Concise, authoritative background information on U.S.-China relations is provided for journalists in this guide, one of a series dealing with topics of interest to the U.S. media. The guide begins with a chronology of U.S.-China relations from 1979 to 1982. The texts of documents on U.S.-China relations are then presented. These include the Shanghai Communique, 1972; Normalization of Relations, 1978; National People's Congress Standing Committee Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, 1979; Taiwan Relations Act of 1979; Reagan's Statement on Ties to China and Taiwan, 1980; Chairman Ye Jianying's Elaborations on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan to Motherland and Peaceful Reunification, 1981; speeches delivered by nationalist leader Chiang Ching-kuo and Deputy Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.; and U.S.-China Communique on Taiwan, 1982. Tables on volume and composition of U.S.-China trade and leading exports and imports are provided; protocols under the U.S.-China science and technology agreement and institutional agreements between American and Chinese universities are listed. The guide concludes with listings of American China specialists and governmental and private organizations working in China. (RM)
U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

The China Council of the Asia Society

COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
777 United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017

1982
INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This guide is intended to provide working journalists with concise, authoritative background information on U.S.-China relations, along with some suggestions of individual specialists and institutions able to provide additional background. It was prepared by the China Council of the Asia Society for the Council on International and Public Affairs.

The China Council since its inception in 1975 has regarded print and broadcast journalists as important brokers in fulfilling its goal of improving American understanding of China, broadly defined. Through its national staff and regional affiliates, The Council provides background materials on recent developments in China, sponsors briefings when events warrant, offers consultation and referrals on specific stories, and assists correspondents prior to posting in the field. For the seventeen American news bureaus in Beijing, the Council has recently begun sending significant but relatively inaccessible articles that bear on current issues covered.

The Council on International and Public Affairs also has a longstanding interest in working with the media as one of the principal instruments for enlarging American public understanding of international affairs. Through efforts such as this series of source guides for the media, it seeks to strengthen contacts between working journalists and academic and other specialists on major world regions and international problems. Concerned with pluralizing international news flows, especially from the Third World to the U.S., it works in cooperation with media and other organizations in making available additional sources of international news to the U.S. media. Further information about the Council is given on the outside back cover.

This guide is one of a series of similar guides dealing with diverse topics likely to be of continuing concern to the U.S. media. Additional titles and information on their availability are given on the inside back cover.

The media source guide on U.S. relations with China and a parallel one on India are also seen by the Asia Society as an experimental first step in its media relations program toward the preparation of a more comprehensive source guide. This follow-on publication will be based in part on the seminar organized by the Society for representatives of the media on "Covering Asia in the 80's" in September 1981. At that all-day symposium, academic specialists and former Asian correspondents identified and discussed future issues in the regions of Asia and the problems involved in covering them.

Because of the experimental nature of this source guide, comments and suggestions by users would be very much appreciated. They should be sent to Richard Bush of the China Council (1785 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, 202/387-6500).

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This Media Source Guide was prepared under a grant from the Language and Area Research Program, Office of International Education, US Department of Education. The content is the responsibility of the grantee institution and does not necessarily reflect the views of the US Department of Education.

1949: Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) established. Nationalists abandon mainland and flee to Taiwan. State Department "White Paper" on China ascribes Nationalist defeat to corruption and incompetence. US follows interim policy of withholding recognition from new government while attempting to disassociate itself from the Nationalists and wait for the "dust to settle."

1950: Under increasing harassment of Americans in China, US withdraws all official personnel, closes embassy and consulates. North Korean invasion of South Korea. Truman reverses policy and orders the US Seventh Fleet into Taiwan Straits to prevent any Communist attack. China enters Korean War as UN forces (over half of which are US troops) approach the Yalu River and Chinese territory. US freezes Chinese assets in the US and begins a trade embargo.

1953: Korean Armistice; several thousand US troops remain in South Korea.


1955: US-PRC ambassadorial level talks begin in Geneva, later to be moved to Warsaw where they continue intermittently for 15 years. State Department rejects Chinese proposal that Dulles and Zhou Enlai meet to discuss "Taiwan and other problems," citing continued imprisonment of 13 Americans in Beijing.

1956: In speech to the National People's Congress, Zhou states that "traditional friendships" between the American and Chinese people will eventually lead to US diplomatic recognition of China.

1958: Chinese precipitate crisis by shelling Nationalist-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.


1966: Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds hearings on US-China relations. President Johnson declares the "US will persist in efforts to reduce tensions between the two countries" (US and PRC). At the United Nations, Ambassador Goldberg announces support of Italian proposal to take a fresh look at seating China in the UN.

1969: Secretary of State Rogers implies United States is prepared to accept principle of "peaceful coexistence" with PRC. US eases restrictions on American travel to China for scholars, journalists, students,
scientists, and members of Congress. US suspends Seventh Fleet patrols of Taiwan Straits. Trade restrictions eased, permitting foreign subsidiaries of US companies to trade with the PRC in non-strategic goods. Sino-Soviet border conflicts encourage Beijing to explore rapprochement with non-Communist powers.

1970: Mao Zedong tells American journalist Edgar Snow that he would welcome a visit by President Nixon to Beijing. US-PRC talks resume in Warsaw but cancelled after two meetings by Chinese in protest over US invasion of Cambodia. US announces it will support entry of PRC into UN as long as it is not at the Nationalists' expense. Selective licensing of direct exports to China authorized.

1971: State Department abolishes travel restrictions to China. US table tennis team invited to Beijing in April. In July Henry Kissinger travels secretly to Beijing; a few days later President Nixon announces he will visit China in 1972 to seek "normalization of relations between the two countries." UN votes to seat People's Republic of China and expel Nationalists' representative (October).

1972: President Nixon makes his trip to Beijing, and Shanghai Communique is issued. The US acknowledges and does not challenge that all Chinese maintain that "there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China"; agrees to progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan "as the tension in the area diminishes," but states its interest in "a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves."

1973: Liaison offices are established in Beijing and Washington, and exchanges between the US and PRC gradually increase.

1974-76: Sino-American relations lose momentum for a variety of reasons. Succession conflicts in both the US (Watergate and the 1976 election) and in China (the deaths of Zhou and Mao) make normalization of relations impossible. Because of the recession and political factors, trade declines to $336 million in 1976 after hitting a peak of almost $1 billion in 1974. China criticizes US-Soviet detente and wonders what role the US will play in Asia after the fall of South Vietnam (1975). President Ford visits China in December 1975 without concrete result.

1977: At the beginning of his administration, President Jimmy Carter reaffirms that normalization of US-PRC relations is US policy. In August Secretary of State Vance visits Beijing for an "exploratory" exchange of views with Chinese officials. One month later, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping terms the trip a "setback" in Sino-American relations, but also notes the PRC's recognition of "special conditions" in the US relationship with Taiwan.

1978: In May National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski visits Beijing to discuss strategic and bilateral issues. In July President Carter's science adviser, Frank Press, leads a delegation of government science
administrators to China. On December 15, after five months of secret negotiations, President Carter announces the normalization of relations between the US and the PRC. Mutual recognition is extended, and diplomatic relations are to begin on January 1, 1979. Formal US relations with Taiwan are ended, but trade and cultural relations are to continue. The US reiterates its interest in a "peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question."

1979:
China begins a campaign for "peaceful reunification" of Taiwan with the mainland. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visits the United States on a nine-day tour (January-February). Agreements are signed on a variety of scientific and cultural exchanges; American consulates are to be established in Shanghai and Guangzhou, Chinese ones in Houston and San Francisco. The two sides state different points of view on the Soviet Union. When the PRC invades Vietnam in mid-February, the US calls for a withdrawal of Chinese troops. On March 2 the US and China initial an agreement settling the issue of frozen Chinese assets and blocked American claims, deadlocked for 30 years. After amendments that provoke Chinese criticism, Congress passes and President Carter signs (April 10) the Taiwan Relations Act, which establishes the American Institute in Taiwan to handle future relations, and specifies future US obligations to the island. In May the US and China sign the claims-assets agreement and initial a trade agreement. In the absence of an agreement on Chinese textile exports, the US unilaterally imposes quotas. The US-PRC trade pact is signed (July). In August Vice President Mondale visits China. He offers $2 billion in Export-Import Bank credits over five years, signs an expanded cultural agreement and a preliminary hydropower agreement. The US Supreme Court upholds President Carter's authority to terminate the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan (December).

1980:
In the context of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Brown visits China. Both sides agree to take coordinated, parallel actions vis-a-vis Pakistan and Thailand (threatened by Vietnam). The US offers to sell China selected non-lethal military equipment. Congress approves the US-PRC trade agreement, thus granting most-favored-nation treatment to China (January). The two sides agree to take separate but "mutually reinforcing" actions to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, reach final agreement on cooperation in developing China's hydroelectric power (March). Vice Premier Geng Biao visits Washington and selected military-installations, and the US allows China to purchase air-defense radar, helicopters, and transport planes, and authorizes American companies to build electronics and helicopter factories in China (May). China protests the US sale of defensive military equipment to Taiwan (June). The US and China conclude a textile agreement (July). Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan elicits protests from Beijing by suggesting that he would restore official relations with Taiwan (August). The two sides sign agreements on establishment of consulates, airline and maritime service, and textile import quotas (September). The US grants Taiwan's representatives the privileges and immunities normally accorded diplomats, provoking a PRC protest (October).
1981: February After suggestions that it might upgrade relations with Taiwan, the Reagan Administration announces that it will honor the "solemn undertakings" made by the United States at the time of normalization. The PRC downgrades relations with the Netherlands after Holland sells a submarine to Taiwan. China's action is seen as a signal to the US not to supply Taiwan with advanced military equipment. June After a three-day visit to Beijing, Secretary of State Alexander Haig reveals that the US will consider on a case-by-case basis the sale of lethal weapons to the PRC. Haig is said to feel that there is "no urgency" for the US to sell advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan. US Government sources report that the US and the PRC have cooperated in secretly monitoring Soviet missile tests. September The US and China sign a new, two-year cultural exchange agreement. Beijing renews and elaborates its proposal to Taipei on reunification, by which it would tolerate the political, economic, and military status quo on the island in return for Nationalist recognition of PRC sovereignty. Taipei immediately rejects the offer. November China steps up its warnings to Washington not to sell advanced fighters to Taiwan.

1982: January Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge travels to Beijing to inform the Chinese government that the US will not upgrade the fighter aircraft sold to Taiwan. Negotiations begin on the future of US arms sales to the island. April Ronald Reagan sends letters to Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping and Premier Zhao, enunciating the basic American approach to US-China relations. May Vice President Bush visits Beijing in an effort to remove the obstacles to a settlement of the Taiwan arms issue. August On the 17th, the US and PRC governments issue a joint communique in which the PRC terms peaceful reunification a "fundamental policy;" the US pledges that arms sales to Taiwan will not increase in "quality or quantity" and ultimately decline.
A. The Shanghai Communique, February 27, 1972

. . . The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The US side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world require efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to reexamine its own attitudes for the common good. . . .

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. . . .

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:
Progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries; Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict; Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all US forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The US side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior US representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.


The Joint Communique

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai communique and emphasize once again that:

- Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.
- Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
- Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
- The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China.
- Both believe that normalization of relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange ambassadors and establish embassies on March 1, 1979.

The United States' Statement

As of January 1, 1979, the United States of America recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. On the same date, the People's Republic of China accords similar recognition to the United States of America. The United States thereby establishes diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

On that same date, January 1, 1979, the United States of America will notify Taiwan that it is terminating diplomatic relations and that the mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Republic of China is being terminated in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. The United States also states that it will be withdrawing its remaining military personnel from Taiwan within four months.

In the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official government representation and without diplomatic relations.

The Administration will seek adjustments to our laws and regulations to permit the maintenance of commercial, cultural, and other nongovernmental relationships in the new circumstances that will exist after normalization.

The United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future. The United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese people themselves.

The United States believes that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic will contribute to the welfare of the American people,
China's Statement

As of January 1, 1979, the People's Republic of China and the United States of America recognize each other and establish diplomatic relations, thereby ending the prolonged abnormal relationship between them. This is an historic event in Sino-United States relations.

As is known to all, the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan is a part of China. The question of Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States. It has now been resolved between the two countries in the spirit of the Shanghai communique and through their joint efforts, thus enabling the normalization of relations so ardently desired by the people of the two countries.

As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China's internal affair.

At the invitation of the U.S. Government, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Deputy Prime Minister of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, will pay an official visit to the United States in January 1979, with a view to further promoting the friendship between the two peoples and good relations between the two countries.

The Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress at its Fifth Plenary Session on December 26, 1978 adopted after discussion a message to compatriots in Taiwan. Following is the full text of the message.—Ed.

Dear Compatriots in Taiwan:

Today is New Year's Day 1979. We hereby extend our cordial and sincere greetings to you on behalf of the people of all nationalities on the mainland of our motherland.

As an old saying goes, "When festival times come round people think all the more of their loved ones." On this happy occasion as we celebrate New Year's Day, our thoughts turn all the more to our kith and kin, our old folks, our brothers and sisters, in Taiwan. We know you have the motherland and your kinsfolk on the mainland in mind, too. This mutual feeling of many years standing grows with each passing day. From the day when Taiwan was unfortunately separated from the motherland in 1949, we have not been able to communicate with or visit each other, our motherland has not been able to achieve reunification, relatives have been unable to get together, and our nation, country and people have suffered greatly as a result. All Chinese compatriots and people of Chinese descent throughout the world look forward to an early end to this regrettable state of affairs.

The Chinese nation is a great nation. It accounts for almost a quarter of the world's population and has a long history and brilliant culture, and its outstanding contributions to world civilization and human progress are universally recognized. Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times. The Chinese nation has great vitality and cohesion. Throughout its history, foreign invasions and internal strife have failed to split our nation permanently. Taiwan's separation from the motherland for nearly 30 years has been artificial and against our national interests and aspirations, and this state of affairs must not be allowed to continue. Every Chinese, in Taiwan or on the mainland, has a compelling responsibility for the survival, growth and prosperity of the Chinese nation. The important task of reunifying our motherland, on which hinges the future of the whole nation, now lies before us all; it is an issue no one can evade or should try to. If we do not quickly set about ending this disunity so that our motherland is reunified at an early date, how can we answer our ancestors and explain to our descendants? This sentiment is shared by all. Who among the descendants of the Yellow Emperor wishes to go down in history as a traitor?

Radical changes have taken place in China's status in the world over the past 30 years. Our country's international prestige is rising constantly and its international role becomes ever more important. The people and governments of almost all countries place tremendous hopes on us in the struggle against hegemonism and in safeguarding peace and stability in Asia and the world as a whole. Every Chinese is proud to see the growing strength and prosperity of our motherland. If we can end the present disunity and join forces soon, there will be no end to our contributions to the future of mankind. Early reunification of our motherland is not only the common desire of all the people of China, including our compatriots in Taiwan, but the common wish of all peace-loving peoples and countries the world over.

Reunification of China today is consonant with popular sentiment and the general trend of development. The world in general recognizes only one China, with the Government of the People's Republic of China as its sole legal
Government. The recent conclusion of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the normalization of relations between China and the United States show still more clearly that no one can stop this trend. The present situation in the motherland, one of stability and unity, is better than ever. The people of all nationalities on the mainland are working hard with one will for the great goal of the four modernizations. It is our fervent hope that Taiwan returns to the embrace of the motherland at an early date so that we can work together for the great cause of national development. Our state leaders have firmly declared that they will take present realities into account in accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and respect the status quo on Taiwan and the opinions of people in all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settling the question of reunification so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses. On the other hand, people in all walks of life on Taiwan have expressed their yearning for their homeland and old friends, stated their desire "to identify themselves with and rejoin their kinsmen," and raised diverse proposals which are expressions of their earnest hope for an early return to the embrace of the motherland. As all conditions now are favourable for reunification and everything is set, no one should go against the will of the nation and against the trend of history.

We place hopes on the 17 million people on Taiwan and also the Taiwan authorities. The Taiwan authorities have always taken a firm stand of one China and have been opposed to an independent Taiwan. We have this stand in common and it is the basis for our co-operation. Our position has always been that all patriots belong to one family. The responsibility for reunifying the motherland rests with each of us. We hope the Taiwan authorities will treasure national interests and make valuable contributions to the reunification of the motherland.

The Chinese Government has ordered the People's Liberation Army to stop the bombardment of Jinmen (Quemoy) and other islands as from today. A state of military confrontation between the two sides still exists along the Taiwan Straits. This can only breed man-made tension. We hold that first of all this military confrontation should be ended through discussion between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Taiwan authorities so as to create the necessary prerequisites and a secure environment for the two sides to make contacts and exchanges in whatever area.

The prolonged separation has led to inadequate mutual understanding between the compatriots on the mainland and on Taiwan and various inconveniences for both sides. Since overseas Chinese residing in faraway foreign lands can return for visits and tours and hold reunions with their families, why can't compatriots living so near, on the mainland and on Taiwan, visit each other freely? We hold that there is no reason for such barriers to remain. We hope that at an early date transportation and postal services between both sides will be established to make it easier for compatriots of both sides to have direct contact, write to each other, visit relatives and friends, exchange tours and visits and carry out academic, cultural, sports and technological interchanges.

Economically speaking, Taiwan and the mainland of the motherland were originally one entity. Unfortunately, economic ties have been suspended for many years. Construction is going ahead vigorously on the mainland and it is our wish that Taiwan also grows economically more prosperous. There is every reason for us to develop trade between us, each making up what the other lacks, and carry out economic exchanges. This is mutually required and will benefit both parties without doing any harm to either.

Dear compatriots in Taiwan,

The bright future of our great motherland belongs to us and to you. The reunification of the motherland is the sacred mission history has handed to our generation. Times are moving ahead and the situation is developing. The earlier we fulfill this mission, the sooner we can jointly write an unprecedented, brilliant page in the history for our country, catch up with advanced powers and work together with them for world peace, prosperity and progress. Let us join hands and work together for this glorious goal!
D. Taiwan Relations Act of 1979

Declaration of Policy

Sec. 2. (b) It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area;
(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;
(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;
(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

(c) Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the United States in human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all the approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.

Implementation of US Policy with Regard to Taiwan

Sec. 3. (a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such a quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

(b) The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and the quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by the United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and Congress.

(c) The President is directed to inform Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional process, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.

Application of Laws

Sec. 4. (a) The absence of diplomatic relations shall not affect the application of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, and the laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979.
The American Institute in Taiwan

Sec. 6. (a) Programs, transactions, and other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any other agency of the United States Government with respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by and through—

(1) The American Institute in Taiwan ["Institute" hereafter], a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia, or
(2) such comparable successor nongovernmental entity as the President may designate.

(b) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to enter into, perform, enforce, or have in force an agreement or transaction relative to Taiwan, such agreement or transaction shall be entered into, performed, and enforced, in the manner and extent directed by the President, by or through the Institute.

(c) To the extent that any law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the District of Columbia, or of any State or political subdivision thereof in which the Institute is incorporated or doing business, impedes or otherwise interferes with the performance of the functions of the Institute pursuant to this Act, such law, rule, regulation, or ordinance shall be deemed to be preempted by this Act.

Taiwan Instrumentality

Sec. 10. (a) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to render or provide to or receive or accept from Taiwan, any performance, communication, assurance, undertaking, or other action, such action shall, in the manner and extent directed by the President, be rendered or provided to, or received or accepted from, an instrumentality established by Taiwan which the President determines has the necessary authority under the laws applied by the people on Taiwan to provide assurances and to take other actions on behalf of Taiwan in accordance with the Act.

(b) The President is requested to extend to the instrumentality established by Taiwan the same number of offices and complement of personnel as were previously operated in the United States by the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979.

(c) Upon the granting by Taiwan of comparable privileges and immunities with respect to the Institute and its appropriate personnel, the President is authorized to extend with respect to the Taiwan instrumentality and its appropriate personnel, such privileges and immunities (subject to appropriate conditions and obligations) as may be necessary for the effective performance of their functions.

Definitions

Sec. 15. For the purposes of this Act—

(1) the term "laws of the United States" includes any statute, rule, regulation, ordinance, order, or judicial rule of decision of the United States or any political subdivision thereof; and

(2) the term "Taiwan" includes, as the context may require, the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghu), the people on those islands, corporations and
other entities and associations created or organized under the laws applied on
those islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United
States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor
governing authorities (including political subdivisions, agencies, and
instrumentalities thereof).


D. Excerpts From Reagan's Statement on Ties to China and Taiwan, August 25, 1980

Ambassador Bush returned last night [from Japan and China] and has reported
his finding in detail. [During] Ambassador Bush's trip to China, he held a
series of high-level meetings. As I said on August 16, we have an obvious
interest in developing our relationship with China, an interest that goes beyond
trade and cultural ties. It is an interest that is fundamental to a Reagan-Bush
administration. The meetings in Beijing provided for extensive exchanges of
views. George has reported to me in great detail the points of similarity and
agreement as well as those of dissimilarity and disagreement.

We now maintain full and friendly diplomatic relations with China. This
relationship began only three years ago, and it is one we should develop and
strengthen in the years ahead. It's a delicate relationship, and the Reagan-Bush
administration will handle it with care and respect with due regard for our own
vital interests in the world generally and in the Pacific section specifically.
China and the United States have a common interest in maintaining peace so that
our nations can grow and prosper. Our two-way trade has now reached
approximately $3.5 billion annually, and China's program of modernization depends
in a major way on Western and United States technology. Along with many other
nations, we and China share a deep concern about the pace and scale of the Soviet
military buildup. Chinese leaders agree with Japanese leaders that the United
States must be a strong and vigorous defender of the peace, and they specifically
favor us bolstering our defense and our alliances.

It is quite clear that we do not, however, see eye-to-eye on Taiwan, and,
thus, this is an appropriate time for me to state our position on this subject.
I intend that U.S. relations with Taiwan will develop in accordance with the law
of our land, the Taiwan Relations Act. This legislation is the product of our
democratic process and is designed to remedy the defects of the totally
inadequate legislation proposed by Jimmy Carter. By accepting China's three
conditions for normalization, Jimmy Carter made concessions that Presidents Nixon
and Ford steadfastly refused to make. I was, and am, critical of his decision,
because I believe he made concessions that were not necessary and not in our
national interest. I felt that a condition of normalization, by itself a sound
policy choice, should have been the retention of a liaison office on Taiwan of
equivalent status to the one which we had earlier established in Peking. With
persistent and principled negotiating position, I believe that normalization
could ultimately have been achieved on that basis. But that is behind us now.
My present concern is to safeguard the interests of the United States and to
enforce the law of the land.

[The Taiwan Relations Act] was a timely action of the Congress, reflecting
the strong support of the American people for Taiwan, that forced the changes in
the inadequate bill which Mr. Carter proposed. Clearly the Congress was
unwilling to buy the Carter plan which it believed would have jeopardized
Taiwan's security. This act, designed by Congress to provide adequate safeguards for Taiwan's security and well-being, also provides the official basis for our relations with our longtime friend and ally. It declares our official policy to be one of maintaining peace and promoting extensive close and friendly relations between the United States and the 17 million people on Taiwan, as well as the 1 billion people of the China mainland. It specifies that our official policy considers any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to peace and of grave concern to the United States. And most important, it spells out our policy of providing defensive weapons to Taiwan and mandates the United States to maintain the means to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion which threaten the security of the social or economic system of Taiwan.

This act further spells out in great detail how the President of the United States, our highest elected official, shall conduct relations with Taiwan, leaving to his discretion the specific methods of achieving policy objectives. The act further details how our official personnel, including diplomats, are to administer U.S. relations with Taiwan through the American Institute in Taiwan. It specifies that for that purpose they are to resign for the term of their duty in Taiwan and then be reinstated to their former agencies of the U.S. Government with no loss of seniority, status or pension rights.

The intent of Congress is crystal clear. Our official relations with Taiwan will be funded by Congress with public monies, the expenditure of which will be audited by the Comptroller General of the United States and Congressional oversight will be performed by two standing committees of the Congress.

Now you might ask what I would do differently. I would not pretend, as Carter does, that the relationship we now have with Taiwan, enacted by our Congress, is not official. I am satisfied that this act provides an official and adequate basis for safeguarding our relationship with Taiwan. And I pledge myself to enforce it. But I will eliminate petty practices of the Carter Administration which are inappropriate and demeaning to our Chinese friends on Taiwan. For example, it is absurd and not required by the act that our representatives are not permitted to meet with Taiwanese officials in their offices and ours. I will treat all Chinese officials with fairness and dignity. I would not impose restrictions which are not required by the Taiwan Relations Act and which contravene its spirit and purpose.

I recognize that the People's Republic of China is not pleased with the Taiwan Relations Act which the U.S. Congress insisted on as the official basis for our relations with Taiwan. This was made abundantly clear to Mr. Bush and I'm told is clear to the Carter Administration. But it is the law of the land. It will be my firm intention to preserve the interests of the United States and, as President, I will choose the methods by which this shall be accomplished.
YE JIANYING, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, in an interview with a Xinhua correspondent on September 30, 1981, elaborated on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of China's peaceful reunification.

The full text of his statement follows:

Today, on the eve of the 32nd anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China and at the approach of the 70th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, I wish, first of all, to extend my festive greetings and cordial regards to the people of all nationalities throughout the country, including the compatriots in Taiwan, Xianggang (Hongkong) and Aomen (Macao), and Chinese nationals residing in foreign countries.

On New Year's Day 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued a message to the compatriots in Taiwan, in which it proclaimed the policy of striving to reunify the motherland peacefully. The message received warm support and active response from the people of all nationalities throughout China, including the compatriots in Taiwan, Xianggang and Aomen, and those residing abroad. A relaxed atmosphere has set in across the Taiwan Straits. Now, I would take this opportunity to elaborate on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of peaceful reunification:

(1) In order to bring an end to the unfortunate separation of the Chinese nation as early as possible, we propose that talks be held between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang of China on a reciprocal basis so that the two parties will co-operate for the third time to accomplish the great cause of national reunification. The two sides may first send people to meet for an exhaustive exchange of views.

(2) It is the urgent desire of the people of all nationalities on both sides of the straits to communicate with each other, reunite with their families and relatives, develop trade and increase mutual understanding. We propose that the two sides make arrangements to facilitate the exchange of mails, trade, air and shipping services, family reunions and visits by relatives and tourists as well as academic, cultural and sports exchanges, and reach an agreement thereupon.

(3) After the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and it can retain its armed forces. The Central Government will not interfere with local affairs on Taiwan.

(4) Taiwan's current socio-economic system will remain unchanged, so will its way of life and its economic and cultural relations with foreign countries. There will be no encroachment on the proprietary rights and lawful right of inheritance over private property, houses, land and enterprises, or on foreign investments.

(5) People in authority and representative personages of various circles in Taiwan may take up posts of leadership in national political bodies and participate in running the state.

(6) When Taiwan's local finance is in difficulty, the Central Government may subsidize it as is fit for the circumstances.

(7) For people of all nationalities and public figures of various circles in Taiwan who
wish to come and settle on the mainland, it is
guaranteed that proper arrangements will be
made for them, that there will be no discrimina-
tion against them, and that they will have the
freedom of entry and exit.

(8) Industrialists and businessmen in Tai-
wan are welcome to invest and engage in
various economic undertakings on the mainland,
and their legal rights, interests, and profits are
guaranteed.

(9) The reunification of the motherland is
the responsibility of all Chinese. We sincerely
welcome people of all nationalities, public figures
of all circles and all mass organizations in Tai-
wan to make proposals and suggestions regarding
affairs of state through various channels and in
various ways.

Taiwan’s return to the embrace of the
motherland and the accomplishment of the great
cause of national reunification is a great and
glorious mission history has bequeathed on our
generation. China’s reunification and prosperity
is in the vital interest of the Chinese people of
all nationalities—not only those on the main-
land, but those in Taiwan as well. It is also in
the interest of peace in the Far East and the
world.

We hope that our compatriots in Taiwan will
give full play to their patriotism and work ener-
getically for the early realization of the great
unity of our nation and share the honour of it.
We hope that our compatriots in Xianggang and
Aomen and Chinese nationals residing abroad
will continue to act in the role of a bridge and
contribute their share to the reunification of the
motherland.

We hope that the Kuomintang authorities
will stick to their one-China position and their
opposition to “two Chinas” and that they will
put national interests above everything else,
forget previous ill will and join hands with us
in accomplishing the great cause of national
reunification and the great goal of making China
prosperous and strong, so as to win glory for our
ancestors, bring benefit to our posterity and
write a new and glorious page in the history of
the Chinese nation!

(Xinhua News Agency, September
30, 1981, Beijing)

Source: Beijing Review, October 5, 1981
Alarmed by our movement of "unifying China under the three principles of the people," the Chinese Communists have recently engaged in one united front propaganda move after another. They have even proposed the so-called talks to be held "on a reciprocal basis" between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party to "cooperate for the third time." Rather than "cooperating," the Chinese Communists have actually tried to make their way into the ranks of the national revolution in gestures of surrender twice during the last sixty years. .

There is a watershed between the benevolent government based on the three principles of the people and the tyrannical rule of communism. No confusion can be allowed between these two. The happy and peaceful lives of our compatriots in this bastion of national recovery has for more than thirty years provided a striking contrast to the unparalleled misery of our compatriots on the mainland, and shows which is good and which is evil. But the Communists distort this as "partisan intransigence," partisan rivalry," and "powers and privileges to be enjoyed by the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party.

To the Communists, peace talks are another form of warfare. Although the two look different, the aim is identical. So often I say: "To talk peace with the Chinese Communists is to invite death." This is an agonizing, bloodstained lesson that we and many other Asian countries have learned.

Although the Chinese Communists know that we will not talk peace with them, they still shout their slogan at the top of their lungs. Their stratagem is to create in the world the false image that we do not want peace. Anyone who bothers to look into history will find that the government of the Republic of China has taken up arms only in self-defense and has never been militaristic. The Chinese Communist regime has been officially branded by the United Nations as an aggressor. It sent troops to help the aggressors in both the Korean and Vietnam wars. India assisted the Chinese Communist regime and was suddenly stabbed in the back by its supposed friend. The Chinese Communists backed the Vietnamese Communists in seizing South Vietnam but before long turned on those they had helped. They have supported Communist infiltration and subversion in Southeast Asia and Latin America with money, weapons, and guerrilla warfare tactics. Aren't these facts sufficient to make all people aware of the belligerent nature of the Chinese Communists? It is obvious that the "peace talks" advocated by the Chinese Communists does not mean peace but is mere political chicanery.

I want to state clearly and resolutely once again: We shall never "negotiate" with the Chinese Communists. In solemnly expressing this view, I want to tell our compatriots on the Chinese mainland that we are resolved to remove the yoke that the Communists have imposed upon them. In their clamor for "peace talks," the Chinese Communists are intending to deceive our compatriots on the mainland by saying, "The government for which you yearn is about to talk peace with us, so you have lost all hope." We must tell our mainland compatriots of our confidence and determination to deliver them and assure them that we shall never talk with the Communists they hate so deeply.

Our solemn mission is to carry out the three principles of the people and unify China. We must courageously carry on the struggle to its victorious end. From [Sun Yat-sen] and [Chiang Kai-shek] on down, all dedicated revolutionaries have known only that their responsibility is to "wage the revolution for the rule
They have never thought of life or death or of such selfish goals as fame, rank, or power.

The three principles of the people have reached deep into the hearts of the people at home and abroad. The success of benevolent rule based on the three principles of the people has created the greatest era in the seventy years of the Republic of China. This success is our best assurance of unifying China under the three principles of the people. We have the increasing confidence of victory here in this prospering bastion of national revival. We have the determination to win the struggle against communism and for national recovery.

Following is an address by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Deputy Secretary of State, before the National Council on U.S.-China Trade, Washington, D.C., June 1, 1982.

It is a great pleasure to be here today. I know that you and the other members of the National Council on U.S.-China Trade have been deeply involved in developing a strong, mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and China. I can honestly say that without your constructive approach and persistent efforts, we would not have come as far as we have in our bilateral relations.

Fostering a lasting relationship between the United States and China has been a vitally important bipartisan objective for the last four administrations. A strong U.S.-China relationship is one of the highest goals of President Reagan's foreign policy.

Strong U.S.-China relations are not only critical for our long-term security but also contribute to Asian stability and global harmony. The United States and China are both great countries, strong and vigorous, with tremendous potential for promoting world peace and prosperity. As President Reagan noted in his letter to Premier Zhao commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Shanghai communique, "our contacts have embraced almost all areas of human endeavor."

We view China as a friendly country with which we are not allied but with which we share many common interests. Strategically, we have no fundamental conflicts of interest, and we face a common challenge from the Soviet Union. In areas such as trade, tourism, banking, and agriculture and in scientific, technological, and educational exchanges, a close, cooperative relationship has resulted in a productive flow of people and ideas between our two societies. It is for these reasons that the Reagan Administration believes it essential that we develop a strong and lasting relationship.

During the decade-long process of normalizing our relations, a number of principles upon which we base our China policy have emerged. These principles, which President Reagan has strongly endorsed, include our recognition that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China and our acknowledgment of the Chinese position that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.

They also include a firm acceptance that the U.S.-China relationship, like all relationships between equal, sovereign nations, should be guided by the fundamental principles of respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. The relationship should be based on a spirit of consultation, cooperation, and strong efforts to achieve mutual understanding on the wide range of issues of interest to both of our countries.
The Reagan Administration is committed to pursuing a durable relationship with China based on these principles. President Reagan values the relationship highly and believes it is important to work together to expand the benefits to both countries. As he said in a recent letter to Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, "China and America are two great nations destined to grow stronger through cooperation, not weaker through division."

It is because of the importance that President Reagan places on the U.S.-China relationship that Vice President Bush recently visited Beijing as the President's personal emissary. We were highly pleased with the outcome of the Vice President's trip, both in terms of the reception he received and in terms of the clarity and quality of the high-level communication which it produced. We believe that both the United States and China saw in this visit the opportunity to demonstrate the high value each places on the relationship. We also believe that good progress was made in addressing the one serious issue that threatened good relations—Taiwan arms sales.

We are continuing our discussions with the Chinese on this complex, historical issue. We believe that so long as both sides demonstrate the statesmanship, vision, and goodwill that have characterized our relationship, we will be able to overcome our difficulties. Indeed, anything other than a successful outcome would be a great misfortune for both sides. The only beneficiary would be our common adversaries.

Reagan Administration Initiatives

It is not my purpose to address the Taiwan arms sale issue today. Indeed, public attention on this issue has tended to obscure the continuing progress which this Administration has made in carrying out important China policy initiatives. These steps play an important role in removing residual impediments to a relationship based on mutual trust, and will further strengthen the foundation for a durable long-term partnership between the United States and China. These initiatives grew out of a thorough review of all aspects of U.S.-China relations conducted during the first 5 months of the Reagan Administration. They were launched just 1 year ago, when Secretary Haig visited Beijing. During his meetings, the Secretary reaffirmed our common strategic perceptions and announced new steps aimed at deepening our bilateral relationship. The subsequent implementation of this policy focused on four main areas—technology transfer, arms transfers, legislative restrictions, and consular relations. In the 11 months since the Secretary's visit, important progress has been made on all fronts.

We have substantially liberalized our export control policy toward China. This initiative has reflected not only a desire to expand business opportunities but also our strong national interest in contributing to China's modernization. We recognize that a secure, modernizing China is important to the United States from a global and strategic perspective. We strongly believe in supporting Beijing's ambitious efforts to improve the quality of life of more than one-quarter of the world's population.

Over the past year, there has been a dramatic rise in approvals of export licenses for China. Since July of 1981 through March of this year, 1,203 license applications were approved. This represented an increase of nearly 40% over the prior 9-month period.

A recent White House directive reaffirmed this policy of substantial liberalization, emphasizing that U.S. export policy "should support a secure, friendly, and modernizing China" and underscoring the importance of "prompt and full implementation" of the President's June 4, 1981 decision. This new directive should give additional impetus to our efforts to expand trade relations. I fully expect that as U.S.-China relations continue to advance, there will be important further progress.

Another area in which we have opened the way to future cooperation is in arms transfer policy. During his June 1981 visit to Beijing, Secretary Haig announced that we were prepared to cooperate with China in this area on the same case-by-case basis governing U.S. arms transfers to all other nations. In December 1981, we lifted the historical bars on munitions sales to China.

The Administration also recognized that the increasing flow of businessmen, tourists, and students between the United States and China made it imperative that we establish regular consular relations. Accordingly, Secretary Haig rapidly concluded negotiations on a consular convention which was ratified last fall and came into force this year. Since the differing social systems of the two countries at times lead us to take differing views on some issues, involving our citizens, the convention provides important protections for Americans in China. We intend vigorously to uphold its provisions, not only in letter but in spirit.

The Administration conducted a thorough review of legislation affecting our relationship with China. The review identified three areas in which outdated laws discriminated against China in ways inconsistent with our current strategic relationship. These were: eligibility for foreign assistance, PL 480, and the importation of seven previously banned furskins.

Congressional reaction to these proposals has been positive. We have no plans to extend PL 480 and are only contemplating limited technical assistance through Chinese involvement in established programs. However, these are important symbolic gestures, which we hope will contribute to a relationship based on equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect.

The Growing Relationship

I would now like to share with you some of my thoughts about the value of the U.S.-China relationship, both past and future. We have made tremendous strides and will seek continued progress in the years ahead.

To start with, the strategic benefits that we see now—some 10 years after the beginning of rapprochement—have been substantial. It is an obvious but often overlooked and vitally important fact that the United States and China no longer face each other as hostile adversaries and no longer need to deploy forces against one another. This has made a tremendous difference to both nations and will continue to be of critical importance to planners on both sides.

The relationship has been important to our entire global strategy. U.S. and Chinese security policies are basically compatible. The relationship has supported our alliance structure and enhanced China's ability to deal with challenges to its security. In many areas of the world our economic assistance and political relationships have been mutually reinforcing.

To turn to specific areas, our consultations with the Chinese on Kampuchea have been an important complement to our cooperation with the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] nations in attempting to turn back Vietnamese aggression. In Afghanistan and Southwest Asia, the United States and China have maintained closely parallel policies, recognizing that the entire region is threatened by a southern thrust from the Soviet Union.
Indeed, even where we disagree, the very fact that we can maintain a high-quality dialogue on international issues is an important byproduct of the relationship. In one area which we approach in different ways—the Korean Peninsula—our good relations have been an important factor fostering regional stability.

Bilaterally, of course, there have been major benefits. U.S.-China trade is of tremendous importance to our nation. Its volume has increased dramatically, and its potential for further expansion remains great. We were pleased, for example, to see Premier Zhao Ziyang receiving important American businessmen recently even at a time of difficulty elsewhere in U.S.-China relations. The Premier's reception of Mr. Phillips [Christopher H. Phillips, President, National Council of U.S.-China Trade] and Mr. Tappan [David S. Tappan, Jr., President and Chief Operating Officer, Fluor Corporation] are strong indicators that the importance we continue to attach to building a long-term commercial relationship is reciprocated at the highest levels in China.

It is impressive to note the levels of cooperation that already exist between our two countries.

- The volume and value of bilateral trade have been increasing dramatically. China is now our 14th largest trading partner.
- U.S. agricultural sales to China were around $2 billion in 1981. China has thus become our fifth largest market for agricultural products.
- There are currently over 8,000 Chinese students in the United States. They are now the largest group of students from another country to be studying here. Hundreds of Americans have also studied or done research in China.
- Tourism and other travels between the two countries have grown to massive dimensions. Tens of thousands of Americans visit China annually. Official delegations are already numerous and are increasing.
- At least count some 80 American companies have established permanent offices in Beijing. Many companies with representatives in Hong Kong or Tokyo are also involved in frequent business discussions with the Chinese.
- Opportunities for joint ventures are growing. The Chinese recently adopted a joint venture law that establishes a legal framework for such undertakings. Under the auspices of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, the Chinese have announced 130 joint ventures open to foreign participation.
- Our two governments have begun to explore the possibility of a bilateral investment treaty which would further facilitate U.S. investment in China.
- We have also been conducting discussions with the Chinese on the possibility of an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, which would enable us to compete commercially in the development of China's nuclear power program.
- Exchanges have increased substantially in the science and technology area. During 1981 dozens of delegations were exchanged, and three new protocols were signed—bringing the total number of protocols under our bilateral science and technology agreement to 17. The benefits to both sides in this area, which span a wide variety of fields ranging from health to earthquake studies, have proven to be even more impressive than we had foreseen.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize again that the Reagan Administration values the U.S.-China relationship very highly. That relationship must be based on the principles of equality and mutual respect. We will continue to work closely with the Chinese leadership with the objective of resolving the Taiwan arms sales issue. We will seek to expand cooperation with China in areas where our interests are parallel or complementary.

American foreign policy is sometimes accused of being shortsighted and of operating in a 4-year context. It is clear from the record of four administrations that this is not the case with China. U.S. foreign policymakers clearly recognize that it is not in our interest to perpetuate the hostility that existed between the United States and China but to look ahead to decades of close Sino-American cooperation.

I believe that the coming years will see the development of an even deeper and more extensive relationship between our two great countries. We at the State Department would welcome your comments on areas that remain to be explored and initiatives for the future. With your help we can forge a lasting relationship of mutual benefit to both the United States and China that will take us well into the 21st century.

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Text of U.S.-China Communiqué on Taiwan

WASHINGTON, Aug. 17 (Reuters) — Following is the text of the communique issued by the United States and China today on arms sales to Taiwan:

In the joint communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on Jan. 1, 1979, issued by the government of the United States and the Government of the People's Republic of China, the United States of America recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China. Within that context, the two sides agreed that the People of the United States would maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between the United States and China were normalized.

The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it would raise the issue again following normalization.

Recognizing that this issue would seriously hamper the development of United States-China relations, they have held further discussions on it, during and since the meetings between President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and between Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua in October, 1981.

Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding United States-China relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communiqué of Feb. 28, 1972, and reaffirmed in the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on Jan. 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue to govern all aspects of their relations.

The Chinese Government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued by China on Jan. 1, 1979, proclaimed a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the motherland.

The nine-point proposal put forward by China on Sept. 30, 1981, represented a further major effort under this fundamental policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.

The United States Government attaches great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of "Two Chinas" or "One China, one Taiwan." The United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question as indicated in China's Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued on Jan. 1, 1979, and the nine-point proposal put forward by China on Sept. 30, 1981. The new situation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favorable conditions for the settlement of United States-China differences over the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan.

Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.

In order to bring about, over a period of time, a final settlement of the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan, which is an issue rooted in history, the two governments will make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the thorough settlement of this issue.

The development of United States-China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples but also conducive to peace and stability in the world. The two sides are determined, on the principle of equality and mutual benefit, to strengthen their ties in the economic, cultural, educational, scientific, technological and other fields and make strong joint efforts for the continued development of relations between the governments and peoples of the United States and China.

In order to bring about the healthy development of United States-China relations, maintain world peace and oppose aggression and expansion, the two governments reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué and the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. The two sides will maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral and international issues of common interest.

Highlights of U.S.-China Trade

Million U.S.$

1,200
1,100
1,000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0


1. Data are from US Department of Commerce and show both exports and imports on an f.o.b. basis.

Source: US Department of State, Background Notes: China, June 1981

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<td>21.1</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>52.4</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>63.5</td>
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<td>806.9</td>
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<td>135.4</td>
<td>171.3</td>
<td>818.2</td>
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<td>Manufactured goods</td>
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<td>75.6</td>
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<td>228.2</td>
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<td>Agricultural goods</td>
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<td>28.7</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>84.7</td>
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<td>11.3</td>
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<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>142.4</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>63.7</td>
<td>114.7</td>
<td>158.3</td>
<td>201.9</td>
<td>202.7</td>
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<td><strong>TRADE TURNOVER</strong></td>
<td>97.5</td>
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<td>87.6%</td>
<td>65.7%</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>71.6%</td>
<td>74.3%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
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<td>31.3</td>
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<td>692.2</td>
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<td>-31.3</td>
<td>494.3</td>
<td>1124.3</td>
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### US-China Trade: Leading Exports and Imports, 1980

#### US Exports to China (f.a.s.*)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>% of total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Wheat, unmilled</td>
<td>$1,039,308,818</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>696,973,449</td>
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<td>Yellow corn</td>
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<td>Polyester fibers</td>
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<td>Soybeans</td>
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<td>Passenger airplanes</td>
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<td>Diammonium phosphate fertilizer</td>
<td>85,168,077</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kraft linerboard</td>
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<td>Soybean oil, crude, degummed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polyester resins</td>
<td>50,836,636</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polyester yarn</td>
<td>45,168,346</td>
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<td>Noncellulosic tire fabrics</td>
<td>39,958,168</td>
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<td>Urea</td>
<td>35,036,552</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logs and timber, fir</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wood pulp</td>
<td>32,845,515</td>
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#### US Imports (f.o.b.* customs value basis)

<table>
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<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tr>
<td>Gasoline</td>
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<td>Wool-pile floor coverings</td>
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<td>Naphtha</td>
<td>33,714,589</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women's knit wool sweaters</td>
<td>24,129,907</td>
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<td>Fireworks</td>
<td>23,251,188</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ammonium molybdate</td>
<td>23,067,271</td>
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<tr>
<td>Woven shirting</td>
<td>20,936,114</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metal coins</td>
<td>20,625,658</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feathers</td>
<td>19,233,585</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crude petroleum</td>
<td>18,808,941</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crude batite ore</td>
<td>18,560,490</td>
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<tr>
<td>Titanium sponge</td>
<td>16,508,032</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tungsten ore</td>
<td>16,129,800</td>
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</table>

* f.a.s. = free-alongside-ship; f.o.b. = freight-on-board

Source: Department of Commerce statistics, supplied by the National Council for US-China Trade.
Protocols under the US-China Science and Technology Agreement*

Student and Scholar Exchanges (agreed to October 1978), Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China
Agricultural Exchanges (agreed to November 1978), Department of Agriculture
Space Technology (agreed to November 1978), National Aeronautics and Space Administration
High Energy Physics (signed January 31, 1979), Department of Energy
Management of Science and Technology Information (signed May 8, 1979), Department of Commerce
Metrology and Standards (signed May 8, 1979), Department of Commerce
Atmospheric Science (signed May 8, 1979), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

*Also noted are the US Government agencies responsible for carrying out the cooperative exchanges.

Source: China Exchange News, March 1982

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**Institutional Agreements**

**Between Chinese and American Universities**

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<th>Year Agreement Signed</th>
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<td>California State University at Los Angeles</td>
<td>Harbin Institute of Technology</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City College of New York</td>
<td>Shandong University</td>
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<tr>
<td>College of Staten Island/City University of New York</td>
<td>Hebei Teachers University, Shijiazhaung</td>
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<tr>
<td>Columbia University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cornell University</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southwestern Jiaotong University</td>
<td>1980</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Xi'an Jiaotong University</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Fudan University</td>
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<td>Goddess College</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>
WHO TO CONTACT: AMERICAN CHINA SPECIALISTS

The American China specialists listed below represent only a small sample of the large number working around the country. For other names, or for referrals to specialists on particular areas, contact Richard Bush and the China Council.

A. Doak Barnett
School of Advanced International Studies
1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
202/785-6200

One of America’s senior China specialists.

Richard Baum
Department of Political Science
University of California
Los Angeles, CA 90024
213/825-1987

June Teufel Dreyer
Director of East Asia Programs
Department of Politics
University of Miami
Coral Gables, FL 33124
305/284-4303

Harry Harding
Department of Political Science
Stanford University, Bldg. 160
Stanford, CA 94305
415/497-4355

Robert Kapp
Washington State China Relations Council
360 Grand Central on the Park
Seattle, WA 98104
206/464-1409

Kenneth G. Lieberthal
Department of Political Science
Swarthmore College
Swarthmore, PA 19801
215/447-7092
Michel Oksenberg  
Center for Chinese Studies  
Lane Hall  
University of Michigan  
Ann Arbor, MI 48109  
313/763-6481

Oksenberg was the National Security Council staff person responsible for China policy during the Carter Administration.

Robert A. Scalapino  
Institute of East Asian Studies  
University of California  
460 Stephens Hall  
Berkeley, CA 94720

Scalapino is a senior American specialist on China and East Asia.

Richard Solomon  
Social Science Department  
The Rand Corporation  
1700 Main Street  
Santa Monica, CA 90406  
213/393-0411

Solomon was National Security Council staff person responsible for China policy during the Nixon and Ford Administrations.

John Bryan Starr  
The Yale-China Association  
905A Yale Station  
New Haven, CN 06520  
203/436-4422

Starr was the director for a United Nations Association of the USA project on US-China relations 1979-80.

Peter Van Ness  
Graduate School of International Studies  
University of Denver  
University Park  
Denver, CO 82010  
303/753-2753

Allen S. Whiting  
Department of Political Science  
University of Arizona  
Tucson, AZ 85721

Whiting played an active in formulating US China policy during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.
WHO TO CONTACT: INSTITUTIONS

The following is a list of the principal organizations--governmental and private--working on China. Where appropriate, a contact person is identified.

Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs
US Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

CONTACT: James Menard, Public Affairs Officer, 202/632-2538

Office of PRC Affairs
US Department of Commerce
Washington, DC 20530
202/377-3583

CONTACT: David Lau, Director

East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
4229 Dirksen Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
202/224-4651

CONTACT: Broadua Bailey, Jr., Staff Director

Asian and Pacific Affairs Committee
House Foreign Affairs Committee
2170 Rayburn Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202/225-5021

CONTACT: William Barnds, Staff Director

American Institute in Taiwan
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, VA 22209
703/525-8474

CONTACT: David Dean, President

The American Institute in Taiwan is a private organization that represents American interests in Taiwan.
Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States
2300 Connecticut Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20008

CONTACT: YU Zhizhong (Yoo Jr Jhong), Press Officer, 202/328-2511

Coordination Council on North American Affairs
5161 River Road
Washington, DC 20016
202/657-2130

CONTACT: C. Y. Chang, Director of the Secretariat

The Coordination Council is a private organization that represents Taiwan's interests in the United States.

National Council on US-China Relations
777 United Nations Plaza, #9B
New York, NY 10164
212-922-1385

CONTACT: Arthur Rosen, President

The National Committee is the principal agent for exchanges with China in the areas of education, public affairs, and urban planning.

Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC
National Academy of Sciences--JH226
2100 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20418
202/334-2718

CONTACT: Mary Bullock, Staff Director

The CSCPRC coordinates national-level scholarly exchanges with the PRC, and screens American students and scholars wishing to study and work there.

National Council for US-China Trade
1050 17th Street, NW--Suite 350
Washington, DC 20036
202/828-8300

CONTACT: Christopher Phillips, President

The National Council is the chief private organization for providing information on US economic relations with China.
CONTACT: Richard Bush, Deputy Program Director

The China Council is a nonpolitical public education organization that provides services for journalists who cover China. It has affiliates in thirteen states that can identify resources in their area. They can be reached as follows:

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<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>CONTACT</th>
<th>TELEPHONE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Ford N. Burkhart</td>
<td>602/626-5463</td>
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<td>Alice Renouf</td>
<td>303/492-7741</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Everett Keach</td>
<td>404/542-7265</td>
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<td>Michigan</td>
<td>Warren Cohen</td>
<td>517/355-7507</td>
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<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>Richard Bohr</td>
<td>612/641-3238</td>
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<td>Joel Glassman</td>
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<td>Larry Kessler</td>
<td>919/962-5091</td>
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<td>Jane Larson</td>
<td>503/229-3049</td>
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<td>Mary Bernson</td>
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<td>Joy Light</td>
<td>614/459-1187</td>
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<td>John Bryan Starr</td>
<td>203/436-4422</td>
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<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Edward Rhoads</td>
<td>512/471-5236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>David Buck</td>
<td>414/963-7039</td>
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</tbody>
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East Asia Area Centers

Another source of information and contacts on US-China relations are East Asia resource centers located around the country, usually affiliated with a university. The principal ones are:

Harvard University East Asian Educational Project, Children's Museum, 300 Congress St., Boston, MA 02210 (617/426-6500).

Council on East Asian Studies, Yale University, 85 Trumbell Street, Box 13A, Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520 (203/432-4029).

East Asian Studies, Princeton University, 211 Jones Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544 (609/452-4276).

East Asian Curriculum Project, Columbia University, 420 West 118th Street--9th Fl., New York, NY 10027 (212/280-4278).

East Asian Language and Area Center, University of Virginia, 1644 Oxford Road, Charlottesville, VA 22903 (804/295-1808).

East Asian Studies Center Outreach Program, Indiana University, Woodburn Hall, Bloomington, IN 47405 (812/337-7587).
Project on East Asian Studies in Education, University of Michigan, 108 Lane Hall, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (313/764-5109).

Midwest China Center, 308 Gullixson Hall, 2375 Como Avenue West, St. Paul, MN 55108 (612/614-3238).

Center for Far Eastern Studies, University of Chicago, 5848 University Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637 (312/753-2632).

Center for Asian Studies, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66502 (913/864-3849).

Texas Program for Educational Resources, University of Texas, Center for Asian Studies, SSB4.126, Austin, TX 78712 (512/471-5811).

East Asian Studies Center, University of Arizona Tucson, AZ 85721 (602/626-5463).

Bay Area China Educational Program, 221 Lou Henry Hoover, Stanford, CA 94305 (415/497-1115).

East Asia Resource Center, School of International Studies DR-05, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195 (206/543-1921).