If U.S. foreign policy is to be prudent and effective, it must cease relying on the doctrinaire images and cold war rhetoric of the past and take into account five intractable problems, none of them specifically military, that the Soviet Union faces. These problems are: (1) unabating deficiencies in its economy; (2) a precarious battle with communist orthodoxy and alliance management in Eastern Europe; (3) a jittery relationship with China; (4) an adverse shift in the balance of world power; and (5) the constraint which global interdependency and the thermonuclear age impose on the rational formulation of defense policies. The future will be intensely demanding for the Soviet Union because it has achieved global military capabilities at precisely the time its economy appears worn out. U.S. leaders need to undertake frequent fresh appraisals of Soviet threats and realistic capabilities in the domestic and international contexts in which they occur. Defense strategists should not attribute to Soviet foreign policy nonexistent successes, but rather should be critical of claims that the balance of power has shifted to the Soviets. Both countries should agree to a moratorium on the habitual counting of weapons. Finally, the United States should be skeptical about the view that problems besetting Soviet decision makers can be resolved by war. (Author/KC)
Soviet Security in Flux

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Soviet Security in Flux

The uncharacteristic application of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Central Asia with the occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 and far-flung projections of Soviet power in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and all along the world’s major waterways have kept alive the puzzling question of Soviet intentions. Although our historical knowledge is encyclopedic, our understanding of Soviet attitudes toward contemporary events is too often minuscule when it counts most. Whatever its advances for over thirty years, US scholarship on the USSR is still ambivalent, sometimes excessively apologetic or accusatory, and most of the time in doubt about the true political processes in the Kremlin. We simply do not understand enough about decision making in that aged group of Politburo men deciding the fortunes of 270 million of its own citizens and indirectly the fate of mankind. We do not know enough about the impact of our profoundly changed world on Soviet strategic thinking. One reason is that from all appearances they themselves have been slow in recognizing the pervasive changes wrought by the international affairs of our time. Except for a few suggestions to reduce military deployments in Europe, the 26th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (February-March 1981) proved mainly to be a holding operation, not a bellwether of creative insights and certainly not a perceptive analysis of world problems.

Comprehending Soviet motivations, intentions, and actions has never been easy and the stakes have always been high. Today, however, US leaders are grappling with a vastly empowered opponent, tormented by this paradox: never before has the Soviet Union possessed more sophisticated and formidable weapons, yet it suffers from great insecurity and vulnerability. Why this is so merits careful inquiry.

Much of US foreign policy exaggerates Soviet military capabilities by downplaying five intractable problems held over from the Brezhnev era, none of them specifically military, yet all of them critical to national security. If US policy is to be effective, it must moderate its fixations on the habitual enumeration of weapons and their physical dimensions. It must avoid the inevitable seesaw of armsmanship through vows to negotiate from positions of strength based on inflated appraisals of the other side. It must cease relying on the doctrinaire images and cold war rhetoric of the past. At the very least, US policy must be informed by:

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1. unabating deficiencies in the Soviet economy.

2. a precarious battle with communist orthodoxy and alliance management in Eastern Europe.

3. a jittery relationship with China.

4. its true, not fancied, position in the international balance of power.

5. the constraints which global interdependency and the thermonuclear age impose on the rational formulation of defense policies.

The Brezhnev administration is bound to be remembered most for its quantum leap in military stature. No single achievement under Brezhnev's leadership caused more self-doubt and trepidation in Western capitals. By adding a global striking force of conventional armaments to strategic thermonuclear power, the Soviets have posed a new dilemma for the United States: there is no reliable historical experience by which US military planners can anticipate and predict Soviet behavior under such conditions. In 1979 the SALT II Treaty was debated in the US Senate and currently plans are being made by the Reagan administration for the most massive increases in military spending in the history of mankind, but without a clear understanding and agreement about Soviet security perceptions and the likely direction of their foreign policy. No areas of research are more critical to bilateral negotiations for the relaxation of tensions. Yet, both statesmen and scholars have reason to be confounded by extensive studies on the sources of Soviet motivations and conduct, including the mysteries of whether decision makers are reckless or cautious, aggressive or defensive, trustworthy or deceitful.

A prime example of unwarranted conclusions about Soviet strategic intentions occurs in scholarship purporting to show that they believe they can fight and win a nuclear war. The case is built from copious statements, many dating back to the 1960s, culled from military journals such as *Voyennaya Mysl*. Frequently what appears to be rigorous analysis amounts to no more than the stretched assumption that because some military writers believe that nuclear war is not impossible or unthinkable, it is therefore likely and winnable; so the best course is to prepare for it. From this it is deduced that the Soviets are preparing to win it.
Such analysis prompts several reservations. First, even though evidence abounds that some professional Soviet military men may believe the case for winnable nuclear war, others do not, as expressed in the differences between Marshal Ogarkov and Lieutenant General Mil'shtein. One should add that there have been similar differences in perspectives between Nikita Khrushchev and Rodion Malinovsky and between Leonid Brezhnev and Andrei Grechko, one side stressing the benefits of cooperation with the United States, the other, the impossibility of cooperation. Secondly, we know from sociologists such as Morris Janowitz that the innate tendency of military professionals—both Soviet and US—is to exaggerate militancy and the use of force for international conflict resolution. This problem is especially accentuated in the Soviet Union where, because of a restricted press and minimal public discourse and contention, a viewpoint in a military journal will appear to have more support than it actually has.

In charting an appropriate policy on the US side, it is important to recognize the fallacy of merely imitating select Soviet marshals and generals whose views as expressed in military journals in the 1960s have lost significance for several reasons—the passage of time, the achievement of considerable conventional force capabilities, and the stockpiling of nuclear weapons to levels which defy rational objectives. Their views do not necessarily reflect the thinking and policies of the Politburo, and it does not enhance US judgment to reinforce these views through unreserved and uncritical agreement. To put it bluntly, they are most likely wrong. Most of all, it is a non sequitur to aver that because some Soviet experts believe they can win a nuclear war, the Soviets therefore enjoy military superiority and a strategic advantage.*

On the question of preparations for nuclear war with the objective of winning, one must remain skeptical. If the presumed evidence in military journals is the basis for policy, this same evidence was absent in assessments at the 26th Party Congress which outlined the next five years. Granted, the Brezhnev report to the Congress was entirely self-serving (typically, the Soviets accept no responsibility for world tensions); still it contained numerous statements reflecting fear of international military disaster and nuclear war. In Brezhnev's words: "To try to prevail over the other side in the arms race or to count on victory in a nuclear war is dangerous madness."*
intentions is the popular tendency to talk about inferiority, parity, and superiority in categories of weapons, apart from other considerations, such as quality and serviceability; training, readiness, and stamina of their operators; resistance to technical foulups; reliability in achieving missions; national economic base and logistical supports; and the international contexts in which their use is likely to generate allies, enemies, and neutrals—in short the many determinants of military success which cannot be reduced to dazzling charts and bar graphs.5

Concerning the annual debate about the military balance in Europe, facts presented by the respected International Institute for Strategic Studies show that NATO’s GNP far exceeds that of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) countries. In military manpower, enormously complicated by NATO superiority in some areas and WTO superiority in others, it appears that the two alliances are roughly equal making aggression highly risky. Most of all, the Institute’s analysis stresses the impossibility of reducing to numbers such qualitative factors as training, morale, leadership, tactical initiative, terrain, and geographical advantage, all vitally significant in warfare.6 That the Soviets generally deploy greater warhead megatonnage and missile throw weight is a result of their decision to capitalize on an early advantage in rocket thrust and the corresponding US decision to concentrate on accuracy through more sophisticated guidance systems. Reported Soviet advances in guidance are now said to nullify the long-held US lead. Over 300 SS-18s are poised to knock out the US retaliatory force of Minuteman ICBMs. Over 350 SS-20 mobile launchers, capable of being reloaded, place much of Europe at risk. Yet, these impressive strengths are by no means the whole picture or even the most important part.

The Perennial Problem

Of the nonmilitary problems affecting Soviet military capabilities, none is more fundamental than a mix of unfavorable domestic developments, especially the dismal and unreliable performance of their economy. This has to be of considerable embarrassment because it is an area highly subject to direct government controls. Economics is the veritable heart of socialism whose virtues have been extolled as an example to the rest of the world. Poor and erratic performance can only sap the USSR’s international image and the sources of its national power.
Signals of persistent difficulties have been sounded by Soviet officials who have repeatedly castigated the indifference, dereliction, and mismanagement that have become commonplace. Problems continue where they have always been—in economic management, pricing, incentives, labor productivity, food production, transport, and competitive investment priorities—both within single geographic regions of the country and among widely separate regions with markedly different levels of development and labor supply. References abound in the press concerning shortages and poor distribution of industrial raw materials and consumer goods. Indeed, one of the pivotal issues before the Andropov leadership today is how to maintain communism without the economic disabilities of communism.

Evidence compiled by Seweryn Bialer of Columbia University shows plainly that in the past half decade all of these economic problems have worsened because of exhaustion in the major factors for economic growth, and it appears that none of the measures which the government is prepared to employ are likely to cause an upturn in the near future. So monotonous have the disabilities become that the world has become inured to their significance for national security. The Soviet military establishment and its domestic hard-line allies must conclude that, given steadily increasing security problems, successful East-West competition will depend on increasing outlays for advanced military hardware. Yet economic performance shows gloomy shortcomings, plus exceptional strains from a decade of breakneck military spending amounting to 10 to 15 percent of the GNP, compared to US expenditures of 5 to 6 percent. Most of all, the military has to expect strong political and economic arguments against further escalation of defense outlays on the grounds that they lead to economic breakdowns.

By committing themselves to military parity, Soviet leaders have programmed themselves for spending sprees, analogous to those in the United States. Simply put, global reach means massive spending for its maintenance. The consequences are far more oppressive for the quality of life in the Soviet Union because its GNP is less than half of the United States and its standard of living, measured by consumer comforts, lags substantially. By every reasonable estimate, additional military expenses can only attenuate the timetable which for years has promised Soviet citizens a more comfortable life.
The most publicized weakness of the Soviet economy is agriculture. Unpredictable in performance and suffering from chronic bureaucratic inertia and overcentralization, agriculture bears the seeds of two exceptional prospects, one ideological, the other in consumer expectations. Neither is without risk. A simple calculation suggests that production could probably be increased at least 100 percent by doubling the size of private plots where individual farmers, motivated by self-interest, raise the bulk of the nation's truck-garden produce and small livestock. Even by revolutionary standards, this would be a remarkable breakthrough for the quality of life, but such an economically rational decision highlights the fragility of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Utilizing the labor of others in private enterprise necessitates a revision of principles, a step sure to erode Marxism-Leninism. Thus the dilemma of decision makers on such a seemingly simple solution is obvious. Granting the reform would lead to greater consumer satisfaction but at the expense of ideological orthodoxy. And it would lead to a probable spiral in consumer expectations throughout other sectors of the economy which eventually could limit freewheeling defense options. Not granting reform would reinforce stagnation in living standards and sensitize the Soviet working class to reformist demands in Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe.

The Question of the Warsaw Pact

A second great challenge to Soviet national security is posed by the questionable reliability of Eastern Europe as a military and ideological ally. Historically strategic to the defense of the Soviet Union and to the Russian Empire before it, Eastern Europe retained its centrality during the Brezhnev era and will continue to do so under his successors because of two interrelated priorities:

1. an ongoing ideological commitment to the realization of Marxism-Leninism on an international plane.

2. military security, supported by the Warsaw Pact pledge that a threat to any signatory will be considered a threat to all.

Practically speaking, in today's world the East European states of the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) and the Warsaw Pact constitute the only genuine context for the accomplishment of international communism subject to Soviet leadership. Called "international relations
of a new type," the result is a subsystem of highly specialized exchanges and interdependence based mainly on the shared political origins of Eastern Europe's ruling communist party states. The essential countries are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) plus the distant countries, Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam. (The latter three are included because they are formal members of COMECON and serve important Soviet security interests in return for economic benefits and protection.) This predominately East European subsystem is proof that cooperative plans in the name of the loftiest objectives of international communism are productive, doctrinally sound, and realizable—at least in the purview of Soviet leaders.

It has always been a cardinal principle of Soviet foreign policy that once a state is Marxist-Leninist and ruled by a communist party it must not be permitted to evolve into anything else. This explains the massive investments—sometimes peaceful, sometimes punitive—in the GDR, 1953; Hungary and Poland, 1956; Cuba, 1962; Czechoslovakia, 1968; Vietnam during its long war with the United States; and in Poland since 1980 during the rise and fall of its Solidarity workers' movement.

Not surprisingly, the diversity normal to Eastern Europe has provoked in the Kremlin deep suspicions of sporadic reformist trends, any of which could subvert socio-economic life in the Soviet Union. The fear has been that if a contiguous East European state, or any ruling-party state, adopts anything other than a Marxist-Leninist regime, the Soviet Union's security system and even the authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) might well give way. They are simply not geared to withstand the loss of a Marxist-Leninist state to another kind of political system. Nothing in communist ideology prepares them for this possibility.

It follows that traditional military analysis focusing on weapons can only fall short in assessing events in Eastern Europe. For example, it is no exaggeration to say that unprecedented democratic upheavals in Poland in 1980-81, capped by the extraordinary Party Congress in Warsaw, July 1981, plus popular pressures for economic reforms and a rash of both threatened and actual labor strikes all posed as serious a challenge to Soviet security as NATO deployments in Western Europe. Any final verdict on Poland is complicated by an array of worst-case scenarios and the uncertainties of power and author-
ity surrounding General Wojciech Jaruzelski’s military regime. These uncertainties are likely to go on frustrating the Kremlin’s decision making: no matter what actions are undertaken in Poland—or indeed if no actions are undertaken—Moscow cannot attain bona fide communist objectives. No conceivable achievements in weaponry or favorable shifts in the international balance of power would compensate for the irreparable damage to the theory and practice of international relations of a new type which a massive disciplinary incursion against the Poles would cause. Meanwhile, it appears that Polish nationalism will retain its vitality.

Expansive boasts about a socialist commonwealth, socialist internationalism, and international relations of a new type all testify to the significance of Eastern Europe where communist ideals and controls were planted but where they have grown progressively irrelevant as instruments of social mobilization. Organized in 1955 to generalize and legitimize Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact’s military power has been enlisted not against outside enemies but against its own members—notably the Hungarians and Czechs who manifested popular expressions of nationalism, tinged with anti-Sovietism. Martial law in Poland not only spoke eloquently about the shortcomings of communism as a public order system but also bore ramifications without parallel. For the first time, military power was used not against NATO, not against another Pact member, but by a member government against its own people who were caught up in a popular reform movement. Soviet leaders thus have every reason to question how tall they really are when the very heart of communist principles, the dependability of its proximate allies, and even, in fact, citizen support for the government of the Pact’s largest East European member are all momentously uncertain.

Near the end of World War II, opportunities were seized to extend Soviet power westward which in its classical imperialism provided both an East European bulwark and the first substantial evidence that, after a long hiatus, international communism was on the march as Marx and Lenin had predicted. Quite paradoxically, Stalin’s security world was dominated by near failure in the most devastating war in modern history, a war which almost destroyed Marxism-Leninism and at the same time created a unique opportunity for its internationalization through the imperialistic extension of Soviet power.

Since World II, East European communism under the strin-
gent tutelage of its powerful eastern neighbor has faced the most critical test of its history. Wracked by bold and persistent national self-assertiveness, it is apparently failing the test in the only area of the world where Soviet military controls are reasonably certain.

China

A third major challenge to Soviet security emanates from yet another sector of the communist world. The national urges and ambitions of the People's Republic of China (PRC) have produced one of the bizarre political ironies of our time: the communist superpowers intermittently choose to have worse relations with each other than either one has with the capitalist superpower.

Looking back, we sometimes forget that the successes of Chinese communism owe little to the Soviet Union. Having established the PRC in 1949, Mao opted for the policy of Lean to One Side toward the Soviet Union, with the expectation that China would receive massive technological and military aid to fulfill its destiny. But the Soviets seemed to heed Machiavelli's dictum that he who contributes to the power of another ruins his own. Whatever the anticipated gains from adding millions of Chinese to the ranks of international communism, Kremlin leaders concluded that aid to China would only impede the Soviet Union's own development and in addition create a menace along a frontier of nearly five thousand miles. The Kremlin's termination of aid and the recall of advisers, beginning in 1959, exacerbated a variety of squabbles, many with deep roots.

Conflicts resumed where they had always been—over vague frontier demarcations and Chinese claims on Siberia. Most of all, post-Mao leaders have not yet forgiven Moscow for reneging on aid essential to the Chinese dream of standing up in this century. Moscow for its part hardly felt able to boost a population four times its own into the technological future and to reverse centuries of Chinese humiliation and economic inertia.

The most far-reaching consequence of the Sino-Soviet schism has been the loss of Soviet influence and control over Chinese developments, with the result that noncommunist powers have gained a clear edge in influencing the future of a fifth of mankind. Both ominous and irritating to Soviet security perceptions is the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations indicat-
ing that Japan may help to provide advanced technology and economic modernization essential to first-class conventional and nuclear military capability.

It must be stressed that the future will be more worrisome than the present. Chinese imports of military hardware to fortify an antiquated arsenal, even if affordable, would probably generate less Soviet insecurity than the gradual acquisition of a technologically advanced economy for the internal production of modern weapons. To date, China's zeal for grandiose modernization has been tempered by the shortage of development capital, the difficulties of massive borrowing in international money markets, and the lack of a modern infrastructure.

In this instance US foreign policy is complicated by the need to practice empathy, to comprehend likely contingencies and policy options from the Soviet perspective. For the Soviets, China's development programs and manpower have alarming implications, especially when added to the Soviet Union's other demanding defense needs. Kremlin leaders can well ask, what will be the Soviet Union's security problems in several decades when China could be ten or twenty times stronger economically and a more formidable military power? Indeed, their impressions in even a contemporary time frame are hardly reassuring:

Drawing on the help of the imperialist states, Peking expects, in a short period, to considerably bolster its military and economic potential, which it could use to attain its great-power chauvinistic goals. While the Chinese leaders are not abandoning their intentions to pit the USA and the other imperialist states against the Soviet Union, they are being drawn more and more deeply into the mainstream of proimperialist, anti-Soviet policy. The danger of this type of partnership is also compounded by the fact that the Chinese leadership has not shelved its hegemonistic and expansionist policy, its stake on world war, and methods of perpetrating armed aggression against neighboring countries.6

Unfortunately, as yet one cannot speak of any changes for the better in Peking's foreign policy. As before, it is aimed at exacerbating the international situation and at making common cause with imperialist policy. This, of course, will not return China to a healthy path of devel-
opment. The imperialists will not become friends of socialism.

A simple calculation lies behind the readiness of the U.S., Japan, and a number of NATO countries to expand military-political ties with China—to use its hostility to the Soviet Union and the socialist commonwealth for their own imperialist interests. A risky game!9

Of the many setbacks in Soviet foreign policy over the past decade, foremost has been the refurbishing of Chinese-American relations. Initiated by President Nixon’s visit and the Shanghai Declaration in 1972, China and the United States reversed over two decades of bitter hostility and in so doing shifted the global balance of power which previously had been favorable to Soviet interests. At no time was the shift more dramatic than during Deng Xiaoping’s historic visit to Washington in January 1979 which signified the culmination of the normalization process and the loss of the Soviet Union’s mainstay in Asia since 1949.

From all indications, China today is in the hands of leaders who have recovered from the excesses of economic leaps forward and cultural revolutions. Just as the United States was incapable of preventing the Soviet Union from becoming a superpower, so too will the Soviets fail in preventing China from becoming one, if the Chinese muster the wherewithal to do so. However voluminous China’s domestic problems, the country appears to have shelved ideological and revolutionary models of development in favor of four modernizations along more rational and pragmatic lines. For these reasons, it promises to be stronger and potentially more intimidating. It is to be expected that periodic overtures from both sides will seek to ameliorate tensions and continue the uneasy modus vivendi. China’s deep impact on Soviet security perceptions, however, is bound to endure.

Geopolitical Imbalance

A fourth challenge to Soviet security emanates from an adverse shift in the balance of power in world affairs today. Five great power centers—the United States, Soviet Union, European Economic Community, People’s Republic of China, and Japan—dominate. Four of the five are perceived to be anti-Soviet, three with frontiers on the Soviet Union. In sheer numbers this pits the productive energies of 270 million people against
those of over a billion and a half. Simply from a geopolitical standpoint, whatever was gained in the 1970s by Brezhnev's achievement of global military power, including parity with the United States and even superiority in select fields, has thus in the same period been significantly offset by a massive enlargement of opposing economic and military capabilities.

Compounding this asymmetrical pattern since the mid-1970s is an arc of crisis (Zbigniew Brzezinski's phrase) throughout the belt of Islamic nations undergirding the Soviet Union in Middle Asia. Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have all experienced political instability, nationalism, civil strife, economic crises, and surges of religious fervor, perplexing to Western observers and potentially unsettling to the Soviet Union's 50 million Muslims. It is true that for years the Soviet Union's diplomatic and intelligence establishments developed firsthand experience with radical politics in Asia, Latin America, and the postindependence movements of Africa. However, the vulnerabilities of Eastern Europe and the vast expanse of Siberia, plus cumulative uncertainties posed by 350 miles of Turkish frontier, 1200 miles with Iran, 1000 miles with Afghanistan, and close proximity to Pakistan, all bring Kremlin decision makers face to face with a qualitatively new development with unsettling implications. Instead of deep suspicions about a possible two-front war, it has become at least plausible for the military mind to speculate about wars on several fronts.

It is in this broad geopolitical context that the ill-fated incursion into Afghanistan is best understood. Afghanistan, after all, is a country which has been the scene of extensive Russian involvement since the second half of the nineteenth century. It is a country whose peoples have ethnic and religious affinities to peoples just across the border to the north. It is a country which has long been in the throes of political instability and has felt a major Soviet presence dating back to aid programs of the early 1950s.

By late 1979, Soviet hard-liners, aware that the geopolitical and military balance had been shifting against them, were provided with two catalytic events of deep significance for frontier security. Both events served to tip the scales in favor of a bold crisis response. First, following the ouster of the neutralist Mohammad Daoud government in April 1978 and the fall of the first Marxist government in the summer of 1979, rebel Afghan tribesmen continued their defiance of a second
pro-Soviet regime, creating the strong prospect of years of political turmoil along 1,000 miles of common frontier. In the same period, revolutionary events in Iran reached an astonishing climax with the seizure of the US Embassy by militant students who were backed by the Ayatollah Khomeini and his amorphous and confused government. It was the Ayatollah who unwittingly supplied Kremlin strategists with proof that the United States suffered from a poverty of power in the Persian Gulf and could safely be ruled out of any military intervention. This evidence, the patent inability of the US president to protect US property and citizens incarcerated abroad, convinced Soviet leaders of what they could not have known for certain before: it would be unrealistic to expect effective US military opposition to the application of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Afghanistan. Thus the disciplinary incursion was virtually risk free.

As in the case of the placement of offensive missiles in Cuba in 1962, there were diverse objectives in entering Afghanistan:

— to placate Soviet military and other hard-liners,

— to regain the initiative in a country whose socialist government was about to be toppled,

— to achieve strategic advantages in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea,

— to insure access to Middle Eastern oil.

The incursion also made clear that the Soviets did not wish to be counted out of Middle Eastern politics, and it showed determination to counter upheavals which could affect border security.

If the Soviets judged that they had everything to gain and little to lose in a low-risk venture, their lengthy involvement and unexpectedly high casualties prove that they miscalculated. After a great economic and military investment, it does not appear that they are any closer to victory in 1983 than they were when they entered in 1979. Meanwhile they have forfeited the goodwill of the Islamic world, reinforced their interventionist image throughout the Third World, and revealed what the United States could have told them in advance: even an overwhelmingly superior conventional force cannot prevail over indigenous nationalistic guerrillas and attain perma-
ment political goals in a country unless local conditions are favorable. Whatever has been gained from combat tests of modern conventional weapons must surely be balanced against an indictment of Soviet armed forces for taking too long at too high a cost to do what appears to be so simple.

Recall Nikita Khrushchev's ideological dispensions about war and peace at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. His analysis of the balance of forces included observations about the Third World—much of it formerly colonial possessions—which he contended constituted a zone of peace because of its pro-socialist sympathies. One must argue with Khrushchev's prognostications, for many areas of the Third World today are not zones of peace but zones of war. There is not a notable case of a noncommunist Third World country which has provided dependable and significant defense for Soviet interests. All too frequently, political advantages are said to accrue to Moscow from nations which are radical and socialist, and so they are routinely placed in the Soviet column. Such advantages, if they exist at all, are often dubious and temporary because they depend on unpredictable domestic politics, especially unstable leaderships.10

Notwithstanding a variety of involvements and military footholds throughout the Middle East in the past twenty years, the Soviets have suffered reverses, particularly the withdrawal of their troops and advisers from Egypt in 1972. President Anwar Sadat's peace initiative in 1977, the Sinai Treaty, the diplomacy between Egypt and Israel (however fitful and unpromising), and Israeli forays against Iraq, Syria, and PLO sanctuaries in Lebanon all sidelined the Kremlin, indirectly influencing the resolution of Middle East disputes. At one time a cochairman of the Geneva Conference, mediator in Middle Eastern affairs, and an avid defender of Arab causes, the Soviet Union finds itself in the eighties with generally waning influence.

To be sure, the Soviets have scored gains in the Middle East, but the record is at best patchy. Only in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) does a Marxist party hold power. Even there, however strategically located, it is not clear that the PDRY translates into tangible assets for Moscow. Throughout much of the rest of the Middle East, what have been considered footholds and leverage have proved in several important cases to be of limited value. Even in Iraq and Syria, local communist party aspirations and a strong
Soviet presence have been frustrated by fervent Islamic fundamentalism and grassroots suspicions that Soviet interests are not geared to resist imperialism or aid economic development but rather to establish bridges to enter the region. Similarly, Soviet support for the PLO has not translated into meaningful strategic gains. Indeed, given the role of the United States in extricating the PLO from its West Beirut enclave, and the farsighted, potentially beneficial views of Secretary of State George Shultz, the PLO should have reason to doubt the efficacy of their understandings with Moscow. In sum, generalizations about Soviet influence in so vast and diverse a region must be modified by evidence that, first and foremost, the Arabs want widespread economic development for the masses and the natural evolution of their traditional Islamic way of life.

Though the Soviets have demonstrated strong resolve to fashion wide-ranging and varied policies toward developing countries of Africa, direct involvements in each case have been based on invitations to cooperate and not political and military pressures. Complicating their moves, local and regional conflicts have on significant occasions defeated Soviet objectives. For example, by responding to Ethiopia's request for arms beginning in 1976, the Soviets bungled their entree with Somalia which ordered them out in 1977. Angola, in spite of its Marxist government and conspicuous Soviet and Cuban presence, presses for expanded trade and economic relationships with the West. Without underestimating Soviet ambitions, particularly in desiring port facilities for its blue-water navy near the Horn of Africa, it is still true that there are no Soviet satellites in Africa. Whatever the favorable climate of residual anti-Western resentment, abject poverty, and regional animosities, the possibilities of the Soviets converting economic and military aid into dependable political advantage remains doubtful.

How can one resolve such a mixed Soviet record with their claims that a principled class analysis enables the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to determine correct foreign policy and steer confidently through complexities and contradictions; that the decisions of the CPSU highlight the powerful worldwide impact of socialist foreign policy in radically restructuring international relations on a just and democratic basis; in short, that the correlation of world forces militates in the Soviet Union's favor?
One of the issues that eventually divided Washington and Moscow on détente provides a clue to this question of correlations and the riddle of who is ahead and who is behind. Despite agreements with the United States, it is normal for the Soviets to insist that the ideological battle ground remains intact, that the Third World is fair game, and that they are destined to win because of superior principles, logic, and the forces of history. This is an outlook, however. It has not precluded tangible shifts against them in the international balance of power, although it is scarcely possible for them to admit this.14

Another key to understanding perceptual dilemmas of this sort was provided years ago by Robert C. Tucker’s study on the subject of deradicalizing Marxist movements. Seeking to understand the problems of communism in settling down and accommodating itself to the existing world, he explained the discrepancy between persistent ideological goals and the continuing necessity to scale down actual communist accomplishments.

Not only would a Soviet Communist movement in process of deradicalization go on proclaiming its adherence to the final goals of the movement; it would by virtue of the dialectic of the process, reaffirm the goals in very strong terms, as it has done. For intensified verbal allegiance to ultimate ideological goals belongs to the pattern of deradicalization.

Not the end of ideology but rather the growth of a stable discrepancy between ideological symbols and political deeds is the true mark of deradicalizing change in once-radical movements.15

Indeed, instead of witnessing the end of communist ideology, we should be prepared for its rationalizations. It is infinitely easier for Soviet leaders to acclimate to the world around them by manipulating it ideologically than by sticking to worn dogmas justifying its violent transformation. Today, the Soviets may try to compensate for losses in ideological zeal and revolutionary fervor by routinely denouncing the vestiges of western colonialism and imperialism and by offering rhetoric claiming to show a shift in the correlation of forces in their favor. Such rhetoric typically points to class struggles, wars of national liberation, socialist internationalism, and proletarian internationalism and their consequent threats to capitalism.
All this serves to project the US-Soviet balance into a wider arena where the Soviets can claim advantages, contrary to the reality that their security is really dependent on much of the world where they cannot expect permanent advantages whatsoever, a world in which nonmilitary threats to survival are steadily increasing beyond the capacity of any single nation to subdue them.

**Global Interdependence**

For many years, US scholars have combed Soviet writings, seeking evidence of changed perceptions and attitudes promising altered policies. Motivated in the main by peace research and world order values, these efforts have sought diversity and moderation in communism's world view. Confident that the post-Stalin environment was particularly conducive to change, the hope has been that the Soviet Union can be drawn into cooperative ventures to promote problem solving with mutual benefits.

Looking back over the record, not only have there been alterations in doctrine by Nikita Khrushchev, but also a substantial limitation of its role in influencing Soviet analysis of contemporary international politics. William Zimmerman's well-known work, for example, presented a strong case for a striking transformation in Soviet thinking about the influences of international relations on the course of history. One of Khrushchev's greatest legacies was the encouragement of a whole generation of international relations specialists, relatively freed from dogma and attuned to the responsibilities of power and the realities of survival in the thermonuclear age. The research and publications of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and the Institute for the USA and Canadian Studies, directed by Academician Georgi Arbatov, have all signified an expansion of perspectives on major international security issues as well as the refinements of US politics.

Confirming this trend in 1979, a superlative study for the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs stressed diplomacy and negotiations as instruments of accommodation and stability in US-Soviet relations. The study concluded that there are exceptional possibilities for negotiations owing to "... the growing tendency in Soviet ... behavior to revert to forms, and perhaps even the norms, of traditional diplomatic behavior as understood in the Western diplomatic
tradition." It is as if the international community acts as a magnetic force that pulls the Soviet Union into the vortex of a system whose objective is the avoidance of thermonuclear war through peaceful accommodation, whatever the obstacles. Concluding on the theme of new opportunities and new burdens, the study focused on an old article by Nikolai Inozemtsev, the late Director of the Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

As early as 1973, Inozemtsev echoed the theme of common global predicaments confronting mankind, including not only the avoidance of nuclear war but also the preservation of the quality of life. Ecological abuse, resource depletion, and excessive population growth were all seen as problems "of pan-human scale" necessitating global action. In an unusual departure, his analysis seemed to inch away from Marxist-Leninist class conflicts as the chief force for social change to a stress on "contradictions in the development of the human race as a whole." Similar references underscoring the resolution of global problems through international cooperation are to be found in the highly authoritative Soviet journal Kommunist and the monthly journal, The USA: Economics, Politics, and Ideology, published by the Institute for the USA and Canadian Studies. The latter specializes in reviews of US political science scholarship, findings by international peace research institutes, the experiences of senior Soviet scholars at foreign professional meetings, and coverage of joint US-Soviet efforts in space, oceanographic projects, environmental preservation, health care, and a variety of technical fields.

None of this is to argue that Soviet views of US hostility have disappeared. Nor is it to contest the view persistent in Soviet scholarship that doctrinal commitments predispose Soviet leaders toward the judgment that the United States will be antiscialist, antagonistic, and a center of predatory imperialism so long as it adheres to the capitalist system.

What is advanced is that Soviet international relations specialists are well enough traveled and schooled to know that the potential for radical foreign policy gains has greatly narrowed in our time. Their scholarly output has been showing recognition of a vastly changed world which imposes tightening constraints on all actors in international relations, necessitating both perceptual and policy changes, and especially caution. Caution is all the more warranted so as not to dislocate or destroy sectors of the international environment on
which the Soviets themselves have become unquestionably dependent for well-being and survival. The strong likelihood of continued dependency, of course, signifies additional strains for Marxist-Leninist ideology which is not geared to accept permanent interdependency. Whatever the ideological costs, however, prudent self-interest will have to temper radical historical ambition. No reasonable alternatives are apparent.

Focusing for instance on benefits through trade (although experience with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment taught that Soviet sensitivities can be pressed too far), there remains the prospect that Soviet economic problems can be alleviated by importing technology, industrial raw materials, and foodstuffs, and that such necessities will solidify their stake in international stability. On the one hand, they are understandably committed to their East European security sphere and COMECON partners, much of whose economic viability continues to depend on steady supplies of energy, raw materials, and finances. At the same time, despite ideological bombast about the periodic crises of capitalism, the record shows a steady propensity toward expanding economic relationships abroad and firming up a considerable network of ties with technologically advanced capitalist states traditionally considered enemies.

Trade figures compiled by the International Monetary Fund show that from 1974 to 1980 the value of Soviet exports to 20 of the world's leading industrialized nations rose steadily from $7.6 to $22.3 billion and imports from $7.4 to $21.5 billion.22 Central Intelligence Agency assessments place the total value of Soviet commerce with the world in 1980 at $145 billion—$76.5 in exports and $68.5 in imports.23 On the specific matter of technology flows between East and West, it is significant that after the sixties, Soviet and East European leaders shifted from a policy of self-sufficiency to one based on an international division of labor. According to a 1980 study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the rising number of industrial cooperation contracts between East and West has been impressive. The flow has been mainly from West to East, reinforced by the prominent role devoted to foreign technology by the Soviet Union's Ninth and Tenth Five-Year Plans. A major conclusion of the OECD study stresses Eastern Europe's pressing need for Western technology which to expand will require an increase in East European exports to the West.24
However promising the evidence that the Soviet Union has become steadily integrated into a network of international trade, a far more cogent case for global interdependency can be made by confronting the solemn question of whether mankind will self-destruct. For both Washington and Moscow, the tasks of engineering responsible and productive bilateral relationships are unreservedly compelling because thermonuclear weapons have made security indivisible: the security and survival of each inevitably depend on the security and survival of both. As Robert Legvold has so eloquently argued, the task of drawing the Soviets into more cooperative ventures based on convergent interests rests on the proposition that they now have an equal stake in preserving the very international system that they have been historically committed to radically transforming.25

Phrasing the human predicament in starkly apocalyptic terms, Jonathan Schell has underscored the enormous responsibility on both sides by recounting the overlapping and obscene ways in which human beings and other creatures would die if nuclear megatonnage is detonated. He also cocks his eyes to the future.

That so much should be balanced on so fine a point—that the fruit of four and a half billion years can be undone in a careless moment—is a fact against which belief rebels. And there is another, even vaster measure of the loss, for stretching ahead from our present are more billions of years of life on earth, all of which can be filled not only with human life but with human civilization... Yet we threaten, in the name of our transient aims and fallible convictions, to foreclose it all. If our species does destroy itself, it will be a death in the cradle—a case of infant mortality.26

History will probably show that no US-Soviet enterprise has been more crucial in reducing the chances of accidental war and nuclear holocaust than the Hot Line or Direct Communications Link of June 1963. Upgraded and modernized with a space satellite communications systems in 1971, it was designed to facilitate immediate discussions during a crisis. Test messages are reportedly relayed between the superpower capitals on an hourly basis to verify the system’s operational effectiveness. That it has functioned for nearly two decades as a virtual superpower safety net is impressive proof that the parties are capable of high levels of integrity and sophisticated
technical coordination. Both benefit in the interest of what the Club of Rome has aptly called "interexistence." Phrased in their language,

Interexistence typifies what, in the language of game theory, we may call "plus-sum games." This contrasts with "zero-sum games," where the gains and losses of the players balance each other—their sum remains zero. In a plus-sum game each player can gain without thereby causing losses to the others. When we view the planet as a reservoir of a fixed and finite amount of goods and resources, we play a zero-sum game: We assume that what one gains the other will have to lose. When we view the world situation as a field of opportunities for the achievement of mutually beneficial global goals, we play a plus-sum game—we aim to enable all players to gain what they need through mutual cooperation.27

The Future

The future will be intensely demanding because the Soviets have achieved global military capabilities precisely at a time when their economy appears worn out. Their venerable political and economic tenets are under assault, and the orthodoxy of neighboring communist regimes and the East European alliance system are suffering divisive stress. China, having emerged from decades of political soul searching, seems to be moving toward modernization which is likely to produce greater challenges to Soviet interests. The balance of economic, political, and military power in world affairs has tilted against Soviet interests, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Lastly, the apparent acceleration of interdependency (interexistence already being a reality, given the thermonuclear threat), dictates extreme restrictions on superpower adventurism in the name of national self-interest.

The specter that should haunt the Soviet Union is the contradiction between the contemporary world in which it must live and the irrelevant dogmas fundamental to the legitimacy and authority of its leadership. It is a world far more remarkable for its threatening geopolitical realities and global interdependency than for the revolutionary convulsions so essential to a Marxist-Leninist conception of history.

Although there is frequent cognizance, both official and academic, of separate vulnerabilities in the Soviet arsenal, US
policy makers have yet to successfully relate vulnerabilities to each other; to comprehend their intensifying and compound-
ing effects on Soviet security perceptions; to apply them in arriving at a truer picture of opposing military capabilities and intentions; to improve the US capacity to influence Soviet perceptions by an awareness of what they are; and, most importantly, to formulate policies which are lean and efficient. It is certain that as long as Washington strategists lack a com-
prehensive formula for assessing Soviet vulnerabilities, US defense preparations are likely to be exaggerated, misplaced, exorbitant in cost, and unduly risky. A more comprehensive and integrated approach would enable the United States to more precisely match defense spending with realistic needs. Instead of ballooning military redundancy and accelerated obsolesence, there would be a greater incentive to balance military means and political ends. Government spending might even moderate, causing a salutary trend for annual deficits and a host of related economic problems. Bizarre debates over the MX basing mode might be more enlightened.

More than ever, worldwide forces for peace are challenged to magnify the stake of the Soviet Union in the stability of today’s international order. Diplomacy and negotiations must be given a chance to reduce anxieties and threat levels all around. Both Soviet and US leaders must pledge to maintain a diplomatic system whose disruption threatens to destroy us all. Both nations must concentrate on sectors of mutual benefit—most notably strategic arms control, but also trade, technology, agriculture, science, medicine, environmental controls, and development strategies for Third World countries. It is certain that the goal of relating to each other in positive and creative ways cannot be achieved by regressing to the strident vocabu-
laries of the cold war and behaving like a couple of nuclear gunslingers spoiling for a fight.

There is unmistakable evidence that in the Brezhnev era Soviet military requirements underwent profound changes which pose enormous constraints and responsibilities for his successor, Yuri Andropov. US leaders could bide their time and trust that normal evolutionary processes will be benign. On the other hand they could take a bolder course. They could undertake frequent fresh appraisals of Soviet military requirements and realistic capabilities. They could even encourage moderation in Soviet perceptions.

Toward these ends, several recommendations are in order.
First, all of us would profit from a more critical and comprehensive analysis of the Soviet Union’s capabilities and threats, not in isolation, but in the domestic and international contexts in which they naturally occur. Such analysis must include dispassionate evaluations of obvious political and economic vulnerabilities, especially the record of sluggish economic growth and performance. In this connection, it is vastly mistaken to parrot the muzzy notion that the Warsaw Treaty Organization is more formidable than it actually is, especially by avoiding the critical question of East European reliability and by separating the military alliance from its unsettling political, social, and economic environments. (One can ask: how much confidence would US defense strategists have in NATO today if some of its members were billions of dollars in arrears to COMECON banks and had the vivid memories of punitive and disciplinary actions which the Hungarians, Czechs, and Poles know all too well?) Admittedly, this task is a gigantic undertaking, necessitating sensitivity for complexity, nuance, empathy, and judgments which reject single-factor analysis, demonology, and a conspiracy theory of the world.

Second, US defense strategists must take care not to attribute to Soviet foreign policy nonexistent successes, partial successes, or precarious successes which rest on mercurial foreign leaderships and unstable political environments. All too frequently, assessments of Soviet foreign policy are guilty of attempting to out-Lenin Lenin or to out-Andropov Andropov—in short to exaggerate their strategic gains far beyond what even they imagine them to be. This is not to deny that the Soviet Union is a formidable superpower; that its projections of military force endanger fundamental sources of industrial raw materials for the United States and its technologically advanced allies; that its incursion into Afghanistan constitutes a military overreaction against one of the poorest countries of the world; that its forays into Third World countries can destabilize and radicalize political systems in the throes of modernization; and that its worldwide network of espionage includes submarines reconnoitering in foreign territorial waters.

What is called for however is the removal of Soviet accomplishments from the realm of the supernatural and a rigorous balanced assessment of what has and has not been achieved and what can and cannot be achieved. We should be critical of claims that the international balance of power has shifted
in favor of the Soviet Union when abundant evidence indicates that the reverse has taken place. Again, the fallacy lies in subscribing unreservedly to boastful ideological rhetoric about the correlation of world forces in the service of socialism without examining the forces at all, as distinct from doctrinaire wishes about alleged laws of class struggle.

Throughout much of the cold war it became conventional wisdom that, against the status quo policies of the United States, instabilities in developing countries were all conducive to Soviet power and security. It was normal to conclude that the Soviets had a corner on political upheaval because of their revolutionary expertise. The record, however, is more ambiguous. Time and time again, both Soviet and US hopes for dependable strategic footholds in Third World countries have been collapsed by unforeseen local developments. Most particularly, the balance sheet must include Soviet failure to convert China into a long-term ally; their abrupt ouster from Egypt and Somalia; their inability to parley economic aid and close ties with Toure in Guinea, Nkrumah in Ghana, Keita in Mali, Ben Bella in Algeria, and Nimeiry in the Sudan into more permanent political influence; their indefinite military entanglement in Afghanistan; and their uncertain prospects with Islamic fundamentalism and regional animosities throughout the Middle East, especially in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. It would be naive to assume that this record will not continue as long as the bulk of the world’s people grope for economic modernization and political stability—two objectives so frequently incompatible. Nothing in the Soviet record guarantees that they will have an easier time than the United States will have on this score.

Third, we should all agree to a moratorium on the habitual counting of weapons to determine who is ahead and who is behind unless the counting is coupled with genuine comprehensive evaluations of the capabilities of the weapons under stress, the geopolitical settings in which they will be used, and factors critical to achieving their missions. One should avoid deterministic conclusions about the comparative performance of US and Soviet weapons during the Lebanon war. Yet, the clearly superior record of US aircraft, flown by Israeli pilots under battle conditions, can only accentuate the value of qualitative analysis before settling on the military balance based on numbers alone. Pentagon want lists of more and better weapons and the momentum toward supersophistication (gold-plating it is called) should be subjected to more rigorous scrutiny by congressional oversight committees in the future.
Fourth, contrary to popular views, trust is a false issue. Just as abiding mistrust on all sides renders international agreements essential, so too would unreserved trust render them unnecessary. It is the nature of diplomacy that frequently an explicitly detailed understanding is stretched to the limit. What is certain is that US-Soviet agreements will not be observed unless the interests of the parties are unequivocally served. The general observance to date of the SALT Agreement and the unratified SALT II Treaty signifies that agreements will be observed when there is reliable verification, unmistakably convergent self-interests, and a strong emphasis on compliance to insure credibility in future negotiations.

Fifth, we should be skeptical about the view that problems besetting Soviet decision makers can be mitigated or resolved by war. There is no evidence that the Soviets have launched foreign wars to maintain national unity, domestic tranquility, and the authoritarian power inherent in their Marxist-Leninist state. Except for Khrushchev's Cuban missile venture, which, to be sure, nearly produced war with the United States, Soviet security policy has been conducted at low levels of risk and close to home. Of course the unprecedented Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (it was, after all, in Asia, not Eastern Europe) may be signaling greater military threats for the future. If so, the lessons of Cuba and Afghanistan must serve as reminders (just as the experience in Vietnam serves the United States), that foreign interventions come excessively high in both short-term and long-term costs to the quality of life at home. The nagging weaknesses of the Soviet economy and relentless political and economic stirrings in Eastern Europe indicate that vulnerabilities close to home will make extended military forays excessively costly and ill advised.

The foregoing nonmilitary analysis is as much an appeal for additional research as it is an effort to probe the sources and conditions of Soviet insecurity. The Harriman grant to Columbia University is a beginning. What is called for is an intellectual Marshall Plan to evaluate the vast corpus of new data on the Soviet Union and to vitalize our understanding of their security implications in the ninth decade of this century. Such a task must include timely assessments of economic policies on both sides—intended consequences as well as unwanted ones. For example, how true is the proposition that the US strategic position stands to be eroded not only by an unfavorable military balance but also by economic sanctions such as those against sales of European technology for the Yamal
pipeline, sanctions which threatened to disrupt NATO, thereby serving a key communist objective since 1949? Obviously, more questions can be posed than answered. What, for instance, are the tolerance levels of the Soviet economy and consumers long pressed by steadily burgeoning defense costs? To what extent and at what pace can the Soviet economy be subjected to rational reforms without irretrievably disjointing ideological sources of political power? How critical is East European reliability in dictating (or straining) the distribution of Soviet frontier defenses and especially extensive and prolonged projections of military power? To what extent are Polituro perceptions influenced by social discontent in Eastern Europe and its potentially destabilizing effects on Soviet popular attitudes? What do the Soviets perceive to be the optimum techniques for managing their relationship with China, particularly in view of the distribution of international power? How is Soviet defense planning and risk-taking affected by China’s physical and demographic size, coupled with four incipient modernizations with ominous implacations for the future? To what extent do the Soviets believe that stability and predictability in the international system, which they have traditionally considered inimical, must be preserved because the alternatives are too dangerous?

It is clear that given available means, the Soviet leadership is not likely to resolve its security dilemmas. That it coped with them at great cost was a hallmark of Brezhnev’s administration. Most notably he guided his nation through a period of major transformation in military capabilities while the world in which they must be exercised was also transformed. Although expenditures of 10 to 15 percent of his nation’s GNP for several years have led to parity with the United States in important military areas, the results cannot convince his successor that the country is any more secure today than it was ten years ago. Indeed, he should have every reason to conclude that in the thermonuclear age the peculiar affliction of superpowers is that increased military spending purchases less security rather than more.

Just as Stalin found it prudent to depart from Lenin’s world view, and Khrushchev from Stalin’s, so too will Andropov find that Brezhnev’s world view must be revised by the logic and imperatives which none of his predecessors had reason to foresee. His was an era dominated by Soviet security in flux.
Notes

1. Here I agree with George Kennan who has advocated a process of reeducation in the realities of Soviet power.

There are available to us today masses of new factual material on conditions in the Soviet Union—material which, given the rather low state of Soviet studies in our country, has scarcely been digested by the scholars, much less by the policymakers, the critics and the old-timers in this field of expertise. And in this latter category I include myself. I am much aware that it is exactly 50 years ago that I entered on my own career as a so-called Russian expert, and I think that because of this long preoccupation with the subject—not despite it, mark you, but precisely because of it—it is time that my ideas, too, were taken thoroughly apart and put together again with relation, this time, to the present scene, and not to all the memories I cherish, and all the anecdotes I have been accustomed to telling, about the earlier years.


For a contemporary analysis of attitudes (some more hopeful, others more hard-line) toward Soviet motivations and politics, and commentaries by some of the most eminent scholars of the subject, see Robert E. Osgood, Containment, Soviet Behavior, and Grand Strategy (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 16, 1981). Osgood sees two basic attitudes. Analysis A—"The USSR is a conservative, unimaginative, but expansionist state, responding ad hoc to something more than case-by-case opportunism but to something far less than a strategic grand design." Analysis B—"The Soviet Union is a revisionist or revolutionary state which is relentlessly expansionist—not, in the first instance, because of geopolitical insecurity, but because of an inner compulsion that arises from an ideological fixation, the totalitarian nature of the regime, and its search for domestic legitimacy." (I hasten to add that the present study falls in the camp of Analysis A.) For a survey of methodological approaches, including references to a totalitarian model—see Robert M. Cutler, "The Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy: Organizational and Cognitive Perspectives," World Politics, XXXIV, No. 3 (April 1982), pp. 418-436.


* This is not to suggest that the authors cited here constitute the only scholarship on the Soviet Union. Many others, some to be cited later, have presented conclusions denoting pluralism and even moderation in Soviet strategic thinking which US policy should aim to influence. It is safe to say, however, that at the highest levels of policy making in the Reagan administration, the more moderate wing of US specialists on the Soviet Union has not been notably influential.


10. For research which shows that there has been an exaggeration of Soviet influence abroad, see "Soviet Geopolitical Momentum: Myth or Menace?" The Defense Monitor, Vol. IX, No. 1, 1980. Using power ratings for 78 countries developed by Ray Cline in World Power Trends (1980), results indicate a division of the world's power into 20 percent for the pro-Soviet camp (including the USSR), 70 percent for the pro-West and China camp (including the United States), and 10 percent for the rest. According to the Defense Monitor, there was almost no change in these percentages from 1974 to 1979 (p. 6). In the view of this writer, world events since 1979 would still not warrant any significant change in these percentages.


14. For an analysis of the contrived distinction between the Soviet concept of the military balance on the one hand and the more nebulous and manipulable concept of the correlation of forces on the other—a distinction amounting to "cognitive deception"—see Vernon Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," Problems of Communism, Vol. 29, No. 3 (May-June 1980), pp. 9-12.


22. *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1981), p. 387. (Since the USSR is not a member of IMF, figures indicating its trade turnover are derived from reports of other nations.)


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About the Essay

If US foreign policy is to be prudent and effective, it must moderate its fixation on the habitual enumeration of Soviet vs. US weapon systems. It must cease relying on the doctrinaire images and cold war rhetoric of the past. It must instead take into account five intractable problems of the Brezhnev era, none of them specifically military, yet all of them critical to national security. Consideration must be given to the fact that the Soviet Union faces:

1. unabating deficiencies in its economy.
2. a precarious battle with community orthodoxy and alliance management in Eastern Europe.
3. a jittery relationship with China.
4. an adverse shift in the world balance of power.
5. the constraints which global interdependency and the thermonuclear age impose on the rational formulation of defense policies.

In this Occasional Paper, Professor Jamgotch discusses the implications of these problems for US policy and urges more realistic US appraisals of Soviet capabilities and perceptions.

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