The focus of this volume is anthropological diplomacy: the promotion of peace and prevention of war by knowing, understanding, and appreciating the basic affirmations of society. Eight articles examine the role of race, language, and culture in inter-ethnic and international relations. Vinson Sutlive, Jr., examines the interrelationship of race and culture. Mamitua Saber presents the Philippines as a case study of the processes of cultural integration. Mario Zamora writes about the cross-cultural themes and values of the Asian aged as migrants to America. Choong Soon Kim discusses the implications of culture and values for U.S. foreign policy formation, with particular emphasis on relations with China, Korea, and Vietnam. Kerri Fritz relates cultural anthropology to the development of international law, while Lynn Thomas relates anthropology to trends in international relations. In the final article, C. D. Macaulay demonstrates how anthropological theory can be useful to international relations. An epilogue, by Indera Singh, underscores the significance of universals of human culture. Notes on contributing authors conclude the journal. (LP)
STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES

is devoted to the study of cultures and societies of the Third World. Each publication contains papers dealing with a single theme or area, addressed both to scholars and laymen as well as to teachers, students, and practitioners of social science; the papers should be of value also to applied social scientists, planners, demographers, community development workers, and other students of human cultures and societies.

COPYRIGHT 1982 by THE EDITORS

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 82-074172

Communications concerning editorial matters, including requests to reprint or translate, and correspondence about subscriptions, change of address, circulation, and payments should be addressed to:

The Editors
STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES
Department of Anthropology
College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, Virginia 23185 U.S.A.
Phone: (804) 253-4522
International Editorial Advisory Board

Teodore Agoncillo (University of the Philippines), Carlos H. Aguilar (University of Costa Rica), Muhammad Ali (University of Malaya), Jacques Amyot (Chulalongkorn University, Thailand), Ghaus Ansari (Kuwait University), George N. Appell (Brandeis University), Harold Barclay (University of Alberta, Canada), Etta Becker-Donner (Museum für Volkerkunde, Vienna, Austria), Harumi Befu (Stanford University), Ignacio Bernal (Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, Mexico), Ronald M. Berndt (University of Western Australia), Fernando Camara (Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, Mexico), Paulo de Carvalho-Heto (São Paulo, Brazil), Joseph B. Casagrande (University of Illinois), S. Chandrasekhar (California State University), K.C. Chang (Yale University), Chen Chi-Iu (National Taiwan University, China), Hackeny Choe (Seoul National University, Korea), George Coelho (National Institute of Mental Health, Maryland), Horacio dela Costa (Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines), Ronald Cohen (Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria), Ronald Crocombe (University of the Pacific, Fiji Island), May N. Diaz (University of California, Berkeley), K. O. Dike (Harvard University), Fred Eggan (University of Chicago), S. C. Dubb (India Institute of Advanced Study, India), John M. Echols (Cornell University), S.N. Eisenstadt (Hebrew University, Israel), Gabriel Escobar M. (Pennsylvania State University and Lima, Peru), Claudio Esteva Fabregat (University of Barcelona, Spain), Orlando Fals Borda (Bogota, Colombia), Muhammad Fayyaz (Punjab University, Pakistan, and Queens University, Canada), C. Dean Freudenberger (School of Theology, Claremont, California), Morton H. Fried (Columbia University), Izo Fujimoto (University of California, Davis), C. von Furer-Haimendorf (London School of Oriental and African Studies, England), Dante Germino (University of Virginia), Walter Goldschmidt (University of California, Los Angeles), Nancie L. Gonzalez (Boston University), W.W. Howells (Harvard University), Francis L.K. Hsu (Northwestern University), Charles C. Hughes (University of Utah Medical Center), Erwin H. Johnson (State University of New York, Buffalo), Victor T. King (University of Hull), Koentjaraningrat (University of Indonesia), T.A. Lambó (World Health Organization, Switzerland), Gottfried O. Lang
(University of Colorado), Peter Lawrence (Sydney University, Australia), Diane K. Lewis (University of California, Santa Cruz), Dapen Liang (Asiamerica Research Institute, California), Abdoulaye Ly (University of Dakar, Senegal), Robert A. Manners (Brandeis University), Jamshed Mavalwala (University of Toronto, Canada), Eugenio Fernandez Mendez (University of Puerto Rico), Alfredo T. Morales (National Research and Development Centre for Teacher Education, University of the Philippines), Gananath Obeyesekere (University of California, San Diego), Gottfried Oosterwal (Andrews University), Marvin K. Opler (State University of New York, Buffalo), Morris E. Opler (University of Oklahoma), Alfonso Ortiz (Princeton University), Akin Rabibhadana (Thammasat University, Thailand), V.J. Ram (United Nations, Beirut, Lebanon), M.S.A. Rao (University of Delhi, India), J.B. Romain (CRESHS, Haiti), Renato I. Rosaldo (Stanford University), Iryng Rouse (Yale University), Miguel Acosta Sainges (Caracas, Venezuela), Kernal S. Sandhu (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore), Edward H. Spicer (University of Arizona), Spiegal-Rosing (Rhur-Universitat Bochum, Germany), Rodolfo Stavenhagen (El Colegio de Mexico), Akira Takahashi (University of Tokyo, Japan), Reina Torres de Arauz (Instituto Nacional de Cultura y Deportes, Panama), Donald Tugby (Queensland University, Australia), Victor W. Turner (University of Virginia), Victor C. Uchendu (University of Illinois and Kampala, Uganda), Lionel Vallee (University of Montreal, Canada), Mario C. Vasquez (National Office of Agrarian Reform, Peru), L.P. Yidarthi (Ranchi University, India), B.M. Villanueva (United Nations, New York City), Hiroshi Wagatsuga (University of California, Los Angeles), Wong Soon Kai (Kuching, Sarawak), Inger Wulff (Danish National Museum).
ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIPLOMACY: ISSUES AND PRINCIPLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mario D. Zamora</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinson H. Sutlive, Jr.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;That's Just Like 'Em:&quot; Race and Culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamitu Saber</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Problems and Achievements of Cultural Integration in the Philippines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mario D. Zamora</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Asian Aged as Migrants to America: Cross-Cultural Themes and Values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choong Sohn Kim</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Foreign Policy and Its Cultural Implication: An Anthropological Perspective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karri L. Fritz</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Communion of Cultures: Cultural Anthropology as it Relates to the Development of International Law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lynn L. Thomas</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthropology and International Relations: Mutual Scope and Focus?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. D. Macaulay</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture and Foreign Policy Making: A Case Study in Improving US-USSR Relations Through Functional Integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indera P. Singh</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epilogue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes on the Contributors</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

This issue of STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES is dedicated to Dr. Jovito R. Salonga, the Philippines’ foremost international lawyer and distinguished scholar and public servant. Currently the President of the Liberal Party of the Philippines, Dr. Salonga is a graduate of Harvard and Yale Universities and is the author of several books in his field of expertise: international law. Professor Salonga has been Professor of International Law at the University of the Philippines and was former Dean of the College of Law, Far Eastern University in Manila. He was also a congressman and later one of the best senators of the Republic of the Philippines before President Ferdinand E. Marcos declared martial law in 1972.

In the preparation of this volume, the editor thanks Professors Vinson H. Sutlive, Jr. and Nathan Altshuler (co-editors of STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES) for giving us the opportunity and privilege to publish the papers on anthropological diplomacy. I also thank Jean Belvin, the cheerful and efficient secretary of the Department of Anthropology of William and Mary, for producing this volume. Ms. Sharon Haegle, a student in anthropology, deserves our gratitude for her proof-reading of the manuscript. Finally, I want to thank the authors of this issue for their cooperation and their great ideas.

MARIO D. ZAMORA
INTRODUCTION

MARIO D. ZAMORA
College of William and Mary

The central focus of this volume is anthropological diplomacy, the promotion of peace and the prevention of war by knowing, understanding, and appreciating the basic affirmations of society. These basic affirmations are reflected in the study of race, language, culture, ethnicity, themes, values, and other concepts. They considerably affect the character and conduct of inter-ethnic and international relations.

Specifically, the authors attempt to answer the following fundamental questions: What is the role of race, language, and culture in inter-ethnic and international relations? What are the different factors for promoting harmony and unity in a plural society? What is the role of cultural themes in cross-national understanding? What is the significance of values in international diplomacy? What is the relevance of anthropology to the development of international law? How are cultural anthropology and international relations related to each other? What can anthropological theory contribute to international relations?

Vinson H. Sutlive, Jr., a leading authority on Iban culture, society, and personality, considers race and culture as "inseparable" concepts. To him, "the English term and the universal concept 'race' derives from human cultures and is an analytic construct, based upon cultural processes of evaluation, selection, abstraction, and generalization." Cultures, according to Sutlive, are "bridges to understanding between those who share their symbol system, yet barriers to understanding between those of different systems."

Further, Sutlive wrote: "Analytic constructs such as language, race, and culture are real—and the political implications within them for
differentiation and discrimination are enormous. They provide the bases for human hierarchies, for nationalism, and racism.

Mamitua Saber, a pioneer Muslim sociologist from the Philippines, reinforces Sullivan's thesis of culture as both "constructive and constrictive." Saber briefly reviews race and ethnic relations in selected parts of the world such as Malaysia, the Union of South Africa, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States. He then presents the Philippines as a case study of the processes of "cultural integration." According to Saber, Philippine Civilization is a mosaic of elements from both East and West, from ancient and modern, in the context of its Asian and Pacific cultural heritage. "The continuing effects of these cultural currents," according to him, "have both integrative and disintegrative results, which Philippine society and government should recognize." One of the crucial issues in Philippine life is "how to minimize or to bridge the gap between the majority and minority groups which have built-in ethnocentric attitudes, prejudices, biases, and discrimination among themselves in their multifaceted relationships."

The relevance of integrating or disintegrating elements within a nation such as the Philippines equally applies to cross-national analysis. Mario D. Zamora explains seven cultural themes for Asian aged migrants to the United States. He compares and contrasts cultural themes from the Philippines, India, and the U.S.A. Among these themes are: age is authority, wisdom, and respect; the group is more important and powerful than the individual; men are superior to women in many respects; life is governed by fate; harmony, cooperation, and humanitarianism are essential to life; personalism provides basic security; and duty, obligation, and sacrifice promote happiness in the group.

Choong Soon Kim, a Korean-American anthropologist, pursues in more depth the role of cultural themes and values and their implications for the foreign policy of the United States. Through concrete examples, he contrasts some themes from the U.S. and Vietnam, Korea, and China. Kim postulates that "culturally imposed qualities of American character strongly influence American foreign policy decisions. These largely unconscious patterns of reaction and behavior have been shaped by and emerged from American culture." He identifies several themes, two of the dominant ones include: (1) fairness, and (2) time. Kim feels that fairness is evident in every aspect of American life. To cite just one example, Kim mentions fairness in international relations:

During the early stages of the Vietnam war, Americans did not bomb Hanoi because they thought that it would not be fair to the unarmed civilians. Often, Americans agreed with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong for a temporary ceasefire for them to celebrate their New Year Holidays. However, the Vietnamese violated the gentleman's agreement, and attacked Americans, and brought many casualties. It was a total violation of American thinking of fairness.
With respect to time,

This linear time concept of Americans is denoted in the tense verbs of English. The root form of verbs changes in many elaborate ways, while Chinese, for instance, does not. As reflected in English, Americans perceive time as if an arrow passes a certain reference point. Thus, they have to save time, use the time optimally and operate things within the time frame. On the other hand, the Chinese concept of time would be like a wave in a calm pond, coming and going. For Chinese, there is nothing you can take, kill, save, and/or earn as far as time is concerned.

Karri L. Fritz, the lone lawyer-contributor to this issue, relates cultural anthropology to the development of international law. Cultural forces are significant dimensions in international law and relations. According to Fritz, "a legal system must be rooted in the culture of a society in order to take hold and survive the trials of time...research must explore the cultural factors influencing law and its effectiveness." Fritz believes that the following questions should be raised: "What is the relation between whole legal systems and their culture? What legal families exist and how do they relate to each other culturally and historically? What are the distinct features of legal systems of industrial nations and states and how do they differ from theocratic states or nomadic or tribal societies?" She considers culture and custom in the development of American/Western law, understanding and appreciation for others' (non-Western) law, and the common bonds from which to form international law.

Lynn L. Thomas, a promising scholar on Indonesia and cognitive anthropology, states that "anthropology and international relations differ significantly in their respective core emphases in the ways in which four kinds of asymmetries interplay with discourse and thinking...limits of knowledge, elite/folk asymmetries, asymmetries in ethics, and asymmetries in action. According to Thomas, while anthropology has been traditionally concerned with folk and folk ways, international relations has been preoccupied with elites and elite ways. "The asymmetry is embedded in the very nature of the historic notions of elite and folk." In ethics, "anthropology had an ethics which was already beginning to be relativized. The discipline loses much innocence in participation in historic destruction of other peoples...International relations has tended to see ethics grounded in scientized philosophy, political theory, and elite power." In addition, wrote Thomas, anthropology has been "less policy oriented" than international relations.

C. D. Macaulay, a serious scholar of both international relations and anthropology, demonstrates how anthropological theory can be useful to international relations. She wrote that "functional integration as an international relations concept refers to nations' permitting a supranational control over some previously national tasks. In several postwar
cases, functional integration has been successfully accomplished." This article is an anthropological explanation and justification of the concept of functional integration. It offers suggestions on policy changes which would stimulate increased integration. Macaulay adds, "In this approach, cultural attitudes, traditions, and stereotypes are seen as the supporting bases of foreign policy in the U.S. The domestic policy changes and innovations which are suggested, therefore, are directed at changing the culture which supports foreign policy in the U.S. and influences Soviet foreign policy."

Macaulay further notes: "Planned change should not be directed at deeply rooted cultural beliefs, but rather at peripheral practices; the alteration of these does not threaten cultural disorganization. These changes must be perceived by the changing culture as minor changes representing a better adaptation of society and its foreign relations to the international economic, cultural, or political environment."

In this issue's epilogue, Indera Pal Singh, one of India's eminent physical anthropologists, underscores the significance of stressing the universals, rather than the particulars, of human cultures and civilizations in order to ensure international peace and understanding.
"THAT'S JUST LIKE 'EM"
RACE AND CULTURE

VINSON H. SUTLIVE, JR.
The College of William and Mary

"Race" has become perhaps the vilest four letter word in our language. But race, although a biological fact, is quite unimportant in understanding man's relationship to his habitats and quite as ordinary in itself as the fact that there are two sexes...And yet the existence of these simple differences has often led mankind to cohabit with a hellishness of mind that is unknown anywhere else in organic nature. It is probably impossible for anyone save an infant to be neutral about race, to look at it in its own terms, or to be unaware of the fetid odor of human pyres that have been built on the innocuous fact that one man's skin has darker pigmentation than another's, that one's hair is of a different texture than another's, that one man has an epicanthic fold over his eye while another does not. But let us try. (Cohen 1968:134).

Introduction

Boating on Sarawak's Rejang River one morning, my Chinese companion and I passed a longhouse whose residents were performing the ritual Sandau Hari because one of them had had a bad dream the night before. "That's just like an Iban," snorted my companion.

Driving past a cemetery an Iban and I saw an elderly Chinese woman burning paper money at a grave. "Just like a Chinese," laughed my friend.

During the debate in the Virginia General Assembly in 1983 on the proposal to establish the birthday of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., as a state holiday, one speaker argued that he was opposed to honoring a man "committed to the mongrelization of the white race."
At an international conference on institutionalized racism, staff members propounded the thesis that racism is (exclusively) an American phenomenon; that only whites are racist; and all whites are racist.

In his book *Beyond Culture* Edward T. Hall writes that it is possible to group the crises of the world into two major categories: the ecological and the cultural. "Race and culture" clearly fit into the latter category. But, as we shall see, the distinction between the terms in Hall's sub-title, is more analytic and heuristic than real. For any current crisis in ecology--or race relations--may be traced back to the impact of human cultures.

**Race and Culture: Learned Concepts**

The idea of "race" or its equivalent is universal. The idea that behavior is determined by race is one of the most important--but incorrect--ideas in human thought. By a logical extension of the reasoning that those who look alike must also behave alike, we group people on the basis of their physical similarities, but confuse physical similarities and behavior, as seen in the incidents of the Iban and Chinese. Physical features, however, have nothing to do with handling bad dreams or attending the dead.

Race and culture are inseparable concepts. This is not to suggest that they are synonymous, as did 19th-century scholars (e.g., Morgan 1877; Prichard 1855; Tylor 1881). This certainly is not to suggest that race determines culture, or that there are differential rates or abilities for learning between members of physically different groups. Rather, the English term and the "universal concept" "race" derives from human cultures and is an analytic construct, based upon cultural processes of evaluation, selection, abstraction, and generalization.

One of the facts discovered by social scientists is that all people--and persons--are endlessly evaluating, comparing, categorizing, and interpreting experiences, the nature of societies, and the world. Gregory Bateson wrote that:

> the human individual is endlessly simplifying, organizing, and generalizing his own view of his own environment; he constantly imposes on this environment his own constructions and meanings; these constructions and meanings (are) characteristic of one culture as over against another (1944:723).

As we shall see--and as all of us are aware at different levels of consciousness--cultures are both constructive and constractive; they are at the same time bridges to understanding between those who share their symbol system, yet barriers to understanding between those of different systems. We are an altogether remarkable species--all of us together--yet we are invariably generalizers. Through the juxtaposition of phenomena and experiences we determine likenesses and differences,
continuities and discontinuities. On the basis of such determinations we establish categories within which—and out of which—we live. Thus, this belongs, that does not. Members of this group are darker, taller, thinner and belong together; members of that group are lighter, shorter, and heavier, and they belong together.

One of the clearest examples of our propensity for generalizing is in our visual associations of members of other ethnic groups. Those of you who have lived among members of other ethnic groups—and who has not—know that members of other ethnic groups do indeed look alike. (But, of course, so do members of one's own society, and resemblances can easily lead to embarrassing situations of mistaken identity.) Apropos this fact is an experience of Professor Morton Fried who early in his career was one of two Caucasians living in a relatively small Chinese town. The other was a much taller and fairer skinned Englishman who was distinctly different in appearance from Professor Fried. To both men's annoyance, the Chinese postman regularly handed over the Englishman's mail to Fried, or Fried's to the Englishman. Finally, Fried confronted the postman and asked him why the confusion. "But, sir," replied the postman with obvious sincerity, "you all look alike to us."

Race and culture are constructs formulated from the observations of form (for race) and function (for culture). The application of each assumes some degree of regularity between the members of the race—"you all look alike"—or the practitioners of the culture—"you all act alike." As constructs, "race" and "culture" are cryptograms, shorthand, schematic devices: neither is comprehensive, for variation is implicit in the nature of constructs. One of the most familiar constructs, by way of example, is "language". A language is a set of rules for speaking and writing, an idealized and normative guideline, which is inferred and constructed from speech, an existential process of verbal communication which is behavioral, variable, and irregular. As each of us is aware, speech sometimes follows the rules of language, sometimes digresses from the rules of language, and is sufficiently dynamic and changeable that no language can entirely describe—let alone predict—the varieties of spoken expressions.

Anyone who has proof-read manuscripts is keenly aware of this fact. Try as one may typos slip through into print for any number of reasons: distractions, pre-occupation, or, most commonly, "the self-correcting eye." The "Daily Press" of Newport News, Virginia, reported a lawsuit in which the defendants were accused of conspiring to "refurbish the public image" of one of them. (After my wife reread the sentence I finally pointed out that it did not read "public"). Publication Number Fourteen in this series was delayed when a type-setter changed the name of the journal from Studies in Third World Societies to Studies in Third World Series. No question about his favorite game! Or, consider these examples from church bulletins (unquestionably one of the richest sources for discrepancies between "language" and "speech").
This being Easter Sunday we will ask Mrs. Swanson to come forward and lay an egg on the altar. And, this afternoon there will be a meeting in the north and south ends of the church. Children will be baptized in both ends.

One of the functions of constructs is to determine what goes with what, and to establish boundaries between what is alike and what is different. Ideally, in constructs, what is within such boundaries belongs because it is similar; what is outside such boundaries does not belong because it is different. Within our own society we interact with one another in understandable and predictable ways. We practice a common culture. We speak a common language. When we travel to another country where we must live among persons who are physically different, speak another language, and practice another culture, we cross cultural boundaries and experience "culture shock."

William Condon has compared the learning of one's own culture with learning "a dance of life" (1974; Condon and Ogston 1967; Condon and Sander 1973, 1974; cf. Hall, 1976:61-73). We learn the symbols, the appropriate space, the sense of rhythm and time, the movements and prescribed patterns of interaction. So long as we move within the setting for which the dance was created, we move easily. When we move to another society where the dance is different, we get our toes stepped on even as we step on toes.

Analytic constructs such as language, race, and culture are real—and the political implications within them for differentiation and discrimination are enormous. They provide the bases for human hierarchies, for nationalism, and racism.

History abounds with examples of what philosophers term "illegitimate teleology," or Jack Hornerian logic, in societies whose members in effect declare "what good boys we are" on the basis of some alleged superiority. Herodotus felt the Egyptians had everything backwards with men doing the weaving and women tending the store, hence, were clearly inferior to the Greeks. Tacitus lauded the close-knit family units of the north Europeans, but condemned their excessive swings of emotion in contrast to the more moderate Romans. But Greeks and Romans alike were disparaged by Renaissance writers who conceived one of the most pervasive and pernicious notions of Euro-American culture, viz. the so-called "Idea of Progress," that subversive enemy of tradition that states "the newer the better." (Jonathan Swift effectively satirized the "Idea" in The Battle of the Books in which he ridiculed the mediocrity, clamor for recognition, and intellectual patricide of his contemporaries.) But Japan was not impressed with European renaissance and from 1600 to 1868 maintained a "westless" society by rejecting all external influences. The Industrial Revolution impelled Europe—and Japan through the Meiji Reformation—into a position of technological and military superiority vis-a-vis non-industrialized societies for whom, it was held, European societies had a responsibility—more, a "burden"—to save them from
themselves. (Similarly, discussing Japan's role in Asia, I was curtly informed by the son of one of Japan's leading jurists that, "we do not consider ourselves an Asian country, rather, we are a misplaced western nation."

It is important to note that while ideas about human hierarchies are common, such hierarchies are not part of an ontological scheme of things. Just as history abounds with examples of Herderian logic, so, too, is it replete with numerous problems which arise when a race of a culture is assumed to be superior (or inferior) to others.

Race and Culture in National Perspective

Apropos the focus of this volume, we shall consider one of the rituals of modern nationalism to illustrate the political implications of analytic constructs for differentiation and discrimination, viz., registration as an alien. Many readers can identify with the following episode.

In June, 1975, I arrived in Manila for a research project supported by a Fulbright-Hays grant. As I made my way through the various checkpoints in the airport, one official said, "Before you proceed to Mindanao, it will be necessary for you to register at the Bureau of Alien Registration" (B.A.R.). Having registered as an alien in Malaysia numerous times, I gave little thought to his words. I took a taxi from the airport to the YMCA on Concepcion Street, called friends at the University of the Philippines and set up appointments for the next morning, had lunch, and then walked over to the B.A.R. The scene in the main room was disconcerting, if not downright unnerving. About 25 American exchange students were in the large room where registration forms were provided, and where the procedure began and ended. Several were distraught, and one girl sobbed, "If I had the money, I would leave here today!"

The room contained two semi-circular desks behind which were seated six clerks. The clerks were approached not in lines but by push-and-shove as one could. (The procedure was a splendid example of the distinction Hall makes between "monochronic" time-space orientations in Euro-American cultures, and "polychronic" time-space orientations in Asian cultures; 1976:14, 19). Along the walls--at least so in 1975--were the "brokers" who for P 20 would help one run the maze of offices for registration. Working my way to the desk I told a clerk I wanted to register. "Fill these in," she ordered, thrusting 12 foolscap length forms at me, "and bring pictures of yourself," she added. Ah, I thought, I anticipated this, and produced one of the 24 passport pictures I had with me. "Too big," she responded. "It will not do." But, I replied, with a little cropping it will fit. "No," she said, "you will have to have photos the right size, made in Manila." "Well, I thought, I won't be able to finish this afternoon. "What time do you open in the morning?" I asked. "Seventy-three," she answered, turning already to the next client to indicate that she had answered enough of my questions.
Still feeling reasonably confident about the whole affair, I walked back to the Y, asked the clerk about a photographer and found that there was one just up the street. After sitting for the photos, I returned to the Y and began the tedious task of filling in all 12 forms. Three forms and an hour-and-a-half later, I walked back to the photographer's, picked up the pictures, then back to the Y for dinner, and spent the rest of the evening completing the forms. Having flown from Honolulu via Guam the previous night, I was ready for sleep at an early hour, and so awoke at 6 a.m. the next morning, eager to get the registration finished and see my friend at the university. Still exhilarated from the flight, I indulged myself in a sumptuous breakfast—papaya with lime, rice, fried eggs with bacon, toast and marmalade, and two cups of coffee—and felt about 7:15 for the B.A.R. When I walked in at 7:30 the building was deserted. Five minutes or so later a Filipina and her two children came in. We exchanged pleasantries and she said that she had flown from Baguio the day before, and was registering her children as she was married to an American and her children had been born in the United States. We lapsed into an uneasy silence, and marked our wait by all-too-frequent glances at the clock. Eight o'clock came, 8:15, 8:30, 8:45, and finally, at 9:00, a custodian came through. "What time will the clerks be in?" I asked impatiently. (Oh, that I had asked that question the day before, rather than, "What time do you open in the morning?"") "Any time now," he answered, moving on. At 9:25 the first clerk appeared carrying her cup of coffee.

During the time we had been waiting, I had studied the check-points through which one had to move in the registration procedure. Altogether 17! The plan resembled a flow-chart, and to pass the time I copied one of the schedules down for my field-notes.

Shortly after 9:30, I began moving along the route. In one office, out, into another, out, back to the same office but to another clerk, out, until, eventually, I came into an office dominated by a large and officious Filipina reading the Manila Bulletin. Maybe she didn't see me, I thought to myself, and, in the appropriate manner of self-announcement, cleared my throat. Still no acknowledgement. Suddenly the two doors to the office opened and two men walked in. Immediately the clerk folded the paper, greeted one of the men whom she recognized, who said to her, "I want you to meet Mr. Smith who is joining the embassy staff. He just arrived, and I brought him to make sure his papers are in order." With scarcely a glance at the documents placed before her, she chopped them with authority and warmly welcomed Mr. Smith to the Philippines. Slow burn was giving way to white-hot anger, and only after they left, did she turn to me and inquire, "May I help you?" Replying that I hoped she could, I presented my papers which were carefully examined, then was told that I would have to be fingerprinted, and eventually, just before noon, made my way out of the building. Needless to say, I had to call my friends at the university and reschedule my appointments, the times for which had long since passed.

Returning to the Y I reflected on the experiences of the morning, attempting to puzzle them out and to make sense of the entire affair.
Suddenly, it occurred to me that registration is a rite of passage by which a person is effectively albeit temporarily dissociated from his former state, exists during the ritual as a liminal persona (cf. Turner 1964), until such time as he is given the alien registration card and his presence in the new state is legitimized. He then belongs, having been "moved" legally and ritually into a validated status.

In defense of the Philippines and their institutions, it must be noted that our rituals of registration are just as complex and frustrating—if not more so—than the one just described. Darrel Miller, a Latin Americanist, comments that the ritual process is similar in Brazil, even to the "brokers" who are known as "dispatchers." Further, he writes, "My reflection about dispatchers in a similar situation led me to conclude that money made the difference (money to pay the dispatcher) in a highly stratified society like Brazil. Discovering that there was such a thing as a dispatcher to expedite the process was my "rite of passage.""

Having rationalized the experience I was somewhat more prepared for the ritual of dissociation which proved necessary to obtain an exit visa, upon completion of my research. Arriving in Manila from Negros, I went immediately to the Pan-American office to confirm my reservations. As I was walking out the door, congratulating myself on expediting the final requirement and thinking that's it, the clerk called after me, quite casually, "Sir, do you have your exit visa?" No, I answered, where do I obtain one? At the treasury, he replied. After a taxi ride to the treasury I made my way to a relatively small room on an upper floor. Behind a U-shaped configuration of desks were clerks passing out forms and taking in completed documents and payments in settlement of money owed the government. I obtained two forms, went to a vacant desk, filled them out, and returned to one of the clerks who, after examining the forms said, "You must go down to the floor below and pay P 938 for wages earned in the Philippines." But, I protested, my wages were paid by the U.S. government. "That's right," he said most agreeably, "but you could not have received the wages if we had not granted you permission to enter the Philippines for your research." Conceding the merits of his statement, I paid the tax, obtained my exit visa and, the following week, departed the Philippines.

Registration as an alien and procurement of an exit visa are fairly routine procedures for moving across national boundaries. They are modern "rites of passage" with the phases of separation, transition, and incorporation as described by van Gennep (1960) in his classic study. As such, they permit and effect the movements of persons across social boundaries. Such rites communicate the critical messages, "You belong," because you have submitted to the demands of our society, you have behaved in ways we prescribed and can understand; or, "You do not belong," you are moving out, going somewhere else.

Most social and cultural boundaries are not so clearly established and the procedures for moving across them are not so dramatically
institutionalized. Most are implicit, hidden, unspoken, unarticulated. But, as we shall see as we examine the construct of "race", either we become aware of their existence or we stumble along, not understanding what is happening to us, and why.

Becoming Members of Societies -- and Races

Movements across national boundaries still are experienced by only a minority of human beings. More commonly-universally-individuals become members of societies through being born into them and through the processes we call "socialization" and "enacturation". By socialization we refer to the positions (statuses) and appropriate behavior (roles) which exist in each society. By enactment we mean the internalization of the values and ideals of our society. Although the distinction between the two processes is analytically useful, I shall refer to the ways people learn their cultures as "socialization".

No person knows how to behave, or what behavior is appropriate in his particular society, at birth. Each human being undergoes the transpersonal process of socialization during which genetic potential is modified and realized as a functioning "human", so defined according to the values of the society (cf. Landy 1965:8-10). Within pre-modern societies, rites of passage--in some instances, four or five dozen--were observed and marked the changes in rights and responsibilities of the individual.

During socialization, very basic changes occur in the individual. These include changes in (1) metabolism, as infants are taught to lower the blood sugar level and to go for increasingly long periods of time between eating; (2) food, as infants' diets are changed to introduce them to what is defined as "edible" and when and how much should be eaten; (3) appropriate techniques of physical relief and moving one's body--to point or not to point; how to sit; where to sit; etc.; (4) emotional expressions--what will be tolerated, what will not; and (5) language, described by Edward Sapir as "the best show humans put on."

The learning of a culture is the learning of order. Contrary to Freud, socialization is not altogether an inhibitory process requiring the compromise of the individual to accession to group will. Rather, it is a means of focusing otherwise diffused psychic and physical energies according to models provided by the society. And the person who grows up without rules or responsibilities suffers an uncertain sense of rootlessness and groundlessness (cf. Geertz 1962:734-5).

Thus, the socialization experience is constructive--and in a particular way, according to the prescriptions of one society. It is the process by which the individual comes to terms with the biological facts of life, with the demands of society, and the expectations of parents and peers. In the midst of these transactions--at the very center--the individual develops a sense of "self". Selfhood does not develop in vacuum, despite much of what we may hear about a person trying to find "the self."
The popular song with the lyrics, "I've been to paradise, but I've never been to me," reflects "the culture of narcissism" rather than "selflessness". The orientation to "self" developed in socialization is a dynamic process of interaction with one's fellows, is critical and it should be continuous. The image of an appropriate self varies considerably among societies. The Semai of the Malay Peninsula have emphasized non-aggression, passivity, and their cardinal virtue is captured in the word penan--non-threatening. By contrast, the Iban of Borneo have emphasized aggression, achievement, and the term ulih--capable, competent--fits well the self-image they are expected to achieve.

During socialization we develop attitudes of other peoples as well. The world and its peoples--so far as they are known and are considered worth considering--are ordered with one's own society in the center, with lesser peoples declining in a gradient from the highest and best. Thus, the symbol for China was a circle with dot in the center. Each Iban longhouse was the ritual center of the world. And, as Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn has written,

The Universe has as many different centers as there are living beings in it. Each of us is a center of the Universe ...(1973:1).

Not infrequently, members of other societies are caricatured by the use of animal epithets, or through the use of myths about their origins from the union of the myth-maker's society and some animal. At the opposite extreme, members of technologically simpler societies may employ apotheosis or terms of deification in describing members of more advanced societies.

Attitudes towards resources also are culturally determined, a point to which I shall return. Not infrequently, there is considerable consonance between our attitudes towards members of other groups and natural resources—which is consistent with the nature of culture as a system: Either or both may be considered exploitable, or worthy of conserving. As a rule, members of technologically simpler societies, specifically hunter-gatherers, have lived symbiotically in relatively undegraded environments, living in but not transforming the habitat. By contrast, practitioners of other technologies—from horticulturists to industrialized societies—have viewed ecosystems as "passive stages" on which they have enacted their dramas of change, and all too often, destruction.

Our values and norms also are culturally mediated and learned through socialization. Our capacities for evaluation—indeed, our practices of evaluation—are established and enhanced through socialization. What, or who, counts? How much? What is important? What is worthwhile? Answers to these and hundreds of other questions are provided by society.
Culture: An Adaptive System

A culture is a symbol system, and it is imperative that we recognize it as such, and the nature of the uniquely human ability to symbolize. Symboling is possible because of the human capacity for discriminating, evaluating, assessing, and judging, a capacity which is the basis for the development of cultures and races. Someone has correctly observed that our species might well be renamed Homo evaluaticus. There may be physiological bases for this human propensity--stereoscopic vision, in which each eye sees almost but not quite the same, and the development of the human hemispheric brain--but it is important that we recognize this capacity as species-wide, shared by all members of our species.

Symboling is necessary because of the human need to economize energy and transmit messages--an energy saving technique in communicating. Symbols are shorthand devices for conveying a multiplicity of messages, some of which are understood, others which are ambiguous and misunderstood even by persons who share the same culture.

Symbols are based upon perceptions of likenesses and differences. We recognize structural similarities, or homologies ("Sturdy as an oak") and functional similarities, or analogies ("Can run like the wind") and on these similarities and differences we create our cultural systems which, in turn, determine our views of the world and its people.

It is imperative that we recognize the systemic character of a culture. Though it is composed of thousands--hundreds of thousands--of identifiably individual symbols, these ingredients are merged, internalized, and habituated by the bearers of a culture. As individual symbols are incorporated into cultural systems, their particularity or peculiarity does not impress persons who learn them from infancy. One of the fascinating facts about the life-long process of socialization is our discovery of the inter-relatedness of information. This is abundantly clear in higher education. Freshmen in large introductory classes ask, "Why don't you give us essay exams rather than objective, short-answer exams?" There are a couple of reasons. An obvious one is that instructors do not have time to read the essays. But a pedagogical one is that freshmen would be at a severe disadvantage competing with juniors and seniors who are not only capable of producing more verbiage ("show") but also are able to perceive relationships that have yet to be discovered by freshmen and sophomores. An excellent example of the perception of interrelatedness occurred five years ago when an executive of one of the country's largest insurance companies audited an introductory anthropology course. His experience enabled him to perceive relationships which were not apparent to the instructor and students. So, when older people find associations in virtually everything, this is perfectly human--and cultural.

What occurs in socialization--the merging of symbols, generalizing from particulars--is reversed when we cross cultural boundaries. Our senses are assaulted by an apparent chaos. Rather than being impressed
with order of the new society, we are appalled at the disorder. Rather than appreciating the genius of the cultural creations, we are dismayed at the peculiarities of the people. Rather than perceiving "natural" system, we are struck by the odd particularities of sounds, actions, and values. The symbols which are systemic to members of the new society seem disjunctive and discrete to us, until we have participated in the society for about six months, after which time we begin to perceive regularities. As in socialization so in acculturation, we internalize and rationalize, so the unnatural becomes natural.

Our emphasis upon the symbolic content of culture frequently has been at the neglect of the adaptive character of cultures. At the risk of exaggerating, we must stress that a culture is a system of adaptation (of which symbolic orientation and physical adjustments are parts). As a system of adaptation a culture includes the adaptive strategies of the society, the form(s) of technology, the patterns of social organization--economic relations, groupings of kin and non-kin, decision-making processes, and various institutions (political, religious)--and the ideology of the society. To understand a culture requires an holistic approach, appreciation of its bearers quite literally from the ground up and in terms of their history.

As a system of adaptation, a culture reflects--and indirectly is determined by--the energy resources its practitioners exploit. Essential to understanding any culture are the ecological concepts of energy flow, ecological dominance, and ecological succession. Ruyle (n.d.) writes that

the concept of energy flow refers to the flow of solar energy through successive levels of life-forms (trophic levels)--what eat what?--and the fact that ours is a solar-powered world. This flow is what keeps life going, and life may be viewed as ultimately a struggle for free energy. (This struggle underlies and is implicit in cultural imperialism and racism.) In such a system all species influence all others, but this influence is not equal. Often, one or a few species, the ecological dominants, will exert the major controlling influence on the system as a whole. Further, the system may undergo major changes, with ecological dominants succeeding each other in a regular way.

Unlike other animal species which simply appropriate naturally occurring environmental use-values and exert a largely unconscious influence on the environment, human societies impose their wills on the environment through the expenditure of their own labor energy. This peculiarly human dependence on labor contributed to the selective pressures which gave rise to a new ecological force--human intelligence--and the ability to symbolize and thus to create cultures.

Natural selection--which has resulted in "raciation"--has been accompanied by the parallel process of cultural selection, a process which operates according to what economists term a
"mini-max principle." That is, to the extent that labor is not in itself satisfying, individuals will attempt to minimize their own effort while trying to maximize their own satisfaction. The mini-max principle is not, of course, the only selective force operating in cultural evolution, nor does it necessarily depend upon the conscious, rational calculation of members of the population. It is impossible, however, to account for the observed transformations of cultural systems without recourse to this principle.

When applied to human/habitat relationships, this mini-max principle favors the selection of increasingly productive systems. Propelled by the driving force of human intelligence, human dominated ecosystems have passed through a regular succession of technological types: hunting and gathering, horticultural, pastoral, agricultural, and industrial.

When applied to intra-specific relationships, human and human, this mini-max principle favors the selection of cooperative labor systems and social devices which substitute the labor of others for one's own, that is, to exploitation.

Beginning about 10,000 years ago, for reasons as yet incompletely known from archaeological research, human societies in various parts of the world--Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, South Asia, Africa, and the New World--began to farm and to develop new patterns of economic relations. With an increase in productivity which resulted from the Neolithic Revolution (the most important technological development in human history), larger, sedentary populations emerged. Surpluses in the yields made possible for the first time in human history institutionalized exploitation of labor, as more astute and ambitious members of armed societies lived off the produce of other members and established themselves as managers or rulers.

About 5,000 years ago, a second revolution, viz. the independent establishment of state forms of organization, occurred, in which were included new patterns of social organization. If the Neolithic was the most important technological breakthrough in human history, the conceptualization and organization of states was the most important sociological breakthrough in human history. Supported by myth and rituals, states have concentrated to themselves the right to use physical force, authority to adjudicate disputes, focus of information flow and source of decision-making processes. Perhaps more crucial for our concern is the fact that historically--though not teleologically--states have promulgated myths of justice and equity while protecting rituals of inequality and injustice.

The state represents a type of cultural climax, in which it has grown to become a major symbol, an ecological dominant, whose officials determine not only the course of nations but events which affect and
influence the lives of every person. And, through processes of socialization we submit to the rituals and internalize the myths. And beyond any question, some of the most dangerous myths are those created to account for and justify treatment of those who are different. Let us now examine the cultural construct of "race".

Race: A Cultural Construct

Races are not fixed or permanent groupings. Rather, through geographical separation and the creation of cultures shared by members of small groups, autonymic societies have emerged, distinguishing themselves from other groups. Southeast Asia is the region par excellence for studies of what we may term imprecisely "ethnic evolution." We estimate that there are 800 autonymic societies in the region, which usually are grouped for the sake of convenience into considerably fewer. Some societies appear, others disappear. For example, Islam has provided the catalyst for the aggregation of Malays who, 500 years ago, constituted undistinguished fishing and piratical societies, but today are the largest and politically dominant society in Malaysia. More recently, the Kadazans of Sabah--a people who were no people--have grown into a discrete ethnic group during the past century: By contrast, the Bukitan of Sarawak have disappeared as they have been assimilated by Iban.

The concept of race is problematic. For the sake of clarity let us define a race as a population in which there is a particular frequency of a gene or cluster of genes. Beyond this general definition, however, there is little we can say. For example, in Africa, Oceania, and Australia, there are populations with much higher frequencies of genes for dark skin pigmentation than in China or the Soviet Union. Such genetic frequencies are inferred from observable characteristics. Does the fact that there are higher frequencies of dark skin pigmentation in Africa, Oceania, and Australia mean that populations of these areas are members of the same race? Clearly it does not, for beyond similarities of skin coloring they have little in common.

The concept of race is nothing more than a cultural device for classifying people into different genetic populations. But how many genes should be used as a basis for classification? One group? If only one, which genes should serve as the criterion for classification? Skin color? Shape of nose? Eyes? Why, not others, such as fingerprint patterns or consistency of ear-wax? Two or three? Which two or three? Morphology? Height? Texture of hair? Why the exclusion of others? Sherrwood Washburn has written that we should require everyone who tries to set up a system of racial classification to give his reasons for setting up the taxonomy and a justification of his selection of genetic criteria.

We cannot agree on the genetic bases for racial classification, nor can we agree on the number of "human types." In the 18th century, Johann Blumenbach, using cranial material and pictures, identified five racial types, the best known being Negroid, Mongoloid, and Caucasian.
(Let me insert parenthetically that typological thinking is itself a cultural phenomenon, the most serious flaw in its application to human types being the confusion of sterile, static types with non-static groups, natural selection being a continuous process. Most of our thinking is modelic, and if our models are forever becoming rather than established, it is difficult for us to fix categories with any degree of permanence and authority. And, I suspect, this is precisely what is most bothersome to authoritarian personality types.)

Subsequent to identification of the major racial types, scientists recognized that some groups did not fit and added others, for example, the Capoid and Australoid. Still this taxonomy was defective, so more recently, one based upon physical and geographical differences has been invented. It groups together the Amerindian Geographical Race, the Polynesian Geographical Race, the Micronesian Geographical Race, the Melanesian-Papuan Geographical Race, the Australian Geographical Race, the Asiatic Geographical Race (what a catch-22!), the Indian Geographical Race, the European Geographical Race, and the African Geographical Race. As comprehensive as this taxonomy is, there still are groups which do not fit. The last effort of which I am aware is a taxonomy with 33 racial types. And it is still deficient.

The work of anthropology has made perhaps no more important contribution than the determination that all people are members of a single species. This determination was in response to what may be called "the crime of the 19th century." During the Age of Discovery, travellers reported men with tails, men with one eye, men with three toes, and, in Borneo, men cohabiting with orang utans. (Out of such unions was conceived the founder of a society different from that of the story-teller.) While I was teaching at the University of Pittsburgh, one of my students brought in a story which appeared in the Post-Gazette about a tribe in Africa whose members had only one toe, and asked what I thought of the story. In the 19th (cf. Morgan, Tylor) and early 20th centuries, metaphor was translated into biological image, and non-Euro-Americans were caricatured as "childish," and mentally deficient. Thus, Lucien Levy-Bruhl (1966) divided the world's people into two groups: Europeans and Americans, sober and scientific, and the rest, simple and superstitious. But, anthropological research has determined that (1) cognitive processes are essentially the same for all human beings, and that (2) any person has the potential for learning any of the elaborate codes subsumed under the rubric "culture" (cf. Levi-Strauss 1962).

Happily, texts on physical anthropology published over the past decade devote an average of one page each to the topic of race. Yet, discussion of human races generates endless emotion and confusion. This is due, first, to our attempts to establish what really are unestablishable categories. The confusion of categories is well-illustrated in a "letter to the Editor" of the Virginia-Gazette (April 6, 1983) by Professor Vernon H. Edmunds, a sociologist who writes:
I have stated that any two races are bound to differ with respect to a rather large number of genetically affected traits, and that general intelligence is one of those traits.

The logic upon which such a conclusion is based is not hard to follow:

1. All separate breeding populations are virtually certain to differ genetically on any trait that is under substantial genetic control.
2. General intelligence is under substantial genetic control.
3. Races are separate breeding populations.
4. Therefore, races are virtually certain to differ genetically with respect to general intelligence.

(Professor Edmunds confuses "breeding populations" (species) with races, which are analytically distinguished units within "breeding populations"). A second source of confusion comes from imprecise application of the term. We refer to the French race, the Jewish race, or the Aryan race, when what we mean is the French population or nationality, the Jewish religion, and the Aryan language. There are times when biological features may coincide with linguistic, religious, or national categories, but the unlikelihood of such coincidence precludes our applying the term with any significance. Nationality is a matter of historical accident. Religion is a matter of parental or individual choice, and a language is learned during socialization. A third source of confusion derives from political efforts to arrange typologies hierarchically, with one's own society at the top. "Black is beautiful" and "White is right." Folklore abounds with stories such as that of the Plains Indians whose skin color was baked "medium well" in contrast to the overdone Black and the underdone White. Discussing physical features as bases for categorizing people with Iban students I was told emphatically that the White nose is too long--"like the nose of the proboscis monkey"--and the Black nose is too short and flat, but, observed one with obvious pleasure, "ours is just right."

Perhaps the most critical problem—and the one which led Ashley Montagu to term race "the most dangerous myth"—is the use of dehumanizing stereotypes by which members of other groups are considered "less-than-human." Such stereotypes exaggerate physical differences—maximizing minimal differences—to rationalize mistreatment or even exploitation of other people. Again, Southeast Asia provides a clear example of this "maxi-min" principle, as members of societies physically similar have used geometric figures and other symbols to differentiate themselves, thus providing a basis for warfare which was endemic in many parts of the region.

Stereotyping is universal; we all do it. Yet the costs of stereotyping particularly among those discriminated against are enormous, negatively
affecting self-image, inhibiting free expression, and even cutting short the life expectancy of those discriminated against. One of my advisees recently completed her senior thesis on career goals of black students at our local high school. She discovered that 85 percent expected to take up service-related jobs as custodians, maids, groundkeepers, waiters, and waitresses. These young people have been programmed for what Oscar Lewis has called "the culture of poverty." Lewis (1966) has written that the culture of poverty is a self-perpetuating, independent culture, but he is quite wrong. The poor are kept poor through the use of stereotypes and the communication of these to their young, to serve the economically dominant members of their society. And, to paraphrase Peter Berger (1973 et al., our self-image is based on what we do, our worth evaluated on what we earn. Consequently, victims of discrimination suffer low self-image and react with rage which may be directed at themselves or the more affluent and powerful.

The concept of race has perpetuated profound misunderstandings of behavioral patterns, in particular those related to the performance of tasks related to so-called measurements of intelligence. In the minds of a majority of the world's peoples, behavior is determined by physical type. And this is sheer nonsense! There is an extensive literature about the "Sambo" complex, the servile, obsequious behavior of Blacks during slavery and even into this century in the southern United States. Having grown up in Alabama, when I read about this complex I immediately thought of Van, the custodian in our church. He fit it perfectly: He was obedient, always pleasant, and his response to anything addressed to him was consistently monosyllabic. To appreciate Van's behavior, you must know that my home church was a meeting place for the White Citizen's Council, and included among its members Bull Connor. Reviewing material on the Sambo complex, Stanley Elkins (1959; 1961) discovered a striking similarity between the behavior of Blacks in the South and that of White soldiers in German concentration camps. In both groups the behavior was almost the same, leading him to conclude that the complex was a strategy for survival, with an adaptive advantage in the role-play of both Blacks and Whites, and quite independent of any biological basis.

We are now aware that all human beings are programmed to learn, and that we may continue learning throughout our lives. The human is born with less than a third of the adult human capacity, and there is tremendous growth of the cortex after birth. Thus, there is no mammalian species in which the environment has a longer and more direct effect on the nervous system than humankind. So, as rats raised in an efficient environment are much more efficient as mazesolvers than rats given no opportunity to learn and practice before testing; as monkeys have been shown to learn, even more so human behavior--including test results--will be affected by the environment, and is not explainable in terms of "racial differences."
Summary and Conclusions

Several facts about races and cultures must now be obvious. First, racial categories are cultural categories; that is, the idea of race is not based upon scientific analyses of the natural order of things, but rather a product of the human propensity for ordering, the world by evaluating and categorizing. Second, this propensity appears to be innate—there may be physiological bases—so that despite advances in technology and increases in information, we continue to evaluate and sort out into categories. Third, the potential for rank-ordering individuals and groups in "human hierarchies" exists in each person, but actualization of the potential depends upon personal and social decisions. Fourth, racism, whether in individual or institution, is a transcultural phenomenon, and no respecter of persons, places, or times. It has existed—and exists—in every nation, on every continent, among all societies. It was practiced by Egyptians who enslaved the Hebrews and other pastoralists. It was practiced by the Chams who captured tribesmen of the Viet Nam hills for sale as slaves in Java. It was practiced by the Incas in the development of their empire. It was practiced by the Zulu in their assimilation of "different" African societies. And, most recently and perhaps most dramatically, it was practiced by colonial powers who politicized "race" and "ethnicity" to a degree never before known. Currently, there are numerous examples of racism in administrations and in particular in transnational corporations in many newly independent nations and businesses (cf. southeast asian CHRONICLE, Issues No. 66-67).

A good friend, sensitive to issues of race and culture, introduced a speaker to a conference on "Institutionalized Racism" by paraphrasing the confession standardized by Alcoholics Anonymous. "I am so-and-so," he said, "and I am a racist." Knowing the friend who is married to a member of another ethnic group, with two children adopted from other ethnic groups, I seriously question the confession.

For racism operates on what George Peter Murdock, in referring to another social phenomenon, viz., ambilinale descent, has identified as an "optative-exclusive principle" (1960:i-ix). As with ambilineal descent with racism, one chooses one's group to the exclusion of others. There obviously are both positive and negative connotations in the principles positive in the relationships which one chooses, negative in the relationships one rejects. Thus, in the mayoral election of Chicago, charges and counter-charges of "racism" were made by the candidates and their supporters, the overtones and undercurrents being those of exclusion and rejection.

Evaluation and differentiation, choices and groupings, are inevitable. But discrimination and hostility, abuse and rejection, are not. The solution of problems of racism—and nationalism—requires our acknowledgement of the essential egocentricity of each person and the fundamental sociocentricity of each group, and the awareness that, if we are to understand those who are different from us, "understanding" will
require our "standing-under" their tutelage and appreciating them for who they are.

Carl Sagan has written that

by far the most exciting, satisfying and exhilarating time to be alive is the time in which we pass from ignorance to knowledge ... the age where we begin to wonder and end in understanding. In all of the four-billion-year history of life on our planet, in all of the four-million-year history of the human family, there is only one generation privileged to live through that unique transitional moment: that generation is ours.

The fulfillment of this unique moment depends upon our recognition of our "family" relationships and requires that we move from the transitional phase of nationalism to internationalism, of racism to humanism. For, if our species is to remain a viable species we must build a global society, with relations to and responsibilities for all.

Notes

1. Sandau Hari is a minor ritual observed to appease a variety of spirits and to reassure a person who has had a bad dream or seen some omen of misfortune.
REFERENCES

Bateson, Gregory

Berger, Peter, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner

Cohen, Yehudi
1968 Man in Adaptation: The Biosocial Background, Chicago, Aldine.

Condon, W. S.

and Ogston, W.D.

and Sandifer, L. W.

Ellis, Stanley


Geertz, Clifford

Hall, Edward T.

Landy, David

Levi-Strauss, Claude
Lewis, Oscar  

Morgan, Lewis Henry  
1877 Ancient Society, New York, Henry Holt.

Murdock, G. P., ed.  

Prichard, J. C.  

Ruyle, Eugene  

Sagan, Carl  

Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr  

Turner, Victor  
1966 “Betwix’t and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage,” in Max Gluckman, Editor, Essays in the Ritual of Social Relations, Manchester, Manchester University Press.

Tylor, Sir E. B.  

van Gennep, Arnold  
1960 The Rites of Passage, London, Routledge.
THE PROBLEMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF CULTURAL INTEGRATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

MAMITUA SABER
Mindanao State University

In the contemporary world including the Asian-Pacific Region, there are modern nation-states facing common problems and desires to promote peace and harmony among the diverse peoples and institutions within their respective territories and political boundaries. This problem of societal plurality is characterized by the existence of internal diversity of racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural traditions of different human groups comprising a country's population.

Academic interest in the study of plural societies and their inherent problems has developed a social science discipline known as Race and Ethnic Relations. Students under this discipline are familiar with literatures about countries where internal peace and order are made relatively unstable by the pluralistic structure of their societies and cultures, and where the attempted resolution is to effect inter-societal and cross-cultural integration.

Similar Problems in Brief

Among the countries or areas affected by this social problem of plural societies are the Union of South Africa, Belgium, Canada, the United States, the Philippines, etc., to mention only a few of the many cases known. Before reporting the Philippine case which, of course, is the focus of this country paper, it is perhaps useful for academic knowledge to mention in brief the parallel situations in other countries.
In the Union of South Africa, there are four competing and conflicting multi-racial and multi-cultural groups: the Afrikaners of White European background, the Black African natives, the Colored, who are of mixed white-and-black ancestry, and the Asians mostly from the Indian sub-continent. These racial groups desire not "integration" but internal "segregation" from one another, which they call "apartheid." Their ethnocentric attitudes and values and inter-group prejudices and discriminations had often caused violence between any two or among several of these diverse communities in recent years.

In Belgium, there are two white groups speaking two different languages: the French-speaking, power-majority Walloons and the Flemish-speaking, power-minority Flemings. The communication gap between both had further aggravated their political, economic, and socio-cultural rivalries, despite the effort of the state to forge both into a national harmony.

Canada is likewise socially, culturally, and linguistically divided into the English Canadian majority and the French Canadian minority, who even attempted to carve a separate nation within the Canadian border.

The case of the United States is well-known for its diversity in religion, despite the regard that that nation is the "melting pot" of humanity from all the continents and that the Anglo-Saxon language and culture tends to be embedded by the diverse groups and to provide integrative force, at least socially and politically.

In Southeast Asia, we are quite familiar with the case of Malaysia which emerged as a nation-state with diverse citizens composed of the Bhumiputra (natives of multi-ethnic background), the Chinese, the Indians, and the Europeans. As a result of inter-racial hostilities arising from socio-cultural and politico-economic rivalries, the Nanyang or overseas Chinese group succeeded in creating the separate state of Singapore from the newly-established union or federation. Yet, the rest of Malaysia still retains its multi-racial and multi-cultural diversity with the inherent problem of integration.

While we portray gloomy pictures of countries having inter-group frictions arising from their societal pluralities, we should not fail to mention and appreciate a few places in the world where peace and unity are relatively stable; places, in short, which are models of integration. As a part of the United States, the State of Hawaii shares the multi-racial and multi-cultural structure of the union. Yet, Hawaii is the union's happy model for integration among the diverse groups who, on those Pacific islands, developed a sense of belongingness as Hawaiians all, besides being Americans, and who are also proud to recall their respective origins from different lands, races, and nationalities. Interestingly, such model of integration inspired the U.S. Federal Government to establish thereat an institution called the East-West Center. The Center conducts training and experiment along international living and learning, besides studies on the
resultant effect of acculturation, in which diverse individuals and groups tend to imbibe some of one another's culture traits or values, thus developing a cross-cultural integration.

Another classic model of integration is Switzerland, where diverse groups of citizens are made up predominantly of German, French, Italian, and East European groups. Each group maintains its linguistic and cultural identity under the system of cultural "integration" and not of "assimilation," a different social process whereby one group may lose its original identity and becomes completely submerged under another entity or group identity.

**Philippine Integration**

Any inquisitive observer looking at the map of the Philippines may well wonder how the islands, peoples and their institutions could be unified or integrated into a single nation-state under the Republic. For indeed, one can see the natural physical barriers that impede societal integration. Geographically, the Philippines is composed of 7,107 islands where communities are virtually isolated from one another by seas and mountains that ordinarily impede communication. On these islands live the 48 million Filipinos who, despite their common national identity ("isang bansa"), are diverse in their historical, racial-ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds.

To comprehend, among the Filipinos, the contrast between unity and disunity, or integration and disintegration, this paper presents a taxonomic tabulation of the differentiated or stratified community-groups within the Philippine population, as follows:

**TABLE**

**GROUP DIFFERENTIATION/STRATIFICATION OF PHILIPPINE POPULATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP IDENTIFICATION BY RACE, NATIONALITY, ETHNOLINGUISTIC, CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS AND/OR OTHER DIFFERENTIATING FACTORS</th>
<th>GROUP'S GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GROUP A: ALIEN OR FOREIGN</td>
<td>mostly in urban centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westerners: Spanish, American, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientals: Chinese, Japanese, Indians, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GROUP B - CHRISTIAN MAJORITY

Ilocano, Pangasinense, Zambal, Tagalog, Bicol, etc. Luzon

Cebuano, Ilongo, Samar-Leyte (Waray), etc. Visayas

Mixed or heterogeneous Christian groups, originally migrants from Luzon and Visayas, and Christianized natives in the region Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan (Minsupala)

GROUP C - MUSLIM MINORITY

Maguindanaon, Maranao, Irianon Mindanao

Sang-ir, Kalagan, Tausug, and Samal Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, other islands of Sulu Sea

Tausug, Samal, Jama Mapun, Badjao (Islamized section)

Yakan, Tausug, Samal, Maranao Basilan

Maguindanaon

Palawani, Tausog, Samal Palawan

Molbog or Melebugananon Balabac

GROUP D - ISOLATED TRIBAL MINORITIES (NON-CHRISTIAN OR NON-MUSLIM)

Ivatan, Bontok, Âpayao, Gaddang, Luzon


Magatbat, Negrito, Bukidnon, Visayas

Ati, Mundo, Kabugan

Ata, Bagobo, Bilaan, Bukidnon, Mindanao

Kualaman, Mandaya, Mangguangan, Tirural, Tasaday (newly-discovered stone-age tribe), etc.
Badjao or Luaan (boat-dwelling) some being Islamized or Christianized
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Mindanao Visayas (recent migration)
Latak, Tagbanua Palawan

Using the above taxonomic chart, we may describe the position of some selected groups or sub-groups in the total societal relationships as follows:

Group A, Alien or Foreign, does not constitute a single social structure. In fact, each sub-group within Group A is a different racial, national or cultural community, from the others. During the colonial past, the Spanish, despite their small number, once represented the dominant power-majority over the more numerous native Christian population, and partly over the Muslim and the tribal minority groups. This dominance proceeded from the Spanish's strong civil, military, and religious-cultural organizations, that imprinted upon most of the natives the Hispanic civilization, including the Catholic faith. The Spanish brought the influence of the Old World to the Philippines as they have done to Latin America. Rightly, the Christian Filipino of Spanish acculturation and conversion may be regarded as a "Latinized Asian," a parallel to the "Latin American."

The Americans, also relatively small in number, who replaced the Spanish regime at the turn of the 20th century, left behind them cultural effects that even today continue to have impact not only on the Christians, but upon the relatively resistant Muslim and tribal cultural minorities. They left behind them their institutional traits and values that are still retained under continuing contact and socio-cultural affinities in the process of inter-group integration. The Filipina today is to a certain degree Americanized culturally, as much as she is Hispanic. The influence of the Old and the New Worlds added a new dimension to the racial and cultural personality of the celebrated Filipino mestizo or mesticlta, who had won in some world or international beauty contests.

Group B in the taxonomy represents the all-Christian "majority" in terms of their interrelated advancement along the social, cultural-educational, economic and political life of the nation. Although quite diverse in their regional habits and spoken languages, like the other cultural communities, the Christian group and sub-groups are obviously advanced in their westernization and modernization and serve as the reference group for the model of integration and development.

Providing the leadership, this Christian group imprints its imbibed traits from Spanish, American, and modern influences upon the ways of life of other Filipino communities in Group C (Muslim) and D (isolated tribal groups) who have been less affected by foreign and modern
influences. Such transmission or sharing of culture traits happens through conscious as well as unconscious processes like the integrating effect of migration, intergroup settlements in rural and urban areas, acculturation, mass education, communication, and other governmental and non-governmental processes affecting this nation and its institutions. By these processes the centuries-old isolation of minority cultural communities is increasingly becoming minimized, thus bringing each community into more accessible contact.

As observed since colonial times, the direction of change in the Philippines has been toward the integration of the diverse and isolated small tribal communities into a developing national society or nation-state. These community-groups which are the object of the integration process differ in their cultural levels from the "primitive" stone-age Tasaday to the most modern city-dwellers of Manila and other urban centers. Again, observers will wonder how these ranges of cultural levels could interinfluence one another through time and space. But it does happen. For example, the once "primitive" village of Chief Lapulau of Mactan Island, where Magellan met his doom centuries ago, is today changed into a site of a huge airport and other urban developments.

**East-West Cultural Heritage**

Let us look farther into the cultural synthesis of the Philippines. Along with her Southeast Asian neighbors, this country had in the earlier centuries-felt the impact of the Great Traditions of Asia-from the centers of Civilization in Arabia, India, and China-whose influences are traceable in past and contemporary life. With its Asian and Pacific cultural heritage amalgamated with Western traits, Philippine civilization is a mestizo-type between the East and West and of the Ancient and Modern.

The continuing effects of these cultural currents on Philippine life have both integrative and disintegrative results, which Philippine society and government should recognize in the task of resolving the situations between peace and conflict or between unity and disunity. The past Western colonization by Spain and America was not without socio-cultural integrative effects upon the diverse community groups which gradually emerged as a nation today. But the process also created a Westernized cultural majority and, indeed, a gap between this majority and the less-Westernized cultural communities, which are relatively slow in the enrichment of their own cultures via external influences.

One of the nagging problems, therefore, of integration is how to minimize or to bridge the gap between the majority and minority groups which have built-in ethnocentric attitudes, prejudices, biases, and discriminations among themselves in their multifaceted relationships. This problem is not easily resolved by the interacting groups or by the government agencies and other institutions concerned with establishing peaceful co-existence. The government is the principal institution that is concerned with resolving problems of potential, if not actual, conflicting
groups. It uses either the "hard" or "soft" approaches or both, depending upon the need or circumstances.

Let these contrasting approaches be illustrated in the Philippine experience. In the past, the early American Military Administration faced the resistance of the Moro or Muslim minority with bloody military operations designed to get them join with the Christian groups under a common government. Yet, history can attest to the truth that it was the American Civil Administration which won lasting victory over the total "Moro Problem" through what was called the "policy of attraction"-a pacific, diplomatic or human approach, rather than the bloody one, which was used as the last resort.

The American civil or civic approach brought a gradual degree of political integration of the once-resistant Muslims into the American-Philippine body politic, as well as a social and cultural bridge between the so-called "Moro" and "Filipino" groups, who were long hostile to each other. Indeed, it was the American who mandated the once-independent Moro into becoming politically the Filipino that he is today, though he maintains his cultural and religious identity as a "Muslim Filipino."

Race and Ethnic Relations

Race and ethnic groupings are often inseparably discussed along with cultural relations insofar as these variables are closely interrelated. Very often a racial or ethnic group constitutes a distinct cultural community. For a significant case of race and ethnic relations, let us take up the Chinese and other alien minorities in association with the indigenous Philippine groups.

The Chinese in the Philippines have not gained or exercised political dominance over the natives, as had the Spanish and the Americans. The group or an individual member was often a victim of a mild degree of racism, especially from the Spanish and natives. A Chinaman is often envied, pre-judged and discriminated against by the natives for his continuing economic dominance in business and industry in most of the country's trading centers.

A Chinese in a mixed marriage with a Filipino produces a Sino-Filipino mestizo/mestiza. These mestizos or mestizas or their progeny often gain dominance in the socio-economic and political life of the nation. The pure Chinese female often rejects the native male as a marital partner, but the Chinese mestiza seldom discriminates against a pure Filipino male.

The Filipino's stereotype image of a Chinese is that of a merchant or an expert cook who is a suki or an individual whom the Filipino regularly patronizes. In his association with the Chinese, the Filipino has developed a taste for Chinese cuisine such as the pansit noodle, mami, siopao, etc.
The Filipino and Chinese majority-minority problem has been softened by government restrictions on Chinese retail trade and the increasing shrewdness of the Filipino in business, thus minimizing their rivalries.

To a mild extent, perhaps, the Filipino racially discriminates against the Chinese, forgetting that the Chinese is an ancestor of the Malays of which the Filipino is one. Malay ancestors came from ancient Southern China, according to physical anthropologists, geneticists, and historians.

The Japanese was, until recently, discriminated against by the Filipino. This was due to the Japanese pre-war and wartime military and political ambition to dominate the whole of Asia. The Japanese image to a Filipino was that of an expert carpenter who turned into a ruthless soldier during World War II. The post-war Japanese image, however, softened into that of a technologist and manufacturer who sells such luxuries as motor vehicles, cameras, watches, toys, carpentry tools, transistor radios, TV sets, etc. for the enjoyment of Filipinos. But the Filipino is still suspicious of the Japanese because of the latter's wartime record in the Pacific military theater.

The Indian, locally known as "Bombay" or, erroneously, as "Turko" (Turk), is not considered much of a threat to Filipino interests. Like the Chinese, he is also a suki to the native but unlike the Chinese, he is not a dominant business rival. The Indian limits his merchandise to the relatively high-prestige goods. Some Sepoys (lit., Indian soldiers), who deserted the British occupation army in Manila in the late 18th century, married Tagalog women. These unions resulted in pretty descendants in the town of Cainta, Rizal. It is still a historical incident of Indian-Filipino amalgamation that also happens today.

Except for the Filipino-Sino majority-minority problem brought about by business rivalry, which has been softening since recent decades, the Filipino's relationship with foreign groups is generally peaceful and mutually beneficial. The dominance of foreign groups has gradually eased since the later part of the American Administration. The direction of change was from colonial domination to independence of the Filipinos, which the latter peacefully gained and now protect.

**Ethnicity**

As the chart shows, the native Filipino population grouped into B, C, and D, is not homogeneous. They are separated by religious, cultural, and ethnolinguistic identities, though scholars trace their common origin to some ancient racial stock and the Malayo-Polynesian language matrix. The integration process, either consciously administered by agencies or naturally operating in the course of intergroup contacts, tends to achieve a relationship of unity within diversity.
The Christian, Muslim, and Isolated Tribal group and subgroups are said to belong to the racial stocks of the Malay and the Indonesian, but both are distinguished from the physical type of the aboriginal Negritos who in turn is related to other negroid peoples in Asia and the Pacific. Except to the physical anthropologist and other meticulous observers, the features of persons of Malay and Indonesian types are indistinguishable from one another. Nevertheless, Filipinos belong to various racial strains which tend to amalgamate in the course of physical contact in past and contemporary life, especially in the mixed urban setting. Except for the most isolated tribes (Group D), lowland and coastal natives (Group B and C) have racial admixture with later foreign stocks who are listed under Group A. Through centuries of trade, conquest or colonization, and the foreigners' incoming immigration, a certain degree of racial amalgamation (a correlate process to socio-cultural integration) has been and is still taking place.

Filipinos travelling locally and abroad can easily distinguish the physical type of their countrymen even from other Orientals such as the Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and a variety of Southeast Asian types. Racially and culturally, Filipinos share the psychology of "consciousness of kind" like most other peoples.

**Lingual Relations.**

The community groups are further segmented into a variety of spoken languages and dialects. Eighty-seven (87) of them have been recorded or studied; plus the recent ones reported by linguists, thus increasing the number to more than a hundred today. These tongues (which belong to the Malayo-Polynesian family) have varying degrees of interlingual intelligibility. Thus a cosmopolitan speaker of one native dialect may understand and communicate in a number of these cognate tongues. A born Ilocano speaker, for instance, can easily learn and use Tagalog, Cebuano, Maguindanaon, etc., through simple exposure to these tongues. The case is not the same if he were to learn, say, English or Spanish, which he could speak mainly from formal schooling in these foreign languages.

From the colonial period to the present, the introduction of Spanish and English has played the role of bridging the community gaps among the groups. In today's inter-communication, the "national language," called "Filipino" purportedly based on Tagalog, is increasingly an effective influence in nation building, along with English, the medium of governmental, educational, and business affairs. Two major native tongues also exhibit integrative effects, and they are the Illokó (Ilocano) in Northern Luzon and the Cebuano (Cebu-Visayan) in Central Philippines and Mindanao-Sulu area. Recently, (1970's) the Hilongo-speaking group from Western Visayas and the Maguindanao-speaking Muslims in Cotabato have developed a private mutual friction, erroneously labelled as "Muslim-Christian Conflict," that upset the unity of their socio-political and economic relations.
Religious Relations

Likewise, this country is fragmented by multi-religious identities of groups and individuals. Christianity is adhered to by the Christian majority. This is the basis for labelling the Philippines as the only "Christian nation" in Asia. But Christianity is also fragmented into the Roman Catholic and the multi-denominational Protestant that includes the Aglipayan or Philippine Independent Church and Iglesia ni Kristo. Adhered to by slight minorities are Hinduism and Buddhism, especially by Indians and Chinese, respectively. A close rival to Christianity is Islam. Though it has here a minority adherence, Islam is the largest religious fraternity in the entire Southeast Asia. At the coming of the Spaniards, Islamic influence; introduced earlier than Christianity, extended from Brunei to as far as the Manila Bay area, and to some scattered small pockets in the Visayas and Bicol. But currently, Islam's adherents are confined to central, southern, and western Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan, and southern Palawan, and a sizeable group who permanently reside or commute in Metro Manila; whereas, the Christians are fairly distributed throughout the Archipelago.

The tribal communities adhere to ancient folk religion (sometimes called "animism") and they are being encroached upon by missionaries. While Christian and Muslim covertly or overtly look down upon each other's group, both are prejudiced and discriminate against these tribesmen whom they regard as "pagans," most of whom resist conversion to either Christianity or Islam. Tribesmen greatly exposed to urban ways tend to become Christian converts.

Islam has no organized mission, although it has Arabic schools, teachers, religious associations, and mosque congregations. Thus, it is not fast penetrating the tribal communities. But since the postwar era, new organized Islamic associations have been gaining new converts among Christians in the Metro Manila area. Muslims becoming Christian are relatively fewer than Christian converts to Islam.

It may be recalled that followers of Christianity and Islam had once fought each other in a series of wars and battles due to the Spanish program to Christianize both Muslim and tribal groups. The Spaniards and their converts had allied against the Muslims who resisted any religious change in times of war and peace.

Sectarian Callings

Past war experiences, caused by religious and other motives, left behind scars that have caused Filipinos to distinguish themselves divisively as Christian, Muslim, and "Pagan," a profane term resented by persons identified repugnantly as such. The Constitutional mandate, however, on religious freedom in this non-sectarian state tends to establish religious toleration among the different religious sub-communities. But again, the state should realize the divisive effect of
calling (officially, and customarily) these community groups and their institutions as Christian, Muslim, and Pagan. The last two, once called "cultural minorities," are today renamed "cultural communities," by the New Constitution, perhaps a further improvement from the long-discarded term "non-Christian" which tended to alienate our other countrymen.

Ethnolinguistic Relations

Within each large Christian, Muslim, or Tribal group, there are still sub-groups on ethno-linguistic-cultural bases. The Christians identify themselves as Ilocano, Tagalog, Visayan, etc.; the Muslims classify themselves as Maguindanaon, Maranao, Tausog, Samal, etc. The Tribal Groups are most fragmented due to physical barriers isolating their localities. For example, there is no intergroup contact between the I'lugao (mountain-terrace rice cultivators) of Northern Luzon and the sea-roving Badjao, whose life is built around his boathouse and fishing in the Sulu and Mindanao Seas.

Integration Goal

It is hoped that the foregoing discussion provides the information about the nature and problems of integration. But often integration is an elusive term due to its varied connotations and applications among different people and institutions using the term.

Integration, in the ordinary sense, is the association of integral parts that constitute the whole--but not purposely the annihilation, mutilation, submersion; fusion or assimilation of any member unit into another member unit or into the whole body structure. Likened to a basketball conference, the sports-organization is an association of teams peacefully competing to achieve the value or goal of sports.

In the Philippine situation, the means and avowed goal of integration is "integration of the national cultural minorities (now called 'cultural communities') into the body politic." Obviously, a socio-political program enunciated by the government, the said integrant communities, being thought of as less-integrated, need acceleration of their development like that of the larger society's participation in the affairs of the nation-state.

Historically, this program has evolved from the past eras. First, during the Spanish regime, the hispanization program aimed to dissolve the non-Christians' cultures or sub-cultures in order to convert or assimilate them into the complex Christian-socio-cultural-religious-political system. Despite its centuries-old success, this program had met resistance from the Muslims and other non-Christian communities.

Secondly, during the early American period, administrators using other terms different from the present concept of integration stated and pursued the aim of American presence to "assimilate and civilize" the
Moros or Muslims and other non-Christian natives. The processes of assimilation and civilization meant many expected results in American thought and action. With the U.S. constitutional mandate on separation of church and state or on religious freedom, American leaders precluded religious conversion or assimilation as a part of their program. But their other secular institutions of government, education, technology, economics, etc. were accepted with continuing innovative results even in the present era that retains Anglo-American influence along with the earlier introduction of Latin-Spanish traits.

Cautioning against the repugnance of assimilation, often mistaken as integration, President Ferdinand E. Marcos in some of his public pronouncements, said:

We shall continue to exist as a nation, diverse in creeds, in ideas, in cultures. It is the duty of those in the center of progress to seek out their (minority) brothers—and convince them that their survivals depend on how they adapt themselves to modern times. Minorities should participate in the national government.

The final goal of the integration program of the government, of all the efforts to reach the 4 million Filipino minorities, is to have a society where there would neither be a minority nor a majority, where everyone will be equal.

(The Cultural Minorities) should recognize that they are citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, that they are integral members of the Filipino community. United as a nation, we will move forward.

The above quotation was the President's reiteration (1968) of the purpose(s) for which in 1965 the defunct Commission on National Integration (CNI) was organized to assist in the government program of accelerating the integration of the cultural minorities into the national body politic. Before the CNI agency was abolished a few years ago, after the expiration of its charter, it had a multi-faceted program aimed at the development or "progress in civilization" of the integrant minorities.

Much as the CNI had served its underdeveloped clientele communities, even with limited success, along "moral, material, economic, social, and political" developments, it nevertheless achieved the educational uplift of a sizeable educated class among the minorities whose social-and-cultural development is not behind that of the so-called majority.

The CNI did not duplicate the function of the school system, but it administered a scholarship program for deserving youth members of the cultural minorities whose modern training and exposure qualified them to
participate in the affairs of government and the private sector. On different levels, these minority members "who passed" are now leaders of integration, if integration, as both a process and a result, also means development, advancement or progress where members share or participate.

The term "culture" seems to be all-embracing of the total ways of life of a people. Therefore, the target of Philippine development efforts is to uplift the cultural levels of the so-called underdeveloped cultural minorities to be on the same plain with that of the majority society. Of course, this ideal proposition is easier said than applied with fast results, although social science studies reported cases of primitive folk societies which have developed into modern urban cultures. Magellan's voyage in 1521 A.D., had met with folk islanders on Cebu and Mactan whose descendants today are modern. In fact, from colonial Governor-General's time, Philippine folk communities developed into urban cities as exemplified by Cebu, Iloilo, and Manila today.

The Philippines' majority and minority cultures with their sub-culture units are in contact as their human bearers communicate and interact together. This contact or communication results in acculturation, which is the exchange or borrowing of culture traits between or among the cultures in contact.

In community development, whether there is an agency-administered program or not, a minority community in the rural area tries to emulate the majority community's development in the urban, hence the diffusion of new culture traits and patterns into the minority community. Or, the urban majority's style of life tends to be imbibed, as it actually happens, by the rural minorities. Thus, acculturation contributes to integration. But in this cross-cultural relationship or bilateral culture-swapping more traits are diffused from the majority rather than the other way around from the minority. At any rate a tendency toward cultural levelling happens through this and other interrelated processes at work.

What potential or actual contribution do the minorities have to give to national cultural development? Even the "primitive," but gentle Tasadays can give a moral lesson from their peaceful way of life in their interpersonal and family relations. Their acceptance of the iron bolo to innovate their stone-age tools illustrates their potential to adjust to civilization, if aided by their civilized lowland brothers. The Bontoc and Ifugao tribesmen contribute to Philippine ancient engineering their construction of mountain rice terraces which geographers consider as "one of the seven wonders of the world" along with the Hanging Gardens of Babylon.

Observation and Proposal

Justice Frank Murphy, the last of the American Governor-Generals, had paid a high tribute to the Muslim (whom he called "Mohammedan")
culture for its potential to help enhance Philippine national culture. He
made his commendation after gaining an insight into the richness of the
local Muslim culture.

On the same theme of Filipino heritage, President Marcos, in two
separate occasions is quoted as follows:

For as long as I am President, it shall be the policy of
the government to preserve the Islamic cultural heritage of
the Filipino Muslims as its contribution to world culture and
civilization.

Islam has become one of the bedrocks of Filipino
cultures. And we are committed to the protection and
preservation of the Islamic way of life and the enhancement of
the Filipino Muslim community, so that it can live in peace and
in harmony with the rest of the national community.

Revivalism and Development

Since the inception of Philippine Independence (1946), there has been
a persistent movement toward cultural revivalism for the rediscovery of
Philippine ancient heritage which now, mingles with the patterns of
modernization. Even the First Lady, Imelda Romualdez Marcos, provides
the enthusiastic leadership along art and culture development. This is
indicated in her appreciable sponsorship of the establishment in Manila of
the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) and the Folk Art Theater
which hold programs of both indigenous and modern cultures and arts.

Through trade and commerce, this country exports goods including
artcrafts in exchange for cultural imports from the world markets.
Interestingly, postwar-organized cultural troupes in the performing arts
exhibit their wares before thrilled audiences in all the continents' popular
art centers—(New York, London, Paris, Berlin, Cairo, Tokyo, etc.).

Philippine folk songs, music, dances, colorful costumes and
instruments in the stage repertoire include cultural minorities'
representations. For instance, it has been reported that the colorful
sinali dance from Muslim Lanao has been the most applauded number by
foreign audiences during the Philippine Bayanihan Troupe exhibitions
abroad. These stage shows, an integration of traditional folk arts, have
been described by journalists as "enchanting, exciting, and eye-
catching." The troupe's performing artists variably represent the
typical kayumanggi (brown beauty) and the mesticilla along with the
handsome mesticillo. All represent the amalgamated racial stocks in
Filipino veins. In a sense, this is a contribution not only to local cultural
integration, but to world theatrical entertainments as well.
Worthy of mention is the introduction of Mindanao's kolintang music (which belongs to the same matrix as the gamelan of Indonesia and Malaysia) to a growing group of musicians in the United States. Initiated by some American and Muslim Filipino ethnomusicologists at the University of Washington, trained Americans give kolintang entertainments to audiences on the Pacific coast. This seems to reciprocate the Filipino youth's craze for imported American jazz, rock and now disco music, which tend to make him forget his ancestor's songs and music of long ago.

But the direction and context of the nation's cultural integration is not merely the modern choreographer's renovation of a folk dance and music for a new stage presentation or for "body language" satisfaction. As lengthily discussed, our concept of cultural integration or development is perhaps roughly equivalent to what in Mainland China was called a "cultural revolution," encompassing all other kinds of desired developments.

Constituting the complex structure of civilization, culture as a human institution is inseparable with society. This country's cultural change direction is toward accelerating modern civilization, where all elements of this plural society share and participate in its integrity and unity.

NOTES
1. Adapted from two papers of the 1) "Majority-Minority Situation in the Philippines" read before the ASAIIIL Conference, Manila, 1974, Mindanao Journal, July-Sept. 1974; 2) and "Peace and Unity Through Graduate Research in Culture," Second Annual Convention of the Philippine Association for Graduate Education (PAGE), Davao City, May 1-2, 1980.


3. Won in international beauty titles: Miss International - Gemma Cruz (1964) and Aurora Pijuan (1970); Miss Universe - Gloria Diaz (1969) and Margarita Moran (1973).


6. See Muslim Philippines, cit. p. 3 map showing Muslims spread in Southeast Asia.


8. Aide Memoire - "The Filipino Muslims As a National Problem and Their Role in Nation-Building," by Delegate Ahmad Domocao Alonto to 1971 Constitutional Convention.


13. F. M. A. Keynote Speaker, the 15th Hijra International Conference, Islamic Affairs Quarterly op. cit. p. 8.

14. 2nd Philippine Folk Festival, Folk Arts Theater 5th Anniversary (Souvenir Program), 1979 see inside backcover.

15. The University of Washington Ethnic Music Department trained and employed Dr. Usopay H. Cadar (Maranao) and Danogan Kalanduyan (Maguindanaon) who both teach and play kolintang music. Cadar wrote his dissertation on Maranao vocal music, 1980. Both came from the Durangan Cultural Troupe of Mindanao State University at Marawi City.

In this paper, I present seven cultural themes from Asia (focused mainly on the Philippines and India) and from the United States and their implications for the aged Asian immigrants (herein referred to as Asian "senior citizens") to the United States. Specifically, I address myself to the following fundamental questions: What is a cultural theme? What are the seven basic cultural themes that either facilitate or block the adjustment of Asian aged immigrants to American culture? What are some of the suggestions to help solve the problems of the handicapped senior citizens in their new environment?

Morris E. Opler defines a "theme" as "a postulate or position, declared or implied; and usually controlling behavior or stimulating activity, which is tacitly approved or openly promoted in a society" (Opler: 1945:198). Watson (1964) in his A Dictionary of the Social Sciences makes the following general statements about themes in culture:

a. Every culture has multiple themes;

b. While there is necessarily some harmony among the themes of a given culture, there is no assumption of a complete lack of conflict;

c. Each theme is likely to have multiple expressions;

d. A theme may find its expressions in one or several parts of the institutional structure;
a theme in one culture can presumably be similar to that in another regardless of whether their expressions occur in all the parts of the institutional structure and; themes may be part of an implicit or explicit culture.

According to Opler, the word "expression" of a theme stands for its "translation... into conduct or belief... the activities, prohibition of activities, or references which result from the acceptance or affirmation of a theme in a society... (and which) aid us in discovering it" (1945:199).

The seven themes to be explored are the following: (1) Age is authority, wisdom, and respect; (2) The group is more important and powerful than the individual; (3) Men are superior to women in many respects; (4) Life is governed by fate; (5) Harmony, cooperation, and humanitarianism are essential to life; (6) Personalism provides basic security; and (7) Duty, obligation, and sacrifice promote happiness in the group.

THEME 1

Age is authority, wisdom and respect

The theme "age is authority, wisdom, and respect" is one of the most important, if not the most significant cultural theme in Asian life, especially in the Philippines and India. The senior citizens' self-esteem, attitudes, and world-views will undoubtedly be affected positively by this theme. Their sense of responsibility and authority, combined with their feeling of respect and usefulness for themselves, will serve them in good stead in old age and in their adjustments to the physical and sociocultural environments in the USA. Ethnic migrants from Asia, especially those coming from India and the Philippines, have this positive reservoir of values to aid in their efforts to adapt to the American communities. At the same time, this cultural theme may work against them in the light of the individualistic, impersonal, and egalitarian orientation of American society.

THEME 2

The group is more important and powerful than the individual

This theme may be both useful and disadvantageous to Asian senior immigrants. The group provides basic security and stability. The family or ethnic club accord the individual the emotional, social, and economic support needed to cope with the changing situations in their lives. There is, however, a complex condition, perhaps a thematic or value conflict: American society stresses individual initiative and freedom, self-reliance, and self-identity, thus confronting the Asian senior citizen migrants in their adaptation to their seemingly "strange" sociocultural milieu. The
emergence of social clubs to take good care of their welfare and interests, immensely facilitates their cultural conditioning.

THEME 3

Men are superior to women in many respects

Some Asian traditional cultures (India, the Philippines, and to a large extent China and Japan) have a clear-cut definition of the roles and statuses of men and women. Generally, in these societies, the man is dominant in the crucial decision-making processes in the family, especially in the spheres of finance, child-rearing, and education, among others. The woman relies heavily on the man for many of life's concerns. She is very self-sacrificing and supportive in the major business of daily life and problems. However, authority, prestige, and wisdom accrue with age and seniority for both male and female so that senior women possess a great voice in major family decisions. This Asian male dominance differs drastically from the American case, where egalitarianism (at least theoretically) is the rule rather than the exception. The movement toward total egalitarianism, however, is still moot and continuing. Asian senior immigrants, confronted with the American egalitarian traditions, might alter their views of their own relations, with the opposite sex of their nationality or generation.

THEME 4

Life is governed by fate

In the Philippines the expressions Bahala Na (leave it to Bathala or God) or Gulong Ng Paled (wheel of fate) are both positive and negative affirmations of destiny or fate. One takes great risks in life and resorts to Bahala na, regardless of the consequences of one's actions. Dangers are faced with great courage because of Bahala na. At the same time, Bahala na appears to have a negative impact; it is an unscientific, seemingly superstitious attitude of resignation. Filipino senior citizens must have been fortified by Bahala na regardless of their fate, fortune, and future in America. Bahala na must have worked for them; the same theme must have made others suffer. In India, the theme of dharma works both for and against individual and social changes. Dharma enhances personal and communal security and solidarity. Dharma in the same vein militates against change, despite such pathologies as personal and community frustrations, injustices, and poverty in Hindu India, particularly for the Harijans (untouchables). Americans believe passionately in self-reliance, individual achievement, and effort. The phrase, "don't just sit there, do something!" signifies perhaps too literally that one can be the master of himself and of his spiritual, physical, and social universe. Senior citizens are asked to be on their own--to be self-reliant. Asian aged persons may not understand why U.S. senior citizens live alone or in nursing homes. To be daring, and at the same time strengthening self-confidence in one's ability to achieve, seems to be the feasible compromise.
THEME 5
Harmony, cooperation, and humanitarianism are essential to life

In Philippine culture, the theme of cooperation, harmony, and humanitarianism is pervasive. The best example is bayanihan, working together in harmony and giving one another help when needed in the daily round of life as well as in times of crises. Bayanihan is manifested behaviorally in building and moving houses, planting and harvesting rice, and constructing roads and wells, among other activities of a Filipino farmer. There is a great deal of interdependence among community members. There is indeed reciprocity in social relations. In India, the caste system and the jainam system also exemplify, within limits, this theme of harmony and cooperation. Members of a caste perform specific hereditary occupations. Castes exchange economic goods and services through the so-called jainam system. The Indians also donate free labour (shramdan) or land through Vinoba Bhave's Bhoodan movement. Eric Wolf, an American anthropologist, believes that one of the basic themes in American life is humanitarianism—helping others personally or in an institutionalized way through the Red Cross, United Way, and other civic organizations. This is one theme that Asian senior citizens will find congenial and useful in their effective adjustments to American life. Despite the fact that American society is associated with racism and violence (partly portrayed or reflected in Western movies and television), Americans in general make an effort to build communities of harmony, cooperation, and charity—a climate conducive to the mental and social health of Asian immigrants.

THEME 6
Personalism provides basic security

Three Filipino sociologists state that:

Personalism attaches major importance to the personal factor which guarantees intimacy, warmth and security of kinship and friendship in getting things done. Impersonalism refers to the tendency to eliminate the influence of friendship or kinship in working situations. Behaviour is depersonalized, standardized or institutionalized. Thus, it becomes the function of a position, and not of the person occupying it, that sets the patterns of behaviour in the group. (Panopio et al.:1978).

An eminent Filipino psychologist, Jaime Bulatao, explains "the effect of personalism on the economic, social and political growth of Philippine society". According to Bulatao, the Filipino is unable "to disassociate personalities and functions and positions..." thus affecting adversely his objectivity and his judgment. Bulatao continues:
The Filipino persists in settling matters in a roundabout way. He resorts to 'pakiusap', 'arreglo' and 'lakad' which causes the weakening of the merit system in unemployment.

Personalism in Indian culture is, to a great degree, a fact not only in the rural scene but also in the bureaucracy. Despite the much vaunted Indian civil service, inherited from the British after Independence in 1947, the Indian still performs on a personal basis (especially appealing to caste and other forms of identification) in matters demanding objectivity and meritocracy. This is perhaps a very broad and vague generalization still needing detailed documentation. American society stresses achievement, merit, objectivity, and impersonality. Personal intervention, especially in delicate matters of State involving relatives and friends, is taboo. Asian senior immigrants are ingrained in personalism. They might find American bureaucracy frustrating and not at all conducive to their smooth functioning in the new society.

THEME 7

Duty, obligation, and sacrifice promote happiness in the group

American, Philippine and Indian societies are congruent and yet divergent in their approaches to the cultural theme of duty, obligation and sacrifice. The concept of tungkulin (duty, obligation) in Philippine society has been an over-riding or dominant ethos, especially in the traditional rural society. It is one’s tungkulin to obey and support one’s elders and to take good care of brothers and sisters. It is one’s tungkulin to do service to one’s community, town, province and country. It is one’s tungkulin to raise and educate one’s children. Even if all these tasks entail a great deal of sacrifice, one should live up to his tungkulin. In India, the idea of dharma signifies the theme of duty, obligation and sacrifice. Dharma governs the thought and behaviour of Hindu India. American society, on the other hand, also underscores one’s rights and duties but in a more impersonal way, especially when community and country are concerned. This specific theme of the Philippine tungkulin or the Indian dharma may confront the institutionalized and individualistic emphasis in American culture.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

My discussion of themes in India, the Philippines and the United States is broad and somewhat sketchy. I have explained, in a general way, some of the fundamental ideas that govern behaviour among Asian senior citizen immigrants to the United States—ideas that either help facilitate or inhibit the handicapped citizens’ ability to cope with their new environment. There is an acute need for more research and publication on the status and role of Asian senior citizen migrants in America by social scientists, especially by cultural anthropologists and sociologists. More
seminars and symposia to exchange and analyse information are needed in the coming years. Hopefully, some of the pressing problems confronting one type of minority group in America—the migrant handicapped aged immigrant—may be solved in the future. This paper merely introduces the subject.

NOTES

1. An abbreviated talk by Prof. Mario D. Zamora at the symposium on "Ethnicity and Aging" sponsored by James Madison University, Harrisonburg, Virginia, USA, November 1980. The author is Professor of Anthropology at the College of William and Mary in Virginia and is the founding President of the Association for Anthropological Diplomacy. This paper is highly tentative. Errors of fact and interpretation are solely the author's. I wish to thank the James Madison University for giving me the forum for explaining (or perhaps confusing) the implications of cultural themes to Asian senior migrants in the United States. I also thank my student collaborator, Susan dela Cruz; and my hosts, Dr. and Mrs. Romeo Olivas of Harrisonburg, Virginia. I thank Romy Gaida for typing. This article is reprinted from the International Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1982, pp. 60-67. The author is grateful to Dr. Lalita P. Vidyarthi, editor for his written permission to reprint the paper in this volume.

2. For an extensive appraisal of the theory of themes in culture, see Mario D. Zamora, J. Michael Mahar, and Henry Orenstein, editors, Themes in Culture (Essays in Honor of Morris E. Opler), Kayumanggi Publishers, Quezon City, the Philippines, 1971. Besides Opler, the reader should consult the works of Milton Singer and Vangala J. Ram (for themes) and the following for Indian culture, society, and personality: M. N. Srinivas, S. C. Dube, L. K. Mahapatra, M.S.A. Rao, T. N. Madan, Andre Beteille, Surajit Sinha, L. P. Vidyarthi, I. P. Singh, David Mandelbaum, Gerald Berreman, John Hitchcock, Bernard S. Cohn, Pauline Kolenda, and others too numerous to mention. For authoritative works on Japanese values, see the writings of Ruth Benedict and Chie Nakane; for the Philippines, consult the works of Frank X. Lynch, Mary Hollenacker, Charles R. Kaut, Robert Lawless, John J. Carroll, Ruben D. Santos-Cuyugan,
among others. For study of U.S. values, refer to Clyde and Florence Kluckhohn, Robin Williams, Francis Hsu, Eric Wolf, David Bidney, Dorothy Lee, Ethel Albert, Margaret Mead, among others.

3. The "great man" theory stresses the role of the "mighty individual" in the shaping of a society or culture. Witness the roles of heroes like Ataturk of Turkey, Gandhi of India or the many inventors and discoverers that can partly refute the power of the group over the individual.

4. The Filipino senior citizens' group of Tidewater, Virginia, is a good example of the supportive role of family and ethnic club. The aged are actively involved in gardening, and group singing, among other activities that I once witnessed.

5. This theme is from the analysis of Morris Opler for India and for the Apache Indians.

6. The Hindu and Philippine senior women are good examples.

7. This statement is controversial. One raises the question of the role of women in the USA working hard for the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and women's efforts to fight against sexism and discrimination in jobs, etc.

8. The concept of dharma is well explained in Zamora, et al. 1971, Themes in Culture.

9. For concrete studies on the role of untouchables, see the publications of J. Michael Mahar, Gerald D. Berréman, and Joan Mencher. The works of M.S.A. Rao on social movement will also clarify this point.

10. For excellent sources on the caste system and the jajmani system, see the writings of Louis Dumont, M. M. Srinivas, S. C. Dube, David Mandelbaum, among others.

11. One of the requirements for assistance under the Community Development Projects of the Government of India is donation of free labour (shramdan) by villagers.

12. For studies on American values, especially on contrasting views, see Eric Wolf's and Francis L. K. Hsu's publications.

13. General Sociology: Focus on the Philippines by Panopio, et al. is my main source for this theme and for the statements made by Jaime Bulatao.
14. This point is moot. The Indian Civil Service (ICS) and the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) are supposed to be models of impersonality, efficiency and rationality.

15. One can think of corruption cases in the USA involving public officials (e.g. the case of Governor Marvin Mandel of Maryland and others). The involvement of the presidential brothers of Carter, Johnson and Nixon is another case.

16. This theme is partly from Morris Opler and Vangala J. Ram (for India) and partly from the author (the Philippines).

REFERENCES

Opler, Morris E:


Panopio, Isabel, et al.

Ram, Vangala J.

Watson, J. B.
Zamora, Mario D.  
1965 "Tradition, social control and village administration", Thai Journal of Public Administration, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand.


1967 Studies in Philippine Anthropology, Ateneo-Phoenix Publications, Quezon City. (Editor)

I. Prologue

On March 7, 1975, on the television screen, I watched an agonizing moment of the final day of the Vietnam war as the last U.S. helicopter took off from the U.S. Embassy compound. I became chagrined by the heart-rending scene as if a loyal alumnus were watching a homecoming football game which was ending with the score tied against an underdog team without pursuing the "sudden-death" beyond the regulation time. The Vietnam war cost over 141 billion dollars, and took the lives of more than 56,000 young Americans, not mentioning the wounded ones. That very scene made me think, "why in the world was the most powerful country in the world simply pulling out from the war without attaining an ultimate victory?" Without knowing who Americans are, and what they believe in, it is almost impossible for an outsider to comprehend that the mighty U.S. military power which has the capacity of destroying the entire earth gave up fighting against North Vietnamese and southern guerrillas.

*This is a revised version of a paper presented at The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, Seoul, Korea, during the author's tenure as Visiting Professor, Summer, 1981.*
In March, 1976, Jimmy Carter, then a Presidential candidate, revealed his plan to withdraw the U.S. ground forces from Korea during his interview with the Washington Post. The following year, Carter as President executed his withdrawal plan partially, despite the manifest dissensions from the leaders and experts on this issue from home and abroad, including the leaders of the People's Republic of China. Until Carter deferred his withdrawal plan temporarily in February 1979, by the end of 1978, already more than 3,000 ground forces left Korea for home. I felt as if I were hallucinating by watching a mid football game, and was walking away from the field. It is again difficult for a foreign-born anthropologist to understand such American actions.

My observations on the above two instances have led me to postulate that American foreign policy decisions might be activated by something fundamentally different from external threat or internal economic conditions. It appears to be the culture-bound causes. For this reason, I am interested in analyzing American foreign policy in terms of a cultural frame of reference. Of course, analysis of American foreign policy decisions in this paper is macroscopic against the microscopic details in such decision-making processes. Inevitably, the analysis tends to be selective, mainly with the policies related to the Korean War and the war in Vietnam.

Parenthetically, this is a proper place to admit that I am neither an expert on American foreign policy, nor am I an authority on international relations. Instead, I am a cultural anthropologist who was raised in a non-Western background, and transplanted later into American society by going through the process of resocialization with American culture (Kim 1977). Ironically, during the Korean war, I was a native Korean who was very appreciative of the role of Americans in that war. And, during the Vietnam war, I became an American taxpayer to support the seemingly everlasting war. This unique position allowed me to observe American foreign policy as an outsider and also as an insider.

2. Mood and Cultural Theme

Although there are hundreds of articles, books, and solicited lectures dealing with American foreign policy, most of them have been directed to analyze a series of diplomatic responses to the objective problems, situations, and external challenges. There has been very limited information in understanding U.S. foreign policy as conditioned by American character of mood of the public.

Recently, regarding the application of "mood" in analyzing domestic politics, David Barber has made an interesting observation that a Presidential election depends as much on the "mood" of the time as it does on the qualities of the successful candidate (Barber 1980). For the foreign policy, perhaps Gabriel Almond's work, The American People and Foreign Policy (1967) may be one of very few documents which stress American character and mood, and their impact on foreign policy.
Such a mood of Americans has been clearly expressed at the end of the Vietnam war as much as it was in the Korean war. Michel Jobert, former Foreign Minister of France, has made a dispassionate observation regarding the mood of the Americans since the Vietnam war and their eager participation in foreign policy decisions:

For many years, in Jobert's view, the American people were content to let the administration conduct the nation's foreign policy, assuming that the principal motive behind this policy was democracy allied to morality. When the Vietnam war brought home to many ordinary citizens that foreign policy was actually following the lines of real politics, there was a cry of conscience. Now, says Jobert, the public wants to control foreign policy, and American foreign policy-makers have lost considerable freedom of action (The Christian Science Monitor, November 9, 1976).

If Jobert's assessment is accurate, which I believe it is, then perhaps awareness of American mood would be a very important variable in the understanding of American foreign policy.

Although mood is essentially an unstable phenomenon, Almond believes that it is not totally arbitrary and unpredictable. He postulates that our knowledge of American character tendencies makes it possible to suggest potential movements of opinion and mood which may have some significant effects on foreign policy. He interprets that "American moods are affected by two variables: (1) changes in the domestic and foreign political-economic situation involving the presence or absence of threat in varying degrees; (2) the characterological predispositions of the population" (Almond 1967:54).

For these two variables identified by Almond, I am unqualified to analyze the variable associated with the foreign or domestic situation and the presence or absence of external threat, because I am not trained in international relations and/or military strategies. Rather, as an anthropologist, I am interested in discussing the variables associated with "the characterological predispositions of population," which refer to American character. The study of culture, particularly American character under the title of "national character," has been a major realm of cultural anthropologists for some time, thus my interest in these culture-related topics is legitimate and appropriate.

The major premise of this paper postulates that culturally imposed qualities of American character strongly influence American foreign policy decisions. These largely unconscious patterns of reaction and behavior have been shaped by and emerged from American culture. For this reason, this paper may be labeled as a culture-centered analysis of American foreign policy.

Regarding the orientation of this paper, several anthropologists have made a similar observation on cultural themes of each society which are
reflected in their social, economic, and political activities and decisions. David Maybury-Lewis did his log-racing among the Shavante Indians of Brazil as a model to understand their efforts to restore harmony of social order of the Shavante Indians beset by political divisions (Maybury-Lewis 1967). The analysis of cock fighting in Bali has been used to explain national character by Clifford Geertz (1972). W. Arens is more positive in his example of American football as an American symbol and ritual, and further, he says that "it is reasonable that other people express their basic cultural themes in symbolic rituals, then we are likely to do the same" (Arens 1976:13). Most recently, an interesting paper on "Political Culture as a Background for Foreign Policy Making" by Diane Macaulay was presented at the 1981 Southern Anthropological Society Annual Meeting in Fort Worth, Texas.

There is a likely confusion in regard to the definition of national character and cultural theme. Often, national character refers to particular personality traits or characteristics believed to be typical of or widely found among individuals who share a common cultural background. Individuals who share a common culture frequently tend to have particular personality traits in common. And cultural theme is known to be the fundamental attitudes, perceptions, and preoccupation of a society. But, since both of the concepts are so closely related to each other, no specific efforts have been made to make a distinction. In this paper, I used them almost interchangeably.

The list of scholars, intellectuals, and social scientists who have studied cultural theme or national character of Americans is long and extensive, including scholars from France, Germany, England, Russia, China, and others. Most notable are James Bryce, Henry Steele Commager, Geoffrey Gorer, Francis L. K. Hsu, Clyde and Florence Kluckhohn, Harold Laski, Margaret Mead, N.Y. Ostrogorski, David Riesman, Herbert Spencer, Alexis de Tocqueville, and others.

Their perceptions on American character vary from person to person, ranging from very positive aspects to very negative ones. Some of the traits have been mentioned by quite a few of them. Some of those characteristics may seem painfully obvious to Americans, but often others appear to be dubious to foreign observers. Robin Williams has compiled rather an extensive list, almost a catalogue of American values. They are "achievement," "success," "activity," "work," "moral orientation," "humanitarian mores," "progress," "material comfort," "equality," "freedom," "external conformity," "science and secular rationality," "nationalism," "patriotism," "democracy," "individual personality," "racism," and "racism—and related group superiority themes" (Williams 1960:415-479).

In discussing American character, there is a possibility that perhaps native Americans as well as Western European scholars to a certain extent might have a blind spot because they are part of or share many similarities with American culture. Francis L. K. Hsu expresses his precautions regarding such a possibility that:
This retarded state of our scientific analysis of value conflicts inherent in American culture is, I believe, due to the fact that many Western and especially American scholars have been too emotionally immersed in the absolute goodness of their own form of society, ethic, thought, and religion that it is hard for them to question them, even in scientific analyses. Consequently, they cannot see anything but the eventual triumph of their cultural ideals such as freedom and equality over realities such as racism and religious intolerance (Hsu 1972:245).

However, some of them are exceptional to that precaution. Some of those observations made by native Americans scholars have been more dispassionate and objective than any foreign observer has been. Often they have been even cynical.

For instance, Geoffrey Gorer, a cultural anthropologist whose area of specialization has been national character study, stresses moral dualism in American character, the conflict between Christian ethical standards and the ethics of the market-place. He further points out that American iconography includes two symbols—the shrewd, horse-trading Uncle Sam and the magnanimous Goddess of Liberty. Gorer believes that Americans represent the short-hand of symbolism, a most important psychological truth. America in its benevolent, rich, idealistic aspects is envisaged by Americans as female; it is masculine only in its grasping and demanding aspect (Gorer 1948:28). Can such a moral dualism be seen in the contemporary American foreign policy? Perhaps a random application of "Human Rights" issues during the Carter administration might be a good example.

Clyde and Florence Kluckhohn stress the American tendency to reduce problems to naively rational terms. The assumption tends to be made that any problem can be resolved by reasonable discussion and the "personal" or direct approach. The Americans tend to be anti-expert, anti-intellectuals: there is faith in the simple rationalism of the "Average Man" (Kluckhohn and Kluckhohn 1947:106-28). An example for the former case is that, even at the present time most Americans still believe that they can talk, and negotiate, with "die-hard communists.

The latter regarding "anti-expert" or "anti-intellectuals" has been exemplified by the role of black "Civil Rights" leaders who took part in the Middle Eastern affairs. Jimmy Carter's choice of the former heavyweight champion Muhammad Ali to undertake a five-nation African tour in 1980 would be the most bizzare diplomatic mission, and the best example for the situation described by Kluckhohn and Kluckhohn (Time, February 18, 1980).

Regarding the sense of superiority in American character identified by many authorities, although it is just another way of saying the ethnocentrism of Americans, it is interesting to note that Americans typically over-react to their self evaluations. According to Almond,
Americans over-and-under-estimate their skills and virtues, just as they over-and-under-estimate the skills and virtues of other cultures and nations. Almond continues, "one may entertain the hypothesis that Americans tend to judge other nations and cultures according to a strictly American scoreboard, on the basis of which they are bound to win. It is difficult for Americans to accept a humane conception of cultural and national differences" (Almond 1967:63).

3. American Foreign Policy Decision as the Reflection of American Cultural Theme

As Emmett Grogan once said that "Everything anybody can say about America is true" (Marty 1977:134), so any statement by anybody about American character can be partly true also. Thus, instead of discussing the validity of each trait identified by the authorities, and reviewing each case in detail, I rather choose to discuss a few major American cultural themes, which are reflected in the daily lives of Americans and their foreign policy decisions, seen by Asian anthropologists, Francis L. K. Hsu and myself...

It has been generally understood that foreign-born anthropologists, particularly those of non-Western origins, in this case Manchuria and Korea, often take advantage of analyzing American culture. (For the natives, certain patterns of American culture have been overlooked, and/or often they are unaware of, because they are part of them.) Even European scholars often do not recognize some of them because they took them for granted. Henry Steele Commager has made an allusion that non-Western scholars like Hsu can be more objective in viewing American culture. In his words of introduction for Hsu's book, Americans and Chinese (1970), Commager relates that "Tocqueville, incomparably the greatest of the foreign interpreters, was not unaware of the limitations imposed by these Western and therefore parochial assumptions, but unable to free himself from them" (Commager 1970:xxvi).

According to Hsu, the American core value is "self-reliance," the most persistent psychological expression of which is the fear of dependence. This has been a basic belief of Americans. Hsu believes that "American self-reliance is basically the same as English individualism except that the latter is the parent of the former and the former has gone farther than the latter" (Hsu 1972:248). "It is embodied in the emphasis on freedom, equality in economic and political opportunities for all, Puritan virtues, Christian love, and humanitarianism" (Hsu 1972:258). But when it is applied in international relations with allies, it creates an image of a "lone ranger" from the view of allies.

Recently, Nixon's as well as the Carter administration's foreign policies have been criticized by European allies, particularly France and West Germany, that they as allies have not been consulted enough. For example, Michael Jobert, former Foreign Minister of France, crossed swords with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1973 and 1974,
regarding unilateral foreign policy decisions made by the U.S. without consulting fully with her major allies. France and Germany criticized the lack of teamwork among allies. A secret mission of Kissinger to the People's Republic of China was far more distressing even for the Japanese than the shock wave of the oil embargo and its price hike. But if you understand the core value of Americans, it is not altogether unpredictable. The value of self-reliance as often shown in interpersonal relations is reflected in many popular “Western movies.” A lone cowboy comes into a strange town all alone without much fear. And eventually he defeats all “bad guys” by himself. He does not need any help from anybody.

Although none of the authorities on American cultural themes has ever recognized it, as far as my observation for the last 20 years is concerned, “fairness” is considered to be one of the most fundamental attitudes, perceptions, and preoccupations of Americans. The value of fairness has been evidenced in every facet of American life, including the “Western movie.” A town marshal must not shoot a “bad guy,” in the back even in an exchange of gun fire. A fighting cowboy must not step on the “bad guy” after he has knocked him down. Instead, he ought to wait until the foe stands up and then give him another punch if necessary. Otherwise, Americans would not tolerate such action, because they think it is unfair. One might say, why not step on top of him when he fell down after the first punch, and get the fighting over with? The American concept of fairness might not allow them to. Even if the result might be the same, they rather like to give him a chance to get up and defend himself.

What is the practice of the concept of “fairness” in international relations then? Definitely, Americans applied their principle of fairness even in war against the enemies. During the early stage of the Vietnam war, Americans did not bomb Hanoi, capital of North Vietnam, because they thought that it would not be fair to the unarmed civilians. Often, Americans agreed with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong for a temporary ceasefire for them to celebrate their New Year Holidays. However, the Vietnamese violated the gentleman’s agreement, and attacked Americans, and brought many casualties. It was a total violation of the American sense of fairness. It would be unthinkable for Americans to attack Vietnamese during the Holidays which they agreed upon. Equally, it is unthinkable for an average American to expect the enemy’s sneaky attack against the agreement. If Americans had attempted to win the war against Vietnam, disregarding the principle of “fairness,” and using all available strategic weapons, everybody knows that the U.S. would have won.

Along with the concept of “fairness,” “time concept—linear time” is another preoccupation of American minds. This linear time concept of Americans is denoted in the tense of verbs in English. The root form of verbs changes in many elaborate ways, while Chinese, for instance, does
not. As reflected in English, Americans perceive time as if an arrow passes a certain reference point. After it has passed that point, the time has passed, and it will never return. Thus, they have to save time, use the time optimally and operate things within the time frame. They have to be a master in utilizing the time. If necessary, you have to take time, kill time, waste time, and earn time. Otherwise, time will work against you. On the other hand, the Chinese concept of time would be like a wave in a calm pond, coming and going. For Chinese, there is nothing you can take, kill, save, and/or earn as far as time is concerned. If we would apply the time concept in interpreting the "closed-door" policy of the People's Republic of China to the West for the last 30 years or so, it would be very interesting. Of course, they have many other internal and external reasons for their semi-isolation policy, but certainly their different time concept might have contributed a great deal to it. On the other hand, no U.S. Secretaries of State would have a foreign policy which would be free from the time frame. Americans would not tolerate such a policy without having any time table.

Such a time concept of Americans has been reflected in virtually every facet of American life, including sports. Most American sports, particularly American football, set up a time clock and count down. In football, almost a symbolic ritual of Americans (Arens 1976:3-16), for instance, they are supposed to play very hard for four quarters or 60 minutes. If time runs out, they end the game without achieving a victory. Recently, the National and American Football Leagues, adopted a new rule, called "sudden-death" (which is a very interesting label by itself) to break the tie score. Before the introduction of "sudden-death," the game was played only for 60 minutes. College football still has not adopted the rule of the "sudden-death," and the game is played only for 60 minutes.

I believe that the time concept of Americans has been apparent in American foreign policy decisions, especially in the two Asian wars, the Korean conflict and the conflict in Southeast Asia. When the Korean war started in June 25, 1950, Americans swiftly moved to protect Korea from the invasion from the North. They fought furiously against the communists for three years. At the end of the third year, the American public was tired of the war. Finally, Americans agreed to a ceasefire without pursuing an ultimate victory, as seen in a tied score in a football game. "At the time, the entire Korean population was against the proposed ceasefire, not because they loved the war but because the proposed redivision of the country in the name of a truce would neither solve their problems nor bring permanent peace in the Far East" (Hahm 1964:169).

Again, when the Carter administration announced the withdrawal plan for the U.S. ground forces from Korea, almost all Koreans have manifested an aching void in their hearts as if they were watching the last scene of a Western movie when the cowboy, true to tradition, rides off into the sunset, leaving the ranch behind him. Why must the cowboy leave the ranch without knowing a permanent peace is warranted in that ranch?
Why shouldn't the tie be broken to secure an ultimate victory? And why doesn't the United States stay in Korea until Korea is ready to be on her own?

A very perceptive and astute writer, scholar, and diplomat, Pyongchoon Hahm, a former Korean Ambassador to the United States, relates his wish for American patience in international relations. He hopes that Americans would be free from the ultimate time framework, and become patient in international relations in dealing with multi-cultural nations, saying that:

"...But I venture to use two words to describe two intangible commodities that seem to me essential for my nation's future. One is patience; the other is confidence. ...But I am thinking more in terms of the patience of our allies and their confidence in our ability to achieving finally a visible democracy in our corner of the world. ...As beginners and learners, we are naturally very sensitive to the impatience of our allies. ...My belief is that this patience and this confidence are the "foreign aid" we need most" (Hahm 1964:174).

A similar interpretation is applicable to the Vietnam war. Over a decade of fighting, increasing casualties, and the draining of billions of dollars made the American public tired. In fact, the war had never been popular in the minds of Americans. If the American public supported the war as they had during World War II, with such a mighty military power and sophisticated strategic weaponry, no one would have had any difficulty in predicting a decisive military victory for the U.S. over North Vietnam. As Hahm has pointed out, "what frustrated a decisive military victory by the U.S. in Indochina has not been its military inferiority but hostile public opinion at home" (Hahm 1972:342). One might call it the mood of Americans as we discussed previously. They might believe since they fought very hard for 60 minutes or four quarters, they would not particularly care what would be the outcome of it. Nothing says they have to be ashamed of the result. The regulation time was over, so that the game should be ended, even if it would mean a tied score. As Hahm indicates, "If the game is played with cool rationality and chivalrous gallantry, it could be even more of a gentlemanly sport. Unfortunately, international balance-of-power games have not always been played with "finesse and sportsmanship" (Hahm 1972:343).

Regarding this time concept, it is rather interesting to recognize that on occasion, Americans set up the "dead-line." It can be interpreted as a means to achieve a certain goal effectively within the time limit. But when it is imposed in international relations in dealing with the different cultural groups, particularly having a different time concept in their minds, setting up a dead-line is not always wise. The Carter administration set a dead-line during the occupation of Afghanistan by Russia, announcing that "if Russia would not withdraw her troops from..."
Afghanistan by February, 1980, Americans would boycott the Olympic games." The most visible instance regarding the time concept was seen during Iran's seizure of American hostages in 1980-1981. The former CBS anchor and dean of the television anchormen, Walter Cronkite, counted the number of days every evening. That count made everybody nervous, and Americans became impatient.

4. Epilogue

As evidenced in the above example, it is an undeniable fact that American foreign policy decisions are closely related to the American character, governed by their basic cultural themes as manifested in their daily life. Although the illustrated instances are limited, on a macroscopic level, there is yet a consistent pattern in American foreign policy. That is, Americans react rather strongly against the external threat using every available military means, if necessary, as evidenced in the Korean war and war in Vietnam. But the long term solution was always based on the basic cultural themes of Americans. The immediate reactions made by Americans to the external challenge has been hasty at times, but the solution has never lost its "fairness." The Marshall Plan was the major vehicle for European recovery after World War II. Whatever the Japanese have done for their economy, American generosity to Japan after the war cannot be denied. Americans even talked about aid to North Vietnam after the war, and promised to return the Iranian assets to Iranians after the unprecedented hostage ordeal.

Especially after the Vietnam war, a growing number of ordinary American citizens demanded that foreign policy ought to be controlled by the public rather than by a few elites in Washington. Under such a circumstance, a profound knowledge of American character—a total sum of beliefs and values of Americans—would be an absolute prerequisite for understanding American foreign policy.

In closing this paper, a word should be mentioned regarding the Korean-American relationship. In fact, since the conclusion of the Korean-American Treaty of 1882, America had deeply penetrated the Korean consciousness. The intimate relationship between the two nations has been intensified after World War II through the Korean war and via the Vietnam conflict. Such a close contact between the two nations has led them to presume that they understand each other fairly well. Often a permanent and intimate friendship between the two nations has been taken for granted. But at times, particularly in the late 1970's, there have been certain indications that mutual understandings between the two nations came short of their expectations. For instance, "gift-giving" even without expecting any reciprocal return is an alien thing in American culture, thus, such a practice could be interpreted as a form of "bribery." Yet, it is common in some other parts of the world, including Korea.
In order to narrow the gaps existing between and among cultures in various countries, the role of cultural anthropology cannot confine itself merely to documenting simple, indigenous, and isolated societies. It should broaden its role beyond the traditional realms. One task is to relate culture to the study of policy decisions.

REFERENCES

Almond, Gabriel A.
1967 The American People and Foreign Policy. N.Y.: Praeger. (Orig. 1950)

Arens, W.

Barber, James David

Gorer, Geoffrey

Geertz, Clifford

Hsu, Francis L. K.


Kim, Choong Soon


A COMMUNION OF CULTURES: CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY
AS IT RELATES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Karr L. Fritz
Marquette University

I. INTRODUCTION

"The quality of the imagination is to flow, and not to freeze."
Ralph Waldo Emerson

Recently there has been a profound change in our world, in our culture, and in our society. A new world order is emerging out of the whole of humanity with an emphasis on world and global culture. Because of this, there is a definite need for comparative studies of different legal traditions. We must arm ourselves with knowledge for it is the naivete and lack of understanding of other peoples which dogged and frustrated the emergence of lasting world peace throughout man's history. Cultural factors are critical in determining relations between nations. The study of cultural anthropology plays an important role in establishing a basis of mutual understanding of different cultures and peoples. Because of the increased flow across national boundaries, there has been a recrudescence of interest in the comparative dimension of legal scholarship. Interdisciplinary studies are invaluable in promoting the unification of law. The study of primitive law in ethnological studies helps us find broad anthropological and psychological basis for analysis of more complex legal systems. Parallel studies also allow us to discover cosmic universals and advance universal social significance. Finally such study is indeed a consciousness expander, offering deeper insight into the problems of our own society, forcing us to measure our own values and legal system. Thus the richest source of discovery is through comparison and contrasts. However, as scholars and more importantly, as members of the human race, we must not only study these relationships but must apply what we have learned; transport our discoveries from mere essays to
reality. We must not only analyze it on the microscopic level as most anthropologists do, but also concentrate on the macro-legal dimension. There is indeed a real intertwined relationship between law and anthropology. Each discipline can benefit from the other. This paper will analyze cultural anthropology and the study of comparative legal systems as they relate to the development of international law and relations. It will focus on: custom and culture in the development of our own law, understanding and an appreciation for others' law, and common bonds from which to form international law. Such exploration and exchange in these fields are necessary in order to create international unity and a viable world community.

An understanding of culture is inherently difficult for it entails the objectification and questioning of deeply ingrained beliefs and received truths whose power is so great that one's inquiry is always in danger of being subverted by the objects of one's analysis. The student must be alerted to this problem before indulging in its study. Culture can best be described as a "language of interaction" which has been learned, shared and transmitted. To interact meaningfully men require a social setting in which the moves of the participating players will fall generally within some predictable pattern. To engage in effective social behavior, men need the support of intermeshing anticipation.

Culture is often referred to as an "unwritten code of conduct." A society's culture evolves from the melting into a vapor or blending of different human experiences and customs over the centuries. Culture has an existence of its own, apart from the way people experience it. It appears in every social setting, and it varies in quantity and style from one place and time to the next. Culture behaves, it is possible to predict and explain the behavior of culture of every kind. It is a patterned mosaic: There is continuity to one's culture. It is superorganic and vitally dynamic. Culture is an intimate part of the makeup of man. And as Aristotle postulated "man is a social animal." Through culture, man learns to adapt to his social environment.

Law is an integral part of that social milieu and is vitally indispensable to any functioning social group. Without it there would be no society. It is thus necessary to understand what is meant by law. This is indeed difficult for many scholars (both anthropological and legal) have struggled over its meaning. Judge Carrozza has defined law as "a principle or rule of conduct so established as to justify a prediction with reasonable certainty that will be enforced by the courts as if its authority is challenged." Perhaps a less ethnocentric definition suggests that law is the cultural knowledge that people use to settle disputes by means of agents who have recognized authority. In essence then, law is but a reflection of the beliefs and the needs of the society it is intended to serve. It is part of the social web, an integrating medium. Law is functionally dynamic for it is sensitive to public opinion—a spirit of the age. The role of law is to facilitate and maintain peace. This is not only on the microcosmic level of bands and tribes but also on the macrocosmic international sphere. International policy, reflects a
country's hopes and aspirations and develops out of its cultural history. Therefore, law should be studied not as an autonomous endeavor but as an integral part of the cultural whole.

A legal system must be rooted in the culture of a society in order to take hold and survive the trials of time; for as an old Chinese proverb states, "Law does not depart from human principles." Because of this interrelation between communal value and law, legal research must explore the cultural factors influencing law and its effectiveness. Macroscopic questions must be pondered upon: What is the relation between whole legal systems and their culture? What legal families exist and how do they relate to each other culturally and historically? What are the distinct features of legal systems of industrial nations and states and how do they differ from theocratic states or nomadic or tribal societies? What the study of legal culture on a comparative dimension promises is the discovery to some of these questions and enlightenment necessary to promote world peace.

II. CULTURE AND CUSTOM IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR OWN LAW

Before solving international problems and dealing with world law it is mandatory that one knows internal law first. "Know thyself," as Socrates proclaimed. Custom plays a preponderant role in our own legal system for our laws are based on our value system which is part of our culture. In some primitive societies, including the infant global society, it is said that "custom is king." It has been argued however, that custom now occupies only a minimal place in our own legal structure and has been dismissed as largely irrelevant in our advanced civilization. It tends to be regarded as a kind of museum piece, offering an object for serious study only to the anthropologist curious about the ways of tribal people. However, custom has always preceded the organization of law. Our customs, based on Greco-Romano philosophy and Hebrew-Christian religion, have become "law" through judicial recognition in the decisions of our common law. Thus, in order for us to maintain a durable legal system, it must have its foundations in custom and culture. And it is custom which deals with the nuances not made evident in the black-letter law. Custom can be described as the body of norms followed and practiced, or as habitual courses of action. Once these norms are formed they gather strength and sanctity over the years. Customary law is conceived as being "internalized" by the majority of the members in a society. In order for law to be effective it must correspond to living law. It must specify our normative inner order and moral philosophy. It must be reasonable, certain, peaceably and continuously observed and consistent with other established customs. Customary law owes its force to the fact that it has found direct expression in the conduct of men towards one another. Under the doctrine of opinio necessitatis, customary law arises out of repetitive actions when such acts are motivated by a sense of obligation. This continues to apply within our domestic system but enjoys more esteem in international law. Through
re-examination of aspects of our own legal system based on its cultural ideals and theories in comparison to that of other countries we can gain great insight for promoting legal reform. Only through marked contrast and the implementation of a different perspective can light be shed on the faults and misgivings of our own system. For example, the individual-centered American can learn from exposure to the Chinese legal tradition which is more group or situation oriented. The advantages and disadvantages of such a system can be appreciated in light of our own conventions.

III. UNDERSTANDING AND APPRECIATION FOR OTHERS' LAW

We must push out from our Continental/Anglo-American universe of experience and recognize the multiplicity of law. One of the causes of dissension among nations and peoples is ignorance of each other. A lawyer is naturally ethnocentric with his idiosyncrasies and temperaments, making law one of the most difficult disciplines with which to study a foreign culture. Anthropology has warned the jurist that his conception of law is perhaps egocentric. American jurists, for example, fall into the trap of assuming that institutions elsewhere denominated as legal are analogous to the legal institutions in the United States. But to approach legal culture in that fashion is to court the danger of misinterpretation. We must refrain from making such assumptions. These cross-cultural misunderstandings stem from ethnocentrism. The West especially has sustained incredible, hegemonic conceit stemming from the ages of Imperialism and the Enlightenment, accentuating the superiority of its culture. The study of other cultures allows one to see the force of these points.

For centuries Western scholars have clung to the notion of assuming that a literate culture is superior to a purely oral culture. In fact it is believed by many that no law exists within primitive societies. Proponents of this view suggest that where culture is sparse (i.e. the nomadic tribes of the Masai), so is law. Where it is rich (i.e. the United States, melting pot of many diverse cultures), law flourishes. The ethnocentric identification of law per se with its Western manifestations cannot long survive when Western institutions confront indigenous legal forms. Likewise, "underdeveloped" nations of the world have adhered to an historic distrust of foreigners. To them the West seems mysterious and the Western mind is difficult to fathom. This provincial sense of superiority of one's own norms and people, as representing the sole carrier of true culture must be subdued. All peoples must learn to be sensitive to the norms and cultures of others. Anthropologists and comparative lawyers argue that their disciplines lead to the breakdown of parochialism and narrow nationalism. Anthropology avoids such ethnocentric bias and has several advantages over disciplines like jurisprudence, political science and sociology. It is not culture bound and studies societies comparatively no matter how primitive or civilized. And in contrast to other social sciences, it does not arbitrarily carve out from human culture a segment such as the economic, political structure, law, personality
structure or social relations but conceives and studies human culture as an integrated whole. Thus a legal scholar can learn from anthropologists. In order to reduce ethnocentric effects, he must recognize its existence as a natural phenomenon. He must make himself aware of the wide range of human customs and values. And finally, he must adopt a temporary perspective in which he accepts alien customs as desirable. Thus the legal anthropologist must recognize this awareness and cross the horizons of other cultures.

We live in a pluralistic society. (Living in America has given us a keen cognizance of this because of the flowering of cultures from around the world.) Pluralism is an expression of our individualities that set us apart from one another. Other countries have approached the world with different intellectual and cultural baggage. Each cultural unit embraces a normative ideology of its own and a personal formula for world peace and these are distinguishable. Gandhi’s inner order for society, Confucius’ plan of harmony, and Lenin’s idea of peaceful co-existence are each unique. And if an organization of states is to succeed, a radically amended world law of the United Nations grounded in the basic fact of ideological and cultural pluralism must be introduced. The traditional monolithic concept of globally relevant international law must give way to a transitional concept of cultural and legal pluralism. It is from the latter base, grounded in empirical reality, that the movement towards a realistic globalism must begin (Gause 1969).

We may never be able to fully understand the many rich, diverse cultures of the world but we can at least learn to appreciate the differences, understand the distinctions and kindle a sense of sincere awareness, tolerance, and respect. We must instill within ourselves a concern for other human beings, a sense of altruism. As Herman Hesse brilliantly expounded in his essay on “War and Peace” in If the War Goes On, “don’t deprive yourself of the other man; don’t harm yourself! The other man is not a stranger; he is not something remote, unrelated to me, and self-sufficient. Everything in the world, all the thousands of ‘others’, exist for me only insofar as I see them, feel them, have relations with them. Relations between me and the world, between me and ‘others’, are the substance of my life,” and the life of human-kind.

IV. COMMON BONDS FROM WHICH TO FORM INTERNATIONAL LAW

The world has become smaller. People once alien increasingly share in a larger world. Even the Masai of the Serengeti Plains and the Aborigines of the outback of Australia have not remained untouched. Isolation is a relic of the past. We all have to function in an international sphere; operate and compromise in the international arena. The time is now. Transnational, international contact is unavoidable. We must all act in readiness.
We must respond to the macroscopic relation to the whole and look towards a holistic vision of man in his world. We must determine common bonds and relative universals from which to determine an international code based on values rooted in common rationality. We need a program for living together in harmony. This can only be accomplished by recreating the pristine sense of community and ultimately creating a whole community of mankind with international unity and felicity. We must begin by developing a world system of cultural cooperation on an informal basis. The key to this is to first appreciate each microcosm of the world's matrix for what it is. Understanding an individual nation and the specification of those of its properties which will determine its international reactions is to be found when the major common norms of its people are determined. The international politics of nations is reducible to the interplay of power and norms. This interplay corresponds to the dual nature of man --- both good and evil, social and egotistic, and to the ideals and material characteristics of reality. Thus we must discover a common spirit, a common morality. In fact it is not even necessary to ascertain true belief but to be enlightened as to common belief. Whenever men join together for common ends or at least make sense of common means, there arises within the feeling of collective strength and with it confidence and courage. Perhaps it would prove more fruitful to initiate this on a smaller level first. For example, this type of organization has already gained success in Europe under the European Economic Community. What helped maintain its success were the shared attitudes, cultural values and moral values possessed by the member states. There is definitely a need for a consensus of values and also adequate means of enforcement before such unification can be implanted and perhaps to a certain extent, this does not yet exist on the international level. There remains a different concept of priority of rights. In the East, freedom "from" hunger is sought whereas in the West it is freedom "of" speech that is revered. Therefore at least in these infant stages there is probably a greater chance of lasting success regionally before there is globally. We should follow the example that the European Common Market has introduced. However, eventually the type of legal background should not matter. What is essential is that we align ourselves together. The sine qua non of global harmony is cultural rapprochement. It is necessary to sever the cleavage between the East and West and between highly developed and third world countries. It is time to break down the walls of national sovereignty and persuade people to study and cooperate with each other. Archibald MacLeish of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations once said that, "If people of the world know the facts about each other, peace will be maintained. Cultural relations of government are its most important relations." Only if we know the facts, the idiosyncrasies, the tendencies of nations, can we use law in the service of global truth.

Hopefully within the twenty-first century of human history, after we have accomplished the necessary field work in discovery of universal principles of law, we can create a new legal level. We can coalesce in a cosmic community. Before this great feat can be achieved we must
discover a value map of the world, a chart of relative universals focusing on intercultural law and global culture. An effective world policy can only survive if grounded on living law pluralism. True nations and true men live by their spiritual values and their ideals. The only foreign policy therefore which will work is one which wins men and nations by the ideas and spiritual values for which it stands. It is not necessary to all possess the same values and ideas before embarking on the construction of international law. All that is necessary is mutual respect for the protection of diverse ideologies and values. Principles of living law pluralism make the basis for world law.

In its present state international law can be defined as a system of law which governs the relations between states. More specifically, it is the “body of rules of conduct, enforceable by external sanctions, which confer rights and impose obligations primarily, though not always exclusively, on the sovereign states and which owe their validity both to the consent of the states as expressed in custom and treaties and to the fact of the existence of international community states and individuals.”

The law of the international community is the law of the individual and collective units comprising the international society predominantly as organized in the form of independent states. The objective of international law is to produce an ordered system of international relations. The aim then of international diplomats, scholars and lawyers should be to “keep close to concrete facts by means of a consideration of recent events in the international field while at the same time pursuing the analysis of cultural background, basic beliefs and principles necessary to understand these events and to make correct decisions of policy with respect to them.”

Grotius (1583-1645), the father of international law, stressed that basic principles of international law must be derived from principles of justice which had universal and eternal validity. Later, the Positivists maintained that the basis was the actual behavior between states. In relation to this, Lenin concluded that the prolonged existence of the two systems of socialism and capitalism was historically inevitable and that peaceful cooperation (competition) between them was necessary and desirable.

To this end the Soviets have regarded international law as promoting peaceful “co-existence” and cooperation between all states regardless of their social systems. International law has been conceived as a special form of law with all the general features characteristic of domestic law yet with distinctions.

However, are these definitions satisfactory? How much of what is denoted as international law really deserves the term “law”? There has been much skepticism surrounding this issue. A popular belief often asserted is that international law is not law at all. This has been claimed because in the arena of world organizations, members carry no weight or responsibility for what they decide. As such, international law cannot subsist without public recognition and conscious support. International law takes into account a wide gamut of human activity. A difficulty therefore arises among scholars who derive their model for international law too narrowly from that law which is associated with a uncentric
power system. They must consider the multicentric power system and take into account the whole legal landscape of the world.\textsuperscript{52} Policy must accept diversity and maintain flexibility. International law effectiveness requires interaction and unilateral action.\textsuperscript{53}

The sources of international law include: treaties, custom, general principles of law, judicial decisions, academic teaching, and possibly acts of international organizations, equity and natural law.\textsuperscript{14} Since this essay deals specifically with culture as it relates to law, discussion of this topic of sources will be limited to customary international law. Custom can be defined as evidence of a general practice accepted as law and must be based on a constant and uniform usage. The elements included are actus reus (practice) and mens rea or opinio iuris (opinion). Actus reus entails the material fact: the repetition by states of a practice. Opinio iuris involves the psychological fact: a conviction felt by states that certain conduct is required by international law. A balance is achieved between these elements. Something can become international law in less time if there exists a great weight of consensus. Custom is interrelated with treaties. A treaty can simply be a statement of custom which already exists or it can create custom by postulating declaratory evidence of customary law.\textsuperscript{55} In order for international customary law to be enforceable it must be bound in universality and remain fluid.

For customary international law to progress, a fount of cultural exchange must be propelled. A global network of correspondence must be set into motion with controlled interchange and social intercourse. We as participants must ignite world-wide dialogue on ideas. Peaceful relations are built on the foundation of mutual understanding. To be sustaining this requires the gradual and patient establishment of reciprocal interests. And diverse culture recognition is but one of the last hurdles in the diplomacy of ideas.

Civilizations thus, seem to be at the crossroads. We have the power to destroy ourselves. It is either communication or annihilation. This is the most crucial issue of our age. If the doctrine of the survival of the physically fittest and the destruction of the physically weakest is to prevail then there is no hope for a better, nobler world.\textsuperscript{56} As Thomas Huxley expounded, “Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process; the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be the fittest in respect to the whole of the conditions which obtain, but of those who are ethically the best. The intelligence which has converted the brother of the wolf into the faithful guardian of the flock ought to be able to do something toward curbing the instincts of savagery in civilized man.”\textsuperscript{37} Therefore civilization must be based not on affluence and industrial values but on survival, for peace is so terribly fragile. “Peace is something we do not know. We can only sense it and search for it.” Peace is an ideal. It is infinitely complex, unstable and fragile — a breath can destroy it.\textsuperscript{38} It is vital then that we build up strength for a durable peace and this can be achieved only through
Collective Security. Through cooperative efforts military disarmament can come about only if preceded by a moral rearmament. All cultures and nations must work forward and adapt.

In search for global unity however, each nation should maintain its cultural fruits and habits of thought. The world as a whole must accept the diversity of human riches. The ideal is not cultural uniformity in which national characteristics are blurred. Mankind flourishes in diversity, differentiation and gradation. It is a wonderful thing that there should be many races and nations, many languages, many variations in mentality and outlook. A symphony of diverse cultures, the richer because of the diversity, rather than the dull monotony of all the nations fiddling away frantically on one string, is the vision of an ideally informed and realistically wise foreign policy. It is indeed important to preserve the integrity of the people and their cultures. Nations must continue in existence strong enough to retain their political independence and cultural lives. They must maintain separate, independent destinies but as subordinate parts of the total movement. In an attempt to visualize a global utopia, it would be rational to conceive it less as an ideal than as an improvement on the present. We are not utopias.

A balance of forces must be struck, for in a mixed order, there is room for the dynamics of power and the normative restraints, including law. Equilibrium is all that is perhaps possible in the reality of world affairs. And if equilibrium is disturbed the equilibrating mechanism must intervene within international actuality to redress the imbalanced view of international reality. Too often the price has been war, but today this price is too great to pay.

CONCLUSION

Mankind's greatest dream is a warless world. Law is the medium for implementing world peace for the most exalted, universally admired concept which all men share in common is the Rule of Law. Law is inherently purposive. It deserves more purposive attention for on its immediate growth hangs the fate of civilization. The science of comparative legal dynamics is called upon to add its catalytic effect to the crystallizing metamorphosis from primitive law to modern on the plane of world society. If international law and diplomacy are to succeed people must be informed. We must rid ourselves of indifference and ignorance. Government power and intellectual power are natural comrades. We must digress from benign international law and make it work, make it active. If we can at least appreciate the force of this argument we have achieved a landmark in history. "For the world of tomorrow will be shaped, for good or evil, by each peoples' degree of self knowledge, the extent to which they understand one another, and the manner in which they deal with the burdens and opportunities that the past has bequeathed to the present."
Let us recapture an awareness and feel the power of international cohesion. Let us strike bridges in "renewed humanistic diplomacy." This is the collective responsibility of all people united in the hands of tradition, history and culture. We must all learn the wisdom of mutual tolerance and respect for as the Preamble to the U.N. Charter states, "to practice tolerance, and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors," and to unite in "strength to maintain international peace and security." This is the creed mankind must live by.

We have but gained a foothold on the trodden path of the eternal quest for peace and unity. We are all participants in the drama of the history of man; explorers in the journey toward the meaning of mankind. We are transient, "not yet human but on the way to humanity."70

**NOTES**


2. These interpretations have done something for the science of law as it is today. They have led us to a wider basis for the philosophy of law. They have introduced thorough study of primitive social and legal institutions and thus have exploded many traditional false ideas that had come down from the days of the state-of-nature theory. They have given added impetus to the movement of unification of the social sciences by establishing connections with ethnology and anthropology and social psychology. Most of all they have suggested lines of preparatory work that must be carried on before we can achieve an adequate social theory and hence an adequate theory of law as a social phenomenon. Roscoe Pound, *Interpretations of Legal History* (1923) p. 91.

3. Whatever relates to the nature of man is interesting to the students of every branch of knowledge and hence ethnology affords a common ground on which the cultivation of physical science, of natural history, of archaeology, of language, of history and literature can all harmoniously labor. *Memoirs of James Smithson.*

Illumination can be cast by comparative work on pervasive questions underlying the entire legal order: How specific or universal is the Western idea of law? What are the premises? How universally are these premises shared? What moral assumptions, cultural traditions, historic experience and economic considerations are reflected in a given society's attitude toward social control? Arthur Taylor Van Morden, "Roscoe Pound and Comparative Law", Am. J. of Comp. Law, Vol. 13, 1964, p. 514.


8. Id.

9. Id. at 213. Customary law is characterized as a language and generally observed course of conduct. Hollands, Elements of Jurisprudence, 8th ed. (N.Y., 1896) p. 50-51.


15. "Its strands flow without break into the total fabric of culture and it has no clear-cut edges. Law is not sharply separable from all other forms of human activity," Id.


17. Montesquieu realized that law in a given society was not a reflection of a universally valid set of legal principles but rather an integral part of a particular people's culture. Montesquieu, De l'Esprit de Lois as cited in Leopold Pospisil, Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Theory (N.Y., 1971) p. 130. "They should be relative to the physical nature of the country; to the climate, ice bound, burning or temperate; to the quality of its territory, its situation, its size; to the way of life of the peoples whether tillers of the soil hunters or herdsmen, they should accommodate themselves to the
measure of liberty which the constitution may admit; to the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, their wealth, their numbers, their trade, their mores, their manners. It is in all these aspects that they must be considered (Stark 1960, p. 208) Montesquieu 1750, Vol. 4, p. 9. These aspects are emphasized in the field of anthropology and are the essence of its study.

18. Old Chinese proverb.


21. Fuller, p. 213. It remains true that a proper understanding of customary law is of capital importance in the world of today....first much of international law is essentially customary law. Upon the successful functioning of that body of law, world peace may depend. Second, much of the world of today is still governed internally by customary law especially in new emerging nations. Id.


23. Fuller, p. 213. "Custom is the embodiment of those principles which have commended themselves to the national conscious as principles of truth, justice, and public utility." John Salmond, Jurisprudence 7th ed. (London, 1924) p. 208-209.

24. Pospisil, p. 344.

25. F.S.C. Northrop, Taming of Nations (N.Y., 1952) p. 5. Law is ineffective when norms for ordering the relations between people which it prescribes contradicts or departs too far from the norms and ideals built into beliefs and bodies of people as given in inner order of their total behavior ---- their living law. Id.

26. Id.

27. Lecture, Prof. Greenstreet, Fall 1982, Comparative Legal Systems.


29. Id.


31. Id., p. 112.


34. Black, p. 65.


36. Winterton, p. 111.

37. Pospisil, p. x.


41. Northrop, p. 38.


44. Ninkovich, p. 126.


46. Green, p. 138.

47. *Id.*


50. *Id.*, p. 111.

51. *Id.,* at 101.

52. *The Differing Realms of Law* p. 90.


55. Id.
58. Hesse, p. 52.
59. Ninkovich, p. 22.
60. Hesse, p. 141.
64. Lenin 1943, p. 75 as cited in Pospisil, p. 165.
65. Liska, p. 3.
68. Francis L. K. Hsu, Americans and Chinese (Garden City, 1972) p. 11.
70. Hesse, p. 105.
REFERENCES

Akehurst, Michael

Américano, Jorge

Berman, Harold J.

Black, Donald

Cairns, Huntington

Cohen, Ronald and Middleton John

Coudert, Frederic

David, René and Brierley, John

Ehlich, Eugen

Friedman, Lawrence and Macaulay, Stewart

Fuller, Lon

Gould, Wesley and Barkun, Michael
Green, L. C.

Harris, Marcin

Heald, Morrell and Kaplan, Lawrence

Hesse, Herman.
1946 If the War Goes On. Zurich: Fretz & Wasmuth AG.

Hoebel, E. Adamson

Hsu, Francis L. K.

Korovin, Y. A.

Liska, George

Pospisil, Leopold

Ninkovich, Frank

Northrop, F. S.C.

Rhyne, Charles

Schlesinger, Rudolf

Spradley, James and McCurdy, David

Taylor Von Mehren, Arthur

Thomas, Lynn

Winterton, George
"Comparative Law Teaching", 23 Amer. J. of Comp. Law 69.
ANTHROPOLOGY, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: MUTUAL SCOPE AND FOCUS?

LYNN L. THOMAS
Pomona College

Purpose and Outline

Colleagues at a small liberal arts college have encouraged me to think that the college's international relations program has a place for anthropology. Experience suggests that finding a place is no easy matter. The local experience could be atypical, and even if it is, it nevertheless suggests that certain asymmetries and attendant incommensurabilities in social life and in social science frameworks will have to be examined as a part of any serious dialogue between anthropology and international relations, or between anthropology and any mainstream American social science. The purpose of this paper is to expose some ethnographic (and therefore parochial) observations to the light of day so that they may be critically evaluated (and perhaps de-parochialized). The ethnographic observations concern the following asymmetries and incommensurabilities:

1. Limits of Knowledge. First, there are asymmetries in relations among social sciences. One set of these asymmetries involves limits of knowledge in social sciences taken separately and together. Questions of limits of knowledge will be given attention in the first part of the paper, and again later.

2. Elite/Folk Asymmetries. Asymmetrical distinctions between elite and folk orientations to life have come to encompass and distort other distinctions of social science and modern life. Urban/rural, large/small, secular/religious, scientific/humanistic distinctions are among the large
set of ideologically constituted divisions which interact with and are colored by elite/folk asymmetries.

Contemporary elite/folk asymmetries developed in the same historic processes that non-coincidentally gave rise to the social sciences. These asymmetries have come to significantly structure our modes of discourse and thinking: they pervade our most salient social and cultural conflicts.

3. Asymmetries in Ethics. Most fundamental, culturally are asymmetries in ethical ideas and analytical perspectives derived partly from ethical ideas. Our ethical ideas are structured in part by, and in turn structure, asymmetries of elites and folk.

Asymmetries in Action. Ethical concepts are constrained by the social patterns in which they are immersed just as they inform the social actions that constitute the social patterns. Elite/folk asymmetries are built into ethics and through ethics are built back into social life. In social science work, moreover, it is realms of policy making and implementation--increasingly informed by social science training--that present the clearest opportunities for facing the perniciousness of Western hegemonic concept and arrogance.

Anthropology and international relations differ significantly in their respective core emphases in the ways in which these four kinds of asymmetries interplay with discourse and thinking.

1. There are differences in limits of knowledge in the two fields. Anthropology has been described this way: "Anthropology, in consonance with the etymology of its name, "study of (humans)," is the most comprehensive of the academic disciplines dealing with (human/kind). ... Although anthropology is... in principle all-inclusive, it is, in fact but one of a number of disciplines that study (people). Indeed, the very richness and variety of its interests lead inevitably to fragmentation into a number of semi-autonomous sub-disciplines, practically all of which, moreover, must share their subject matter with some other well-established and independent field of study... (But) even where it overlaps some other field of study in subject matter, it tends to approach the data somewhat differently and in terms of problems posed within the general frame of anthropological theory. One particular set of interconnected problems may be singled out as historically the core of anthropological interest--namely, the description and explanation of similarities and differences among human ethnic groups." (Greenberg 1968:304-305).

The limits of knowledge in anthropology come in more kinds of shapes, sizes, and colors than the limits of knowledge in international relations or of any elite-oriented mainstream American "social" science. This may be a fundamental asymmetry between the two fields; as such it would be a potentially quite significant reversal of general elite/folk asymmetries.
It should be one clear as the paper progresses that asymmetries among social sciences in limits of knowledge are not primarily those of diversity of subject matters. I have no doubt but that each social science discipline has justly and proudly pointed to great diversity. Rather the limits of knowledge I have in mind concern the fundamental categorizations of allowable kinds of knowledge treated in a field, especially those involving the kinds of realms of and connections among human experiences dealt with.

2. While anthropology focuses on folk and folk ways, international relations focuses on elites and elite ways. The asymmetry is embedded in the very natures of the historic notions of elite and folk. It is not only because anthropology has had to confront "cultural differences" that it has not been able to clearly delimit its limits of knowledge. It is also because anthropologists have had to traffic between elite and folk.

3. Even in the last century when the discipline was being institutionalized, anthropology had an ethic which was already beginning to be relativist (Stocking 1971). The discipline did lose much innocence in participation in historic destruction of other peoples. It also has helped support Western culture's evolutionary conceits, sometimes even in the acts of criticizing those conceits. Nevertheless anthropology has commonly had to see ethics as grounded in social life and in folk ethics and religion. International relations has tended to see ethics grounded in scientized philosophy, political theory, and elite power. The ethics of both folk and elite perspectives need to be situated.

4. Anthropological work has been less policy oriented than work in international relations. Given elite conceit, anthropological work has been seen as trivial and sometimes it has trivialized itself in romanticisms. But elite Culture (see Williams 1976) has given a value of spiritual purity to exploration which makes anthropology's vice also into a virtue, as seen by elite eyes. The celebration of esoteric ritual has been valued in itself, sometimes partly decreasing some of the hard edges of Western practicality, but only momentarily, in the end, and only supporting the historic conceptions of elite folk ways.

There are also some intriguing partial and potential overlaps in the two disciplines. Most obviously, both have the potential to be genuinely international, cross-cultural, comparative. Both have the potential to cut across the grain of the predominant themes of hegemonic life, especially as expressed in the predominant American "social" or behavioral sciences of political science (especially as government of policy administration), economics (especially as business administration), and psychology (especially as personnel management or administration). Other fields have similar promise, most notably certain kinds of history, sociology, linguistics, folklore, and Marxist studies. But the purpose of this paper is not to explore the overlaps. It is rather to explore how anthropology might contribute to the study of international relations, if only it could, and if only international relations had some interest in its contributions.
Boundaries and Unruly Creatures

Anthropology is the least profound and the most tentative of the social sciences. Least profound—in the terms of elite scholarship—because it more consistently comes closer to human experiences as they are lived than any other. The almost ritually obligatory field work, for example, means forcing oneself to interactively confront realities of particular people's lives, in the light of significant intellectual puzzles concerning the ways these people live or might live. That encounter means putting into question, over and over again, one's conceptions of how things are. Elite scholarly profundity is the last thing thereby engendered when the job is done well. Field work is only one manifestation of the closeness which anthropologists try to achieve with personal experience, kinds of closeness which, if successful, allow for wonderful broadening and deepening of a person's sense of human ways. However, the promise of closeness to experience is difficult to achieve. Anthropological understandings are faulting, partial, delicate, and tentative because the experiences through which they are achieved are fleeting and the conceptual tools of the trade clumsy. This is in the nature of the work. It is a part of the great challenge and richness of the discipline. But, seen in relation to social problems, anthropology is also tentative because it is so inclined to ignore, gloss over, or romanticize the hardest realities of malnutrition, war, poverty, genocide, and exploitation. A major thrust of the field is to overcome these tentativeness without losing the experiential and disciplinary sources of strength.

Anthropology is the smallest of the standard social sciences, in number of workers, in monies spent, in size of particular research ventures, in numbers of pages of learned discussion. It is also the most eclectic, the most recklessly ambitious in scope, and one of the thinnest in depth of theory as theory has come to be narrowly understood in the social sciences (cf. Homans 1967, Bernstein 1978). Still, it has been one of the most influential in terms of fundamental ideas as well as suggestive hints.

At the most pessimistic assessment, anthropology has always stood at the limits of knowledge of the other social sciences, as the perennial interstitial grab-bag field. Anthropological breadth and the tentativeness of the contours of the discipline's limits are most obvious in the endless discussions of the nature and workings of culture. It is something of a pity that the mainstream social sciences do not have quite such a grand unruly creature as culture to constantly remind them of the shadowy areas of their limits. Mainstream social scientists curiously demarcate substantive domains such as economics, politics, and psychology, and act then as if they were real domains of life. They are thereby apt to miss seeing the unruly creature lurking about in the interstices. When culture is so classified instead of investigated in its own right, results are apt to be especially curious. For example, some political scientists' notions of "political culture" have been where the "residual variance," or unexplained aspects of a phenomenon, are understood to reside. Viewing culture as a source of unexplained variation is utterly fatuous in contexts in which the
unexplained variation greatly exceeds the explained and in which even the
crude shape of the "culture" doing the "explaining" is not described. It is
not very helpful to allow the cultural and social to place only vague limits
on "individuals" or on the well-hidden "invisible hands of a "market," or
the motives of individuals or direction of "firms." In the social sciences,
it is not simply a matter of each discipline setting limits on the others,
though that in itself is problematic enough (and seems to be quite a
problem in international relations); rather the most serious problems
concern the relative scope, nature, and importance of different kinds of
limits. The rough and ready institutional divisions by subject reflect
institutional struggles (in the academy and out) as much as they reflect
careful thought about where the seams are in social and cultural fabrics.
It is certainly hard to escape the institutional rubrics, under which much
important work has been gathered and under which some people actually
guide their lives. But the breakdowns too easily become cliches, which
often cripple thoughtful discussion. Anthropological work often suggests
challenges to the limits of social science categories, as for example in
Clifford Geertz's recent book *Negara*: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-
Century Bali. A reviewer commented:

> It is part of the fascination of Geertz's work that he seems to
> be pointing to yet another case in which...obfuscation of our
> current experience by our inherited theories may be taking
> place. Our theories tell us that the ceremonies of public life
> are merely the trappings of power, but it may be that such
> contentions are no less misleading about our own society than
> they are about classical Bali. (Skinner 1981:57)

No less misleading indeed! Might received Balinese theories also mislead?
Anthropology may play a useful limits role, certainly not alone and not in
all respects, but just as certainly at least as often as any other social
science. Anthropology sometimes approaches an especially global and
consequential kind of limits role. It is one of anthropology's best. But
this pessimistic, reactive assessment of the discipline may be
unwarranted. More optimistically what anthropologists might have lost in
eclecticism and thinness of certain kinds of theory, has been made up for
in a radical unwillingness to close off avenues of investigation in a
constantly breathtaking confrontation with the extraordinary richness of
human lifeways as they are ordinarily lived. Margaret Mead saw meaning
in this:

> Contemplation of human culture is especially touched with
> wonder and hope... one learns to trust ordinary (people) as well
> as to wait for (those) of genius." (see also Richardson 1974a)

**Elite vs. Folk Focus**

Whereas international relations is most concerned with the workings
of elites and elite institutions, anthropologists mostly work with people
who are ordinary in particular historical contexts, so-called tribal folk.
peasants, workers, villagers, crowds, masses, citizens. Elites fixate on
capital cities, on high technology, on haute cuisine, on the core areas of
the West, on Polite Society, on high-toned kinds of sophistication. The
strong fixation in academic life on elite, especially elite Western, and
most especially elite anglophilic culture is but one manifestation, and a
powerful reinforcing, of the general pattern. Anthropologists fixate on
out-of-the-way places, on poor people, on folkways and folk. Even when
anthropologists look into elite matters, it is apt to be from the vantage
point of a rambler's house on a dusty road in a small and destitute
village somewhere in a poor country. Members of each of these two
settings, folk and elite, repeatedly misunderstand and mistrust members
of the other, as for example in the following two statements, one from a
villager in the Punjab. The villager is talking about some Americans who
came to the village in order to introduce birth control devices. The
 euphemism for birth control is "family planning." The other statement is
from two American scientists, the directors of the birth control project.
First, the directors:

Westerners have strong feelings about the value of persons and of
human life not necessarily shared by Punjabi villagers. Some readers
may feel that the pressures arising from growing numbers of people
were self-evident. The villagers did not always hold that view.
(John Wyoii and John Gordon, as quoted by Mahmood Mamdani, 1972.)

And the villager:

These Americans are enemies of the smile on this child's face. All
they are interested in is war, or family planning. (Mamdani 1972)

The authors of the first statement, in spite of what they indicate to
be beliefs to the contrary, did come to partially believe that their family
planning devices were not accepted by Khanna villagers because "until
low-income parents have assurance that live-born sons and daughters will
survive, couples are unlikely to be interested in restricting the number of
pregnancies" (Sternshaw 1978:5). In that assessment there was some
limited shared understanding with villagers, even if it came painfully late
in the process. But the above quotations betray greater misunderstandings
between the directors of the project and the villagers. Such
misunderstandings are commonly described, egregiously simple-mindedly,
as reflecting "cultural differences," "ethnocentrism," or "prejudice." The
misunderstandings express a mutual lack of respect which does not
necessarily stem from cultural differences or prejudice. There is,
moreover, a fundamental asymmetry in the underlying frameworks of
perceptions. The directors of the project purport to give general truth, or
at least, the best scientific understanding leading self-correctively toward
objective general truth. The villager on the other hand is not apt to be
heard by anyone as giving more than a very local interpretation, one that
is apt to be denigrating as parochial. It then becomes a matter of quite
serious concern, given the interventions into people's lives by elites, that
elites claim so much more than folk. It becomes a matter of quite serious concern that scientists imply that Punjabi villagers do not necessarily share "strong feelings about the value of persons and human life." What is most saddening about the statement is the ease with which it seems to have been made, coupled with its lack of differentiation, in a context of interference, as if any people's feelings and understandings on such matters are not more involved than such acts as such it is a form of what Frederick Gearing has called nondescription by the notion of character. 

Nondescriptions tell what people lack, leaving unanswered what they are like. Character nondescriptions attribute contextless and undifferentiated intrinsic personal qualities. Nondescriptive opaque characterizations are sometimes manifestations of estrangement. One wants to say to the villager: "Wait, I'll explain, you are partly wrong...." One does not know what to say to elites who have been raised to accept the abstract statements of informed tolerance but who have also been raised to see that tolerance is the first thing dispensed within the hectic day to day workings of life. Is it too much to expect that people whose heritage says they know better should take special care in these matters?

A potential misunderstanding of these last points needs to be considered. Many mainstream social scientists as well as anthropologists have been all too often happy to rest content thinking that anthropology deals with "microcosms"—the small-scale worlds of village and kinship groups, while leaving it to other fields to deal with "macro-cosms"—relations among entities of larger scale (but cf. Keesing 1981:Part V). Apart from reasonably serious questions, even of the descriptive adequacy of the characterization, what has never been specified are the boundaries of scale or the principles that render one sort of study inappropriate when seen from the vantage point of another. One can wonder if the various parochialism of life in these different realms do not more complexly inter-relate than is typically seen. If the international relations specialist is suspicious of study in mere villages, for example, the anthropologist may still fairly wonder why Washington is not just a strange sort of village. Apart from fancy gadgets, some political power and endless pedantry, just what is it that gives elite capitals their luster?

Ethics of inequality and Equity

Although cross-cultural misunderstanding involves ethnocentrism, it also involves much more. First, human beings involve themselves in situated meanings in which are embedded purposes and perspectives. Systems of meanings are built socially and culturally. These meanings guide, constitute, and constrain (but do not straight-forwardly cause) our situated actions (Sapir 1968a, 1968b; Boas 1889, 1940, Taylor 1979). But this is still not nearly enough to allow interpretation of the encounter between villager and family planner.

More to the point, Western cultures, the world hegemonic cultures of the past few centuries, carry with them as heavy baggage incredible conceits stemming most recently from the various ages of Imperialism and
Enlightenment. Western concepts embody peculiar notions of natural law and science and civilizedness and of the superiority of the cultural and social institutions which are supposed to realize and support those notions. The beliefs themselves are manifestly consequential, not merely trappings of our social and material lives (see e.g., Tawney 1921). But the beliefs are not necessary truths, either for all time or even for the social-cultural systems of which they are part (see e.g., Whitehead 1925). The anthropologist might suggest a review of other cultures to allow one to see the force of these points, but very few people are willing to admit either the necessity or relevance of such a review. The understandings called for of other cultures are difficult to garner and place in proper perspective. So reliance must usually be placed on the study of Western history which, however, in the absence of a broader comparative framework, requires exceptional honesty and acuity. And it does require the broader comparative perspective to see how fully Western Enlightenment thought may express some of the richest hopes of upright primates. Nevertheless, the allied imperialism and centralization of power in the first place and the historic institutions which oppose the imperialism in the second place, have brought and continue to bring wholesale destruction to many folk. Imperialism is not accidentally related to Enlightenment or its reactionary romanticisms; it is another face of the same society. Sometimes the destruction is visibly vicious—so many dead in the tragedy of the Congo Free State, the bombs falling like broadcast seed on the Plain of Jars in Laos, the genocides of Brazil and Timor, the enslavement of Czechs, Poles and Afghans—and El Salvadorans and Guatemalans (see e.g., Bodley 1975). More often, the destruction is a quiet denigration involving much suffering.

Martin Orans has pointed out similarities in the ways in which poor ethnic minorities are stigmatized by members of the dominant societies in which the minorities are embedded: "Shiftless, lazy, amoral, unable to postpone pleasure; impulsive" (1971:64). Many of the same attributions are applied to women. Orans observes that such attributions are "negative forms of virtue which are held to explain, in fact, to justify positions of wealth and power" (1971:64). The anthropological (and other) literatures documenting such denigration and its effects on those receiving it and internalizing or fighting it in the tyrannies of everyday life—the snub, the sharp remark, the incapacity to act in anger, or the angry act—are vast and in close agreement. There is, of course, a great debate, paralleling the "Race and IQ" debate, concerning the truth of denigratory attributions—sometimes the attributions are seen as "charming and quaint" or "deep and mysterious" customs, and thereby nice after all; often they are seen as hold-overs of earlier strata of human history; often they are seen as being what hold the poor and powerless down. Such views are part of the denigratory process itself—inappropriately blaming the victims for that which is outside of their power to control, and too much work suggests, at the very least, that the denigrations often miss the mark the way half-truths do if they are not utterly absurd misconstruals of experience. Denigrations sometimes come obliquely close to the core of realities in which people are having to adapt
themselves to extremely harsh circumstances. Left and right versions of managerial-liberal ideology—the dominant ideology of the West—have superficially debated the issue in terms of inherent characteristics vs. environmental determination—the poor are that way because that is the way they are vs. they are that way because poor things, life is hard for them. The questions asked are put in terms of ruling elite hegemonic interests. The questions have been put in elite terms in the sense that the focus of discussion has been, for example, on whether "we should help them" or "leave 'em alone." Such a framework is insincerely held if in ostensibly helpful policy situations elite interests override folk realities. Elite ways of putting the guiding questions often preclude real attention to the nature and workings of elite-folk inter-relationships, replacing such attention with profound elite-folk asymmetry. The folk are seen as not "necessarily" valuing persons and human life. But it simply will not do, to replace denigration with its simple opposite, insincere and factually incorrect praise. Global attributions, whether framed as virtues of the folk or as their vices, will not help unless or until virtues and vices are seen in carefully developed analytical perspectives about warm living people who matter.

Western concepts cannot by themselves "act out in the world" but they are a significant part of the framework of action and easy charter for actions. The Western world's elites have never faced up to their violent imperialist, racist, fascist, and sexist modes of conduct—those sides are undeniable; such conduct has been not accidental or natural; it continues systematically to destroy and denigrate ordinary folk. Western elites have often embraced dogmatic institutional forms in order to protect or acquire hegemonic concepts or privileges at the expense of humbler truths and at the expense of lives.

That most (or all) other societies besides Western ones face similar evil is incontrovertible. It is also irrelevant in the face of the magnitude and systematic character of Western hegemonic destruction and even greater destructive potential, in the face of Western notions of law and decency, equality and equity, and in the face of reasonably good knowledge of the great magnitudes of the discrepancies between our actions and our beliefs. References to the ubiquity of human indiscretions do not suggest an overriding indecent human nature (Einstein 1949). Even so, some people's senses of realism and practicality suggest we give up the high moral claims and just, mysteriously and incoherently as well as immorally, face the realities in terms of "practicalities." Western elites do not, as a rule, know or critically examine moral limits. It is not clear that the ability is even there with which to do so, so far do latter-day social darwinist ways of thinking permeate Western conduct. Certainly our practice should not in the end be judged only by our grandest moral claims, which are as much or more, expressions of hope and ideal as they are guides to action. It does remain true of course that parochial moralisms are a danger also. Nevertheless, if we fail to judge ourselves by potentially realizable hopes, we put ourselves face to face with a most pernicious self-denigratory bankruptcy which could not even be touched by moral sanctions such as those of Dante's unforgettable Hell.
The moral and ethical questions cannot be fully addressed in the abstract or by themselves. Indirectly they might be seen to involve such questions as the extent to which violence against others is deemed necessary as a response to untenable states of affairs which cannot be handled in other ways or be avoided without excessive loss of that which is dear. On these grounds, I think, societies of the first and second worlds would be found to be excessively violent, by virtue of our actions and our pretentious and overly generous, self-serving definitions of the terms of our evaluations of ourselves and others. It has to be understood in such an evaluation, for one thing, that denigration itself is in its very nature a form of violence.

I have suggested that the problem of ethnocentrism points to socially and culturally constituted systems of meanings. These systems of meanings are constructed out of ordinary life, to which they are held tenaciously albeit indirectly. Elites too, the anthropologist must never forget, have ordinary lives and they also are not mere puppets of "a tradition" or of naked self-interest except when they so choose. Ethnocentrism is not just a tendency of people mechanically to misunderstand one another as a function of disembodied cultural "traditions." The very idea of a determinant cultural tradition simplistically misconstrues the delicate interactions among meanings, motives, intentions, presuppositions, social institutions and, not the least, of actions, experiences and constraints in the world. Some of the best work in anthropology successfully challenges the very notion of culture as merely learned tradition or as residual archetypical, inescapable mold. The day when social phenomena were explained by redescribing them as culture patterns and noting that such patterns are handed down from generation to generation is very nearly past (Geertz 1971:249). One wishes it was past (cf. Geertz 1980).

So, given a history of Western hegemonic conceit and rule, one of anthropology's major tasks is to remind elite folk of the conceits, of the responsibilities those conceits entail, and of the real and always present dangers inherent in the hegemonic culture and social system. Nuclear and environmental destruction are among our greatest worries. There are also the worries of the historic ordinary people who must also make do. Some of their focal worries have been imposed on them by the first and second worlds' utter irrelevancies.

Such reminding is not something which can be done once and for all. The self-righteous anthropologist aforesay nodding his or her head and muttering about ethnocentrism is of no help to anybody. Building the reminders into our workaday understandings is what is necessary. How best to do that building is one of anthropology's proudest fields of debate. The rethinking of our conventional ideas, as Edmund Leach and others have occasionally expressed so well, is a continuing struggle which cannot ever be taken for granted (Leach 1961; Gellner 1970).
It should be obvious that this is not asking for acceptance of the decades-old anthropologists' claim for cultural relativism—which has sometimes been viewed as a tolerance embedded in a neutral stance of objectivity which implies in the end that "anything goes" since "folks are just different" or because "folks are odd or unique" (the latter viewpoint stemming from cultural conceits as concern humans vs. other life forms). Actually, the old tolerance is fine as a partial corrective to hegemony. Since, especially, in the realms of international relations, people usually lose sight of the folk orientations of tolerance and prejudice, they must be seen concretely in social context, or else they will be meaningless. Specifically, in the first moment, the relativism that informs tolerance has to be set next to or made subservient to a prior constraint on human social life. This constraint is that power relations are asymmetrical, that equality, equity and solidarity relations are symmetrical and that power and solidarity therefore constantly tend toward incommensurability. The more asymmetrical a social relation is, other things being the same, the more the relation is apt to dissolve into enmity in the face of conflicts of interest. It is, of course, true that other things never are the same and so constraints on the constraint need to be recognized. First, it is often true that where those below emulate the ways of those above, or where those below genuinely come to feel that their interests converge with the interests of those above, there may be the appearance of a fuller commensurability of interests than really exists. It is certainly true, second, that those who set the terms of discourse often in the process tightly constrain the forms which opposition may take in any of several ways: Taking a stance which is a simple opposite to one's opponent's stance is not just a bad debater's trick. It is all too natural a trap to fall into. Being preopted may tightly constrain the forms opposition may take, most especially in asymmetrical social relations. Third, it is true enough that conflicts of impulses in a context of symmetrical relations (or in merely distant, but not asymmetrical ones) are also apt to drive people apart. This case has usually been mistaken for the general one to which theories of conflicts of interest are addressed. It is sometimes in the perceived best interests of both powerful and powerless not to address a conflict in terms in which the most serious inequalities are recognized frankly as such. Fourth, social scientists must consider the possibility that the powerful, pernicious metaphors of contemporary econo-speak social darwinist "competition in the market place" and "competitive struggle for survival" make vices into necessities, self-fulfilling prophecies for which the learned elites of the Western world bear much responsibility. Fifth, the interests of powerful and powerless sometimes really do converge. It is only that such cases should not be confused, as they often are, with cases of the previous types (of only tactical, contrived, or perceived convergence) and that the nature of and constraints leading to such convergence need be given due attention.

It follows that far more seriously than we need an ethics of relativity, and more so than we need an ethics of inequality and inequity, we need to build these kinds of ethics into one another and into our active conceptions concerning our place in the world. More reformulations of existing ideas about democracy and the revisions suggested by the
philosophers of justice and the sociobiologists just do not cogently address the most serious issues. Part of the problem is to extend our own ethical system's values beyond that system in such a way as to enlarge the scope of what we consider "human" and what is considered to define and situate decency. Former President Carter may have made decent moves in that direction (but see Chomsky 1982) and in the process raised serious questions concerning the difficulties of bringing our practices and our more incidental beliefs into line with our deeper, presumably more cherished impulses. Such questions must be faced. There is also "Kant's critical rejoinder to Rousseau, that inequality is a 'rich source of much that is evil, but also of everything that is good' " (Dahrendorf 1968:173). In facing these problems, the relativity of ethics must be itself relativized lest it remain charter for virtually any act or for abstinence. Ethics of inequality and equity must be invoked in this relativization since power relations themselves derelativize as they inexorably cross social boundaries. Ethics must, by the same token, be seen in such a way as to take account of their embedding in society and culture. Notions of culture-free ethics are just as paradox-ridden as notions of supra-cultural ethics, and so we must give much thought to ways in which the various types of incommensurability implied by a multiplicity of (not a neutral "plurality" of equally weighted, as in a relativized understanding) cultural systems might be honestly conceptualized. In international relations, just as in society generally, the pretenses of equality expressed in forms which presuppose inequalities can stand in the way of frankly attending to the inequalities. It was striking to hear most of the speakers at a human rights conference a few years ago refer to human rights issues as if they were primarily matters of equality before the law. These legalistic views were expressed even in reference to situations in which it seemed intrinsic to the human rights violations that access to law was systematically denied to some persons. Equality ran roughshod over equity. One interesting consequence of the prevailing view was the inattention given at the conference to socially induced instances of malnutrition and ill health (Sen 1981), perhaps because typically no laws are violated or because the problem is seen as "political"...or as too political? The conference did not attend to the problem of what human rights mean. Non-pedantic attention to that problem would necessitate attention to the issue of ethics in relation to inequalities. This viewpoint obviously does not mean that all inequalities entail corresponding inequities.

What seems to happen often in cross-cultural encounters are garden variety mistakes of inference compounded by conflicts involving people wanting different things and differing in their powers. One mental process involved is the conversion of local attributions into global ones. The conversions are especially serious in the case of invidiously ranked cross-cultural relations because the denigratory attributions mentioned earlier tend to render it inappropriate to trust the worth, in terms of virtue, but also in terms of veracity, of "the other side." The Punjabi villager reminds us that this works both ways across otherwise asymmetrical culture gaps. (Obviously it also works across elite-elite and folk-folk encounters.)
Attributions developed in one context, say that the so-and-so's are warlike (or in econo-speak that "they give high assessments of returns to war") might be fed into, or develop unannounced into, an attribution-set in which it becomes presupposed that the so-and-so's are not to be trusted at all. Their every act is apt to become assimilated into the negative attribution-set. Crucial questions get begged in the conversions of experiences into worth-laden or worth-related attributions. If the so-and-so's are seen to be warlike, the questions must be asked as to why they are this way and what assessments they should and could be giving to what alternatives and why. Attributions imply comparisons; comparisons imply criteria; criteria imply alternative terms of comparisons rejected or held in abeyance. If any inferential step is missed, it becomes easy to stop with the simple attribution and encompass it or let it become encompassed by global nondescriptions by attribution. This problem is acute in social science work precisely because linkages of what people do and why they do it are so rarely unmediated relations. People tend to do things for reasons; acts undertaken tend to have various alternative or complementary reasons for which they might have been done, even within a cultural system, and there are also reasons for these reasons. Reasons-for-action are often enough not manifest and must be inferred, sometimes with great difficulty. Having reasons-for-actions implies that actors are themselves caught in webs of attribution-worth and reason-action relations. Because of this, the complex real-life situations interpreted by social scientists are seldom amenable to glossing with straightforward attribution descriptions. I take the trouble to outline these elementary connections because they are rarely explicated in reasonable ways. Social scientists often take naively dichotomous methodological stances (cf. Hirschman 1979). Here is one example. One side of such a dichotomy might be characterized like this: "What we need are generalizations across observables—forget about all the and's, if's and but's, especially the merely subjective meanings— we can get at those trappings later after we get down the main part of what is objectively going on." The other side is the point of view that "human behavior is complex, only the details of meaning matter, generalizations are impossible, or uninteresting because of their lack of richness." Neither alternative is reasonable save in suggesting grounds for criticizing naive work. The middle ground is silly solipsism: Since all things are possible anything can happen, which puts us right back where we started, wanting badly to guide our interpretations toward wiser understandings. Previous comments suggest first that the richness of detail of social-cultural connections has to be mastered, but that such mastery cannot be significant without taking into account regularities in the workings of the system in which the details have meaning or import, and without taking into account also, perhaps the hardest part, the nature and workings of the systems of meanings in general and all that are involved in rendering human experiences meaningful. Social scientists have often been too boldly hegemonic in skeptically (and reactively) favoring "meaningful" detail or optimistically favoring so-called objective generalization, the latter in contexts in which the idea of an encompassing objectivity is incoherent. They have also
been too timid in not investigating systematically enough the subtly 
interwoven kinds of meaning, not all at once, but as is appropriate for the 
materials at hand.

An ethics of inequality must obviously have built into it some ways 
for handling even mere attributions and preventing their inappropriate 
generalization or encompassment, whether in terms of "meaningful" detail 
or "objective" generalization. The point, then, is not to invidiously 
compare anthropology and international relations in terms of which 
discipline suffers more from over- or under-generalization. Such 
characterizations would, in fact, miss the issue entirely. It is rather the 
point to force the realization too often concealed in glib statements of 
relativism-vs.-absolutism that abstract construals of concrete social 
relations must virtually always be built into social science understandings 
because it is already in the nature of the social and human creature that 
both co-mingle. Merely pointing to the dangers of reification is only the 
beginning. This is, in part, a question of levels of analytical awareness 
but, more seriously, it is a consideration of decency.

Certain classes of ethical systems do not meet even these crude 
desiderata. Lifeboat ethics, as espoused by Malthus or more recently by 
Hardin and others, for example, is structurally-and-morally the antithesis 
of what we need. As such it may usefully provide a needed limiting case, 
but by itself it is a perversion of that for which a human primate might 
stand with unpretentious pride. It has built deeply into it some quite 
incredible pretenses (cf. the essays in Lucas & Ogletree 1976). It 
exemplifies the thesis that essentially fascist kinds of ethics are not too 
far behind our most cherished conceits. Liberation and process theology, 
work in marxian ethics (e.g., Fisk 1980), and the Pope's recent encyclical 
seem to be among the better starts presently available in beginning to 
express what is needed.

Levels of Analytical Awareness

One basic reason for anthropological tentativeness then involves the 
field's confrontations with differing cultural logics and the asymmetries of 
weighting in and among them. Anthropologists constantly debate our 
approaches in studying them. One has to be comparative in both of two 
ways, across-cultures and across-institutions. But one usually can't do it 
directly in both ways at once. That very possibility of both is subject to 
much doubt and scrutiny: it is hard even having it one way at a time. One 
anthropologist put the problem this way in a conversation: Whatever 
analytical cuts we make, he said, there seems to be quite a flow of blood. 
That is to say that, first, the cuts tend to be clumsy and second, lots of 
violent ink is spilled in the debates about where and how to make them. I 
have a suspicion that too little blood of the second kind is spilled in IR. Is 
it the case that IR takes its lead rather a lot from political science, 
psychology and economics, the hegemonic, elite-oriented social sciences? 
Is it the case that those fields, and IR by default, take too much for 
granted in assuming what are but realms of discourse are realms of life?
If these suspicions have any merit, it means that IR must work at least as hard as anthropology at evolving its own peculiar institutional awareness. My guess is that like anthropology—and like history—IR will not be able to just take the sum of the standard social sciences, and most of all will not be able to take the interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary sums or products—for that would be doubly damning, a weak compromise. If you don’t see what is meant, take the case of “economic anthropology.” It is not just the sum, or the intersection, of economics and anthropology—though part of it is, and good work is done in that part. But the field is much more interesting. It has to ask itself such questions as what “work” is and how “work” is different from “labor” and from “leisure.” It has to ask why gifts both are and are not commodities. It has to ask what the “economics” or “politics” of “kinship” are, and vice versa (see for example Godelier 1980).

The kind of analytical breakdown that is appropriate for one problem may well not be appropriate for another. It need not be trite to remember that the guiding questions of research need to guide the process. The debates about the IR which focus on “the international system” vs. “national diplomacy” might be seen in part in this light. I am sure that many experienced practitioners in IR are aware of this point, and aware also, that problems of research do not come neatly packaged so that some readiness to grasp more encompassing structures and move between them and narrower ones is absolutely necessary.

Also, the awareness that elites are natives too is not just glib anthropomorphizing: their conceptions in IR—most especially their viewpoints about specific scenes and events—obviously have to be given a specially privileged place in one’s formulation. This is because elites have power and influence. It is not because they are privileged in any analytic sense. But if they are also natives of one’s own culture, one must not forget that even people who seem to speak the same language do not always, or even typically, do so in fact. The natives’ concepts cannot in any case be given a privileged place at the expense of other considerations. For one thing, actors’ objectives are not in general the same as an investigator’s—to simply pretend to be or become a native won’t quite do. Second, actors’ self-awareness typically lacks acuity in some crucial dimensions—natives as well as investigators often fool themselves. Surprise and confusion are quite common experiences in Washington, Moscow and Jakarta. Third, the hard realities which inform natives’ conceptions do not generally do so automatically or determinately. And so, fourth, social patterns and milieux have also to be considered to have privileged places. Analytical breakdowns of mere convenience are probably the worst danger whether they are native-instigated or social science-instigated.

A few comments on some Iranian-American encounters a while ago may illustrate these points. Judging from news reports, the common claims made by elite Americans of Iranian irrationality, barbarity and savagery were not just rhetorical devices used to manipulate—in part to
plead for rational American audiences, nor were the irrationality claims merely themselves irrational ethnocentric denigrations of the “bad” guys. They were these things, to be sure, but as if that weren’t bad enough they were also integral parts of local policy “decision-making,” and even more seriously, of the logic of the framework of what was perceived to be threatened hegemonic interests. Revolutions are obviously confusing, devastating, destructive affairs; they do have an irrationality to them. But they also reflect, variously, people’s hopes and high ideals and their deepest fears: they also embody social contradictions which, although invisible, are as real as helicopters, warships and oil wells (cf. Geertz 1973). It is a part of the workings of revolutions that those attempting to lead them will act in extraordinary ways. Karl Marx suggested the best guide to analysis of such cases, and ipso facto of all other similar ones: People make their own history, but they do not do so just as they please. The insight should not be dismissed because it is elementary; it is fundamentally and incisively elementary. Structural constraints and imaginative possibilities have both to be seen singly and in combination, in the analysis of rapidly moving concrete social life. That must mean a genuine confrontation with and a surpassing of one’s estrangement. In the Iranian case, the actors—Iranian or American—were not fully rational in either their own or the others’ terms. But irrationality itself has its logic. Some perceived irrationalities turn out, on closer examination, to be rational in the terms of a different social system and situational patterning. One way to see what this means would be to reflect on some things which the American press and government chose not to stress. Is it at all curious (especially in view of subsequent events) that the hostages were not killed, not put on mock trial or executed, given perceived Iranian barbarity? Is it at all curious that more Iranians were not killed or are still not being killed right now? Is it at all curious that when that American rescue attempt was made and aborted there was not more bloodshed? Perhaps it was merely irrational hysterical or paranoid Iranian fears that prevented these things from happening. Perhaps it was irrational Iranian greed or religious fervor. Or, perhaps an attempt to extract tribute from the hated hegemonic power and take revenge on the Shah and his allies. But perhaps these are self-serving truths which are also in part misconstruals. Perhaps Iranian fears and hatred were at heart quite justified, coming from people who have been so viciously treated, who in some cases were tortured and who had no “graceful polite society” from which to draw “different perspectives.” People of genius and genuine goodwill may seem rare in Iran. Are they less rare in Washington? Mainstream social scientists sometimes provide “policy people” with guidelines for thinking analytically about such things; however, some prevalent tools of the trade, such as difference equations, pareto optima, psychological profiles, bureaucratic and decision analyses, and integration analysis miss the point when they are substituted for investigations of differing socio-cultural logics. As Edmund Leach put it: “However incomprehensible the acts of the terrorists may seem to be, our judges, our policemen, and our politicians must never be allowed to forget that terrorism is an activity of fellow human beings and not of dog-headed cannibals” (1977:36). Leach’s should not be seen as a weak-willed plea for
mere relativistic tolerance. It is rather a plea for analytical courage in facing up to the issues at hand. The failings of political-analytical courage are not confined to the particular governments that happen to get caught. Rather, in those moments of angry confrontation, whole histories of systematic arrogant hegemonic conceit are laid bare. They cry out to be seen as such. Whether or not, as some think, the world is indeed making it increasingly harder for the elite of the first and second worlds to have their way, an ethics of inequality will be needed as a part of a more human, wiser, way of looking at the world without either fearing the mob or hopelessly romanticizing merely ordinary, and incredibly frail creatures.

Pure and Applied Social Science

These last considerations require that attention be given to distinctions between pure and applied social science. While international relations people often concern themselves with policy questions, anthropologists concern themselves more often with "reaching understandings." Obviously there are exceptions to this on both sides. Anthropology, for one side, has always had its applied branches (and nowadays these branches are being actively worked by increasing numbers of anthropology graduates who find academic life closed off). The basic move is still to the academy, but more and more even choose to work elsewhere.

Two things are clear from anthropological experience with applied work. First, it seems that people have been rather surprisingly pleased by it when, in the rare case, it has been taken seriously—as in the famous Vicos project, Polly Hill’s work on Ghanaian farmers, or Carol Stack’s work on poor American black family life, or when it might have been taken seriously as with Skinner’s work on regional marketing structures in China. When it is done well, there is a freshness and a getting down to basics about it. In some cases, people are surprised to find it there. Sometimes, not knowing it was there, people rediscover the wheel: The 76-page "A Strategy for a More Effective Bilateral Development Assistance Program: An A.I.D. Policy Paper," distributed to all USAID missions as an attachment to its "Program Guidance for FY 1980," stresses that the USAID strategy: "...involves effective popular participation by the poor...in decision making so that their needs, desires, capacities and indigenous institutions are recognized, understood, and given major weight" (Korten 1980:481). At least one economist much involved in international development efforts, Leonard Joy, argues eloquently for a strongly anthropological approach (1981).

But the anthropological experience, to be useful, would usually require considerable re-thinking of policy objectives themselves. That means it would have to be internalized by power-holding elites. But then, incommensurability problems have to be confronted in all their detail, not passed by quickly. A main reason for occasional anthropological freshness of insight is its implicit awareness of incommensurabilities, which

102
engenders a certain aloofness from elite culture and institutions. But anthropology may appear to elites to be the least scientific of the social sciences. Even the strongest scientific anthropological works contain the inevitable stories about that woman and her family or some such. A' oo, there is a real problem in the diffuseness of "merely" trying to "improve understandings" without sufficient attention to certain kinds of critical evaluation. The problem for anthropologists, policy planners, and administrators is that, given the bureaucratization of social science, hard answers to tightly focused questions are what are expected in policy work. It is a shame that so few anthropologists can tell policy people what to do with stories about that woman and her family. However, this is only half the picture, and appearances may be deceiving. Much work in anthropology has focused attention on ethnography--the in situ study of lifeways--as a kind of theory, of what can and what cannot fairly be inferred from the stories. This work might be amenable in some cases to policy direction, but it should not be a descriptive servant of elites. It should be done with (and done on and simultaneously by) policy makers themselves. In that case, it obviously cannot be an entirely "objective" explication of a "cultural logic."

This means that if standard anthropology's weaknesses are standard social sciences' strengths, then the reverse is also partly true. Consider an hypothetical three-part argument on the relation between theory and practice: first, the theories of "pure science" are technically applied in practice via predictions deduced from theory; second, theorists learn from applications how to revise theory; third, the theory itself, nevertheless is somehow value-free (meaning value-less?). Something like this evidently has been a common view in mainstream social science. Meanwhile, however, anthropological work, "pure" and "applied," sharply suggests that policy-oriented work cannot be done as "technical application of theory." Theory itself has to be seen in relation to the questions which informed its construction. This is not to say that it is not in interesting and important ways fair and accurate if not transcendentally objective. (Those judgments depend on other considerations.) Nor is it to suggest that theory is not, in its nature, deductive in structure. "Applied" or "policy" social science is not the practice of applying theory developed elsewhere, though it involves the latter. Policy work has to be viewed as synthetic in that policy worlds are complex. Policy worlds involve many embedded, partially autonomous entities and relations, each of which needs to be given a local interpretation set in interaction with other local interpretations. An overriding interpretive framework is necessary to guide theory-use and development. It also remains ever problematic in policy work whether given concrete world events have or do not have a large component of what is theoretically construed an accident or idiosyncrasy. Whereas "pure" theoretical work attends to only certain kinds of "exceptions to the rule," applied work must anticipate broadening or narrowing the notion of exception--in short, what may be inconsequential theoretically may be incredibly consequential practically--recall the Implausible interpretation Americans were given of the helicopters in the desert in Iran. Social science theory cannot be expected
to anticipate events outside its scope, though some branch of it should
damn well involve itself in the field of learning about how to learn about
and react to the unexpected (cf. Bateson 1972).

Policy people need to be educated to ask themselves harder
questions. They need to learn about learning as they are doing their work.
It is here that the need is greatest for the ethnographically-based ethics
of inequality I referred to earlier, an ethics of inequality or several of
them, seen both as retrospective cultural constructions and prospective
guides for action. Most people cannot even imagine the possibility of such
theories even though significant pieces of them are already parts of our
various common senses and religious and philosophical traditions, folk and
elite.

Even if such theories are impossible to fully capture out in the open,
there is one more problem to which serious thought needs to be given in
the realm of pure and applied social science, a problem which troubles
people in international relations study (e.g., Hoffmann 1977). I will take it
for granted here that you will agree that the world is sufficiently
imperfect that I can ignore for the moment, simple statis and focus on the
issue of reform vs. radical change.

Elite-oriented reform-minded people seem sometimes to wish to
ease the pains that afflict us. They see the merit of addressing the world
as it already is and as it stoutly threatens to remain (in part because it
was constructed in their image). They face the prospect of preserving the
sources of the pain, or increasing their strength, and of ignoring higher
hopes and aspirations in favor of compromised usually narrowly self-
serving ones. Radicals on the other hand wish to more fundamentally
change the system which generates the pain, but to do that they must
espouse moves that threaten to bring the whole house down. The radicals'
self-proclaimed merit lies in their unwillingness to take what are serious
problems to be merely blemishes and in their unwillingness to face the
prospect of foreclosing the future of what they take to be ordinary men
and women. Reformers can often react with a social system: radicals
often have to react against it. As a result, the latter put themselves all
too often in the position of countering paranoid dogma with paranoid
dogma. Radicals tend to be despised for their lack of practicality and for
ignoring ordinary folks' sense of having just one short life to lead and
having the kids to feed and care for. Few want to, or are able to, engage
in the often futile and always costly efforts required of a genuine
radicalness which does not defeat itself. Radicals must face futures that
give no assurances of being really better rather than just different with
new sources of pain.

But what have most to be understood here are the linkages between
issues of reform vs. radical critique and the great historic asymmetries
discussed earlier between elite and folk. The historic elites set the terms
of discourses that much is in their power even when they do not foresee or
get their way completely. The first advantage is almost always theirs.
When the pain they thereby engender reaches past the limits of tolerance, they are not even apt to blink an eye, except when it comes back to haunt their own house or when they can take advantage of it. Then they have the power to act or react ever so viciously. When, as part of this process, elite institutions are available to render every transaction in the light of sacred elite mythology, they beg to be reacted against with equal viciousness. Persons who criticize are the carping or envious nay-sayers, the sour-grapes complainers, the politically incorrect, the ideologically impure or even the insane. As such persons react, if they have not given up connections with elites, they are apt to even take on such self-characterizations as parts of their very persons. If they are exceedingly modest in their perceptions and goals they may be tolerated as do-gooders or gadflies, and if they wear academic or clerical gowns and know well the limits of their place, they may even be listened to. If active in political life and if they persist in nagging about 'intractable problems' engendered by elite arrogance, they have to toe a very narrow line, and very often have to go out of their way to show their loyalty, and so they often become in the process limited to 'one issue.' Otherwise, they are scarcely tolerated save when problems come to be perceived as seriously intractable and seriously threatening.

These points are not made as abstract pan-historic generalizations, but as contemporary ethnographic observations. For it is most of all in an elite civilization that still may have the future on its side for some time to come, that believes that everything is possible in the name of its progressive evolutionary emergence from barbarity, that threats are so apt to be perceived to be all-encompassing. It is just such a social system that out of its own nightmares engenders such opposition as institutional forms of communism. In the terms of such elite civilization, of either its liberal capitalist or communist variants, it comes about that only reform is grammatical--deemed appropriate--and even reform is apt to be perceived as threatening or disturbing. Active sanctioning, if not outright sabotage, often dulls reformers' efforts.

It then becomes a matter of some interest to perceive that whether international relations or anthropology is more reform or radical critique oriented is rather beside the point. For so long as anthropology remains outside the mainstream of American life, it is no threat at all, and so long as international relations remains inside the mainstream, it has to seriously contend with its ideological purity, whether it is engaged with policy or not (cf. Hoffmann 1977; Chomsky 1982).

The obvious advice would be for each of the two fields to assiduously cultivate, but in its own terms, what it lacks in emphasis. I suspect that such advice misses the point. But if we can talk to each other, then perhaps we can learn to rely less on our whims or physical struggle. We face incommensurabilities. But humans always work by making incommensurables commensurate. That means that we ought not to ignore those linkages among intention, motive, social structure, cultural construction, and action in the world. If such a plea seems too naive in
that it would involve what political history suggests might be too difficult, I do have one other suggestion, and that is that just as anthropology might get closer to policy questions than it has—though not too close as a matter of primary focus, and not in a way that reinforces managerial culture, international relations might need some distancing from policy questions if only because we must all learn that culture, even the culture of nuclear weaponry, is not just practical reason (cf. Sahlins 1976). Nor is it just twitchings of meanings.

Conclusion

Broadly, here is what anthropology might be seen to be about in relation to IR from one anthropological point of view: Anthropologists explore the nature and workings of cultural systems, necessarily in the abstract and simultaneously as concretely expressed in experienced social life. Anthropologists at the same time explore the nature and workings of social-cultural systems seen as historical, as made by human beings and as dependent on human beings, but also seen as setting in motion forces acting contingently on human beings. Anthropologists search for the underlying mainsprings of basic and of particular human moves and inclinations. Inevitably, these searches challenge hegemonic cultural conceit. Not so inevitably, but often enough, the searches help us to see cobwebs of meaning where we might have thought there were bedrock truths. Even less often, the searches help us free ourselves from being dimwittedly comfortable with our senses of meanings and of relations among them. Anthropologists direct attention to historical ordinary men and women. (I expect that anthropology seen from an IR perspective would look rather different.)

Perhaps you can see that I am pessimistic about IR learning much from anthropology or vice versa. There may always be some room for communicating the latest 'findings' or ideas, but the pessimism is because of underlying conflicts of frameworks and the motives, purposes, and presuppositions involved in them. The pessimism is not cynical because the promise that we might learn when we face real political incommensurabilities is retained (cf. Dunn 1979).

I have put the incommensurabilities problems I have discussed in the context of the notion of ethics of inequality, and in the elite contexts of levels of analytical awareness and of the distinction between theory-simple and theory-complex types of interpretive frameworks. Most of the discussion has presupposed cross-cultural contexts. Each of these contexts has involved a mode of intercourse in which there is marked separation of oneself—as villager or director, or policy analyst or scientist, or government official—from others or from social-cultural constructions. Each mode of discourse therefore presupposes potentially different ways of construing the very notion of oneself in relation to other kinds of entities. Each mode of discourse therefore brings out into the open challenges to one’s nature and being in the worlds of which one is a part. What, then, are notions of social selves like? Jean Jackson delicately suggests some of the kinds of understandings involved:
Tukanoans (of the central northwest Amazon) do not focus on the particular individual as a unique intersection of attributes, but focus on one or a set of attributes at a given time, often opposing them to others...the position of an individual Barao or other Tukanoan is not one of a lack of differentiation, but it is far less one of unique and permanent differentiation than in our own and many other societies. The implications of this greater emphasis on individualism for Western identity—the individual marked off from others, permanently and significantly a separate self—is the subject of many books and articles (e.g., on anomie). Tukanoan society, while exhibiting many oppositions, does not oppose the individual qua individual against other individuals and groups nearly so much. Oppositions are transformed into continua, and positions on scales slide, depending on contextual considerations. With the emphasis on self and other as a process, an identity to be maintained rather than something absolute and eternal, self and other become even more flexible concepts, and are often literally and figuratively linked together in conceptualization and action. Although all of this occurs in the West, I have argued that it does so to a lesser degree and that we tend to see ourselves far more in terms of being effectively and permanently separated. (Jackson 1980; see also Tawney 1921, Dunn 1979.)

I take these kinds of understandings to be fundamental for any social science. Yet the gulf separating them from other kinds of understandings, say those of international relations, may seem absolutely unbridgeable. The great difficulties concern the larger contexts of such notions (not so much the anthropologists' as the participants'), their implications for action, the comparable sorts of understandings which might be approachable in other realms, and the extent to which one can free oneself from the parochial aspects of one's given situation while maintaining—at the same time—a hold on a viable sense of reality, which must involve retaining local senses of particular realities.
NOTES

1. This paper grew out of the indirect approach I took to a task set me by Avery International Relations Professor Jay Zawodny of the Claremont Graduate School and Pomona College. Professor Zawodny asked me to present to a graduate seminar some comments on the nature of anthropology, directions in which it is headed, and what in it might be useful to students of international relations. Jim Gould of Scripps College made available an early draft of the paper to undergraduate students in his international relations seminar and a discussion of the paper with those students proved most helpful.

The author thanks Linda Talisman, Ralph Bolton, David Kronenfeld, Lee McDonald, and David Elliott for their comments on earlier drafts. Jean Russell helped greatly with typing and editing.

2. Great difficulties attend any effort to characterize the social asymmetries of Western nations. I cannot even begin here to address these difficulties, save in placing the notion elite/folk asymmetries in perspective. The use of the notion here parallels Dahrendorf’s (1968) intentions (if not his terminology) more closely than those of any other systematizer of the notions of ‘inequality’ and ‘stratification system.’ According to this view, social rankings of inequality stem from social structures of power through the imposition of sanctioned norms.

It should be obvious that in this formulation, particular elites and folk need not be seen to be homogeneous, united, or even more joined than separated on specific issues. Of course, particular persons who are elites or folk in respect to one criterion may not be so in respect to another.

The notions of folk/elite asymmetries discussed in this paper are ideological and cultural more than structural. Any full analysis of Western social asymmetries will obviously have to be at once historical and structural as well as ideological, and will have to address much attention to the placement of elite/folk asymmetries in social class contexts (see, e.g., Bottomore 1964, Cohen 1978).

Finally, some readers may be troubled by difficulties in placements of ordinary citizens of the wealthy nations in terms of elites and folk. One approach would be to ask if a citizenry or segment thereof is oriented in some respect to hegemonic sorts of claims. Another approach would be to ask questions concerning who is manipulating whom in respect to what.

3. Hegemony here has the meaning of an encompassing kind of domination.
4. The various critiques (anthropological and other) of social darwinism, of racism, and of social evolutionism have been unsuccessful in many respects. Contemporary conduct in terms of econo-speak (metaphorical "economics") retains in modified form essential tenets of social darwinism. For example the emphases often placed upon "credibility" of officials in government or governmental policies might be seen to involve an ethics of expediency which judges effects to be the "bottom-line" as opposed to other virtues. Ethics of expediency have their clearest charter in images of competitive struggle taken as natural moral law. The impetus for racist ideology is often retained in culturally constituted images of families, ethnic groups and social classes, with the accompanying conceits retained. Notions of evolutionist progress are still significantly informative of debate on social issues.

It needs to be tediously added that of course it is the case that many serious substantive issues raised in these elite ideologies are still poorly understood. Sometimes it seems as if the critique was only able to establish a taboo on serious discussion for a time, until a contentious issue is raised again in a new crystallization (as perhaps in sociobiological forms of neo-racism?). In any case the ideas may remain compartmentalized in various notions of common sense so that the uncommonness of the sense goes unrecognized, the ideas lose much of their force, and many forms of criticism get foreclosed..

5. Some other statements from the Khanna experience may help a reader see better the issues: The paragraph from which Mamdani drew his quotation from Wyon and Gordon reads:

The concept of population pressure obviously is open to subjective interpretation. No observer can claim a perfect insight into the feelings of others, particularly in a society initially unfamiliar. Nevertheless, this study ventures an objective evaluation of how the local people were responding to population pressure. Westerners have strong feelings about the value of persons and of human life, not necessarily shared by Punjabi villagers. Some readers may feel that the pressures arising from growing numbers of people were self-evident. The villagers did not always hold that view. (Wyon and Gordon 1971:xviii).

In an earlier paragraph on the same page in Wyon and Gordon:

...the authors claim no unusual freedom from their own cultural prejudices as they sought to record objectively facts, opinions and ideas. (What can "objectively" mean here?)
Note also:

"Parents are unlikely to practice birth control with much conviction if they are aware that many children in their social unit fail to reach adulthood" (p. 286); the statement comes under the heading "obstructions to rational action," in a general discussion of 'desired facts' which need to be collected in view of "Recognition and Management of Population Pressure" (p. 285).

More significant is the statement found in Wyon & Gordon's report of followup study:

Remarkably few seemed to be aware of the existing high mortality among young children (p. 309).

Yet, earlier in the book:

The people of the study area were acting in a variety of ways, unappreciated before the study, to reduce their population pressure. Moreover, good reasons were established for their reluctance to apply sharper and more direct measures. Too many children were dying in the early years of life. They had no clear means of assessing the true impact of rapidly increasing numbers on their personal welfare (pp. 289-290).

And on the last page of text of the book:

Fundamentally these village communities must themselves undertake the task of learning the gains to be made through lesser growth in numbers. More specific direction is needed toward practical methods of keeping young children alive and well before parents will be convinced that two to three children adequately insure another generation. The motivation and strength of purpose to achieve the desired ecologic balance can issue only from its single effective source, the people themselves (p. 314).

Mamdani's conclusion was that:

No (birth control) program would have succeeded, because birth control contradicted the vital interests of the majority of the villagers. To practice contraception would have meant to willfully court economic disaster (1972:21).

Mamdani found Khanna people to be rational.

6. By "fascist ethics" I mean ethical notions similar to those of historic fascist societies such as that of Italy ca. 1922-1943. Fascist ethical notions are prototypically those expressive of, or presupposing,
alliances of state and business elites and institutions of the right, explicit opposition to the left, nationalist forms of chauvinism, and allied militarism and repression.

7. The reader should understand that it is part of the built-in parochialism of this paper that what are viewed as major thrusts and core concerns of anthropology and international relations are not taken to be exclusive attribution. Anthropologists often act in ways that specialists in international relations are portrayed and vice versa. For example, anthropologists often seek out the elites of the folk cultures they study. It should also be clear from the pattern of the paper's citations that workers in other disciplines, notably some historians and philosophers, have what are (parochially, from just one evolving anthropological conception) described here as anthropological concerns.

8. The earlier discussion of the insufficiencies of analysis in terms of ethnocentrism should be kept in mind. Perhaps the remainder that anthropologists are often (in the nature of our investigations) the major perpetrators as well as critics of ethnocentrisms will help in stressing the problematic nature of socially placed parochialisms.

REFERENCES

Bateson, Gregory  

Bernstein, Richard J.  

Boas, Franz  

Bodley, John H.

Bottomore, L.

Chomsky, Noam

Cohen, G. A.

Dahrendorf, Ralf

Dunn, John
1979 Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future. Cambridge University Press.

Einstein, Albert

Fisk, Milton

Gearing, Frederick O.

Geertz, Clifford


Gellner, Ernest

Godelier, Maurice
Greenberg, Joseph H.

Hirschman, Albert O.

Hoffmann, Stanley
1977 An American Social Science: International Relations. Daedalus (Summer) 106(3):41-60.

Homans, George C.

Jackson, Jean E.

Joy, Leonard

Keesing, Roger M.

Korten, David C.

Leach, Edmund

Leach, E. R.

Lucas, George R. and Thomas W. Ogletree

Mamdani, Mahmood


Tawney, R. H. 1921 The Acquisitive Society. London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd.
Taylor, Charles  

White, Benjamin  

Whitehead, Alfred North  

Williams, Raymond  
1976 Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wyon, John B. and John E. Gordon  
INTRODUCTION

The similarities between the fields of international relations (IR) and social anthropology, in breadth of scope and in specific interests, are striking. Yet in its interdisciplinary search for applicable concepts, IR has not been able, for a variety of reasons, to make much use of social anthropology. IR is replete with hopeful but nonproductive references to the corpus of anthropological research. Behavioral students of IR who expect to be able to borrow directly from anthropology, or to have their theoretical foundations dug for them...deserve to be disappointed...Both the mode of study and the resultant findings tend to discourage the comparison and consolidation of empirical data...and the building of broad-gauge theories to encompass processes across societies.

It is the present purpose first, to take a close look at the relationship between social anthropology and IR; and then, to illustrate how, in several cases, anthropological theory can contribute to understanding the problems of IR. Specific attention will be given to the problem of reducing the level of tension and increasing the level of cooperation between the two superpowers, the US and the USSR. It is suggested that the concerns of anthropology and IR are so closely related
that IR can benefit from certain elements of the anthropological orientation. This contention will be supported by comparing both the historical development and the current concerns of the two disciplines. The second section will examine the anthropological concepts of cultural integration, cultural relativity, and culture change; and demonstrate that they lend theoretical support to the hypothesis that durable US-USSR cooperation can be better achieved through the process of incremental functional integration than through the search for comprehensive agreement. Section three will examine the writing of international politics relevant to the hypothesis. Section four will explore short-term policy implications; section five will deal with long-term effects of the suggested policy changes; and section six will recapitulate major points, draw conclusions, and summarize.

1. Anthropology as a Philosophical Framework for International Relations

Anthropology and international politics: common historical roots and modern concerns. The historical antecedents of both anthropology (referring here to social or cultural anthropology) and international relations stretch back into antiquity to the classical observers and philosophers of man and the state. With elegance and simplicity lacking in many modern theoretical formulations, Herodotus summarized the kingpin of anthropological theory with the observation that given the opportunity to observe all customs, man would conclude by preferring his own. Meanwhile, Plato and Aristotle opened the continuing discussion on the nature, rights, and obligations of the state. It was impossible to separate these discussions of man and of the state from one another, for the nature of man was seen to determine the nature of the ideal state.

From at least the age of Greek expansion in the seventh century B.C., political philosophy has been informed and directed by discoveries of new lands and new forms of culture, society, and government:

Each fresh start on the never-ending quest of Man as he ought to be has been the response of theory to fresh facts about Man as he is. And, meanwhile, the dreams and speculations of one thinker after another...have ceased to command man's reason, when they ceased to accord with their knowledge.

Despite their common provenance in philosophy, the relationship between anthropology and politics has commonly been lost in the contemporary scholastic marketplace where

the sanctity of "specialization" has been carried so far that each person frantically tries to pick out and hold on to his own territory--thus free "to do his own thing"...

Even so, anthropology and politics often found themselves, apparently behind one another's backs, to judge from the intradisciplinary lack of
recognition of the phenomenon, considering the same practical as well as theoretical issues.

The heavy involvement of anthropologists in government during the years previous to and during the second world war underscores these common concerns. Much of the anthropological work of this period, and for that matter of the current period as well, has been criticized by political scientists for methodological imprecision. Much of it is also recognized as groundbreaking and fruitful.

This traditional ability of anthropology and political science to attend to the same sociopolitical phenomena without theoretical cross-fertilization is now recognized as inefficient use of resources. Yet practitioners in both disciplines are insecure about how to rectify the situation. Perhaps one reason for this insecurity is the fact that the developmental stereotype of each discipline has tended to ossify its concepts in the eyes of the other. Thus anthropology thrills to the discovery and delineation of the exotic, while political science plods through the philosophy and mechanisms of government. As is often the case with stereotypes, the utility of these does not justify their effects.

Anthropology and international relations: common contemporary identity crises. Both of these disciplines, youthful even among the social sciences, continue to define themselves. Anthropology, from its early interest supplied by the discovery and exploration of previously unknown or little understood societies, is facing a case of vanishing evidence, and is redirecting its focus. But the new focus remains in many cases tentative, and in no case unanimous. The difficulty in narrowing the domain of anthropology lies in its own definition of that domain: man, his environment, and his creations, considered in all dimensions of space and time. One social scientist, in mild frustration, wonders if it would not be easier to transfer the broad anthropological perspective to trained specialists in other fields than to train anthropologists to be specialists in everything else.

It is no surprise that as anthropologists attempt to probe this breadth and depth, anthropology is regularly criticized for the ambiguity of its experimental methodology.

In scrupulously avoiding this methodological trap, how much better has international relations fared? Instead of defining man and his affairs as its domain, contemporary IR has defined all the social sciences which study man and his affairs as its domain, thereby leaving the monitoring of methodology to the other disciplines. But in exchange for the gift of methodological strictness which it expects from the other disciplines, IR has relinquished much of the integrative framework which the anthropologist takes for granted.
The integrative framework is consistently supplied to the anthropologist by the concept of culture. The "levels of analysis problem," ubiquitous to every IR endeavor, is an indication that the transference of inference between disciplines is often more difficult than between phenomena considered within the framework of the same culture. Thus the theory of IR abounds in "heuristic" models whose authors attempt to organize the field of IR, while claiming little correspondence to reality. The theory of anthropology never loses consciousness of the "holistic" approach through which man as he actually exists can be understood and studied, despite the fact that scientific methodology sees this explanation as intuitive. It appears that anthropology rushes in where IR fears to tread, and each approach makes its gains and suffers its losses. The levels of analysis problem is not a trivial one, and will be discussed further below.

In the face of such apparently uncontrolled scope on the part of anthropology, it is useful to outline its unifying philosophical concepts. Systematic theoreticians of IR regret the lack of such a "philosophy of IR." I suggest that the unifying concepts of anthropology are applicable as well to the problems of IR.

Anthropological emphases and their relevance to IR: culture and holism. Ever since social anthropology emerged from the letters of Marco Polo and the journals of Ibn Khaldoun into modern history, with the status of a social science, the explication of culture and its generative and explanatory powers has been its dominant modus operandi. Not surprisingly, anthropologists have defined, redefined, and overdefined culture. Simply, culture includes all of man's material, social, and intellectual creations in adaptation to his physical and social environment. Culture is learned, and is constantly changing in response to changes in man himself or in his environment:

The real measure of mankind's advance lies in the development of human culture. Culture has become our chief adaptive mechanism...We are...

The concept of holism implies a methodology for studying culture. The holistic nature of culture has become a truism in the social sciences. "Geography, environed organisms, the psychomilieu, technology, and the operational milieu, and beliefs all affect each other." The IR definition of a system, as a whole which functions as a whole by virtue of the interdependence of its parts, simply defines culture as a system, as Margaret Mead pointed out:

General systems theory has taken its impetus from the excitement of discovering larger and larger contexts, on the one hand, and a kind of microprobing into fine detail within a system on the other. Both of these activities are intrinsic to
anthropology. It is no revelation to any field-experienced anthropologist that everything is related to everything else, or that whether the entire sociocultural setting can be studied in detail or not, it has to be known in general outline. General systems theory, in a sense, is no news at all.

From the central concepts of culture and holism spring the corollaries of cultural integration, cultural relativity, and the rest of the basic theoretical equipment of the anthropologist. While it is not suggested that IR has failed to recognize either of these organizing principles of anthropology, it is suggested that exploratory and explanatory avenues are overlooked because the international relationist's recognition of them is not as reflexive as the anthropologist's. But even this observation is not novel. Gabriel Almond, a political scientist and international relationist, observed in 1949 that

Progress in developing a science of human behavior is to be achieved not by one-sided efforts to achieve total interpretations by means of a narrow body of data, but by the integration of the stock-in-trade of the anthropologist with that of the other social science disciplines. It is not a matter of great importance whether this is done by anthropologists who have assimilated history, political science, sociology, or economics; or by sociologists, economists, political scientists, and historians who have assimilated anthropological hypotheses...or by a convergence toward a common body of hypotheses, methods, and theories.

Some specific contributions of anthropology to IR. It is not surprising, considering the above discussion of the parallel developments of anthropology and international politics, their frequent common concerns, and their often overlooked similarity of approach, that anthropology should have made substantial contributions to the field of IR. Not only did anthropology check and guide the early development of political science, it has also provided, through cross-cultural comparisons, scientific support for presuppositions which international relationists have for centuries taken for granted. These suppositions include that the human personality is not invariably destructive, that war has a cultural, not a biological impetus, and that peace can be achieved through intercultural tolerance or sympathy. On an innovative rather than corroborative level, anthropologists have illuminated the dynamics of traditional and developing cultures, have drawn instructive parallels between primitive political systems and the modern international system, and have contributed the productive concept of political culture. This last is a major preoccupation of this paper.

Conclusion. Having established a close relationship, both historically and presently, between anthropology and international politics, we are now ready to proceed to a specific application of anthropological theory to the formation of an international relations
hypothesis. We will then examine the literature of international politics in order to test the hypothesis.

II. Theoretical Concepts from Anthropology

Cultural integration and cultural relativity. The principle of cultural integration, which made the traditional study of exotic cultures per se a valid anthropological raison d'être, has easily remained central to the generalizing and explanatory imperatives of contemporary anthropology. This is the idea that all institutions of culture, to whatever degree they are differentiated from one another, comprise together an integrated system of mutually supportive meanings. It is the focus of Ruth Benedict's Patterns of Culture. Each integrated system will reveal a consistent pattern, an ethos, a Gestalt throughout its institutions which is both the evidence and the result of its integration.

Cultural relativity follows logically from cultural integration. One cannot understand, much less explain, cultural traits except from within that particular configuration. One can therefore not judge the utility or morality of cultural traits except by the norms of that culture. Cultural integration and cultural relativity have crucial definitive value for the understanding of culture change.

Culture change and the role of the change agent. Understanding culture as an adaptation to the environment, it is clear that culture change is both constant and inevitable. Man adapts to an environment that by the nature of his intellectual processes and his interaction with the geographical and social ecology is constantly changing. Bronislaw Malinowski summarized the distinction between change as a result of internal, and that resulting from external, forces:

Culture change is the process by which the existing order of society—its organizations, beliefs and knowledge, tools and consumers' goods—is more or less rapidly transformed. Change can be induced either by factors and forces of spontaneous initiative and growth, or by the contact of two different cultures. The result in the first instance is a process of independent evolution; in the second, that which is usually called diffusion.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the problems which result from understanding this distinction too simply. The concern here is with the possibility that publicly administered foreign policy changes in one society might be directed toward achieving the degree of change, in not only itself but in another society as well, necessary to increase their cooperation. The discussion will concentrate on the dynamics of diffusion. The assumption, for reasons which will become apparent, is that planned change, even internally planned change, partakes of the dynamics of diffusion.
The organizing principle of diffusion is its selectivity. A culture "selects from among the possible traits in the surrounding regions those which it can use, and discards those which it cannot." Not only does a society select from surrounding traits those most useful to its purposes, it proceeds to modify these borrowed traits, imprinting them with its own distinctive character, so that taken up by a well-integrated culture, the most ill-assorted acts become characteristic of its peculiar goals, often by the most unlikely metamorphoses. The form that these acts take we can understand only by understanding first the emotional and intellectual mainsprings of that society.

Furthermore,

Acceptance or rejection depends on the degree to which the innovation is aligned with pre-existing orientations. Fundamental in the diffusion process is the manner in which cultural borrowings are reworked as they move from people to people...the fact that the acceptance of what comes from the outside is never a total acceptance, that reworking is the rule and reinterpretation inevitable, shows how stubbornly a consistent body of custom maintains its unifying pattern.

Closely related to selective diffusion is the concept of stimulus diffusion. In this case, the idea of a cultural trait may be diffused, but take on such a widely different manifestation in the borrowing culture as to be unrecognizable to the donating culture soon after the fact.

The clash and interplay of the two cultures produce new things. Even a material object, a tool or an instrument...changes in the very process of culture contact.

Whether or not a trait will be accepted depends in part on its proximity to the core ethos, or ideology, of the receiving culture. That is, its acceptance depends on whether or not it directly threatens what Benedict calls the cultural configuration, or what Melville Herskovits calls the phenomenon of focus. Russian caviar is welcomed in American society, while the Russian system of government is not. The common definition of diffusion, in fact, refers to material culture rather than to ideology, for "the inventor of intangibles is rather termed a revolutionist." These early theories of change tended to be couched in terms of cultural structure, or of the social psychological processes. Recent studies of change have both reconfirmed the earlier skeletal outline of change dynamics, and expanded it by examining the omitted middle level: the organization.
In a discussion of planned organizational or institutional change, the strategy of the change agent, whether an individual or itself an organization, emerges as critical to the success or failure of the change effort. In discussing the relationship between social movements and the legal system, for example, political scientists have reconfirmed the conclusion that legislation does not bring about quick social change unless it is in harmony with the pre-existing goals and interests of the people. And if this is the case, "successful change will be incremental, gradual, and moderate so that the basic political and economic organization...will not be disturbed."

Another new approach to social change may be called the "political economy of the organization" model. This model recognizes the influence of power politics on bureaucratic change. Once such theorist, however, also reconfirms that strong integration inhibits organizational change:

organizational change...disturbs existing power relations, leading to resistance to its implementation. The more likely the planned change to threaten existing relations in the organization, the greater the need of the change agents to enlist sources of power in support of their cause.

In organizational terms, selectivity of diffusion may imply an increased problem-solving capacity:

An alternative strategy to acquire power in the organization is for actors to move into areas of high uncertainty for the organization and successfully cope with them.

In other words, the perceptive change agent knows that change can be effected only when it can be represented as relatively minor, in harmony with existing norms, and adaptive to current problems. By extension, major change must be expected to be a very slow process involving many stages.

Summary and hypothesis. To summarize the anthropological concepts which are relevant to the problem of increasing international cooperation through culture change:

1. Culture is an integrated system of beliefs, practices, and institutions, each of which supports and legitimizes the others.

2. Because culture is an integrated system, it can be most accurately understood and analyzed according to its own norms.

3. Because culture is an integrated system, the possibility of change in one institution must be evaluated in terms of the effect such a change will have on other institutions. For this reason, change as the result of external stimuli (diffusion) will be selective. It will occur when the diffused trait fits into the existing system of cultural norms.
4. Even those traits eventually accepted from the outside will be modified for a better "fit" to such a degree that their origins may be difficult to identify.

5. The changes most easily achieved will be those which do not appear to interfere with fundamental cultural values. They will appear rather as superior adaptations of less important procedures or practices.

The IR concept of functional integration refers to limited taskspecific cooperation on an international level. Theoretically, such limited cooperation "spills over" into broader and more fundamental forms of cooperation, as has occurred in the case of the European Economic Community. The anthropological concepts summarized above imply that functional integration at the international level is likely to be the most effective route to culture change for the purpose of greater cooperation. Nation states place high priority on sovereignty and security, which could be seen as threatened, if not actually compromised, by a wider, more comprehensive kind of international agreement. This is an essentially negative support of functional integration; it will work because the alternative won't.

Positive support is offered by the adaptive nature of culture itself. If functionally integrative programs can be devised which appear to increase the adaptability of the sociocultural system to its environment, their prospects of adaption are good.

Anthropological theory thus leads to the hypothesis that if the US and the USSR are to establish durable cooperation and a decrease in the level of tension, incremental functional integration will be a more effective strategy than the search for comprehensive agreement.

Methodological questions. The following comparison of political cultures will deal principally with the group level. Use of the group level is justified by the fact that it is group pressure, or consensus, which influences national decision makers. This may be active pressure or simply consensual apathy which allows national decision-makers to pursue their preferred policies. It is argued in addition that to a significant degree, the group under consideration here is the culture group. A culture group may have the distinctive characteristic of not conforming neatly to the "group level of analysis." A culture group may exist as a discrete entity within, but not corresponding to, the nation state, such as subnational ethnic groups. Or it may be a transnational entity, such as the Kurds or the Jews. Culture cannot be considered a clear horizontal level of analysis. It must rather be seen as a diagonal dimension of the other levels, yet it must be given consideration in the attempt to explain or predict behavior, or to implement policy. Cultural values affect patterns of behavior at any level, possibly producing behavior unexpected to the observer from another culture. It will be difficult, and perhaps unnecessary, to keep the discussion purely at the group level. But in discussing behavior at the individual and national levels which affects
national policy-making, reference will be made to the origins of such behavior which are to be found in the culture group, specifically the political culture group.

The geographical area relevant to this study is simply that area where the political culture in question obtains. In terms of policy-making, the geographical area of the Soviet political culture exceeds the geographical boundaries of the USSR to a much larger extent than the American political culture exceeds the US geographical boundaries. Soviet political culture encompasses Eastern Europe and parts of Asia and Africa. The political culture itself, regardless of its correspondence to the nation state boundaries, will be the main object of attention. It is, after all, the nature of the political culture which is the basis of the nature of policy-making.

Culture, as an object of anthropological study, can only with loss be separated from the historical processes which produced it in whatever its present form. However, political culture, especially as it affects international relations, can be examined in terms of its operant norms and their products without excessive reference to its origins. The study of political culture undertaken here is a study of the contemporary.

III. Dynamics of Political Culture

The concept of political culture and the criteria for comparing Soviet and American political cultures. One of the earliest thorough treatments of the concept of political culture was Gabriel Almond's and Sidney Verba's Civic Culture. Political culture refers to political orientations on the part of the population. This involves individuals' attitudes toward the political system, and their concepts of their own roles within it. The political culture represents the normal orientation to the political structure among the members of a nation.

Almond and Verba identify three ideal types of political cultures: the parochial, the subject, and the participant cultures. These three represent an increasing degree of self-involvement, and perception of self-efficacy, within the political system. The parochial political culture represents the lowest level of political awareness and involvement in the political system. The political system itself is often not differentiated from kinship or religious systems. Since the parochial political culture is typical of tribal and underdeveloped societies, we will not consider it further here.

The individual in the subject political culture is highly aware of the political system, but feels he has no role in it. He is essentially subject to the authority of the government and elite structures. But individuals in the participant political culture "tend to be oriented toward an 'activist' role of the self in the polity, though their feelings and evaluations of such a role may vary from acceptance to rejection." There exists, however,
a gap between the citizen's perception of his ability to affect politics and his actual involvement. In the participant political culture,

(1) the citizen is not a constant political actor. He is rarely active in political groups. But he thinks that he can mobilize his ordinary social environment, if necessary, for political use. He is not the active citizen; he is the potentially active citizen.

The distribution and flow of influence in the decision-making processes in the participant and subject political cultures may be represented as follows:

**Individual's Perception of the Distribution and Flow of Influence in Political Culture Ideal Types**

The civic culture is a participant culture in which the political structure and citizens' beliefs about the political structure are congruent. Individuals' orientations are then positive toward the structure; it is an allegiant participant culture. Almond and Verba identify the following further characteristics of the civic culture. It is a culture oriented toward the humanistic management of change. It is a "mixed" culture, containing individuals whose personal orientations may be subject or parochial, for in fact no modern cultures conform perfectly to any one of
the ideal types. It can exist only in the context of social trust and cooperation which encourages participation. It is transmitted according to the processes of socialization by family, peer groups, and education. And it is the political culture which represents the best foundation for stable modern democracy. It is interesting to note here that Harold Lasswell's personality inventory of the ideal democrat includes both trust and confidence in the human environment, and relative freedom from anxiety. 24

Having discussed political phenomena at the levels of personality characteristics, group dynamics, and system structure, let us examine the levels of analysis issue again. The problem which the political scientist sees in the literature of political psychology is that it "fails to make the connection between the psychological tendencies of individuals and groups, and political structure and process." Almond and Verba see political culture as the missing link between micro- and macropolitics.

...we can relate political psychology to political system performance by locating attitudinal and behavioral propensities in the political structure of the system...The most productive research on political psychology in the future will treat childhood socialization, modal personality tendencies, political structure and process as separate variables in a complex, multidirectional system of causality. 25

It appears that Almond and Verba discovered with excitement what anthropologists have long understood: cultural integration, properly operationalized, can provide a cross-level tool of analysis.

The participant and subject political cultures will necessarily use different decision-making processes. As seen diagramatically above, they are so incongruent as to make mutual perceptions of political situations, much less perceptual changes, unlikely. But to determine more closely the nature of the political cultures in question is the first step in the attempt to plan the desired changes to perceptions which are to be made within the structure of either.

The Soviet and American political cultures will be compared with reference to three aspects. These aspects are particularly important to an examination of political culture. They are: 1) the sociology of knowledge, which has the culturally interpretive effects found in Benedict's "patterns" or "configurations" of culture. 2) Location of the political culture on Almond's and Verba's subject-participant continuum, and the related elite-popular structure. 3) Tolerance of change, with attention to institutionalized mechanisms for change.

Sociology of knowledge. The difference in the way knowledge is employed in American and Soviet societies indicates a deeply-rooted and pervasive difference in cultural ethos. This difference can be viewed as
the difference between a system (the Soviet) which retained a substantial part of its original, utopian beliefs and wants to transmit them, and one (the American) which has not. This Soviet ethos is reflected in the nationwide attempt to recast the personality and ideological orientation of the entire Soviet citizenry into what is characterized as the New Soviet Man or the New Communist Man. It is also evident in the pervasiveness of communist ideology throughout all society, in the censorship of the press, and in the censorship even of science itself:

The greater the commitment to the perfection of its values and institutions and the stronger the belief in the influence and power of ideas, the more anxiously the guardians of a given social order will keep watch over the social sciences...In the Soviet political-ideological tradition, ideas are treated as "weapons," and there is a somewhat exaggerated sensitivity to the interdependence of ideas and institutions, belief and action, theory and practice.  

Knowledge in Soviet society is viewed as a very proper tool in the attainment of the highest social goal of mankind: the eradication of opposition and the securing of peace for the communist brotherhood of nations. With such utility, knowledge quickly loses the empirical basis for which it is prized in western thought. Thus the Soviet press praises the "ever increasing participation" of Romanian citizens in the management of their own cultural life, and the "great debate" among Soviet citizens and the Soviet press on the new federal constitution. Meanwhile, with an emphasis on knowledge as empirically verifiable rather than knowledge-as-politics, the western presses fail to substantiate the ever increasing Romanian participation, and note the profound criticism of Soviet dissidents of the "great debate" as propaganda. 

No one in American society has ever seriously considered, much less undertaken, the ideological reformation of the entire population in quest of a utopian ideal. Likewise, in the western tradition of pragmatism and empiricism, ideas are potential, but rarely in themselves powerful or dangerous. Yet the concept of knowledge as a tool, or the dangerous idea, has not been completely absent from the American political scene, as McCarthyism demonstrated. Most American sociologists are now ready to admit the historically demonstrable: that American sociology is not, and never has been, value free. Similarly, the proper role of journalism is debated. At one extreme of this debate, journalism is strict reporting. According to this view, even news media-sponsored public opinion polls are condemned as unjustified creation of news. At the other extreme, journalism is a form of social science. Like the other social sciences, it is interested in drawing conclusions based on observation. 

The very fact that these debates continue in American society indicates a different orientation to knowledge than that in Soviet society,
Regardless of where one stands in the debate, the point to be noted is that even in American society with its tradition of empiricism, and much more so in Soviet society with its ideological-political tradition, knowledge is not unarguable, and facts are not unassailable. Rather, they bear the imprint of the society which generated them.

Location on the subject-participant continuum, and the elite-popular relationship. The Soviet political system of government by elites gives every appearance of leaving the majority of citizens in a subject role. The various elite groups maintain and enhance their position by jockeying for power among themselves, since their positions are not popularly mandated. Changes in the political positions of the government are indicated to foreign observers by changes in the persons of the elites themselves, not by changes in opinions among the population, which remains inaccessible to observers.

This weakness of the citizen-elite link has two effects. First, it makes a low level of concurrence between the population and the elites probable. Second, the elite system is unstable. The population enters debates when the discussion is opened to it by an elite group hoping to use popular opinion as a weapon in its power struggle. It is noted, for example, that the "technical intelligentsia--despite the material and symbolic rewards granted them--remains vulnerable to criticism from below." This elite group is both "an object of domination and an agent of discipline in the labor process, insecure and socially privileged".

According to both Almond’s and Verba’s description of the civic participant democratic culture, and Lasswell’s personality characteristics of the democrat, such a society bears no resemblance to a democracy.

The American political culture, by contrast, has a deeply-rooted tradition of popular participation. So deep is this tradition that social control becomes the capacity of the group or of society to regulate itself, rather than an imposed regime. Social control thereby depends on the citizens’ participation in the political process. Community organization is then "a strategy for strengthening social control." Community organization is a direct link between the individual and the governing elite groups. In such a political system, even neighborhood groups are "important in bridging the gap between the individual and government (at) all levels." But the American political system is so responsive to popular opinion that the individual need not necessarily join a neighborhood group to make himself heard. Survey data show that the public holds the president responsible, through polls, for the economic situation as they evaluate it.

In sum, the Russian and American political cultures appear to approximate the diagramatic representation shown above. Their structural incongruity complicates the process of interaction for the purpose either of attitude change or of influencing the decision-making
This complication arises because a lack of awareness of the other's political culture leaves each side ignorant of how to approach the other should it wish to for any purpose.

Tolerance of change and the mechanisms for achieving change What influences the development of the political attitudes which define political culture? Early studies credited socioeconomic factors for the direction, "liberal" or "conservative," of political attitudes. A recent study finds that political involvement, both the parents' and the child's, correlates more closely than socioeconomic factors with both the development of political attitudes in the child, and the direction of those attitudes.

This correlation suggests that political attitudes in participant cultures are paradoxically both more stable and more accessible as a result of their foundation in involvement than are attitudes in subject political cultures. This raises a problem peculiar to the study of a closed political system. How does one attempt to instigate change when not only cross cultural contact but also information flow are strictly controlled?

Change of neither attitude nor policy presents much of a problem in American political culture. The civic culture develops, after all, in response to demand for change, and strong citizen-elite links ensure responsiveness to popular pressure for change. The greatest impetus to change in the American political culture is economic considerations. As an example, popular support dwindled for Israel and increased for Arabs as a result of the energy crisis. The energy crisis was a successful economic tool to make Arab cultural concerns salient to the American consumer.

Economic conditions also affect both presidential popularity, and citizens' support for the respective parties in congressional elections.

In a book called Economic Thought and Social Change, J. Ron Stanfield suggests that the effects of economics could perhaps alter ideology. He suggests what he calls "social economics," which focuses on the needs of society, as the overdue replacement of orthodox economics, which focuses on goods and services. Stanfield's revolutionary economics does not represent actual change, but only the suggestion of one. Nonetheless, from the speed with which the American political culture responds to economic anxiety, one can guess that social economics will replace the more traditional economic ideas if it represents an adaptive culture change to a genuinely changing environment. In sum, change is a norm of the American political culture, and the mechanisms for achieving it at every level are part of the political structure.

The Soviet elite structure uses popular opinion only occasionally. Public opinion in such cases is used most often to formalize approval of changes which are imposed by the elites. This role of public opinion in change bears no resemblance to the goal of humanistic change which is central to the civic culture. However, both the way change occurs and the causes of change are inherent in the structure of the Soviet political
system, although they are not part of the legitimate political process. As might be expected, such changes affect both ideology and the elites without involving ordinary citizens except as they are affected by the change.

The cause of major change in the Soviet political system resides in the very brittleness and resistance to change of the elite system. Power and position are seldom conferred or relinquished on the basis of age, competence, or technical training. (This is obviously less true of the artistic and technical elites than of the governing elite.) Because new ideas are suspect, elites associate themselves so closely with accepted ideology that they cannot be attacked until the ideology itself begins to fall from favor. Change can be introduced most effectively when there is a change in the persons of the elites. The political structure does not deal with change; rather, its failure deals with change. Change is then seen as a result of the failure.

This structural uneasiness with change exists throughout the Soviet elite groups. Anticipating policy changes and lines of succession within the perennially aged Soviet government is an equally perennial preoccupation of non-Soviet political scientists. The historical fact remains that major changes in Soviet national policy trends have coincided with changes in regime.

While the mechanisms for change are radically different in the Soviet and American political structures, the impetus to change is similar. Economic issues such as limited energy and technological resources, and the problem of allotting resources between the domestic and the strategic military sectors, occupy the attention of policy-makers, and eventually force policy changes.

But when ideology is ubiquitous throughout society, what begins as mere policy change tends to infect ideology as well. It has been suggested that the Soviet political structure as it currently exists developed incrementally as Lenin tried to deal with post-revolutionary chaos by progressively centralizing authority in an ever smaller elite group. This process of ideological adaptation to changing economic and political realities can be seen to continue in contemporary Soviet politics. This fact offers the possibility of influencing such adaptation.

The polymorphous communist party of Eastern Europe offers another area vulnerable to change in both ideology and policy. The national communist parties have struggled with nationalism, ideological insurrection, and economic brinksmanship in Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and at one time or another the other countries of the Eastern bloc. Still another point of instability is the eurocommunism of Western Europe. This is an unruly and amorphous entity, within which each national party deals with its peculiar economic, class, and ideological problems with varying degrees of allegiance, or even attention, to the Kremlin. Expressed bluntly, eurocommunism is a
strategy of the communist parties of the advanced capitalist countries, since the Soviet model has lost its appeal and applicability to the West.

In sum, the issues which provide impetus to change are perhaps even more numerous in the Soviet political system than in the American. The reason for this is that the Soviet political structure creates for itself internal tensions, and therefore pressures to change, by its rigidity. Its utopian vision has exacerbated this situation by the quasi-messianic conviction with which it has spread to many, often nonconsenting, nationalities.

The question to be addressed now is how it may be possible for two nations to reach tension-reducing agreements while they have major structural differences in political systems, and perceive major ideological differences.

IV. Policy Recommendations--Functional Integration

Criteria for viable policy recommendations. The anthropological theory outlined above shows that the most easily achieved change is change which does not affect central cultural values, or the belief systems which are critical bases of cultures. It shows also that what changes do take place are likely to be both slow and difficult to evaluate from outside the culture. It is clear that changes can be effected more easily and monitored more accurately within the American political system than within the Soviet.

The discussion of the respective political cultures indicates that the most salient discrepant values, communism in the USSR and democracy in the US, are too basic to their cultural systems to be amenable to change. It also shows that the bases of immediate political influence, those powers who must sanction and/or initiate change, are also discrepant. They consist of various elite groups in the USSR, and of the general population in the US.

The important criteria for effective policy changes, then, are that policies should be directed only at peripheral values, that they should actively enlist elite groups in the USSR and the public in the US, and that they should not set dramatic short-term goals.

Types of policy recommendations. Long-term policy changes which seek to increase cooperation between the US and the USSR must seek mutual cultural values. The political policy recommendations made here are representative of those which could facilitate change in the underlying cultural attitudes and beliefs of the people of both nations. They are changes, however, which affect directly only the American political and legal structures.

1. The easing of US legal restrictions on US-USSR travel for tourism, business, cultural exchange, and similar purposes. This includes easing
restrictions on both the travel of Americans in the USSR and of Soviet visitors in the US. This recommendation would end tit-for-tat American restrictions in retaliation for Soviet restrictions, as far as this did not threaten American interests. Its rationale is to allow increased exposure of the business, scientific, sport, artistic and other cultural and governmental elites from each nation to the culture and people of the other nation; and to allow greater mutual exposure of American tourists and the Soviet people.

2. Greater US government encouragement of participation in international organizations. This encouragement could take the form, for example, of tax exempt status for organizations which meet standards of efficiency in international cultural exchange. This policy repeats at the group level the rationale expressed at the individual level in the first policy. It encourages not only individual and small group international exposure, but also the development of organizations to advance this goal.

3. The establishment of a research institute to make studied proposals directed at reducing international tension. In order to be useful at the international level, this institute needs to be seen in all respects as a scholarly institution rather than as a governmental institution. But in order to influence US government policies, it should be able also to maintain a cooperative relationship with the government.

This institute might be organized by a consortium of representatives of business, government, the arts, and the international community such as the UN. It may even be found that an existing international organization could more efficiently expand its functions, or branch into the functions suggested here.

The research staff should direct its attention initially to the three broad issues which have been indicated here. First, research should result in proposals of legal changes such as those mentioned above, and in specific plans for effecting them. Second, the staff should coordinate efforts to educate American attitudes toward the USSR. It is not suggested here that US-USSR conflict is a result of misdirected attitudes which can be socialized out of the American population. It is suggested, rather, that reflexive reactions on the part of both Russians and Americans to one another needlessly impede efforts at tension-reduction.

There is strong support for the proposition that on each side there is a blind spot where there should be recognition of fear as a reason for the "bad" behavior of the other side.

Third, research should result in the formulation of international projects of mutual economic, developmental, or other cultural interests which could be perceived as beneficial by both nations and would therefore enlist their cooperation.
As a fourth function, the research staff should generate a steady stream of articles for publication in its own cultural exchange magazine or in similar existing magazines. The Moscow Weekly News provides an instructive format. A recent edition includes articles such as "Outer Space as an Arena of Cooperation," with photos of the joint Soviet-American Soyuz-Apollo experimental flight; articles on subjects of universal interest like the family, sports, the arts, all emphasizing intercultural exchange, and generally, cooperation; "Doctors Oppose the Most Terrible Disease of All" in a meeting of physicians from eleven countries outside Washington D.C. by writing letters to Brezhnev and Reagan in favor of nuclear arms control; and the "Robert Burns Jubilee in Leningrad." Amid this outpouring of evident intercultural good will, "Kampuchea: Return to Life," and the comparative "Constitutions of Socialism" seem rather innocuous propaganda.

In addition to such image improvement efforts in the international presses, the research staff would also cultivate the domestic media as channels for education and information to further its goals. The "major influence" of behavioral science researchers on government regulatory agencies with regard to policy-making for television is recognized:

Social and behavioral science...conceivably could also provide evidence that would help the (television) industry present entertainment and public affairs broadcasting consistent with the public's needs, and in this area the greatest need at present is for research that would contribute to improving the service provided by national television news.

One researcher has found that international images may exist at four levels: 1) official government statements; 2) the news media; 3) the minds of national leaders; and 4) the minds of common citizens. He also notes that in the United States, which has a free public press, these images will differ from one another. The research staff could therefore function as a scientific source of image coordination, and correction for these different images. This correcting function is not inherent in a free press; journalism often reinforces shared beliefs because the journalist who writes the news had his opinions formed by the public to which he reports.

The emphasis of such an organization should be the reformation of the American attitude which sees the US in nearly uniform opposition to the USSR. The assumption behind this emphasis is that cooperation between the two nations will not be achieved unless each is able to alter its view of the other enough to recognize shared problems. It is also assumed that alteration of the Soviet image in the American view will alter the American image which is transmitted to the Soviets, altering in turn Soviet response. Much of the Soviet propaganda directed against the US is in response to US perceptions of the Soviets. From typical issues of The Current Digest of the Soviet Press come articles on "Pravda Ridicules Reagan White Paper on 'Communist Interference' in El Salvador,"
"Professor Pipes Links USSR to World Terrorism" "Secret Aid to Salvadoran Rebels?" "Terrorist Attacks on Soviet Representatives in New York Continue," and "Does Reagan Want a New Cold War?" Aside from the issue of the truth or falsehood of such American charges or actions, the image of the US in the Soviet press is one of constant attack and accusation. In an important discussion of the self-perpetuating nature of nations' "mirror images" of one another, Urie Bronfenbrenner advises breaking this mirror image:

If we can succeed in dispelling the Soviet Union's bogeyman picture of America, we stand to gain, for to the same degree that militant communism thrives in a context of external threat, it is weakened as this threat is reduced.

The research staff should attempt to change the Soviet cultural attitude of excessive fear and distrust of the US by first attempting to alter the American attitude.

Finally, the research staff would monitor its own progress, changing methods where research and experience indicate that alternate strategies might be more productive in reaching goals.

The process of improving relations between peoples is a long-term one, and there is time for more research to be done, and for its results to be fed back into policy decisions.

Summary, All of the policy recommendation made here may be seen as typical. Other specific recommendations, and perhaps better ones, could be made. It should be noted, however, that these recommendations are directed at facilitating a culture change, a change of underlying attitudes which become translated into a nation's concrete and specific foreign policy. These underlying attitudes are the ultimate support of foreign policy within a democracy.

V. Foreign Policy Implications; The Immediate Goal and the Long-term Effects of Integration

The policy recommendations made here represent functional integration. The original theory of functional integration saw the spillover effect drawing nations eventually into political integration. Reaching the immediate goals of durable cooperation and a reduction of tension between the US and the USSR depends on attitude change as a spillover from the policy changes.

An anthropological bias, however, prevents one from imagining that spillover could eventually lead to political or social integration between two societies with widely differing cultural histories and traditions. More recent political science research supports the view that integration has its limits. From the anthropological perspective, functional integration is
more sensibly an end in itself rather than the means to political integration. Functional integration spillover facilitates further functional integration, but stops short of the cultural amalgamation implied by political integration.

This is no loss whatever to world peace or economic advantage. The ramifications of reaching even the modest goal of cooperation are dramatic. The constructive potential of redirecting material resources and human energy from policies of defense, containment, and deterrence to policies of development is immense. The integrationist's utopian dream could not surpass the reality of a peacefully functionally integrated, yet culturally pluralistic, world system. It is tantalizing that this possibility appears to be such small functional incremental steps away, and that it has eluded us nonetheless.

VI. Summary and Conclusion

Functional integration at the international level has worked in cases as diverse as the International Postal Agreement and the European Economic Community. The anthropological approach taken here supports and amplifies the phenomenon of functional integration, and suggests policy changes which would encourage further integration. In this approach, cultural attitudes, traditions, and stereotypes are seen as the supporting bases of foreign policy. Therefore, domestic policy changes and innovations have been suggested which are directed at changing the culture which supports foreign policy in the US, and to a lesser degree, in the USSR.

Anthropological theory establishes the criteria for successful culture change. Planned change should not be directed at deeply-rooted cultural values, but rather at peripheral practices, the alteration of which does not appear to threaten cultural disorganization. These changes must be perceived by the changing culture as minor changes representing superior adaptation of the society to its international environment.

Several typical policy recommendations have been made which meet these criteria, while serving to increase not only intercultural exposure, but also cooperation on issues of common and perceived need. These recommended changes are incremental. They should be accomplished within the present legal and political structure of the US by either a directing agency or a popular social movement, regardless of corresponding action by the Soviets. The recommended changes are therefore necessarily modest and not highly innovative. Similar organizations with functions similar to most of those recommended here are already in operation. Such operations necessarily take a low profile. This paper has presented theoretical explanation for the political phenomenon which appears in international relations to be confirmation that plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. Changing traditional national attitudes, especially those of another country, can be expected to
be a lengthy and undramatic process. Nonetheless, the payoffs which would result from either success or failure dictate that the process not only be pursued, but expanded.

NOTES


17. Malinowski, Dynamics of Culture Change, p. 25.


22. Ibid., p. 19.
23. ibid., p. 481.


25. Almond and Verba, pp. 31-34.


27. Ibid., p. 12.


42. Almond, "Anthropology," p. 278.


REFERENCES

Primary Sources

Almond, Gabriel A.

Anghene, Mircea et al.

Baker-Jackson, Maxine

Belkaouli, Janice Monti

Bailer, Seweryn

Bielaslaw, Jack

Bronfenbrenner, Urie

Chapple, Elliot D.

Comstock, George

Cobb, Tyrus W.
Diaz Lopez, Cesar Enrique

Erasmus, Charles J.

Gallie, W. B.

Gill, Graeme

Hasenfeld, Yeheskel

Hough, Jerry F.

Jäger, Wolfgang

Jarlov, Carsten and Lise Togeby

Kazmer, Daniel R.

Kinder, Donald R. and D. Roderick Kiewiet
Langton, Stuart  
1979 "American Citizen Participation: A Deep-Rooted Tradition."  

Lowit, Thomas  
1979 "Le Parti Polymorphe en Europe de l'Est."  

Masters, Roger D.  
1964 "World Politics as a Primitive Political System."  
World Politics 16:595-619.

Maziarski, Jacek  
1979 "Democratie et Efficience."  

Mihajlov, Mihajlo  
1979 "The Dissident Movement in Yugoslavia."  

Murphy, James M., Jr.  
1976 "Images and Reality in Soviet-American Relations."  
M.A. Thesis, Claremont Graduate School.

Papiaoannou, Kostas  
1979 "Lenine ou le Socialisme Scientifique au Pouvoir."  
Countrepoint 30:9-27.

Papiaoannou, Kostas  

Perlman, Janice.  
1979 "Grassroots Empowerment and Government Response."  

Pollock, John Crothers  

Schena, Patrick  
1979 "From a Dictatorship of the Proletariat to a State of the Whole People."  

Schneider, Eberhard  
1979 "Zur innersowjetischen Diskussion der neuen Bundesverfassung der UdSSR."  


Secondary Sources

Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba

Benedict, Ruth

Buchanan, William and Hadley Cantril

Dai, Bingham

Dougherty, James E. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
1971 Contending Theories of International Relations. New York: J. B. Lippincott.


Herskovits, Melville J.

Hollander, Paul, ed.

Janowitz, Morris

Kluckhohn, Clyde

146
Lampert, Nicholas

Leighton, Alexander H.

Malinowski, Bronislaw

1945 The Dynamics of Culture Change, ed. Phyllis M. Kaberry. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Mead, Margaret


Myres, John Linton

Pettman, Ralph

Stanfield, J. Ron

Verba, Sidney and Lucian W. Pye

White, R. K.
EPILOGUE

ANTHROPOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY

INDER A. SINGH
Delhi University, India

The self-interest of each nation state has long been the accepted norm of international diplomacy. That even today, the world diplomatic scene is dominated by self-seeking interests is testified to, by the language of diplomacy itself, which includes such terms as gun-boat diplomacy, brinkmanship and cold war. New words such as shuttle diplomacy have not changed the basic situation. The nations of the third world feel increasingly deprived and helpless in this world dominated by militarily and economically powerful nations. It is a common consensus that this situation needs to be changed. However, solutions towards the change are few and far between.

The complexity of an increasingly interdependent network of nations and the rapidly advancing technology demands not only a humanistic over-emphasis, but also, it is a categorical imperative, that each nation view itself as a part of a larger whole. Humanity has to be seen not only as a whole within itself but also as in relation to the environment on earth as well as in outer space. Given this view, the self-interest of nations loses much of its traditional meaning, wherein the loss of one nation was considered the gain of another and vice-versa.

It may be asked now, what happens to the narrow interests of the individual nations whose welfare is equally important for a variety of functional and historical reasons? How can the interest of technologically and educationally backward peoples be safeguarded in international relations? The two questions are not as diametrically opposed to each other as it seems at first sight. A new synthesis can be found and it is the duty of the intellectual world to work towards bringing together the different nations into a common stream of goals and inter-relations.
This calls for a new international network that would cut across the boundaries of nation states. A step towards building such a new modus vivendi can be taken if we look at different primitive societies and their organizations. These societies provide us with a clue as to the nature of cross-cutting ties that could bind humanity together on more solid foundations, based on common relations and emotional integration rather than an integration based on materialistic considerations.

Anthropological knowledge about other cultures can fruitfully be applied in this situation even keeping intact the aims of the more powerful nations which are dominating the world scene today. Anthropology tells us in the first place what should not be included in the new order. Quite importantly, it also helps us towards finding a solution to the problem of delineating a new world system.

First, the new order must not be based on a new division of labour; as division of labour does not remain a process of social and economic differentiation but invariably leads to stratification and inequality. Second, we must not create new functional bodies with supra authority with supra powers, even if these superior structures are democratically elected. If we know of the tyranny of consensus, we also know of the ill effects of rule by the 51 percent. The studies on culture of poverty and alcoholism clearly show, that, when a segment of the population dominates over another even by democratic means, it manages to quite successfully perpetuate a system of discrimination and suppression. Thus the creation of new democratic authority or even an assembly is no solution to the integration of the world. Third, the new order must not lean too heavily upon trade and exchange, for it is well known that trade and exchange is non-exploitative and non-discriminatory, only if it takes place between total strangers and with the minimum of communication. This being contrary to our professed ideal of internationalism it can not be accepted. It is well known that no two trading partners can be emotionally bound together, and trade and exchange do lead to the creation of hierarchy and exploitation.

What then must be the basis of the new internationalism? First, it must depend upon educational and intellectual mobility. The diffusion of scientific knowledge in all spheres is a precondition. A plea for a change in the educational process also means that the world of today needs a new culture.

Second, the new system should be based upon a re-orientation of science policy. Today, increasingly, scientific questions are being asked that relate to the long-term and short-term socio-economic policies of dominant nations rather than on universal scientific values. The questions which the sciences of Botany, Zoology, Anthropology, Physics and Chemistry pose today are pseudo-scientific and are closely related to the interests of powerful nations. Consequently, the world is becoming a more and more ugly place to live despite the great leaps made by science and technology. Human relations are suffering at the hands of the science God.

143
To take an example, much time and money is being spent in Anthropology on questions relating to the diversity and uniqueness of different populations in different countries. Justification for this is found in the so called fact that to understand oneself better one must look into other cultures. Studies on ethnicity and identity are the other side of this coin. No effort, however, is being put into understanding the unifying characteristic of the different peoples of the world. Sometimes it is said, that theory that is built upon the knowledge of different peoples is a unifying element, but it must be remembered that the basic question on which it was based was the question which related to the distinctiveness of different populations. If the unity of different peoples had been kept in mind, then the theory that would have emerged from this would have been different.

The questions posed by science regarding populations are sometimes justified in the name of scientific procedure, especially, the control and constancy of variables. This too, to say the least, is only a self-justification and not based on any logical considerations, for the same control can be achieved at an intra or across the population level.

Thus in any new beginning, there is a need for developing a new philosophy that is divorced from specific disciplines. The unified philosophy of yesteryears has gone into oblivion. Philosophy as a subject is fast disintegrating into different disciplines such as philosophy of sciences etc. The question that this new philosophy must ask are questions such as the role of history in giving directions to science and how can a break from history be made; the role of language in the international order; the role of emotions and rituals in establishing a new world order and the relativity of rationality itself.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

KARRI L. FRITZ is a lawyer with the Law Offices of Barry W. Szymanski, S.C. in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Her major interests are in cultural anthropology, family law, international law, and comparative law. She obtained her law degree from Marquette University Law School and her Bachelor's degree from the College of William and Mary. She also studied at Exeter University and at Cambridge University in England. Her most recent article is "Domestic Relations Litigation: Return on Educational Investments" published in the Wisconsin Bar Bulletin, June 1983. She is a Fellow of the Association for Anthropological Diplomacy.

CHOONG SOON KIM is Professor and Chairman, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, The University of Tennessee at Martin. A Ph.D. from the University of Georgia, he has done field research in the U.S. and Korea. He published a book entitled An Asian Anthropologist in the South (1977). In 1982, he published a book in Korean language on Korean Value System Reflected in a Fortune-telling Book. Most recently, he is working on a book-length manuscript on the dispersed Korean families during the Korean war, based on his recent fieldwork, 1982-83.

CYNTHIA DIANE MACAULAY is on the faculty of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Loma Linda University, California. She did her graduate studies (M.A.) in cultural anthropology with emphasis on Middle Eastern Studies and is currently a doctoral candidate at Claremont Graduate School in the field of International Relations. She studied at Seminar Marienhoehe, Darmstadt, Germany and at the Middle East College, Beirut, Lebanon. She speaks German and French. Among her papers to be read at the world congress of anthropology in Canada are: "Islam and Development," and "Women in Khomeini's Revolutionary Iran."

MAMITUA SABER is Professor of Sociology and Dean of Research at the Mindanao State University, Marawi City, Philippines. A Ph.D. from the University of Kansas, he carried on research among the Muslims of Mindanao, especially his own ethnic group, the Maranao. He has published several articles on Maranao culture, ethnic relations, art, politics, etc. Saber is one of the leading Filipino sociologists from the Muslim population of the Philippines.

INDERA PAL. SINGH is Professor of Anthropology, Department of Anthropology, University of Delhi, India. He is one of the most eminent physical anthropologists of India and is currently Associate Secretary General of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences. He is author of several papers in his field of expertise published in India and abroad.

VINSON H. SI "LIVE, Jk. is Professor of Anthropology, Department of Anthropology, College of William and Mary. A Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh, he did research among the Iban of Sarawak.
is author of "The Iban of Sarawak" and many articl. on the Iban. He is co-editor of STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES and editor of THE BORNEO RESEARCH BULLETIN. He is former Chairman of the Anthropology Department of the College of William and Mary.

LYNN L. THOMAS is Associate Professor of Anthropology at Pomona College, Claremont, California. A Ph.D. graduate from the University of California, Riverside, he did research in West Sumatra, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia in the fields of sociology of cognition, social and political theory, linguistic and cognitive anthropology, etc. A recipient of several fellowships and awards, Dr. Thomas has published several scientific papers and reports on his fields of specialization in the U.S. and abroad.

MARIO D. ZAMORA is Professor of Anthropology, College of William and Mary. A Ph.D. from Cornell University, Zamora did research in the Philippines and in India. He is a major editor/co-author of STUDIES IN PHILIPPINE ANTHROPOLOGY and is author of several articles on Philippine and Indian cultures. A co-editor of STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES, Zamora was former Chairman of the Anthropology Department, University of the Philippines and Dean of the University of the Philippines at August.