The media imperialism approach to studies of communications in South America lacks sensitivity to the historical dimension, and tends to define the issues of western media imperialism in the context of the United States post-World War II ascendancy to world power. Through an examination of the expansion of U.S. communication interests into Latin America prior to the war, a deeper appreciation of media imperialism as a complex historical phenomenon can be achieved. In 1898, the U.S. began a period of phenomenal economic and political expansion into Latin America, matched by the expansion of American communication interests in the region and an increase in the control by U.S. companies over Latin American communications media, particularly cable and radio. Much of this expansion was an effort to restrain European control and keep communications in the hands of the Western hemisphere. At the end of World War I, North American news agencies successfully challenged European control over the distribution of foreign news to Latin American newspapers. North American interests also penetrated and soon controlled the Latin American film market, and North American exporters became major financial supporters of both print media and radio through advertising. Thus, by the end of World War II, U.S. commercial interests had already achieved a substantial degree of penetration into Latin American communications and media systems. The U.S. then faced the post-war era of world expansion with a partnership between government and media interests based on its experiences in Latin America. (HTH)
FRED FEJES

The U.S. in Third World Communications: Latin America, 1900-1945

November 1983

Published serially since 1966 by the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication. An official publication of AEJMC.
An AEJMC Publication

JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS is one of four official publications of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication: Journalism Quarterly (founded in 1924), Journalism Educator (founded in 1946) which continues its affiliation with the American Society of Journalism School Administrators, Journalism Abstracts (founded in 1963), and Journalism Monographs (founded in 1966).

JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS was supported for its first two years by a gift from the University of Texas, and until 1979 by the American Association of Schools and Departments of Journalism.

All numbers are in print and may be ordered from the Association, singly or in bulk.

Monographs appearing here are regularly abstracted and indexed in Historical Abstracts, America: History and Life and the ERIC Clearinghouse on Reading and Communication Skills.

Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
University of South Carolina College of Journalism
Columbia, SC 29208 803-777-2005
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Executive Director Publications Coordinator

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No. 88 November 1983 JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS is published serially at the University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208. Copyright 1983 by the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication.
EDITOR'S NOTE

This is the final issue of Journalism Monographs published with funds provided by the Gannett Foundation. At this time I wish to express my appreciation to the Gannett Foundation and to Richard Cole, who arranged the grant for Monographs.

Lee B. Becker
Editor

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Lee B. Becker
Editor
Publication of Journalism Monograph No. 86 was made possible by a generous contribution by the Gannett Foundation to the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication.

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Accepted for Publication February 1983

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WITHIN RECENT YEARS in the field of international communications there has been growing attention to and discussion of media imperialism, or the process by which modern communication media have created, maintained and expanded world systems of dominance and dependence. There is by no means complete agreement among communication scholars and researchers on the nature and characteristics of this phenomenon. Indeed some communication researchers would argue such a phenomenon does not exist. Nonetheless, the media imperialism approach, as represented by the works of Herbert Schiller,1 Armand Mattelart,2 Tapio Varis,3 and others, has fundamentally changed the orientation and research agenda in the field of international communications. Of course, such success must be seen in a larger context. The growth and prominence of the media imperialism approach is one reflection of the general critical assessment and rejection by many Third World countries of western models of development and world order. Along with calls for a “New International Economic Order,” there have been calls for a “New International Information Order.” Much of the current research within this approach has direct and important relevance for communication policy formation in Third World countries.

While acknowledging the importance of the issues raised by the media imperialism approach, both critics and adherents have noted that research undertaken within this approach has failed to deal adequately with a number of important issues and areas of concern. While at the empirical level there has been much progress in dealing with the concerns of media imperialism, such progress has not been matched at the theoretical level. Very little effort has been made to articulate and develop media imperialism as a comprehensive theoretical approach by which future
research can be guided. Moreover, while research on media imperialism has brought to light the overwhelming role of transnational interests in world communications, it tends to ignore the forces and factors operating on a national and local level that tend either to mitigate or perpetuate the condition of communications dependency.

In addition to the lack of theoretical development and examination of intranational factors and forces, the media imperialism approach, as embodied in the various empirical studies, lacks a sensitivity to the historical dimension. Tied as it is to the pressing concerns over current problems, the approach tends to define the issues of media imperialism primarily in the context of the United States post-World War II ascendancy to world power. As such, it does not have much to offer regarding the role of communications media in creating dominance and dependence prior to the war. This is ironic, for the media imperialism approach does not represent a radical breakthrough in the study of communications. It is a revival and reformulation of an older concern (perhaps best represented in the works of Canadian economic historian Harold Innis) of the relations that have existed throughout human history between the development of communications media and the extension of domination by particular societies.

This present study is intended to contribute to the development of an understanding of media imperialism as an historical phenomenon. It is devoted to an examination of the expansion of United States communication and media interests in Latin America prior to 1945. There are a number of reasons why this topic and period are of special relevance to an understanding of media imperialism as a part of the post-World War II global expansion of United States military, economic and political power. Yet the United States had a great deal of experience in influencing and controlling the destinies of other nations prior to World War II. In the first third of this century, Latin America was the major arena for United States economic and political expansion. By 1920, the United States had achieved overwhelming economic and political dominance in that region. Many of the techniques, practices, and policies that the United States employed after World War II in expanding its dominion over the globe were first developed through trial and error in Latin America. As one observer noted after World War II in commenting upon the United States foreign policy in Latin America, "Latin America is a laboratory in which much of the application of foreign policy can get its first workout."

An important element in the establishment of United States power in the hemisphere was the control of communications and the mass media. The United States demanded that both European and Latin American nations adhere to an "open door" policy in cable communications in the
hemisphere. With the development of radiotelegraphy, the United States demanded that all nations recognize this country's preeminence in hemispheric radio communications. In time the various mass media — first film, then newspapers and magazines, and lastly radio broadcasting — were integrated into the media structure of the United States. By 1945, United States hegemony in hemispheric communications was complete.

Through an examination of the expansion of United States communication interests into Latin America, a deeper appreciation of media imperialism as a complex historical phenomenon can be achieved. Moreover, an understanding of the historical relations between the United States and Latin America can be enriched by a knowledge of the role communications has played in their development.

**United States Expansion into Latin America**

While the United States government expressed an interest in Latin American affairs almost from the beginning of the Republic, it was only in the latter part of the 19th century that the U.S. seriously began to develop and expand its economic and political power, and influence throughout the hemisphere. With its farms and factories producing more goods than could be consumed domestically, foreign markets were playing an increasingly important role in the American economy. In 1889 the first Pan American Conference was held in Washington, D.C., with the purpose of expanding trade with Latin American nations. In this and the following Pan American conferences, the United States strove to implement measures that would open Latin American markets to American goods while assuring American industries supplies of raw materials.

Following the Spanish American War in 1898, the United States began a period of phenomenal economic and political expansion and penetration into Latin America. Between 1898 and 1913 United States trade with Latin America grew 243 percent, from $240 million to $801 million. In 1897 United States investments in Latin America totaled $304 million. By 1914 they grew to $1,641 million, accounting for roughly half of all United States foreign investments.

Much of this trade and investment was in Central American and Caribbean nations. World War I provided additional opportunity for United States expansion into South America. With European production devoted to the war effort, the United States took over Europe's role as the major supplier of manufactured goods for the South American republics. In 1913 the United States supplied Latin America with only a quarter of its imported goods while Britain, France and Germany together supplied half. By 1918 imports from these three countries had dropped to a little less than one-fifth of total Latin American imports while the United States was supplying the region with 54 percent of its imported goods.
After the war, the European nations attempted to revive their trade and financial relations with Latin America only to discover that the United States had established for itself a dominant position in the commerce and finance of the Western Hemisphere. Although European trade and investment in Latin America recovered somewhat during the 1920s, the United States succeeded in maintaining its position as the region's major trade partner and supplier of funds. By 1929, total United States trade with Latin America was $2,080 million. In terms of investment, in the 15 year period between 1914 and 1929, total United States investment in Latin America grew from $1,614 million to $5,370 million, an increase of 233 percent. In comparison, during the period 1913-1928, British investment increased only 20 percent. Moreover, by 1929, over half of total United States investments were in South America. While on the eve of World War I the major portion of United States economic activity was limited to the Caribbean and Central America, by the end of the 1920s, the United States had succeeded in penetrating and dominating the commerce and finance of the entire Western Hemisphere.

Such economic penetration was matched by the expansion of United States political power in the region. Theodore Roosevelt, in his annual message to Congress in 1904, claimed for the United States, under the Monroe Doctrine, the right to exercise international police powers in Latin America, ostensibly to forestall European intervention in hemispheric affairs. The Monroe Doctrine thus was transformed from a passive warning aimed at European nations into an active instrument justifying unilateral intervention into the affairs of any Latin American nation. In the first third of this century, citing reasons of political unrest, financial instability, or violation of United States rights, the United States undertook major military interventions in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti, and Mexico in addition to maintaining troops in Panama and Cuba and exercising political suzerainty over Puerto Rico. The scope of the Monroe Doctrine was even further expanded in 1912 to apply to the sale or transfer of strategic Latin American property, such as harbors, to corporations which were controlled by or had close relations with foreign governments.

Complementing United States economic penetration of Latin America was the expansion by American communication interests in the region and the general increase in the control by United States companies over Latin American communications media. A major area of such penetration was cable and radio communication.

The U.S.-owned Central and South American Telegraph Company (renamed All American Cables in 1920) laid a cable line in the 1880s and 1890s down the western coast of the continent. The company received monopoly cable concessions from the governments of Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Eventually the cable company
succeeded in connecting the United States with Chile and, by overland route, Argentina. However, all cable communication on the eastern coast of the continent was dominated by British interests. The situation was particularly critical as the British-owned Western Telegraph Company had monopoly concessions on underwater cable communications in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. By World War I, it was evident that such British control could seriously hamper United States expansion in the region. Given the prospect of post-war hemispheric rivalry between Britain and the United States, United States business and military interests did not feel secure in transmitting commercial and military information, often of a confidential nature, over British controlled facilities. Attempts by All American Cables to expand were met by opposition by Western Telegraph.

The United States government dealt with this situation after the war by establishing an "open door" policy in cable communications. The State Department actively opposed the continuation of any monopoly concession grant by any Latin American government in cable communication. It brought pressure on the British government and the various Latin American governments to drop exclusive cable concessions. More importantly, it withheld from Western Telegraph and its United States ally, Western Union, landing rights in the United States for its Latin American cables. Eventually the State Department was able to force Western Telegraph to waive its monopoly rights in Latin American countries. United States cable companies also relinquished their monopoly concessions in Latin America. The continent was thus opened to expansion by United States cable companies, an opportunity which a number of them quickly took advantage of by laying new cable lines and buying up smaller existing cable companies. By 1924, it was possible to send a message to any country in the hemisphere over United States-owned facilities.

In the area of radio communications, it was regarded as equally important that the United States establish a dominant position in Latin America, particularly since this was a developing new technology in which no company or country had, as yet, established a dominant position. In October 1915, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, in a circular to all United States embassies in Latin America, noted that the State Department, given the war in Europe, was very concerned that the ownership and control of radio communication in the Americas should not "pass beyond this hemisphere and into European or Asiatic hands." The circular instructed the embassies to communicate to the various Latin American governments that "the Department would accordingly be inclined to look with favor, and believes that other American governments share this view, upon any mutually acceptable agreement whereby the control of this vitally important method of communications between the
American continent might rest wholly in sympathetic and disinterested hands, thus realizing another conception of a broad and beneficial Pan Americanism." Lansing proposed that an informal exchange of views on this matter take place among the representatives of the American governments attending an upcoming Pan American Scientific Congress to be held in Washington that December.

On January 7, 1916, delegates of all the Latin American governments represented at the scientific congress met at the State Department to discuss the issue of the control of hemispheric radio communications. It quickly became evident that the United States had something more in mind than a general discussion of radio control in the Americas. The United States representatives outlined a broad plan for the organization and construction of a Pan American system of radio communications which would link all the nations of the hemisphere. This system would be based on government ownership and control of all radio communication facilities and would conduct all military, governmental and commercial radio communications within the hemisphere and with other parts of the globe, thus allowing American nations to bypass British control of world cable communications. Within this system the United States would take leadership, as government-controlled stations would be rendered available for the use of all American governments in case of exigencies demanding united action by them or by the United States." While all Latin American delegates agreed informally on the need to keep control of radio in the Americas in hemispheric hands, they could not officially commit their governments in any manner to any plan or agreement other than to study the proposals put forward on the matter.

The United States plan was given more definite form in a memorandum circulated by the State Department to U.S. Latin American embassies in March 1916. This memorandum, to be formally presented to the various Latin American governments, contained the proposals made by the United States for a hemispheric radio-relay network which would be centered in the Canal Zone with major relay stations in Washington, D.C., Cuba, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Argentina. Latin American governments were asked to study this proposal as the basis for a planned Pan American conference which would establish a hemispheric radio network. While the immediate purpose of this plan was to establish a system of radio communication for the military defense of the hemisphere, the consequence of such a proposal was that it would organize hemispheric radio communication on the basis of United States interests and control. The Latin American governments were understandably not excited about the proposal, and the planned conference never took place.

While its growing involvement in the European war shifted the United States government's attention away from Latin America, the concern
over North American control of hemispheric radio communications never really was abandoned and such a goal was again actively pursued after the war. An internal State Department memorandum dated June 16, 1919, noting the post-war prospect of the growth of British and German interests in Latin American radio communications, stated, "It is vital that the American interest dominate wireless communication in this hemisphere, vital from a military, naval and communications point of view." As the issue of the ownership of radio communication had, by this time, more or less been settled against the formation of the government monopoly, the memorandum noted that "The only practical method we know by experience to have proven its worth is the selection of some powerful American interest and persuading it to go down into that field and the rendering to it of every possible government support whether it be diplomatic or financial." The memorandum suggested that Latin America be divided between two American radio companies: (1) The Tropical Radio Company, the radio subsidiary of United Fruit, taking Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico, and (2) the Pan American Wireless Company taking South America. It further suggested that these companies' expansion in radio communications be financed, in part, through government funds as the companies would be fulfilling a governmental aim, "in obtaining for the United States a dominance of radio communication in the western world." 

While the State Department was concerned about Latin American radio communications, more definite plans were taking shape in the Department of the Navy. Admiral W.H.G. Bullard, chief of the Naval Communications Service, was deeply involved in assisting the General Electric Company in its planned formation of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and that company's subsequent purchase of the American holdings of the Marconi Company, a purchase designed to protect the United States against British control of radio communications. In the original agreement between the Marconi Company and General Electric (in which the British company agreed to sell its American assets) it was recognized by both parties that the soon-to-be-formed RCA and the Marconi Company would work together, in the development of Latin American radio communications. Both companies would form and jointly own a new company called the South American Radio Corporation that would build stations and conduct radio traffic in Latin America. In line with its informal compact with the United States government that all American radio communications would be controlled by American citizens, however, RCA was to dominate the new company both by having sole control of the management and by having five seats on the company's seven-member board. RCA, deeply involved in organizing its radio service in the United States, was not ready to act in South America, and plans for the construction of the first radio station there, to be built in
Argentina, were left to the Marconi Company. Such a large measure of North American control over the new South American Radio Corporation, however, was objected to by the British government, and the Marconi Company asked for increased representation on the Board of Directors before proceeding with its plans for a station in Argentina.

The picture was further complicated by the fact that the German radio company, Gesellschaft Fur Drahtlose Telegraphie (Telefunken), had organized an Argentine company for the purpose of constructing a radio station in Buenos Aires for communication with Europe. The French radio company, Compagnie Generale de Telegraphie (CGT), also was expressing interest in constructing Latin American stations. RCA's and Marconi's delay and the German and French plans worried the American government. While an "open door" policy worked to American advantage in the already established field of cable communication, in the as yet undeveloped field of international radio communication it could be disastrous. Given the expense of constructing a radio station and the probability of a low volume of commercial radio business in Latin America, competition would make any Latin American radio station unprofitable. More importantly, at a time when the potential of shortwave radio communication was as yet undiscovered and international radio communication was based on high-power, long-wave communication, there was only very limited spectrum space available for the new South American stations. To avoid probable interference, it was most likely Latin American governments would give priority rights over frequencies to the first station built. In a letter to the RCA Board of Directors in July 1920, Admiral Bullard expressed his concern over the situation and appealed for measures which would exclude Europeans from gaining control over communication in the Western Hemisphere. RCA, unable to act in South America, could only try to meet the British objections and get the Marconi Company started on a South American station. In September, the RCA Board of Directors agreed to increase Marconi's representation on the Board of the South American Radio Corporation to four (with five RCA representatives). This, however, was still unacceptable to the British.

In November 1920, RCA and Marconi officials met and decided that the best way to deal with the South American matter, given the progress of the German company in constructing its radio station in Argentina, was to recognize German and French claims in Latin American radio communication and form a consortium of the American, British, German, and French radio interests for the purpose of developing Latin American radio. The German and French interests were receptive to the idea, and the four companies met in Paris in August 1921 to work out the details of the new organization. Before proceeding to the South American matter, the companies agreed to refrain from competing with each other within
their own national boundaries or in territories controlled by their respective governments. Thus the world was partially carved up among the four radio companies with the Marconi Company receiving Great Britain and its colonies, the CGT France and its colonies and dependencies, RCA the United States and its dependencies, and Telefunken restricted to operating primarily within Germany. South America was to be developed by all four of the companies through the consortium. As with the prior arrangement between RCA and Marconi, however, the major point of contention was the degree of control RCA was to exercise in the consortium.

The RCA delegation, led by RCA's President Owen D. Young, argued that given the political and military importance of radio communication and the dominant position of the United States in Latin America, American interests should have priority in the South American radio situation. He proposed that the board of directors of the consortium should consist of two representatives from each company plus an American chairman chosen by RCA but not directly associated with RCA. Not only would the chairman be able to break ties but he also would be able to veto any decision made by the board. The Marconi delegation, the principal opponent of this plan, countered with a proposal for a board of directors consisting of two representatives from each company. One of the RCA representatives would be chairman and would have two votes in case of a tie. After two months of heavy argument, and only after RCA threatened to break off negotiations and form a separate South American radio company with the German interests, the Marconi delegation gave in and accepted the American proposal. The new consortium, known as the AEFG Trust, was to control all the radio facilities owned and built by the four companies in South America. Plans were made for the completion of the Argentine station and for the construction of new stations in Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. United States control thus was assured over Latin American point-to-point radio communications. Owen D. Young proudly hailed the creation of the AEFG Trust as the extension of the Monroe Doctrine into hemispheric radio communications.

Paralleling the creation of the AEFG Trust was the emergence of another North American company in the field of Latin American electronic communication. In 1920 the North American concern International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) was organized with initial assets consisting of telephone companies in Puerto Rico and Cuba. During the next decade, the company pursued an aggressive expansion policy in Latin America. By 1930, ITT had acquired the principal telephone systems in Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, and the state of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil. Although ITT's major business was the operation of telephone systems, it also quickly expanded into other areas of electronic communications in Latin America. In 1927 it acquired controlling interest in All American Cables, the principal North American cable com-
pany in Latin America and the only cable company with facilities in every Latin American country except Paraguay. The next year, gaining control of the Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company and utilizing the newly discovered potential of shortwave radio communication, ITT proceeded to organize radio communication companies in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. This was part of a larger ITT effort to establish and operate an international radio communication system to compete with RCA. In Latin America the Mackay company became the chief competitor of the AEFG Trust. With the Latin American investments of ITT and AEFG-Trust and the investments by smaller North American radio companies such as United Fruit’s Tropical Telegraph Company, United States interests organized and controlled the major elements in the entire system of Latin American electronic point-to-point communications by the end of the decade. The only major exceptions were the generally state-owned national telegraph systems.

Although electronic point-to-point communication was the major area of penetration by the United States interests in Latin American communications, the overall growing dominance by the United States in the hemisphere also was reflected in the Latin American mass media. The end of World War I saw the North American news agencies, United Press and Associated Press, successfully challenge European control over the distribution of foreign news to Latin American newspapers. Until the beginning of the war, the three major news agencies, Reuters (Great Britain), Havas (France), and Wolff (Germany), along with the Associated Press, agreed upon a system of news exchange among themselves which divided the world into exclusive spheres of activity which tended to follow the divisions of global political power and influence. The news-gathering and dissemination activities of Associated Press were limited by this agreement to the United States and parts of the Caribbean and Central America, with Havas having exclusive press rights in the rest of the Caribbean and Central America and on the entire southern continent. After the outbreak of the war, however, a number of Latin American newspapers objected to Havas’ refusal to disseminate German war communiques and to the press agency’s strong bias in favor of the French war effort. A number of papers requested international news from Associated Press, which it could not provide due to its agreement with the other news agencies. The Latin American papers turned to Associated Press’s main competitor, United Press, which, not bound by the Agreement with the European agencies, provided them with news. Moreover, as part of its war-time propaganda campaign, the Wilson Administration actively encouraged and supported the efforts of United Press to expand its activities into Southern America. Associated Press, sensing the danger of news dissemination in South American being taken over by its domestic rival, negotiated in 1918 a change in the agreement with Havas. With
French interests in Latin America experiencing a decline because of the war, the French agency could do little but recognize the right of Associated Press to organize a news distribution system in South America.

The next year Associated Press signed contracts for the distribution of news with 25 Latin American newspapers, including *La Nación* and *La Prensa* of Lima. Associated Press's policy of supplying news to rival newspapers, however, proved incompatible with the fierce newspaper competition in Latin America, and a number of Associated Press's new clients subsequently dropped the news agency in favor of United Press. Not only did Associated Press and United Press provide Latin American newspapers with the bulk of their foreign news, they also in time came to operate major domestic news agencies in a number of Latin American countries, such as Argentina, due to the unwillingness of many of the Latin American newspapers to cooperate with one another to form national news gathering pools.

The growing ties between the United States and Latin American press were reflected in the First Pan American Congress of Journalists held in Washington in 1926. This Congress, whose organizing committee was headed by the president of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, was attended by over a hundred Latin American publishers, editors, and reporters representing the most powerful and influential newspapers in the Southern Hemisphere. It had the status of a semi-diplomatic affair with the Latin American newspapermen being given diplomatic privileges by United States customs. Messages of welcome were voted by both houses of Congress and the meeting was addressed by both President Coolidge and Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg. After a week-long meeting in Washington, the group was given a three-week tour of the eastern and central United States during which they were feted by local newspapers, chambers of commerce, and other groups and individuals.

Another area of the Latin American mass media which North American interests penetrated and controlled was the film market. Prior to World War I, much of the Latin American film market was supplied by French products, particularly films from the French film company, Pathé, which maintained distribution offices in Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Havana, and Mexico City. The war forced European producers to discontinue making and marketing films, however, thus leaving the Latin American market completely open to products from the United States. In 1914, Universal Pictures Corporation sent a film scout to investigate the Latin American market, and, by the end of the war, Hollywood film producers successfully captured Latin American screens. Although Hollywood's
domination of Latin American film reflected its domination of the world film market in general at that time. In Latin America it was particularly overwhelming. One source estimated that in 1922 North American films took up 95 percent of the Latin American film market, as compared to controlling 90 percent of Australia's and 85 percent of Continental Europe's. Little local production was attempted, and it was rarely commercially successful or popular because American films had already defined the style of film making popular with Latin American audiences. Latin American producers and film companies could rarely hope to compete with the technical excellence and pervasiveness of the North American product.

With the United States looking to Latin America as a market for its goods, there was growing attention given to the various Latin American mass media and their potential as advertising media. The Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce of the Department of Commerce was particularly active in exploring the use of advertising as an aid to promote United States exports. As early as 1917, when the war in Europe had cut off European goods to Latin America, the Bureau had initiated an investigation of advertising practices and media in the various Latin American countries. The results of this investigation, published in a series of pamphlets in 1919 and 1920, offered the North American exporter a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the state of advertising in the various Latin American countries and a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a broad and diverse range of Latin American advertising media, including not only newspapers and magazines, but also billboards, trolley car posters, and calendars. In general, the investigation revealed that throughout Latin America, with the possible exception of Buenos Aires, the practice of advertising as a form of sales promotion was very undeveloped. Most newspaper advertising consisted of close copy ads for patent medicine, cigarettes, and sundry personal items. Audited circulation of newspapers and magazines was unknown, as were rate cards and discounts. Advertising agents, where they existed, were generally nothing more than space brokers.

Yet this state of affairs had promise as the entire field of Latin American advertising was open to development along the lines of practices and ideas in the United States. A pamphlet on advertising in Argentina noted:

While Europe influences them from almost every other angle, its advertising has scarcely ever touched them. The whole field of modern advertising is peculiarly an American development of selling: nowhere in this field are there better evidences of American originality than in copy and illustration, and nowhere is Argentine advertising more poorly developed. The Argentine gives no particular indication of taking to advertising as a business and of becoming his own copy writer. The European nations have not developed either the science of the art of advertising as has the United States, and it lies largely with the advertising men of this country to take the opportunity that the media, the intelligence...
and the purchasing power of Argentina and turn it to good account for the American export trade.

Continually stressed in all of the Bureau's pamphlets on advertising in Latin America was the recommendation that United States advertising agencies set up branches in the principal cities of Latin America.

During the 1920s United States advertising agencies handling the accounts of large exporters such as Ford and General Motors set up branch offices in a number of Latin American cities. Such arrangements, however, were exceptional. Generally most North American companies doing business in Latin America worked through local sales representatives or distributors in placing their advertisements in local Latin American media. Usually the advertising division of a company in the United States would prepare advertisements for a particular Latin American market, often just translating domestic advertisements into Spanish and Portuguese. The advertising division then would send the advertisements to the sales representatives or distributors in Latin America, who would place the advertisements in the local media. Much of the early advertising by North American exporters was of the "hit or miss" variety, with very little attempt to develop a consistent advertising campaign based on the utilization of local themes or tastes and with very little thought given to proper media selection or appropriate audience. Some of the larger newspapers, however, such as La Nación of Buenos Aires, established offices in New York in the early 1920s in order to advise companies on their advertisements and to handle placement of advertising directly.

By the 1930s American advertising had become a major financial supporter of Latin American print media. Despite the great decline in United States-Latin American trade due to the Depression, a survey undertaken by United States consulate officials in Brazil in the mid-1930s revealed that approximately 64 percent of all advertising space over a 30-day period in 21 of the country's most prominent daily newspapers and ten of the leading weekly magazines was devoted to products imported from the United States.

In addition to promoting United States advertising in Latin American print media, the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce also was very interested in exploring the use of radio broadcast advertising as a means of sales promotion. As an aid for United States exporters, the Bureau issued a series of reports in 1932 dealing with the possibilities of broadcast advertising in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin América. By the mid-1930s, it was evident that United States exporters were beginning to utilize advertising on the local broadcast media in various foreign markets: According to one estimate, foreign broadcast advertising by United States exporters in 1935 totaled more than $10 million, a 700 percent increase over the amount spent the previous year and roughly one.
tenth of United States domestic radio advertising sales. The next year the amount doubled. As in the print media, there was a growing mutual dependency in which United States exporters depended on Latin American broadcasting media to advertise and sell their products. Latin American broadcasters, along with the publishers, in turn depended on American advertising dollars as a major source of financial support. It was estimated that in 1935 United States sponsors provided one-third of Argentina’s total commercial advertising revenue.

Latin America was seen as a particularly good place for radio advertising. With the exception of Radio Luxembourg, which grossed over $1 million from United States advertisers in 1935, European stations either banned or severely restricted all radio advertising. Outside Shanghai, the possibilities of radio advertising in Asia were limited. In contrast, reported Business Week in 1936, “Central and South America are wide open to exploitation, and the high rate of illiteracy makes radio the only effective direct-to-consumer advertising medium. Loudspeakers in public squares help spread the advertising gospel.”

Most of the foreign radio advertising was arranged by New York agencies specializing in such matters. Much of the actual production was done in New York, where recorded transcriptions were made, and sent to agency representatives in foreign markets who then placed the advertisements on local radio stations. In cities such as Buenos Aires where there was a large pool of local talent and suitable production and studio facilities, the agency representative would arrange for live local commercial production. In 1925 Broadcast Abroad Inc., one of the major agencies specializing in foreign radio advertising, served as the United States representative and had contracts with 47 radio stations in 16 Latin American and Caribbean countries. Among the commercials heard on local Latin American radio were those for companies and products such as Parker Pen, Quaker Oats, Standard Oil, Ford Motor Company, Heinz Ketchup, Listerine, Oxydol, and over 50 other products and companies.

In addition to the growth of a United States presence in Latin American print and broadcasting media, United States broadcasting companies, particularly the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), the Colombia Broadcasting System (CBS), and the Crosley Radio Corporation of Ohio began in the mid-1930s to expand their shortwave broadcasting services to Latin America. Initially such broadcasts consisted of simulcasts of regular network programming. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, however, the broadcasting companies began to upgrade their Latin American service and include a substantial amount of programming directly aimed at Latin American audiences. Up until 1939 such shortwave broadcasting was classified as experimental by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC), and broadcasters were not allowed to sell time to advertisers. The Departments of Commerce and State and the
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, however, regarded such broadcasting as a potentially powerful tool to both increase United States exports to the region and strengthen the political position of the U.S. in the hemisphere. In order to insure that the shortwave broadcasters would maintain and expand the level of activity in this region, the Federal government tried to provide shortwave broadcasters with commercial incentives. In May 1939 the FCC announced that shortwave broadcasters could sell time on their shortwave services to advertisers wishing to reach Latin American audiences.

Thus by the eve of World War II the United States commercial interests had achieved a substantial degree of penetration into Latin American communications and media systems. In the case of cable, radiotelegraphy, and telephony this involved the ownership and control of communication facilities. In the case of the press and film, U.S. firms were major suppliers of the media product; and in the case of the advertising media in general there was a growing reliance on the advertising dollars of United States exporters.

An important dimension of this process of penetration was the role played by the United States government. As evident in the activities of the Departments of State, Commerce and the Navy and the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, the government was far from a passive observer in these matters. Generally the government set and defined the broad aims and interests of the United States in the region and then sought to have private companies and individuals accomplish them. For strategic political and military reasons, the government strove to insure American control over hemispheric point-to-point communications. In order to promote the expansion of United States trade in the region the government urged exporters to take advertising seriously and to utilize Latin American media in reaching and expanding Latin American markets. The emphasis on the media as a means to expand trade was increased in the 1930s as part of the overall government program of expanding exports as one means of achieving domestic economic recovery.

As the world political situation worsened in the late 1930s, however, the interests and activities of the United States in Latin American media shifted. Starting in the mid-1930s Germany and Italy began to challenge United States hemispheric dominance by energetically expanding their trade with Latin America. By 1938 Germany had replaced Great Britain as the second major supplier of goods after the United States. At first the United States responded only passively to this commercial challenge. By 1938, however, it was becoming increasingly apparent that German commercial expansion into Latin America was seriously threatening U.S. economic dominance in the region. Moreover, there was concern that growing German propaganda aimed at Latin American audiences and the increasingly visible presence of small but vocal Nazi-oriented political
movements in Latin America could have serious implications both for the United States political position in hemispheric affairs and for the U.S. policy of hemispheric solidarity and neutrality.

Concomitant with this perception of the growing challenge to the United States position was a greater appreciation of the role the mass media could play in supporting and furthering United States political and economic interests. United States advertising in Latin American media was still primarily seen as a means of commercial promotion. There was a growing feeling, however, that this was not enough and more should be done to counteract German propaganda activities in the region and mobilize Latin American public opinion behind the hemispheric goals and interests of the United States.

United States War-Time Activities in Latin American Media

After the German invasion of Poland in September of 1939, and particularly after the fall of France in the spring of 1940, the need to utilize the media to mobilize the Latin American public in support of United States policies assumed priority over commercial goals. After the spring of 1940 the media were seen as a political weapon to forge stronger political ties between the United States and Latin America. Before that time the United States government relied upon private companies and individuals to accomplish its broad foreign policy goals in the region. Under critical war-time conditions the government had to play a far more open and active role in all aspects of inter-American relations. This involved the creation in 1940 of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA). The individual who played a major role in the creation and subsequent activities of the OCIAA was Nelson Rockefeller, the 32-year-old grandson of John D. Rockefeller, founder of the world-wide Standard Oil empire.

Rockefeller developed an early interest in the affairs of Latin America. During the 1930s he made a number of trips there in connection with the affairs of Standard Oil which had major holdings in a number of Latin American countries. He was impressed by the numerous social and economic problems of the region and felt a major problem was the lack of understanding between the United States and Latin America. While Latin Americans, according to Rockefeller, misunderstood the economic and political values and institutions of the United States, North American businessmen and investors knew or cared little about the culture, social and economic needs of the region. Rockefeller argued that United States investors had a responsibility to help solve the region’s many problems. Speaking about Standard Oil’s Latin American holdings at an annual meeting of company stockholders in the late 1930s, he argued:

In the last analysis, the only justification for ownership is that it serves the broad interest
of the people. We must recognize the social responsibilities of corporations, and the corporation must use its own assets to reflect the best interests of the people. If we don't, they will take away our ownership."

Rockefeller, a liberal Republican, viewed capitalism as a progressive force that could be directed toward socially useful ends. He felt that a program of planned private investment and government cooperation could help alleviate many of the problems of the region and assist its overall economic, social, and political development. In 1937 he met with aides of President Franklin Roosevelt to discuss the possibility of a joint industry-government program for inter-American economic development. While the administration expressed interest, nothing came of it.

In Spring 1940 the Nazi victories in Europe made Latin American economic and political cooperation critically important, and Rockefeller's interest in Latin America was remembered by administration aide Harry Hopkins. At Hopkins' request Rockefeller and his aides prepared a memorandum on the need for immediate United States action in Latin America in light of the critical war situation. In mid-June Hopkins forwarded the document to Roosevelt.

The Rockefeller memorandum urged that, in order to counter the Axis threat, measures be taken to "secure economic prosperity in Central and South America, and to establish this prosperity in the frame of hemispheric economic cooperation and dependence." The measures suggested included efforts to absorb surplus Latin American agricultural and mineral products, the freest possible flow of trade, encouragement of both private and government investment in Latin America, improvements in the economic stability of the region, and closer inter-American economic and political ties.

In addition to economic measures, Rockefeller also felt that "A vigorous cultural program should be pursued concurrently... The main lines of a cultural program are fairly obvious, but here again, it is a question of personnel and the use, in a non-traditional way, of government funds where private agencies are unable or unwilling to act, or in matters where the activity of private agencies is less appropriate."

Roosevelt was impressed with Rockefeller's ideas and gave the memorandum to various department heads for study and comment. On August 16, 1940, Roosevelt approved the official order creating the coordinating office for inter-American affairs with Rockefeller designated as coordinator. Although the Rockefeller memorandum emphasized the threat that economic problems posed to hemispheric security, Roosevelt and other administration officials were as concerned about the threat of Nazi propaganda. One of the major responsibilities of the new OCIAA unit was to undertake measures to counter such a threat. In drawing up the order establishing the OCIAA, Roosevelt personally saw to it that the coordinator, among his other duties, was charged... with the formula-
tion and the execution of a program in cooperation with the State Department which, by effective use of Governmental and private facilities in such fields as the arts and sciences, education and travel, the radio, press, and the cinema, will further national defense and strengthen the bonds between the nations of the Western Hemisphere."

Although the OCIAA engaged in a number of economic, commercial, and health projects, its major activity throughout the war was in cultural and information affairs. This campaign was designed to create and maintain hemispheric political and economic solidarity. As outlined in one early account of its activities, the OCIAA's goals were:

- to persuade the Latin Americans to take joint defensive action with us against the German menace which many of them do not admit exists ... (to) persuade them that in the end the planes that are now only on our planning boards will conquer German bombers that have struck down eight countries in twenty-two months ... (to) convince them that we know the answer to the economic as well as the military defense of the hemisphere ... (to) convince them that somehow we will help them get rid of the same agricultural surplus we have not been able to get rid of ourselves, and ... above all things (to) convince them all of them, that the "Good Neighbor" policy is not a temporary expedient designed to get us out of a tough spot, but a sincere and permanent reversal of our 19th century policy of "dollar diplomacy" and "manifest destiny."

To fulfill these goals, the OCIAA launched a broad and well-coordinated campaign involving the press, radio and film industries.

As organized in the fall of 1940, the OCIAA consisted of four major sections: Cultural Relations, Communications, Commercial Development, and Trade and Financial. The head of the Communications section was James Young, former chief of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Many of the Bureau's promotion and information activities in Latin America were taken over by the OCIAA. Within the Communications section were the Radio, Movies, and Press Divisions. In line with Rockefeller's policy of close business-government relations, the heads of the media divisions were drawn from private industry. In charge of the Press Division, for example, was Karle Bickel, former president of United Press and then current chairman of Scripps-Howard's radio division. John Jay Whitney, a motion picture executive and chairman of the board of Freeport Sulphur Company, was head of the Motion Picture Division. Don Francisco, president and part owner of the major advertising agency, Lord and Thomas, was appointed head of the Radio Division. Later Francisco replaced Young as head of the OCIAA's Communication activities. Also working for the Radio Division were Merlin Aylesworth, former president of NBC, and Sylvester Weaver, an advertising executive who, after the war, would play a major role in the development of television programming. As with the heads of the other OCIAA divisions and sections who came from the industry, these individuals took a drastic cut in pay to work with the OCIAA. Whitney, for example, left an $80,000 a year position and Francisco a $120,000 a year
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position to come to work for the OCIAA in $8,000 a year posts.59

In contrast to the Office of War Information (OWI) which broadcasted toward war areas, OCIAA’s efforts were aimed at audiences in nations not actively engaged in the war.44 Before Pearl Harbor, the major aim was to evoke “passive collaboration,” or a unity which emphasized the defense and solidarity of the hemisphere. This campaign was considered a success. In the words of Rockefeller, “when the critical moment — declaration of war against this country — arrived, all the other American republics, without exception, volunteered some expression of allegiance to the U.S. cause.”55

After the United States entry into the war, the aims became more specific. The information activities sought to evoke full, active hemispheric collaboration by making a case for the breaking of diplomatic relations with the Axis powers, followed hopefully by a declaration of war. Also sought were full military cooperation, the suppression of subversive Axis activities including propaganda, and a coordinated economic program for the production and control of critical materials.46 The emphasis on these various aims changed with the course of the war. In the first year and a half of the war, emphasis was placed on convincing Latin America that the United States would win. News and programs dealing with the progress of the war and the power of the Allies were highlighted. This was meant to counteract any defeatist Axis propaganda and to encourage Latin Americans to get on the winning side. In addition, the OCIAA highlighted the part Latin America was playing in the war by portraying efforts aimed at the acquisition of strategic materials and the development of various U.S.-supported economic projects in Latin America. In the latter part of 1943 and on into 1944, with victory in sight, the OCIAA, looking to the post-war world, began to de-emphasize the war and increase attention to hemispheric economic interdependence, solidarity, and post-war planning.47

OCIAA’s efforts, however, were complicated by a number of problems. The Latin American media were heavily dependent on United States export advertising, particularly since European export advertising totally dried up after 1939. Although there were no precise figures, it was generally estimated that in the early 1940s approximately 40 percent of all print and radio advertising revenue in Latin America came from United States companies doing business in the region.48 Initially the OCIAA tried to take advantage of the Latin American media’s dependency on United States advertising dollars by urging United States exporters to boycott pro-Axis media outlets and support those radio stations and publications that were friendly to United States policy aims. With the United States entry into the war, however, there was a decline in U.S. exports to the region. Exporters, in turn, began to cut back on their advertising expenditures, creating serious financial difficulties for
the pro-United States media. For newspapers and magazine, there was the additional problem of a heavy dependency on North American newsprint, shipments of which were curtailed due to shipping shortages.

To the OCIAA this was a major opportunity to further insure the cooperation of the Latin American media in its information activities. In August 1942 Rockefeller persuaded the Treasury Department, in line with its ruling on domestic advertising, to allow companies to deduct as business expenses all export advertising, even though they actually had no products to sell. He then contacted over 1,300 United States companies doing business in Latin America and urged them to maintain or even increase their pre-war level of advertising in the Latin American media. He argued that this would be a significant, and tax-deductible, contribution to the war effort. Also looking forward to the post-war market, he noted that it would be important for them to keep their name before the Latin American public.

The overall response by United States exporters was very positive. A survey conducted by the OCIAA in early 1943 revealed that 65 percent of the 376 exporters surveyed intended to maintain or increase their Latin American advertising. In spite of the fact that United States exporters had little or no goods to sell, expenditures by United States advertisers in the region grew from $8 million in 1942 to $16 million in 1944 and $20 million in 1945. In order to assist exporters, the OCIAA issued thematic guidelines and directions to be followed by advertisers in writing their copy. Thus, much of the advertising, in addition to keeping the exporter's name before the Latin public, also stressed the various propaganda points (e.g., inter-American solidarity, the Allied war effort, etc.) that the OCIAA was trying to get across. By mid-1943, the OCIAA had been in contact with over 1,500 firms, assisting them in their advertising in Latin America. This included both Latin American print and local radio advertisers.

The primary task of OCIAA's activities in this area was to direct United States advertising toward pro-Allied media and use such advertising to win Latin American support for United States policy. In some instances, however, newspapers and radio stations were pressured to drop advertising from blacklisted firms. In Mexico, for example, a number of newspapers were informed that unless they discontinued advertising from suspected pro-Axis firms, United States motion picture advertisers, who purchased several full pages daily, would withdraw their advertising. The Mexican newspapers gave in.

In conjunction with its black-listing and advertising projects, the OCIAA's press section began to supply news releases, feature stories, photographs and other editorial material to Latin American publications and radio stations: By mid-1944 the OCIAA estimated that it was distributing an average of four items of information daily to each of over
The OCIAA also expedited shipment of newsprint to those publications friendly to the Allied war cause.

An early area of OCIAA effort was the promotion of United States shortwave radio broadcasting to Latin America. Before Pearl Harbor the OCIAA provided the commercial shortwave radio broadcasters, particularly NBC and CBS, information about broadcasting reception, the characteristics of the Latin American audience and suggestions for programs. Initially such shortwave activity consisted primarily of direct broadcasting. Both the OCIAA and the shortwave broadcasters however, soon realized that a far larger Latin American audience could be reached through rebroadcasting shortwave programs over local radio stations. This required that the shortwave broadcasters organize chains of affiliate stations in Latin America to which they would transmit shortwave programs for rebroadcasting. In 1940 and 1941 NBC, CBS and Crosley each organized their own separate network of stations. By the end of 1941 NBC claimed 117 stations in its network. CBS, 76 and Crosley, 24. Of the approximately 700 radio stations in Latin America in 1941, roughly one-third were affiliated with United States shortwave networks.

After the United States entry into the war, the OCIAA considered a number of plans to re-organize the United States shortwave service. The sale of advertising time on shortwave services proved to be a commercial failure, and shortwave broadcasters could not run their services indefinitely at a loss. The OCIAA, along with the OWI, finally settled on an arrangement whereby the government leased all time on the shortwave stations. OCIAA signed contracts with NBC and CBS to do the programming under OCIAA program guidelines. Such programming was then beamed to the Latin American affiliates and rebroadcast locally.

An important element in the OCIAA’s media activities, particularly in radio, was the OCIAA coordinating committee that existed in each of the American republics. These committees oversaw OCIAA activities on a local level. They had official government status, worked in conjunction with the local United States embassy, and were funded by the OCIAA. Their connections to the OCIAA or the State Department, however, were not publicized. The local committees were comprised of prominent United States citizens, most of whom were employees of Latin American subsidiaries of United States companies. The coordinating committee in Argentina, for example, was headed by an official from the local branch of the Standard Oil Company. Committee members included employees of Ford, National City Bank, Armaco and General Motors. The press-radio division of the Argentine committee was run by representatives of the local branches of RCA, McCann Erickson, N. W. Ayers and J. Walter...
In time the coordinating committee became an effective field organization for the OCIAA.

OCIAA radio operations were divided between direct shortwave and shortwave rebroadcasting and local radio broadcasts based on transcriptions and local live productions. Time on local radio stations was bought by the OCIAA. In the case of the shortwave rebroadcasts on the local affiliates of NBC and CBS, the local stations received their fee through the networks. For transcription broadcasts and local live productions, the local coordinating committee made all the arrangements, bought the time on the local station and checked the actual broadcast. The majority of programs transmitted over shortwave were news and commentary focusing on the war. Both shortwave and transcribed programs also included musical and variety shows (including a Spanish version of the "Hit Parade") and dramatic productions. The following example of radio shows, taken from an OCIAA program handbook, gives an idea of the programs produced by the OCIAA and broadcast by shortwave, transcription, or live local production:

Cavalcade of America — The struggle for freedom in the United States... Places special emphasis on the part played by American citizens in the fight.

Hero's Tribute — Re-enacted dramatization of the American fighting men on the far-flung fronts of Europe.

The Mysterious One — Based on authentic information of pro-Axis activities... Takes the form of fictionalized drama depicting a typical Latin American, his sincere admiration of the United States and the United Nations... An extremely powerful means of making clear to the masses what pro-Axis activities really mean in terms of their own independence, their own economic welfare, and the existence of their nations' sovereign states. (sic)

Believe it or Not for South America — These programs present interesting facts with particular reference to the war and hemispheric defense effort.

Fighting Youth — Patterned after Major Bowes' Amateur Hour. Programs center around a master of ceremonies who interviews men in the army camps. Performers discuss their training to defeat the enemy, describe Army life, and talent is demonstrated in singing and playing of musical instruments.

OCIAA shows attempted to achieve the overall goal of creating Latin American support for the war effort and establishing closer ties between the United States and Latin America. How successful the individual shows were was never precisely determined. A number of the programs, however, were popular enough that after the war regular commercial sponsors in Latin America took them over and continued producing them.

OCIAA involvement in producing and broadcasting these programs over Latin American radio was not a secret. The OCIAA, however, generally tried to keep as low a profile as possible. Initially the OCIAA prohibited local coordinating committees from seeking local commercial sponsors for the transcribed and locally produced OCIAA radio pro-
grams. By 1943 it had changed that policy, however, both to save money and to take "the sting from our propaganda message because the show is not automatically suspected of being government inspired."  

Although the immediate major goal of OCIAA's information activities was to counter Axis propaganda and mobilize Latin American public opinion in support of United States policy, a concomitant, but not as well articulated, objective of OCIAA officials involved the "modernization" of Latin American media. With few exceptions the OCIAA radio staff came from backgrounds in advertising or commercial radio broadcasting. In trying to reach Latin American radio audiences they applied their knowledge, assumptions and biases acquired from working in U.S. broadcasting to the Latin American radio situation. Many of them felt that compared to the United States much of Latin American radio was vastly underdeveloped and that few Latin Americans understood or appreciated the potential of radio. OCIAA radio officials tied the success of their Latin American activities to their ability to upgrade and modernize the medium. This attitude is well expressed in a memorandum written in 1941 suggesting a major subsidization of NBC and CBS program and network activities in Latin America in order to consolidate the networks' presence in the region and build major radio audiences. The memorandum argued:

We will find ourselves, at the cost of a million dollars or so, revolutionizing the radio picture in Latin America, bringing to those countries the same benefits that accrued to our nation from the development of chain radio. We will build the habit of listening on one side, and we will create the star show philosophy on the other. We will make radio not only more desirable from the quality of offerings, but more exciting, more varied, more colorful, and hence increase its efficiency in the sale of more sets, the greater use of sets, and as our audience builds, we will have the means of educating, influencing, and informing the peoples of the other republics.

After 1943, the OCIAA emphasized the role that advertising would play in expanding and developing markets in Latin America for United States goods and saw much of its information activity as preparing for this. Much of the information gathered by the OCIAA on Latin American media and markets was made available to United States advertisers and exporters. In 1943 the OCIAA put together a "media cost plan" for United States exporters "which enable[d] a manufacturer to form a quick rough estimate of the cost of an advertising program in Latin America to fit almost any budget." In 1944, the OCIAA compiled all its information on radio, press, and magazine advertising rates and market size in Latin America in a book made available to United States exporters. This publication represented the first comprehensive guide to Latin American advertising media and was heartily welcomed by exporters.

Overall, the impact and success of the OCIAA's information activities in Latin America are hard to gauge. Rockefeller estimated that the Mo-
tion Picture Division's material at its peak was viewed by over 40 million Latin Americans weekly; the Radio Division output was heard by 15 to 20 million daily, and the Press Division's material reached 40 to 60 million Latin American's monthly. No efforts were made to study or measure the effect of such output on Latin American public opinion. No substantial surveys were conducted and, other than anecdotal accounts, there is no clear evidence that OCIAA's efforts were successful in countering Axis propaganda or mobilizing public opinion in favor of the United States.

The greatest observable impact of OCIAA's activity was on public opinion but on the structure and operation of the Latin American media. By exploiting the media's dependency on United States advertising revenue the OCIAA strangled those publications and radio stations which did not support United States interests or war aims and bolstered those media which did. In the press, it accomplished this largely through the willingness of United States advertisers to follow OCIAA's guidelines and directives. In radio, this practice was complemented by direct United States government payments to radio stations. It was estimated that by the end of the war the United States government, through the OCIAA, was the largest radio time user and revenue producer for Latin American broadcasters. While the OCIAA may not have won the support of the Latin American masses, it nevertheless gained the allegiance of the Latin American media owners.

Aside from its political impact on the Latin American media, the OCIAA information activities had the more basic effect of assisting the development of the Latin American media, particularly the newer medium of radio, along the lines of the United States model. One goal of the OCIAA was to further develop Latin American media as advertising outlets for United States exporters to the region. Moreover the OCIAA, through its radio programming activities, played a great role in determining the character of Latin American radio. Program formats and styles began to resemble those of the United States. As the Latin American correspondent for Variety noted happily after the war:

Ten years ago Latin American radio was attuned to the Old World. The tastes of its directors and listeners were altogether European. Today Latin American radio, celebrating its 25th anniversary, is distinctly of the New World.

Advertising agencies, some local, many branches of North American firms, find radio one of their best media. In the smaller places, the stations do the whole job themselves, getting their own business, developing programs and doing their own collecting. Bigger stations are following the trend from the United States and are producing more and more live programming, especially during evening hours. These stations and others like them time their productions and program them as in the United States. Broadcasters who once imported their top talent, ideas, equipment and way of operation from Europe now look to the United States. They bring down Yankee artists and even struggle through the hot-pixtix language of Variety, the U.S. radio and theatrical weekly, to catch up with what's new. They have their programs cut and fitted to the tastes of local listeners, but they've borrowed many ideas, from quiz shows to commentators and man-in-the-street interviews.
Soon after the war the OCIAA was disbanded and its media activities either discontinued or transferred to other government agencies. Nonetheless the OCIAA was successful in its attempts to gain the allegiance of Latin American media owners for United States interests and to remold in great part the Latin American media to better meet the post-war advertising and marketing needs of United States exporters.

Conclusion

By 1945 the dominant position of the United States hemispheric economic and political affairs was unchallenged. In post-war world affairs the United States government could safely ignore the social and economic problems of Latin America while it turned its major attention and efforts toward the problems of recreating a new world order.

As a laboratory for economic policy and political practice, Latin America served as a testing ground for United States policies and practices in the area of communications and media. Just as the modern United States policy of free trade received its first manifestation in Latin America in the form of reciprocal trade treaties and Export-Import Bank loans, so also did United States policies and practices of control over international communications and cultural diplomacy receive their first workout. The testing-ground nature of United States communication policies and activities in Latin America continued after the war. At the 1945 inter-American conference in Mexico City the United States called upon Latin American governments to support the principle of the free and unrestricted flow of communications and information among nations. This marked the first appearance of the principle upon which United States post-war policy in international communications was based. The final declaration of the conference embodied the free-flow doctrine and further committed the American republics to promoting its acceptance by all the nations of the world.  

Thus by 1945, the United States had developed communications practices and policies in Latin America designed to complement and enhance its economic, military, and political control of the region. In those areas where private media interests were successful in penetrating Latin American nations, such as the film and advertising industries, the United States government lent assistance and encouragement. In the areas where private interests were not successful, such as in shortwave broadcasting, the government itself stepped in and undertook media activities. Thus the United States faced the post-war era of world expansion with a partnership between government and media interests worked out on the basis of the experience in Latin America.
NOTES

1. For a discussion of the various points of view on media imperialism, see C.C. Lee, "Media Imperialism: Reconsidered. The Homogenizing of Television Culture" (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980), especially chapter 2.


6. Empire and Communications (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950); The Bias of Communication (Toronto: University Press, 1964). For a recent study a United States global expansion during the years 1890-1945 that includes an excellent analysis of U.S. expansion in the communications field, see Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982).


17. Ibid., pp. 5-10.


American telephone companies acquired by ITT were originally established in the 1880s and 1890s by North American and British telephone interests. See J. Fred Rippy, "Notes on the Early Telephone Companies of Latin America." Hispanic American Historical Review 26:1, 1946, pp. 116-118.


29. Ibid., pp. 34-35.


31. Advertising Methods in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, op. cit., p. 22.


40. For a detailed discussion of the FCC decision to commercialize shortwave radio broadcasting see Fred Fejes, "Imperialism, Media and the Good Neighbor; New Deal Foreign Policy and United States Shortwave Broadcasting to Latin America" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1932), pp. 99-121.


42. When the OCIAA was originally created in August 1940, it was named the Office for the Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics. The next year it was reorganized and renamed the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. For the sake of convenience, the OCIAA designation will be used throughout.


44. U.S., Office of Inter-American Affairs, History of the Office of the Coordinator-

45. A copy of the memorandum is found in OCIAA History, op. cit., Appendix, pp. 279-280.

46. Ibid.

47. OCIAA History, op. cit., p. 280; p. 7, footnote 8. Before Rockefeller was offered the job as head of the OCIAA, the White House considered appointing CBS President William Paley as head. Paley, however, let the White House know that he was not interested. William Paley, As It Happened (Garden City: Doubleday, 1979), pp. 140-141. No doubt this gesture was a move on the administration's part to create closer ties between the broadcasters and the White House. It does emphasize the fact that the White House perceived the development of an information campaign as one of the main activities of the OCIAA.


50. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Second Deficiency Appropriations Bill for 1941, 71st Congress, 1st Session, 1941, pp. 694-718. Such drastic reductions in salary were not as bad as they seem as both Whitney and Francisco were receiving income from their investments and other holdings. In mid-1941, including Rockefeller, there were 36 "dollar-a-year" men working for the OCIAA, most of them as consultants or members of advisory committees, Op. cit., pp. 698, 720-725. By 1943 the number had declined to seven. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the National War Agencies Appropriation Bill for 1944, 74th Congress, 1st Session, 1943, p. 381.

51. Of the Latin American nations which declared war on the Axis powers, only Mexico and Brazil contributed troops. Mexico sent an air squadron to the Pacific war theatre and Brazil sent a division to Italy.


54. Ibid., p. 35.


66. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

67. "Cavalcade of America" program was entitled "Citizen Franklin D. Roosevelt" and depicted the President as a world leader and hero. The program contained such
statements as "He is facing a gigantic globe . . . touching it with his fingers, the globe turns slowly and the face of the President reveals profound meditation as the continents and oceans pass before his eyes." At the end of the program, the narrator concludes, "At his back is the enormous terrestrial globe: before him is destiny." Similar programs dealt with MacArthur and Hull. Asked about these programs, a spokesman for the OCIAA said, "You could call in propaganda, but we prefer to call in dramatizations with completely factual backgrounds, designed to tell our Latin American neighbors in an interesting manner what we are doing in the war and what we are fighting for." New York Times, 14 July 1943. 40:2.

74. New York Times. 27 July 1944. 28:3. After the war, the OCIAA's activities in Latin American market research were carried on by advertising agencies. In November 1946, the New York Times reported the first contingent of Latin Americans arriving in this country to be trained in United States marketing research techniques and advertising practices. 10 November 1946, III:6:4.
76. Ray Josephs, "Latinos Tune In," The Inter-American September 1945. p. 39. Josephs was the Latin American correspondent for Variety.
77. Ibid., pp. 17, 18-19.