A review of policy statements made in the past 10 years in Soviet academic journals and Communist Party newspapers indicates that integrating rural and urban populations has become a concern of academics, government officials, and policymakers in the Soviet Union. One means by which the rural segment of Soviet society could be pushed or helped onto the cultural, social, and economic plane of its urban counterpart is through the mass media, specifically, the newspapers. Many Soviet policymakers have concluded that mass media fare—centrally produced and distributed—is capable of "powerful effect," and have begun calling for the use of such media products in the integration of the rural and urban populations. Such integration is a complex task, complicated by differing levels of urbanization, income, literacy, migration patterns, and languages. Although the success of the Soviet government's attempt to unite its people remains inconclusive, it is clear from statements made by government officials and policymakers that the mass media are viewed as powerful agents or mobilizers of rural-urban integration. (FL)
Soviet Rural-Urban Integration Through Mass Media Use:  
A Dependency Model Analysis

by

Jo Ellen Fair

School of Journalism  
Ernie Pyle Hall  
Indiana University  
Bloomington, IN 47405

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY  
Jo Ellen Fair"

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Presented to the International Division, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication at the annual convention in Gainesville, Florida, August 7, 1984.
ABSTRACT

Soviet Rural-Urban Integration
Through Mass Media Use:
A Dependency Model Analysis

In a country comprised of diverse cultural and ethnic heritages, economic conditions and regional differences, creating a sense of "nation-ness" in the Soviet Union has long been a problem for the government. Based upon policy statements made in the past ten years in Soviet academic journals and party newspapers, integrating rural and urban populations has become a concern of Soviet academics, government officials and/or policymakers.

One means by which the rural segment of Soviet society could be pushed or helped onto the cultural, social and economic plane of its urban counterpart was through the mass media: here, specifically, newspapers. Many Soviet policymakers concluding that mass media fare -- centrally produced and distributed -- was capable of "powerful effect," began calling for the use of such media products in the development and integration of the rural population.

Indeed, integrating rural and urban populations in the Soviet Union through the mass media is a complex task, complicated by differing levels of urbanization, per capita income, literacy, migration patterns and language barriers. Unlike many so-called developed or industrialized nations such as the United States or Japan, the Soviet Union appears to be a country partitioned into developed and developing spheres. As such, a dependency model analysis is used to examine how the dominant Moscow-center prepares and disseminates ideological messages designed to pull, link or integrate rural regions or peripheries.

Although the success of the Soviet government's attempt to unite its people remains inconclusive, it is clear from statements made by government officials and policymakers that the mass media are viewed as powerful agents or mobilizers of rural-urban integration.

by Jo Ellen Fair
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana
1984
Soviet Rural-Urban Integration Through Mass Media Use: A Dependency Model Analysis

In a country as diverse as the Soviet Union is ethnically, culturally and economically, developing an accurate picture of the society as a whole may result in a blurry image. Instead, what may be needed to understand the Soviet Union as a sum of all its parts is to focus on one process or phenomenon occurring within the country. In part because of regional differences in cultural and ethnic heritages and economic conditions, the Soviet government has found creating a sense of "nation-ness" difficult. To a certain extent, summing the disparate regions into one Soviet state has exerted a centrifugal rather than centripetal force against the development of Soviet nationhood.

Judging from policy statements made in the past ten years, integration, or to use the phrase of several Soviet sociologists, the convergence and equalization of the rural population with the urban, has become a concern of Soviet academics, government officials and/or policymakers. In an article first printed in Izvestia, three sociologists note their policy imperatives: The sociologists explain:

"A tremendous stratus of social problems is associated with the development of our multinational states, the convergence of nations, and the development of fundamentally new community of men -- the unified Soviet people (Rumiantsev, Burlatskii, Osipov, 1969-70:5)."

Integration of the rural and urban people, another sociologist suggested, would lead to a homogeneity of social class and culture leading to development of features common to all Soviets (Simush, 1978:49). One means by which the rural could be pushed or helped onto the cultural, social and economic plane of their urban counterparts was through the various forms of the mass media: newspapers, television, radio, books and movies. Many Soviet policymakers, concluding that mass media fare -- that is, mass media products created and
distributed by the central government -- was capable of powerful effects, began calling for the use of the mass media as a factor in the "urbanization of the non-material culture of the rural population" (Simush, 1976-77:41).

The use, however, of the mass media to spread similar ideological and/or cultural messages to diverse groups resulting in an integration of urban-rural audiences is a complex task. The Soviet Union, unlike many industrialized or developed countries such as the United States, West Germany or Japan, has the characteristics of what Emile Durkheim called mechanical and organic societies. In Moscow and its immediate environs, Soviet life appears based on a high division of labor, high interdependence and large urban-industrial complexes. Rural life, by contrast, is based on a low division of labor (largely unskilled agrarian work), a lower level of interdependence and a more pervasive collective consciousness. While the Soviet Union has quickly industrialized and urbanized, many areas remain without necessities and conveniences (such as a broad access to education or consumer goods) that members of an organic society demand.² The rural regions, partially because of their geographic isolation, share a common fate of cultural/information dependency on established urban-industrial centers such as Moscow.

The world -- both in and outside the Soviet Union -- can be thought of in terms of dominant centers tugging at weaker, less stable peripheries. The center produces and transmits messages pertinent to and congruent with its ideology and/or folkways. The peripheries, without an established means of producing their own messages, are the recipient of the center's messages. It has been argued by researchers using the "dependency model" as a theoretical tool that the United States, for instance, has functioned as a center spreading its dominant ideology to periphery areas in Africa, Asia and South America.³ It will be argued here that a similar relationship exists in the Soviet Union.
between rural and urban areas whereby the center -- Moscow and Soviet government seated in Moscow -- prepares and disseminates ideological messages designed to pull, link or integrate the rural regions with the urban. Based upon readings of Soviet economics, agriculture and rural sociology, it seems that, at least in policy statements discussed in Soviet academic journals or reported in Soviet party newspapers, the messages to be sent by the center through both the print and electronic media attempt to outline for the agricultural laborer both the reasons for his/her staying in the rural region and how a particular farm worker and the rural community are integral, despite language and ethnic diversity, to building the idealized socialist society. The purpose, then, of this study is to examine whether, through Soviet policy statements on rural integration reported in speeches, journals or government publications such as newspapers, Soviet rural and urban audiences are linked through mass media use. However, before beginning discussion of the role of the Soviet media as rural-urban integrators, it is first necessary to look at the ways in which the media and policy statements on rural integration will be analyzed and the theoretical assumptions underlying development and dependency.

**Methodology**

Generally, this work is theoretical in the sense that scholarly research, newspaper articles and speeches on rural policy and/or rural-urban integration have been compiled and worked into the dependency model framework to explore whether the Moscow center pulls at the rural periphery in an attempt to integrate the two parts (the center and periphery) into one whole. It will be posited in the study that the Soviet Union shares characteristics of both mechanical and organic societies. As such, much of the research is based on previous studies that examine the attributes of developing and developed societies. Moreover, dependency model research is added to demonstrate the ways in which the center's
policies on rural-urban integration serve as a gravitational-type force tugging at the periphery. The Soviet Union is actually used here as a case study for examining the mechanics of the dependency model.

In terms of the role of the mass media, communication of often a key to the success of a development project -- here, the linking of urban and rural areas to form one nation or one people. There are several roles the mass media play in a developing society or the rural areas of much of the Soviet Union. Here, the mass media as possible agents of integration serve to: (1) raise levels of aspiration; which may be translated into incentives for action or production; (2) create new norms in a period of transition (such as moving from an agricultural to urban state); (3) create a sense of nation-ness; (4) help the (rural) population realize their importance in the process of Soviet development; (5) teach new skills; (6) create a climate conducive to social change or development (Hedebro, 1982:17-18). Although many of the Soviet policy statements made during the study's time period (approximately 1973-1983) do not discuss specifically the use of the mass media to achieve a bond between urban and rural workers, many of the articles do address the need for integration and in general terms, the use of communication or culture.

Theoretical Assumptions

The Soviet Model of Development

Many analyses of Soviet society concentrate on its socialist or totalitarian characteristics. Few studies, however, appear to have analyzed the Soviet Union as a developing society. Although Leninist doctrine on development and actual Soviet policy do not always fully coincide, Lenin's interpretation of Marx was instrumental in legitimizing the components of the Soviet development model: urbanization, industrialization, collectivization and cultural transformation. Engels' writings were key to the Soviet government's concern for both human and physical resource investment. Following Engels' writings, Lenin
called for the improvement of economic and cultural living conditions of the rural and urban populations to advance the growth of the socialist system (Shorish, 1975:409). To develop the Soviet Union's rural-mechanical societies, Lenin asserted, resources had to be committed to the rapid industrialization of the farmlands (de Kadt and Williams, 1974:25).

In his concept of development, Lenin advocated public participation, the dissemination of secular norms and the creation of the new Soviet worker -- a laborer characterized by achievement and hard work (Lerner, 1968:386). Lenin's formulation of industrialization-as-development followed his earlier writings positing that once "the deleterious effects of bourgeois ownership relations" were no longer present, then industrialization could proceed at a fuller pace (de Kadt and Williams, 1974:27). Despite Lenin's call (borrowing from Marx) for "urban relationships" between urban and rural areas (Simush, 1976:42), the urban areas prospered and developed while the countryside remained generally underdeveloped. "We know," wrote Lenin, "that cities ... grow very much more rapidly than the countryside; the cities are the centers of economic, political and intellectual life of the people and are major engines of progress" (Kozhurin and Pogodin, 1981-82:3).

Characteristics of Soviet Society: Mechanical and Organic

The rural segment of Soviet society has had a long history of relative isolation from the urban centers of the country. Referring to the rural laborer, Lenin states:

He is partly property owner, partly a worker. He does not exploit other workers. For years, he had to defend his position against the greatest odds. He suffered exploitation at the hands of the pomeschchiki (landowners) and the capitalists. He put up with everything. Nevertheless, he is a property owner. For this reason, the problem of our attitude toward this vacillating class is one of enormous difficulty (Lewin, 1968:65).

From this statement, it seems that Lenin, like his successors, was faced with
the difficult task of deciding how the amorphous mass of rural farm workers, from both a political and doctrinal point of view, would or could be fit into the development of an industrialized Soviet state.

Bolshevik ambivalence toward the "peasant" as a class and the adoption of rapid industrialization and collectivization policies were contributing factors in the alienation or isolation of the rural segment from the urban. Soviet ideology, Hollander notes, places emphasis "on the proletariat with disproportionately high capital investment in urban amenities, together with implicit and sometimes explicit slurs on peasant loyalty have also contributed to the 'gap between the city and country,' as it is called in the Soviet press" (Hollander, 1972:18).5

Although historically Bolshevik ambivalence may well have been one factor contributing to rural isolation or to the neglect of rural cultural, social and economic development, it seems likely that the wheels of urban-rural inequities were grinding some time before the Bolsheviks took power.6 As in many relationships between developed (organic) and developing (mechanical) societies, the largely agrarian sector -- whose members are often characterized by unskilled labor, little formal education and political and economical impotence (Hill, 1975:110-111) -- plays a constant game of "catch-up" with the urban-industrial centers. But besides ambivalence, other potential sources of urban-rural cleavages are rooted in patterns of industrialization, urbanization, social mobility, educational and employment opportunities, distribution of retail goods and migration (Bandera and Melnyk, 1973:48 and Lewis et al., 1975:287).

From a 1977 article entitled "A Labor Heroine's Plea for Culture in the Village" featured in Selskaya zhizn (Rural Life), a collective farm woman from Rostov Province recounts her disappointment in her village's neglect of cultural life: movie house, music shows, libraries and museums. She writes:
I have been to Moscow more than once. Walking in Moscow or Rostov and window-shopping, one feels not sad but dissatisfied, as if we do not make the best use of what we have in our rural life and what we have gained in recent years. ... Every village nowadays has (cultural) specialists. In Matneyev, a large district in our province, the specialists organized a whole program of community up-bringing. I think such programs should bring cultural living conditions to every family (CDSP, vol. 29, 1977, 20, 23).

Despite what the Rural Life reader calls gains in cultural life — leisure activities, including the use of newspapers, television, books, movies and radio, to entertain or with which to inform or pass one's time — young and adult villagers alike, in rates alarming to the Soviet government, are migrating from the rural areas of not only the Russian Republic but from such republics as Tadzhik, Uzbek and Kirgiz to escape the perceived isolation of country life.

The reasons for migration are many. When asked why they wished to leave their rural homes for the city, 1,190 young villagers surveyed in the Russian Republic cited the lack of access to higher education (57.7%), few employment opportunities (42.9%), limited cultural services (34.4%), boredom with their rural lifestyle (29.0%) and low earnings (26.2%) (Voronstov, 1980-81:55). As one respondent in a similar survey reports, his village lacked "the spark of life" (Powell, 1974:9).

Until recent years the rural exodus showed few signs of slowing (Powell, 1982:23). Some of the migration might be explained by the mixed signals sent out by Moscow to the inhabitants of developing areas of the Soviet Union. Perhaps inspired by the Marxian phrase, "the idiocy of rural life," the Soviet government promised a better life for those rural laborers — seemingly tired of low wages and long hours — who would migrate to the city and work for the industrialization of the nation. In terms of migration patterns, however,
migrants tend to move to the Russian or Baltic republics. Although increasing birth races may contribute to low urbanization, the percentage of urbanization in some republics such as Turkmenistan (48%), Kazakh (41%), Kirgiz (39%), Tadzhik (35%) remain relatively low when compared with Estonia's 70 percent urbanization (Kozhurin and Pogodin, 1981-82:6-7).

In 1979, 38 percent of the Soviet population lived in rural regions (Academic American Encyclopedia, 1980:387). Roughly, of the nearly 100 million rural inhabitants, 21 percent work in agriculture-related jobs (Kerblay, 1983:76). By far, most rural-agriculture laborers work as unskilled manual laborers (72.2%), with skilled manual laborers accounting for 20.8 percent of the rural work force. Still smaller, the rural intelligensia and administrative personnel combined comprise only seven percent of jobs held in rural areas (Kerblay, 1983:100). Interestingly, of all the types of employment opportunities open to Soviet workers throughout the nation, the least attractive are virtually always relegated to the rural youth (Mickiewicz, 1972:12).

In part, because of the largely unskilled nature of agricultural work, wages and real consumption power are low. In 1975, Estonia, Latvia, RSFSR, Kazakh and Lithuania had the highest fixed per capita incomes ranging from 137 for Estonia to 101 for Lithuania, with the USSR as a whole equaling 100. By comparison, the 1975 fixed per capital incomes for the remaining 10 republics -- largely rural areas -- helps to demonstrate the gap between rural and urban sectors: the per capita incomes ranged from a high of 90 in the Ukraine to a low of 51 for Tadzhik. Moreover, when trends of real consumption per capita are analyzed a similar hierarchy emerges. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Russian republic are found with the highest rankings of consumption, with Estonia placing highest with 130.2 (the base again being 100 for the USSR as a whole) and the RSFSR falling in the fourth position with 106.6. However,
like the fixed per capita income, consumption patterns differ from urban to rural region. (Kazakh this time was not included with the more urban or developed republics.) Of the rural or developing republics, Belorussia ranked first with 98.5, while Tadzhik had the lowest rate with 64.1 (Koropeckj and Schroeder, 1981:160,129).

Other variables that help to explain the way in which the Soviet Union is broken into developing-mechanical and developed-organic regions are the distribution of goods and services and education. Briefly, as a percentage of urban state and collective retail trade, rural trade comprised in 1977 44.2 percent; and as for the volume of domestic services such as laundries, dry cleaners, repair shops, rural services constituted 56.3 percent of the urban expenditures (in rubles) in 1977 (Evans, 1981:51-52).

The last variable to be examined here is education. Rural schools suffer from geographic isolation and cultural/social "backwardness." Pupils often live far from schools and lack public transportation. And no doubt because of the geographic isolation, rural settings are not centers of attraction for teachers, who are sometimes placed in the countryside after graduation. Moreover, a large number of students come from families with low levels of education, often creating an atmosphere were formal education is not given priority. For instance, Mickiewicz (1973:7) notes that of unskilled manual laborers, including farmers, only 14 percent desired higher education for their children. Although as of 1977, 80.6 percent of the rural students (as a percentage of urban students) were able to go to secondary school, inequities between rural and urban areas exist at the higher education level. Only 33.6 percent of the rural students (as a percentage of urban students) attended institutions of higher education (Evans, 1981:53-54).
"The Soviet village," writes a scholar in the 1950s, "is the weakest point of the Soviet system, its Achilles' heel. It will have a great part in the destruction of Soviet power" (quote from Naum Jasny in Cohen et. al., 1980:135). Today, this statement may still hold some validity to the extent that development of rural republics such as Moldavia, Uzbek, Kirgiz, Azerbaijan, and Tadzhik is neglected, while the Baltic and Russian republics are maintained in a comfortable state of development.

The Dependency Paradigm

Historically, the dependency paradigm stems from the Hegelian view that the whole has a more forceful or greater "logic" than the sum of its parts (Smith, 1983:222). This statement means that whenever a nation such as the Soviet Union is studied, it must be approached in a systematic fashion where all variables influencing the development of the nation are present. It is this level -- where all influencing variables are identified -- that the "whole" can be studied. By contrast, the "part" can only be understood in terms of its relationship with or place within the "whole." It is the whole that gives the part meaning. In the case of the development of rural regions within the Soviet Union, the process (of development) can be examined using the dependency model by looking at the interaction of the rural-periphery with the urban-center; the interaction between the urban and rural parts affords the opportunity of seeing the Soviet Union perhaps in a somewhat different light. An attempt to study only the rural regions or only the urban would fail, dependency theorists would argue, because one "part" alone cannot describe what might be a phenomenon occurring as an interaction between the two regions. 10

As a theoretical framework, researchers have applied the dependency model as a means of understanding how developing countries -- most notably Latin American nations -- have "qualified" for inclusion into the international
capitalist system, a system currently led by the United States and/or U.S. transnational corporations. The dependency model suggests that once a nation has been brought or integrated into the international capitalist system, the weaker, less developed nation and the dominant nation will begin to share common values of culture and ideology. Dependency has been defined as:

...a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected... (Dos Santos, 1970:231).

The dependency model emphasizes the unequal relationship between developed and developing sectors at an international level. However, for the purposes of this paper, it is argued that a dependency relationship exists between the rural and urban sectors of the Soviet Union. To infer from dependency theory based in highly stratified societies such as those in Latin American, Moscow serves as the center because as "in any society, those who control income (wealth) also to a great extent, control or exercise political, social and cultural power as well" (Fagan, 1977:12). Moscow and its surrounding area, with its strong industrial base, act as a center able to draw in or integrate the developing rural periphery through mass media messages that are created with intent, for instance, of demonstrating how agricultural labor contributes to the well-being of the Soviet nation as a whole.

The relationship of dominance by the center can be expressed as a power struggle within the society. Within countries, here the Soviet Union, there are regions that are developed and modern. Those regions comprise the center; outside the center, there also exists the peripheral regions that are developing, less modern and isolated from the more powerful center. Although originally speaking of a gap between developed and developing nations, dependency theorist Evelina Dagnino's statement appears analogous to the urban-rural gap in the Soviet Union. Dagnino writes:
This cleavage cuts across different classes dividing each of them in a way that hinders the formulation of national classes. Thus, entrepreneurs, middle classes and workers are absorbed in different proportions by the integrated sector\textsuperscript{12} (Dagnino, 1973:131).

Dependency comes in several forms: economic, ideological (political), military, technological (which includes communication) and cultural.\textsuperscript{13} Combined, communication and cultural dependency form what is referred to by some researchers as media dependence. A relationship of media dependence exists when, for example, the Soviet rural regions must rely on the urban sphere for mass media training, technology, education and most importantly, information and/or news. As Dagnino points out, culture, communication and ideology are all parts of the dominance relationship:

For it (culture, communication and ideology combined) must fulfill a strong need for holding together a system that is heavily divided by inequalities in the distribution of resources (Dagnino, 1973:131).

To the extent that the Soviet rural areas depend on the urban for mass media fare, then the greater control/power the developed urban-center may exert over the developing rural-periphery. The mass media, then, controlled by the urban-center may be used as tools of integration, a means by which the urban-center may pull in and unite the rural-periphery in the cause of Soviet nation-building.

Findings: Rural-Urban Integration

The realization of regional underdevelopment comes to the fore when there is communication and ultimately comparison with other regions; development is a relative concept based upon assessments made of the living conditions of others (Groenman, 1969:24). Furthermore, Karl Deutsch, in his study of development and its relationship to nationality, suggests that "social communication" links, including the use of the mass media, were particularly important in determining the degree to which individuals in developing regions could integrate into developed sectors of society (Deutsch, 1966:96-104). Nikolai Tikhonov,
chairman of the council of ministers, perhaps taking his lead from Lenin's view of the media as propagandizers, agitators and organizers, briefly notes the role of the media in "enriching the intellectual life of the Soviet people."

Tikhonov says:

The steps to develop television, radio and publishing and improve the work of cultural and education institutions will also contribute to the fuller and all-around satisfaction of cultural needs (Tikhonov, 1981:17).

As will be further explained, the development of the media -- and in particular the print media -- contributes not only to cultural satisfaction but to cultural, social and political integration of the rural segment of the Soviet population with the urban.

The press, an article in Pravda notes, plays the leading role in the dissemination of information; the role of each newspaper is to address a specific audience by analyzing and interpreting facts for its readers. The article adds that in view of the increased space taken up for official proclamations, central (nationally distributed) newspapers must increase their size and distribution (CDSP, vol. 29, 1977:13). Radical changes in the "means of communication," one Soviet sociologist notes, has influenced the rural way of life and the rural population's system of values. Notes Simush:

The notion of 'peasantry' and 'countryside' are less identical today, for the countryside is losing its peasant character. Rural areas are no longer purely agricultural. ... In general form, the social composition of the rural population corresponds to the social structure of socialist society as a whole (Simush, 1978:47-48).

One reason cited for the decline of "rural characteristics" is the increase in the consumption of centrally prepared media products (Simush, 1978:53 and Voronstov, 1980-81:37). The mass media have even been credited with reducing the exodus of the rural population from the villages by demonstrating the value
of rural labor and improving the cultural conditions of daily existence (Zubanov, 1980:47).

Too little attention, Lenin wrote (1972:339), is given to everyday life in the villages; however, the centrally produced Selskaya zhizn (Rural Life), with a circulation of 8.5 million (Kurian, 1982:905), attempts to cover the socio-political, economic and cultural life of the Soviet rural region (Mass Media in C.M.E.A. Countries, 1970:212). Quite logically, Soviet researchers have found subscription rates to agriculture-related periodicals/newspapers higher in rural than city settings (Starovoytov, 1982:247). The central newspaper, according to Soviet press philosophy, functions to disseminate mass-scale political work. It was found that as a larger number of central newspaper (and radio and television programs) entered the countryside, rural workers began participating more in socio-political activities (Anderson, 1979:10). At the 25th Congress of the Communist Party, the goal of bringing together intellectual and cultural conditions of the urban and rural areas was addressed. "Today," writes one Soviet sociologist of the conference, "the press, radio and TV have become inseparable parts of the intellectual lives of the Soviet people, entering literally every house, every family" (Anderson, 1979:4,11). Mickiewicz suggests that central newspaper reading (media use in general) is a means by which the reader (media user) can be integrated into the larger fabric of society (Mickiewicz, 1981:57). This function of the central newspaper (and other forms of mass media) is, then, key to integrating rural and urban regions, especially when given the relative isolation of the rural dweller. 16

It seems that as the Soviet policy or rather the Soviet government took more interest in integrating the rural and urban sectors of the nation, centrally produced newspapers (in Russian language) became a useful means through which
to build a single Soviet society. Soviet sociologist Ostapenko argues that
the effect of the media have been one of which:

... country people are steadily becoming aware of the
community between their personal interests and those
of society. The self-isolation of the tiny world of
their village is dissolving, and the characteristics
of socialist collectivism are developing in the minds

For instance, in 1923, only four copies of two newspapers came to the village
of Gadyshi -- one copy of Rabochaia gazeta and three of Bednota, an early
version of Selskaya zhizn. Today, in Gadyshi, every family subscribes to a
newspaper, the most popular being Leninets (local) and Selskaya zhizn.¹⁷
Gadyshi villagers report reading a newspaper daily (89% of those surveyed)
and listening to the radio daily (94%) (Ostapenko, 1971-72:294-295).¹⁸

The increase in media use in general, and central newspaper use in
particular, was not a phenomenon occurring only in the village of Gadyshi.
In Belorussia, for instance, during the 1960s, more Russian-language
newspapers
were printed than were Belorussian. To fit into society -- the new, ruling
Soviet society -- it was expedient to know Russian.

It cannot ever be said that Belorussian is the language
of the countryside, that celebrated mainstay of nation-
ality, in contrast to Russian being the language of the
city: the republic's rural reading public appears to
have displayed a preference for Russian (Szporluk, 1967:491).

Interestingly, only five republics have agricultural or farm-related newspapers:
Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Lithuania, Moldavia and the Ukraine (Mass Media in
C.M.E.A. Countries, 1970:218,219,227,228,240).¹⁹ None of the republics
with their own newspapers are located in Central Asia, an area that has,
generally, a lower rate of fixed per capita income, a lower rate of real
consumption per capita (with the exception of Azerbaijan) and a lower percent
of urban population (with the exception of Moldavia).
When compared with the rate of urbanization, the republics with the greatest number of newspaper copies (unit is in 100s) are also generally the most urbanized. For example, the Russian republic has the largest number of newspapers (87) and is second, after Estonia, in urbanization, while the Uzbek republic has the fewest newspaper copies (30) and ranks eighth in urbanization and fourteenth in per capita income (Newspapers of the USSR, 1982:226-228). Moreover, the same trend holds true for the number of periodical (excluding newspapers) copies and the number of periodicals with agricultural themes (unit is in 100s); when there is a high rate of urbanization, per capita income and real consumption power, there is a corresponding large number of periodicals. Again, the Russian republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have the greatest number of periodicals (Newspapers of the USSR, 1982:203-205 and 214-222). Perhaps the most reflective of Soviet policy concerns for rural-urban integration is the number of collective-farm publications. If, as has been suggested in this paper, the Soviet policymakers/government officials have tried to integrate or pull the rural population up to the social, cultural, ideological and economic level of the urban, then it might be expected that the number of local collective-farm newspapers would drop presumably because the number of central newspapers into rural region has increased. Indeed, the decline of the collective-farm newspaper can be seen. In 1960, 2,740 collective-farm newspapers existed with 45,484 issues; by 1980, the number of collective-farm newspaper had fallen to 607 with 13,178 issues (Newspapers of the USSR, 1982:114). In fact, only six republics — the Ukraine (466), Russian (98), Kirgiz (23), Georgian (15), Armenian (7) and Kazakh (1) — have any collective-farm newspapers (Newspapers of the USSR, 1982:229-231).

Given much of the empirical evidence presented concerning migration patterns, urbanization rate, per capital income, educational and occupational levels, it seems safe to conclude that the Soviet Union, unlike other so-called developed
nations, is indeed partitioned into developing and developed spheres. The Soviet government, facing internal social, cultural, economic and ideological tensions that may arise when large numbers of people remain separated from the whole, chose to work through the central mass media -- notably newspapers -- to integrate the rural-periphery population with the urban-center. The success of this Soviet attempt to unite its people remains inconclusive. However, what is conclusive from examining the way in which the Soviet government officials and/or policymakers have attempted to bring together rural and urban dwellers is that the Soviets seemingly still regard the media as having "powerful effects," a concept generally abandoned in U.S. or Western research. Moreover, it seems that the Soviet press/media have continued to act during the past ten years or so as mobilizers of the rural population, with media products created and disseminated from the urban-center and received and used by the rural-periphery. As long as cultural, social and economic inequalities exist in the Soviet Union, policymakers and government officials may have to use the media as mobilizers of Soviet unity or integration in order to maintain the delicate balance between the urban-center and rural-periphery.
ENDNOTES

1 Soviet sociologists define integration or convergence as the narrowing of differences existing among Soviet nations/nationalities leading to internal development and the transformation of a socialist state into a communist. See Igitkhanian and Gaft, "Convergence of the Social Class Structure... ."

2 For a comprehensive discussion of development, urbanization and industrialization in the Soviet Union and the effects of those changes on rural segments of the population, see Charles Wilber, The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries, pp. 29-109.

3 For an introductory discussion of the historical and philosophical foundations of the dependency model, see F.H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America and T. Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependency."

4 The focus, however, of this paper will be primarily on print media.

5 In contradistinction to Hollander, Soviet scholars see the emphasis on the proletariat rather than the rural laborer as a necessary part of the transition not from a traditional to modern society but from a capitalist to a socialist/communist society. See Z.S. Chertina, "The Bourgeois Theory of 'Modernization' of the Real Development of the Peoples of Soviet Central Asia."

6 For a concise examination of the historical roots of rural inequalities, see Daniel Pipes, "The Third World Peoples of Soviet Central Asia." Pipes traces the urban-rural cleavage back to the days of the czars whereby the czars "conquered" the Soviet middle eastern territory to exploit the resources/land in an effort to build the Russian empire. See also, Alec Nove's, The Soviet Middle East for a more detailed discussion.

7 In a survey of members of four collective farms, a majority at each farm responded that he/she believed considerable improvement in cultural life had been made (the time period is not specified). Mean percentages for all four farms combined of those who responded affirmatively cannot be computed since the survey results did not include the total number questioned on each farm. See Vorontsov, "The Growth of Intellectual Requirements... ."

8 Rural out-migration in the Soviet Union, especially among the young is high. Robert Taaffe estimates an annual average of 1.6 million villagers migrate to the cities. Migration among the young, Taaffe says, has resulted in the "virtual evacuation of some rural areas by the young." Another scholar, David Powell, figures that between 1959 and 1970, some three million villagers left rural regions to resettle in the cities. See Robert Taaffe, "The Migrational Process in Centrally Planned Economies," and David Powell, "The Rural Exodus."

9 The total 1979 population figure for the Soviet Union reported was 262.4 million people. In comparison, 26 percent of the U.S. population (total population being 226.5 million) lived in rural areas in 1980. However, of those who lived in rural areas somewhat less than four percent were engaged in agriculture-related jobs (Academic American Encyclopedia, 1980:387,431).
The use of the dependency model to explain the gap between urban and rural areas in the Soviet Union may have some limitations in this paper because international forces/interactions are not considered. However, it is conceivable that, hypothetically, international demand for a certain product/resource found in the rural areas of the Soviet Union may pressure Moscow indirectly into maintaining the region(s) as rural-developing areas so as the "exploit" the product/resource for export.

Critics of the dependency theory argue that although nations are integrated into the international capitalistic system, they are not passive recipients without critical abilities. See Ingrid Sarti, "Communication and Cultural Dependency: A Misconception."

J. Galtung describes thoroughly the ways in which the center and periphery interact. Rather than defining dependency types, Galtung identifies forms of imperialism or ways which the center may exploit the periphery. See Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism."

Although strictly speaking, the Soviets -- as followers of socialist-Marxist principles -- might challenge the existence of such a stratified class structure, Soviet sociologist V.S. Semenov identified four variants of Soviet class structure. They were: (1) class differences between working class and collective farm peasantry; (2) social differences between manual laborers and intelligensia; (3) social-economic and cultural differences between urban and rural dwellers; (4) social differences with the working class, collective farm peasantry, intelligensia and employees. See E. Weinberg, The Development of Sociology in the Soviet Union, p. 66.

See also T. Khachaturov's article, "New Perspectives on the Economic and Social Development of the USSR." Khachaturov reports that included in the 25th Communist Party's draft was a reference to the "comprehensive development of the Soviet individual" whereby the access of the entire (both rural and urban) Soviet population to similar cultural values would promote interaction between all segments of the population and greater economic development.


Perhaps to integrate the rural and urban populations, television and radio programming, similar to newspapers, become more centrally produced and distributed in an attempt to counter growing nationalism in the republics. See Mickiewicz, Media and the Russian Public.

Unfortunately, Ostapenko does not reveal the number of families in the village so the usefulness of this data is somewhat lessened. He does say that 1,185 persons were surveyed so it is probably safe to say there is much more use of the media and in particular the central newspaper, Selskaya zhizn.

The republics having rural or agrarian-related newspapers are: Azerbaijan (Sovet kendi, circ. 162,000); Belorussia (Selkskaya gazeta, circ. 142,000); Lithuania (Valstechu laikrashtie, circ. 276,000); Moldavia (Vyatsa satului, circ. 116,000); and the Ukraine (Silski visti, circ. 559,000) (Mass Media in C.M.E.A. Countries, 1970).

In terms of the publications with agricultural themes, Belorussia tied with Lithuania with six such periodicals.
REFERENCES


