schools to be effective for everyone in them, and not just for the beneficiaries of special programs, must at least face this "trade off." If they are wise they will consult principals and teachers before making such decisions and will build into their programs as much flexibility as they can for those who must implement them within the schools. Finally, it should be noted that one reason for giving schools more discretion over the allocation of non-categorical funds is to make it easier for them to "compensate" for dislocations caused by categorical programs—though it should also be noted that all too many of the categorical programs are hedged about with prohibitions against precisely that kind of off-setting compensation!
8. Because restrictions on the uses of money are not the only shackles that local, state and federal policymakers attach to schools, a somewhat separate (though related) point needs to be made: by and large, policymakers should eschew practices and actions that inhibit school governance in fundamental realms of teaching, learning and internal organization. This is a limited prohibition, because fairness, politics and sometimes the Constitution itself create certain overriding reasons for tempering school-level autonomy. Obviously an individual public school cannot segregate students on the basis of race or ethnicity; cannot concentrate the lion's share of its resources on some youngsters while neglecting others; and cannot treat its own professional staff in arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory ways.

But policymakers at every level of government (and in all three branches, assuredly including the judiciary) have generally failed to recognize the importance of the school's own "moral order," and have instead tended to suppose that justice, morality and equity reside only at higher levels of authority. While it is regrettably the case that some schools have not always conducted themselves in ways that inspire confidence in building-level morality, and while it is also the fact that timid school administrators often fail to press against the limits of the residual autonomy already granted them, policymakers frequently do things that make it harder to run schools effectively. Obvious examples include (a) system-wide disciplinary codes (sometimes in the guise of civil rights requirements) that, viewed from the school's perspective, make it hard to remove chronically-disruptive youngsters from regular classrooms; (b) "compensatory education" and "special education" regulations that either force schools to pull youngsters out of regular classes who would be better off in them or, alternatively, to "mainstream"
students whose presence in regular classrooms markedly reduces the amount of instruction the teacher can provide to other children; (c) complex system-wide desegregation plans that re-draw district boundaries every year or two, that thereby create enormous "turnover" in student (and sometimes teacher) populations, and that oblige children to leap onto buses promptly at 3:05 every afternoon to travel long distances, thus making it difficult to provide extra attention to students who might benefit from tutoring, supervised after-school study periods, or even from writing "I will not throw the eraser at my teacher" five hundred times. In addition to major disruptions, of course, state and federal policymakers often impose short-lived harassments, such as the need to suspend the regular curriculum for "energy education day" or "United Nations day" or for a badly-timed "teacher professional day."

To say that virtually all such impositions are well-intentioned does not paper over the harm they can do to aggregate school effectiveness or to the school team's sense that it is "in charge"—the sense of authority that must accompany a sense of responsibility if teaching is to elicit more from teachers than a feeling of unrequited burdensomeness. While it is true that the remarkable individuals who are characteristically found in the principals' offices of truly effective schools are astonishingly resourceful in devising ways of eluding the obstacles thrown up by local, state and federal policymakers, it is outrageous that running an effective school has to be a matter of outwitting, outflanking and perhaps gently deceiving "the authorities" in an era when the selfsame authorities ostensibly want more schools to be more effective.

As with cognitive achievement standards, then, the proper rule of thumb for policymakers with respect to divers social, legal and programmatic
objectives that schools are asked to embrace is to exercise self-restraint. Select only the truly indispensable ones—and make other social agencies and institutions responsible for the others—and frame them in ways that allow individual schools to select their own routes and schedules for reaching the designated ends. Just as it is common for a federal statute to say "Notwithstanding other provisions of law, such-and-such must occur," so should those making policies for school systems adopt a general provision that says "regardless of whatever else we may ask you to do, school teams have the authority to decide for themselves what must and must not occur within their buildings in order to maximize their overall educational effectiveness, and so long as their overall performance is satisfactory we will not fault them for the choices or compromises that they made." Any such general permission will, of course, make for a less tidy and homogenous school system, will complicate the attainment of any single extrinsic goal, and will probably offend sundry outside interest groups that think their particular causes paramount. But without such flexibility the prospects of enhancing school effectiveness will be much reduced. The more that "school effectiveness" can be defined in terms of the cognitive skills and knowledge that are the singular competence and ineluctable province of formal educational institutions, the easier it will be to deflect conflicting activities and objectives onto the agencies, institutions and governmental mechanisms that can more appropriately undertake them.

9. Come to regard the improvement of school effectiveness as a dynamic, cyclical process that takes place over a long period of time rather than as a static or transitory enterprise. This may sound self-evident, but in fact the tendency of policymakers to treat schools as bureaucratic units rather than
living organizations has not just resulted in institutional homogeneity; it has also fostered a sense of presentism that gives greater heed to the documentation of immediate events and the preparation of short-run tactics than to the subtler strategies, plans and evaluations that are most apt to yield significant improvements over the long run.

Shifting school policy from efforts to cope with "inertial autonomy" to the purposeful development of what we might term "strategic independence" entails recognition that while organizational effectiveness is usually slow to develop, it almost never develops unless the people who bear responsibility and exercise authority have a clear sense of what they would like to see different at the end of, say, five years.

Here a caution is in order, for what often passes for "long-range planning" can be a sterile, even futile undertaking. Indeed, long-range planning as generally defined within school systems is not what I have in mind. Rather, I urge the development of a mind-set that regards the development of school effectiveness as a set of overlapping cycles at both the building level and the system level (and quite possibly at the state level, too), in which each cycle can be visualized as having at least five stages: (a) the development of an objective and criteria for gauging the extent to which it is currently attained, (b) assessment of present performance and diagnosis of the sources and causes of less-than-satisfactory performance, (c) the development of a plan for attaining the objective more completely by easing or eradicating the obstacles to its attainment, (d) implementation of that plan, accompanied by (e) continuing evaluation of the implementation efforts, leading in turn to mid-course corrections, the development of revised (or more ambitious) objectives, the diagnosis of additional problems, the preparation of further plans, and so on into the future.
This way of thinking is hardly new to students of the planning process or to experts on organizational development, but it is rarely found in schools today and not very often in school systems or state education agencies, most of which simply go on from day to day or year to year more-or-less repeating what they did before with new names and numbers in place of the old ones.

It would be an oversimplification to visualize a school or school system as having a single "planning cycle," for in fact a great many such should be underway simultaneously, some of the rather formal, ambitious and long-lived, others much shorter and simpler. But with respect to any major educational objective at any level of educational policymaking, a good starting point would be the identification of the outcomes that policymakers would like to see at a point two or five or eight years in the future, accompanied by systematic plans to achieve those outcomes on the desired timetable.

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In the end, it is well to recall the "problem" with which we began, namely the tension between school-level autonomy and system-wide uniformity. Policymakers characteristically want all schools in their domains to be "effective" and their instinct is to mandate actions that they suppose will achieve that result. They will be strongly tempted simply to take the superficial attributes of "effective schools" and order all schools to develop those attributes.

Insofar as this instinct leads policymakers to focus on school effectiveness, to define effectiveness as the attainment by students of greater cognitive skills and knowledge, and to pay attention to the qualities of schools that are most apt to be associated with such effectiveness, it is a sound instinct that virtually all parents, taxpayers and citizens will applaud.
But policymakers cannot order schools to be effective any more than parents can force children to be good. Just as the development of "goodness" entails the internalization by children of the norms, values, standards and procedures that the society associates with "goodness," so too does the achievement of greater educational effectiveness by schools entail their internalizing the requisite norms, values, standards and procedures. And just as parents—and other adults—must strive to remove from the paths of their children as many of the obstacles, distractions and disabilities that interfere with the youngsters' own progress toward goodness, so must those who want to foster school effectiveness take steps to eliminate the impediments to it. School effectiveness ultimately depends on what the people inside the school do, how they organize themselves, relate to each other, allot their time, apportion their resources, magnify their strengths and overcome their weaknesses. What policymakers can best do—and really all they can do—is to establish the overall norms and standards, select competent people, provide adequate material resources, remove as many obstacles as possible, and then get out of the way. That does not mean they should feign disinterest or assume greater maturity on the part of a school than it actually possesses. But as many wise parents have learned—sometimes too late and sometimes to their sorrow—maturity is not developed by simply making more and more detailed rules.

In education, the tendency to make more rules as a way of changing things is a response to the conditions we termed inertial autonomy and essential uniformity. These are widespread and deeply-rooted conditions that cannot be wished away. Both will be eroded if the quest for what I termed "strategic independence" is successful; in the former instance, that is almost wholly
desirable, in the latter it can become undesirable. But policymakers who want their schools to become more effective will do well to recognize these choices and trade-offs, and to steel themselves for the large task of making them. This will not be easy. But there are very few challenges facing the United States in 1983 that are consequential.
Notes

1. Gerald Grant, Education, Character and American Schools: Are Effective Schools Good Enough? (Syracuse University, 1982)


3. See, for example, the reports (all issued in 1983) of the National Commission on Excellence in Education, of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Policy, and of the Task Force on Education for Economic Growth. Also see the author's article, "The Drive for Educational Excellence: Moving toward a Public Consensus," Change, Vol. 15, No. 3, April 1983

4. The research literature on "school effectiveness" is now voluminous, and no attempt is made here to itemize its particular findings, to point out specific technical shortcomings and possible inconsistencies, or to supply a comprehensive bibliography, as all of these tasks have been skillfully carried out by other authors. The interested reader is referred with particular enthusiasm to the following works:
   a. Cohen, op cit
   b. Stewart C. Purkey and Marshall S. Smith, "Effective Schools--A Review" (Wisconsin Center for Education Research, University of Wisconsin; forthcoming in Elementary School Journal)
   c. Educational Researcher, Vol. 12, Number 4. This special issue, edited by William E. Bickel, contains four pertinent articles, including an especially good survey of recent research on school improvement by Donald E. Mackenzie and a "cautionary note" by Brian Rowan, Steven T. Bossert and David C. Dwyer (American Educational Research Association, April 1983)
   e. "A Review of Effective Schools Research: Implications for Practice and Research," a paper commissioned by the National Commission on Excellence in Education and written by Eleanor Farrar, Matthew B. Miles and Barbara Neufeld
   g. Nauren B. and Daniel F. Resnick, "Standards, Curriculum, and Performance: An Historical and Comparative Perspective," yet another paper prepared for the National Commission
h. *Educational Leadership*, Vol. 40, Number 1. This journal of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development devoted most of its December 1982 issue to "effective schools" and contains fifteen pertinent articles, some of them good.


j. Rutter et al., *Fifteen Thousand Hours* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1979)

5. On the matter of "boring sameness," see Goodlad, op cit.

6. The reader interested in the "assessment" of leadership potential in principals is referred to the National Association of Secondary School Principals, which has pioneered this effort.

7. The author's opinion is that persons with outstanding leadership ability may become effective principals even if they have not been teachers.

8. There is no contradiction between the third and fourth points. The skills and knowledge can indeed be acquired, but only if the commitment, character and intellect are already present.