This guide is intended to provide journalists with a critical analysis of U.S. media coverage of Lebanon and the underlying issues which make it such a difficult story to cover. It is one of a series of guides treating topics of concern to the U.S. media. The major portion of the guide contains an article, "Reporting Lebanon the Christian Way," in which specific examples of oversimplification, misinformation, and biased selectivity on the part of the media in their coverage of the missile crisis in Lebanon during 1981 are described. For example, during this period most of the media featured news that inevitably led to the conclusion that the crisis was just another battle by Israel and the West against international Soviet instigated terrorism. The guide also contains annotated listings of universities and research centers and nonacademic information sources on the Middle East. The names and addresses of U.S.-based scholars informed about Lebanon are also provided. (RM)
A MEDIA SOURCE GUIDE

Issues for the '80s

REPORTING LEBANON THE CHRISTIAN WAY

The Media in the United States on Lebanon

Don Peretz

COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
777 United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This guide is intended to provide working journalists with a critical analysis of U.S. media coverage of Lebanon and the underlying issues which make that such a difficult story to cover, along with some suggestions of sources for additional background. It was prepared by Don Peretz, Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Binghamton and one of the leading U.S. authorities on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the role of Palestine and the Palestinians in that conflict.

The body of this source guide, while prepared especially for the Council, has been published in Vol. II, No. 4 (1982) of Middle East Insight, which "aims to enlighten public opinion on the political, social, economic, and historical issues of the Middle East, to promote better understanding between the American and Middle Eastern people, and to help search for peace in the area." (From the magazine's Statement of Aims). It is reproduced here with permission from the publisher of Middle East Insight, International Insight Inc., 1715 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.

This guide is one of the series on topics likely to be of continuing concern to the U.S. media. Additional titles and information on their availability are given on the inside back cover. Because of their experimental nature, comments and suggestions by users would be very much appreciated.

The Council on International and Public Affairs has a longstanding interest in working with the media as one of the principal instruments for enlarging American public understanding of international affairs. Through efforts such as this series of source guides for the media, it seeks to strengthen contacts between working journalists and academic and other specialists on major world regions and international problems. Concerned with pluralizing international news flows, especially from the Third World to the U.S., it works in cooperation with media and other organizations in making available additional sources of international news to the U.S. media. Further information about the Council is given on the outside back cover.

Ward Morehouse
President

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The Media in the United States on Lebanon: Part I

Reporting Lebanon the "Christian" Way

BY DON PERETZ

The "missile crisis" in Lebanon during 1981 reawakened American interest in the war ravaged country when it became the focus of the first serious foreign policy dilemma faced by the new Reagan administration. Much of the media simplistically described the crisis as a conflict between the Lebanese Christians, supported by Israel, and Palestinian guerrillas with their Muslim allies backed by the intruding Syrians. This oversimplification completely missed the origins and real issues, often making it appear as just another battle by Israel and the West against international Soviet instigated terrorism. It was not that most of the media overtly linked the Syrians, Palestinians and Lebanese nationalist movement with the forces of evil and the Israelis and Christians with the struggle against terrorism (although ABC's 20/20 Newsmagazine presented a one hour special on April 2, 1981 which did exactly that), but the tendency was to feature "news" that inevitably led to that conclusion.

After Reagan's inauguration until the "missile crisis" four or five months later, most of the media featured articles on international terrorism like Claire Sterling's in the New York Times Magazine of March 1, 1981 which purported to show: "There is now extensive evidence... that for the last decade the Soviet Union and its surrogates have provided support for terrorists around the world." The Soviet's "two chief proxies in this regard" are "Cuba and the Palestinians." Much of the Times article was adapted from Sterling's book, The Terror Network, published in April by Reader's Digest Press/Holt, Rinehart and Winston. A major theme of both book and article was that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was operating Soviet supported terrorist training bases in Lebanon. These are the same bases that

ABC charged were used by the PLO for its terrorist attacks on Israel, and from which, in alliance with Syria, the PLO was seeking to either wipe out or to subjugate the Lebanese Christians.

The book was reviewed by former ACLU Chairman Aryeh Neier in The Nation of May 9 under the headline, "A Sterling Vapor Gun." Neier wrote that instead of proving her accusations, Sterling attempted to "make her case with a torrent of innuendo... When all the adjectives, innuendos, logical fallacies and plain nonsense are cleared away, what is left to substantiate Sterling's conspiracy theory? Precious little!"

In later Times articles its own correspondents seemed to agree with Neier. On March 28 Judith Miller wrote that: "A draft report produced by the Central Intelligence Agency has concluded that there is insufficient evidence to substantiate Administration charges that the Soviet Union is directly helping to foment international terrorism." Another Times piece on May 3 by Philip Taubman headlined, "U.S. Tried to Back Up Haig on Terrorism - But Repeated Intelligence Studies Find No Direct Link to Soviet," explained the difficulties faced by the new administration in linking Moscow with "The Terror Network."

ABC's 20/20 program, dramatically titled "the Unholy War," followed Secretary Haig's lead, purporting to show a direct link between international terrorism, the Soviet Union, the PLO, and Syria. It stated that the Christians of Lebanon backed by Israel are in the vanguard of a crusade to stop the unholy alliance. "The Unholy War is usually seen as being fought between Israelis and Arabs, Jews and Muslims, but the fight is bigger than that. Terror is malignant, it spreads, and it's already infected countries throughout Europe," proclaimed ABC.

Nearly a third of the program was staged in Lebanon where the terror "started in 1975." There, "a force that consists basically of Lebanese Christians has been fighting to keep the PLO and its Syrian allies from taking over their
country.” In Beirut, Lebanon’s capital, “the fight . . . is basically between Palestinians and Christians, not Palestinians and Jews; but the parallels are so striking we [ABC] thought it was all part of the same story”; the story of: “Relentless warfare in the Middle East between Soviet trained terrorists and the world’s toughest intelligence forces” (the elite Israeli counter intelligence forces).

ABC described four Palestinian refugee camps encircling the “Moslem side of Beirut.” With more than 600,000 inhabitants, they are “not unlike the rest of the city, except that they hold approximately fifty thousand armed men.” If the implication is that these 50,000 armed men were all Palestinian “terrorists,” the figure was greatly inflated, for most informed estimates place the total number of Palestinians in all armed organizations at no more than 30,000 (see Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement by John W. Amos II, Pergamon Press, 1980).

A star of the program was Sheik Beshir Gemayel, “the commanding general of the Christian Lebanese forces. Outside of Israel itself, this thirty-three year old man is the PLO’s most formidable enemy . . . By political persuasion and by force of arms, he’s united most of the country’s Christians. He now commands twenty-five percent of the country and over a million people. As such he’s much more powerful than Lebanon’s central government.”

To imply as does most of the media, that Lebanon’s Christians are united is not only misleading, but patently false. Even the country’s largest Christian sect, the Maronites, are engaged in internecine battle for control of the sectors they occupy. Although most members of the dozen or more groups allied against Bashir Gemayel are Muslims, they include the Patriotic Christian Front and the Nationalist Social Party, both pro-Syrian and largely Greek Orthodox, according to an article by Patrick Worsnip in the Jerusalem Post of May 24. While ABC and Bashir Gemayel assert that Lebanon’s Christians back his Phalangist force a good many Maronites dispute the claim. They included the Maronite President of Lebanon, Elias Sarkis, former president Suleiman Franjieh, whose Marada militia has engaged in frequent clashes with Gemayel’s Phalangists for control of Christian areas in northern Lebanon, and Danny Chamoun, son of another ex-president, Camille Chamoun. the N.Y. Times of July 9, 1980 reported that: “A highlight of this internecine struggle came in 1978, when Tony Franjieh, son of former President Suleiman Franjieh, another Christian leader, was murdered by Phalangist gunmen.” As a result of Bashir Gemayal’s attempt to impose hegemony over the diverse Maronite factions: “At least 75 people were known to have died in the fighting between the Phalangists and Mr. Chamoun’s National Liberal Party . . .” according to the same article. The younger Chamoun accused the Phalangists of “treachery,” and said that “he was resigning his position as head of his party’s Tiger militia unit and quitting politics in disgust.” A few days later he vowed to wage an offensive against the victorious Phalangists “to save the Christians from these blood-thirsty madmen,” the Times reported on July 14, 1980.

The general media consumer would have difficulty in perceiving events in Lebanon as other than a conflict between Christians and non-Christians (Syrians, Palestinians, Muslims). Indeed, Near East Report, an influential Washington, D.C. publication widely distributed to congress and the media through the American Israel Public Affairs Committee to explain Israel’s perspective on Middle East events, stated on May 15 that: “The crisis in Lebanon first arose when elements of the PLO began to infiltrate into the country in large numbers in 1968-69 . . . Until then, for 20 years—from Israel’s independence in 1948—a happy peace had reigned between Lebanon and Israel. The Lebanese border was the only quiet one Israel shared with any Arab country.”

According to the Report, Israel engaged in its forays across the northern border, “to defend Lebanon’s Christians from devastation.” In an editorial, “Lebanon for the Lebanese,” on May 8th, The Report stated that there are three concurrent wars in Lebanon: (1) the PLO war against Israel; (2) the Leftist-Muslim-PLO war against the Christians of Lebanon; and (3) the Syrian encroachment, disguised as ‘peace-keeping’ and designed to dominate the country. In 1978 Israel came to the “rescue” of the Lebanese Christians “both as a humanitarian gesture and to protect itself against PLO terror and Syrian threat.” Overlooking the fact, scarcely mentioned in the U.S. media, that Syria received Israel’s consent to enter Lebanon during 1976 (documented in a Jerusalem Post interview with ex-prime minister Rabin), the Report threatened: “the PLO and the Syrians do not belong there. It
is their pressure that crushes the people of Lebanon and creates a threat of war. Every effort must be made to evict them from the country; only so can a measure of peace be restored.”

Before examining the origins and implications of the 1981 crisis, which most of the media has overlooked because of its convoluted character, it should be noted that terms such as Palestinians, Christians, Muslims, Syrians, and Arabs are already loaded with strong biases and emotional overtones. An article on “The Image of the Arab in America: Analysis of a Poll on American Attitudes,” in the Spring 1981 issue of the Middle East Journal, published by the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., asserts that “the American media have broadcast a predominantly negative picture of the Arab personality. Sophisticated content analysis of news coverage as well as monitoring of television has supported this contention... the perception of the Arab as threatening the peace and security has been grossly caricatured on television. Indeed, without the ethical obligation of objectivity, the entertainment media have given us the most extremely stereotyped image of the Arab present in our culture. The Arabs remain one of the few ethnic groups who can still be slandered with immunity in America.”

The article based on results of a poll conducted by a reputable private research organization in the fall of 1980, observed that the low opinion of Arabs, Muslims and the Arab states "seems to be due to the perception that the Arabs are anti-Christian and militantly unfriendly towards the U.S." Attitudes reflected in the poll towards individual Middle Eastern states and leaders were not monolithic—for example, there was a very high opinion of Sadat and Egypt, but a very low opinion of the PLO and Syria. “A large percentage of the respondents feel that the Arabs can be described as ‘barbaric, cruel’ (44%), ‘treacherous, cunning, (49%), ‘mistreat women’ (51%) and ‘warlike, bloodthirsty’ (50%). Furthermore, when asked how many Arabs are described by a long list of traits, a large percentage view ‘most’ of all Arabs as ‘anti-Christian’ (40%), ‘anti-Semitic’ (40%) and ‘Want to Destroy Israel and Drive the Israelis into the Sea’ (44%).” Because many Americans consider their country to be Christian their perceptions of Arabs is that they are anti-American.

In the poll, the Palestinians were apportioned many of the Arab negative stereotypes. “Of the 13 negative traits on the list, eight are cited most frequently as applying to Palestinians... it is significant that the traits which the Palestinians are most often associated with are ‘barbaric’ (23%), ‘treacherous (29%), ‘warlike’ (34%) and ‘mistraters of women’ (23%).”

The relevance of this poll’s results to U.S. media coverage of the Middle East and to the Lebanese crisis in particular is that terminology used to describe parties to the conflict is not only frequently inaccurate, it also feeds American prejudices. In the Lebanese situation “Christian forces” or “Muslim forces” have become the incorrect short-hand terms for Lebanese-Phalangist-Maronite forces or Lebanese-Palestinian-leftists. The
inaccurate terminology both misinforms and
distorts the real significance of the larger
issues which have caused more than a decade
of turmoil in Lebanon, and have led to inter-
nationalization of the conflict so that it could
become a flash point for east-west confronta-
tion.

Rarely has even the most reliable media
coverage described the conflict as other than
a struggle between Christians and Muslims,
leftists, Palestinians, or Syrians. In his ar-
ticles from Beirut for the Washington Post,
Jonathan Randal wrote on May 6 about the
Phalangists, but he also oversimplified by
discussion of "the current round of Christian-
Syrian hostilities." The Post more often than
not discussed the conflict in the latter
terms—it frequently referred to "The Chris-
tian military leader, Bashir Gemayel," or to
Begin's commitments to "the Lebanese
Christian forces." Time magazine occasional-
ly described the battles between "Christian
Phalangist forces" and Syrians, or between
"Christian militias known as Phalangists"
and "mainly Muslim leftists," but the im-
pression conveyed by most Time reporting
and in the other weekly newsmagazines was
that the Phalangists were the Christians.

Limited space and air time are not the only
limitations on reporting the labyrinth of
Lebanese politics. Without knowledge about
the complicated skein of the country's social
history it is almost impossible to fathom why
the Lebanese are killing each other. Aside
from the obvious committed publications
representing perspectives of one or another
party to the conflict there are journals that
offer other than the conventional wisdom
about Christians and Muslims, Soviet backed
terrorists and pro-American Maronites. For
example in the Nation of June 6, 1981 an ar-
ticle by Nubar Hovespian, "The Lebanon
Quagmire," analyzed in less than three pages
some of the prerequisite history necessary to
understand the "missile crisis."

Hovespian placed the origins of Lebanon's
civil conflict in its "system of quasi-
autonomous ethnic religious communities
instituted by the Ottomans, which provided for
a form of centralized control over decentraliz-
ed religious groups," (there are more than a
dozen officially recognized). No single
religious group constitutes a majority,
although the diverse Christian sects out-
numbered the Muslim ones until after World
War II. This "miliet system" was helpful to
and was encouraged by the Europeans "in
their successful political and economic
penetration of the Ottoman Empire."

Conflict engendered by inter-ethnic ten-
sions erupted long before the Palestinians ap-
peared on the scene. An article by Fordham
University professor John P. Entelis, "The
Politics of Partition: Christian Perspectives
on Lebanon's Nationalist Identity," in the
May/June 1981 International Insight, probed
aspects of Maronite nationalist thinking that
helped to spark the inter-communal tensions.
The Phalangists or Kata'ib, Lebanon's
largest and best organized, political group
most represents Maronite nationalism,
although not all Maronites subscribe to its
ideology.

In an attempt to counter Arab and Syrian
nationalism Phalangist ideology traced
Lebanon's origin to ancient Phoenicia
(Phoenicianism) and emphasized the
country's "Mediterraneanism." The
Phalange used "lebanonism" as the foil to
"Arabism," with emphasis on maintaining
the country's territorial integrity and
political sovereignty.

It seems certain, Entelis observed: "that
the rise of Palestinian nationalist con-
sciousness in the form of a revolutionary
resistance movement among Lebanon's
350,000 Palestinian refugees reinforced by
the overt support of many of Lebanon's disaf-
fected Muslim masses, students, leftist
intellectuals, and radical political groups
brought into serious question the legitimacy
of the confessional principle and, with it, the
durability of the Muslim-Christian
'entente'."

Entelis does not blame the Palestinian
presence in Lebanon and its radical politiciza-
tion in the post-1967 period for breakdown of
the confessional system, basis of the
Christian-Muslim entente. However, "it did
create a number of pyschological and struc-
tural conditions which ineluctably led to a
militant, indeed violent, disavowal of the
pluralist formula by large segments of
Muslim elites and masses and smaller but not
inconsequential groups of non-Maronite
Christian elites."

Describing Phalangist apprehensions
about the large number of Palestinians in
Lebanon Entelis wrote: "The Christian
response to Palestinian revolutionism has
been drastic, indeed fanatical. Born of fear, disarray, and desperation radical Christian nationalism, tinged with unmistakable isolationist tendencies, has reemerged among Lebanon's formerly most 'moderate' and 'progressive' Christian-dominated political organization.' Fear of being drowned in a Muslim sea aroused the Phalange to abandon, in the early 1970's, its previous efforts at promoting reformist principles. Instead, it reverted to its fundamentalist origins and engaged in provocative attacks.'

Palestinian rebellion was only one manifestation of Lebanon's social and economic disequalibrium. In his Nation article, Hoveydes' describes the economic deterioration among much of the indigenous Lebanese population during the 1970's. "The increased foreign investment that entered Lebanon never filtered down to the working people... Beirut's reputed affluence presented a facade of stability to outside observers, but internally it aggravated social tension because of the system's inability to deliver the needed goods to its people."

There has been little if any coherent discussion in the U.S. media of the complex tangle of events in Lebanon. Although ABC's, "The Unholy War" blamed Syrian aggression and Soviet inspired terrorism, Syrian troops entered Lebanon in force during June 1976 to restore the balance of power between the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), an alignment of more than a dozen anti-status quo factions allied with the Palestinians, and the Lebanese Front representing a coalition of Phalangists and other pro-status quo, predominantly Maronite forces.

Syria's role in Lebanon was legitimized—by the Arab League which gave Damascus responsibility for manning the Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon, and by Israel through a tacit agreement later confirmed by that country's leaders but scarcely mentioned in the U.S. media. When the balance of forces in Lebanon changed to the advantage of the pro-status quo Maronites, Syria shifted its support to the LNM-Palestinian alliance, much to Israel's chagrin. As the conflict was prolonged, there were frequent incidents of sectarian violence, although it still has not become a war between Christians and Muslims. Hoveydes' notes that "sectarian practices increased at an alarming rate in 1975-76," when old sectarian wounds were reopened. This does not, however, justify the constant American media repetition about the "Christian-Muslim" confrontation, especially as presented in the ABC 'Unholy War' script.

The Christian versus Muslim perception was reinforced by Secretary of State Haig, who, in a widely quoted statement during his visit to Jerusalem in April 1981, accused the Syrians of "brutality" against the Christians. American coverage of Haig, in Jerusalem also cited his "very strong hunch that the shooting in Zahle was instigated by Moscow. The next question is, why now?" Indeed, why at all?; questions that seemed to have been totally ignored by the media, leaving the reader or listener with the impression that the Soviets did have a direct role in the Lebanese debacle. To date no reputable Middle East specialist or correspondent who has consistently covered the story has offered hard evidence of a direct Soviet involvement in the Civil War.

Labor Alignment leader Yitzhak Rabin, Israel's prime minister during 1976, revealed many of the details of the tacit agreement with Syria during an interview in the Jerusalem Post of May 19. Rabin's comments, which were mentioned at the tail end of a New York Times article, refute much of the impression left by coverage in the American press of the Syrian role. The terms were negotiated through U.S. mediation before the Syrians entered Lebanon, and defined in a letter from foreign minister Allon to secretary of state Kissinger. In essence,
the “agreement” contained the minutes of a conversation between Rabin, Kissinger, and ex-President Ford during June 1976. Although Syria never signed the terms, or formally accepted them, there was a tacit understanding which the Syrians observed for five years. On the basis of the agreement, Israel stayed put when Syrian troops entered Lebanon, “and did not have second thoughts about accepting the Syrian presence,” according to Rabin.

He observed that “the Christians publically welcomed the Syrian troops (in 1967) and with their help overcome the Moslem-Leftist-PLO troops at Tel el-Zaatar, for example.” Some Maronite leaders were apprehensive about the Syrian presence and sought a counter-force. They secretly appealed to Israel for military assistance which Rabin’s government offered, not “in place of the Syrians, but parallel to them.” Rabin’s intent was to help the Maronites “to help themselves” with Israel weapons.

After Begin became prime minister, some Lebanese Maronite “extremists” stepped up their efforts to involve Israel in a war with Syria. “We always warned them against it,” Rabin cautioned. However, last April Bashir Gemayel tried to push the Syrians by blocking the main road between Beirut and Damascus near the Greek Catholic city of Zahle which the Phalange occupied. This, in Rabin’s estimation, triggered the whole incident leading to the “missile crisis.”

According to the ex-prime minister, Syrian attacks on Phalange ground troops were forbidden, but “it was not absolutely clear that the Syrians had violated the status quo by sending their helicopters in. Using helicopters is not the same as using planes,” he said. Although Syrian introduction of SAM-6 missiles was a violation, “in strictly tactical terms, the move does not change the situation very much.” It does not really interfere with Israel’s mission in Lebanon or what Israel can do there, in Rabin’s estimation. As a result of the Phalange push near Zahle, and the cycle of escalating incidents, Rabin concluded that “some concessions must be made to Syria to reach a political settlement—‘we’ll have to pay something.’”

As the “missile crisis” threatened to escalate into war during May 1981, American media coverage gave little indication of the extent to which it became a central issue in the Israeli election campaign for the Tenth Knesset. The impression was conveyed that Begin’s pronouncements represented public opinion. An editorial in the Washington Post on May 25 stated that “next-month’s Israeli elections center, to an important extent on this choice,” between Israel’s armed intervention in Lebanon and political manipulation there, or in seeking Lebanese neutrality. The N.Y. Times hinted at the role of the crisis in the election when, on June 14, it ran an article headlined, “Begin and Rabin Battle in Parliament Over Lebanon.” But neither paper indicated the depth or extent of disagreement between Israel’s two major parties over Lebanon. The day to day reporting on the verbal exchanges between Begin and Syria’s president Hafiz el-Assad, Phillip Habib’s shuttle diplomacy, and the events on the ground in Lebanon tended to obscure the origin of both Syrian and Israeli entry into the conflict, the diverse composition of the forces fighting the Phalangists, and the complicated motives of the Phalangists themselves.

There was little reference to Rabin’s perception of the Phalangists as aggressors or to his estimate that the Syrian missiles did “not change the situation very much” or did “not really interfere with Israel’s mission in Lebanon.” David Shipler briefly mentioned the 1976 understanding between Israel and Syria, in his report to the Times from Jerusalem on May 5, but the significance was vitiated by the obscure manner in which it was presented. Aside from the June 14 report in the Times on the Begin-Rabin parliamentary battle, the paper scarcely mentioned the role of the crisis in inter-party disputes within Israel. At the end of a lengthy report from Jerusalem on May 19, mention was made about criticism of Begin’s policy in Israel’s leading daily, Haaretz. It cited an article by commentator Yoel Marcus who wrote: “The pen cries out to write that the man [Begin] has gone mad, that he’s doped up, that he’s under the influence of medicines, that he’s leading the country into a national disaster.”

Begin’s commitments to the Maronites, although not the most significant issue in Israel’s election campaign, were controversial enough to make them a focus of attack by the major opposition party. The Jerusalem Post reported on May 27 that the chairman of
the Labor Alignment charged that Begin had virtually contracted a unilateral treaty with the Christian leadership in Northern Lebanon and given it all the power to determine when, where and how the Israel Defense Forces should intervene in Lebanon. Several Alignment leaders, themselves former commanders of the IDF including Rabin and Haim Bar-Lev, accused Begin of recklessness in his Lebanese policy and commitments. On June 1 the Alignment ran one of its first election advertisements in the Jerusalem Post stating: "The undeniable fact is that Menachem Begin without authority, in an unprecedented move, committed Israel militarily. This was done in an irresponsible manner. Without prior consultation or reflection, without relying on any process of decision making, he committed the Israeli Air Force to support the Christian forces in Northern Lebanon. He thus placed a Syrian or Phalangist finger on the trigger of the Israel Defense Forces. This man cannot be relied upon to bear the responsibility for the conduct of Israel’s defense forces."

Although it may not be the responsibility of the media to alter the perceptions Americans have of Middle Easterners, the press and TV should at least be aware of the dangers of oversimplification or biased selectivity in controversial issues related to the third world. Reportage on the 1981 "missile crisis" is only one example of these tendencies common in media treatment of the Middle East. While it may simplify matters to freely distribute labels of Christian, Muslim, leftist, terrorist, and pro-Soviet, it certainly does not increase public understanding of the crucial questions involved for Americans in the Middle East. The real danger in the media distortions is that they also shape perceptions of important policy influencing bodies like the Senate and House of Representatives committees dealing with foreign relations; committees whose members are more inclined to see events in Lebanon or elsewhere in the Middle East through the pages of the New York Times and the Washington Post than through the Nation or the Middle East Journal. Occasionally the Times, the Post and other dailies feature an analytical piece that might help to rectify the reader’s myopia, but the daily impact of conventional imagery is so great that the rare insightful reporting has almost no affect on the average reader, whether congressman, senator, or political science professor.

Writing about the influence of such stereotypical labeling in the Christian Science Monitor of April 30, John Yemma observes that the danger of the Israeli and Phalange inspired oversimplifications "is that when church, mosque, and synagogue become brick and mortar symbols to rally around, important distinctions are lost—both in the Middle East and to the outside world—and a dangerous polarity occurs." Of course Israel benefits by calling the conflict Muslim versus Christian-Jew because many Westerners will automatically side with the latter. Yemma has talked with "at least one well-informed Mideast analyst [who] predicts that the Phalange more and more will adopt the badge of Christianity in an attempt to enlist worldwide support..." Bashir Gemayel has stressed this theme, and in his discussions with Yemma repeatedly called attention to the "plight of Christians in this part of the world."

Yemma concludes: "It can be a stunning experience to hear a Maronite talk as reverently about Mt. Lebanon as a Jew does about Mt. Zion. Many Maronites wear fashionable gold crosses around their necks, just as many Israelis wear gold Stars of David. Some Phalangists even go so far as wearing the Star of David themselves."
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Located in Washington, D.C., the Institute is a major academic resource center and publishes the quarterly, Middle East Journal, newsletters, books, and other items. Holds annual conferences and other meetings and briefings. Often perceived by pro-Israelis as pro-Arab and by pro-Arabs as U.S. establishmentarian:

Attempts to promote public (including media) awareness of the Middle East without becoming politicized or representing any special interest group or organization. The Council's affiliates are located in the Near or Middle East Studies centers of more than a dozen American universities, including Harvard, Chicago, NYU, UCLA, Princeton, Michigan, and Arizona. MEOC receives assistance from the U.S. Department of Education through Title VI of the NDEA. Details can be obtained from the Outreach Coordinator, Near Eastern Center of the University of Arizona, Tucson.

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Publishes Foreign Affairs and other publications and books on Middle East. Its New York City headquarters has an extensive library, and its staff includes specialists on the Middle East.

Publishes research materials on strategic aspects of Middle East with a right-of-center orientation. Its Middle East scholars are also affiliated with the Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 37 and O Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20057, 202/625-3128.

Has a number of excellent scholars working on Middle East problems for Congress.

Also has several experienced Middle East scholars on its staff.

Frequently has well-established scholars on its staff, working on Middle East and at times, former government officials involved in Middle East problems such as William Quandt, ex-National Security Council, and Hal Saunders, ex-Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs.

U.S.-BASED SCHOLARS INFORMED ABOUT LEBANON

Michael C. Hudson, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 37 and O Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20057, 202/625-3128. Author of The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon.
Michael Suleiman, Department of Political Science, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas 66506, 913/532-6222. Author of Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of a Fragmented Society.

Leonard Binder, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 5801 South Ellis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60637, 312/753-1234. Author of Politics in Lebanon.

Iliya F. Harik, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47450, 812/332-0211. Author of Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711-1845.

Walid Khalidi, Middle East Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, 617/495-1000. Author of Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East.

John P. Entelis, Department of Political Science, Fordham University, East Fordham Road, Bronx, New York 10458, 212/933-2233. Author of Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon, Al-Kata'lab, 1936-1970.

Lewis W. Snider, Department of International Relations and Government, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, California 91711, 714/621-8025. Coeditor of Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues.

John Gulick, Department of Anthropology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514, 919/933-2211. Author of Social Structure and Cultural Change in a Lebanese Village.

NON-ACADEMIC INFORMATION SOURCES ON THE MIDDLE EAST

American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)
444 North Capital Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
202/638-2256

Popularly perceived as the "Israeli Lobby," AIPAC is one of the most powerful influences on American Middle East policy. From its Washington, D.C. offices a wide range of information is available on all aspects of the Middle East in news releases, pamphlets, and in the periodical, Near East Report, which is widely distributed to the press and on Capitol Hill.

National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA)
1825 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009
202/797-7757

Established in 1972 to counteract the efforts of AIPCA, NAAA has become the most prominent of the diverse American groups promoting the Arab cause. Its offices in Washington offer information, occasional pamphlets, and background material on the Middle East.

American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East
330 7th Avenue
New York, New York 10001
212/563-2580

Closely affiliated with American Professors for Peace in the Middle East. The two New York based groups have a variety of publications, hold frequent seminars, sponsor speakers and discussions, usually with a decidedly pro-Israel orientation, although occasionally speakers and articles that do not represent an Israeli perspective are included.

Association of Arab American University Graduates
556 Prapelo Road
Belmont, Massachusetts 02178
617/484-5483

Closely affiliated with the Institute of Arab Studies, also in Belmont, Massachusetts, the organizations publish newsletters, the Arab Studies Quarterly, and other materials intended to counter prevailing stereotypes of the Arabs and to counter the Israeli lobby.

Americans for Middle East Understanding, Inc.
475 Riverside Drive
New York, New York 10027
2/870-2053

This New York City based group which is close to American Church groups publishes The Link, and other items which attempt to encourage American sympathy for the Arab perspective.
American Jewish Committee
165 East 56th Street
New York, New York 10022
212/751-4000

Lebanese Information and Research Center—Affiliated with the American Lebanese League
1926 I Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
202/347-5810

American Friends Service Committee
1505 Cherry Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102
215/241-7000

One of the most influential American-Jewish "defense" groups, ostensibly non-Zionist, but in recent years has presented positions in its publications and periodicals which vary little from the Israeli view.

Affiliated with the American Lebanese League, this Washington based group represents Lebanese-Americans who sympathize with the country's Maronites.

National headquarters in Philadelphia, but has regional offices which distribute peace oriented materials on the Middle East.