A preliminary investigation into the World Bank's support of non-formal education in less-developed countries discusses the role of education in the development process, the Bank's concern with education, and its funding of non-formal education projects. The Bank's involvement in education projects is described, from support for upper division schooling (beginning in 1963) to a shift to an emphasis on non-formal education when Robert McNamara became President of the Bank in 1968. McNamara's concern with rural education and functional literacy programs for adults, and his broadening of the scope of educational projects supported by the Bank are noted, as well as his emphasis on teacher training, curriculum development, and educational innovation/experimentation, rather than physical construction. Specific Bank-funded non-formal education projects are mentioned briefly, with an analysis of impacts and obstacles to project effectiveness. The study concludes that few persons writing about or orchestrating non-formal education policies agree on the intended beneficiaries or whether intended benefits are received; that the Bank's strategy evolved from "trickle down" to "growth and equity"; that presidents of the Bank have had major impact on funding priorities; and that the minimal impact of McNamara's push for primary and non-formal education was due to the fact that he was fighting an uphill battle against many obstacles. (MH)

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ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS; THE CASE OF THE WORLD BANK AND NONFORMAL EDUCATION

by

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This paper represents a preliminary investigation into the World Bank's support of non-formal education projects in less developed countries. For the sake of convenience, both projects supported by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliate, the International Development Association, will be investigated simultaneously. For sake of clarity, non-formal education can be defined as organized or deliberate as contrasted to informal education) out-of-the formal classroom setting education. An "ideal" non-formal education program's purposes are short-term, specific and non-credential oriented; its timing is short-cycle and students are enrolled on a part-time basis. Moreover, the ideal non-formal education project is individualized, aimed at providing particular practical (rather than academic) skills and the entry requirements are determined by the clientele, instead of vice versa. Finally, the project's delivery system would be environmentally-based (rather than institutionalized), community related, flexibly structured, learner-centered and self-governing.1

present in a "typical" non-formal education project, but the presence of some of the more prominent features differentiate non-formal from formal and informal (such as child-rearing) educational programs.

Although there is a pressing need for "serious" and "systematic" studies of the efficiency (cost-effectiveness) and socio-economic impacts of non-formal education projects, the aims of this paper are much broader. The goal is to begin "... to trace the individual and interrelated roles of the assistance and financing agencies in the development of education ... and to assess the impact of changing policies and programmes of the agencies." This is to be accomplished by surveying and assessing the World Bank's activities in the educational field in less developed countries, and specifically in the area of non-formal education. Such an approach promises not simply "to study just how and why they make certain decisions, who the technocrats who run these institutions and set policy are ..., but also aims at contributing to the scanty literatures on the influence of executive heads in affecting intergovern-


4 On the need to work specifically in this area, see: Simkins, Non-Formal Education, p. 64.

mental organizational effectiveness, the politics of inter-intergovernmental organization politics, the bureaucratic politics of intergovernmental organizations, as well as impact studies of intergovernmental economic organizations.

More specifically, this paper tries to answer such questions as what the Bank has been telling loan and aid recipient "countries in terms of what they will support and will not? How have priorities changed over time? What processes exist in the various agencies for policy development, review, and revision, and how do these processes themselves influence the end product? What effect do aid-receiving countries' political structures and perceptions of the World Bank -- an "instrumental" perspective in relation to their primary goals -- have on educational goal achievement? What effects do the goals and priorities of World Bank officials -- and particularly the executive head who is concerned with institutional continuity and the expansion of tasks and strengthening of the authority of the intergovernmental organization -- have on educational outcomes? And "what are the ideological underpinnings of the

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\[ \text{\cite{Cox, E. B. Haas}}\]

\[ \text{\cite{Finkelstein, Jacobson}}\]

\[ \text{\cite{Schechter}}\]

\[ \text{\cite{Spaulding}}\]

\[ \text{\cite{Cox}}\]
In seeking answers to these questions, what becomes abundantly clear is the importance of several variables in explaining the impact of intergovernmental economic organizational projects: the validity of changing economic development theories and their adoption or rejection by intergovernmental organizational officials, most particularly the executive head; the personal predilections and power of the executive head relative both to this organization and potential donor and recipient countries; the relative efficacy (often correlated with organizational structure), commitment and priorities of recipient country officials, including those involved in the most minute implementational activities, and of course, the validity of educational strategies supported or contrasted to those cast aside.

In seeking to answer these questions and concretize these phenomena, the paper is organized in the following manner: first there will be a cursory overview of the role played by education in the development process, and particularly the rising criticism of formal education as a precursor to the push for exogenous funding of non-formal education programs. This overview will be followed by a discussion of the historical evolution of the World Bank's concern with education as part and parcel of the development process. Throughout these two sections, the importance of evolving economic development theories will become evident; in the latter discussion attention will be focused on the seemingly quintessential importance of the executive head, first George Woods

but much more importantly Robert McNamara. Following these rather extensive introductory discussions, attention will be directed on the specific case of World Bank funded non-formal education projects. Flowing from that analysis—which involves a discussion of recipient country politics as much as World Bank issues—will be a more theoretical summary, and concluding section dealing with the issue of "impact studies," intergovernmental organization policy-making as well as the relationship between exogenously funded non-formal education projects and the on-going debate concerning the dependent relationships, proponents of the N.I.E.O., and defenders of programs of self-reliance. In so doing, the last section necessarily returns to the ever-controversial issue of the appropriateness of the economic development theories endorsed and acted upon by World Bank officials and policymakers in its member countries.

A Methodological Note and Caveats

As noted at the outset this is merely a preliminary paper; further research, including on-site-and at-the-Bank interviews are clearly called for before anything definitive can be reported. However, even at this point, the findings contained herein are based on numerous on-site studies (some resulting from dissertation research and/or World Bank evaluations) as well as discussions with participants in such projects. 

More generally, it is easily conceded that the assessment of impacts of World Bank projects is an extraordinarily convoluted task, no matter what the methodology employed. Indeed several earlier students of the field concluded that:

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14 Even at this point, George Axinn, should be singled out in this regard.
It is unrealistic to focus only on the impact of Bank projects, for the Bank often ties its project loans to changes in the borrower's sector and macro policies, such as agriculture prices.  

Relatively, there is a problem of timing. As an earlier study characterized it:

Perhaps the most serious constraint on assessing the effectiveness of the Bank in benefitting the poor is that it is probably too soon to measure the results.  

The new styles of projects -- such as non-formal education -- only began in the mid-1970's (more on that later) and as most projects usually take five to seven years, systematic inquiries can only now be begun.  

Relatedly, as one of the goals of this study is longitudinal, cross-project comparison, there is the problem that most earlier projects did not have the same sorts of objectives as those in 1982 (e.g., pre-1972, there were no "basic needs concerns" expressed in World Bank undertakings).  

Furthermore, since most educational programs, particularly those that are locally initiated and operated on shoe-string resources (such as the earliest of the non-formal education programs), are not very conscious about the importance of systematic evaluation and maintenance of records of what happens to their clientele, there is a strong possibility of skewed inferences being drawn. "Major achievements, problems,

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16 Ibid., p. CRS-72.

17 Ibid.

and significance are probably sufficiently visible, but lesser known successes and failures are likely doomed to historical obscurity and social scientific ignorance. Moreover, seldom is there any public discussion of the pro's and con's of an educational program before it is undertaken in a "third world" country; "policy formulation is often centralized and hidden." Likewise, "third world" governments and intergovernmental organizations have an "understandable temptation" to avoid any attempt to evaluate effectiveness when that evaluation may reveal findings unfavorable to the program.

Not only must all of these concerns be kept in mind, but so must the very sensible demand that any analyst look at direct effects (on jobs, incomes, increased outputs), indirect effects (such as income and employment multipliers, price effects and the releasing of other resources of investment and side effects, including unanticipated outcomes). As Etherington aptly noted, one can't limit an evaluation of a project to the achievement of its goals, for that overlooks the effects on the underlying social structure and perhaps the impact on the processes which spawned the program in the first place.


21 Alan Etherington, "No Education is Neutral." Commonwealth Conference on Non-Formal Education for Development; Supplement to Committee 4. CCNFED/4/L/3. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, [1979], pp. 3-4. Etherington also suggests that there are unlikely to be good evaluations of programs for which analysts and practitioners have little sympathy, for there is a fear that such evaluations may help a bad program improve and become "perhaps more oppressive or give it a certain unwarranted credibility."

22 Ibid., p. 3.
On the other hand, in order to assess this last set of effects, it does not seem incumbent (even if it were possible) upon the analyst to utilize Scriven's proposed "goal-free evaluation" techniques. Indeed, it seems a bit misguided to deliberately avoid rhetoric related to program goals in that that rhetoric itself can affect policy outcomes.

Although Patton's recommendations to pursue Scriven's methodological suggestions will not be followed, Patton's more general arguments for qualitative research techniques in studying program implementation do seem persuasive and should be followed in studies of this kind. Inter alia, Patton argues that qualitative data require depth and detail -- the requirements of evaluative research. Moreover, Patton's defense of case studies seem persuasive and relevant, indeed worthy of repetition:

While studying one or a few critical cases does not technically permit broad generalizations to all possible cases, logical generalizations can often be made from the weight of evidence produced in studying a single, critical case.

23 "All that should be concerning us," Scriven writes. . . was determining exactly what effects that product had (or most likely had), and evaluating those, whether or not they were intended." Michael Scriven, "Prose and Cons about Goal-Free Evaluation," Evaluation and Comment, 3 (December 1972), p. 1. See also, Patton, Qualitative Evaluation, pp. 55-57.

24 See Schechter, "Assessing the Impact."

25 Patton, Qualitative Evaluation, pp. 22 and 70.

26 Ibid., p. 22

27 Ibid., p. 37. Contrariwise, quantitative research methods must assume that local cities are attempting to implement processes or attain outcomes which can be measured along a standardized set of scales or dimensions, thus disguising a dimensality of qualitative differences among programs. Ibid., p. 66.

28 Ibid., p. 103.
The main objective of the educational system established in the colonial world by the colonial powers was rather straightforward: "to facilitate the economic exploitation of the colonies by the 'mother' countries, for it was realized that if the administrative and economic system set up by the colonial powers was to function smoothly, it needed indigenous staff who could serve as intermediaries and interpreters between the local people and the colonial administration." Thus education was designed to:

- pick out and train from among the workers a chosen body of collaborators who, as technical personnel, foremen, supervisors and clerks, will make up for the inadequate number of Europeans and meet the growing demand of the colonists' agricultural or commerical enterprises.

Thus the educational system in the colonies was established by the foreigners to serve foreign interests. Consequently upon gaining political independence the aim of the leaders of the newly independent states was to have the educational system serve their interest, namely the achievement of development.

In the aftermath of political independence -- most notably during the 1950's and 1960's development was often simply equated with economic growth. This was the period in which Walt Rostow's famous stages of growth theories were in vogue: the development challenges of the newly independent states of Asia and Africa, as well as the developing, but much longer independent states


30 Albert Sarrault as quoted in Ibid.

31 Sambou, "Co-operation Among Developing Countries," p. 617.
of Latin America had much to learn from the development processes of the
formerly underdeveloped states of the Northern hemisphere. 32

This replication of the developed countries' success stories seemed to promise a quick fix: "catching up with the rich country. (What it also did, to a certain extent, was to prevent the developing countries' leadership from elaborating original and viable models of society for their countries.)" 33

In terms of education, what this meant was that the role of education was to produce high and middle-level manpower with the knowledge, skills, and attitudes which would permit the rapid expansion of the economy, not least of all by producing teachers of the teachers. Thus, the object of the educational system was to produce a middle class to replace the former colonial masters. This approach was dignified by the name of "human capital production." 34 Perhaps the most succinct statement of that role was stated by

32 See, e.g., Paul Streeten, "In the Rostovian Tradition," Ceres, 8 (January/February 1975), p. 56. Rostow's non-Communist manifesto argued that development is a linear path along which all countries travel. Development was seen primarily as a matter of economic growth, associated with social change. It was taken for granted that organizing the march along the development path was the main concern of governments. Rostow's linear view begged a host of questions about the nature, causes and objectives of development; it tended to focus on constraints or obstacles, the removal of which would set free the "natural" forces making for the steady move toward ever higher incomes. Obstacles could be overcome with the supplying of various missing components, chiefly capital, foreign exchange, skills and management.


none other than George Woods himself, then President of the World Bank Group:

Whatever else is said about the needs and prospects of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the criterion that really counts when it comes to engineering an escape from poverty is productivity.

The aim of development assistance was to help achieve these ends. Woods continued:

To get more output from a given input should be the motto of all those engaged in "foreign aid" -- or development finance, as I would rather call it ... when a few years ago the Bank began to address itself to the huge problem of education for development, we approached the subject from the point of view of increasing productivity. 35

In this regard, the approach of the World Bank Group was hardly novel. The focus of all those concerned, at this time, with education for development was on productivity: on manpower training, and particularly on developing a professional class.

During the 1960's, education planners began to take their cues from manpower studies -- often crude and superficial -- which tended to emphasize the kinds of highly skilled manpower which only secondary and higher education could provide. 36

The consequence was a massive increase and skewing of educational budgets throughout the developing world; it was not unusual to find 50% of the educational budgets being spent on secondary and higher education, where less than 20% of students were. 37 The educational focus on rapid productivity and


37 World Bank, Assault on World Poverty, p. 279.
a replication of the developed world's experiences also led to an almost exclusive gearing of educational programs "... to the needs of the modern, urban sector, especially those of industry and the public service ...". The underlying philosophy of the "developmentalists" as to the function of the educational system was clear: schooling was viewed as a liberating process, "in which the child is transformed from a traditional individual to a modern one." This transition was expected to enable the child "to be creative as well as functional." Schooling was expected to enable the graduate to contribute to the economy, polity, and society. Thus concern was focused on teaching the requisites of "modernization": time, organization, notions of progress and mobility, acceptance of new ideas, and competitiveness. Further, as some sociologists at the time contended, the educational system in "third world" countries should be organized to provide the "socialization" (e.g., docility, punctuality, discipline, etc.) necessary to permit individuals to absorb on-the-job training more readily and thus to increase productivity. More specifically, one of the most influential educational analysts of the time -- Philip Coombs -- argued that education packages aimed for rural

38 Simkins, Non-Formal Education, p. 21.


40 Grandstaff, Non-Formal Education, p. 21.


development should hope to provide: positive attitudes (e.g., cooperation with family, needed for good working attitudes); functional literacy and numeracy (so one could ingest agricultural and health information); a scientific outlook and an elementary understanding of the processes of nature (e.g., food storage and preparation); a functional knowledge and skills for raising a family and operating a household; functional knowledge and skills for earning a living, and functional knowledge and skills for civil participation.  

Coombs' goal suggests that he accepted the notion that the educational system had an important role to play in forging and safeguarding national unity, a popular view of the time. Portrayed graphically, the role of education in the development process was perceived to be much like Todaro has pictured it.

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The philosophy behind Coombs' analysis, which some have taken to be "policy statements" and which all concede to have influenced "both academic and nonacademic thought, and in turn affected[ed] the thinking of investors and institutions offering assistance from developed countries toward the underdeveloped world," probably warrants some exploration.

To Coombs, the primary concern -- the so-called educational crisis confronting the "third world" -- was the lack of sufficient funds to provide adequate education to the citizenry so that "third world" countries could develop and prosper. In large part, this was perceived to be a problem in the inefficiency of management and technology.

The problems of underutilized labor -- of unemployment and of educated unemployment -- thus were management problems: "... the economy and the schools must be aligned so there are more jobs available and more appropriate training in the schools to fill those jobs." Stated otherwise, the need was to set goals which were attainable and which accorded with the developmental aspirations of less developed countries. Coombs wasn't arguing that "third world" countries were in trouble because of an unequal distribution of education, nor that income inequalities resulted from those unequal educational opportunities. On the contrary, he tended "... to ignore the elimination of social inequalities as an important objective for those in

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47 Ibid., p. 251.

48 Ibid., p. 247.
power. In that way, Coombs' analyses were consistent with a belief in linear, evolutionary progress.

Analyses such as Coombs' were obviously attractive. They promised "third world" leaders the achievement of national development by a rapid quantitative expansion of their educational systems. Moreover, such studies suggested that development was possible without any radical structural changes, either within the developing country or in terms of relations between developed and developing countries. Further, the role for bilateral and multilateral development assistance seemed fairly clearly delineated: provision of funds for school construction and personnel, for textbooks, revising curriculum (to make them more job-related) and training and/or providing teachers.

But Coombs' analyses and policy recommendations weren't without their critics, initially in the academy, but inevitably in policy-making circles in both donor and potentially recipient countries. The criticisms took many forms and included the empirical and the ideological.


50 Ibid.


There were those who, while perhaps endorsing Coombs' policy suggestions, found them impractical. It was clear that universal education, especially if it took the form that it did in developed countries -- formal schooling -- was financially impossible: sufficient capital could never be generated internally, nor expected to come externally. Galtung argued that there really was only one way in which this might be achieved and that was to raise the floor of schooling by giving everybody pre-primary education and perhaps a middle-school education (totaling 10 years), while at the same time lowering the ceiling on education by cutting down on university education.

Other criticisms focused on the inappropriateness of the Western formal school system for the needs of less developed countries. Educational assistance programs of the 60's were criticized for generally attempting to duplicate in the "third world" the school system (but not the comprehensive learning environment) of the developed nations and to clothe the duplication in a rhetoric that links schooling with the development-economic growth process. This transmission of an inappropriate, formal educational system was often explained by "involvement of schoolmen in educational planning" rather than "the result of careful deliberation and choice-making." The result was an overconcern

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53 See e.g., Simkins, Non-Formal Education, p. 2 and W. Senteza Kajubi, "Is the School an Obsolete Institution?" in Deschooling: A Reader. Edited by Ian Lister, [n.p.]: Cambridge University Press, [n.d].


55 Grandstaff, Non-Formal Education, p. 20.

56 Ibid.
with book learning and examinations tending "to divorce the school from the world of reality." The children coming out of such an educational experience were often prepared for a future which didn't exist in their country and actually had a "distaste, if not contempt" for manual labor.  

Simkins explained this in large part by the fact that teachers were often from outside the community, using authoritarian methods.  

There were additional, related problems in the rural sector. Youthful teachers lacked credibility among older persons as did those teaching out of books. Moreover, there were problems of sex bias. Most of the teachers were invariably male, whereas much of the farming done in many "third world" countries is accomplished by females.

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57 Kajubi, "Is the School an Obsolete Institution?", pp. 81-82.

58 Simkins, Non-Formal Education, p. 27. Friere elaborated on this point, by speaking of formal, Western-style education as "banking education" which "... mirror[s] oppressive society as a whole: (a) the teacher teaches and students are taught; (b) the teacher knows everything and the students know nothing; (c) the teacher thinks and students are thought about; (d) the teacher talks and the students listen -- meekly; (e) the teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined; (f) the teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply; (g) the teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher; (h) the teacher chooses the program content, and the students (who were not consulted) adapt to it; (i) the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his own professional authority, while he sets in opposition to the freedom of the student; (j) the teacher is the Subject of the learning process, while the pupils are mere objects." Thus students' creative powers are minimized, which, in turn, is seen as serving the teachers/oppressors' interest, "who care neither to have the world revealed nor to see it transformed." - Paulo Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Translated by Myra Bergman Ramos. New York: Herder and Herder, 1972, pp. 59-60.


60 Ibid., p. 9.
Nyerere went even further. He contended that pupils in his country were learning to dispise their own parents because they are old fashioned and ignorant; there was nothing in the "existing educational system which suggests to the pupil that they can learn important things about farming from their elders."61 A much more widespread refrain was the recognition that formal schooling and the curricula being devised in the 1960's were "... geared almost exclusively to the needs of the modern urban sectors, especially those of industry and the public service."62

Somewhat more in line with Coombs' observations, but reaching different conclusions were those like LaBelle who observed that to the degree that schools "succeed in fostering attitudes conducive to modernization, they may be raising expectations and aspirations to a level beyond fulfillment and thus serve to retard economic output." His argument was something like the following: frustrated school graduates or school leavers would become alienated at the least and perhaps even join the political opposition.63 Ward carried this to its logical conclusion by noting that an uncertainty began to arise about the relationship between the expansion of formal schools and political stability. Whereas, at first it seemed clear that societal unrest was likely to arise if segments of the population were denied education, later it began to be perceived that unrest might be equally probably if people were being educated,


to arise if segments of the population were denied education, later it began to be perceived that unrest might be equally probable if people were being educated, but didn’t find satisfying jobs. Coming from a somewhat more radical ideological perspective, Carnoy criticized formal schooling because it legitimized the "capitalist myth of meritocracy" (i.e., that success or failure in school is an individual responsibility).

Simultaneous with these rising criticisms of the formal schooling concept, and particularly its inapplicability to the developmental aspirations and needs of the "third world" was a "revolution" in economic development theory itself. As ul Haq baldly stated it: "... all of us have finally graduated from a fascination with the means of development [like increased g.n.p. and productivity] to a consideration of its ultimate ends." Smyth nicely summarized the sources of this "revolution," what he characterized, as a sensitivity to the equity criterion in development. He cited four factors: 1) the concern in developed countries, most manifest in the 1960's, with social class and ethnic inequalities; 2) the concern, in less developed countries, with rural-urban and inter-regional inequalities; 3) the heightened political

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cultural assault -- especially in developed countries -- on the utilitarian ethic. 67 The educational consequences were not immediate, perhaps because of the reasons cited by Ward:

On their part, national elites, while often agreeing in principle with these criticisms [i.e., the irrelevance and dysfunction of Western education], found it difficult, in practice, to tear their own nests; and the masses, offered education for the first time, would accept no substitute for places in the same inherited system that had given so many social and economic advantages to the national elites.

(Indeed much empirical data have been accumulated, of late, to substantiate the latter point: the mass attraction to formal schools, where available, even if they do not lead to any immediate job payoff.) 69

These trends culminated in increased prominence and expansion of non-formal education programs. (Depending on one's definition, nonformal education programs have always been an integral ingredient in educational offerings in less developed countries.) Nonformal education was seen as a way out of the dilemma of meeting escalating demands for more relevant education for greater numbers of people while having relatively fixed financial resources. In large measure this was to be through the mobilization of local capacities


68 Ward, "Introduction," p. xvi. Phillips explains the same phenomenon by the vested interest of the local elites, who were themselves educated along traditional lines. H. M. Phillips, "The Reployment of Educational Aid," Ibid., p. 262.

to achieve locally perceived development goals. Nonformal education was expected to "save money" through on-the-job training; thus the use of institutional space, equipment and teachers in job settings rather than school rooms. Further, nonformal education seemed to promise equity of access to education, decreased distance between education and the world of work and life; development of rural areas; accelerated political participation and thus social development; an educated elite who wasn't detached and alienated from society; and even a decrease in the rural-urban migration. Thus the proponents of nonformal education sought to meet all of the problems identified by Coombs as well as all of the criticisms leveled against the expansion of formal educational opportunities, i.e., Coombs' solution to the problem which he identified. In fact, some proponents of nonformal education went so far as to try and round the square by even arguing that as functional literacy grew "naturally" from nonformal education schemes, so eventually would "a demand for [formal] schooling."

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71 Ibid., p. 2.


73 Martin and Howard, "Interim AID Guidance," p. 5.

Not surprisingly, with such high expectations and promises, funds went into nonformal education. And as empirical evidence began to accumulate criticisms of nonformal education proliferated. It quickly became evident that only small numbers of people were being served by nonformal education projects. Moreover, it was clear that such projects focused upon individual changes, not systemic ones — clearly disappointing the more radical opponents of formal schooling. More fundamentally, there seemed to be an important fallacy behind the whole nonformal education movement. LaBelle states it well:

It is widely assumed that nonformal education can transmit new skills and values effectively and inexpensively, thereby contributing to national development and enhancing the status and income levels of marginal groups. Yet our contention is that these groups are disadvantaged not so much because of their lack of skills but, in part, because they lack the formal school credentials which are necessary for advancement. Thus nonformal education — by definition, education without formal credentials — could not alone change occupation levels and improve standards of living: a concomitant change in values and institutions associated with a society's occupations/stratification process was necessary. Simkins reached a similar conclusion; he stated bluntly that the proponents of nonformal education ignored the role of formal education in social stratification. The same certainly couldn't be said for the rural people in "third world" countries who:

75 Evans, "Ghana and Indonesia," p. 226.
77 Simkins, Non-Formal Education, p. 25.
saw formal education as the only channel for their children to escape the stagnant rural sector and obtain a salaried position in the government or private urban sector. Non-formal education was perceived as a design that would deny these opportunities to their children and they were at first reluctant to give full support to the idea of the Village Polytechnic. Due to this pressure, some Village Polytechnics have become more formalized and tried to copy the government's secondary schools rather than promote their original objective.

Bacchus' criticism was of a similar direction, but even more direct:

The substitution of nonformal education for formal education "... might have a negative effect on the productive efforts of the masses for whom an important motivating influence for working hard is their desire to give their children a chance to escape the subsistence and sometimes below-subsistence life which they have to endure.

As Evans put it, nonformal education seemed to permanently socialize people into accepting permanent inferiority, clearly one of the criticisms of formal schooling which led to the promotion of nonformal education in the first place.

The current consensus seems to be that the problem was that some of the proponents of nonformal education seemed to present it as an alternative, rather than a complement to formal schooling systems. But even that argument...

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80 Evans, "Ghana and Indonesia," p. 267. Evans sees Cuba, Tanzania and China as exceptions to this generalization.

81 See, for example, Evans, "Educational Policy Dilemma," passim. The Bank explained this phenomenon as resulting from the fact that nonformal education "... schemes are usually conceived in isolation and, unfortunately, are not designed as components of an integrated structure." World Bank, Assault on World Poverty, p. 290.
is really beside the point. For if both formal schooling and nonformal education seem to fall far short of the claims of their proponents, then combining the two isn't necessarily going to achieve the intended goals either. But rather than wrestle with this issue further on a theoretical level, it seems more useful to turn to the ways in which the World Bank has sought to cope with the very same issues confronted by the academy, although — as will be seen — often with a considerable time-lag.

The World Bank and Education

Initially the Bank had steered clear of loans in the educational sector. Indeed, during the period 1949-1962, Bank officials almost unanimously perceived their function as providing infrastructure investment (especially in the power and transportation sectors) to facilitate the effective functioning of the privately owned products which comprised the economies of most of the less developed countries to which they were making loans.82 This seemed to work well with the requirements of the Bank's Articles of Agreement: loans could be made for specific investment projects only and Bank financing was to be limited to the foreign exchange costs of projects.83 (Few of the major expenditures in the area of educational expansion and/or reform were expected to consume foreign exchange!) Moreover, the Bank eschewed educational loans


83 Ibid., p. 34.
during this period because of the difficulty of measuring the often indirect contribution to development of such projects. Always keeping in mind that the Bank was indeed a bank, heavily dependent upon raising funds on Wall Street, the incentives to support successful and financially lucrative projects was always quite high. Indeed the ideal Bank projects during this period included project aid for specific purposes (e.g., building dams and highways); a great majority of the funds was given to buy goods (usually capital goods) from the developed countries. Such projects were preferred; they were easier to control and evaluate. Indeed Hayter explains the slow movement of the Bank into the educational field by this very fact: it was hesitant, she asserts, to move from "safe" projects, with a minimum of social implications and complications. As has been suggested above, the factors seem a bit more complex or at least numerous.

In part, the explanation seems to be a philosophical and related managerial one. As Adler explains:


It may be a fair guess that in the very early days of the Bank's operations in development finance, the Bank derived very little help from the "outside" while it was groping for a consistent concept of development. As time went on, intellectual innovations conceived on the "outside" undoubtedly did much to change the Bank's views and operating stance. 87

Among these outside influences, Hirschman's view of the growing importance of noneconomic factors, such as education, population controls and cultural behavioral patterns were among the most prominent. 88 Thus by the early 1960's Bank officials came to see the availability of foreign capital as a necessary, but not sufficient prerequisite for development. 89 This phenomenon seems to accord with Asher's observation that the Bank has historically been "... a follower rather than a leader in thinking, about the development process and how to expedite and enrich that process. It has been financially oriented rather than development oriented. 90 Indeed, Asher in a jointly authored history of the Bank explains the enlargement of the scope of Bank lending during the Wood administration -- including the movement into education -- "probably more as the result of a change in the Bank's conception of its proper role than its conception of development requirements." 91 But he recognized that many outside the Bank had broadened the concept of the development process,

87 Adler, "World Bank's Concept of Development," p. 50.


89 Adler, "World Bank's Concept of Development," p. 45.


91 Mason and Asher, World Bank Since Bretton Woods, p. 472.
which naturally suggested an expansion of the scope of the World Bank Group.\textsuperscript{92}

The clearest manifestation of these changes was the decision in 1963 to support a number of educational projects, a clear departure for the Bank and one which involved an open modification of its prior development "philosophy." This departure not simply underscored the acceptance of Hirchman's views that factors other than capital (i.e., skills) were essential to development, but also that development was indeed a slow process.\textsuperscript{93} The formal manifestation of this change took the form of an October 1963 memo from President Woods on Proposed Bank/IDA Policies in the Field of Education:

\begin{quote}
\textit{... the Bank and IDA should be prepared to consider financing a part of the capital requirements of priority education projects designed to produce, or to serve as a necessary step in producing, trained manpower of the kinds and in the numbers needed to forward economic development in the member country concerned. In applying this criterion, the Bank and IDA should concentrate their attention, at least at the present stage, on projects in the fields of (a) vocational and technical education as training at various levels, and (b) general secondary education. Other kinds of education projects would be considered only in exceptional cases.}
\end{quote}

Thus there were clear limits to the departure: the Bank would concentrate on projects in the modern sector;\textsuperscript{94} upper division schooling (during the period

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{92} Mason and Asher, \textit{World Bank Since Bretton Woods}, p. 473.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Adler, "The World Bank's Concept of Development--An In-House Dogmengeschichte," pp. 43-44.
\item \textsuperscript{94} World Bank. \textit{The Assault on World Poverty}, p. 315. See also: Phillips, "Reemployment of Educational Aid," pp. 260-261.
\end{itemize}
1963-69, only 0% of the funds were devoted to primary and basic education, concentrating on technical education and vocational training for industry, commerce and agriculture and continued to maintain "... an emphasis on capital support in educational aid and a preference for supporting technical education segments that afford[ed] the donor the security of using familiar budget and planning procedures. ...". In addition, the original Bank projects in the educational field provided for a major role for UNESCO. Indeed in joint IBRD/UNESCO projects, of which there were many in this period, UNESCO was charged with assuming responsibility for initial project identification, for assisting in project preparation, and for evaluating projects to determine whether they were meeting the educational objectives that were originally sought. (Not long after, the Bank "... found that it had to make its own investigations to a greater extent than had been expected." )

Most importantly, perhaps, the World Bank criteria for approving loans continued to have an "overtly narrow economic orientation." Indeed Woods himself later noted that the form of finance of these early loans was usually determined by the credit worthiness of the country and not the value and/or need for the project.


On the other hand, it is noteworthy that most early educational projects were financed through International Development Association credits and only 10% of the projects in fiscal years 1963-1967 were in countries with per capita incomes above $200 per year. (Indeed, subsequently the income range of borrowers broadened and, in fiscal years 1970-71, fully 56% of the financing was in countries with per capita incomes greater than $200). Mason and Asher have explained this by noting that the "... crying need for such projects and the paucity of domestic resources to finance them helped ... to fan the flames for grants and soft loans to supplement the lending then being done by the World Bank on close-to-commercial terms."

Woods' replacement as President of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, fairly quickly and dramatically expanded the parameters for change in the World Bank's programs, not least of all in the area of educational funding. Again there were related managerial and philosophical reasons for the expanded and altered Bank role.

In part it was simply because of McNamara's own vision of the World Bank. As he bluntly stated in September 1968 in a speech before the Board of Governors: "I have always regarded the World Bank as something more than a Bank, a Development Agency." This assertion, not surprisingly, "was not well received by the many conventional bankers present." But a permissive economic

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102 Mason and Asher, World Bank Since Bretton Woods, pp. 151-152.

climate had been established: the Bank's record in its earlier economic programs had clearly met the economic standards set for them and thus the new President was not to be deterred. Indeed, McNamara's vision was one in which the Bank would perform as a key instrument in the restructuring of the world's economy so that the poorest two-thirds could enjoy a fair share of the earth's resources. McNamara was reportedly "impatient" with those who contended that it was beyond the competence of the Bank to provide such leadership.

More specifically, McNamara had concluded that the educational systems of less developed countries were "all too often" inequitable, favoring city dwellers and the relatively rich and "... in many countries, they have served educational objectives that were irrelevant to economic and social development." Thus, McNamara, concluded:

What is required is that the systems should be reshaped to ensure that all members of society get at least a minimum basic education. More equal educational opportunities would enable the poor to become more productive, and to participate more fully in the development process.

The goal was clearly still economic. As McNamara himself put it:

We have not financed in the past, and we will not finance in the future, any education project that is not directly related to ... economic growth.

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106 Robert S. McNamara, "Preface [and chapter introductions]," in Assault on World Poverty, p. vi.
It is the World Bank's task to determine, in a given situation, precisely what sort of education contributes most to solid economic growth, and to invest accordingly.  

Years after, looking back over this period, McNamara evidenced the coincidence between his views and those of the first wave of educational analysts we have discussed, most notably Coombs:

Ever since the World Bank decided to enter the field of education development in 1962, its aim has been basically one: to help developing countries reform and expand their educational systems in such a way that the latter may contribute more fully to economic development.

In terms of means for achieving these goals, McNamara began much as the first wave of educational analysts did. In his first public speech as President of the Bank, delivered on September 30, 1968, before the Bank's Board of Governors, he declared:

With the terrible and growing shortage of qualified teachers all over the developing world we must find ways to make good teachers more productive. This will involve investment in textbooks, in audio-visual materials, and above all in the use of modern communications (radio, film, and television) for teaching purposes.

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109 Reproduced in The McNamara Years at the World Bank, p. 10.
A year later, McNamara expanded on the same topic. He called for: 1) greater attention to functional literacy for adults; 2) decreased emphasis on physical construction and more on teacher training and curriculum development; and 3) a greater contribution to educational innovation and experimentation (including televised education). McNamara's emphasis on capital support in educational aid and preference for supporting technical education schemes was criticized as insuring their irrelevance. "From the donor side, it takes much more effort, more man-hours, and higher administrative costs to spend a given amount of money in a diversity of small projects, rather than in a large heavy capitalized project." But even these criticisms were soon to be addressed by McNamara.

In a July 1970 memo addressed to the Executive Directors, McNamara called for a broadening of the scope of educational projects and a determination of priorities and selection of projects "on the basis of a thorough examination of the education systems as a whole rather than by a priori designated areas of eligibility which may not relate to the particular country." Still the Bank's focus was on formal educational systems; only "a few projects for adult training -- which would now be called nonformal education . . . " were

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110 Speech to the Board of Governors on September 29, 1969. Reproduced in The McNamara Years at the World Bank, p. 77.


112 World Bank. Assault on Poverty, p. 16.
supported in the period 1968-71.  

McNamara's expansion of the Bank's activities in the educational field required a further strengthening of relations with other international agencies, a challenge to which McNamara brought "... none of the aversion congenital to some of his predecessors." Some saw the net result of this as an erosion of the influence of other international organizations "presumably with greater expertise" in the educational field. UNESCO was most often thought of. Others saw an "uncoordinated proliferation in UN projects promoted by different agencies with different interests..." Still others contended that the diversification of the Bank was weakening other UN agencies.

The expansion also required -- as prophesied -- a much more political role for the Bank. Bank officials themselves identified half of the issue of politicization:

113 Indeed, over the period 1963-71, only 4% of the education funds went for what would now be called nonformal education. See: World Bank, Assault on Poverty, p. 16. See also: External Advisory Panel, Report, p. 14.


115 Aart van de Laar. The World Bank and the Poor. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, 1980, pp. 84-85. "Although the Bank might have financed less than 10% of total educational students in developing countries, its real influence on the allocation of school resources the world over must certainly exceed that of UNESCO. No matter what UNESCO recommends in its normative, project-preparatory capacity, it is the Bank that holds the most powerful financial lines." George Psacharopoulous, "The World Bank in the World of Education: Some Policy Changes and Some Remnants," Comparative Education, 17 (June 1981), p. 141.

116 World Bank, Assault on Poverty, p. 291.

117 van de Laar, World Bank, p. 89.

118 Hayter, Aid as Imperialism, p. 51.
A deeper and more continuous dialogue between the Bank and the borrower is necessary if we are to encourage in the borrower a greater willingness to reform and innovate and if we want to succeed with the projected financing of education. "

The donors -- in the form of the U.S. Congress -- weren't long to follow in manifesting the other half of the politicization equation. 120

But the controversial educational activities of the Bank had only really just started. As McNamara began to travel around the world, he quickly came to the realization that capital investment projects of the Black and Woods eras had had little effect on the rural areas. 121 This proposition was surely buttressed by the opinions of the large influx of "third world" personnel whom McNamara had insisted be brought into the Bank. 122 McNamara was hardly an "originator" of development theory or even critiques of theory. 123 Still he quickly came to see the inadequacy of the "brickle down"


122. When McNamara took over about half of the professional staff was Anglo-American, and fewer than 5% were from the "third world." By 1972, the staff was much more representative of the Bank's membership. Ibid., p. 169. See also: Escott Reid, "McNamara's World Bank," Foreign Affairs, 51 (June 1973), p. 809.

123. Clark notes that most of the ideas of the "basic needs" approach, with which McNamara is so closely identified, came from others. The exception was concern about the population bomb. Clark, "Robert McNamara," p. 173.
approach to economic development. This was the beginning of McNamara's personal endorsement of the basic needs' approach, one aimed at improving the "well-being of the lower 40% of the population through increased productivity and employment and improved income distribution." In educational terms, McNamara established a number of guiding principles. These included:

1) minimum basic education for all, as fully and as soon as resources permit;

2) further education provided selectively, including "... the knowledge and skills necessary for the performance of economic, social and other developmental roles";

3) "A national education system should be viewed as a comprehensive system of learning, embracing formal, nonformal and informal education, all working with maximum possible internal and external efficiency;

4) "In the interest of both increased productivity and social equity, educational opportunities should be equalized as fully as possible."

The aims were clearly both inter and intracountry equity of distribution.

More concretely, McNamara told the Board of Governors in their September 1973 meeting in Nairobi:

Educational systems should stress practical information in agriculture, nutrition, and family planning for those both within and outside of the formal school program.

The greater emphasis "on objectives of social equity" quickly began to show up in educational projects and in the studies and research being conducted by the Bank.

124 Clark, "McNamara Years," p. 6.


126 bid., p. 274.

127 Reproduced in The McNamara Years at the World Bank, p. 255.
Both actual operations and studies reflect[ed] a new strategy, with greater stress on people in the traditional-transitional sectors of the economy which have hitherto been left outside educational systems. The aim [was clearly] to find appropriate ways to enable education systems to promote both economic growth and social justice. This . . . required a comprehensive approach at all levels and areas of both formal and non-formal education and training.  

The allocation of funds tells the story particularly eloquently. Among other things, it shows that McNamara was serious about his concern about and countries could "... afford to invest in higher education, but fail to offer incentives to attract teachers to rural areas . . .". The data also evidence

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128 McNamara. McNamara Years at the World Bank, p. 256.
the mass movement into nonformal education, which naturally and quickly followed
from McNamara's discovery of the inadequacies of "trickle-down" approaches
from the universities and formal schooling in general to help the rural poor.
(The Bank's reevaluation of the formal schooling was credited to its study of
low participation rates -- completion of school -- in heavily populated Asian
countries.)

The Bank's new directions in terms of investment priorities opened
up a whole panoply of questions and risks:

Would the role of sound banker be "undermined" by the social
concerns of helping the poorest in the ldc's and therefore
diminish the Bank's credibility on the creditor side?

Would increased aid to the lowest income countries not
stimulate political and economic rivalry already evident
among the Group of 77?

What would be the fate of a "popular" rural project without
the support or at least the consent of the elite in the less
developed country?

131 A. S. Abraham, "Aid to Education: To Change in Order to Preserve,"

132 Phillips argues that few inferences should be drawn from such data.
He doesn't believe that increased support at one educational level rather than
another should be taken to be an indication of the Bank's priorities. Some
levels of education, e.g., technological institutions and science teaching,
figure largely in foreign aid because they are large consumers of skills and
equipment that need to be imported. They may also be the educational priorities,
but they may not be -- others like primary education, can be top priorities,
but small consumers of external aid. H. M. Phillips, "Criteria and Methods of
Generating-Education Cooperation Projects for External Funding," Comparative
Education, 17 (June 1981), p. 195. Phillips' warning seems useful only as a
cautions against studies which rely solely on quantitative data for inferring
changes in motivation; this study uses a more catholic approach in terms of
sources and methods.

133 World Bank, Assault on Poverty, p. 274.
Can the Bank, as an "outsider," really reach the poorest without losing the credibility in the eyes of the local government?

Isn't there a tension which exists between the Bank's commitment to free enterprise and its new found concern with social and distributional ends?134

The forthcoming investigation of the Bank's activities in the realm of non-formal education seeks to begin to address some of these questions.

The World Bank and Non-Formal Education

Duncan S. Ballantine, Director of the Bank's Education Division, explained the expansion into non-formal education quite simply. He saw it as following "naturally, I think" from McNamara's [previously quoted] D. C. and Nairobi speeches about the small farmer and lower 40% poverty group within and between countries. "Each sector" sought to see and spell out effects on its area; non-formal education was the "effect" on the education sector.

The efforts were manifest in a policy paper which was published in December 1974: "... while we did not depart entirely from the old policies we had followed -- nevertheless we did open up new areas for emphasis."135 Ballantine continued: "In effect, what we are talking about is not so much a new educational policy as a new definition of development."136 Indeed, much of the

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Bank's "experimentation" in non-formal education was expected to take the form of "the development of delivery systems."¹³⁷ "Like President Nyerere," the Bank officials accepted the notion "... that the simple expansion of education may be counterproductive when its content is conceived as only a step to higher levels."¹³⁸

Specific projects followed accordingly. In Mauritania the Bank funded a project to see what the Koranic schools could accomplish for modern education that was "developmental in character." In Ethiopia -- a project subsequently "aborted" by the revolution -- a project was approved which involved building a school to train the village priests to act as change agents in the development process. In both instances, the Bank's aim was to build on what was already there and in which people had already instilled confidence. Indeed, in Upper Volta this took the form of picking up a project originally funded by the European Fund.¹³⁹ In Senegal, the Bank funded projects in which village education centers -- for both children and adults -- were established at the points where the nomads periodically congregated.¹⁴⁰ In Tanzania -- the scene of what some see as the most successful non-formal education projects, under the Bank's auspices and others -- the Bank sought to train 20,000 - 25,000 village managers, people to lead cooperatives, acting as weightmasters.


¹⁴⁰ Ibid.
bookkeepers, etc.  

141 In Chile, the focus was on industrial training.  

142 In addition the Bank "... commissioned a research study designed to discover other types of non-formal education which might be assisted by the Bank."  

143 Thus the aim of the Bank was not simply "... to meet the borrowing country's immediate and most pressing manpower needs" but also to "... encourage more long-term, comprehensive and incisive objectives."  

144 Indeed, this latter aim -- which probably appears to many to be closer to the proper aims of the Bank -- was quickly criticized as injecting educational priorities onto the recipient governments. Whereas in the earlier era, the less active Bank depended upon general procedures in which the recipients' development priorities -- as reflected in their national plans -- were accepted or rejected by the Bank, in the new era the Bank's research and newly expanded development expertise  

145 became part of a "development dialogue."  

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143 Ibid.

144 Ibid., p. 23.

145 This didn't occur until quite recently. One observer noted in 1973, that there weren't "... enough people with influence in the Bank Group [who] knew enough firsthand of what life is like for the poorer people in the low-income countries and for their governments." Reid, "McNamara's World Bank," p. 806. In 1977, the Economics Department was expanded into a Development Policy Staff headed by Hollis Chenery, which significantly improved the technical and country staffs. Clark, "Robert McNamara," p. 170.

For this "development dialogue" between Bank officials and recipient governmental leaders to succeed:

"... it [was] necessary to open the dialogue in a different way and to say we [were] continuing our practice of trying to meet your needs as you see them in the matter of national development priorities, but there are some social problems in the world not being given the attention we think due, and we have earmarked a certain part of our funds for this purpose to which governments can have access."147

A seemingly uncontroversial example often cited was the elimination of "barrios," credited to the urban migration in part resulting from the attraction of formal schools in the urban centers.148 Naturally what some called a "dialogue," others saw as leverage. While not rejecting this notion, Bank Education head Ballantine, underscored that while "too much leverage" by the Bank could result in a "paper accord," there would be no follow-through by country officials.149 Others were less sanguine, however. They noted that even reluctant governments were likely to implement unpopular -- or perhaps inappropriate educational reforms -- in order not to alienate the Bank: For whereas the Bank's education funds were always rather limited

"... the Bank [has] the largest body of expertise in development; it [has] the most important source of information on the economies of less developed countries, and it has a large capacity for commercial lending in addition to aid."150 Others have alleged that such aid -- at times -- might have been

148 Ibid.
150 Murdoch, Poverty of Nations, p. 262.
conditional upon educational reforms which were hoped to "defuse potential revolutionary situations." Indeed, one commentator went so far as to contend that the Bank gave priority to non-formal education in order to create a "contented peasantry" rather than to promote modernization and industrialization. Others, however, noted that while it wasn't clear whether these development dialogues have altered the Bank's priorities, the "change of style" from where the Bank seemed to be certain that there was one right and rational answer to most problems, was "both welcome and right."

An equally significant "change in style" required of the Bank because of its non-formal education initiatives related to the size of projects which it could fund ("economies of scale do not seem to apply to educational systems") and relatedly its ability to evaluate and control those projects. Historically, Bank loan officers set target quotas for countries and judged

151 Hayter, Aid as Imperialism, p. 10.


156 Williams, "Education in Development Countries; View," p. 476. See also: Murdoch, Poverty of Nations, p. 263.
their subordinates on how well they found project outlets to fill those quotas, often complaining that there were not enough big projects. ("Finding outlets for prodigious sums of foreign exchange isn't exactly conducive to Bank officers reflecting on the social consequences of projects they are planning"). 157 This problem -- what the Bank called being "output-oriented," concerning themselves with dollars loaned and projects processed at the expense of quality and ultimate development impact 158 -- appeared to be particularly serious at the end of any fiscal year 159 (as any bureaucrat would expect).

More substantively, the Bank's projects seem to have shown some success in dealing with the problems of primary school leavers -- especially by offering more "relevant" education and by decreasing rural-urban migration and the resultant high levels of unemployment. 160 Such successes should not be underestimated as they were oft achieved over the objections or at least lack of enthusiasm of the local power elite. 161 Bhola notes, for example, that the "power elite" in Bolivia were concerned with finding oil, exporting tin and


159 George Axinn saw this repeatedly in his experience in the non-formal education field and in working with the World Bank in general.


buying other countries' weapons. The concern with education was minimal, but the highly politicized Ministry of Education was willing to "move with the winds." Stated somewhat more broadly, the Bank staff itself had recognized that

Innovations, which are seen by outsiders as necessary to remedy qualitative and financial problems, may often be resisted by the developing country -- and particularly by teachers and ministry officials -- as changes which would downgrade the system and endanger vested interests. They may refuse to participate in experiments which they feel should be tried but in other countries which could better afford failures.

More specifically, there was concern that governments of less developed countries might not feel "sufficiently confident to allow whole-hearted encouragement of non-formal education when this may mean some loss of central control" over resource allocation. The importance of overcoming this political obstacle can not be overstated for the evidence is fairly clear that the more decentralized the administrative structure, the more effective has been utilization of the non-formal education process. Ibanez Salazar explains why:

Experience has shown us that the best non-formal programmes are those in which members of the communities themselves,


chosen by their groups, take part as organized and direct collaborators. They identify with their milieu, its customs, problems, aspirations and language, and are consequently in the best position to carry out efficient work, since they are trusted and respected in their communal groups...  

Indeed, it is not by coincidence that both Bank supporters and opponents point to Tanzania as the area of greatest Bank impact in the field of non-formal education; for it is only in a country like that with a strong commitment and leadership on the top, willing and confident enough to take the risks involved in decentralization that non-formal education can succeed.  

But there are additional problems which Bank projects have had to overcome in order to succeed in the non-formal education arena. For whereas administrative decentralization is required in terms of power to the community, the pluralist nature of federal bureaucracies concerned with non-formal education at the national level is a constant bugaboo for World Bank administrators. The institutional apparatus "in most countries" is "spread all through  

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For example, it was not unusual to find a "piece of non-formal education action" located in the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Campesino Affairs and Agriculture, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labor, universities with service functions (much like our land-grant schools); churches, libraries, museums, and the military and the media. Most of these ministries were "too busy making new regulations and processing forms, to regard adult education as a major part of their functions." Moreover, to get those who had been trained as health or agricultural specialists to see their major task as "education" was a familiar and formidable obstacle. In many countries the Bank found that it was presenting a "... new label in search of a new structure and profession only beginning to find a new identity as non-formal educators." The result, often times, was that ministries appeared to be

169 A good general discussion of this phenomenon can be found in: James H. Cobbe, Governments and Mining Companies in Developing Countries. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979, pp. 76-94.


172 Paul Fordham, "Interaction of Formal and Non-formal Education," Commonwealth Conference on Non-Formal Education for Development; Committee 6. CCNFED/6/L/1. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, [1979], p. 1. The problem was to get extension agents to "... consider themselves as teachers of adults, an idea unfamiliar to many of them, as some prefer to pose as administrators and bureaucrats." Paul Mhaike, "Non-Formal Education Components of Other Development Services." Commonwealth Conference on Non-Formal Education Development. Committee 8. CCNFED/8/L/1. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, [1979], p. 3.
using the out-of-school rhetoric as a way to develop a parallel school system on an extension basis. "The intent was to enable adults and youth to pursue formal schooling goals through flexible time periods and local facilities." 173

Those with a more critical eye wondered aloud why there was something wrong with retaining a system which both government bureaucrats and rural farmers seemed to prefer to the World Bank imposed non-formal education alternative, a preference which seemed even to take the form of subverting the intentions of the Bank bureaucrats by using their rhetoric and their money for other purposes. 174

In addition to having to cope with uncoordinated, other-interested bureaucracies, the Bank found that the "natural constituency" for non-formal education within recipient countries is usually fragmented and much of it had a weak political voice. 175 In part, this was as reflection of the lack of a single ministry or department to serve as its daily advocate, promoter and defender. In part it was a lack of a devoted alumni in high places. (Indeed one commentator contends that non-formal education projects can only be called


175 Coombs, New Paths, p. 78.
a success when such alumni exist. And, in part, it was simply due to the fact that there was little governmental access or concern with people beyond the urban areas.

Finally there are a number of people who found the supposedly successful impacts of the Bank -- in increasing the numbers of trained farmers, cooperative managers and the like -- the source of significant unease. That is, the successful procedural and substantive impacts thus far related came in for loud and vociferous attack. Not only was the Bank attacked -- as suggested by Hass's aforementioned questions -- for its more explicit political involvement in the processes of policy-making in less developed countries, but it was criticized for exacerbating the dualistic societies it was trying to assist. Indeed, some came to find McNamara's entire educational expansion and particularly the massive expansion of support for non-formal education misguided. Williams' observation is typical: He contended that the Bank's...

176 Coombs, New Paths, p. 79.

177 Ibid.


179 Williams, "Education in Developing Countries: View," p. 474.
Evans makes a related point:

any system which becomes a dual set of educational institutions will be seen as prejudicial to the group whose access is limited to the lower-status level. Any such system will face a difficult future either because it does not provide access to channels of mobility, or, in the future when the low-status alternative succeeds in beginning to effectively enfranchise rural groups, because it is a threat to the existing power structure.

Carnoy seems to agree at least on the general proposition. He wonders aloud why the Bank was trying to find ways of supplying "cheap" agriculture-oriented basic training when the demand of the rural families is precisely for urban-type primary education which would allow them to leave the rural areas.

Indeed, Carnoy -- at one point -- tries to push his argument to its logical conclusion. In so doing, he provides an interesting and challenging scenario.


as to the possible (largely unmeasured) impacts of the Bank's movement into the realm of non-formal education:

The bank is pushing countries to increase primary education at the expense of higher education, to invest in rural areas rather than concentrate on the modern sector, to improve quality of education for the poor. These are such that if pursued, will to a certain extent reduce the opportunities of the poor relative to the rich, and could increase the contradictions in societies already beset by contradictions. The education of the unemployed could increase rapidly and perhaps dissatisfaction with unjust distribution of income and wealth increase as well . . . . Most of all, forcing countries to invest heavily in education, especially primary education, could divert resources from other projects which tend to raise incomes of the wealthier relatively to the poor. In this way the Bank may actually be helping to set in motion exactly the kind of radical change which the corporate dualist model sees as unnecessary, indeed, detrimental, to progress. 182

Others are less contentious, but no more hopeful. Ahmed is probably representative:

. . . steps have to be taken to eliminate the duality of full-time formal institutional education and non-formal programmes. For if the latter -- whether skill development, basic services, or "second chance" programmes -- are to succeed, they must be accorded full "parity" esteem with corresponding formal education programs. 183

Ballantine tried to dismiss or at least deflect arguments that Bank supported non-formal education programs are really second class education by contending that the choice in most poor countries is often "between second best and . . . .


nothing."¹⁸⁴ But there is the rub; something hardly unknown to Bank officials. Murdoch summarizes the problem well.

... as long as the [Bank's] new strategy injects aid into a system in which resources are already very unevenly distributed, it will likely cause an increase in inequality. The Bank is of course aware of this danger and has stated its support for land reform and other changes designed to help the poor. However, the Bank cannot force such reform but can only support it where it occurs.

Obviously this last point is where Murdoch and Bank (and non-formal education) critics (in general) diverge. They believe that the Bank's leverage can indeed be exerted in directions such as those to which Murdoch alluded, but the coincidence between Bank interests and those of the ruling elite in less developed countries preclude them making such demands.¹⁸⁶

Others simply believe that the Bank should fund formal schools for those in the rural areas as well. Barber presents this view most vividly, a position which seems to overlook the entire reason why non-formal education evolved in the first place (i.e., costs and school-leaving resulting not simply from perceived educational irrelevance, but also from locational problems and problems of timing the school year to students' life demands).¹⁸⁷


¹⁸⁶ See, e.g., Carnoy, "International Institutions," pp. 256-257.

¹⁸⁷ Evans makes an argument along these lines, see "Educational Policy Dilemma," passim. See also: Ralph M. Miller, "The Meaning of Development and Its Educational Implications," in Education and Development Reconsidered, p. 89.
... the education designed for children in rural areas should not, essentially, be different from that considered suitable for urban children. What is often called "general education" or "basic education" is preferable to special (or vocational or "relevant") education for rural children. 188

The Bank's dilemma is obvious. Having made considerable procedural accommodations -- some which clearly are at odds with the views and interests of some of the staff -- to move into an area which displeases many of the donors, the Bank now finds itself being attacked for exacerbating societal inequalities because it was trying to increase productivity along with enhancing equity (a task many economists view as impossible) while injecting itself into the political affairs of less developed countries as little as possible, because its interests coincided with the power elite of the less developed country, because as a bank it sees the desirability of maintaining domestic and interstate stability and/or because it accepts and practices as much as is possible what its Articles of Agreement dictate.

The result at least to some observers seemed to be a withdrawal from the field of non-formal education, even prior to the assumption to power of the new President of the Bank.

188 Barber, "General Education Versus Special Education," p. 216.

Conclusions

The conclusions need to be brief, only in part because this is a preliminary study. Perhaps equally as important is the fact that the impacts of World Bank activities in the education field -- and particularly in the non-formal education area -- have been portrayed as a series of moving targets. Those targets include both the sorts of projects supported and not unrelatedly the sorts of impacts identified as appropriate for assessment. Thus, when the Congressional Research Service contended that "Some claim that there is not enough examination of who is likely to benefit overall from new style Bank projects..." they were onto something. (Indeed, they were certainly closer to the mark then when they boldly asserted that the Bank's designation of intended beneficiaries in educational projects has made the task of its new Operation Evaluation Bureau much easier.) Indeed, if this study has evidenced anything in regard to impacts, it has shown that few of those writing about or orchestrating non-formal education policies agree on the intended beneficiaries, much less whether those designated are indeed receiving what has been intended. Stated more forthrightly: it appears clear that the Bank's educational policies have evolved in accordance with the evolution of development theories or strategies. McNamara was perfectly right when he asserted that the problem with the Bank's educational projects wasn't a mismatch with development strategies.


191Ibid., p. CRS-119.
but rather that they fit well with the "... basically irrelevant development strategies they were supposed to uphold and sustain." And clearly, one of the main points of difference between the strategies was in terms of who would benefit from such projects. But as the study tries to show, whereas the Bank's strategy clearly evolved from the "trickle down" to "growth and equity," it is not apt to pick up the thoughts of the dependendistas, but it has pursued their policy recommendations anyway, presumably for very different reasons. That is, the Bank has seemingly moved away from non-formal education, but not because the dependendistas convinced it that such activities were reinforcing intranational and international dualism, but rather because of a scarcity of resources and reordering of priorities, or perhaps a returning to normal, more preferable priorities. But in addition to evidencing the difficulty of assessing the impacts of intergovernmental economic organizations in an area in which there has been no single accepted paradigm (either by academics or policy makers), the study has evidenced the impact which executive heads have on intergovernmental organization priorities and consequently impacts on those served and not served. For the study surely evidences that McNamara's push for primary education and then for non-formal education significantly altered the Bank's funding priorities and presumably affected the sorts of individuals served in recipient countries. At the same time the study suggests that the minimal nature of those impacts was due to the fact that McNamara was fighting an uphill battle all along the way, dealing with inexperienced and uncommitted

192 McNamara, "Preface [and chapter introductions]," p. 265.
personnel, with structurally maladapted bureaucracies, over the wishes of some of the Bank's own personnel, against the wishes of major donor countries, in opposition to the wishes of competing intergovernmental organizations and even in opposition to the cultural mores of the intended recipients. In light of these obstacles, it shouldn't be surprising that the impact was both minimal and short-term and that the Bank seemed willing to reverse its policy innovations when the academy began to muster arguments contending that the Bank's policies were ineffectual at best, and perhaps even misguided.

Thus what may be most surprising and interesting is that the Bank pursued the non-formal education route as long as it did and with as much impact as it had. Here, the answer seems to lie in the willingness of recipients of such aid to accept the Bank's funds and experimentation in order to gain other, higher priority goals of their own, knowing full well that in the long-run either the effects of the Bank's projects could be erased or perhaps even in the short-run could be subverted. Not surprisingly then, it was members of the academy more than personnel in less developed countries who expressed their outrage at the Bank's direction.

Thus for the student of intergovernmental organization the findings of this study are somewhat paradoxical. The study clearly evidences the ways in which a powerful executive head, with a clearly articulated organizational ideology, can change the direction of his organization. Moreover, it evidences how that change -- if the leader is one who isn't timid about jurisdictional fights -- can be made even if it means coming into conflict with other (less financially secure) intergovernmental organizations and even if it risks antagonizing some of the major donor states. At the same time, however, the study
indicates how easy it is for the actions of that intergovernmental organization to be frustrated, even if intergovernmental organization bureaucrats have been won over and donor countries have been mollified. Indeed that frustration may even manifest itself in being taken advantage of by clever bureaucrats in recipient countries. Moreover, significant impacts may require the very structural changes in less developed countries which intergovernmental organizations are either incapable or unwilling to seek to achieve.

For the student of development studies, the results are certainly incomplete. All that has been identified are the areas which need to be studied in-depth in micro-impact studies. That is, this study seems to have shed some light on the moving and multiple targets of potential impact by Bank supported non-formal education projects, but empirical data on those limited impacts still need to be garnered. Perhaps less incomplete, but also ambiguous, are the findings relating to the relationship between exogenously funded non-formal education projects and the on-going debate concerning dependency relationships, the N.I.E.O. and defenders of programs of self-reliance. What the study seems to suggest is that the Bank's activities in the non-formal education field have evolved from an acceptance of the theoretical underpinnings of the N.I.E.O., i.e., the need for growth and equity focusing on the poorest of the poor, and abandonment of "trickle down" approaches to aid. But what the Bank seems to have learned -- at least in this instance -- is that there are clear limits to what the liberal solution of the N.I.E.O. can accomplish at least in the short-run (i.e., in the absence of alterations in the ways less developed countries conduct their governmental business, changes in cultural mores relating to school credentialism, etc.). That doesn't necessarily argue that the dependendistas are right, much less that Bank officials have come to
that conclusion. But it does seem to argue that some sort of self-reliant policy or more massive structural reform may be necessary. That doesn't seem in the cards however, especially not for the Bank now with a new executive head and with a set of donor countries (led by the United States) and financiers concerned with economic pay-offs for funds loaned. In the end, perhaps the Bank is a bank and not a development agency, especially not one specializing in innovative educational activities which can only be successfully implemented as part of massive programs of structural reform.
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