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Basic values in higher education and the way that values are made operational are discussed in an article and three responses to the article. Conflicts among values in American higher education and the structures of accommodation are also addressed. In addition to valuing liberal arts studies, professional education, and research, competence in these pursuits is highly valued. Achieving equality and equity for students and staff is also desired, and another set of values links together choice, initiative, innovation, criticism, and variety. Expectations of individuality and self-expression are also raised by democratic values. Finally, there is always a body of interests that pertain to the operation of the state, particular regions, and the nation as a whole. The structures of accommodation that abate conflict among contradictory values are many, within and among institutions. It is concluded that in the long run it is the structures of work and authority in higher education that largely determine who does what to whom, and what matters most about any structure are the values and principles it embodies. Structures can be studied at the level of national policy, state systems, and sectors. Brief responses to the article are provided by Hermann K. Bleibtreu, Charles E. Davis, and Fred F. Harcleroad.

(SW)
VALUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION

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THE WILSON LECTURE SERIES
LECTURE TWO

VALUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION

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April, 1983
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VALUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION

"Values in higher education" is the best of topics and the worst of topics. It is the best topic—the right one to hold before us—because it lifts our eyes from the details of daily life and turns our attention to basic concerns, causing us to wonder how education evolved from the past to the present, why we are doing what we are doing, what we should stop doing, what we ought to begin to do, and where we will be, and should be, several decades down the road. Addressing ourselves to values, we face large issues and worry about the long run. We become more responsible in the deepest way—critical of ourselves and our institutions, aware of opportunistic adjustments that leave us adrift, and hopefully recommitted to a steady course that moves us toward those ends, those purposes, that we care about the most. Values is altogether the right topic. The Wilson Lectures have, without doubt, a focus to which we all should respond.

But values in higher education is also the worst of topics. Its track record is dismal. The topic was a loser thirty years ago, and its value has only grown worse with time. There is almost always less there than meets the eye! For many scholarly meetings we can paraphrase the Bible and say "Many shall run to and fro and knowledge shall be increased." But for meetings on "values," we do not expect any increase in knowledge. We only need to note two common outcomes: the topic invites an inordinate amount of daydreaming and it puts us asleep. It brings out the utopian urge in us all; we drink headily of Large Visions and imagine the world as it ideally should be. We trot out every cliche in the book of education: scientific excellence; liberal education; freedom of research and freedom of teaching; community of scholars; personality development; enlightenment; education in the service of the nation; and even liberty, equality, and fraternity. We drift off into the clouds of rhetoric that we otherwise reserve for deans and presidents on commencement days—the occasions when we drowse in the sun and simultaneously warm ourselves with the well-worn phrases that bring a peaceful moment in our lives and perhaps cause us to think better of one another, to love our institution, and to believe life is worthwhile, even beautiful. One hardly needs to be cynical to agree with Michael D. Cohen and James G. March when, in their book on the American college president, they observed "Almost any educated person can deliver a lecture entitled, 'The Goals of the University.' Almost no one will listen to the lecture voluntarily. For the most part, such lectures and their companion essays are well-intentioned excercises in social rhetoric, with little operational content" (1974, p. 195). Addressing values, in short, we tend to become symbolically
drunk or at least pleasantly tipsy. And few of us are immune. I have lived long enough to see tough scholars, even ones known for steel-trap minds, wipe the corners of their eyes at the ceremonial occasions that are topped off by a lofty declamation about "purposes" or values. I have shed a few tears myself. Thus filled to the brim with emotion, the topic can make us cry.

What is wrong with the drifting and the emoting is that we have to wake up, come out of our tipsy or euphoric state, and get back to work, back to what we normally do in the 99 and 4/100ths of our waking hours when we are not commencement or otherwise thinking about "our values," "our purposes." The president goes back to his desk on Monday morning to face the deficit, the outrageous behavior of a professor in the medical school, the demanding call from a state legislator—with no guidance from the big words and the large visions. The professors return to their offices, classes, and laboratories, to the real world, and carry on. The brute fact is that discussions of values in higher education nearly always carry us away from the pragmatic decisions and flows of activities that constitute daily life. "Values" becomes the worst of topics because we thereby disconnect ourselves from the realities of our existence.

How then can we discuss values without putting one another to sleep and without ignoring reality? We can do so by talking about how values are implemented, how they are made operational in universities and colleges and in state and national systems. We can attempt to specify how values conflict in practice. We can search out the ways in which our institutions and systems work out accommodations among conflicting values. This agenda is large; it is an endless one. But it is a useful direction in which to steer our thought. I shall try to illustrate it with some broad observations on conflicts among values in American higher education and how our existing structures help us "handle" those conflicts. I shall be broad but hopefully not out of touch. First, a few values.

Some Basic Values

What is it that we most want done in higher education? We certainly want to do research, particularly scientific research, and we want it done competently. We certainly want to do professional education, for an ever-wider array of professions and semiprofessions, and we clearly want to do

that competently. And in this country we have had a long-standing commitment to general education and liberal education and still strive to fulfill these promises even if we are increasingly uncertain about how to effect these values and even sense that we are not very good at this sort of thing.

Embedded in all these preferences or desires is a search for competence, what used to be known as the pursuit of excellence. Let us be highly competent in research in economics, for otherwise our economists will mislead our rulers even more than they do now. Let us ensure excellence in training in the medical schools of your university and mine; when you are wheeled into the operating room, it is the better part of intelligence to have a competent surgeon behind the knife. Let us find anew how to effect a liberal education, for hundreds of thousands of students each year, to help form enlightened citizens capable of intelligent and rewarding choices in government and personal life. In short, we are never far away from a set of values centered around capability, quality, competence, and excellence. And such preferences come in many sizes and shapes throughout a state or national system of higher education: in the admission and graduation of students; in the hiring and promotion of faculty; in the overall effectiveness of an entire institution; and even in the capacities of our own national system as compared with that of Japan, Germany, the Soviet Union, and other major countries.

In understanding the pragmatic reasons for our high valuation of competence, it is important to note that academics belong to disciplines and professional fields that cut across universities and colleges. Judgments on individual capability are generally made within particular subjects; the judging of merit by other disciplinarians is made on the basis of national and international standards. We can also note the robust fact that fields of study have structures of knowledge that have to be mastered by those who teach and those who learn. The general framework of education cannot take any shape at all that happens to fit other values but must be constrained by the relatively fixed forms and sequences constructed in many fields as ways of organizing knowledge, e.g., we still have algebra and calculus today in clearly defined sequences as we did years ago.

We can watch whole nations learn the hard way that academic competence should not be given low priority because of neglect or a turning of attention to other values. The Cultural Revolution in China was one such occasion, when a political regime thought it best that professors and students spend large blocks of their time out in the rice fields or in some
other way of participating in the work of the poorly educated masses. Much time was lost—a decade or two—in the development of the educational capacity of that nation before the central regime turned toward a political posture that allows professors and students to concentrate on academic tasks, on what they are able to do best.

What else do we want? Of course we also want justice in higher education, as in other sectors of society, pressing toward the ideal of fair treatment for all that has become a set of issues of equality and equity, first for students but then also for faculty, other staff members, individual universities and colleges, and whole sectors thereof. With respect to students, we work to effect equality of opportunity in the sense of access. Beyond that, the more committed egalitarians also pursue equality of outcomes or rewards: do members of minority groups graduate in the proportions exhibited by those in the majority group; do degrees from different institutions have grossly unequal value? Under the banner of justice, we can be interested in uniform standards of performance and certificates of equal value as well as fairness in access.

In the case of personnel and institutions, we can note everywhere the cry of the “have-nots” for parity with the “haves,” for the elimination of categories of being second best or third best. Unequal shares give so many of us a powerful interest in fairness: in determining salaries within and across departments or in the state allocation of resources to the state university on the one hand and the state college on the other. Equity is a natural concern of the bureaucrat, since the concept of fair share, of evenhandedness, is central in public administration. We always live close to this set of values: it is all around us and permeates many of our actions.

And then what else—what other basic values drive our lives? A third set of values links together choice, initiative, innovation, criticism, and variety. The central idea in this complex is liberty, a traditional value in Western political thought that emphasizes freedom of action as the basic condition for exercising choice, encouraging initiative, engaging in innovative behavior, sustaining criticism, and inducing variety. Liberties are

sought by groups and institutions in higher education as well as by individuals. Departments seek self-determination within the university; the university presses for autonomy from the state and from outside groups. And this third major set of values includes the powerful academic ideologies of freedom of research, freedom of teaching, and freedom of learning. Those who do research claim maximum freedom is necessary at work if they are to do their job properly and help science and scholarship to advance. Those who teach have long elaborated the notion that they must be free to say what they please without retribution if society is to benefit from self-criticism and if social wrongs are to be righted. Those who learn, in a variety of nations, assert individual choice in what they will study and even in what way and at what pace they will pursue learning. Students choice, we may note, was greatly widened and deeply institutionalized in the American system about a century ago when a fixed, "no choice," classical curriculum was replaced by the elective system. That system also greatly extended the choice and freedom of professors to teach what they wanted to, in their many specialties. In general, freedom for one's own group is near the core of much group self-interest.

Basic to this set of values in our day is the desire for individual self-expression among larger proportions of the general populace as well as among academics and intellectuals. Democratic values raise expectations of individuality—freedom taken to mean more people allowed to do as they please. Economic progress lifts more people to a standard of living where time and resources are available for something beyond dawn-to-dusk labor. Rising educational levels encourage expectations about the enriched life that was formerly the province of the few. And linked to the desire for self-expression is desire for variety and even for eccentricity. More people came to think that higher education could help them to be creative—and creative people, in myth and in fact, have long modeled to the world how richly rewarding it is to be eccentric.

One other pressing broad set of values may be mentioned to complete a primitive catalog of only four. There is always a body of interests brought to bear upon higher education that are located in the operation of the state, a group of interests bound up, at the best, in the identity of nations and, at the worst, in the survival of particular regimes. Fealty or loyalty seems the core idea here, but one that stretches widely from a general interest in the contribution of higher education to national integration and progress, as seen by state officials, to a narrow straightjacketing of academic thought and criticism.

To overlook this set of values would be to avoid issues that are the heart of the higher education question in one country or another. It is
extremely difficult in developing societies, for example, to dissociate the
tasks of the university from the tasks of the state. Central governmental
officials expect those in higher education to march shoulder to shoulder
with them in the cause of nation building—helping to promote a cultural
unity, to integrate diverse tribes and factions, to construct an infrastructure
of transportation and communication networks. And, of course, the more
authoritarian, even totalitarian, the regime, the more does explicit political
loyalty enter. Wide boundaries for criticism can contract sharply when
authoritarian regimes come to power and act vigorously to stay the flow of
critical comment. And narrow boundaries are institutionalized as one-party
regimes remain in power and have the will and the means to define opposition
as illegitimate and even illegal.

In Western democracies, subservience to the will of the state
operates generally within broad limits on personal political expression. In
Britain, Sweden, and any number of other countries, academic “fools” have
to be suffered gladly by officials because there is virtually no way to get rid
of them. Across our own system, we find much variation on the theme of
loyalty—greater tolerance in some states than in others, more in universi-
ties than in community colleges, more in high-quality institutions than in
mediocre ones. Most of the time, we do not have a head-on clash between
officials and academics—although the tendency to occasionally “shoot the
system in the foot” by political policing of academic expression has been
noted in that large state to the east of New Mexico. No board of regents is
fully equipped unless it has one regent who can light up a whole room simply
by leaving it. Texas has its fair share! In general, for this country, the
meaningful political demands now center upon “accountability”—follow-
ing upon the official version of the Golden Rule that he who has the gold has
the rule. Fealty to the state shifts to the institutional level.

Without going any further into other values that are brought to bear
on higher education, we can sense immediately the flood of contradictions
and conflicts turned loose by just these four broad sets of interests. The
values press behavior in contradictory directions; they encourage antitheti-
cal forms and procedures. For example, the American interpretation of
justice presses toward open-door admissions, mass passage, and even
uniform graduation. But the interest in competence argues for selection at
the outset, a willingness on the part of faculties to fail and to weed out, and
for graded certification that will label some persons as more capable than
others. As “liberty” enters the fray, it plays at times against both equity and
competence, equality and excellence. Under equity, fair shares is the name
of the game, and therefore procedures and requirements must be set that
apply across the board. The competence camp also presses for some
uniform arrangements—we generally call them “standards”—well-constructed barriers to entry, required sequences of courses and examinations for passage, and quality controls on certification. But liberty is contrary to both, pressing away from both fair shares and standardized forms and toward a maximizing of choice and a celebration of variety. Under full sail, liberty means individual students seeking individualized programs of study with little worry about unequal treatment and common standards. It means autonomous faculty members acting with little regard for group norms. It means institutions striking out on their own and possibly varying all over the map in what they do—including the marketing of shoddy goods to uninformed customers in the soft underbelly of a diverse system.

These three broad values alone stir up a lot of dust. The tensions among them are inherent and likely to grow larger. And it needs only bare mention that loyalty can and often does conflict with all three, subordinating justice, competence, and liberty in the name of a single higher good. When political regimes are preoccupied with the loyalty of faculty and students, little heed is given to equal treatment or competent training or freedom of choice.

We can also immediately note that each of these values is a set of concerns, a bundle of contradictions in itself. Equality becomes equalities, as we noted earlier in examples; competence is a large set of desirable competencies—and when we concentrate on one we withdraw effort from others; liberty is a vast array of freedoms for different groups; and loyalty is, in operation, numerous kinds of relevancies, demands, and expectations.

In sum, our values are inordinately pluralistic: to attempt to implement them is to bring them into conflict. There is no longer any wonder why higher education must be full of contradictions, inconsistencies, and compromises. We will it so, as we attempt to express effectively, in our institutions and in our actions, these four disparate primary values, let alone some others. And thus, post-1980, we need not wonder why modern systems of higher education exhibit a bewildering mixture of the open and the closed, the elitist and the democratic, the flexible and the rigid, the traditional and the modern.

The Structures Of Accommodation

Any sensible administrator asked to confront directly these four

orientations, and to rationally reconcile them, would undoubtedly seek other employment. Fortunately for officials—and faculty—the "system," not individuals, does most of the work of accommodation. Institutional organization and system organization become compromises written large. Let us look briefly at just a few of the ways in which we accommodate and compromise, implementing conflicting values without generating a war of all against all.

First, within the single institution—the university, for example—we divide tasks horizontally and vertically in units that are allowed to march to different drummers. In the Physics Department, the physicists follow the canons of physics, without disturbing the sociologists over in their own roost. One unit can be stuffed full of highly structured knowledge and the other adrift in a sea of assorted opinions: one can be hard and the other soft, one highly selective and the other a dumping ground: one a center of excellence and the other a pit of mediocrity. The university is a "loosely-coupled" organization, and in that loose coupling lies much leeway for alternative expression of values.

In the vertical dimension of tasks, we have, in the American university, impressive differences between the undergraduate realm and the higher postbachelor tier of the graduate school and the advanced professional schools. We play to general education at the first level and to research and professional training at the other. We often pull off a veritable sleight-of-hand on the clash between open access and selective admission by generosity at the first level and sharp selection at the second—within the single enterprise. As much as horizontal separation, vertical differentiation allows us to pursue contradictory concerns.

We find a similar story when we turn to the more macro level of a set of institutions, as in a state system composed of the state university, the state college, and the community college. We sort out values in a tripartite structure, as we arrange a division of labor among these three forms. The university gets research and the high professions and the prestige that goes with these operations. It soon wraps itself in the banner of excellence—usually academic excellence but often also, in this country, athletic excellence and, ideally, both—as at the University of Michigan. The community college, at the other extreme, with its open-door and its concentration on teaching in the first two undergraduate years, flies the flag of equality in the most populist sense—all can enter, even those who are illiterate. The state college, in the middle, it turns out, is the most confused segment of this typical American division of tasks where a stable blend of values is the most difficult to work out. Our state colleges generally do not
like the role we have assigned them in master plans and seek escape—becoming our foremost cases of "academic drift," institutional drift—as they seek to converge on the more rewarding and prestigious set of tasks and values embedded in the university. The state college role can be stabilized apparently only if it acquires strong legitimacy, and that seems to require a state college doctrine or ideology, expressing basic values that faculty and outsiders believe in deeply.

And then of course our institutions and sectors do not remain simply side by side but rather take up location along a vertical dimension, within a hierarchy. There is an operational hierarchy of community colleges feeding students "upward" to the other sectors, of four-year colleges feeding students "upward" to the universities that have graduate programs and advanced degrees. And there is a prestige hierarchy, a rather considerable one in this country, even if it does not have the sharply tapered peak that we find in Japan, Britain, and France that sorts out students, faculty, administrators, and resources. That hierarchy very definitely sorts out values, most notably in upholding a limited number of "centers of excellence" in science and scholarship. "Best science" does not fare well under democratic ideas of distributing resources equally across 3,000 institutions. Those who are already "best" get a large cut of the monies distributed by the staff and peer review panels of the National Science Foundation. The club of the best can be crashed, but it takes a great deal of patient hard work over a long period of time, with a central valuation of the importance of doing so. Those positioned way down the institutional hierarchy must necessarily express a quite different set of values as they work with a different set of programs and services.

In sum, the structures of accommodation that abate conflict among contradictory values are many, within institutions and among them. The abatement of value conflict centers on two features of the higher education system. One is the loose coupling of parts that I have already mentioned. This sector of society is very loosely put together, compared to traditional models of business and public administration. And that loose coupling serves us well. The other feature is sheer structural complexity. When a system of human activity becomes organized basically around "subjects"—fields of advanced knowledge, disciplines—and these subjects endlessly multiply in the modern knowledge society, the structures of implementation—from departments to national bureaus—will become inordinately complex. That complexity will confuse us: we will say that we cannot see clearly what we are about, we lose a sense of boundaries, we send out a call for the philosopher-statesman who will again give us conceptual clarity and for the expert in organizational theory who will give us structural clarity. But the complexity is compellingly necessary, if we want to get even a half of the loaf, to find the glass of water even half-full, while trying to effect
in higher education the four values of competence, equity, liberty, and loyalty. The key is great structural complexity.

On this fundamental matter, we have been lucky in this country, reaping the benefits of disorder (Clark 1976, pp. 31-37). At the most macro level, our educational structure is enormously federal in nature, based on a division of authority among fifty public polities, supplemented by a prestigious and varied private component. In higher education there is a great deal of dual authority of co-sovereignty, from that of the faculty and the administration within leading universities and colleges to that of the state and the federal government. And compared to other countries we have a "bottom-heavy" federalism at the broadest level, with state finance and control remaining primary. This insures "disorder." The fifty states do not move together the way they would if they were subordinate parts of a unitary system and subject to a government-defined national policy. They are individually steered by their own local and regional conditions and possibilities; they can individually initiate. Thus, whatever its faults, the deeply rooted federalism of the higher education sector in this country adds greatly to its complexity and hence to the ways—the combinations and the blends—by which conflicting values are accommodated.

If we want our value conflicts sharpened and written large, then we should work toward a unitary national system. If we want our value conflicts muted and written small, then we should learn more about the virtues of a much divided fifty-state pluralism. Those virtues include the contribution made by multiple sources of support to the autonomy of the university. Clark Kerr recently added a 1982 update to his 1963 book, *The Uses of The University*, asking what we have learned or relearned in the last twenty years (pp. 23-31). He noted first the strength and resilience of the American university and then went on to note "how important to the university are its autonomy and its financing from a series of independent sources; [and] how significant that there is no one master but rather a series of fifty states and of many independent private boards" (Kerr 1982, p. 31). Our structure guards us well against the greatest error of all in higher education, that of a monopoly of control.

**Conclusions**

In the short run we argue about the contents of higher education: student aid, funds for scientific research, general education, faculty tenure. Specific program reforms capture our attention; a pay raise for next year becomes the priority item. But in the long run it is the structures that count, since it is the structures of work and authority that largely determine who does what to whom—and who determines who does what to whom. And what matters most about any structure are the values and principles it
embodies. A recent editorial in the (London) *Times Higher Education Supplement* put it well: "The terms on which a nation chooses to organize its system of higher education are the clearest possible indication of the priorities that the system is expected to pursue. Far from being an administrative irrelevance structure is a powerful metaphor about the public purposes of higher education" (*The Metaphor of Structure* 1982). Seen comparatively, the great structural diversity of the American system expresses a priority given to variety and choice, liberty in general, and an effort to be all things to all people. The structural singleness of some other national systems expresses a high valuation of a few things done well for a smaller share of the population and equality of rewards for those who are admitted.

The first question is what balance of preoccupations and priorities is represented in a particular structure for higher education? The second is does it work in promoting its own primary purposes? Thus, structure is not simply a game to be left to MBAs and second-line administrators. It is a powerful metaphor about the public purposes of higher education. Value complexity is mirrored in structural complexity. Value ambivalence is mirrored in structured ambivalence. Inherent value contradictions lead to mixed structures. And the structure of a flexible modern system must mirror uncertainty. For good reason, we are more uncertain now than in the past; for good reason, we shall be more uncertain in the future about "our values" and how to compose a system than we are now. One old joke has it that there are two things you should never watch being made—sausages and educational policy by a legislature. We should add a third thing that you should never watch being made: the structure of a modern system of higher education. The "governance" of higher education anywhere is a little like industrial management in Great Britain: it is not done well, but you are surprised to find it done at all.

Lucky then is the nation that has a national system of higher education so complicated that no one can understand it, no one can clearly see it in the round and lay it out in a table of organization, no one can steer it in its entirety. And no one can program it in a linear fashion. Those who try to make things very neat, to order the system into hierarchy of command and responsibility, are simply pushing in the wrong direction, even, unbeknownst to themselves, engaging in brinksmanship (Landau 1969, pp. 346-358). Linear systems fail for the want of a nail; they are no stronger than the weakest link; when one bulb blows the whole string of lights goes out; there is little or no fail-safe. If an airplane needs three or four ways of getting the wheels down in order to be a reliable device, a system of higher education needs a much larger set of redundancies to compensate for weakness and failure, to promote flexible adjustments. If we are to effect a vast plurality of values by means of a work force of over 500,000, serving the interests of over 10 million students,
and of science, and of modern professions, then we need a vast plurality of
operating instruments that exhibit considerable redundancy.

We can study these structures in action: at the level of national
policy, state systems, and sectors. We can study the university itself as
perhaps the most complicated of modern enterprises. We can study the
faculty, the department, the research center. And we can study what goes
on within the classroom much better than we have to date. As we do so, at all
these levels, we can observe values in action—values implemented, values
compromised, values traded off.

Hence, it is possible to talk realistically about values, since they are
made concrete—even "set in concrete!"—in the structures within which we
carry out the work of education. Then we no longer need to drowse in the sun
or fall to sleep when the word values is mentioned, for then we are talking
about what you do and what I do and why we do it. We then talk about real
interests, genuine mandates. Each discipline and professional school at a
university is a cultural house, itself a set of values, norms, and rules of
behavior. The institution as a whole is a cultural mansion, one that has many
different wings, floors, and rooms. As we roam the corridors of these houses
and mansions, here and elsewhere, we find the values that are most worth
talking about because they are in action. They are possible: they are being
implemented.

Thus we will learn more about the values of higher education as we
study the specific tools that we use to realize them. We have to sneak up on
values, find them, by studied indirection. We become observers of underlying
values by becoming acute observers of the organizational forms that have
come down to us through history and that we ourselves create, the tools that
are our means of acting collectively. We thereby make values more tangible.
In a sense we find the vessels that carry values, that effect them. And we find
the broad "structural values" that define the rules of the game for expressing a
host of "cultural values." This is what our Founding Fathers were about in
1787 when they defined a broad constitutional apparatus—a federal
structure, a checks-and-balances separation of power among branches of
government—a major form into which a host of "contents" could be poured
and accommodations made among conflicting interests. On a smaller scale,
we do likewise in each major sector of society.

Thus we draw values toward us, out of the clouds of commencement
rhetoric, seeing them alive as we sense how they are a part of our reality. Thus
explicated, the "values of higher education" become worthy of critical
reflection. "Values" then becomes the best of topics.
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Response by Hermann K. Bleibtreu

Acting Dean, Social and
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Professor of Anthropology
University of Arizona

I agree that diversity in American Higher Education is indeed one of its strong points—as long as that diversity is limited to the kinds of programs available and not to their quality.

I believe we are involved in two kinds of education at the postsecondary level in this country. One is scholarly teaching, a kind of discourse that cannot be decoupled from research and the creation of new knowledge. The other is the teaching of skills—i.e., straightforward instruction or training, which at the University level can be quite sophisticated and comprise much of a preprofessional training program.

I prefer to have “teaching” reserved for scholarly/research based discourse and “training” or “instruction” for skills acquisition.

The fact that the public is confused about this and the universities themselves get these two missions confused in part because 1) scholars and non-scholars often hold the same degree (the Ph.D.) and 2) we in academia have begun to believe our own sales pitch that the primary purpose of higher education is to qualify people for jobs. The primary purpose of higher education is to broadly educate students. The secondary purpose is to educate them to a level from which they then can be trained as professionals.

I think the diversity and pluralism of values apply mainly to training rather than to scholarly education. Where postsecondary education has been revolutionized is in its accessibility. Formerly skills had to be learned by restricted apprenticeships or through fortuitous membership in privileged socioeconomic, sex, or ethnic groups.

The next evolution in higher education will be when the diversity encompasses scholarly education as completely as it has training. The former is still too much the preserve of those same fortuitous membership categories. Scholarship is as elitist today as professional and technical training was many decades ago.

In the meantime, we have to exercise more caution than we currently exercise to preserve the quality of scholarly education. Examples of being
off-guard are all the “for” courses (Basic Math for...), all the courses modified for junior colleges and state colleges, where “modified” means sacrifice of quality to compensate for the presumed intellectual inability of the students, the faculty, or both. That is reminiscent of the days when it was incorrectly assumed women were incapable of certain kinds of thinking and similarly that certain ethnic groups inherently could not grasp complex reasoning.

Whether we value training over scholarship or vice versa is largely a culturally determined choice which will ebb and flow over time, but the value of quality itself surely must remain constant. Quality and excellence in scholarship are obviously of no less importance than quality in training. A course in welding at Harvard must be of as high quality as at the best vocational or community college. By the same token a course on Shakespeare must be equally excellent at the latter as at the former. A dual standard here is a great disservice to higher education.

As educators we are the trustees of quality higher education. Even when those we serve will settle for less, and in some cases even demand less for purposes of economy, faster and easier certification, etc., we must hold the line. Our quality control must come from our own individual sense of professionalism and adherence to the highest standards of our disciplines. Like physicians or musicians, the public wants our services, and we must deliver only the highest quality possible. That is a value that has no qualifiers.
Response by Charles E. Davis

Associate Professor of English
Director of English Composition
University of Arizona

I fail to recognize how universities or colleges or, for that matter, prisons or restaurants have value systems. They are institutions which may reflect the system of value held by their owners or customers, wardens or chefs; they may seek to make themselves desirable in terms of the value systems of those whom they enroll, imprison, or entertain, but do they have values that are distinguishable from those who own, sponsor, or inhabit them?

This weekend I drove my nine-year-old daughters to Phoenix to catch a direct bus so that they could spend a week with the cousins, my cousin and her husband, a retired professor of physics, she a volunteer for everything from a symphony society to Planned Parenthood. Just before we got to the Gila there was a beautiful sight, miles of glistening creosote bush set in endless fields of soft, blue lupine. My daughters and I made a quick stop in Tempe to visit my father, who had just that day been moved to a nursing home, where he will probably spend the rest of his life, trapped by outliving everyone of his generation. My systems of values had a real workout. I was pleased that my daughters had a chance to strengthen their own sense of family. The blue lupine and creosote brought to mind the landscapes of Monet, whose paintings inform us of the parts that go into the making of beauty of nature as a whole, and reminded me of A. E. Houseman too, and his themes of the fragility of life and the celebration of the recurrent beauty of spring. My sense of duty to my family, my sense of beauty, both are mine and come from a system of values learned in my family and my schooling.

In “Loveliest of Trees, the Cherry Now” Houseman decides

And since to look at things in bloom
Fifty springs are little room,
About the woodlands I will go
To see the cherries hung with snow.

I enjoy the sight of lupine on the hills. We shared something of a value in common, though he sees the spring of the English countryside and I the spring bloom of the desert after a particularly mild and rainy winter. But the values are ours, as human beings individually, as men trained to admire, fixed in words, the beauty of the natural world. I don't know if Houseman oversaw the care of an elderly father or took twin daughters on visits to his
family, but I suspect he did something similar to enforce and strengthen his individual commitment to his family, values based on what he was by birth and training.

The people who make up a university—its teachers, its students, its staff, the taxpayers who support public education—all have values, quietly expressed in their day-to-day living; they have a sense of competence and excellence, a sense of liberty and of loyalty; they bring to a university values they already have; they gain new experience and training that modify and, through their association with a university, expand and refine their systems of values.

But I cannot see that a university has, in the sense that an individual has, any sense of values at all other than the collected values of those assembled in the place. The personification of the university becomes merely a rhetorical device confusing the basic issue of individual responsibility. I suppose at this level of abstraction, this personifying of the university and giving it the human attributes of attitudes and opinions, all universities support free speech. But I suggest that anyone who thinks that a university can speak for freedom of speech ought to ask Ambassador Kirkpatrick whether she thinks it is a university which makes impossible her delivery of an address on foreign policy or a series of individuals whose system of values her mere presence offends. I question the merit of attributing the exercises of virtues or vices to an institution rather than to its students, its faculty, its staff, and those individuals who make up the institutions. If public institutions represent any kind of analogy at all, is it not the barometer, an instrument reflecting the atmosphere in which it is placed, rather than an individual human being?

Values are attributes of people, not institutions. Oedipus Rex reflects the values of Sophocles, values which a good many other Greeks, but not all, may have shared. Monet's view of a landscape does not make sense to everyone who has looked upon the same scene, but, to many, after Monet no lily pond is ever exactly the same again, nor is the sound of the sea after hearing Debussy's La Mer, nor one's sense of growing old after reading Shakespeare's Lear. The achievement of art is an artist's vision giving rise to new values of perception in those with whom the artist communicates.

Dickens went on beyond the initial paradox:

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light,
it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way — in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.

The cumulative effect of these paradoxes is irony, the irony of assigning to times or places or institutions the attributes which only people, always one by one and sometimes together, have.
Response by Fred F. Harcleroad

Professor of Higher Education
University of Arizona

In his provocative and yet low-keyed way, Professor Clark has performed a real service for us—taking "values" from a "dismal" topic to values in action, alive realities. Any remarks I can make serve only to supplement—neither to oppose nor even to question.

His central idea, "liberty" and "freedom," strikes a ringing chord for Americans. Symbols stressing this concept are critical in higher education. A quarter-century ago I was fortunate enough to start a new public university in California—one where new traditions began daily. We decided that May 1, the same day Communist tanks paraded through Moscow, we would celebrate "liberty" annually, on Law and Freedom Day. Professor Clark's central value idea has the utmost relevance on every campus and in every school.

As a minor add-on to his significant statement, I offer two brief notions. The first relates to our increasing diversity and the second to the increasing breadth of goals established by our society for its institutions of postsecondary education.

First, our diversity expands regularly to meet changing social demands—those required to provide more equal opportunity. Just a decade ago the Educational Amendments of 1972 made federal support available to students of proprietary institutions. No one knew how many there were, either institutions or students. Recently, some interesting data showing the extent of this unknown universe have been compiled:

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<th>Type</th>
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<th>Degrees</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Others Not Accredited</th>
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<tr>
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<td>100</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>approx. 3,000</td>
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<td>600,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>3,150,000</td>
<td>approx. 5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This shows that Professor Clark is correct and that higher education's complexity grows constantly—and in non-linear ways.
Second, I would briefly mention the expansion of purposes of institutions of higher education. Years ago I, as an institution’s president, sonorously intoned the regular litany, a triad, teaching, research, and public service. Today, John Millett and the Carnegie Commission have added (4) creative, cultural activity and leadership, (5) provisions for educational justice, and (6) constructive criticism of our society, leading to self-renewal of our social institutions. I now add a seventh, overall, student development beyond cognitive learning. Adding these purposes, and changing the structure to accommodate them, illustrates how we act to create organizational forms which make tangible our values.

Is there a “value” or “ethical” dimension to leadership in higher education? In our first institutions it was built in. No one considered it a separate dimension. Today, we have to work to escape being managed by efficiency, objectives, or budgeting systems. Professor Clark has done well to consider first things first and to stay alert to the best of topics.
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