In order to design a cognitive model of ethnic attitudes, an interdisciplinary project has analyzed strategies used in everyday conversation among majority members about minority groups, e.g., immigrant workers from Turkey and Morocco and people from Surinam. Data were collected through unstructured interviews among people in an Amsterdam neighborhood where a relatively high percentage of ethnic minorities live. Following background information and a discussion of the general notion of strategy, a detailed discussion points out the complex sequences of social interaction, which involve pragmatic, semantic, stylistic, and rhetorical discourse strategies. Subtle discourse analysis of the transcribed interviews suggests hypotheses about the contents, representation, and strategic uses of ethnic attitudes (and prejudice, in particular). Strategic moves may be defined at several layers of analysis and along several dimensions. Also, it appears that quite a number of moves and move sequences appear to be typical for talk about ethnic minorities. These moves are categorized as dissimulation (e.g., vagueness, presupposition), defense (justification, explanation of attitudes), accusation (blaming, negative experiences with ethnic groups), and positive self-presentation. Future research will involve an analysis between specific kinds of prejudiced beliefs and specific moves and strategies. Transcripts of some interviews are presented in English and Dutch. (KC)
COGNITIVE AND CONVERSATIONAL STRATEGIES
IN THE EXPRESSION OF ETHNIC PREJUDICE

Teun A. van Dijk

Prepublication/Working Paper No. 2, March 1983

ETHNIC PREJUDICE IN COGNITION AND DISCOURSE

A series of working papers and prepublications from the project "Prejudice in Conversations about Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands", sponsored by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO).

Project Researchers: Eva Abraham-van der Mark, Rob Rombouts, Martijn den Uyl, Adri van der Wurff.

Directors: Teun A. van Dijk, Nico Frijda.
COGNITIVE AND CONVERSATIONAL STRATEGIES
IN THE EXPRESSION OF ETHNIC PREJUDICE

Teun A. van Dijk

March 1983


Comments welcome!
In the framework of an interdisciplinary project at the University of Amsterdam a social cognitive model is being elaborated about ethnic attitudes, in particular prejudices, concerning ethnic minorities in the Netherlands (mainly blacks from Surinam, and immigrant workers from Turkey and Morocco), and the ways these attitudes are expressed in everyday conversations. Extensive interview and informal talk data have been collected and are being subjected to close discourse analysis. Results serve as qualitative data that are used in the construction of a cognitive model for the representation and strategic use of ethnic attitudes. This model is based on current work in cognitive psychology and Artificial Intelligence about text processing and the representation of knowledge and beliefs, and in particular on the text processing model developed in collaboration with Walter Kintsch (U of Colorado, Boulder, Colo., USA) in our book Strategies of Discourse Comprehension (New York, 1983).

In the present paper attention will be focused on the relations between specific cognitive strategies for the interactional, conversational, use of such ethnic attitudes, and the strategies underlying the effective monitoring of conversational turns in storytelling about experiences with ethnic minority groups and members. It will be shown that subtle discourse analysis of conversational data allows interesting hypotheses about the contents, representation and strategic uses of ethnic attitudes (and prejudice in particular). This approach is intended both as a new contribution to the social psychology of language and discourse and to the study of prejudice and intergroup attitudes and conflicts within the wider field of social cognition.
COGNITIVE AND CONVERSATIONAL STRATEGIES
IN THE EXPRESSION OF ETHNIC PREJUDICE

Teun A. van Dijk

1. Aims and backgrounds

One of the ways ethnic prejudices become shared social attitudes is through everyday conversations among majority members. In this paper we will analyse some of the strategies used in such talk about ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands, e.g. immigrant workers from Turkey and Morocco and people from Surinam. In particular we will pay attention to the strategic moves in storytelling about these 'foreigners', as they are indiscriminately labeled in everyday usage. Such an analysis may provide insight into the various interactional and social functions of prejudiced talk, and at the same time reveals how people may effectively persuade others about the seriousness of their experiences and the 'legitimacy' of their opinions about foreigners.

Besides the important social dimension of this kind of 'expression' of ethnic prejudice in informal communication, there is also a fundamental cognitive aspect underlying these strategies. First, of course, there is the cognitive monitoring of the conversational interaction itself. Second, however, we will assume that various conversational strategies may, sometimes indirectly, exhibit more specific cognitive strategies for the adequate manipulation of ethnic attitudes. Foreigners are a prominent topic of talk for many people in the Netherlands, but depending on various contextual constraints such conversations may be subject to restrictions such as social norms of non-discrimination and tolerance, and legal sanctions upon public expressions of ethnic prejudice. Hence, storytellers not only have the task to present themselves as kind, understanding and tolerant citizens who are aware of prevailing social norms, but at the same time they must accommodate their, possibly negative, personal feelings, experiences or opinions about foreigners. This complex goal requires extensive cognitive problem-solving, conflict
resolution or other strategic moves for the management of 'delicate' beliefs. Maybe with the exception of talk with family members, close friends or political peers, opinions about foreigners may not be formulated directly and uninhibited to anybody in any situation. Hence, considerable cognitive work is needed to combine appropriately, personal goals and beliefs with social rules and norms of interaction and acceptable conversation. We thus hope that an analysis of conversational strategies will also yield access to the cognitive moves in the manipulation of ethnic beliefs.

1.2. This paper has been written in the framework of an interdisciplinary project at the University of Amsterdam about conversations on ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. The major aim of that project is to design a cognitive model of ethnic attitudes and the ways these are expressed (or not) in everyday conversation. Data for this project are being collected, through undirected interviews, among people in one of the neighbourhoods of Amsterdam in which a relatively high (10%) percentage of ethnic minorities live, after an earlier pilot study in other, both 'contact' and 'non-contact' neighbourhoods of Amsterdam. The project itself is part of a series of investigations about 'ethnic minorities in discourse', in which also attention is being paid to such topics as ethnic minorities in the press and the portrayal of ethnic relations in textbooks.

The specific data for this paper derive from an exploratory inquiry into the nature of 'storytelling' about ethnic minorities, in which a group of students collected stories, also by way of undirected interviewing, in the same neighbourhood as the one mentioned above. Relevant portions of the interviews, and especially the narrative sections of the interviews, were being transcribed from tape-recorded talk. Since the participating students were not previously trained in the more technical conventions of conversational transcription, only an approximate rendering of the 'real talk' could be achieved. This means that although the data have not been 'edited', no precise transcription of pauses, hesitations, false starts, overlap, or other typical phenomena of conversations was aimed at in this exploratory investigation. Another serious
limitation is that only approximate English translations of the Dutch original expressions can be presented in this paper. This is another reason why we will have to focus on those conversational strategies that do not crucially depend on subtle transcription techniques or on Dutch surface structural style for an adequate analysis, viz. strategies that we will simply call semantic.

Moreover, the semantic strategies we are concerned with will be essentially local. That is, they characterize individual turns and moves in relation to immediately preceding and following ones. In the framework of a single paper, we cannot possibly provide a fulfledged analysis of complete interviews or stories, although full understanding of local strategies, and especially of locally expressed-ethnic opinions, is only partial when they are disconnected from the global, overall, topics, point or strategies of speakers and the very complex cognitive representations and maneuvers exhibited by them in a complete interview. In other words, methodologically, theoretically and empirically, this paper can only account for some details of everyday talk about minorities.

1.3 Theoretically, our analysis will have several sources. First, the semantic strategies will be described in terms of our own earlier work on coherence in discourse (van Dijk, 1977, 1980), but at the same time require a serious extension of our previous approach to coherence. This extension is in part influenced by the insights obtained in more than ten years of conversational analysis, into the nature of spontaneous everyday talk, and especially about the strategic properties of discourse interaction. At the same time, though, we hope that our analysis of semantic strategies provides some new insights into the theory of conversational moves. A crucial difference between our approach and other work in conversational analysis is however that we take properties of talk as possible indications of cognitive and social dimensions of interaction. In this respect, our approach is not so much 'structural', but rather 'functional' (in the linguistic sense of these terms). In other words, we are not merely interested in the various properties of prejudiced talk per se, but also in the cognitive basis and the social functions of such talk.
It follows that, within an integrated interdisciplinary theory, this discourse analytic approach should be based on a cognitive model. Again, we will here make use of results of our earlier work, in collaboration with Walter Kintsch, in the field of the psychology of discourse processing. In particular our recent monograph (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) about strategies of discourse processing will be relevant in this respect. This strategic approach to discourse production and understanding, much like the discourse analytic theory, is also a reaction to earlier, more static and structural models of discourse processing, including our own earlier model (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978). For this paper, this work will allow us to formulate several basic properties of (cognitive) strategies, which may then be matched with the set of more descriptively assessed textual strategies, hypothetically derived from our data.

As has become usual in cognitive psychology and Artificial Intelligence (AI) research about discourse processing in the last decade, the Van Dijk & Kintsch (1983) model incorporates an account of the representation and the uses of world knowledge in understanding. For the purpose of this paper, this will not be enough, though. As soon as we deal with prejudice, we enter a domain of what is variously called 'hot' or 'soft' cognition, that is of beliefs, opinions, attitudes, and emotions. In other projects at the University of Amsterdam, we try to extend the current cognitive models of discourse in this more social psychological direction, e.g. by accounting for the role of opinions and attitudes in discourse comprehension (van Dijk, 1982). Since ethnic attitudes pertain to groups and inter-group relations and conflicts, studied more recently under the label of 'social cognition', and since conversations are forms of interaction, our inquiry as a whole properly belongs to the field of social psychology, despite its linguistic and cognitive backgrounds.

Finally, it needs to be emphasised that our approach to ethnic prejudice here does not imply a reduction of this important form of social cognition -- and of this social problem -- to the individual and inter-personal level. On the contrary, although we cannot here pay detailed attention to the social, historical, cultural or economic dimensions of prejudice and racism, this wider context is crucial for the proper understanding of ethnic prejudice.
In fact, our analysis of prejudiced talk, as we have argued before, is also intended as a contribution to our insight into the social mechanisms involved in the formation, the spreading and the acceptance of prejudiced beliefs and discriminatory practices in society. Besides the well-known social and cultural constraints on conversational interaction in general, we here witness, within a micro-sociological perspective, how prejudice and the ways it controls our everyday talk at the same time exhibit, create, and confirm such macro-sociologically relevant aspects as group conflicts, discrimination, dominance and racism at another level of analysis.

1.4. These last few remarks would require a broader investigation into the specifics of the ethnic situation in the Netherlands, which however cannot be provided in this paper. As a background to our analysis of prejudiced talk, therefore, a few observations must be sufficient (See Bovenkerk, ed., 1978; WRR, 1979, among other studies).

After immigration of Jews in earlier centuries and of groups of Chinese in earlier decades, the Netherlands after World War II witnessed first of all the immigration of large groups of people from its former colony in the East Indies, now Indonesia, such as Moluccans, at the end of the forties and in the fifties. Despite reports about 'peaceful integration' (e.g. Bagley, 1973) on these groups, it should be kept in mind that even today opinion polls consistently show widespread prejudices about these groups, especially Moluccans (opinions that cannot be fully accounted for against the background of some actions of young Moluccans intended to promote their cause of an independent state of the Moluccas). The fifties and the sixties then brought the economic situation in which large amounts of immigrant workers were recruited, mainly from Italy, Spain and Yugoslavia, and later also from other Mediterranean countries, such as Turkey and Morocco. Especially for the latter groups, the socio-economic situation has been bad: low pay, bad housing; exploitation (especially of 'illegal immigrant workers'), inadequate social services, growing unemployment (especially for the second generation) and steadily increasing forms of prejudice and discrimination were prominent features of their minority status. Similar observations may be made about (mostly coloured) immigrants from Surinam, after the independence of that country in 1975.
Although there are many different minority groups in the Netherlands, and although most of these groups are subject to at least some of the socio-economic conditions and to various forms of prejudice and discrimination, the actual situation warrants special attention for two major groups, viz. the immigrant workers, or 'guest-workers', from Turkey and Morocco, on the one hand, and the group of people from Surinam (who predominantly have Dutch nationality and who speak Dutch, though often as a second language), on the other hand. In Amsterdam, these groups are those which are the object of the more prominent forms of public interest, and hence of talk, and at the same time the target groups of the more obvious types of prejudice and discrimination, much like in other cities in the Netherlands. They form with a total of approximately 400,000 about two-thirds of the estimated number of 600,000 members of ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands. Governmental policy until the end of the seventies has always been that the immigrant workers would eventually go back to their home countries, but this policy has been changed when it appeared that most of them were here to stay. Severe immigration restrictions are actually combined with a rather unclear policy of acceptance of a 'multi-ethnic society', in which (often implicit) hopes of eventual 'adaptation' or even 'integration' if not 'assimilation' can be discerned against the background of vows in favour of cultural diversity. Typically, as we find both in survey research and in our own interview data, large segments of the population, would not only welcome even stricter immigration policies, but especially resent what they perceive as unfair, unequal treatment in favour of minorities in the areas of housing, social services or education, while at the same time assigning them the role of scapegoat for the serious socio-economic problems of the Netherlands, mainly unemployment, housing shortage, and substantial cut-backs in the benefits of an extensive welfare system.

Thus, whereas on the whole prejudice and discrimination can be said to characterize Dutch history and society throughout the ages (despite a well-known myth of Dutch tolerance, mostly towards economically welcome groups), the last decade has witnessed more pronounced forms of ethnic conflict.
2. The concept of 'strategy'

2.1. The notion of 'strategy' is widely used, not only in everyday usage, but also in several social sciences. In order to be able to identify cognitive and conversational strategies in prejudiced talk, however, we need some conceptual clarification of this rather vague notion. (For details of this conceptual analysis, see Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Let us therefore briefly enumerate some of the major features of what we mean by the notion of a strategy.

First, strategies in general characterize properties of action and interaction. It says something about the way of doing things; that is about a style of action. More specifically, actions are usually analysed in terms of purposes, intentions or plans on the one hand (the cognitive dimensions of action) and in terms of overt, observable doings or activities on the other hand. Thus, purposes are cognitive representations of the goals agents want to bring about (or avoid) through their activities. Strategies pertain in particular to the way agents go about reaching such a goal. They become relevant as soon as we deal with complex forms of action and interaction, that is with sequences of (inter-)actions. This means that often there will be various possible routes in a complex course of action in order to reach a wanted ('purposed') goal. We will here briefly assume that strategies in particular can be defined in terms of the (cognitive) planning of the most effective way to reach the goal. Effectiveness itself, however, is a complex and rather vague notion. It may mean, for instance, that we choose an optional route of action that will have a high probability of establishing a goal, but at the same time it may also involve notions such as 'cost' or 'difficulty'. In other words, it may sometimes take a lot of effort and high costs to reach a goal 'optimally' (the best possible outcome), so that people may rather opt for an easier route that will nevertheless bring about the desired goal with reasonably high probability. Hence, a strategy is a property of a (cognitive) plan or complex action in such a way that an often difficult goal is reached in the most effective way. In interaction this may mean that we take into account the possible (counter-)actions of other participants or the interpretations and evaluations by other of our actions, e.g. in terms of social norms and values.
be ignorant about a large part of our own, more local, actions during the complex sequence of actions. Therefore, a good strategy involves planning that takes into account, by way of the calculation of probable (re-)actions of others, or of the probability of intermediary outcomes of our own actions, parts of the action sequence that the agent still ignores. This means that strategies, contrary to rigid plans or especially rules or other forms that regulate and monitor behaviour, should be flexible.

2.2. This brief summary of some of the features of the notion of strategy already allows us to try to specify it, still rather intuitively, for conversations about minorities. Conversations are also complex sequences of action. They may have (sometimes several) goals, and they involve other participants of which the (re-)actions, e.g. turns in talk, are seldom known in advance, at least not in detail. If in storytelling about some, negative experience a speaker wants to convey, often indirectly or implicitly, a negative opinion about some minority group, the realization of this goal may be hampered by a number of problems. Thus, the hearer may not understand our point, the hearer may not believe what we try to assert, the hearer may have or change his/her opinions about what we say and therefore about our 'character', and so on. In other words, if a speaker at the same time wants to reach a 'good opinion' about him/herself, the expression of beliefs and opinions that might be interpreted as contradictory with such an opinion or with more general social norms and values, might interfere with the wish to reach another social goal. This is a typical situation in which a strategy is called for, a strategy that optimally combines those moves in an action sequence that realize as much of both goals as possible. Direct expression of what we 'really think' may realize the goal of getting across our communicative point, but may 'cost' us a favourable opinion, such as 'a good, tolerant, understanding citizen'. On the other hand, making a good impression might well inhibit us to tell what we would like to tell, e.g. because it represents an important experience, feeling, or opinion. Obviously, therefore, the strategy will be flexible with respect of the kind of hearer we are talking to: friends, family members or political peers may al-
ready have an opinion about us, including an opinion about
our opinions about minorities, so that in that case we might
be less concerned about making a good impression (although we
may be concerned about maintaining an already established good
impression). In that case, obviously, the 'consonance' between
the opinions of the participants in the conversation will be
crucial. In talk with unknown others, e.g. in interviews, part
of the strategy may therefore consist in moves aiming at the
expression of the opinions of the other.

From this informal application of the notion of strategy
to the issue of conversational communication about ethnic mi-
norities, we may conclude that indeed it makes sense to speak
of strategies when we deal with the complex interactional pro-
blem of realizing both the goals of optimal self-presentation:
and those of wanting to tell about, to share, our experiences
and opinions with others of the same group. Below, then, we will
try to make these observations more systematic and explicit in
the analysis of conversational moves that are geared to the
optimal, effective ways to realize these goals.

2.3. Conversational strategies are typically strategies of action and
interaction, involving planning, goals and a choice among possi-
ble alternative courses of action. Cognitive strategies might
of course be defined in terms of reaching difficult 'mental'
goals through a complex series of mental actions. In this res-
pact the comparison (or the metaphor) holds. Yet there are a
number of theoretical and methodological problems, such as the
nature of 'mental acts', the possibility of planning such acts
(and hence of making a strategy), the 'consciousness' of the
execution and monitoring such acts, and so on. Despite these
problems, which will not be discussed here, we will simply
assume that indeed we may also speak about cognitive strate-
gies. Yet, in that case we do not apply it to (always) conscious
mental actions, but rather to (often automatized) cognitive opera-
tions, to which we only have limited access and which are not
always under full and explicit control. Think aloud protocols
of e.g. problem solving tasks have shown however that sometimes
people may have such strategies and may even talk about them.
We have assumed above that the manipulation and expression of 'delicate beliefs' in some social context may well constitute such a problem for social members. We therefore will also assume that people try to solve such problems in a strategic way. We claim that traces of these cognitive strategies can be found in the more 'overt' forms of communicative interaction, and hence also in conversations. Monitoring their own utterances and the, sometimes non-verbal, reactions of the hearer, we thus 'see' how a speaker chooses a certain 'path', goes back to earlier points and takes another path, and so on. Obviously, such an analysis requires an explicit model of verbal production, both at the sentence and at the discourse levels. We at present have only some hypotheses about fragments of such a model, so a possible analysis of underlying strategies in the expression of ethnic attitudes will be obscured by our ignorance about the more general strategies people use in the accomplishment of the complex task of participating in a conversation. Both what we say, and how we say it, are involved, so specific constraints upon local and global semantics and pragmatics, as well as local grammatical and non-verbal styles are relevant in the more specific problems of 'delicate' topic expression.

3. A strategic cognitive model

3.1. This paper cannot possibly discuss the full complexity of a cognitive model of strategic discourse processing. Yet, some central features of this model should be mentioned: in order to understand both the conversational strategies and the more specific cognitive strategies for the use and expression of ethnic attitudes. After the analysis of discourse data in the next section, we will therefore return to the cognitive model with hypotheses about this more specific use of ethnic attitudes. Here we are concerned only with more general strategies of discourse processing and the role of information in memory in this process.
3.2. Although higher level generalizations are possible about cognitive discourse strategies, it makes sense to distinguish between strategies of production and those followed in comprehension. The goals in these two cases are different, so by definition the strategies will be at least in part different. To simplify the discussion we will here say little about the specific surface structure strategies used in the effective production of grammatical strings or their decoding and interpretation as semantic units, viz. propositions. Relevant at this point is the assumption that strategic production and decoding, unlike the operation of grammatical rules of an algorithmic nature, is not mono-level. Thus, in production, a language user will not first fully construct underlying semantic representations and then feed these into a surface structure formulator specifying lexical entries and syntactic structures and their phonetic realization. Rather, partial semantic information will lead to partial surface structure formulation, which again will constrain further semantic production by self-monitoring feedback. If these constraints are semantically and pragmatically unacceptable, repairs may be made, and sentences may be started anew. In other words, both during production and during comprehension, language users will constantly shift from one level to another using the relevant information of one level in the construction process going on at another level. This may mean that the model, although roughly working in a linear, on-line fashion, may need parallel processing in order to keep track of all the 'information lines' being handled at the same time.

Another feature of a strategic model of discourse processing is that again both in production and in comprehension both textual (grammatical or other) and contextual information is dealt with at the same time. That is, in comprehension we not only decode and interpret textual data, but also numerous data from the social and communicative situation, such as paraverbal activities (gestures, face-work, etc.) of participants, other actions, and setting characteristics of the situation. In addition, the language user
will make use of large amounts of already stored information in memory, such as general world knowledge in so-called semantic long term memory, as well as more concrete context-bound personal recollections of past events and discourses, stored in so-called episodic long term memory. This information will be intelligently stored and hence organized so that effective, that is strategic, use can be made of it during comprehension and production. Thus, in a 'minority story' about how the speaker's bike was stolen on the market, we need not activate from memory all we know about bikes and markets. Only a more strategic use will be made of the relevant information in order to understand the story. Below, we will have to examine how (ethnic) opinions and attitudes are thus strategically used in the production and comprehension of stories about minorities.

We see that strategic production and comprehension in discourse allows the language user to permanently adapt utterances as well as their interpretation to the locally available information and interactional constraints from the text, from context and from cognition. This complex process is possible only if we assume that it is also effectively controlled. We will therefore also assume that the complex flow of information of different types needs to be monitored at higher levels: we must know what information we must now attend to, which information may be (temporarily) stored in episodic memory for possible reinstatement later, which more general world knowledge we now need in short time working memory, or which additional information is required from the context, e.g. in order to disambiguate the interpretation. Therefore, the control system will keep track of what has been said so far (by us, by the other), what our overall or local plans are, which interest or bias must be active to understand the discourse in view of our own goals, etc. It is at this level that we assume that overall conversational and social goals and norms influence the production and the comprehension process.
It is roughly in this way strategic discourse processing takes place. Thus, through a cyclic process of clause-by-clause or sentence-by-sentence production or understanding in STM, surface forms are connected with underlying propositions. For text this means, in addition, that propositions must be coherently connected to form a textual representation. This representation is gradually constructed and stored in episodic memory during understanding, and forms the goal of the process of understanding the discourse of the speaker. And the reverse holds in production: here the semantic representation is not a goal but a starting point for surface structure encoding. Yet, the two processes of production and comprehension are not simply each other's mirror image. Comprehension is also a constructive process, in which top-down processes provide expectations about probable coming surface structures, propositions and overall themes (semantic macrostructures) or the pragmatic 'point' of the text or conversational turn.

Although strategies may use information from various sources (text, context, memory), we may still characterize them by their specific goal. Thus, semantic strategies have as their goal the construction of semantic representations of discourse, whereas syntactic strategies have as their goal the analysis of construction of syntactically well-formed strings of a given language. Also, strategies may be differentiated according to the scope or unit they operate on. Thus, we may have strategies for the understanding of lexical items, the understanding of clauses, the establishment of coherence relations between propositions, or the derivation of higher level 'themes' or macrostructures from the more detailed propositional sequences expressed by the text. The same holds for the formulation or interpretation of stylistic variations in lexical choice or syntactic structure, of rhetorical devices, and of overall schemata, such as those of stories, argumentations or conversations as a whole. Finally, it must be determined which social speech act or other social implications are intended by the speaker or implied by the utterance. All these strategies should be reviewed in more detail when we deal with conversations about minorities.
3.3. When we assume that the goal of discourse understanding is the construction of a textual representation (TR) in episodic memory, we only tell half of the story. In the Van Dijk & Kintsch (1983) model another important component has been built in: a situation model (SM). This situation model can best be conceived as the cognitive correlate of the kind of models or model structures used in formal semantics. In formal semantics, expressions such as sentences are interpreted relative to or 'in' a model. Intuitively, a model is an abstract representation of world(s), the domain(s) of individuals in these worlds, and possibly other parameters such as those of time, place, speech participants and even the knowledge available to the speech participants. The cognitive situation model we here postulate is an integrated structure in episodic memory: it is the collection of relevant previous experiences (and hence also discourses) about a given 'situation'. A good example is the kind of situation models built up and used in newspaper reading. It is not plausible that we recall all the individual news items we have heard or read during months about say the war in Lebanon. Gradually we have constructed a 'mental picture' of that war, both on the basis of concrete news items and on the basis of more general knowledge and beliefs about the Middle East, about Lebanon, and about civil wars. During the interpretation of a new news item, this SM will be activated and where necessary 'updated'. There are a large number of important cognitive functions for these situation models. Among other things they provide the referential 'base' for the interpretation of (co-)referring expressions, e.g. pronouns, in the discourse. Also, they serve as the episodic, and hence personal and variable, point of departure for the process of learning: through abstraction, generalisation and decontextualisation, SM's may become the well-known scripts or frames (Schank & Abelson, 1977) of semantic memory. Reading about several civil wars provides us the more general knowledge about the notion of 'civil war', that is a CIVIL WAR script.

For our purposes, situation models are essential in the account of strategies and the processes dealing with opinions and attitudes. We assume that models of situations also feature
our personal opinions that have been activated or construed during the processing of information. If we hear a story about an event that involves members of an ethnic group, we not only may activate the 'ethnic situation model' that represents the relevant social relations in our neighbourhood as we see them, but we may at the same time activate or form our opinions about actions of minority members as part of that SM. In other words, the ultimate goal of communication and hence of discourse understanding is not so much the construction of a TR in episodic memory, but rather, through TR, the activation, updating or (re-)construction of our relevant situation model about a given topic. Clearly, SM's are subjective, and their updating need not at all be consonant with the intentions of the speaker as indicated by the style, topics or opinions expressed in his/her discourse. For the formation or change of ethnic prejudices this means that of course not all prejudiced stories will automatically lead to 'prejudiced' situation models. Since an SM is crucial in the very process of understanding itself, e.g. because it provides the relevant knowledge base necessary for understanding, it may even influence the process of understanding itself, and hence the construction of a TR that is different from the TR intended by the speaker. This is an explanation of the familiar phenomenon that hearers and readers often are said to understand only what they 'want' to understand or at least tend to pay attention above all to the information in a text that is 'consistent' with their own knowledge and opinions. This means that even for stories or newspaper items that as such are not directly ethnically biased, a hearer or reader may well (re-)construct the textual representation in a way that is coherent with his/her own 'biased' situation model. Similar remarks may be made for the production of prejudiced discourse. The informational and attitudinal basis for what we want to say in a story or interview forms the relevant situation model we have about minorities and events involving minorities in our neighbourhood, town or country. Since however there are conversational and social norms for what we can say to whom in what situation, strategies are necessary for the optimal expression of these contents of the situation model.
4. Conversational strategies

4.1. Everyday conversations are complex sequences of social interaction, and therefore need strategic control by the respective participants of their contributions to the ongoing talk in order to realize their various local and global goals. Clearly, these goals may be very diverse. Thus, during a party it may be one overall goal of the conversation to just have a "pleasant" talk with someone, which may be a subgoal of the overall goal of amusing oneself during the party, or of the goal of 'getting to know people'. Also, informal everyday talk may serve the cognitive or emotional goal to tell about important personal experiences, to voice opinions, to persuade somebody to adopt these opinions or to share in our experiences. Talk about ethnic minorities (EM), even as a sub-topic of a larger conversation, will often have these latter goals. Apart from the personal functions of these goals, they also may have a number of important social functions, such as communicating knowledge and beliefs about relevant out-groups, the shared updating and testing of group norms and values and in general the formation or change of group attitudes, on the basis of which group members may control and monitor future action, interaction and opinion making.

It is within these more general personal and social goals that we should understand the more specific goals of everyday talk and hence of conversations about minorities. Subgoals of the conversation in turn are geared towards the optimal realization of these overall goals of the conversation, and should be realised through the performance of a sequence of moves. Thus, a move is any action that is functionally defined within a sequence, relative to other actions, under the scope of the intention (or plan) to realize a (sub-)goal. In a telephone conversation that has as its main goal to invite someone for dinner, it may be a relevant move to ask first whether that person is free that night. After the other's move (e.g. "Yes, why?") has realized the subgoal of obtaining relevant information, the speaker may then proceed with the proper invitation speech act, which may again be complex, e.g. consist first of an assertion such as "Next week Susie is having her birthday...", and "We
are giving a party", or informations like that. For the hearer, this sequence of moves if often sufficient enough to guess, strategically, what the 'point' will be, viz. an invitation for the party, so that the speaker may even omit the proper invitation speech act, which makes it a typical 'indirect speech act'. From this example we see that, within the framework of larger goals, speakers may try to realize relevant sub-goals first by the performance of a sequence of moves. If one of the moves provides information to the speaker that the overall goal cannot be reached (such as the hearer's not being free at the night of the party in the invitation example), the goal may be changed and hence also the strategy for the rest of the conversation. This will especially be important in those situation where the motivations, intentions and plans of the speaker might be 'awkward', so that the speaker prefers the hearer not to know about them unless a relevant request can be met (e.g. borrowing money from someone, inviting the girl one has fallen in love with for dinner, etc.).

The strategy informally analysed above is a pragmatic strategy, because it involves the execution of a number of speech acts (a request, an assertion, etc.) that are merely intended to establish the necessary conditions that make another speech act, namely the invitation, appropriate and effective. Of course, a direct invitation would have been possible after the initial (greetings, etc.) of the telephone conversation, but due to a number of rather subtle social norms, such a direct invitation might indeed be an infraction upon the liberty of the hearer: saying "Sorry, I can't..." may be awkward both for the hearer to say or for the speaker to hear as a necessary answer. Hence, the initial moves make sure whether the hearer has time, and motivate the occasion of the party. Apparently, the overall invitation-goal must not conflict with general norms of politeness according to which awkward next moves in the conversation are avoided. This is but a simple and rather straightforward example. Actual talk involves many more, and more subtle, strategies for the realization of a number of sometimes conflicting goals.
4.2. Besides the pragmatic strategies mentioned above, a speaker may also use semantic discourse strategies. Whereas a pragmatic strategy may consist of a series of pragmatic moves (speech acts) intended to establish the conditions to perform a main speech act, or to realize an overall, macro-speech act (see Van Dijk, 1977, 1981 for details), a similar kind of strategy may be used at the semantic level. In order to convey an overall meaning, topic or theme, that is a semantic macrostructure for one fragment of a conversation, the speaker must express a number of propositions at the more local micro-level. Also here, one proposition may be expressed in order to denote a situation or condition with respect to which another proposition in the conversation becomes intelligible: someone's birthday is a normal condition for a party.

In this way, speakers may establish, through several turns of talk, a coherent proposition sequence or text base (Van Dijk, 1977). The strategic semantic moves may be both local and global: the expression of a proposition may be intended to just provide, locally, the necessary condition for a next proposition — expressed in the same turn by the same speaker, or in the next turn by the next speaker (as in asking a question and getting an answer), or it may function as a component in a more global, overall topic of discourse. In a story about the birthday party, thus, propositions such as 'We went by car' or 'We arrived at ten o'clock' may be components in the overall topic, represented by the macroproposition 'We went to a party at Susie's'.

In conversational interaction also other semantic strategies are relevant. Especially in those situations and for those topics where it is important that the hearer establishes more or less exactly 'what we mean', the speaker will closely monitor the possible implications and interpretations of what has been said. This may result in moves such as 'explaining' previous propositions, 'correcting' or 'repeating' what has been said, or 'contradicting' possible negative implications of previous propositions. As we have seen before, these strategies may not only be geared towards the construction of an adequate interpretation by the hearer of the utterances themselves, but also towards the adequate evaluation of the speaker as a social member.
In the framework of our cognitive model this means that the aim of the speaker is at least threefold: to contribute to an optimal TR in episodic memory, to contribute therewith to an optimal updating of the situation model, but also to the construction of what we could call an appropriate context model for the communication. Such a context model will feature, among other things, a model of the speaker, and intuitively speaking it will generally be an important aim of the speaker, in any conversation, to establish a 'positive' speaker model with the hearer, that is 'to make a good impression'. Hence, the expression of propositions that might conflict with the opinions or the attitudes of the hearer, may result in a negative speaker model. This is a slightly more sophisticated formulation of the situation, sketched earlier in this paper, in which speakers tell about their experiences and opinions regarding ethnic minorities. The examples of semantic strategies mentioned above are therefore a good starting point for the study of the strategic management of self-presentation in storytelling about minorities. They are the means to realize the important goal of avoiding misinterpretations (the "don't get me wrong"-strategies). We will return to these strategies shortly.

4.3. Another set of conversational strategies pertain to the surface formulation of these underlying propositions. Besides the more general strategies for adequate, grammatical and effective formulation, which we will ignore here, these strategies will be stylistic and rhetorical. Thus, lexical choice, clause structure or word ordering may be crucial in the expression (or avoidance) of fine-grained semantic subtleties. Under referential identity, variable expressions may be used to denote ethnic minority groups or their actions. Certain expressions will have negative implications or associations. Similarly, rhetorical figures of speech, such as repetitions, understatements, overstatements (hyperboles), metaphors, comparisons, or irony, may emphasise, de-emphasise, or draw attention to certain propositions. In this paper, we can only pay indirect attention to these surface strategies of conversation.
4.4. Finally, conversations are typically made up of sequences of turns by different speakers. (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). It has been established that participants in a conversation follow a number of rules in the distribution of turns: they know how to keep a turn, to take one or to give one. Besides these more general rules (such as 'speakers do not speak at the same time'), participants will use more personal and context-bound strategies of turn-taking. They may 'violate' the rules, e.g., interrupt a speaker at a non-permitted location in the ongoing talk, when a number of conditions are satisfied. For instance, if it appears that a hearer has misunderstood a previous turn of the speaker, this speaker may immediately try to correct the hearer, who is now speaking, so that the ongoing turn becomes ill-occasioned. Similarly, within a turn, a speaker may strategically make use of typical conversation phenomena such as hesitations, repairs or false starts (Polanyi, 1979) in order to convey a specific interpretation, such as 'I am not sure about this', or 'I feel uncomfortable saying this'. Obviously, such strategies need not at all be 'conscious' in the sense of being explicitly intended or controlled. Many of the surface strategies of style, those of turn-taking, and those of intonation, paraverbal activities and those of 'realisation' (repairs, false starts) may have become automatised.

We have seen that the various types of strategy mentioned above are closely related with the semantic strategies of conversation that will be further examined in the rest of this paper. This is perfectly in line with our definition of the notion of a strategy. If semantic strategies of production are geared towards the effective realisation of a semantic representation of what is said in the memory of the hearer, they may well make use of various other textual, contextual and cognitive means, such as style, gestures or presuppositions, to achieve that goal optimally. We will however not study these properties of other discourse levels in this paper, but merely mention some of them when we analyse the purely semantic aspects of semantic strategies, viz. the structures of and the relations between propositions in or between the turns of conversations.
5. Semantic strategies in conversations about ethnic minorities

5.1. Having established the theoretical and empirical backgrounds for the analysis of everyday talk about ethnic minorities, we may now turn to the more specific issue of the semantic strategies people use in such conversations. The theoretical account of such strategies however is not straightforward. Some semantic strategies may be formulated in terms of well-known semantic notions such as 'implication', 'presupposition', 'synonymy' or 'antinomy'. Other notions though, such as 'specification', 'generalization', or 'correction', seem to be less clear.

Whereas the traditional notions of linguistic and formal semantics are rather structural or 'static', the others have a more 'dynamic' nature: they are more like semantic acts than properties of propositions or relations between propositions. That is also the reason why we want to speak of semantic strategies, rather than of semantic relations. This means that confusion with (pragmatic) acts, accomplished by the performance of speech acts, or even with rhetorical acts, becomes likely here. Proper definitions and distinctions will therefore be needed to specify the semantic strategies as a separate level of conversational and cognitive analysis, although 'in reality' the cognitive operation of these strategies will be 'mixed' with others.

5.2. The interviews that have been held with majority members of one of the 'contact' neighbourhoods of Amsterdam are of course not examples of natural conversations. Even 'free', non-directed interviews are constrained by special goals and intentions of an interviewer, in such a way that the interviewer takes a minimal role, mainly by asking questions or encouraging the interviewee to 'go on', but nevertheless may control the overall topics. Without going into the details of the specific rules and strategies of interview dialogues, we will here assume that there is sufficient resemblance with spontaneous conversations to warrant conclusions about the kind of strategies that occur in talk between relative strangers: within a specified topic of talk, the interviewee has the liberty to spontaneously organise his/her contributions to the conversation.
5.3. Before we try to be more systematic and explicit, let us examine a number of concrete examples. One of the initial questions in the interview, after some introductory talk about living in Amsterdam (which is the purported aim of the interview as presented to the interviewee), and about the neighbourhood, concerns possible contacts with "foreigners" if the interviewee does not mention this topic spontaneously as a sub-topic of the 'living in this neighbourhood' topic. The following excerpt comes from an interview with a 30-year old woman (see APPENDIX for Dutch original transcripts):

(1) KW-1
1. Iter: Do you also have contacts with foreigners in this neighbourhood?
2. Itee: Well, no, uhhm, that is very difficult, uhhm, she is just about to say hello to me, our neighbour
3. Iter: Oh, is she Surinamese, or
4. Itee: No, not, I think she is Turkish or Moroccan, but I
5. Iter: Oh, is she Surinamese, or
6. Itee: No, not, I think she is Turkish or Moroccan, but I
7. sometimes talk with the children, I think she is mostly inside the house; they are not allowed to go out alone.

In her negative answer the woman in line 3 after some hesitation, marked by 'uhhm', adds a possible reason for the lack of contact with her foreign neighbours: such contacts are very difficult. Specifying reasons for an answer about negative actions (not having contacts) can be interpreted as explanations. That is, the second move of 3 can be heard as explaining the first move, which appropriately answers the question 'as such' but does not complete the possibly required information. A simple "No", would be too short, and would probably lead to a "Why not?" move of the Iter, so Itee herself provides 'good reasons'. Yet, a statement about the difficulty of establishing contact may be too general, and needs backing up. Hence, the third move is to instantiate the difficult contacts by giving an example: the (foreign) neighbour barely greets her. Although the woman admits several turns later in the interview that she is seldom at home and does not establish contacts so much herself, this first backing up of the explanation by giving an example attributes the source of the difficulties to the foreign woman: she is the one who is avoiding
contacts; although this negative action is formulated in the form of a quasi-positive statement (she does say hallo) presupposing that she did not greet before (she is just about to...). Similar strategies characterize the next turn of Itee, after a question about the ethnic group of the neighbour. Again, a negative answer is followed by a specification providing a correction to the supposition of the Iter: the neighbour is not Surinamese but Turkish or Moroccan (two groups of which members are often hardly distinguished by Dutch people). The third move of this turn (line 6/7) is initiated by but, although it hardly seems to connect, e.g. by contrast or negative expectation, with the previous move. Rather, her assertion about the contact with her neighbour's children should be interpreted as a further answer to the initial contact question. The but in that case can be fully interpreted: no contact with the neighbour herself, but contact with her children. Then, however, the next turn (she is mostly inside) reverts to the previous discourse referent, but specifies, possibly as a further reason for the absence of contacts, that she is mostly inside. That is, the assertion that provides further specification about the neighbour is not arbitrary, but provides further reasons for the local topic of conversation, viz. the absence of contacts. Finally, in line 8, this assertion is generalized in a following move that states that these women are not allowed to go out alone. Such a generalization is often used as a further explanation of a statement of fact: here by specifying assumed knowledge about habits, rules or norms of the outgroup. Besides an explanation of the fact that the neighbour remains inside, the formulation of assumed norms of the outgroup at the same time provides a further explanation of the lack of contact, and attributes it precisely to these norms of the outgroup. It is not an accidental situation, a specific habit of this neighbour, but says something about possible contacts with the outgroup in general. In other words, in a few turns and by several moves, the Itee follows a complex strategy of (i) answering the question, and at the same time of (ii) justifying and explaining her answer to the question, by providing reasons, facts, giving an example and a generalization.
The second example comes from an interview with a 62 years old woman who reluctantly accepted to talk about her experiences with foreigners. Her macro-strategy is to assert that she has no contacts with foreigners at all, so that she cannot tell about her experiences. This general strategy of what could be called topic-avoidance by claiming ignorance is very common in the interviews. A fragment of the interview runs as follows (her husband sometimes joins in the conversation):

(2) RA-2

1. Iter: Yes, what kind of, kind of experiences you have
2. with (...) foreigners (...)
3. Woman: We here don’t have any contacts with foreigners,
4. not at all.
5. Man: (coming from the back) Well, I am a man, but
6. then I find it really terrible, that is frankly my
7. opinion, I am a healthy bloke, I am standing firmly
8. with my feet (?) in life, but that’s a big scandal
9. when you here see young woman Turks walking around (...)
10. 18 years old with an old bloke of 50.
11. Woman: Yeeees
12. Man: with three, four; five children, for which you and
13. I pays, and then I say, they have to do something
14. about that.

Although the English translation is only a distant approximation (including the various grammatical 'errors', as in line 13, and the mixture of two expressions in lines 7 and 8 --such as 'standing with one's feet on the ground' and 'standing in the middle of life'), the passage shows rather well the strategies used in such kinds of 'opinion-talk'. As was mentioned above, the woman in line 3, repeats her avoidance moves, by denying contacts with foreigners. At the end of her turn, she repeats the negation (same words in Dutch: "helemaal niet" --not at all), which can be interpreted as a move of emphasising an earlier assertion. Then, her husband joins the conversation, starting with the typical Dutch particle Nou (approximately well in English but with many other meanings), which may signal the starting of a new turn, but also, semantically,
the first segment of an contrast pair, with the approximate meaning here: although I am a man, I yet find it... The assertion about his manhood is of course not arbitrary, but part of a strategy to back up his opinion: 'although as a man I may be expected to take sides with other (here: Turkish) men when relations with younger women are involved, I still find it...'. The negative evaluation in that case becomes more credible, and the concession ('I am a man') then becomes rather an apparent concession. This concession is followed by another move in line 6 and 7, about his frankness, which again delays the object of the judgement ('terrible'). This move, although occurring regularly in the interviews, may not always have a clear function. First, it may imply that the situation is such that the speaker is entitled to such a frank opinion, and in that case it is both an excuse and a justification for expressing oneself in this negative way about others, or to mix oneself in the private affairs of others. Second, it may imply, more generally, that the speaker is frank and does not conceal his 'real opinions'. Third, the move may more specifically 'look back' at the qualification just used ('really terrible') and confirm the choice of the evaluative predicate. Follow two other moves, one about being a healthy bloke, and the other about 'standing firmly on the ground/in life'. The first of these seems to repeat and specify the 'I am a man' move, and thus emphasises the weight of the negative evaluation: 'healthy men like me could in principle understand these other men, but...'. And, similarly, with the second move: 'I know about life, and I am realistic, but...'. These various moves are made to sustain the negative judgement of the speaker by eliminating possible doubts about his credibility or honesty: the negative judgement from him might be heard as a case of jealousy or envy about having such a young woman. In line 8, then, the negative judgement may be repeated and even emphasised ('a big scandal'), and then finally the core of the semantic moves may follow, viz. the object or reason for the negative judgement. This final move of his turn, phrased in a circumstantial clause, uses a semantic opposition (young women vs. old bloke, with a further rhetorical function, namely a contrast, specified with the possibly exaggerated guesses
about the ages of the relevant outgroup members. His wife
joins him in line 11 with a positive agreement, with an extra
signal, lengthening the vowel of "Yes". The man continues by slightly changing the topic: after the 'difference of age' topic for foreign couples, he can easily slip to the 'they have many children' topic. The move again is rhetorically performed by a numerical climax (3, 4, 5), and is followed by a standard move: in this kind of talk: we have to pay for this, which can be interpreted as functioning as a negative consequence for the WE-group. The negative consequence, following reference to a number of properties assigned to foreign families, is however not enough: what is needed is a kind of evaluative conclusion, a pragmatic moral: "we should do something about that", which here is preceded again by the performative move "then I say", which again functions as an indication of the (personal) opinion being formulated. We may call this the perspective establishment move, by which a speaker signals that some opinion is his/her opinion, or that he/she sees the situation from his/her point of view. Notice, finally, that in the stereotypical move "for which you and I pay", we not only find a negative consequence function, but also an interactional appeal function: the interviewer, both as representative of other (white, Dutch) people, and as 'belonging to the same, our, group', is referred to as involved in the negative consequences, and therefore appealed to, viz. in order to agree with the judgement.

Again, our analysis is still fairly informal and far from complete. Further moves, relations between and functions of moves might be discerned in this kind of, rather typical, example of prejudiced talk. We have provisionally found that speakers will do such things, semantically, as repeating or emphasising what has been said before, as making apparent concessions, to invoke credibility despite appearances of possibly biased judgements, to establish semantic oppositions, e.g. to operate rhetorical contrast, and especially to make positive self-assessments as preparations for and excuses for negative judgements about others. Finally, we also saw that there may be a more specific conversational strategy of postponing important propositions, thereby creating both 'suspense' and providing enough warrants for an opinion.
5.4. These few examples have given us the flavour of the kind of strategies involved in talk about minorities. We have found, rather informally and intuitively, that speakers make moves, as parts of more complex strategic steps, that can be interpreted as e.g. 'explanations', 'giving examples', 'specifications', 'corrections', 'generalisations', 'denials', 'emphasising', 'avoiding', 'concessions' (or apparent concessions), 'repetitions', 'establishing contrasts', 'stating negative consequences (for the WE-group)', or 'specifying perspectives'. Clearly, these are just examples, and the expressions used to name these semantic moves are no more than lexical approximations of what is 'going on'. Before we continue with systematic observations on our data, further theoretical clarification is in order. Is it possible, for instance, to find common underlying principles organising these strategies? Also, should these strategic moves all be called semantic, or do they also involve pragmatic or other dimensions of description? And, finally, what semantic description can be given so that the strategies can be specified in unambiguous terms?

In order to provide the theory with somewhat more results from empirical analyses, it should be added here that examination of some other forty interviews, collected in a pilot study for this project in various neighbourhoods of Amsterdam, already yielded some thirty further semantic (and other) local moves in the management of minority talk. These moves have been termed e.g. 'presupposition', 'implication', 'suggestion', 'mitigation' (or 'understatement'), 'exaggeration' (or 'overstatement'), 'vagueness', 'indirectness', 'displacement', 'blaming the other', 'ignorance', 'distance', '(apparent) contradiction', and so on (see Van Dijk, 1982a, for details). It was also observed there that moves may have several of these functions at the same time.

One of the first theoretical observations that come to mind is that some of the moves are strictly relational, in the sense that they can be defined only relative to other moves in the sequence. In that respect they contribute to the local coherence of the discourse. Thus, a 'correction' can be defined only with respect to what has been said before, and so does
'mitigation': something is claimed in less negative terms than it was in a previous move: the speaker 'tones down' a previous move. Other moves though do not have a relational function, but can be categorised in their own right, though often implicitly relative to expectations, a norm or properties of the communicative context. Thus, an 'exaggeration' can be identified as a move in which something is claimed, or a judgement is made, which is obviously 'more', e.g. 'more negative', than was planned by the speaker, expected by the hearer, or relative to the implicit norms and values holding in the communicative context for judging about events or actions of others, such as 'foreigners' in this case. Some strategic moves may appear both as relational and as autonomous. Thus, for instance 'displacement' is a move in which a previously expressed own negative opinion is 'displaced' (attributed) to others, e.g. other members of the WE-group, as in "I don't mind so much, but others in this neighbourhood get really mad at these things". In this case the displacement move follows a typical avoidance or denial move, in which a speaker denies negative evaluations of the THEY-group. Obviously, such a displacement may also occur alone, that is without the explicit previous denial of the speaker about his/her own feelings. In both cases though, like for the other moves, the ultimate functions of the moves should be established not only locally, that is with respect to preceding and following moves, but also with respect to the goals of the conversation/interview as a whole. Thus, 'mitigation' both tones down, locally, a previous move, but also, globally, aims at the establishment of a positive impression of tolerance and understanding.

The theoretical criterion we would like to apply in the decision whether a move is semantic or not, is that a semantic move should be definable in terms of semantic relations between propositions or between the referents of propositions, that is 'facts' in some possible world. In other words, the specification may be either intensional or extensional, or both. Pragmatic moves, on the other hand, should be definable in terms of relations between speech acts, whereas rhetorical moves may again be based on both semantic and pragmatic (and surface structural)
information, viz. by applying a specific transformation to this information. Thus a repetition, as we have in the examples analysed above, is a semantic move if its underlying proposition(s) are equivalent with those in a close previous move, where equivalence is defined as usual, viz. as mutual entailment. Strictly speaking, according to pragmatic conditions on appropriate assertions, the repetition of a same proposition in the same local context would be 'superfluous': hearer already 'knows p'. Therefore, semantic and pragmatic repetition also functions as a rhetorical move, viz. in terms of an ADDITION (of 'same') operation, that also defines phonological rhyme, or syntactic parallelism. Such a rhetorical move would be functional with respect to the overall goal of being (more) effective, e.g. by making sure that the right 'message' is conveyed. In other words, the semantic and pragmatic moves hardly contribute anything 'new' to the discourse representation in the memory. representation of the hearer --according to the cognitive model sketched above-- but its rhetorical function may attribute extra 'weight' or 'relevance' to the repeated proposition or assertion. This extra memory 'tag' will be helpful in retrieval and hence makes the proposition/assertion more effective. From this brief theoretical analysis of the move of a 'repetition' --for which further cognitive processing will not be discussed here-- we see that moves may be defined at several levels of analysis.

Similarly, we may try to define other moves. An explanation, for example, can be defined in terms of postponed reasons or causes of a fact denoted by an earlier proposition, as in: "I have no contacts with them. They do not speak our language". A separate explanatory move may of course collapse with the previous assertion by a complex sentence with an embedded because-clause, for which however the sequential and the presuppositional conditions are different. Explanatory moves are always separate (mostly assertive) speech acts, usually expressed by an independent sentence. Of course such moves may be recursive: several assertions may be made, each or together functioning as an explanatory move.
Example and specification moves can semantically be defined in terms of one-sided entailment: \( q \) is a specification of \( p \), if \( q \) entails \( p \), and an example would similarly be definable in terms of an instantiation relation, specifying a member of the set denoted by a previous proposition. 'Generalisation' is defined the other way round: the generalising move is itself entailed by its previous move, or defines the superset of which a previous move specifies a member. Although this is not yet quite impeccable from a logical point of view, and although further constraints are necessary (not any generalisation is acceptable, but only 'relevant' ones), these theoretical definitions will do for the moment.

Other moves are semantically somewhat more complicated. A correction, for example, is of course not any other proposition, added as a substitution for a previous proposition. Often the correction is merely lexical: a better predicate is chosen to represent the intended state of affairs referred to. Or, interactionally, the hearer corrects a wrong presupposition of the speaker/iter, e.g. by referring to the intended, but at first mis-identified, discourse referent. In other words, correction usually pertains to members of the same class, of individuals, their properties or relations, or of facts. Thus, if we find in an interview the statement: "They do not work. Well, that is to say, they mess around with cars and sell them" (31, 144), the correction is from paid, regular occupation to irregular, private occupation. That is, common to both terms is the implicated proposition about their occupation, featuring the same discourse referent and predicates of the same class.

Emphasising, and its converse (mitigation), functioning often at the same time as rhetorical hyperboles and understatements, respectively, may be defined along similar lines. In fact, they are corrections of a specific kind, whereby often the same fact is referred to, but only in 'stronger terms' (or 'softer' terms). This move may affect the quantifiers (saying 'all' instead of 'many', 'always' instead of 'often'), or the choice of a more positive or more negative evaluative predicate, such as "a big scandal" after saying "it is terrible" in our example about the young Turkish girls that marry with old Turkish men.
Although, formally speaking, sometimes these relations may be defined in terms of entailment, it is essentially our world knowledge and the system of our norms and values that will specify whether one proposition can be interpreted as a 'stronger' or 'softer' representation of some state of affairs. The same holds for the definition of contrast. Formally, we may try to capture part of the semantic relation in terms of antonyms, or in terms of the implication of a negated proposition (\( p \) is an antonym of \( q \), if \( p \) entails \(-q\), and \( q \) entails \(-p\)). But again, what is interpreted as a contrast may heed specific culturally variable beliefs, opinions or emotions. 'Young girl' and 'old man' are certainly contrasts, both along the dimension of gender and along that of age, but the contrast is relevant only within a proposition in which these two terms are connected by the predicate 'to marry' (or 'are seen together'), which is conflicting with the mating norms of a given culture. Hence, the semantic opposition should be evaluated relative to a set of beliefs, opinions or norms. In fact, this important condition holds for all our semantic analysts: we are not here talking about abstract, universal semantics, but about socio-culturally variable, and hence cognitively variable and relative semantics. For the moves of the interviewee this means interpretation relative to the beliefs, opinions, norms or values of the (dominant) WE-group, in which usually the interviewer is expected by the interviewee to share. The move of what might be called establishing a perspective is precisely the initial or 'reminding' way to constitute this basis for the interpretation of what is said, or to guarantee that the same basis is shared with the interviewer. In other words, we here find a meta-semantic move, that is a move that guarantees or defines the (correct) interpretation basis for other moves (typically: "that is how I see it"). Such meta-moves may at the same time function as a form of relativisation and hence as a form of mitigation if they follow a more absolute statement.

Presupposition, implication and suggestion are moves by which a proposition is entailed, intended or not, that is not fully or not at all expressed in the surface structure of a move, again relative to the beliefs and opinions of the speaker.
Thus, instead of saying "They abuse of our social services", a speaker may presuppose the underlying proposition of this sentence as known to the speaker, or as shared by the WE-group, by directly stating: "I don't understand why they are abusing our social services". Or, with an implication, we may have it that people say "We have to pay for it" (e.g. that they have many children), which implies that they do not pay for it themselves. And finally, an expression like "They always have the nicest clothes" suggests the implication "they have money" or even "they have obtained that money/those clothes by illegal means". We see that the implicational relations between the explicitly stated and the implicit propositions might be increasingly weak, depending on the amount and strength of the underlying common beliefs and opinions about the social world.

We here touch upon the large class of moves which not only contains moves such as those of the implicit, but also those of vagueness and indirectness. Vagueness could be defined in terms of referential adequacy together with a pragmatic maxim that we should say no more and no less than relevant for the situation. If a speaker wants to represent the (intended) fact 'He stole my bike', vagueness may become a necessary move in order to avoid outright accusations (against a minority group). This may be done by adding modalities like "probably", "maybe" or "I think that...", by choosing a more general term, such as "he took my bike", or by specifying normal conditions or consequences, such as "I have seen him where my bike was...", or "I have seen that he had my bike". For the hearer the probable inference about theft remains the same in that case. Similarly, indirectness, e.g. of the whole speech act, may be strategically necessary if the 'direct' speech act would be too impolite, too negative for the discourse referent or otherwise socially undesirable. Instead of an accusation, the speaker may then resort to the kind of indirect accusation performed by the assertion of possible conditions of the accusation as in the theft example just mentioned.
A denial also requires both a semantic and a pragmatic definition. On the one hand, a denial will semantically often be a negation of some proposition, but pragmatically it is the assertion that some presupposed proposition, or a previous assertion, is false or inappropriate, respectively. Self-denial may in that case be the negation of propositions implied by previous moves, whereas other-denial negates propositions implied by moves of the other speaker (here, of the interviewer, for example). Typical denials in our data are moves such as "I have nothing against them" which precede or follow moves in which negative evaluations are made about foreigners. Therefore, such denials should also be heard as a kind of correction or a warning, viz., that the other speaker should not draw the wrong inferences.

Finally, we often find concessions as moves in our conversational data. These may be of different types. For instance, before or after negative evaluations, a speaker will typically assert that minorities also have 'good qualities'. Similarly, an actual right may be denied (such as sharing in the benefits of social housing) when a more general right is conceded (such as "They have the right to be here"). Also, concessions will typically be made about possibly negative properties of some members of the WE-group, before or after assertions about the same negative properties of the THEY-group: "They ruin our park here. Of course, also some of the Dutch children do this." Whereas explanatory moves could be collapsed to a previous move by a complex because-clause, these concessive moves may be collapsed to a complex although-clause or a compound but-clause or sentence.

Since denials, concessions, and contradictions and similar moves may often be incoherent with the overall meanings or intentions of the speaker, it often makes sense to add the term apparent. This qualification is necessary in order to explain the local and global coherence of the discourse and to specify the (relative) semantics for each move. In other words, we thereby want to convey that the move is strategical only relative to the goal of 'making a good impression', rather than to the goal of 'being sincere and honest'. Semantically, thus, propositions of such moves may be false, and pragmatically the speech acts
may not satisfy the general condition of sincerity. Note that
this analysis does not necessarily imply a negative judgement
about the interviewee by the analyst, but rather a specification
of the way another speaker, e.g., the interviewer, may hear such
moves. (And maybe this was an apparent denial, too!).

5.5. We now have some better theoretical understanding of what
kind of semantic strategies are involved, and along which
lines they can be defined. We have found that moves may be
relational or not, that some are semantic and others prag-
matic, and often both, and that some require intensional
and others extensional semantic interpretation. Also we
observed that the semantic basis for the interpretation
should be the set of socially shared beliefs, opinions,
norms and values of the WE-group of which the speaker (and
possibly the hearer) is a member. Next, some of the moves
may be self-relational, whereas others relate to previous
or expected following moves of the other speech participant,
viz. in the framework of the usual recipient design of con-
verational interaction. Thus, moves may be backwards and
forwards, so to speak. A general property of backwards moves
is to semantically or pragmatically 'repair' previous ones,
e.g., by correcting, specifying, explaining, making more cre-
dible, etc. a previous move or implications of such a move.
Forward moves will usually have a similar function the other
way around: they will by anticipation try to take away possible
negative inferences of planned moves of the speaker. The most
typical move of this kind is maybe: "I have nothing against
foreigners, but...".

Another general property of the semantic moves we have
discussed is what we could call the management of (un-)wanted
inferences: entailed propositions may be expressed later, as
in generalisations, or earlier as in specification; may be
kept unexpressed, as in presupposition, implication or sugges-
tion; or may be negated as in denials or concessions. Also,
adding or deleting semantic information of the same class is
a property defining a number of moves, such as emphasising,
exaggerating or making understatements.
Similarly, whereas sameness is involved in repetitions and exaggerations, difference or even opposition underlies such moves as contrast, contradiction, denial, drawing negative consequences, or concessions.

Finally, a number of semantic moves can be defined only together with their pragmatic and interactional functions. Expressing ignorance, distance, avoidance, etc. is typical for the kind of moves we find in these interviews. People often state things like: "I have no contact with them...", "I avoid them...", "I have nothing to do with them...", etc. In further analysis we mostly find that these statements are not (quite) true, and therefore we interpret them as specific moves, which would allow the speaker to avoid having to give (honest) negative opinions, which is a good move within the overall strategy of positive self-presentation. Instead of refusing an answer, which would be impolite within the framework of a once granted interview interaction, the speaker can thus avoid making specific statements: not knowing a person/group is a good and acceptable reason for not being able to say something about him/her/it. Since this move involves an (apparent) denial of the facts, it is strictly speaking semantic, but 'refusing a wanted answer about known information' is also a pragmatic move. The social avoidance of THEY-groups may thus sometimes turn into conversational avoidance to talk about them if that would hurt our self-presentation.

From this summary and generalising remarks about the semantic moves, we also may conclude that each move may be definable along several dimensions. Many moves involve the management of conversational inferences, either of the move itself, or of other, previous or next moves (of the speaker or of the other participant) under the general goal of strategy of saying 'one's piece' adequately on the one hand, and preserving a good personal evaluation by the other, on the other hand. The more specific operations then involve features such as 'adding', 'taking away', 'blocking', 'substituting', 'avoiding' or 'hiding' such inferences. If these general conclusions are correct, we now should go back to the data and make them more precise so that more subtle and more relevant observations can be made.
5.6. By definition, moves do not come alone. Together with other moves they form courses of strategic interaction. A next question for an analysis of conversation, therefore, is to see how the various moves discussed above form sequences, how they interact, or how the one is a condition for, or a consequence, of another move. We have assumed earlier that in addition to this kind of local analysis of moves, e.g. within adjacency pairs or triplets, a more global analysis of move sequences requires the identification of overall goals of the strategy: what are the individual moves aiming at, what do they add up to, at this more global level. Let us try to find some answers to these questions by analysing a next piece of conversation.

As an example we have taken another fragment of the interview with the 62 year old woman (and her husband, who sometimes joins the discussion), of which we earlier examined another series of moves (example (2)). The next passage follows the topic in which she, or rather her husband, formulates a negative opinion about the Turkish custom that older men can marry very young women. This topic and especially the evaluation is repeated first, together with the expression of opinions about the amount of children "they" have. In order to be able to analyse this example for its interactional move sequence, we here translate it in full (again, only approximate English equivalents are used):

(3) RA-2
1. Iter: What do you mean by that when you see them [Turkish couple] in the street?
2. Man: Yes, yes, well, let's be honest, they are all kids of fifteen, sixteen, seventeen years old
3. Iter: Yes
4. Man: They are married with a bloke of forty, fifty, all old goats, and making children one after another,
5. Iter: You understand, well you pay for that, I pay for that
6. Man: with social contributions
7. Iter: yes, you understand?
11. Woman: Yeeees (...) one may not discriminate, but
12. Iter: (Laughs) No, that is a taboo, isn't it?
13. Woman: One is
14. Man: (...) it goes again the grain with everybody
15. Woman: One is nevertheless confronted with it. I haven't
got them here in ehh my ehh around me, no, I haven't
got contact with foreigners here at all.
16. Iter: But what kind of experiences do you have with it?
you just said
17. Woman: Yes, a couple of Surinamese live here; well you
know, Surinamese, this week the police and the
ambulance have, well I wasn't there, a police car
and ambulance have been here, well you know how
it is with Surinamese, that is a (takes deep breath)
ehh temparent ehh kind of people, we know that
18. Iter: Yes
19. Woman: But ehh, I can't I am afraid (pause) I am amidst
Dutch people (pause)
20. Iter: And you are glad about that, or don't you mind?
21. Woman: Ehh, look madam, if these people adapt themselves
to us ehh our Dutch, our Dutch manners and customs,
then I won't mind at all! not at all, just like my
husband says, ehh yes, in these bad economic times,
dutch women they are reminded that they ehh should
not have more than one two children, something like
the pill and all those things, and then you come out-
side and then you see there (pause) my husband he
says those old blokes, I say old men, yes eehh look,
that is what goes against the grain with us
22. Iter: those old foreign men with those young women, you mean?
23. Woman: Yeeees, and then the number of children! (pause)
24. Iter: Did you ever talk with foreign women, how she thinks
about that herself?
25. Woman: No, you don't get into contact with them! Not allowed
to have contact with Dutch people (...)
The overall strategy of the interviewer, within this interview, should be understood against the background of the special aims and methods of this sub-project, viz. to collect stories about concrete personal experiences with 'foreigners', rather than to ask for opinions about (the presence of or experiences with) foreigners. It was assumed that through the method of eliciting everyday stories, we would not only hear about experiences, but also --perhaps indirectly-- get to know the opinions of Dutch majority people about foreigners, opinions based on experiences in everyday life. The repeated question, e.g. in line 18-19, of the interviewer, therefore should on the one hand be interpreted as part of this general interview goal, and on the other hand, more locally, as a (desperate) reaction to the woman's many times repeated assertion that she has no contact with "them", implying that she can't tell anything. This move has already been identified as part of an avoidance strategy, in which social avoidance somehow reflects itself in conversational avoidance: claiming lacks of contact, allows the excuse that nothing can be told, which is a possible move to avoid saying negative things. This couple does report some negative opinions though, but they keep using hedgings. For this passage, the overall personal aim of the man and the woman is to at least express their critical judgement about the family customs of foreigners (marrying too young of women, and having too many children). This criticism is globally founded on the perceived negative consequences for the WE-group, as expressed (again, see the first fragment in (2)), in line 8, by a 'negative consequence' move, together with a move of 'appeal' to the interviewer (who is taken to be part of the WE-group), and a rhetorical repetition move (with proper enumerative stress on both you and I).

If we go through this passage move by move, we may observe the following move connections. First, Iter wants some more observations and opinions about the briefly indicated topic of age discrepancies of foreign couples. The man, who has initiated this topic, answers in line 3 with a repeated "yes". This affirmation should not be interpreted as a signal that the request for more information is understood, but rather as a general confirmation of his earlier observation and judgement about the
foreign couples. He then repeats his earlier observations, but introduces these with a stereotypical (Dutch) expression displaying his honesty, which usually functions as an excuse or a good reason for the expression of 'frank', that is negative, opinions about a subject. In the form of a generalisation and a rhetorical climax (15, 16, 17) mentioning the estimated ages of the women (he uses the word 'kids' instead of 'girls' or 'women', thereby emphasizing the very young age of the women) he then repeats his earlier observation. In his next turn he mentions the men, this time with a two-step climax of estimated ages, and adds the generalised expression "all old goats", as a negative evaluation of the sexual role of the men involved. Again, this topic of age discrepancy is merely an introduction to the more relevant topic of having (too) many children. The stylistic choice of 'old goats' is an appropriate preparation for the change to that topic in the same turn: "they make children one after another". (In fact, in Dutch he uses a mixture of two sayings, viz. "en maar kinderen maken aan de lopende massa", that is 'making children on the assembly line' combined with 'making masses of children', combined with the Dutch particle maar, which has no English equivalent, but implies 'they do so without any restriction, or scruples'). Follows an appeal to the interviewer for understanding of his analysis of the situation, and then the 'negative consequence' move in its rhetorical repetitive manner. The interviewer then wants to make sure the precise implication, and mentions the social contribution 'we' have to pay (for all those children), a supposition confirmed by the man in a next turn, and followed by a repeated appeal to the understanding of the interviewer: (line 10).

Then the woman takes over again, first by confirming the earlier (negative) judgement. However, at the same time she wants to display her awareness of the fact that such a negative evaluation may be heard as a form of discrimination, and she expresses this awareness with a stereotypical expression (in Dutch: "je mag in wezen niet diskrimineren, maar") with an interpolated 'in wezen' (lit.: 'essentially') which here functions as a particle which signals that an exception is going to be made to this general norm, an exception stereotypically introduced
with *but* in a next clause, which however she does not finish in this turn. The function of this move is at the same time an (apparent) concession, viz. of the fact that making negative evaluations in general is not allowed, but that here no other judgement is possible. After the laughing agreement of the interviewer, who here voices a now common opinion that it is a taboo to speak negatively about foreigners, the man interrupts the woman who wants to finish her *but*-clause and uses a Dutch saying ("tegen de borst stuiten") which is a mitigated form of saying that something is shocking. He does so however by making a generalisation: everybody is shocked by this, which repeats and strengthens his earlier judgement. The woman in line 15 then is able to finish her *but*-clause and uses the rather vague expression that "one is confronted with it", which also sounds rather formal ('to be confronted with' in Dutch colloquial talk seems as uncommon as it is in English). However, as soon as she volunteers such an expression and also a conclusion of the earlier observations, the implication is that she does have contacts with foreigners, and therefore she in the next move starts to 'draw back' as it were, by repeating that she does not have foreigners right where she lives, followed by the relevant macro-conclusion that she does not have any contact. She is back in the avoidance strategy.

However, once volunteered an observation, the repeated question of the interviewer does seem to trigger other memories of experiences and she starts to tell in line 20 about Surinamese even before the interviewer can finish her turn by an argument ("you just said") that the woman did admit that she had contacts. The story about the Surinamese is however extremely succinct, and does not all all develop along the usual structural lines in which a full setting and complication are described: only the major participants, a couple of Surinamese, and the police and ambulance, are mentioned, which leaves open any suggestion of crime or violence or both. These few details of the untold story are however embedded in a number of interesting moves. The overall local move seems to be to express the shared opinion "You know how they are, the Surinamese, they have temperament, and...", which she does by first making an appeal to the interviewer ("you know") which also signals a shared social knowledge. Then
she interpolates another kind of avoidance move, namely the 'absence' move: "I wasn't there". The function of such a move is complex. On the one hand it suggests that if she wasn't there, she must have the story from hearsay, and that therefore maybe she should not tell it, or that she doesn't know the details, and therefore should not judge. Second, conversationally, it signals again that she rather does not want to speak about it, or does not want to provide details or judgement. This avoidance strategy is marked by further appeals to the interviewer, which puts the incident into a more general perspective of 'common knowledge': we all know what happened, I need not tell you. Still, in line 23/24 she has to give a clue about what happened (it was not an accident, say), and does this by a move of indirectness and vagueness: instead of saying what happened, she merely makes a (very hesitant) statement about some generally ascribed property of Surinamese: that they have a lot of temperament. This is again closed by the appeal to common knowledge, which implies that she is not making a personal (negative) judgement. The interviewer just encourages with a simple "yes", but in line 27 the woman again retreats to her strategic base-line: she can't (tell more?), because she lives among Dutch people, which is a condition-move to implicitly state (again) that she has no contact, and hence no experiences, and hence nothing to tell.

The interviewer does not give up and in line 29 provokes the woman, with a rather far-reaching conclusion about the woman (are you glad about living among Dutch people?) but adds the more polite 'leaving an option' move (or don't you mind?) This move directly addresses the possible prejudiced feelings of the woman, and after a hesitation, she starts a resolution to that conversational predicament, by the rather definite "look, madam" (which is formal and polite when said to a female student who is much younger: a less polite you-form (jij) would be more normal, but at the same time the polite address form seems to create the necessary distance for the following frank statement of her opinion). The next move is a well-known 'condition': if they behave such and such, then (I accept them, then it would be OK, etc.). The content of the condition is
one of the most frequently heard objections to foreigners in Holland: they do not adapt themselves (to our norms and habits). After such a condition move, a repeated 'positive opinion' move may follow. This 'positive opinion' move occurs often in this kind of interview, either in its rather weak form of 'I don't care...', or in stronger forms as in 'I don't mind at all' or even 'I find it OK if...'.

Yet, it is the specific condition move that has the dominant function here. Therefore, the next moves provide further backing for this condition, viz. by a number of 'argumentative' steps. To defend, make plausible or back up opinions about ethnic minorities, conversationalists in interviews will often set up an argumentative schema. Instead of paraphrasing the conversation, let us lay out this schema, move by move:

1. Appeal (to husband). Comparison (with what was said). 33/34
   Coherence establishment. Agreement. Authority?
2. Cause, reason: explanation (circumstances) bad economy) 33
3. Comparison (Dutch women) 34
4. Negative condition (we have few children) 35
5. Positive condition: enabling (pill, etc.) 36
6. Situation, setting, concretisation ("then you see...") 37
7. Hesitation before conclusion (Pause) 37
8. Co-reference to earlier expression. Style correction. 38
9. Style correction ("I say: 'old men'") 38
10. Implicit/incomplete conclusion (old men with young women) 38
11. Appeal ("yes, look") 38
12. Judgement. Conclusion. 39
Iter: Making sure what object if conclusion is. 40
13. Confirmation (Yeeees) 41
14. Clarification, Extension (of judgement: and the children) 41

The argumentative schema is built up first with coherence moves that at the same time function as repetitions of what has been said and claimed by her husband, so that further weight (if not authority) is given to her coming facts. The two major grounds for the premises of the argument are (a) the economy is bad (so we cannot afford many children), and
(b) Dutch women were also urged to have less children. An additional premise she uses pertains to the possible control over the recommended acts: there is the possibility of birth control ("something like the pill and all those things"). In fact, the actual conclusion, viz. "they should have less children", remains implicit, as is often the case in conversational argumentation: the hearer can draw the conclusion from the available premises. We see that each move is functional with respect to this argumentative strategy, but the interesting point is that this relevance in each case may be 'double'. On the one hand, a move may provide a valid premise that provides grounds for a plausible conclusion. This conclusion is presented not so much in terms of personal preferences, likes or dislikes, at least not explicitly, but derives from more general social and cultural norms and habits: economic and social conditions (for the WE-group) make birth control necessary. On the other hand, another strategy aims at the reasonable presentation of the premises and the conclusion. In that perspective moves such as the (conditional) acceptance of foreigners and the move that "we Dutch women had to do so too" can be understood. In other words, the two strategies that interact here could be summarised at a reasoning strategy on the one hand, and a reasonableness strategy on the other hand. The first argues why something is wrong and what should be done (by the others), and the second shows that such a conclusion is a 'fair' expectation. Another interesting point in this argumentation is that most of the moves are based on vagueness and indirectness or even implicitness (like the 'conclusion'), except the positive move of conditional acceptance ("then I won't mind at all"). Also the appeal to common and generally accepted social norms is typical for this kind of arguments: although we have found data that show direct and explicit personal (dis-)likes and preferences regarding ethnic minorities, most of the moves of negative evaluation are based on assumed general norms and values of the WE-group as a whole, so that the speaker cannot properly be taken responsible for the endorsement of the evaluative conclusions based on them. Only the "we have to pay for it" move is both personal and social, but can be used because it fits the
conditions of everyday commonsense reasonableness: we need not pay for their particular habits.

Similar remarks can be made for the unfinished story that precedes the argument: many of its moves are indirect, implicit, vague or incomplete assertions, so that only fragments of the story are given. Together with the distance or avoidance move ("Well, I wasn't there"), these features define the nature of the overall strategy of avoiding or suspending (negative) judgement about ethnic minority groups, which again is one of the conditions for positive self-presentation if the speaker is aware (as it is the case here, see line 11) that "one is not allowed to discriminate".

Of course, this is but one example. Many other move sequences are possible in this kind of talk. Others will simply adduce a great many 'good reasons', both in the form of opinions and beliefs (e.g. based on the media, information from others) and in the form of personal experiences; why foreigners 'do not belong here', 'should adapt themselves', 'should be sent back', or 'should not be helped anymore by the state, the town or the social services'. Others again may mention no negative opinions or experiences at all, and will in that case often follow a strategy in which other WE-members are criticised for their prejudice or discrimination, which of course is a straightforward strategy of positive self-presentation. Or, negative opinions and experiences are mentioned, but these are differentiated, personalised, explained or excused, and compared with similar 'difficulties' one may have with Dutch neighbours. It is striking that independent from these variations in the kind of prejudice displayed by the various interviewees, many of them will mention situations in which they "helped" specific foreign neighbours in the course of everyday neighbourly contact, but at the same time this move in the self-presentation strategy may again often be used to introduce a frustration or disappointment move: WE helped them, but THEY nevertheless did something negative, sometimes followed, implicitly or explicitly by a conclusion that future help or understanding will not be given.
5.7. We now have a first approximation to the definition of strategic moves in interview talk, have identified a number of these moves and provided a semantic characterisation for them, and have finally shown how these moves connect in a sequence under the control of the aims of a more global strategy. Although much more could and should be said about these moves and much empirical work has still to be done to describe their precise conversational and interactional characteristics, there is one point left that should briefly be discussed in this section. Strategic interaction, and hence moves of the kind discussed above in principle may occur in any kind of conversation or interview. Especially in order to draw cognitive conclusions, or to pin down concrete social functions and consequences, it is necessary to ask whether there are specific moves for this kind of talk.

Although of course the specificity of this kind of conversation is ultimately based on the (i) topic, (ii) the situation (including the intentions of the speech participants, and their mutual social relations), and (iii) the kind of discourse (interview) involved, we have the impression that indeed quite a number of moves and move sequences appear to be rather typical for talk about ethnic minorities. Typical of course does not mean exclusiveness, but rather that such moves are specifically effective, and hence probable, in such talk. In other words, we might also expect them in talk about other topics concerning socially 'delicate' topics, such as sexism, exploitation, welfare provisions, and so on. The delicacy of these topics hinges upon a perceived conflict of interests, or apparent contradictions between personal experiences, opinions, attitudes, or goals, on the one hand, and more general norms and values in society, or criteria for 'reasonableness', 'goodness', 'tolerance' (i.e. personal characteristics) on the other hand.

It follows that a direct, outright and explicit strategy for the expression of negative experiences or opinions may conflict both with the prevailing social norms and values, and with the criteria for positive self-presentation. If so, we may indeed expect that moves in talk about ethnic minorities tend to be of the following types:
A. **Dissimulation**: implicit, indirect, vagueness, presupposition, suggestion, association moves;

B. **Defense**: excuse, defense, justification, explanation, etc. moves (pertaining to past --negative-- actions or present opinions of the speaker);

C. **Accusation** (possibly also as a form of defense): accusation, blaming, attack, criticism, negative experiences (stories), comparison, and norm-explication moves. (mostly pertaining to actions of THEM).

D. **Positive self-presentation**: admission, concession, agreement, acceptance, excuse, self-assessment, norm-respect, understanding (empathy), etc. moves.

This list is not complete, but it shows the beginning of a pattern for the typical strategic moves we can expect in majority talk about minorities. Of course, the assumption is that these moves will typically occur in 'prejudiced' talk, which however seems a circular characterisation if we describe talk of prejudiced persons as prejudiced talk. This circularity can only be broken if we provide an autonomous cognitive description of prejudiced people or groups. But, on the other hand, we might well take such a strategic pattern as a possible indication or 'symptom' of underlying prejudices. Also, together with semantic content that can be characterized as prejudiced, these moves are conversational actions, and therefore social practices and hence relevant manifestations of 'prejudiced behaviour'. Comparison here with sexist talk is instructive: not only will sexist men often display their sexism by 'sexist remarks', defined at the semantic level, and compared to social norms and values or goals of women, but also their conversational moves may display strategies that are rather typical, such as the moves mentioned above.

It also follows that different prejudice patterns might be inferred from different strategic patterns. A person who mainly uses type C (Accusation) moves, has a different style (and will often appear 'more prejudiced'), than somebody using those of A or D, whereas those using A (dissimulation strategies) may be seen as less honest than those using C (explicit accusation) strategies. Of course, differences will be of degree: there may be different distributions (and frequencies) of certain types of move in the talk of each person (and in each different context):
in principle it can safely be assumed that all members of the WE-group will occasionally use such strategic moves in their talk about members of THEY-groups. Not only ethnic prejudice, we assume, is usually different only in degree, but also its conversational 'manipulation' will depend on personally and socially (situationally) variable strategies and strategic abilities.

At this point though we already enter the domain of the relations between cognitive properties of social members on the one hand and their 'overt' social (inter-)actions, on the other hand. Moves, strategies and their characteristics have not only been defined in 'overt' properties of talk, but involve interpretations, categorisations, intentions, plans, goals, beliefs, opinions, interests, norms, values, and so on, that is cognitive dimensions. In other words, strategic moves, even in their own right as functional actions in an interaction sequence, already require further cognitive analysis. A pure 'behaviour analysis' of conversational devices, therefore, is indeed a behaviouristic illusion: socially relevant actions need interpretations, need attribution of intentions, plans or motivations, both of the agent and of participating or observing other social members. Similarly, what we hear in a conversation is merely the top of the interaction iceberg: most of it is invisible, viz. part of cognitive representations. Besides this cognitive management of the conversation 'itself', there is the cognitive representation and manipulation of the 'subject matter', the referential basis, or the topic of the conversation, viz. our beliefs, opinions, attitudes, emotions and represented experiences, in this case about ethnic minority groups, about our daily contacts with them, about social life in our neighbourhood and about our society and culture in general. Although these representations can be known and are relevant only when they manifest themselves in what we do/say, it remains important to assess them autonomously, in their own terms first, so that we have a general and flexible input to the many ways they can be manifested in (inter-)action and discourse.
6. Cognitive strategies for the use of ethnic information

6.1. The major aim of this paper is to try to link conversational strategies with cognitive strategies for the 'use' of ethnic prejudices. Or, to phrase it slightly differently: is it possible to infer how people think about minorities from the ways they talk about them? This is a typical theoretical and methodological problem. Social members hardly ever bother about such a problem: a person simply is prejudiced if he or she talks in a prejudiced way. The only problem which may arise in that case is that for some social members talk is not (and therefore the speaker is not) prejudiced and for others the same talk and speaker is prejudiced. This will most dramatically be the case in the confrontation with the minority members themselves. Hence, the theoretical problem is more complex. On the one hand we have a problem of observational methodology. On the other hand we have a problem of social judgement and 'position': just as for many social members, social scientists will often use the notion of prejudice exclusively for other people of the WE-group. In addition, it is still customary to approach the problem of prejudice and discrimination from either a WE-group perspective, or a quasi-neutral 'observer' perspective, instead of from the point of view of the ethnic minority members. To put it even more directly: the minority members themselves are the best observers of prejudice and discrimination; they will know it when they see, hear or feel it. Hence, the methodological problem is not that they (or others) can infer prejudiced cognitions or 'personality' from observed actions or talk, but rather how they do so. In our case, part of that issue could be taken care of with an empirical semantics, that is by an adequate model of discourse production and understanding. However, such a model only yields insights for direct, explicit, and monological expression of semantic representations, and as yet hardly allows full treatment of complex and subtle conversational moves. Therefore, rather than to focus here on what is said, taken as an expression of what is thought, we rather want to pay attention to the strategic dimension: does the answer to the "How is it said?" question allow us to infer anything interesting about "How is it thought?".
6.2. In section 3 above we have defined cognitive strategies as sequences of complex operations, or plans for such operations, that are flexibly geared towards the effective realisation of a goal. Understanding the meaning or the pragmatic functions of a discourse is such a goal. We have assumed that such a process of strategic understanding involves, among other things, the on-line construction of a semantic representation for (a fragment of) the discourse and the retrieval and up-dating of a relevant situation model. This situation model is the, personally variable, episodic representation of what the discourse is 'about' and features all the knowledge we need in order to understand the discourse, thereby filling in, so to speak, what remains implicit in the discourse as expressed. It follows that this SM is crucial in the understanding of what has been called implicit, indirect or vague expressions or moves. If the hearer knows the structure of the speaker's SM, then even incomplete, implicit or indirect expressions will be sufficient for correct interpretation. For those parts of SM about which the hearer has no sufficient knowledge, the discourse (or other contextual information) need to supply the information. This is of course the situation in conversations with relative strangers and for interviews. In other words, incomplete or implicit information may in that case be expressed as a strategy of (in-)voluntary concealment of the precise contents of the SM. One of the reasons for this strategy is that SM not only contains memories of relevant experiences (which we may or may not want to share), but also beliefs and especially opinions connected with events, actions or individuals represented in SM. And for these opinions we may be held 'responsible' in the sense that they may be compared with more general norms and values upon which these opinions are based.

Against the background of these assumptions, we take it that people have an SM about the 'situation in their neighbourhood'. Such an SM allows them to speak about the neighbourhood, but also to perform the many relevant everyday actions in the neighbourhood, such as shopping, walking in the street, and interacting with neighbours. A representation of 'people' in the neighbourhood is therefore an important dimension of the Neighbourhood-SM. Obviously, this SM is subject to continuous updating: new experiences, events, actions, participants and their properties may be added or replace...
previous information. As seems to be obvious also from our data, people have access to 'previous' SM of the neighbourhood: they will often notice that 'things have changed'.

One set of cognitive strategies pertains to the use of SM-information in the construction of semantic representations for the discourses about the neighbourhood. Even if people would be able to retrieve all information about the neighbourhood that is part of SM, then only a fragment of this information is relevant for the communicative interactions and hence for the discourses about it, depending on (i) the type of discourse, (ii) the other speech participants, and (iii) social features of the communicative situation. Thus, with family members we may of course expect other discourses than with strangers, and the same holds for a spontaneous everyday story when we compare it with a formal interview on television. As an overall pragmatic constraint we in addition have it that only the information is formulated which is relevant for the topic and the goals of the talk and which the speaker assumes the hearer to be interested in. It follows that the speaker must first have a representation of this topic, as well as of the goal of the conversational interaction, of the interests of the hearer. We have assumed that this information is located in the Control System monitoring the conversation. Finally, it should be assumed that other properties of the speakers play a role, such as their social role, status, power, but also 'personality' characteristics, such as (perceived) trustworthiness, friendliness, understanding, and so on. In other words, the input for the strategies that handle the retrieval and use of SM-information is extremely complex.

We can only guess about the prototypical structures of situation models in general, and of that of 'one's neighbourhood' in particular. Given our empirical data, and speculating about the necessary and possible uses of such forms of episodic information, we will however assume that a prototypical neighbourhood SM at least contains the following types of information:
I. SETTING. Neighbourhood structure/lay-out, position in town.
   Streets, parks, blocks
   Public Places, Shops,
   \{ properties

II. PARTICIPANTS. Major groups. WE-group(s), THEY-groups
   Public service people (shopkeepers, bartenders, etc.)
   Neighbours, friends
   \{ properties

III. EVENTS. Major localised events (fires, or other catastrophes)
   Recent events.

IV. ACTIONS. Major actions of groups or group members
   Recent specific actions of participants.

This, of course, is only an practical approximation. The episodic
information thus construed is derived from direct observations,
interactions, and various discourse types (stories, conversations).
In conversation and storytelling participants will 'transmit'
parts of their neighbourhood (henceforth: N)-model to other
people, by making assertions about new, remarkable or typical
properties of the Setting, new participant groups or individuals
and their properties and actions. In this way, by informal infor-
mation, people get updated their 'picture' of their own neigh-
bourhood. In conversation or interview talk with relative stran-
gers about the neighbourhood, we therefore will typically find
some types of information and not others. That is, a relevant
selection will be made. For many of the poorer and popular
neighbourhoods we have been investigating, this selection is
predominantly negative. Apart from the possibility that this selec-
tion may be based on subjectively perceived facts, there may also
be other constraints determining the predominant negative bias
in neighbourhood description: the possibility of complaining
(interviewers of the university may be seen as part of a high
status group, to which also local government officials belong),
and the usual characteristics of interestingness and reporta-
bility for everyday talk and storytelling. Indeed, a general
evaluation is that the neighbourhood is 'going down' in all
respects: streets and parks get dirtier, the kind of new people
arriving are seen as socially inferior, various sorts of street
crime are perceived, there is more noise, and so on. It is in-
teresting that the 'real facts' do not matter much here: it may
be that vast rehousing plans are carried out, new parks and green
zones are being laid out, or that the groups living in the neighbourhood fifty years ago were maybe much poorer (and therefore 'socially inferior'), or that crime was not statistically lower then or of different types (a 'drug problem' may have replaced a more traditional 'alcohol problem'). In other words, models are subjective constructions even though they are based on own experiences and information.

For our specific topic, a number of rather striking strategies seem to affect the retrieval of information from an N-model about ethnic minorities:

(i) If general information about the neighbourhood is required, negative information will trigger associated information about ethnic minorities, and conversely, a foreigner-topic will retrieve negative general information about the neighbourhood.

Several of the interviews feature a spontaneous mention of groups of foreigners as soon as the neighbourhood is mentioned, that is if positive or rather negative properties of the neighbourhood need to be retrieved. Deterioration of the neighbourhood is thus often associated with the arrival of foreigners. This associative link in the N-model is formed of a number of concepts, viz. A. Noise, B. Dirt, C. Strange habits/apparances and D. Violence and Crime. This means that both as general property of the neighbourhood and as property of THEY-groups, we find the central features of various kinds of norm-, rule- and habit-breach (silence, cleanliness, peacefulness, and conformity).

These general features that characterise the N-model of prejudiced social members may in turn act as retrieval cues for more specific events and actions in the model: relevant happenings that may serve, strategically, as examples for the more general forms of episodic information. In our interviews, therefore, we will have repeated complaint-stories about children, and especially EM-children, who are noisy, make dirt, are insolent, ruin public provisions, and so on. Next, we find complaints-stories about loud music and noise from immediate neighbours, again predominantly foreigners (especially Surinamese). Third, stereotypical information about (Turkish, Moroccan) foreign workers will include beliefs about strange habits, especially those leading to 'dirt'.
such as slaughtering sheep in the bathroom, remainders being thrown on the street, and houses becoming untidy and deteriorating. Fourth, 'strange habits' are resented, such as (too) young marriage of women, age differences (see our earlier example), (too) many children, the different role (and perceived lack of freedom) of the women, especially of Turks and Moroccans, and 'funny' clothing. These are some of the prototypical contents people may have about outgroups in their neighbourhood and the links with more general properties of the neighbourhood itself. Although there are obvious individual differences, different opinions and interpretations of what is going on in the neighbourhood, the propositions, complaints, negative remarks and stories are so similar as far as these 'topics' are concerned, that indeed we may speak of a prototypical N-model, and in particular about a prototypical outgroup-model as part of that N-model. Of course, this is precisely what we usually understand by a social "stereotype". Yet, theoretically things are somewhat more complex than in traditional stereotype theory: we are not talking about some vague memory list of (negative or positive) general properties assigned to some social group, but about a structured, episodic model, featuring information about relevant everyday experiences. According to such a model it is much easier to 'associate', and spontaneously 'change topics' in a conversation, between e.g. housing conditions on the one hand and some properties of foreigners on the other hand. Also it allows a more natural transition from general beliefs to concrete experiences, which in the stories is usually signalled by phrases like "Take for example(these people across the street...)".

6.3. The theoretical account of cognitive representations and retrieval strategies for ethnic information is however more complex than that. Situation models are typically episodic, and therefore are characterised in terms of own experiences and actually processed discourses. People however also have more general, context-independent and more abstract, information about ethnic minorities. For one thing, they need not have (many) experiences at all, and yet may have general opinions that seem to presuppose such experiences. And second, even if they have such experiences,
they will tend to abstract, decontextualise and generalise this particular information. From observations of and experiences with foreigners in the neighbourhood, or even from heard stories or information in the media, they will construct a more general pattern of information about 'foreigners in the Netherlands', that is as a general social (out-)group. This will allow people to understand also stories from other neighbourhoods, or to judge about indirect information from the media. In other words they will try to construe frames or scripts about these groups or about 'living with these groups'. We here come to the more general problem of the representation of knowledge and beliefs in semantic memory, a topic which cannot be dealt with here. We will simply assume however, that besides general knowledge about say houses, going to parties or driving cars, we also have general beliefs and opinions and attitudes about relevant social groups. Under opinions we understand 'evaluative' beliefs, that is propositions with an evaluative predicate, and attitudes are here taken as organised collections of such opinions together with further knowledge and beliefs about social groups. It is useful, in addition, to distinguish between the more general opinions in these 'group-frames', on the one hand, and the more specific, instantiated top-down or inferred bottom-up, opinions people have about certain social group members in a given situation. That is, the latter opinions will typically occur in models. What the precise organisational characteristics are of a group frame, e.g. the group-frame 'foreigners', 'Turks' or 'Surinamese', for given autochthonous Dutch groups, cannot be spelled out here. Some of the organisation will follow principles of fast, effective processing, and may therefore be hierarchical, relevance-oriented (what information is most 'useful'), and so on.

For the strategies of prejudice expression however it is important to distinguish between propositions that are retrieved from an N-model and those that come from a more general type of semantic knowledge, beliefs or attitudes, e.g. group frames. The former will typically be instantiated, concrete experiences and related opinions, whereas the latter will tend to be in present tense generalised forms (universal quantifiers, etc.).
So, as a next general principle of prejudice expression strategies we might formulate:

(ii) Instantiated or particular propositions about EM will tend to be model-based, whereas general (opinion) propositions will be typically derived from semantic memory group-frames.

A very general prediction for talk about EM would be that conversations about minorities by people from non-contact areas will rather be frame-oriented, whereas for people from contact-areas talk will rather be model-oriented.

In other words, the first group will tend to predominantly generalise, whereas the latter group will predominantly 'exemplify', e.g. by stories. This prediction is of course very rough. We do have a lot of generalisations also in our interviews from contact-area members. However, it seems as if these are somewhat different in type and scope. First, they will often be limited generalisations: they pertain to general properties of the neighbourhood, people and actions or events in the neighbourhood (such as "streets are getting dangerous nowadays"), they follow, as extension and generalisation moves, specific information about more concrete events, they justify concrete actions and opinions about EM-members, or are about those properties of and experiences with EM which the specific subject has no or little direct information about (e.g. assumed robberies). Now, one of the crucial strategies of stereotypical thinking, especially about out-groups, is the strategy of replacing model-information as soon as possible by frame-information. Of course, this is a general cognitive (learning) tendency, but in this case, one single 'experience' as represented in the model may be taken to be sufficient 'evidence' for the general opinions stored in the group-schema. We herewith have a slightly more explicit description of the familiar operation of 'over-generalisation' in prejudiced thinking. The formal definition of ethnic prejudice now follows from this brief theoretical exposition: it is a group attitude, that is a schematic frame of (general) social opinions about an ethically different group, opinions that are dominated by high level
negative opinions, and derived from 'insufficient' models (e.g. incomplete models, models without intersubjective testing, etc.).

For our analysis it follows that if a speaker formulates a general opinion that cannot be 'substantiated' by model-information ('own experiences'), than the expression will be heard as prejudiced if it implies negative evaluations of a socially non-dominant group. Speakers will sometimes know about this interpretation maxim, and will therefore do something about it. The first strategy, then, will be to search for relevant model information: is there one experience that can be seen and presented as an 'instantiation' of the general proposition. If not, or in addition, the speaker may argue only in the more general terms, e.g. from generally 'accepted' beliefs, opinions, norms and values, to an abstract backing up of the general negative opinion. For instance, the general opinion "they abuse our social services", is mostly formulated in general terms, and the 'evidence' for this prejudice is seldom direct but 'circumstantial', such as "you don't see them going to work, and yet they drive a big car or have fancy clothes". The "you see them" strategy is striking here. It suggests model-based information, but its form is still in generalised terms (quantifiers, present tense, etc.), and therefore probably an over-generalisation (which may come from hearsay or 'irrelevant' observations: the one seen in the big car, may have a well payed job, after all). Model-based justifications of general opinions will therefore lead to storytelling, whereas frame-based justifications will typically lead to forms of argumentation, although of course there will be combinations of both types of strategic information use.

We now have discussed some more general strategies of information manipulation in memory during the expression of ethnic attitudes in everyday conversations. We now know more or less where the 'contents' of the prejudiced utterances may come from, and how this information is organised in memory, and what kind of features these have in talk (tenses, quantifiers, discourse types such as stories or argumentation, various signals such as 'take for example'). What about the more specific strategies?
6.4. Hypothetically we will finally try to briefly characterize some of the conversational strategies described in the earlier sections of this paper in terms of possible cognitive strategies within the framework and against the background of the general principles of the organisation of group-prejudices sketched above.

1. **Generalisation.** Move used to show that the (negative) EM-information just given, or about to be given, e.g. in a story, is not just 'incidental' or 'exceptional', so that a possible general opinion is warranted.
   Typical expression forms: "It is always like that", "You see that all the time", "This happens constantly".

2. **Example.** The converse: a move used to show that the general opinion is not just 'invented', but is based on concrete facts (experiences).
   Typical expressions: "Take for example", "Last week, for instance?", "Take this bloke next door. He...".

3. **Correction.** A formulation or rhetorical strategy (often lexical). Monitoring own production leads to the assumption that the formulation is either referentially 'wrong', or may lead to unwanted interpretation and evaluation by the hearer about underlying implications or associations. Part of a general semantic adequacy or of a positive self-presentation strategy.

4. **Emphasising.** A formulation strategy geared towards a better or more effective attention monitoring of the hearer ('drawing attention'), towards a better structural organisation of relevant information (e.g. of negative predicates), or for highlighting subjective macro-information.
   Typical expressions: "It is terrible that, a scandal that...".

5. **(Apparent)Concessions.** Move which allows conditional generalisation even if counter-examples can be mentioned, or which may display real or imagined tolerance and understanding as part of a positive self-presentation strategy.
   Typical expression: "There also good ones among them", "We may not generalise, but", "Also Dutch people can be like that". (which is also a Comparison).
6. **Repetition.** A formulation move, with similar functions as the move of emphasising: drawing attention, structuring information, highlighting subjective evaluations, major topics, etc.

7. **Contrast.** Move with several cognitive functions. Rhetorical: drawing attention to the members of the contrast relation (information structuring). Semantic: highlighting positive and negative evaluations of persons and their actions or properties, often by opposing WE- and THEY groups.
Typical example: "We had to work hard for many years, and they get welfare and do nothing", "We have to wait for years to get a new apartment, and they get one directly when they come", and all situation where conflict of interests is perceived.

8. **Mitigation.** Move that generally serves a self-presentation strategy, showing understanding and tolerance, or (apparently 'taking back' an evaluation or generalisation that cannot be backed up).

9. **Displacement.** Essentially a move for positive self-presentation.
Typical example: "I don't mind so much, but the other people in the street they get angry about that".

10. **Avoiding.** In fact this is a set of different moves within a more general avoidance strategy. Cognitively, conversational or topical avoidance moves may indicate (i) no or insufficient relevant EM-information in the model, (ii) only irrelevant, unreportable, information can be retrieved from the model, or (iii) only negative experiences and hence opinions can be retrieved and these are blocked by a general criterion of not speaking negatively about other people, other groups.
Typical expressions: "I don't know", "I have no contacts with them", "I don't care what they do or not", "I have no time...".

11. **Presupposition, implication, suggestion, indirectness.** Semantic and pragmatic moves allowing the speaker to avoid the formulation of specific propositions, e.g. those of negative observations or opinions, or to draw upon general, shared knowledge or opinions, for which the speaker is not responsible.
Some typical indicators: usual presupposition markers (e.g. pronouns,
definite articles, that-clauses to certain verbs, specific particles and adverbs, such as even, also, etc.), and the use of second person pronouns for distant or general reference ('you see it all the time'), vague terms ('things like that'), incomplete sentence or stories, and so on.

These few examples show that it is in principle possible to attempt a reformulation of specific interactional and conversational moves and goals in talk about minorities in terms of their 'underlying' cognitive functions and strategies. We saw that some of the moves have merely an instrumental function: they draw attention (that is: bring specific information into working memory), structure information, point to macro-topics, etc. That is, they contribute to a better organisation of the information, and hence better retrieval chances, of specific information in memory. Most rhetorical moves have this function. Other moves allow us to see how the speaker indeed 'moves' from episodic model information to more general semantic information about EM-groups: they are typically used to back up, justify or explain assertions (either by generalisation or by exemplification). A third set of moves should be seen as contributing to the realisation of self-presentation goals of speakers: there will be a possible monitoring control such as 'whatever I say, the hearer must not think negatively of me'. Mitigation, avoidance moves, and the various moves of implicitness or indirectness belong to this set.

Of course, this cognitive description is not only speculative, but also still very rough. Precise processing steps should be spelled out, the relevant information specified, and representations of the beliefs, opinions or attitudes involved should be laid out. Yet, we believe that in this first stage of observation and theory formation, these approximations will do. Indeed, the conversational strategies are very often interactional displays of cognitive strategies that are geared towards the effective management of inferences. Thus, a generalisation is used to block the possible inference 'this is only an incidental event', and to 'propose' the same general proposition as a general conclusion (learning from the situation). In the more
specific situation of talk or interviews about minorities, these cognitive strategies are organised towards two major goals, viz. those of OPTIMAL SELF-PRESENTATION, more specifically as a tolerant, understanding, broad-minded citizen or neighbour, on the one hand, and of OPTIMAL EXPRESSION, which is the strategy needed for the particular communicative situation (interviews require that we say what is expected), and for the --autonomously motivated-- expression of personal experiences and opinions and attitudes (e.g. the complaint or accusation function of talk). Sometimes, interviewees will pay much more attention to the first general goal, and most of their moves will be those realizing the goal of making a good impression. Other people --often men-- couldn't "care less" and especially pay attention to the second goal and strategy: e.g. by making their stories and arguments as 'convincing' as possible.

6.5. In this paper we have, in a still rather informal way, discovered several properties of talk about minorities and possible relations with prejudiced 'thinking' about ethnic groups, but at the same time have raised at least as many questions as we have tried to answer. What is needed is a more explicit and subtle description of conversational moves, and the same holds for cognitive moves. This will require both more theory formation, and much more data analysis. Obviously, other empirical methods should be used to assess the relations between talk and thought of prejudiced people, e.g. experiments and other types of field work (e.g. participant observations). A very concrete object for future research is an analysis of the relationships between specific kinds of prejudiced beliefs and specific moves and strategies (thus, we observed that many interviewees will show hesitation, false starts, or correction moves even when they simply have to name or refer to some minority group, or will avoid explicit reference by abnormal pronominalisation). Also, we have indiscriminately talked about 'prejudiced' people, and have hardly payed attention to the immense differences in the amount, kind or style of prejudiced beliefs people have, and the differences in using, applying or expressing them.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

General acknowledgement is made to the members of the interdisciplinary research group about "Prejudice in Conversations about Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands" (Eva Abraham-van der Mark, Martijn den Uyl, Adri van der Wurff and Rob Rombouts) for discussion about the general topic of this paper, and to the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO) for funding this project.

More specific thanks go to the members of a seminar on "Stories about Ethnic Minorities": Marion Algra, Wilmy Cleyne, Myra Kleinendorst, Trudi Konst, Lyanne Lamar, Arghje de Sitter, Evelien van der Wiel and Hans Dekken. The fragments used in this paper come from interviews conducted and transcribed by Evelien van der Wiel (1), and Marion Algra (2, and 3). Responsibility for the English translation of these fragments is mine, however.
N.B. References in this first version of the paper have been kept to a minimum. For further references and theoretical details about the discourse analytic and cognitive background of this paper, consult my work mentioned in the references. No specific reference is made here to the large amount of work, in several disciplines, about racism, prejudice, group stereotypes and interaction between ethnic groups. The same holds for the large literature about conversational interaction, in general, and about (strategic) moves in particular (see e.g. the work by the scholars of the Birmingham school, e.g. about moves in classroom interaction, as in Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975, and in Coulthard & Montgomery, eds., 1981).

Bagley, Christopher

Bovenkerk, Frank (ed.)
1978  *Omdat zij anders zijn* (Because they are different). Meppel: Boom.

Coulthard, Malcolm, & Montgomery, Martin (eds.)

van Dijk, Teun A.
1982a  *Towards a Model of Ethnic Prejudice in Cognition and Discourse*. University of Amsterdam: Dept. of General Literary Studies.

van Dijk, Teun A. & Kintsch, Walter

Kintsch, Walter & van Dijk, Teun A.

Polanyi, Livia

Sacks, Harvey, Schegloff, Emmanuel, & Jefferson, Gail
Schank, Roger, & Abelson, Robert P.

Sinclair John, & Coulthard, Malcolm

WRR (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid/ Scientific Council for Government Policy)
1979 Etnische Minderheden. The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij. (An English translation has been published of this report under the title Ethnic Minorities).
APPENDIX

Original Dutch Transcriptions of the Examples

(1) KW-1

Iter: Heeft U ook contact met buitenlanders in de buurt?
Itte: Neenhoor, eh, dat is heel moeilijk, eh, ze is nu zover
dat ze me gedag zegt, onze buurvrouw
Iter: O is dat een Surinaams of -
Itte: Nee, niet, ik denk dat ze een Turkse of een Marokkaanse
is, maar ik praat wel eens met de kindertjes, ik denk
dat ze meestal binnen is, die mogen niet alleen naar
buiten.

(Interview and transcript by
Evelien van der Wiel)

(2) RA-2

Iter: Ja, wat voor, wat voor ervaringen u heeft met, want in
de Transvaal, vrij veel buitenlanders wonen naast hollan-
ders, dat we denken, ja we willen wel eens horen wat hol-
landers daarvan meemaken
Vrouw: (snel) wij hebben hier helemaal geen kontakt met buiten-
landers, helemaal niet
Man: (komt van achter uit de kamer op ons toe) Nou, ben ik
een man, maar dan vind ik heel vreselijk, dat is eer-
lijk mijn mening, ik ben een gezonde kerel, 'ksta goed
met m'n benen (?) in 't leven, maar da's een groot.schan-
daal als je hier die jonge Turken vrouwen ziet lopen,
achtten jaar met een ouwe kerel van vijftig jaar
Vrouw: Jaaaaah
Man: Met drie, vier, vijf kinderen, waar U en ik voor betaalt,
dan zeg ik daar moeten ze wat aan doen.

(3) RA-2

Iter: Wat bedoelt U van dat als U ze ziet lopen op straat?
Man: Ja, ja, nou, laten we eerlijk wazen hè, 't zijn allemaal
kinderen van vijftien, zestien, zeventien jaar
Iter: Ja
Man: zijn getrouwd met een kerel van veertig, vijftig jaar, allemaal van die ouwe bokken, en maar kinde- ren maken aan de lopende massa, begrijp goed, nou daar betaalt U voor, daar betaal ik voor
Iter: met sociale premies
Man: ja, begrijpt U?
Vrouw: Jaah (...) je mag in wezen niet diskrimineren, maar
Iter: (lacht) nee, daar hangt ook zo'n taboo op, hè?
Vrouw: Je wordt er eh er
Man: (...) stoot iedereen tegen de borst
Vrouw: je wordt er toch wel mee gekonfronteerd, ik heb ze niet hier in, in eh, mijn eh omgeving, nee, ik heb hier helemaal geen kontakt met buitenlanders
Iter: maar wat maakt U er wel van mee, U zei net van
Vrouw: ja, hier wonen een stel Surinamers, nou ja, U weet het wel, Surinamers, is van de week nog de politie en de ziekenwagen, ja ik was er niet bij, politiewagen en ziekenwagen geweest, nou ja U weet het met Surinamers, dat is een (haalt diep adem) eh tempe-rament eh soort volk, dat weten we
Iter: Ja
Vrouw: Maarre, ik kan U daar helaas (pauze) ik zit rondom in de hollanders (pauze)
Iter: en daar bent U blij om of maakt het niet uit?
Vrouw: eh, kijk mevrouw, als de mensen zich aanpassen bij ons, eh, onze hollands, onze hollands zeden en gewoonten, dan heb ik daar helemaal geen bezwaar tegen, helemaal niet; net wat mijn man zegt, eh ja, in deze slechte ekonomische tijd, de hollands vrouwen die worden erop geattendeerd dat ze eh niet, niet meer als één, twee kinderen mogen hebben, iets aan de pil en al dergelijke toestanden, en dan kom je daarbuiten en dan zie je daar die (pauze) mijn man zegt dan die ouwe kerels, ik zeg dan ouwe ouwe mannen, ja eh kijk eens, dat is wat ons allemaal in wezen tegen de borst slaat.
Iter: die oude buitenlandse mannen met die jonge vrouwen bedoelt U?

Vrouw: Jaaaa, en dan het aantal kinderen! (pauze)

Iter: Heeft U wel eens gepraat met buitenlandse vrouwen, hoe ze dat zelf vindt?

Vrouw: Nee, krijg je geen kontakt mee, mogen toch geen kontakt hebben met Hollanders (...)

(Interview en transcripts by Marion Algra).

Note: No specific transcription conventions have been used, except for special stress, in which case the first letter of the stressed tone unit (syllable) has been underlined.