ABSTRACT

The problem of educational policy for language minorities, particularly those minorities who might be considered oppressed, include the right to education in the minority language. Rights properly considered also carry with them obligations; in this case, minority language speakers would have obligations toward the language of the majority. Two considerations in the area of minority and majority claims and counterclaims relate to economics and to the concept of "mediating structures." Economic considerations relate to the costs and benefits of different policies, as evaluated by the different language groups. These evaluations affect the extent to which formally enunciated rights and obligations are honored in practice. With regard to policy, its aim should be to minimize the perceived costs of a pluralistic approach and to maximize the perceived benefits to all concerned. The second set of considerations on "mediating structures" is shown to be relevant for policies governing the education of language minorities. The controlling aim should be to enable the minority family and its children to negotiate the "megastructures" of society. The mediating structures—neighborhoods, churches, voluntary associations, and the like—would assist the families in the negotiation. (Author/AMH)
Educational Policy for Linguistic and Cultural Minorities: The State and the Individual

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The State and the Individual

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Abstract

The OECD study of the education of linguistic and cultural minorities deals with 14 groups, as examples of a phenomenon that is universal in all of the OECD countries, and indeed beyond. The present paper treats some of the problematics of educational policy for language minorities, and especially the "right" to education in the minority language.

The strongly assimilationist official policies of the past are contrasted with the marked changes that have now emerged. A right to instruction in the home language is now acknowledged in most OECD countries. However, rights properly considered also carry with them obligations, in this case obligations on the part of minority language speakers toward the language of the majority.

However, it is not possible to set fixed, absolute limits to minority and majority claims and counter-claims in the area of language instruction. Two sets of considerations are described.

The first relates to the costs and benefits of different policies, as evaluated by the different language groups. These evaluations profoundly affect the extent to which formally enunciated rights and obligations are honored in practice. The aim of policy should be to minimize the perceived costs of a pluralistic approach and to maximize the perceived benefits to all concerned.

The second set of considerations relies on the concept of "mediating structures", as advanced by Berger and Neuhaus in To Empower People (1977). This concept is shown to be especially relevant for policies governing the education of language minorities. The controlling aim should be to enable the minority family and its children to negotiate successfully what Berger and Neuhaus term the "megastructures" of society (in this case the school), assisted in this task by a strong and rich array of neighborhoods, churches, voluntary associations, and the like—the "mediating structures".
'E Pluribus Unum' is not a zero-sum game. That is, the unum is not to be achieved at the expense of the plures. To put it positively, the national purpose indicated by the unum is precisely to sustain the plures.

Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuwaus, To Empower People (1977)

Introduction*

Any consideration of minority-majority language relationships in the OECD countries today requires broad historical and linguistic understanding, detailed legal knowledge, familiarity with the educational scene—both administrative and curricular, and skills which are best described as those of the social and cultural anthropologist.

As I have read in the literature of language policy, language planning, and the sociology of language, while trying to reflect usefully on the findings of the OECD study, I have developed a great respect for the awesome knowledge and sophistication of scholars and practitioners writing in these fields. I am clearly not so richly equipped, and I admit at once to a profound lack of scholarly credentials in the field of language and cultural policy. I come to the subject very much as Winston Churchill is said once to have described the British Labour Party leader, Clement Attlee, as "a modest little man—with much to be modest about".
I shall confine my remarks to the narrower area of linguistic policies, and I shall therefore be neglecting the broader area of cultural policies; and I want to refer primarily to those countries that have had to make and implement policies for relatively powerless minorities. Hence, I will largely exclude from this discussion such groups as the Welsh in Britain, the francophones in Quebec and the Maritime Provinces, and the Danish-speaking German minority. Much has been written and said concerning language policies by and for these groups: there is very little indeed that I can or would wish to add.

Context

The OECD study of the education of linguistic and cultural minorities examined a broad array of minority language groups, by my count 14 groups in all. (1) Yet, so extensive is the phenomenon of minority language groups that the study in no way claims to be exhaustive. For example, while France was represented by "immigrant and foreign workers" (surely a sizeable category), not included were any of the seven ethnic dialects spoken in France in distinctive regions of the country: Flemish (about a quarter of a million) in Westhoek; Breton (some two million speakers) in Brittany; a dialect of German (used by a further two million inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine); a dialect of Italian, spoken by nearly 3000,000 Corsicans; Catalan (a few thousand speakers on the border with Spain); more than a
quarter-of-a-million Basque speakers in the southwest of France; and finally Langue d'oc in Provence. (2) A formidable list of minority languages indeed that should dispel any notion that in France they speak only French!

Similarly, the study treats the position of the Welsh in Britain (about 20 percent of the population of the Principality speaks Welsh) and the many new immigrant groups, but does not discuss the cases of the French dialect speakers of the Channel Islands, the Gaelic dialect speakers of the Isle of Man, Scots Gaelic in the Highlands (about 100,000 persons), and Cornish which is now being resurrected. (3) They don't speak only English in Britain, either!

One could go on and on. One last example must suffice. The study deals with educational policies for guestworkers in Germany, but even for Germans there are linguistic factors in education. Alongside standard German there exists a large number of regional variations, especially in southern Germany, that coexist with the standard form and are widely used for unofficial communication. Nevertheless, the schools in Germany teach in the standard language from the beginning, although the children frequently use regional dialect among themselves and in their families. (Compare this with the situation in Switzerland where the local form of German is used as the initial language of instruction in the schools, with the transition to standard German made quite late and quite gradually.) (4)
Rights and Obligations

Consideration of minorities and their languages in the OECD countries raises important questions of political obligation, that is, questions of the rights and the duties of both the individual and the State.

States have tended to be rather restrictive, in law and in practice, concerning the languages recognized for official business. In addition, employers and their workers impose considerable constraint on minorities (and on immigrants, especially), who might wish to continue to use their own language. All of the OECD countries, without exception I believe, can provide examples of historical periods when educational policy toward the languages of minorities was distinctly hostile. From the time of annexation in 1898 until 1952/ the United States forbade the use of Spanish in publicly supported Puerto Rican schools, (5) and Native American children were not allowed to use their own languages in schools provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. (6) The use of French in Ontario schools was proscribed for a time; (7) similarly, the use of Welsh was heavily discouraged by the British government. (8) Even today there are examples of a certain linguistic intolerance to be found in otherwise exceptionally tolerant environments. The Danish government is currently resolute in its policy of forbidding instruction in immigrants' home languages during the regular programs of the Danish schools, with the aim of immersing immigrant children
in a Danish language environment from first grade on.
Immigrant children are permitted instruction in their own language only after regular school hours or at the weekend. (9)

In Greece, the considerable Albanian, Macedonian, and Romanian minorities are not educated in their own languages, although Turkish children in Thrace are granted that privilege (presumably as reciprocity for the willingness of Turkey to permit Greek children in Turkey to have instruction in their own language). (10)

In France before 1951 (the loi Deixonne), the rule was "French language only" in state-supported schools. Since then, progressively greater rights to choose education in the minority language have been granted to parents, although it is probably still true to say that French language policy remains largely dedicated to the goal of assimilation. (11)

Although the general trend across the OECD countries has been to accord greater and greater educational rights to indigenous minorities, and even to establish ways to support the education of children of immigrants and guestworkers in their own languages, assimilationalist forces are everywhere strong. Even long-established indigenous minorities feel constant pressure to become at least bilingual, if not to drop entirely "public" use of their own tongue. While there are many examples of lengthy resistance to assimilation and homogenization, both long-indigenous and recent-immigrant
cultures typically have had a tough time in modern societies withstanding the assault of the dominant language. We must be cautious in predicting the final impact on minority languages of the headlong development of the mass media, particularly the electronic media. In the end they may well prove to have been important in helping minorities to preserve their languages in otherwise indifferent, if not outright hostile cultures. But for the present I would judge that the mass media have been part of the problem of the survival of minority languages and culture, rather than part of the solution.

If there is one conclusion to be drawn from the array of cases presented in the OECD studies and synthesized in Stacy Churchill's overview, it is that language rights (if indeed they do exist) demand, like liberty, eternal vigilance on the part of those who would enjoy them, together with a goodly reinforcement of political power. States appear to recognize their obligations to minority languages only when their hands are forced.

In consequence, the notion of a "right" to instruction in the language of the home has become attractive. In a number of the OECD countries such rights are part of the fundamental laws of the land. There they constitute the sine qua non of contiguad existence of the state (vide Canada and Belgium), whose origins were in the coming together (or the putting together) of two groups, neither of which was, or is, prepared
to concede linguistic dominance in the nation as a whole to the other. But these are not currently the typical cases which have thrown up in much of Europe and in North America a language rights movement of notable strength.

As a result of court decisions and administrative rulings in the U. S., linguistic minorities, however small, are now endowed with the right to have their children educated in a bilingual-bicultural environment in the public schools. (12) Similarly within each of the member countries of the European Economic Community, there has been a noticeable trend, embodied in national laws, to accord linguistic minorities rights to education in their own languages. Sometimes this has been with a view to helping the children eventually to move over into dominant-language-only education; in other instances, the emphasis has been more on reinforcement of the minority language and culture. In addition, both the EEC and the Council of Europe have concerned themselves with policies for linguistic minorities at the supra-national level, and have sought to establish codes that respect minorities' (and especially immigrants') rights to instruction in the home language, at least through the primary grades. What has emerged in the past 10 to 15 years is a patchwork of legislation and regulations, embodying either explicit or implied answers to a set of highly contentious questions: What are the limits to an individual's claim to be instructed in the language of his choice? If so, for how long, by whom, on what schedule, and with what intention—transition in short
order to instruction in the majority language, maintenance of the home language, reinforcement of the home language, or effective bilingualism? Does the State have a duty to support all the languages spoken by its citizens? If so, what are the criteria for deciding what is the appropriate level of support for each? Are some languages to be regarded as more equal than others?

Less obvious, but just as important, are the questions that speak to the language rights of the State and the language obligations of the individual. Is there a duty to become bilingual that may fairly be placed on individuals in many of the OECD nations? What claims may a State properly make on its citizens, to require them to use more than one language? How far is an individual entitled to push his claim to have the rest of society march to his particular language tune? Is there a limit beyond which it is inappropriate to push particularism?

I do not believe it is possible to give absolute, permanent, fixed answers to these questions. Instead, I would argue that we need to recognize the importance of two sets of factors, one diagnostic and the other contextual, as guides in trying to come to terms with the language claims and counterclaims of minorities and majorities. The first is a set of broadly economic considerations, the second is broadly political.
An Economic Calculus

As I read the story of minorities and their languages in the OECD countries, I am increasingly convinced that rights and obligations in language matters for minorities are best established within a framework that takes into account rather specifically the cost-benefit balance of granting those rights and assuming those obligations.

My theses here are as follows:

1. Policies adopted to accommodate (or frustrate) the linguistic and cultural aspirations of minorities impose costs and yield benefits;

2. These costs and benefits fall on different groups and individuals in society, so that a tension is set up between those who wish to retain (or enhance) their benefits, and those who wish to shed (or diminish) their costs;

3. Language policies can be usefully analyzed in such a costs and benefits framework; even though the actors are rarely able to quantify explicitly the costs they must bear or the benefits they may gain;

4. Unless the cost-benefit context is recognized and taken into account, policies based on abstract, legalistic rights and obligations are prone to fail: rights claimed will be resisted if their grant and exercise impose unacceptable costs; obligations will be accepted willingly if their
benefits are evidently enough to outweigh the perceived costs.

The implication of all this for language policies for minorities is that neither rights nor obligations are usefully viewed as unconditional. They become real and defensible as they are:

- exercised in practice;
- exercised in such a manner as, wherever possible, to bring benefits rather than costs to the majority group;
- exercised with an eye to reducing costs as much as possible, where net costs rather than net benefits are the likely outcome.

In this sense a language and its associated culture may be viewed as a type of property, from which benefits may flow (a kind of income), but which requires the expenditure of resources (in the form of time, energy, and perhaps forgone opportunities) to maintain. When a government establishes the majority's language as the only official language, it may be regarded as acting to protect and even enhance the value of a piece of cultural property; when a minority presses a claim to wider use of its language, it is similarly seeking an increase in a "property value". However, in both cases costs may be imposed on other groups (the economist's term is "externalities")—on the minority in the first case, on the majority in the second. The critical question then becomes: to what extent are the gains of one group simply the losses of
another?

If the cost-benefit calculus of minority language policy is played out as a zero-sum game, the stage is set for a potentially bitter conflict of interests. If however, the parties are open to the possibility that all can gain from a pluralistic solution, it may be possible to transcend the limits of a simple trade-off between, say, the majority group’s costs and the minority’s benefits. (13)

We are already beginning to see a welcome shift in the terms of the debate in this direction. Even in the United States, where a unilingual assimilationist philosophy has been dominant at least since World War I, if not before, arguments citing the benefits rather than the costs of a bilingual (English-Spanish) society are now occasionally to be heard.

When the issue of language rights for minorities comes up for discussion, minority language speakers typically cite two types of costs. The first is a set of "technical" costs (organizational, translation, interpretation, and associated key-punching, printing, and paper costs); the second is a set of socio-political costs reflecting the fear of a weakened national purpose and of a divided society and culture. On occasion, the two types of costs are seen to merge, as when the State requires the military establishment to employ the dominant language of the country, even when recruits come from many language groups. (For example, in the armed forces of the USSR, the rule is "Russian only" as the language of
military command, even though the Soviet Union is a distinctly multilingual state.) (14) 

The "technical" costs are rarely regarded as prohibitive, whereas the perceived socio-political costs are commonly much emphasized. Although we have many examples of multilingual states that exhibit considerable national spirit and cohesion (the Soviet Union, Canada, and Indonesia, to cite only three countries in widely different circumstances), it would be wrong to dismiss out of hand the fears of those who see great costs in terms of national unity flowing from large claims to linguistic pluralism and cultural particularism. We are no doubt still experiencing the legacy of the nationalist movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when language was made to equal nationality, and nationality made to equal language. (15) It is unlikely that this legacy will soon be abandoned, yet in Europe particularly it is under attack from two sides: from the internal linguistic minorities whose rights claims, as noted, are securing increasing recognition; and from the slowly but palpably developing sense of European citizenship emerging out of the welter of nations and nationalities. Against the ideal of a European citizen even the nine national languages of the EEC appear, somewhat ironically perhaps, as themselves parochial interests, just as the host of ethnic dialects and immigrant languages historically have appeared as parochial interests vis-à-vis the great national languages.
What mechanism can bring about some reconciliation of these diverse universalistic and parochial aspirations?

Mediating Structures

Nearly two hundred years ago Edmund Burke reminded his readers that a democratic state can be as oppressive as an unconstrained monarch. His caution is still worth recalling:

In a democracy the majority of citizens is capable of exercising the most cruel oppression upon the minority . . . and that oppression of the minority will extend to far greater numbers, and will be carried on with much greater fury, than can almost ever be apprehended from the dominion of a single sceptre. (16)

In modern society the individual is typically caught between public demands and private allegiances. For none perhaps is this tension between public and private worlds more explicit than for linguistic and cultural minorities. Their situation throws into bold relief what for others may be no more than a muted sense of internal conflict and unease. Many resolve the tension by outright assimilation to the majority, where this is feasible. Others, usually fewer by far, opt for isolation in order to preserve what they have of their own cultural "property". Typically, however, most minority families and individuals pursue their lives partly in the majority culture and partly in their own.

If the appropriate public policy stance toward addressing the needs of linguistic minorities (and indeed of the needs of the dominant group) is to do so without imposing unacceptable
levels of costs on either group, institutions are needed that can mediate the gap between the majority and minority worlds. For a discussion of the importance of such mediating institutions I turn to the slim, yet most significant volume by Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, entitled *Empower People*. Their principal thesis goes as follows:

For the individual in modern society, life is an ongoing migration between [the] two spheres, public and private. The megastructures are typically alienating, that is, they are not helpful in providing meaning and identity for individual existence. Meaning, fulfillment, and personal identity are to be realized in the private sphere. Many who handle [the dichotomy] more successfully than most have access to institutions that mediate between the two spheres. Such institutions have a private face, giving private life a measure of stability, and they have a public face, transferring meaning and value to the megastructures. Thus, mediating structures alleviate each facet of the double crisis of modern society. Their strategic position derives from their reducing both the anomic precariousness of individual existence in isolation from society and the threat of alienation to the public order. (17)

Berger and Neuhaus point to the neighborhood, the family, the church, and the voluntary association as the significant mediating structures of our time, and they deplore the tendency of modern states to pursue policies that undermine and weaken them.

Their argument is patently applicable to the relationship of minority language children to their schooling. To the child and his family, the school system too often appears as a megastructure, offering little in the way of effective choices, alien (in the fullest meaning of the word) to the
immigrant child, and alienating the child from his family (as so many parents fear). The challenge for policy is to support mediating structures in the form of cultural and language associations, hobby and sports clubs, and the like (as well as the neighborhoods, family, and church), so that while learning what is needed to negotiate the majority society, minority language children have a rich network of intermediate institutions to sustain them. Indeed, wherever minority groups have been successful in establishing the principle that commonality of national purpose does not have to mean uniformity of language and culture, this is precisely the strategy they have followed.

There is encouraging evidence in the OECD studies that this lesson is being well learned by many of the minority language groups. Increasingly it is recognized that educational policy is by no means simply a matter of school policy, and that nowhere is this more the case than for language policy. Society in all its dimensions can offer the child (whether of the minority or majority group) a host of out-of-school occasions to practice and perfect a broad range of language skills and cultural styles. Hence, the proper goal of minority language policy should be to multiply, not restrict, the options available to learners within each national society.
Notes and References

I am grateful to Isaura Santiago-Santiago for giving me access to her collection of materials on bilingual education. They provided me with much useful material, as I prepared this paper. I alone am responsible, of course, for all errors of omission and commission.

(1) Reference is to Stacy Churchill, The Education of Linguistic and Cultural Minorities in the OECD Countries. In press. This work draws upon and systematizes the findings of a series of country studies commissioned by the OECD in Australia: (aborigines); Ontario, Canada (francophones); Denmark (non-Danish-speaking); England and Wales (immigrants and descendants); France (non-French-speaking immigrants); Germany (foreign-workers); Netherlands (Moluccans); New Zealand (Maori and Pacific Island peoples); Sweden (immigrants and Lapps); Switzerland (Romansch-speaking, immigrants, and foreign language children); Turkey (Turkish workers abroad); United States (pupils in bilingual programs).

(2) Charles Foster and Guy Héraud, "How can we safeguard Europe's minority tongues?", Europe 82, pp. 8-9.

(3) See Nigel Grant, "The British Isles as an Area of Study in Comparative Education," Compare, 11:2, 1981, pp. 135-146, for an informative discussion of the multiple dimensions of intra-British Isles educational differences. The author identifies no less than "eight systems, large and small, officially linked or independent [in the British Isles]...", ibid., p. 138.

(4) Elmer H. Antonsen, "Language Standardization in German Urban Society," Language and Development: An International Perspective, Division of Applied Linguistics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, No. 1, Fall, 1980, pp. 4-5.


(7) Following a ministerial committee report on the public and separate English-French bilingual primary schools published in 1912, Instruction XVII was passed restricting the use of
French as a language of instruction. This action was greeted with strong resistance in Franco-Ontarian areas of the province, especially in Ottawa, where the Separate School Board refused to implement the change of policy and was deprived of government grants. In 1927, a second ministerial report on the same question effectively restored to Franco-Ontarians the rights to an education in their own language. In 1968, it became possible to teach all secondary school subjects using French as the language of instruction.

(8) "The institutions that the English center had imposed upon Wales—the Church, the legal system, the schools—disseminated purposefully and effectively an influence against the Welshness of Wales. . . . The decline of the language [Welsh] begins to be recorded very soon after the Act of Union of 1536 stated Henry VIII's intention to 'reduce them [the Welsh] to the perfect Order, Notice and Knowledge of His Laws of this His Realm and utterly to extirpate all the singular and sinister usages and customs differing from the same. . . .' The Welsh language was the most obvious of these "singular" influences, and for that reason it was enacted that 'henceforth no person or persons that use the Welsh speech or language shall have or enjoy any manner of office or offices within the realm.' " E Glynn Lewis, Bilingualism and Bilingual Education: A Comparative Study. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1980, p. 99.


(10) Foster and Héraud, op. cit.


(13) In Joshua A. Fishman, *Bilingual Education: An International Sociological Perspective*. Rowley, Massachusetts: Newbury House Publishers, 1976, the author strongly sounds this theme, as the titles of his first four chapters indicate: "Bilingual Education is Good for the Majority"; "Bilingual Education is Good for the Minority"; "Bilingual Education is Good for Education"; and "Bilingual Education is Good for Language Teachers and Language Teaching."

See also the statement made in OECD, *Reviews of National Policies for Education*: Canada. Report by the Examiners. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1976: "... it would be totally in line with all recent developments in the cultural politics of Canada if policy were to be based on the understanding that the presence of a six million French-speaking minority is a great asset for the Canadian Federation. ... Nor would this approach be in any way out of tune with the social and cultural trends in other advanced countries, where the discovery and redevelopment of basic cultural roots is being increasingly perceived as necessary among people of industrialised countries who tend to feel completely stifled by the standardizing pressures of a tasteless consumers' society. ... Strong cultural minorities are a hindrance only from the perspective of the traditional nation-state." Pp. 114-116.


