
May 83


Viewpoints (120) -- Information Analyses (070) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

Behavior Patterns; *Communication (Thought Transfer); Communication Research; *Communication Skills; *Discourse Analysis; *Interaction; *Interaction Process Analysis; Linguistics

Communications Behavior; *Negotiation Processes

Drawing upon the philosophical and technical frameworks of discourse analysis, this paper suggests the rules governing linguistic choices in constructing negotiation. First, it clarifies the philosophical assumptions underlying different approaches to analysis, specifying a conceptual focus, particularly with regard to the situation and the inference of actor intent in the study of the structure of interaction. Then, using that focus, the paper draws upon previous negotiation research to propose a conceptual definition of negotiation as a type of "situation set" and a related definition of negotiation competence. It explores the areas of discourse work required for negotiating competently, deriving a set of constitutive rules for speech events at either end of a competitive continuum. Finally, it discusses the usefulness of such a rules set and probes its implications for future research.

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Negotiation Competence: A Conceptualization of the Constitutive Rules of Negotiation Interaction

by

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NEGOTIATION COMPETENCE: A CONCEPTUALIZATION
OF THE CONSTITUTIVE RULES OF NEGOTIATION INTERACTION

This paper develops a conceptualization of a specific area of communicative competence, namely speakers' ability to conduct a range of communicative behavior in negotiation situations. In the tradition of discourse analysis, the paper links the notion of situation, particularly as it encompasses speakers' goals, with the knowledge needed to structure interaction within negotiation settings. Drawing upon previous negotiation research to define a range of negotiation situations, the paper proposes a definition of negotiation competence. Then, using paradigm examples of negotiation behavior in naturally occurring competitive and cooperative goal settings, it explores the areas of discourse work required for negotiation and derives a set of constitutive rules related to that work. The usefulness of the rule set and its implications for future research are discussed.
Despite its obvious relationship to communication, negotiation research has been pursued almost exclusively in the disciplines of social psychology, economics, sociology, and marketing for over two decades (cf. reviews by Putnam & Jones, 1982; Roth & Malouf, 1979; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Strauss, 1978). Only recently have communication scholars begun to focus on the area, pointing to the need to examine interaction patterns in negotiation, and noting that communication has been too often controlled or even eliminated in mainstream negotiation literature (Donohue, 1978; Putnam & Jones, 1982).

Much communication research in negotiation, however, still shows the influence of a social-psychological view, treating communication as an independent variable, for example, by looking at the effect of mode or amount of communication on outcomes (Miller, Brehmer, & Hammond, 1970; Steinfatt, Seibold, & Frye, 1974; Turnbull, Strickland, & Shaver, 1974, 1976; Wichman, 1970), or by examining the effects of manipulation of message strategies on outcome (Michelini, 1971; Tedeschi & Rosenfeld, 1980; Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1973). Other work, growing out of interaction-based approaches, has treated communication more functionally, by identifying phases of negotiation interaction (Druckman, 1977; Theye & Seiler, 1979), or by categorizing tactics and strategies (Angelmar & Stern, 1978; Donohue, 1978, 1981; Donohue & Diez, 1982; Putnam, 1982), but this approach has proceeded at a fairly macroscopic, generalized level.

None of these approaches has drawn upon important, current strains in communication theory that could explicate the mechanisms allowing individuals to understand how various types of negotiation proceed, or, indeed, to conduct negotiation competently. They do not address the question of how adult speakers of American English conduct interaction so that it becomes negotiation of one
sort or another. To begin to answer that question would require a focus on
the structuring of communication as negotiation.

This paper will develop such a conceptualization of speakers' ability to
conduct a range of communication behavior labeled "negotiation" drawing upon
the philosophical and technical frameworks of discourse analysis to suggest
rules governing the choice of linguistic features used to construct negotiation.
First, it will be necessary to clarify the philosophical assumptions of discourse
analytic approaches, specifying a conceptual focus, particularly with regard to
the importance of situation and the inference of actor intent in the study of
the structure of interaction. Then, using that focus, the paper will draw upon
previous negotiation research to propose a conceptual definition of negotiation
as a type of "situation set" and a related definition of negotiation competence.
It will explore the areas of discourse work required for negotiating competently,
deriving a set of constitutive rules for speech events at either end of a
competitive continuum. Finally, it will discuss the usefulness of such a rule
set and probe its implications for future research.

Discourse analysis: A conceptual focus

Discourse analysis, as the term implies, focuses on communication itself
and its production (Cicourel, 1980). It is philosophically rooted in a pheno-
menological or ethnographic stance, arguing that a specific type of interaction--
e.g. negotiation--does not exist as an entity, but is created by actors operating
together to enact it, out of a shared understanding, or "common stock of
knowledge" (Schutz, 1973; cf. Mead, 1934) or sets of schemata (Chafe, 1972;
Hymes, 1972; Ellis, 1980) for that type of interaction.

Typically, discourse analysts have a common interest in communication
beyond the sentence level (hence, "discourse") and in language use as "situated" (Kreckel, 1981). It is this focus on situation that distinguishes discourse analysis from other approaches to communication and interaction (e.g., social psychology in general, persuasion study within communication). Since Goffman's (1964) complaint about "the neglected situation," discourse analysts have extended the study of situated interaction considerably (cf. Argyle et al., 1981; Bates, 1976; Brown & Fraser, 1979; Erickson & Shultz, 1981; Ervin-Tripp, 1968, 1980; Goffman, 1974; Graham et al., 1981; Gregory & Carroll, 1978; Hall & Cole, 1978; Halliday, 1979; Kreckel, 1981; Scherer & Giles, 1979).

The elements and their relationships integrated in the notion of "situation" as commonly employed include the "setting" (literally the place or type of place) or "type" of interaction. Both follow Schutz's (1973) notion of "typification," the taken-for-granted, implicit expectations that speakers have for the common-sense world, as generated out of a social structure. These expectations imply, according to Argyle (1980), a "repertoire" of moves available to interactants or a set of limits on what may transpire. The typification of situation also includes the participants and their role relationships within the situation. Role relationship features, e.g. social distance, social status, power differential, are not (as is sometimes assumed) stable attributes of either the persons or of their relationships. Rather these features may and do shift depending on activity and setting (Brown & Fraser, 1979; Ervin-Tripp, 1980).

Perhaps most important, however, is the "built in" sense of goal of purpose that is part of the typification included in "the situation." As Brown and Fraser (1979:35) note, "Purpose is the motor which sets the chassis of setting and participants going." Observers faced with any situation define it by asking "What are the participants trying to do?" (Gregory & Carroll, 1978; Hall & Cole,
And Goffman (1959) refers to this goal-centeredness as the interactants' understanding of their task, a "working consensus" of what they are about.

Discourse analysts have argued that situation is important to the study of situated interaction because the purposes inherent in the definition of situation are crucial determiners of linguistic behavior (Brown & Fraser, 1979; Graham et al., 1981; Hall & Cole, 1978) and because meaning itself depends on the elements of the situation (Argyle et al., 1981). But this is not to imply that the sense of situation provides a rigid framework—for researchers or interactants. Some situations are defined fairly clearly within a culture (e.g. for middle-class America, a classroom lesson, a job interview), but they may be "portable" (e.g. a class visiting a supermarket, cf. Hall & Cole, 1978) or "adjustable" (cf. Miller & Steinberg's 1978 notion of the movement from extrinsic to intrinsic rules in interpersonal communication). Thus, the discourse analytic view is that the "shared stock of knowledge" is at once made available to members of the culture and subtly redefined by them in an ongoing way. As Mehan et al. (1976:463) explain (emphasis added):

> Ultimately, social contexts consist of mutually shared and ratified definitions of situation and in the social actions persons take on the basis of those definitions.

The central difference between discourse analysis and other approaches to interaction is this understanding of the situation as central (See Figure 1). Much of experimental social psychology and even communication research has attempted to eliminate situational variables, in order to test and be able to generalize conclusions about the variables of interest. But it has been the
argument of many discourse analysts (e.g., Brown & Fraser, 1979; Argyle et al., 1981) that since situation cannot be eliminated, these studies merely produce "the experimental situation" with its own particular sets of expectations, repertoires of moves, and registers of linguistic choices.

Within discourse analysis, there is variation in the approaches to situated interaction, depending upon the focus, viz., on interaction-as-shaped or on the actors as shaping it. At one extreme (see Figure 1) are studies which parallel linguistic study of language at the sentence level. Looking at interaction-as-shaped, and seeking to find a "grammar of interaction," these researchers generally situate the interaction in cultural, language-bound contexts, but do not attend to goal focus. Thus, they have produced fairly abstract rules for turn-taking (Duncan, 1972, 1973; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974), side-sequences (Jefferson, 1974), openings and closings (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973; Nofsinger, 1976) and adjacency pairs (Sacks, 1972). The rules these researchers seek are not intended to access the actors' intent; rather the rules function to reproduce or recover the activity, relating to structure at a level of abstraction above intent.

The other two broad categories within discourse analysis focus on more specifically situated interaction, attending to the sense of goal, but this attention is Janus-like, one inferring the societal "shared knowledge" evident in the structuring of interaction and the other probing the activity of the individual interactants in their intending and interpreting processes.

Researchers who use the interaction-as-shaped approach are interested in getting at the "shared knowledge" that native speakers have about linguistic choices in specific situations as a "type" of goal-directed exchange (Argyle et
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al., 1981; Brown & Fraser, 1979; Ervin-Tripp, 1980). They proceed by making inferences about what Schutz (1973:71-72) called the "objective because motives" present in interaction:

The genuine because motive is an objective category, accessible to the observer who has to reconstruct it from the accomplished act, namely from the state of affairs brought about in the outer world by the actor's action...

In fact, Schutz (1973:72) argues that this is the same data open to the interactant who did the acting:

Only insofar as the actor turns to his past and, thus, becomes an observer of his own acts, can he succeed in grasping the genuine because motives of his own acts.

Even though most of Harré's (1972, 1974) work fits in the actor-as-shaping category more than in the interaction-as-shaped category, he has argued that the actor's intent is "somehow present in the action," thus giving support to this approach. And much of the work in sociology and sociolinguistics sparked by Hymes's (1972) definition of communicative competence follows this tradition. Hymes (1972:286) argues that the study of speakers' ability to produce and interpret language in situated discourse proceeds by examining "the ways in which the systematically possible, the feasible, and the appropriate are linked... in actually occurring cultural behavior."

The focus, then, for this view is on how situated language use occurs, on the patterns known by native speakers—the same kind of latent knowledge that one's knowledge of grammar is. Because it is latent, not readily articulated by those who take it for granted, this view holds that the only way to get at what
constitutes the "possible, feasible, and appropriate" choice is to see the choices people make in naturally occurring discourse, or at the way they interpret the choices made by others—both examples of inferring the objective "because" motives (cf. research by Clarke, 1975; Ellis et al., 1981; Ervin-Tripp, 1980; Scotton, in press). When the research interest is in linguistic choices that mark interaction as belonging to a situation or set of situations, it is reasonable to look for rules to describe the pattern in "because" motives of linguistic choice (Brown & Fraser, 1979; Ervin-Tripp, 1980).

The approach of the third discourse analytic "stream" (See Figure 1) does not reject this position; rather, it builds upon the notions explained above. Some researchers (e.g., Harre, 1974; Kreckel, 1981) attempt to probe the interactants subjective "in order to" motives, which Schutz (1973:71) says "can be revealed to the observer only if he asks what meaning the actor bestows on his action." Others are interested in the impact of psychological variables like social perspective-taking and cognitive complexity (Delia & Clark, 1977; Hale & Delia, 1976) on the development of communicative competence. While one cannot dismiss as irrelevant the view that actors' operating social theory, intent, or psychological makeup in some ways accounts for the discourse produced by those actors, these seem to be considerations more appropriately explored when the "common stock of knowledge" regarding behavior that is "possible, feasible, and appropriate" in those situations is more fully understood. The "in order to" motive and psychological variable approaches appear to assume communicative competence as a given (cf. Delia & Clark, 1977), and so their emphasis is on the actors' awareness of choice, the development of actors' skills, or the relationship of psychological variables to choice and development.
For a conceptualization of the patterns of linguistic choice related to situations which fall under the category of "negotiation," the discourse analytic stream focused on interaction-as-shaped appears to be the appropriate framework; it will be the one employed in the work of this paper.

Development of a conceptualization of negotiation competence

The focus of this paper is a conceptualization of what native speakers of American English need to know to structure interaction as negotiation; it places that knowledge within the larger framework of communicative competence—the generally tacit knowledge used by speakers to produce and interpret situated discourse. Thus, the focus is on interaction as structured by the inferrable, objective "because" motives available in naturally occurring discourse. Since the idea of situation is central to this framework, the development of a conceptualization of negotiation competence will begin with a review of previous research in negotiation, as one way of tapping the "shared knowledge" of both the social science community and, by inference, the broader community of speakers.

The varied conceptions of negotiation (a term used in the literature somewhat interchangeably with "bargaining") tend to be focused on specific aspects of the "event" being labeled. For example, some are concerned with conflict (Chertkoff & Esser, 1976; Swingle, 1970), others with more competitive vs. more cooperative exchanges (Bartos, 1974; Hagburg & Levine, 1976; King & Glidewell, 1980; Zartman, 1977), or even mixed-motive interaction (Schelling, 1960; Walton & McKersie, 1965; Beisecker, 1970). Some focus on outcome exclusively (Benton, Kelley, & Liebling, 1972; England, 1979), distinguishing between zero-sum and non-zero-sum "games" (Schelling, 1960; Roth & Malouf, 1979). Others have been concerned with settings,
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...intra-organizational (Walton & McKersie, 1965), inter-organizational (Druckman, 1977; Hagburg & Levine, 1976; Spector, 1977; Walton & McKersie, 1965), international politics (Schelling, 1960), and even interpersonal problem-solving (Fisher & Ury, 1981). The common elements appear to be that the interactants create or affirm relationships that fall (or move) along a continuum from high conflict orientation (e.g., "distributive" or "confrontational" or "competitive") to low conflict orientation (e.g., "integrative" or "cooperative" or "collaborative"), and that they arrive at decisions as mutual outcomes.

Combining this composite definition of negotiation as a range of outcome-determining behavior along a continuum from relatively more competitive to relatively more cooperative goal orientation, with Hymes's (1972) notion of communicative competence, a definition of negotiation competence can be proposed as:

the ability of adult speakers to draw upon a continuum of linguistic choices in order to create or affirm both the relationships between interactants and the limits of their mutual decision-making process.

Having proposed this conceptualization of negotiation competence, the next task is to clarify more specifically what is involved in that ability by examining naturally occurring negotiation interaction, representing the relatively more competitive and relatively more cooperative ends of the negotiation continuum, and by using the body of literature about the meanings of linguistic choices across situations in social interaction. This will provide a means to draw up a list of rules that will capture the sense of a native speaker's tacit knowledge of the structuring of interaction as negotiation.
Methodology: A pilot study of naturally occurring interaction

Consistent with discourse analytic philosophy and practice, the conceptualization of the interaction work of negotiation and the initial rule set grew out of a pilot study examining naturally occurring interaction. Interactions at both ends of the continuum from competitive to cooperative were studied. One question that will be raised in spite of the careful explanation of what "stream" of discourse analysis this paper follows, however, is this: "How do you know that the discourse you analyzed as negotiation was defined by the participants as negotiation?" Clearly, what was needed was a situation where the goals were explicit—and commonly agreed upon. So the interactions studied were situations in which the goals were assigned by a force outside the actors. These interactions were training sessions for the Michigan Education Association bargaining teams, teachers who serve as bargaining agents in contract negotiations. Participants were given information about contract issues between a school board and the teachers union and were told to act out the negotiations, breaking at certain points for caucuses within the separate teams. Thus, the data can be considered as paradigm examples of negotiation behavior, one competitive (actors were told to fight for the most favorable solution for their side), the other cooperative (actors were told to work together to produce effective strategy decisions).

The transcripts and tapes (approximately 80 pages, representing nearly six hours of negotiation and caucus interaction) were examined by a team of two undergraduate students in an organizational communication class and the researcher. Meeting weekly, over a three month period, the students were instructed to listen to the tapes and read the transcripts, taking notes on what features of
discourse stood out consistently in the two types of interaction. They were instructed to look particularly for behaviors that appeared to provide contrasts between the two types of interaction in the linguistic choices made by speakers.

Emerging from this pilot study examination of naturally occurring negotiation interaction were three kinds of discourse "work" that appeared to require different choices in the two situations: coherence making, distance setting, and structuring. Each will be developed more fully below, both in terms of the general patterns observed in the data and in relationship to findings in other discourse research. Specific rules related to each type of work will be proposed.

**Coherence work**

The first kind of discourse work relates to the need to make connections, both within the flow of discourse and between the discourse and elements outside it. Within discourse, coherence work fulfills the need to clearly tie references and referents. Ambiguities result from unclear links, so coherence work is disambiguating work. This aspect of coherence is generally defined as the correspondence between elements in a sequence of parts, whether words and clauses or sentences and paragraphs. It is the sense-making work that allows discourse to be heard as connected (Clark, 1975; Ellis et al., 1982).

Another aspect of coherence work, however, is the linking of new information to old, or as Clark & Haviland (1977) term it, "the given-new contract" (see also Halliday & Hasan, 1976; Hopper, 1981; Tyler, 1978). These researchers have identified the various means by which speakers refer to some information in an utterance as assumed to be already in the other's awareness and the means by
which speakers highlight that information not assumed to be known.

In the interactions examined, there appeared to be differences in the need to specify what is "given" and what is "new." Competitive negotiation sessions produced exchanges with very clearly spelled out content; speakers would give, for example, an introductory statement on a topic, a rationale for the proposal, and implications for the other side's accepting or rejecting the proposal. Subsequent utterances were tied specifically to these context setting utterances. Cooperative negotiations, or caucus sessions, in contrast, often used shorthand references to common understandings (at times such that, while the "observers" could tell that there was such a reference, they weren't able to identify what the exact referent was!).

In competitive negotiation, there appeared to be reason to be even more attentive to marking the given information, emphasizing what one wants to assume as shared. For one reason, negotiators may want to be able to use past agreements or shared assumptions as the basis for making their proposal stronger (e.g., in the data, both sides appeal to the common concern for "the education of our children" as a basis for promoting their position). That "given" information receives more stress may be part of the overall persuasive strategy of the negotiator in a competitive situation.

Another reason may be the need to control equivocality. If meanings are not clearly tied to other meanings (the business of coherence), then utterances may be interpreted in various ways. There is more danger in being equivocal if one's opponent might thus be able to reinterpret one's utterance to their advantage. As a result, competitive negotiators appeared to choose to connect ideas tightly, preventing ambiguity.
The impact on linguistic choices was fairly clear. Competitive negotiators appeared to be careful about specifying the "given" and the "new" in their use of referents (more likely to be anaphoric or cataphoric than exophoric). As a result, their sentence structure was often complex, with dependent clauses and subordinating conjunctions used to link ideas. The overall result was the production of longer utterances.

In cooperative interaction, neither of the reasons to specify the gives appeared to function. Past agreements among team members could be assumed because they were shared along with the goal. As a result, references were less tightly constructed and were often exophoric or implicit. Utterances could be equivocal, not only because there was no fear of exploitation of ambiguity, but also because positions were open to change within the group as it worked a strategy.

The following rule sets contrast how coherence work appears to be accomplished through the linguistic choices of interactants in the two types of negotiation:

Rule C

(Coherence work rule: Negotiation)

If P (one negotiator or side) cannot assume knowledge on the part of O (the other negotiator or side) or if P does not want to allow O to redefine equivocal statements

1) P will specify clearly what is "given" and what is "new" by structuring utterances with clear referents and explicit relationships

2) P will use anaphoric and cataphoric referents, avoiding exophoric referents.
3) P will tend to encode longer utterances
4) P's sentence structure will be, grammatically, both complex and complete

Rule $C_c$ (Coherence work rule: Caucus)

If P (one speaker on a given side) can assume both shared goals and shared frameworks for processing information on the part of Q (another speaker on the same side)
1) P will tend to leave connections implicit
2) P will use exophoric referents
3) P will tend to encode shorter utterances
4) P's sentence structure will often be elliptical or incomplete

Distance work

The second kind of discourse work relates to the ongoing definition of relational control within the interaction. Ervin-Tripp (1980:395) has pointed out that language "does social acts, and systematically relies on social features to do so." Scotton (in press) has argued that code choice, or the form of the message, creates conversational implicatures which allow interactants to interpret relational messages, i.e., indications of the rights and obligations speakers what to be in force relative to one another. Donohue & Diez (1983) have extended Scotton's idea of "negotiating identities" through code choice to include negotiation of a broader range of rights and obligations relative to the distributive bargaining situation.

People "code their social world" (Ervin-Tripp, 1980) and establish rights and obligations through distance work. Distance work involves linguistic choices
which signal psychological distance (immediacy), social distance (relative formality) and role distance (power/solidarity). In the two paradigm examples of negotiation interaction which were examined, there appeared to be differences in all three aspects of distance work.

Psychological distance is signalled by what Wiener and Mehrabian (1968) call immediacy, or "the degree of directness and intensity of interaction between the communicator and his referents." They explain that the use of encoding differences in the verbal content of the communication implies varying orientations about the psychological relationships between the speaker, the addressee, and the topic.

While the two sets of interactions were not coded using Wiener and Mehrabian (1968) exhaustive scheme, they were examined for signals of directness. In referring to their own team in the negotiation sessions, for example, speakers had the option of saying "we" or "our team" or "the teachers union"/"the school board." Likewise, in referring to the other side, a similar set of variations from "you" to "the school board"/"the teachers" was possible. The following statement was directed to the board by the teachers union representative:

"It is incumbent upon the board to re-examine..."

The statement is doubly distancing; "you" is replaced by a third person reference, and the subject of the clearly imperative-in-intent statement is moved, through use of a transformation, out of the subject position.

There were more examples of distancing through referent use and construction of sentence in the negotiation interactions; few, if any, marked the exchanges in the caucus interactions. Rarely did either side use anything except "we" and "us" to refer to themselves during the caucuses, and "they" for the opposing team.
was the common, direct reference in planning. Thus, cooperative interaction appeared to be more "immediate" in Wiener & Mehrabian's terms.

Social distance, or formality, is indicated by overall "register" (see Joos, 1962; Gregory & Carroll, 1978), a collection of linguistic indicators tied to situations. Brown and Fraser (1979) have noted the correlation between interactants' sense of "formality" and the extensive use of nominal constructions, nouns, adjectives, and prepositions. Similarly, they have pointed to the predominance of verbs, pronouns, and adverbs in more "informal" situations. It is commonly observed that elaborate vocabulary and careful pronunciation is more formal than simple vocabulary and slurred speech; contractions are less formal than full forms (Gregory & Carroll, 1978).

Goffman (1959) noted that "front region" (formal) behavior is likely to include the use of titles and avoid humor and vulgarity, in contrast to "back region" (informal) behavior which will incorporate humor, vulgarity, personal references, and slang.

In the two sets of interactions, there were concrete indications of "more formal" and "less formal" exchanges. For example, in a range of choices like these:

"Let's talk about it"
"Let's discuss it"
"Let's submit it to discussion"

the last example would be most likely found in the negotiation interaction and least likely in the caucus setting, where the first example was the rule. Note that the most formal variation is also nominalized, underlining the "nouny" nature of formal interaction. "Big" or "hard" words were characteristic of
the negotiation interaction. Examples included: "ameliorate," "allude," "abdicated," "advise ment," "behooves," "incumbent," and "expunged." Technical terms were also common, particularly in the discussion of the terms to be spelled out in the contract agreement. There was little or no humor, and no vulgarity in the negotiation sessions.

In spite of the fact that the same speakers were involved in the caucus sessions, there were noticeable differences in the vocabulary used there. None of the "hard words" above appeared. The technical terms did, but their presence was tied to the caucus task of drafting specific wording to present in the negotiation. When contract language was not being discussed, technical terms were not present in the caucus exchanges. While the teams were generally "down to business" even in the caucuses, there was some evidence of humor and any constraints against minor vulgarities appeared to be relaxed.

Role distance is cued by the dimensions of power and solidarity encoded in linguistic choices. In their classic discussion of "tu" and "vous" as signals of power and solidarity, Brown and Gilman (1972) explored how reciprocal and non-reciprocal relationships are signalled by the use of pronouns in a number of languages. Non-reciprocal use of pronouns—the superior says T and receives V—indicates a power relationship, a particular kind of recognition of rights and obligations encoded into language. Reciprocal use signals solidarity, with reciprocal T the more intimate choice.

While modern English has not retained the T/V distinction, we are not without means of signalling the message of power and solidarity. One way is the use of indirect forms (replacing "you" with "the board"); another is the presence or absence of backchannels and other supportive cues. Finally, Ervin-
Tripp's (1976) research on directives, those illocutionary acts by which speakers attempt to constrain the actions of others, has shown how encoding differences signal relational messages or power or solidarity.

In the negotiation interactions, more indirect forms of address were used, as noted before. There were few backchannels, and any support statements were generally directed at content rather than toward the persons. The most common directive forms used in the negotiations—need statements, embedded imperatives, and question imperatives—are among those Ervin-Tripp (1976) identifies as appropriate in a superior-subordinate relationship. While negotiation is not necessarily a superior-subordinate situation, the zero-sum-game of competitive negotiation involves parallel attempts to establish power.

In the cooperative interaction, very different signals were given. The use of the pronoun "we" was a particular cue of the solidarity being established. Backchanneling (both "uh huh" and repetitions of the other's idea) was common, and support was given both for ideas and to persons. There also appeared to be more socio-centric language, i.e. language focussing on the group and its mutual goal rather than on the individuals within the group (see Bernstein, 1962, for a discussion of socio-centric speech).

Participants in the caucuses used many direct imperatives, a form in which the speaker assumes the right to make a bald request of another. Ervin-Tripp (1976) notes that these are most common among equals and co-workers, and are "marked" between superiors and subordinates. While embedded imperatives were used in both caucus interaction and the negotiations, the "sense" of their use appeared to differ—a politeness message inferrable in the negotiations contrasted with a tentative-planning signal in the caucuses.
The rules, then, that appeared to structure negotiation interaction and caucus interaction in different ways are these:

**Rule D**<sup>n</sup> *(Distance work rule: Negotiation)*

If P wants to establish a differential power relationship with O

1) P will use linguistic forms that impose obligations on O while maintaining P's rights.
2) P will use less supportive language in the exchange (e.g., fewer backchannels).
3) P will use more technical and formal vocabulary in the exchange.
4) P will use indirect references to both P and O as teams.
5) P will use little socio-centric speech.

**Rule D**<sup>c</sup> *(Distance work rule: Caucus)*

If solidarity and shared goals are salient to P and Q in the situation

1) P and Q will use linguistic forms that emphasize co-action and co-responsibility.
2) P and Q will use supportive language and frequent backchannels.
3) P and Q will use informal vocabulary, including humor and vulgarity as acceptable choices.
4) P and Q will use more direct references to each other, and of O.
5) P and Q will use more socio-centric speech.
Structuring Work

The third kind of discourse work relates to the organization of the interaction, both in the management of "the floor," usually studied as turn-taking, and in the management of the flow of information, a question of processing techniques. The management of turn-taking and information processing appeared to create different forms of talk at either end of the continuum from more competitive to more cooperative interaction in negotiation. Specifically, cooperative interaction, focused toward an explicitly common goal, appeared to require less attention to overt structuring than did more competitive interaction. The differences seemed to impact the length of individual utterances, the types of turn exchanges, and the form of illocutionary acts employed.

The length of utterances has already been addressed as a function of the relative need to make explicit the links between ideas in the interaction, i.e., coherence work. But length could also be related to the factors involved in turn management, as will be explained below.

More competitive negotiations appeared to have what Edelsky (1981) has recently called "a singly developed floor." That is, although the situation is a multi-party interaction, the flow of turns is parallel to what Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) have described for dyadic interaction. In the more competitive setting, turn exchanges were relatively smooth, with interruptions occurring rarely. In fact, interruptions were generally not attempts to take over the floor, but requests to facilitate the attention of the other side to the turn itself (e.g., a request to slow down so that the other side could get specific contract language down in writing). Length was thus affected, because few turns were cut off by interruption.
For the most part, then, the exchanges could be charted in an alternating pattern:

\[ P \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow P \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow P \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow P \ (\text{etc.}) \]

The more cooperative interactions functioned much differently, with frequent talkovers, break-ins, or multiple speaker segments. These appeared to be like Edelsky's (1981:383) "shared floor" interactions: A collaborative venture where several people seemed to be either operating on the same wavelength or engaging in a free-for-all. The alternating pattern seen in the negotiation interactions was replaced by several interactants speaking at once, or in such quick, over-lapping succession that the turn appeared to be shared. The focus, and its manifestation is caught in this diagram:

\[
\begin{align*}
P & \rightarrow \\
Q & \rightarrow \text{POSITION BEING}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
R & \rightarrow \text{CREATED}
\end{align*}
\]

showing that the "shared floor" acted not to have the speakers respond in turn to each other's questions or statements, but to have them mutually engage in what Goffman (1959) called "building a common front." Thus, speakers not only accepted interruptions and talk-overs, but appeared to invite participation through the formulation of their own talk.

Of course, not all of the interaction in caucus sessions displayed the same intensity of "shared floor" exchanges. As the group moved toward agreement on what their position on a given issue would be, there tended to be a more ordered approach to solidifying or specifying the wording or strategy. However, there were no instances of this kind of "free-for-all" floor in the
competitive interactions.

The structuring of the interactions differed in another way as well: the relative firmness of statements, indicated by the form of speech acts. Differences in illocutionary force encoded within the two types of interaction distinguished the situations, as did the use of forms which prevented or invited specific types of responses by the other.

The competitive negotiations were marked by four primary types of utterances: proposals, directives, questions, and clarifications. Proposals generally stated the "offer" being made by one team, or restated a previous offer which had been adjusted in the course of the interaction. Directives included "need statements," statements attempting to gain compliance with a proposed way of operating or statements attempting to establish the relative importance of a given aspect of the discussion. Other directives (e.g., embedded imperatives and question directives) served as information requests, but more often information requests took the form of information questions. Responses to information requests by the other side resulted in clarifications, which were often coupled with a repetition of the proposal (serving a kind of coherence function as well).

The pattern observed in the use of the types of utterances was similar to that reported more extensively in a recent study by Donohue & Diez (1983), which argues that questions and directives, particularly, are used for information management in distributive bargaining. Building on educational interaction research by Mishler (1975a, 1975b, 1978), they found that negotiators control patterns of interaction by using a series of questions to maintain their right to uncover the information needed to move toward a favorable decision.
natively, this pattern may be over-turned when negotiators respond to a question and then, in the same utterance, pose a question of their own. Both patterns of attempt to control the flow of information were observed in the competitive interaction. Moreover, the directives and questions, as well as proposals and clarifications, were marked by the "firmness" of their tone and construction. Even though proposals were not the "bottom line" discussed in the caucus, they were presented as firm and clear, as exemplified in the following excerpts:

"We're asking that recall shall be based on reverse order of layoff..."

"We expect to have complete retroactivity to July of 1986"

The cooperative caucus sessions, in contrast, were marked by a wider variety of utterance forms, with a general pattern of identifying the areas to be focused, discussing and clarifying various options for approach to the area, suggesting a specific focus, and coming to agreement on a position. Participation tended to be the free-for-all described by Edelsky (1981) as characteristic of "shared floor" multi-party groups. The utterances were often partial, elliptical, or otherwise incomplete. When directives were used, they tended not to be elaborated as need statements or embedded imperatives; rather, they were most often direct imperatives. At times, they appeared to be addressed to the group as a whole, rather than to another specific member, e.g., "Go for an 8% C.O.L.A."

During the phase of discussing and clarifying options, caucus utterances were marked by their tentativeness and by the use of what Bernstein (1962) has called "sympathetic circularity." Interactants used tentative expressions like
"I think" or "What do you think about...?" to signal that they were suggesting possible positions rather than proposing a plan they had fully worked out and were committed to. They invited feedback through the use of tag questions (e.g., isn't it? can't we?), a particular form of sympathetic circularity, and invited "shared floor" responses by leaving the ends of sentences unfinished for others to pick up and fill in.

The rules that appeared to operate to make the structuring work different in the two examples of negotiation interaction are divided into two sets for each, one relating to information management and the other to the handling of proposed actions.

Rule $S_{ni}$ (Structuring work rule: Negotiation/information)

If P wants to manage information in the exchange such that maximum information is elicited from O,

1) P will use multiple question forms
2) P will follow answers to O's questions with their own questions
3) P will maintain clear turn sequences with O

Rule $S_{np}$ (Structuring work rule: Negotiation/proposals)

If P's purpose is to win as many arguments for proposed actions/statements as possible and to accept as few of O's proposals as possible,

1) P will avoid tentative expressions
2) P will conclude utterances firmly
3) P will not accept interruptions from O
Rule $S_{ci}$ (Structuring work rule: Caucus/information)

If $P$ and $Q$ are focused on planning their joint strategy with relationship to $O$,

1) $P$ and $Q$ will use directives addressed to the group as a whole

2) $P$ and $Q$ will use brief and varied utterance types

3) $P$ and $Q$'s talk will be characterized by talk-overs and interruptions

Rule $S_{cp}$ (Structuring work rule: Caucus/proposals)

If $P$ is open to $Q$'s modification of proposed actions or statements,

1) $P$ will encode utterances with tentative expressions and expressions of sympathetic circularity

2) $P$ will leave utterances unfinished to invite completion by $Q$

3) $P$ will allow $Q$ to interrupt

Discussion

Two initial comments need to be made regarding these sets of rules guiding interactants' choices of linguistic forms in negotiation settings. First, these proposed rules are "constitutive" rules; that is, they function to make an interaction competitive rather than cooperative in the same way that the rules of chess or football define the game by demarcating it from other games. They are not rules for which there are sanctions imposed if the rules are not followed. To follow constitutive rules simply means that interactants are
structuring that which the rules describe as the game being played.

Second, these rules define the extremes along a continuum of negotiation settings. To the degree that interactants structure negotiation following either rule set, e.g. $R_n$ for competitive negotiation, they are creating competitive negotiation interaction. Of course, as they make adjustments moving toward the middle points of the continuum, they create slightly different senses of negotiation, for example what researchers call "mixed-motive" bargaining (Weiseger, 1970). Because both competitive and cooperative goals are involved in such a situation, aspects of both rules sets may be employed in its structuring. The concept of the rule-governed nature of the interaction implies that interactants produce and interpret linguistic choices using the $R_n$ and $R_c$ rule sets as guides.

Because the features identified in the sets of rules cluster behaviorally in an extreme situation, speakers respond to a "collection" of behaviors in interpreting the relative position of an ongoing interaction on the competitive-cooperative continuum. As Owsley & Scotton (1982:32) suggest, communicative competence "includes a component which can sum incidences of related features and evaluate them as percentages in relation to some probability framework."

Another aspect of communicative competence, needed for producing effective interaction, would be the speakers' knowledge of these rules—sufficient to be able to make choices that signal changes through manipulation of the linguistic code (Widdowson, 1979).

The usefulness of such a notion is that it helps explain how communicative competence functions in experienced speakers. This paper argues that the rule sets are part of the "taken-for-granted" knowledge included in typifications.
developed for the range of negotiation situations. By bracketing (in Schutz's sense of setting out for examination) these examples of competitive and cooperative interaction performed by the same interactants, it is possible to examine the patterns of linguistic choices to see how the speakers make specific types of adjustments in order to create the coherence, distance, and structure effects appropriate to those situations. Thus, it is possible to explain communicative competence as that ability to produce and interpret interaction in an ongoing way.

The conceptualization of negotiation competence and the sets of constitutive rules are useful, too, in providing direction for further research. The conceptualized rules, specified in terms of linguistic choices, may now be tested in other tapes and transcripts of naturally occurring interaction in negotiation situations. If the same patterns of choice are empirically present across a range of negotiation situations, defined as relatively competitive and relatively cooperative, then the rule set could be used to pursue additional questions about code choice, perhaps extending the applicability of the set to similar situations, as suggested by Brown and Fraser (1979).

Likewise, after the rule set is empirically tested, it would be appropriate to move to the third stream of discourse analysis identified earlier in the paper. The question of what awareness actors have of their linguistic choices related to the structuring of negotiation as relatively more competitive or cooperative could be pursued using this conceptualization. The question of what limitations are placed on the ability to develop communicative competence in general, and in relationship to negotiation situations, might be further examined. For example, in labor-management negotiations between labor unions...
and management, researchers might examine the distinctions found by Bernstein (1962) regarding working class and middle class code restrictions, to see if identification with different social classes creates discrepancies in the ability to negotiate competently. Or, put another way, researchers might examine the effects of differential levels of academic training on the ability to negotiate competently. Finally, the question of whether negotiation competence can be explicitly taught by making the rules explicit to the participants might be explored.

In another direction, the conceptualization might lead to further specification of the constraints operating within a negotiation situation, by examining whether other types of rules, viz., regulative rules, function in negotiation situations. Beyond the taken-for-granted behaviors of the constitutive rule-structured interactions, are there other behaviors which are sanctioned because their presence (while not creating another, different situation) causes serious difficulties? For example, to what degree may an interactant withhold information from others? Are there different standards operative for competitive and cooperative interaction regarding the amount of information sharing? How is "good faith" bargaining determined? What sanctions operate to influence bargaining in "good faith"?

The range of questions awaiting the work of researchers is truly rich, and their examination is promising for the development of effective social interaction. Thus, while the conceptualization of negotiation competence and the initial constitutive rule set appropriate to the ends of a continuum of goal orientation is only a starting point in the examination of negotiation from a discourse analytic point of view, it is a necessary beginning in the exploration of the structuring of negotiation interaction as communication.
"STREAMS" OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

FOCUS:
Study object produced to infer abstract rules (e.g. Grammars of Interaction)

Study patterns producing talk to infer situation-bound decision rules (e.g. Hymes' notion of Communicative Competence)

Study pattern both of situated interaction and of actors' perception of why/how interaction is produced, to infer social theories of actor (e.g. Harre's Dramaturgical Model)

Study actors' perceptions and/or traits to infer causes of psychological results or other outcomes, generally in controlled situations (e.g. Social Psychology)

RELATION TO ACTOR
Motive of speakers not of interest in viewing interaction-as-shaped

Objective "because" motives are inferred for viewing interaction-as-shaped

Objective "because" motives are checked against subjective "in order to" motives of actor-as-shaping.

Subjective "in order to" motives are studied (e.g. through self-report) and psychological variables are tested

VIEW OF COMMUNICATION
Communication itself is not at issue: form is abstracted

Communication is studied as both production and interpretation of interaction, with focus on society's shared knowledge

Communication is studied as both production and interpretation of interaction, focusing on actors' awareness, intention, and/or psychological variation.

Communication itself is not usually studied, except as an independent variable or mediating variable.

EXAMPLES OF RECENT RESEARCH
Linguistics
Sociolinguistics
Symbolic Interactionism
Social Psychology

Philosophy of Language
Anthropology
Ethnography
Persuasion

Turn-taking Studies
Ethnomethodology

Figure 1
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