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ABSTRACT After an overview of the political history of Project Follow Through, this paper offers (1) an analytical history of the program, with special attention being given to the first years; (2) a description of model development and implementation; (3) an analysis of the role of longitudinal research in Follow Through; (4) a discussion of external issues in the next phases of Follow Through; and (5) a synthesis of Follow Through's history and its potential for the future. The analytical history describes changes in the program, activities of program sponsors, preselection of participating communities, program expansion after 1968, later developments, and the evaluation of the program. Model implementation is discussed in terms of the sponsor concept, the status of Follow Through sponsors in 1968, and documentation of sponsor performance. The section on longitudinal research presents arguments against using data obtained from third-graders as an ultimate test of program effectiveness, reviews followup studies of Follow Through programs, and concludes that further studies are needed. The exploration of external issues in the long term development of Follow Through provides a discussion of economic, demographic, and political trends. In conclusion, recommendations for ensuring the continuation of the program are offered: these include suggestions for followup studies and for the development of new program approaches. (RH)
I. Introduction

Follow Through was a programmatic and legislative afterthought. Even Head Start, the program from which Follow Through was built, was not explicitly authorized in the original Economic Opportunity Act (EQA--PL-88-452); instead, it was begun under a provision that was sufficiently vague in its wording as to permit Head Start's introduction.

No one predicted the immediate success that Head Start experienced. Early projections suggested that as many as 100,000 children might be enrolled in the initial summer (1965) projects. Instead, a ground swell of interest surged across the country; 560,000 children in almost fifty percent of the nation's counties were enrolled. (McDavid, Gordon, Grotberg, and Datta, 1968) This overwhelming response and the attendant publicity provoked intense interest in the early childhood period, especially as it related to long-range solutions to problems of poverty and ethnic minority groups. However, despite Head Start's popularity with the public, many of those persons responsible for administering community action programs, under which Head Start was funded, were critical of it. They maintained that Head Start did not provide adequately for community control of its projects. (e.g. Lewis, 1967) This point is particularly important because only as Head Start shifted much of its local decision-making responsibility from professionals to parents and other members of the community did it achieve credibility with Community Action Program (CAP) personnel and with many of the parents whose children were enrolled in Head Start projects. The same dedication to community
control that was described in the Economic Opportunity Act and that came
to characterize Head Start was also made a corner stone of Follow Through,
both in legislation (PL 90-222) and in program direction. In an exchange
of correspondence in July 1967, Sargent Shriver, Director of the Office
of Economic Opportunity, and Harold Howe II, U.S. Commissioner of Educa-
tion, both spoke favorably of the "thinking" and "speaking" of the person
they were about to appoint as the first permanent director of Follow Through
(Shriver, July 13, 1967; Howe, July 18, 1967). The thinking and speaking
to which they referred centered to a substantial degree on parent and
community involvement in the control of local Head Start and Follow Through
projects.

President Johnson proposed the Follow Through program in his January
1967 State of the Union message. In this message, he requested 120 million
dollars in FY 1968 funds to operate such a program for up to 200,000
children. (Johnson, 1967). In late October 1967, two months before the
Economic Opportunity Act was amended to include it, the Johnson Adminis-
tration formally decided to reduce the funding for Follow Through from
the $120M that the president had requested to no more than $15M.

The severe curtailment of funding set by the administration ensured
that Follow Through could not meet its initially proposed purpose—to
follow up on the vast majority of Head Start graduates as they moved
into elementary school. The administration followed its funding reduc-
tion decision by designing an expensive experimental program that further
restricted the number of children that could be served and that also made
it extremely difficult for program personnel to attend to the full range
of services mandated in Head Start. However, no attempt was made to modify
the legislative language to permit this change in program intent and
design, nor was the nature of the changes communicated to those who had a
special interest in the program. (Tucker, 1977) Consequently, neither
members of Congress nor Follow Through's natural constituent groups fully
understood either the nature of the program changes or the reason for
them. Furthermore, a sharp division developed within the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity on the issue. Program personnel in CAP and Head Start
insisted that Follow Through, funded as it was under Title II of the
Economic Opportunity Act, must adhere to community action principles and
must ensure a full range of Head Start type services. They felt that the
experimental program devised to respond to the reduced funding was a giant
rip off by the Office of Education. On the other hand, persons in OEO's
program planning and evaluation group wanted an experimental program that
focused on academic achievement and an experimental design that would
permit identifying winners and losers among the program models. (Madow &
Sorenson Memo, 8/15/68; Evans, 1969) Follow Through program administra-
tors were committed to community action principles (Egbert, 1971); they
also wanted to find out more about what would work best for Follow Through
children. (Follow Through meeting notes, September 16-17, 1968) Pro-
ceeding idealistically, these administrators tried to combine the two
approaches (1) a community action program, including Head Start-type
comprehensive services, with (2) an experimental program. They described
what they were doing as "a research and development effort, but an effort
implemented in a setting designed to provide the services described in
Title II, Section 222, a, 2 of the Economic Opportunity Act." (Egbert,
talk to Great Cities Research Council, 1970, p. 2.)

Neither set of constituent groups was fully satisfied with this
solution. CAP and Head Start personnel and many parents and community persons did not approve of Follow Through's requirement that each project utilize the program approach of a model sponsor and they were skeptical of the emphasis on testing. They did not like the tests available and they thought the testing and evaluation constituted an unfair burden for their children to carry. On the other hand, evaluation persons in the O.E.O and the U.S.O.E. as well as various external reviewers have judged the design to be somewhere between moderately and severely flawed. (Elmore, 1975; House, et.al., 1978; Kennedy, 1977; Anderson, 1978; Haney, 1977; Berdner, 1976)

The conflicting perspectives that marked Follow Through's beginnings have remained with it ever since. This mixed heritage must be considered in any interpretation of Follow Through's past, in evaluating its outcomes, and in planning its future.

The remainder of this paper is organized around five major themes.

1. A brief, analytic history of Follow Through with special attention to the first years.
2. Model development and implementation
3. The role of longitudinal research in Follow Through
4. External issues in the next phases of Follow Through
5. A synthesis of Follow Through's history and its potential for the future
II. A Brief History of Follow Through

Follow Through has two histories. One is a history of conception, birth, growth, and maturation. The other is a history of conflict and confusion. Although each of these histories has been reported in some detail elsewhere (Krulee, et. all, 1972; Elmore, 1975; Rivlin and Timpane, 1975; Haney, 1977), a brief review of those two histories, especially a review that sharpens the points of conflict, may be useful in interpreting where Follow Through is and in speculating where it may reasonably be expected to go next.

Brief History of Follow Through

An abbreviated and simplified version of Follow Through's conception, birth, and growth history may be summarized as follows.

1. The program was first proposed by Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) Director Shriver at a meeting of the Great Cities Research Council on November 18, 1966.

2. President Johnson formally requested a Follow Through program, to continue the Head Start experience, in his message on Children and youth in February 1967.

3. OEO delegated the proposed Follow Through program to the U.S. Office of Education (USOE) and forty pilot projects were initiated in September 1967 to assist program personnel in designing a fully operational program planned for 1968.

4. Budget pressures created by the war in Vietnam caused a reduction in the amount of money appropriated for the Economic Opportunity Act (EAA). As a new program within that act, Follow Through had its
proposed budget reduced; the program was re-designed from one of service to children to one intended to produce information about how early elementary school experiences could be made more effective for Head Start graduates.

5. A program of "planned variation" was begun in order to develop the desired information. In this program, local projects chose from among a set of model sponsors (program approaches) the one they would most like to implement in their community. Data were gathered on children, parents, teachers and other project staff, classroom processes, and project functioning. These data were analyzed and then reported in 1977.

6. At its peak size, Follow Through had a budget of about $60M. It enrolled approximately 60,000 children in 170 projects, each of which was associated with one of twenty model sponsors.

7. Follow Through still serves more than 50,000 children in 150 projects. Many of its projects have been "validated" as successful and are listed in the National Diffusion Network.

A More Detailed History of Follow Through

The history of Follow Through as a history of conflict and confusion is both more complex and more important to our understanding of its past and its future than is a simple developmental history. It is the history of conflict and confusion that I have chosen to emphasize.

Beginnings. The Follow Through program was authorized by a single paragraph amendment in one piece of social legislation passed in the 1960s. The total set of social legislation that came into being during that period grew from conflict--conflict in the civil rights movement and in the widespread concern about poverty and the problems faced by ethnic minorities--
and emerged in a nation torn by dissension from events taking place both internally and abroad. Follow Through itself was the alternative chosen as governmental leaders tried to decide where to place the blame for the failure of any gains which were produced by a summer 1965 Head Start project to show up in tests administered at the end of kindergarten (Wolff and Stein, 1966). Some chose to blame the Head Start concept; others criticized the assumption that school achievement provided an appropriate measure of the success or failure of Head Start; and still others said it was the fault of the schools. Mr. Shriver's speech (1966) implied that primary responsibility for Head Start's "failure" lay with the schools. "The readiness and receptivity they (the children) had gained in Head Start has been crushed by the broken promises of the first grade." President Johnson (1967) attributed the failure of achievement gains to be found at the end of kindergarten to the combination of an abbreviated Head Start experience and the child's out-of-school environment and experience. "Head Start occupies only part of a child's day and ends all too soon. He often returns home to conditions which breed despair. If these forces are not to engulf the child and wipe out the benefits of Head Start, more is required."

Though the direct implications of the Shriver and Johnson Statements differed, the solution—a continuation of Head Start into the school years—was similar. Shriver's call was for a change in the school; Johnson's was for a continuation of the Head Start experience in the school, which would require changes in school programs.

Despite the conflict that surrounded the conception of Follow Through, the first several months of planning were relatively idyllic. A national advisory committee was formed and began drafting materials to be used in
guiding the formation of local projects and a $3M advance was secured from Head Start to fund 30 pilot projects. It was anticipated that experience gained with these projects would be helpful in implementing a full-scale program the next year. Competition was held for selection of the thirty pilot projects. From the approximately ninety proposals submitted--only 100 communities had been invited to apply--the thirty judged best were accepted. Almost immediately, political pressure was exerted; U.S.O.E. and O.E.O. decided it would be a good idea to choose ten more projects for funding. (Internally, this became known as the "Tampa round" of selection.) It was no coincidence that among the additional sites selected were Tampa (Congressman Sam Gibbons), Providence (Senator Claiborne Pell), and Chicago (Mayor James Daley).

Although administration of Follow Through was delegated to U.S.O.E., Head Start personnel, representing the O.E.O., retained a co-equal interest in the program. For example, on August 3, 1967, the Head Start Director and his assistant met with the Director of U.S.O.E.'s Division of Compensatory Education (where Follow Through was to be housed) and his assistant, and the director-designate of Follow Through to establish procedures for selecting Follow Through grantees for the 1968-69 school year. (Herzman Memorandum, 1962) The group specified more than two pages of details to be observed in the selection process. Shortly thereafter, Head Start appointed a staff person to serve as liaison with Follow Through. Whether it was intended or not, this person monitored the purity of Follow Through projects and of Follow Through's adherence to Head Start principles of parent control and comprehensive services. (eg. Orton to Egbert memo, 9/30/1968; Egbert to Wyatt & Snyder memo, 10/14/1968) Furthermore, on numerous later occasions (e.g. Sept. 16 & 17, 1968 and November 18 & 27, 1968) senior Head
Start personnel participated in planning meetings with the senior Follow Through staff and OEO staff made the final determination of what was permissible under the law. For example, the twenty percent non-Federal share presented a serious problem to school districts. OEO would not concede that Follow Through had any freedom of interpretation of this requirement. (Boikess to Egbert memo, May 21, 1968)

In mid October 1967 there began to be rumblings that Follow Through would not be funded at $120 M (Hughes memo to Estes, 10/18/67), but it was not until the twenty-sixth of that month that the semi-formal announcement was made that the most the program could expect for FY1969 was $15 M, of which $3.75 M had been borrowed from Head Start for the forty pilot projects for 1967-68. From the relative calm of monitoring on-going projects, preparing guidelines, and planning a school-year 1968-69 program of reasonably well-defined parameters, Follow Through was plunged into the requirement, and the opportunity, of planning an experimental program of unknown dimensions.

A Change in The Program. The next ten months of Follow Through's life can best be described as a time of haste and confusion. Not only must the shape of the program be changed; the expectations of numerous constituent groups had to be recognized and dealt with. Furthermore, staff attitudes and commitments had to shift. And the staff was entirely inadequate to handle the task. Total staff was approximately a dozen in number, both professional and support. The director was new to government and naive about its functioning. Less than half of the group had any experience in education. Besides this, Follow Through was placed far enough down in the administrative hierarchy that it had no position-power. Only its independent (OEO/EOA) source of funds gave it any strength
at all.

In discussions within DHEW, OEO and USOE, the decision was made that Follow Through should be a program to produce information about how to work more effectively with children from low income families.

However, in planning their programmatic response to this general decision, those responsible for translating it into an operational program considered both the Follow Through legislation and the real world in which any large scale extension of Follow Through would be implemented. The result was a design called planned variation.

In retrospect, it is clear that planned variation was conceived quite differently by persons having one responsibility or another for Follow Through. Alice Rivlin, HEW Deputy Assistant Secretary for Planning and evaluation at the time that planned variation was designed, has said, "It was never made clear to all concerned that these programs (Head Start Planned Variation and Follow Through) were planned variation experiments whose primary purpose was to try out and evaluate different approaches to

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1Some writers (e.g., Elmore, 1975; Bell, 1974) have written with almost an appearance of disbelief that Follow Through administrators in 1967 viewed the restricted funding as a temporary precursor to a reintroduction of a full scale program. That not only Follow Through administrators but also others in much more influential governmental positions held this same perspective is borne out by notes from a Sept. 16-17, 1968 planning meeting that involved the USOE's Division of Compensatory Education Director, Head Start's Deputy Director, and the BOB (OMB) budget examiner responsible for Head Start and Follow Through. (Conference notes, 1968) In that meeting several references were made to Follow Through becoming a service program. The same concept was expressed in a June 19, 1969 memorandum from the Chief of OEO's Evaluation Division in RP/E to the Director of Follow Through (Evans, 1969) "...the time will soon arrive when some decision is going to have to be made about a major expansion of the Follow Through program. Indeed, such decisions are already being made." Gordon Hoke, writing in 1968, said, "There are strong indications of a major expansion in Follow Through... when and if the VietNam struggle ceases." (Hoke, p. 21) Even the FY 1972 budget prepared by Follow Through in August 1970 stated, "If results of Follow Through appear promising, new legislation with new and expanded funding should be requested." (National Follow Through Budget Presentation FY 1972, p. 5)
early education . . . The shift in objectives was clear enough at the policymaking level (but it was not) made clear to many of the lower-level federal, state, and local officials within whose ambit Follow Through was required to operate." (Rivlin and Timpane, 1975, pp. 12-13) From the tone of this entire discussion, it would appear that Rivlin was describing a classical social experiment complete with independent, dependent, and control variables and with randomly assigned experimental and control groups. Certainly many writers since that time have said or suggested as much. (House, et. al., 1978; Anderson, et. al, 1978; Elmore, 1975; and Wisler, 1978)

That Follow Through administrators did not view planned variation as a classic experiment is borne out both by the actions they took and by what they said. For example, in describing the program to an external review panel, the Follow Through director said, "By the time the appropriations bill had been passed, an essential agreement had been reached... that Follow Through would be a research and development program. Local programs would be funded as previously planned (and) an R. & D program would be superimposed--an R and D (program) in which there would be deliberate variation of program approach, deliberate variation in contrast to the sort of variation that normally occurs in a local community when it develops its own program." (Egbert, 1970, pp. 2-3)

If policy makers in HEW, OEO and OMB viewed planned variation differently from those at the operating level, they failed in their many opportunities to describe this difference in perception in 1967, 1968 and 1969 when the decisions were made that determined that the program would be the one described by "lower-level federal...officials". During the formative years, policy makers were concerned with form and procedure. (e.g. LaMoure to Hereford memo, April 18, 1969) Only later did
they decide that the design should have been tighter and the research questions more explicit.

**Program Sponsors.** In order to provide a structure for projects and for consistency across them, Richard Snyder, director of Follow Through's Research and Evaluation Section, conceived a program model/program sponsor concept. The strategy of sponsorship required that each project select from a set of pre-developed, pre-determined approaches the one they would like to adopt and then to work with the program sponsor in the further development and implementation of the approach. The concept was developed during the period from November 1967 through January 1968 in a series of formal and informal meetings, conversations, and telephone calls. In essence, Snyder and his assistant, Frieda Denenmark, talked with essentially all of the leading research child psychologists and early childhood program development persons of the period. Based on those discussions they arranged and conducted a series of four meetings.

The first meeting, December 18-19, 1967, was devoted to a discussion of the planned variation and model sponsor concepts. Though agreement was not unanimous, this meeting did serve to confirm the Follow Through staff judgment that the program sponsor concept was viable and should be implemented.

This first meeting was followed by two meetings of potential program sponsors on January 5 and 6 and January 26 and 27. (Meeting notes, 1968) Whereas the December meeting had been largely limited to theoretician/researchers, the January meetings were devoted to hearing from persons who either were established early childhood educators who represented a particular perspective, e.g. Elizabeth Gilkeson from Bank Street, William Hull from Educational Development Corporation and Marie Hughes from the
University of Arizona, or were persons who were developing an apparently significant, theoretically based, new approach to educating young children. Included in this latter group were such persons as Ira Gordon (University of Florida) and Susan Gray (George Peabody College) who used a parent training approach and Siegfried Engelmann, (Illinois) Larry Gotkin (NYU) and Don Bushell (Kansas) who derived their programs from behavioristic psychology. From the presentations at these meetings, it was obvious that despite the growing interest in early childhood education and despite the extensive publicity given various new programs, no one was fully prepared to move into the primary grades with a completely developed, radically different approach to working with young children. (For example, the highly publicized Engelmann approach was partially developed for preschool [kindergarten] but not beyond.) Despite their limitations, a number of approaches seemed to be sufficiently well developed and to have a sufficiently secure and supportive institutional base that including them in Follow Through was justified. However, it became clear at this time that Follow Through sponsors would need to continue their program development efforts at the same time that they were working on implementation strategies and helping communities to begin their Follow Through projects.

The two January meetings of program sponsors were followed by one on February 9-11 during which an attempt was made to achieve working relationships between potential sponsors of similar persuasion and to secure some better understanding of what might be involved in program sponsorship. Neither effort was markedly successful.

Because it was obvious that certain sets of approaches (models)
were derived from common theoretical bases--(e.g. Kansas, Illinois (now Oregon), and Pittsburgh all have behaviorism as their base)--some time was spent in exploring whether such groups might form consortia or, at least, common interest groups. While common elements were recognized in these discussions, disparities were also noted. (For example, Kansas depends almost entirely on published materials and individual reinforcement procedures; Oregon and Pittsburgh produce their own, quite different materials, but Oregon utilizes extensive small group, direct instruction, while Pittsburgh uses individual materials and individual progress.) Furthermore, there were strong institutional identifications. As a result, each sponsoring institution remained as a separate approach. Analyzing the nature and degree of program similarities and differences for the various sponsors became a major task in the national evaluation.

An additional complicating factor was that in the absence of any precedents, no one knew the capacity of sponsors, either individually or collectively, to work with communities. Whether a sponsor could work with two or five or ten projects in varying locations was totally unknown. Indeed, one of the most perplexing issues which Follow Through faced in February, 1968 was estimating what would be involved in sponsorship. (Egbert to Snyder note, Jan. 6, 1968) Strategies for field implementation of new education programs had to be planned and resources allocated against these plans, but serious attention to this issue was preempted by concerns with program content and with establishing appropriate associations between communities and potential sponsors.

Community Selection. In a separate set of meetings, which included local, State, and federal education and OEO representatives, it was decided: (a) communities could be pre-selected to participate in Follow
Through, if States were involved in the selection (Both the USOE and OEO preferred alternative would have been to accept proposals from all eligible communities, i.e., those having full year Head Start or similar "quality pre-school program." Follow Through administrators judged this to be both burdensome and counter productive.) (b) communities could be required to choose from a restricted set of program approaches, associate with a sponsor, and accept the assistance of the sponsor in developing and implementing his approach; (c) communities could be required to contribute an amount of Title I money equal to 15% of the EOA grant or 10% of the Title I grant, whichever was less; and (d) communities could be required to involve parents and other community members in program planning and operation. Although each of these decisions was important to Follow Through and each came to be generally accepted, each was an issue of some concern at that time. (Follow through meeting notes, Dec. 11-12, 1967)

While these meetings were taking place, the process of identifying potential new Follow Through communities began. From approximately 225 school districts nominated jointly by State educational agencies and State economic opportunity offices and reviewed by regional selection panels, 51 new communities, in addition to the forty 1967-68 pilots, were invited to participate in Follow Through's program of Planned variation. Two meetings were held in Kansas City, Missouri, February 20-24 and 25-28, 1968—the first for representatives from the pilot projects and the second for representatives from the prospective sites. The meetings were designed to acquaint participants with the new phase of planned variation. Old projects were given the option of participating in the new phase o
continuing with their original pilot plans. New communities were required to select one of the fourteen program approaches.

Expansion after 1968. In succeeding years additional communities—approximately sixty in 1969 and twelve in 1970—were brought into the program, following selection procedures paralleling those used in 1968.

The fourteen sponsors were expanded to 20 in 1969-70. Besides providing somewhat different approaches to working with children, five of these six new sponsors gave opportunity for representation by three different groups—a State education agency, minority colleges, and a profit making company—not included in the first set of sponsors.

The decision to bring these five sponsors into Follow Through was not entirely programmatic. The USOE has always been anxious to ensure that states have an opportunity to play a major role in federally funded programs. Follow Through sponsorship provided an opportunity to explore a new state role. In 1968, too, private businesses were becoming increasingly vocal in their demands to be included in new educational ventures. A number of persons in the federal government wanted to give them the opportunity to become more directly involved, and Follow Through provided a convenient vehicle for gaining such experience. Finally, none among the initial fourteen sponsoring organizations truly represented ethnic minorities. At a meeting of Follow Through general consultants (Each project has a general consultant who helps with parent involvement and other non-sponsor issues.) in Atlanta in October, 1968, Black general consultants caucused. After this caucus and a follow up meeting of a few Black consultants, Follow Through agreed to locate appropriate minority sponsors, give more attention to community involvement, employ
additional minority persons on the staff, and consider minority concerns
in the evaluation.¹

Three primarily Black institutions were selected as Follow Through
sponsors in 1968-69, and in 1969-70 developmental grants were made to a
fourth Black potential sponsor who proposed a role-trade model for Follow
Through and to a Chicano educational psychologist who proposed develop-
ment of a new approach to bilingual-bicultural education.

Later Developments. By the early 1970s, the administration had
established new priorities and sought ways of reducing on-going programs
to secure support for its priority programs. Beginning in 1973 attempts
were made to reduce Follow Through funding and to phase out the program.
(Bell, 1974) These administration efforts continued through 1979, but
each time they were blocked when various Follow Through constituent groups
interceded with Congress.

¹Perhaps of equal importance to the agreements was the effect of
these meetings on Follow Through staff, sponsors, and general
consultants. This meeting followed Dr. King's assassination by
only six months and feelings were strong and powerfully ex-
pressed. For some, this was the first direct contact with
Black anger, articulated and personally expressed. Few
people left Atlanta unchanged.
Evaluation

The Follow Through evaluation has been the subject of numerous reports and critiques, e.g. House, et al. 1978; Elmore, 1975; Haney, 1977; Krulee, et al. 1973; McDaniels, 1975; Cohen, 1975; Mosteller & Bereiter & Kurland, 1978. Quite correctly, most of these reports have dealt with both the overall program design and with what the government termed the evaluation. Although in some sense the two (the program design and the evaluation) are separable, in other ways the various evaluation efforts were so dependent on program decisions that they are best considered together. Furthermore, several decisions that some critics consider to have been errors were program decisions and no amount of cleansing in the evaluation effort could correct them.

The most commonly noted "error" in the Follow Through program is that it did not meet the requirements for an experiment, e.g. communities were not randomly chosen and assigned to different sponsors and within projects, neither the school nor the child was randomly assigned to Follow Through (FT)/non-Follow Through (NFT) conditions. This fact has never been a secret; the decision for non-random choice and assignment was never even debated seriously. The non-random decision was made explicit at the program level but neither internal evaluation experts in DHEW or OEO nor external consultants insisted that this was a fatal error in 1967-68.

There were several reasons for choosing the procedures that were used. Whatever reasons others may have had for not raising the non-random issue in 1967-68 cannot be reconstructed in 1981.

Reasons for using non-random choice and assignment
1. The procedure of SEA/STA nomination and then negotiated selection
between state and federal offices was followed because

a. State offices possessed the essential information about the location and size of Head Start and Title I preschool projects.

b. EOA required (1) a mixture of rural and urban projects, and (2) non-public school involvement. (OEO officials were the interpreters of these requirements. [David to Egbert memo, Dec. 9, 1968])

c. The memorandum of agreement between OEO and USOE required that at least half of the children served in a FT project be graduates of a Head Start of other quality pre-school program. Only through careful tracking and extensive negotiation could these requirements be met.

d. Both the "Tampa round" of selecting Follow Through projects and the consistent victories, in other programs, of STAs and SEAs working through their elected representatives on the hill provided convincing evidence that wherever possible potential problems should be worked through in advance with state agencies. In general this policy paid off with good FT/State relations.¹

¹Despite its care, Follow Through had one substantial failure in a political battle over funding a local project. Ironically, the Nixon administration, with no commitment to community action, supported a local CAA and a Democratic Congressman in their fight with Follow Through. The issue was that the LEA was unwilling to accept the project. The CAA offered to accept the funds and establish a project, with parent decision making, in a non-public school setting. Because of its commitment to LEA/CAA cooperation, Follow Through refused. Furthermore, when the Democratic Congressman in whose district the project was to be located summoned the Follow Through director to his office for an accounting, the FT director declined. The Republican administration, which was trying to eliminate the OEO and which did not support EOA programs, including FT, insisted that the director meet with the Congressman (It turned out to be an aide.) and the local CAA director. Furthermore, the administration "encouraged" Follow Through to give the grant. After a great deal of additional negotiation, the LEA agreed to cooperate and the grant was given.
2. The procedure of permitting the local project to select its own program approach was used because

a. Community action suggested that those involved in the local project should have as much control as possible.

b. Tradition dictated that local schools control their own curriculum and teaching methods.

c. Follow Through staff felt that if the project made its own model selection it would have a greater commitment to that program approach. Even one critique which is generally negative concerning early Follow Through program decisions defends the logic of securing local commitment through self selection of program approach. (Wisler, Burns & Iwamoto, 1978)

d. Some State and local advisors were uneasy about even requiring that local projects adopt a sponsor. Only after extensive discussion did they concur that, if given a choice, the project could be required to implement a program approach developed outside of the community. (Follow Through Meeting notes Dec. 11-12, 1967) [There's little question that, if some of the pilot projects had been required in 1968 to choose a sponsor, those projects would have appealed to powerful political figures. [e.g. Portland, Tampa, New York] Had they done so, the entire program likely would have been scuttled. Persons at high levels did not care enough to fight for it.]

3. Children were not assigned randomly for essentially the same reasons that projects were not assigned randomly to program sponsors. In addition, assigning children randomly would have required extensive inter-school and inter-school and inter-district assignment and transportation.
4. In the mid-1960s researcher/program developers were reporting remarkable success with new approaches to working with children. It seemed likely that these approaches which had worked so well in controlled experiments would also succeed in Follow Through.

Program administrators recognized from the first that the Follow Through planned variation program was not a traditional experiment and special accommodations would be necessary in the evaluation. (Egbert to Hughes research and evaluation budget justification memorandum, February 19, 1968)

It must be reemphasized that the "planned variation" design of the current Follow Through program by no means approximates the paradigm of the controlled experiment. Hence, it will be particularly important that we obtain measures, not only of the educational and developmental accomplishments of the children and their families, but also of the processes which each community has succeeded in putting into effect. The types of information needed for these assessments--including but not limited to the kinds of sociological data referred to in (1) above--are costly to obtain but essential for inferences and conclusions needed for future program guidance. It should be made clear that we are talking here about such time-consuming procedures as direct classroom observation, observations of small groups of children in special settings and lengthy interviews with school administrators, teachers and parents. These activities require large resources even when the most efficient sampling designs are used.

This perspective was reinforced in an AERA presentation by Follow Through's Chief of Research and evaluation. (Snyder, 1969, pp. 11-12)

The paradigm for the ideal field experiment would call for a situation in which a small number of clearly defined parameters or program elements could be systematically varied, in which self-selection played no part in determining which treatment was adopted by the communities, and in which each experimental group was matched with a true control group--i.e., in which the distinction between experimental and control groups was determined by random assignment. However, although inherent limitations prevent even approaching this paradigm in Follow Through, we believe that it will be possible to make useful comparisons among the different approaches; we also believe that the
experience of the program sponsors will soon permit them to define much more sharply a number of issues which can be studied with more systematic research designs, either on an intra or inter project basis. "Action research" always involves compromises; and by now you must see how complicated a task we face in trying to study the development and measure the impact of the different program approaches in ways which will yield the kind of information on which decisions about future program development can be based.

Serious planning for the Follow Through evaluation began at a March 21-23, 1968 meeting of HEW and OEO staff and such external consultants as David Cohen, Eugene Glass, Robert Hess, Thomas Hastings, Halbert Robinson, Michael Scriven, Susan Stodolski, Robert Thorndike & Edward Zigler. As reported in a long memorandum by one of the participants (Wyatt to Rivlin & Wholey, March 25, 1968) a number of issues were discussed, agreements were reached, and next steps were decided upon. Among the decisions were: (a) There was not enough time to prepare and issue an RFP; contacts would need to be made with a restricted number of organizations inviting them to prepare proposals. (b) Some minimum, common pre-test data should be obtained in the fall of 1968. (c) Additional child measurement instruments were needed. (d) (strong agreement) There are two stages in the development of a program approach and it is important to distinguish between them in the evaluation. During the first (formative) stage, which could last for several years, the evaluation should focus on the development process as much as on "outcomes" with children. "A comparison between programs, to the extent it is possible (this was not fully resolved), can begin to take place only after (Emphasis in original) a period of time, as programs become comparatively less fluid and more summative." (This two-stage concept was explicitly recognized in Follow Through's 1970 "Reporting Plan for Follow Through Evaluation. Egbert to Hereford, June 24, 1970)
Of interest also in Wyatt's summary is that at least some suggestion was made that teachers and other project populations, including students, should have some input into the evaluation. No reference is made in Wyatt's summary that anyone objected to non-random assignment of projects, schools, or children.

Following the March 21-23 meeting discussions were held with a number of organizations considered capable of conducting the Follow Through evaluation. Three of the organizations actually submitted proposals—Stanford Research Institute (SRI), American Institutes for Research in the Behavioral Sciences (AIR) and Educational Testing Service (ETS). The AIR proposal was brief, explicit, and specific; the SRI proposal was longer, and contained a more complete discussion of issues and problems; the ETS proposal was brief (four pages), vague, and suggested that the first year should be spent in planning, exploration of centers, public relations, identification of sample, "beginnings of professional cooperation with centers," and, in May, collection of child baseline data. The SRI and AIR proposals were precise, "slick" documents with the usual institutional capability boilerplate; the ETS proposal was headed "Notes on Possible ETS Participation in Follow Through Research and Evaluation" and was reproduced on a spirit duplicator. The AIR and SRI proposals were explicit about staff and made half time and greater commitments of senior staff members; ETS was vague in its staff commitments.

The review panel, including outside experts as well as representatives of OASPE, OPPE, BESE and RP/E (OE0) agreed unanimously on SRI. (Hughes to Ester memorandum, June 25, 1968) Retrospective judgment suggests that the ETS proposal, with an entire year spent on planning, community relations, sample selection, etc., would have been a better
choice. But no one recognized that in 1968.

The Stanford Research Institute held the major Follow Through Evaluation contract through 1972, at which stage its role became restricted largely to data gathering. Abt Associates secured the data analysis contract in 1972 and completed its final report in 1977. The activities, successes and failures, and results obtained through these contracts have been amply analyzed and critiqued elsewhere, e.g. House, et al., 1978; Elmore, 1975; Haney, 1977; Wisler, et al. 1978; Cohen, 1975; Mosteller, 1975; Bereiter & Kurland, 1978; and Evans 1974.

Despite the publicity surrounding the SRI/Abt evaluation, they were not the only Follow evaluation efforts. Follow Through funded several evaluation contracts which have been largely ignored. Only Haney (1975) has recognized the range of efforts which Follow Through attempted as it struggled to comprehend and master the conceptual, developmental, administrative, and logistical issues involved in the evaluation. Among others, the Follow Through evaluation funded the following efforts, in addition to the child data described in the Abt reports.

1. Classroom process studies--SRI (Stallings); University of Florida (Soar)
2. Project case studies--SRI (Crockett and others)
3. Development of non-cognitive measures--SRI (Rhine and others)
4. Development of measures of complex cognitive processes--ETS
5. Health Services--Bio-Dynamics (Sullivan)
6. Development of classroom process/child measures--Columbia University (Grannis)
7. Parent Interviews--SRI (NORC)
8. Assessing & trying to improve evaluation techniques--SSRC (Rieken & Zellmer)

9. Analysis of organization and implementation issues--Northwestern University (Krulee); NERO (Judd)

10. Teacher Characteristics and Attitudes--SRI

11. Cost Analysis--RMC

12. Planning and Design Assistance--Huron Institute

Most of these contracts and subcontracts dealt with specific issues considered important by Follow Through administrators, higher level evaluation specialists in HEW or OEO, or by sponsors. But one contract, the one to SSRC, was a serious effort to provide the continuing, strong conceptual support and guidance recommended by the March 21-23, 1968 panel and suggested by others later on as having been needed. Unfortunately, despite the quality of those who participated with SSRC, this contract was not successful in its major objectives. Issues were raised, but resolutions were not achieved. It remained for the technicians at Huron Institute to provide the external assistance needed for evaluation decision making. In one sense, the Huron Institute guidance was useful, because the design did become tighter, but, as Haney (1977) has noted, "...if the evaluation has improved over time, it has been getting better at answering narrower and narrower questions." (p. 249)
III. Model implementation

At the heart of the planned variation concept in Follow Through was the arrangement whereby a local project chose from a pre-determined list the program sponsor with which it wanted to associate. During the first year of planned variation Follow Through there were fourteen program sponsors. In subsequent years, the list was expanded to more than twenty. (For a listing of the sponsors, a description of the range of approaches, and a discussion of the process used in selecting sponsors see Egbert, 1973; Krulée, et. al. 1973; Elmore, 1976.)

The Sponsor Concept.

The notion of program sponsorship has had different meanings for different people; furthermore, the meaning has shifted over time, both for sponsors and for others closely associated with Follow Through.

The simplest definition of program sponsor (approach) is an instructional model, fully developed, completely static, and uniformly implemented. A number of persons associated with program evaluation appear to have identified with this definition. Such persons appear to consider any program deviation from this definition to be a failure and any conceptual deviation to be wrong. They also tend to use the term "experiment", attaching it as a modifier either to Follow Through or to planned variation. (Wisler, et. al., 1978; Mosteller, 1975; Evans, 1977)

In fact, by 1970, some of those persons with OEO responsibility for Follow Through became so disenchanted with Follow Through's lack of definition & control that they ran a controlled experiment in which there were program models and randomly assigned schools. This experiment--performance contracting--met the technical requirements which Follow Through did not, but the only outcome from that effort seemed to be that more than one year was required to "install" and test even math
& reading models, a fact to which Follow Through sponsors gladly would
have attested prior to the initiation of The Performance Contracting
experiment.

The definition/description which has operated in Follow Through is
that (a) the sponsor have developed a promising approach to working
with young children, (b) the approach had a theoretical basis, (c) the
sponsor was willing to work with a number of communities in implementing
the approach, (d) the sponsor had a supportive institutional base, and
(e) the sponsor accept mutual accountability for the program's im-
plementation and success.

By contrast, in the Performance Contracting experiment, the model
did not need to describe a theoretical basis nor was there mutual accoun-
tability. Instead of mutual accountability, there were carefully pre-
scribed separate responsibilities. The school district was responsible
to provide the students for a specified number of instructional periods
and minutes; the contracting firm was responsible to provide instruction
leading to achievement gains. The firm was to be paid by OEO (The
Federal Government) in proportion to test score gains achieved beyond
a certain minimum grade level increase. (GAO, 1973) Some persons
clearly have assumed that Follow Through program sponsors either were,
or should be, similar to performance contracting firms. (e.g. Wisler, et.al., 1978)

Status of Follow Through Sponsors in 1968. Programs that became asso-
ciated with Follow Through in 1968 (or in succeeding years) were in
varying stages of development. They ranged from the Bank Street College
of Education approach that had been developed and tested over a period
of several decades to a number of programs that were still in an early
developmental phase and had scarcely been tried at all with school aged children, e.g. those approaches described by Engelmann and Becker, Bushell, Gotkin, Smock, and Hodges. However, each one had been written up in the professional literature and many had received publicity in the popular press, publicity suggesting an exciting, highly successful program. (e.g. Newsweek January 29, 1968, pp. 47-48; Pines, 1966)

Something of the tentative nature of the program status for some sponsors is evidenced by a quotation from the Engelmann-Becker proposal for participation in Follow Through: "The curriculum focuses on 3 major academic areas–language concepts, arithmetic, and reading. Programmed material will be available for the reading and perhaps for the language programs by the beginning of the fall semester." (Proposal for Bereiter-Engelmann Participation in Project Follow Through, undated mimeo p. 1)

In his proposal, Bushell wrote about tokens given contingently, reinforcing events in the classroom, and programmed materials, but he did not describe how these would be put together in a Follow Through classroom. (Bushell mimeo, undated) The reason that he did not describe a detailed program was that one had not been worked through. The group of behaviorists at the University of Kansas (Baer, Wolf, Risley, etc.) had published extensively concerning their work with young children and had established a continuing, if at times uncomfortable, relationship with Head Start. Bushell, a new arrival in the group, had demonstrated that motivation and reading achievement could be improved through reinforcement techniques. It was because of this demonstrated competence in working with what was then a relatively new technology that had grown from behavioral psychology, rather than an established program,
that caused Follow Through to invite the University of Kansas to submit a program sponsor proposal.

The Far West Laboratory for Educational Research and Development proposed a program that was a "logical extension of the program that was developed for environmentally deprived three- and four-year-old children at the New Nursery School in Greeley, Colorado." (Nimnicht FWLERD mimeo, undated) The New Nursery School was created by Glen Nimnicht, who also was to manage the FWLERD Follow Through sponsorship. It was based on the assumption that the child's self-concept, motivation, and learning skills as well as his/her achievement would be improved through working with equipment and materials that themselves give feedback of success (reinforcement).

Clearly none of these three potential model sponsors had a fully developed program ready "to install and be evaluated". Instead, each one of them had a well described theoretical base, a partial program and a clear notion of what a full program might be, good leadership, and a strong support institution. There were several other groups at a similar stage of development, e.g. those at the University of Florida and the University of Georgia.

As indicated above, at the other end of the spectrum from those sponsor approaches that had come into being in the mid-1960s was the approach sponsored by the Bank Street College of Education. This approach to the education of elementary school children had its roots in Deweyian philosophy and analytic psychology and had been developed and refined during half a century of working in its own laboratory and in the New York City schools. Bank Street did not propose to do anything radically different in Follow Through from what it had already been doing.
Somewhere between Bank Street and the new arrivals to early childhood education in its degree of program development was the University of Arizona. Dr. Marie Hughes, the initial manager of that sponsorship, had a life long history of work in elementary education. In the 1960s she initiated a project with the Ochoa Elementary School in Tucson which emphasized language competence and other skills the child would need in order to succeed in a changing and technical society. Special attention was given to the needs of non-English speaking children. As partial support for this project and related activities, Dr. Hughes secured funding as a Center in the National Laboratory for Early Childhood Education. From her extensive experience in working with elementary school age children and their teachers and her specific work at the Ochoa School, Dr. Hughes proposed to Follow Through a new, although well-developed, approach to early education.

Although the proposed program was Follow Through's primary focus in considering a potential sponsor, also of great importance was the sponsor's ability to work effectively with a set of local communities in the adaptation and implementation of the program. The nature of program development was reasonably well understood; the issues involved in local adaptation and implementation were much less well understood, and there were few precedents in education for such an undertaking. Certainly, the traditional teacher education institution/local school district relationship did not provide very useful guidance. In that instance the teacher is educated in one institution and then employed by another on an individual basis. The teacher education institution assumes little responsibility for the school district's program, and the school district employs the teacher for his/her
personal capabilities rather than because of the institution granting the degree. There is no required institutional relationship involved. In Follow Through on the other hand, the sponsor has a strong, continuing commitment to the nature and success of the district's program and, hence, to the performance of the individual teacher. The district is concerned about the sponsor's philosophical base because that base shapes the entire program. It also is concerned about the sponsor's ability to deliver its program.

In order to be effective in transmitting (with appropriate local adaptation) a complex educational program, the Follow Through sponsor had to devise a delivery system which would both insure that the program's intent was properly implemented and that adequate feedback was provided to assist in making needed specific and generic modifications.

Review of initial sponsor proposals suggests that at least some of them understood something of the nature and size of their implementation problem. FWLERD (Nimmich, p. 9) described a year-long plan that included nine seminars for program assistants--each district was to have one. This proposal described a staff of five persons to develop materials and conduct the seminars and stated a five year minimum for program implementation in a given district.

The Universities of Kansas and Pittsburgh described a three stage program including orientation, training institutes for supervisory personnel, and four to six week visiting internships for teachers and/or supervisory personnel at the Pittsburgh and Kansas developmental schools. (Resnick, Bolvin, & Bushell memo, February 21, 1968)

The Engelmann-Becker group described a three phase teacher training program--(a) a six week intensive summer program for all teachers, (b)
field supervision, with a ratio of one supervisor for twelve teachers, and (c) a demonstration class that would pilot the materials for the local projects and that would be visited by local project teachers, in groups of eight, for one week sessions during the first semester. (Bereiter-Engelmann proposal; mimeo; undated) Dr. Hughes described a similar approach in a letter to local projects dated March 22, 1968.

Common to all of these proposals were a central staff, pre start-up training, and continuing training and feedback. Three of the five described a specific, continuing liaison between the sponsor and the local project. Other proposals were reasonably parallel, with some sponsors placing relatively greater emphasis on summer workshops, e.g. Bank Street, and others on a continuing sponsor/project liaison. Two of them, FWLERD and the University of Arizona, explicitly referred to microteaching as one of the techniques to be used.

A reasonable generalization about the Follow Through sponsors might be that their programs were not as fully developed as research reports and the popular press implied; however, their developmental capacity and their willingness to tackle the tough problems of implementation were greater than anyone had any right to expect.

Beginning in the summer of 1968 fourteen program sponsors, later expanded to twenty-two, began working with from one to fourteen separate projects, with a given sponsor's projects likely to be scattered across the entire country, though the projects of some sponsors tended to be concentrated more in certain parts of the country than did others. More than a dozen institutes and workshops ranging from one to six weeks in length were held during that first summer. Some sponsors held only one workshop; others held one for each local project. (Hoke, 1968)
Beginning in the fall, liaison persons (often called program assistants or field representatives) started assisting local projects to implement and adapt the sponsor's program approach. They used many approaches including the modeling of teaching behaviors, micro-teaching, classroom observations of teaching and teacher-pupil interaction, and serving as a resource person. They also provided formal and informal feedback to the sponsor.

Over the next several years, scores of workshops were held, and thousands of visits and telephone calls were made to and from local projects. From this experience, numerous changes were made in programs and in delivery systems. By the winter of 1970-71 when sponsor reviews were conducted by USOE staff, substantial progress had been made by most sponsors in both of these major dimensions of their responsibilities. Problems identified seemed to be divided fairly evenly between the two. (Follow Through Internal Memos, December 1970 to May 1971)

One of the most remarkable aspects of sponsor activity was the amount of program, implementation, and feedback material produced. A comprehensive study of materials used by each sponsor, conducted in the early 1970s, resulted in a several hundred page volume devoted primarily to listing and describing materials in four categories; classroom instruction, staff development, parent education/involvement, and evaluation system. (Judd & Wood, 1973)

Comprehensive descriptions have been published elsewhere of Follow Through implementation processes. (Kruize, Hetzner, & McHenry, 1972; USOE, The FT Planned Variation Experiment, Vol. III; and Elliott, Judd, & Wood, 1975). An anthropological interpretation was reported by Beers (1976); and in a special report of sponsor needs Weikart and Banet (1975)
have argued that educational models should be fully developed before a 
Follow Through type attempt is made to implement them in multiple sites. 
The reader is referred to those reports for detailed narratives and 
analyses of sponsor processes, materials, and problems. 

**Documentation of Sponsor Performance.** Follow Through has been criticized 
for doing too much evaluation, for spreading its evaluation resources 
too thinly, for expecting too much from its contractors, especially from 
SRI; it also has been criticized for not doing enough, especially in the 
documentation of sponsor performance, that is, procedures, nature of 
classroom processes, and degree of implementation, etc. (Elmore, 1975) 

The Krulee, et. al. (1973), Judd & Wood, (1973), Elliott, Judd, & 
Wood (1976), and the sponsor volume of the USOE planned variation exper-
iment report all attempted to document some portion of sponsor behavior. 
However, there also were at least three other attempts to achieve some 
level of documentation. Two of these were major undertakings at analysis, 
comparison, and assessing the achievement-related effectiveness of 
classroom processes. The third was a questionnaire request for sponsors 
to judge the degree of project and classroom implementation of their 
models. 

Both SRI (Stallings, 1975) and the University of Florida (Soar, 
1973) received contracts to study classroom processes. Soar used the 
same sorts of observation instruments that he had in other studies. 
Stallings constructed special instruments which were explicitly intended 
to reflect teacher and pupil behaviors which different sponsors valued 
and sought to establish. Both Soar and Stallings found differences 
among the various sponsors; they also found some marked similarities 
and considerable overlap on many dimensions between classrooms from 
different sponsors. They also found achievement test score: relationships
with various classroom processes.

Funding of the Soar and Stallings studies began in the first year of the Follow Through evaluation program, 1968. There never has been any major, separately identified funding for a study of the degree of model implementation at the classroom and project level. However, both in 1969-70 and in 1970-71 SRI obtained fairly extensive data from sponsors concerning implementation. (Sorenson memo to Egbert & Snyder, April 9, 1971) Sponsor judgments were obtained on the degree of classroom and project implementation; ratings also were obtained for individual teacher performance. In 1969-70 the classroom/project ratings were undifferentiated as to reason for the judgment; however, the 1970-71 evaluation asked for the criteria used in making the judgment and for a weighting of those criteria.

Concluding Statement on Part III. The Follow Through concept of program sponsors was unique in education at that time. The concept has been praised (e.g. Hodges, 1978; Weikart & Banet, 1976; Stallings, 1974); it also has been questioned (e.g. Anderson et.al. 1978; Elmore, 1975.) The number of Follow Through sponsors has been of particular concern to some critics (e.g. Elmore, 1975; Bell, 197A). The most commonly expressed criticism of those who think that Follow Through works with too many program sponsors is that there "cannot be that many discrete educational approaches." Nobody ever said there were. In fact, from the earliest meetings, Follow Through staff members who saw similarities among sponsors tried to encourage groupings and mutual efforts. (Follow Through staff papers, mimeo, undated) Others, not directly associated with Follow Through also sought a basis for organizing the program approaches. For example Giammetteo (Undated mimeo, 1968) conceived
three major thrusts which he expects to continue to develop during the next twenty or thirty years." The three thrusts that he identified were derived from the work of Skinner, Piaget, and Rogers. Giammetteo also said (p. 7) that "with the multiplicity of approaches subsumed under each (of the three general thrusts), research should continue for at least ten or twenty years... until funding for such research is considered an essential part of the educational institutions in the regions."

Attempts to group the sponsors continued from 1968 through the summative evaluation conducted by ABT Associates in which the sponsors were organized in three groupings. (Stebbins, et.al., 1977) However, sponsors have resisted all efforts to bring similar sponsors together. Undoubtedly some resistance to joining in coalitions comes from the obvious institutional advantages of remaining separate, but there also are substantial; readily apparent differences among programs which are derived from the same theoretical base. Justify considering them separately. The most naive observer would be unlikely to misclassify a token economy classroom for a DISTAR classroom or either one of these for an IPI classroom, yet all three programs are derived from a behavioral base. Though the differences may be more subtle, after reviewing materials and program descriptions, a sophisticated Piagetian scholar described the cognitive curriculum and the Mathemagenics approach, both Piagetian in origin, as being derived from quite different portions of Piagetian theory. (Santmire, personal communication, 1975)

The decision to have a fairly large number of sponsors was, then, both programmatic and pragmatic. The programmatic reason rested in the uniqueness of individual approaches within the same theoretical framework; the pragmatic reasons were both administrative, concern that some sponsors would fail in the implementation process, thus leaving voids...
in the theoretical domain and political; the internal and external
desire to give previously unrepresented groups an opportunity to become
program sponsors.
IV. Longitudinal Research and Follow Through

From the very first meetings that led to Follow Through's planned variation approach and the use of program sponsors, some of those involved have argued that analysis based on data gathered at the end of third grade would be inconclusive at best and that it could lead to conclusions the opposite of those which should be reached.

The arguments against using third grade data as the ultimate "test" are three-fold:

a. Gains resulting from the Follow Through experience might wash out within a year or two after the program's conclusion. (Except for the so-called Basic Skills programs' performance on achievement tests this fear has been laid to rest by the ABT Associates report. [Stebbins, et.al., 1977])

b. The success of education, particularly Follow Through, cannot be measured by test scores alone. Other school and out-of-school indices are equally as important as test scores. These other indices, e.g. school attendance and graduation, delinquency, employment, etc., do not have readily identifiable correlates at the third grade level.

c. The third grade may not be a good time to take measures even on traditional achievement instruments. At that age, the child is in the middle of the concrete operations stage of development. Although there is in general a substantial correlation between achievement test performance at the end of third grade and later scores, there is little evidence on the later impact of different models of primary grade education. However, it seems likely that there would be differences between those models that emphasize content and, hence,
may build strong structures from which equilibration can proceed, and those models that emphasize the processes of development. There may well be further differences among content models and among process models depending on the nature of the content or the process that is given emphasis.

If this logic is valid, only when the majority of the children in a given Follow Through cohort have had a reasonable opportunity to achieve the formal operations stage of development would it be appropriate to administer traditional achievement tests. Such tests should be supplemented by instruments designed to measure both the extent of formal operations progress and the level of conceptual development.

The importance of follow up studies of Follow Through graduates has been given empirical credibility by reports published during the past few years showing positive results for children who were enrolled in preschool programs. (Weikart, Epstein, Schweinhart, and Bond, 1978; Weber, Foster, and Weikart, 1978; Schweinhart and Weikart, 1980; Ryan (ed.), 1974; and Lazar, et. al. 1977.) The Lazar and Ryan reports summarize follow up studies from a number of different research groups. The three other reports are extensive, detailed studies of children studied by a single research group.

The Lazar report concluded that "(1) Infant and preschool services improve the ability of low income children to meet the minimal requirements of the schools they enter. .. (2) Low income adolescents who received early education rate their competence in school higher than comparable adolescents who did not have preschool education. .. (3) As measured by the Stanford-Binet and WISC tests preschool programs produce
a significant increase in the intellectual functioning of low-income children at least during the critical years of the primary grades in school." (Lazar, et.al, p. 107) The Ryan report gave similar results for intelligence gains but also stated that achievement test gains showed up even after IQ differences were not found.

The Weikart, et. al. study, which compared three different curriculum approaches in the education of preschool children, concluded that, if well implemented, any of the models studied can produce a long-term positive impact on standardized aptitude and achievement test scores. The Weber, Foster and Weikart study was a cost benefit analysis of an intermediate grades follow up of children from a preschool program. The researchers concluded that, even without further research, one year of preschool compensatory education has economic justification. (There was not enough evidence at this age to draw a similar conclusion for two years of preschool education.) The Schweinhart and Weikart study reports a later follow of the same children studied by Weber et.al. It contains further behavioral evidence that a quality preschool experience has beneficial effects later on.

Although a number of critics have questioned the validity of any results derived from the Follow Through/non-Follow Through population (Elmore, 1975; Mosteller, 1975; House, et.al. 1978; Kennedy, 1977), Bereiter & Kurland (1978) have argued quite convincingly that this perspective is unduly pessimistic. Their reanalysis of the Abt data shows a clear "victory" for the behaviorally oriented programs. As an argument for further studies of the Follow Through child population, the important issue of the Bereiter & Kurland study is not "who won" but that there is enough potential power to permit finding inter-sponsor differences.
(Bereiter & Kurland finessed the FT/NFT issue in their analysis; however, as the Abt report is viewed by at least some observers, e.g. Wisler, et al., 1978, it appears to provide similar justification for comparing FT/NFT groups.)

In view of the logic presented for follow up studies of Follow Through children, plus the empirical results obtained from later studies of pre-school children, it seems obvious that high priority should be given to further studies of Follow Through children.

Based on the results of other studies, further studies of Follow Through/non-Follow Through children should be conducted at intermediate grades, junior high, high school, and post-high school levels. Measures should include traditional achievement tests, measures of progress toward formal operations, measures of conceptual level, and a variety of non-cognitive and behavior indices. If such studies are to be successful, special attention must be given to sample selection and individual child/youth location.

In view of the extreme variability of results from project to project, institutional case studies should be made of a few carefully selected successful and unsuccessful projects.
V. External Issues in the Long Term Development of Follow Through

Head Start and Follow Through came into being during economic and demographic boom periods. On both of these crucial dimensions, economy and demography, the United States has experienced dramatic reversals since that time. From a high of 4.3 M births in 1958, we dropped to a low of 3.2 M in 1975. The economy has changed from low inflation, low unemployment, and high annual increase in the GNP. In addition, the political mood of the country has changed from liberal and expansive to conservative and defensive. All three of these conditions have affected Follow Through and the way it is perceived.

Anyone planning national policy related to early education would do well to consider the economic, demographic and political trends and the likelihood of their continuation or reversal and the possible multiple impacts of either eventuality. Although all three are mentioned in this paper, there is only time to give an extremely brief, overly simplistic review of present status and alternative predictions for each and to suggest a few dimensions that policy planners should consider as they think about Follow Through's future.

a. Demographic Trends. Beginning in 1976 and continuing through 1980 there has been a stabilizing of the fertility rate accompanied by an increase in the number of births. This increase has resulted from the constant fertility rate combined with the increasing number of women in the child bearing years. Some researchers predict that as the number of women in the most productive of the child bearing years begins to decline, there will be an accompanying decrease in the number of births. Other demographers, notably Easterlin (1978), predict an age-specific improvement in economic conditions for persons in the smaller age cohorts that will enter
the child bearing years beginning in the mid-eighties and that this improved economic condition will result in fewer women choosing to be employed which will, in turn, result in a higher fertility rate and hence, either a constant or an increased number of births.

b. Economic Trends. The economic turmoil of the past few years probably will continue at least for the next two to three years. Even if the supply side economics of the Reagan administration (a) can be implemented, and (b) proves successful, several years will be required for a major stabilization and improvement of inflation, unemployment, and economic growth. If, as most economists seem to believe, it will be necessary to combine restraint in government spending and a substantial increase in personal savings with a tax cut to produce the positive effects predicted from the proposed reduction in taxes, the outlook is less hopeful. Apart from defense, the federal budget offers less potential for large reductions than some people suppose. On the other hand, to produce substantial increases in personal savings will require much stronger action than was taken by the Carter administration. Even if the Reagan administration succeeds in increasing both depreciation rates and the incentives for personal savings, the resulting improvement in the economy is likely to require several years.

In summary, a major improvement in the country's economic condition in the next one to three years seems unduly optimistic. Indeed, some economists predict that unless we take steps that probably are politically impossible our economy is due to worsen rather consistently until we achieve an essentially bankrupt state.
c. Political Trends. Political views tend to be cyclical and it seems likely that the present conservative trend will reverse itself. More difficult is predicting when the reversal will occur and how the more liberal perspective that replaces it will be expressed. What does seem likely is that the emphasis in a new spending expansion, will shift, at least in relative terms, from the young child to an older age group.

Despite the prediction of a shift in relative interest from younger to older persons, there is some evidence to suggest a mid-1980s increase in interest in young children. As a result of the increased number of births occurring since 1975, there will be a growth in the early elementary school population during at least the first half of the 1980s. Eggert & Kluender (1980) have shown that while funding for school programs ultimately will match (or exceed) changes in the school population, there is a delay between the population growth and the parallel funding increase. Thus, it might be predicted that public interest in the younger school age child (Follow Through) once again will increase, but that this increase will begin to occur about the middle of the decade.

If there is to be another major increase in federal interest in the early elementary age child, we predict that it will occur about 1985 or 1986. This prediction is based the following assumptions.

1. Growth in elementary school population
2. Increased public attention to this group
3. Improved economic conditions
4. Beginning of shift in the political cycle from conservative to liberal
Based on this prediction, we suggest that Follow Through prepare for increased funding opportunities to begin in the middle of the decade.

As preparation for this opportunity, Follow Through should conduct the follow up studies described in Section IV, thus providing the data base needed to rationalize the planned variation efforts of the 1960s and 1970s and to justify a new and improved round of experimentation. It also should develop some new models, following a process similar to the one described by Weikart and Banet (1975).

Although a variety of new program approaches should be considered, it is recommended that special attention be given to the rationale and the recommendation for new program models contained in an internal "position paper" written by Egbert in 1970. This paper argues that both Head Start and Follow construed the intent of their authorizing legislation too narrowly when they concentrated on "school" settings and the direct instruction of the child. This classroom based approach carries the implicit assumption that child learning occurs only in formal instruction. This approach also has the disadvantage of complicating the provision of service to poor children in rural areas, in regions of low poverty incidence, in non-public schools and integrated schools. Egbert recommended "development of Follow Through approaches not focused on the classroom, nor even on the school." (p. 3) Presumably also he intended something different from the Florida parent education model and AFRAM's transfer of power model. He specifically recommended "That the approach have as its primary concern the child's out-of-school life, while retaining (as a possible goal) improving the dialogue between the child, the child's family, and the school." (p. 4) He also recommended broadly defined child outcome goals.
VI. Synthesis and Projection

Follow Through and Head Start were legislative and programmatic afterthoughts. Neither one was mentioned in the original Economic opportunity Act (PL 88-452). Head Start was begun as an experimental child development program in the summer of 1965. Because its funding came from the Community Action portion of PL88-452, Head Start built Policy Advisory Committees (later, Policy Committees) into its program structure.

Follow Through was derived from Head Start both legislatively and programmatically and it preserved the Head Start traditions, including comprehensive child development services and community action. When reduced funding forced Follow Through into an experimental, i.e. planned variation/program sponsor, mode, it still maintained the Head Start traditions. In doing so, Follow Through Compromised its experimental purity. This compromise was made because (a) it was considered necessary in order to comply with the law, (b) Follow Through administrators respected the Head Start format and thought that modification of that format would result in an artificial condition which would not be replicated when a large scale Follow Through was funded, (c) mid-1960s researchers/program developers reported results which suggested that program effects could be obtained that would be educationally meaningful and much larger than barely statistically significant, and (d) state level advisors considered it politically infeasible to be more restrictive with local projects than requiring that they choose from a range of program sponsors. Indeed, some state level people
objected to local projects having any model requirements.

Follow Through commissioned a set of evaluation studies characterized as both too ambitious and too narrow. Among others, these studies included (a) community case studies, (b) classroom process/outcomes, (c) health services, (d) development of complex cognitive process measures, (e) development of non-cognitive measures, (f) teacher characteristics and attitudes, (g) parent interviews, and (h) comparisons of Follow Through and non-Follow Through children using traditional measures and also measures of other child characteristics. Some of these studies produced a great deal of information; others produced very little.

Follow Through evaluation studies have been characterized as being of little value because of flawed program design and/or restricted range of measures. The same studies have been judged by others to show that "basic skills" program approaches worked best. Although both of these perspectives have some validity, recent follow up studies of children from preschool programs strongly suggest, as early Follow Through participants always have maintained, that it was premature to base judgments about Follow Through and its individual program sponsors on third grade data. Achievement, intellectual, behavioral, and economic data all indicate that studies should be continued at junior high, high school, and probably at post high school ages.

Beginning in 1973 and continuing through 1979 successive administrations have attempted to kill or to phase out Follow Through. Thus far these attempts have failed because Follow Through constituent groups have successfully interceded with Congress.
The years immediately ahead will be marked by political conservatism; economic instability, inflation, and low growth rate; a modest increase in the primary grades school population; and an increased demand that those receiving welfare work for their payments. Within a few years the increase in primary grades enrollment will lead to renewed interest in early elementary education; however, there will be a delay between the increased enrollment and the elevated interest. Furthermore, the renewed interest will be tempered by the political conservatism and the economic instability.

To ensure continuation of Follow Through during the next few years, it is important to preserve the constituent groups as viable forces. Therefore, emphasis in the immediate future should be concentrated on:

a. Follow up studies of

1. Children at junior high, senior high, and post high school levels (A reasonable sample must be located.)
   a) Academic measures
   b) Intellectual measures
   c) Developmental measures
   d) Behavioral measures

2. Follow Through Projects. Institutional studies of successful and unsuccessful projects.

b. Development, but not implementation, of 2-4 new program approaches. At least one or two of these approaches should emphasize the child's out-of-school life, while retaining the possibility of focusing on improving the dialogue among the child, the child's family, and the school.
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