The aim of this paper is to indicate how Project Follow Through can contribute to a better-integrated and rationalized federal programming strategy. The first section identifies areas in which federal programs have consistently succeeded or failed and presents reasons why those outcomes are probably the inevitable results of the policy tools that the federal government has available. Discussion of successes focuses on efforts that make disadvantaged children important clients, build school districts' capacities, encourage curriculum experimentation and research, and strengthen local protectors and advocates for disadvantaged children. Failures include approaches that encourage districts to adopt and faithfully implement promising new curricula, involve the institutionalization of curricular and other practice improvements once grant funds run out, and promote exact compliance in detail with federal financial and service requirements. The second section discusses the problems of the present federal program strategy, specifically focusing on ways in which the programs may be unnecessarily reducing one another's effectiveness. It is argued that two aspects of the federal program structure—the multiplicity of programs in one local site and unfunded requirements—contribute significantly to interference (conflict between categorical programs and the core local program) and cross subsidy (the use of federal funds intended for one purpose or group to provide services for another purpose or group). A third and final section briefly identifies ways that Follow Through can help solve the problems of federal program strategy. (RH)
FOLLOW THROUGH AND THE PROBLEM OF FEDERAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS

by

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My assignment is to review the experience of federal education programs for the disadvantaged, and identify lessons that can be applied to the future of Follow Through. I shall adhere to that assignment, but in what some may consider a roundabout way. Though NIE's original question was, "What can other federal programs tell Follow Through about the problems of developing and implementing new curricula?", the question I shall answer is somewhat different, viz. "What do we now know about the role that Follow Through can play in a better integrated federal programming strategy?"

That change in orientation reflects what I think is the most salient message about the federal government's recent experience in education. It is that efforts to establish separate programs for specific groups of children have gone too far. The sheer number of separate programs for needy children has exceeded school districts' ability to manage and coordinate instructional activities. No one federal program imposes an unbearable burden, but school districts that must deliver services under several categorical programs are often overwhelmed. As I have argued elsewhere, federal programs have effects in the aggregate that are quite apart from the effects of any one program.* Some of these "aggregate effects" are positive, in that the diversity of federal programs often matches the diversity of student population that districts must serve. But multiple federal programs often interact in ways that reduce the quality of instruction.

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delivered under both the school districts' regular academic program and the federal programs themselves. This calls into question the viability of the existing federal programming strategy. It clearly makes no sense to continue enacting federal programs as if each one could operate autonomously to serve a special purpose. Federal programs interact with one another in complex and important ways, and it is unrealistic to design or evaluate any one program without considering those interactions.

Follow Through has been part of the federal programming strategy for twelve years, since 1968. For most of that time, however, the relationship between Follow Through and other federal programs has not been clearly established. It was one of the few major federal efforts to develop and test curricula, and some districts used it as a funding source to supplement Title I. But Follow Through was enacted for a special purpose and was run as an autonomous program. Its contributions to other federal programs were fortuitous, the result of isolated local arrangements, rather than a reflection of any grand design.

The key question for federal education policy is thus not how to improve any one program's operation, but how to make the whole federal programming strategy work better. As it now exists, Follow Through is definitely part of the problem: in many districts it contributes to the instructional management burdens that create the

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problems discussed above. Follow Through is, however, especially well suited to become part of the solution. Compared to the larger programs like Title I and P. L. 94-142 (the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, or EHA), Follow Through has a flexible rules about funding, beneficiary selection, and permissible services. It might, consequently, provide the resources that local officials need. That flexibility might be the foundation for a vital new role for Follow Through in helping local educators manage the problematic aggregate effects of federal education programs.

The ultimate purpose of this paper is to suggest how Follow Through can contribute to a better integrated and rationalized federal programming strategy. To put the suggestions in context, I need to provide a far richer factual background than the foregoing sketchy introduction has conveyed. The next two sections will therefore discuss existing federal programs; the third will build on them to propose a possible future for Follow Through. The first section will identify the areas in which federal programs have consistently succeeded or failed, and present the reasons why those outcomes are probably the inevitable results of the policy tools that the federal government has available. The second will discuss the problems of the present federal program strategy, i.e., ways in which the federal programs may be unnecessarily reducing one another's effectiveness. The third section will identify ways that Follow Through can help solve the problem of the federal program strategy.
THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF FEDERAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS

Successes

Some readers may be surprised to see a discussion of the success of federal education programs occupying as much as a single page. The history of federal education programs is indeed strewn with dashed hopes. The fault, however, has been far more in our early expectations for federal education programs than in their performance. Federal education programs have been highly successful in:

- Making disadvantaged children important clients for local educators;
- Building school districts' capacity to deal with children who have unusual or special needs;
- Encouraging curricula experimentation and research on the needs of disadvantaged children;
- Strengthening local groups that can serve as protectors and advocates for disadvantaged children.

The following short sections clarify and give short examples of each of these achievements.

Making disadvantaged children important clients. I would argue this has been the most important achievement of federal education programs. Title I and similar programs for the disadvantaged—including Follow Through—assigned top priority to the needs of low-income, minority, and low-achieving students. Federal program regulations (e.g., Title I's comparability and supplanting provisions) established that disadvantaged students must receive the full benefit of district-funded instruction plus federally-funded compensatory services. The evaluation requirements that accompanied federal aid further sharpened the focus on disadvantaged children. The public controversies about LEAs' use and abuse of Title I funds, and about program evaluation results provided further reinforcement. The
controversy over instructional effectiveness may have been embarrassing to program supporters, but it paid dividends by establishing the legitimacy and urgency of public concern about the quality of services to the needy.

Observers may differ about whether school districts were treating disadvantaged students equitably before the advent of federal aid, but there is no doubt that local priorities have changed since 1965. Some, in fact, claim that the shift in priorities has gone too far, and that students of average or better ability are being deprived of benefits they formerly received. But few will contest the effectiveness of federal programs in creating a shift in local priorities.

Building school districts' capacities. Federal programs have helped to establish career lines for local educators who deliver, administer, or evaluate services for the disadvantaged. This has been done directly, through line-item funding of program administrators and subsidized pre- and in-service training, and indirectly through the creation of a demand for specialist teachers. The three largest federal programs for elementary education (P. L. 94-142 and ESEA Title VII) have all created solid career lines for appropriately trained professionals.

Again, there is some dispute about how good the specialized teachers and administrators are. But they do make the school districts able to deliver large-scale programs of instruction specially tailored to the needs of disadvantaged children. That simply could not have been done before 1965: some of the early scandals about misuse of Title I funds may, in fact, have been caused by districts' inability
to find teachers who were able or willing to work as compensatory education specialists. More recently, Title VII has helped to create a market for trained bilingual teachers. Though the supply of such teachers still lags far behind the demand, Title VII's influence on student teachers' career choices may be its most significant long-term effect.

Encouraging curricula experimentation and research. Title I and other compensatory education programs have had a profound effect on the R&D agenda of the whole education profession. Program evaluation projects provided salaries for researchers and data for them to mine. School districts could use program money to conduct curricula experiments and to establish evaluation units. Federal agencies—the Office of Education, NIMH, the Office of Child Development, and NIE—were attracted by the controversy over program effectiveness and assigned top priority to compensatory education research grants. Follow Through itself was part of the same phenomenon. In short, federal categorical programs have created a whole new industry: organizations that invent and market curricula, institutions that do studies and publish reports, and a specialized labor market for professional schools to serve.

Yet again, opinions vary about whether the industry was worth creating. Though many are discouraged about the average quality of federally-funded R&D products, there has been some scientific and practical progress.* That progress, and the pool of research

*See, for example, L. B. Resnick and P. Weaver, *The Theory and Practice of Early Reading*, Vols. 1-3, Hillsdale, N. J., Lawrence Earlbaum Co., 1979, for a broad review of the results of curricula R&D in compensatory education.
professionals who have been trained for the R&D industry, are clearly the results of federal programs.

**Strengthening local protectors and advocates for disadvantaged children.** All of the major federal education programs pay the salaries of specialist administrators and mandate the establishment of local parent advisory councils. Program coordinators and parent groups can play far more significant roles than their respective administrative and advisory titles would suggest. They can be, and frequently are, permanent sources of advocacy pressure on behalf of the goals and beneficiaries of federal programs.

As I have argued elsewhere, the core of any successful federal effort to influence school districts is to strengthen the hands of local actors whose interests are inherently consistent with the goals of federal programs. * Virtually every program has done this, and the most influential programs have done so most assiduously. Title I has paid for a large cadre of state and local administrators and has tried, through conferences, internships, and technical assistance, to meld these into a nationwide network of program advocates. As Lorraine McDonnell and Milbrey McLaughlin have found in looking at programs with similar strategies, the professional loyalties thus created often last even after administrators are reassigned or their programs are eliminated.** P. L. 94-142 has provided political resources in the form of clear statements of children's rights and ready access to the courts to already-existing handicapped advocacy groups. (Parent

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groups for Title I, Title VII, Follow Through, and other federal programs are not in the same league as handicapped parents' groups, due both to their low level of prior political organization and to the authorizing statutes' vagueness about their purposes and rights.)

The significance of these local groups is that they can influence local educational policy even when federal enforcement officials are absent. They are autonomous and permanent sources of pressure on behalf of disadvantaged children. Of all the achievements of federal education programs, this one is the hardest to belittle. It has made a lasting change in the decisionmaking structure of school districts--one that would probably survive the death of the federal programs that first established them.

If the foregoing list of federal program "successes" appears biased, there is a good reason for it. I have deliberately saved up the evidence of opposing failures for the following section.

Failures

Federal programs have been distinctly unsuccessful in: encouraging districts to adopt and faithfully implement promising new curricula; institutionalizing curricular and other practice improvements once grant funds run out; and promoting exact compliance in detail with their own financial and service requirements. The following subsections discuss these failures in more detail.
Adopting new curricula. I rely here on the authority of the Rand Change Agent Study* and on brief informal conversations with assorted Follow Through sponsors. From those sources, it is clear that federal programs have utterly failed whenever they tried to get large numbers of school districts to faithfully copy an instructional method developed elsewhere. For reasons that Bill Hawley** has made clear, this failure is probably inevitable: the federal government cannot offer any incentives powerful and precise enough to induce districts to adopt a particular instructional method, and curriculum developers probably do not understand their own products well enough to make detailed copying possible. Instruction is a decentralized problem-solving activity to which Landau and Stout's warning against inappropriate use of command-and-control methods certainly applies.***

Institutionalizing change. Again, I rely on the Change Agent Study. Federal seed-money projects, which provide short-term subsidies for educational improvements in hopes that permanent local funding will follow, have generally not worked. School districts use seed money grants to fund speculative ventures or to indulge an employee's pet idea. Local budget-makers are seldom so taken by such a project that they are willing to fund it by raising taxes or curtailing an existing service.

***Martin Landau and Russell Stout, "To Manage is Not to Control: Or the Folly of Type II Errors," Public Administration Review, March/April 1979, p. 148.
There is one circumstance under which seed money projects are likely to work. When the federal government provides funds to help districts implement changes that will later be mandated by court orders or regulation, the changes usually persist after the grants expire. ESAA desegregation assistance and ESEA Title VII grants for bilingual education are good examples. They give districts a head start in responding to what will later become unfunded requirements (e.g., desegregation court orders or the Department of Education's Lau remedies). In those cases, however, the institutionalization of change is due far more to the enforcement powers of courts and the Office for Civil Rights than to temporary federal funding. This exception effectively proves the rule, viz., that seed-money grants per se generally have no lasting effects on school districts.

Promoting exact compliance. Curriculum is not the only area in which federal programs have failed to produce exactly the desired response from school districts. Most of the service delivery and financial management requirements that federal programs impose have also proven unenforceable. As Barro* demonstrates, there can be no sure or rigorous test for compliance with such key Title I requirements as school targeting, identification of eligible students, and non-supplantation. Federal officials are forced to assess compliance according to loose rules of thumb, or to treat the requirements as general principles around which to build hortatory appeals. Few

other programs have as clear or verifiable a set of requirements as Title I.

Despite those weaknesses in the federal government's ability to enforce exact adherence to programs' service and financial management requirements, most districts make serious efforts to comply, at least in spirit. District officials know that it can be costly to fight a federal compliance action or local citizens' complaint. They therefore head off such actions by operating in general compliance with the principles, if not the exact prescriptions, of federal programs.* Thus, judged by the criteria of exact compliance, most federal programs are failures. Most come out far better when judged according to the criterion of fidelity to their underlying principles and objectives.

Conclusion. In general, the important successes of federal programs have been political—changing educators' attitudes and practices and strengthening local pressures on behalf of federal purposes and client groups. The key to federal programs' successes has been the actions of their local allies. The federal government has been able to institutionalize political change in ways that it could not institutionalize curricular improvements, and for a very good reason. There are individuals—parents, social activists, public interest lawyers, etc.—who are inherently interested in maintaining benefits for federal program client groups. In contrast, there is seldom

*This argument is developed in detail in Hill, *Enforcement and Informal Pressure on the Management of Federal Categorical Programs in Education*, op. cit.
anyone at the local level whose commitment to an externally-imposed curricular innovation, planning process, or financial management scheme springs spontaneously from deeply held personal values.

In short, federal programs have been effective when they built realistically on existing local resources, and ineffective when they did not. As the next section will suggest, however, the effective federal strategy of strengthening local allies has its limits. That section will try to identify those limits, and the problems caused by designing programs without due attention to them.

Many readers will have noted by now that I have not listed "raising student achievement" as either a success or a failure of federal programs. That is no oversight. Though everyone hopes that federal programs will have such an effect, success and failure seem equally unverifiable. There is growing evidence that compensatory instruction increases disadvantaged students' achievement in basic skills,* but the beneficiaries of federal programs have made up little, if any, of the ground between themselves and their higher-achieving peers. Special federally-funded services are part of a much broader set of influences on children's academic performance.

It is perfectly plausible that the quality of school districts' core instructional offerings and other elements of disadvantaged students' living environment have deteriorated even while the number and quality

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of federally-funded services has been improving. Federal programs could therefore be having a positive effect on students' achievement, or none. Either way, the truth is hopelessly tangled up in the complex and shifting context in which the programs operate.

PROBLEMS OF THE FEDERAL PROGRAM STRUCTURE

The preceding section established that federal programs can achieve some goals and not others. This section focuses on the problems, i.e., apparent failures to attain apparently realistic goals. Federal programs are apparently making it difficult for one another to succeed; there is both logical and empirical evidence that the problems federal programs create for one another can be solved through a combination of federal and local effort.

Since 1975, the federal government has published six major new sets of requirements affecting school districts.* It has, in addition, fundamentally revised and expanded the requirements governing such older programs as the ESAA, Titles I, IV, and VII of ESEA, and vocational education.

The new requirements cover such diverse aspects of educational policy as education for the handicapped, teacher training, students' rights to privacy and due process, sex equity, and education for the gifted. Each new program is established and administered separately.

*Schools are affected by a large number of new laws and regulations established since 1975 including: regulations prohibiting discrimination based on sex (ESEA Title IX); regulations prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped (Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); regulations governing schools' use of tests; the Privacy Act; and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (P. L. 94-142). The Department of Education has also published draft regulations concerning the education of limited English-speaking children, implementing the principles established by the Supreme Court in the case of Lau v. Nichols.
from all previous requirements. School districts also tend to create separate administrative structures for the various programs. However, requirements that have been kept apart at higher levels all come together in the schools, the only organizations in the intergovernmental system that are too small to have a separate bureaucracy for each requirement. Principals and teachers must therefore cope with the combined effects of requirements that legislators and higher-level administrators can deal with separately.

Many of the newest requirements must be partially or wholly financed from local revenues rather than from categorical state or federal funds. Five of the six new federal requirements established since 1975 are unfunded. The sixth, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act provides federal subsidies for only about 12 percent of the services it requires school districts to deliver. These provisions exert leverage on local budgets by making further grants from programs like Impact Aid, Title I, and ESAA conditional on compliance with the unfunded and underfunded requirements. School districts must either reallocate resources to respond to the new requirements, or risk losing federal funds.

The increase in the number of federal requirements, and the greater reliance on unfunded mandates, have come at a time when school districts are under severe financial strain. Declining enrollments, fiscal limitation movements, collective bargaining agreements, and inflation have reduced districts' purchasing power. Many local officials claim that they are unable to maintain the quality of their basic instructional programs, and cannot find the money and staff to implement external requirements.
The existing combination of program requirements and financial strains threatens to undermine the basic assumptions on which the federal role in education has traditionally been based. As a recent Rand study has identified, there are two classes of problems that federal programs are experiencing.*

*Interference* is conflict between categorical programs and the core local program. A basic assumption of categorical programs is that students will receive full benefit of the core local curriculum, and that the categorical programs provide supplementary instruction. When federal programs interfere with the core local program, they reduce its scope or quality in at least one of the following three ways:

1. **By interrupting regular classroom teaching.** In some schools, children are pulled out of class for categorical programs so frequently that the teacher has the total class only 1-1/2 hours daily, and is unable to implement the state-mandated educational curriculum. Pullout problems are especially severe in districts where multiply eligible children are served by every program for which they were eligible. In districts with migrant Hispanic populations, students are often involved in 6-7 pullouts daily. Their instructional

*For a detailed account of the study, see Kimbrought and Hill, op. cit.*
day is so fragmented that they fail to receive the state-mandated curriculum; by grade 5, many have received no instruction in science or social studies.

- By clashing with the teaching methods used in the regular local program. In several districts, core and categorical programs used incompatible reading methods and instructional materials. Not surprisingly, many children became confused, and regular classroom teachers had to abandon their lesson plans in order to help federal program beneficiary children adjust to the differences in teaching methods.

- By imposing administrative burdens on district-paid teachers and principals. In some districts, regular classroom teachers spend so much time developing Individualized Educational Plans for students served by P.L. 94-142, or charting the progress of Title I or bilingual students, that they have to reduce time spent in actual instruction.

A second major class of problem is cross subsidy, the use of federal funds intended for one purpose or group to provide services for another purpose or group. Cross subsidy violates the basic assumption that each federal program will confer benefits on its target group without reducing the services or benefits enjoyed by other groups. Forms of cross subsidy include:
Providing services purchased by one program to students who qualify for a different program. Some districts adjust their Title I eligibility criteria to ensure that services for learning disabled children are purchased by Title I whenever possible. One method of accomplishing this is to use more restrictive definitions of "learning disability" in Title I than in non-Title I schools, so that fewer students are identified as handicapped in the Title I schools. Similar methods are employed to channel services from fully-funded programs into programs mounted in response to unfunded mandates.

Changing the services offered by a funded program in order to fulfill the requirements of an unfunded or partially funded program. In several districts with limited special education funds, resources allocated for Title I and Title VII were diverted to provide special education services to learning disabled and handicapped children. This practice resulted in a reduction of services for Title I- and Title VII-eligible children.

Diverting administrative and teaching staff from one program to fulfill the requirements of another program. In some districts, Title I and ESAA coordinators are assigned to administer unfunded mandates such as Section 504 and Title IX. In some
districts, teaching staff paid by one federal program assume teaching responsibilities in other programs. Specific examples include Title VII teachers supervising ESAA and Title I aides who worked in bilingual programs; and Title I teachers working under the supervision of a special education coordinator to supplement the special education program.

The evidence strongly suggests that interference and cross subsidy do not result from federal program structure alone, but are the joint result of program structure and local choices in managing large numbers of programs and unfunded requirements. Two aspects of the federal program structure—the multiplicity of programs in one site and unfunded requirements—contribute significantly to problems of interference and cross subsidy. For example, some schools have so many federal programs that they can't avoid interference, and so little local money that cross subsidy is the only way to pay for unfunded mandates. However, it is equally clear that the problem of interference and cross subsidy can be controlled, and at times eliminated (or exacerbated and at times created!) by local choice. Some districts have invented excellent ways of integrating the work of their regular and categorical program teachers, and of ensuring that federal program beneficiary students get what they are entitled to, under both locally- and federally-funded programs.

From the results of the "Aggregate Effects" study, I conclude that the chief problems of federal programs can be solved. Congress must supply part of the solution, by loosening the requirements to
keep federal programs separate from one another, and by reducing its reliance on unfunded mandates. But educators can help solve the problems too, by exploring ways of integrating federal programs with the regular curriculum and with one another. At present, no program, group, or academic discipline has undertaken the job of making regular and categorical programs work better together. In the next section, I shall propose that as a new orientation for Follow Through.

**FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR FOLLOW THROUGH**

The foregoing sections establish the premise for my conclusion, that an important future role for Follow Through is in helping schools cope with multiple categorical programs. Improvements in curriculum and school organization can do a good deal to ameliorate the problems of interference and cross subsidy. A full solution, as I suggested above, will require some changes in federal statutes and enforcement strategies. But it is likely that multiple programs and their problems are here to stay. Consolidation movements may succeed from time to time, but interest group demands and Congressional desires for legislative achievements are always forces for program proliferation. The problems of interference and cross subsidy won't go away; they have to be attacked at the school level where they are felt most keenly. An effort to help schools cope with federal programs should concentrate on:

Helping schools cope with the multiplicity of separate programs.

Some schools cope relatively well with multiple categorical programs. Principals create opportunities for communication between categorical
program specialists and regular classroom teachers and arrange opportunities for teachers to visit and help out in others' classrooms. Such arrangements fit some curricula better than others. No one has tried to identify the most effective practices, develop teaching or instructional management strategies that complement them, or disseminate them to schools. Those things are unlikely to be done under any one of the existing categorical programs: in fact, there is no source of funding for efforts to improve the joint operation of federal programs. Follow Through could make an enormous contribution by taking on that task.

Developing ways to reduce the separation between categorical programs and regular instruction without reducing the value of services to federal program beneficiaries. Many forms of interference and cross subsidy are created by the requirement that categorical programs may serve only eligible students. Through such requirements, the federal government tries to ensure that program funds are not syphoned off for tax relief or used to pay for services that are of little or no help to the intended beneficiaries. That may not, however, be the only way to guarantee that disadvantaged students get the full benefit of federal program services. Changes in regular classroom services, designed specifically for disadvantaged children but available to all, may reduce the tension between regular and special instruction.

No one has tried seriously to develop or test such services. California's School Improvement Program is based on a similar rationale, but it has not made careful distinctions between school-wide improvements targeted on the median child and those done specifically for the
disadvantaged. Beneficiary interest groups and federal enforcement agencies are profoundly suspicious of efforts to weaken the link between federal funds and disadvantaged children. They should, however, be willing to cooperate with an R&D effort whose real motive is to improve the categorical programs, not just to distribute program benefits without reference to students' eligibility.

The task of developing such methods will not be done unless a program with new and flexible resources undertakes it. This, too, is a useful possible new direction for Follow Through.

These prescriptions come in part from my belief that curriculum development in the abstract is unlikely to have much effect on the neediest schools. The help those schools need is problem-solving. They must reform their curricula to take account of multiple categorical programs; new experimental curricula are counter-productive if they add new special services or fail to help integrate the existing ones.

The people who traditionally work as Follow Through developers and researchers are the right ones to take on the tasks identified above. Doing so would force some changes in their methods of operation: their work would inevitably be driven less by theory and more by the immediate problems of instructional management.

But such a change in orientation offers a significant new role for Follow Through, and can involve Sponsors and researchers in an effort that is likely to pay dividends as long as there are federal education programs.