Factors Associated with Successful Developmental Investment in Title III Eligible Institutions: A Special Report to Program Managers in the U. S. Department of Education.

Research Triangle Inst., Durham, NC. Center for Educational Studies.


RTI/2102/07-01F

Oct 83

300-80-0834

66p.; For related documents, see HE 016 847-850.

6p. For Evaluative/Feasibility (142)

Black Colleges; Case Studies; *Developing Institutions; Eligibility; Evaluation Criteria; *Federal Aid; Federal Legislation; Higher Education; *Improvement Programs; Institutional Characteristics; Institutional Evaluation; Low Income Groups; Private Colleges; Program Effectiveness; Program Evaluation; *Public Policy; State Colleges; Technical Assistance; Two Year Colleges

*Higher Education Act Title III; Institutional Survival

Findings from a study of the viability of a sample of 51 institutions that received substantial federal funding are summarized. The institutions received funding through Title III of the Higher Education Act during the 1981-1982 academic year and the 5 prior academic years. Study objectives included the following: to determine general factors associated with institutional development (growth, stability, and decline or stagnation), to identify developmental activities that fulfilled institutional needs and purpose as well as the intent of the federal legislation; and to determine factors associated with specific successful investment. The present document is designed to summarize findings that are particularly relevant to program development and operations functions at the federal level, as well as to continuing policy issues. Special emphasis was placed on the achievement of fiscal viability and movement toward independence from federal support through Title III, and the achievement of excellence in serving low-income and minority students. Characteristics of the study institutions and their activities are summarized, and implications of the findings for the following program events are addressed: eligibility, application and award process, monitoring, technical assistance, and evaluation.

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FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENTAL INVESTMENT IN TITLE III ELIGIBLE INSTITUTIONS: A SPECIAL REPORT TO PROGRAM MANAGERS IN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

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Report No. RTI/2102/07-01F
October 1983

This report is a special summary and extension of the second phase of work completed under contract number 300-80-0834 with the Office of Planning, Budget, and Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Education. However, the content does not necessarily reflect the position or policy of that agency, and no official endorsement of findings or recommendations should be inferred. The amount charged to the Department of Education for the Phase II work associated with this report was $16,781.
Acknowledgments

The special report following is an abstract of findings presented in a longer and more detailed final report of a two-year inquiry into factors associated with institutional development and fiscal viability, with factors associated with attainment of objectives of developmental activities, and with the impact of developmental activities on the institutional condition.

In addition to professional staff at the Research Triangle Institute (RTI), which had contractual responsibility for the study and for a preceding inquiry into the intent and purposes of Title III together with an appraisal of program management challenges, the effort reported had substantial assistance from specialists serving as consultants, site visitors, and reviewers of the final products. These include: Robert Albright, formerly Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs, UNC-Charlotte, now President, Johnson C. Smith University; George Breathett, Director of Planning and Title III Coordinator, Bennett College; Robert Broughton, Vice President for Business, Colorado College; Ben Cameron, independent consultant; Collie Coleman, Vice President for Academic Affairs, Shorter College; Wade Ellis, independent consultant, Associate Dean (Emeritus) Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies, University of Michigan; James Garnes, Executive Director of Development, Marquette University; Archie Hargraves, President, West Side Organization, Chicago, Illinois; Rose Mary Healy, Director of Institutional Planning, Iona College; Thomas James, Executive Assistant to the President, Spring Hill College; William Jenkins, Vice Chancellor for Finance and Business, N.C. State University; Wright Lassiter, formerly President, Schenectady Community College, now President, Bishop College; Sylvia Law, Chief of Accounting, Maryland State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene; William McFarlane, Professor of Philosophy and Religion, George Mason University; Warren Morgan, Vice President for Academic Affairs, Paul Quinn College; Mae Nash, formerly Associate Director for Special Programs, NACUBO, now Vice President for Planning and Advancement, Paul Quinn College; Alan Pfister, Professor of Higher Education, University of Denver; and Marvin Wrolstad, Vice President for Business Affairs and Treasurer (Emeritus), Lawrence University.

At the initiation of the study reported, RTI was assisted, through a sub-contractual agreement, by the Center for Systems and Program Development.
CSPD staff or consultants who participated in the early site visits included William Ellis, Lenneal Henderson (of Howard University), Ruth Perot (President), and Stanley Straughter (of the CPA firm, Leevy, Redcross & Co.).

Many others have been of substantial, indeed crucial, assistance. We owe particular debt to the presidents, chancellors, and other administrative officers of the institutions that agreed to participate in the research, select appropriate developmental activities, and arrange productive visit schedules. We are also indebted to the many key personnel and faculty who went far beyond the call of their immediate responsibilities to share their experiences, and to speculate with us on the issues involved in equal opportunity, program quality, and institutional development. Including students and staff at all levels, as well as certain individuals no longer formally associated with given institutions, we interacted productively with well over a thousand persons. In a very real sense, this is their report, although the authors accept the usual responsibilities for any errors in interpretation or generalization.

The technical monitor, Dr. Sal Corrallo of the Office of Planning, Budget, and Evaluation of the U.S. Office of Education, was forceful and effective in steering the inquiry into profitable channels. Many staff then or now in or associated with the Division of Institutional Development (the Title III Program office) of the U.S. Department of Education provided immeasurable assistance in gathering and interpreting relevant materials and in giving unselfish and creative advice; we are grateful here, in particular, to John Rison Jones, Jowava Leggett, Roger Norden, James Ormiston, and Joel West. Rose Mary Healy, a consultant and site visitor for RTI, with former service in the Division of Institutional Development, ED, served as a critical reviewer of this special report as well as of the final study report; her special insights were exceedingly helpful.

The full report of the inquiry is a rather formidable document of nearly 500 pages. Some readers of this special report may want to examine all or parts of that more complete report. As a guide for such review, an appendix to this report presents a chapter-by-chapter synopsis of the longer report.

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Appendix A. Synopsis of Content: The Anatomy of Institutional Development for Higher Education Institutions Serving Students from Low-Income Backgrounds
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose of the Study, and of this Special Report:

This is a special brief report¹ to Title III operations and development managers and staff of an intensive inquiry, involving case study procedures, into the current and prospective future viability of a sample of 51 institutions with substantial Title III funding in the 1981-82 academic year and the five prior academic years.

The purposes of the general inquiry included the following:

(1) the determination of general factors associated with the direction of overall institutional development (growth; stability; and decline or stagnation) for institutions receiving substantial support under Title III;

(2) the identification of developmental activities that seemed to be serving their functions well, in terms both of Federal intent and institutional needs and purpose, and the determination of factors associated with such specific successful investment; and

(3) the extrapolation and postulation of a general process of institutional development, as the success experiences observed may suggest.

The purpose of this special report is to provide an abstract of the findings that seem particularly relevant to program development and operations functions at the Federal level, as well as to continuing policy issues. As such, special emphasis was placed, in our inquiry, on the achievement of fiscal viability and movement toward independence from Federal support through Title III, and the achievement of excellence in serving low-income and minority students.

B. The Essential Strategy of the Inquiry

The essential strategy of the study was to focus particularly on excellence at the institutional and activity level. Our purpose was to learn as much as possible about success by recognizing it where it existed, and by

¹ This report is drawn essentially from work performed by RTI under Contract No. 300-80-0830 with the U. S. Department of Education, as presented in the final report (of October 1983) entitled An Anatomy of Institutional Development for Higher Education Institutions Serving Students from Low Income Backgrounds. Research Triangle Park, NC: Research Triangle Institute, October 1983.
attempting to understand it in terms of associated factors. We did, as expected, encounter an unmistakable range in institutional condition and activity quality, and the contrasts were useful in distinguishing factors that seemed to account for differences as opposed to those that were more likely to be truly distinctive of the success experiences. We did not employ a design that would permit any reasonable overall evaluation of the Title III program or of its management by program staff or institutions at large: that was not our elected or assigned purpose. Our work proceeded under the assumptions (1) that the Congress, in the 1980 reenactment of the Higher Education Act, designated continuing and substantive interest in developmental support of certain institutions of higher education; (2) that there have been some exemplary uses made if Title III and other soft funds by institutions characterized by eligibility for Title III support; and (3) that focus on factors associated with successful application of Title III funds would be instructive for Program and institutional managers.

C. The Organization of this Report

The sections following will encompass, first, a brief description of the sample of institutions and activities, and of our procedures. We shall then present a summary of the most salient findings at the institutional and activity levels. The final sections will examine the implications of the findings for the major events in the program cycle: determination of eligibility; the application and award process; monitoring; technical assistance; and evaluation.

II. CASE STUDY PROCEDURES

A. Case Study Procedures, in Brief

Case studies were undertaken in fifty-one institutions that had received an average annual Title III grant of $200,000 or more for investment in 1981-82 and for at least four of the five years preceding the 1981-82 academic year. Site visits averaging two days' duration were made between July 1982 and April 1983 by teams of three specialists (one in higher education administration and management, one in fiscal affairs, and one in academic and support program evaluation) drawn from a pool of 27 RTI professional staff and consultants, using semi-structured interview guides and a structured reporting form.
Each specialist was assigned two primary tasks at each institution: (1) to examine the overall functioning of the institution in his or her area of specialization; and (2) to examine in detail a pre-selected developmental activity (in that area of specialization) which the institution believed had served its purposes well, and had made a positive impact on the institutional condition.

For the overall examination of the institution, the fiscal specialist was charged, first, with determining the institution's fiscal condition in terms of current values, and trends over the preceding five years, in revenue, resources, expenditures, and overall risk position. He or she was also charged with speculating on the internal and external factors that appeared to affect the fiscal condition of the institution; with characterizing fiscal management practices and the role assigned to soft money; and with postulating changes in fiscal practice that would advance institutional development or reduce risk.

The management specialist was charged with examining the institution's condition in such areas as faculty resources, numbers and qualities of applicants, quality of educational and student support programs, and fit between mission and market—in terms of current status as well as trends over the past five years. He or she was also asked to abstract the institution's apparent philosophy of development (including the role and weight of soft money), the process by which the institution defines its needs, and the context factors affecting development. The management specialist also was asked to explore the history of Title III and similar external support, in general, in terms of present and future needs. Finally, the management specialist was asked to express his or her view of the outlook for the institution, and the critical management challenges it faced.

The program specialist was asked to examine the overall program development efforts over the past five years, in terms of their origin, the interrelationship among these efforts, their fit with and/or impact on mission, their management, the internal facilitating forces and barriers, and the impact and consequences of the specific program development activities. He or she was also asked to note in particular the role played by Title III in overall program development, and the perceptions of key faculty and staff in how this role might be enhanced.

For the three developmental activities, each specialist was asked to explore the origin of the assigned activity (why, by whom, and how it was
initiated); the objectives established for the activity, and the particular strategies employed to achieve those objectives; the resources invested; the plausibility that the given strategies and resources could lead to objective attainment; the factors in the institutional climate and context affecting the developmental activity progress, and revisions made in objectives or strategies; and the impacts and consequences of the activity, and its long-term operational prospect.

Site visit teams assigned to predominantly black institutions (and to most of the others) included at least one black member.

Interviews were generally conducted with the presidents and other chief administrative officers, the Title III coordinator; the developmental activity directors; and selected faculty, other administrative staff, and students. The numbers of individuals contacted generally ranged from 15 to 30, depending on the size and complexity of the campus. Extensive recourse to a variety of material, some assembled prior to the visits and some collected or examined by the site visitors on site, was also made: this included data on revenue and expenditures from the fiscal years ending in 1976 through 1981, enrollment, and faculty counts, as assembled for the annual Higher Education General Information Surveys (HEGIS) of the National Center for Education Statistics; student aid dollars received over that period; formal annual audit reports; catalogs; self-studies and accrediting commission reports; presidents' annual reports; information on Title III awards, 1978-1982, and selected portions of the institutions' Title III proposals and/or operating statements; and internal and external evaluations of developmental programs and activity. The observations and findings presented in this special report draw essentially from intensive and structured review of these materials, the site visitor reports, and the site visit experience itself; definitions and procedures are described in some detail in the longer technical report.2

B. The Selection of Institutions for the Case Studies

In selecting a sample of institutions for case study, it was felt that the issue of public versus private control has particular implications for

institutional purpose and use of developmental funds, and that a sufficient number of each kind of institution should be selected to permit contrasts. It was arbitrarily agreed that the sample of 50 institutions would include at least 20 publicly controlled and 30 privately controlled institutions.

Beyond this, it was reasoned that any detectable impact of Title III funds would probably require continuation in the program over time, and something more than minimal investment (as in the generation of a developmental plan or incidental support of a few activities). Accordingly, it was decided to restrict the sampling pool to institutions with active grants in the 1981-82 academic year that also (1) had received grants for institutional (as opposed to consortia) activity for at least 4 of the years preceding the 1981-82 academic year; and (2) had received an average annual award for investment at the institution over the 6-year period of $200,000 or more. For practical reasons, it was also decided to keep the sample within the contiguous United States. Applying these criteria to the 537 institutions with prime grants in 1981-82 yielded a group of 77 public and 81 private institutions (a total of 158).

From the resulting group of 77 public institutions, two samples, each of 20 institutions and designated prime and backup samples, were drawn by purely random means; similar procedures were employed to establish prime and backup samples of 30 privately controlled institutions from the 81 private institutions meeting the criteria. Letters (signed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary then responsible for the Title III Program), explaining the study and inviting participation, went to the presidents of institutions in the prime samples, with follow-up telephone calls by senior project staff. Of the prime sample group of 20 public institutions, the presidents of 15 ultimately agreed to participate and did so; for the 30 private institutions, the corresponding number of acceptances was 24 from the prime sample of 30, providing initial acceptance rates of 75 and 80 percent, respectively.

Replacement institutions for those declining to participate were drawn from the relevant backup sample lists, with attempts (ultimately successful in all instances) to match the replacement institution with the original institution in terms of control (public versus private), program (two- versus four-year), and predominant ethnicity of student body. Where there were multiple replacement options in these terms, the institution geographically nearest the nonparticipating institution was designated as the prime replacement option.
The sampling process yielded, then, a group of 20 public institutions and 30 private institutions representative of those in each of these categories that were eligible for support in 1975-76, and that had had continued support of $200,000 or more per year through 1981-82. One additional private institution was added from the back-up list, because one institution that had initially declined to participate later agreed to do so. The characteristics of the sample may be summarized as follows.

Of the 51 institutions, 20 (or 39 percent) were public, and 31 (or 61 percent) were private. The public group included 9 two-year and 11 four-year institutions; the private group, 1 two-year and 30 four-year institutions. Twenty-seven (or 53 percent) of the institutions were traditionally black, a percentage significantly higher than that in the total population of 1981-82 prime grantees. Headcount enrollment for the two-year public institutions ranged from about 900 to 9200 students, with median of about 3700; for the four-year public institutions, headcount enrollment ranged from about 1100 to 8000, with median of 3900. The private four-year institutions were smaller, with headcount enrollment ranging from about 500 to 3200 students, and median of approximately 1000. Thirty percent of the sample institutions had been first involved in the AIDP program; of the remaining 70 percent starting first in the BIDP program, 25 percent had moved into AIDP prior to the start of the new SDIP program in 1979. Average annual Title III awards ranged from $200,000 to $780,000 with median values of $281,000 for public two-year institutions, $483,000 for public four-year institutions, and $408,000 for private four-year institutions. Using 1979 FTE fall enrollment, the institutional per FTE student share value of these Title III awards ranged from $50 to $1,021, with mean values of $276 for the two-year public, $145 for the four-year public, and $342 for the four-year private institutions. Of the 51 institutions, 20 were no longer funded in academic year 1982-83, when site visits were made.

C. The Selection of Developmental Activities for Intensive Examination

While institutions were selected at random from a particular subgroup of prime Title III grantees in 1981-82, developmental activities for intensive examination by the site visitors were definitely not selected at random. First, a "developmental activity" was defined as a unit of activity, operated within the last six years, designed to improve the fiscal viability and self-sufficiency of the institution directly or through improvement of quality of
program or functioning; and which was: (1) described by a formal plan prescribing purpose, strategies, expected outcomes, and timelines for accomplishment; (2) assigned a discrete budget; (3) directed by a person (or committee) designated as responsible for its management and conduct; and (4) formally monitored as to progress with records of milestone attainment or outputs maintained. Developmental activities were specifically not restricted to those funded by Title III in whole or in part, but included activities meeting the definition and that were supported by other kinds of "soft" money (e.g., foundation grants), or, in a few instances, regular institutional funds.

The presidents of the institutions were asked, in the initial contact, to nominate up to four activities in each domain (fiscal, management, or program improvement) meeting the definition employed, and which were believed to have accomplished something meaningful or significant in the development of the institution. In selecting one activity in each domain for intensive study, an effort was made to derive a variety of types within each domain, sometimes resulting in selection of an option that may have been ranked less than first priority by the institution.

The institutions have variable definitions of what constitutes an "Activity", even within Title III support; what constitutes several separate Activities on one campus may be combined and viewed as one Activity on another. Most of the campuses had operated as many as six or more Title III Activities each year, with separate Activities spanning 1 to 5 years. By asking institutions to select among these (and others) in terms of significance rather than by any random means, and by the further attempt to obtain a variety of types of activity within each domain, the selection procedure was highly purposeful, and the Activities selected are, as noted, clearly not representative of all funded activity at the sampled institutions.

Of a possible 153 Activities (one per domain per institution x 51 institutions), 150 were ultimately selected for review.

Although most institutions volunteered several program Activities as highly satisfactory, not all institutions volunteered fiscal or management Activities; and, some management Activities involved both management and fiscal elements. The selected Activities were ultimately classified as follows:
Fiscal Domain: Fiscal Accounting Systems (22 Activities)
Resource Enhancement (11 Activities)
Planning and Improvement of Fiscal Management (6 Activities)

Management Domain: MIS Development (10 Activities)
PME or PME/MIS Development (11 Activities)
Institutional Research (11 Activities)
Long Range Planning (5 Activities)
Administrator or Trustee Training (2 Activities)
Development Office Development (1 Activity)
Institutional Self-Study (1 Activity)
Program Evaluation (1 Activity)
New Organizational Unit Development (3 Activities)
Student Recruitment (1 Activity)
General Administrative Support (2 Activities)

Program Domain: New Programs or Majors (10 Activities)
Strengthening, Refining, or Upgrading Existing Programs (12 Activities)
Enhancements to Instruction (Methodology; Academic Services) (16 Activities)
Student Support Services (25 Activities)

Of these 150 Activities, Title III was a source of support for 133; at least 139 were able to present some good evidence of partial (or in a few cases, total) support from the regular institutional budget. Many of the Activities were also supported, usually in part, by foundations, Federal grants other than Title III, businesses, special state appropriations, and other "soft" or temporary money sources.

III. ANALYSES IN BRIEF, AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:
INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL

A. Characterization of Institutions as Strong, Stable, or Vulnerable

As an analytic strategy, it was decided first to evaluate the overall developmental status of each of the 51 institutions in terms of characteristics expressing current status and trends and to assign institutions to strong or positively developing, stable, and vulnerable groups. Then, factors that might account for these differences could be more readily and reliably extrapolated by contrasting the several institutional groups.
Utilizing all data assembled on the institutions, a fiscal, management, and program specialist (each of whom had also served frequently on the site visit teams), each independently attempted to rate the developmental status of the institution in his area. The principal focus in this assessment was on qualities that express the current intent of Title III, that is, on fiscal health and viability, together with quality of program for the students served. Some care was taken to identify conditions or qualities, and to avoid the forces and processes contributing to these conditions and qualities; the latter was to be determined by contrasting the institutional groupings by developmental status.

For the classification in terms of fiscal development, emphasis was placed on such fiscal indicators as trends in and sources of revenue; the distribution of expenditures; the unrestricted current fund balance; and enrollment. In the program domain, attention was focused on proportions and absolute amounts expended on instruction; the student-faculty ratio; quality and morale of faculty; student morale; quality of academic and/or technical program offerings; nature of student support and academic resources available; and clarity and distinctiveness of educational mission. In the administrative/management domain; the evaluation considered absence of friction within the governing board or between the board and president; the appropriateness of the size and composition of the board; the attitude of board, faculty, and staff toward the president; the president's knowledgability about the institution; his or her tenure and active involvement in institutional affairs (i.e., not on leave), and absence of any significant challenge to his or her tenure; the coverage of other administrative functions by appropriate staff, and their knowledgability about the institution; reasonable continuity of key administrators, and absence of conflict among them; the absence of significant institutional crises (lawsuits, scandals, disruptive protests, etc.); and adequacy of physical facilities.

Of the 51 institutions, nine were placed through this rating process in the "strong" or positively developing category, with overall positive ratings in each of the three domains; 20 were unanimously placed in the stable category; and eight institutions were unanimously rated as "vulnerable." The remaining 14 institutions received mixed ratings among the three domains, with six rated positively in the fiscal domain, seven rated positively in the management domain, and six rated positively in the program domain (but each rated as stable or "vulnerable" in one or both of the other two domains).
All but one of the 9 strong institutions were privately controlled; all 8 vulnerable institutions were privately controlled. The public institutions represented half of the mixed group, and over half of the stable group. Traditionally black institutions appeared to be more evenly distributed among the four groups, with four in the strong group, seven in the stable group, six in the vulnerable group, and ten in the mixed group.

It should be noted that, of the criterion qualities distinguishing the strong from the vulnerable institutions, the most consistent indicator was a trend of increasing positive unrestricted current fund balances (UCFBs) over the five-year period reviewed. In effect, this was the individual criterion factor appearing to be the most highly related to all the other factors reflecting such criterion qualities as program quality, enrollment increase, faculty and student morale, appropriateness of size and composition of the board, etc.—though perhaps largely as a function of our definition. Within the four groups, the median value for the 1981 UCFB was: for the strong group, $314,000; for the stable group, $161,000; for the mixed group, $92,000; and for the vulnerable group, minus $295,000.

B. Factors Differentiating or "Explaining" the Differences in Developmental Status

Institutions rated positively were then contrasted with the other groups, to determine what factors or forces might be associated with the differences in developmental status, or that might constitute plausible explanations of these differences.

1. The Centrality of the Institution's President in Institutional Development

The most significant potentially causative factor explaining positive developmental status, from the perspective of the fiscal, management, and program observers and analysts, appeared to the leadership and management capability of the institution's president. There was a substantial consistency in the values, foci, and styles of operation of the presidents of the positively developing group which contrasted sharply with the values, foci, and style of operation of the presidents of the stable or vulnerable groups.

A first distinguishing characteristic of the presidents of the successful institutions was that they were rather clearly their institution's prime decisionmaker. They appeared to be firmly in control of their institution's
destiny, and realistic in their assessment of its problems. Yet, the emphasis was seldom "this is what we are," but rather "this is what we are going to be, and this is how far we’ve come to this point." They held a sense of positive optimism about the institution’s future, and were action, not reaction, oriented. This was not a matter of riding rough-shod over the faculty or a president’s council; the presidents of the positively developing institutions generally were good listeners, and acutely aware of serious and creative voices. Yet, as one president put it, "The faculty’s job is to teach; mine is to manage the institution."

A second prime distinguishing characteristic of the presidents of the strong institutions were that they were planful. They started with a keen sense of mission and market on the one hand, and what the institution had to offer on the other; they expressed developmental priorities in these terms. They also seemed to operate with particular sensitivity not so much to impact of prospective changes but with sensitivity to their longer term consequences for the institution as a whole (for example, a new emphasis on remediation was seen as important by the initiating president not so much for its direct impact on students, but more for its pervasive signal to faculty that individual attention to students was valued; this was one of several attempts by a successful president to improve faculty attitudes and behavior toward modal students at that institution). The vision of the presidents of the successful institutions was directed to what the institutions could become 5 or 10 years in the future, and on how they could maintain themselves in that new functioning and condition.

Equally striking was the sense of pervasive fiscal awareness of the presidents of the strong institutions. Major decisions were made in a cost context; or, the decision procedures were so established that costs would be the controlling factor. There was an equal concern with revenue potential, with fiscal priorities well articulated. The presidents not only were aware of the various factors contributing to revenue generation, but were actively involved in this arena, whether seeking ways to increase enrollment, or actively and personally pursuing new revenue sources, or both. Day to day cash management and expenditure control was generally delegated, but always in a context of clear rules and constant monitoring and adjustment when necessary. In contrast to the presidents of the vulnerable institutions, the presidents at strong institutions were never surprised or caught off guard by a "sudden"
fiscal emergency: initial investments were made with an eye to contingencies, a plan for monitoring, and one or more avenues for new support or graceful retrenchment or revision, before a new venture could become overwhelming or threaten other desirable ongoing enterprise. Budgets were based on money assuredly to be available. The presidents of the strong institutions were, as one analyst expressed it, "conservative entrepreneurs" who did not delegate the responsibilities--only associated tasks--of revenue generation; they were equally mindful of the necessity of expenditure control.

The attitude of the presidents of the strong institutions toward Title III funds was particularly distinctive. First, although all Activities examined pre-dated the enlarged emphases in the 1980 legislation on the attainment of self-sufficiency, the presidents had at the outset considered this source of support to be ephemeral, and had planned from the beginning to structure the Activity so that it could make its own place in the fabric of the institution. For some, this meant emphasis on what added assets and resources the institution would have at the termination of the current funding; for all, this meant a preconceived strategy for assuming support by revenue or savings generated, for using initial success or substance to attract continuation funds from other sources, or by displacing funds from less desirable activity. These presidents were acutely aware of the consequences of a cessation of special support, and planned accordingly. Second, the developmental Activities selected represented prime and deliberate priorities of the president, and were clearly not random faculty entrepreneurship nor a simple attempt to capitalize on funds that were available for a specific purpose; the institution's purpose, expressed through Title III or other soft money sources as specific kinds of Activity, was held prior to the opportunity, and was considered to express high developmental priority. The presidents of the strong institutions produced their shopping lists first, and were not distracted by an available item not consistent with their priorities. Third, the presidents had done their homework personally--they were familiar with the statute and regulations, and had been actively involved in the preparation of the application, and in many instances had had personal and direct contact with Title III staff in Washington; they less frequently were involved in hearings or meetings with political representatives. Finally, they were genuinely positive in regard to requirements and procedures, as frequently evidenced in these cases by the adoption and application of Title III monitoring and management practices to other developmental or operational activity.
Many of the presidents of the strong group had also addressed the improvement of their board's functioning in revenue generation and in understanding the substantive issues driving major decisions. It was not unusual that an institutional turn-around appeared to have come with some crisis prompting the board to take on a new president; the new president then frequently went to work on the board, as well as on the institution's problems. The boards of the successful institutions tended to be eclectic in membership, more faithful in attendance, more active in key committee work, and more involved in policy relevant to the institution's developmental needs, and not relegated to a position of providing only emotional support to the president.

2. Characteristics of Senior Administrative Staffs at the Strong Institutions

The senior administrative staffs of the strong institutions were also distinctive in a number of plausible ways. First, there were few incumbents from a prior administration in place, whether the institution had then been moving positively or not; the presidents of these institutions had picked their own teams. Second, the administrative staffs seemed to be relatively lean. They tended to have positive regard for one another in public or in private, and aware that as a team they were in some sense interdependent; this in turn appeared to be a function of delegation of responsibilities and delineation of limits by the president, and some considerable and deserved security of the incumbents in their assigned role.

Two key positions appeared to be those of the Chief Academic officer and the Chief Fiscal Officer, the former designated to manage the faculty and academic program, and the latter to provide the staff functions of adequate accounting procedures, timely reports, and control of expenditures.

With regard to the chief academic officers at the strong institutions, these were the individuals charged with operating the academic program and maintaining productivity and morale among the faculty. In these roles, they presided relatively impartially over the teaching faculty and the academic/technical programs, and were generally perceived as able spokespersons for the faculty and fair reconcilers in academic debate. However, as a group, the chief academic officers at the successful institutions were more than this traditional officer over the past few years. They had much to do with expanding the concept and the availability of various forms of faculty development, and--particularly germane to this group of institutions--had creative roles in
reviewing and expanding the academic/technical offerings. They were on the "side" of institutional development more than on the side of traditional faculty values, and were generally open to new (sometimes controversial career-oriented) program offerings and new student populations. Nevertheless, they retained the traditional role as the formulators and guardians of academic quality and standards, and tended to be respected for this by all thriving segments of their academic community.

The chief fiscal officers at the strong institutions tended to be individuals acutely concerned with good funds management and accounting practices and procedures, and the integration of these functions with other institutional functions; they were individuals who, despite serving essentially a staff function, could hold their own in meetings of the board, the president's council, or the faculty. They enjoyed the full confidence of their presidents, who prized them for particular qualities: timely and accurate operating reports, attention to audit requirements, the interpretation and application of controls, and, in some instances, knowledge of the investment market. Though most of the institutions involved tended to be relatively small, the fiscal support staffs were well-developed, with relatively little turnover; they knew their assigned functions, and were oriented toward accuracy and timely production. While the prime characteristic of the strong institutions in this area was the availability of good accounting information available in a timely fashion to decision makers in appropriate form, and the avoidance at year's end of audit exceptions, there was also a pervasive concern by the chief fiscal officers with reading the data to identify problems (e.g., student accounts receivables, or escalating damage from deferred maintenance), and active involvement in relieving these problems. The strong institutions were also notable for the fact that all administrative or faculty staff persons with budget responsibility appeared to know where they stood each month, from information routinely provided through the chief fiscal officer.

The chief fiscal officers of the vulnerable institutions were the mirror image of these characteristics; rapid turnover was frequently apparent in these instances, and not infrequently this appeared to be not only a function of poor management but also of improper practices that had come distressingly to light. The strong institutions had chief fiscal officers of unquestionable integrity in all personal and professional senses.
Other administrative officers played more variable roles, and seemed, in general, to exercise less control in establishing developmental options; a notable exception involved some institutions where the president had delegated some of his functions to a strong senior vice president or provost, to permit more personal time to be given to fund raising. The chief student affairs officers tended to focus on keeping the campus a comfortable living environment; student support services at the strong institutions were generally integrated with the academic functions, and the critical shots were called in that area, not so much by student personnel officers and staff. The development office functions were generally not well established in any of the institutions, although many were beginning to move in this direction.

Special attention was devoted to the Title III coordinators; in most instances, this was, of course, the individual serving as the president's delegate to arrange the site visit meetings and to provide additional material as requested or needed. Over the total group of institutions, the Title III coordinator incumbents represented a considerable variety of backgrounds, current roles, and future prospects with the institutions. Some were principally a minority representative on a majority campus, functioning here largely in a symbolic way; some were simply administrative assistants or aides; others were individuals of substantial credentials or corollary responsibilities. Some were comfortable and secure, while others were obviously concerned with what would happen to them when Title III funds expired.

The strong institutions, while experiencing some of these varieties, had Title III coordinators who not only reported to the president or a strong chief academic officer, but also did in fact do so frequently and personally, and who enjoyed his or her respect and support. All coordinators in the strong institutions saw their futures bound to how well they performed for the institution, not with how well they performed for Title III program management. They were individuals of disciplinary substance, secure in their current or prospective roles with the institution. Some were, in fact, and others operated as if they were, the chairperson of an effective long range planning committee; they were as much or more concerned with broader institutional development as they were with the operation of Title III activities per se. And, they appeared to be concerned with the institution as a whole, not just a particular program area.
The Title III coordinators at the less clearly successful or vulnerable institutions tended to spend their time "coordinating"—that is, they prepared operational manuals, were in the sign-off chain for approving expenditures, and served as an administrative secretary at application time. There were some notable exceptions in the stable or vulnerable institutions, where the Title III coordinator was one of the strongest developmental agents in the administration; yet, in none of these instances had he or she really been in a position to affect the overall institution very much.

3. Practices or other Factors Appearing to Distinguish the Strong Institutions

Many of the distinguishing practices that appeared to explain institutional differences in developmental status have been expressed in the foregoing subsections, but some others deserve special note.

For most of the institutions reviewed, any formal long-range planning activity or emphasis was absent; yet, this did not hold for the majority of the institutions rated as strong. Several had had some formal concern and activity in this regard over a ten-or twelve-year period, frequently prompted by an accrediting review, a self-study, and/or a concern widely held that more structure and direction was needed in deciding among options for the future. Faculty and administrators were variously involved; the structure for the planning activity tended to change from time to time, or to move from periods of activity to periods of quiescence. Though in an initial document some recommendations were generally made to a president, it was apparent that rules for decisions, or priority areas for examination, or a structure for proceeding was a matter of presidential involvement and guidance. Yet, the fact that groups of individuals broadly representative of institutional goals and functions worked together to debate and spell out priorities seemed, in the strong institutions, to have provided a positive focus and general awareness of desirable directions about which most members of the institutional community were aware and supportive.

The strong institutions had tended to take accreditation renewal (at the general level), or accreditation of particular programs (by the appropriate national agency), seriously. Accreditation was not just something fervently hoped for, but something planned and deliberately stalked. Accreditation needs frequently seemed in these instances to merge well with Title III options, and to add legitimacy and urgency to attaining the quality-related objectives.
The strong institutions combined a strong sense of mission with an orientation to their current and prospective markets. They seemed to share a sense of why students were attracted, and, at the same time, to go to work on their behalf. Admissions and recruiting functions were given high priority, with increasing aggressiveness and targeting of prospective students.

Prospective new or enhanced programs tended to build on, rather than to displace, existing strengths, and there were few if any detectable tendencies at the strong institutions to proliferate, to go in several diverse directions at once. The trend in most of the institutions in program development was toward more pragmatic or career-specific programs: e.g., areas like business administration, justice administration, health careers, and media and communications were expanding, with some decline in many of the more traditional liberal arts and sciences areas. Most institutions were taking basic skills more seriously, and viewing this area as something other than a salvage operation or an odious necessity. The transition to a more pragmatic program orientation seemed to be moving smoothly at the strong institutions, with a new sense of pride and quality; the vulnerable institutions, on the other hand, seemed less sure as to what they were about, more likely to defend blindly the "traditional" values and programs, and less susceptible to change, with pockets of vested interest holding on grimly enough in some instances to prevent an exciting new program or department from getting off the ground.

The strong institutions were also those that were frequently able to supplement Title III funds with other special "soft" monies to facilitate or speed up development, or to cover special costs believed essential but unallowable under Title III. In none of these cases were the efforts a simple result of raw grantmanship, but, as for the basic Title III funds, represented a planful and deliberate search to cover predetermined priorities, with versatility in selling assets or potentials. And, whatever soft monies the strong institutions had acquired, there was good evidence that their infusion covered activities already integrated within the regular organizational structure of the institution, and did not constitute special and separate pockets of activity operating outside the traditional channels.

The strong institutions had also clearly made better use of consultants and assisting agencies. This seemed to be a function of exploration before commitment, use of established agencies or professional groups (e.g., accrediting commission staff,) sorting out to truly useful assistance sources quickly,
and the use of outsiders to help develop capability internally rather than to provide it as a continuing service. The developmental Activity directors at the strong institutions tended to know where similar institutions had had success experiences in the tasks of concern.

As noted elsewhere, Title III requirements were seldom challenged, more frequently adopted and applied to other efforts outside Title III, at the strong institutions. These were also the locales where the developmental efforts supported by Title III became the elite efforts, not those stigmatized by associations with less desirable students or salvage operations. The data also clearly suggest, however, that when Title III funds exceed some portion of total revenue (about 8 or 10 percent), the institution (a) is more likely to be in the vulnerable category, and (b) is less likely to be able to see the developmental effort attain operational fruition after Title III support ceases. In such instances, it seemed that dependence on Title III was encouraged, or that the amount of the "loan" exceeded the prospects for payoff, or that Title III was carrying in some way a vital portion of the ongoing operating costs, at least to the extent that its removal would leave some serious holes in staffing and functioning.

Finally, it was noted that the institutions varied substantially in their stage of readiness for development, as a function of a number of factors. Some institutions entered the current decade with adequate and cost-efficient buildings and equipment, while others were now suffering because of long-deferred maintenance costs. Some had relatively stagnant and marginally qualified faculty, with able newcomers quickly cooled out; others, including some with faculty salary schedules low in comparison to other institutions in the sample, had found ways to attract and maintain a high quality faculty that afforded some guarantee that program development funds would be used well. And, some institutions were impacted heavily by such external context factors as competition from nearby lower cost public institutions or problems in the local economy. Those institutions with their house reasonably in order at the beginning were more likely to make good use of the Title III investment; those institutions overwhelmed by problems prompting a constant crisis situation or a continuing hand-to-mouth condition were less likely to be able to look very clearly beyond the current year. The dilemma posed is that Title III is intended to impact on developmental condition, yet appears (and plausibly so) to improve condition to a much greater degree at the institutions with sub-
stantial developmental momentum already underway. The issue is further complicated by the general finding that whatever the developmental status of the institution, it is those activities that institutional sources are truly convinced they need, and have laid a groundwork for prior to Title III funding, that are used to developmental advantage. Those activities imposed on the institution from outside, however reasonable, are less likely to be taken seriously or used to developmental advantage—they are as if tolerated as a condition of the grant, and cast aside when no longer required for that purpose or when they no longer come free. This was particularly apparent, for example, in the MIS development area, where there was either poor progress, or good progress with not many people paying attention to the data except for routine operational purposes.

IV. ANALYSIS IN BRIEF, AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: ACTIVITY LEVEL

A. Criteria for Determining Success of Individual Developmental Activities

Under the current interpretations of Title III intent, any developmental activity should bring the institution closer to the ability to maintain itself without further Federal support for that or other purposes. Some Activities are, essentially, one-time only efforts—e.g., involving the acquisition of equipment, or a management reorganization—that leave important no-cost residues; others lead to new ongoing operations that must be supported if they continue. Most Title III activity falls in the latter category.

Activities designed to initiate continuing operational activity which requires fiscal support may be successfully institutionalized (i.e., their potential validated) only if either:

1) funds for the new activity costs can be generated by the activity operation either through new revenue or cost savings achieved through the activity itself, where institutional policy allows such increase or cost savings to be invested in continuance or surplanted funds to be used; or

2) funds for the activity can be and are displaced from less desirable activities; or

3) the case for new costs can be and is successfully sold to the regular fiscal authority (if publicly supported) or to a new support source (public or private institutions); or

4) the case for the urgency or desirability of increasing revenue in general to cover the activity is made sufficiently by the experience
that revenue generation activities in general are deliberately and effectively enhanced; or

5) new or operational costs are insignificant (e.g., although substantial start-up or developmental costs may be involved, the result is a modified but no more costly replacement program or effort).

The reasoning suggests that one should be able to characterize a developmental Activity as successful if the conditions it was intended to improve are improved, or if the ongoing activity it intended to set in motion proceeds after the developmental period, without deleterious impact on (or, more simply and directly, without decline in) such bottom line indicators as overall enrollment or current fund balances. In short: whether a developmental activity is actually institutionalized or not in its operational form becomes an important criterion of success. One also needs to know how operating costs are covered, however, and what is happening to the overall fiscal condition of the institution.

Yet, the experience of examining the some 150 developmental Activities intensely in the context of asking what indeed each contributed to the totality of the institution constantly illuminated the fact that an institution is the sum of all the forces it experiences and all of its component parts. This raises a simple question: How reasonable is it to try to detect change at the institutional level that may be associated with any single Activity? It was noted, too, that some desirable Activities were not intended to "make money" but add dimensions of depth and quality. And, of course, it was recognized at the outset, and verified many times over in the case studies, that exemplary Activities could be found in overall contexts that overwhelmed any positive impact—that is, that highly significant developmental activity, as a function of attaining its reasonable and valued objectives, could be found in many instances where the overall trend was one of continuing decline at the institutional level.

Yet, Title III funds—and most other forms of soft money support for developmental purposes—are not awarded on a general, block grant basis, but for specific propositions (i.e., developmental Activities) that can be construed as reasonable investments, and that can be monitored as to the specific progress made in carrying them out.

Although all Activities examined were nominated with the belief that they had served institutional purposes well (or, in a few instances, were added
because they so impressed the site visitors), a considerable variety of apparent success was found in each Activity area. For example, one new program development Activity now in the operational phase had in and of itself clearly turned around a major decline in enrollment, with added tuition income clearly supporting more than the costs of the program; at the other extreme in this area were new programs that failed to attract the expected students, or that were abandoned because other changes in the overall condition, at no fault of the Activity, prompted further belt-tightening. In a few instances, new operational programs were continued in spite of poor subscription by students and obvious drains on meager budgets. But in between such extremes were Activities in various stages of development and/or institutional assumption of costs, with various objectives and later options for contribution to the institution and for their support.

The following criteria were applied in distinguishing successful developmental Activities:

1) The Activity has (or promises to have) recognized and recognizable value in relation to its objectives and place in the institution or in relation to its consequences for the institution;

2) There are at present detectable positive outcomes and consequences that outweigh any detectable negative outcomes and consequences;

3) The Activity contributes (or promises to contribute) in demonstrable ways to institutional condition—e.g., it attracts new revenue, it provides a necessary function at a lower cost, it increases or stabilizes enrollment, it improves the quality of instruction or instructional resources, it places the institution in a better competitive position for students or new revenue, it leads to a greater capacity for change in positive directions, etc.;

4) It is accepted or valued and utilized on a continuing basis, by the relevant constituent members of the institution (administrators, faculty, students) in terms of its original or revised purpose.

B. Factors Related to Success of Developmental Activities

This section will present, first, some of the characteristics found associated with successful Activities in general, no matter what their content. Then, for each of the major kinds of Activities reviewed, some factors appearing to be associated with the success of that particular kind of Activity will be summarized.
1. Factors Related to Success of Developmental Activities in General

Whatever the nature of the particular developmental Activity, some observed factors seemed to distinguish the successful from the unsuccessful in plausible ways. In effect, these are by and large institutional factors, and are not inconsistent with observations presented in the prior section; nevertheless, they reflect conditions or circumstances that emerge rather clearly when the successful Activities are contrasted with those judged less satisfactory.

First: the origin of the notion or concept for the Activity seems to be strongly predictive of what may become of it if development is pursued. Successful Activities generally were not those solely suggested by institutional guesses of what would be funded and what not, nor the result or any quick search or creativity at application writing time: instead, most had had thought, attention, some ground work, and in many cases some real investment of time and money (hard or soft), for two or more years prior to their first presentation in a Title III application. This and other more direct evidences suggest that the successful Activities are those where the need and priority for what they may contribute was recognized at an institutional level, and that stood the test of examination over time; success of these Activities may also stem in part from the fact that some necessary start-up planning or work had already been accomplished, and/or that the necessary resources short of those realizable immediately from the grant were in place. A distressing dilemma frequently noted with some floundering Activities, or some of those abandoned quickly upon cessation of support, was that these Activities, though usually directed toward a need obvious to the site visitors, had their origin in pressure from Title III program staff, and were a response to obvious trouble or weakness. This phenomenon did not seem to hold when the origin was in some deliberate review of a point made in a good self-study or an accrediting review, or by a respected consultant with nothing to gain personally from the decision by the institution to move ahead in the direction suggested. The experiences even more likely to be disastrous were those sold by a seller prompted by, or susceptible to, profit motives--e.g., computer hardware salesmen--or by someone who would provide some required continuing service.

Other factors associated with success are suggested by other aspects of origin. Successful Activities tend to be those related to institutional mission in some essential way: they correct an inadequacy in carrying out
that mission, or they help bring it to fuller expression. Successful Activities also tend to be those new-venture activities that have the involvement and support of the president as well as other administrative officers concerned, and frequently can be found as priorities in the president's prior reports to the board or in planning documents that predate substantially the Title III application.

Another characteristic of successful Activities detectable potentially at the outset was that their goals were clearly realistic, sometimes to the point of approaching modesty. The student services program that would reduce attrition by 50 percent, for example, was much less likely to be impressive on any count than the program that projected a 10 percent reduction. This may be a signal that the originators of good Activity know pretty well what they can realistically achieve, or that a modest goal, when exceeded, reinforces the apparent success. It was believed, however, that the matter was more a function of the former, when competent judgments of what would be reasonable goals were made at the beginning, with assurance that that progress would be satisfactory if those terms were acceptable, and that the objectives could indeed be attained.

It was also noted that, where products or services are involved, the origin was more frequently in the mind of the utilizer or beneficiary of any services or products to be produced, rather than in the mind of the individual assigned or aspiring to be the product developer. There were some notable exceptions, particularly in the program area; but, the finding again suggests that the institution is the real and proper beneficiary, not the developer himself.

There were striking differences in some pre-planning hurdles for the successful Activities. In the successful instances, some appropriate authority--usually the president--moved only after considering how associated costs outside the grant could be picked up, and how increasing support over time by the institution could be derived or achieved. Successful Activities were in most cases those where real development time and costs were known, and strategies for the assumption of support for the Activity (or for the developers, in some instances) had been projected, examined, and judged reasonable. In short, though development was seen as a risk, the risk-taking was relatively conservative, and prospects for bringing the diver to the surface were considered carefully before the plunge. Those blinded by the prospect of sudden wealth for an attractive purpose did not fare so well with their largesse, if
achieved. Also characteristically anticipated in the success experiences were not just the formal outcomes desired, but the positive and negative consequences for the institution as a whole—with action taken to encourage the positive consequences, and to neutralize or vitiate the negative. Hosts of examples came with probing—e.g., the president who gave equal priority and greater effort to raise some development money elsewhere for development in the humanities, while going hard after Title III for new (and more pragmatic) program areas; or, the institution deliberately involved in the careful seduction of the faculty to the computer, apace with more general automation of records, by deliberately making hands-on experience attractive and easy.

Another characteristic of the successful developmental Activity was that it was not housed in some special place until it had proved itself worthy, but from the beginning was placed in the responsibility of the regular producers and consumers, as prescribed by the organization chart and regular responsibilities. This tended to hold in many cases even when some key person in the organizational hierarchy was skeptical at first, as long as the priority at the top was clear. Perhaps even more importantly, the successful Activities were those that were built on existing strengths—that utilized staff ready to move into larger responsibilities, that used one or more existing courses if a new program Activity, that capitalized on available resources, that accentuated a growing market, etc.—rather than those that attempted to generate everything needed de novo.

The initiation processes for the successful Activities also presented some clearly distinctive differences. First, general concern that the Activity should be made a success by all involved was characteristic of the to-be-successful Activities, which were previewed in positive terms and facilitated actively as they proceeded. Considerable care was taken to place development in capable hands—if assigned to a current staff or faculty member, to someone believed from prior experience to be a person who could carry it off; or, if to a new person brought in, one whose potential utility to the institution would go beyond that developmental responsibility per se. If particular technical competence was required for a person to be specially hired—as was frequently the case in MIS development—evidence of competency that the president or administrative officer concerned could understand were required, such as prior products, or (in some cases) successful performance as a consultant or member of an assisting agency, or the recommendations of trusted
professionals with known and appropriate experience themselves. In general, where an Activity represented something relatively new for the institution, good consultants quickly invoked proved to be key--again with the proviso that they were so situated (e.g., as secure professional staff of a regional accrediting agency) that their motivation was clearly service rather than profit related, and their focus was on helping the institution rather than helping themselves. There were also some general features that characterized the carrying out of the successful developmental Activity. These Activities were, first, watched closely and personally by at least the developer’s supervisor, and in many cases those higher in the organization line. The presidents were aware of the specific progress--probably not just because progress was good, but because he or she was keeping up with it personally. Many successful Activities were show-pieced both at home and abroad, which could be a function of early apparent success for any reason, but which seemed more frequently to represent facilitating strategies or an early test of potential or salability. Costs were watched closely, and progress was actively monitored--not only by the Title III coordinator, but also by the administrators concerned, with special intervention if schedules were not met or unusual difficulties emerged. There was a press--usually from the developers themselves--for supplemental funds other than Title III, and while many of the successful Activity directors gave prime credit to Title III if that were involved, many had found supplemental funds to sweeten the pot, cover needed but unallowable costs in terms of Title III specifications, extend the developmental time period in a needed way, or solidify a prospective success through extended tryout. These findings may, of course, stem from the fact that the prospect in itself was attractive as a likely winner to other soft money investors, but the impact of additional funds generally seemed to be beneficial. At the activity level, only two or three clear instances of deleterious impact from overfunding over any period of time by multiple support was apparent (these were costly new program ventures that had seemed promising but as yet had attracted few students). Most of the institutions weren’t very proficient in getting more money than they needed for real developmental purposes outside of Title III.

The successful Activities also were those with built-in criteria of a cost accounting sort. The probable costs were anticipated; if met and not exceeded, the work progressed. Few of the institutions had significant bail-out funds; but, those that attempted to bail out Activities generating significant
unanticipated costs generally seemed to suffer in the long run or be as a consequence in a situation of real risk. Some situations were noted—for example, need to upgrade computational equipment—where the new costs were deliberately considered and the necessary funds sought deliberately before purchasing or leasing the replacement equipment, with some slowdown in the interim more tolerable than the act of robbing (or borrowing from) Peter to pay Paul.

The successful Activities supported by Title III funds almost always had principals who viewed Title III not as a gaggle of rich maiden aunts in Washington who hopefully wouldn't visit them any time soon, but as a group of respected professionals, whose requirements were reasonable, whose prescriptions would be listened to carefully, and whose interests would not be subverted for any reason, fair or foul. Where the institution tended to see Title III as somewhat tainted rather than elite money—as for "perpetrating salvage operations" or "inflicting" faculty with less desirable students—the Activities, whatever their nature, tended to flounder and fizzle out. The Activities were more likely to prosper when construed or interpreted as elite or prestigious in terms of campus values.

Finally, before examining specific Activity types, it should again be noted that the institutional base provided any Activity has a large role in its success. Institutions in year-to-year decline seldom seemed either to turn around on the basis of one or more good and exciting Activities, or to be able to maintain many developmental Activities to any fruition. Activities were much more likely to be successful at institutions moving purposefully and planfully, rather than attempting to hold to lost dreams or operating on a crisis management basis. The strong institutions were, of course, the institutions also strong enough to sustain the Activity if successful, and not to suffer unduly if it had to be abandoned.

2. Factors Related to Success of Specific Kinds of Developmental Activity
   a. MIS and Fiscal Accounting Systems Activity

   A frequently nominated and investigated Activity type was something labeled Management Information Systems development. Some of these were primarily involved with fiscal data (general accounting, payrolls, etc.); some were primarily directed toward student based operational data (transcripts, student aid, registration, space usage, etc.). Most of these developmental Activities had been funded by Title III three or more years at the time of the
site visits; yet, there was a wide range of rate of progress in terms of what systems were up and operating routinely.

When the emphasis was on fiscal data, the successful Activities tended to have been originated by the president or the chief fiscal officer, with both or either stating a recognition of a need for more timely month-to-month accounting and projections. There was a recognition of the hazards of delayed reporting, and of the increasing complexity of accounting needs. (The successful MIS Activities serving student based record systems were less clear or consistent in origin, though the institutional president was seldom out of the picture.) Some presidents of the successful institutions made less than what would be considered optimal use in their own day-to-day planning and work, though an equal number attributed the imposed emphasis on planning and the associated emphasis on timely information the major positive impact of Title III on their institution and management capability. But in all successful instances, the systems developed were for a variety of consumers, and designed to ease day-to-day operations and reporting.

The successful systems in either mode were without exception directed by individuals with two distinct kinds of capability: (1) technical competencies in developing and working with automated data systems, and (2) a service orientation to the potential uses and users, and a strong interest in working for or with them in achieving a useful product. Nevertheless, most had had outside help from consultants and/or assisting agencies at the beginning, and consequently had grown in the job; frequently these developers were former faculty or associate administrators who had become interested and had devoted time to learning their skills in other contexts at the institution before taking on the formal MIS development. The mirror image generally spelled disaster, or very limited progress, which seemed to be predictable where the developer had limited technical ability, had a disinterested faculty and/or administration, and exhibited little outreach in looking for ways to be useful.

Whatever their emphasis, successful MIS Activities appeared to follow a sequence something like this: (1) recognition and assignment of priority to need for a more efficient systems; (2) careful advance planning as to what the system should progressively accomplish; (3) exploring software options for specific priorities of kinds of data and outputs, both with other institutions of similar size and resources, and with consultants or assisting agencies; (4) committing to software so determined, with an eye to needed and practical
modifications; (5) selecting hardware based on needs and software options selected; (6) giving special attention to convincing adversaries that the systems would be useful (not infrequently, in general training or workshop settings, or by teaching them something useful they could accomplish; and, by taking care to have back-up manual systems so failure during development would not be total disaster); and (7) giving constant attention to user interests and needs, and manifesting versatility in creating add-on modifications.

In general, consortia approaches seemed to work well when a computer or MIS center served each institution in that institution's own terms, and did not seem to work well when the institutions tried first to agree on data and format needs, then turn the matter over to the programmers. Resolving inter-institution differences before starting work on the software generally did not get much moving very fast (particularly when the prime developer was the potential user of the data, not the software specialist). Consortia or shared service centers were sparse in the sample of Activities and the interpretations are open to some question on this basis. A more clear correlate of developmental difficulties was initial commitment to hardware, and/or dependence on the hardware manufacturer or salesman for advice, software, and technical assistance.

b. **PME-MIS Activity**

Developmental Activities entitled and concerned with Planning, Management, and Evaluation (PME) systems, and sometimes described as PME-MIS with the MIS function clearly emphasized as well, were distinctly different from the MIS labeled Activities in that their emphasis was first and primarily on planning, with any MIS development function not really represented or lagging (although in one case, where all attempts at planning had failed to accomplish anything, attention had turned to the MIS development function).

What PME actually consisted of turned out to be quite variously interpreted. For some, it was essentially the generation of operational manuals; others focused on cost analyses and budget projections. Some focused on evaluation; others were involved in attempts to explicate mission or to create objectives for a management by objectives system. Most involved the creation of a planning document, which was generally a report of what had been accomplished in any formal planning activity. Those PME Activities judged to be operating well and of developmental value focused more generally on planning,
and were concerned with overall planning as a process, concerned with evaluating program performance, making projections, and determining priorities for development in some systematic way—in short, they were the umbrella for some formalization and systematizing of a more general planning process involving individuals in debate with one another, committees making particular inquiries, etc., but resulted in some criteria and projections or recommendations. They also were generally those giving emphasis as well to MIS development, or leaning on such capability in place.

The successful PME Activities traced their origins 5 or 10 years back, and clearly predated Title III support. Some useful start had been achieved in which the president was interested; developmental support made it possible to relieve a key committee chairperson of other duties, and turn him or her loose for all or a major part of available time. The Activity directors tended to be institutional-loyal and skilled planning committee chairpersons (or a lesser person striving to achieve that status); the focus was on working through the political structure and using it to achieve insight, creative thinking, and reason for the overall institutional-benefit. The successful PME Activities also made costs and productivity indices central in the planning mechanisms created, involved some formal training components for planning participants, and served as a prime basis for determining budgetary priorities.

Probably in no instance was a truly model PME system found, nor were associated ongoing and systematic data systems to operate as a formal part of the PME system very well integrated. The variety of efforts also suggested that in this area the institutions decidedly needed instruction and structure beyond what a passing consultant, a brief workshop, or a mail-order manual could provide, and that others than the Activity director needed to be involved in this personal development.

c. Institutional Research Activity

Developmental Activity under the label "institutional research," tended to be generally unimpressive; not infrequently, where operating without an effective MIS, it appeared to be the poor man's substitute for an MIS. The incumbent directors represented a variety of disciplines and levels; many focused on descriptive compilations of relatively routine data of greater interest to the institutional researcher than others. For some, this seemed a way to do something in the management area for which a loyal faculty or administrative staff member could assume responsibility. The two clear exceptions
were, in one instance, an Activity created by a president with a good idea of the kind of data he needed for decisions, board meetings, speeches outside the college, etc., and where a thriving MIS was already in place; the other was an instance where a remarkable young lady, also with access to an exemplary MIS and its responsive director, could always suggest useful analyses to address any issue of interest. In both of these instances, the incumbent directors were skilled in the beginning in developing or adapting information systems to particular purposes. It was learned that the key questions to ask were not "What do you do?" and "How often?" but rather "Whom are you assisting?", "Where do you get your data?", and "What have you been able to do for those you assist?" Too frequently, the site visitors found exciting data produced but few relevant people on campus who could say anything about it, much less generalize from it. The institutional research Activity was one of the more frequent not to survive when developmental funding ceased, or to disappear as a formal function with the separate achievement of a good MIS system.

d. Long-Range Planning Activity

Activities labeled as Long-Range Planning tended to reflect planning in the most traditional, yet solid, sense; the focus was using a process involving individuals and committees of different perspectives, establishing special task forces, and placing some synthesis of opinion or findings in the service of the institution. Though the fiscal aspects of planning were not featured, they clearly were not ignored.

The successful Activities in this area seemed to be the administrative development Activity most consistently associated with the separately determined overall positive institutional development status; and, four of the five LRP activities examined were rated as successful. Communalities among these four included: origin in the early 1970's; a period of approximately 10 years in which progressive planning activities were engaged in; initiation three to five years before taking on Title III support; original impetus in an authoritative outside (e.g., accrediting commission) or inside (e.g., faculty self-study committee) concern; and substantial assistance from the outside in training faculty and administrators in plan development. All were formally concerned with such elements as examination of mission; market and enrollment trends; current resources; projection of effects of present and ideal programs; establishing cost and other criteria for allocation of resources; recommending allocations and noting alternatives; and monitoring, evaluation, and replanning.
Faculty and administrative involvement was generally coordinated by a person all held in respect; the president was never very far away. And, the coor-
dinator generally had an assistant to help collect and assemble data.

e. Other Administrative Development Activities

Overall findings strongly suggest administrative leadership and management skill as the key to successful institutional development (or mainte-
nance, for that matter); most Title III assistance in the management area seemed to focus on funding for equipment for automation, and for the development of MIS or PME systems. The history of the systems work suggests that development, as interpreted by the institutions and Title III program staff, can be a long-term and continuing process as new modules are added or old systems updated; the findings clearly suggest that such factors as modernizing or acquiring equipment are in some instances more powerful incentives in applying for funds than are any real insights into what may be achieved, or how to use it in planning and development; and, it seems apparent that improve-
ment of routine operating efficiency transcends improvement in developmental planning. The successful presidents in some instances seemed to be individuals whose intuitive senses are sharp in less than well charted and documented situations; they must recognize their need for better data if any useful application of the systems instrumentation to top management decisions is to be achieved.

These troublesome matters prompted a closer look at other administrative and fiscal development activity. In the fiscal area, the most exciting other kind of effort was what has been termed "resource enhancement," or improvement of fund raising procedures; useful training was provided, and some real gains were made, yet the institutions concerned have alumni of limited affluence, and are more likely to attract assistance as a matter of need and philanthropy than as a matter or promise and investment. Some of the more impressive work (e.g., the creation of a new administrative unit or a new program) was covered by regular operating funds; indeed, development is an important part of the administrator's job. The more urgent need seemed to be well encapsulated in such developmental Activities as trustee training and the assignment therein to produce trustee handbooks in one instance (involving the president and the Association of Governing Boards), and as general administrator training in another (involving a continuing series of workshops, variously supported and staffed by outside specialists, for administrator development). Also noted is
the clear benefit some institutions realized with the release of the president to other important duties, such as fund raising, by a new appointee to assume some of the president's former responsibilities, or with the placement of a permanent or temporary senior and seasoned administrative aide who served as an advisor and instructor to the president (a matter reportedly working well in some high-risk situations involving foundation assistance).

f. New Program Development Activity

The new program development Activities rated as successful presented some strong lessons in successful development, to some degree from the physical evidences of motivated faculty, adequate resources, and serious students in place, but also from the plausibility of associated features. These programs seemed to start not with a faculty member wishing to expand his area, but by key administrators with a clear view to attracting more students; there was a conscious effort to build on and utilize existing strengths (e.g., to modify other relevant regular courses to permit them to serve double duty), while at the same time to respond to a detected new opportunity, usually in an area without significant competition. The projected programs were part of, and not at variance with, the institution's long-range plan; their fit with mission, or their role in accentuating it, was clear: the opportunities responded to were not those that would proliferate a mission, but that would clarify, tighten, or extend it. The fulfillment of other values—e.g., the attraction of more able students, or the improvement of employability of graduates—was also a frequent consideration.

The successful new program efforts were also marked by careful planning. First, the presidents were usually involved as determiners of priorities. Most institutions contributed some hard dollars to the planning venture from the beginning, and typically, two or more years of intensive planning and data collection had been sustained prior to Title III support (i.e., the findings suggest that these Activities may need a longer period of developmental support than other program development Activities). The planning process was open to general dialogue as it proceeded. There were deliberate efforts to cultivate honest positive attitudes and enthusiasm among the planning members, their colleagues, and the potential program operators.

Curiously, monitoring the initial operational steps following new program development did not seem to be related to success. This may be explained by another observation: generally, a minimum of from 2 to 3 years of experience
and fine tuning seemed to be required to determine whether or not the new program would indeed be viable in its own right, and a contributor to institutional development: early signs frequently proved unreliable.

It was no surprise that new program development efforts that floundered were at variance with a number of the characteristics cited for the successful efforts. Also, some failures were associated with change in the lead person for the development effort, with gross misjudgment of the attractiveness of the program to students (in some cases because of outdating by the time the program was ready to go), or with failure to anticipate early operational costs that the program might need while gaining momentum.

g. Activities Designed to Strengthen, Refine, and Upgrade Existing Programs

These Activities, in contrast to new program development Activities, were generally not directed toward increasing enrollment, but were conscious efforts to improve and augment the legitimacy of current offerings. As upgrading efforts, they were concerned with improving quality; they were not particularly susceptible to any argument for improving revenue in any short-term period in the future, and frequently likely to involve new activity not routinely affordable in the past.

The successful Activities were, as others, marked by support of the president (although in many cases the chief academic officer or a faculty member appeared to be the originator); planning appeared to be constantly cognizant of the place of the improved capability in the light of the historic mission of the institution. There was early and frequent dialogue with outside professionals in the involved disciplines; program strengthening Activities were seldom strictly bootstrap ventures if successful.

The successful Activities also tended to emphasize the deeper academic values and concepts of substance and quality. Accreditation goals were frequently powerful guides and motivators, and adjunct improvements--e.g., a concomitant library development--were powerful convincers that the changes had their own rightful reputability and wider value. The aura of increased professionalism and disciplinary integrity was never far away, and there was conscious effort to displace threat that weaker faculty might feel by providing them encouragement, moral support, and specific upgrading effort as a part of the process.
Activities Involving Enhancements to the Instructional Enterprise

Activities interpreted as involving enhancements to the instructional enterprise encompassed a variety of developmental endeavors: the development of a new instructional approach (e.g., move to a competency-based paradigm); review and revision of curriculum and requirements; developing instructional technologies; developing media and instructional materials; seminar activity of one sort or another; changes in program structure such as adding an internship experience; and creation of some instructional support such as a learning resource center, computer-assisted instruction adjuncts, etc.

Again, as for the program strengthening Activities, these changes represent attempts to improve quality; though increased efficiency may also be involved, they not infrequently result in more added costs than cost savings or new income. What was done is hopefully now to be done better by the same faculty and resources, or there is to be some desirable augmentation involving additional resources. Success, in terms of the mechanisms employed in the study, thus must be judged mostly in terms of the campus response through student and faculty attitudes, the logic of the basic propositions, or some notion of what constitutes quality in a particular area.

Those Activities judged successful were thus necessarily those well-accepted on a campus-wide basis. The origin was frequently with the chief academic officer or a competent and relevant faculty member; presidential determination of priority, support, and enthusiasm seemed less essential, but the underpinning provided by his or her deliberate effort to move faculty in a direction considered desirable was generally detectable with a little probing (in this sense, the successful efforts were those that aimed to go beyond the mere improvement of student opportunity to learn or instructional efficiency, and encompassed improvement of faculty quality and attitudes as well). Most successful Activities in this area draw heavily on some outside professional source or authority, as in a the move to a new approach in vogue elsewhere (e.g., criterion-based instruction; establishment of an instructional media development center). It was noted that if these developmental activities progressed to the point of readiness for operation (seminar activity excluded), they were generally used or institutionalized, and if additional operational funds were required (as for a new Learning Resources Center), they were generally found in the regular budget or through new hard or soft money attracted for that purpose. No Learning Resource Center ghost towns, for example, were found.
i. Student Support Services Activity

The kinds of developmental Activity presented thus far had frequent support outside of Title III; this was not the case for student support services examined, which not only generally had Title III as the sole source of outside support, but also were by far the most frequently nominated kind of program development activity. The programs judged successful in this area tended to be institution-wide, in the sense of serving all students or all students classified as needing special assistance. Deliberate efforts had been made to remove any stigma from use of services, with attention to promoting or achieving legitimacy as to what was done in the eyes of the faculty: this was achieved by such mechanisms as standard setting, the involvement of faculty with relevant disciplines, department controls, or otherwise placing oversight responsibility in the academic as opposed to the student personnel organizational chain of command. One successful basic skills program, for example, set goals at bringing students in their first college year to 10th grade competency levels (with most starting at the seventh or eighth grade levels); the president and academic vice president were able to convince key faculty involved that this was not only a realistic goal, but that real rigor and attention to quality of learning experiences were necessary, and that accomplishment of objectives represented one of the most difficult, but important, challenges extant on that campus. Keeping support services as part of the academic structure in turn frequently led to many other academic support facets or spinoffs: a revised freshman orientation program, required basic skills programs, testing programs, new approaches to academic advising, etc.

Improved retention of students was almost always the stated prime objective for the support services Activities, although the programs were so diffuse, and student involvement sufficiently varied, that attribution of any improvement in retention to a specific service could not be made with confidence. No adequate Activity evaluation efforts were found, nor could good designs be easily achieved. The successful programs were characterized, nevertheless, by greater attention to tracking students, and to maintaining special records on services received and hurdles passed.

Strategies varied considerably, but appeared to be tuned, in the successful programs, to sensitive interpretations of all particular handicaps or barriers the student faced. Thus, one campus notarized two counselors so they could handle financial aid transactions; on another campus, a minor in Native American
Studies was as much an adjunct to improve attitudes toward Native Americans by other students as to provide a study program of interest to Native Americans. Where students were found confronted with personal problems, clinical components were added. Yet, the same array of strategies was found in the student services Activities judged as weak; the strong Activities differed as a function of the energy directed, the commitment of the staff and the nourishment of that commitment by the rest of the campus, their cultivation of and attention to academic values, and efficient coordination of services. That is: where the students affected were truly valued, where the campus dedication to them was real, and where their academic growth was a serious objective, the efforts seemed to be of considerable value. Where the efforts were take-out operations, or a grudging recognition of responsibility imposed by student problems that had to be contended with in some way to ease the institutional conscience, the efforts seemed sterile, and students responded accordingly.

V. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS FOR PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

A. Introduction and Qualifications

Note should again be taken of the particular purposes and strategies of the study. It was not directed toward evaluating Title III, as a Federal program, in terms of its impact on institutional development, or on improving the quality of education, or on enhancing equal opportunity; neither was it concerned with assessing program management practices (this was, however, a purpose of the earlier evaluability assessment3). Rather, the study was concerned, first, with explicating factors of all kinds--institutional, contextual, programmatic--that appear to be related to institutional viability defined essentially in terms of integrity of mission and quality of program, subscription or student enrollment and productivity, and fiscal health, with emphasis on the latter in such terms as revenue and expenditure trends, current fund balances, and formulations of risk position. Second, the study was focused on identifying developmental Activities, or formal units of work,


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supported by specific soft money investment for improving institutional viability, that appeared to serve their developmental purposes well, and on explicating factors associated with the impact of the Activity on the institution. Some indirect inferences can (and surely will) be made as to the plausibility and value of the Title III program from the findings briefly presented in this special report, but the more proper and real utility of the findings is in understanding the forces that moderate successful application of the Title III investment, as a guide to improvement of institutional and Title III Program practices.

The seriously concerned reader involved in any role with the Title III program will have drawn his or her own conclusions, from the findings presented, as to how the impact of the Title III program may be enhanced. But, this is a serious game that the principal investigators in the study should also play. Their interpretations are from a 3-year immersion in examining the intents of the program and what goes on in the field, without distraction by the day-to-day management and political issues. This third party view, though not fettered by some of the daily realities, has a limited but special kind of validity, though final decisions at action points will surely need to be made from multiple frames of reference.

The following sections present what the principal investigators believe to be the most salient general implications, generally intended and expressed as issues for further consideration, of the findings for major functions in the Title III management activity cycle, toward the improvement of the developmental impact of the Federal funds invested. This is done with some apprehension, for the more basic underlying issues are complex, and the study parameters placed certain limitations on any prescriptions drawn entirely therefrom.

B. Implications of the Findings for the Improvement of the Application and Award Process

The application for Title III grant is the basic document on which the decision for award or non-award is based. That document goes through a carefully structured review and recommendation procedure, involving outside readers and program staff, who attempt to determine the reasonableness and integrity of the several Activities proposed, both in their own right and in terms of their impact on the further development of the institution, the adherence to
regulations and allowable costs, and the reasonableness of the funds requested.

Although discrete developmental Activities provide the essential units for review and decision, both collectively and one by one, the finding that certain endemic characteristics and conditions of the institution seem to control the success of the developmental Activity as well as control the overall developmental progress of the institution, reinforces the need to collect and assess relevant evidence in this regard.

The related findings include: (1) the differential current condition and developmental status of the eligible institutions, and their capability to recognize their real needs, select appropriate strategies, carry out particular developmental enterprises, and institutionalize them successfully, with the latter a matter both of utilizing the developmental advances to their fullest potential, and the generation and assumption of fiscal support outside Title III; and (2) the centrality of the president's role in institutional development; (3) the importance of a clear concept of mission, the honest achievement of a reasonable long-range plan, some deliberate prioritizing of developmental options, and some preliminary work (beyond the planning that started with application preparation) on the developmental Activity itself.

This suggests that the application should provide as much objective information as possible on the current condition and developmental status of the institution, and trends in the recent past. It is believed that this could reasonably include a 5-year history of fiscal status (probably best expressed in terms of the year-end current unexpended fund balances) and FTE enrollment; the institution's perception of its mission and market; a summary of recent past developmental effort or activities, however supported, and what the impact and consequences have been (in particular, what has been institutionalized or abandoned, how activities now operational are now supported, and what has happened as a result); and what crises or particular challenges the institution currently faces, who is involved, and what is being done about them. This is not so much to suggest any answer to the difficult question of whether funds should be invested where developmental need is greatest, as opposed to where maximal impact is likely to be obtained. Such matters may be relevant to the yes or no investment decision, to how much faith can be put into the institution's perception of its developmental priorities, but they also indicate what conditions should be imposed on any particular grant. This emphasis would also be conducive to putting the Title III proposition into a
context of its basic intent and proper utility, for laying a foundation against which to judge overall institutional track record in the future, and for a more clear determination of the level of risk involved. It is also noted that with attention only to needs (as opposed to past progress), Title III can to some extent be construed as a reward for mediocrity or prior failures, and that it may therefore be only proper to take note in the context of the award decision as well as in other administrative action that the desired payoff is institutional advance in self-sufficiency from Title III support.

With regard to the president, it should be recalled that developmental success at the institutional or Activity level is associated with his or her management capability and leadership qualities; with his or her designation, endorsement, and active support of developmental priorities; with his or her active involvement in the planning and substantive content of the application; with his or her (and the institution's) developmental track record; with the deserved confidence and support of the board of control, the administrative staff, and the faculty in the president (and in the developmental programs and strategies espoused).

The Title III proposition cannot, of course, be concerned with removal or selection of presidents; it can be and has been concerned with providing strategic support to presidents, or creating conditions that may have real impact on their own development. The proper incorporation of any associated level of risk in the overall award decision is also a consideration apparently taken into account in some instances.

The findings suggest that more direct evidence of involvement in and endorsement of the developmental priorities proposed by the president than signature on the application cover sheet be considered. This suggests that the application should be scanned for any evidence indicating active involvement by the president in the planning and prospective work. Program management might also consider, for the application, a required statement by the president that would outline his or her personal commitment to the proposed Activities, their place in his or her larger developmental program or objectives, the responsibilities for their monitoring that he or she will assume or delegate, and the potential strategies for achieving or assuming operational support. It might also be instructive to solicit the president's perception of fiscal risk position, to be supported by data considered relevant to documenting the judgment provided, and to request the general plan or strategy for reducing
any risk factors (as well as for outlining how the proposed Activities would fit with mission and fit into the long-range development plan). Although anything said in the properly executed application may be assumed to have been approved by the president, the special statement might also serve to place him or her into a greater public accountability at home and abroad for the institutional commitments made in the application.

It would also seem particularly important to require, for the non-competitive continuation award affirmations, reports of progress at the institutional and activity levels against the initial projection. We suspect there are instances where a substantial refunding has been awarded without the knowledge that the institution's risk position is progressively deteriorating.

The importance of a sense of mission, and the way developmental priorities will relate to impact on mission, has long been recognized by Title III management as important for explication in the application; serious attention to long-range planning is a new feature of the application content requirement. Continuing concern with careful planning beyond the current or immediately following budget year was one of the most consistent indicators of probable developmental success; and, it was not difficult, in the field situation, to distinguish in the planning documents between serious and casual underlying efforts.

This suggests that the new requirement for preparing and abstracting the long-range plan, and specifying the place of the proposed developmental activities therein, is a sound move by Program management. The study experience also suggests that consideration be given to some required documentation of how the current plan was achieved: any special impetus therefor, a description of the planning process and those involved, the criteria for setting priorities and for assuring their successful attainment, and any relevant actions of the president and board. Also of potential value, both for the institutions and the evaluators, would be a brief report of any prior long-range planning goals, the experience of the institution in attaining these goals, and the lessons learned. Program development and application reviewers also need to recognize that for many of the institutions, serious long-range planning is a new venture.

Only a few institutions were hesitant to share with the site visitors the most recent institutional independent audit report. The site visitors found these much more helpful, accurate, and usefully descriptive than the summary
data provided in the HEGIS reports, in terms of presenting the present condition of the institution and in revealing the adequacy of its fiscal accounting procedures. Also found helpful in understanding developmental progress was inquiry into whether any special fiscal self-study, such as that outlined in the current NACUBO workbook, had been conducted, what its findings suggested to whom, and what consequent actions had been taken.

Some academicians, and most institutions in fiscal difficulty, will protest any move to emphasize key fiscal indicators; and the NACUBO indices certainly, and to some extent the formal audit reports, are subject to misinterpretation or undue focus on an indicator out of context. Nevertheless, although Title III has program quality and equal opportunity objectives as well, the reduction of fiscal risk, and the attainment of fiscal viability, is the bottom line of what institutional viability without continuing Federal subsidy is all about. Additional fiscal information, and the inclusion of a higher education fiscal specialist in the application review team or process, might go a long way toward guaranteeing better investments, in determining the developmental feasibility of the Activities proposed, and in suggesting special requirements that might be imposed as a condition of the grant or established as conditions for non-competing continuation grants. Also, institutions may be affected positively by reporting requirements as well as by facilitating their ability to understand their condition.

Findings with regard to the correlates of successful Activities, in general or with regard to specific Activity types, suggest many direct and subtle indicators that could be used to augment judgments of the potential developmental merit of individual Activities. Many of these indicators will come as no surprise, as their use has been a part of standard operating procedure in application review. Some findings, however, deserve special attention.

Developmental Activities differ in the degree to which they may enhance fiscal viability; some are properly directed principally toward improving quality. The ways in which costs can be met come operation time vary by both Activity and institutional circumstance. Nevertheless, the study experience suggests that a hard look at the costs and strategies for institutionalizing and operating the developed activity is reasonable both for the investor and the grant recipient. Firm dollar values, in new income, cost efficiencies, or diverted revenue, will not realistically be possible for either party to use.
as an inviolate standard; yet, the institutions that began serious considera-
tion of this matter only at developmental grant close out time were generally
in trouble, and some activities leading to continued operation, if guarantee
of continued operation for five years following the developmental period were
required, would almost surely be withdrawn.

The fact that there had been prior (or pre-Title III) investment in many
of the successful activities, and that most successful activities had origins
several years prior to the more formal and intensive effort possible with
grant support, strongly suggests that information on origin, relevant prior
activity, and considerations involved in the judgment to proceed if funds are
made available, would be highly relevant to the funding decision. The qualifi-
cations of the proposed Activity director, and his or her place in the
regular organizational structure (i.e., the identification of who would have
oversight beyond the Title III coordinator and the fiscal representative),
also seems relevant. The requirement of a vita for the Title III coordinator
does not seem unreasonable; such should be helpful in revealing the variety of
coordinators in place, in anticipating personal vulnerabilities, and in further
professionalization of the role through planned technical assistance. To the
specification of objectives and milestones might be formally added the antici-
pated broader consequences--i.e., the "fringe benefits" or potential "fringe
liabilities," and, if the latter, how these might be counteracted. To be sure
this latter option would generate some apple-pie and motherhood kinds of
statements. But in many instances of success, the anticipated positive conse-
quences were the more important goals, and the adequacy of the planned strategies
to counteract negative consequences were critical to success.

We are very much aware of the valid concerns, in the Division of Institu-
tional Development, FEDAC, and OMB, for the reduction of respondent burden.
Yet, some very substantial sums of money are awarded to institutions that may
or may not be safe risks; and, many of the foregoing recommendations involve
the prospect of positive impact on the institution from the exercise of providing
specific information and the expectation that it will be considered in the
award and followed up later. These considerations strongly suggest that to
freeze or reduce the present application requirements simply on the grounds of
respondent burden would be injurious to the institution and the government.
C. Implications of the Findings for the Monitoring Process

Monitoring by and large appears from the field to be largely a matter of the grant monitor responding to questions raised by the Title III coordinators, as issues requiring interpretation arise, and the receipt and review of standard reports. From the standpoint of the Title III coordinators, all evidences, including the relationships established and the apparent responsiveness of Title III Program staff, seem to reveal no particular problems or suggestions for improving the probability of success through these standard operating procedures.

Although study procedures were not designed to search out deviations from required practices (e.g., no specific search for unallowable expenditures was made), nor were any formal audits undertaken, the site visitors did confront some irregularities from time to time, or instances where an "allowable" label was used for what seemed in practice to be an essential unallowable activity. These were almost always found associated with troubled institutions and Activities, and did not appear likely to be detected except through visit, searching inquiry, or formal audit. The recommendation made in many of the other studies of the Title III program, that Title III program staff make more field visits, appears reasonable on this and other grounds. Occasionally, there was some evidence that grant monitors were aware of irregularities, but apparently did little or nothing about them, or that the right questions of the coordinator would reveal the irregularities. This suggests that training of grant monitors in the detection of violations of regulations might be useful.

The external evaluators' reports, also scanned carefully in most instances, were occasionally useful, and deserve more careful review by Program staff than is believed customary; but again, sometimes the more critical reviews were for the better and least threatened situations. With the institution controlling the contract, their third party status is questionable; but superficial reports are relatively easy to detect. (In several instances, an external evaluator had made use of word processing equipment to turn out almost identical rosy reports on several institutions with which he had accounts.) It is suspected, however, that as long as the institution controls the award of an external evaluation contract, its evaluative integrity for Program staff will not be assured; the value for the institution might be enhanced if the report to the institution was considered to be the institution's private
Certainly, an evaluation for DID purposes should be a matter for DID itself or its own contracted agents.

The contrasts in the progress made on highly similar activities from one institution to another were quickly apparent; and, when schedules were lagging, there were usually significant reasons therefore. Yet, in some instances where lack of progress had been endemic for a considerable period, this appeared to escape detection from the inside or the outside. Although the circumstances affecting the time required for development vary by institutional situation as well as by Activity type, we came to believe both (1) that time required for good development is generally longer than commonly believed, and (2) that nevertheless time lags that are currently not detected frequently conceal real difficulties and waste of Federal funds. Where developmental time estimates are too low, such practices as "renaming" the Activity are encouraged, both for the institution and the concerned project monitor. Neither too much nor too little time, nor pressures that encourage winking at the regulations, are in the best interests of all concerned. For many of the frequently proposed Activities, some norms of reasonable progress might be useful in evaluating progress, in detecting when some special intervention should be undertaken, or in reaching a deliberate conclusion to increase or withdraw support.

The site visitors also noted the frequent inquiry from Activity directors working to maintain reasonable movement as to where in the study experience the site visitors may have encountered model activity of the sort involved, as well as the frequent positive association between knowledgeability about successful activity in similar institutions, and with successful endeavor at home. This suggests the possibility of a more natural and positive "policing" if ways could be found to identify exemplary Activities and Activity directors, and to encourage or support contact between such and their struggling counterparts.

Whether more active monitoring is both desirable and feasible is a matter of some question. A variety of elements, each with some implications for monitoring, were found associated with lack of success. These included extravagant or unrealistic objectives for Activities; delays in staffing, or frequent change in Activity directors; isolation of the development Activity from the place in the organizational structure where it would ultimately be housed; general apathy or continuing conflict within the faculty and administrative staff or between faculty and administration; or, no one but the Activity
director paying any real attention to problems and progress. Some of these signals may be more usefully responded to at application or non-competitive continuation review time than in month-to-month monitoring.

It is believed that monitoring can and should serve two purposes: protecting the Government's interests by assuring in all ways possible that the grantees are complying with regulations; and, by providing advice and instruction toward the achievement of better developmental effort by the institutions, while recognizing that the institution must have its own insights and priorities. Better advice and instruction could conceivably be considerably enhanced if a series of formal in-service training programs for Title III Program staff, led by capable people from the field or relevant professional associations, could be mounted (additional experience of the Program staff in multiple field visits would also be helpful in this regard). This is directed toward the second monitoring function named, that of providing advice and instruction when such would be useful, not the policing and prescription function. In a real sense, the institutions need to make their own choices and do their own policing, as the successful ones most assuredly do. The less successful institutions need to learn how to make good choices and police their work, and a policing kind of monitoring may be a counterproductive strategy to see this learning take place.

D. Implications of the Findings for Technical Assistance Activities

Note is taken that technical assistance currently comes in two modes: that made a part of the grant in terms of provisions for consortium, assisting agency, external evaluator, or consultant assistance; and that provided, in a conference setting, by Title III program staff.

Outside assistance for the institutions has been a recognized need from the beginnings of Title III; many instances were found where good specialized outside help had been an utter necessity for any real progress. Though the more sophisticated institutions clearly knew better how to locate needed assistance and assure that it would be effective, the more significant difference observed by the site visitors was in the sensitivity, quality, and effectiveness of the assisting agencies or consultants.

Competitive procurement is an inviolate "given." It is suggested that consideration also be given to requiring formal report of experience with outside agents, toward the establishment of some formal or informal rosters of
those that perform well on particular problems or with particular kinds of institutions. Many institutions approaching a new area for the first time are naive in where to go for good help, and are easy targets for the hucksters that still exist; or, even with established and reputable firms and agencies, there were misfits that sometimes went undetected by either side for some time. Prior abuses during the period of greater activity by assisting agencies are well known; yet, it is believed that the baby should not be thrown out with the bath water.

Another source of technical assistance worth serious consideration toward promotion or greater use is suggested by the frequent origin of productive developmental enterprise in accrediting investigations and reports, or the general finding of apparent good impact of consultants from accrediting agencies or from or through professional associations. (The principal investigators were also constantly impressed with the integrity, specialized knowledge, and keen insights that the consultants used in the case studies as site visitors provided institutions visited as well as the study). The idea: to establish some mechanism for recognizing particular non-profit professional organizations or accrediting agencies that would be charged to develop one-shot or periodic review teams that would make brief inspection tours to institutions in trouble or to institutions desiring a special appraisal overall or in a particular area, and that would operate under ground rules and procedures designed to assure effectiveness and prevent abuses (e.g., follow-on work from the outside by any agent involved in the appraisal not allowable without special approval; required in-person reporting to the president, chief fiscal officer, and/or board chairman or executive committee).

The regional technical assistance meetings have focused on the regulations and application procedures; it is apparent that both Title III program staff and the institutional representatives have found these extremely helpful and valuable. Yet, many instances are noted where substantive help which is specifically targeted toward a developmental problem would be productive, or where those institutional representatives really needing help are not involved.

In the latter category are the presidents and key members of the boards, certainly important actors in moderating the effective use of developmental funds. It is believed that a program of special workshops, to involve successful presidents, or active representatives of boards, and/or professional association representatives, would be of substantial value in helping Title
III staff and the institutions to address some now apparently inaccessible problems in effective ways. We also believe that there would be merit in considering special meetings or workshops for Activity directors involved in similar kinds of effort, particularly where the structure and progress of response is highly variable (as in the PME activities, for example). Again, the focus should be on the substantive aspects of the developmental challenge.

The same strategy can be applied to other critical program functions (e.g., fiscal affairs, where the key national professional organization, NACUBO, has had a distinguished record of impartial service). Most program or discipline areas have professional organizations—e.g., the American Personnel and Guidance Association for student service workers, the American Educational Research Association for researchers and evaluators, etc.). Funds designated for attendance at professional meetings appear to have been well used. But, special conferences or seminars, to involve institutional and program staff concerned with particular developmental areas and problems, if well planned and involving carefully selected and nationally reputable representatives of the disciplines involved, could provide a substantial additional service to beginning and advanced developers, as well as contribute to the sense of professional elitism that has been found conducive to better work.

E. Implications of the Findings for the Revision of the Regulations

Although the findings have a number of implications for possible revision of the regulations governing the program, this responsibility is best vested in program policy, development, and operations staff who rely on the wealth of day-to-day experience since 1965. It is felt that any specific recommendations in this regard would be improper, considering the tentative and sometimes speculative nature of the study findings. Any revision of the regulations should be based on agreement that particular findings highlight problems experienced in day-to-day management, and that the findings suggest workable alternative policy or requirements.

It must also be said at the outset that the findings tend more to confirm generally the soundness of recent changes and emphases than to refute or augment any provisions of the regulations. For example, the greater press for achievement of independence from continued need for Federal support, and for distinguishing when development stops and operation begins, emerge as something
the institutions moving positively were already taking seriously, and which those declining for the most part were decidedly not.

Several issues are nevertheless highlighted by the findings. A major issue is, as noted earlier, how long a time particular kinds of developmental activities may reasonably require. Time required depended to some extent on how far the institution had to go as well as on such aspects as competent management and developmental Activity directors; and, it should be noted that some of the institutions visited, both successful and declining, had been in the Title III Program virtually from the beginning. We noted that good development at the Activity level, and certainly at the institutional level, frequently required longer than is generally anticipated by either party; and, that there are many ways to qualify what is being done in successive years as new development, when it is really in part operational support or the fine tuning that would go on anyway in operational activity. (The MIS and student services development activities are notorious potential offenders by taking too much time, the former because new costs are indeed incurred in specialized staff and equipment, the latter because good student support services usually represent added activity for which the costs are hard to recover.) These matters underscore the need for defining what time by Activity type may be reasonably required for development. It may also be important to recognize that some Activities lead to increased revenue and some lead to desirable but higher cost operation, or involve continuing costs beyond those currently allowed if the activity is to get off the ground without unduly taxing the institution. This may be why evidences were found that both sides may bend the rules in extending the "period of development" by renaming it. It would seem better to recognize what is reasonable time, and to stick to it.

Another issue highlighted by the findings is that a positive turnaround in developmental trends frequently, but not always, follows some visible recognition of crisis sufficient to require the appointment of a new president whose selection and marching orders are in themselves a recognition of particular needs. Where the choice has been sound—and in most cases, it seems usually to signal a new breath and opportunity—modest Title III support appears to have been well used. This may suggest some special consideration of the institution that has a new crack at development.

The regulations do not exclude the notion that good development may include the proper management of decline, and the achievement of new health by
effectively adjusting to more modest size and programs; and at least two institutions rated as strong had accomplished just that. It is believed that the general declining enrollment trends for some kinds of institutions may make viability a matter of drawing in one's horns, of focusing on doing fewer things better. This may suggest some subtle emphases that need to be recognized in the language or the criteria for special review of eligibility or merit of long-range plan and Activities proposed in the application. That is, development toward viability may not be only a matter of growth, but also can be a matter of attaining a more modest and efficient operation.

Review of the current criteria for waiver of the E&G requirement, in the light of study findings, seems to suggest that waiver is directed not only to those institutions in the most difficult circumstances, but also to some least likely to be capable of making good developmental use of Title III funds. This was dramatically apparent in one case where an archaic and extremely costly heating plant continued to gobble up money that Title III in effect replaced; a better development buy would have been a new boiler and steam lines, which would have paid for themselves in four or five years, freeing for other purposes a quarter million dollars a year, which was a significant amount when compared with the Title III grant. This is not to suggest, of course, that Title III assume plant upgrading costs, but to state that some institutions may, without combining forces with another or taking some unusual action, be relatively certain losers. Escalating E&G expenditures in the face of enrollment decline may be a trend that should suggest careful examination of the Federal risk.

Although the evidence from this study alone is insufficient to make the case and prescribe the value, we note the suggestion of deleterious effect when the Title III grant amount exceeded some proportion of the annual E&G expenditures. This suggests that consideration might usefully be given to setting some ceiling on grant amounts related to the institution's size and revenue.

The predominantly white institutions varied substantially in the degree to which they were seriously pressing to accommodate minority students; frequently, the ascendancy of one minority group tended to be a depressant for others on that campus. It is not an easy matter to characterize the institutions' real concern and effort to provide equal opportunity and compliance with civil rights legislation, but it should be kept in mind that there are
still pockets of prejudice (found even in some of the exemplary institutions) that go undetected in the present program operation.

Nothing has been said to this point to highlight two other findings with regard to college type. The first is that good development was no different for the traditionally black colleges than for the traditionally white colleges (although each had some distinctive needs the other did not have, the dollar values for development were not much different). On a per-student basis, the traditionally black colleges have been heavier benefactors of Title III, and one still hears the program popularly labeled as the "black college program." The political issues are complex, and so are other factors (some observers felt that greater proportions of students with Pell grants at traditionally black colleges prompted tuition increases that could be particularly disastrous if Federal student support funds were cut). Certainly the study findings only highlight the issues and the complexities; and do not indicate directions for change; no comparative assessment of the relative costs of any distinctively needed development was made. How much of the Title III funds should be designated for black colleges is probably a matter best left to the political and legal processes. But particularly where past heavy support by a "soft" source--Title III, a church affiliation, whatever--had encouraged dependency, the institutions were substantially behind their peers not so blessed in generating alternate sources of revenue, and consequently having at least a prayer for self-sufficiency. In these cases, heavier funding was not a blessing.

A similarly sticky problem is what Title III provides the public vs. the private institutions. One cautiously expressed view found in the field is that Federal money may be justified when state governments can't be trusted to support some Federal priorities. Yet, the state institutions serve public purposes; developmental priorities perceived in those terms were not ignored in the regular institutional or budget authority funding algorithms and budgeting procedures, frequently suggesting that developmental priorities needing recourse to Title III for support were at a lower level of import for the public institutions than were those proposed by the private institutions. There were other tradeoffs: for example, state purchasing and audit procedures, personnel policy, etc., generally served as an additional protection against excesses that are of concern to Federal agents as well; state plans seemed to be effective in preventing deviation therefrom in any soft money requests, not just in Title III applications where compliance with the state is required by the
statute. Surpluses cannot in most cases be easily or wisely generated; borrowing options are different. The principal investigators were left, however, with the conviction that although public vs. private colleges were contrasted in the study design, and though the developmental proposition and indicators are different for the public institutions from those for the private, the issue needs further study—in this instance, to help clarify and inform the political forces that will make ultimate determinations as to the relative degree and kinds of support.

F. Implications of the Findings for Program Evaluation

Evaluation, properly conducted, is a never-ending process; Title III Program management structure includes a component for evaluation activity, and institutional or third-party evaluation studies can be encouraged or commissioned. Consideration should be given, of course, to the housekeeping needs generated by ongoing program operation and experience. It should be noted that the several potential priorities outlined in this section focus on those prospective evaluative activities that the reported findings, in particular, suggest, whether placed in-house or with a contracted agent.

1. Time Required for Development

Mention has been made in several places in the foregoing of the variation in time required for effective development by activity, and the fact that reasonable development times are not known but appear to be underestimated. This has substantial consequences for application review, monitoring, and technical assistance, and institutional planners themselves. We believe high priority should be given to (1) developing or perfecting a taxonomy of developmental activities, and (2) establishing an experience base showing the ranges of times required to achieve particular developmental endpoints.

2. Normative Trends in Fiscal and Other Indicators of Institutional Development

For application to the monitoring process (and perhaps to confirmation of the non-competitive continuation award), we believe some normative evaluation of year-to-year trends in enrollment and selected fiscal indicators for eligible institutions, by type, would be most useful. No good basis is presently available for distinguishing what is good, average, or mediocre performance for the eligible institutions in general. Given the HEGIS and student aid data, this matter should involve only careful planning as to what
indicators would be most relevant, what institutional subgroups should be established, and what provision for routine compilation and updating would be most efficient.

3. In-Depth Studies of Particular Kinds of Activity

A very real limitation of the reported inquiry is that particular kinds of activities, some with obvious significant variability in success and impact, were not studied in sufficient number and depth to permit understanding of how effective the activity type can be, or the basic factors involved in success of that kind of developmental effort. The PME and MIS activities are notable examples, where no one contests the developmental potential, but where there is considerable variability in time required and quality of outcome. Better understanding of what is required for such activities, particularly when frequent in the Title III portfolios, would be extremely valuable, both in determining DID strategy to assure successful developmental application, and in providing strategic technical assistance.

4. Studies of Effective Long-Range Planning Efforts

The study reported confirms the importance of long-range planning, but the detail possible in this study does not yield an adequate picture of what is involved, and what strategies are successful in different situations. Neither the institutions nor Title III program staff have much experience in this area, and the literature on long-range planning is largely based on institutions of a different sort or on experience by business and industry. We believe more searching examinations of the successful planning process in eligible institutions would have considerable utility.

5. Relationship of Grant Amounts to Fiscal Trends

The findings reported strongly suggest that for one reason or another, institutional vulnerability is more likely when Title III grants exceed a certain proportion of available revenue. This has major implications, if affirmed, for formal or informal award ceilings. ED data of record could be exploited to determine, within the larger population of institutions receiving multi-year funding, the relationship between amount of grant (as a proportion of revenue or E&G expenditures) and positive or negative trends in annual revenue and unrestricted current fund balances.

6. Evaluations of Developmental Progress of Individual Institutions

It has been noted that the current practice of external evaluation under the contractual control of the institution has built-in problems which limit its utility for any serious need for valid evaluation data by DID. This
suggests that if such need is felt to exist, for grantees in general or for particular institutions, the contract responsibility should be vested in DID rather than the institution.

In this connection, we note that seldom in our travels and painstaking search for evaluation studies of activity impact by the institutions themselves did we find anything of much validity. Design problems are horrendous; good evaluation design talent is seldom available from or for activity directors. The finding that those who attempt to evaluate progress do better than those who do not argues strongly against deemphasis of institutionally derived evaluation studies, but also suggests that not much is likely to be reliably learned from them outside the institution.

VI. CLOSING COMMENTS

It is probably not possible to summarize adequately the many findings, or to identify those that augment prior findings in other studies and/or in Program experience itself. But several major conclusions or important issues do emerge.

First, the impact of the institution's president in Activity or institutional developmental success stands out clearly, even though the Chief Administrative officer was not a particular site visit target at the beginning of the study, only one of the targets. In the Title III context, this suggests that development of the president may be tantamount to institutional development. Strategic activities that provide him or her with proper perspectives, or special developmental workshops for presidents, may be key in some instances to good investment and to effective and proper use of Title III funds.

Second: developmental activities seem to require more time in some instances than is commonly believed; and no evidence was acquired that institutional development is assured at some defined point of cumulative impact of separate developmental Activities. Yet, many of the ineffective Activities had stumbled along for some time without particular accomplishment. Some norms for what constitutes reasonable time, including front-end planning and operational fine tuning, could be useful to Program and institutional management.

Third, the findings underscore the importance of adequate long-range planning, in terms of fit with or actualization of mission, and in terms of
short term and long term costs and revenues (a necessary consideration from the beginning). Not an inordinate number of development efforts had been abandoned, but those that had could frequently have been considered doomed from the beginning because they were not rooted in planning and long-term fiscal implications.

Fourth, the relationship between informed and rigorous compliance with the Title III regulations, and positive development, is quite clear. This confirms to some extent the integrity of the regulations, and emphasizes the import of assuring compliance; but it also may say something about the institutions found to be in a strong or vulnerable position.

Fifth, the investigators were impressed anew that though some Activities generated their support and more, and a variety of strategies were revealed as to how institutions could assume operational support, other Activities were directed from the beginning toward quality enhancement or some other aspect of the institution and its program that could only result in operational greater costs. While the essential wisdom of the Congressional strategy that funding lead to improved self-sufficiency is quite clear, some institutions need quality improvements whose non-recoverable operational costs will exceed periods of funding for some time in the future, and which must be met by such revenue enhancement activity as tuition increase, enlarged endowment income, larger or more selective state appropriations, alumni or corporate giving, profitable auxiliary enterprises, etc.

In this regard: although the developmental activity is the unit of investment, the impact of any given activity on the broader viability of the institution is not easy to measure, nor always reasonable to assume as of much significance. Operational costs following some activities are insignificant, and for others may represent substantial sums. These costs can be met in a limited number of ways: by the generation of new revenue through the operation of the activity; by cost savings the new activity generates; by displacing dollars needed from less desirable activities; by using the activity success or developed capability to make the case for new investment from regular sources; or by separate activity generating additional revenue in general, from tuition increase to new general funding resources development. The different support possibilities differ by activity type and institution. A realistic look at how operationalization can be accomplished, and what it may entail, is a practice found to characterize the strong institutions. The vulnerable institutions need help in this regard.
If the concern with institutional development is taken seriously, it must encompass the fiscal and enrollment bottom lines. It was no surprise that the institutions building attention to fiscal impact into every decision were those most likely to be moving positively, or secure in their own right; but, it would seem critical, for application review, year to year monitoring, and evaluation purposes, that more formal attention to indicators signaling developmental progress at the institutional level be given, by the presidents and boards at the institutional level, and by the Title III Operations and Program Development staff. The developmental battle is handicapped if program quality suffers; both quality and the institution are lost if expenditures exceed revenues for very long.
Appendix

Synopsis of Contents of the Full Final Report
entitled

The Anatomy of Institutional Development for Higher Education Institutions Serving Students from Low-Income Backgrounds
Chapter I - Overview:

This chapter presents the purpose of the study, as the determination of factors associated with the effective use of Title III funds or other "soft" money for the improvement of the quality of educational programs and of the long-term viability of institutions of higher education. The case study methods and sample of institutions are briefly described, followed by a brief history of the Title III program from the original legislation (The Higher Education Act of 1965) through the current reenactment (The Higher Education Act of 1980). Final sections provide a working formulation of institutional development as a process of positive change toward self-sufficiency (independence from the need for Title III support) in terms of three operational domains: fiscal, administrative, and program. An overview of the content and organization of the remainder of the report is also given.

Chapter II - Description of the Samples of Institutions and Developmental Activities:

The institutions and developmental activities were selected in ways that would support the stated purposes and research strategies employed, but which limit applications and generalizations for other purposes. This chapter describes the sampling procedures for institutions and for developmental Activities, and provides descriptive data characterizing the institutions involved as well as the total group of institutions with prime Title III grants in FY82. These background statistical data should be helpful to the reader in illuminating the particular segment of American higher education on which findings presented later are based.

Chapter III - Definitions of Effective Development at the Institution Level:

The 51 institutions selected for study were expected, on logical grounds, to represent a considerable variety of developmental statuses and of success in utilizing Title III or other external funds for developmental purposes. This chapter presents an account of how each institution as a whole was evaluated with respect to overall developmental status, providing a basis for extracting hypotheses about the underlying causes or associated factors by contrasting the more successful institutions with those less successful. Also presented are the characteristics of the resulting clusters of institutions, with clusters expressing the assessed status of institutional development.
Chapter IV - Factors Associated with Effectively Developing Institutions:

The previous chapter outlined how institutions were classified as "strong," "stable," "vulnerable," or "mixed," in terms of developmental status. This chapter provides a brief account of the analysis strategy for determining why the differences in developmental status may exist. Then, factors at the general institutional level that seem to account for the differences found are presented, with separate attention to fiscal, management, and program factors. This chapter addresses the question: "What is it that the kinds of institutions studied have done that results in continued progress toward overall fiscal viability and program quality?"

Chapter V - Classes and Dimensions of Developmental Activity:

We turn here from examination of the institution as a whole to a focus on what constitutes the basic unit for investment as the Title III Program operates: the developmental activity. This chapter presents several sets of dimensions, or classification schemes, that were found useful in characterizing discrete developmental activities and types. Section A summarizes the categorical descriptions and definitions provided by the current Title III legislation and regulations, including any restrictions established by current designations of unallowable costs. Section B presents several other schemes believed particularly relevant, in terms of Title III intent, noting that developmental activities may lead to one-time only events or to continuing operation, may have varying options for later operational support and fiscal contribution in return, or may be variously supported. The final section provides the broad functional framework utilized in the field examination of selected Title III activities, as reported in subsequent chapters.

Chapter VI - The Nature of Effective Developmental Activity:

In the site visits, certain developmental activities were examined in depth. This chapter provides, first, an operational definition of what constituted a discrete developmental activity for study purposes. Then, the procedure for examining and analyzing the activities is described, with particular regard (1) to general criteria defining successful activity contribution to institutional development, (2) to the procedure for applying these criteria, (3) to the characteristics of the developmental activities that were examined, and (4) to a summary description of the developmental activities selected in terms of their content and the preliminary evaluations.
Chapter VII - Factors Associated with Effective Developmental Activities:

This chapter examines the factors found associated with successful developmental activities. Activities reviewed in the general administration improvement area include MIS, PME, and MIS/PME development; institutional research; long-range planning; and "other" activities. In the fiscal improvement area, developmental activities include fiscal accounting system development, resource enhancement planning, and fiscal management planning and improvement. In the program improvement area, developmental activities include new academic programs or majors; strengthening, refining, or upgrading existing programs; instructional enhancements to instruction; and student support services. Successful activities in each domain are generally described in such terms as their origins and objectives, the inputs required, implementation strategies, problems experienced and solved, and their impacts on and consequences for the institution.

Chapter VIII - Contribution of Title III and Other External Support to Institutional Development:

This chapter provides, first, a summary of the implications of the findings in each of the three domains of particular relevance for Title III policy and procedures. Then, the more general (and Title-III relevant) characteristics of the positively developing (or "strong") institutions are discussed, in such terms as their degree of readiness for development (and factors contributing thereto), and characteristic response to program requirements and regulations. Finally, implications of the success experiences for Title III program policy, development, and operations are considered, with special attention to current program intent; use of consortia, assisting agencies, external evaluators, and consultants; and purchase of equipment.

Chapter IX - Related Issues and Applications:

Several special topics and issues that emerged in this study have not been properly addressed in the more general examination of institutional development. These are matters of substance, however, as related to the process of development and the kinds of institutions specifically eligible for Title III assistance (and other external support). This chapter highlights some of these special issues: the different developmental proposition for private as opposed to public institutions; the impact of "uncontrollable" external factors that affect institutions (e.g., political aspects affecting boards of control, competition, sudden wealth, accrediting agency pressure); development challenges in the historically black institutions as a special class; the minority student on the majority campus; and the matter of where "development" stops and "operation" begins.
Chapter X - A Functional Blueprint for Development:

In this chapter, a brief examination is made of what we believe constitutes the essence of the process of development as it may be deliberately controlled by the institution. This has to do with long-range planning--its inputs, the process itself, and the intermediate and ultimate criteria it must employ, with emphasis on criteria of fiscal health. It is our "functional blueprint for development," drawn broadly from what we observed at the strong and the stable institutions, but found largely absent at the vulnerable institutions.