Although many colleges offer programs in women's studies, research on the psychology of women has very low visibility in professional journals. Feminist research can enrich the discipline of social and personality psychology through its unique orientation and methodology. Gender must be viewed as both a characteristic of participants in a situation and a stimulus to which persons respond. Both men and women must be used in research samples in order to derive conclusions about all of human behavior. Gender stereotypes must be separated from definitions of good functioning and mental health. To date, uniquely female roles, behaviors, and occupations remain relatively unstudied, due to the tendency to study women in terms of their relationships to men. The study of behavior must acknowledge the differences in status and power between the sexes. Feminist research must examine new sources of information from ethological/observational modes as opposed to laboratory studies of social behavior. Behavior should be studied as a function of both the person and the context. In reporting gender differences, the feminist researcher must take into account the magnitude of effect along with statistical significance and the traditional values and language used in the male-dominated field. Feminist theory's response to gender differences is still in its infancy. Both social factors and life experiences have created a women's culture with both historical and contemporary significance. However, caution must be employed in focusing on women's uniqueness as it may lead back to gender stereotypes, while ignoring within-gender variability. Feminist theory can aid social/personality psychology by forcing a revolution in scholarship directed toward change. (ML)
THE POTENTIAL ENRICHMENT OF SOCIAL/PERSOALITY PSYCHOLOGY THROUGH FEMINIST RESEARCH, AND VICE VERSA

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The Potential Enrichment of Social/Personality Psychology
Through Feminist Research, and Vice Versa

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When I first began this paper my intent was to sketch how social and personality psychology has been challenged by the new woman's movement: challenged to critically examine its hidden assumptions about women and men, i.e., its beliefs about gender; challenged to raise new questions; and to formulate and test hypotheses derived from a new theoretical orientation. I speculated that those among us who are committed to the Lewinian proposition that behavior is a function of the interaction between Person and Environment could not fail to be attracted to feminist research, since it was precisely such an interaction which would explain gender and the vast number of its correlates. I had certainly been moved to re-examine old concepts, and was caught up in the rich literature, the energy and insights of feminist scholarship. This, then, was a good time to step back and do some assessment in my own field. The results of that very limited first look, since I have just begun and can see the forests yet to be explored, led me to a somewhat different place from that which I had hoped to reach. My two general conclusions are reflected in the paper's title: 1. Thus far, feminist influence on mainstream social/personality psychology seems to be modest while our potential remains enormous; and 2. there are some fundamental issues in feminist theory for which psychological research and analysis are essential.

Supporting the first conclusion are the results of a simple frequency count of selected titles in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Although some may question how representative this journal is of research in
our field, few will doubt its prestige and its reflection of issues supported by our academic leadership and funding agencies. It has been said by some in social science (e.g., Westkoff, 1979) that "women have become the latest academic fad...[or] marketable commodities." It has been suggested that, like the case for blacks in an earlier period, social scientists are currently exploiting women as a prolific source of data and amassing facts without a complementary concern with improving the social conditions of women's lives. But this focus on women as objects of knowledge does not seem to be an accurate characterization of the present status of social/personality psychology. I checked all the titles in five complete volumes of JPSP, beginning in 1962 and then, by 5 year leaps, in 1967, 1972, 1977, and 1982, looking for subjects relevant to women's lives. I read some abstracts where titles were ambiguous but relied primarily on the titles themselves. Omitting editorials and monographs, the percent of such papers relevant to women in JPSP is as follows: 1962, 2% (3 out of 135); 1967, 6% (12 out of 205); 1972, 4% (9 out of 210); 1977, 11% (10 out of 92); and 1982, 14% (32 out of 224). We can be pleased by the steady increase in 20 years from 2 to 14%, or we can be dismayed by the current paucity of research relevant to women. Contributing most heavily in 1982 to this research (23 of the 32 articles) were gender comparisons of various behaviors and studies of masculine, feminine, and androgynous personality types. Again, depending on your perspective, this can be a source of gratification or pain.

An earlier review by Denmark (cf. Grady, 1981) of JPSP and six other journals yielded similar findings to mine: in 1965, 5% and in 1975, 11% of the published papers were judged relevant to "the psychology of women." One might keep in mind, in evaluating these figures, that the Association for Women in Psychology (AWP) was established 14 years ago in 1969, and APA's own Division
In 1973, about 450 colleges offer women's studies programs, and about 20,000 women's studies courses are taught at schools around the country, while 40 schools now have women's studies research centers (Azzi, 1983). Prominent within these programs and courses are topics in the psychology of women. More specifically, Russo (1982) has reported from a national survey of graduate departments of psychology, that 670 faculty members in 219 programs identified themselves as having an interest in research or in clinical activities relevant to the psychology of women. There is also a formal effort underway in a number of colleges to mainstream the results of feminist research, i.e. to incorporate into already existing courses and programs material on women, new insights and feminist challenges to traditional scholarship.

It seems clear nevertheless that social/personality psychologists concerned with such issues cannot rely on our standard journals. Unger (1982) recently addressed this problem of the low visibility of women as a research area in our field and asked, "Is work in the Psychology of Women ignored or undercited because it is done by women, because it is about women, or because it stems from a new and revisionist theoretical perspective?" She suggests the latter, and I would concur.

**Feminist Research**

What is feminist scholarship? Definitions have been proposed in most of the disciplines in which such work is being done. In our field, Division 35's Task Force on Issues in Research in the Psychology of Women (1977) listed as objectives of feminist research: the clarification of "psychological, biological, and social-cultural determinants of behavior"; along with "the integration of this information about women (and men) into current psychological knowledge and theories"; and the promotion "of a benevolent
society in which individual self-actualization is possible. What Rhoda Unger (1982) has called the "socially activist component of the psychology of women" is a distinguishing feature. The methods of feminist research in psychology, according to the Task Force (1977), are "cooperative, participative, interdisciplinary, and non-hierarchical...[beginning] with personal experience" and recognizing that "truth is not separate from the person who speaks it." A more recent Division 35 Task Force (1981) suggests that a vital function performed by feminist research is to present the alternative perspective of the "outsider". A number of feminist writers from a variety of disciplines have noted that feminists can provide particularly insightful criticism of their own fields because as women scientists, scholars, and academicians we both "belong" and "do not belong" to the primarily male establishment and are thus both insiders and outsiders (e.g. Keller, 1982; Westkott, 1979).

The feminist enrichment or potential enrichment of scholarship in any field takes two general and interrelated forms: 1) self-conscious and critical analyses of the discipline to uncover its androcentric bias in both content and method, thus revealing the "invisibility or distortion of women as objects of knowledge" (Westkott, 1979); and 2) the indirect influence which arises from the asking of new questions, and the presentation of new hypotheses and theoretical formulations which follow from a focus on women's experiences and the conditions of women's lives. From both these sources can be abstracted specific influences on the content, the methods, and the theories in social/personality psychology. It is difficult to keep these categories separate since they are interdependent and each has an obvious or subtle effect on the other, but I will try to move in a more or less orderly fashion from one to the other, in answering the question: how can feminist
research enrich our discipline?

Enrichment of Social/Psychology

1. There is ample evidence that gender is often a significant variable, both as a characteristic of participants in a situation, and as a stimulus to which persons respond (Committee...Sociology, 1980; Grady, 1981; Wallston, 1981). Because the socialization of girls and boys, women and men, is demonstrably different, it is predictable that they will respond differently, for example, to achievement situations (Horner, 1972), to moral dilemmas (Gilligan, 1977, 1982b), to conformity pressures (Eagly, 1978), etc.

Gilligan's work is particularly persuasive in pointing out that it is not the case that women do not attain the "highest" stages of morality, as Kohlberg concluded, but rather that his stages mirror the socialization of boys or men in our culture more than the experiences of women. Gilligan found evidence that many women tend to consider moral questions in the context of issues of responsibility and concern for others, not isolated from interpersonal consequences.

We must use women and men in our search for general principles and note both differences and similarities. We cannot derive conclusions about behavior by using male samples as representative of the human population (Division 35, 1981). If we are studying aggression, or interpersonal attraction, or empathy, or prosocial behavior, etc., we must observe women as well as men in similar situations and utilize the same dependent measures. Frodi, et al. (1977) have noted that most studies of aggression have utilized male participants, and that when women are used they are more likely to be asked to respond to paper and pencil measures than to the behavioral measures used with men. Similarly, but conversely, McKenna and Kessler (1977) found that interpersonal attraction studies tended to make use of female
participants, and that in both interpersonal attraction and aggression research, when females, rather than males, are subjects... the independent variable is less likely to involve the active treatment or arousal of the subject and dependent variable measurement is less likely to involve the active behavior of the subject. This phenomenon illustrates well the connection between the implicit assumptions of researchers and both the content and methodology of our work.

3. It is not correct to assume that good functioning or mental health for women (or men) is necessarily related to fulfilling the "dictates of the gender stereotype" (Kahn & Jean, 1983). There is, in fact, strong evidence to the contrary, for women. Independent assessments must be made of satisfaction with self, effective functioning, and their correlates.

4. There are vast areas about which we have remained in relative ignorance because they pertain exclusively or almost exclusively to women's lives (Division 35, 1981): e.g., housework; sex discrimination in employment; sexual harassment and assault; menstruation; contraception, pregnancy, and childbirth; motherhood, and so on. These are areas, issues, or conditions to which women in our culture must learn responses, overt and attitudinal. They are anchored to our culture's definition of women, and to our physiology, as mediated by society. Similarly, there are women in special populations, such as those in prisons, victims of violence, single parents, widows, pink-collar workers, minority women, professionals, community activists, poor women, etc. who have been insufficiently studied.

Wide new fields of inquiry present themselves when we cease thinking about women primarily in terms of relationships to others (men) and when we cease thinking about women in terms of stereotyped roles and attributes. One extremely important consequence is that the probability of obtaining more
accurate descriptions of women's behavior in meaningful situations is thus increased (Kahn & Jean, 1983; Westkott, 1979).

Feminists are not surprised to find that the topics on which a discipline tends to focus reflect the background and interests of those who do the work in that discipline. In the natural as well as the social sciences, science is done by persons, and women as well as non-white and working-class persons have been largely outside of this process (Hubbard, cf. Fiske, 1981). It is cause for concern, but not surprising, that research problems in mainstream science reflect sexist assumptions and expectations. Thus, for example, Sherif (cf. Unger, 1982) has pointed out that when early studies of the menstrual cycle failed to show any reliable impairment of behavior, the mostly male researchers turned to studies of self-reported mood. Now, feminist researchers are once again looking at performance and finding no consistent menstrual-related effects.

Related to all of this, of course, is the question of publication. What is deemed worthy of public report is very likely to complement the bias of the reviewers (Grady, 1981).

5. When we study the workplace, we must not utilize only male participants; and when we study parents and children we must not focus our attention only on mothers (Committee...Sociology, 1980). We must not assume that employed men but unemployed women are representative of their respective groups (Division 35, 1981). Baruch, Barnett and Rivers (1983), for example, have found that paid employment is a significant predictor of feelings of self-esteem and competence among women, a finding which should not be surprising in view of the fact that half the adult women in our country are salary or wage-earners. Parleè (1981) has noted that choice of appropriate control groups reveals the investigator's assumptions and "implicit
theoretical framework" as much as the choice of problem to study, hypothesis to test, procedures, participants, and measures.

6. We can no longer study the behavior of women without acknowledging and making explicit the differential in status and power between the sexes. Thus, for Chesler to have suggested as she did in 1972 (cf. Alpert, 1978) that "men, including male therapists drive women crazy, in order that men may maintain their favorable position", is an hypothesis which must be taken seriously. Similarities in the behavior of oppressed persons, such as American blacks and women, are new subjects of inquiry as is the behavior (verbal and non-verbal) of high status persons such as white men directed toward the less powerful (e.g., Henley, 1977).

7. When we study women we must go to new sources of information – to journals, letters, and other historical and contemporary records of women's lives since attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions may be better reflected in such records than in observed social behavior which is subject to more rigid sanctions (Westkott, 1979). Thus, issues of content become issues of method. More methods must be explored and accepted (Wittig, 1982) since "the narrowness of our methods may also shape the way we ask questions" (Wallston, 1981) and the very nature of those questions. For example, while agentic methods tend to separate observer from the observed, communal methods recognize their interrelatedness and highlight the connection. Both modes of inquiry should yield information of value.

Ethological/observational modes seem better suited than laboratory techniques for the study of reactions to life-long oppression. Thus, Muriel Rukeyser has written in her poem "Kathe Kollwitz" (cf. Adams, 1982):

What would happen
if one woman told the truth about her life
The world would split open.
Feminist scholarship seeks this truth and anticipates the consequences foretold by the poet.

8. Among the most wide-ranging and significant lessons to be learned from feminist research is that which is the \textit{sine qua non} of social psychology, namely that behavior is a function of both the person and the context, and that the same person may behave differently in different situations. To understand gender, multiple contexts must be employed (Division 35, 1981). For example, by examining aggression, influencibility, and self-confidence of women in different situations, Frodi, et al (1977), Eagly (1978), and Lenny (1977), respectively, have successfully refuted the stereotypic, widely-held assumptions and conclusions that women are less aggressive than men, more influencible, and less self-confident. Only in some situations, but not in others, we discover as we ask questions which have not been asked before. As Kay Deaux has reported (cf. Division 35, 1981), "Research has demonstrated that gender by situation interactions are more the rule than the exception, being found more frequently than main effects for gender." Related to this is a recognition that ordinarily in our society, women and men "are differentially distributed across situations" (Division, 35, 1981), a fact of enormous significance.

Recognition of situational influences on behavior necessitates that we pay attention to the demand characteristics of the conditions present in laboratory or field studies. Are cues provided for differential responses according to gender, i.e. for participants to conform to sex-typed expectations, as for example when under public scrutiny (Unger, 1981)? It has been suggested that exploratory and qualitative methodologies may minimize researcher-imposed definitions of a situation (Division 35, 1981).

9. In reporting gender differences on any measure, we should note, along
with its statistical significance, the magnitude of the effect, since some reliable differences are found to be relatively trivial. In addition, we should report within-gender variability so as to "accurately reflect the degree of overlap between the sexes and avoid translating small average differences into dichotomies" (Division 35, 1981):

10. Finally, feminist researchers have joined with other voices with philosophy and science (cf. Manicas & Secord, 1983) to challenge some of traditional tenets of "objectivity" in science. There appear to be two thrusts to the feminist challenge. The first is the recognition that values are an integral part of science, that they influence all phases of the process, and that they should be acknowledged and made explicit in the same way as we recognize that scientific truths are not independent of time and place. This position is shared by other social psychologists (e.g., & Morawski, 1980; Sampson 1978). The second challenge to traditional scientific thinking goes further and argues more explicitly that the long objectives, and methods of individual disciplines, and of science itself, particularly as defined by the experimental method, have been shaped by "masculine" concerns, interests and personality.

It is argued, relative to the first point, that the investigator and object of the research, as well as those who serve as subjects/participants are interrelated, separable for analytical purposes but tied together by expectations, assumptions and hidden or overt values. Facts are always "construed" by an active investigator/interpreter (Morawski, 1982), and (or biases) are present throughout the research process (Wallston, 1981; Wittig, 1982). Traditional research in social/personality psychology will thus almost certainly reflect the sexist values of our patriarchal culture. Grady (1981) has suggested that "some of these biases can be corrected
through an even-handed application of the principles of scientific method, and others require a raised consciousness, an awareness of the sexist society in which we live."

The second challenge is regarded by the biologist/mathematician Keller (1982), one of its foremost proponents, as the "radical critique". Because it is primarily men who have been doing science in western society: not only have women been kept out (through lack of encouragement, training, or discrimination); not only has the choice and definition of research problems been affected; not only have men been taken to be representative of the species; but "masculinity" has intruded upon and distorted the goals and rationality of the entire "scientific enterprise". Science, it is said, has stressed separation, compartmentalization, and the search for prime causes in contrast to an equally plausible focus on interaction, interdependence, and process; in this way science has reflected masculinity. According to the biologist Hubbard (cf. Fiske, 1981) the approach of men, and science, is "to reduce things to their component parts, not to envision them as a functioning whole."

The vocabulary of science manifests a preoccupation with power, dominance and an adversarial stance vis a vis nature (Kahn & Jahn, 1983; Keller, 1983). Thus, science "attacks" problems with the aim of "mastering" or "controlling"; variables are "dependent" or "independent" and experimenters "manipulate" the latter. Keller (1982) is cognizant of the fact that the traditional scientific mode has also been criticized by male scientists and philosophers, but insists that this criticism must also follow from a rigorous feminist analysis. She writes (1982), "the emphasis on power and control so prevalent in the rhetoric of Western science [is a] projection of a specifically male consciousness." What is required, she suggests, is not abandonment of
objectivity, rationality, and empiricism but the addition of concern with complex interactions, and with the dynamics of process, as well as a "critical self-reflection" on the part of scientists.

While objecting to the search for "top-down" theories, and explanations in terms of governing causes, Keller unfortunately embraces such an explanation in attempting to account for the connection between masculinity and power motivation. She utilizes psychoanalytic theory in its modern guise as "object relations theory" (acknowledging the influence of Chodorow, 1978, and Dinerstein, 1977), to trace links among masculinity, a concern with objectivity/autonomy, and the focus of science on power and domination.

Keller (1982) argues that from the male infant's earliest experiences with his primary care-giver, the mother, are formed his conceptions of the world and his "characteristic orientation to it" and that the major attribute of this experience is separation. For females, on the other hand, the early experience is of connectedness and identification with the mother. In my view, such an explanation of male concern with power and dominance rests on untested and naive assumptions: first, that such early experience in a prototypical Freudian nuclear family is universal or widespread; and, second, that it has predictable consequences for the formation of stable, personality traits such as motivation for power. Such an explanation ignores all the further years of our continuing exposure to social conditions, and the positive and negative sanctions for adult behavior. It is here that the vice versa portion of the title of this paper becomes relevant. Social/personality psychology has the potential to enrich feminist theory and to contribute to the vital debate on the nature of gender differences and similarities, a debate which is central to the feminist perspective.

Contribution to Feminist Theory

We return inevitably to questions of nature and nurture and as Unger...
(1981) has put it, "The issue of what sex differences actually exist and how they are produced is crucial for the psychology of women". It is also crucial for feminist theory applied to analyses of literature, history, art, and so on.

In the nineteenth century, the so-called 'Victorian' era, women and men occupied largely separate spheres (at least within middle-class western society) because it was believed that "there were such profound distinctions between what biological and psychological evolution had mandated for masculine and feminine thought and action that women could never enter the public sphere without contravening laws of nature and thus endangering their own health" (Cravens, 1983). This view was vigorously challenged by early 20th century scholars, particularly women in psychology and sociology/anthropology, such as Helen Thompson Woolley, Jessie Taft, Elsie Clews Parson, Mary Roberts Smith Coolidge, Celia Dibel Mosher, and Margaret Mead. There were also challenges from some influential men: Dewey, Mead, W.I. Thomas, and Franz Boas. What followed was a virtual disappearance of the subject of sex differences from the social science literature, beginning in the 1920s. Women simply disappeared as a subject of concern and Man became the species representative and the fitting object for study about personality and culture (Cravens, 1983). Not until the 70's was there a rediscovery of women in mainstream psychology but, as might have been predicted, the focus was on the differences from men, not the similarities. That studies demonstrating differences are more likely to be published is, of course, a likely factor (Division 35, 1981).

The contemporary feminist response to the question of gender differences, a response still in its infancy in terms of its generation of mainstream research, has taken two major forms. The first is an emphasis on the role played by social factors in separating the lives and therefore the expectations, attitudes and behaviors of the sexes. This argument views
socialization as an ongoing, life-long process and looks for explanations of gender beyond the influence of early experience on individual personality. Segregation by sex and sexism, i.e., a commitment to the inferiority of women, as expressed in negative attitudes, stereotyped beliefs, and discriminatory behavior, is found to be imbedded in all of our social institutions—in the media, family, economy and the political sphere (Lott, 1981a). These institutions maintain women's low status and low power throughout the life span and across divisions of class and ethnicity thus reinforcing gender differences, in the same way as differential status and power contribute to observed differences among racial, ethnic, and socio-economic class groups. Thus, Grady (1981) has urged that "awareness of the different social and economic conditions for men and women cannot be left to sociologists if psychology is to maintain its integrity as a science", and Parlee (1981) has noted that "sex, race, age, class—all are...variables that point to clusters of life experiences that are systematically different for different groups of people." In this view the more likely explanation of fear of success, for example, observed in some (but not all) women is less a stable personality trait in the form of an acquired motive, and more in the objective consequences which success is known to have for some women. Persons (women or men, black or white) will not avoid success if the outcomes are primarily positive; nor will they avoid aggression, competition, leadership, and so on, if the situation is appropriate and the consequences non-punitive or satisfying.

A related but essentially divergent position in terms of its emphasis is represented by the work of Gilligan (1977, 1979, 1982a, 1982b) and (1976). This position highlights and focuses on the positive effects of women's life experiences, in contrast to men's, and asserts that these
experiences and the imposed separateness from men have created a women's culture with both historical and contemporary significance. We are urged to examine this culture carefully, to give recognition to its distinctiveness, and to study the situations which define women's lives, our responsibilities and roles. Hyde and Rosenberg (cf. Kahn & Jean, 1983), for example, suggest that "We must observe women in their own habitat, the home, the steno pool, the factory, and find out how they behave, how they think and feel." What we will find, according to this view are expressive, sensitive, communal persons concerned with relationships, the needs of others, interpersonal responsibility and harmony. Women are different from men in these ways, this approach goes on to note, and not only should these characteristics be valued, respected, and applauded in women but they should be strived for and learned by men. Thus, Gilligan (1977, 1979) has traced moral development in girls and women and found it not the same as for boys and men. She has rightly objected to the presentation of male-based data as the foundation for general theory, pointing out that men have shaped the constructs through which we are all supposed to see life. Examination of the experiences of girls and women, she argues, suggests that different "moral lessons" are learned. For men, justice may be equated with abstract forms; for women, however, "the moral problem is seen to arise from conflicting responsibilities rather than from competing rights" (Gilligan, 1979). Women's experiences are rooted in attachment and we are therefore concerned with expressiveness, caring, and with contexts, while men who have experienced separation, are more concerned with instrumentality and the balancing of individual rights. Women, Gilligan (1979) asserts, judge themselves in terms of their ability to care. The value of intimacy, that contemporary men are now discovering in mid-life, is something women acquire early.
In explaining such value differences between women and men, Gilligan relies heavily although not exclusively on Chodorow's analysis of early mother-child interaction. Although cognizant of the later differences in experience between girls and boys, Gilligan appears to give Chodorow's position centrality. Because, writes Chodorow (1978) "they are parented by a person of the same gender...girls come to experience themselves as less differentiated than boys, as more continuous with and related to the external object-world". The end result is differing values, and Gilligan (1979) concludes that "women bring to the life cycle a different point of view and...order human experiences in terms of different priorities." The work of Miller (1976) complements such a conclusion, and both emphasize that from the woman's point of view, from the concern with harmony, caring, responsibility, and relationships, emanates strength not weakness.

While such clear expositions of women's strengths are vital additions to our data and theory, one problem with this position is that in focusing on the differences between women and men observed in contemporary society, what tends to be de-emphasized is that these differences are only a function of differing experience, reflecting historical, social class, ethnic, and racial factors.

Note Gilligan's words (1979), "Women's deference is rooted not only in their social circumstances, but also in the substance of their moral concern." Does this suggest that women's moral concerns are not rooted in their social circumstances? If not, then from what other source?

The focus on sex differences loses sight of their source in particular circumstances, history, expectations and social sanctions, and in so doing over-generalizes from some women (and some men) to all, a trap leading us back inevitably to gender stereotypes. The focus on differences ignores significant within-gender variability. "Ain't I a Woman?", asked Sojourner
Truth in countering the female stereotype of her day. Yes, southern white upper class women were supposed to be slender, weak, and too fragile to open carriage doors for themselves, but not the slave women who heaved sacks of potatoes or cotton and worked the fields along with their men, or did the cooking, the laundry and the child care for the master's family as well as their own. There are similar and additional differences among groups of contemporary women.

Basic principles of social/personality psychology should lead us to expect that women and men will differ to the extent that the behaviors they are able to practice and the reinforcements they receive continue to differ. This is also the case for within-gender differences, and psychological disparities between the highly and less well-educated, the poor and the affluent, black and white, urban and rural, etc. To the extent that persons share life conditions they will behave similarly. Thus we must look for similarities as well as differences since both are explainable by the same principles of learning. We acquire responses to and in situations. When a society segregates individuals on the basis of sex (or race, etc.) and systematically exposes the segregated groups to different conditions, expectations, rewards and access to society's resources, the result will be differences in interests, motives and overt behavior. In our society such segregation by sex is complicated by other status factors. Thus, to know, for example that Phyllis Schlafly, Margaret Thatcher, Shirley Chisholm and Kate Millett are all women will permit reliable prediction of only some behavior. They have all been daughters and wives, probably menstruated regularly, and function in a society which oppresses and devalues women, but not evenly or homogeneously. Can we predict that each of these women is similar in their concern for relationships, caring, harmony, and responsibility? My guess is that we could
more easily match Thatcher and Millett, for example, to two different men than to each other on values, interests, beliefs and moral position. What we need to search out and understand are the antecedents and correlates of behavior. It is not sex that matters, but those life conditions which are systematically related to it by cultural prescription, regulation, or arrangement. Where such experiential/situational correlates are weak or overridden by others, sex ceases to be a discriminating variable.

We need to understand that the culture-prescribed experiential/situational correlates of sex are only partially related to early childhood socialization and to past personal history. Sex-typing is maintained in a society by contemporary cues for adult behavior and appropriate rewards and punishments. Unger (1981) has pointed out that "Sex-related effects often have a 'now you see them, now you don't' quality", an inconsistency she attributes to the use of different methodologies. But, fundamentally, what this phenomenon suggests is that sex differences appear or do not appear depending upon the social conditions or context of the behavior. This principle, well supported by empirical data, is emphasized by feminist research, but is also the essence of the social psychological approach.

In a previous paper (Lott, 1981b) I offered a feminist critique of the androgy concept. I argued that while androgyny was an advance over the earlier idea of masculine and feminine as either-or bipolar opposites, it continues to link behavior to gender and to label certain attributes as characteristic of women, and others as characteristic of men, with little regard for the abundant evidence of within-gender variability (often uncovered by the same research). Recently I have read other similar critiques. Morawski (1982), for example, suggests that the androgy model renovated rather than replaced "the assumptions of human nature that initially received
criticism," while Wallston (1981) now urges discontinuing the use of masculine/feminine labels which "imply false dichotomies." Bem (1981) has also come to recognize that the androgyne concept is insufficiently radical from a feminist perspective because it continues to presuppose that masculinity and femininity have an independent and palpable reality rather than being themselves cognitive constructs. The same general criticism is applicable to the approach which focuses on opposing feminine and masculine attitudes, values, perceptions and behaviors. While making women visible and uncovering the realities of their lives, while exposing the adrocentric bias in social science, such a focus also tends to blur our vision of the variations in the behavior of women, and reduces our attention to the antecedents. I agree with Willis (1981) that "the logic of feminism...leads to ending sexual role divisions and rejecting the idea of opposing masculine and feminine natures," and that to assert "that men have a monopoly on aggression...while women are nonviolent, [and] nurturing" returns us to "oppressive cultural stereotypes." Such assertions deny the reality of contrary evidence, and what we know about situational variation in behavior.

In conclusion, what social/personality psychology can profitably take from feminist research and theory is: 1. recognition of the role played by sexist assumptions and biases in the development of hypotheses, procedures, and the exploration of problems; 2. expansion of areas of research concern and of methodologies; and 3. the consideration of new questions, theoretical formulations, and concepts. What is required is reconstruction, as recently proposed by Wittig (1982); and for the reconstruction to be truly revolutionary, our scholarship must be "directed toward change."

And feminist theory can profit from psychology because it is we who are best able to probe the connections between what people do, feel, believe, and
think and the conditions which make particular behaviors, feelings, beliefs, etc. more probable. To understand the learning or acquisition of behavior is to understand how culture constructs gender. Thus, we can consider seriously a question asked by Alpert (1978): when women and men share equally in the worlds of home and work, what will they be like then? We can anticipate that the range of experiences then available to individuals will increase, and that individual differences will flourish while gender differences will cluster about those few biological imperatives which now distinguish the human sexes.
Footnotes

1 This is an expanded version of a paper read at the American Psychological Association meetings in Anaheim, California, August 1983, as part of a Division 35 Special Symposium Series on "Educating for the Psychology of Women".
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