This study is a comprehensive exploration of six mechanisms of control, both hierarchical and nonhierarchical, which constrain the work of elementary school principals but provide them a balance of control and autonomy. The database consists of extensive indepth interviews with 113 elementary school principals in 59 school districts from 3 suburban counties, focusing on their relations with their central district offices. The hierarchical control mechanisms examined include supervision, input control (personnel and monetary controls), behavior controls (for administrative and instructional tasks), and output controls (student testing), while the more diffuse nonhierarchical mechanisms of control include selection-socialization (patterns of hiring and ranking) and environmental control (derived from school community relations). For each of these control mechanisms, variation in patterns of usage are analyzed, characteristics are described, and practical implications of trends emerging from the data are discussed. An extensive conclusion summarizes findings on each mechanism of control and on the relationship between organizational control and such factors as school social status and district size. These findings are collectively brought to bear on a discussion of the principal's role. An appendix provides the interview form and the fact sheet filled out by all those interviewed. (TE)
MECHANISMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL IN EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Considerable interest in the nature of organizational control, its measurement and patterns, derives from recent investigations into effective management practices in Japan\(^1\), from thought provoking discussions of the role of ritual and ceremony in the channeling of organizational work,\(^2\) and from the synthesis and development of newer frameworks for conceptualizing organizational control systems, which suggest a combination of hierarchical and non-hierarchical controls.\(^3\) This recent work contends that students of organizations must examine administrative level organizational control systems in a more comprehensive manner, that the traditional approaches which focused only on the application of hierarchical controls are no longer the most effective ways of describing the means upper level administrators use to constrain and direct the work of subordinates. These scholars suggest that organizational control systems are multi-faceted, that they vary on a number of dimensions, and that they are often composed of


hierarchical, social, and extra-organizational elements. Using these newer approaches to the conceptualization of organizational control, this study will first define the purpose and shape of control, then operationalize it, and finally examine the patterns it takes in elementary school districts. This study will be exploratory, examining the variation in the application of six mechanisms of control in suburban elementary school districts which constrains the work of principals, but provides a balance of control and autonomy.

Background

The elementary school principal is a middle-level manager whose work has a significant influence on the effectiveness of schools. Functioning as the linkage between central office and classrooms as well as the linkage between parents and teachers, principals must provide the articulation necessary to keep resources, personnel, and students working efficiently toward organizational goals and objectives. To do this, they must neither be so tightly constrained that they cannot cope with changing conditions, nor so loosely controlled that they seek personal rather than school system goals. The constraint and direction of principals is important to superiors who wish to make optimal use of this managerial resource for the attainment of organizational goals. At the same time, though, superiors must afford the principal enough autonomy to cope with unexpected problems or variable local conditions. In short, superiors seek an appropriate balance of control and autonomy which will maximize organizational

effectiveness. The ways superintendents balance control and autonomy is the subject of this study.

Purpose

There are several key reasons for this study. First, few studies have looked at the controls that central office uses to channel and direct the work of principals; this study fills this important gap in our knowledge. Second, this study provides initial empirical information about the ways upper level administrators attempt to control the work of middle-level administrators in not-for-profit organizations, information which presently is deficient. Finally, this study will further our conceptual understanding of the control systems of organizations in the public sector, organizations which are key to the training of society's youth.

This study is exploratory and descriptive, providing information about the nature and pattern of administrative control in elementary school districts. It is meant to generate new ideas and concepts about the nature of organizational control in these organizations rather than test hypotheses about a specific population. The data came from a particular type of school district found in few states, elementary school districts which send graduates to other districts for secondary school. These data and observations about the balance of control and autonomy should help guide future research in the field, as well as help us understand the nature of principals' work.

The Problem

In this study we will examine the combination of control mechanisms used to channel and to direct the work of principals. We
will look at the kinds of controls used to constrain principals, as well as the patterns of usage. In addition, we will see how the social status of the school and the size of the district differentially influence the application of various mechanisms of control. From this examination we will be able to determine how the central offices in suburban elementary school districts balance off the need to control the work of principals with the need to allow them the autonomy to discharge their duties and responsibilities.

Specifically, we will describe the use of six control mechanisms, four hierarchical (supervision, input control, behavior control, output control), and two non-hierarchical (selection-socialization and environmental control). Both the central tendencies and the distribution of these controls will gain our attention. These empirical descriptions will point to the ways control systems in suburban elementary school districts provide a balance of control and autonomy over the work of school principals.

Overview of the Study

In this first chapter we will introduce the problem to be investigated, provide a background to the research, and describe the theoretical underpinnings of the study. In Chapter II, we will review the literature on control looking at studies and analyses of six different mechanisms of organizational control. Here we will discuss research conducted in commercial and industrial organizations as well as in school districts. Chapter III details the methodology used to gather the data, the characteristics of the population and sample, and the ways we plan to analyze the data. Chapter IV, the first of two
chapters detailing the findings, describes the use of four hierarchical mechanisms of control including supervision, input control, behavior control, and output control. Following this, we will discuss the use of two non-hierarchical controls including selection-socialization and environmental control. In both of these chapters we will look at both the pattern of usage as well as the influence of school social status and district size. Finally, in Chapter VI we will summarize the findings, note the overall properties of these systems of control and speculate on the affect of these patterns of control on principal time use, motivation, and stress. We will conclude the chapter with suggestions for further research on the structure and function of organizational control systems.

Theoretical Framework

Introduction

Theories of organizations and how they function guide this study of organizational control. These theories help us understand the ways central office balances control and autonomy in elementary school districts. This study is guided by several ideas about how organizations work and the properties of organizations which influence the pattern of control which is used to constrain principals. In this section we will discuss some of these ideas and note how they shape the thinking behind this study.

Reasons for Control Systems

Why do control mechanisms and control systems exist? Organizations have tasks that they wish to accomplish, goals they wish to achieve, maintenance activities which need to be done. Accomplishing
these activities is not easy; accomplishing them is problematic. Some of the difficulties lie in a lack of understanding of how to accomplish a particular goal and some lie in getting people to cooperate and spend their energies in achieving organizational goals. In addition, problems of control may exist because organizational members hold divergent goals, some which conform to those of the organization and some of which are in conflict with those of the organization. Lack of goal consensus makes cooperation and goal accomplishment difficult. In short, organizational members do not always work toward organizational goals, complete tasks, or work hard indefinitely like industrial robots.

In order to ensure that employees work toward objectives, organizations use a system of control mechanisms in particular combinations and patterns. That is to say, one of the central ways that organizations seek to ensure goal attainment is to develop and institute systems of organizational control.¹

Suggesting that these are the reasons for control systems does not tell us why there are patterns of control and, conversely patterns of autonomy.

Control Mechanism Variation

The use of different control mechanisms will differ in various ways due to a number of factors. In this study we will be examining the control systems in educational organizations looking specifically at control strategies used by central office to constrain and direct

the work of principals and schools. Control use may differ by occupation, by hierarchical level, and by type of organization.\(^1\) We will be looking at the ways different controls vary across a single type of organization at a particular hierarchical level and within a single occupation. By examining the reliance on different controls used by central office to influence and direct the work of principals we can limit the variability produced by differences in occupation, hierarchical level, and different types of organizations. We can thus concentrate on variation produced by other features of the position and the organization.

Relations between Different Control Mechanisms

It has been suggested that control mechanisms are related to each other in a number of ways which affect the balance of control and autonomy. Control mechanisms may be substitutes for other controls, add influence to other controls, or at times reduce the effect of other controls.\(^2\) Research suggests that some control mechanisms are substitutes, alternatives, or replacements each for the other. Studies point to the ways performance records may be a substitute for direct supervision in state employment agencies.\(^3\)


\(^3\)Ibid.
Other writers on organizations, though, have pointed out that control mechanisms may not be substitutes in some circumstances, but may be independent, and/or additive instead.\(^1\) When organizational control mechanisms are additive, they may act (1) as supports for other controls in areas of behavior or output in which the other control cannot function effectively, (2) when the other control is weak in effect, or (3) when two controls might increase the overall control effect. In these cases the two types of control, such as behavior control and output control, serve different, but cumulative functions in the organization.\(^2\) In short, some control mechanisms support each other in an additive or cumulative way, while others may be alternatives or substitutes for one another.

Control mechanisms potentially can have subtractive or reductive influences on each other such that employing one control could decrease the effectiveness of other controls. Though not specifically studied by any of the authors looking at this phenomenon, the possible negative effects of different controls are intimated by Reeves and Woodward who contend that control efforts emanating from separate sources or levels in a hierarchy may cancel out each other or lessen the power of one control on some particular organizational behavior.\(^3\)

Additionally, organizational controls may be hierarchical, collegial, or non-hierarchical. Hierarchical controls emanate from the

\(^1\)Ouchi, "The Relationship between Organizational Structure and Organizational Control," pp. 95-113.

\(^2\)Ibid.

organizational member's superior in the form of rules, procedures, directives, and policies, and also in the form of evaluation of a subordinate's work, either through direct supervision or through the evaluation of outputs or results. Collegial control occurs when the subordinate claims professional status and is constrained by the rules, training, and expectations of that colleague group. Finally, organizational controls may be non-hierarchical deriving either from the power of internalized norms and values or from the strength of environmental groups who cross the organizational boundary to exert influence on the subordinate. In particular, the use of hierarchical and non-hierarchical controls in elementary school districts provides a complex partitioning of control and autonomy.

In summary, individual organizational control mechanisms may be alternatives, additive, or subtractive. The overall balance of control and autonomy will reflect the sum effect of these control mechanisms.

Control Systems

Organizational control systems focused on principals are made up of a set of hierarchical and non-hierarchical control mechanisms. The pattern of controls formed in an organization will provide the outlines of subordinate zones of autonomy.

An organizational control system can vary in a number of important ways. The control system can be unitary with all controls coordinated and emanating from one superior or fragmented with control efforts emanating from different internal individuals or units, or from
external groups. The relative degree of unity may vary, and the relative combination of hierarchical and non-hierarchical controls may vary.

The overall tightness of control in different control systems may also vary. The pattern of tight and loose control may be similar in some types of organizations and different between types of organizations. For example, most assembly lines use close supervision (a tight control), while religious organizations may depend on selection-socialization (a loose control). This pattern of variation is related to the overall balance of control found in the organization.

Finally, organizational control systems may vary in the effectiveness of ensuring organizational productivity and survival. Some patterns of control for particular organizations may be more effective than other patterns of control in ensuring the accomplishment of organizational goals. Though an important feature of control systems, this study will not take up this issue.

In summary, four important ways that organizational control systems vary are the degree of control system unity, the overall pattern of tight and loose control, and the effectiveness of the organizational control system in ensuring high levels of productivity and organizational survival. We will examine the first three ways

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1Ibid.


control systems differ but suggest research needed to determine the effect on productivity in school districts.

In this study, we will look at the distribution and features of individual control mechanisms, as well as point to the systems of control we find in elementary school districts; that is to say, how these individual controls appear to combine in varying ways into systems of control. To better understand the balance of control and autonomy afforded school principals, we must both examine control mechanisms individually and as they combine into control systems.

Determinants of Organizational Control

In this section we discuss some of the features of organizations which influence the decision to use different types of control mechanisms in school districts. In particular we will discuss (1) how the nature of organizational technology influences control use; (2) how the types of goals, objectives, and outputs may influence the use of controls; (3) how relationships with the environment influences control use; and (4) how one feature or organizational structure, size, as defined by number of subunits, may affect the use of different mechanisms of control. In summary, the types of tasks principals do, the nature of school goals and outputs, the relationship with the environment, and the size of the district will influence the pattern of control and autonomy we find in school districts.

Technological Determinants

Students of organizations have noted the powerful influence of technology on both the structures and the processes of organizations. Technology, and at a more micro-level, the sets of tasks making up an
individual's or unit's work, have a strong influence on the types of controls used in organizations. Let us look at the ways organizational tasks and technology may influence the pattern of control administrators employ to constrain and direct middle management.

Two characteristics of tasks and technology have an influence over the patterns of control used by superiors. The first characteristic, the knowledge of the transformation process, will affect the usefulness of instituting mechanisms which control the behavior and tasks of subordinates. Can the superior establish sets of standardized rules, procedures, and directives which will ensure goal accomplishment? Second, the degree of task variety a subordinate must perform will affect the type of control which can be imposed. Does the employee perform a single repetitious task over and over, or is the individual or unit beset with a multitude of tasks and activities which vary greatly on a number of crucial dimensions? Task variety constrains the use of some control mechanisms rather strongly.1

The level of knowledge about the transformation process, which varies from known to unknown, will influence the types of controls a superior can choose to use. When an organizational superior has a nearly perfect knowledge of how to accomplish a task or produce a good, then it is possible, at this extreme on the continuum, to design a machine to produce the end product—we find this in continuous process plants which manufacture chemical products.2 But, when the

organizational superior has somewhat less perfect knowledge of the transformation process, he or she may establish broad rules and procedures to direct the subordinate. This is the common approach in office bureaucracies and government agencies. At the far extreme, where knowledge of the transformation process is unknown or unspecified, organizational superiors can neither design machines to do the job, nor can they specify rules and procedures for personnel to follow. If one has low knowledge of the transformation process, control mechanisms other than rules and procedures must be employed.

If we assume that the organizational superiors want to design effective controls, then we can assume that they will use those controls which better cope with the exigencies of differential knowledge of the transformational process. We would expect to find the use of rules and procedures in those areas of activity where the transformation process is fairly well understood and we expect not to find them in those areas where the knowledge is less perfect. For example, we would expect there to be more rules specifying the use of monetary resources, but would not expect there to be rules specifying how teachers are to instruct their pupils. The use of rules and procedures, which we call behavior controls, should be found to be used to constrain tasks for which there is greater knowledge of the transformation process, but that other forms of control may be employed to constrain tasks for which knowledge of the transformation process is poor.

A second important property of individual or unit work is the variety of tasks which are to be performed. The greater the variety of

tasks to be performed the more difficult it is to use rules, procedures, and directives.¹ This is particularly true when the tasks are not logically sequenced. When there is a greater variety of tasks for individuals or units to do during a circumscribed period of time, the superior may have difficulty specifying which task should be done when and in what order and will have difficulty specifying in rules when to "change gears" and move on to another task or activity.² This is less of a problem when tasks are logically sequential and and rationally linked and ordered. An example of this would be open heart surgery in which we find a wide variety of tasks, but a clear and specified sequence of tasks. In this example, one can specify rules and procedures to guide behavior. It is a problem though, to control subordinates when there is substantial task variety, when the tasks do not occur in any logical or known sequence, and when individual tasks are regularly fragmented by interruptions as we find in the work of principals.³ Furthermore, when this problem exists, superiors may need to allow the subordinate greater autonomy in order to cope with task variety and technological imprecision.

Goal Determinants

A second important characteristic of tasks, positions, or units is the nature of their goals, objectives, outputs, or outcomes. If the organizational superior can specify and measure with precision the

¹Dornbusch and Scott, Evaluation and the Exercise of Authority, pp. 1-100.


³Ibid.
outputs and outcomes of an individual's or a unit's work, then the superior has a concrete, quantitative way of evaluating the effectiveness of the subordinate's or unit's work. If the outputs are ambiguous, difficult to measure (for any number of reasons: lack of instrumentation, time between tasks and outcomes, and so forth), or have been produced cooperatively with others, then the superior has a difficult time using the number and quality of outputs as a measure of productivity and cannot rely solely on output control. In these instances multiple controls may be employed to constrain subordinates.

Environmental Determinants

The environment influences the structure and processes of an organization in a variety of ways. Recent scholars have gone as far as to contend that organizations must be isomorphic with environmental demands or they cannot survive. We take a somewhat less deterministic approach to the issue. Agreeing that the task environment has an important influence on organizational functioning, we argue that the environment is not the absolute determinant of organizational functioning or of the pattern of the control system. We contend that the task environment of elementary school districts will be part of and partially influence the pattern of control and autonomy allowed by central office.


Several properties of elementary school districts increase the importance of the relation they have with the task environment. First, elementary school districts are public organizations receiving their financing from public monies; the state, the federal government, and local taxation provide the financial support for school districts. In public organizations all aspects and processes of the organization are, or legitimately can be, evaluated by representatives of the public. Means, as well as ends, can be monitored and controlled by the governing board which is the legal representative of the public. The public has a legitimate, as well as personal, stake in both the means employed and the ends sought by school districts.\footnote{Raold F. Campbell et al., \textit{The Organization and Control of American Schools} (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1975).}

In addition, school districts are organizations which function with in local environments. Often, the clients they serve are children from the immediate community. When the children of the immediate community are the clients, the school district must cope with the powerful and cathedected concern of local parents whose ties to the workings of the school are strong. This type environmental involvement in the organization is intense. In short, these organizations face task environments which are connected both through financial support from local taxation and through the emotional attachment of the parents to their offspring. These two connections are strong and often produce active involvement in what the school districts do.

In designing control systems for school districts central office must take into consideration the powerful and pervasive influence of
the local community. It does this by incorporating the environment as part of the control system and by defining community support as one of the "products" of the work of principals.

In short, we expect both individual controls and the overall pattern of control and autonomy to reflect this relationship to the task environment.

Structural Determinants: Size

Many aspects of organizational structure have been studied and related to variations in patterns of organizational functioning.¹ Many features of organizational structure have been examined including formalization, centralization, number of hierarchical levels, and size.² Though all these features of organizational structure may influence (and probably do in some ways) the use of control mechanisms, we believe that the particular configuration of school districts make size, as measured by the number of schools, an important factor in the types of controls central office administrators establish.

The elementary school districts in our sample, like most public school districts, are comprised of many geographically dispersed, relatively self-contained, bounded subunits each headed by a school principal.³ The pattern of control and autonomy employed to constrain these school administrators and their faculties will be affected by the

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number of schools in the district. This may be the case for several reasons. First, as school districts increase in size, the superintendent must deal with a larger number of subordinates, (both in the central office and in schools) whose goals, skills, and knowledge may vary. This increases problems of control. Second, with many units it is more difficult to maintain close interpersonal ties with each unit and unit head.¹ This also increases problems of control. Third, as the number of schools increases the amount of time necessary to visit all the schools increases while administrative responsibilities at central office increase, thus limiting the time available for direct supervision. Finally, increased size brings on greater potential for internal competition for resources which may increase the need to employ tight controls over the distribution of resources.² In these ways increased district size results in an increasing potential for control loss with which central administrators must cope. Thus, the balance of control and autonomy may be affected by variation in the size of the district.

Properties of School Districts and Their Influence on Control

Technology

First, the technology of teaching and educational administration is unclear. There exists poor knowledge of the means-ends chains for


many of the tasks required for the role.\textsuperscript{1} This makes the use of behavior control problematic and at times dysfunctional. Second, principals possess unsystematic knowledge of task sequencing; it is not clear what tasks must be accomplished in what order. Again, this makes the use of behavior control problematic and necessitates increased autonomy for principals by using looser controls such as selection-socialization and output control. Third, the work patterns of principals involving brevity, variety, and task interruption militate against the establishment of tight constraints such as behavior control.\textsuperscript{2} Instead, central office may employ controls which allow principals autonomy in the daily progress of their work. Fourth, the tasks of principals are often indivisible.\textsuperscript{3} This property makes tight hierarchical controls difficult to design and influences the use of other forms of control, such as selection-socialization and environmental control.

These properties of the technology of the principals' work, in short, militate against the use of tight, mechanical control mechanisms such as behavior control (except in administrative areas where the technology is clearer) and necessitates the complementary use of more flexible controls such as selection-socialization, environmental control, and output control which permit the principal autonomy to cope with the unclear, complex, unsystematic technology of their work, but


\textsuperscript{2}Ibid.

which constrain what they accomplish. This pattern of control allows greater autonomy in the instructional and the socio-political areas of responsibility while maintaining tighter control over administrative tasks.

Goals

The properties of goals in educational organizations are another factor which will influence the balance of control and autonomy we might find in Three County school systems. First, the goals of school districts and the principalship are multiple.\(^1\) Goal multiplicity should increase the use of control mechanisms which allow autonomy for managers. Such controls as selection-socialization, environmental, and output control provide greater autonomy for principals while holding them responsible for coordinating their time and channeling their energies to organizational purposes.

Second, goals related to instructional and public relations areas are hard to measure accurately which makes the dependance on carefully measured outputs problematic and increases the use of reference group assessments of principal and schools.\(^2\) Administrative tasks, though, are easier to measure; one can determine whether reports are punctual and accurate and whether principals have attended meetings. In these cases, clear standards can be demanded by central office and tight controls more easily employed.

\(^1\)Campbell et al., *The Organization and Control of American Schools*, pp. 1-73.

Third, priorities among goals are often unclear; goal priorities remain uncrystallized. Again, this makes use of strictly applied output assessment inappropriate, further promoting the application of reference group (particularly parents' and teachers') assessments. This feature of control allows principals the autonomy to work on diverse goals which will satisfy local reference groups. Here, selection-socialization also may, through internalized norms and values.

In short, the multiplicity of goals, the difficulty in measuring goals, and the lack of goal prioritization all necessitate stronger reliance on control mechanisms which allow the principal autonomy in the instructional and public relations aspects of work, while maintaining tight controls over activities in the administrative area.

Relations with the Environment

The special nature of school district-environment relations also influences the relative reliance on different control mechanisms that will affect the balance of control and autonomy central office employs.

First, local communities provide both the major share of financing for the district as well as the raw materials--their children. This increases the local environment's concern with the use of local funds, with the nature of classroom instruction, and with the level of student performance. These intricate ties with the environment require the principal to be sensitive to local constituencies and aware of their demands. The control systems established by central office must allow adequate discretion for principals to deal flexibly with local community demands. We find looser controls over instruction and over

\(^{1}\)Ibid.
dealings with the community in order to provide this discretion. In addition, though, central office will monitor the socio-political effectiveness of principals by using community reactions as measure of goal attainment.

Second, schools have permeable boundaries and "fluid participation" from community members. This makes principals and teachers open to direct observation by community members as well as permitting irate parents direct access to the organization's middle management. This degree of openness to the environment due to boundary permeability increases the non-routine and unpredictable environmental problems with which principals must cope. Organizational control systems which provide autonomy are necessary for managers who must cope with these sorts of unpredictable problems. In short, the strong relationship to the environment increases the need for central office to rely on controls that allow principals adequate autonomy while holding them accountable for socio-political results.

Some Expected Properties of School District Control Systems

The pulls between the needs for central control and local autonomy are particularly acute in school districts. Due to these pulls, the control systems which surround principals must balance off the needs to keep principals and schools working towards the goals and objectives of the organization while allowing principals and schools the necessary autonomy to make decisions, choose courses of action, decide on the sequencing of tasks, and cope with non-routine instructional and local

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environmental demands. Under these conditions neither a totally hierarchical and bureaucratic system nor an entirely non-hierarchical, ceremonial system of control can ensure adequate goal accomplishment. Rather, a system of control composed of a combination of control mechanisms, some hierarchical and tight, others non-hierarchical and loose, can produce the appropriate mix of control and autonomy.¹

We would predict that school districts will use control systems which provide a combination of control and autonomy. First, these control systems will be comprised of multiple control mechanisms, none of which predominates because no single mechanism of control can adequately constrain all the tasks for which principals are responsible. Second, control systems in these districts will be zoned, that is to say, central office employs tight hierarchical controls in the area of administrative activities such as reporting and budgeting, at the same time it employs looser modes of controls (e.g., selection-socialization, environmental control, and output control) in the areas of instruction and socio-political effectiveness. Third, these systems of control probably are pervasive affecting all aspects of their work through the melding of six mechanisms of organizational control which form a net of formal and informal constraints involving superiors (supervision), subordinates (internalized norms), as well as environmental actors (public pressure). This pattern of control envelopes principals with a net of constraints—subtle and yet complex.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

The literature on organization control, though relatively weak and poorly systematized, delineates a number of control mechanisms which are found in organizations. There are six major types of control mechanisms superiors use in organizations. These six mechanisms have been called by many names, but for this study they are: (1) supervision, (2) input control, (3) behavior control, and (4) output control, (5) selection-socialization, and (6) environmental control.

Unfortunately, empirical research on control systems in school districts and other organizations is neither linear nor cumulative. The findings illuminate bits and pieces of the puzzle while the theories on control in organizations provide only occasional explanatory linkages between concepts. At the present time, the literature on organizations lacks a theoretical framework or organizing scheme which describes the ways individual control mechanisms work or precisely how they vary. We also do not have analyses which explain the ways control mechanisms are integrated to form a system of control in organizations. Recent studies do suggest some of the dimensions on which these six control mechanisms vary, when they occur, and how they function.
Supervision

Direct supervision by an immediate superior is one of the most common methods of organizational control. Supervision, as a method of control, involves the direct observation by a superior at the work site which prompts supportive or corrective feedback by the superior. Research on this control mechanism suggests that the use of supervision to control workers may be related to particular characteristics of organizational tasks and structure.

The use of supervision may vary in organizations. Frequency of supervision may vary depending on the nature of the technology or the type of tasks supervised. Blauner suggests that the closeness of supervision varies across industries due to the tasks being monitored. His description of the technical process of the four industries suggests that supervision of printers, textile workers, automobile assemblers, and chemical workers varies: (1) due to the differential knowledge of the transformation process, (2) in proportion to the level of task interdependence, and (3) in response to the degree of mechanization of the process. When the tasks are routine and the transformation process known (except in the case of chemical workers who were controlled almost totally by the machinery), supervision is more frequent, that is, closer. The opposite is the case when the tasks are non-routine and the transformation process less specified. In the absence of mechanized, continuous process technologies, knowledge of the transformation process and routinization of tasks increases the
likelihood of supervision being used to control behavior and also increases the frequency of supervisory contact.¹

Similarly, Dornbusch and Scott suggest that there are three characteristics of tasks or "task arrangements" which influence the frequency of supervision. They argue that frequency of supervision may increase when there is high efficacy, predictability, and clarity of the task.² These characteristics specify the degree to which tasks produce outcomes and the degree to which goals can be clearly defined.

Further support for this argument comes from several studies conducted by Ouchi. Using questionnaire data gathered from several levels of a retail sales company, they conclude that knowledge of the transformation process, which varied considerably among the levels studied, is associated with differential use of supervision as a mode of control. Greater knowledge of how to accomplish tasks is related to more frequent supervision.³

Research also supports the notion that the use of supervision is associated with the skills and capacities of the superior. When the superior knows how, or believes he or she knows how, to do a set of tasks, or a particular task, he or she is more likely to use supervision as a mode of control. Walker, Guest, and Turner suggest that foremen who know the jobs their subordinates perform may supervise


²Sanford D. Dornbusch and W. Richard Scott, Evaluation and the Exercise of Authority, pp. 1-100.

more frequently. Similarly, Ouchi and Maquire point out that the capacities and skills of the managers appear to be related to differential use of supervision.\footnote{William G. Ouchi and M. A. Maguire, "Organizational Control: Two Functions," Administrative Science Quarterly 20 (1975), 359-381; Charles R. Walker, Robert H. Guest, and Arthur N. Turner, The Foreman on the Assembly Line (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).} Superiors who are not as skilled as their subordinates may hesitate to supervise for fear of appearing less knowledgeable, unable to determine what the worker should be doing, or unable to demonstrate what to do if necessary.

Furthermore, the frequency of supervision appears to vary by hierarchical level, decreasing in frequency as one moves up the hierarchy. Walker, Guest, and Turner's study, which describes the ways foremen supervise assembly line workers, also shows that foremen spend twice as much time supervising their subordinates as their superiors spend supervising them. This supervisory pattern is also found in Jacques' study, in which he states that close supervision is more common at the lower level of an organization than at the managerial level. Ouchi and Maguire find that supervision is less frequent at the managerial level. In a study of chief executive officers, Mintzberg reports that they spend little time with subordinates and infrequently supervise managers.\footnote{Elliot Jaques, Measurement of Responsibility (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 1-110; Ouchi and Maguire, pp. 359-381; Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).} It may be that the nature of work at the technical core of organizations is easier to supervise than at the managerial level. In general, supervision at the managerial level and in the principalship is expected to be relatively infrequent. Infrequent
supervision at the managerial level is associated with knowledge of the transformation process, but it may also be related to the autonomy which is necessary to cope with multiple problems of one's unit.

Several researchers argue that the use of supervision may be a function of the normative expectations of the occupation, company, industry, or nation. Blauner shows that closeness of supervision varies across occupations and may be related to the norms of the industries and the occupations he studied, which include printing, textile, automobile, and chemical workers. Similarly, Ouchi and Maguire point out that the differential use of supervision they find may be due to the norms of the companies studied.\footnote{Blauner, pp. 1-90; Ouchi and Maguire, pp. 359-381.} Ouchi contends that control systems may differ depending on the normative expectations found in different countries.\footnote{Ouchi, "A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Systems," pp. 833-847.} In short, the culture of an organization, industry, or nation may influence the frequency at supervision just as technical exigencies may. Few organizations use only one type of control; more often they use some combination of controls which comprise their control system.\footnote{Kaufman, The Forest Ranger: A Study of Administrative Behavior, pp. 1-120.}

Control mechanisms interact with other control mechanisms in a variety of ways. Some argue that one type of control mechanism is an alternative or substitute for another type of control. Others contend that some controls are not alternatives but are complementary in that they serve different functions in the organizations. Still others
suggest that different control mechanisms are cumulative, that is, each control adds further influence or control to the total system of control. Finally, authors indirectly suggest that some controls may be subtractive when used in combination with other controls.

All of these findings about supervision in organizations are mediated by size. Mintzberg's data suggest that at the managerial level increased organizational size brings on decreased supervision as larger organizations replace direct supervision with a form of output monitoring.¹

Writers on supervision frequently contend that supervision is interchangeable with other types of control, usually with rules and procedures or performance records. In a study of state employment agencies, Blau found that supervision in a bureaucracy is used interchangeably with the use of performance records, which is a form of output control.² In contrast to this finding, Ouchi provides evidence that in retail sales organizations supervision and rules are not interchangeable, but that these controls vary independently because they serve different organizational functions.³

Other factors, such as the nature of the transformation process or measurability of outputs, may affect interchangeability of controls. Ouchi contends that when a superior has knowledge of the transformation process, and when outputs which can be precisely measured, then either


²Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, 1-200.

³Ouchi, "The Relationship between Organizational Structure and Organizational Control," pp. 94-113.
supervision or output controls may be used. He further suggests that when the measurable outputs do not include or cover certain important tasks, such as maintaining stocks or assisting fledgling employees, then output control may not be an effective substitute for supervision or an alternative to socialization—a control mechanism which also covers a broader array of tasks that cannot be easily measured as outputs.¹

Research in supervision as a control in school systems is sparse. Supervision in educational organizations has been studied at the technical level,² but few studies describe the supervision of principals by a central office. These studies provide a somewhat incomplete picture of how central office supervises principals.

Researchers find that principals spend little time interacting with central office personnel for any reason. Supervision is infrequent, if it occurs at all. For example, in one study of the role of the principal in a large metropolitan district, McDowell finds little evidence of supervision by the central office. In a different type of district, Wolcott, in an ethnographic study of a principal in a small Oregon system, found that the superintendent visited the schools once a year to evaluate principals, a clear case of supervision, and that the principal spent on average 6 percent of his time with central office staff. Much of this time may not have been supervisory in function. In another observational study of two inner-city principals, Peterson

¹Ibid.

reports no contact between principals and superiors.\textsuperscript{1} This lack of contact may be due to the short length of observation. Further, Friesen and Duignan report that the Alberta superintendents spend a little less than 6 percent of their time in observational activities which are "primarily for evaluation," by taking two trips daily within the system. Occasional supervision may have occurred, but their data do not indicate who was being supervised or visited, as the "tours" are not described.\textsuperscript{2}

Data from studies of upper management in a number of settings also provide little evidence of close supervision of middle management by superiors. In an observational study of five managers, Mintzberg states that none of these chief executive officers closely supervised their middle- or lower-middle level managers. One superintendent in the study, who directed a large suburban district, visited no schools during the forty hours of observation. This may be due to the fact that the data were collected toward the end of the year.\textsuperscript{3} Supervision of managers tends not to be frequent; they are not closely supervised.

In brief, studies of superintendents and principals indicate either no supervision or infrequent supervision by central office personnel. Furthermore, none of the studies of educational organizations relate variations in the organizational structure, goals, or the


\textsuperscript{2}David Friesen and Patrick Duignan, "How Superintendents Spend Their Working Time," The Canadian Administrator 19 (1980); 1-4.

\textsuperscript{3}Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work, pp. 1-100.
tasks of principals to variations in supervision. In addition, as none of the studies examine the relationship between the use of supervision in school districts and the use of other types of control, it is not known whether supervision is substitutive, complementary, cumulative, or subtractive when used alongside other control mechanisms in a control system. Similarly, these studies of school districts do not report comparative use of supervision in districts of different size.

Input Control

Input controls constrain the amount, use, and flow of resources to subunits. Newman and Wallendar were first to suggest this type of organizational control found in the control systems of nonprofit enterprises. Starting with a list of particular characteristics which may act as constraints on the use of other controls in these organizations, the authors derive a series of predictions about control over inputs in nonprofit organizations. They suggest that control in these enterprises "involves the same elements as control in profit-seeking firms," but that there are severe limitations on the use of output control. Because of this, managers must rely more on controls over such inputs as expenses, and use of personnel. Presently, the author knows of no studies of school districts which examine use of this type of control.

Behavior Control

A fifth common control mechanism is behavior control. The structuring of activities through plans and procedures, the standardization

of work in rules and directives, or the mechanization of production through the design of man-machine processes may act as forms of behavior control which channel and direct the work behaviors of organization members.

Research on the use of behavior control has been quite varied, in part because of its widespread use. Weber is perhaps the first modern theorist to point to the important use of rules and procedures in the structuring and control of organizational activities. Blau's study using Weber's concepts shows that state employment agencies use standard operating procedures extensively to control employees.¹

Other studies point to particular factors which may restrict the use of standardized rules and procedures as mechanisms of control. Pugh et al., state that the structuring of activities, one type of behavior control, is related to organizational technology and the number of work sites.² Similarly, Stinchcombe argues that the nature of construction technology makes control by standardized rules and procedures, i.e., behavior control, ineffective. Construction technology is characterized by uncertainty, and is thus not controllable through the standardization of tasks in rules and procedures. Stinchcombe argues that in mass production, where the transformation process is known, the control of work by rules and procedures can be effective. He suggests that when there is a clear technology and a high concentration of routine tasks superiors establish rules and


procedures. When this is not the case, other types of control must be utilized.\textsuperscript{1} Behavior control requires that tasks can be specified and prescribed in rules, procedures, or directives.

Few studies examine the differential use of behavior control methods across levels in a single company or across different organizational roles. Ouchi, though, suggests that output control will be used more at the technical level than at the managerial level, due to the more varied tasks which managers must perform compared to the less varied tasks of the technical level worker.\textsuperscript{2}

There is little research on the use of behavior controls in school districts, particularly at the administrative level. Though some of the more recent observational studies of principals do not specifically focus on the use of rules to control the work of principals, some of the tasks described in these studies may be constrained by rules, procedures, or directives. Principals must prepare reports, attend meetings, evaluate teachers, and fill out budgets.\textsuperscript{3}

The relationship between the use of behavior control and other controls has been examined in two major studies. Blau contends that behavior control can be replaced by output control; that is, the examination of performance records can be substituted for specific rules


and procedures. In contrast, Ouchi argues that in retail sales companies behavior control cannot be replaced by output control because these controls serve different purposes. In summary, behavior controls are used to control tasks when the transformation process is known and rules can be specified.

Output Control

Output control mechanisms, or control through the monitoring and evaluation of performance, output, or results, is extensively used in all types of organizations. It has been called control by results, output control, and management by objectives (MBO) works by examining the quality and/or quantity of output production in organizations.

Research points to some of the diverse patterns of output control usage in organizations. Blau suggests that the use of performance records, one form of output measure, can replace supervision. In contrast, Ouchi and Maguire, in an extensive study of control in retail sales companies, argue that supervision and output control are not alternatives, but are independent, noninterchangeable mechanisms of control because they fulfill different functions in the organization. Output control is used when managers need "to provide legitimate evidence of performance."

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1Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, pp. 1-100.
3Anthony, Planning and Control Systems.
4Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, pp. 1-100.
5Ouchi and Maguire, "Organizational Control: Two Functions," pp. 359-81.
Properties of organizations influence the application of output controls. Ouchi argues that increased company size is related to greater reliance on output control. He also reports that output control is more common than supervision as a means of ensuring satisfactory performance in the upper levels of the organizational hierarchy.¹

The measurability of outputs may influence use of output control. Turcotte, in a study of two state liquor agencies, found that high performance is related to precise performance expectations from superiors and to control systems which emphasize output over other measures of performance. Further, Zald suggests that it is difficult to use output controls when goals are diffuse and difficult to measure and when the transformation process is not well understood demonstrating this in a study of a metropolitan YMCA.²

In spite of the increased interest in educational productivity, there are few systematic studies of the use of output control in school districts. More than a decade ago, Bidwell commented on the potential importance of "control by results" at the technical level, that is, granting teachers the right to determine instructional methods and content, but holding them responsible for educational outcomes.³ He did not comment on control by results at the administrative level, but


a similar pattern of output control might be expected. Unfortunately, no research resulted from this useful observation.

In summary, research suggests that output control, one of the major forms of organizational control, will be found in most organizations. The size of the district and the level of the individual in the hierarchy also influences the use of output control. Additionally, greater use is found of output control compared to behavior control in positions where the knowledge of the transformation process is relatively poor, as is the case with the work of principals. Finally, the diffuseness and measurability of goals, i.e., outputs or results, may also limit the use of the output control mechanism.

**Selection-Socialization**

As a method of control, selection-socialization is the process by which norms, values, and modes of action are internalized and which later act as rules of organizational behavior. While many organizational control systems derive from direct actions of superiors, selection for or socialization to the norms of the company, institution, or profession exist in, and are activated by, the individual, and are less costly of organizational resources. As a mechanism of control selection-socialization is similar to supervision except that the monitoring, evaluation, and feedback are generated internally by the subordinate. One might conceive of socialization as internalized supervision.

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As a control, selection-socialization can influence a wide range of organizational tasks and processes by internally directing behavior; for example, setting the proper way to deal with parental conflict or the appropriate dress to be worn to school meetings. In addition, socialization-socialization acts at a distance; no superior need be at the work station for the control to be enacted. When the employee is totally socialized, adjustments to tasks and managerial decisions can be made outside the physical presence of the superior.

What does research say about the use of selection-socialization as a mode of organizational control? Studies of professionalization stress the power of socialization to control and to channel the work of professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and military officers.\(^1\) A few studies demonstrate how organizations use socialization of nonprofessionals and managers as a mechanism of control. For example, Kaufman's study of the United States Forest Service shows the complex ways forest rangers are socialized into the organization. He points out the effectiveness of this mechanism when used in conjunction with other control efforts, showing socialization to be useful in combating the problems of control loss in a fragmented organization with highly dispersed subunits.\(^2\) Various organizational practices are related to the use of socialization as a control. In a study by Edstrom and Galbraith, transfer of managers to different units or locations (similar to transfer practices found in the forest service) were used to socialize


managers of multinational corporations in an effort to control their work.¹

Other organizations develop complex socialization structures. Ouchi suggests that some organizations employ socialization as the primary control mechanism in what he calls a "clan" structure. In clans, control is exercised through the strict internalization of organizational norms and values. These norms and values are instilled and reinforced through organizational rituals and ceremonies and heralded in myths and sagas.²

In summary, some studies point to the use of selection-socialization in public, as well as market-based companies. Selection-socialization may develop as a result of early specialized training, transfer of members to various units, or socializing rituals and ceremonies. As with other types of control mechanisms, selection-socialization varies in its use. The degree or extent of selection-socialization may differ. Also, its use may vary by level in the organization.

The reasons for variation in the use of socialization are not known completely. Selection-socialization may be employed as a mode of control when other controls cannot influence all the important outputs or when tasks are highly varied.³ Or, socialization may be used as a


control when an organization has subunits or divisions which are
dispersed and must deal with separate, but potent, environments and
where local discretion is required. A framework of shared norms,
values, and goals, allows managers the discretion necessary to deal
with variable local conditions and complex sets of tasks without goal
displacement.

While no known empirical studies examine the differential use of
selection-socialization at the administrative level in school
districts, Meyer and Rowen contend that school districts may depend on
commitment and shared goals i.e., socialization, to ensure the coor-
dination and control of internal functions. Meyer and Rowen argue that
school systems rely on these nonbureaucratic means of control
because schools have a weak technology and their output is difficult
to measure. Commitment and shared goals of administrators may be a
product of occupational as well as local socialization practices.

Selection-socialization of administrators may be part of the
control system in school districts, but few researchers have studied
this phenomenon empirically. Wolcott suggests that socialization might
provide a means for school districts to control principals but offers
little empirical evidence of this.2 Lortie describes the importance
and complexity of socialization processes as they influence the work of
teachers, but does not extrapolate his argument to the work of
principals.3 There is no study of administrators which examines

1John Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations:


3Lortie, Schoolteacher, pp. 1-90.
selection-socialization as a mode of administrative level control in educational organizations. Ortiz, while describing administrative socialization, does not clearly point to its role in school district control.\(^1\) Prior research suggests that as selection-socialization affects teachers and administrators, its influence will have an impact upon their actions as principals and may be part of a complex system of organizational control.

Selection-socialization, like supervision, may interact with other modes of control. Edstrom and Galbraith suggest that socialization is cumulative and supportive of other controls, especially output control.\(^2\) Little research has investigated the relationship of selection-socialization to other controls in an organizational control system.

In summary, we may find selection-socialization used as a mechanism of administrative level control in educational organizations as it is in other enterprises. Researchers show it to be effective with professionals as well as managers in corporations. It is found often in organizations with dispersed units and for discretionary, environmentally pressed positions.

**Environmental Control**

Organizational research abounds with studies of the environment as a constraint on the organization, but few indicate the manner in which administrators incorporate the environment into the control system.\(^3\)

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\(^2\) Edstrom and Galbraith, pp. 248-63.

\(^3\) Aldrich and Pfeffer, "Environments of Organizations," pp. 79-105.
The environment may be part of the control system in a number of ways and to varying degrees. Agents of the environment may act as part of the control system. These agents may function as important sources of information used in evaluating subordinates, or their opinions may be used by superiors as criteria of effectiveness for individuals or units.

Research on organizations points to some of the ways the environment may be incorporated into the control system. Kaufman suggests that the United States Forest Service control system uses the environment—the local communities served by the rangers—as sources of information on unit functioning and as a criterion of effectiveness. He argues that since the dispersion of the units makes direct supervision difficult, socialization is not totally effective as a control system, and rules cannot cover all contingencies. Therefore, the service ensures that client complaints are heard to supplement these controls.2 Ouchi also finds the environment to be a direct source of control actions. In retail stores with high income clientele, he suggests that there is less supervision of sales people because assertive clientele demand that certain norms of sales behavior are followed.3 McDowell, in his study of urban principals, states that when the local community complains to the superintendent (and only in those instances) the superior imposes sanctions on the principal


In this case, information from the environment activates administrative sanctioning, acting as part of the control system.\(^1\)

Overall, the community is a powerful force in the world of the school administrator. As Bidwell suggests, the influence of communities at all levels of school district functioning is both legitimate and pervasive.\(^2\) It seems plausible that the environment will be used as part of many school district control systems. Though not an easily controlled influence, it is a resource which superintendents may use to control principals and their schools.

Control through environmental agents interacts with other control mechanisms and is seldom, if ever, the primary control. Kaufman's study suggests that the environment is used when community reaction and public support for local units is important and when rules, procedures, and directives are inadequate to deal with complex or varied tasks. Thus, the environment acts as a complementary control of rules and procedures. His study also indicates the complementary relationship environmental control may have with supervision and socialization.\(^3\)

In summary, organizational superiors may use the environment as part of the control system: (1) when other controls are not enough, (2) when the public has a legitimate interest in organizational functioning, and (3) when units are dispersed.

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\(^1\) McDowell, "The Role of the Principal . . .," pp. 1-150.


Summary

Prior research and analysis point to the need to examine organizational control from a comprehensive perspective. It seems clear from this literature that control systems are comprised of a number of different control mechanisms with each providing some additional constraint or direction to subordinates. Four of these mechanisms of control are hierarchical, emanating from upper level superiors. These include supervision, input control, behavior control, and output control. Two other mechanisms of control are non-hierarchical and derive from internalized norms and values or from the influence of external pressure groups. These include selection-socialization and environmental control. Examination of the literature suggests that these non-hierarchical controls may be particularly important in school districts, though no prior research has adequately examined the means central office uses to constrain and direct principals. Prior studies also suggest that the environment and the size of the organization will affect the pattern of controls which may be applied in a particular situation. Finally, the literature on control suggests that organizations use control systems which provide a balance of control and autonomy, combining sufficient constraint with adequate autonomy for subordinates in order to ensure optimal organizational productivity and long-term survival.
CHAPTER III

SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY

Methodology

This study describes work completed at the Finance and Productivity Center of the University of Chicago. It presents the findings of a study looking at the relations between central office and the school principal using data gathered in extensive interviews. I will describe the types of administrative level control mechanisms we find operating in elementary school districts, examining the central tendencies and distributions across a stratified random sample of principals, and noting their influence on the balance of control and autonomy afforded principals.

Preparation of the Interview Schedule

In depth interviews were used to gather data from these elementary principals. Ranging in length from two to four hours, the interviews probed every major aspect of the principalship, the job, the school, and the district. Extensive work went into preparation of the interview. Initially, the researchers defined a range of interests, aspects of the principalship and educational organizations which needed investigation. The study team transformed these areas of interest into questions to be asked of principals, then wrote and revised these questions several times before using them in an exploratory study of
about twenty non-randomly selected elementary principals. Each of these interviews, conducted by the author, was taped in its entirety.

A secretary transcribed all these exploratory interviews which the research team read and analyzed, looking for patterns and themes in the responses. The research team produced cross-tabulation tables and coded open-ended questions, oftentimes multiple coding responses, to get a broader, more comprehensive picture of the administrative position and the characteristics of its surrounding organization.

During this early period, the team began writing an extensive interview for superintendents. After several revisions, we completed this interview schedule and chose a non-random group of eighteen superintendents to be interviewed. Again, the interviews were tape recorded, transcribed, and analyzed, seeking patterns, themes, and factors which seemed to differentiate between types of superintendents and types of districts as they related to the control and autonomy of principals. In addition, we wanted to determine whether the principal's interview provided an accurate picture of the principalship and the district system of control. On the basis of these two sets of interviews the research team determined that the principal's interview would provide accurate, reliable information on principals, districts and control mechanisms as similar responses were received during the investigation.

With further work and refinement, taking into consideration what had been learned in the early principal's interviews and in those with superintendents, then developed the final form of the principal's interview schedule. At this point the author pretested the final
interview schedule with several principals, making small adjustments in
the format and the wording of a few questions to improve flow and
reliability.

Selection of the Population

The population we chose to sample works in perhaps the least
complex type educational organization, elementary schools in elementary
school districts. They are the least complex for a number of reasons.
First, elementary schools have a simpler internal structure than either
junior high or senior high schools. They have little subject speciali-
zation or staff differentiation, as they are primarily age-graded with
pupils remaining, in most cases for the entire, day with the same
teacher. Second, elementary school districts are structurally simpler
than unit districts. Often we find only two types of schools in
elementary districts, elementary and junior high, and a flatter, less
differentiated administrative hierarchy. This population provides a
useful exploratory study of the work of principals and their relations
with superiors in educational organizations in large part because these
relations are not confounded by enormous organizational complexity.

Drawing the Sample

We drew the sample of principals in two steps. First, we strati-
fied the sample by the size of the district as defined by the number of
elementary principals in the district. Second, we randomly selected
two principals in each district. The sample consisted of 60 districts
and 120 principals from three suburban counties surrounding a large
midwestern city. One hundred thirteen principals, 94 percent of the
original sample, agreed to participate. One position disappeared
through the death of a principal, and six principals chose not to participate. One district was lost when both principals chose not to participate. The only identifying feature of those who refused is the disproportionate number who hold doctorates compared to the total for the sample. The final set included 113 suburban elementary principals from 59 different districts in three counties. Henceforth we will call this the "Three County" sample of districts and schools.

We chose a random sample of districts by size for several reasons. First, organizational theory suggests that organizational size significantly affects most features of the organization from specialization to differentiation, from communication to control. We assumed that the number of elementary principals in a district, one measure of size, would influence the relationship between central office, principals, and the system of control. Second, by selecting 60 different districts in three suburban counties we hoped to ensure variation in geographic location, in the socio-economic composition of the district, and in the race of the community. Finally, by randomly selecting districts and principals in those districts we would be able to use either districts or principals as the level of analysis.

The Sample

The sample produced a diverse array of districts, schools, and principals. The districts range in size from 2 to 28 schools. Districts from all parts of the suburban ring were represented. The schools and districts vary in the socio-economic background of the parents, assessed valuation, per capita expenditures, and experience of the superintendent, to name a few dimensions. The schools which these
principals head vary in size, complexity, age of the teaching staff, and educational level of the parents. The characteristics of the principals also vary considerably. They range in age from their early 30s to their mid-60s, with experience in the role ranging from a few months to 32 years. The sample is disproportionately composed of white male principals with a small percentage of blacks (9 percent) and females (16 percent). There are neither Oriental nor Hispanic principals in the sample. In sum, the sample represents a wide cross-section of districts, schools, and principals which makes it possible to determine how different districts with diverse schools and different superintendents use mechanisms of control to direct and channel the work of principals providing a balance of control and autonomy.

Analysis of the Data

The approach we will take to data analysis follows directly from the basic exploratory and descriptive nature of this study. In this research we are searching for patterns and themes in the data, gathering empirical information about a phenomenon which is seldom examined. Analysis will provide a rich descriptive examination of a complex process in order to produce a picture of control and autonomy in these school districts. We hope to generate ideas, concepts, and new research about these systems of control. We are not attempting to test hypotheses or to make statistical inferences about specific populations.

Initially we will describe the central tendencies and distributions of the data, looking at various measures of organizational control. Next, we will show how the use of organizational control
varies across schools of different social status and across districts of different size. For school social status we used a measure of the predominate occupational status of the school community as reported by principals. The size of the district was measured by the total number of schools in the district, which included both elementary and junior high schools. To examine the relationship between our measures of organizational control with school social status and district size we use crosstabulation tables and where appropriate Pearson product-moment correlations. We will not be presenting measures of statistical significance for the tables or the correlations because the purpose of the study is not to make inferences about populations but rather to explore this phenomenon. In addition, the sample is not a simple random sample. Given the nature of the sample, levels of statistical significance should not be used as there is a high probability for error in applying these types of mathematical tests.¹

The analysis of the data, in short, will be straightforward and uncomplicated in order to explore and to describe the nature of organizational control systems in elementary school districts, control systems which combine zones of constraint and zones of autonomy.

CHAPTER IV

HIERARCHICAL CONTROL MECHANISMS

Supervision: Findings

Introduction

In this section we will be discussing the use of supervision as a mechanism of control over the work of principals. Supervision, the first control we will examine, works in conjunction with five other mechanisms of control which, when taken together, comprise the complete system of administrative level control. When we discuss the balance of control and autonomy afforded by the differential use of supervision, we will mean the degree of control or autonomy provided by the one control mechanism alone, for as we shall see later, in instances where infrequent supervision provides considerable autonomy for principals, other forms of control such as input control or behavior control are instituted to restrict the total autonomy the principal would enjoy if supervision alone were employed. In short, while each mechanism of control differentially affects the autonomy of various segments of our sample, the overall balance of control and autonomy for principals derives from the combination and patterning of all six mechanisms of control.
Measuring Supervision

How does one measure supervision in an educational organization? Most often, researchers either count through observation the number of times a superior visits the work site of the subordinate or, alternately, they ask the subordinate to report the number of visits superiors make to their work station for a given time period. Both direct observation and self-report can provide a measure of the frequency of direct supervision. Generally, neither the length of visits, the content of supervisory interactions, nor the affective component of the supervision have been examined.

Following the lead of others, this study asked principals to report the frequency of visits by superintendents per year, (Question 32F, Appendix A) and by all central office personnel, including superintendents (Appendix A) to their schools per month. Supervision is defined as a visit made by the superintendent and/or other central office personnel to the respondent's school. As this study is concerned with a broad set of control mechanisms, it was decided to exclude potentially lengthy questions about the specifics of what occurred during these visits. Future studies may wish to delve into the content, focus, and length of these visits.

Overview of Section

In the following pages we will look at the frequency of supervision found in Three County school districts and factors which are associated with variation in frequency of this supervision. First, we will look at supervision by the superintendent alone and later at supervision by all central office administrators, including the
superintendent. For both of these measures of supervision, we will examine the distribution of the entire sample as well as probe the differential influence of district size and the social status of the school on frequency of supervision. In addition, we will determine how frequency of supervision for these two measures is related to the sources of information central office uses when they evaluate principals, noting how supervision sometimes serves as information gathering purposes. Finally, we will examine the reasons principals give for differential supervision in their districts noting how these reasons vary by district size. Through these analyses we will depict the degree to which the central offices in Three County schools employ supervision as a mechanism of control and, conversely, the degree of autonomy permitted principals when supervision is infrequent.

Supervision by the Superintendent

Central Tendencies and Variation

The superintendent is the principal's most powerful superior, the primary determiner of salary, promotion and retention. Supervisory visits by superintendents will have important consequences for principals and will either increase their autonomy through infrequent supervision or decrease their autonomy by frequent school tours.

Superintendents visit individual schools regularly, but infrequently. Modally, superintendents visit respondent's schools nine times a year or about once a month. Some 26 percent of the respondents are visited by superintendents less than once a month.

In our sample, the median and mode of nine more accurately reflect the central tendencies of the data because the distribution is skewed.
The mean number of visits by superintendents is 24 times per year, reflecting a small number of cases in which these superiors visited schools 50 or more times per year and in one case 450 times per year. These special cases, which will be discussed shortly, substantially increases the mean of superintendent visitation for the sample.

Supervision by superintendents exhibits considerable variation. The range of 450 starts at no reported visits per year and ends with one superintendent who was in a principal's school 450 times over the year. The standard deviation of 61.4 reflects this fact. Frequency of supervision, in sum, though great in range, is dramatically skewed toward the lower end of the distribution with 76 percent reporting visits of once a month or less.

The modal characteristics of supervision in Three County schools point to considerable freedom from control through superintendent supervision. Modally, these principals seldom have their top superior in their schools during which superiors would have the opportunity to gather information, to make face-to-face commands, or to criticize the functioning of the school. Infrequent supervision gives the principal considerable autonomy to choose what to do, when, and how.

In several particular cases, though, supervision by the superintendent is extremely frequent, sometimes once or more a day. We find those special cases in very small school districts with less than 4 schools and when the superintendent's office is located in the respondent's building. Under these conditions, we find superintendents tend to tour the building frequently; autonomy for these principals is considerably circumscribed by close supervision. In short, principals with central office-school site combinations represent a unique
situation where close supervision, facilitated by "joint tenancy," decreases overall autonomy.

Just as joint tenancy is related to the degree of autonomy, the geographic distance between central office headquarters and the respondent's school also is associated with frequency of supervision and, by definition, to the degree of autonomy enjoyed by principals. The correlation between geographic distance (Question 32E, Appendix A) and supervisory frequency is positive ($r = .26$). As the greatest distance from central office to the respondent's school is no more than eight miles, we see that small distances can influence the frequency of supervision and decrease administrative autonomy for principals.

Superintendent Supervision and District Size

The size of the district influences the frequency of supervision. As can be seen in Table 1 the frequency of supervision by the superintendent is negatively related to the size of the district; the larger the district the less frequently superintendents visit schools, while the smaller the district the more frequently superintendents tour schools. Modally, 66.6 percent of the small district principals fall into the high visit category (ten or more visits per year), 54.8 percent of the mid-sized district principals fall in the medium visit category (4-9 visits per year), and 52.6 percent of the large district principals fall into the low visit category (0-3 visits per year). This relationship is linear and strong.

Superintendents supervise principals more frequently in smaller districts for several reasons. First, in smaller districts there are fewer schools to tour making regular visits more manageable. Second,
as we shall see shortly, smaller districts require fewer reports, reports which take superintendent's time that could be used to visit schools. In larger districts paperwork decreases the time available to superintendents for school visits. Third, as organizations increase in size they differentiate roles and increase the number of central office staff. These additional administrators will require a substantial proportion of the superintendent's time, leaving less for school visits. Finally as districts increase in size, superintendents are less likely to know each school intimately. This lack of close personal knowledge will decrease the superintendent's willingness to drop into the schools for doing so places them in unknown or at least unfamiliar territory.

**TABLE 1**

**NUMBER OF SUPERINTENDENT VISITS PER YEAR BY SIZE OF DISTRICT**  
(Question 32F)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of District</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Small (1-4 Sch)</th>
<th>Medium (5-8 Sch)</th>
<th>Large (9+ Schools)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent-</td>
<td>Percent-</td>
<td>Percent-</td>
<td>Percent-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>age</td>
<td>age</td>
<td>age</td>
<td>age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (10+ visits)</td>
<td>32 22.9</td>
<td>18 66.6</td>
<td>11 26.2</td>
<td>3 7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (4-9 visits)</td>
<td>43 40.2</td>
<td>5 18.5</td>
<td>23 54.8</td>
<td>15 39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (0-3 visits)</td>
<td>32 29.9</td>
<td>4 14.8</td>
<td>8 19.0</td>
<td>20 52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>107 100.0</td>
<td>27 99.9</td>
<td>42 100.0</td>
<td>38 100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lower frequency of supervision by the superintendent will increase a principal's autonomy. As districts increase in size, the superintendent supervises principals less frequently thereby increasing the principals' time span of discretion and autonomy. The autonomy allowed by infrequent supervision, though, may be mediated in larger districts by the use of other controls. As we will discuss later, with increased district size comes increased use of formal controls and behavior controls which overcome the control dampening effects of infrequent supervision in the larger districts.

In brief, district size differentially influences supervision by superintendents and thus the balance of control and autonomy from the use of this control mechanism. Small district size increases superintendent supervision which in turn increases control. As districts increase in size the frequency of superintendent supervision decreases which decreases control from this method and increases the autonomy of principals.

Supervision by Superintendents and School Social Status

In a 1977 study, Ouchi discovered that the social status of retail store customers was associated with the differential use of various mechanisms of control. In particular, he suggests that customers of higher social status are more likely to be incorporated into the control system of the store acting as extra-organizational supervisors of sales people. Ouchi suggests that higher status clientele may partially replace hierarchical controls over subordinates. In short,

1Ouchi, "The Relationship Between Organizational Structure and Organizational Control," p. 102.
increased social status of clients may be associated with decreased use of supervision.

Is the social status of the local school community associated with the frequency of supervisory visits by superintendents? It turns out that the social status of the local school is not significantly associated with variation in supervision by the superintendent. Using a Pearson correlation to examine the relationship between measures of school-level social status and frequency of supervision, we find only a small negative correlation (r = -0.12). This lack of relationship demonstrates that superintendents do not differentially supervise principals depending on the social status of the local school community. As social status of the school does not influence the degree of autonomy provided by infrequent superintendent supervision, district size remains a much stronger predictor of monthly visits from superintendents.

Much research on organizations suggests that properties of the environment often strongly affect how organizations function. In educational organizations, superintendents are particularly vulnerable to pressures brought from the environment by parents and other members of the community, but the social status of schools, one important characteristic of the district environment, is not related to differential supervision by superintendents. Why might this be the case? As superintendents do not choose to visit schools based on their social status, other factors may influence this decision. It may be that the social status of schools influences central office activity primarily though the complaints the community voices regarding their discontent with the principal or teachers. We have found also that the size of
the district affects supervision; as the number of schools a superintendent has to visit increases the rate of visiting declines because time available per school declines. Furthermore, as we will discuss shortly differential supervision increases when central office hears of problems about the school or the principal. This suggests that differences in supervision and the control produced by supervision are affected more by the constraints brought on by district size and the extent of problems at the school level than independently by the social status of the school's community.

In brief, the influence of school social status may function indirectly though the differential assertiveness of high or low status parents, though it has no direct influence on supervision by superintendents.

Superintendent Supervisory Intensity and Evaluative Information

Visitations to work sites by a superior not only provide direct influence over the work of subordinates, but they supply concrete, first-hand information about how well managers and their units are performing. Superintendents may visit schools in order to gather detailed information which they use later to evaluate the work of the principal and the school. When superintendents use visits to gather evaluative information, their control over principals increases and the autonomy of principals decreases.

Principals were asked what sources of information they thought superintendents used when they evaluated principals (Question 47B, Appendix A). Principals report that in addition to other sources, they believe the superintendent gathers evaluative information during visits
to schools, at meetings, and so forth. Overall, 41 principals, 37 percent of the respondents believe the superintendent is a major source of evaluative information and that school visits are used to gather this information.

Do principals mention the superintendent as an important source of information more often when he or she visits the school on a more frequent basis? The data point to a relationship between the mention of the superintendent as such an information source and the frequency of school visits. As the number of superintendent visits increases, the percentage of mentions of the superintendent as a source of information increases in a linear fashion. The more the superintendent is in their school, the more principals think they are being watched. Of the different sources of information mentioned by respondents whose superintendents visited least frequently, from no visits a year to three visits a year, 14 percent mentioned superintendents as a source of evaluative information. Of the total mentions from principals whose superintendents visit four to nine times a year, a medium-level supervisor, 18 percent mentioned the superintendent as a source of evaluative information. Finally, of all the mentions from principals whose superintendents visited most frequently, ten visits a year or more, 24 percent mentioned the superintendent as a source of information.

In short, visits by the superintendent increases control of principals in two central ways. First, superintendents may directly sanction, reward, or command principals when they visit the school. Second, superintendents are likely to use information gleaned during these visits in the evaluation process. Supervision by superintendents, therefore, provides both direct control while they are
in the school building and indirect control when information gained in those visits is used in evaluation of the principal. Greater superintendent supervision decreases the autonomy of principals both directly and through the evaluation process.

Supervision by Central Office Personnel

Central Tendencies and Variations

The superintendent is the principal's most powerful and important superior, but other central office administrators may also supervise the principal at the school site. Central office supervision may include direct command, information gathering, or sanctioning and rewarding activities which are supported by and supportive of the control efforts of superintendents.

Central office personnel including the superintendent, supervise the work in schools more frequently than does the superintendent alone. Visiting patterns of central office personnel show a mean of 7.5 times a month compared with less than three times a month for superintendents. The mode, comprising some 65 percent of the sample, includes central office personnel who visit respondent's schools twice a month. For many principals, though, central office personnel visit their schools less than three times a month and 14 percent report central office administrators in their schools less than once a month. In short, while the mean is 7.5 monthly visits, the median number of monthly visits is two, a condition produced by a few very high visitation rates. Ten principals report twenty or more visits a month by central office personnel in contrast to 32 principals reporting that they see central office personnel in their schools once a month or
less. Given a distribution significantly skewed toward the lower end, the median and mode of two visits per month represent better measures of central tendencies. The typical principal in Three County schools, who is infrequently supervised by central office personnel, therefore, has considerable autonomy in what he or she chooses to do.

Supervision by central office people is quite intense for some principals. Supervision varies from no central office visitors per month to over fifty visits per month, with a range of 99 and a standard deviation of 16. Ten principals have at least one central office person in their school every day representing 20 visits per month. These principals are deluged by superiors who might gather information on problems in the school, make specific directives to them, or informally evaluate their performance and that of their teachers. For these principals, central office presence is considerable, control is great, and their autonomy substantially diminished. In contrast, those principals who are seldom visited by superiors are neither confronted by the power of superiors nor can their superiors gather rich information about the school from either direct observation or from conversations with such school employees as the school secretary, the custodian, and the cadre of classroom teachers. This information provides important data about how the school is running, how students are performing, and how the principal is dealing with problems and providing opportunities for effective instruction. This information may delineate problems in the school which require immediate attention, though more often they supply crucial bits of data on the school, the principal, the instructional program, and relations with the community which, when combined with other data gathered from other sources
provides a comprehensive picture of what is occurring in the school. In short, these visits supply important pieces of the information puzzle which is needed for the evaluation and control of principals. Alone, though, infrequent visits do not enact tight control over the work of principals.

Supervision by superintendents and by central office administrators overall was expected to be relatively infrequent. The work of principals involves many complex, non-routine tasks and multiple goals making close supervision less appropriate and overly constraining. Principals require a degree of autonomy because the nature of their work and the complexity of their goals cannot be influenced easily though direct supervision. Principals need discretion in order to select the means appropriate to the task.

Central Office Supervision and District Size

The size of the school district is associated with supervisory frequency of central office personnel. Supervision by central office personnel is related to district size though not in a linear fashion. As districts increase in size principals tend to have fewer visits from central office personnel.

As we see in Table 2, the mode for small districts including 58 percent of those respondents falls within the high supervision cell (4-99 visits per month), the mode for mid-sized districts including 35 percent falls within the medium visit range (2-3 visits per month), while the mode for large districts including 41 percent of the respondents also falls within the medium visit range. We find fewer large district principals in the high visit cell and more in the low visit
cell than for the principals in mid-sized districts. The distribution shows there is a tendency for fewer visits in larger districts. The negative relationship between district size and central office supervision is not as strong as the relationship between superintendent supervision and district size.

TABLE 2

NUMBER OF CENTRAL OFFICE VISITS PER MONTH BY SIZE OF DISTRICT
(Question 32F)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Size of District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (4+ visits)</td>
<td>37 34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (2-3 visits)</td>
<td>37 34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (0-1 visits)</td>
<td>32 31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>106 101.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we found with supervision by the superintendent, increased district size multiplies the paperwork for central office administrators thereby decreasing the amount of time available for school visits. In addition, though increased district size often brings increased numbers of central office administrators, these new assistant and associate superintendents are not necessarily hired to supervise
principals. More often they are hired to take over administrative functions such as transportation, budgeting, or purchasing, not to supervise principals and the instructional program. In short, though increased district size is associated with larger central office staffs, many of these administrators do not deal with school-level functions and therefore do not visit schools on a regular basis. This would explain the lack of a strong linear relationship between district size and supervision by central office administrators.

Lower frequency of supervision by central office personnel decreases the degree of control provided by this method of constraint. In medium and large districts, therefore, control through supervision by central office personnel is less potent than in small districts where these administrators tour schools more frequently. Principals in medium and large districts have greater autonomy and a longer time-span of discretion in which to act. As we will discover later though, larger districts utilize other forms of control mechanisms to constrain principals in order to counteract the greater autonomy afforded by infrequent supervision.

Supervision by Central Office Personnel and School Social Status

As we found with supervision by the superintendent, school social status is not related to the frequency of central office visitation. Using Pearson correlations we find that though there is a small, positive relationship between school status and control ($r = 0.14$). From this we conclude that social school status does not directly influence the frequency of central office supervision. Here again we find that district size is a more important factor in explaining variation in
central office supervision than the socio-economic status of individual school communities.

Central Office Supervisory Intensity and Evaluative Information

As we have discussed previously, supervisory visits may provide the opportunity for administrators to gather information which is used later to evaluate principals and their schools. We discovered that as superintendent visits increased, principals were more likely to believe that superintendents gathered evaluative information during these visits. Similarly, we might ask, does an increase in visits by central office personnel increase the degree to which principals mention these administrators as sources of evaluative information?

Central office personnel are mentioned as a source of evaluative information by 24 percent of the respondents as we see in Table 3. This is less frequently than either the community and parents (45 percent of respondents) or the superintendent (36 percent of respondents). In contrast, respondents report central office personnel as frequently as they report teachers and themselves as sources of evaluative information. In summary, central office personnel fall somewhere in the middle as reported sources of information; they are important sources but not the most important.

Does the mention of central office as a source of information increase as frequency of visitation increases? The data do not suggest a clear relationship between central office visitation and their importance as a source of evaluative information. When we divide the frequency of central office visits into low (0-1 per month), medium (2-3 per month), and high (4 or more per month) categories an
TABLE 3

PERCEIVED SOURCE OF INFORMATION HAVING THE GREATEST EFFECT ON CENTRAL OFFICE EVALUATIONS OF PRINCIPALS
(Question 47B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Mentions</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Community and Parents</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Superintendent</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Teachers</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Central Office Personnel</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Principal Directly</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. School Board Members</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Reports, MBO, Written Materials, etc.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Test Scores</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. I really don't know</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An interesting distribution occurs. Modally, central office is mentioned as a source of evaluative information more often by those who have the lowest frequency of visits (zero to one monthly visit). This modal category includes 44 percent of all who mentioned central office as a source of evaluative information. Of those who fall in the medium visit category, 26 percent mention central office as a source, while 30 percent who mentioned central office as a source fall in the high visit category. As principals see it, increases in central office
supervision does not necessarily make these administrators an important source of information when principals are evaluated.

Differential Supervision in Three County Schools: Other Factors

So far we have found that modally, superintendent and central office supervision is infrequent, that size of the district decreases frequency of supervision, and that the socio-economic status of the school community is not related to differential supervision. Are there other reasons for differential supervision? Within districts do principals believe that supervision is differentially applied, and if so, what do they think are the reasons for it?

Principals were asked whether all principals were treated the same or whether supervision was differentially applied (Question 43, Appendix A). Fifty-two percent reported the existence of differential supervision while 48 percent stated that principals were treated the same. Distribution of those who reported differences is related to the size of the district with 40 percent of those in large districts reporting some differential supervision, 36 percent in the mid-sized reporting differential supervision, and 55 percent in small districts reporting differences for some principals.

Principals who reported that they thought there were differences in supervision were asked to state what they believed the reasons were for such differential treatment. Three major categories of response were given. The first category, involving difficulties in the principal's performance and including parental complaints, was mentioned 37 percent of the time. A second category including mentions of the superintendent's evaluation of the principal and the degree of
congruence between the superintendent's and the principal's educational philosophy garnered 35 percent of the mentioned reasons. Finally, the third category including 20 percent of all the reasons which were mentioned, included a variety of neutral reasons such as location of the superintendent's office in the principal's building and the preferences of the principal. A residual category, "other reasons," included 8 percent of the stated reasons. The distribution of responses makes it clear that superintendents supervise principals differently and more closely when there are actual or suspected problems in the school or with the principal.

Supervision which is initiated due to problems is related to the size of the school district. Of those cases where differential supervision existed, problems were stated as the reasons for differential supervision in 32 percent of the large districts, 19 percent of the mid-sized districts, and 6 percent of the small districts. This strong, linear relationship suggests that in larger districts where the superintendent's time is tighter, difficulties explain differences in supervision rather than more neutral conditions. In larger districts where visits by the superintendent are rare and frequently prompted by malefaction, principals may be fearful of any visit by central office concerned that it may indicate dissatisfaction with their performance. Also the greater social distance between the principals in large districts and the superintendent may increase this concern. In smaller districts, on the other hand, there is generally greater face-to-face contact and more frequent meetings which may decrease their anxieties when superintendents visit them more often.
In short, we find principals reporting differential supervision often prompted by perceived, reported, or actual problems at the school level. Differential supervision is related to the size of the district, with the smallest districts reporting differences most frequently. The data suggest that the autonomy of principals will be constrained by greater frequency of supervision when central office receives negative information about the performance of principals, when previous evaluations have been less than positive, when the principals' educational philosophies are not congruent with the superintendent's, and finally, when the superintendent's office is located in the principal's building. When these conditions do not exist, the principal is visited less frequently and granted a longer time span of discretion thereby increasing their autonomy.

In short, we find principals reporting differential supervision often prompted by perceived, reported, or actual problems at the school level. Differential supervision is related to the size of the district, with the smallest districts reporting differences most frequently. The data suggest that the autonomy of principals will be constrained by greater frequency of supervision when central office receives negative information about the performance of principals, when previous evaluations have been less than positive, when the principals' educational philosophies are not congruent with the superintendent's, and finally, when the superintendent's office is located in the principal's building. When these conditions do not exist, the principal is visited less frequently and granted a longer time span of discretion thereby increasing their autonomy.
Input Control: Findings

Introduction

So far we have examined only one type of control, direct supervision. In this section we will examine the first of three other hierarchical controls which do not involve direct visits to the school but which act at a distance. They focus on three central aspects of organizational functioning including the distribution and use of inputs, the influencing and directing of behavior, and the monitoring and evaluation of outputs. These controls are named input controls, behavior controls, and output controls. In this section we will be concerned with a precisely focused control which constrains the particular set of organizational functions and resources relating to the flow of inputs to principals and schools. We call this constraint mechanism input control.

The difficulty of controlling the distribution of resources is compounded by features of schools and the nature of these resources. First, lack of a clear instructional technology makes it hard to specify with precision to amounts and types of inputs needed to reach technical goals. Second, the existence of multiple organizational goals whose priority is not always the object of consensus means that distributional choices are difficult to make. Third, many crucial decisions about instruction occur at the school and classroom levels, with weak information linkages between these levels and central office.1 This condition sets limits on the decision making effectiveness of upper level administrators. Finally, local governance and fiscal support of

school districts increases the public scrutiny of and political accountability all allocation decisions and forces superintendents to be particularly fearful of potential cases of favoritism by community groups.

The control of inputs, particularly personnel and fiscal resources, is important both to the administrative hierarchy and to the school receiving these resources. The administrative hierarchy is legally responsible for the legitimate use of school district resources pursuant to state and federal statutes as well as school board policies. In addition, administrators attempt to distribute inputs in ways that foster the achievement of their educational objectives as well as enhance their political survival. Hence the administrative hierarchy must find ways to balance technical needs and socio-political pressures in designing input controls. In contrast, principals and their school staffs seek to maximize their autonomy by gaining as much control over inputs as they can; greater control over inputs increases their chances of buffering themselves from administrators and community in order to achieve their own goals. The pattern of actual input control demonstrates how the administrative hierarchy balances the need to maintain control over resources against the demand by principals to retain sufficient autonomy over resources to enhance goal achievement at the school level.

These technical and political pressures bring on the "zoning" of controls, typically tight controls over administrative areas and
tangible resources, and looser controls over instructional areas and
difficult-to-measure resources.¹

In addition to the zoning of control, we will examine Wallendar's
contention that administrators in not-for-profit enterprises place
greater emphasis on the use of input control because other forms of
control are attenuated.² Basically, we will ask whether principals are
granted little or much autonomy over the distribution and use of
inputs.

Overview of the Section

We will focus on the controls central office uses to constrain two
key inputs, personnel and money. Several aspects of the distribution
of these two inputs will be described. Related to personnel, we will
look at (1) constraints over hiring, (2) policies about transfers, and
(3) controls over firing. Related to money we will look at, (1) budget
processes, (2) the degree to which transfers of funds can be made by
principals, and (3) the availability of contingency funds for principal's use. For each aspect of input control, we will note initially
the overall distribution for the entire sample and then turn to the
differential effects of first, school social status, and district size
on the nature of input controls. Finally, we will summarize the
findings about input control usage and note how these controls provide
a balance of control and autonomy for elementary principals.

¹Dan C. Lortie, "Control and Autonomy in Elementary School

²William H. Newman and Harvey W. Wallendar, "Managing Not-for-
Initial Hiring

The people who work in schools, particularly teachers are perhaps the most important technical inputs in the production of learning. By controlling the types of personnel, the numbers of each type of employee, and the actual selection of the individuals to fill personnel vacancies, the administrative hierarchy can powerfully limit the autonomy of principals. The types of personnel and the number allocated to each school all commonly constrained by school board policy and depend greatly on the total funds available in the district. Discretion in the initial hiring of individuals on the other hand, may vary no matter what types or numbers of personnel are assigned to each school. In short, upper level administrators may control the initial hiring of personnel or may allow principals to make these decisions.

Three County principals were asked about hiring practices to determine whether they were allowed to make initial hiring decisions or whether they needed to compromise with central office in these matters (Question 35A, Appendix A). The majority of Three County principals report that they most often are allowed to hire whom they want and did not have to compromise with central office. Some 82 percent of the principals said that they were granted autonomy in initial hiring, while only 18 percent reported that they had to reach compromises over hiring decisions with central office.

Principal autonomy in initial hiring is a dominant pattern in these districts. There are a number of reasons central office allows principals to make these personnel decisions. First, by decentralizing selection in this way central office decreases selection costs;
principals accomplish what a central office administrator would have to be hired to do. Second, and perhaps more important, local conditions may influence the characteristics needed in the position and principals are most aware of the special conditions that exist in their school, including knowledge of the children to be taught, the parents to be served, and the social system of the school. Principals are more likely to possess this knowledge than central office administrators. Finally, by giving the principal the responsibility for initial hiring, central office is making the principal responsible for the effectiveness of that teacher. By granting hiring privileges to principals superintendents are diffusing responsibility for those personnel decisions.

Hiring and school social status

Prior studies of school districts have not examined the ways variation in the social status of the school may impact upon the autonomy granted principals in hiring teachers. In this section, we are concerned with the effects of school social status upon the degree of control exerted by central office over hiring. Using the prior division of schools into three levels of social status, we find modally that high, medium and low status school principals all report that they are granted the autonomy to select teachers. There is some slight increase in the proportion who report this autonomy as school social status increases. We find 78 percent of the principals in low status schools, 81 percent of the principals in middle status schools and 91 percent of the principals in high status schools report that they can
select teachers and do not have to compromise with central office. Control by over hiring decreases slightly as school status increases.

Effects of district size

A large proportion of Three County principals reports that they are given the discretion to hire teachers and others without compromising with central office. The size of the district, though, does have a small effect on the degree of central office control over hiring. As we see in Table 4, which shows the distribution of controls over hiring initial hiring by size of the district, a larger percentage of principals in the smallest districts, some 93 percent, report that they do not have to compromise. This is a larger percentage than in either mid-sized districts, where 75 percent report autonomy, or large districts where 83 percent report this privilege. As districts grow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRINCIPALS' RIGHT TO HIRE STAFF THEY CHOOSE BY SIZE OF DISTRICT (Question 35A)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Size of District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Small (1-4 Sch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Percentage</td>
<td>N Percentage</td>
<td>N Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>89 82.4</td>
<td>25 92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15 13.9</td>
<td>2 7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 3.7</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
<td>4 10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108 100.0</td>
<td>27 100.0</td>
<td>40 100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
larger they tend to become more centralized and more impersonal as we shall see in the section on behavior control. They hire additional central office administrators, some of whom become involved in personnel hiring decision, and decrease the autonomy allowed principals in the smaller districts. The percentage differences of about 10 percent are not great but they repeat the pattern we see in almost every form of control: as districts enlarge they tend to become more centrally controlled granting less autonomy to principals while increasing the use of more formal, bureaucratic mechanisms of control.

Transfer of Personnel

Another way central office administrators may constrain the flow of inputs is to control the flow of teachers from school to school through the use of centralized transfer procedures. Though most Three County principals report that they are allowed to hire whom they want, central office exerts more control in the matter of teacher transfers.

Respondents were asked whether they ever had to take teachers into their schools on transfer whom they considered to be of doubtful ability (Question 35B, Appendix A). We find that, in contrast to the discretion enjoyed in initial hiring, 64 percent of the principals report that they have had to take into their building on transfer someone they thought was of doubtful ability. It seems that while principals are granted autonomy over initial hiring, further personnel decisions, particularly the flow of people from school to school, fall more under the control of central office administrators. Here we see that autonomy for principals decreases when flows between schools are at issue.
Administrators may lessen the autonomy of principals in these cases in order to reduce the conflict which could develop between principals over the transfer of a questionable teacher. Further research should examine those principals who are able to maintain hegemony over transfers, keeping questionable teachers out while accepting only effective teachers on transfer.

Teacher transfer and school social status

We find no clear relationship between school social status and the control central office maintains over teacher transfers within the district. A greater percentage of principals of middle status schools, some 73 percent, report that they have been forced to take teachers on transfer whom they did not want, while only 58 percent of principals in low status schools and 61 percent of principals in upper status schools report having to take teachers they did not want. The greater autonomy of principals in both low and high status schools, though, may occur because these principals can argue that they are against certain teachers being transferred because they have socially distinctive populations, an argument not available to the principals in middle status schools. As we shall discover shortly, school district size has a stronger, more linear relationship to controls over teacher transfers.

Effects of district size on transfer controls

The degree to which principals are centrally controlled regarding the transfer of teachers is related to school district size. As we see in Table 5, the percentage of principals who report that they were required to take on transfer teachers they thought were of doubtful competence increases as district size increases. In small
districts, 48 percent report taking questionable teachers, 65 percent of the principals in the mid-sized districts report taking questionable teachers, and 76 percent of the large district principals report taking questionable teachers. This is a difference of 28 percent from the smallest districts to the largest districts. It may be that as districts grow larger the absolute number of transfers increases, thus stimulating the establishment of formal, standardized transfer procedures to cope with the greater number of transfers. These procedures will decrease principals' autonomy in making decisions about transfers. In smaller districts the number of transfers are less numerous and may be handled informally, allowing the receiving principals some input into the decision. Further research is needed to map the flow of both

**TABLE 5**

**PRINCIPALS FORCED TO TAKE STAFF ON TRANSFER BY SIZE OF DISTRICT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent-</th>
<th>Size of District</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent-</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent-</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>age</td>
<td>Small (1-4 Sch)</td>
<td></td>
<td>age</td>
<td></td>
<td>age</td>
<td></td>
<td>age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24.4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>111</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
able and incompetent teachers within school districts and the ways in which formal and informal processes influence transfer decisions.

**Firing Personnel**

Central office administrators may control the dismissal of personnel, requiring a principal to fire someone the principal considers acceptable. Whereas initial hiring is the domain of the principal and transfers are frequently constrained by central office, firing decisions are the responsibility of the principal. We asked our respondents whether they had been forced by central office to let someone go they felt was acceptable on the job (Question 35C, Appendix A). They were told not to consider "reduction in force" layoffs in their answer. A nominal 21 percent reported affirmatively, that they had been pressed to relieve someone in their school whom they considered acceptable. Although not a large percentage of the sample, it is enough to suggest that central office, occasionally, but not frequently, makes decisions about personnel and may unilaterally press principals to relieve some teachers of their duties. Additional study, though, is necessary to determine the circumstances under which these firings occur, their frequency of occurrence, and the types of personnel who are involved.

In general, we find that principals are granted autonomy over firing decisions.

In summary, the control of personnel by central office is dual in nature. On the one hand, it is loose and decentralized for initial hiring and subsequent firing decisions thereby granting principals the autonomy to select teachers for their schools, so long as the question of internal transfers, and to leave the decision...
teachers to individual principals. On the other hand, control over personnel is strict and centralized for decisions concerning internal transfer of personnel, thereby restricting the autonomy of individual principals in these decisions. Central office allows discretion in the selection and retention of teachers for an individual school but maintains control over the movement of teachers around the district. In summary, district size decreases the autonomy of principals by increasing the centralization of some personnel decisions.

Firing and school social status

As only a small percentage of the total sample of principals reports that the central office has pressured them to fire a competent teacher, making judgments about the effects of school social status on this control are statistically difficult and must be made cautiously. We do find some differences across schools of different social status, though these differences are not large. Of those who reported firing a teacher under pressure from central office, 21 percent lead low status schools, 23 percent lead middle status schools, and 13 percent lead high status schools. Central office controls over firing are somewhat stronger in the lower and middle status schools and less potent in upper status schools, though these percentage differences are small.

Firing and school district size

We find that controls over firing do not vary systematically with school district size. Thirty percent of principals in the mid-sized districts report that they have been pressured to let a competent teacher go, while only 15 percent in the small districts and 14 percent of the large district principals report this happening. Firing is
usually left up to the principal, but in mid-sized districts principals report greater controls in this process.

Monetary Controls

Monetary resources are important organizational inputs to schools. Unlike subunits in some organizations such as retail outlets or regional divisions of corporations, schools do not generate expendable income through unit activities. Rather, they receive yearly budgets from a central administrative unit. Schools are therefore almost wholly dependent on the central administration for monetary inputs. The controls placed on these monetary inputs limits the autonomy of principals. In general the central administration in Three County school districts maintains close control over the distribution and use of monetary inputs as we will see when we examine their handling of initial allocation processes, transfer restrictions, and availability of contingency funds in these school districts.

Allocation Processes: Budgetary Controls

Organizational administrators and accountants have developed a multitude of ways to allocate monetary resources to employees and to units. Allocation processes, usually in the form of budgets, differentially constrain the autonomy of subordinates and subunits by maintaining control over the amount and use of centrally distributed funds. The budgetary controls in Three County districts constrain the autonomy of principals by limiting how much they get and the uses to which they can put various centrally distributed funds.
In order to determine the types of allocation processes used in these districts, principals were asked what type of budget process they used. Using categories developed during the exploratory period of this study, we asked principals whether money was allocated after principals submitted a list of requests for the coming year or whether money was distributed to schools according to a per capita distribution formula (Question 34A, Appendix A). The first type of budget process (referred to as the "Submission of Requests" method) involves the principal submitting a list of items he or she wishes purchased for the school in the coming year. This list is sent to the superintendent who may accept it or delete particular items. The second major type of budget process (referred to as the "Per Capita Allocation" method) involves distribution of monetary inputs to schools based on student enrollment. In this budget process, central administrators develop a formula which specifies how much money the school will receive for each student in the school. This formula can be a simple lump sum based on enrollment or a complex formula specifying down to the pennies how much the principal can spend in a set of line item categories. These two budget processes are quite different and they restrict the autonomy of principals in different ways.

The largest proportion of Three County principals (as we see in Table 6) including 57 percent, in all, report use of the "Per Capita Allocation" method while 29 percent of the principals report using the "Submission of Requests" method. Twelve percent use a combination of the two methods. The dominant budget procedure, therefore, is the more formal, standardized, and bureaucratic "Per Capita Allocation" method.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Budget Process</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>Small (1-4 Sch)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium (5-8 Sch)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Large (9+ Schools)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Submission of requests</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Per capita allocation</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Both</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Neither</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These two types of budgetary control processes provide different degrees of control over the allocation of monetary inputs. The degree of specification varies in these two methods. Greater specification produces greater control. While the "Submission of Requests" approach leaves unspecified the amount available and the distribution of money across functional areas, the "Per Capita Allocation" approach details precisely how much can be spent and, in its most strict forms, the percentages which must be spent in specific budgetary categories. In this way the "Per Capita allocation" method places greater controls on principals but concomitantly limits central office autonomy also.
Allocation processes and school social status

Overall, central office maintains strong control over the allocation of money to schools, though there are some differences across schools in the type of allocation method used. The modal type of allocation process is the "Per Capita" method used in 56 percent of the low status schools, 61 percent of the middle status schools and 52 percent of the high status schools. Here we see no major differences according to school status. In contrast, we find that a substantially larger proportion of high status principals report using the "Submission of Requests" method, some 39 percent of them. This compares with 26 percent of the low status principals and of the middle status principals reporting use of this method, a method that allows the school principal more autonomy in the utilization of district funds. The greater assertiveness of parents in higher status schools may require central office to use this method so that principals have the discretion to select materials and equipment acceptable to the potent and changeable demands of these upper status parents. In summary, central office maintains close control over the allocation of monetary inputs through the widespread and consistent use of "Per Capita" distribution methods for most schools, while granting greater autonomy to principals of high status schools who use the "Submission of Requests" method proportionately more than principals in middle or low status schools.

Effects of school district size

Larger school district size increases the likelihood of monetary inputs being distributed through the "Per Capita Allocation" method and therefore lessens the autonomy of principals. Formal, standardized
allocation processes increase in a linear fashion as school district size increases. As we see in Table 6, the use of "Per Capita Allocation" methods increases as district size increases with only 26 percent of the smallest districts employing this method, 62 percent of the mid-sized districts, and 73 percent of the largest districts. In contrast, the use of the "Submission of Requests" method increases as district size decreases with only 20 percent of the large districts, and a substantial 56 percent of the small districts reporting use of this method. There is a large percentage difference at the break between small and mid-sized districts; a 35 percent difference in use of the requests method and a 36 percent difference for the per capita method. In mid-sized and large districts control over the allocation of monetary inputs is strong, while in the smallest districts principals are allowed more autonomy.

Transfer of money in budget categories

Central office administrators may also increase or decrease the autonomy of principals by permitting them to transfer money from one budget category to another when special conditions demand new purchases. Over half the principals (52 percent) report that they are not allowed to make transfers of money among these budget categories, while 47 percent report that they could. In short, some principals, though not most of them, have some discretion once the budget is established.

Transfer privileges and school social status

Increased transfer privileges are associated with the social status of Three County Schools. As the social status of the school rises the proportion of principals reporting that they can transfer
funds across budgetary categories also increases with 40 percent of the low status, 47 percent of the middle status, and 62 percent of the high status school principals reporting this privilege. Here again we see that principals who have parents in the school community of higher social status are given greater autonomy in the use of inputs.

**Effects of School District Size**

A larger proportion of principals in smaller districts, 52 percent, report that they are allowed to make budgetary transfers than in either mid-sized districts, where 44 percent say they can, or in large districts, where 47 percent say they can make these transfers. These differences are small, but they reinforce the general theme we are finding across types of control that principals in smaller districts are granted more autonomy over monetary inputs than principals in either mid-sized or large districts.

**Contingency Funds**

The central administration of a school district may allow principals additional autonomy over monetary inputs if they allot principals a contingency fund. We asked principals whether central office granted them a contingency fund to use as they needed it (Question 34B, Appendix A). Only a small proportion (28 percent) of Three County principals report that they receive a contingency fund and fewer than that report having a petty cash fund. Seldom are these principals granted contingency funds, though some seek independently to augment their limited autonomy by seeking funds from their parent teacher associations, with 12 percent reporting that these types of funds are available to them.
Contingency funds and school social status

Consistently, we have found that principals of high status schools are granted more autonomy over monetary inputs than principals in either middle or low status schools. We continue to find this pattern when we examine the allotment of contingency funds to principals; a substantially higher proportion of principals in high status schools report that they have contingency funds than do principals from either middle or low status schools. Contingency funds are allocated to 21 percent of the principals in low status schools, 25 percent of the principals in middle status schools, and 44 percent of the principals in high status schools. This is a difference of 23 percent between principals in low status schools and principals in high status schools. This consistent pattern of control suggests that central office more often constrains principals of low status schools in the use of district monetary resources, while granting proportionately greater autonomy to principals serving high status parents.

Effects of district size

School district size is related to the allocation of contingency funds, but not in a linear fashion. In the larger districts, 39 percent of the principals report having contingency funds, as do 19 percent of those in mid-sized districts, and 30 percent of the small district principals. Further study will be necessary to determine the particular reasons for this bi-modal distribution as size by itself does not predict the existence of contingency funds for principals. In summary, the larger and the smaller districts allow some autonomy for
principals in the allotment of these special funds, while fewer mid-sized district principals enjoy this privilege.

Summary and Conclusions

In summary, we discover that central office administrators differentially utilize input controls in Three County school districts, applying greater control over monetary inputs and generally less constraint over the inputs of personnel thereby producing zones of relative control and zones of relative autonomy for principals.

Input controls are affected most strongly by the social status of the school and somewhat less by the size of the school district. Both higher status clientele and smaller size are associated with greater autonomy for principals while lower status schools and larger districts bring greater control from central office.

As we have seen in these data, the use of input controls provides zones of control and zones of autonomy in a pattern we will see in the use of other control mechanisms. We find that a zone of tight controls constrains the distribution and the use of those inputs which are not centrally connected to instruction. Tight control exists over the funds allocation process, the transfer of money across budget categories, and the allotment of contingency funds to school principals. In contrast, we observe a zone of looser controls over inputs and greater autonomy for principals in the instructional arena. Here, autonomy is granted to principals over the hiring and firing of teachers. One exception seems to be the relatively tight control over teacher transfers, probably brought on by the administrative need to reduce internal conflict between principals and with teachers' unions.
First suggested by Lortie in 1969, this zoned pattern of organizational control means that principals are more tightly constrained in their administrative tasks, many of which involve work for central office, but are permitted more autonomy over instructional processes and functions.¹

The degree of autonomy afforded principals is mediated by a characteristic of the school's clientele, the social status of parents. Generally, principals in higher status schools are afforded more autonomy than their counterparts in middle and low status schools. This is true for many input controls though not all of them. To begin with, there is either no influence or a mixed influence of school social status on the control of teacher transfers and on the proportion of principals using the "Per Capita" method of budgeting. In contrast, we find some influence of school social status on the hiring and firing of teachers. Principals in higher status schools are granted more autonomy in whom they hire and more autonomy in the firing of teachers. Finally, we discover that school social status has a substantial influence over the autonomy provided principals in the allocation of monetary inputs. We find that higher school status is associated with greater use of the "Submission of Requests" method of budgeting, with more discretion over the transferring of funds once the budget is set, and with the allotment of contingency funds to use in their schools. Principals in lower status schools are faced with relatively greater central control over these areas. In short, central office exerts greater control over schools of middle and low social status and

allows autonomy to schools with upper status parents. This is particularly evident in the allocation and use of money. We will discover later that principals of high status schools are more often granted greater autonomy while principals in lower status schools face greater use of organizational control.

In summary, we find strong use of input controls over monetary inputs and relatively weak use over personnel. School social status is negatively related to the application of input control while school district size is positively related to input controls. Newman and Wallendar's contention that not-for-profit organizations rely more on input controls is only partially supported, for as we see in small districts with high status parents the principal may enjoy considerable autonomy from the use of input controls.1 As we shall discover in the following sections, organizational control systems in elementary school districts employ multiple controls to channel and direct the work of principals.

Behavior Controls: Findings

Introduction

Up to this point, we have discussed the ways elementary school districts utilize two forms of control, direct supervision and input control. In this section we turn to a third form of control that is used to influence and constrain the work of principals. Whereas input control focuses on the distribution and use of inputs, behavior control is designed to constrain and direct behaviors or actions of

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subordinates. In order to do this, superiors promulgate rules and procedures, send directives, and standardize organizational tasks.

Behavior controls are mechanisms of constraint and direction from the center that are crucial to any system of organizational control. These are among the earliest mechanisms studied by scholars of organizations, and have been found to be some of the most common and frequently employed forms of control. The extent to which behavior controls are employed in elementary school districts is an important but relatively unstudied phenomenon that merits close attention.

From early times, organizations have employed procedures, directives, and standardized tasks to control work.\(^1\) By specifying (usually in writing) what a subordinate or subunit is to do, a superior is able to direct the work of underlings without the need to be on the work site using direct supervision to ensure task accomplishment. Behavior controls work at a distance and can be more impersonal.

Behavior controls specify, usually in writing, what organizational members or subordinates are to do in particular situations, what tasks they are to perform, how they are to do these tasks, and with what equipment. These prescriptions may be written in policy statements, work manuals, job descriptions, or work procedures.

Overview of the Section

In this section, we will examine four aspects of behavior control and the patterns of central office control and principal autonomy that result. These four aspects are (1) specific controls over

administrative tasks, (2) specific controls over instructional tasks, (3) general controls over principals' work, and (4) perceived use of behavior controls. For each of these four properties, we will focus on two or more features of behavior control.

The first broad topic we will examine is the ways central office uses specific behavior controls that prescribe administrative tasks. Here we will note how central office requires principals to prepare regular reports and to attend district meetings.

The second broad topic will be the specific behavior controls over instructional tasks promulgated by central office. Here we will look at the degree to which central office sets curriculum objectives in four subject areas including math, reading, science, and social studies. Then we will examine the extent to which teachers are expected to adhere to these curriculum objectives as well as the extent to which they actually do adhere to the objectives. Next, we will point out how central office controls instructional tasks through the districtwide adoption of textbooks in the above mentioned four subject areas. Following this, we will describe the degree to which central office exerts influence over classroom organization. Finally, to round off our look at controls over instructional tasks we will examine the extent to which central office prescribes and standardizes teacher evaluation procedures.

The third broad area to gain our attention will be the use of generalized behavior controls. Generalized behavior controls are groups of rules, procedures, or directives which focus on broad sets of subordinate tasks rather than on specific task areas. Two generalized
behavior control forms will be probed, the use of job descriptions for principals and the use of district management systems.

The fourth topic to be addressed will be the perceived use of behavior controls as reported by principals. To do this we will describe (1) how principals perceive the degree of decision-making centralization in their districts, (2) the degree of behavior control usage to constrain principals as well as (3) the rules which are perceived as most important to central office.

In short, this section will describe the use of specific behavior controls in administrative and instructional areas, note the application of more generalized forms of this control mechanism, and finally, present the principals' perceptions of the extent to which central office employs behavior controls in their district.

For most forms of behavior control we examine, we will note initially the distribution for the entire sample and then turn to the differential use of these controls across schools of different social status and across school districts of different size. Finally, we will summarize these findings about behavior control usage noting the relative reliance on different controls and how the pattern of controls provide a balance of control and autonomy for elementary principals.

Specific Controls Over Administrative Tasks

Central Office Required Reports

One of the most common activities in organizations is the writing of reports for administrative superiors. Written reports provide superiors with data about the activities, accomplishments, and problems of subordinate units which can be used to evaluate performance, to
supply governing agencies with information, or to provide information necessary for planning and coordinating organizational activities. Requirements for reports usually specify the content and the deadline for the report, thereby constraining the subordinate and reducing autonomy. In short, the greater the number of reports required by central office, the less the autonomy of principals.

School administrators regularly complain that much of their time is spent preparing required reports for central office, time which could be more profitably spent improving the quality of instruction in their schools. In order to determine the degree to which principals are actually controlled by report preparation, we asked them how many reports, on average, they had to submit to the central office every month (Question 32A, Appendix A). The findings point to some clear central tendencies, but with considerable variation.

For the majority of principals, the preparation of central office required reports, though not an enjoyable task, is not overly constraining. The median number of reports is six per month, while the mode, representing 13 percent of the sample, is four reports per month. Forty-eight percent of these elementary principals are required by central office to prepare than seven reports per month, equivalent to less than two per week. The mean for the sample, which is larger than either the median or the mode, is nine reports per month due to a skewed distribution which we will discuss shortly.

Some principals, though, state that they have substantial responsibilities for reporting to central office. The distribution for the sample illustrates this. The number of central office reports range from none at all to over thirty per month with a standard deviation of
Nine. Sixteen principals in Three County schools must prepare 20 or more reports for central office each month, a number which will substantially constrain their time, and reduces the amount available for other activities. This not insignificant number of principals faces greater control from central office and less autonomy.

In short, the overall distribution suggests that while most principals enjoy relative autonomy from the burdens of heavy reporting requirements, a small number face considerable constraint from the demands of reporting. But most central offices do require some regular reporting, an act of behavior control.

Effects of school social status

Do these requirements vary by school social status? In order to answer this question, we grouped monthly reports into "low frequency," including from 0 to 4 reports a month, "medium frequency", including from 5 to 10 reports a month, and "high frequency", including those who prepare 11 or more reports a month. These were then compared with the three levels of school social status mentioned before.

The relationship between reporting and status is not linear, but more principals in high status schools report low numbers of monthly reports than principals in either low or middle status schools. Modally, principals in low status schools report low frequency of reporting including 38 percent in the cell. Principals in middle status schools are almost bi-modal with 35.5 percent in the low frequency cell and 35.6 percent in the high frequency cell. In contrast, principals in high status schools fall modally into the low reporting cell which includes 50 percent of the responses. In short, we find principals in
low and middle status schools somewhat more constrained by their reporting loads, with principals in high status schools enjoying somewhat greater freedom from these requirements. The patterns we are finding suggest that central office grants more autonomy to principals in upper status schools, perhaps in part because these principals have students who regularly achieve above national norms on standardized achievement tests and who therefore can demand greater autonomy based on these greater successes with their schools.

Effects of District Size on Reporting

As we have noted previously, research on organizations has found that increased organizational size brings with it increased formalization, including greater need to receive written feedback and information about the activities of subordinates and subunits. In addition, increased school district size brings increased numbers of central office administrators, who also desire information from principals and so increase the reporting requirements for principals which decreases autonomy.

In order to compare district size with the frequency of monthly reports we examined crosstabulation tables. First, we subdivided the distribution of reports into "low frequency" including from zero to four reports a month, "medium frequency" between 5 and 10 reports, and "high frequency" including 11 or more reports a month. Second, these divisions were crosstabulated against school district size as seen in Table 7. From Table 7 we find that while the smallest districts

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modally fall in the low frequency category with 53 percent, while both mid-sized and large districts modally fall in the high frequency reporting category. We see that the relationship is not linear and that, modally, mid-sized districts are more like large districts than like small districts. When faced with the problems of information channeling, mid-sized districts increase the number of written reports as do the larger districts. For principals in these districts, control is increased and autonomy lessened. In contrast, principals in smaller districts modally are allowed greater autonomy and lessened control through the infrequency with which central office demand reports.

TABLE 7
FREQUENCY OF REQUIRED REPORTS FOR CENTRAL OFFICE
BY SIZE OF DISTRICT
(QUESTION 32B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of District</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Small (1-4 Sch)</th>
<th>Medium (5-6 Sch)</th>
<th>Large (9+ Sch)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. High (11+ Reports)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>7 25.0</td>
<td>15 37.5</td>
<td>20 52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Medium (5-10 Reports)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6 21.4</td>
<td>12 30.0</td>
<td>4 10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Low (0-4 Reports)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15 53.6</td>
<td>13 32.5</td>
<td>14 36.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are several reasons for this. First, as districts grow in size superintendents visit schools less frequently and therefore have less chance to gather direct, face-to-face information about the principal and the school. This surely increases the need for superintendents in larger districts to use more formalized ways of gathering information about the principal and the school. Written reporting is one of these ways. Large size thus may decrease direct sources of information and increase the need to use indirect sources of information, specifically reports. Second, it is difficult to process large quantities of information when it does not arrive in regular, standardized forms. While sorting through irregular, casual information from two or three schools is not difficult, sorting through information from eight or ten schools could become impossible. By requiring formal written reports in larger districts, the information processing burden is eased. In sum, both the need to replace direct sources of information with indirect sources, e.g., reporting, and the need to ease the information processing burden in larger districts fosters increased frequency of formal reporting by principals and increased control.

Summary

Principals in Three County schools are constrained by central office reporting requirements, but these constraints allow most of them considerable autonomy to spend time at other things. In addition, we find that schools of high social status and small districts modally are least constrained by the burden of reporting while both mid-sized and large districts face greater controls in this area. As we shall see shortly, other forms of behavior control increase the constraints on
principals in the administrative arena and as regards the content of curriculum.

**Required Central Office Meetings**

Another important requirement for principals is attendance at required central office meetings. Requiring attendance at meetings is a form of direct behavior control may substantially constrain the work of principals by restricting the amount of time they have at the school site level. Three County principals find their autonomy diminished through attendance at required central office meetings.

Attendance at meetings is a form of direct behavior control that specifies where a subordinate is to be at a particular time. In addition, attendance may prescribe the role of the subordinate is to take during the meeting, e.g., member, chairperson, coordinator. Often, the dynamics of the meetings prescribe the activities of and role requirements of the subordinate, controlling the accomplishment of alternate activities at the meeting. Most significant to principals, though, is the fact that they are away from their buildings and unable to attend to the tasks required of them there. More frequent or longer meetings mean diminished autonomy for principals.

To examine the pattern of this constraint, principals were asked how many meetings the central office called monthly (Question 32C, Appendix A). Modally, principals are required to attend two meetings a month called by central office, with 23 percent of the respondents falling into this cell. The median is three meetings a month while the mean is four meetings a month, reflecting, as we shall see, a skewed distribution. The overall pattern points, as with the pattern of
report writing, to some constraints by central office but no substantial control over the time of principals and the autonomy which time affords these subordinates.

The frequency distribution of central office meetings per month shows that there is considerable variation among principals. Central office meetings range from no meetings per month to 20 meetings a month, with a standard deviation of three. Though the range is substantial, from no monthly meetings to almost one a day, only 11 principals (representing less than 10 percent of the sample) meet more than twice a week. In short, most principals are not extensively constrained by required attendance at central office meetings in themselves.

Effects of school social status

What is the influence of school social status on the number of meetings principals are required to attend? In order to answer this question we grouped the responses on required central office meetings into low frequency, from none to 4 monthly meetings, medium frequency, from 3 to 4 monthly meetings, and 5 high frequency, 11 or more monthly meetings. These three groups were compared against the 3 levels of school social status.

We discover that though low number of monthly meetings is the mode for all levels of school status, the percentage of principals within the mode decreases as school status increases. We find that 74 percent of principals in low status schools, 67 percent of principals in middle status schools, and 60 percent of the principals in high status schools fall in the modal category representing infrequent monthly meetings.
This points to relatively greater autonomy from central office meeting requirements as school social status increases. Central office may call fewer meetings in the upper status schools so that principals can remain on site to cope with a more assertive and participative community.

Effects of district size on frequency of meetings

Do principals in different sized districts attend meetings at the same rate? Are they equally constrained by attendance? In order to answer these questions we subdivided the sample into low meeting frequency (no meetings through 2 monthly meetings), medium meeting frequency (3 to 4 monthly meetings), and high meeting frequency (5 or more monthly meetings). By crosstabulating meeting frequency with size we can see how frequency of meetings is influenced by size of the district.

As we can see in Table 8, the distribution we noticed for reports and district size is almost reversed. We find that for small districts the modal cell is the high frequency meeting category including 50 percent of those principals, while the modal cell for mid-sized districts is the low frequency meeting category including 48 percent of these principals, and for large districts the modal category of medium frequency meeting including 38 percent of these principals. Principals in small districts have more meetings and fewer reports than principals in either mid-sized or large districts. In short, principals in small districts have their autonomy restricted more by required attendance at meetings than by the necessity to prepare reports. On the other hand, principals in mid-sized and large districts have their autonomy

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restricted more by reporting requirements than by attendance at meetings.

TABLE 8
FREQUENCY OF CENTRAL OFFICE MEETINGS PER MONTH BY SIZE OF DISTRICT
(Question 32C)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required Meetings</th>
<th>Size of District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. High (5+ Meetings)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Medium (3-4 Meetings)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Low (0-2 Meetings)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, principals are required to fulfill central office administrative requirements which restricts their autonomy by decreasing the time available for self-initiated tasks. The combined effect of both preparing reports and attending meetings clearly and directly constrains the work of principals. Our knowledge of the extent of these controls will be enhanced when further study examines the length and complexity of required central office reports and the length and demands of central office meetings.
Specific Controls Over Instructional Tasks

As we have just seen, central office uses behavior controls to ensure that administrative tasks, specifically reporting and attendance at meetings, are accomplished by principals. These requirements restrict the autonomy of principals by restricting the amount of time available for discretionary activities. At this point we are going to turn to the behavior controls central office employs to influence and constrain yet another important arena of school activity, classroom instruction. Here we will examine the use of rules, procedures, and standardized tasks that bear upon the instructional arena. We will see that, as Bidwell first noted, "...insofar as instruction is concerned, it seems likely that school-system rules bear more heavily on content than method, for example, system-wide curricula or courses of study."¹ In short, behavior controls are extensively used to specify the content of instruction but are less viable instruments of control over the process of instruction. This pattern differentially controls the work of principals and their teachers.

Curriculum Objectives in Four Subject Areas

Central office administrators may control the work of principals and teachers by specifying in writing the curriculum objectives teachers are to accomplish in different subject areas. Curriculum objectives influence the work of subordinates by delineating the content of instruction, while leaving unstated the processes by which this content is to be imparted. The greater the use of curriculum

objectives across subject areas, the greater the control over principals and teachers and the less the autonomy these subordinates enjoy.

In order to determine whether Three County schools used central office prescribed curriculum objectives, principals were asked whether these objectives existed in each of four subject areas including mathematics, reading, science, and social studies (Question 38, Appendix A). As shown in Table 9, most principals report that their districts have centrally-authorized curriculum objectives in all four subject areas; a clear case of control over content in these districts. It is useful to note that the proportion of principals reporting these objectives in mathematics and reading, 80 percent and 78 percent, versus science and social studies, 73 percent and 75 percent, are substantially the same in spite of the fact that mathematics and reading are considered core elementary school subjects, while science and social studies are considered peripheral. This suggests that behavior controls over the content of subject areas are employed irrespective of subject importance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Areas</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mathematics</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>80.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reading</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Science</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Social Studies</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Effects of school social status on curriculum objectives usage

Crosstabulation tables comparing the use of curriculum objectives and school social status suggest that there are no differences due to the social background of the parents, as percentage differences between different status schools are all less than 10 percent. In addition, there are no clear patterns of distribution to suggest that statistically significant relationships would obtain were the sample larger. In sum, the use of curriculum objectives is not related to the social status of the school.

Effects of district size on curriculum objectives

We do find that the use of curriculum objectives is differentiated by the size of the district as illustrated in Table 10 with small districts using them most frequently, large sized districts using them least frequently, and mid-sized districts using them somewhere in the middle. From this we conclude that principals in the smallest districts have the least autonomy in selecting curriculum content while principals in the largest districts have the most autonomy, with principals in mid-sized districts falling somewhere in the middle. This relationship is linear for all four subject areas with the percentage differences being largest in the two least important subjects, science, and social studies. This suggests that district size has more effect on the use of curriculum objectives in the less crucial subjects and less effect over the two core subject areas.
TABLE 10
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF CURRICULUM OBJECTIVE
USAGE BY SIZE OF DISTRICT
(Question 38)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Area for Curriculum Objectives</th>
<th>Small (1-4 Sch)</th>
<th>Medium (5-8 Schs)</th>
<th>Large (9+ Schs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Mathematics</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reading</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Science</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Social Studies</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Usage for Four Subjects</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary

We find that central office prescribes and controls the content of curriculum in four subject areas for most elementary principals, close to 80 percent in most subjects. This relationship is not affected by the social status of the school, but is affected by district size. Freedom from centrally adopted curriculum objectives increases as district size increases with principals in the largest districts reporting greatest autonomy over curriculum content in all four subject areas. In brief, central controls over curriculum are substantial and widespread, but principals in larger districts are allowed somewhat greater autonomy over the content of curriculum in their schools.
Adherence to Curriculum Objectives

Central office may promulgate curriculum objectives, but do they expect teachers to adhere to them? In order to find out the answer to this question, we asked principals to report the degree to which teachers were expected to adhere to district curriculum objectives using a scale of 1 to 6, with 1 representing strict expectations of adherence and 6 representing loose expectations (Question 39A, Appendix A). We followed this question with another using similar wording and scale which probed the degree to which principals believed that teachers actually adhered to district curriculum objectives (Question 39B, Appendix A).

When we examine the responses to these two questions, we see that district curriculum objectives are not generally expected to be followed absolutely and that teachers are perceived to take liberties in adhering to the objectives. On the adherence expectations scale, 67 percent fall in categories 2 and 3 while the mean is 2.5, the median 2, and the standard deviation 1.1. When we look at the degree to which principals believe teachers actually adhere to these curriculum objectives, we see more license is taken. Here the mean is 2.9, the median 3, with 55 percent of the cases falling in categories 3 and 4. In sum, principals are allowed some autonomy in following curriculum objectives and they in turn believe they grant teachers some autonomy in adhering to those objectives demonstrating looser controls over content as they are articulated into classroom activities.
Effects of School Social Status

Do central office expectations regarding adherence to curriculum objectives vary by school social status as we have found with several other control mechanisms? In order to investigate this question, we grouped the responses into three categories, low adherence (responses 5 and 6), medium adherence (responses 3 and 4), and high adherence (responses 1 and 2). These levels of expected and perceived adherence were crosstabulated with the three levels of school social status.

Regarding expectations of adherence, we find that there are small, nonlinear differences by school status. Modally, both low status schools and high status schools fall into the "high expected adherence" category with 59 percent and 60 percent of each respective group at this level. Middle status school principals fall modally into the medium adherence category and including 49 percent of these principals. In short, greater adherence is demanded in schools at the extremes of the social status scale.

There are no strong differences in modes by school social status for perceived adherence to curriculum objectives. Principals in low status schools responded bimodally, with 49 percent in both high and medium perceived adherence cells. The modal response for principals in middle status schools is medium perceived adherence, which included 60 percent of these principals, as it is for principals in high status schools including 57 percent of these principals. Perceived adherence to curriculum objectives in lower status schools is greater than it is in either middle status or high status schools, possibly reflecting greater acceptance of the curriculum controls enacted by central office.
Effects of district size

When we compare the distribution of responses for both expected adherence and perceived adherence to central office curriculum objectives district size, we find that linear differences do not occur but patterns of adherence are found. Principals in small and mid-sized districts report similar levels of expected adherence to curriculum objectives, but different from the level of expectations reported in large districts. Modally, we find in the high expected adherence category, 57 percent of the principals in small districts, 55 percent of the principals in mid-sized districts, and 47 percent of the principals in large districts. Here we see that there is somewhat greater leeway in larger districts as far as expected adherence to curriculum objectives is concerned.

When we look at the distribution of perceived adherence to curriculum objectives by district size, we see larger differences. Modally, principals in large districts are more likely to perceive medium adherence to curriculum objectives (69 percent) than do principals in either small districts (54 percent) or principals in mid-sized districts (45 percent). In short, lower expectations for adherence may be transformed into lower perceived levels of adherence to curriculum objectives.

In summary, principals in large districts not only report lower central office expectations of adherence to curriculum objectives, but they also report lower perceived adherence by teachers as compared to the level of actual adherence reported by principals in small or mid-sized districts. Principals in these largest districts are granted the
most autonomy related to the following of centrally mandated curriculum objectives.

Control of Instruction Through Textbook Adoption

Another form of behavior control which constrains instruction involves the central adoption of textbooks for a school district. By adopting textbooks in various subject areas, the central office is exercising control over a core tool of the classroom teacher while promoting the specific content contained in the textbook. As we shall discover, the autonomy of principals and teachers is substantially constrained by the practice of adopting textbooks centrally in four subject areas.

In order to determine whether central office adopted textbooks in Three County schools, principals were asked if this were the case across four subject areas including mathematics, reading, science, and social studies (Question 38C, Appendix A). Their answers resulted in the information in Table 11. This table shows that most adopt a single textbook in each of the four subject areas and that the rest adopt multiple texts for the district which allows some discretion for principals and teachers. When we combine both single and multiple textbook adoption percentages, as we have done in the last column of Table 11, we see that almost all the districts control the choice of textbooks in all four subject areas. This is a clear and substantial pattern of behavior control in these elementary school districts with few principals allowed the discretion to select textbooks for their schools.
TABLE 11
FREQUENCY OF TEXTBOOK ADOPTION
DISTRICTWIDE BY SUBJECT AREA
(Question 38C)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Area</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mathematics</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>88.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reading</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>85.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Science</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Social Science</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effects of school social status

There are some differences in the proportion of principals from schools at varying social status reporting central adoption of textbooks, but there is no clear pattern. Overall, principals in low status schools report single textbook adoption practices more than either medium status or high status school principals. Tentatively we might suggest that in lower status schools, principals have less autonomy in textbook selection than the principals in middle or upper status schools. The cell sizes of these measures, though, suggest further research is needed to substantiate this inference.

Effects of district size on textbook adoption

As with the pattern of differences brought on by school social status, district size does not produce clear and strong linear differences in the application of textbook adoption practices. Some observations, though, can be made. First, principals in mid-sized districts
report adoption of single textbooks on average more often than either principals in small districts or principals in large districts. This is particularly clear in science and social studies where the percentage differences are greater. Second, on average, a larger proportion of principals in the largest districts report adoption of multiple textbooks than do principals in either the small districts or the mid-sized districts. Multiple textbook adoptions allow greater autonomy to these principals. Here we find another example of the mid-sized districts with greater controls over principals, sometimes even more formal controls than in larger districts.

Summary

In summary, we find that central office exerts considerable control through centralized adoption of textbooks in four subject areas. Over three quarters of the principals report that central office adopts either single or multiple textbooks for use in their classrooms, thus limiting the autonomy of principals and teachers in this instructionally important matter. In addition, we find that school social status and district size do not have a linear influence on textbook adoption. The data do point to lessened autonomy for principals of low status schools there is increased autonomy for a proportion of principals in large school districts where there is multiple adoption of textbooks which allows more choice. In short, total central office control over the choice of textbooks is substantial, consistent, and strong across the four major subject areas we examined.
Classroom Organizational Preferences

The modal picture so far shows that central office maintains control over the content of curriculum both by the promulgation of curriculum objectives and by the adoption of particular textbooks in four major subjects. As we shall see shortly, central office does not maintain such tight control over the instructional processes which teachers apply in the classroom. Central office shows little preference for the ways classrooms should be organized.

In order to find out about central office controls over instructional processes principals were asked whether central office had any preference as to the ways classrooms were to be organized (Question 40A, Appendix A), one important aspect of instructional process. The modal responses were overwhelming; 76 percent of the principals report that central offices have no preferences regarding classroom organization. In short, central office grants principals the autonomy to influence this aspect of instructional process.

Effects of school social status

The effects of school social status on central office preferences for classroom organization are not linear. Central office preferences are reported most often in schools with low status clientele, some 33 percent, and least often in schools with middle status clientele, some 17 percent. Central office preferences fall in the middle for high status schools with 25 percent reporting such preferences. Though these percentages must be taken tentatively due to the small number of responses, we do find another example of greater central office control.
in the lower over the lower status school as we have found in the use of other controls.

Effects of school district size

As with school social status, we do not find linear differences in central office control over the ways classrooms are organized but we do find some differences. A larger percentage of principals in large districts report that central office has preferences. This includes 32 percent of the responses. Only 17 percent of the principals in mid-sized districts and 25 percent of the principals in the small districts report such preferences on the part of their central office administrators. In large districts we are more likely to find specific central office administrators directly responsible for instructional matters which would increase the extent of expressed preference about classroom organization. Superintendents in the small districts are more likely to have direct contact with instruction and express preferences of classroom organization due to this closer contact. In mid-sized districts superintendents are just removed enough from schools not to share these preferences and are less likely to have large differentiated staffs who would, as in the large districts, exert influence over issues of classroom organization. In these ways district size differentially affects the control over central office influence on the organization of classrooms.

In summary, control over instructional processes by central office are not strong. Most of the time they do not have preferences about classroom organization. Central office is most likely to have classroom organizational preferences in lower status schools.
Use of standardized teacher evaluation procedures

Another means of influencing instructional processes, and to some extent instructional content, is to require principals to use standardized evaluation procedures for teachers. Use of standardized teacher evaluation procedures is a direct form of behavior control that constrains the work of principals and influences classroom activity. This form of behavior control is widespread in Three County schools and restricts the autonomy of principals.

Three County principals were asked whether the central office expected principals to evaluate teachers in a standardized way, using similar forms and visiting patterns or whether principals were allowed considerable discretion over the evaluation of teachers (Question 37, Appendix A). A total of 84 percent of the principals are constrained by this form of behavior control and must evaluate teachers in a standardized way, using similar forms and visiting patterns. Only 16 percent of the principals are granted the autonomy to vary the way they evaluate teachers in their schools.

Effects of school social status on teacher evaluation

It turned out that school social status has no effect on the proportion of principals reporting this form of control. The percentage differences between the three levels of social status was never over 8 percent. Social-economic differences therefore are not significant in this matter.
TABLE 12
USE OF STANDARDIZED TEACHER EVALUATION PROCEDURES BY SIZE OF DISTRICT
(Question 37)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of District</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Small (1-4 Sch)</th>
<th>Medium (5-8 Sch)</th>
<th>Large (9+ Sch)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N Per-cent-age</td>
<td>N Per-cent-age</td>
<td>N Per-cent-age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Standard evaluation procedures</td>
<td>90 84.1</td>
<td>21 75.0</td>
<td>37 84.1</td>
<td>37 90.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. No standard evaluation procedures</td>
<td>18 15.9</td>
<td>7 25.0</td>
<td>7 15.9</td>
<td>4 9.8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>113 100.0</td>
<td>44 100.0</td>
<td>44 100.0</td>
<td>41 100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effects of school district size on teacher evaluation

We find some differences in the use of standardized teacher evaluation procedures related to school district size; increased district size is associated with increased use of standardized teacher evaluation procedures. This relationship is linear with 75 percent of the small district principals, 84 percent of the mid-sized district principals and 90 percent of the large district principals reporting use of these procedures as seen in Table 17. Again we see that increased district size increases the use of formalized, standardized mechanisms of control which lessen the autonomy of principals. This is the case for several reasons. First, by formalizing teacher evaluation procedures
central office ensures consistent and easily comparable data on classroom personnel which eases their examination of the more voluminous data. Second, standardization decreases the likelihood of conflict deriving from differential teacher supervision by principals who design their own evaluation procedures.

Summary

Control over instructional processes is generally weak, though teacher evaluation may act to constrain this organizational function. School social status is not related to use of standardized teacher evaluations, but larger district size brings on greater use of these procedures.

Generalized Behavior Controls

We will now turn to two other forms of behavior control which have a more generalized and less specific focus; these are the less restrictive job description and the, more restrictive, use of programmatic management systems such as MBO or PPBES. Both of these generalized behavior controls may focus on instructional management tasks, on building management tasks, on community relations tasks, or any number of different tasks of principals. We find that whereas the job description is widely used, programmatic management systems are found in less than half the schools.

Written job descriptions for principals

In order to determine whether written job descriptions were used as control mechanisms, principals were asked whether they had a job description or a manual which gave a detailed, written description of
their responsibilities (Question 46, Appendix A). A total of 82 percent reported affirmatively, that such a description did exist. In addition, principals were asked whether they were expected to adhere to that job description (Question 46, Appendix A). Of those principals who reported having a job description, 84 percent said that they were expected to adhere to it. In short, most principals have a job description and are expected to adhere to it.

Effects of school social status

Differences in the use of job descriptions by the social status of the school are neither large nor linear. We find 90 percent of principals in low status schools report having a job description, while 78 percent of the principals in middle status schools and 83 percent of the principals in the high status schools reporting having a job description. These differences are similar to the pattern of teacher control through the use of standardized teacher evaluation procedures. There we found also that principals in low status schools were more constrained by formalized behavior controls with principals in high status schools reporting the next highest constraint and principals in middle status schools reporting the lowest use of this formal control. This pattern is suggestive; principals with low status students are more controlled and have less autonomy due to greater use of formal, formalized, standardized controls than principals in middle or upper status school.

Effects of district size

We find very small differences in the use of job descriptions by school district size. As expected, principals in smaller districts
less frequently report use of job descriptions, 78 percent, principals in mid-sized districts report them more often, 82 percent, and principals in large districts report them most often, 86 percent. These differences are small (less than 8 percent). District size, in short, has a minor influence over the use of job descriptions.

In summary, we discover a pattern of control through the use of job descriptions in nearly all school districts. In general, neither school social status nor district size has any powerful effect on the use of this control, though principals in low status schools and those in large districts report somewhat greater use of this control.

Use of Programmatic Management Systems

Another form of generalized behavior control comes through the use of programmatic management systems which districts use to for setting objectives and plans (MBO) and in establishing budgets through the delineation of program plans (PPBES). Both of these formalized systems of management and their hybrids yield tasks which principals must accomplish and, like the preparation of reports, these tasks constrict through prescription what principals can do. In addition, they function as structured systems of planning which involve the accomplishment of specific, time consuming tasks during the year. In sum, programmatic management systems are themselves prescriptions for behavior as well as methods of further constraining the behaviors of principals and teachers.

Principals were asked whether their district used some form of management system (Question 46C, Appendix A). In Three County schools 40 percent of the principals report that they are required to use a
management system. Conversely 60 percent of the principals do not use any district mandated programmatic management system. These 60 percent are granted autonomy from these formal planning systems. Modally, then, principals in these schools are not constrained by a structured centrally mandated management system.

Effects of school social status

Though the modal picture is of little control through the use of management systems, we discover that school social status is associated in a linear fashion with use of these management systems. As the social status of schools increases, the likelihood of finding programmatic management systems increases also. Twenty percent of the principals of lower status schools report use of management systems, while 43 percent of the principals in middle status schools and 65 percent of the principals in upper status schools report use of management systems. This relationship is strong, with a difference of 45 percent between low status schools and high status school. Here we see that though generally programmatic management systems are not used in these schools, the modal pattern for high status schools is to employ these management systems. This pattern points to greater freedom for principals in low status schools, but greater control over principals in upper status schools.

Effects of district size

Unlike the relationship between school social status and the use of management systems, we find no substantial relationship between district size and use of these management systems. In mid-sized districts 45 percent of the principals report use of these systems.
Principals from small districts report the least use, some 33 percent using them. Principals from large districts report middle-range usage, some 38 percent with these systems. As can be seen in these percentages, the differences by district size are small non-linear, and not statistically significant.

It is interesting to find that district size is not related to the use of programmatic management systems, for we would have expected such a relationship. Prior studies of organizations point to the increased use of formalized, standardized operating procedures as organizations grow in size.¹ This would suggest greater use of formal management systems in larger district, but we do not find this. It may be that because educational goals are multiple, hard-to-measure, and often not consensual the use of management systems will not work as a way of increasing and centralizing control in larger school districts. Other forms of control must be employed to cope with the concomitant control loss in larger school districts.

Summary

In summary, we find mixed use of these two forms of generalized control mechanism. Modally, most principals have job descriptions and are expected to adhere to them, but most superintendents do not use programmatic management systems in their districts. Principals in low status schools and those in large districts report job descriptions somewhat more than other principals. Furthermore, we discovered a strong, positive, and linear relationship between school social status and the use of programmatic management systems. Principals in higher

status schools have to work under these management systems more frequently. In contrast, district size has very little effect on the differential use of these management systems. In short, principals in lower status schools have their autonomy lessened by job descriptions more than by management systems, while the opposite is true for principals from high status schools. And these more generalized controls seem to be associated with social status rather than district size.

Perceived Use of Behavior Control

In the previous sections we have examined the actual use of a variety of forms of behavior control, ranging from the requirements of regular reporting to the use of programmatic management systems. These have given us a picture of behavior control in these schools, but they have not shown us whether principals perceive themselves to be particularly constrained by these control mechanisms. We wish to determine the degree to which principals think that their work is controlled through the use of rules and directives or whether these controls provide little constraint. This will provide information about the salience of behavior controls for principals and will be useful when we compare the use of behavior controls with the use of output controls in the next section.

Here we will look at three aspects of the perceived use of behavior controls. First, we will examine the degree to which principals feel that decision making is centralized. Second, we will find out whether principals perceive low, medium, or high use of behavior control over their work. Third, we will inspect the rules which principals perceive to be most important to central office. As we
shall see, these three aspects point to what we have discovered so far, that there is relatively light use of rules, procedures, and directives to control principals that there is somewhat greater control over administrative tasks than over instructional tasks and that these differences are sometimes negatively related to school social status but positively related to district size.

Centralization of Decision Making

One important indicator of the use of behavior controls is the centralization of decision making. Though, direct measurement of this aspect of centralization is difficult, perceptions help fill out the picture. In order to find out about centralization in Three County districts we asked principals to rank their districts by gauging the degree of centralization on a scale of 1 to 6, with 1 representing high centralization and 6 representing low centralization. The findings picture a wide range of perceived centralization.

Modally, principals fall in the middle with 23 percent reporting a centralization level of 3 which is just slightly more centralized than decentralized. The mean is 3.5, almost exactly in the middle, and the median is 4. A minimal 6 percent fall in each of the two extreme positions on the scale. The standard deviation is 1.7. These findings suggest that though there is a slight tendency for principals to see their districts as decentralized, a substantial number also perceive decision making to tend toward centralized control. As we shall see, school status and, more powerfully, district size are associated with variation in perceived centralization.
Effects of school social status

Perceived centralization of decision making varies across schools of different social statuses and indicates again that principals in schools with high status clienteles feel more autonomous. Modally, principals in low and middle status schools report a medium level of centralization, while principals in high status schools report a low level of centralization. The modes include 51 percent of the principals in low status schools, 44 percent of the principals in middle status schools and 48 percent of the principals in high status schools. In sum, principals in low status schools and middle status schools feel less autonomous than those in high status schools. These perceived differences may translate into actual differences in the centralization of decision making in these schools. Principals in upper status schools may be allowed to make more decisions at the school level because central office knows that upper status parents are more assertive and will act as informal controls over the actions of principals and their teachers. Parents in middle and lower status schools are not as assertive, and thus do not provide informal constraints which could counterbalance greater decentralization of decision making.

Effects of district size

Prior research into organizations points to a relationship between size and the centralization of decision making.\(^1\) This relationship also obtains in Three County school districts where we find a correlation between school district size and centralization (\(r = .27\)). As school districts grow larger, more decisions are made centrally,

\(^1\)Ibid.
thereby increasing the control at the top of the hierarchy and decreasing the autonomy of principals.

Increased centralization in larger districts is necessitated by number of factors. Centralized decision making can decrease the conflict between schools and principals for scarce resources, conflict which may increase as more are competing for resources. In addition, in larger districts there is less face-to-face contact from supervisory visits and meetings. Because of this, superintendents are likely to have less personal influence over principals and may centralize decisions to maintain control. In summary, larger size brings with it greater chances for control loss as units multiply and social distance increases; centralization is one way of counteracting this shift in power.

In conclusion, we find that centralization of decision making varies considerably in these school districts with both school lower school social status and larger district size being associated with greater centralization. Autonomy for principals is greater in low and middle status schools and in smaller districts, while centralized decision-making and central control are greater in high status schools and as district size increases.

**Level of Behavior Control Use Perceived by Principals**

In addition to asking principals about the degree of centralization in their districts, we queried them about the level of behavior control used in their districts. In order to do this, we asked them to what extent they felt that central office controlled their work by establishing rules and directives (Question 45A, Appendix A). We used
a three-level scale of high, medium, or low use of rules and directives. The responses are striking.

The perceived use of behavior control is dramatically skewed to the low end of the scale. Sixty-two percent of the principals felt central office made low use of behavior control, another 34 percent perceived medium use of behavior control and only 5 percent reported high use of this approach. The mean, median, and mode are all 1, or "low use," while the standard deviation is 2. This is a clear pattern; elementary principals do not feel themselves powerfully controlled through the use of rules and directives. That is to say, they see behavior controls as light. Principals prepare reports, attend meetings, evaluate teachers, and so forth, but the combination of these various forms of behavior control does not make many of them feel greatly constrained. Both school social status and district size, however, are related to variation in the level of behavior control perceived to be used in these districts.

Effects of school social status

Let us turn to the question of whether principals in schools of different social status perceive themselves to be differentially controlled through the use of rules and directives. When we compare the distribution of behavior control use and school social status, we do not find a linear relationship, though there are some differences. Modally, principals in all three levels of schools fall in the low use cell representing low perceived use of behavior controls. There are differences, though, in the percentages which fall in these modal cells. We find that 59 percent of the principals in low status...
schools, 60 percent of the principals in middle status schools, and 70 percent of the principals in high status school report low use of behavior controls. With the case of principals in high status schools, assertive clientele may replace in part the need for greater use of rules and directives. Here again, we see somewhat greater perceived autonomy for principals in high status schools.

Effects of school district size

District size has a larger relationship to perceived behavior control usage than does school social status. Here we find that district size is correlated with perceived behavior control (r = .21). This suggests that principals in larger districts feel more controlled through the use of rules and procedures than do principals in smaller districts. In short, increased size brings greater reliance on rules and directives and consequently lessened perceived autonomy for principals.

The relationship between school district size and the perceived level of behavior control use is reinforced by two other findings; level of behavior control usage is correlated with both centralization of decision making and the number of required reports required by central office. A strong correlation exists between level of behavior control usage and centralization of decision making (r = .48). Centralization of decision making increases as the sense of being controlled by rules and directives from upper level administrators increases. Also, we see that number of required reports is correlated with behavior control use with a correlation coefficient of (.18). Increased requirements to report to central office may increase the
sense of being controlled by rules and directives. In short, increased centralization and increased reporting is associated with a decrease in sense of autonomy as represented in the perceived level of behavior control.

In conclusion, we find overall that principals report relatively low use of behavior control to constrain their work. Furthermore, the perceived use of behavior control is influenced slightly by the social status of the school, but more by the size of the district with lower status and larger size bringing greater perceived use of rules and directives. Again, we see that both the environment of the school and the size of the district influences the patterning of control and the autonomy of principals in Three County districts.

Rules and Directives Perceived By Principals to Be Most Important to Central Office

As we have just learned, principals in Three County schools on average believe that central office makes relatively low use of behavior control. For those principals who felt that central office made medium or high use of behavior control we asked which rules and directives were most important to the central office? Following the question regarding the relative use of behavior controls, those who had reported either medium or high perceived use were asked which rules they thought were most important to central office (Question 45B, Appendix A). Here again we see that the total number of mentions is small, but a pattern does emerge. Rules related to personnel, administrative tasks, and board-and-central office policy are mentioned most frequently, almost twice as frequently as those relating to students or instructional issues. Here again, we see the pattern of behavior
control which we have noticed previously, light application of rules in student and instructional areas, and relatively heavier use of rules in administrative and policy areas. It may be that principals do not conceive of curriculum objectives as rules or directives which control their work directly and therefore do not mention them as often. Nevertheless, we see again that central office exerts greater behavior control over administrative and policy domains while allowing greater autonomy from these controls in the instructional domain.

Summary and Conclusions

In summary, we find that central office differentially utilizes behavior controls in Three County school districts, applying greater control over curriculum content and routine administrative tasks and less control over instructional processes and other core tasks of principals such as public relations and school level planning. The utilization of behavior controls is differentially affected by the social status of the school and the size of the district though not in a linear fashion in all cases. Principals in high status schools report the most autonomy (from these controls), while principals in larger districts report greater application of the more formal methods of behavior control. Overall, principals perceive relatively low use of this form of control by central office to channel and direct their work.

As we have seen with the use of input controls, upper level administrators provide zones of control and zones of autonomy for principals and their schools. We find a zone of tight controls through the specification of district curriculum objectives and the central
adoption of textbooks, i.e., strong constraints over the content of the curriculum. In addition, we find a zone of tight controls over tasks principals consider disagreeable such as the preparation of reports, the attendance at meetings, and the formal evaluation of teachers. Though these tasks may not require great amounts of time, basically all principals are required by central administrators to fulfill these responsibilities. In short, we find tight controls over the content of curriculum and the accomplishment of administrative tasks.

In contrast to the application of control in these areas, we observe a zone of greater autonomy over the specification of instructional processes, the procurement of parental support, and over general management functions. Here, principals are granted the autonomy to organize classrooms as they prefer, to develop their own public relations program, and the autonomy to establish management and planning procedures of their own choosing. Principals are granted autonomy, then, over tasks which are difficult to specify and to standardize, and which may require special adjustments due to variable factors at the school level.

The degree of autonomy afforded principals through differential application of behavior control varies across schools of different social statuses. Though in most cases these differences are not linear, we do find in many instances a pattern of greater autonomy for principals in schools with high status clientele as compared to the autonomy allowed to principals with middle or low status clientele. Principals in schools with high status clientele report a lower level of required reporting, fewer central office meetings, lower use of job descriptions, lower perceived centralization of decision making, as
well as a generally lower perceived use of behavior control. This
greater autonomy, though, is restricted by somewhat higher expectations
from central office to adhere to the curriculum as well as greater use
of programmatic management systems. The application of behavior
controls in schools with low and middle status clientele are not as
clearly patterned as they are for principals with high status clien-
tele, as we have shown above. The social status of the school seems to
have its strongest effect of behavior control usage as it applies to
high status schools where we find greater autonomy for principals.

As other studies have found, organizational size is related to the
application of behavior controls. Our findings suggest, though, that
not all forms of behavior control are positively associated with
increased district size. The use of standardized teacher evaluation
procedures, the centralization of decision making, and the perceived
level of behavior controls are all positively associated with district
size. On the other hand, in contrast to large districts, we discover
that principals in small districts report the highest number of
meetings, face greatest use of curriculum objectives, and do not adopt
multiple textbooks as often. In these areas small districts control
more tightly than do large districts. In spite of these specific
behavior controls found in small districts, we still must conclude
that, in general, the use of behavior controls are more extensive,
salient, and potent in larger districts.

In summary, we find strong use of behavior controls over curricu-
lum content as Bidwell has suggested and over the standardization of
routine administrative tasks. School social status influences the use of different forms of behavior control, and in general principals in high status schools report greater autonomy across a number of different controls. In addition, district size is related to the perceived use of behavior controls, centralization, and the standardization of teacher evaluation procedures, with principals in smaller districts allowed greater autonomy. The same principals, though, face greater controls over meeting requirements, curriculum objectives, and textbook adoptions. As we see from this data, school districts differentially utilize behavior controls across different tasks, different school clientele, and in districts of different size. Again, we see that this form of organizational control provides far from total constraint or direction over the work of principals and their schools. Instead, behavior controls are one more part of the total set of controls comprising the complete system of control in elementary school districts. In the next section we will turn to still another of these controls, output control, which constrains through the collection and evaluation of organizational outputs.

Output Control: Findings

Introduction

So far we have investigated the ways central office attempts to constrain principals and their schools through the use of three forms of control: direct supervision, input control and behavior control. In this section, we will turn to a fourth mechanism called output control, which is used to channel the work of principals toward organizational

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goals. Whereas input control focuses on the constraint of resources flowing to principals, and behavior control deals with constraining the tasks and activities of principals, output control is designed to influence the work of principals by collecting measures of outputs, outcomes, or results, evaluating them against some standard, and then rewarding or sanctioning the subordinate.¹

Output controls are mechanisms of constraint and direction which are central and crucial to any system of organizational control, though their use varies across organizations. As we noted earlier this form of control has been studied in many different types of organizations, but not in school districts. Thus, the extent to which output control is used in elementary school districts is an important yet relatively unexamined phenomenon that is central to any full understanding of the balance of control and autonomy afforded principals.

Output control permits some autonomy while exerting control over principals. Output control, because it focuses on the measurement of ends rather than means, allows subordinates the discretion to select the activities, tasks, and procedures that they believe appropriate for reaching the ends, for producing the output, or for achieving a particular result. Control is imposed at the end of the process when the superior examines results of the subordinate's activities. At this point, the superior may reward the subordinate for effectively reaching the stated goal, sanction the subordinate for not achieving the goal, or, alternately, change some aspect of the production process to achieve ends more effectively. Because output control, occurs at

the end of the process, it allows considerable discretion during the process itself.

Overview of the Section

In this section we will examine the use of output control in three different ways. We will, (1) look at the extent to which central office collects measures of student output through the administration of achievement tests and criterion referenced tests, (2) examine the perceived results or outcomes which principals believe central office watches, and (3) learn what principals perceive to be the level of output control use. For each we will suggest reasons for variation, as well as point to the resultant balance of autonomy or control.

First, we ask whether central office collects concrete measures of output for education's central goal, cognitive achievement by students. Here we will note whether two types of tests are administered in four core subject areas: mathematics, reading, science, and social studies. We ascertain whether central office has information on student achievement derived either from standardized achievement tests or from criterion referenced tests. If students do not take one or both of these tests, we can assume that central office does not have a solid measure of student achievement and therefore cannot evaluate the performance of schools with respect to this output. If these tests are not given, principals will have greater autonomy. Conversely, in cases where these tests are administered, central office can evaluate principals according to these outputs. In addition, we will examine the use of standardized achievement tests and criterion referenced tests across
schools of differing social status and across districts of different size.

Second, we will look at the school results or outputs that principals believe are watched by central office. Examining the answers given in two open-ended questions, we see what results principals believe influence the evaluations central office makes of them. Here we discover what results principals believe are being assessed by central office in its application of output control. The results which principals believe are watched by central office influence and constrain what they do, acting as output controls.

Finally, we turn to an analysis of the perceived level of output control usage. We asked respondents to rank how much they felt central office used control through the assessment of results.

In short, this section will describe the monitoring of student performance through the use of standardized achievement and criterion referenced tests, examine the range of results which principals believe are important when they are evaluated by superiors, and finally present the principals' perceptions of the extent to which the central office utilizes output controls. These three parts will provide a picture of output control usage in these school districts and point to the relative balance of control and autonomy this pattern of usage produces. In addition, we will note initially the distributions for the entire sample and then in some cases turn to the differential application across schools of different social status and across districts of different size. Finally, we will conclude the section with a discussion of the pattern of output control usage and its relation to autonomy and control in these systems.
Before superiors can employ any form of output control, they must first gather measures of outputs, results, or outcomes of the work of the subordinate. These measures of output are then compared against some standard of expected accomplishment. Some of the most common and frequently gathered measures of educational output are student test scores. When students regularly take formal examinations that can be compared across classrooms and schools, central office has a powerful measure of school and classroom "output." When test scores are collected and assessed by central office, the autonomy of principals is lessened. It follows that when these tests are not administered, this form of output measure is not available to central office, and autonomy of principals is increased.

**Standardized Achievement Tests**

Not all school districts administer standardized achievement tests. In order to determine which districts used these tests and in which subjects students were examined, we asked principals first whether standardized achievement tests were used in their districts, and second, if these tests were given in four subject areas: mathematics, reading, science and social studies (Question, 38B, Appendix A). The findings point to greater use of these tests in the core subjects and lesser use in secondary subjects.

A slight majority of principals reports use of standardized achievement tests in mathematics and reading. As we see in Table 13, 51 percent of the principals report use of such tests in mathematics for all grades and 53 percent report their use in reading for all
grades. In addition, 3 percent of the principals administer these tests in mathematics for only some grades, while one percent administer reading tests in some grades.

TABLE 13
USE OF TESTS IN THREE COUNTY SCHOOLS
(Question 38B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Areas</th>
<th>Criterion Referenced Tests</th>
<th>Standardized Achievement Tests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Math</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reading</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Science</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Social Studies</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These tests are used less frequently in the secondary subjects of science and social studies. Thirty-nine percent of the principals report testing across all grades in science, while 41 percent report their use in social studies across all grades. Partial use is reported for both science and social studies by 4 percent of the principals. These data suggest a bi-modal distribution of achievement test usage. Just over half administer these tests and just under half do not. For those principals who administer these tests, the threat of output control from central office looms large, while for those principals whose pupils do not take these tests, the threat of output control through the evaluation of student performance on standardized tests
does not exist. In order to employ output controls, superiors must have outputs to evaluate; without these measures of productivity the control cannot be used to influence subordinates.

In short, where standardized tests are not administered, the autonomy of principals is increased. Where standardized tests are administered, principals face greater control. This is the case whether or not central office actively evaluates student scores on standardized tests, for the fear that central office may use test scores in this way will influence how principals behave by affecting their beliefs about what knowledge their superiors possess. In short, we find that a slight majority of principals are constrained because standardized achievement tests are administered for mathematics and reading, while about 40 percent are constrained through the collection of test scores in science and social studies.

Effects of school social status

Does the social status of the school influence the differential use of these forms of testing? In order to investigate this issue, we produced crosstabulation tables comparing the use of standardized achievement tests using our previously discussed tripartite divisions of school by social status. Though the pattern of usage is not linear, several consistent arrangements present themselves.

As we can see in Table 14, a disproportionate number of principals with schools of high status clientele report that they administer standardized achievement tests in all four subjects. Principals with middle status clientele disproportionately report the lowest use of standardized achievement tests, again in all four subjects. Finally,
principals with low status clientele report a medium level of standardized test administration, falling in between the usage reported in high status schools and middle status schools. Principals with low status clientele report use of these tests at a level just above the average for the entire sample. In terms of the autonomy afforded principals in these three strata of schools, principals in high status schools enjoy the least autonomy and principals in middle status schools enjoy the most autonomy, with principals in low status schools enjoying a middle level of autonomy. These differences are substantial, with the difference between the percentage in high status schools using these tests and the percentage in middle status schools being 20 percent or more (except for reading where the difference is only 19.6 percent).

TABLE 14

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED ACHIEVEMENT TEST USAGE IN FOUR SUBJECTS
BY SCHOOL SOCIAL STATUS
(Question 38B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Area</th>
<th>Low Status</th>
<th>Medium Status</th>
<th>High Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N Percent</td>
<td>N Percent</td>
<td>N Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Mathematics</td>
<td>19 52.9</td>
<td>20 41.7</td>
<td>15 65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reading</td>
<td>19 52.8</td>
<td>22 45.8</td>
<td>15 65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Science</td>
<td>16 44.4</td>
<td>13 27.1</td>
<td>12 54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Social Studies</td>
<td>16 44.4</td>
<td>14 29.2</td>
<td>13 56.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Why might this be the case? First, parents in the high status schools generally have more years of formal education and may have higher educational expectations for their children. In addition, as we shall see, these parents are perceived as more assertive and may make greater demands on central office for higher student achievement as measured on standardized achievement tests, the types of tests they themselves may have taken. In these ways, the social background of the parents may affect the degree to which the central office monitors student achievement. Second, we might find parents and central office staff strongly concerned with the achievement of students from low socio-economic backgrounds, using standardized achievement tests as a way of pressuring and signaling to principals in these schools that achievement is an important output and one which will be monitored. The reason for the disproportionately low use of standardized achievement tests in the middle status schools is not clear. It may be that because these students are neither poor nor outstanding performers, the interest central office shows in measuring how these students do academically is lessened. The principals in these middle status schools are granted considerable autonomy from the control which derives from the evaluation of measured student achievement.

Effects of district size

What of the influence of district size on the administration of standardized tests? Again, we used crosstabulation tables to examine the effects of school district size on the monitoring of these outputs. As with the effects of school status on the use of standardized tests,
district size produces a non-linear, but consistent effect on use of these tests, as we see in Table 15.

**TABLE 15**

**FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED ACHIEVEMENT TEST USAGE IN FOUR SUBJECTS**
**BY SIZE OF DISTRICT**
*(Question 38B)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Area</th>
<th>Small (1-4 Schs)</th>
<th>Mid-Sized (5-8 Schs)</th>
<th>Large (9+ Schs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Mathematics</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reading</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Science</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Social Studies</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We find that mid-sized districts use standardized tests most frequently, followed by large districts, with principals in small districts reporting the lowest use of these tests. This pattern holds for all four subjects without exception. In general, we find that smaller districts avoid the use of more formal types of control in favor of more subtle and less formal means of control. This may explain the relatively infrequent administration of standardized tests, tests which could cause rifts between schools by setting up formal distinctions between principals. It is less clear why mid-sized districts employ standardized tests disproportionately more often than small or large districts. Here we are probably seeing the attempts of central office to cope with increased size and the control loss which
accompanies increased size. In a sense, the disproportionate use of standardized tests in these districts is an over-reaction of a district which has neither the informal ties of the small district nor the increased rules and procedures of the larger district. Also, as we shall see shortly, these mid-sized districts make high use of standardized tests but low use of criterion-referenced tests, while large districts make medium use of standardized tests but high use of criterion-referenced tests as a way of monitoring the outputs of schools. In this way, perhaps, mid-sized and large districts balance off their differential needs for information about student performance. In short, we discover that principals in mid-sized districts enjoy the least autonomy due to high use of standardized tests while principals in the smallest districts enjoy the most autonomy, with principals in the large districts falling in the middle.

**Criterion Referenced Tests**

Criterion referenced tests measure the degree to which a student has or has not learned a particular skill or acquired some piece of knowledge. These tests measure on an absolute scale what a pupil has learned and are not normed to local or national populations. The purpose of the tests is to measure whether pupils have acquired the knowledge and the skills detailed in the district’s curriculum. They show how a child is doing on prescribed performance criteria, but do not show how the child is doing relative to their age cohort. The findings point to proportionately less frequent use of these tests as compared to the use made of standardized achievement tests.
Most principals report that they do not administer criterion referenced tests in any of the four subject areas. As we can see in Table 13 above, 40 percent use criterion referenced tests in mathematics and 43 percent use them to test students in reading. The proportion employing these tests drops precipitously when we look at their use in science, reported by 27 percent of the principals, and social studies, reported by 20 percent of the principals. In general, criterion referenced tests are used less than standardized achievement tests for monitoring the output of student learning and are, modally, not employed in Three County districts. We do find, though, that approximately 40 percent of the principals report these tests in mathematics and reading. This will decrease these principals' autonomy and stimulate them to focus on ensuring that students do well on these examinations.

Effects of school status

Unlike the pattern of usage for standardized tests, we do not find any clear pattern when we compare the use of criterion referenced tests across schools of different social status as seen in Table 16. We do find somewhat greater use of criterion referenced tests in schools with either low status or high status clientele. Principals in the middle status schools report the lowest use of criterion referenced tests, a pattern similar to what we discovered regarding the use of standardized achievement tests. The percentage differences though are relatively small with no differences over 20 percent. Nonetheless, when we look at the monitoring of school outputs through the gathering of student test scores, we do find that principals in middle status
schools consistently report disproportionately lower use of this form of student testing suggesting that these principals have proportionately more autonomy than their colleagues in schools with either low status or high status clientele.

**TABLE 16**

**FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF CRITERION REFERENCED TEST USAGE IN FOUR SUBJECTS BY SCHOOL STATUS**

(Question 38B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Area</th>
<th>Low Status</th>
<th>Medium Status</th>
<th>High Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Mathematics</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reading</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Science</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Social Studies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effects of district size

When we examine the distribution of criterion referenced test usage in four subjects by district size, we find a non-linear, but consistent pattern. First, if we look at Table 15 we see that principals in large districts report the largest proportion giving criterion referenced tests across all four subject areas. Second, principals in mid-sized districts report the smallest proportion giving criterion referenced tests across all four subjects. Finally, principals in small districts fall in between large and mid-sized districts in the proportion using these tests; this is true for all four subjects.

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TABLE 17

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF CRITERION REFERENCED TEST USAGE IN FOUR SUBJECTS
BY SIZE OF DISTRICT
(Question 38B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Area</th>
<th>Small (1-4 Sch)</th>
<th>Mid-Sized (5-8 Sch)</th>
<th>Large (9+ Schs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Mathematics</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reading</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Science</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Social Studies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Principals in the largest districts therefore face the greatest output control deriving from the collection of criterion referenced test scores for their students. In contrast, principals in mid-sized districts face the least output control coming through the use of these tests. Small districts fall in between these two categories. Superintendents in the largest districts collect measures of output which, unlike standardized achievement tests that are norm-referenced, provide an absolute measure of student performance within specified areas and along prescribed criteria. By gathering these forms of output measure, superintendents in large districts are able to compare across schools with diverse populations and exert influence towards clear, measurable outputs and results. In these ways they may combat control loss. Superintendents in small and mid-sized districts do not have as great a problem of control loss and may choose to use these tests less
frequently. In addition, criterion referenced tests may be employed less in mid-sized districts because it is in these districts where we find the highest use of standardized achievement tests which may act as alternatives to the use of criterion referenced tests.

Results of Outputs Perceived to be Important to Central Office

We have shown that some measures of student performance in the form of test scores are collected in many, though far from all, districts in Three Counties. Student performance on tests is one of the more concrete and measureable types of educational outcomes that might be monitored and evaluated by superiors. What other results might central office collect and use in the application of output control? As our source of data on these controls is the school principal, we asked these respondents two different questions meant to tell us something about the results or outputs which might be watched by central office. Specifically, we asked the principals to tell us what they believed were the most important results which central office watches (Question 45B, Appendix). This question followed an inquiry into the degree to which central office employed results control. The second question asked principals what they believed was important to central office when these superiors evaluated their performance (Question 47A, Appendix A). This second question was stated in broader terms in order to capture a wide variety of evaluation criteria, only one of which was the output or results of principals' work. These two questions provide a broad picture of the results or outputs which are perceived to be used to assess principals.
The results or outputs that principals believe to be important to central office when evaluations are made will have a powerful influence on the goals they attend to. Given the facts that educational goals are multiple, diffuse, and oftentimes hard to measure, and that consensus about goals within individual school districts is often lacking, principals must develop some hierarchy of goals within which to work and which act as guides for decision making. If principals believe that particular outcomes or results are more important than others to their superiors then they are likely to work toward these. The importance of producing results which are monitored by the superintendent is particularly meaningful. It is the superintendent who possesses considerable power by controlling promotion and retention, as well as by controlling material and symbolic resources principals may need. In this way, perceptions of what is important constrain the behavior of principals.

Results Perceived to be Important to Central Office

Let us turn now to an examination of those results that principals believe are watched by central office, as reported in Table 19. These represent a mapping of the goals and objectives which influence the work of principals and thereby lessen their autonomy.

When we examine the results mentioned by principals in this open-ended question in Table 18 we are struck immediately by the enormous variety or responses ranging from student performance and progress to more diffuse results such as quality of instruction and school atmosphere. We find 22 percent of the sample mentioned other miscellaneous results as well. Principals perceive central office to be
watching a potentially broad scope of results; the broader the scope the more restrictive is the system of control.

### TABLE 18

**MOST IMPORTANT RESULTS PERCEIVED TO BE WATCHED BY CENTRAL OFFICE**

*(Question 47A)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage Mentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Student performance and progress:</strong> academic, performance, test results</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Public reaction:</strong> positive or negative</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Teacher performance and attitudes, includes affective such as morale</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Adherence to district rules and procedures:</strong> includes budget, committee work, curriculum, reports, paper work</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Not &quot;making waves&quot;: no problems, smooth running</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Student behavior and relations with students:</strong> discipline, enrollment</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7. General quality of instruction:</strong> good programs, teacher improvement, etc.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8. Atmosphere of school, good climate</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9. Other</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Total 101% greater than 100% due to rounding)
Two outcomes were mentioned by a substantial proportion of the principals. Student performance and progress was mentioned by 67 percent of the respondents, while the nature of public reaction, was mentioned by 64 percent. These two results become the dominant goals that principals believe are watched by central office and that constrain and channel the work of principals.

One is struck by the importance of both student performance and public reaction as significant results of principals and their schools. As Bacharach points out, principals, like other administrators of localized government organizations or agencies, face what he calls a "dual imperative" involving both the accomplishment of technical goals such as student performance as well as the accomplishment of political goals such as local community support of schools.¹ Here we see this dual imperative illustrated in the perceptions of principals regarding the results which their superiors watch. In short, output controls in these school systems exhibit, along with variety, a strong dual nature; principals must both work to secure student achievement and work to ensure public support for their school. The existence of these two central outputs restricts the autonomy of principals by channeling them in the direction of these primary goals. Principals must reach instructional ends while keeping parents satisfied.

Finally, Table 18 exhibits a third property of output control in these elementary school districts: the results of the work of principals are evaluated both objectively and subjectively. That is, results

are assessed in part as the achievement of particular objective goals, student performance for example, and in part as the opinions of important reference groups, public reaction for example. As Thompson points out, reference group assessments of performance may be employed when means-ends chains are not known and when goals are not crystallized. This is the case with the principals' goals of securing community support. Less subjective assessments may be employed, suggests Thompson, when means-ends chains are more clearly known, as is the case with student performance.¹

The existence of both objective and subjective means of assessing outputs will influence the potency of output control, particularly when part of the subjective assessment comes from outside the boundaries of the organization. We would suggest that the autonomy of principals and of their superiors in central office decreases in proportion to the salience of public reaction as an important organizational goal or objective. In short, the inclusion of extra-organizational subjective assessments decreases the salience of control from intra-organizational assessors.

In summary, we find that the results that are perceived to be watched by central office are enormously varied, exhibit a dual imperative among those results most frequently mentioned, and include both objective and subjective assessments of performance, some of which derive from groups outside the boundaries of the organization. These characteristics suggest that, for many principals autonomy is constrained by the scope of the results which are monitored, the

¹James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action, pp. 132-44.
importance of more than one goal, and the inclusion of extra-organizational subjective assessments of performance. In short, output control provides a complex and broad scope of influence over principals.

Criteria Perceived to Be Important to Central Office During Evaluation

In order to gather information about the broader topic of the ways central office evaluates principals, respondents were asked to tell us what they thought was most important to central office when they evaluated principals. The responses to this question, seen in Table 19, provide another picture of the criteria, many of which are examples of results or outputs, that principals believe central office assesses when examining the performance of principals.

We see immediately that these are similar to the answers to the more watch. First, the criteria mentioned by principals are enormously varied, from public reaction to two large categories of miscellaneous criteria, including 51 diverse responses which could not be categorized within the first nine groups. Second, we see that the mentioned criteria include objective criteria, such as student performance and progress, as well as subjective assessments from important reference groups in the school community, such as teacher reaction and public reaction. Third, these criteria involve both intra-organizational and extra-organizational sources of assessments. Principals believe that the community is a crucial part of the evaluation system, an important point we will take up in the next section when we discuss the use of environmental agents as a mechanism of control. These three similarities add support to our prior discussion of output control.
TABLE 19
CRITERIA PERCEIVED TO BE IMPORTANT WHEN CENTRAL OFFICE EVALUATES PRINCIPALS (Question 47)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Percentage Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage Mentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Public reaction: parents are happy no complaints, public relations...</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Teacher reaction: good orale, no grievances, teacher-principal relations...</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Principal and teacher compliance to district rules and procedures includes meeting attendance and paper work...</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Not making waves: smooth running, few problems taken to central office, keeping superintendent informed, not raising difficult questions...</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Student performance and progress: test scores, academic performance.</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The instructional program: innovation, good programs, instructional leadership...</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Overall school operation: includes atmosphere and climate...</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Relations with students, student compliance, and discipline...</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Good working relations with central office...</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Miscellaneous #1: includes plant management, leadership style, peer relations...</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Miscellaneous #2: no clusters...</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

360 N=112 100
In this broader question, we find some differences in the pattern of criteria mentioned. Here, principals mention public reaction most frequently, whereas student performance and progress was first in the question focusing on results alone. The differences, though, are small. Second, and more importantly, student performance and progress, mentioned by 67 percent of the respondents in the question regarding important results, was mentioned by only 31 percent and placed fifth in ranking in this question concerning criteria perceived to be used in evaluations. This suggests that while student performance and progress is an important result, it is less salient as a criterion used in the evaluation of principals. Another way to look at this question is to compare the percentage of all mentions for instructionally related criteria with those of powerful reference group assessments. We discover 17 percent of all mentions are included in student performance and progress and the instructional program categories, while 35 percent of all mentions are included in the public reaction and teacher reaction categories of criteria perceived to be important. These principals are more constrained by the belief that they must keep parents and teachers satisfied than they are by the belief that student performance and progress are important to central office.

In summary, these data point to perceived importance of outputs or results in the ways central office evaluates principals. Principals will be constrained by their beliefs that public reaction and teacher reaction will count heavily when central office assesses them, while results of instructional effectiveness, though important outputs of their work, are somewhat less salient. These principals must keep reference groups supportive and happy while ensuring that
students progress academically. These beliefs will channel principals in the work they do and act as controls on their behavior. They are allowed autonomy, within the rules and instructional policies we have noted earlier, to select the means but will be held accountable for the end results.

Perceived Degree of Output Control Usage

We have discovered that the majority of principals report the use of standardized tests while a smaller proportion report the use of criterion referenced tests. In addition, we find that principals believe that central office watches a wide variety of outputs with particular concern, it seems, about student performance and public reaction. Given these conditions in Three County schools, to what extent do principals feel that central office constrains their work through the use of output or results control? What are the perceived degrees of output control usage in their situations?

In a parallel question to the one regarding behavior control usage, we asked the principals to report on the degree to which they felt central office used the evaluation of results to control their work (Question 45B, Appendix A). We asked them to rank results control usage as either high, medium, or low. The responses are revealing in that they differ substantially from those responses relating to behavior control usage.

Principals report that they perceive central office to make relatively strong use of results control. Modally, 41 percent report medium use of results control, while another 33 percent report high use of this control mechanism. Only 26 percent say that their superiors
make low use of this method. The mean is 1.7 with high use equaling 1, medium 2, and low 3. The standard deviation is 2.2. Principals feel that central office tries to control them more through the monitoring and evaluation of results than through the promulgation of rules and directives. As we learned above, on a similar scale, 61 percent of the principals report low use of behavior control, with 5 percent reporting high use. In short, principals perceive that central office attempts to control them more through output control than through behavior control. These principals believe that they must decide much of what they are to do in their work, but that they will be held accountable for overall results, outputs, and outcomes deriving from what they do. They perceive central office controlling the ends while allowing discretion over selection of means which fall within the broad district instructional and organizational guidelines. Again, this finding supports the point made by Bidwell which suggests that due to the unclear technology of education, schools are more likely to hold educators responsible for results while allowing them discretion over the selection of means.¹ In sum, this is a pattern of output control over a wide scope of results combined with considerable autonomy over the patterning of tasks, activities, and behaviors which the principal employs to achieve those results.

Effects of School Social Status and District Size

In order to determine whether any relationship exists between the results control scale and both school social status and district size,

¹Bidwell, "The School As a Formal Organization," p. 1010.
Pearson correlations were run. We find no relationship between the perceived use of results controls and either school social status or school district size as the correlation coefficients were ($r=-0.09$) for the results control scale and school social status and ($r=0.06$) for the results control scale and district size.

**Summary and Conclusions**

In summary, we find considerable evidence of the application of output control in Three County school districts, with central offices collecting concrete measures of student output, as well as assessing the accomplishment of other results or outcomes through the monitoring of opinions from such important reference groups as teachers and the community. The utilization of output control is differentially applied to schools serving different social strata, though the association is not linear. Similarly, we find patterns of output control usage among districts of different sizes, but here, too, the association is not linear. Finally, in contrast to the perceived use of behavior control, principals perceive high use of this mechanism of control in these school districts.

As we have found in examining the application of other mechanisms of organizational control, upper level administrators provide zones of control and zones of autonomy for principals and their faculties. That is the case here, too. First, principals believe that they are held accountable for a wide variety of results and outputs. They are controlled and constrained by the belief that central office is watching, monitoring, and evaluating what they accomplish and what their subordinates accomplish. In addition, they are influenced by the belief
that the major groups with whom they work are potential sources of information about their work; that is, they work as indirect monitors of principals for superintendents. Principals perceive the reactions of these same reference groups as being used by central office as standards of performance that are important during the evaluation process. These features of output control, as we find it utilized in Three County districts, provide a pervasive, though at times diffuse, zone of control over principals. We also find a broad zone of autonomy afforded by the use of output control. This zone of autonomy permits principals the discretion, within district rules and policies, to select appropriate means for achieving goals, satisfying teachers and parents, and ensuring acceptable levels of student performance. This autonomy allows principals considerable leeway in carrying out the tasks of their offices, with the knowledge and perhaps trepidation that they will be held accountable for results. This is a highly adaptive balance of control and autonomy due to the lack of a clear technology of school administration and the concomitant difficulties of prescribing patterns of behavior given the variety and fragmentation of tasks, as well as the multiple goals of principals' work.

The degree of autonomy afforded principals through the use of student testing varies across schools of different social status, but not in a linear pattern. Principals in high status schools have less autonomy due to the more frequent use of standardized achievement tests and generally greater use of criterion referenced tests. In contrast, we find that principals in middle status schools enjoy the greatest autonomy due to the lowest reported use of standardized achievement tests as well, as the lowest reported use of criterion referenced
tests. Principals in low status schools fall in the middle in regard to autonomy, exhibiting neither most frequent nor least frequent use of standardized achievement tests or criterion referenced tests. We find no association between school status and the perceived usage level of output control.

The effects of district size on the use of output control are also not linear. When we compare the use of both standardized achievement tests and criterion referenced tests, we find the largest districts affording the least autonomy by administering standardized achievement tests at a middle level of use, while employing criterion referenced tests more frequently than either small or mid-sized districts. In contrast, small districts report proportionately least use of standardized achievement tests and a middle level usage of criterion referenced tests, thereby affording the principal more freedom from output control. Mid-sized districts make the most frequent use of standardized achievement tests, but the least frequent use of criterion referenced tests. In these mid-sized districts central office may trade off standardized testing for criterion referenced testing.

In conclusion, we find the use of output control in these school districts to be widespread. We find that the range and diversity of the outputs or results that are perceived by principals to be evaluated are extensive, including concrete and measurable accomplishments such as student performance, as well as more diffuse and hard-to-measure results, such as the support of the parents and community. School social status impacts differentially on output control, with principals in high status schools afforded the least autonomy, and principals in middle status schools afforded the most autonomy. Similarly, we find
that district size influences output control usage, with the largest districts exerting somewhat greater control this way, with small districts and mid-sized districts using different mixes of testing to control principals. Output control in these three County districts provides a broad band of constraint and direction over these principals, pressing administrators towards the accomplishment of a set of diverse objectives. Nonetheless, within the complex web of influence, deriving, in part, from the control mechanisms we have discussed so far, output control allows principals considerable autonomy to choose the means to employ, while holding them accountable for achieving results.
CHAPTER V

NON-HIERARCHICAL CONTROL MECHANISMS

Introduction

The four mechanisms of control which we have examined in the previous sections: supervision, input control, behavior control, and results control, are relatively common and widely applied in organizations, and are perhaps the first forms of control one would investigate in any research on organizational control systems. The next two mechanisms of control we will examine are less common and less frequently studied. These two mechanisms, called selection-socialization and environmental control, provide important additional constraints over the work of principals and, in the case of school systems, are key to the channeling of principals' work.

These two control mechanisms work in special ways. First, superintendents are more likely to gain appropriate behavior from their principals when principals share their norms, values, and educational philosophy. Superintendents may procure principals who share their norms, values, and educational philosophy by either selective recruiting individuals for these characteristics or by socializing individuals into these norms and values. Second, superintendents may include the environment in the district control system by using the agents of the community as sources of evaluative information as well as by using public opinion as a measure of principal performance. These
two mechanisms control in unique ways. Selection-socialization exerts control via the internalization of norms and values and is non-hierarchical. Environmental agents act as controls when superintendents incorporate elements of the environment into the system of evaluation, and it is extra-organizational. We will turn to these two controls next. First, we will examine the use of selection-socialization, then, in a separate section, we will turn to the application of environmental control in the control systems of Three County schools. Discussion of these two final control mechanisms will complete our discussion of the six controls used in these elementary school districts.

**Selection-Socialization: Findings**

**Selection-Socialization As a Mechanism of Control**

One of the central problems of any organization is ensuring that subordinates work towards the goals of the organization. As we have been finding in our examination of other controls, there are many ways of doing this ranging from direct supervision to the evaluation of outputs. Each of these controls involves hierarchical application of constraint. With either the selective recruitment of appropriate individuals or the socialization of incumbent administrators, it is possible to ensure that subordinates are working towards the goals of the organization without reliance on hierarchical controls. Thus, selection-socialization is a non-hierarchical method of control which
can either replace other controls or add additional constraint over the work of principals.¹

Selection-socialization is a particularly important control in school systems for it supplies a constraining force in an organization which has a primitive technology at the administrative level as well as hard-to-measure goals. As Bidwell so eloquently points out, control through selective recruitment permits the subordinate discretion while diminishing the chance of goal displacement. Though discussing teachers, his observations hold equally well for principals. He notes:

Control through recruitment can be achieved by hiring staff members committed to school-system goals and modes of procedure, members whose special training is likely to produce orientations to goals and standards of performance consistent with those of the school system, or members whose personal qualities seem compatible with the definition of school offices. Control through recruitment, of course, is especially suited to such professional service organizations as school systems, since it allows staff discretion while minimizing dangers of goal displacement.²

As Lortie further notes, selection-socialization provides important constraints over the work of educators which is necessary due to the relative weakness of both hierarchical and collegial controls.³

Administrators interested in employing this mode of control, though, need not rely simply on selectively recruiting individuals who fit their school district's value system; active socialization may also occur. Superintendents may place future principals into positions where these candidates are exposed to norm-setting and norm-reinforcing


experiences which produce internalization of the desired norms. These norms, once they have been internalized by the individual, act as guides for behavior; behavior which is defined as appropriate or correct by the norm-setting group. By placing these socialized individuals into principalships, superintendents increase the likelihood of appropriate behavior and lessen the chance of goal displacement, all without the need for constant surveillance. In this way socialization acts conjointly with the selection process as part of the overall system of control by filling the district's principalships with professionals committed to the school system's norms, values, and goals.

Selection-socialization permits a balance of autonomy and control in the work of principals. As the source of the actual control actions are internal to the subordinate, autonomy is allowed but direction comes through the subordinate's own normative system. While issues of the degree of influence of selection-socialization must await more intensive study than the present one, we can gain considerable insight into the use of this control in these elementary school districts by examining the selection of principals and the experiences which socialize them.

Overview of the Section

In this section we will examine the use of selection-socialization in Three County school districts. First, we will look at the types of people selected for the principalship in these districts. Second, we will look at experiences which socialize those who have become principals. In conclusion, we will note how selection-socialization adds
constraints and direction to the systems of control we find in these elementary school districts.

Superintendents will selectively recruit candidates who have been at least partially socialized by earlier experiences in childhood, college, work, schools, or they may socialize them in district activities. Several of these points are examined by answering the following questions:

1. Do superintendents hire individuals who are from a particular region? Extensive hiring of individuals who grew up locally would indicate interest in employing individuals who have the same regional socialization and are more locals than cosmopolitans.¹

2. Do superintendents hire principals who went to college or graduate school in the region in which the school district is located? Colleges and universities in particular regions are more likely to instill norms which are similar to nearby districts than are colleges and universities which are located in other regions of the country. If superintendents select many of their principals from local colleges and universities, they are hiring principals who are more likely to share local norms and values.

3. Do superintendents hire principals with a certain career pattern? Superintendents might selectively hire those who made early decisions to enter education, rather than late deciders. Those who decided to become teachers in college or before are more likely to have stronger commitments to education than those who decided later. In addition, early deciders have had a longer involvement in education and, thus greater commitment to the institution. The length of time Three County principals spent in teaching is also examined. Superintendents might hire those who spent little time in the classroom, indicating stronger commitment to administration rather than to teaching. Principals who have taught many years are likely to share the norms and values of teachers rather than the norms and values of administrators.

4. Does the pattern of job search suggest use of this control? The patterns of search suggest that principals are

selectively recruited by the superintendent, indicating that the central office actively seeks individuals who fit their normative expectations.

5. Do superintendents hire predominately from inside the district or outside the district? Insiders are more likely to be socialized and their norms and values known more precisely by the superintendent. The types of positions held prior to taking the present principalship will be examined for patterns pointing to the selection of socialized administrators. Certain positions are more likely to instill norms and values similar to the superintendents than are other positions.

6. What are the experiences within the district which socialize principals? Here, the extent to which principals attend either internal training or external training programs will be examined.

In summary, these various selection and socialization processes work to put norm controlled educators into positions as principals in these districts. Let us now turn to the pattern of selection-socialization in Three County districts.

Selection of Locals

When we examine the background of principals we find that they come predominately from the region surrounding the Three County schools. For the most part they have grown up, gone to college, and attended graduate school in the Midwest. This information comes from answers to questions about the location of their childhood community (Question 11, Appendix B) about the college where they received their bachelor's degree (Question 17, Appendix B), and about the graduate school they attended, if any (Question 19, Appendix B).

Superintendents overwhelmingly select principals who are locals. Eighty-one percent of the respondents grew up in three midwesterns states: Illinois, Wisconsin, and Iowa. Illinois alone accounts for 74 percent of the respondents while 4 percent came from Wisconsin, and 3...
percent came from Iowa. The next most frequently mentioned state is Pennsylvania where a scant 3 percent grew up. Thus, Three County principals attended elementary schools and secondary schools and acquired norms and values of the region in which they work.

Superintendents in these districts also hire principals who attended local colleges and universities. We find 67 percent of the respondents attended undergraduate institutions in Illinois and, thus, were further socialized into norms of midwestern life during their college days. This extensive regional socialization is further intensified by the respondents' graduate education.

Superintendents disproportionately hire principals who have attended local universities for graduate training. Almost 60 percent of the respondents report attending four universities in the metropolitan area. Another 22 percent attended public institutions in Illinois of neighboring states. The modal group, comprising a little over 39 percent of the respondents, attended one state university, Northern Illinois University, which is just outside the suburban ring of Chicago and an close to many of the districts in the sample. Graduate work, therefore, reinforces the regional and the local norms and values and educational philosophies of these principals. In short, superintendents selectively recruit principals who share these regional and local norms and values and who have been trained by local institutions. For a number of reasons, the congruence of norms, values, and educational philosophies between local universities and local school districts is probably considerable. Local universities and their departments of education must maintain strong and regular interaction with local school districts in order to ensure the availability of such program
needs as student teaching assignments and administrative internships, as well as ensuring future job openings for their graduates. Likewise, school districts may seek expert help from local university faculty in curricular areas, in-service training, or professional workshops, which again increases contact between these two organizations.

These forms of regular interaction and contact stimulate the development of similar norms, values, and educational philosophies.\(^1\) This development of similar norms and values will occur in both directions, with the district influencing university norms and values and the university influencing district norms and values. Over time the congruence of norms and values between these two organizations may be quite substantial and the principals coming from these universities will possess norms and values which mesh closely with those of the district into which they are hired. In short, selectively recruiting principals who have attended local colleges and universities is a means of ensuring that these administrators will have internalized appropriate norms and values which will guide their behavior in the direction of district goals and objectives.\(^2\)

In summary, we find that superintendents selectively recruit principals who are locals, who have grown up in the Midwest, attended nearby undergraduate as well as graduate institutions. These types of experiences socialize them to norms and values of the region and the district.

\(^1\)In James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958) an extended argument on the importance of norm acquisition and its influence on organizational control is outlined.

Career Decisions and Socialization

These principals appear to have decided earlier to become teachers than did the overall sample in Lortie's classical study of school teachers, though they did not decide to be teachers as early as did the women in that study.¹ A precise comparison cannot be made because the categories in this study do not overlap exactly with his. Unlike a career in medicine, individuals need not decide early to become teachers due to what Lortie calls "eased entry" into the occupation, therefore those who do decide early exhibit somewhat greater commitment to the occupation and to the norms of it.² Principals who were early deciders should have greater commitment to the norms and values of education and its organizations, school districts.

In spite of the decision to enter education and become teachers initially, Three County principals did not stay in the classroom for much of their career. Almost 65 percent of the respondents were not classroom teachers seven years after entering teaching. The mean classroom tenure is 7.2 years with a large standard deviation of 4.3 pointing to a few teachers, many of them women, who had long tenures in the classroom. The range is from no complete years of teaching to 25 years of teaching. The median tenure as a teacher is 6 years and the mode, including some 20 percent of the respondents, is 4 years. In large part these principals stayed in the classroom long enough to satisfy state certification requirements and long enough to complete the coursework necessary to qualify for the principalship in Illinois.

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
While still classroom teachers, most respondents must have decided to leave teaching and become school administrators. This suggests a limited attachment to the norms and values of the teaching profession. These respondents, particularly those who became administrators within four or five years, must have decided within a year or two of becoming teachers that they would seek administrative positions. This seems to be the case, for in order to have an administrative certificate by the fourth year, a diligent part-time student would have to take several courses a year to qualify by the end of the fourth year. Following such a path precludes taking graduate work in curriculum and instruction which would prepare the individual for classroom teaching as a career. The respondents, in short, committed early to education as an occupation and early to school administration as the route to advancement.

Given this early commitment to education and an early decision to leave teaching for administration, respondents may have been particularly susceptible to socialization into administrative norms and values. In addition, many principals did not teach long enough to be socialized as teachers, to internalize the norms and the values of classroom pedagogues. Also, those with short tenures in the classroom would also be somewhat easier to socialize into administrative norms and values as their internalization of teaching norms would be relatively weak. This is because the longer one works in an occupation, the more socialized he or she is likely to become and the more difficult it will be to socialize that individual to a different set of occupational norms. Superintendents may select as principals those
with shorter tenures as teachers so that their own socialization efforts are more influential and effective.

In short, these patterns point to the use of selection-socialization in Three County school districts, with superintendents selecting for the principalship many who decided early to become educators and who also decided early to leave the classroom and become administrators. Administrators with these characteristics are more likely to internalize norms and values of the administrative role than those who decided late to enter education and late to become administrators.

Job Search Patterns and Socialization

The patterns of job search provide some indication that superintendents actively recruited respondents for the principalship. In cases where superintendents recruited individuals into administration, socialization and commitment to the district may have been internalized more rapidly and more intensely. Recruitment into a special, higher-status position by a superior may make the recruit more responsive to socialization attempts by the recruiter due to the emotional impact of feeling "specially selected."

In order to look at these job search patterns, we will look at several issues. First, we will see whether respondents believed they were going to stay in teaching when they first entered education (Question 5C, Appendix A). Second, we will look at the question of whether they were actively searching for a principal's job when they got their present one (Question 7A, Appendix A). Finally, we will examine the question of whether their superintendent helped them get the present
job (Question 7B, Appendix A). If we find that the superintendents in these districts actively recruited and selected these individuals for the principalship, then we can assume that this mechanism of control is being used. If, on the other hand, we find that these respondents were seldom sought out or helped by superintendents, then selection-socialization may or may not be at work. Active recruitment and selection points to the aggressive search for persons who fit the principalship mold as conceived of by the superintendent.¹

First, a majority of Three County principals, 59 percent, report that when they entered teaching they expected to stay in that position. In spite of this early belief, all did enter administration. Second, when asked if they were looking around for a job when they were chosen for their present one, almost 47 percent reported that they were not looking for a principalship, 37 percent said that they were looking, with the remainder uncertain about whether they had been looking. These findings suggest that many of the respondents neither expected to move up into administration nor actively searched for the principalship which they ultimately attained. Given these rather passive career orientations, it is possible for the superintendent to "tap" individuals who look acceptable, exhibiting norms, values, and educational philosophies which fit those of the hiring administrator. Here superiors seek out acceptable candidates, rather than waiting for them to apply for the position.

In fact, many of the principals report that the superintendent helped them in getting their job. The superintendent was reported as

helpful by 32 percent of those answering our question. This example of active recruitment suggests the use of selection-socialization as a means of control in these districts. By selectively recruiting individuals who exhibit appropriate norms, values, and educational philosophies, superintendents, are able to grant principals the autonomy to make decisions and lead their schools, knowing that they will work within the limits of the normative system.

Hiring Patterns As Indicators of Selection Socialization

Hiring patterns are indicators of the extent to which selection-socialization is being employed as a mechanism of organizational control. Superiors utilizing selection socialization will tend to hire persons from positions which provide (1) the greatest development of skills, (2) the greatest internalization of administrative norms and values, and (3) the greatest internalization of district norms and values. In addition, they will tend to hire persons from positions for which accurate, recent information on norms, values, and skills can be collected.

There are numerous characteristics of organizational positions which could be examined; we will be examining two key characteristics. First, we will examine the extent to which Three County superintendents hire from inside the district or search outside for principals. Second, we will examine the types of administrative or non-administrative positions from which principals were recruited. We will look at the extent to which insiders and outsiders are hired for the principalship from particular types of positions.
Hiring Insiders Versus Outsiders

Do Three County districts hire individuals who already work in the district, that is insiders, or do they go elsewhere to seek individuals for the principalship and therefore hire outsiders for the principalship? In order to answer this question, we compared the location of respondents' present principalship to the location of the position they held prior to taking the present job (Question 21A, Appendix B).

We find that our respondents were hired disproportionately from inside the district where they work, with a smaller proportion hired from inside for their first principalship in the district where they work. Overall, 68 percent of Three County principals were hired from inside the district of their present principalship, while 32 percent were hired from outside the district. In other words, over two-thirds of the respondents moved from another position in the district, often times another principalship, into their present school. This is because superintendents are able to monitor insiders to determine the skills they possessed and the norms and values they hold, gaining an accurate picture of these potential principals. This information was not available for those who come from outside the district.

When we look at the percentage of principals who received their first principalship in the district where they now work, we find a somewhat different pattern of hiring, 51 percent of the respondents were hired from inside the district for their first principalship and 49 percent being hired from outside the district for their first principalship. In short, a little over half of all Three County principals were hired for their first principalship in the district where they now work.
This hiring pattern points to the use of selection-socialization in these school districts. Superintendents have hired over two-thirds of their principals from inside the district, and 51 percent gained their first principalship in the district where they work. These administrators are likely to share many of the norms, values, and goals of the district; norms, values, and goals which act as internalized mechanisms of control.

**Previous Positions of Inside Hires**

In order to gain a more refined and focused picture of the use of selection-socialization, let us examine the positions which insiders held prior to gaining their present principalship. The patterns of movement from one position to another provide some indication of the characteristics that are important to superintendents when they select individuals for the principalship. When superintendents select insiders, they increase the likelihood that these recruits share district norms and values. In addition, when superintendents hire persons already holding an administrative position, they are increasing the likelihood of these recruits holding the norms and values of the administrative role. We will look at these two key characteristics, being from inside the district and moving from an administrative position.

As we see in Table 20, Three County principals who were hired from inside the district of their present jobs moved from a number of different positions and from several hierarchical levels, from classroom teaching through central office positions. In column three of Table 20, we see the percentage distribution by position of those who moved into
their present principalship from inside the district. The column excludes those who moved from outside the district. Disproportionately, respondents moved from one principalship in the district to their present principalship. The largest contingent, including 41 percent of the insiders, had been working in the district in another principalship learning what the role entailed, developing ties with the community, and being socialized both to the administrative and district norms and values. This group developed both skills in the role and appropriate norms and values.

**TABLE 20**

**POSITION PRIOR TO PRESENT PRINCIPALSHIP IF HIRED FROM INSIDE THE PRESENT DISTRICT**
*(Question 21B)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Positions</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>(2) Overall Percentage</th>
<th>(3) Percentage of All Applicable</th>
<th>(4) Percentage of All Non-Principals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Teacher</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Assistant or Assoc. Principal</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Other Administrators: School Level</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Principal</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Other Administrator: Central Office Level</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Not Applicable</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>111</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>111</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second most frequently hired group of insiders, including 29 percent of all inside hirees, are assistant or associate principals (Table 20, Column 3). Assistant or associate principals working in a district have the opportunity to develop some administrative skills, as well as to internalize administrative and district-specific norms and values. These administrators, promoted to the next higher administrative position, worked in the district in a position from which they could learn some of the mechanics of the principalship while being socialized by central office and gaining visibility. By hiring these assistant and associate principals, superintendents are employing selection-socialization as a control.

The third most frequently hired from inside the district are teachers comprising 19 percent of all inside hirees. These educators, who were not in administrative positions, had less chance of being socialized into administrative norms and values but could have been socialized to the norms and values of the district through contact with district personnel.

Central office personnel constitute 9 percent of those hired from inside the district. Central office administrative posts are the most susceptible to direct socialization attempts by superintendents; these persons would be highly socialized. The percentage from central office, though, may be small because moving into an elementary principalship could be viewed as a demotion. This may decrease the likelihood of hiring central office administrators from inside the district.

Finally, 1 percent of the inside hires moved from school level administrative positions other than the assistant or associate
principalship. No other positions from inside the district were reported by Three County principals.

In summary, we find that the pattern of hiring from inside the district points to the use of selection-socialization as a mechanism of control, with superintendents disproportionately hiring insiders who have been in positions where they can develop both administrative as well as district specific norms and values; these include hiring from the principalship and assistant or associate principalship positions. Less frequently superintendents hire insiders who were teachers or central office personnel.

**Previous Positions of Outside Hires**

Having looked at the positions from which insider hires moved, let us turn now to examine the positions from which those who were hired from outside the district moved. This will sharpen our picture of how central office employs selection-socialization in these districts.

Three County superintendents hire fewer outsiders than insiders. In addition, the proportion of those who came from particular positions into the principalship differs somewhat for outside hires. The pattern of hiring outsiders points to the use of selection-socialization as a mechanism of control.

When we examine Table 21, Column 3, which shows the distribution by prior position of those who were hired from outside the districts, we see that superintendents disproportionately hire outsiders from the principals' ranks. Of all those hired from outside their present districts, 47 percent came from other principalships. Similar to the
selection of insiders, superintendents prefer to hire those who have worked as principals before, but we find that these superintendents hire a larger proportion of outsiders from the principal position than they hire insiders from this position. Principals from other districts have had the chance to be socialized into administrative norms and values and may have developed some skills in running schools. In addition, superintendents can get information and evaluations from the sending district on their performance and behavior in the role. These administrators, though, have not been socialized to the specific norms and values of the receiving district. Nonetheless, of all outside hires, the largest proportion come from principalships.

**TABLE 21**

POSITION PRIOR TO PRESENT PRINCIPALSHIP IF HIRED FROM OUTSIDE THE PRESENT DISTRICT (QUESTION 21B, APPENDIX B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Positions</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Overall Percentage</th>
<th>(3) Percentage of all Applicable</th>
<th>(4) Percentage of All Non-Principal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Teacher</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Assistant or Assoc. Principal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Other Administrators: School Level</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Principal</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Other Administrators: Central Office Level</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Not Applicable</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>111</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The next most frequently selected outsiders come from two categories in equal numbers, from the teaching ranks and from central office, as shown in Column 3, Table 21. Of all outside hires, 16.6 percent had been in teaching positions and the same percentage had been in central office positions. The percentage drops slightly to 13.8 percent when we look at the frequency of hiring assistant or associate principals from outside the district. Finally, 5.5 percent of the outsiders were in a variety of positions other than the major categories. These findings suggest that superintendents selectively recruit those who have had some prior administrative position during which skill building and socialization could occur. By hiring individuals with both administrative skills and administrative norms and values, the potential for control loss is diminished and the system of control strengthened.

Hiring Non- Principals: Insiders Versus Outsiders

We can gain further information on the utilization of selection-socialization by examining the differential selection of non-principal insiders or outsiders by the positions they held. By comparing Table 20 and Table 21 we see that superintendents are almost equally likely to hire insiders or outsiders who have positions as principals. The decision to hire someone who is a working principal is somewhat less problematic than hiring someone not in that position as one can gather accurate information about their accomplishments, skills, and values. More difficult decisions arise in hiring someone who is not a principal. What is the pattern of hiring non-principals in Three County districts? Is there a different pattern for insiders than for
outsiders? In order to look at this issue, we have calculated in column 4, Tables 20 and 21, the percentage by position held of those hired from inside or outside.

To begin with, when not hiring someone who is a principal, superintendents are equally likely to hire teachers either from within the district or from outside. As we see in Column 4 in Tables 20 and 21, just over 31 percent of the insiders and 31 percent of the outsiders, excluding those who were principals at the time, were hired from the teaching ranks.

In contrast, when principals are excluded from the calculations, Three County superintendents are almost twice as likely to hire assistant or associate principals from inside their districts than from outside the district. Again, looking at Column 4, we see that 50 percent of the insider non-principals were assistant or associate principals while only 26 percent of the outside non-principals were assistant or associate principals.

This hiring pattern may be due to several factors. First, superintendents can train and socialize assistant or associate principals in their own districts and cannot do this in other districts. Second, superintendents may hire assistant or associate principals from inside in order to maintain the status of this position and its value as an organizational reward to those subordinates who wish to move up. Beliefs about career pathways are important organizational myths which can stimulate effort and commitment on the part of subordinates. Finally, superintendents have more accurate and comprehensive information about these assistant or associate principals.
on which to base a hiring decision. For all these reasons, superintendents disproportionately hire from these positions.

This pattern of disproportionately hiring assistant or associate principals from inside the district is reversed when we examine the percentage of non-principals who come from central office positions in other districts. Whereas 16 percent of the inside who were not principals are from central office positions, 32 percent of the outside hires who were not principals are from central office positions. It may be that taking an elementary principalship in a same district after holding an administrative position in central office is considered as a loss in status. If this is the case, then superintendents will be discouraged from making these appointments. On the other hand, if one hired central office administrators from other districts one would have the benefit of concrete, current information about the employee from other superintendents while the sense of status loss would be less obvious.

In summary, we find superintendents hiring the same proportion of teachers from both inside and outside the district from among those who are not principals. Further, superintendents disproportionately hire assistant or associate principals from inside their district from among non-principals. Finally, of those who were not already principals, they tend to hire central office administrators from outside their own districts more than from inside their own districts. These hiring patterns point to the use of selection-socialization as a mechanism of control. It shows a concern for hiring individuals who have gained administrative norms and values as well as those who have demonstrated commitment to the district. The pattern also suggests that
superintendents are sensitive to the maintenance of career pathways, status hierarchies, and reward systems which stimulate those who wish to be principals to acquire appropriate norms and values.

The Overall Ranking: All Hires

Having fixed our attention on several of the more specific details of principal selection practices, let us return to an examination of the broad picture of principal selection in these elementary school districts. Here we will look at the overall rankings and patterns of selection.

When we look at the overall distribution in Column 2 of Tables 20 and 21, we find that superintendents disproportionately select from those who are already principals, predominately those who are principals in their district. The second most frequently hired are assistant or associate principals, who are selectively recruited more frequently from the hiring district than from outside the district. In addition, we see that superintendents more frequently hire assistant or associate principals from inside their own district than principals from outside the district. The third most frequently hired as a principal are teachers, especially those working in the same district. But, teachers in the hiring district were selected somewhat less frequently than principals from other districts. The fourth most frequently hired are central office administrators, which for the entire sample are almost equally drawn from outsiders and insiders.

These hiring patterns suggest that superintendents employ selection-socialization as an important form of control. They select those who have demonstrated skills in administrative positions, who
have internalized administrative norms and values, and who have acquired norms and values appropriate to the district. This is demonstrated in their tendency to hire those who have been principals, those who have been assistant or associate principals, and those who have worked in the district. These selection criteria enhance the effectiveness of selection-socialization as a mechanism of control.

Where principals possess these appropriate norms and values, principals can be granted more autonomy with less chance of control loss or goal displacement. As we have seen this is an important and widely used mechanism of control and influence.

Internal and External Training: Method of Socialization

Active training of principals while on the job is a means of socializing individuals into the norms and values of administration and the district, as well as a means of inculcating skills and knowledge. We will look at the extent to which these districts operate district training programs or send their principals to programs externally. Internal training programs offer more opportunity to socialize these administrators than do external programs because they are more directly under the control of the district. External training experiences, though, will help crystallize administrative norms and values of those who attend.

In order to find out about the frequency which these principals attend internal training programs or external ones, we asked them how many days over the past two years they had attended internal training programs and subsequently how many days they had attended external training programs (Question 46B, Appendix A). Due to the paucity of
either internal or external training, this approach provides only partial impact on the internalization of norms and values.

Internal training in Three County Districts is not extensive. The modal response is no internal training for the past two years, including 64 percent of the sample. The range is wide from no days of training to 80 days in the past two years, with a mean of 3.5 and a standard deviation of 9.2. Of those principals who reported some internal training, 19 percent had between one and 10 days of training in the past two years. The more frequent meetings called by central office, frequently on a monthly or bimonthly basis, may provide more opportunity for socialization than this level of internal training.

Principals participate in external training programs or institutes somewhat more frequently. The mode, comprising 30 percent of the respondents, is no days spent in external training during the past two years. As with internal training, the range is considerable from no days of external training to 80 days in such programs. The mean is 8, the standard deviation 10.9, and the median 6 days of external training. Of those who had any external training, 51 percent attended between one and 12 days of training. Though principals attend external training programs or institutes somewhat more frequently than they do internal programs, this level of training is not frequent enough to provide significant socialization experiences. Training, though, may provide partial socialization experiences which reinforce and crystallize the more informal socialization which occurs within the district as a result of contact with other administrators, central office people, and members of the community who act as norm-setting and norm-reinforcing forces on principals.
Effects of School Social Status and District Size

Do either of the social status of the community or the size of the district influence the quantity of internal or external training for Three County principals? Correlations of school social status and internal as well as external training are small and negative ($r = -0.02$) in both cases. Thus, differences in the social status of the community are not associated with differences in the extent to which principals attend training institutes or seminars.

In contrast, we do find an association between district size and the utilization of internal training. To begin with, we find little association between district size and external training; the correlation between the two is $(-0.07)$. Nonetheless, we do find a positive association between district size and the number of days of internal training reported by these principals. Here, there correlation is $(0.19)$. This relationship may be due to the needs of larger districts to lessen control loss by increasing the quantity of the internal training of these principals. During internal training sessions central office is provided with time both to impart skills and to inculcate norms and values in their principals. Smaller districts may provide this skill development and norm reinforcement informally during administrative meetings, both of which are frequent, and during superintendent visits to the school. In short, these informal means of training and socialization utilized in smaller districts are replaced by more formal means of training as district size increases. This greater training increases central office's hold on principals.
Environmental Control: Findings

Introduction

The environment of an organization can provide constraints and contingencies for organizational goal attainment and survival, but it may, in addition, and in special cases, act as part of the control system of the organization aiding central administrators in securing appropriate and effective performance from managerial level subordinates in widely spread divisions. Environmental control along with selection-socialization are special types of control which add influence to the four more traditional modes of control discussed above. Superintendents often include the environment in the district control system by using agents of the school community as sources of evaluative information as well as by using public opinion as a criterion used in the assessment of school principals. At other times, the environment acts directly on the principal through influence attempts at the school level. In this section we will examine this, the last of the six mechanisms of control, and its use in Three County school districts.

Environmental Agents as Mechanisms of Influence

While commercial and industrial organizations incorporate the environment into their systems of control through the regularized evaluation of response to products and services, many organizations particularly in the public sector, cannot use the level of sales or market share to control subordinates. Public organizations which receive their financial support through taxation do not have a direct and clear measure of how well a particular unit, such as schools, provide for the needs of the clients. Upper level administrators need
to ensure that schools are performing up to the expectations of the local community.

Schools are dispersed units of a larger organization and serve local constituencies which may have differing expectations and goals. Superintendents therefore have the problem of maintaining some central control over principals, while allowing principals ample autonomy to deal with the special demands of local constituencies. Environmental control is designed to exert control over principals through the pressure of those local constituencies. This form of control permits principals to make discretionary decisions but holds them responsible for satisfying the demands of the local clientele. Environmental control, an extra-organizational, non-hierarchical form of control, adds strength to the overall balance of control and autonomy in these school districts.¹

Overview of the Section

In this section we will examine the utilization of environmental control in suburban elementary school districts. First, we will examine perceived characteristics of the environment which will influence the application of this control. Second, we will look at the ways principals use community reactions as a way of gauging their own performance. Third, we will examine the degree to which central office is perceived to use public reactions as a criterion of effectiveness when it evaluates principals. Here we will examine two different reports of this phenomenon. Finally, the reported use of community

agents as sources of information on the performance of principals and schools will be noted. Examination of these four topics will show the ways central office incorporates the environment into the control system of Three County districts, thereby adding constraints to the work of principals.

Community Characteristics and Environmental Control

The characteristics of an organization's environment will influence the use of environmental control. If the environment of the school is active, assertive, and involved in what goes on in the school, it should exert more constraint on principals. In order to find out about the environments surrounding the respondents, we asked the principals to report where their immediate school community ranked on five dimensions using a scale of from 1 (representing high on the dimension) to 6 (representing low on the dimension). (Question 13 ABCDE, Appendix A) The five dimensions were: (1) assertiveness, (2) eagerness to participate, (3) responsiveness to the school, (4) predictability in their reactions, and (5) homogeneity of expectations. We will look at the overall distribution, the relationship between environmental characteristics and school status, and finally, the relationship between environmental characteristics and district size.

The overall findings point to communities which are in general highly responsive to the school, fairly predictable, somewhat more eager to participate than not to, while lacking of homogeneity of expectations, and falling near the middle on the assertiveness scale. We see these means, medians, and standard deviations in the following table. We see that there is somewhat greater variability in two
dimensions, assertiveness and eagerness to participate. These two dimensions, as we shall see shortly, are related to variation in the social status of the school.

**TABLE 22**

**PERCEIVED CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES (QUESTION 13)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Assertiveness</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Eager to participate</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Responsiveness</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Predictability</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Alike in expectations</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What does this pattern suggest about the potential use of the community in the control systems of these districts? First, they point to a group of diverse environments which are perceived to be relatively assertive and eager to participate in school activities. This assertiveness will increase their influence over principals, while the participation increases their interest and ability to monitor the work of teachers and principals. Second, when parents are perceived to be predictable in their reactions, principals will be more able to gauge what parents will do in certain situations. This will channel the work of principals away from those activities which may bring predictably negative responses from parents. Finally, as with predictability, perceived homogeneity of expectations will tend to channel the work of principals in the direction of those expectations. Thus, perceived
clarity and predictability will increase the likelihood of principals being influenced by the environment as will high assertiveness and an eagerness to participate.

Effects of School Status

The school communities which surround these elementary principals modally are perceived to be relatively assertive, eager to participate, responsive, predictable, and sharing similar expectations for the school. These is variation, though, across schools with parents of differing social status as can be seen in the following table which shows the correlations between environmental characteristics, school social status, and district size.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>School Social Status (Low=7; High=1)</th>
<th>District Size (Low=1; High=28)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Assertiveness</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Eager to Participate</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Responsiveness</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Predictability</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Homogeneity of Expectations</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The reader should be aware of the way these variables are measured. In some cases "high" was measured with a low number thus reversing the direction of association. For example, as district size increases eagerness to participate actually decreases even though the correlation positive.
We find positive correlations between the social status of the school and three perceived characteristics of those communities. As the social status of the school increases, the perceived assertiveness, eagerness to participate, and responsiveness of the community also increase. There is no relationship between school social status and either predictability or homogeneity of expectations. What does this suggest about the involvement of the environment in the control system? First, as school social status increases, the assertiveness of the environment is perceived to increase in a linear fashion, thereby increasing the demands on principals and the need to cope with environmentally-based pressures. Second, increased status is associated with increased eagerness to participate in school activities. If this perceived interest translates into actual participation by parents, which we expect that it does, the principal, will have the aid of parents in the schools, but also increased visibility of school activities; direct monitoring of the principal's performance will increase from this participation. Both positive and negative information gathered by parents may be transmitted to the superintendent which could be used in the evaluation and control of the principal. Third, we find a positive relationship between school status and perceived responsiveness which may only indirectly affect control by increasing the potential local support for principals from local constituencies. To some degree this could act as a countervailing force to demands from superintendents.

In summary, school status is associated with variation in the perceived characteristics of the community which would increase the influence and the use of environment as part of the total system of
control. Both perceived assertiveness of the community and their eagerness to participate in school activities may enhance the use of environmental control, while responsiveness may act as a countervailing force when the principal seeks community support. In general, though, this association between environmental characteristics and school social status suggests greater environmental pressure and environmental monitoring as school status increases.

District Size and Environmental Characteristics

In Table 23, we find no strong associations between district size and the perceived characteristics of the community. Two small associations, between district size and eagerness to participate and predictability, are somewhat interesting. Increases in district size are associated slightly with perceived decreases in interest in participating in school affairs ($r = .15$) and perceived decreased predictability ($r = .12$). It may be that in larger districts parents feel less personal connection to the district making them less eager to participate, thereby decreasing the amount of monitoring they do in schools. In general, though, district size is not strongly related to these perceived characteristics.

The Community As a Gauge of Principals' Performance

The school community also directly acts as a mechanism of control by supplying direct evaluative feedback to principals. Feedback from the community functions as a mechanism of control when organization members use this information to gauge the effectiveness of their own performance. Environmental feedback works in much the same way that
evaluative information from a supervisor works, providing the subordinate with assessments about performance which are used to redirect the activities of the person receiving the assessments.

In order to find out whether principals used feedback from parents and the community, we asked principals what they used to gauge their own performance (Question 17A, Appendix A). Responses to this question demonstrate that parental and community feedback is an important performance gauge that principals employ. Over half the principals (61 percent) mentioned that they used parent and community feedback to assess their performance. In terms of the total number of assessment methods mentioned by principals, parents and community ranks third, with 19 percent of all mentions, behind teachers, with 28 percent of the mentions, and students, with 22 percent of all mentions. In short, parent and community feedback is important to many principals and will influence and constrain what they do in their work, demonstrating the effect of the environment on the overall pattern of autonomy and control in the principalship.

Environmental Reaction As an Important Result and Criterion of Effectiveness

So far we have learned that the environments of Three County schools are at times quite assertive and involved with what occurs at school and that principals often utilize parent and community feedback in assessments of their performance. These point to the constraining influences of the community. Now we will turn to the ways in which the environment works through central office to constrain and direct the work of principals, thus limiting the principal's autonomy. We will first look at the results which principals perceive to be important to
superintendents and then we will turn to the criteria which principals believe superintendents use to assess them. Both of these issues point to public reactions as important objectives, results or outcomes of the work of principals.

There are many results of the work of principals which are important to central office, as we noted in our discussion of output control. One of the results mentioned by 64 percent of the respondents and included in Table 18 above, is public reaction. That is to say, principals believe that public reaction is one of the results of their work which is important to their superiors. They believe that what they do and how their school runs will produce either positive or negative reactions from the community. If a subordinate believes that certain results are important to his or her superior, the subordinate is likely to attend to those results more than to other results. In this way the autonomy of subordinates is restricted and control enhanced.

The importance of public reaction is reinforced by the findings in Table 19 which we discussed in the output control section above. Table 19 reports the various assessment criteria which principals believe are used when central office evaluates their performance. Though there are many criteria which could be used to evaluate principals, one of the most frequently mentioned is public reaction that 64 percent of the respondents mentioned. For this question, this is the highest number for any of the coded categories. Principals believe that what parents and community members say to the central office about the school and their work as principals will be important when evaluations are made. Again, these beliefs about what is important to central office, and
particularly what is important in the evaluation process will have considerable impact upon what principals do, the tasks they will attend to most readily, and the types of daily decisions they will make. Believing that public reaction is important to their superiors will constrain their autonomy and increase the potency of the overall system of controls composed of the six separate, but reinforcing mechanisms of constraint.

The Environment As a Source of Information

The environment of schools also acts as an important source of information for central office superiors monitoring the performance of schools and the behavior of principals. Information concerning the behavior or performance of a subordinate of a subunit is a central component of organizational control. If a superior can gain information about the accomplishments of a manager or the manager's unit, steps can be taken to influence or constrain what they are doing.\(^1\) Information comes from many sources, both from within the organization and from outside it, as we saw in Table 3 above. When information is gathered by superiors directly it is part of supervision, but when it comes from parents and community members, it is a component of environmental control.

In order to discover which sources of information the central office used in the evaluation process, we asked principals where they thought superintendents got information which was used to evaluate principals (Question 47B, Appendix A). In Table 3 the various sources

\(^{1}\text{Kaufman, Administrative Feedback, pp.12-68.}\)
of information and the number of times the principals mentioned them are listed.

The sources of information which principals believe are used by central office are many, but the most frequently mentioned one is the community and parents. We find that 50 percent of the principals mention the community and parents as a source of information used in the evaluation process. The second most frequently mentioned is teachers with only 29 percent of the respondents reporting this source. The data point strongly to the perception of the environment as a monitor of principal performance which transmits information central office that is used to assess principals. We see that the community and parents are believed both to supply information to central office, that is, act as extra-organizational supervisors, and to provide actual evaluations in the form of their opinions of the principal's work. These are indications of the application of environmental control in Three County school districts, a mechanism of control which is supported by central administrators but which emanates from outside the formal boundaries of the organization.

Summary and Conclusions

In summary, we find convincing evidence that Three County school districts use environmental control in their systems of organizational control. There is evidence that the characteristics of the community, which vary by social status, place direct pressures on principals and their work. In addition, these communities serve as gauges of performance for principals. More importantly, we discover extensive use of the environment, both as sources of information for evaluation, and as
criteria of principal effectiveness used by central office in the evaluation process. This extra-organizational method of control over principals adds to the level of total control achieved through the five previously discussed mechanisms of control.

Characteristics of the school environment will affect the nature and the potency of environmental control. The immediate communities of schools in Three Counties are perceived by principals to be fairly responsive to the school, relatively predictable, somewhat eager to participate in school activities, somewhat heterogenous in their expectations, and falling near the middle on assertiveness. Two characteristics which will affect the utilization of environmental control, eagerness to participate and assertiveness, both increase as school social status increases. In schools where parents are eager to participate, we can expect more parents to drop in on school activities. This will increase the visibility of both positive and negative aspects of school programs and principal activities and will increase the amount of information parents can transmit to superintendents. In short, greater participation indirectly increases the monitoring of principals' activities. Similarly, in schools where parents are more assertive, principals are more likely to be directly pressured by members of the community and superintendents are more likely to receive influence attempts by assertive community members. In these ways increased assertiveness will increase the constraints on principals from environmental factions. Thus, control increases as the social status of the school increases.

We have also found that many principals use parental feedback to gauge their performance on the job. In this way the environment acts
directly on principals by supplying feedback about performance which is
used to assess the effectiveness of their actions so that corrective
measures or redirection can occur. The importance of parental feedback
for principals may derive from prior socialization by the superinten-
dent and central office staff and, thus, may indirectly be linked to
the use of selection-socialization. This linkage should be investi-
gated in further research.

Parent and community reactions are also perceived to be part of
the evaluation system used by superintendents. A large proportion of
principals believe that environmental feedback is (1) an important
result which is watched by central office and (2) a criterion used in
the evaluation of principals by central office. In these two ways
central office utilizes environmental control, decreasing the autonomy
of principals in those areas which are of concern to parents. Autonomy
remains in those areas of principals' work and school activities which
are of little concern or interest to parents, for parents will not take
complaints or compliments to central office regarding less salient
areas of performance.

Parents and community also are perceived by principals to be
sources of information to superintendents. Parents and the community
are perceived to be monitors or supervisors of principals and schools,
thereby acting as part of the overall system of control. This is
another way that the environment is part of the control system.

In conclusion, we have found evidence of environmental control in
Three County schools. This form of control works directly on
principals and indirectly through the superintendent by way of the
evaluation process used with principals. Environmental control is
extra-organizational, pervasive, and works with the other five mechanisms of control to produce a web of influence over the principal, a web of influence which allows autonomy over some actions, but constrains and directs in a number of subtle ways. Environmental control exerts widespread influence over principals, and provides broadly based monitoring of school and principal performance.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

Renewed interest in the nature of organizational control, its measurement and forms, derives from recent investigations into effective management practices in Japan,\(^1\) in provocative and illuminating discussions of the role of ritual and ceremony in the channeling of organizational work,\(^2\) and in the synthesis and development of newer frameworks for conceptualizing organizational control systems.\(^3\) These recent treatises and studies have argued that students of organizations must deal with the notion of administrative level organizational control systems in a more comprehensive manner, that the traditional approaches which focused on the application of hierarchical controls were no longer the most effective ways to understand the means upper level administrators used to constrain and direct the work of subordinates. These scholars suggest that organizational control systems are multi-faceted, that they vary on a number of dimensions, and that they are often composed of hierarchical, social, and

\(^1\)Ouchi, Theory Z, pp. 2-160.


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extra-organizational elements. Based on these newer approaches to the conceptualization of organizational control, this study has tried to explicate the concept of control, operationalize it, and then see what patterns it takes in educational organizations. This study has been exploratory, examining the variation in patterns of six mechanisms of control used in suburban elementary school districts which are designed to constrain and direct the work of principals. We have tried to demonstrate the variety and range of these controls in order to gain a better grasp of the phenomena, rather than to test hypotheses about its variation.

In this concluding section we will review what we have learned about the balance of control and autonomy in elementary school districts, draw several broader implications about systems of control in public organizations and make suggestions for further research. First, we will summarize succinctly the patterns of usage for the six mechanisms of control and the ways school social status and district size influence the differential use of these control mechanisms. Second, we will describe the characteristics of these control systems, particularly noting the use of multiple controls, the zoning of controls, and their pervasiveness. Third, we will extrapolate from the findings and speculate about the ways these patterns of control may influence the time use of principals, their working world, as well as their motivation, skill learning, and job stress. The section will be concluded with a discussion of suggested research on the nature of organizational control in school systems, research which will further our knowledge of organizational control and the nature of principals' work.
Six Mechanisms of Control in Educational Organizations

The control systems instituted by central office in Three County school districts to constrain and direct the work of principals and their schools are composed of a set of different mechanisms of control each of which adds a portion of influence to the overall system of constraint. In this study we have found evidence of six mechanisms of control, including the hierarchical mechanisms of supervision, input control, behavior control, and output control, as well as the non-hierarchical mechanisms of selection-socialization and environmental control.

Supervision is used as a mechanism of control in almost all Three County school districts. Superintendents visit schools modally once a month, while central office personnel visit more frequently, often several times a month. Variation in the use of this control mechanism is considerable, with some principals visited by superiors several times a day and others only a few times a year. Overall, though, we conclude that supervision is light, providing more autonomy than control in these school districts. Supervision adds to the system of control by affording the superintendent and central office administrators who visit schools with rich, immediate information about the school, its faculty, and non-certified staff. In addition, when supervision is frequent, it may function as a training and socializing action on the part of superiors.

Input control, involving constraints over the amount and the flow of resources to schools, is used extensively in these school districts. This mechanism of control is most constricting when applied to monetary...
resources. Most districts use a per capita budgetary process which constrains the autonomy of budget decision making. Most principals are not allowed to transfer money across budget categories and are not granted contingency funds to use at their discretion. In contrast to controls over monetary resources, principals are allowed considerable autonomy over the selection and firing of personnel. We find that principals are more constrained by input control in administrative tasks and are less constrained in decisions more closely tied to the instructional area.

Behavior control, which involves the constraint of subordinates through the use of rules, procedures, directives and required activities, is used in these districts, but principals perceive central office to make relatively low use of this control mechanism. Overall, principals are required to prepare several reports and attend one or two meetings each month. Over three quarters of the principals are required to evaluate teachers using a standardized approach, and a similar number have job descriptions to which they are expected to adhere. For most principals, instructional activities are constrained through two central components of behavior control: centrally mandated curriculum objectives and centrally adopted textbooks. In all of these ways, central office applies behavior control and limits the autonomy of principals. On the whole, though, principals do believe that central office makes relatively light use of behavior controls to constrain them, suggesting that these various forms of behavior control which we find in place in these districts are not perceived by principals to constrain central aspects of their work. In short, behavior controls appear to be stronger over administrative tasks which have a
less essential salience for principals and weaker in more crucial areas.

Output control involves the monitoring of important outputs or results, the evaluation of these against a standard, followed by either sanctions or feedback to the individual or unit responsible for the outputs or results. We find use of output control in several forms. First, just over half the principals report the administration of standardized tests in math and reading, and somewhat fewer principals administer them in science and social studies. Less than half administer criterion referenced tests to their students in any subjects. Second, principals report that they believe central office watches a wide variety of results or outputs when they evaluate principals. In general, the outputs which principals perceive to be important to central office are primarily student performance and public reaction. Finally, in contrast to the perceived low use of behavior control, principals feel that central office makes relatively high use of output control. These principals are left relatively free to decide on means to apply and processes to use, but feel they are held accountable for results.

Selection-socialization, a non-hierarchical means of control, is a relatively important means of controlling principals in Three County school districts. We find strong evidence of central office selectively recruiting for the principalship those who share the norms and values of the region, of the administrative role, and of the district. Central office selectively recruits individuals who are locals, people who have been born, bred, and educated in the locale of the district. Additionally, over half were hired from inside the district and many
received their first principalship in the district where they work. Superintendents also hire individuals who have been socialized to administrative norms and values in prior administrative positions. Selection-socialization is a commonly used mechanism of control in which norms and values act as an internalized system of constraint.

Finally, we find considerable evidence that central offices in Three County districts use another non-hierarchical control—environmental control. This control mechanism works directly on the principal, but, more importantly, the community works through central office as an informal monitor of principals and community opinion acts as a criterion of effectiveness used by superintendents in the evaluation process. A substantial number of principals report that they use feedback from parents to gauge their performance. In addition, a majority of principals believe that community feedback is used by central office when it evaluates the work of principals and schools. Finally, principals believe that for superintendents the community is used as a source for information about the principal and the school. In these ways central office employs environmental control in these school districts.

School Social Status and Organizational Control

The social status of schools is associated with such important factors as desirability of the teaching assignment,\(^1\) per capita

We find in this study that the social status of the school also is associated, though not always, in a linear fashion, with variations in the application of organizational control. There are indications that in high status schools, organizational control is decreased and principals are granted more autonomy. For example, we find that there is a small association between supervision and school status, with supervision decreasing as school status increases. In addition, principals in high status schools report more autonomy in the hiring of teachers, often use a more discretionary form of budgeting, and have more say over the transfer of funds once the budget is set. Principals in higher status schools also are afforded greater autonomy through lessened application of behavior control, with central office requiring fewer reports, calling fewer meetings, using job descriptions less often. In addition, these principals perceive there to be less centralization of decision making and lower use of behavior control. Nonetheless, principals in higher status schools face greater output control, with greater use of standardized achievement tests and criterion referenced tests in their schools than in either middle or lower status schools. Pressures brought on by a more assertive environment will also constrain principals in higher status schools.

The relatively greater autonomy for principals in higher status schools allows them greater flexibility in the selection of means to achieve ends, but increased testing and a more assertive environment makes them more accountable for achieving ends. Principals in middle

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and low status schools face greater hierarchical controls and lessened autonomy. In summary, the greater assertiveness of high status parents and greater salience of academic goals may make it possible to grant principals in these schools greater autonomy; it may be that in these instances output control and environmental control replace other more hierarchical forms of control. As these other forms of control are less potent in middle and low status schools, central office may need to depend more on hierarchical controls over principals.

**District Size and Organizational Control**

While much research has demonstrated how organizational size increases the application of more bureaucratic controls such as rules and procedures, which we call behavior control, few studies have pointed to the ways organizational size may influence the application of a broad range of control mechanisms. In this study we have found that district size, as defined by the number of schools, differentially affects the application of the six mechanisms of control which make up the overall system of control. First, we find evidence of all mechanisms being used in these school districts. Second, we find that increased size produces decreases in the supervisory frequency of central office as a whole, as well as the frequency of superintendent visits. Third, increased size produces differential use of input control; the budget process in larger districts is more likely to be a system of per capita allocations. Fourth, increased district size is associated with increases in the degree to which principals perceive themselves to be controlled through the use of rules and directives, a form of behavior control. Fifth, control through the monitoring and
evaluation of outputs or results, called output control, is not influenced in a linear fashion by district size. Also, district size is not related to differences in the perceived use of output controls. Sixth, selection-socialization is somewhat differentially applied in districts of different size, with large districts disproportionately hiring insiders for the principalship. Finally, the incorporation of segments of the environment in the system of control, that is use of environmental control, is not substantially affected by district size.

In summary, we find that district size has greatest influence upon the utilization of supervision, input control, and behavior control, but either has no influence or only slight influence upon the utilization of output control, selection-socialization, and environmental control. Differential use of these last three mechanisms of control may be affected more by other properties of the organization such as the measurability of outputs, the intensity of early training experiences, or the strength of the environment. Further research is needed to determine whether use of these mechanisms of control will be more substantially influenced by district size in districts two or three times larger than those in this sample. We believe that district size will have more influence on the structure of organizational control in districts which are significantly larger.

Overall Characteristics of Control Systems

This study points to several conclusions about the nature of control systems in elementary school districts. First, these systems of control are made up of a combination of several control mechanisms each of which adds influence and potency to the overall system of
control. These are systems of multiple controls. Unlike organizations where only one or two mechanisms of control may dominate, we find multiple controls providing a broad-based and pervasive influence over the work of principals. The utilization of multiple controls may be necessary given the complex nature of principals' work and the numerous goals of the position (many of which are difficult or impossible to measure accurately) and the dispersion of units which may promote control loss.¹ The use of multiple controls within a single organization makes it possible to gain multiple perspectives, multiple measures of effectiveness, and information from multiple sources, thus increasing the accuracy of evaluation and constraint. Furthermore, these multiple controls often complement each other, adding constraint or direction in an area or over a task which another control does not effectively reach. In this way multiple controls provide a cumulative influence over principals giving them the sense of considerable autonomy while maintaining subtle, but perhaps substantial control.²

Second, as Lortie has suggested, control appears to be "zoned" with tighter control over administrative areas and somewhat looser control over instructional areas.³ This provides the principal and faculty with more discretion in decisions relating to instructional processes and less discretion over administrative tasks and responsibilities. This zoning may occur for a number of important


²Ouchi and Maquire, "Organizational Control: Two Functions," pp. 359-81.

reasons. It may be that control is tight over administrative tasks because these are key tasks which must be accomplished to satisfy state and federal statutes. Alternately, we may find tight control in these areas because the tasks themselves are more clearly specified and amenable to control.\(^1\) Similarly, controls over instructional areas may be looser both because the means-ends chains are less well specified in these matters and because the inherent variability of classrooms and teaching require greater flexibility and autonomy for teachers and principals.\(^2\) Whatever the reasons for this zoning of control, it is a central feature of these systems of control.

Finally, the patterns of control which we find in these school districts point to a subtle balancing of control and autonomy, with principals constrained through the evaluation of outputs and the mandatory accomplishment of administrative tasks, but permitted considerable autonomy in the selection of means to achieve ends, in the choice of tasks to attend to, and in the selection of faculty.

This balance of control and autonomy may be well fitted to the characteristics of the work of principals and the structure of school organizations. The work of principals is characterized by tasks which are brief, varied, and highly fragmented requiring, perhaps, greater discretion. In addition, school districts, which are composed of dispersed units serving local populations, may require flexibility and discretion over the choice of means in order to make it easier for administrators to

\(^1\)See Dornbusch and Scott, Evaluation and the Exercise of Authority for a similar socio-technical argument.

cope with variable demands from local constituencies.\(^1\) For these reasons, balancing control and autonomy may be an effective, highly adaptive response to the potential problems of control loss in school districts.

In summary, we find that these systems of organizational control in suburban elementary school districts employ multiple control mechanisms, provide zones of tighter control and zones of looser control, and exhibit a balancing of control and autonomy for principals and their schools. These characteristics in combination comprise a system of control which is broad in scope and pervasive in influence.

**Control Systems and Principals' Work**

In addition to constraining and directing the work of principals, systems of control in school districts indirectly affect many aspects of the principal's work. Let us speculate about some of the unintended effects of the systems of control we find in these school districts. These observations remain tentative, awaiting further research to support or refute them.

First, the systems of control, comprised of multiple controls and exhibiting zoning of influence, will directly impact upon the ways that principals use their time. The use of multiple controls should fragment the work of principals for these administrators will be required to respond to the pressures and constraints of different controls throughout the day. A zoned pattern of control will also affect the time use of principals. We would expect to find principals

\(^{1}\)Edstrom and Galbraith in "Transfer of Managers as a Coordination and Control Strategy in Multinational Organizations" make a similar argument regarding multinational corporations.
spending more time working on tasks which are more tightly and more hierarchically controlled and spending less time on tasks which have looser or more diffuse controls.

Second, the relative balance of control and autonomy will affect the motivation of principals. We would expect greater motivation to be found in districts where principals are afforded greater autonomy and are less constricted by various mechanisms of control. In districts where we find greater constraints over principals and relatively little autonomy, we would expect motivation among administrators to be low, depleted by the binding web of control.

Third, the one-the-job learning of skills will be affected by the nature of these control systems. Control systems with multiple mechanisms of constraint and diffuse evaluation systems increase the difficulty of learning what goals and objectives are important, what processes to employ, and what tasks to accomplish. In these situations, skill learning may be haphazard, as the subordinate has little idea of which skills are most important for which tasks. In organizations where controls are clearer and evaluation more specific, subordinates may determine more easily what skills are needed to accomplish which tasks.

Finally, the control systems of elementary school districts may increase job stress for principals. These systems of control employ multiple sources of information; principals are being monitored by everyone around them. This will increase stress. Furthermore, the results of their work which will bring them rewards or sanctions are often not clearly delineated by central office nor are the ways central office determines effective performance always evident. Principals
will feel increased stress due to this diffuse connection between performance and rewards and the unclear means used in performance evaluations. Greater clarity in these processes would decrease stress and perhaps increase performance.¹

Future Research Directions

The present study of organizational control in suburban elementary school districts should provide the foundation for further research into the nature and the effects of organizational control in other educational organizations. We conclude this chapter by suggesting three studies of organizational control which would considerably increase our understanding of this important organizational process. The first is an empirical study of systems of control in structurally different school districts. The second is a study of the direct effects of control on the time use of principals. The third is an examination of the relationship between patterns of control and student achievement.

As we suggested at the beginning of this study, we chose to look at the pattern of control and autonomy in the structurally least complex educational organization, elementary school districts. Now that we have a better idea of the systems of organizational control in these less complex districts, additional study should be undertaken to examine patterns of organizational control and the relative balance of control and autonomy in structurally different districts. In more

¹See Turcotte "Control Systems, Performance, and Satisfaction in Two State Agencies" for a discussion of the relationship between different systems of evaluation and levels of performance. He points to the importance of outputs or objectives which subordinates can work towards.
complex districts, such as high school or unit districts, we would expect to find greater reliance on hierarchical controls and relatively less reliance on non-hierarchical controls. In addition, we would expect to find different patterns of zoning in secondary districts due to the greater distance between the principals and the instructional process as well as due to increased subject matter specialization. Also, districts comprised of schools with different grade levels need to design mechanisms of control which allow for the problems of these different schools. These studies would supply useful comparative data on how the balance of control and autonomy shifts with variation in structural components.

A second study should be undertaken which examines the direct effects of organizational control on the ways principals use their time. Though a costly investigation, we need to learn how the balance of control and autonomy, derived from the utilization of different mechanisms of control, influences the time use of principals. We would want to find out how patterns of control increase or decrease the time principals spend on various tasks. This study should be conducted in districts which are structurally and environmentally similar in order to control for the influence of these factors on how principals spend their time. We might wish to answer such questions as: "Do principals whose superintendents evaluate student performance spend more time improving instruction?" or "Do principals spend more time at administrative tasks when behavior controls are more specific and detailed?" Organizational control is designed to affect the behaviors of subordinates; we need to study directly how and to what extent various patterns of control do this.
Finally, a careful study should be conducted which examines the association between different patterns of organizational control and student achievement. Presently we do not know what pattern of control and autonomy will enhance the production of student learning. One might expect to find a relationship between extensive application of output control and higher student achievement. Alternately, this study might search for the most effective "mix" of controls for particular organizational circumstances. Additionally, the independent contribution to student achievement of the six control mechanisms should be investigated. We might expect to find that the application of input control contributes little to student achievement, while the contribution of output control usage is substantial. As one of the key objectives of schools is the production of student learning, studies of the influence of organizational control on student learning is essential.

The renewed interest in systems of organizational constraint coupled with several more comprehensive frameworks for conceptualizing organizational control provide ample stimulus for improved research on the nature of control in educational organizations. These newer frameworks conceive of control as more than sets of rules and procedures or as the results of direct command from supervisors. Rather, organizational controls can better be understood as a combination of hierarchical, social, and extra-organizational forces which act upon subordinates providing a balance of control and autonomy to enhance the pursuit of organizational goals.
PRINCIPAL INTERVIEW

First, I'd like to ask a few questions about your career in education.

1. How long did you teach - or do other work - before becoming a principal?
   __Years (total)
   (Note any intermediate work between teaching and principalship).

2. When did you first become a principal?
   __Date

3. Please tell me about that school - what kind was it and where was it?
   How many students?
   Level: grades incl. __  Place: community & school district __  No. students __

4. What positions have you held since then? (Skip if in first position).

   Level: grades __  Place: community & school district __  No. students __
   ____________  ____________  ____________
   (If more space needed, use the back of the page).

5. A. Going back some in time, when did you make the definite decision to become a teacher?
   During grade school __  During high school __  During college __
   After college __

   B. You probably considered other lines of work seriously. How did teaching emerge as your choice?
   (First or second choice).
C. When you decided to enter teaching, did you expect to stay in it or did you expect to move into administration or other work? (or, for women, other?)

Expected to stay in teaching____

Expected to move up____*  
(Only after probing)

Plan vague at the time____

D. *If expected to move up...did that expectation play a part in your decision to teach?

6. When you decided to become a principal, you probably expected it to be better than what you were doing at the time—(teaching, supervising, etc.). In what ways did you think it would be better?  
(Probe for 3 or 4.)  
(Note comments on realization, but do not probe.)

7. What were the circumstances when you received your first appointment as a principal?

A. Were you looking around at the time?

B. Did anyone give you a hand?

8. A. Principals have told us that they had to learn a good deal on the job during the first year or two. What were the most important things you had to learn?  
(Probe for 3 or 4.)
9. A. People sometimes say that their parent's work, even if different from theirs, prepared them for their occupations. Do you think your father's work helped you, in any way, for your role as a school principal?

Yes____ No____

B. Did your mother work outside the home while you were growing up? If yes*

Yes____* No____

*Did your mother's work help you, in any way, for your role as a school principal?

I'd like to ask you a few questions about the school you head—some are on the fact sheet, but these may help me to understand your situation better...

10. First, the students...

A. How many students are enrolled in your school this year?____

B. What about the social background of the students? Here is a list of occupations. Which group occurs most frequently? What is the second most frequent?

HAND CARD #1

No. 1____ No. 2____ (Note any comments on distribution)

C. How about the education of the parents? Which level is most frequent? Which level is the second most frequent?

No. 1____ No. 2____ (Note any comments on distribution)
D. What proportions of the students fall into the following groups?
   White____% Black____% Oriental____% Hispanic____% Other____%

E. What ethnic and religious groups predominate among the white students?
   (Don't force listing).
   1. ______________________
   2. ______________________
   3. ______________________

F. What special characteristics do your students have which you would mention to another principal in describing your school?

G. Where do most of your students fall on national achievement tests?
   Above the national average_
   At the national average_
   Below the national average_

A. How many adults work regularly in your school? That is teachers, specialists, administrators, aides, secretaries—everyone.

   Total__________

B. If you were to describe your faculty to another principal, what three or four adjectives would you use to describe them?

   ______________________
   ______________________
   ______________________
   ______________________

C. What is the average age of your professional staff?

   Probe: Is there much variation? _______ Years
12. Please imagine a traditional elementary school in which instruction consists of a group of teachers, each of whom works with one class, and a principal who supervises the school. There are no specialized classes, no special programs, and no teaming—or anything like that at all.

HAND CARD #2

A. Please tell me those features on the card which are present in your school.

Interviewer circles#: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

B. Are there any other ways in which your school is different from the traditional school I described?

13. Every school operates in a "community" made up of parents and others who take an interest in school affairs.

HAND CARD #3

Here's a card with several dimensions describing a community, with opposites at each end. Please pick a number along the line which best describes your immediate school community. (In thinking about it, compare it to all school communities you know about).

A. RESPONSIVE TO US AT SCHOOL 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNRESPONSIVE
B. ASSERTIVE IN MAKING DEMANDS 1 2 3 4 5 6 NOT ASSERTIVE
C. PREDICTABLE IN THEIR REACTIONS 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNPREDICTABLE
D. ALIKE IN THEIR EXPECTATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 6 NOT ALIKE
E. EAGER TO PARTICIPATE IN SCHOOL AFFAIRS 1 2 3 4 5 6 NOT EAGER TO PARTICIPATE

14. Has your school or its community undergone any important changes in the last two or three years?

No important changes___ Some or one important change(s)___*

*What were those changes?
15. Is your school special in any way you have not yet mentioned?

Now I'd like to ask you about aspects of the many tasks you do as a principal.
16. A. What 3 or 4 tasks consume the largest blocks of your time?

B. What tasks do you most like to emphasize?

C. In general, do you think the time you spend in various tasks is appropriate or not appropriate? Yes ___ No ___* Why?
17. A. What do you watch to tell how well you are doing as a principal?

(Steady neutral probing).

B. What difficulties do you encounter in evaluating your performance?

(Probe task areas if not clear)

18. How would you describe a really good day — you know, the kind that leaves you feeling great about how things are going?

(Probe with bad day contrast if needed)
19. A. If you could magically find ten hours more per week to spend on your work (magically in that it would not take away from your private life), how would you spend the time? What single activity would you be most likely to use it on?

HAND CARD #4

B. If your choices were limited to those on this card, which would be your first and second choices?

Interviewer circles: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

20. Of the tasks you do, which would you consider to be—

A. The most difficult—that is, the hardest to do well? Why?

B. The most fun... Why?
21. What resources, other than your own skills and knowledge, are most important in helping you get the job done? —Resources can be either tangible or intangible. (Probe past general terms.)

22. There are some dilemmas, we understand, in supervising a faculty—some tough choices which come up where a principal has to trade off one good thing for another. Obviously, you won't do the same thing in each instance, but I'd like to mention some of these problems and ask you to say what you tend to do or think about them.

A. You may believe that a particular decision will improve the effectiveness of your school but also believe that it could endanger your relationship with the teachers. When and if that happens, would you tend to take the action or hold off in the interests of staff morale and your relationship to the faculty?

Take the action_______ Hold off for morale_______

B. Thorough evaluation of teacher performance by the principal improves instruction, say some, while others argue that emphasis on evaluation makes the principal too distant from the faculty. Which comes closer to your opinion?

Evaluation is important_______ Evaluation increases distance_______

C. Some principals say that including teachers in many school decisions (including budget, etc.) increases their commitment and the quality of their work. Others say that it reduces efficiency, slows things up, and so on, and is not worth the time and effort. Which comes closer to your view of things?

Should include teachers in a wide range_______ Should emphasize efficiency_______
D. Principals differ in how closely they think they can or should supervise classroom instruction. Some report that they provide detailed and specific guidance while others prefer to give teachers latitude to use their judgment. In general, which approach do you favor?

Detailed, specific guidance _______ Latitude for teachers _______

E. In school-wide matters, some principals favor the use of clear, definite, and written rules for teachers wherever possible, while others favor a more informal, case-by-case approach to things. Which comes closer to being your style?

Use of rules _______ Case-by-case approach _______

F. Compared to other principals you know, are there any other characteristic ways in which you relate to your faculty—ways not mentioned in this question?

HAND CARD #5

23. Here are some ways in which principals in elementary schools try to improve instruction in their schools.

A. Would you tell me which approach is the most valuable to you? Why?
   If it's not on the list please describe it...

B. What is the second most useful approach? Why?
24. Some people say that tenure and contractual arrangements today make it almost impossible for principals to have real influence over faculty.

A. Do you agree? Yes____ No____

B. Since you can't give teachers more pay, in what ways can you reward desirable teacher actions?

25. A. How important do you think it is to include members of the community especially parents— in school affairs? Other than having a parent and teacher organization, for example, do you think it useful to get parents involved in school matters?

Yes____ No____

Probe: how it is helpful or not helpful.

B. How do your school board members and superintendent feel about the question of community and parental involvement in school affairs? Do they encourage you and other principals to do much of that?

Yes____ No____ Why?
26. A. You probably seek the advice of other persons from time to time to help you deal with problems that come up. What or who are the most important sources of advice to you in your day-to-day work?

(Probe for 3)

1. ____________________________  Kind of advice or problem
   Rel. to respondent

2. ____________________________  Kind of advice or problem

3. ____________________________  Kind of advice or problem

B. What kinds of problems are you likely to get help on from (each in turn)?

C. Who is your single most important source of advice?

27. Do the principals in this district work together closely or do they tend to keep pretty much to themselves?

Work together closely_____  * Stay to themselves________

*Probe for ways in which work together.

28. How often do you talk to other principals—either at their initiative or yours—about common problems or to share and ask for advice?

Never_____  Times per week_____  Times per month_____

29. Principals tell us that they differ in the amount of influence they have within the school district. Where would you place yourself in comparative influence on district affairs—in the top, middle, or lower third?

Top third_____  Middle third_____  Lower third_____
30. As we all know too well, the groups one works with don't always get along too well either internally or with one another.

A. We assume internal conflicts occur from time to time within each of the following groups:

- (1) teachers  yes  no
- (2) parents yes  no
- (3) students yes  no
- (4) principals yes  no
- (5) central office yes  no

a) Which of these internal conflicts occur in your school or district? Let's review each. (Check yes or no.)

b) Which requires the largest amount of your attention? ____________

c) What action do you take to deal with that kind of conflict?

d) Is there another of these conflicts that requires your attention? Which one? ____________

B. Conflicts also can arise between groups: Between—

- (1) Parents and central office yes  no
- (2) Parents and teachers yes  no
- (3) Teachers and central office yes  no
- (4) Teachers and students yes  no

a) Which of these inter-group conflicts occur in this school or district? Let's review each. (Check yes or no.)

b) Which requires the largest amount of your attention? ____________
c) What kinds of action do you take when conflicts of that kind occur?

d) Is there another of these conflicts which requires your attention? Which one?

31. Let's turn to the school district in which your school is located.

A. How many schools are in this district? 
   All elementary? Yes__ No__ How many not? _____

B. With which central office people do you work on a day to day basis?
   1. ________________ 2. ________________

C. How long has the superintendent occupied his position? ________

D. Was he hired from within the district? Yes__ No__

E. Did your superintendent appoint you? Yes__ No__

F. Is the superintendent's background in elementary education? Yes__ No__

32. Communication patterns differ from one school district to another. In your district how do things work?

A. First, how many written reports, on the average, do you submit to central office each month?
   _____ per month

B. Are any of those reports other than routine statistical reports? Do any require you to write about school events in any detail?
   All statistical___ Other___ *

   *What are those reports like?

   *How often?
C. On the average, how many meetings—meetings called by central office—do you attend per month? (Include district committees.)

_____ per month

D. (1) In the average week, how many phone conversations do you have with people in central office?

_____ per week

(2) Most of these conversations are with which officials?

________________________

________________________

(3) What percentage, would you estimate, do you initiate?

___________ %

E. How many visits from central office persons does your school receive in the average month?

_____ total per month

_____ by superintendent specifically

How far away is the superintendent's office?

_____ miles

F. What other ways than those we have asked about do you let central office know what is happening in your school? (Probe for all.)
G. What other ways does central office use to let you know what is expected of you and your school?

(Probe for all.)

33. Some principals have said that it was difficult to learn which matters they should discuss with central office and which they should deal with independently. If you were responsible for training a new principal in your district, what would you recommend in this respect? What should the new principal be sure to talk to central office about?

(Probe for 2 or 3.)

34. As you know, there is constant discussion about how centralized or decentralized school districts should be. Would you please help me to get a picture of how your school district locates decisions at different levels of the organization? We'll cover several aspects of school affairs and then I'll ask your overall view of this problem.

A. As far as budget preparation is concerned, do you participate by submitting requests for your school or do you receive a per capita allocation?

Submit requests____  Per capita basis____

How does that work? (Confirm acceptance of different amounts to different schools.)
B. What discretion do you have over spending money once the budget has been set?

(Own special fund? Yes__ No__)

(Able to transfer from one item or category to another? Yes__ No__)

35. A. When you hire someone—a teacher or another person—can you pretty much count on getting the person you want or is it necessary for you to compromise?

Yes, get whom I want____ Need to compromise____

B. Are you ever forced to accept someone doubtful into your school on transfer?

Yes____ No____

C. Are you ever forced to let someone go you think is okay? Not including: reduction-in-force firing.

Yes____ No____

36. A. As a principal, have you had the opportunity to influence any collective bargaining contracts that have been negotiated? Is it enough?

Yes, enough____ Yes, but not enough____ No opportunity to influence____

B. Once the contract is settled, do you have sufficient freedom to deal with teacher matters?

Yes, enough freedom____ No, not enough freedom____
37. As far as evaluating teachers is concerned, does central office expect all principals to go about it in a standardized way, using similar forms, visiting patterns and so on? Or are you allowed considerable discretion regarding this matter?
(Which comes closer?)

Same approach required____ Discretion allowed____

38. Let's turn now to curriculum and how it's handled in your district.

I want to ask about four subjects and how the curriculum is organized for each.

Now, as far as (Mathematics) (etc.) is concerned:

A. Are there written, specific objectives authorized by central office for each grade in your school in (Mathematics)?

B. Are those objectives linked to any regular standardized test such as the IOWA or Stanford? Are those objectives linked to a criterion-referenced test?

C. Is there district-wide adoption of the same textbook in (Mathematics)?
(Note if there is more than one adopted textbook.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Testing</th>
<th>Textbook</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Stand.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mathematics</td>
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<td>Social Studies</td>
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39. Compared to what you know of school districts, where would you place yours in the question of what is expected of the teacher in teaching content? Would you say that they are expected to stick closely to the prescribed curriculum or are they allowed to use their own judgment?

**HAND CARD #6**

A. Stick to prescribed curriculum 1 2 3 4 5 6 Use own judgment

B. Do they? Please rate what teachers actually do.

Stick... 1 2 3 4 5 6 Use judgment
40. A. Do you feel that you are expected—by central office—to implement a particular kind of classroom organization?

   Yes __ No __

   *Do you do it?

B. Do you have preferences of your own on classroom organization?
   And do you try to influence teachers in this regard?

   Preference: Yes __ No __

   Do you try to influence: Yes __ No __

41. A. In your situation, in which area of your work would you most like greater freedom? Why?

B. In general, is __________ the most important area for a principal to have autonomy in? Or is something else a more important area?
42. From what you know about school districts in general, how would you describe your school district? In general, are decisions centralized in central office or decentralized to the individual schools?

HAND CARD #7

Centralized in central office 1 2 3 4 5 6 Decentralized to individual schools

43. Do you think that the situation is the same for all schools and principals or are some supervised more closely than others?

Same _____ Different _____

*What seems to account for the differences?

44. Political realities differ from one district to another. In yours for example:

A. What do you think is the relative influence of the board of education compared to the superintendent?

Board more powerful _____ Superintendent more powerful _____ Equal power _____

B. Is it your impression that the board works together well or is it divided on important issues?

United, works well _____ Divided on important issues _____

*What are the major divisions?

C. Does the district community give strong support to the school district or are there any problems in this respect?

Strong support _____ Any problems _____

*What are the problems?
45. We have found some differences in the ways central office wields its authority over the principals in a district. In some districts, central office issues many rules and directives to principals, trying to control principals largely through what the principal is told to do and not to do. In other districts the principal is given considerable leeway over how he or she does things, provided the results of his or her work meet central office standards for the principal and the school.

A. In your situation, would you say that central office makes high, medium, or low use of rules and directives regarding your work?

____High*       ____Medium*       ____Low

*If high or medium, what are the most important rules and directives?

B. How about controlling through watching results and giving you feedback about them? Would you say that central office makes high, medium, or low use of that approach?

____High       ____Medium       ____Low

What are the most important results that are watched? (Get 3 or 4 results.)

46. Does your school district have a detailed, written description of your responsibilities as a principal or a manual which does the same thing?

Yes*           No

*Are you expected to adhere to that description? Yes  No
B. Does your district have a regular system for the formal training of principals or send you and others to seminars and institutes for that purpose?

No, neither
Yes, internal
Yes, external

*Days in last two years
**Days in last two years

C. Does your superintendent use any formal system of management such as MBO or PPBES or anything like that?

Yes
No

*What is that system? Does it really affect things? How?

47. What do you think is most important to central office when they evaluate your performance as a principal?

Specifics

Anything else! (Probe for 3 or 4.)
B. What source of information do you think has the greatest effect on the evaluation of your performance made by the superintendent?

Specifics

Anything else?

C. In your district, what difference does it make whether you get a good evaluation or not?

(Probe salary increases if not mentioned)

D. Have any principals been let go in your district within the last four or five years?

Yes* No

*Why were they let go?
48. A. Are principals expected to push for resources for their schools in your district? Would it help them to get government grants or fire up the parents' group or push hard for the school in general? 

(If any doubt, ask if it could hurt.)

B. As far as the distribution of resources within the school district is concerned, do some schools get more than others?

* Why do some get more? 

* Yes * No 

49. There may have been some times when central office wanted one thing for your school and you and the faculty thought something else was much better. Can you give me an example of such an occasion and explain how it worked out?
50. A. From your perspective as head of a school, in what ways does central office help you to get the job done?

B. What might they do to help you get the job done better?

51. What kinds of things can central office people—the superintendent or others—do, or not do, to make your job harder?

(Probe specific examples).
52. A. From your point of view as a principal, what kind of event spells trouble? Would you give me an example of something that was trouble for you within the last year or so?

(Probe: what outcome(s) worried respondent.)

B. Do you ever find it necessary to trade off something desirable in order to avoid trouble?

Yes__*  *Can you give me an example?

No____
53. We all like to have good reputations with those around us. In just a word or two, what kind of reputation would you like to have with:

A) Students:

B) Teachers:

C) Parents:

D) Other principals:

E) The superintendent and his staff:

F) Which of these reputations do you value most? (Get first and second.)

No. 1:

No. 2:
54. As specifically as you can, please tell me what the main satisfactions are for you in your work as a principal.

(Probe: which is most important?)

55. A. Thinking back over the last year or so, what work achievement is the source of greatest pride to you?

(Probe: basis of pride)

B. Looking back over the same period, is there anything you did not do, you wish you had done or anything you wish you hadn't? I'm asking, you could say, for any mistake of omission or commission which you now regret...

Proye: Why was that a mistake?

56. What costs or disadvantages do you associate with the principalship compared to alternative careers you might have followed?
57. A. If you had it to do over again, would you enter teaching?
   Yes_____ No_____* *Why not?

B. Would you become a principal if you had it to do over again?
   Certainly would____
   Probably would____
   Probably not ____*
   Certainly not____*
   *Why not?

C. If you had it to do over again, what changes might you make in the specifics of your career? For example, would you come to work in this district or this school?
   No changes____ Another district____ Another school in this district____*
   *Why?
58. A. What is the next step you would like to take in your career?
   (Probe why attractive.)

   B. What kind of position would you like to attain before you retire?
   (Probe why attractive.)

59. What would another district have to offer to entice you away? To a principal's job...

   A. First, how about salary? How many thousands per year would constitute "an offer you couldn't refuse"? (Assume this offer was from an otherwise similar district.)

   ____ thousands per year more.

   B. What other attractions would lead you to take a principal's position in another district?
C. What other questions would you ask about the school district in considering their offer? What would you want to know about the superintendent and his staff?

(Probe for 4 or 5.)

60. **HAND CARD #8**

Let's say that this circle represents your total "life space"—all your major interests and activities. How many pieces of the pie would you say "belong" to your work as a principal?

A. _____ pieces out of 8.

B. What other interests take up spaces?

_________________ to ___________________
_________________ to ___________________
_________________ to ___________________

61. Would you please let us know your income for the past year?

A. Respondent's salary__________________.
B. Spouse's income if working__________________.
C. Any additional income you made last year__________________.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS INTERVIEW!
FACT SHEET

Identification Number

Please fill in the answers to each question and return in the self-addressed, stamped envelope which is provided. If you need more space, please use the back of the page.

1. How many persons in each of the following categories work in central office?
   - Associate superintendent
   - Business official or manager
   - Assistant superintendent
   - Secretary, clerk
   - Director
   - Other (please name)
   - Specialist

2. What is the assessed valuation of the district? (1979-1980)

3. What is the per capita expenditure per student? (1979-1980)

4. a. Which of the following occupational groups is most common in your district?
   - 1. Higher executives of large concerns, proprietors, and major professionals.
   - 2. Business managers, proprietors of medium sized businesses, and lesser professionals.
   - 3. Administrative personnel, owners of small businesses, and minor professionals.
   - 4. Clerical and sales workers, technicians, and owners of small businesses.
   - 5. Skilled manual employees.
   - 7. Unskilled employees.

b. Which of these occupational groups is second most common in your district?

5. In general, would you say that the people in the district are pretty much alike or are there some who are different in important respects?
   - Pretty much alike
   - We are different

   *What are the differences?

6. Do teachers in your district have a collective bargaining unit? Yes
   *No

   *Name of the bargaining unit.
7. What are the predominant ethnic or religious groups in the district as a whole?
   1. ____________
   2. ____________
   3. ____________

8. As far as your school is concerned, how many persons—in each of the following categories—do you have working for you? Are they full-time or part-time?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No. full-time</th>
<th>No. part-time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Assistant principal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Classroom teachers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Specialist teachers (e.g.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>learning disabilities, music, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Other professional specialists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Para-professionals, aides</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Secretaries, clerks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Custodian(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. In what year were you born? ____________

10. In what kind of community did you grow up? That is, in which of the following did you spend most of the years before you graduated from high school?
    1. In open country but not on a farm.
    2. On a farm.
    3. In a small city or town (under 50,000).
    4. In a medium-sized city (50,000-250,000).
    5. In a suburb near a large city.
    6. In a large city (over 250,000).

11. In what state did you grow up? (If you were born outside the United States, please indicate the country.) ____________________________
12. When you were sixteen, what was your position within the family?  
(Please fill in the number in each case.)

I had.... older brothers.
   _______ older sisters.
   _______ younger brothers.
   _______ younger sisters.

13. What was your father's occupation when you were sixteen years of age?

(a) Name of occupation__________________________________________.
(b) Kind of organization in which he worked________________________.
(c) If he had a farm, business, or shop, did he own the enterprise? Yes___  
     No____

14. If your mother worked while you were growing up, please indicate the kind  
    of work she did.

Did not work_____  
Did work____*

*Type of work__________________________________________________

15. How much schooling did your father have?

_____ 1. Completed graduate professional training.
_____ 2. Completed college or university.
_____ 3. Partial college training.
_____ 4. Completed high school.
_____ 5. Partial high school.
_____ 6. Completed eighth grade.
_____ 7. Less than eighth grade.

16. How much schooling did your mother have?

_____ 1. Completed graduate professional training.
_____ 2. Completed college or university.
_____ 3. Partial college training.
_____ 4. Completed high school.
_____ 5. Partial high school.
_____ 6. Completed eighth grade.
_____ 7. Less than eighth grade.
17. Where did you get your bachelor's degree? (If you attended more than one college or university, please list the one from which you graduated.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Inst.</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Year Graduated</th>
<th>Major</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

18. What study have you done since receiving your bachelor's degree? (Please check one.)

- Some courses
- Master's degree plus certificate
- Master's degree
- Doctorate
- Master's degree plus courses

19. Where did you do the above study? (If in more than one institution, please list the one you consider most important to you.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Inst.</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

20. If you are currently working toward a degree, please indicate the degree and where you are studying.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Inst.</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Degree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

21. Below we would like to have a brief summary of your early career in education since you began teaching. Please list the positions in chronological order.

a. How many years did you teach and at what level?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Name</th>
<th>Grades or subjects</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Length of time (No. of years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. Please list, in order, any administrative positions prior to your first principalship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District name</th>
<th>Position/title</th>
<th>School name and level</th>
<th>Length of time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. To what religious group do you belong?

- Catholic
- Jewish
- Protestant
- Other (please name)
- None

23. How often do you attend religious services or take part in other religious programs?

- Never.
- Less than once a year.
- About once a year.
- Several times a year.
- About once a month.
- 2-3 times a month.
- Nearly every week.
- Every week.
- Several times a week.

24. Do you think of yourself as belonging to a particular ethnic or national group? If yes, please indicate which.

- Yes
- No

Name of group

25. What is your marital status?

- Married
- Never married
- Separated or divorced
- Widowed
26. How many children do you have?
   None___
   1-2___
   3-4___
   5 or more___
   Of these, how many are now independent?___

27. Please list the professional organizations to which you belong and check off how active you consider yourself in each.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member only</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Highly Active</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
   1.          |        |               |
   2.          |        |               |
   3.          |        |               |
   4.          |        |               |
   5.          |        |               |

28. Please list other kinds of organizations (including hobby or athletic groups) to which you belong and indicate how active you consider yourself.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member only</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Highly Active</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
   1.          |        |               |
   2.          |        |               |
   3.          |        |               |
   4.          |        |               |
   5.          |        |               |

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Baltzell, Catherine, and Dentler, Robert. "Characteristics and Patterns of Principal Selection." Boston, 1982. (Unpublished.)


