A cognitive theory about the representation and processing of ethnic attitudes is presented, and strategies people use to express ethnic attitudes in conversations are discussed. Recent developments in cognitive and social psychology and in microsociology have shown that ethnic prejudices or attitudes are both cognitive and social results of social information processing in intergroup relations. Ethnic prejudice, formulated in terms of attitude schemata about minority groups, can be categorically organized in terms of their major social functions: dominance, differentiation, distance, depersonalization, diffusion, diversion, and the various forms of daily discrimination. Ethnic groups are represented according to prototypical characteristics, e.g., origin, appearance, socio-economic position. There are many strategies which can be used to manipulate these cognitions, including irrelevant participant categorization, use of negative prototypical properties of minorities, favoritism in ambiguous situations of ingroup members, and negative information spreading. How everyday talk exemplifies many of these cognitive and social strategies of prejudice is shown. (RM)
PROCESSES OF PREJUDICE AND THE ROOTS OF RACISM

A socio-cognitive approach

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Prepublication/Working Paper No. 3,
September 1983

Working notes for the project "Prejudice in Conversations about Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands", University of Amsterdam, 1981-1983. These notes are also intended for the SSRC Workshops on 'Intergroup Theory and British Race Relations', Bristol, 1983/1984, organized by Charles Husband.

Comments on this version most welcome!
In this paper ethnic prejudice is defined as a form of social cognition shared by the members of dominant ingroups. This interdisciplinary problem is discussed against the background of recent developments in cognitive psychology, social psychology and microsociology about the nature of social information processing and the cognitive representation of groups, intergroup episodes and social conflict.

The cognitive analysis of social representations is carried out in terms of strategies for the management of social information about groups, and presupposes a distinction between on the one hand situation models and on the other hand more general group schemata (attitudes) in memory. Strategies are the processes that use these beliefs in a flexible and context-sensitive way, both in understanding and in the planning and execution of prejudiced discourse and interaction. It is shown that large part of the cognitive processes involved have a social nature.

In particular ethnic prejudice, formulated in terms of attitude schemata about minority groups, are categorically organized in terms of their major social functions: dominance, differentiation, distance, diffusion, diversion or displacement, depersonalization, and the various forms of daily discrimination. This functional organization of ethnic attitude schemata also displays other forms of information ordering, such as local and global coherence, hierarchical relations, and differentiation into relevant social domains. It is assumed that ethnic groups are strategically represented according to a number of relevant prototypical characteristics: origin and/or appearance, socio-economic position, cultural norms and values, typical actions and interactions, and attributed personal properties.

Besides the contents and the organization of ethnic group schemata, especially the cognitive strategies for the manipulation of these cognitions appear to be crucial for prejudiced social information processing in concrete situations. These strategies include: irrelevant participant categorization, actualization and use of (negative) prototypical properties of minority members and the evaluation of their actions in terms of these group properties, favouritism in ambiguous situations of ingroup members, negative macroproposition formation, confirmation of negative group schemata from incidental models of experience, negative information spreading and displacement across models and group schemata, and in general negative information retrieval. It is shown that these cognitive strategies correspond to, and are the basis for, social strategies of everyday discrimination (as in discourse, selective negative attention and derogatory treatment, negative attribution, negative expectations, and the maintenance of distance and power).

Finally, it is shown how everyday talk exemplifies many of these cognitive and social strategies of prejudice, and how discourse serves various functions in the social diffusion of ethnic attitudes, the sharing of experiences and the formulation of social precepts for the interaction with minorities.
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In our recent work on ethnic attitudes and prejudice, and the expression in everyday talk about minority groups in the Netherlands, we have found the familiar pattern of racist beliefs and opinions among white majority members of Dutch society (van Dijk, 1982a, 1983b, c). The major aim of that project is to design a cognitive model of ethnic attitudes and to formulate the strategies people use in the expression of such attitudes in conversational interaction. Detailed discourse analysis of non-directed interviews with people from various neighbourhoods in Amsterdam revealed that talk about minorities exhibits two conflicting goals. On the one hand, people want to express their beliefs and opinions about the minority groups in their own neighbourhood or in the country in general. Typically, they will often do so by telling stories about negatively interpreted personal experiences or by formulating arguments that are intended to support negative conclusions about the properties and the presence of minority groups. On the other hand, they need to present themselves as kind and tolerant citizens, who respect the social norms and values of a multi-ethnic society, according to which negative talk about minorities may be interpreted as an expression of discrimination and racism. This conflict between two incompatible goals is resolved by a complex strategy of positive self-presentation in which negative opinions about minorities
are defended as plausible conclusions about social reality. Many conversational moves in such a strategy are geared towards the management of unwanted inferences by the hearer about the personal and social characteristics of the speaker: the "don't get me wrong" strategy. At the same time, such conversational strategies may be seen as an interactional display of 'underlying' cognitive strategies for the manipulation of socially 'delicate' beliefs and opinions.

These working notes are intended to further analyze these cognitive processes underlying the uses of ethnic attitudes. Having observed what people think and say, we need to know how they do so. Therefore conversational strategies are used as suggestions for inferences about cognitive strategies. Next, more fundamentally, we should try to answer the question why people have such stereotypical beliefs and opinions about minorities. The descriptive and explanatory framework in which such questions can be answered is necessarily interdisciplinary. Thus, we need an explicit cognitive theory about the representation and processing of ethnic attitudes, on the one hand, and a social-psychological and (micro-)sociological analysis of the functions of such attitudes in interaction, social situations and society at large. The approach taken in this paper, therefore, has been labeled 'socio-cognitive'. That is, prejudice or ethnic attitudes will be taken as specific forms of social cognition. Although cognitive processes are involved, we therefore assume that their acquisition, changes, uses or functions require a wider framework of social analysis. In this way we also hope to establish the necessary link between the micro-level and the macro-level in the account of ethnic discrimination and racism.
Obviously, racist beliefs cannot be fully understood outside the framework of a historical, cultural, socio-economical or institutional account of racism and ethnic inter-group relations. Yet, these macro-levels of analysis should be complemented with more insights into the ways they are manifested or 'enacted' in everyday situations, interactions and interpersonal encounters. Society is also racist because its members are. The realities of the many forms of everyday discrimination as experienced by minority members can be accounted for only if also the micro-level is paid attention to. This does not mean that we want to reduce an account of prejudice to the analysis of personal characteristics of individuals. On the contrary, a socio-cognitive approach sees individuals as social members, and their cognitions as social cognitions. In particular, we are dealing with cognitive interpretations and representations about (ethnic) groups and group relations through the individual cognitive processes and social enactments of their members. This means that our problem concerns two complementary processes: how do social interactions and situations constrain cognitive processing and, conversely, what properties of cognition account for the nature of social encounters between the members of different groups?

One of the most pervasive forms of social interaction in which these complementary processes are showing is everyday talk. Many of our beliefs and opinions about minorities have been formed on the basis of, and are expressed in, conversations. Also, large part of the daily discrimination experienced by minorities comes in the form of 'negative talk' to them (Essed, 1983). Thus, talk
at the same time may reveal our ethnic beliefs and opinions and constitutes a form of social interaction through which members may persuasively communicate their beliefs and evaluation of other social members and especially about other groups. Everyday conversations are the formulation place for shared beliefs, opinions, experiences, norms, values and goals of the ingroup. Besides a channel for the expression of personal feelings, talk about minorities thus is the accessible medium for the informal communication of relevant social information. By way of example we therefore will sometimes refer during our theoretical analysis to properties of such talk. We will assume that especially in talk cognitive and social dimensions of prejudice are sometimes explicitly connected and 'displayed' by majority group members.

This paper is organized as follows. We will after this introductory formulation of our problem and of some relevant questions first sketch the interdisciplinary theoretical framework of our discussion. Then we will summarize the major features of a cognitive theory of social information processing and show how ethnic attitudes and prejudice could be described in terms of that theory. Next, we will try to link that cognitive account with a social psychological and (micro-)sociological analysis of ethnic intergroup relations. And, finally, we hope to illustrate this link in a brief summary of the major social functions of discourse about minorities. On the whole, our discussion will be theoretical, with occasional reference to empirical research findings, although of course only fragments of the various theories involved can be dealt with in a single paper.
2. Theoretical backgrounds

2.1. An interdisciplinary account of ethnic prejudice presupposes the integration of several theoretical orientations. First, our cognitive framework is derived from our own earlier work, mainly in collaboration with Walter Kintsch, about strategic information processing and discourse comprehension (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). This work also provides the model for the expression of ethnic beliefs and opinions in the production of conversation and for the understanding and representation of such cognitions by other social members as recipients and partners in such talk. More generally, we have been inspired by current research in cognitive science about the representation and uses of knowledge and beliefs, e.g. in terms of 'schemata', 'frames' or 'scripts' (Schenk & Abelson, 1977; Schank, 1982). Especially, work about the role of subjective and social beliefs in understanding will appear to be relevant (Abelson, 1973, 1976; Carbonell Jr., 1979; Wegman, 1981). And finally there have been some recent attempts to account for the role of emotions and affect in information processing, which will provide us with suggestions about the affective nature of ethnic attitudes (Zajonc, 1980; Bower, 1980).

The aim of this cognitive framework is to specify how in particular social information is processed and represented, and how it is used in communication and interaction (Roloff & Berger, 1982). Processes of group differentiation and categorization, the understanding of social situations, as well as the participation in interaction, are assumed to be represented in and monitored by our cognitive model of social reality (Higgins et al., 1981; Wyer & Srull, 1980).
2.2. Second, this cognitive approach has also recently found its way into social psychology. In fact, Abelson's work, mentioned above, about beliefs, can be situated at the boundary of the two sister disciplines. Whereas most cognitive psychologists and people working in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have been mainly concerned with the representation and uses of knowledge, he was among the few pleading for the study of hot (or soft) cognitions. Beliefs, opinions, attitudes, ideologies or similar cognitions, however, were usually left to the social psychologist, especially as soon as their acquisition or use in social contexts was concerned.

Socialization, interpersonal perception and attraction, impression formation, attribution, persuasion, behaviour in and between groups, or interaction, are notions that, despite their obvious cognitive dimensions, will hardly be dealt with in textbooks of cognitive psychology. And conversely, social psychologists had until recently hardly engaged themselves into explicit and systematic cognitive analyses of these notions. Only some elementary and rather superficial aspects of the underlying cognitive 'dynamics' of these processes were dealt with, e.g. in terms of cognitive balance, congruence or dissonance, 'dimensions' of social interpretation and evaluation, or 'attributional processes' in the understanding of human action. No precise representation formats, rules, strategies or other processes were formulated, so that the complex cognitive framework often appeared only in the form of some 'intervening variables' in much correlational experimental research (for a recent survey of the cognitive tradition in social psychology, see e.g. Eiser, 1980).
This lack of theoretical sophistication (from a cognitive point of view) also holds for the more specific domain of ethnic attitudes, stereotypes and prejudice. Many cognitive notions have been used, intuitively, in this kind of research without a more systematic account of their cognitive representation, their interrelations or the processes of their use: trait, category, rigidity, salience, (over-)generalization, direction, intensity, etc. (For surveys, see Harding et al., 1969; Brigham, 1971; Ehrlich, 1973; Ashmore & Del Boca, 1976)

As we suggested above, recent years have brought a new orientation in these various domains of social psychology. A new key-notion is that of social cognition, as may be witnessed for a number of papers in collective books that appeared in the last five or six years (Carroll & Payne, 1976; Hastie et al., 1980; Forgas, 1981, Higgins, et al, 1981). Person and group perception, impression formation, attribution and in general 'social information processing' were more and more conceptualized in terms of cognitive schemata or scripts, or similar representation formats, and the processes operating on them (cf. Stotland & Canon, 1972, for an early attempt).

This approach has recently been applied also to ethnic attitudes, stereotypes and intergroup processes. Hamilton and his co-workers in a series of papers have shown how (ethnic) group schemata bias our information processing about (minority) group members (Hamilton, 1976, 1979; Hamilton & Rose, 1980). Understanding behaviour and forming impressions, thus, is based on prior knowledge schemata and their goal-dependent selection (Cohen & Ebbesen, 1979). Selective attention for and recall of (mostly negative) information about members of ethnic minority groups
were found to be the consequences of the use of such stereotypical group schemata (e.g. by Rothbart, Evans & Fulero, 1980).

Also, the analysis of traits or group categories received new inspiration from earlier work in cognitive psychology about prototypes (e.g. Rosch & Lloyd, 1978), for instance in work on person perception (Cantor & Mischel, 1979). Implicit Personality Theory thus found its applications also in ethnic stereotyping, such as the account of the understanding of the behavior of ethnic minority group members (Grant & Holmes, 1981).

These are just a few examples of recent work at the boundaries of cognitive and social psychology, and we will try in this paper to further specify some of the necessary components in such an account of social cognition. It is interesting to assume that people operate with group schemata or prototypes, but in order to be able to explain specific properties of processing social information, we should also specify the precise structures of such schemata. After all, the very notion of 'schema' has been discussed, both for cognitive and social psychology, by Bartlett (1932), already more than half a century ago (Brewer & Nakanura, 1984).

2.3. The research briefly mentioned in the previous paragraph is predominantly psychological, and lacks important dimensions from the social part of social psychology. This has been emphasized also by some European social psychologists working in the domain of ethnic groups relations, notably by Tajfel (1981) and his associates. After earlier work on perceptual judgement, Tajfel progressively takes into account social constraints on group categorization.
and social stereotypes. He shows, among other things, that even for minimal groups created in the laboratory ingroup members tend to treat own group members more favourably than outgroup members. Instead of interpersonal relations, proper intergroup processes are at stake, in which socially shared and uniform analysis of social reality is more important than individual differences or interpersonal behavior. In that perspective, for instance, social categorization is not merely a cognitive ordering or a reduction of social complexity of the environment, but also or rather serves the "protection of the existing system of social values" (Tajfel, 1981: 154). In other words, social stereotypes are developed in social contexts because of the basic functions they must fulfill, such as understanding negative, large-scale social events, justifying derogatory actions against minority groups, or positive differentiation of the ingroup from specific outgroups. Below, we will try to specify these social functions and relate them to the internal structures of ethnic prejudice. If indeed individual prejudices are not causes of ethnic intergroup conflict, but symptoms of it, as Tajfel states, then we apparently need an explicit analysis of how people represent social groups and group conflicts, how this representation influences the formation of stereotypes and prejudices, and how again these are used to process (new) social information, e.g., as 'input' for social interactions of social members. And, also, we especially need more insight into the processes in which this kind of subjective social information becomes shared, and thereby the subjective information of a group (Moscovici, 1981, speaks of 'social representations').
At issue is a complex 'dialectic' relationships between the individual cognitive processing of social reality and the social properties of intergroup relations and their cognitive basis, such as group differentiation and categorization. At both sides of these two levels of analysis, accounted for in different terms, much remains unclear. At the cognitive side, important processes such as accentuation of differences between groups or of similarities within groups, have been extensively discussed and experimentally tested, but the cognitive framework in which this happens has not yet been spelled out. At the social side, we also lack a precise analysis of actions, interactions, situations, or of ethnic intergroup encounters that would provide the empirical basis and the theoretical machinery to account for the social functions of prejudice (see also Tajfel, 1978; Turner & Giles, 1981; Milner, 1981).

2.4. Part of these insights may derive from current work, both in social psychology and in micro-sociology, about everyday interaction and the analysis of social situations. Prejudice and ethnic conflict are not only group characteristics at a global level of analysis, but also properly social notions in everyday face-to-face encounters. Discrimination, exploitation or derogation are actually enacted in such encounters, in the street, the bus, the shop, or at work (Essed, 1983). Socially shared interpretations of such interactions within the complexity of social situations will provide the basis for the development of social stereotypes or prejudice.

The mechanisms and interpretative rules or principles of everyday social interactions have received extensive attention in
more than a decade of micro-sociological work (see Schwartz & Jacobs, 1979, for survey and analysis). Many notions in that approach would be useful for an analysis of ethnic prejudice and processes of ethnically relevant interaction: common sense categories and reasoning, indexicality, interpretation, the construction of social reality, and so on. Yet, especially in ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; Sudnow, 1972; Turner, 1974; Mehan, 1975) notions such as prejudice, discrimination or group conflict hardly occur. One reason is that social interpretation procedures are formulated in general terms, and do not differentiate between distinct or conflicting social groups and their respective common sense categories or reasoning. Another reason is that prejudice and discrimination are not typical members' categories (of some group), but rather categories of other groups (or of the social scientist), and therefore should not be used in empirically valid descriptions. They are evaluations, and therefore cannot be used to understand action and interaction of members who do not analyze social situations in such terms. We hope to show later in this paper that these arguments are unfounded. Interview data display members' uses of these categories and also the relevance of such categories for their own social behaviour relative to shared social norms. Also, since intergroup interaction is at stake, the differences and conflicts in the interpretation of social interaction should be taken into account: minority group members do apply common sense categories such as prejudice, discrimination or racism in everyday encounters with majority group members. Here, and elsewhere in the social scientific study of ethnic relations, it becomes imperative to take the minority group's perspective for a change.
Similar remarks may be made for recent work on social situations (Forgas, 1979; 1982; Argyle, Furnham & Graham, 1981; Furnham & Argyle, 1981). We here find extensive analyses of the different factors of social situations, their cognitive representations by social members, and the ways they influence or are influenced by interaction. Yet, again notions such as prejudice, discrimination, ethnic groups, group conflicts, etc. have not yet been taken into account in such studies, although they are vitally important in the definition of situations in which intergroup interaction takes place. Forgas (1979) recognizes that different groups may have different perceptions of social situations, but shows this only for football teams. In a later collection, edited by the same author (Forgas, 1981), however, a more relevant social-ly oriented approach to situations and social cognition is taken. Here some of the notions mentioned above are analyzed, e.g. in a paper by Tafjel & Forgas (1981), discussing the role of social values in group categorization and the social functions of group stereotypes.

2.5. This succinct review of various approaches to ethnic prejudice and to social cognition in general is meant to provide the background for our discussion in the following sections in this paper. We have seen that some major theoretical notions of social information processing have been provided in these approaches in several disciplines, but at the same time that on the whole the cognitive framework remains fairly superficial. The same holds for the precise relationships between social cognition and interaction in inter-ethnic situations. Hence, most work remains to be done.
3. **Some principles of strategic information processing**

From the previous pages it has become clear that ethnic prejudices, attitudes or stereotypes are both cognitive and social results of social information processing in intergroup relations. In this section we will first analyze some of the cognitive mechanisms of these processes, but at the same time show how these mechanisms are socially constrained. As we suggested above, our approach presupposes the theory of strategic information processing discussed in van Dijk & Kintsch (1983). Instead of the understanding of discourse, we will here of course be concerned with another type of social information, viz. interaction in general and the participant social members and groups involved in such interactions. Also, we will disregard many details about the organization and use of information in memory and pay attention only to those major aspects that are relevant for our discussion about the processes of prejudice.

A central notion in our theory is that of cognitive strategies. Unlike the usual approach to understanding in terms of rules, strategies provide a more flexible and psychologically more realistic account of understanding, e.g. of discourse, interaction, situations, people or groups. Strategies are (mostly automatized) ways of handling complex sequences of (mental) acts or operations on various sorts of information input. They are mostly goal-directed, and in general monitored by a subjective analysis of the social and communicative situation or context. Their flexibility consists in the parallel processing of different kinds of information at various levels. For discourse, for instance, this means
that a syntactic analysis runs parallel to provisional semantic 
interpretation moves, and that at the same time information from 
the context is used in order to infer the (social) speech acts 
being accomplished. These processes mutually influence each other, 
and at the same time will make use of previously established in-
formation in memory, such as episodic memories about previous 
events or more general frames or scripts. The process runs in prin-
ciple 'on-line', but high level information, such as actualized 
scripts, semantic macrostructures ('themes' of a text), or con-
textual goals provide for top-down analysis. Apart from the possi-
bility to operate at different levels at the same time, strategies 
also differ from rules because they accept incomplete information. 
This means that understanding is hypothetical: provisional inter-
pretations of words, sentences or discourse fragments are construc-
ted, after which further data may confirm or change these hypothe-
tical interpretations. In this way, local and global coherence is
assigned between sentences in a text, a process taking place in 
short term memory but resulting in a textual representation stored 
in long term (episodic) memory. Also knowledge is strategically
searched for, activated and applied, for instance depending on the 
current dominant theme or goal of the ongoing discourse.

Similar processes take place during the understanding of social
interaction in general. Activity units are strategically inter-
ted as actions; these must be provisionally interrelated to be
interpreted as coherent interactions, and may in turn be subsumed
under higher level macro-actions (van Dijk, 1980a). This is possi-
ble only if general knowledge about actions or social episodes is
retrieved from LTM and at the same time an analysis is made of the social situation. Part of the efficiency that strategies are supposed to provide for such complex processes of understanding derives from the use of higher-level units (macrostructures), the application of pre-established discourse or action schemata that subsume sub-episodes under culturally established categories (such as the ‘Opening’ of a conversation, a meeting or a court trial), and schemata for the analysis of the whole context or situation.

The overall goal of these processes of understanding is the construction of a coherent representation in episodic memory. Although some surface characteristics, such as activity properties in action or style of discourse, may also be part of such a representation, it predominantly is a representation of the meaning of the action or discourse. It is assumed that this semantic representation is hierarchical, and therefore allows effective search in processes of retrieval, for instance in recall. Typically, high-level meaning units (macrostructures) of discourse or action will be best accessible and hence best recalled: they form the ‘upshot’ or the ‘point’ of the action sequence. Also, the semantic representation is subjective in the sense that variable personal memories, knowledge, and beliefs may be used to interpret sentences, to establish local coherence, or to derive overall topics that define what is most important or relevant of the text or action.

But, obviously, people are not reading texts, participating in conversations or taking part in (inter-)actions only to construe semantic (or pragmatic) representations. They use these representations in the construction of so-called situational models. Models
are episodic representations of the accumulated experiences of people. They organize what we know about specific situations or episodes, and new information is essentially used to update these models (or create new ones). For our discussion about ethnic attitudes this means for instance that people build a mental model of their neighbourhood, featuring the lay-out of streets and parks or other environmental aspects, and especially also the participants, and hence the social or ethnic groups involved. Each news item or each story about a witnessed event involving ethnic minority groups in the neighbourhood will be understood by constructing a particular model (of a specific event), consisting of relevant, strategically selected, fragments of existing, more general, models built from previous experiences. The particular model may directly serve as the input for a (new) story, but may also be used to update the general models. If in our interview data we find a story about a stolen bike, an event in which young Moroccan kids are assumed to have been involved, this story is a partial and strategically controlled (due to the interview situation) expression of the model the storyteller has construed about this event. At the same time, though, the model is used to update a more general model of the neighbourhood, in which small crime, such as theft, is associated with minority members.

General models provide the experiential basis for processes of social 'learning'. They may be generalized and abstracted towards socially shared frames or scripts if they appear to be relevant for interaction or understanding of other social members. In our example, thus, the general (but personal) model of the neighbour-
hood may be decontextualized and form general frame knowledge and beliefs about crime, about the deterioration of the city or about social groups involved in such framed, schematic beliefs.

Another property of models is the role of evaluative beliefs, or opinions, associated with the events represented in each model. Again, these will be particular, personal opinions, such as the evaluation of the stealing of a bike or of the supposed actors in the theft. Model generalization and schema formation will in that case also entail generalization and abstraction of these evaluations, and thereby lead to the formation of general opinions and opinion schemata about social groups, viz. attitudes. And, conversely, these general opinions may be instantiated during the construction of a situation model and even decisively guide this process of model construction. If Moroccans are represented, in a general attitude schema, as potentially criminal, then the unknown agent of the theft may be identified, strategically, as a Moroccan. The default values of a group schema, thus, will be 'filled in' within a concrete model of a social event. We see that social information processing is a two-way process: Situation models are derived from concrete experiences but at the same time lacking information may be supplied from pre-established group schemata or ethnically relevant scripts. Finally, the model thus construed may again be taken as 'evidence' for the general schema.

Evaluative beliefs associated with situation models need not only be subordinated qualifications of participants, but may dominate the whole model. In that case it becomes possible that later
only this evaluative dimension can be retrieved from memory. For-gas (1979) claims that episodes are in fact mainly encoded and me-
morized in terms of such evaluative dimensions, e.g. in terms of
pleasant or unpleasant. The updating and generalization of parti-
cular models may also be selective, e.g. by strategically taking
only 'relevant' information about minority group members,
thereby updating the general model about 'foreigners' in the neigh-
bourhood. Since recall is essentially based on situation models,
this also explains why people will tend to better recall behaviour
that confirms the group stereotypes about outgroups (Rothbart,
Evans & Fulero, 1978). This is not (only) due to the general group
schema, because this is not situation specific, but rather to
the general models we have about 'kinds' of situations. In a situ-
atation or communicative context in which 'crime' or 'theft' is re-
levant, only specific sub-categories of the schema may be relevant,
and these may be used as retrieval cues for personal models that
specify more concrete information about social situations invol-
ved. The implicit goals of everyday storytelling or interviews,
thus, will determine what models are relevant as a knowledge and
belief basis for talk.

Finally, models are supposed to have a strategically useful
overall structure. It is unlikely that we analyze and understand
the many situations in our everyday life in completely different
ways. Rather, it seems plausible that here again people make use
of a handy, ready-made model schema, featuring fixed categories
such as time, location, participants, events or actions and their
respective modifiers (van Dijk, 1984). If we apply such a schema,
we can routinely analyse a great number of situations. Concrete information will then be filled in into the terminal categories of the schema. The overall Control System provides the contextually variable information that allows us to focus on specific categories of the schema, so that schema application becomes flexible and adapted to various kinds of situations. Also, the situation schema may call on more specialized knowledge schemata about its categories, such as the 'action', 'event' or 'location' categories. People have naive theories of action, and these components may again be routinely used during the understanding of complex situations, such that motivations, purposes and intentions, 'doings' and goals may be distinguished for an activity ('behaviour') sequence interpreted as an action. What is briefly described here for the strategic understanding of situations not only holds for observation of or participation in such situations, but also for the understanding of discourse about such situations. From the semantic discourse representation in memory we may systematically 'read off' those elements that can be used to form (or retrieve) a model. That is, specific semantic categories, such as Time, Place, or Participants (and their case structural relationships), may be routinely used to provide the contents for their corresponding categories in the model. This is possible because our strategic analysis of situations has its counterpart in the semantic principles and categories used to understand descriptions of situations, e.g. in sentences and discourse. This does not mean, of course, that semantic representations of discourse are identical to models. On the contrary, models may be much more complex and complete, and dis-
course will usually only express some information about the model, viz. the information that is used to retrieve and update the corresponding model. After all, models feature much information that has been inferred from previous discourses about the 'same' situation, from other previous experiences (such as observations, action), and from general frames or scripts; a model in principle incorporates all we know about a situation. It is our cognitive representation, and hence our interpretation, of 'real' situations (see Johnson-Laird, 1983, for details). Our contact with the real world (or with fictitious worlds) is established through these cognitive models of the world. We will see below that the same holds for our contact with — i.e. our observation of and participation in — the social world. No functional dependence of our actions and attitudes from the social context can be satisfactorily explained without the vital notion of a cognitive model. We here find a somewhat more explicit, cognitive reformulation of crucial classical notions of sociology about the subjective nature of situations and their definition (Thomas, 1928; Schutz, 1970; see Forgas, 1979, for a discussion of this tradition).

To sum up the major notions and processes discussed, a simple schema of the outline of the cognitive theory may be used, as in Schema 1. This schema is highly simplified and only features the major notions used in our analysis. The many processing steps or strategies are not represented here and will be discussed below in the analysis of the strategies of prejudiced social information processing.

```Schema 1 about here```
4. Social information processing

In the brief sketch of the cognitive theory of strategic information processing given in the previous section it has already become clear that large part of the understanding process can be properly called 'social'. Despite the personal and individual, and hence the individually variable, nature of subjective understanding, due to our personal memories based on our own experiences (models), the basic categories, the schemata, as well as much of the conceptual 'content' have a more general, shared, social nature. In order to be able to specify some of the properties of social cognition that are involved in the processes of prejudice, group schemata and their use, we will however briefly resume some of the elements of this social dimension of memory organization and understanding.

First, large part of the actual contents of models are social, viz. (subjective) representations of social events or encounters. Time, location, participants and actions, for example, will be represented in terms of socially acquired and normalized conceptualizations. This means that despite individual differences in the understanding of a situation, there will be important similarities in the ways people of the same culture form models of such a situation. This also allows them to understandably communicate about the same situation, or to use similar models as the basis for possibly coordinated action and interaction. Thus, due to common sense categories and shared principles of understanding, our interpretations of social reality will be reflected in models that are at least comparable. Differences will exist in e.g. the completeness, the hierarchy (relevance) or the evaluations of model fragments.
Second, as we suggested earlier, the strategic schema of models is of course not personal or individual, but a socially shared, learned form of structural or procedural knowledge. To be sure, we here also deal with basic cognitive constraints on complex information processing, such as memory limitations, the need for strategic understanding, parallel processing, hierarchical organization of knowledge, or the fundamental processes of storage and retrieval of information. Yet, the basic relevant categories involved in the understanding of, or the participation in, social situations are of course socially learned. For instance, human participants and action are necessary categories in social situation schemata, which is not the case, say, for 'rectangular objects' or other possible elements of situations. It has been argued above that the socially shared nature of such categories in our situation models in memory is in part due to model-expressions such as sentences or discourse. These also exhibit syntactic categories or ordering principles that express underlying semantic ones, which in turn correspond to conventionalized model structures. In a story, for instance, we may have culturally shared global categories that are part of a story schema or 'superstructure' (see van Dijk, 1980a,b; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983), including eg. the 'Setting' of the events. This notion of 'Setting' may also appear in a model schema, combining e.g. Time, Location and Circumstances.

Third, a next social dimension is represented by the contents and the functions of the Control System. Processing information about situations or discourse is monitored by a (schematic) representation of the communicative situation or context (goals, etc.).
Just as situation understanding is socially normalized, our representation of (models of) communicative situations or contexts of speaking are normalized, e.g. by way of fixed role categories such as Speaker, Hearer, etc. Similarly, also in 'direct recording' of situations, such as in vision or action, we may have fixed social categories such as Observer, Participant, or other elements that are typical for the episodic registration of our experiences.

We have briefly discussed these social dimensions of episodic memory because it is especially here that usually the 'personal' or 'individual' nature of information processing is localized. If we move to long term semantic memory, we seem to have even more social dimensions that have resulted in cognitive content or principles of organization. In fact, we might argue that semantic memory is essentially social memory (even if episodic memory also has socially shared information). General concepts, learned rules and procedures (e.g. those of language and language understanding), frames, scripts or similar organized clusters of knowledge have of course a social nature. They have been generalized and abstracted from personal models precisely because they appear to have intersubjective functions and relevance: they are shared by the same social or cultural community. Knowledge is socially warranted belief. This is particularly true for knowledge about stereotypical social episodes (shopping, birthday parties or traffic circulation) which have been represented in scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977), even if these are also derived from 'personal scripts' (Schank, 1982).

More interesting for our discussion here however is the observation that also many other types of cognition are involved in
this kind of semantic or 'social' memory, such as beliefs, opinions or attitudes. To be sure, we may have personal, private beliefs, and the same holds for opinions, which we will simply define as evaluative beliefs. Yet, we have argued above that particular beliefs, such as 'John was happy yesterday during the party' or particular opinions, such as 'John was a nuisance yesterday during the party', should rather be seen as components of particular models. Semantic memory information should be more general and more decontextualized, and therefore will feature general beliefs and general opinions. These may again be shared, normalized and hence relevant for the adoption by groups of people. Especially when social objects, such as public persons, social events or issues are involved, general opinions are probably seldom purely 'private'. Thus, propositions such as 'Smoking is bad for your health' or 'Nuclear energy leads to pollution', are beliefs/opinions that are typically socially shared by groups of people, e.g. due to media discourse or personal communication, within the context of common (inter-) actions and evaluations (van Dijk, 1982b). This seems even more clearly the case for attitudes. We will take attitudes simply as organized clusters of general beliefs and opinions about social objects. They are typically complex, involve several general beliefs or opinions, and are the primary organizers of our social reality and our own position within that reality. Contrary to traditional conceptions of attitudes, we do not include the so-called 'conative' or 'action tendency' dimension. Action 'tendencies' --whatever they may be exactly -- are understood here as sequences of 'motivations' (wishes, wants, desires, preferences),
of decisions, purposes, aims (goals) or intentions, and we assume that these may be inferred (or formed) on the basis of attitude information. Once formed, action concepts may of course be fed into the attitude schema, but then they will simply be beliefs or opinions about wanted, possible, desirable or necessary action. Since attitudes, by definition, consist only of general beliefs and opinions, a proposition such as 'I would march in a peace demonstration' is merely a personal inference or instantiation of more general opinions from attitudes: they typically form a possible (imagined) model of a future situation. For a theory of the organization of ethnic prejudice, this conception of attitudes has of course rather important implications. For instance, responses to the usual social distance scales, would not be direct expressions of 'ready-made' attitudes, but specific inferences, which also depend on the understanding of the question, and the construction of a possible situation model (see Ehrlich, 1973, for a discussion of the classical tripartite structure of prejudice). Below, we will see what further structures ethnic attitudes and prejudices have. Here it is relevant to mention only the assumption that attitudes, just like frames or scripts, must be intellectually and effectively organized. Otherwise they cannot be strategically used in the many social situations they are called for, such as understanding and evaluating discourse and action, or the planning and execution of action. Since we may have beliefs and opinions of different levels of generality, the attitude may have a hierarchical structure, which would facilitate retrieval and strategic (level-dependent) use. In other words, attitudes are social schemata. (Hastie, 1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981)
Finally, we will assume that semantic (social) memory features the systems of values and norms, of which the social nature needs hardly be assessed. They provide the socially shared, general database for particular and general opinions. Whereas values pertain to general social goals, that is wanted (or appreciated actual) states of affairs (freedom, peace, equality, etc.), norms pertain to the social actions that may or should (not) be performed to achieve or maintain these states. General norm classes would be e.g. those of cooperation, tolerance, respect, etc., and regulate mainly the ways in which social members should take into account the other social members (and their valued goals) in social interaction. We mention these norm and value systems here not only as the social basis for opinions, and hence for (ethnic or other) attitudes, but also because we will see that much of the prejudiced processes of social information processing, and their possible enactment in discrimination and racism, can be formulated in terms of breaches of these norms and values or in the reversal in the hierarchy of norms or values (e.g. personal interest vs. politeness in ethnic encounters).

Just like the other cognitive systems of social memory, we assume that these norm and value systems are organized, so that they can be effectively searched for relevant social information. The organizing principles will not be discussed here however (see e.g. Rokeach, 1968, 1973).

Finally, we assume that attitudes themselves are also further organized, viz. in ideologies. These confer the necessary coherence to various attitudes, and are again typically shared by (large) social groups. They are assumed to be tied to a basic system of
overall 'life' goals of social members and groups, representing the specific selection and hierarchy of possible social values and norms of a society or culture. In ideologies the fundamental interests of people are cognitively represented, viz. as a socialized consequence of their social-economic conditions. It is obvious that ethnic attitudes and prejudice are rooted in this dimension of social ideologies. In our view, therefore, the socio-economic or for that matter the social context do not impinge directly on (ethnic or other) attitudes and hence on opinions, but only through this socially shared cognitive representation of the fundamental goals and interests of social groups in society. This cognitive 'link' also allows a satisfactory account of personal variations in attitudes, opinions, and prejudice --given identical social circumstances.

This summary of some of the relevant notions from social information processing is necessary as a basis for a more specific account of prejudiced thinking and feeling. It is however obvious that each of the notions mentioned would merit its own fulfledged theory, and we may regret that there has as yet been little explicit cognitive analysis, despite many social psychological experiments and some preliminary theory formation about these forms of hot or soft cognition. Also, we have disregarded in this section another important aspect of the uses of attitudes, viz. affect or emotion. These notions are however too complex to be analyzed here. We will assume (with Bower, 1980) that emotion is also a cognitive notion. Also here, understanding, interpretation and categorization are involved, viz. of our own bodily states, and also these categories are socially normalized (e.g. lexicalized).
This does not exclude the assumption that the affective dimension of information is processed more effectively, for instance faster, than the 'cognitive' dimension (Zajonc, 1980). In our terms, this might mean that high-level affective categories, such as 'hate' or 'anger', are assigned to propositions in models or attitude schemata, and that such categories can be effectively retrieved in contexts in which such affective categories are functional. This also holds for our information about minority groups and hence for prejudice (Cooper & Singer, 1956; Ehrlich, 1973: 92 ff; Bagley et al., 1979). Yet, the precise relationships between affect or emotion on the one hand, and ethnic attitudes has not yet been made explicit in such studies. Besides the more general evaluations (favourable vs. unfavourable, etc.) that are part of group schemata, we should distinguish the situationally dependent affective aspects of models. The retrieval of such concrete models, e.g. in storytelling about minorities, may be facilitated by -- or lead to -- emotions (Bower, 1980), but we will provisionally assume here that also here a distinction must be made between cognitive interpreted, categorized 'affects' and their physiological basis (Strongman, 1978).

Similarly, we will also ignore in this paper the personalis-tic approaches to prejudice, e.g. in terms of authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950), frustration and aggression (Berkowitz, 1972) or other dimensions of 'personality' (Bagley et al., 1979). Our socio-cognitive approach does not deny individual differences in the cognitive representations and processes of dealing with socially established ethnic models or schemata, but these differences can easily be formulated in cognitive terms.
5. **Ethnic group schemata, attitudes and prejudice**

5.1. Without going into the history of the treatment of the notion of prejudice in the social sciences, we may conclude that there is a fairly common feature in most approaches, viz. that prejudices are a form of social **group attitudes** (see e.g. Ehrlich, 1973 for a list of definitions). According to the classical approach mentioned above, this means that prejudice consists of a number of beliefs (mostly called 'stereotypes), emotions and 'conations' about ethnic groups. One of the more specific features of prejudiced attitudes (vs. attitudes about groups in general), next, is their negative nature. This negativity is often seen as a moral notion (Estel, 1983), not as a descriptive category. In terms of our notion of attitude, this would mean that the opinions people have about ethnic groups feature negative evaluations. And this negative attitude may again be subjected to social norms and values about the treatment and even the thinking about other social groups. We will see below, however, that 'negativity' is not necessarily a moral category of the observer or social scientist alone: ethnic minority members themselves may interpret prejudiced expressions or actions in negative terms, and our account of their evaluations or experiences may well be descriptive. Only our identification with the values and norms of ethnic minority groups, would make our description of prejudice an evaluative one. Other notions used when characterizing negative ethnic attitudes include 'rigidity', 'over-generalization', 'intensity', 'direction', etc. (Allport, 1954; Ehrlich, 1973). In this section, however, we will take a somewhat different approach, and analyse prejudice first in terms of specific attitude structures.
5.2. From the previous section it follows that ethnic attitudes, just like other attitudes, have a schematic nature. That people have schemata about social groups is however hardly a new idea in social psychology (Bartlett, 1932; Kuethe, 1962; Stotland & Canon, 1972). More recent work inspired by developments in cognitive psychology and AI, in which the old Gestalt notion of a schema was revived (cf. for instance Norman & Rumelhart, 1975; Bobrow & Collins, 1975), provides a somewhat more explicit schema-theoretical account of stereotypes or ethnic attitudes (e.g. Hamilton, 1979). Group schemata in that case become something like an 'Implicit Group Theory', analogously to the Implicit Personality Theory (IPT) used in person perception (Schneider, 1973; Hastie et al., 1980). Such group schemata provide our knowledge and belief basis for the understanding of other group members and their actions (Hastie, 1984). Stereotypical group schemata, may subjectively bias our interpretations and retrieval of information about groups.

Although we here find a new approach to ethnic attitudes, which allows us to apply the explicit processing principles discovered in recent cognitive psychology, some of the social psychological work on group schemata remains rooted in more traditional notions about attitudes, stereotypes and prejudice. Notions such as 'trait' are still used half a century after the well-known Katz & Draly (1933) work on ethnic stereotyping. Similarly, many notions rather reveal something about the methods or instruments of prejudice assessment (scales), than fundamental structural properties of attitudes or prejudices (Bagley et al., 1979).
And even if the more explicit notion of a group schema is used, it is only superficially employed to explain bias in information processing about groups, selective recall, wrong estimations or similar operations. A detailed qualitative analysis of the internal contents and especially the structures of the schema is not carried out (except for the mentioned traits or dimensions). And, more seriously, no precise description, (computer or hand) simulation or specific experimental testing, has as yet taken place of the precise processes involved in the use of social group schemata in general, or for specific instances of prejudiced 'thinking' in some social situation in particular. And finally, how social situations or other social factors are actually perceived, interpreted, represented and how these representations exactly interact with episodic memory models and group schemata, so as to yield specific prejudiced evaluations of ethnic group members and their actions, is also still on the agenda. Although we obviously cannot fill these gaps in one paper, we can at least try to formulate some principles and specify some examples.

First, the organization of group schemata in general, and of prejudiced attitudes in particular (Ostrom et al., 1981; Hastie, 1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Such schemata are not composed of isolated concepts, e.g. concepts for group 'traits', but of propositions, such as 'X are criminal' or 'Y abuse our social security system'. Whereas trait-concepts can be translated into one-place predicates for propositions, the more complex propositions cannot simply be reduced to one group-concept. Such propositions not only characterize properties, but also relations and actions.
Although we do not exclude image-like, analogical knowledge or beliefs in memory, we will simply assume here that semantic memory, and therefore also group schemata, can theoretically be accounted for in propositional structures (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). As such, this propositional nature of ethnic attitudes is not unknown. Ehrlich (1973) explicitly defines prejudices in terms of propositional systems, and provides an inventory of basic principles in terms of propositions. Yet, here and elsewhere the theoretical elaboration of this assumption is not provided, and the methods and experimental set-ups remain predominantly formulated in terms of isolated traits (mostly expressed as adjectives).

This propositional approach to the contents of group attitudes has a number of further advantages. First, relations of implication or entailment can be defined for propositions, and yield possibilities for the hierarchical organization of attitudes. In our own interview data about expressed ethnic beliefs and opinions (van Dijk, 1982a, 1983b,c) there is some evidence for this kind of hierarchical structuring based on semantic entailment. The proposition 'They are criminal' obviously dominates the propositions 'They carry knives' and 'They push drugs'. Second, propositional analysis allows the formulation of presuppositions, that is propositions entailed by a proposition and its negation, in 'That the Turks abuse our social security system doesn't bother me'. Third, propositions allow reasoning, that is, strategic inferences of a (propositional) conclusion from a set of propositions, as in '..... Therefore, you can't trust them'. Fourth, propositions have an internal 'schematic' role or case structure, featuring
participants as Agents, Patients, Objects, etc. Prejudiced beliefs crucially depend on the identification of minority members with one of these roles (in specific situations), such as the Agent role in crime, and the Beneficiary role in social welfare arrangements or housing policy (as prejudiced people see it). Fifth, propositions allow modalization and quantification. Many beliefs are modalized in terms of 'Maybe', 'Possibly', 'Surely', 'Necessarily' and will involve quantifiers, such as 'some', 'all' or 'most'. Such an analysis also permits the hypothesis that one principle of prejudiced information processing precisely consists in the transformation of 'weak' to 'strong' modalities and quantification: necessarily, all, always. Sixth, propositions in semantic memory are by definition generic and hence not about particular social members. Therefore, they feature variables instead of constants, which may easily be 'filled' with concrete individuals during the use of instantiated propositions in situation models. Finally, as we will see below, propositions allow the application of macro-strategies, yielding macro-propositions. These define overall themes or in general high-level meaning units, for instance for action sequences of social members. At the same time, such macro-structures are a crucial component for the hierarchical organization of attitude schemata (van Dijk, 1977, 1980a). Although these few arguments do not exhaust the reasons for using propositions, it may have become clear that it is at least theoretically plausible that propositions are the semantic building blocks of attitude schemata.

But also propositions do not come alone. Attitudes are organized systems, schemata, of propositions. There are various ways...
to assign order among propositions, such as **local** and **global coherence** (van Dijk, 1977, 1980; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Local coherence means that people may organize propositions in the schema according to principles of conditional relations, such as those of cause (or reason) and consequence: 'They ruin their houses. So, we should not provide housing facilities'. Global coherence is defined in terms of overall macropropositions derived from propositional sequences. This process is essential in understanding discourse or action and event sequences, and hence for the construction of semantic representations and models in episodic memory. But, also in the more abstract and general information in attitudes, we may find an organization of proposition sequences by means of overall, higher level propositions. Everyday interaction sequences, such as 'Loud music from (foreign) neighbours', 'Going to protest', 'getting a rebuff', may be globally interpreted by --subjectively variable-- macropropositions such as 'They bother us'. These macropropositions are sufficiently general to act as high-level organizers for many different types of experiences, and will therefore play a crucial role --as one of the forms of generalization-- in the organization of prejudice. The 'they bother us' macroproposition or theme also subsumes stereotypical belief sequences about islamitic slaughtering of sheep at home or aggressive encounters with black Surinamese. The local coherence relations between propositions are not only conditionally based but also **functional**: some proposition may have the function of a generalization, explication, contrast, example, illustration, etc. of other propositions: 'They slaughter sheep in the bathroom. They don't care about hygiene. It is their religion'.

Typically, such sequences may be expressed (in their general, generic form or in the instantiated form of an example) in strategic talk (van Dijk, 1983b), but it is possible that such forms of functional linking, such as the explanatory ones in the given example, are already abstractly 'programmed' in the attitude schema.

Finally, the proper schematic nature of attitudes resides in their overall categorical organization. Categories of different levels of generality will be developed in social contexts in order to organize specific propositional content, for instance by social domains (education, health, public services, government, crime and justice, etc.). These categories are derived from the overall interpretations of the social situations and the models constructed for them. Although there are certainly high-level, situation independent or 'context-free' beliefs and opinions, we assume that many beliefs and opinions are categorically organized for their respective domains of relevance. Thus, 'they are not intelligent' may be more relevant for the education domain, than for the 'abuse of social welfare' domain, for which even the opposite proposition may be relevant ('They aren't stupid'). This also explains why people may express or enact apparently conflicting beliefs about minorities. Within each domain, categories may be hierarchically ordered, such as 'Public life', 'Shopping', 'Supermarket' and 'buying actions'. Each category thus organizes a set of belief propositions which itself may be dominated by one or more macro-propositions summarizing 'typical' properties or behavior of minorities in these social domains and on various levels. Obviously, the categories used here are part of a more general naive social theory or 'society schema' people use when understanding social events.
5.3. We now have some plausible hypotheses about various organizing principles of attitude schemata. We have defined the contents in terms of propositions and macropropositions, and ordering in terms of entailment relations, conditional coherence links, functional coherence links, and the possibilities these relations allow for effective hierarchical organization. This overall structuring however is further defined in terms of categories for social domains or situation classes. It is at this latter point, where a further social dimension should be added.

Despite their complex semantic organization and the many possible attitude structures such semantic principles would allow, there must be stricter social constraints on prejudices. In order to be effectively used in situations and interaction, they must be organized such that they 'fit' their social functions. The picture sketched above hardly takes into account that prejudiced beliefs are used. It is more like an abstract theory of beliefs about groups (which is a prevailing feature of psychological approaches to knowledge organization, scripts and schemata). In accordance with suggestions by Tajfel (1981), we will therefore assume that particular social attitudes are organized according to their relevant social functions. He mentions for instance (i) social understanding of complex events, (ii) justification of actions against outgroups, and (iii) positive differentiation of the ingroup. Strictly speaking these functions are still cognitive (understanding, justification, reasoning and differentiation) although they are cognitive operations pertaining to and used by social groups, of course.
It is possible to further differentiate and systematize these functions of ethnic prejudice. The functions operate at different levels, according to (variable) degrees of social relevance for the ingroup member(s). Our general point of view in the analysis of these functions is that, together, they are geared towards the maintenance of social control (power, privileges, dominance, exploitation, etc.). Prejudice provides the attitudinal basis to process all information, such as planning, action, discourse, that is necessary in the exertion of this control (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Fergas, 1981; Ehrlich, 1973: 161; Simpson & Yinger, 1972: Ch.4; Allport, 1954).

The various functions define classes of action and their cognitive underlying structures (plans, goals), as well as results and consequences of these actions. Such action complexes instantiate what is usually called discrimination, which may therefore be defined here as the maintenance of social control over (against) minority groups.

For mnemonic reasons, we have labelled these different functions, together summarized under Discrimination, with provisional terms all beginning with a D (see e.g. Levin & Levin, 1982, for details):

1. **Dominance.** The major function maybe of social control: maintenance of social and political power, and the control of valuable resources (Ng, 1992). Dominance is exerted by the management of the socio-economic actions of the outgroup. Since dominance also presupposes social hierarchy, it may also have a socio-cognitive counterpart, viz. superiority of the ingroup over the outgroup.

2. **Differentiation,** also mentioned by Tajfel (1981), but here understood especially as differentiating actions, controlled of course by cognitive differentiations (see below). Treating outgroup members differently, e.g. in laws, everyday action, or political decision making. Like dominance, this is a rather general function, and subsumes the more particular functions mentioned below.
(3) **Di stance.** Actions are not only geared towards maintaining differences between ingroup and outgroup, but also more specifically to maintain or create social and physical distance: keeping them out of the country, our town, neighbourhood, street, house or family, according to the usual work on social distance. The localizing features of keeping distance may result in Apartheid, segregation, ghetto-building, concentration, or milder forms of 'spreading' (as in actual Dutch plans, sometimes formulated to "avoid ghettos", but actually intended to keep minorities from their right of free settlement).

(4) **Diffusion.** Here we find all communicative acts of attitude and prejudice diffusion in society, such as everyday stories, literature, the mass media, school textbooks, etc., intended to normalize beliefs about minorities and resulting in the shared social nature of ethnic attitudes.

(5) **Diversion** or displacement. The class of actions that may be taken as the strategies of subjective conflict resolution for ingroups. Blaming the victim, scapegoating, etc. are typical forms of attributing the causes of social problems to the presence or characteristics of minority groups.

(6) **Depersonalization/Dehumanization/Destruction.** These three functions of increasing strengths signal action properties aimed at the non-individual treatment of ethnic group members, their treatment as inferior kinds of people or, in the most serious case, of their physical destruction —or elimination out of the country. These are the ultimate consequences but also means to maintain increasing forms of personal and social distance towards minority members.

(7) **Daily discrimination.** We mention this overall function, subsuming concrete instances of acts mentioned above, because we here deal with everyday interpersonal encounters between ingroup and outgroup members, whereas the functions mentioned above are defined in terms of overall intergroup interactions. Indeed, prejudice explains, motivates, rationalizes and justifies, often unconsciously, the many forms of everyday discrimination, such as denying access, refusing cooperation, being impolite or aggressive, and in general unequal, derogatory treatment.

Although these seven major functions maybe do not exhaust the principal ethnic intergroup interactions between a discriminating, dominant majority and a subordinate minority, they provide us at least with a brief list of the well-known action classes that characterize a racist society. Without going into the social and socio-economic specifics of these functions, we must try to relate them back.
to the cognitive organization of ethnic attitudes, of which they are the social functions and for which they provide the social constraints. For instance, the overall function of social discrimination could be translated back into some form of cognitive 'discrimination' of outgroups. Thus, cognitive discrimination would consist for instance of feelings of moral, intellectual or cultural superiority, of enhanced, exaggerated group distinction and categorization, as extensively studied by Tajfel (1981) and his associates, of the attribution of negative properties to minority groups and group members, and of the denial of rights or the participation in the application of overall norms and values of society, and so on. These rather vague notions, however, should be made explicit in terms of the contents and processing of ethnic prejudice.

5.4. Discriminatory action, we argued, presupposes prejudice about minority groups (which is not the same as saying that attitudes 'cause' discrimination, an intricate problem we ignore here for a moment; cf. Cushman & McPhee, 1981, for a general discussion). The specific action classes mentioned above therefore should require specific categories in group schemata that are so to speak 'tailored' for this use within strategic interaction. We will therefore assume that people organize their beliefs in a relevant schema that goes beyond the schematic organization already discussed above. This group schema is a general, socially shared, system of principles of ways different social groups are perceived and represented in memory. We will assume that people seldom
do this in different, let alone individually idiosyncratic, ways. Rather, the distinction between ingroup and outgroup is relevant through socialization and our everyday social interaction, and will also pertain to people of different religion, social class, social status and occupation, gender, age, political beliefs, and so on. Although the principles for cognitive group information processing may be the same, the actual contents of the schema and its categories of course will vary with social, historical and cultural circumstances and the personal experiences and (other attitudes) of the social member. The interesting consequence of this hypothesis is that when new (out-)groups become relevant groups in our society, we need not start from scratch. We may simply use parts of the schema we already have, even without any particular information about or interaction with the new outgroup members. This explains why ethnic group schemata about different outgroups show such striking similarities, even in different socio-economic contexts (Brigham, 1971; Jones, 1972, Ehrlich, 1973). For our theoretical discussion it shows why and how people can form large parts of group schemata even without situation models of own experiences. We will come back to these links between models and schemata below.

The strategic group schema that allows the effective foundation of the discriminatory actions discussed above is assumed to operate in terms of group properties in different categories and at different levels of relevance or importance. We will provisionally assume that these include the following:
A. Origin/Nationality and/or Appearance. The major categorization, exhibited in spontaneous discourse and the media, of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands is in terms of 'foreigners' (even those, like Surinamese, who have Dutch nationality). This cognitive category is essential for the identification of outgroups vs. ingroup, both in global terms and in everyday encounters. Fundamental notions of (not) belonging here, of territorial possession, of intrusion, and so on, are organized by this category, which is often expressed as 'they do not belong here'.

At this same level of importance we have mentioned Appearance, also as an identificational category. It will of course first of all organize beliefs about race and its associated bodily indicators, primarily skin colour. An ethnic group that is both foreign and black will in that case receive special attention for group schema --prejudice-- formation.

Note that the 'appearance' category also may pertain to gender, age, or specific 'deviant' groups, such as hippies or squatters. This will in variable degrees also hold for the categories mentioned below, but we will further ignore the formation of prejudice against other minority groups.

As a general strategy for the use of this category in the group schema we may assume that the larger the distance or the bigger the difference on this category, the more probable the negative evaluation of the outgroup will be. We will however discuss the strategies for the use of ethnic information separately, but already want to signal here that all these categories and their relations, ordering or hierarchies will of course be flexibly and effectively used by social members in different social contexts.

B. Socio-economic position, involving group size, the socio-economic goals, and the overall social class or status assigned to the group. This overall category can be summarized also under the concept of competition, and would involve the subjective interpretations about the threat of our space, resources, houses, work, money, social security, and so on. Once identified the outgroup as foreign or different, group members will fundamentally organize their prejudiced beliefs in this category. It provides the major rationalization and justification for discrimination. The beliefs organized under this category are well-known and comprise 'They take our jobs', 'This country is full', 'They take our houses' or 'They abuse our social welfare system'. Yet, at the same time, this will include beliefs about the size of the group, and about their social status, whereby ethnic prejudice may be mixed with class prejudice.

C. Cultural norms, values and activities. At a next level of relevance we find the cultural properties of religion, clothing, daily habits, and norms and values of behaviour. In our work we have found that whereas people will typically voice beliefs about the socio-economic position of minorities in general terms, we at this level will not only find general statements about the cultural differences of minorities, but especially also concrete examples, e.g. in stories. People in contact areas have rather extended beliefs and opinions about the cultural properties of outgroups, and we surmise that the negative evaluation of these
cultural properties may often strategically be used to dissimulate negative opinions about the socio-economically relevant information. It is less 'serious', so to speak, to criticize the foreign neighbour for his or her different cooking habits, than denying him or her fundamental socio-economic rights (which would also be punishable by law). Another typical example in our data is the negative evaluation by majority members of the assumed treatment of women by minority men. This is one example among many where minorities are seen 'not to adapt' (the most frequent phrase in our interviews) to our norms and values. This 'solidarity' with a minority within a minority, however, is not merely a strategic selection of an example to illustrate different, deviant norms, however. Since the belief is also formulated by men who seem far from radical as far as women's rights are concerned, we here might want to speak of the old Freudian notion of projection.

D. Typical actions and interactions. The categories above already determine many of the typical actions ascribed to minority group members, such as their socio-cultural activities or their cultural habits. Yet, independent of these higher level categories we also find more specific domains of action and interaction under which prejudiced beliefs are organized, such as 'harassment', 'aggression', 'crime', and 'deceit', involving beliefs about fights, drug use, stealing, and cheating. Here again, especially the basic norms and values of the majority group are taken as the basis to construe systematic deviations of the outgroup. We will see later that selective information input in the press or stories and rumors are sufficient data to form models that sustain these general beliefs in the group schema. The mechanism is however quasi autonomous if people only have to construe actions that violate fundamental values and norms such as those of safety, property, peace, quiet, etc.

E. Attributed personal characteristics. We here finally find the sets of beliefs pertaining to the inherent, internal characteristics of minority members, e.g. along the dimensions of intelligence, morality, skill, and so on. They serve mostly as naive explanations for negative valued actions and performance on social tasks. Yet, they are infrequently formulated in our data, maybe because of social norms prohibiting outright attributions of inherent properties, but research about the experiences of minority members in everyday situations shows that people effectively use such attributions, though often indirectly or implicitly (Essed, 1983).

It goes without saying that this list of fundamental categories used in the organization of prejudiced attitudes requires further analysis. Yet, it provides us at least with some provisional suggestions for (i) the organization of ethnic beliefs, (ii) their social relevance and hence their possible hierarchical structuring in social schemata, and (iii) their acquisition and strategic uses.
We will on the one hand assume that different sub-groups of the ingroup may variably use and re-order these categories, depending on their own goals and interests (Wellman, 1977), but on the other hand that the ordering in the list is not arbitrary when applied to majority attitudes in general. That is, the higher level categories will on the whole be more essential for group members because fundamental aspects of territory, group identification and socio-economic interests are involved. If these are less relevant (for certain sub-groups) then the perceived deviation from norms and values and the cultural differences become more relevant.

The categories run from 'foreign' outgroups in general, to more individual properties of the (inter-)actions of minority members, and we hypothesize that the corresponding beliefs and opinions may be different in modality, quantification and scope. Opinions about the 'criminality' or the 'lack of intelligence' of minority group members will tend to be more often qualified and applied to specific situations, despite the tendency to (over-)generalize. The differential relevance of the prejudice categories for social subgroups in society, finally, would predict that groups of higher status, high income, better educated people will focus the formation and the use of prejudice on the 'lower' categories of cultural difference ('primitivity'), action and interaction ('crime', 'dirtiness', 'agression') and personal characteristics ('lack of intelligence and skill'). This may lead to avoidance of close contact, denying access to jobs or educational facilities, and in general derogatory treatment.
5.5. Besides the structural properties of group schemata discussed above, the propositional contents under each category may be subject to variable evaluations on a number of dimensions. People may hold certain beliefs or opinions with varying degrees of intensity, may assign a value on a scale of favourable to unfavourable, or on affective dimensions such as the one running between 'hate' and 'love' (Ehrlich, 1973). Values on these dimensions may vary according to personal, situational or structural properties of group schemata and their strategic uses. For the moment this means that they are not part of a more general, structural characterization of the organization of ethnic group attitudes. The 'intensity' of a belief is rather a value that varies with specific events or actions in particular situations, and will therefore depend on many ad hoc properties of these situations. **Personal relevance** is defined in terms of the individual organization of the group schema, e.g. in terms of the position of certain categories in the schema and as a function of personal goals and interests. We will assume therefore that these properties of group schemata, as well as their affective basis in personal emotions, need to be accounted for in terms of strategic processes applying to group schema information. These processes determine how a schema is actually used and useful for different people and different situations, and define the **flexibility** of the system. (In order to avoid misunderstanding, it should be emphasized that this kind of 'flexibility' does not contradict the often assumed 'rigidity' of prejudice, which pertains to the (non-) change of group schemata given 'conflicting' models of reality. Flexibility is a property of the strategic uses of such 'rigid' schemata). In Schema 2, we have summarized some of the structural properties of group schemata discussed above.

*Schema 2 about here*
6. **Strategies of prejudiced social information processing**

6.1. One of our major assumptions in this paper is that prejudice should not merely be accounted for in terms of social or individual attitudes, but primarily in terms of the strategies people use in handling information about minority groups. The structural analysis of ethnic attitudes in terms of a group schema in semantic memory only provides the 'data base' for such strategies. What we also want to know is how people think and act in particular social situations. In accordance with developments in social psychology and microsociology discussed in section 2, it seems crucial to us that we are able to account for real encounters in which prejudice and discrimination are involved. General attitudes and general social functions of prejudice, as well as the overall group conflicts and their socio-economic, historical and cultural contexts, are abstractions. The everyday experiences of prejudice and discrimination by minority members cannot only be understood in these general terms.

This way of putting the problem is not simply an analysis of the relationships between prejudiced attitudes and 'behaviour', as it has been usual in traditional social psychology. General 'predictions' about discriminatory behaviour on the basis of known prejudiced attitudes have been notoriously problematic. The major reason for this failure is the superficial and general correlational approach to the issue. Detailed analysis of the conditions of interaction and the properties of situations are the only satisfactory way to relate cognitions with social context and action. This means that generalizations will necessarily be heavily constrained by a complex array of situational variables.
6.2. According to our theory of strategic information processing discussed above, therefore, we will assume that each social act and each social situation should be described in terms of the rather complex strategic processes that underlie understanding and action by the participants involved. Depending on an analysis of the situation, and on the actual goals or other personal features of the cognitive 'set' of a person, action and interaction is strategically planned and executed. Ethnic attitudes are merely one component in this process. We have seen that episodic models, featuring the previous experiences of persons, are involved, as well as a Control System, and general knowledge frames or scripts. We have seen finally that besides the ethnic attitudes, there are also other attitudes that make up the ideology of persons or social members of groups, as well as norm and value systems, and personally varying affective dimensions underlying all this information and processing.

No wonder, thus, that predictions about prejudiced behaviour were seldom significant, and if they were, no real explanation could be given for the correlations, unless in superficial terms of some vague general principles of the cognitive and social 'dynamics' of 'behaviour'. Only if we are able to specify, step by step, how people in social situations interpret the situation, categorize other participants and understand their actions, will we be able to specify the strategic mechanisms of prejudiced actions. And only then do we have some really empirical evidence about the process of acquisition, use and change of ethnic prejudices.

In this section, then, we will try to formulate some of the details of the well-known general principles traditionally formu-
lated in terms of 'overgeneralization', 'rigid or faulty reasoning', 'using insufficient evidence', making 'attribution errors' and the like. Note that these notions pertain to different processes in the first place, viz. to the process of social learning or the acquisition of ethnic group schemata, on the one hand, and to the actual use of such schemata in concrete situations, on the other hand. Although we can't solve all problems here, let us try to devise a somewhat more systematic picture of the processes in involved.

6.3. Let us carry out our theoretical construction by analyzing a real example of an interethnic situation, as derived from our interview data:

A middle-aged white Dutch woman goes to the supermarket. A black Surinamese woman buys a bread in that supermarket, but comes back later to change the purchased item. The manager refuses to change the bread, claiming that bread cannot be brought back. The black woman becomes furious and eventually leaves the store, but takes a package of cigarette from the shelf at the cashier's. The white woman observes this situation, and later tells this story in terms of her interpretation of the situation.

If we disregard for a moment the later reconstruction of the event in the story of the white woman (an analysis which would require further specifics about interviews, stories and the expression of experiences and ethnic opinions), we here have one of the typical everyday conflicts of a multi-ethnic neighbourhood. Especially in public situations, such as public transport, the street, shops or institutions (post office, banks), majority people must interact with minority people. Their experiences, and hence their beliefs, opinions and attitudes, partly derive from such everyday situations. Although many things are 'happening' in the situation described
above, we will here be momentarily interested only in the cognitive processes of a white participant/observer like the white woman. We will try to describe these interpretation processes for various levels and in their subsequent phases, but our ordering does not necessarily imply a corresponding ordering in the understanding process. Also, we can only mention the rough outlines of the strategies involved. A detailed description of even one strategic step would need pages of explicit notation.

A. PREPARATION

It is seldom the case that we enter a situation without any specific information about the situation. Large part of the supermarket scene is cognitively already prepared by the participant in that scene, viz. the white woman (WW) in this case. Her presence in the supermarket is routinely part of the execution of a shopping script, within which she has specific goals, such as buying specific items. This means that she has general knowledge about what people do in supermarkets, what one can buy there, what people come and work there, and so on. As soon as she enters the store, which will be the Setting for the later episode, this information will at least partly be activated, that is prepared for actual use. Besides this script knowledge, her actual goal, and the expectations derived from these about the supermarket, the woman's action plan will feature a general organization of her actions, and maybe a strategy for the way the actions will be performed (fast, cheap, etc.). Finally, if the woman goes to supermarkets, or this supermarket more often, she will have a model of this situation of 'shopping', of which the actual shopping is a particular instance, now being constructed. How the woman sees, interprets and stores the information about this situation is specified by this particular model (henceforth: P-model). Overall information, such as the plan, the shopping strategy, the supermarket script, the general model (shopping in supermarket experiences), and maybe specific general opinions about shopping, will be stored, upon entrance of the scene, in the Control System (CS), which will further monitor the interpretation processes in this situation.

B. EPISODE UNDERSTANDING

We apparently come to situations cognitively 'well-prepared'. Obviously, this strategic preparation of social interactions and situations is highly effective. If all turns out to happen according to plan, much of the prepared information stored in CS will be useful to provide easy top down understanding of the situation, and therefore little problem solving is needed for
action and model building. The P-model, now being constructed, is so to speak only a variant of the general model (G-model) about shopping in that supermarket. Since so much information about the situation is pre-programmed in this way, the woman can attend to small decisions, actions and details of the supermarket episode, e.g. decisions about brands to buy. Thus, the action and the observations are routine, say, until WW arrives at the cash, and observes a black woman (BW) entering the shop, speaking with the cashier, and to the manager, a bread in her hand. It is at this point where our more specific episode starts. Let us try to hypothetically reconstruct the interpretation of that episode as follows:

1. Participant identification and person perception.

After the overall insertion of the episode in the shopping-in-the-supermarket model, which strategically provides a first overall interpretation of the episode (e.g. 'patron speaking with supermarket employees', or 'patron bringing back some item', or 'patron having complaints about a bought item') the stepwise, linear or 'on-line' interpretation of the episode is assumed to start with the identification of the participants. The routine categorization in that case would then simply be 'patron' or 'women' or both, and the possible actual role of the individual thus categorized might be 'complainant', which would activate a specific sub-schema of the shopping script (also figuring in other scripts). Yet, interesting for us here is that the woman is also identified and categorized as 'black', and hence probably as 'Surinamese' since the majority of black people in the Netherlands are from Surinam.

This categorization presupposes the activation and actualization of the 'Surinamese' group schema, maybe featuring opinions such as 'They always make trouble' or 'They steal'. These general prejudiced beliefs project specific expectations on the actual P-model, and may further bias the construction of the model if the Surinamese group schema (S-schema) is taken up into the monitoring control system. Instead of the routine episode of 'having complaints', 'changing items' or 'argument between patron and shop employees', the situation may now be redefined in terms of an interethnic conflict. The model representation of the protagonist black woman BW is no longer dominated by the individual category 'a patron' or 'a woman' or 'someone bringing back an item', but by the ethnic category 'Surinamese woman', including negative opinions.

Even before the actions of WW are observed and understood, WW may instantiate the negative beliefs of the S-schema and expect negative actions of BW, which will bias the understanding of the 'real' actions of BW.

For the shopping-domain of the S-schema, if that features specific beliefs about Surinamese, such expectations may lead to heightened attention for the actions of the Surinamese, and to possible checking of bags, a situation which is familiar to black women in the Netherlands (Essed, 1983).
(2) Interpreting the action sequence

With these expectations in mind, the actual activity sequence will be analysed into meaningful social acts, such as 'wanting to change an item in a shop' and 'refusal to grant the change' by BW and the manager, respectively; and these two actions are coherently connected by a conditional link: the second act is a consequence of the first act. In order to understand this connection though, and in order to make the act of the manager intelligible, WW must assume that BW's intentions, as expressed in her conversation, are unacceptable. This is possible only if she assumes that BW has broken the norms of shopping, and --according to her story-- that is precisely what she does: "In Holland we don't change bread". This means also that she does not see the action of the woman as a personal breach of the prevailing norms, but as an ethnically motivated one. BW is understood to apply the norms of her own ethnic group, which redefined the episode as an instance of an ethnic conflict; BW does not adapt herself to the prevailing Dutch norms. The alternative interpretation does not even seem to be available in that interpretation framework, viz. that the manager refuses to be cooperative, namely by strictly applying the rules of the shop, or questioning the legitimacy of the rules themselves. The conflict is attributed only to the 'deviant' action of the black woman, and this interpretation confirms the negative expectation. 'They cause trouble', which will henceforth dominate the actual action sequence in the model of this situation. This will later allow the woman to retrieve this specific model in storytelling when she wants to illustrate the general point about the 'troubles' caused by minority members.

Once interpreted this sequence of the interaction in this framework, the interpretation of the next sequences, viz. BW's getting furious and taking a package of cigarettes, will take place in the same direction. Getting furious will not be understood as a reasonable consequence of the refusal of cooperation, but as an unjustified act, which may also be subsumed under the 'she is making trouble' macroproposition for the whole event. Apart from breaking the rules, BW also is seen as unreasonable and aggressive. And similarly, the act of taking cigarettes is not understood as an 'understandable' act of revenge against a powerful shop manager, but as 'stealing', which will confirm an expectation from the S-schema.

The resulting P-model, so far, features a major participant categorized as Surinamese at the highest level, and the sequence of actions globally interpreted as social evaluations, viz. breaking the rules/norms, being aggressive and stealing. Since alternative interpretations of a more neutral or positive kind are not given, viz. in terms of the circumstances or in terms of the actions of the manager, BW will be attributed the schema-based properties 'not-adapted', 'aggressive', 'unreasonable', 'troublemaker' and/or 'criminal'. Typically, the story will strategically suppress relevant details that might provide alternative evaluations of the episode (e.g. whether the bread was pre-packed), and ignores the prevailing Surinamese norm of not touching (other's) food.
(3) Other aspects of the situation

The interpretation of the situation involves however more than just a categorization of the participants and a possibly biased interpretation of their actions. In this case, for instance, also time must be crucial: bringing back an item (bread) before paying would probably have been OK, and maybe even directly after paying but still within the shop. The deviance assigned to BW thus presupposes that BW must have left the shop or even already must have gone home, before deciding to bring back the bread. Secondly, the specific object of the interaction, viz. the bread, is essential: it is bread (or maybe also other fresh food) that is assumed to fall under the rules of changing items. The presupposition for this rule or norm is hygiene (if the bread was unpacked, which is not clear from the woman's story). But that means that WW's apparent agreement with the decision of the manager presupposes that the black woman indeed does not meet the hygiene criteria. If that interpretation indeed is part of the strategic understanding of the situation, we find an instance of the general physical distance dimension of prejudice and discrimination: minority members are 'dirty'. Bringing back a bread thus violates the basic value of cleanliness as applied by WW.

C. FURTHER PROCESSING

If we assume that the situation model of WW has been construed more or less in the way intuitively described above, it means that the P-model is no longer simply an instance of the general shopping model: the episode is not only an incident at the shop. Rather, separate models about 'minorities in shops' may be thus formed, featuring 'making trouble' and 'stealing' as general action categories. Such models may then be connected with similar models about experiences in other types of situation, such as 'making trouble' or 'being aggressive' understood in neighbourly contacts or riding a bus. These sets of general models, finally, may be further generalized and decontextualized and yield corresponding group schemata, or confirm extant schemata, and their relevant categories.

We have taken this example because it is characteristic for the kind of stories white majority members tell to back up their ethnic attitudes. Whether the story is true as told is less important here. What counts is the way social members handle specific episodes, and assign social evaluations to ethnic minority members and ethnic relations in general. Also from her other opinions, expressed in the same interview, it appears that undoubtedly the woman is prejudiced against black Surinamese. Interesting though is how these attitudes are used and confirmed by her selection...
of specific ethnically relevant episodes and by her definition of such situations. For this specific case, we witness the following processes that seem to be typical for prejudiced social information processing:

(a) Participants in situations are primarily categorized as ethnic minority groups, and not in terms of relevant social categories (e.g. 'woman') or functional roles (e.g. 'patron').

(b) The dominant participant category will at the same time activate other information about members of the same ethnic group, and these general beliefs or opinions will control the expectations and the interpretation of the activities of ethnic minority members. If the schema beliefs are negative, the resulting evaluations in the model of a concrete situation will also tend to become negative, despite the 'real' things going on. This may mean that (i) all actions are negatively interpreted, (ii) that negative actions are selected, or (iii) that slightly negative actions are assigned heavy negative value.

(c) Actions of minority members tend to be more closely monitored and compared to prevailing norms and values: slight (assumed) deviations become exaggerated and are not tolerantly 'excused' (which would be the social norm; cf. Harding et al. 1969).

(d) Negatively interpreted actions are not attributed to individual negative characteristics of the minority member (e.g. 'an impolite person') but interpreted as instances of a general property of ethnic minority group members (but see Pettigrew, 1979).

(e) Situations of conflict will unambiguously be interpreted in favor of ingroup members, and in terms of ingroup norms and rules. White participants receive positive evaluations (in our example the manager is portrayed as 'patient') (cf. Brewer, 1979).

(f) The social evaluation of negative minority actions will be such that the dominant macroproposition, e.g. 'they cause trouble' is also useful for the negative interpretation of other situations. In this way overall coherence can be brought into the episodic models, and hence in the experiences of people.

We may call this the principle of 'negative transposition'.

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These general models will finally be taken as confirmations of the general group schema, so that the same schema can be used again for the processing of new episodes. The same holds for the use of previous models in the interpretation of new experiences.

These examples of prejudiced information processing about minorities provide in our opinion a somewhat more detailed account of the kind of general principles mentioned earlier, such as overgeneralization, unfounded schema-formation, or 'rigid' thinking. In addition to what we have found in our example, we may add the following operations:

(h) Negative information spreading: negative experiences in one domain, or for one ethnic group or group member, are extended to other domains (e.g. from shopping to work), or to other minority groups, thereby making the attitudes more coherent.

(i) Irrelevant recombination of models or schemata: beliefs from one model or schema may be used as explanatory premiss in the structure of or the reasoning with other models or schema, e.g. 'They do not decorate their houses as we do' as a cause for 'The neighbourhood is deteriorating'.

(j) Negative activation: negative situations in the neighbourhood will 'remind' (Schank, 1982) people of negative situations with minorities.

6.4. The strategic principles outlined here also provide some more explanation for recent experimental findings about the 'biased' information processing about minority members which we mentioned in section 2 (e.g. Rothbart, Evans & Pulero, 1978; Hamilton, 1976, 1979; Grant & Holmes, 1981; Hamilton & Rose, 1980; Brewer, 1979; Howard & Rothbart, 1979; Sagar & Schofield, 1980).

Although we now have formulated a number of principles for the understanding, storage, activation, retrieval, monitoring, updating, spreading and biasing of ethnically relevant information, we should bear in mind that situation understanding may be more...
complex than we have suggested. Specific situation schemata or scripts, special circumstances, the goals and interests of the participant or observer from the ingroup, or special acts of the outgroup member may all lead to the application of different strategies that will interact with the general principles mentioned above. Instead of outgroup derogation, for instance, models and their stories may be about the ingroup member's positive actions, and display a favourable evaluation of the ingroup rather than to a negative evaluation of the outgroup (Brewer, 1979).

Also, there are of course individual differences between the schemata and models about minorities. Negative spreading will not always take place, and it occurs that people have negative beliefs only in one cognitive sub-domain of a group schema, e.g. about the work skills of foreign groups.

Our example does not suggest either that people will only form negative schemata on the basis of even a single model. We have argued that schemata may be formed analogously to other negative schemata about outgroups, even without a single experience. This, however, is a socially rare case, since people will also form models, and hence possible 'evidence' for schemata, through everyday stories, the media, textbooks, and so on. Prejudiced people will indeed tend to make negative generalizations, and will use negatively biased models as a basis for such 'conclusions', but their strategy is nevertheless to look for confirming evidence. This is also necessary in order to diffuse and share ethnic attitudes through everyday communication: without examples or stories people may have no 'point', and isolated generalizations may either be socially unacceptable (anti-discrimination norm) or provide a too small basis for 'interesting' talk (Polanyi, 1979).

Finally, it should be added that the strategies discussed in this section are not socially arbitrary. That is, they are not, or at least not only, effective ways of information processing about other groups, leading to easy model building or schema use. We have earlier seen that schema structure is a function of social discrimination practices, and the same holds for the very strategies used in handling 'ethnic information' in memory.
6.5. This means that we should specify the general functions of ethnic prejudices formulated earlier (pp. 41-21) in terms of everyday social strategies, and examine how these relate to the strategies discussed above for the processing of social information. One obvious reason to establish such a link is the important assumption that interaction itself, and therefore also discriminatory interaction, is cognitively planned, monitored, executed and understood.

The ethnic schemata, situation models and the cognitive strategies for their use are to speak necessary preconditions and components of this cognitive basis of discriminatory action. Let us enumerate some of the social strategies that correspond to these cognitive strategies:

a. Discourse and communication. As we will see in more detail below, many of the cognitive strategies are exhibited in talk about minorities. People make generalizations, will try to provide evidence—through narrated models—for negative opinions, formulate the relevant norms and values that according to them have not been respected, change topics that are only related through 'negative' macropropositions, and so on. The general distinction between negatively valued outgroups and positively presented ingroups is followed systematically in conversational strategies of self-presentation, complaining and persuasion. Stories show how models are represented in memory, and style and rhetoric reveal the points of view and the evaluations regarding minority groups. Although discourse also must respect the constraints of communicative situations, we here find a rather interesting 'expression' of what is going on in the minds of the people. Socially relevant of this talk, as we have suggested before, is that in this way ethnic attitudes and models become socially shared. Also, it has appeared that talk with minority members also often shows the cognitive strategies mentioned above (Essed, 1983). Indeed, much everyday discrimination has a verbal nature. Even under rather strict self-control, prejudiced people will eventually show indirectly—and sometimes overtly—how they think about minorities or the minority member tal-
Generalizations will be expressed, irrelevant links will be mentioned, a host of wrong presuppositions are built into the utterances, and derogatory stylistic choices and semantic content be exhibited. The way people talk about and to minorities is so to speak the communicative center of many other forms of ethnic discrimination.

b. Selective negative attention. Cognitively more attention is paid to possibly negative or undesired actions of minorities. This process is also socially enacted. People will attend more often to events or actions in which minorities are or can be assigned a negative active role. The usual tolerance threshold for slightly 'disturbing' behaviour is lower. They will tend to complain easier about loud music, the noise of playing children, food smells, and so on.

c. Attribution. Similarly, negative circumstances will primarily be attributed to minority members' properties and not to context (Pettigrew, 1979; Hewstone & Jaspers, 1982; Hewstone, 1983). Not only negative acts or events of/with minorities are thus explained, but also the general negatively valued 'situation' in the neighbourhood is attributed to the foreigners. This process is not merely cognitive. On the contrary, it is translated into accusations, uncooperative behaviour and unfriendliness.

d. Dominant categorization. Everyday encounters with minority group members are primarily understood in terms of the minority label of the (other) participant, instead of a relevant situational category. This will show in much nonverbal behaviour, such as extra attention or lack of eye contact, body position (distance), and in forms of address or topics of talk (besides the structures of conversation mentioned above). Typically, foreigners will often be addressed in a 'benevolent' way by asking (irrelevant) questions about their country. Also people of a minority group will tend to be addressed instead of, or as responsible for, other members of the same group.
e. Negative expectations. From negative models or schemata people tend to derive negative inferences about the actions of minorities. These negative expectations translate of course into specific actions, already mentioned earlier, such as prevention, extra control, more watching, self-guarding, and so on, in many public contexts (street, shop, public transport). In shops, minority women will be more closely watched by security guards or shop attendants, and on the bus watch their purses and sit far from minority youngsters from which 'trouble' is expected. These and other assumptions derive from our interview data and from the work on everyday forms of racism as experienced by black women done by Essed (1983).

f. Ingroup favouritism. Negative outgroup schemata are paired with positive ingroup images, and this bias and polarization will of course also show in everyday interaction. In situations of conflict (as in our supermarket example), ingroup members will not only interpret the episode in negative terms for the participant minorities, but also actively take sides with the ingroup members.

g. Differentiation and distance. Perhaps the best known link between cognitive and social strategies is that of group differentiation. Not only individuals are categorized primarily as group members, and not only group differences are exaggerated (and intragroup differences reduced) (Tajfel, 1981), but the difference will also be 'marked' in overt and sometimes subtle activity. The various forms of social distance maintenance (keeping 'them' out) need no further comment. But this may also show in standing and sitting behaviour in public places, or in 'ignoring' in shops when service is to be given (at the same time as extra attention and control when theft is anticipated).

These are only a few examples among many. Each class of everyday strategies would need the usual close analysis in terms of current microsociological methods mentioned in section 2. The strategies of how we see, think and feel about minorities will very often be displayed, simply because they are often presuppositions of social action. These everyday discriminatory activities are often
only the finer grained elements of higher level, more complex social actions or policies that have been discussed earlier under the various forms of social discrimination: dominance, differentiation, diffusion, and so on. For instance, if a black person must be hired or cannot be fired, it is easy to have recourse to more subtle forms of harassment, such as avoidance, derogatory remarks, non-promotion, unfriendliness, and so on. This does not imply that these everyday forms are more serious than the well-known social episodes of discrimination (in housing, getting a job, providing facilities, and so on), but only that they are indeed 'there' every day for social minority members, and often so indirect and subtle that they are difficult to react against (Essed, 1983). There is much resemblance here with the more subtle everyday forms of sexism against women (see e.g. Fernandez, 1981).

In this section we have informally tried to show that there are systematic relationships between social interaction strategies and cognitive strategies for the 'treatment' of minority groups. This is important because it is not sufficient to only relate ethnic attitudes with their overall social functions, nor the structures of ethnic schemata with socially relevant categories of group perception and interaction. The strategies are relevant because they show how the ethnic attitudes actually 'work', how they are used (or not) in concrete situations. They show how and what information is actually drawn from our 'ethnic' schemata or models as the input for our daily actions. Hence, strategies link group schemata to their social display in action. And, at the same time social strategies of interaction show how higher level (e.g. institutional) discrimination is carried out in daily situations. In this way we account both for the undeniable individual differences in prejudice and discrimination by ingroup members, but also and more importantly we show how macrosocial phenomena such as social dominance, are related to everyday actions of discrimination, and these again to the cognitive models and schemata of people, not as individuals, but as social members. Their models, their schemata and their strategies appeared to be essentially social, shared, and functional, despite their flexible use and the individual variation in concrete situations.
At a more abstract level of analysis we may conclude further that the link between prejudiced cognition and discriminatory action can also be formulated in terms of norms and values. Prejudice is negatively valued because it would be a form of 'abnormal' thinking and evaluation about social groups. We have found however that the violation of norms for adequate perception, understanding and especially reasoning should rather be formulated in terms of expedient strategies of social information processing, which do not differ much from information processing in general. What is at issue is rather that these strategies and the kind of cognitive results they have (models, schemata) provide the basis of socially 'abnormal' interaction. Part of the everyday forms of racial discrimination indeed can be described in terms of strategic violations of a number of basic norms, such as the norms for cooperation, mutual respect, tolerance, etc. (Harding, et al., 1969) that would be followed in principle for interaction with ingroup members. For instance, the norm of tolerance would require that minor deviations, mistakes, errors, or lapses by others should be accepted, especially if they are not intentional or due to contextual constraints. This kind of patience is essential for flexible and conflict-free cooperation, but it will systematically not be granted to minority members. A precise formulation of the everyday principles of interaction that are the mundane translations of these general norms will allow us to see at what points breaches of these norms and principles are strategically used in discriminatory actions, with the overall (often unconscious) goal of keeping the minorities out or down.

The cognitive strategies of social information processing about minority groups discussed in this section, hence, are not merely expedient ways to handle complex or new information, but also provide the cognitive basis for the strategies of discriminatory action. As we already have seen for the contents and organization of ethnic group schemata, this again shows how cognition optimally 'works' as a function of social interaction in situations, which again is a function of higher level intergroup relations (for a more general discussion of these relations between the micro- and the macro-levels of social phenomena, see Knorr-Cetina & Cicourel, 1981).
7. Discourse and communication. Or, how becomes prejudice socially shared?

We have seen that ethnic group schemata derive their social nature from the fact that they are shared by other members of the ingroup and that they are formed or transformed in social encounters with both ingroup and outgroup members. In other words, in order for prejudices to become socially relevant, they presuppose various forms of social interaction in general and communication in particular. Personal interaction with outgroup members will on some occasions indeed provide part of the experiential basis that may lead to personal models, and hence attitudes, about such situations and outgroups, but this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for prejudice formation or change. Our experiences, beliefs, opinions, attitudes about outgroup members and outgroups in general should be normalized. That is, they should be subjected to various processes of evaluation, testing or (dis-)confirmation with respect to the (i) goals, norms and values of the ingroup, but also with respect to (ii) the actual experiences, beliefs, opinions or attitudes of other social members. One of the fundamental ways to link personal models (experiences), beliefs and opinions with those of others, and hence with dominant norms and values of the ingroup, is through processes of communication. Thus, if we assume that prejudices are essentially shared social attitudes, we should examine how they become shared in the first place, viz. by various forms of communication, such as everyday informal talk, media discourses, pictures and film, and a large variety of other discourse forms that may be used to 'express' both personal and social experiences, beliefs, opinions, attitudes or ideologies.

(Roloff & Berger, 1982)
Although it is a major aim of the Amsterdam project on "Prejudice in Conversations about Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands" to analyze everyday discourse as a strategic expression of underlying ethnic attitudes, it is obvious that such conversations at the same time have an important social function. That is, they do not merely have the personal function of expressing one's experiences, beliefs, opinions or emotions, but at the same time such conversations (whether informal ones or those in institutional settings) are integral part of everyday interaction among ingroup members. In this way they may serve various communicative functions:

1. The communication of personal experiences as social experiences.

Clearly, the experiences people have with members of outgroups are not just personal experiences, but are instances of intergroup perception and interaction, and hence also relevant for other ingroup members. For other social members of the ingroup, such communicated experiences become 'typical' examples of the intergroup conflict. They are not just talk or stories but intended to build a model of the (ethnic) situation in some neighborhood, which for the hearers may again serve as evidence as if they had lived through the experience themselves. Many of the stories told about ethnic minorities in our data, as well as the opinions and attitudes derived from them, are rooted in such stories by others. This is of course vital for those experiences in everyday life that only occur incidentally, such as serious conflicts, crime or other highly 'narratable' events. Conversations, thus, provide the important social data base on which further talk, shared opinions and attitudes are based.
2. **Self-presentation.** The expression of own experiences and opinions is also a mode of self-presentation in social encounters. People will not only denote their relationships with members of the outgroup, but at the same time mark their position in the ingroup, e.g. as a competent social member, who shares the important values, norms and goals of the ingroup, and who will display knowledge about dominant norms of understanding and tolerance. Despite the negative opinions and the complaints about ethnic groups and group members, the speaker may in this way show at the same time that this negative evaluation is not derived from a personal negative bias. On the contrary, the speaker at the same time wants to be kind and reasonable. It is obvious that this social function is important especially in conversational interactions with relative strangers (e.g. in interviews) and in general with those ingroup members who are outsiders in the local community of the neighborhood.

3. **Identity and social integration.** Closely related to this social function of self-presentation, conversations about ethnic minorities at the same time function as a display of social identity and integration with regard to the own ingroup. Thus, stories and arguments are told in order to express a common basis of evaluation with respect to outgroups. Speakers show that their basic goals, norms and values are those of the ingroup as a whole, and that therefore they properly belong to the ingroup. Their experiences with ethnic minority group members, thus, are narrated as experiences of ingroup members, and
as expressions of a 'common fate' of the ingroup. They thereby signal their social membership as well as their 'normal' reactions to this shared predicament (Festinger, 1950).

4. **Persuasion.** Since not all ingroup members have the same experiences nor the same opinions and attitudes, talk about negative experiences may also have a persuasive function. That is, negative opinions and attitudes are not simply formulated as one's own, personal, beliefs, but as justified, credible and acceptable convictions. Therefore, conversations about minorities have an important argumentative dimension, in which both stories and rhetorical devices are used to make both the experiences and their evaluations more convincing. Indeed, stories are told as personally experienced (and hence 'true') evidence that may serve as valid premises in the argumentation structure that leads to a negative opinion-conclusion. Storytellers will often make appeals to hearers, such as 'What would you do...?' Thus, common talk may lead to 'mutual persuasion' as a form of decision making within groups about relevant action or attitudes, and may lead to the polarization of attitudes (Newstone & Jaspers, 1982).

5. **Informal mass communication.** Closely linked with the first function mentioned above (the expression of personal experiences as social experiences), conversations about minorities also have an important function as a means of informal mass communication.

The mass media will as such hardly explicitly formulate racist beliefs, and do not pay attention to the everyday experiences of 'common people' (although an overall negative bias is obvious in the Dutch media, cf. van Dijk, 1983; see also
Hartmann & Husband, 1974; Husband, 1977, 1980, for Britain). Hence, the only way opinions, events and experiences can become socially shared is through this medium of informal mass communication, whereby some story can be told and retold to family members, friends or acquaintances, thereby quickly spreading in the community (cf. Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). Soon, such stories may indeed begin their own life, and become some form of ingroup folklore. In this respect they resemble rumors and gossip (Allport & Postman, 1946; Shibutani, 1966). Especially in situations of social uncertainty, when basic values and goals are felt to be threatened by a common outgroup, and when public information (e.g. by the mass media) does not provide sufficient data, storytelling about minorities becomes of vital importance for the ingroup.

6. A mode of conflict resolution. The expression of personal negative experiences and opinions, when shared with others of the ingroup, may further serve as a mode of social conflict resolution when other solutions are not available. The resented outgroup is there, the "government doesn't do anything about it", but ingroup members feel uncomfortable, threatened and confronted with everyday perceptions and interactions they cannot handle. Typically, stories about ethnic minorities often lack a Resolution category: a negative event or action, ascribed to ethnic minority members, could not and cannot be countered by effective personal or social action. The story thus must center around a negative Complication category, and an
important Evaluation category, in which the storyteller expresses
the personal opinions about the events, and the overall negati-
ve conclusion that should be drawn. The 'solution' of the social
predicament, thus, is twofold, viz. various acts of discrimina-
tion towards outgroup members, on the one hand, and sharing
one's experiences with others of the ingroup, on the other hand.

7. Amusement. Next, we should not forget that everyday conver-
sation and storytelling also may have aesthetic or 'hedonic'
social functions: people will also tell about their experien-
ces in order to amuse the communication partner. Especially
stories about the 'funny' ways of behavior of ethnic minority
members will often serve this purpose. Their actions not only
are seen to violate basic norms and values, but also common-
sense expectations about routine behavior. Perceived deviations
thus may become the interesting and reportable nucleus of an
everyday story, implying that these people are funny, weird,
crazy, stupid, etc. At the same time, such stories not only
denote 'weird' events, but also signal the social and communica-
tive 'interestingness' of the storyteller. The 'interestingness'
attribution to persons as social members maybe combined in this
case with their positive evaluation as competent storytellers
if they are able to tell not only about an interesting event,
but also have an artful control of stylistic, rhetorical and
narrative devices. We here touch upon the large class of other
forms of racist discourse, such as jokes, rumours, 'funny' TV-
programs and the like (Husband, s.d.)
3. Cognitive display and social precepts. Finally, our analysis in this paper suggests that informal discourse about minorities also functions as a display of both personal and socially shared strategies. The expressive functions of discourse serve the necessary utterance of problems and predicaments, and the persuasive functions are aimed at inducing similar interpretations, models, and schemata in other ingroup members. In this way the 'contents' of our prejudices, as well as our 'evidence' for them, may be communicated. It appeared crucial however that we should also share similar strategies for handling social information about minority groups. Our daily talk exhibits part of such strategies, and our hearers may pick these up again. We may thus learn from others how to think about minorities. This is important, because the topic is not only socially relevant, but also delicate. There are strict social norms for our treatment of groups and group members. If we have beliefs and opinions that would conflict with those norms, this conflict must be strategically resolved. This requires complex reasoning steps, involving justification procedures, the selection of relevant premises (about social 'facts'), and the defense of exceptions to the prevailing norms of tolerance. These strategies need to be learned, and discourse is the preferred location for their exercise, both in production and in understanding and integration. It displays how we handle 'the problem', and allows us to be praised and criticized for our 'solution'. Praise will confirm our moves, criticism will probably help to make them better, more subtle maybe.
Similar remarks hold for the social dimension of such precepts. Stories in talk show not only what the minority member did, but also what we did, how we handled a situation and what kind of action appeared to be effective. We have seen above that this will not always be the case: complaint stories will often only lead to a Complication, featuring a problem, predicament or a 'deviant' or 'strange' event, and not always a solution by the storyteller. But at least an evaluation will be formulated, so that the conclusion about the opinions regarding the event and the participating minorities becomes clear. Yet, other stories do show how ingroup members solve a problem. Thus, the storyteller as an ingroup member is not only a victim, but also the hero. The solution marks his or her superiority, and also suggests how it can be done. This need not always be directly in terms of aggression or discrimination against minority groups. Also more subtle forms of social problem solving are displayed, often implying the recurrence to paternalistic strategies. In both cases though the minority group remains in the negative, subordinate role. They are the cause of the problem, and the discourse shows how we can or should handle such problems. Besides the diffusion of cognitive content and strategies, the discourse apparently also shows the contents and the strategies of the most effective interaction with minorities. The moral of everyday stories thus at the same times becomes a precept for strategic discrimination.
Maybe more functions could be formulated for everyday talk about minorities. Essential for the discussion in this paper is however the vital intermediary, and mediating role of discourse in the socialization of personal experiences, and the individualization of social interaction types and strategies, and the models, schemata and norms shared in the community. Discourse appears to be one of the most important media linking the individual and the social, the cognitive and the interactional, dimensions of racism. It is the place where social cognitions become 'articulate': The implicit preconditions of interaction may become explicit in stories, arguments, conclusions, and their subtle strategies. The discourse shows both how the speaker relates to the outgroup and how solidarity with the ingroup is understood. It shows both the speaker's cognitive/affective position and his or her social position. Upon the arrival of new groups or the emerging salience of an existing group, the discourse can vicariously represent both the attitude to be taken and the actions that are imperative. In case of lack of contacts, experiences or direct information regarding minorities, the discourse is the symbolic substitute for these social encounters, and preformulates the moral conclusions we might infer from such encounters. Therefore, an analysis of racist discourse exemplifies in many respects the complex issues dealt with in this discussion about the systematic relationships between prejudiced cognition and its functions in racist interaction.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Discussions with the members of the project on "Conversations about Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands" (Eva Abraham-van der Mark, Rob Rombouts, Martijn den Uyl and Adri van der Wurff) have helped to develop the ideas put forward in this paper. I am indebted to Adri van der Wurff for critical comments on an earlier version of these notes, and especially to Philomuna Essed both for her comments on this paper and for her more general advice and support for this work.

The Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO) is gratefully acknowledged for the financial support of the project in which this paper was written, and Charlie Husband for his kind invitation to participate in the SSRC Workshops on Intergroup Theory and British Race Relations in order to present some results from our project.

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Hierarchical relations
(Macrostructure,
Implications,

General personal relevance
General ingroup (public) relevance
Situational relevance

Personal properties
Typical (inter-) actions
Culture
Socio-economic position
Foreign/Appearance

Neighbour./ Housing/ Work / Economy/ Immigration

Schema 2. Organizational properties of (ethnic) group schema
(The categories mentioned are only examples)