TOWARDS A MODEL OF 
ETHNIC PREJUDICE IN COGNITION AND DISCOURSE

Teun A. van Dijk

Prepublication/Working Paper No. 1

A series of working papers and prepublications from the project "Prejudice in Conversations about Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands", sponsored by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO).

Project Researchers: Eva Abraham-van der Mark, Rob Rombouts, Martijn den Uyl, Adri van der Wurff.

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Comments welcome!
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SUMMARY

In this study a provisional model is sketched of ethnic prejudice and the ways it is expressed in discourse. Ethnic prejudice is studied as a phenomenon of 'social cognition' and as a specific kind of inter-group attitude. It is assumed that everyday conversations about ethnic minorities in the Netherlands are one of the important sources for the (trans-)formation of prejudice. Also, a systematic discourse analysis of free interviews is shown to provide insights into the structures, uses and possible transformation of 'underlying' ethnic prejudices and their functions in everyday interaction.

The cognitive model of ethnic attitudes is based on earlier work in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence on the representation and uses of knowledge and beliefs. It is shown that the interpretation, learning and use of social events and groups can be made explicit in terms of 'social information processing'. It is assumed that ethnic prejudice can be accounted for, at this cognitive level, in terms of organised group schemata in semantic memory on the one hand and personal experiences, collected in so-called 'situation models', in episodic memory. The use of ethnic opinions derived from these two kinds of information is subject to a number of biasing transformations in communicative and interactional contexts.

A model of ethnic prejudices cannot be fully made explicit in cognitive terms alone, however. It is shown how ethnic opinions in the Netherlands have been shaped and function within a broader historical and socio-cultural context.

After a summary of some recent survey data about the opinions of the autonomous Dutch population regarding such ethnic groups as Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese, some results are presented from a pilot study in which interviews were held with people in Amsterdam. The ethnic opinions expressed, explicitly or implicitly, in these interviews were systematised and described in terms of ethnic group schemata.

Finally, a model has been sketched of the production of discourse and dialogue and the role of ethnic opinions and attitudes in conversations. A systematic discourse analysis was made of the thematic structures, the local coherence and semantic functions, the stylistic and rhetorical structures, the argumentations and narrative structures, and the conversational strategies of the interviews. It was shown that these various structures can be interpreted as indications about the underlying structures and strategies of opinions and their expression in social situations.

PREFACE

Since this study was initially intended as a working paper but finally turned out to be a little book, it deserves a preface. First a word of modesty, not only motivated by conventional rules of scholarly reservation: this study is provisional in all respects. Both the theoretical framework and the analysis of the data are preliminaries for a more systematic investigation into the cognitive nature of prejudice and its manifestations in discourse. At nearly all points our discussion requires further data and a more explicit model. Since so many issues and (sub-)disciplines are involved, also an evaluation of the extant literature and empirical research cannot be given here. In the subsequent studies of the project on “Prejudice in Conversations on Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands”, also to be published in this series of working papers and prepublications, due attention will be paid to this earlier work, and a more extensive study will be made of the various components of the model. The present study, therefore, is merely a sketch of the overall problem and approach to be taken within this project.

The interviews analysed here have been collected by a group of students within the framework of a course taught at the University of Amsterdam. Members of this group were Nico Hergarden, Giovanni Mazzaro, Leen Schiitemaker, Madamu Pruins, Henk Verhagen, Marion Oskamp, and Philomena Essed. I hereby would like to acknowledge my debt to their collaboration in the pilot study and for their suggestions in the analysis of the data.

For a number of more theoretical discussions I am indebted to the investigators within the project, Martijn van der Wurff, Eva Abraham-van den Haak and Rob Ruijbroek.

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And, last but not least, thanks are due to Philomena Essed for her useful comments on the first version of this study and for her general support in and discussions about the critical analysis of ethnic prejudice and racism in the Netherlands.
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TOWARDS A MODEL OF ETHNIC PREJUDICE IN COGNITION AND DISCOURSE

Teun A. van Dijk

1. Introduction

1.1. Aim and scope

The aim of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework for the cognitive study of ethnic prejudice and its manifestations in discourse. Prejudice will be taken as a special form of 'social cognition', operating on the one hand within complex systems and strategies of information processing, and on the other hand within the social context of group interaction. It will be assumed that among several other interactional and communicative conditions for the formation and transformation of prejudice, everyday informal discourses, such as conversations, play an important role. Hence, a systematic analysis of 'talk' about ethnic minorities will be a powerful way to reveal 'underlying' ethnic attitudes and ideologies of speakers, as well as the discourse strategies followed in their expression and 'transmission' to hearers in communicative contexts of social settings.

Empirical data for this study have been drawn from a preliminary investigation into the ways (white) Dutch people from Amsterdam talk about ethnic minority groups, mainly black immigrants from Surinam and foreign workers from Turkey and Morocco.

Although 'prejudice' as a theoretical and empirical object of research has been usually localized within social psychology, our approach will be interdisciplinary: besides the important insights from social psychology and sociology, we propose to apply some theoretical and methodological results from recent developments in cognitive psychology and discourse analysis. This does not mean that we want to provide an 'alternative' theory of ethnic prejudice. We only hope to further clarify the complex picture of prejudice as it has been partly constructed in previous research. Thus, although there have been several cognitive approaches, both before and after Allport's (1954) influential analysis, our actual insights into the structures of memory and the strategies of cognitive-processing allow us to provide a more complete and more explicit model for the representation and operation of prejudice. Similarly, recent advances in text linguistics and discourse analysis on the one hand yield a detailed understanding of both the underlying rules and strategies and the textual manifestations of communicative interaction, while on the other hand showing how discourse is produced and understood under the cognitive and social constraints of beliefs, opinions, attitudes and ideologies.

1.2. Research context

This paper has been written within the context of an interdisciplinary project on 'Prejudice in Conversations about Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands' for which the pilot study, mentioned above, from which we will draw our examples, was a preliminary investigation. It is the aim of this project to devise a cognitive model of current ethnic prejudice in the Netherlands, and to spell out the strategies followed by speakers to 'express' (or not) these prejudices in their everyday discourse. The project is itself part of a larger teaching and research programme about prejudice in discourse carried out in the Section of Discourse Studies of the Department of General Literary Studies of the University of Amsterdam. Within this programme preliminary studies have also been made of the representation of ethnic minorities, discrimination and racism in secondary school textbooks and in the daily press. Some data from the latter studies will provide some evidence about the acquisition and confirmation of ethnic prejudice in more 'public' communicative contexts.
1.3. Backgrounds and earlier work

At the end of this Introduction, it should finally briefly be summarized how the research for this paper and for the project mentioned above ties in with our previous work. After earlier work at the end of the sixties within the field of literary theory and linguistic poetics, it has been suggested (van Dijk, 1972), together with a growing number of other linguists, that linguistic grammars should not be limited to isolated sentences, but rather explicate also the structures of discourse, e.g. the semantics of local and global coherence. Thus, much 'text grammars' account for intuitive notions such as 'topic' or 'theme' of a discourse, viz. in terms of semantic macro-structures (van Dijk, 1977, 1980). Similar arguments were given for the pragmatic approach to discourse: rather than isolated speech acts, we should account for sequences of speech acts and their functions within global speech acts (van Dijk, 1977, 1981). It soon became obvious, however, that many interesting aspects of discourse and language use could not be accounted for within the rather 'abstract' boundaries of a grammar. It appeared, for instance, that local and global coherence in discourse, the derivation of semantic macro-structures, an analysis of topic and comment in sentences, also require a cognitive approach. In addition to various textual structures, a cognitive model should provide insight into the actual processes of production, understanding and representation of discourse in memory (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978, van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). This model allows us to predict how much and what kind of information of a text will typically be recalled after various delays, how summaries of a text are produced, and what strategies are applied in discourse comprehension. In accordance with much other work in the psychology of discourse processing, this model however only specifies the (important) role of world knowledge in discourse processing. Our actual work, therefore, aims at a more comprehensive social psychological model of discourse processing, in which also the role of opinions, attitudes, ideologies and the representation of the social and the communicative context, play a role in discourse understanding. (van Dijk, 1982).

Both as a theoretical specification and as a socially relevant application of this earlier research, our actual work on prejudice and discourse provides us with a research problem in which the 'cognitive' and the 'social' are eminently connected, e.g. in the production and understanding of prejudiced discourse and the (trans-)formation of prejudice in communicative interaction.

1.4. Plan of this study

After this Introduction the plan for this paper is as follows: We will first outline the structure of the complex problem we are dealing with, first by discussing some major properties of prejudice as they have been emerging from the research in this area, and second by 'localizing' the cognitive aspects of prejudice -- and its expressions in discourse -- within the broader framework of its socio-cultural context. The reason for this 'localization' of the problem is twofold. On the one hand the socio-cultural properties of prejudice have multiple interactions with the cognitive properties, and these relations should also be represented in the cognitive model, or at least the cognitive model should be constructed such that it can be adequately inserted into this larger framework. On the other hand the contextualization of the problem is necessary in order to stress the ultimate social and cultural conditions, functions and 'manifestations' of prejudice. In other words, we do not want to 'reduce' prejudice to its cognitive properties.

After a brief summary of the ethnic 'situation' in the Netherlands, within which the prejudices we want to analyse are to be understood, we will then discuss some of the major assumptions that underly the construction of a
cognitive model of prejudice. It should be stressed from the outset that at this moment we only have very fragmentary theoretical and methodological ideas about the nature of such a model, so that our suggestions should be taken as provisional guidelines of our work. Also we would like to emphasize here that the very notion of 'prejudice' implies negative evaluations of its users, that is about people having or showing 'prejudice'. In other words, we may well have prejudices about prejudices -- for instance, the prejudice that we do not have prejudices ourselves. It seems more appropriate therefore to rather speak about ethnic attitudes, also because many aspects of knowledge, beliefs, opinions and attitudes are intertwined with what we usually and intuitively call prejudice, and no strict boundary can be established between such different cognitions. This does not mean that we want to 'explain away' prejudice or make them less serious, in their social effects, by treating them merely as 'attitudes' of some kind. Although we do have our own social judgements about ethnic prejudices and although the ultimate rationale for this whole study should be seen within the socio-political context of anti-racist positions, we would underestimate the complexity of prejudice by taking the notion for granted and essentially unproblematic.

After the outline of the basic properties of the cognitive model, we will finally examine which cognitive and textual strategies are followed in the manifestation of ethnic beliefs in discourse. On the basis of our preliminary data we will systematically study the respective levels and dimensions of 'talk' and show in which, often indirect, ways these beliefs eventually surface in conversation and hence in social interaction. It goes without saying that also this production model as well as the various 'prejudice indicating devices' of discourse will be fragmentary in this stage, but we hope that the approach will provide sufficient structure to our own and our further research in this area.

2. What is ethnic prejudice? The structure of the problem.

2.1. Some intuitions

It is well-known that much of our theory formation is guided by our mundane intuitions about some phenomenon. The study of prejudice is no exception. Many 'definitions' of prejudice are not much more than nicely formulated paraphrases of what we usually mean when the word prejudice is used in everyday discourse. Let us therefore start with a brief summary of some of those intuitions about the meaning and implications of the word, so that below we know in which respect a theoretical reconstruction follows, or deviates from, those intuitions.

First, both the terms 'prejudice' and 'prejudiced' are used to assign properties to persons. Individual people are said to 'have' prejudice, or to 'be' prejudiced, and it seems that we use the terms much less to say something about groups of people or about more general social or cultural phenomena.

Second, the terms are used to predicate something about the minds of these individual persons, much in the same way as we say that people 'have' opinions or attitudes and of the same order as what we say that others 'think' or 'find'.

Third, the notion is used to denote cognitive contents of persons about other people, sometimes individuals, but mostly groups, or members of groups (blacks, women, squatters, professors or businessmen). Only derivatively we sometimes use the notion for opinions about objects, such as apples, or events and actions -- unless these are actions of group members.

Fourth, the notion involves beliefs and opinions and hence implies evaluation and judgment of a person about people or the actions of people. Moreover, this evaluation is usually negative.
Fifth, users of the term 'prejudice' will often imply that this negative evaluation is wrong, misguided, unfounded, and in general inconsistent with some more general norms and values, such as those of 'tolerance', 'rational judgement' or 'sound argumentation'. In other words, the use of the term 'prejudice' itself presupposes a negative evaluation of another person.

Sixth, prejudice is not usually seen as a transient property of a person, but rather as a rather permanent character trait or disposition.

Seventh, prejudice is a typical 'attribution predicate'. That is, it is a property assigned to persons in order to explain, characterize, or argue against the causes or reasons of behavior, such as discriminatory actions or discourse. By transfer or extension, these actions or discourses themselves are therefore often described as 'prejudiced', and hence evaluated as wrong or improper.

Last, but not least, the negative evaluation presupposed by the use of the term prejudice will often imply that the speaker thinks that he/she does not have this prejudice.

Although this is certainly not an exhaustive summary of the components of the everyday notion of prejudice, we seem to have captured the essential ones. Going over the list, we discover that many of these components also appear in the scientific analysis of prejudice, although sometimes implicitly. Of course, such an approach is not a priori wrong; the social scientist will gain much insight into the nature of prejudice by studying the ways social members themselves categorize their social reality. We therefore will have to consider in what respects a theoretical analysis should go beyond this everyday understanding and use of the notion.

2.2. Our theoretical approach to the notion of prejudice is localized at the borders of cognitive psychology, social psychology and sociology. Prejudice is taken as a phenomenon of social cognition. More in particular, as we have suggested above, we take prejudice to be a specific form of social attitude. The attitude part in this case will be theoretically formulated in terms of current cognitive theories of information processing, whereas the social part will be understood in a double sense: (i) they are attitudes about groups or about people as members of groups, and (ii) they are attitudes of people as members of groups. In other words, the social dimension of attitudes is to be specified in terms of theories of group interaction, both in social psychology and sociology. Although, thus, prejudice is seen as a cognitive basis of group interaction, both cognition and interaction, and their interrelationships, are inserted into a broader socio-cultural context, defined in such various terms as 'situations', 'institutions', cultural traditions', or 'economic competition'. It is clear that these various contextual properties of social attitudes cannot even be appropriately summarized, let alone fully spelled out, in this paper; we will have to focus on the various relations between cognition and social context. In section 4 below we will then further specify the proper cognitive aspects of prejudice.

We will articulate the respective social dimensions of ethnic attitudes along the following lines:

a. Acquisition and transformation: attitudes are acquired and transformed cognitively but in various social contexts in which members of groups interact with other members of the same group, e.g. in processes of socialization, or with members of other groups.

b. Expression and communication: attitudes can be expressed, directly or indirectly, in various types of discourse and related non-verbal interaction, such as everyday conversations, the media, textbooks and lessons, official documents and laws, parliamentary debates and other political discourses, pamphlets, and so on. These are important factors in the transmission and hence the (trans-)formation of attitudes within the group.
from individually held attitudes, they thus become shared, 
social, attitudes, and vice versa.

c. Interaction. Apart from the more specific communicative 
forms of interaction mentioned above, social members may 
otherwise act 'upon' underlying attitudes. This does not mean 
that attitudes 'determine' behavior, as it was traditionally 
an object for investigation, but only that in all social 
interaction attitudes play a role in the cognitive program-
ming of action, as well as in the interpretation and eval-
uation of actions of other members.

d. Situation. The (trans-)formation, communication and inter-
action processes take place within specific social situations: 
various dimensions of these situations --and their cognitive 
representations in individual social members-- will interact 
with the underlying attitudinal properties of these processes.

e. Social structure. Attitude based interactions in situations 
are finally localized in the more abstract structures of society, 
represented again cognitively by social members, such as informal 
and formal groups, classes, and institutions, and their various 
relations such as domination, power, competition, or cooperation. 
This social structure is not taken as a given system, but as 
a culturally and historically changing organizing principle 
for social interactions between groups or individuals. It is 
at this more abstract level that relevant norms, values, and 
ideologies are defined as socio-culturally shared cognitions 
of (members of) groups.

Let us try to specify these various dimensions for social 
aditudes in general and ethnic prejudice in particular, 
taking into account the specifics of the Dutch social context 
in which the ethnic attitudes studied below are to be localized. 
It should be emphasized that whereas the cognitive analysis 
is rather theoretical, we do not attempt to provide a further 
thoretical account of the role of social context. Also, due 
to a lack of sociological data about prejudice and racism in 
the Netherlands, our observations will be often impressions, 
based on personal experiences, communications and the media. 
In this area most of the work is still to be done.

2.3. Acquisition and transformation. As we will see in the next 
sections, ethnic prejudice in the Netherlands is widespread. 
At least half of the population is assumed to regularly dis-
play behavior (communication, action) which by at least some 
social members is attributed to negative attitudes about 
ethnically different groups, both within the Netherlands or 
outside. A first question, then, would be "How do these atti-
itudes come about?" One part of the answer has been given 
in terms of the historical and cultural properties of a 
capitalist, (ex-)colonial western society: ethnic attitudes 
are acquired within the context of an essentially racist 
'socio-economic structure in which deep-rooted norms, values 
and ideologies have historically developed during the inter-
actions with ethnically different groups within the country 
(mainly Jews) and abroad, mainly in the colonies. These 
norms, values and ideologies have acquired relative inde-
pendence so that they could be culturally transmitted (see 
2.4.) also in situations which are no longer inserted in the 
context of socio-economic dominance and exploitation, 
of ethnically different groups, either in the colonies or 
within the country itself. As soon as ethnically different 
groups, such as immigrant workers or people from ex-colonies, 
enter the Dutch scene between the forties and the eighties, 
these culturally shared norms, values and ideologies may, 
under specific transformations, be actualized to deal with 
the current socio-economic situation in the Netherlands. 
Although it wouldn't be difficult to find evidence of these 
racist ideologies in various historical documents, this his-
tory is still to be written in detail. Our point here is that 
ethnic prejudice in the Netherlands does not emerge from 
nowhere and only after World War II. Just as in England 
or France, it simply continues a long, colonial tradition. 
It remains to be specified though which particular forms 
these ethnic ideologies have taken during the course of the 
socio-historical development of the Netherlands, so that 
we can explain differences between ethnic attitudes in 
O.G. the Netherlands, England and France.
True as this more general historical 'background' may be in its cultural transmission and justification of ethnic attitudes, it does not provide a full answer to the problem of the acquisition and transformation of ethnic attitudes in the present social context of the Netherlands. Unlike the situation in the USA, for instance, Dutch adults have not been socialized in terms of ethnically relevant ideologies about present ethnic minorities in the country itself. On the contrary, the major dimension, apart from class differences between groups, has been religious: the most prominent outgroups for adult Dutch have been various groups of Protestants, the Catholics, 'humanists' or 'non-believers', the latter often associated with the socio-political categorization of 'socialists'. The education system, broadcasting and, indirectly, the political parties still exhibit this religious organization of Dutch society, although the seventies have somewhat blurred this picture—such that, more and more, Protestants and Catholics are taken together as 'Christians'—also in the corresponding political party (CDA) within a growing social context of atheism. In other words, ethnicity hardly played an explicit role in socialization, either in the family, or at school and in peer group interaction. The attitudes towards Jews did not seem to be widespread or at least are ambivalent: ethnic differences (if any) seem to be superseeded by religious differences and economic dimensions (just as in other countries many Jews were specializing in precision crafts, commerce, manufacturing and banking). It follows that the individual and group acquisition or re-activation of racist beliefs and opinions could not have taken place, except incidentally, by direct contacts or informal communication about such contacts. The resulting picture therefore is rather unclear. At the surface, the Netherlands seemed to be, during centuries, a more or less 'tolerant' society. This on the one hand is a useful self-myth against the background of so much religious differentiation. However, on the other hand, might have some relevance in the framework of the political and socio-economic position of the Netherlands in the 17th and 18th centuries. As the one and only European republic, it had relative political freedom within a context of economic prosperity, which allowed limited acceptance or even integration of small groups (refugees, some immigrant workers) from other countries in Europe. We therefore will assume provisionally that the acquisition or re-activation of ethnic attitudes has the following socio-cultural antecedents:

(i) formal education: lessons and textbooks at school had, and still have, ethnically biased representations of Dutch colonial history, and the contacts between Dutch and other people (races) during travels or commercial enterprises; the portrayal of 'black', 'brown', 'red' or 'yellow' people is comparable to that in most textbooks in western countries (in history, geography, or social science).

(ii) literature: many novels and children's books take their themes against the background of these travels and colonial history, thus combining 'exotic' events with the stereotypical portrayal of ethnically different groups.

(iii) mass media: although limited until this century, the press, and later the radio, has similarly conveyed events and actions, and hence conceptions of, ethnically different groups involved, both in the colonies and in other countries, such that western and white supremacy, both technically and culturally, if not explicitly expressed, could at least implicitly be presupposed in the description of these events.

(iv) informal communication: we have seen already that informal communication, due to a lack of several large ethnically different groups in the Netherlands itself, could not be pervasive in e.g. storytelling events about personal experiences; yet, besides the usual ethnically imbued jokes, there may have been indirect transmission of racist attitudes on the basis of stories of people who had been in the colonies.
Of course there are other social factors determining the development and maintenance of ethnic attitudes in the Netherlands until the 1950's, such as popularization of scientific treatises about other people and races or the explicit and implicit actions of the respective national and local governments as soon as contacts with other countries (and hence other ethnic groups) were involved. We will assume that the influence of these factors runs via the other factors mentioned, such as the media, formal education and literature.

We have stressed that the prejudice picture in the Netherlands has always been ambivalent. On the one hand, the myth of tolerance was kept alive and a rather hypocritical (often religiously based) indignation was often voiced about the treatment of blacks in South Africa or the USA, but on the other hand it was certainly not socially sanctioned until the sixties to have and express beliefs about the inferiority of blacks. Nor do history textbooks, until today, explicitly mention the role of the Dutch in the slave trade, or the behavior of Dutch colonists towards the autochthonous populations of the colonies.

As soon as large groups of ethnic minorities or other 'foreigners' immigrated to the Netherlands at the end of the fourties and until now, these various contexts and sources for the acquisition and change of ethnic attitudes were dramatically supplemented by inferences from personal experience, informal communication about such contacts, by the mass media, and the many institutions (from the government and parliament, reacting to this immigration, to the local authorities which are responsible for housing and employment) dealing with immigration. During the course of about ten years, this new situation has given rise to a process of attitude (trans-)formation, which however can only be fully understood against the picture of the historical and cultural traditions and the socio-economic contexts mentioned above. As we will see, half of the Dutch population still never has contacts with members of ethnic minorities, but this does not mean at all that the attitude structure of those people is much different from those who do have direct contacts. At the same time, the children are now growing up in a multi-ethnic society and their socialization, in the family, at school, and in their peer groups, is increasingly influenced by ethnocritically relevant communication and interaction. Although textbooks and the media are no longer explicitly and systematically racist, their discourses remain ethnocentric and even their 'objective' facts, e.g. about crimes, unemployment and immigration, provide the information on which the readers can operate their subjectively biased inferences which are formed, expressed and distributed in informal communication and interactions. Stereotypical beliefs and opinions, developed over centuries, can now be re-activated and adapted to the few ethically or culturally 'deviant' groups in Dutch society.

2.4. Expression and communication. Ideologies in general and ethnic attitudes in particular can only be 'shared' and have their various social functions if they are expressed and communicated. In the last sections of this paper we will more in particular analyse the ways this happens in everyday conversation. Here 'observation' and ensuing interpretation, attribution and evaluation of (members of) ethnic groups does play a role in the formation of attitudes, but such 'individual experiences' are insufficient determinants of group attitudes. Group interaction and underlying ethnic attitudes require 'confirmation', justification, and common goals and interests, and these are therefore regular topics in discourse. These communicative processes are however rather complex. We already suggested that the official public media, that is, the national press, radio, TV, as well as educational materials, are no longer overtly racist -- although there are occasional exceptions -- but still a majority of these media and discourses remain ethnocentric. On the one hand they report the many 'facts' of a multi-cultural society, from immigration until acts
of discrimination against immigrants, but their definition of the social situation is ambiguous, or provides information which may be transformed into beliefs that are taken as 'evidence' supporting negative attitudes: the very numbers of immigrants are given in absolute terms not in percentages, the housing and employment problems are emphasized, cultural differences are not portrayed as (positive) contributions to Dutch culture, and on the whole ethnic news is framed in terms of 'problems' we have with them (hardly problems they have with us).

The textbooks at school, even the new editions of recent years, are as yet neglecting the fact that the Netherlands has become a multi-ethnic society. Some few pages in history, geography and social science textbooks mention immigration, and none of them will mention one or two paragraphs the 'dirty' jobs, the miserable housing conditions or the discrimination against ethnic minorities. But on the whole the children are not properly educated such that they have the information and the attitudes that prepare them for the direct or indirect everyday experiences in their contacts with ethnically different groups. No wonder that the minority children themselves can hardly find any identification in the textbooks or other educational materials or interaction (teachers pay little attention to the topic outside the textbook based teaching).

But the textbooks do contain mainly stereotypical stories about ethnic prejudice and racism in other countries, such as the USA and South-Africa. Typically, indeed, prejudice in Dutch culture is something others do, and something which is inconsistent with Dutch norms and values. We will see that this institutionalized morality is partly adopted as a folk moral in everyday conversation.

Children's books, after initial ethnocentrism and racism in previous decades and centuries, slowly change towards a more neutral portrayal of ethnically different children.

From this brief summary we may conclude that the communicative transmission of ethnic attitudes in the Netherlands has evolved from a clearly racist portrayal of ethnically distant groups (e.g. in the colonies) to a more subtle, indirectly ethnocentric or biased construal of actions and events related to ethnically close groups, providing so-called 'facts' that can be used for further inference making by people in informal communication and interaction.

2.5. Interaction. Only a minority (15%) of the original Dutch population has daily contacts with members of ethnic minority groups. Large part of these contacts will be of a rather brief, occasional nature, such as observing or briefly talking to a minority member in public places, such as the street, shops, the market, pubs or social institutions. Contacts with ethnically different neighbours are also predominantly superficial. Our data show that most people will avoid contacts, and only part of this avoidance can be explained in terms of language problems. On the job contacts will of course be somewhat more intensive, especially if goals and tasks are shared, but even then people will tend to keep to themselves or to prefer regular interaction with members of the ingroup. Only a slight percentage has intimate personal contact with persons from ethnically different groups, but more often than not, it seems, the resulting attitudes, if they are positive, do not necessarily generalize towards the ethnic group as a whole.

From this general picture we may conclude that the (trans-)formation of ethnic attitudes both determines and is determined by the superficiality and compartmentalization of interaction. On the one hand we will find detailed experiences of everyday contacts and on the other hand, often in the same people, rather stereotypical attitudes about the outgroup.
Although ‘distance’ may be the rather general characterizing property of Dutch inter-ethnic relations, it certainly does not provide the details of everyday interaction. First, discrimination of various sorts is pervasive. Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese will often have difficulty being accepted as tenants, will often in vain try to find a job, will sometimes not be allowed entrance into a bar or club, to mention only a few examples which have been documented in research. More subtle is the everyday discrimination in public places, such as the street, shops, bars or the tramway, ranging from avoidance, impoliteness, refusal of adequate service, to more or less overt racist remarks. As yet, open violence, such as interracial fights or riots have been practically absent on the Dutch scene. Although another well-known myth holds it that the Dutch are not very violent in social interaction, and although there is no tradition of racial riots, it should be kept in mind that the socio-economic context actually will have more influence on the forms of such conflicts than assumed ‘peaceful’ attitudes. Housing shortage rather has led to a more active squatter’s movement (and ensuing clashes with the police) among the young than to interracial open conflicts. Also there is no fascist party of any strength that could fuel politically the frustrations of housing shortage and unemployment towards more open, violent actions against ethnic minorities. But, as we will see below, the attitudes as such would not be sufficient conditions to prevent such a development.

Apart from the occasional encounters mentioned above, thus, interaction predominantly seems to be ‘observational’: we see them on the street, in other public places, observe their behavior, appearance and clothing, sometimes see how they live, at least from the ‘outside’, but on the whole the interaction is indirect, that is ‘via’ acquaintances, via the media, via everyday stories, and the processes of attribution to the groups as wholes of socio-economic problems, such as housing shortage and unemployment. It follows that ethnic attitudes are developing mostly on the basis of these kinds of indirect, inferred information, mostly from media discourse and conversation, supplemented with occasional, superficial encounters and observation. We will indeed see in the next sections that the actual contents of ethnic attitudes in the Netherlands reflect these types of ethnic interaction, and it may be assumed that conversely the resulting stereotypes also are an important component in the avoidance and discriminatory patterns of interethnic interaction.

2.6 Situation. Instead of a theoretical analysis of the relations between ethnic attitudes on the one hand and cultural, economic and colonial history, communication and interaction on the other hand, we have briefly sketched some particulars of the more concrete forms these have taken in the Netherlands. That is, we have tried to informally picture some of the possible ‘origins’ of ethnic prejudice. In order to understand the precise functions of these ethnic attitudes, we should finally also briefly pay attention to the micro-social and macrosocial context in which ethnic attitudes can be displayed in interaction.

It has often been stressed that prejudice may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ‘prejudiced’ behavior, such as discriminatory interaction.\(^22\) Decisive is the further cognitive and social situation, such as (other) beliefs, norms and values actualized in some interaction situation, as well as other factors of the social context relevant in that situation. Since we will pay attention to the further cognitive aspects below, we will here focus on some further social features of the situation. By situation we here understand a dynamic structure of social variables which influence or are influenced by the ongoing interactional event between participants.\(^23\) Although the components of such a situation may have a general nature, so that indeed participants are able to cognitively analyze, that is ‘understand’, the situation, the structure of these components will mostly be specific, except maybe in highly formalized encounters.
For our problem this means that we are interested in those features of social situations which systematically interact with any kind of 'prejudiced' behavior, that is interactions in which ethnic attitudes of participants play a role. Sometimes these actions may be interpreted as being discriminatory against members of minority groups, whereby the minority group member may be a participant (as is the case in the exchange of goods, the purveyance of services, hiring or letting of housing), or only an indirect participant, viz. in those cases where the minority member(s) are somehow affected by the interaction, as in laws, regulations, or other decisions of national and local governments, of directions of businesses, or even of informal groups of the autonomous population.

We will further assume that agents in interactional situations in principle will try to act such that their goals are realized in an optimal way, whereby the goals are set on the basis of complex cognitive decision making processes, in which knowledge, beliefs, wishes, preferences and ultimately concrete intentions or plans are involved. However, the social situation could be considered as a set of constraints on the execution of these intentions: social members know and take into account in their very decision making process, the fact that other participants also have their goals and underlying motivations, beliefs or opinions, and that the encounter will have to satisfy general norms, values and principles of cooperation. Further, they also know that their actions will be perceived, interpreted and evaluated according to these general norms, values and principles and that a complex inference procedure of attribution will take place in which they are evaluated as persons and social members. It follows that part of the goals of interaction maybe the maintenance or establishment of an evaluation that is coherent with the agent's self-image. Sometimes these different components of the interaction goals may well be conflicting with each other: getting done what one wishes may be incoherent with equally desirable positive attributions.

Global planning and local management of the interaction will therefore have to follow a complex decision-making strategy in which an action is chosen which both aspects of the goal are realized optimally. The interpretation of the situation will yield important information for this process of decision making, planning and execution. Let us therefore summarize some of these situational variables.

First, the type of social context should be considered. This typology may be given along the usual dimensions, such as 'formal', 'informal', 'public', 'private', 'institutional', etc., which distinguishes between 'having breakfast in the family', 'talking to a friend in a bar', 'making use of public transport', 'seeing a doctor' or 'testifying in court'.

Second, such social context types will typically be associated with settings of various sorts, such as 'the home', the street, a bus, a hospital, court, a shop or an office, which also establish constraints on interaction.

Third, the social 'positions' of the interacting members, such as their roles, functions, on the one hand, and their social categories, such as gender, age, or ethnic group membership will be involved in setting further constraints. Some of the positions or categories will even institutionally constrain the possible actions of agents, such as of policemen, politicians or judges when acting 'in function'.

Fourth, each social context will be under the general scope of norms, values, principles or other conventions setting the range of possible, acceptable actions: on a bus ride, in a lesson at school, in a court trial, or in an informal talk in a pub, there will be informal or formal principles of the typical, possible or necessary actions of the participants.

Although situations are more complex, these few examples of situational factors will do for our purposes. In interactions with or 'about' members of ethnic minorities, each of these factors will also play a role in the ultimate actions chosen. For instance, if the situation is
public and formal, and if there are general norms or even laws that do not allow discriminatory actions, we may expect that the actions chosen will not overtly violate these norms or laws, because the agent will in that case have to account for unacceptable or unlawful behavior. This does not mean, of course, that ethnic minority members involved in or affected by such actions would not interpret such actions as discriminatory, viz. in those cases where their own goals, wishes, or (higher order) rights are not furthered by the consequences of these actions.

Actions however are much less bounded in informal, private contexts. In such cases there are also general norms and values, but control is less powerful or at least not institutionalized. In our data it is obvious that even for informal situations participants are aware of the general norm that discriminatory action is prohibited. Yet, it may be that more specific (in-)group norms, values and goals are prevailing in the situation, or that the personal goals and motivations are stronger than the possible negative attribution attached to discriminatory action. As soon as the participant of the interaction has low social status, does not belong to the ingroup, or has other properties that would make negative evaluation according to general norms less important for the agent, discriminatory action becomes possible, such as violation of politeness rules, refusal of cooperative action, hiring on jobs or letting an apartment. Hence in situations in which social control cannot be exercised, in which institutional norms or laws cannot be enforced, in which actions are not publicly accountable, and in which other ingroup norms exist justifying specific actions, there is a maximum freedom for the execution of personal plans of action. The lower the status of the other participant, the weaker will be the influence of possible negative feedback from negative attribution, which means that the agent under maximum personal freedom can act independent of the goals and interests of the other participant. It follows that in these situations it is the personal attitude of the agent towards minority group members which determines to a much larger degree the actual choice of plans. Of course, if the agent is aware of the fact that his or her action is possibly discriminatory according to general norms or laws, a cognitive strategy should be operating in which situational principles or other ingroup norms/principles are invoked to justify the action.

In the case of conversational interaction with ingroup members about ethnic minorities, or about ethnically relevant actions and events, the constraints are similar. In this case, it is mainly the assumption about the possible positive, neutral, or negative attribution by the hearer, and the status, power, or intimacy of the hearer, which constrain the freedom of the speaker to express his or her own opinions and attitudes. The more the conversation will be part of an informal, uncontrolled, private context, the more equal the speech participant will be perceived, and the more the hearer will be assumed to share the opinions and attitudes of the speaker, the less constraints on expression will exist. The methodological conclusion from these assumptions for the conduct of free interviews is ambiguous however. As long as the situation is defined by the interviewee as more or less 'formal' interview about the opinions and attitudes, the assumptions about possible control may inhibit more or less direct expression, but on the other hand, in those cases which resemble 'free, spontaneous conversations' it is natural that also the participant, that is the interviewer, actively participates, or at least suggests to participate in the conversation, which would mean that he/she also would voice his/her ethnic opinions. But if these are opposed to those of the interviewee we may either expect argumentation and persuasion, or again inhibition because of perceived differences in opinions or even of perceived group membership. These methodological implications of the situational context of ethnically relevant conversations will be discussed further below.
Social structure. We will be brief about the further social context in which interaction situations are embedded, also because the social structure will be related with interaction only via the respective variables of the situation. That is, institutions, social categorization, stratification, organizations and groups, and the corresponding laws, rules or conventions become relevant only according to the interpretations of the interacting members. By way of example, we may enumerate some properties of Dutch social structure that may systematically be relevant in ethnically relevant situations:

(i) Stratification: compared to other countries, such as England or France, class conflict seems less vehement for a number of reasons, such as smaller differences in income, and a rather developed system of social security, which guarantees a minimum income to all workers, and allowances to the unemployed, the aged or disabled. This may mean that, relatively, there will be less competition generally speaking, between the working class of original Dutch citizens and the class of immigrants as far as income is concerned. Competition however will be more severe in other domains, such as employment, housing and precisely the social services.

(ii) Churches: although a growing part of the Dutch population is no longer actively religious, most Dutch people have been socialized in a religious family; given the fact that Dutch churches have taken relatively progressive positions on a number of issues, including discrimination (after earlier anti-fascist positions in the case of the nazi persecution of the Jews), positions especially taken by protestant churches), general norms and values regarding the treatment of ethnically different groups may be enforced against the background of this influence of the churches in Dutch society.

(iii) Political structure: parties: there is no significant ultra-conservative, nationalistic or fascist party (some of them have only local importance, e.g. in some bigger towns, but never made it to parliament, and actually lawsuits are being followed in court that might prohibit these parties); hence, racist views cannot be supported or enacted under political 'justification' of official parties, whereas the small fascist parties that do exist have extremely negative evaluations in official or public contexts, such as the media. Again, the anti-fascist tradition which is part of the sociocultural context of post-war Dutch society also forces the established parties to adopt anti-discrimination laws. It should be added though, that the immigration policy of the respective governments has not always been very liberal, let alone that the various laws were systematically enacted in favor of the immigrants; police and immigration officers in general display negative attitudes towards (coloured) foreigners, and practices of discrimination are not systematically investigated by the police.

(iv) Pressure groups: there are a great number of formal or informal 'action groups', of which many take anti-fascist and anti-discriminatory positions, organize meetings and rallies, and which have regular press coverage. Although many of these groups rather 'look abroad', that is protest against the situation in fascist or authoritarian countries, rather than criticizing official practices in the Netherlands, the general anti-fascist, and hence anti-discriminatory ideology they subscribe to has significant influence upon the norms and values of at least the more progressive part of the population. But even in the more conservative sections of the population, racist discrimination is not popular as a norm or value.

(v) Organizations of minorities: although the ethnic minorities as such do not have any political power, their organizations do have some influence at least in local and even national policy making; ideas about a national council of minorities have not yet been realized though, but recently it has become possible to elect representatives in town councils. The actions and declarations of minority organizations are not extensively covered by the press, but they do get at least some press interest, and hence their opinions do reach the general public.

(vi) Trade unions: the role of the trade unions has been notoriously ambivalent. They do endorse anti-fascist and anti-discriminatory policies, but they do little to take
significant political action (e.g. strikes) to protect the rights of their ethnic minority members or to protest otherwise against national policies on immigration or the legalization of 'illegal' immigrants. The traditional explanation of this rather passive stand of the unions is of course based on the assumption that competition between ethnic groups is precisely focused in blue-colour jobs, and too positive stands on foreign workers may alienate other union members.

Although the precise influence of these various dimensions of Dutch social structure cannot be measured for individual social members, groups or situations, the general tendency is that racial discrimination is not acceptable according to prevailing norms and laws, and that the majority of the population, either by socialization or by public communication (the media), is aware of this 'official' attitude. On the other hand, the actual enforcement of the laws and norms both by the national and the local authorities is rather weak, such that mostly extra-parliamentary organizations (like the churches) or action groups have taken the role -- sometimes paternalistic, indeed -- of 'protecting' the minorities. Also the persistent actions of the government to curb immigration -- actions that do get broad media coverage -- seem to enforce the public opinion that 'this small country is already too crowded'. On the whole, therefore, it seems that purely racist views are officially unacceptable, but that further immigration of 'foreigners' certainly is not considered to be positively valued. We will see though that these official norms and values in everyday contexts of informal interaction are often superseded by an identification of 'foreigners' with ethnically or culturally different minorities. In other words, racial discrimination and attitudes exist, and some policies even explicitly or implicitly recognize its existence, but it is not recognized that racism may be a fundamental property of Dutch social structure.

2.8. Conclusions

In the previous sections we have, more or less descriptively, reviewed some dimensions of the broader social context of ethnic attitudes in the Netherlands. It has been suggested that the presently existing racial or cultural prejudices and the widespread discriminatory behavior in informal situations have complex relationships with Dutch (colonial) history, culture, and social structure: There seem to be permanent clashes between official ideologies and various (group) norms. Imperialism, colonialism, the slave trade and the general (western) ideologies about ethnically different groups and peoples certainly have left a general cultural trace in the perception of ethnically different groups. This ethnocentric and often openly racist tradition was only partly counterbalanced by religious norms and the political and socio-economic position of the Netherlands in Western-Europe, which allowed immigration and integration of foreigners and many international (mostly commercial) contacts, did not foster extreme nationalism. This ambivalence persists in the actual socio-cultural and political context. The official norms on the one hand prohibit discrimination, and official policy in the last few years is geared towards the emancipation of minority groups, but at the same time the immigration policies are strict, the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws is weak, and affirmative action is left to extra-parliamentary groups and personal initiatives. The consequence is that in most formal, official and public situations, overt discrimination is exceptional or indirect, that the majority of the people officially adopt the general norms and values, but that at the same time, in more informal situations without social control, latent racism, ethnic conflicts, socio-economic frustration (especially in housing and employment), and influences from the media and past socialization (textbooks, children's literature, etc.) interact in the formation of negative ethnic attitudes and possible discriminatory enactment. We will therefore further investigate these informal situations by analyzing the relatively informal conversations about such informal ethnic relationships.
Ethnic relations in the Netherlands: some data

In the last ten years the Netherlands has gone through one of its most significant social changes of this century. Although at earlier periods it had known immigration of some groups of foreigners, such as the Portuguese Jews in the 17th century and people from Indonesia, such as the Moluccans, around the independence of this country, more prominent immigration took place in the sixties and the seventies. The two largest groups are those usually denoted as 'guest workers', mostly coming from Morocco and Turkey (more than 200,000 in 1980), and those coming from Surinam, notably around its independence in 1975 (approx. 160,000 in 1980) (see Schumacher, 1980, and WR, 1979). These larger groups added to the already established groups of foreign workers from Spain, Italy and Yugoslavia, to the immigrants from the Antilles, and to (a much smaller) group of Chinese. The total number of immigrants is estimated to be around 600,000, which on a population of 14 million amounts to approx. 4.3%.

Although these numbers are still rather modest, the social consequences have been considerable. The earlier attitude of both the government and of the majority of the Dutch population had been based on the assumption that the foreign workers would eventually return to their own countries, and that possibly also large part of the Surinamese group might go back. These expectations however were not realistic. In spite of the severe economic recession the majority of the Moroccan and Turkish workers remained in the Netherlands and many were joined by their families. The same holds for the Surinamese. After the well-known report on Ethnic Minorities of the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WR, 1979), this earlier attitude had to be modified. More or less officially was now conceded that the Netherlands had become a 'multi-ethnic' society, and that the national and the local policies should be formulated within this perspective. In 1981 the government presented a first version of a comprehensive policy statement for the ethnic minorities. Starting from the recognition that the Netherlands had become a multi-ethnic society, the basic philosophy of this statement was, however, rather vague. On the one hand, it was emphasized that the ethnic groups should be allowed to maintain their own social and cultural identity, but on the other hand many of the concrete plans of the statement seem to imply integration of various forms. Thus, separate schools or welfare organizations of immigrants are expected to integrate into more general 'Dutch' institutions. Yet, a positive policy is outlined and an increasing part of the national budget is reserved for the education, housing and work of ethnic minorities, with rather heavy stress on the education of the young first generation or second generation children.

As usual, this official policy was not very explicit in its basic philosophy, and it also came rather late. Numbers of immigrants had been underestimated for years, unwarranted assumptions had been made about 're-emigration', and insufficient facilities had been created for housing and work. Growing unemployment, soon reaching 10%, touched mainly the young and the immigrants (26% of the working Surinamese men, and nearly 40% of young Surinamese men between 15 and 24 years old in Amsterdam, 1977) (Gookens et al., 1979). The housing situation, mainly in the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague and Utrecht, already critical before the immigration, further deteriorated at the expense of the poor immigrants. And in some parts of these cities school classes in primary education sometimes have more than 50% children of immigrants. Whereas the Surinamese speak Dutch fluently or at least well enough (besides their own languages, mostly Sranan Tongo) to do well at school, Turkish and Moroccan children experience the usual difficulties. Programs have been set up to give additional lessons in Dutch and at the same time to provide for the possibility to continue education in the language and culture of the home country.

Perhaps most serious, however, has been the reaction of large parts of the original white Dutch population: increasing uneasiness, prejudice and discrimination have scattered the myth of Dutch tolerance. To be sure, earlier racism in the Netherlands (of which the history is still to be written) often did not have the widespread and open forms it now has, but the social and economic situation at the arrival of earlier immigrants (Jews and workers from the Mediterranean countries) was rather in the benefit of the Dutch. Also, despite sometimes rather marked cultural differences, these earlier groups were - if we disregard for the moment the coloured immigrants from Indonesia -
still (more or less) white. But now the presence of a large group of black people from Surinam and the Antilles confronted the Dutch people with the expression of its own more or less latent racism. Black men tend to be criminalized, and have serious difficulties finding a job or lodgings. Whereas after World War I there has been a rather widespread ideology of ‘anti-fascism’ and no adherence to anti-Semitism (more than 100,000 Dutch Jews were massacred in German concentration camps), the self-image of ethnic tolerance is increasingly being blurred.

Although right-wing fascist parties did not manage to obtain a seat in parliament, some of their nationalist, anti-foreigner and racist opinions are spreading through informal communication (we saw that the media predominantly avoid open racism). Our study is mainly intended to obtain insight into the nature and the distribution of these ethnic attitudes. A recent survey of ethnic attitudes in the Netherlands (Lagendijk, 1990) has shown that at least half of the population expresses some form of ethnic prejudice, despite the official social norm of anti-discrimination. Before we go into the qualitative aspects of these prejudices, some quantitative survey data might provide some background (for details, see Lagendijk (1990):

1. An essential condition to be able to judge the nature of inter-ethnic relations in the Netherlands is the degree of contact between the respective groups. As such as 60% of the respondents say they never have any contacts with ethnic minority groups, whereas only 15% have regular, daily, or personal contacts. This implies that for only a small part of the population the beliefs and opinions expressed (see below) are based on personal experience, whereas others derive from informal communication, the media and inferences from pre-established attitudes.

2. If we consider the presence of “foreigners” (buitenlanders) --as they are usually called in everyday conversation-- in the Netherlands as a social problem, and compare this problem with other social problems, 36% of the Dutch agree ‘in general’ and 10% relative to their personal life. Housing and unemployment though both rate twice as high as social problems of Dutch society.

In other words, the presence of ethnic minorities is seen as a relevant problem, but not as acute as housing and unemployment. We will see below that an important aspect of the ‘minority-problem’ of the Dutch is related to these latter issues of housing and unemployment.

It should be stressed that the presence of ethnic minorities is experienced as a problem above all (more than 40%) by those who have few or no contacts with these groups.

3. Asked about the positive and negative aspects of the foreign workers in the Netherlands, the respondents are able to name only a few positive aspects (predominantly the fact that the foreigners do the dirty jobs Dutch people do not want to do), but agree on many negative aspects, such as ‘they take our jobs’ (22%), ‘they do not adapt’ (12%), ‘they do not belong here’ (11%), ‘they take our houses’ (10%) or abuse our social services (8%). We will see below that in our informal interviews those opinions, at least for Amsterdam, rate rather higher than in this survey. Except for the competition on the work market, the evaluation about the contribution of the Surinamese is similar.

On the whole only 3% of the respondents think the ethnic minorities have a positive contribution to give to Dutch society, whereas 21% think that the contribution is only negative. As usual for the Netherlands, the opinions in this respect concentrate towards ‘middle positions’: 43% think the ethnic minorities have been positive but with negative aspects, and 32% that their presence is negative on the whole but with some positive aspects. To resume in even more general terms, somewhat more than half of the Dutch population is violently or predominantly negative about the contributions of the ethnic minorities to Dutch society.

4. The large majority of people think the ethnic minorities should more or less adapt to Dutch norms and values, but at the same time allow them to maintain part of their own habits and culture if these do not disturb the social order or social contacts. We find this opinion also reflected in the opinions voiced in our own interview-data. Note that 14% of the people require full adaptation to Dutch norms, values and culture (total assimilation), and only 1% do not require any adaptation at all.
5. If we further analyze the particular opinions and attitudes about the respective ethnic groups, we find that for each group (Surinamese, Turks, Moroccans), the negative attitudes predominate (between 40% and 50%), whereas about 30% has positive attitudes and about 30% is indifferent. Moroccans are judged most negatively (49%), which is strange in the light of our data which never featured spontaneous negative opinions about this group. Since Indonesians are receiving a much better evaluation, this negative attitude about Moroccans, when explicitly asked about, should probably be explained by their manifest 'terrorist' actions of some years ago. It is possible also the negative opinions about Moroccans are more locally concentrated to areas where they live.

Again we see that contact between the ethnic minority groups and the original Dutch population on the whole favors more positive attitudes: of those having positive opinions about minorities, about 45% have regular contact with them, whereas only about 25% of the people who never have any 'ethnic contacts' are positive. Here too differences are not large respective to the different groups.

6. As usual social distance determines the overall acceptance of the respective groups. The ethnic minorities are accepted as citizens by about 90%, and as colleagues and 'in our street' by about 60% of the respondents. On the other hand, only about 6% want them as close friends or as close kin. The 90% figure however seems rather flattened when we consider a less overall acceptance measure (when citizenship is acceptable only in 40%, neighbourhood in about 25% and having colleagues on the job by about 15%). The latter data seem to be more realistic in view of our own data.

It should of course be stressed, as for the other results of the survey, that the responses are typical survey-responses, which are not open to qualification or nuances.

7. The majority (80%) of the respondents decline own 'ghettoes' for the minorities and favour the 'spreading' philosophy of most local authorities.

8. Two-thirds of the respondents, despite their earlier plea for adaptation, would allow the minorities to keep their own language and culture, and the same number favour intercultural contacts between children at school.

9. More than half of the respondents think our frontiers should stay open for those who want to join their families here, whereas about 25% think admission should be conditional. On the contrary, these figures are reversed for those who do not have a job: 50% percent think they should not be allowed to enter the country.

10. When asked about their ideas concerning the problems the minorities experience in the Netherlands, the respondents first think about the language problem (93% mention this), housing (85%), employment (77%), discrimination (62%), and problems with Dutch society and norms --adaptation. As yet we do not have control data from the ethnic minorities themselves about these issues, but as such the problems are certainly relevant for them, although perhaps the language problem (especially of course for Surinamese) would rate lower, and housing and work and especially discrimination higher.

11. The general expectations about ethnic relations in the Netherlands are rather pessimistic: 75% of the people expect (more) conflict, especially when the second generation grows up. It appears though this pessimism also extends to the relations among Dutch people themselves. There seems to be a general lack of confidence in the future.

It is difficult to sketch a unified picture of Dutch (in-)tolerance towards ethnic minorities as a conclusion to these survey data. Overall acceptance may be more than 50% under condition that we do not have any trouble from them', but the more specific negative attitudes towards the respective groups predominate. If we take acceptance as friends or family-members as a base criterion for full acceptance (or 'lack of prejudice') then only about 6% of the population could be called really neutral or favourable in attitude. We see that indeed the so-called Dutch tolerance has proven to be a myth --especially for those who even do not have any contacts at all with ethnic minorities. Acceptance is strictly conditional and 'at a distance'. As soon as perceived competition is involved, especially in housing and work, the general attitude is predominantly negative.
These general attitudes do not vary much across different political party preferences of the respondents: the leftist and liberal parties have somewhat more tolerant respondents, but the major social factors accounting for the variance are age and education: the young and better educated are on the whole more positive. On the contrary, the rich who live in expensive areas, are more negative (and do not want ethnic minorities in their suburbs). This result is consistent with the higher negative figures for those who do not have contacts with ethnic minorities.

Yet, although there are some tendencies in the survey data about ethnic attitudes in the Netherlands, the complexities and apparent contradictions in attitudes cannot be fully grasped with this kind of research method. Only extensive interviewing, personal histories and the analysis of the local situations can give us insight into the true picture of ethnic attitudes. The overall negative picture of the survey data however is alarming enough to warrant such more qualitative research.

4. The Cognitive Structure of Ethnic Prejudice

4.1. The cognitive model

It has been argued above that prejudice is taken as a special form of social attitude. More in particular, ethnic prejudice should be viewed as a social attitude, shared by groups about ethnically different groups. It has also been assumed that ethnic attitudes are acquired in processes of social information processing, during communication and interaction, within specific situations which in turn are part of a larger socio-cultural and socio-economic framework. In this section we want to explore the cognitive 'result' of this form of social information processing. That is, we want to analyse the internal organization of ethnic attitudes, their relations with other cognitive structures, and their role in social information processing, e.g. in person and group perception and the interactions with or relative to ethnic groups.

Attitudes in general and prejudice in particular have regularly received attention also from a cognitive point of view, and most work in social psychology in this area will follow a general 'cognitive' approach. In our opinion, however, this cognitive approach has been hardly cognitive or only superficially cognitive in the sense we would like to use for this term. Attitudes have been studied as possible 'intervening' variables in a stimulus-response paradigm, or as 'antecedent' factors in the study of behavior. If they were studied in a more cognitive perspective, only some more general, but barely adequately defined, principles were investigated, such as congruence, distance or balance. The content of attitudes was reduced, if studied at all, to a number of concepts or dimensions, typically studied in simple responses to word lists, scales or other methods for which the deeper theoretical presuppositions, such as the relationships between attitudes and actions, were barely further analysed in cognitive terms. The precise processes of cognitive and social information processes were not made
explicit, there was no representation format for social
cognitions such as beliefs, opinions and attitudes, and
the relations with other cognitions, such as knowledge,
or more fundamental norms, values and ideologies, were
not fully spelled out. In other words, there was no cog-
nitive model at all in this so-called 'cognitive' approach.

Recent work in cognitive psychology and artificial intelli-
gence (AI) has provided us with a number of rather explicit
models of cognitive processing and representation. In parti-
cular, the interaction between various cognitive processes
and systems of knowledge have been analysed. Our model
of social cognition, in particular of ethnic attitudes, will
be formulated against the background of these results.

Whereas much work in psychology and AI has been concerned
with language and discourse understanding, with problem
solving and similar complex tasks, the processes of social
cognition we are here dealing with in addition require a
model of person and group perception and the interpretation
and planning of interaction in social situations. It goes
without saying that at this moment such a complex model
cannot fully be spelled out, but we can at least specify
some of the more general principles:

1. All incoming information, whether this is discourse,
actions, events, situations, persons or groups, is ana-
lysed according to similar fundamental principles of infor-
mation processing. That is, constraints on short term memory
capacity, interpretation processes, representation in long
term memory, the use of semantic memory (knowledge), control
procedures, and the role of goals, tasks, or other contextual
and personal information, are similar for the processing of
all relevant input. The same holds for processes of retrieval,
reconstruction, production or planning.

2. A distinction will be made, for purely theoretical purposes
between different memory store or memory functions:

a. Short Term Memory/Working Memory: all information input
is first stored and processed in STM, which also has the
function of a 'working memory', two functions which we
will simply assign here to one STM -- and not to different
'short range memories'. The same holds for a possible
'sensory information store or buffer. STM though has limited
storage capacity, which allows only a few chunks of informa-
tion to be stored and processed before storage in LTM.

The first function of STM is the analysis of surface
structure information of the sensory input, according to
analytic procedures -- for language, actions, or situations
that are stored in LTM. This analysis consists of a
'systematic structural 'chunking' of information into
'meaningful' units. Hence, the second major function of
STM is the assignment of meaning to these units. These
meanings are computed on the basis of the meanings of the
respective units which are stored in semantic [long term]
memory. Also other knowledge is involved in this computation
of composite meanings, e.g. for the derivation of inferences.

Meaning can be derived from input at several levels: we
may have higher level meanings of complex input, such
as discourse or action sequences. These higher level
meanings are accounted for in terms of macrostructures,
and are inferred by a number of rules from lower level
meaning structures. Besides these meaning structures,
complex input may be assigned conventional schematical
forms (e.g. a story schema for discourse, a conversation
schema for talk, or an action schema for stereotypical
behavior).

b. Control Memory. All operations in STM are controlled
by contextually changing information represented in a
'control' or 'executive' store. This control information
contains the current goals, interests or tasks of the
whole system. It specifies for LTM which information
is needed in STM for effective processing, specifies
which information in STM can be provisionally stored
in long term memory, and in general gives the overall
'perspective' or 'bias' to the information processing in STM.
c. Episodic Memory. Long term memory has two major functions of storage, viz. storage of all incoming, contextually specified, information received from STM, and the storage of more general, abstract, decontextualized information inferred (by 'learning') from episodic information. Thus, in episodic memory we find representations of the ongoing actions, events, discourses or situations. As soon as the relevant interpretation processes in STM have taken place and the STM memory buffer has reached its capacity limits, 'old' information will be inserted into these representations in episodic memory, so that 'new' information can be introduced and processed into STM. In fact, we will further assume that there is a 'double bookkeeping' system operating in EM: (i) a representation of the actual input, that is a specific discourse, event, action or situation (or a combination of these), and (ii) a common situation model, which is the result of previous episodic traces of similar events. This is necessary for many reasons, e.g. interpretation of the actual events in the light of 'previous experiences'. Also the model serves as the basis for more permanent storage processes (learning), that is, may be generalized, abstracted from and decontextualized in order to generate more general knowledge and beliefs about structures of discourse, action and situations.

d. Long Term Memory/Semantic Memory. Another aspect of Long Term Memory is exactly the representation of these more general forms of information, such as the lexicon for a language, the 'lexicon' of the 'basic actions' of some culture, the more general knowledge of the world, and further the rules, procedures, strategies and other principles needed to process information in STM. Since semantic memory is vast and complex, effective retrieval of necessary information requires that this information is highly organized, e.g. in various schematic ways, such as scripts, frames, scenarios, situation schemata, person schemata or group schemata.

We will further assume that besides this vast 'knowledge of the world', semantic memory also harbours similarly-organized systems of beliefs, opinions, attitudes, norms, values and ideologies, to which we will turn below. Representations in semantic memory may be thought of as hierarchical networks of concepts. As soon as one of the concepts of such a network is needed (or has been fed into the system as a search cue), such a network will be activated and relevant information from the rest of the network, e.g. certain expectations, may be activated and if needed really actualized, i.e. 'brought into' STM.

3. Processing in STM takes place in a strategic way. That is, information is not always systematically and fully analyzed for each information level (textual or contextual), but also incomplete or vague information from various levels and various sources (from the context of input, from the input or from episodic and semantic memory) may be combined into plausible but effective hypotheses about the structure, meaning and functions of the information input. That is, whereas in abstract characterizations of events, actions, discourses, situations or persons, we may formulate a number of general rules, conventions or principles, processing in STM may make use of such procedures in a much more flexible way, which may mean that original hypotheses might be 'corrected' when more information becomes available. Thus, on first analysis we may interpret certain actions of a person as 'selfish', but further information may change this evaluation.

4. We will further assume that information processing in general and social information processing in particular has a functional bias. That is, all information will consciously or unconsciously be processed from the point of view of its direct or indirect functions, both cognitive and social, for the system. Often these may be goals, which represent the wanted results or consequences of the perceived events, actions, discourses or situations. Thus, we may read a text mainly to acquire information about a topic, or --
Furthermore, to summarize the text to somebody else or to use the information of the text to solve a problem. Similarly, we may interpret an ongoing action of a co-participant in a situation in order to provide necessary information to our own planning of next actions. We assume that conscious (and maybe also unconscious) functions of processing are represented in the control memory store which supervises the whole operation.

5. Finally, we will assume that information processing is not merely a 'passive' or 'analytic' process. On the contrary, basic structural analyses the process involves much more 'active' or 'synthetic' or 'reconstructive' aspects. The interpretation strategies mentioned above are not only 'bottom up' but also 'top down'. That is, incoming information may also be 'matched' with already generated expectations, schemata or higher level information about the plausible further or overall structure of the input. The informations for these top down processes are derived from LTM: in the action schema labelled 'cashing a check' we have expectations about what will probably happen after the moment that a person enters a bank and approaches the counter. We have similar top down controlled processes in the evaluation of persons and groups.

4.2. Processing events and actions in situations

Against the background of the cognitive model briefly, and hence sketehily, summarized above, we will now give some specifications of processing of more relevant social information. In the next section we will do this for discourse, since discourses are the empirical data we use to study underlying ethnic attitudes. Our model for the processing of other social information, such as events and actions (and of persons and groups below) will be formulated in analogy to the discourse processing model, about which we happen to know much more in cognitive psychology than about the understanding of actions and events.

We discuss actions and events here first because discourse and especially conversation is taken as a specific kind of social interaction, and second because person and group understanding always takes place in ongoing actions and events, even if the understander is merely an 'observer' and not an active participant in the action or event.

Theoretically speaking, actions are a specific kind of events: changes in some possible world. Such changes are analyzed in STM into discrete units against the background of a situation, involving a basic 'state of affairs'. Segments of processes in the observed state of affairs, marked by initial and final states, may be matched with the information in the 'event lexicon' in semantic memory. Thus, a change of state involving the downward, uncontrolled movement of objects may be assigned the 'event meaning' of 'falling'. Next, such interpreted events may be grouped into event sequences according to a number of coherence principles. Thus, for events we have the principle of conditional connection, linking events causally or probabilistically, which allows us to distinguish between causing events and consequences. Another coherence principle is that of higher level, macrointerpretation: a sequence of events may be interpreted as a whole, as one 'global' event: a causally connected series of events may be interpreted as an 'accident' at such a higher level. Thus, actual situation may be monitored for relevant events, that is events that are not fully stereotypical or expected, but which are now relevant to the interests, goals or other cognitive controls of the observers. We say that 'attention is payed' to an event if it is analyzed in STM according to the few principles given above; processes are analyzed into discrete meaningful chunks, involving initial and final states (results, consequences), and these chunks are linearly connected by conditional links and hierarchically reconstructed as higher order events. As soon as the event sequence is too complex, part of the event representation will be stored in episodic memory.
From this brief characterization of event processing, we see that it presupposes an analysis of the situation, in this case of initial and final states. Although situations will ultimately always be novel in the strict sense, this novelty need not always be relevant: for all practical --and hence cognitive-- purposes the situation involving our house, our street, our office, our town, may be 'the same'. This means that we will have build up more or less permanent situation models in episodic memory. Such situation models will feature a number of objects, properties of these objects, and relationships (e.g. location, distance, etc.) between these objects. Besides these more concrete situation models, we will also have, in semantic memory, more general situation schemata. Not only we know what our street looks like, but also we have a general schema of what streets, or buildings, or trees, or landscapes in general look like, so that we can handle new information which fits such a (flexible) schema. Thus, a 'street' schema may involve concepts such as 'horizontal', 'outside', 'pavement', 'houses' and 'length' in a specific configuration. Whether this information is stored in conceptual networks, in propositions or in pictorial/analogue way is not relevant here.

Events, as we assumed above, are taken to be specific changes in such situations. That is, some objects will be added to, or deleted from the situation, they may change properties (colour, temperature, form) or mutual relations, such as distance, contact, etc. Strategies will operate to analyse information from known situation models, from situation schemata, and partial input, in order to establish a coherent sequence of event representations in memory.

The interpretation of actions is in many respects similar. They are also changes in some situation, only these changes involve persons, that is conscious human beings with control over their activities/behavior, having cognitively represented motivations (wishes, desires, wants, preferences) being capable of representing goals, viz. as purposes of actions, and having representations of doings ('behaviour') in the form of intentions to realize, by a doing, a represented goal. Persons have, both as observers and as active participants, such a naive knowledge of action, that is an implicit theory. Under specific circumstances, thus, ongoing observed behavior may be analysed in STM as discrete meaningful units, viz. actions. Depending on the culturally variable stock of world knowledge, behavior chunks will thus be coupled with 'underlying' mental representations, viz. purposes and intentions, which together with the observed doings (meaningful chunks of observed behavior), define an action. The processes involved are usually studied, but hardly analysed cognitively, under the technical term of 'attribution'. That is, given some doing in some action context, an observer will 'assign' intentions and purposes to some person. In addition, the observer will assume that an action is carried out to realize some goal, that a person wants to realize that goal --as a consequence of the action-- and that such wants may be part of more permanent wants, wishes or preferences of the agent. We will see below that these assignments are part of a more general, context-free, interpretation of persons.

The further processing of actions is similar to that of events. The difference is that the bodily events we analyse as 'doings' are linked up with mental representations such as intentions and purposes. This means that the interpretation of action sequences should proceed accordingly: local and global coherence can be assigned only if the observer assumes that the sequence of doings 'express' a coherent sequence of intentions and purposes. For instance, it may be the case that some doing in interpreted as an action which has as its purpose to bring about another action. Thus, sequences not only have local goals of action, but also overall or final goals, to be brought about by a whole sequence of action. And as for events, therefore, we not only have 'basic actions' organized in sequences, but also higher level 'macro-actions'.


Eating in a restaurant, cashing a check, having breakfast and taking a vacation are such higher level actions, some consisting, at an intermediary level, only of some connected actions, others consisting of many (often also higher level) actions.

Persons not only have a naive general model of action which is applied to observations of incoming person behavior, but also they may have stereotypical action schemata for action sequences that are routinely performed in some situation. Eating in a restaurant, having breakfast, driving a car or cashing a check are such schemata, called ‘scripts’, in our culture. They represent in semantic memory the information necessary to understand complex event-action-situation information, to provide the possibility to infer information which is absent or implicit in the input, to organize the sequence of action representations in episodic memory and to derive higher order action concepts.

Notice that also here there should be made a distinction between episodic action models, representing composite experiences of some complex action (‘having dinner with Peter’), and the more general, abstract action schemata or scripts in semantic memory, used to understand, but also to participate in and to plan and execute, any action sequence of similar kind.

During strategic processing, in which these various kinds of information are flexibly and effectively integrated, an action representation is built up in episodic memory. When this information is needed, e.g. for storytelling, this action representation can be partly re-activated in STM, often automatically interspersed with information from previous action representations collected in the relevant situation model. Since the representation of complex actions, just as for discourses, as we will see in the next main section, has a hierarchical nature, with global actions high and detailed, basic actions, low in the ‘tree’, the retrieval of specific action memories will proceed from top to bottom. That is, the global actions, which have most structural links with other actions, will be easiest to retrieve. In order words, we will in general recall only the macro-actions of some action sequence, and only those details which are relevant for other reasons -- e.g. because they were processed more specifically according to information in Control memory, or because other structural links are established with relevant evaluations activated from underlying opinions and attitudes.

We have gone into the cognitive processing of events and actions, not only because discourses such as conversations are understood in a similar way, and not only because we understand persons and groups in relation to actions in situations, but also because the conversations about ethnic minorities will often contain stories which express memories of actions in which members of ethnic minorities are involved. With a general model of action understanding, representation and retrieval, we then know what additional principles must be involved when actual stories feature action memories which would not normally be recalled. In more concrete terms: we may remember actions of members of ethnic minority groups which we would not have recalled when performed by members of the ingroup. That is, the relevance structure in interpretation and recall may be different. Also, observed behavior of ethnic minorities may not be fully interpretable because the observer does not have the (perhaps culturally different) action models, schemata or scripts on the basis of which the specific actions were performed. As soon as these models or schemata are lacking, doings are seen as ‘strange’, ‘weird’, ‘irrational’, etc. We will see below in more detail how opinions, attitudes and especially norms are involved in this very interpretation and of course in the evaluation of action.

What has been summarized above for actions and action sequence also holds for interaction in which observers participate as agents. The system in that case operates in reverse in the production of action. Important in this case is again the role of representations of global actions. Intentions of such global actions -- consisting of a sequence of connected lower level actions -- are called ‘plans’. Such
plans organize and control the actual production of the component actions. With the general plan 'I am taking the train' I can derive, by means of general script and episodic models of previous train trips, specific local actions -- and their internal structure, mutual coherence links, and goals, such as 'going to the station', 'buying a ticket', 'going to the platform', 'getting into the train', etc. In interaction, this complex process of decision making, goal-setting and planning, will be taking place under the strategically used information about the ongoing global interaction and the previous actions of the other participant. That is, my action must be locally and globally coherent with the actions of myself and the other participant. In case the goals of the participants are the same or similar, the action sequence will be a kind of 'cooperation', but often goals may be different and in that case, as we have specified earlier, the decision making process will be more complex, involving weighing of importance of own wants, preferences and goals compared to those of the other. The precise steps of the cognitive processes and strategies involved here cannot be spelled out; the full explication of all information involved in a simple conversation would cover many many pages. The upshot however is clear; the information processing system, both for the understanding and the planning of actions and interactions will have to deal with vast amounts of information about actions, action schemata, persons, situations, and so on. This is possible within a few seconds only if we have powerful strategies of information processing, higher level units and macro-rules, an effective content in Control Memory, an extensive organization of knowledge in LTM, powerful retrieval operations, and other principles to facilitate operations, reduce complexity, organize information and build or retrieve representations in episodic and semantic memory.

Another major conclusion from this brief summary of a cognitive model for situation, event and action understanding, is that the strategies for information reduction are operative in the understanding of persons and groups and their actions. Stereotyping is one of the traditional concepts we use to denote some of the strategies and representations used to handle highly complex social information.

4.3. Person and Group Memory

A next important step in a cognitive model of ethnic prejudice is an adequate model of persons and groups. In a very general sense, the memory representation and the actual use of information about people is not very much different from that of objects such as cars, houses or universities. Yet, person information is crucial in all social information processing, and the information about ourselves as persons, as members of groups, and of others is central to nearly all our activities and hence to nearly all information processing. Hence, a more specific model of person and group representation, as part of a more general model of social cognition, seems warranted.

A first property of person representations, as we suggested earlier, is that they come about and are used in action and interaction -- including the action of observing people. We simply cannot understand or plan actions without understanding persons. As we have done above for events and actions, this knowledge about people may take various forms in memory. First, we have, in semantic memory, a very general and abstract model of 'human beings and of (active) persons, that is a naive theory of the basic properties of people, involving normal size, form, colour, weight, components, and possible variations of these. Besides these physiological/biological features -- of which some are criterial and other variable or non-essential (such as having hair) -- we have information about their 'internal' or 'mental' properties, derived from self-observation (intuitions), communications about internal states from others, formal education, and the need to understand external behavior in terms of internal 'conditions'. It is at this point where our general information is stored about what people can do, what relations there are among people, where people typically are, and so on. Of course this general
Information is highly complex, and therefore needs organization. This organization, again, must be schematical. Thus we have partial schemata for possible appearances, on the one hand, and other schemata for possible internal organization, on the other hand. Important from a cognitive point of view are especially the schemata linking the relatively external or internal properties of people to what they do. This is crucial in the planning of our own actions and in the understanding of other actions. Since complex information processing about action sequences and situations needs top-down processing, we for instance must know what to expect, so that we can preplan our own understanding and (re-)actions. These expectations may of course be based on previous experiences of actions, but that may not do for interactions of a different kind and with people we do not know. Hence, knowledge about general relationships between internal structures, such as wishes, desires, wants, preferences, purposes, plans etc. and the actions of others (and ourselves) will yield the framework for such interpretative strategies of expectation-driven understanding. But we need strategies to interpret and represent not only what people can and will do in general, but also more specific types of actions. This means that we will also elaborate various kinds of typologies or categories, again both on external grounds and internal grounds: we differentiate between old and young, male and female, and ethnically different persons. Similarly, we distinguish between different relationships between assumed permanent internal properties and observed actions, that is we distinguish personality types (generous, egotistic, dynamic, passive, dominant, or sensual persons). These personality representations, thus, are flexible interpretation schemata in which a number of mental properties of a relatively stable kind are linked with typical action types. The schema is important because it provides us with a relatively powerful way to deal with complex person information in a context-free way: in most situations a person with personality schema A will choose from possible actions in a way B. And conversely, actions observed may be attributed to the overall-personality schema, such that the conditional (causal) link between the assigned schema and the perceived action counts as a way to understand the action. And more specifically: if an action is interpreted as a particular instance of an action type, then the actual agent may be taken as an instance of a specific person schema.

Besides these more general person or personality schemata in semantic memory, we also have other person representations. First, we have episodic person representations, that is concrete representations in episodic memory of people we know through previous observation and interaction. These episodic models of people may also be constructed through indirect forms of information, such as communication (discourses, pictures) about these people. Although the episodic model is about one person it still has a more or less context-free nature: it is a construction built up from concrete experiences, which may continually update the model. Thus, when we interact with a person we know, we not only understand the actions in the light of a more general, abstract person and personality schema, but also on the basis of the episodic model we have of that person. We will hence understand the more specific actions as typical for that person, which means that the actual action is instantiation of the action type which is part of the model and constructed on the basis of previous actions. In this case, understanding is more complete because particular events in the partial biography of a person we know may be taken as causes or reasons for actual actions.

Finally, we have actual person representations in each context, that is a representation of a known or unknown person as he or she appears in current interaction: what the person now looks like (e.g., pale, red), how she is supposed to feel (angry, happy), and what kind of motivations and plans the person has for the ongoing interaction. Obviously we can only construct such a person representation in STM when we have more general information about persons (in semantic memory) as discussed above and, in case of persons we know, about this person a model in episodic memory. For people we do not know, therefore, the interpretation of behavior is necessarily schema-like, whereas for people we do know the interpretation may involve biographical antecedents and in-
dividual person specifics, e.g. confirmed hypotheses about the personality of the person.

The cognitive information processing about groups, to which we will return in more detail below when we study the attitudes about ethnic groups, follows the principles outlined above for persons. Again, we find categorization and schematization of complex information input. Thus, we not only have person and personality schemata, but also group schemata.

This means, first of all, that a relevant categorization dimension is established. We have seen that in social cognition the major principles of organization should be viewed in the light of possible interactions. Hence, these dimensions will be first of all social. That is, we will rather group people on the basis of social functions, positions, status, gender, age, power, or religion than on the basis of characteristics such as red hair, lefthandedness, or size. Of course these bio-physical criteria may also be used for occasional grouping — and hence stereotyping — but their social implications will be less powerful. On the other hand, as soon as social characteristics can be paired with these directly observable bio-physical characteristics, categorization will be optimal, because the strategies using all kinds of information input have a much wider range. This may imply that for instance sex differences and ethnic differences have such a powerful influence on social information processing: the association of specific appearance with (attributed) relative permanent social positions will allow us to fast processing of actions if both sex or ethnicity and social positions are assumed to be connected with typical action schemata, personality schemata, and hence, for a concrete action, with typical underlying motivations. The strategies of person interpretation in that case use so to speak information from two levels, social and bio-physical, at the same time. And since the bio-physical information may be practically permanent, this allows for a powerful additional dimension of categorization as is the case for age, sex and ethnicity.

If we assume that information about groups is schematically organized, we should be able to specify which conceptual categories are normal parts of such schemata, as well as make explicit the overall organization of such socially relevant schemata. The empirical evidence for these content and organization aspects of group schemata may be assessed by investigating a number of actions, both in the laboratory and in real life situations, which presuppose these schemata. Among the various methods available, we will below analyse the protocols of more or less free interviews about Surinamese, Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands. Theoretically, though, it will be assumed that in each group schema the following categories are typically (and therefore often stereotypically) represented:

a. Location/provenance: many groups are characterized first of all on the basis of information regarding their country or region of origin as well as their actual location (in country or town); the indication may be very vague, such as 'foreigners'.

b. Bio-physical appearance: we discussed above that information about prototypical appearance or other permanent features, such as sex, ethnicity or age, will often be used to identify members of groups.

c. Class/caste: next, groups will be assigned to a specific social level typical for the group as a whole; this information may also be rather vague, such as 'low' or 'high', and may be associated with assignments to a scale of status.

d. Social position/role/occupation: more specifically the group may be assigned to typical positions, roles or occupation (including profession).

e. Actions: next, groups may be associated with a series of (stereo-)typical actions or interactions, often associated in turn with the role of profession.

f. Cognitive structures: these actions are themselves, as we have seen above, typically associated with a number of stereotypical cognitive interpretations about the motivations (wants, preferences, and goals) of the group members, and typical personality characteristics.

g. Inter-group relationships: finally each group is also characterized for its relationships to other groups, and especially with the
own group of the person having a group schema. These relationships will first of all specify for the other categories mentioned above the 'difference' with respect to the own group, as well as social, cultural or economic relations such as dominance, power, influence, etc.

The hierarchical relationships between these categories may be variable for each group, but the general procedure is that lower order categories will often be 'inferred' from the higher level ones: people from country X typically have appearance Y, and will often belong to class/caste Z, have an occupation P, etc.

The cognitive role of a group schema in obvious: when dealing, in observation or interaction, with a member of a group, identified by one of the higher level categories, we will by way of fast strategy assign, as a whole, the other properties of the group to the group member, viz. by a process of instantiation. In principle each interpretation will follow the expectations associated with the prototypical member of the group as defined by the schema, but of course further information from the content allows a flexible application of the categories, providing for the possibility that there are 'exceptions' on some of the categories. Thus, whatever the precise biophysical appearance, if a member is classified as belonging to an ethnic category, all other typical categories of the ethnic group schema will be activated and generate corresponding expectations. It follows that although on most dimensions differences with other groups and with the own group may be gradual, the application of a group schema will lead to the application of a 'maximum difference' strategy. This kind of stereotyping therefore involves (i) reduction of input information (ii) matching with a pre-formed group schema (iii) neglect of incoherent information about a group member (iv) hierarchical inferences from higher to lower categories in the schema (v) the identification of a person representation in episodic memory with a prototypical 'person model' as it is instantiated from the group schema (vi) schema instantiation instead of model building based on accumulated personal experience.

4.4. Beliefs, opinions, attitudes

Information processing in general and social information processing in particular is always based on two kinds of data, viz. 'internal' and 'external' data. The first are activated from the memory of a person, the second are the data drawn from the observation, interpretation and representation of situations, actions, events, persons, groups and objects, in such a way that the internal data influence the processing of the external data. We have seen that the understanding of events and actions, and the persons or groups involved in them, is determined by the pre-established knowledge we have about such events, actions, persons and groups. Besides the knowledge acquired from previous experiences, organized into episodic 'models', this knowledge may take a more general, abstract, stereotypical or prototypical schema-like form, organized in semantic memory and systematically related with other schemata.

Besides knowledge however there are other types of cognitive information which play a role in information processing. This is particularly the case in the understanding of social information. Not only do we have knowledge, but also beliefs, opinions and attitudes about events, actions, persons and groups. In the earlier literature about these concepts no systematic and explicit distinction was made between these various cognitive types of information. Before we go to social attitudes such as ethnic prejudices, we therefore briefly will have to summarize some of these more specific characteristics of the structures and functions of beliefs, opinions and attitudes.

Beliefs, first of all, will simply be taken as personal knowledge. The difference with knowledge is that -- according to the person him-/her-self or according to others -- beliefs do not meet a number of socially established (and hence culturally variable) verification criteria. This means that what we would call beliefs in our culture, now, may well be interpreted as knowledge in another culture or in a different period of our own culture. In other words, knowledge is
belief that has been accepted to be 'true' by a group or culture according to the actually prevailing criteria of factual evidence --e.g. scientific evidence in our culture-- or (i) direct observation and (ii) information from reliable sources in everyday life. In fact, we therefore should distinguish between two kinds of beliefs: the beliefs which for some person cannot be distinguished from knowledge, and the beliefs which also for the person are taken to be 'assumptions' about reality, which however need further justification or verification. Note that in everyday usage knowledge if assigned to a person (e.g. in sentences such as 'She knows that...') presupposes that the speaker shares the belief of the other person that the information is true, whereas the use of the predicate 'to believe' does not have this presupposition, or may even presuppose that the speaker believes that the information of the other person is not true. Beliefs, taken as personal, unverified knowledge --and hence knowledge as socially accepted belief-- will characteristically be about states of affairs, events, objects or persons and their properties or relations, about which insufficient information is available ('I believe that John is ill'), or (ii) about which such information cannot or need not be acquired according to the usual verification criteria ('I believe that God exists').

Just as for knowledge we will further distinguish between particular and general beliefs: particular beliefs are about a particular individual state of affairs, event, object or person and/or about a particular property, whereas general beliefs are more generic, viz. about classes of individuals or about inherent properties and relations.

Opinions. We take opinions to be evaluative beliefs, that is beliefs involving an evaluative predicate, which in sentence surface structure may be expressed by verbs, adjectives or adverbs but also by identifying noun phrases. An evaluative predicate is based on a system of values, which are not categorical but scalar, and organized along several dimensions. Whereas beliefs involve predicates

and denote states of affairs that in principle can be verified or for which verification criteria should be applied, opinions involve predicates which do not have to be socially verified but presuppose the personally variable categorization of individual states, events, objects or persons. This does not mean that evaluations need not be justified: if we say that somebody is 'kind', we also will have to specify why this is the case, so that the evaluation becomes the conclusion of an (often implicit) argument holding for a particular person. Whereas knowledge and beliefs contain information that are assumed or accepted to be true relative to some possible world, opinions always presuppose a relation between such a possible world and a 'subject', i.e. the evaluating person.

Opinions, like beliefs in general, may be particular and general. I may find John kind now, or I may find that many men are sexist in general. According to our cognitive model, this means that particular opinions are processed in STM on the basis of external data and represented in episodic memory as part of a situation, event or person representation, whereas general opinions are either part of a more context independent model of accumulated experiences or part of semantic memory schemata. Also, particular opinions may simply be instantiations of general opinions, more or less irrespective of the input data.

Note that what we call opinions has often also been called an attitude. However, we will make an important distinction between opinions and attitudes.

Attitudes are more complex cognitive units. Whereas knowledge, beliefs and opinions can be represented as isolated propositions, attitudes are complex configurations of propositions. Next, we will assume that attitudes are typically part of semantic memory, that is, they are composed of general information, e.g. various schemata.
Typically, an attitude consists of an organized collection of general opinions. Furthermore, these opinions hold for a specific central 'object', the attitude object, which may be an object, person, group or (general) actions or events. Although theoretically speaking we may acquire attitudes for any object, this is not necessary and not even functional from a cognitive and social point of view.

High level cognitive organization in semantic memory presupposes that the information, in this case the general opinions organized in an attitude, are frequently called upon in processing of information. It follows that attitudes are particularly relevant in processing social information necessary in everyday observation and interaction. Thus if we are regularly confronted with an object, either directly by interaction or through information, and if such an object needs evaluation, there will be developing general opinions about such an object, and if there are several of these it is imperative that these be further organized, viz. in attitudes. In the same way as complex knowledge about objects can be organized in frames or scripts, complex evaluations of objects are organized in attitudes. And the same holds for the various cognitive functions of attitudes. If in STM some external object is identified as an instance of an attitude object, we not only are able to instantiate one general opinion --relevant in the situation-- but at the same time we have fast access to other opinions about the object, so that we can derive expectations about our proper opinions even if the external data do not provide us information as input for these other opinions.

Attitudes may be built up according to several general principles. One principle is that of hierarchy. That is, some general opinions may be more general (include) others. Thus, if prejudiced people say about that its members are 'aggressive', 'criminal' and 'querulous', the higher level evaluative predicate dominating such propositions would e.g. be 'bad', whereas the predicate 'criminal' may in turn dominate such predicates as 'carry knives', 'deal in hard drugs', etc.

A second organization principles is that of relevance or prominence. Thus, it may be that an opinion which is relatively low in the hierarchy is nevertheless more important for the attitude person, e.g. because that opinion is often necessary to handle everyday information about a person or event.

Third, organization may take place according to various perspectives or points of view. Thus, we may distinguish between opinions about the internal or external properties of persons, about different kinds of actions, or situations in which we deal with such attitude objects. Thus, for specific types of actions or situations we may have a number of negative evaluations which for other actions or situations are neutral or positive. These different perspectives allow for apparently inconsistent opinions about the same attitude object, an inconsistency which disappears if we take into account the relevant perspective. Hence, perspective is an organization principle which responds to the variable uses of the attitude in different situations and which allows strategic retrieval of the relevant opinions.

Although attitudes are typically organizational principles for opinions, we will further assume that they also include the relevant knowledge and beliefs about the attitude object. This is important because when we handle information about an attitude object, we not only will activate opinions but also what we know or believe about the attitude object. This makes the attitude notion even more powerful, because it becomes a higher level organizational principle for different kinds of cognitive information in semantic memory. As soon as we need information about some attitude object we then will have easy access both to what is generally known or what I believe but also to what I 'find' about the attitude object. In fact, this means that for instance a negative evaluation of an object is activated before the factual information, and this factual information may be processed under the higher level (or more relevant) scope of the evaluative predicate.
Although it was argued that attitudes may theoretically be formed about any object, the assumptions we have made above suggest that it makes sense to develop attitudes especially for those objects which occupy an important position in our daily information processing, both in understanding and in evaluation. Thus, it will seldom be the case that people have attitudes about cups, walls, trees, or kidneys. Even if these form or are part of knowledge schemata such as frames or scripts, we need not regularly process opinions about these, nor do we have to program our interaction relative to them. Hence, we will assume that in general attitudes will be about social objects, such as persons, groups, social structures, political events or 'issues' (such as 'abortion' and 'nuclear energy'). Since attitudes consist of opinion schemata, since opinions are evaluative beliefs, and since evaluations are the cognitive representations of our 'affective' relations to objects, it goes without saying that especially social objects will give rise to attitudes. About social objects we regularly provide various opinions, and about social objects we form plans which presuppose wants, preferences and goals, because these in turn presuppose what is 'best' to do in a situation. And also, not any social object will be forming the basis for an attitude, but only those about which we have complex sequences of knowledge, beliefs and opinions, that is those objects which play a role in the overall realization of our own goals. In other words, attitudes will be about social objects which are relatively context free, that is rather about groups than about individual persons, rather about general issues than individual events, rather about states of affairs, events or actions which permanently favour or threaten our basic goals. And finally, just like general knowledge, attitudes are social because they are typically shared by others, that is by members of a group. That is, although opinions are personal evaluative beliefs, their 'general' character requires permanent 'validation' or 'justification' relative to similar opinions of others. Social interaction not only presupposes individual motivations and plans, but also more general motivations and goals, viz., those of a group, so that people can coordinate their actions, easily understand the actions of the members of the same group, and permanently 'normalize' the evaluations of actions of others with respect to similar evaluations of members of the same group. Thus, I need not organize my opinions about my neighbour into an attitude system, but it may be relevant for a whole class of interactions and evaluations to have an attitude about 'higher education' or 'Amsterdam' or 'foreigners' or 'art'. If we use the term 'social attitude' this is to single out an important class of attitudes, but it may well be that the terms are synonymous. We will allow however for the possibility that e.g. a stamp collector has attitudes about stamps, that is a complex set of beliefs and opinions which organize much of his or her cognitions and interactions. But even in that case 'stamps' are not merely objects, but may become 'social objects' of some kind, involved in buying and selling, values, status, etc.

Attitudes are complex organizations in semantic memory, involving many general beliefs and opinions, and functioning in many cognitive tasks, such as understanding and planning discourse and interaction. This means that they must be relatively stable. A particular opinion can easily be changed due to specific situational information, but this is already much more difficult for a general opinion, which is either based on many episodic experiences or inferred from other general opinions. Hence, the overall organization is so complex that fundamental change in it would involve a change in many opinions, and would require complete re-evaluation of a sequence of properties of some object. This is possible only in case incoming information is such that it no longer can be strategically matched with information in the attitude, or if actions that are planned and executed according to information in the attitude repeatedly fail or receive negative evaluations of others, especially other members of the same group.
4.5. Prejudice

We have seen earlier in this paper that prejudice is a social attitude, especially about (other) people of (other) groups, a social attitude that is negative and which according to those who use the term is evaluated negatively according to higher level norms and values. We are now able to explicate this informal characterization in terms of our cognitive model.

We will, by stipulation, limit the meaning of the technical notion of prejudice to social attitudes about groups, and -- by instantiation -- to members of groups. We have seen that such an attitude involves general knowledge, beliefs and opinions about such a group, and that this information is organized around a group schema. Next, according to everyday usage, we will assume that prejudices are attitudes involving negative general opinions. However, this is not sufficient. We may well have one, rather unimportant negative opinion about a group but the attitude as a whole may be positive. In other words, only when the higher level, relevant opinions about a group are negative we call the attitude a prejudice. Next, a social attitude is a prejudice only if the negative opinions are not derived from episodic models, that is from repeated experiences, for many members of the group, but if they are formed by invalid inferences from unjustified general beliefs or from an occasional negative opinion. In that case the inference procedure so to speak is not from top to bottom but from bottom to top: if we see somebody belonging to group X carrying a knife, we will first generalize that all members of X carry a knife, and similarly the negative opinion about carrying a knife will be generalized to a negative opinion about this behavior by the group as a whole; next, knife carrying will in turn be abstracted from and generate the higher level predicate 'criminal' of which it is only a possible instance. And finally, this negative general opinion about the group will be related with other negative higher level opinions. We will call this process negative evaluation spreading. Each social attitude about a group that has been formed according to these principles will be called a prejudice. The evaluation of a single member or of actions of a single member on the basis of such a negative social attitude will in general also be negative, due to the strategic nature of information processing through schema instantiation.

Note that this brief characterization of a prejudice indeed involves normative aspects, viz. the fact that negative opinions should not be generalized from members to groups, should be based on experiences, should not spread from one 'area' of evaluation to another, and should be validly inferred on the basis of knowledge and not on the basis of unjustified beliefs. This means that the notion of prejudice is culturally variable, since also knowledge and beliefs and hence evaluations may be culturally variable. Also, what is permitted as a justified cognitive strategy for other (social or other) objects, is not permitted for groups, because of fundamental norms governing the interaction with other people. Thus, the establishment of a negative schema about some town, for instance, may be relevant in our decisions for action (e.g. not to visit this town anymore), but such a negative attitude need not affect the evaluation and the interaction with people; a 'matter of taste', even if unwarranted, is socially acceptable.

The normative nature of the notion of prejudice does not imply that it cannot be used descriptively. The normative nature resides in the fact that group prejudices are negatively evaluated relative to the higher level norms of a given group or culture. If the social scientist identifies with these norms, the relevant social attitudes will also be prejudices according to his/her own evaluation. There is no sound methodological reason why such a point of view should not be endorsed in the systematic study of prejudices. This is particularly the case for those prejudices which are held by large groups of people about minority groups in general and ethnic minority groups in particular, if it is further assumed that prejudices are important cognitive conditions, though neither sufficient nor necessary ones, for discrimi-
nation of groups and members of these groups. We here touch upon a well-known methodological (and moral) problem of the social sciences, which however we cannot go into here in full detail. In this respect our position should be clear: we do not share the opinion, e.g. endorsed in ethnomethodology, that our account of social beliefs and actions should be neutrally modelled after the account of the social members themselves.58 Certainly, understanding the ways social members interpret and organize their social reality may involve a deeper understanding of their motivations and reasons for beliefs and actions, but does not necessarily imply justification nor for that matter refraining from evaluation. If we study social norms and values, we should be aware, also as social scientists, that these may also direct our understanding and evaluation of social reality, in which we also participate through observational, descriptive and theoretical interaction. It is important though that we realize that for instance ethnic prejudice is not simply a property of some individual or some groups but a socio-cognitive property of a whole culture in which we also participate as social scientists. Similarly, we should realize that some people or groups are able and have reason to better conceal their prejudice than others. And thirdly, the everyday experiences of persons and groups may be such that ethnic prejudice is a cognitively and socially 'inevitable' --which does not mean 'excusable'-- consequence of structural factors or indirect influences of other social agents, such as governments, institutions, the media or education. It is also our opinion that the ultimate 'responsibility' will in general be attributable to these more powerful instances.

In the light of this, moral dimension of our methodological principles, we will however assume that a descriptive approach to ethnic prejudice is a necessary precondition for evaluative conclusions, even if our choice for the study of prejudice is originally motivated by our recognition of prejudice as a serious social problem. This descriptive approach, as such, will indeed involve a socio-cognitive reconstruction of the ways social members go about constructing their social reality. Not only their actions but especially also their discourse will in that case be seen as accounts of this interpretation, although we will see in the next main section that the analysis of these accounts does not allow a straightforward inference procedure about 'underlying prejudice'.

4.6. Norms, values, emotions and ideologies

Opinions and attitudes involve evaluations. But these evaluations can be assigned to persons, objects and actions only if the cognitive system finally provides fundamental 'measures' for them. These measures may be personal and social or will combine the personal and social. At the personal level we have, first of all, affective cognitions --emotions-- such as like and dislike, anger, happiness, hate, anxiety, jealousy or fear, which are linked with the basic goals --and their frustration-- of persons and the (im-)possibility to realize these through interaction. That social attitudes and in particular ethnic prejudices involve such affective emotions has long been noticed, and need not be explicated in detail here. Besides the usual psycho-analytical approaches, searching for sources of basic emotional patterns and 'dispositions' in early childhood, we may try to theorize about emotions rather in the framework of our information processing paradigm sketched above. In that perspective, emotions should first be seen as the necessary bridge between higher level information processing (thinking, acting, speaking) and 'lower' level information processing of bio-physiological systems, aiming at the realization of basic bodily needs or the possibility to act. They be able to carry out higher level instructions (of action). Thus, the higher level instructions that we may lose our job may result in an affective cognitive state ('fear') consisting in the realization that our basic wishes, needs, goals or other values states will no longer be realizable, coupled with a, bio-physically based, reaction 'to do something about it' so that the fundamental needs and goals can be maintained or restored. This 'emotional' system is so to speak a continuous and parallel control for the formation and execution of complex motivational structures.
such as wishes, wants, preferences, decisions, purposes and intentions. It has been shown that this 'affective' control is so important that it may even dominate other cognitive operations: emotionality based evaluations may sometimes be accessed even before the relevant knowledge and belief structures about information input. We will further ignore this specific emotional dimension of ethnic attitudes, but we will see that all opinions and attitudes of individual persons are 'fed' by this kind of affective cognitions, of which the precise structures and uses are still unknown.

Evaluations however will often have a social nature as well: they derive from fundamental values and norms, characterizing groups and cultures. The difference between these two large fundamental systems is merely that norms are values related to actions: they say for generic, societal actions, which are allowed, prohibited or prescribed. They are the cognitively represented but socially acquired and shared basic goals and principles of groups and group interaction, organizing social encounters, avoiding or resolving conflicts between members, and defining informal rules of successful social cooperation. We will see later that the norm 'we may not discriminate people' is one which is permanently activated and often even formulated in discourse about ethnic minorities. Instantiations from general norms provide the actual information input for decision processes involved in planning and executing social interactions, in such a way that personal goals must be permanently weighed against those specified by the norms.

Values have a more general nature. Not only they contain the 'action values' we call norms, but they regulate more in general our evaluation of any object, person, event, action or situation, relative to some, socially established, 'standard'. In the context of our discussion, thus, values may be highly abstract attitude organizing principles, such as 'tolerance', 'democracy', or 'patience'.

Norms and values are organized, just like all our cognitive systems. If not, we would not be able to access and use them effectively for permanent use in the formation of opinions and the preparation of action. Again, we may assume that they are hierarchically organized: some values and norms are more fundamental than others: the preservation of human life: say, is more fundamental than the observance of politeness. Similarly, they may be organized or accessed according to relevance, depending on the actual goals of persons and groups. Thus, it may well be that, in general, a person or group may subscribe to the norm that 'stealing is prohibited', but this norm may be superseded in many occasions, e.g., of social deprivation of the pursuance of more fundamental goals, such as self-preservation. In other words, despite their organization they also have a flexible nature: they can-- in their possible varying instantiation-- adapt to situations. On the whole, however, we assume that norms and values are the basic systems of social cognition, underlying more specific attitudes.

Ideologies, finally, will be taken as the overall organizing principle of social attitudes, norms and values within a certain perspective or orientation. They provide coherence to attitudes, norms and values, and permit the formation and transformation towards new attitudes, norms and values. Ideologies, thus, must be linked to the basics of social interaction, such as fundamental socio-economic conditions, group goals, interests and their preservation. In this respect, racism, in our terms, is an ideology--manifesting itself in complex systems of values and norms about ethnically different groups, and the resultant opinions, attitudes, and discourse or actions based on them. In other words, the ideology is the ultimate organizing principle of all our social behavior and cognition relative to the major domains of social life (work, health, living, group interaction, politics, and so on): This extremely simplistic definition of ideology will have to do for our theoretical discussion about the cognitive basis of prejudice.
5.1 The data

After a long discussion about the social context and cognitive aspects of prejudice, we will now try to specify some of the properties of ethnic prejudice as they characterize actual Dutch society. The data for the hypothetical construction of such prejudice models have been drawn, as we said before, from free interviews with people in Amsterdam, including persons who did and persons who did not have contacts with ethnic minorities.

For the specifics of these interviews and the theoretical and practical problems of inferring opinions and attitudes from discourse, we refer to the next main section. At this moment we will be interested only in possible contents and organizational principles of ethnic prejudice. That is, the examples we give are merely illustrative, and do not pretend to give a fully adequate picture of prejudice in the Netherlands.

Clearly, one important fact in the provisional data we can present here is that they are not systematically linked to different person 'types' or 'biographies', nor to different social groups, according to the usual social parameters such as sex, age, profession, income, status, power, interests, and so on. Yet, our interviews were held with approximately an equal number of men and women, with people of various ages between 18 and 79 (but predominantly with the people with ages of around 30 to 50 and the aged from 50 to 70), with people of various quarters of Amsterdam, and various income brackets and corresponding professions. But still, our point here is not adequate social sampling or the explication of social context, but the very contents and structures of prejudice.

What is relevant though is the assumption that, although prejudice as a social attitude in principle may characterize all social members, this will happen in different modes, and we will find, in the next main section, also different modes of expressing them in discourse. Depending on cogitat and organization --an well as use-- we therefore may well try to specify types or even prototypes of ethnic attitudes.

These will merely have a cognitive nature, and we do not even try to relate these with 'personality types', as has been usual in traditional prejudice research. We do not thereby deny relationships between prejudice types and 'personality', but prefer to assign more importance to social situation and context in the formation and 'acting out' of prejudice, whereby personal differences may still be accounted for by the 'personal situation' of individuals in socialization and their actual social context.

Another point to be stressed is that 'Dutch' prejudices are hardly specific. We will see that they conform to a more general pattern of prejudice about ethnically different outgroups and in particular with the kinds of prejudice which has been prevalent in our 'western' and 'capitalistic' culture and ideology as it is shared with many other countries. Only, the relevance structure of Dutch prejudice will eventually have been shaped by the current socio-cultural and economic context of the Netherlands as it has been described earlier in this paper.

Also we will limit our analysis to prejudices about only three target groups, viz. Moroccan and Turkish immigrant workers and Surinamese (and Antillian) immigrants. Often though these will be referred to simply as 'foreigners', and in that case also other groups, not always identifiable for our respondents, may be involved (such as earlier immigrants from other Mediterranean countries: Italy, Spain, Tunisia, and from Portugal or Yugoslavia, and finally the large group of earlier immigrated Indonesians). Also in this respect the attitudes will not always be specific for target groups, and some of them may have been re-instantiations of already existing attitudes about these earlier immigrants. Finally, we will even see that the negative attitudes, as is well-known, may be linked with non-foreign 'outgroups' such as squatters, young people (e.g. 'punks') or otherwise socially different or 'deviant' groups.
5.2 Ethnic opinions in free interviews. Of the fifty interviews collected in our preliminary research, we have analyzed 30 (19 men, 19 women) in more detail. The textual properties of this analysis, as well as the relations between discourse and underlying cognitions, will be further studied in the next main section. Here we are only interested in the "contents" of the opinions and attitudes expressed in these free interviews. We will also ignore the methodological and theoretical problem of reliability of the data thus collected: we just assume for the moment that our subjects are 'sincere' in the sense that if their discourses express an opinion they actually do 'have' this opinion, even if such an opinion holds only for the interview situation and need not necessarily surface in other contexts. Also the reverse holds of course: it may well be that our subjects have opinions which they do not express in the interview situation or which they may express in different ways.

We will start with a simple list (see Table 1) of the ethnically relevant opinions of the 30 interviewees. In this Table we also give an approximate indication of the frequency of occurrence for each opinion. This indication, indeed, must be approximate because the frequency counts of course depend on a scoring criterion for semantic content which needs further theoretical explication. In principle we have only counted the opinions which have been expressed explicitly, omitting opinions and attitudes which are implied or presupposed.

As we can see in Table 1, the opinions overlap at a certain number of points. Thus the (positive) opinion 'It is nice that there are foreigners' may overlap with the opinion 'I have nothing against foreigners' which has a more neutral nature. Also it should be stressed that many opinions are related to others. Thus, some (positive) opinions may be framed within a conditional ('OK that there are so many foreigners, if...'). This stresses the important fact that opinions are not isolated but part of more complex attitude schemes for ethnic groups -- as discussed in the previous sections. This 'coherence' will also show in discourse, e.g. by the use of conditionals such as if and but, or other coherence relations. This may imply, for instance, that a positive opinion can be embedded in a more overall negative (macro-)opinion. Methodologically this situation suggests again that a superficial 'content analysis' of interviews does not yield reliable data: each opinion should be assessed and analysed with respect to the set of other opinions just as each word, clause or sentence in a discourse should be studied relative to other parts of the discourse.

In order to better understand even this superficial list of opinions, some further background data are necessary about the interviewees:

Quarters. The interviews have been recorded in different quarters of Amsterdam. We have categorized these quarters into three classes: I. Contact quarters, II Semi-Contact quarters and III. No-contact quarters. In contact quarters there are high concentrations of ethnic minorities and there will be frequent everyday contacts between minority members and the autochthonous population, e.g. on the street, on the market, in shops and as neighbours. Type II quarters do have some ethnic minorities but only relatively few contacts with them will be correspondingly incidental. In the type III quarters there are practically no ethnic minority groups and most citizens in these areas do not have daily contacts with ethnic minority members, although of course they may have experiences 'on the job' or of occasional visits to others parts of town.

Age. Due to our sampling technique, based on casual encounters in public places (and sometimes visits to homes afterwards), we had to work mostly in the daytime, which of course produced some bias for elderly people and people not having a publicly accessible job (like shop-keepers). This led to the following representation in age groups:

Below 20: 2
20 - 29: 4
30 - 39: 6
40 - 49: 7
50 - 59: 0
60 and over: 11
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession/occupation</th>
<th>Approximate frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>housewives: 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shopkeepers, etc: 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bank-employees,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>office-servants: 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teachers: 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional technician</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hairdresser: 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marketvendor: 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>director: 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, this is not a fully representative sample of people from different professions, but we do have some representation of the major classes or occupations. One notable lack is the absence of blue-collar workers, though. In our further research we of course hope to reach a better representation of occupational groups. On the whole however, we are more interested in the qualitative data themselves and not so much in the relation with the varying social backgrounds.

1. They have to adapt to our Dutch norms
2. They are (too much) favoured/helped, e.g. in housing
3. We do not feel safe anymore/too much criminality on the streets
4. They have different lifestyles/habits/traditions
5. They think/thought that Holland is a social paradise
6. You have good ones and bad ones among them
7. Old good things in Amsterdam now disappear/the atmosphere in town has negatively changed, due to them
8. Other people do not like them/their presence
9. Their women are treated in a different way than our women
10. We let them come/we invited them to come and work for us; we have to accept the consequences
11. OK to have them as neighbours if they do not bother us
12. They have to go back
13. They have the same rights, e.g. on unemployment allowance
14. They do our dirty jobs/ I wouldn't want to do their job
15. I do not have contacts with them; I avoid them
16. I have nothing against them, if...
17. There are too many of them here
18. They have (too) many children
19. The town is pauperizing because of them
20. I don't care/I am not bothered by them
21. We should not generalize about them
22. They are aggressive/quarrelsome; they are provocative
23. They abuse our social securities
24. They live in dirty old houses
25. They bother me with their noise/dirt/food smells
26. I do not have any contacts with them (see also 15.)
27. They are involved in crime (drugs, breaking open cars, stealing)
28. They have a right to have/keep their own ideas/culture/identity
29. There are contact barriers, especially language, between us and them
30. Often they do not work
31. They work hard (especially Turks, Moroccans)
32. They have strange, unacceptable habits (e.g. slaughtering sheep)
33. If they do not (want to) work, they should go back
34. They are a cause of (our) unemployment
They should not form ghettos; they should be 'spread' to many live in one house/apartment
They are discriminated against
They are not more criminal than the Dutch
I only have positive experiences with them
It is nice to have foreigners around
They deserve to have a home. We will have serious conflict/war (due to their presence)
They neglect their children (e.g. because parents/mothers work)
They are more aggressive
They are lazy
Prefer our children not to have contacts with theirs
If they are nice/decent people, I do not mind our children to have contacts with theirs (see also 16.)
Criminality is everywhere
I am against discrimination/generalization: we should judge each person
They have doubtful occupations
They are more easy-going (than we)
There are differences among them (e.g. Surinamese)
I do not know how they live
They (Turks, Moroccans) have little education
I do not feel at ease with them
I do not want them in this neighbourhood
I do not want them as neighbours.

Table 2. Ethnic Opinions according to Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>Neg -3</th>
<th>Neg -2</th>
<th>Neg -1</th>
<th>Neg TOTAL</th>
<th>Neutr.</th>
<th>Pos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact areas</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-Contact areas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Ethnic Opinions in Men and Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENDER</th>
<th>Neg -3</th>
<th>Neg -2</th>
<th>Neg -1</th>
<th>Neg TOTAL</th>
<th>Neutr.</th>
<th>Pos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Ethnic Opinions of Age Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>Neg -3</th>
<th>Neg -2</th>
<th>Neg -1</th>
<th>Neg TOTAL</th>
<th>Neutr.</th>
<th>Pos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Ethnic Opinions according to Area, Gender and Age (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>Neutr./Pos.</th>
<th>Neutr./Pos.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pos</td>
<td>Neutr.</td>
<td>Pos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutr./Pos.</td>
<td>Neutr.</td>
<td>Pos</td>
<td>Pos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutr./Pos.</td>
<td>Neutr.</td>
<td>Pos</td>
<td>Pos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutr./Pos.</td>
<td>Neutr.</td>
<td>Pos</td>
<td>Pos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutr./Pos.</td>
<td>Neutr.</td>
<td>Pos</td>
<td>Pos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note to Tables:
Neg -3: highly negative
Neg -2: rather negative
Neg -1: somewhat negative

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5.3. Systematizing the ethnic opinions. If we inspect the list of ethnically relevant opinions given in Table I, we find that many of them are not just isolated opinions. Some opinions typically belong together, and will be expressed by one person, whereas, more abstractly, opinions may also be variants of each other. Before we try to find some more personally based coherence in opinions, thus defining several 'attitude styles', we first should try to group the opinions in more manageable opinion sets. This is of course a cross-classification: some opinions will belong to several of these sets.

Positive/Neutral/Negative. One obvious way to classify the opinions is to distinguish between the negative, the more or less neutral and the positive opinions. By neutral we mean those opinions which express some feeling of 'I do not care', 'I am not bothered', etc. By positive opinions, we denote those which favour positive actions and attitudes about foreigners. If we inspect Table I, we can provisionally classify them as follows, with accumulated frequencies:

A. Negative opinions: 165 (53.6%)
B. Neutral opinions: 123 (40.6%)
C. Positive opinions: 20 (6.4%)

We see that the majority of the opinions are negative, but that a large part is also neutral, and that only few opinions are explicitly positive. These percentages do not reflect percentages of interviewees, though. Only the total amounts of opinions expressed have been recorded here: people who have negative or neutral opinions express many more of those than those who have positive opinions about ethnic minority groups. The positive group also participates in the neutral opinions of course (such as 'I have nothing against them', 'They deserve a home', 'We have exploited them', etc.). In fact, some of the 'neutral' remarks could be interpreted as negative about the Dutch. We see that often people will express the fact that others discriminate against ethnic minorities.

Major themes/areas in negative opinions. If we consider the negative opinions first, that is those usually interpreted as being prejudices, we can group these in some larger classes or around several 'themes', e.g. as follows:

a. Negative cultural differences
   (e.g. in food, clothing, habits, lifestyle, etc.)

b. Adaptation
   (e.g. they have to adapt themselves to our country, lifestyles and norms, and not vice versa)

c. Crime and safety
   (e.g. we do not feel safe anymore; they are involved in crimes, they are aggressive, etc.)

d. Threat of social system
   (they abuse the social services; they take our jobs, etc.)

e. Negative atmosphere
   (old things have changed for the worse, the town is pauperizing, etc.)

f. General dislike
   (e.g. I feel uneasy, I do not like them here, they should go back, there are too many of them, etc.)

g. Separation
   (they should stay on their own, I avoid all contacts, I have nothing to do with them, they should mind their own business, do not want them as neighbours, etc.)

Similarly, the negative opinions could variously be classified according to the 'source', 'reason', 'cause' and in general the attribution of the negative opinions, e.g. as in:

(i) our own fault (we should not have let them come)
(ii) there are just too many of them (and this is due to the lax policy of the government)
(iii) they have negative personalities (lazy, criminal, dirty, loud, aggressive, etc.)
(iv) their (cultural) habits, lifestyle and behaviour does not fit into our country, and they do not adapt.

We shall see below that these various prejudices can further be organized in ethnic attitude schemata.
Major themes can also be organized according to the sections or areas of our daily life and experiences, such as living, work, leisure, shopping, etc. In that case, we observe that the majority of the negative opinions pertain to housing issues. One frequent negative opinion, in fact a complaint, is that the local authorities assign apartments to them before the original population gets them. Also, frequent allusion is made to the way they live in their houses and 'destroy' these -- 'keeping your house or apartment in order' being a powerful value. For both opinions, it seems, we may find an explanation in the serious housing shortage in the Netherlands and especially in Amsterdam. Also this sector of 'living' determines the many negative opinions about the presence of minorities in general in town: they pauperize, form ghetto's, make the town unsafe, etc. This 'living together' theme also affects opinions as the negative evaluation of different food habits and lifestyles. We will see below, though, that opinions may apparently be inconsistent at this point: on the one hand 'they' should adapt to Dutch norms, and on the other hand 'they' may well keep their own cultural habits. In fact, few opinions are expressed about the minorities in jobs, or on the job, i.e. about work or with them: they are generally seen as a cause of (more) unemployment, and some people think they do not work hard, are lazy, have irregular jobs, etc., whereas many interviewees agree that (the foreign workers) do our 'dirty jobs' for us.

Neutral/positive opinions. The neutral and positive opinions can similarly be grouped in the following major themes:

a. **Difference of lifestyle (non-evaluative)**
   - E.g. they dress and behave differently, etc.

b. **Relativity**
   - E.g. they are also people; there are differences among them; you have good and bad ones; they are not more criminal than we are, etc.

c. **Our behaviour towards them: acceptance**
   - E.g. we discriminate them, they do not like it here, we have exploited them; we have let them come; we should help them (e.g. with language lessons), we will have to accept them; I do not mind their presence;

d. **Rights**
   - E.g. They have the same rights, such as social security, housing facilities, unemployment allowances, etc.

It should be noted that many of the neutral and even of the positive opinions seem to have negative presuppositions: they seem like rejections of what other people might think, or what the interviewer might think about the interviewee, or of what is generally believed about minorities. Thus, if it is stressed that they are also people, that they are not more criminal than we are, that they have the same rights, and that we should accept them, this may often mean that we should do so by general norms. Indeed, many of these opinions have a generalized format, and are not given in the form of positive stories about positive experiences, as is the case (as arguments, see below) for the negative opinions in negative personal stories.

5.4 Towards a formulation of ethnic prejudice schemas.

The categorisation principles mentioned above provide only one way of approaching the organisation problem for ethnic opinions in cognition, and they do at least suggest the major themes, and their relative importance, in conversation. What we need though is some more complex 'picture' prejudiced Dutch people have about ethnic minorities, a kind of 'schema' which they use to organise their opinions and attitudes and with which their experiences might be evaluated. Above (p.51) we have given a provisional schema for group attitudes, and we may see whether such a group schema can accommodate the beliefs of people about ethnic minorities. The schema features such categories as origin, appearance, class/caste, personality, behavior and interaction, social roles and functions, and intergroup relations.
If we put these in a schema in such a way that for each group category we mention relevant knowledge and beliefs, and opinions based on values and norms, respectively, we should get the relevant attitude schema for ethnic minorities. At this level of abstraction we still do not differentiate between the different ethnic groups, also because the social participants themselves often do not differentiate on many categories: they just organize their cognitions for the overall group of 'foreigners'.

In Schema 1 we have listed some of the typical negative opinions held about foreigners (for more detail see Table 1 and the previous paragraphs). We have here simplified the various categories.

### Schema 1: A general (negative) group schema for foreigners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin/Background</th>
<th>Appearance</th>
<th>Social class/Profession</th>
<th>Inter-group relation/conflict/competition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty in own country</td>
<td>Look different</td>
<td>Poor, not educated</td>
<td>Like their own, we avoid them</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge/beliefs</th>
<th>Opinions/values</th>
<th>Opinions/norms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They expected too much</td>
<td>They should go back</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strange/unsuitable</td>
<td>Should not overdress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy, criminal, dirty</td>
<td>Should adapt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stupid, naive, dirty</td>
<td>Should not favor them too much</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see that the cells of this schema do indeed accept most of the general opinion clusters we have met above. For each group category we see that people have a number of beliefs, each associated with an evaluation on the basis of subjective values and a kind of 'conclusion' about what they or we should do, based on norms.

Another way to read this schema, as we suggested earlier, is from bottom to top in such a way that lower categories are seen as caused by or attributed to the higher ones: we have conflicts because they behave such and such, because they are such and such, and because they come from abroad in the first place.

Instead of a categorical schema as given above, we may also try to organize the negative opinions in a more hierarchical way, e.g. as in Schema 2 (here also the final predicates are only illustrative):

### Schema 2: Hierarchical organization of a general group schema for foreigners

![Diagram](image)

Of course, in this schema we could only summarize some of the final opinions organized according to the various hierarchical categories. Thus, cultural differences in action would further split out into different everyday actions, different religious actions, different eating habits, different ways of treating their women, whereas the 'dirty' category will be further specified as dirty houses, dirty streets, dirty neighborhood, etc., and crime can also be further specified. Note that opinions about 'crime' figure both in their own actions (e.g. 'they take drugs') and in the interactional category ('they deal in drugs', 'they are aggressive' to us), 'use knives' (against us), etc.

The schema's proposed above, however, seems to have little empirical validity. At most they would portray persons which on the whole are negative, on all points, about ethnic minorities. Most of our subjects, also the more prejudiced ones, have a more complex attitude schema. For instance, that schema would also feature some positive instances, albeit as 'exceptions' to the rule. Hence, what we need are more personal, variable, prejudice...
profiles, including both positive and negative general opinions, as well as more particular opinions. The latter may be derived from experiences. That is, when asked about ethnic minorities, subjects will typically address both their general attitudes, and opinions within these, as well as more concrete, episodically represented (in situation models) experiences and associated opinions. In fact, it makes sense to distinguish among subjects according to the amount of expressed opinions drawn from general opinions and attitudes (which need not be based on personal experiences) and the amount of opinions which are (sometimes over-)generalizations drawn from personal experiences, both direct (own experiences) or indirect (experiences of acquaintances communicated to them). Let us therefore examine, first, some typical subjects and their ethnic attitude profiles. In the next section, then, we will further examine which of these personal opinions are substantiated by argumentation and stories with personal experiences.

A first subject, C6, is a 60-year-old woman, living in a middle class, non-contact neighbourhood (Muidenveldert). Her opinions can be summarized as follows:

1. Not here, but downtown all is miserable.
2. We are not safe anymore in the streets.
3. This is due to all those foreigners.
4. You have to behave according to the habits of the country.
5. Perhaps not at home, but in public you have to adapt.
6. It used to be nicer in Amsterdam.
7. They are helped much more than 'we are.'
8. Already the Indonesians carried knives.
9. You read about all the crime in the newspaper: always a Turk or so.
10. For example: a gardener was killed by a Moroccan.
11. I do not believe that they (Moroccans) are underpaid.
12. There is a lot of unemployment. They should all go back.
13. We should only keep the good ones.
14. Every country has immigrants.
15. There are also good ones among them.
16. Holland is a social paradise, the social security system is absurd.
17. My daughter is not a friend of foreigners.
18. You have to look for people/friends of your own kind (religion, education).
19. On TV, a Dutch woman and a Turk, it did not work out.
20. My daughter is 'undressed by their looks' on the bus.
21. They have that habit with women.
22. Their woman (girls) are not allowed to go out without supervision.
23. They should adapt to our habits.
24. A Surinamese who works with my husband is fantastic.
25. But they (S.) also say that; some of them are no good.
26. They (Surinamese) come here to study.
27. Many Surinamese girls are nurses; they are sweet.
28. But it would be better if all would go back.
29. In this area there are some foreigners, but not much.
30. The foreigners here are like Dutch people.
31. My daughter's brother in law has been robbed.
32. Their homes (of Surinamese) have deteriorated.
33. You need a wheelchair to carry away the dirt.
34. He (daughter's brother in law) has to clean up and deliver clean.
35. They don't dare to say anything against coloured people.
36. Workers have to work in couples.
37. Because they have to keep an eye on their things.
38. It would be better if we would use all our (social security, etc.) money there (in Surinam).
39. We spend three times as much money for third world aid than Germany.

Note first that these opinions are merely general statements (expressing macropropositions, i.e. topics or themes, see next section) of this interview. In fact, some of them may be expressed in several sentences or even whole stories. The opinions of this woman are fairly characteristic. The list features the major themes of the ethnic attitudes expressed by the interviewees as a group. This woman lives in a middle class neighbourhood where very few people from Surinam live and practically no foreign workers from Turkey or Morocco: this part of Amsterdam is strictly white and is one of the new, post-war suburbs, in the south, with a lot of green. Although it is only a 20-minute bus-ride to the city, this part is clearly separated from the 'old town' and the inner city. The strict opposition between the situation in this part and the situation in the inner city as described by her. Typically her information comes from the newspaper, from family members or hearsay, not from personal experience. There are no complaints against (the middle class, predominantly white) foreigners in the same area: in fact, they are not even categorized as such.

When we have a closer look at the respective opinions, we first notice that they are not all explicitly negative, but also feature some neutral or (quasi-) positive attitudes. However, the neutral or positive opinions (like 'Surinamese working with my husband is fantastic') may be exceptions to the rule, or the expression of general norms ('you also have good ones among them'). The various general themes addressed (see above) are: SAFETY/CRIME, ADAPTATION, DETERIORATION OF THE TOWN, PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT, GOING BACK, ABUSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE.
These are indeed the major themes occupying the minds of many people in Amsterdam which have negative opinions about foreigners. In the case of this woman, however, some of the themes have more relevance. Thus, the CRIME theme occurs several times: safety on the streets, carrying knives and theft are discussed. For a woman, of her age, this relevance has been more often noticed for the perception of crime. Notice though that maybe Amsterdam, even the inner city, is safer than other larger cities in Europe or the USA. A second major theme is that of SEPARATION: there should be no contacts between her or her daughter and the foreigners, e.g., because of different habits in treating women, a sub-theme motivated by hearsay and TV-movies. And the third major theme is the combination of ABUSE of social service money and the conclusion that this money should rather be used in the (other) countries themselves. All major themes however are expressed in rather general terms: they seem to be opinions acquired by hearsay or by indirect evidence or personal interpretation of media discourse. Scarecrowning is primordial: the foreigners are accused of unemployment, the deterioration and crime in the inner city, and strained housing conditions. The general moral, as with most interviewees, is first of all that they should adapt and follow Dutch habits (though not necessarily at home: a sense of privacy and 'tolerance' often occurring), and if not—or if there is no work—they should rather go back. Characteristically, the negative opinions are not seen to be incoherent with the positive experiences told about the contacts of her husband with a Surinamese colleague on the job: in fact the only more or less direct contact of this family with a minority member. Indeed, we have often witnessed that people may have neutral or even positive opinions about minority members as neighbours or even friends, and yet formulate very negative general opinions. In terms of our cognitive model, this would mean that episodic situation models (e.g., established by TV and hearsay) are negatively generalized to overall opinions and attitudes, whereas the positive experiences are left at the purely episodic level. Or conversely, a general negative attitude about foreigners is instantiated during the conversation and 'backed up' with some stories about experiences of 'others'. These stories are like argumentative 'proofs' of the general opinions taken as conclusions. From these observations we may propose the following general conclusions about the nature of ethnic opinions. On the one hand, people may have general opinions which are part of a group schema. These opinions are stored in semantic memory. They may have been formed in two ways: either by (over-) generalization from personal experiences or by general inferences drawn from other general opinions (and without an experiential basis). On the other hand, we have opinions of a more concrete nature, based on evaluations about concrete experiences. These opinions are part of episodically represented situation models. These episodic evaluations may well be positive, that is, be assigned to individual members of the out-group in specific situations, and need not lead to general positive opinions. In other words, the formation of ethnic prejudice, taken as the formation of negative attitude schemata for (out-) groups, requires a selective process of 'social and cognitive learning' in which only negative information and evaluation is used for generalization and not positive information and evaluation, if experiences are used at all in opinion formation. These episodic negative evaluations, in that case, are seen as instantiations, and hence as confirmations of expectations, derived from the already established negative group schema. Cognitive dissonance does not arise because the apparently conflicting types of information are stored differently. Or, in terms of a theory of attribution, we would say: positively evaluated actions of ethnic minority groups are typically represented and explained in terms of the situational context (and hence remain part of the situation model), whereas negatively evaluated actions are seen as typical, that is as instantiations of general opinions about the ethnic minority group. In the latter case the action can be attributed to general or inherent properties ('dispositions') of the members of minority groups, such as laziness or criminal character. And conversely, negatively evaluated actions of (liked) members of the in-group will only be represented and explained in situational terms, whereas the positive actions are seen as instantiations of positive opinions.
of the (positive) group schema. This model holds for actions which indeed have been interpreted and represented as positive or negative. It may also be the case that we have selective opinion formation during processing itself. In that case, positive actions of out-groups are not even consciously processed as such, given the over-all, negative macro-opinion monitoring information input and understanding. Note, by the way, that this model not only holds for group perception and interaction, but also for person perception and interaction: the same will take place even for members of the in-group whom we dislike. In that case, the negative person schema will also lead to negative selective evaluation and situational *explication* of positive actions of such a person and instantiated *typicalness* for negative actions -- in which negative action is ascribed to 'bad character', that is to a general, context-free property of persons. Since the opinions expressed in an interview may be based either on situational models or on general attitudes, we may indeed find that they seem incoherent.

To compare the rather negative opinions of the interview just summarized, let us now take information from an interview which is (relatively speaking) much less negative. In this case, the interviewee is also female, 50 years old, and lives in a contact area (Bijlmer) with many Surinamese and (political) refugees e.g. from Chile. This neighbourhood is relatively new, consisting of large apartment houses. The opinions in this interview can be summarized as follows:

1. I have no contact with my foreign (Chilean) neighbours.
2. There are many foreigners here.
3. You cannot lump all Surinamese together.
4. There are also many decent ones.
5. They have large families.
6. Children sometimes bother me, because their mothers are working.
7. Well, that is there style of living.
8. I would not like it if I would have Turks or Moroccans as neighbours.
9. They have a different lifestyle, another language.
10. In fact, they do not feel at home here either.
11. I am not trying to establish contact.
12. I do not mind if my children have contacts with Surinamese children if these are from a decent family.
13. They may go out in the evening, as long as it is not serious.
14. They are so different they are more 'jumpy' and are 'courting'...

15. I have been hit by a Turk in the supermarket (whom I reproached to not wait for his turn).
16. The information via the media about the minorities is good.
17. Those people should be helped.
18. But, it would be better if they would stay in their own country.
19. We could give them financial help there.
20. They (Surinamese) do not like it here: too cold.
21. They are here because there is no work over there.
22. Suriname is a beautiful country, beautiful culture.
23. They have firm family ties.
24. Would not like to share a room in the hospital with Turkish and Moroccan women, but Surinamese women may be very decent.
25. Those (Turkish, etc.) women wear those funny shawls.
26. I do not feel at ease among all those black people.
27. They deal in drugs.
28. They live with many people in one apartment.
29. They wear the newest clothes.
30. My husband works, they are not working.
31. I would put all these guys to work.
32. They get money right away when they come; I would give them less money to start with.
33. To put them apart would be discrimination, but yet the Dutch should live with the Dutch and the foreigners with the foreigners.
34. Also (our) children at school are discriminated against.
35. It would be better if they had their own schools.

The opinions voiced more or less in this way have a different nature from those of the interview mentioned above. There are also negative statements, but these are most often based on everyday personal experiences in this neighbourhood (drugs, interaction in the supermarket, overcrowding of apartments, etc.). Yet, at the same time, a distinction is made between foreigners on the basis of 'decency': neighbourhood and friendship is possible to a limited degree if the people are decent. This applies especially to the groups which are known in the area: Surinamese. As soon as much less known groups are involved (Turks, Moroccans), the overall evaluation prevails: strange habits, strange language. The more or less neutral or even positive opinions -- though they often have negative presuppositions ('there are also many decent ones') presupposes that many others are not decent -- are again either based on personal experiences, or on general norms and values: they should be helped, that is their lifestyle, they don't like it here either, etc. The wish for separation and contact avoidance, which organizes much of the opinions of this woman, is given a well-known explanation in terms of 'false empathy': the others do not like it either. The negative opinions are not only the stereo-
typical ones (large families, overcrowding, drugs, 'jumpy' nature, they do not work, etc.), but also some based on competition and 'envy', such as wearing new clothes. This is also a typical opinion: poor people should not dress up. In the Dutch (calvinistic) context, over-display (by language, bodily, clothes, etc.) is negatively evaluated in general, and this general value takes a more specific form when modest or poor people are concerned.

We see that the major difference with the previous woman is that judgements in this case are, as can be expected in a contact neighbourhood, much more experiential, more diversified, more explanatory, and show at least some understanding/empathy. Only the general opinions, including the political recommendations, have a much more 'spartan' orientation.

It is this kind of (relatively) 'moderate' prejudice that seems rather typical or average for many Dutch people, especially in contact areas. On the whole their view is indeed negative, in the sense that they clearly prefer not to have foreigners around, and/or that the different ethnic groups keep their distance.

At a more concrete level of everyday experiences; however, the general form of 'distance' still exists (would not like if daughter has a foreigner as a close friend), but in much more mitigated form. Also, the negative opinions at that level directly come from (over-generalized or misinterpreted) personal experiences (drugs, aggression and tension, appearance, living conditions). The major force, however, seems to be not so much these occasional negative evaluations, but the more emotional general feeling of 'strangeness', due to language, clothes, other habits, other behaviour. We here seem to have one of the keys for understanding Dutch ethnic prejudice. It is not always or not predominantly racial or based on skin-colour, but rather on perceptions of differences in culture, language, manners, norms, etc. Foreigners are seen as a threat of the own norms and values, the own 'decent', and --of course-- as competitors in scarce resources. Mention of typical racial characteristics, such as skin colour or 'inherent properties', is rather rare.

Mention of typical racial characteristics, such as skin colour or 'inherent properties', is rather rare. Much more often we hear about 'strange' habits such as slaughtering sheep (by Turks, Moroccans) in the car or the shower, the ways of dressing by Turkish women, the way the others live in their apartments (experienced as 'dirty' or as 'ruining'). The foreigners, indeed, are a breach in a tidy, neat and 'decent' self-image of the Dutch and their neighbourhood or street, and violation of these values and norms is a basic force behind the formation of prejudice. In fact, those foreigners who do live like the Dutch, and who do adapt themselves, are hardly subject to such evaluations. Although not belonging to focused out-groups, a Japanese or Chinese would perhaps be met with similar distance occasionally. This suggests that the amount of foreigners, of a certain group without least initially (hence the non-topicality in our interviews of e.g. Indonesians/Maluccans), lead to negative opinions organised by the principle of perceived competition (jobs, housing, schools, money, social services).

In the latter kind of prejudice which of course will be more prevalent in periods of economic recession. At the emotional level both kinds of negative ethnic attitudes can be subsumed under the concept of perceived threat and resulting fear: on the one hand threat of our basic norms and values, on the other hand threat of our scarce resources (mainly housing and jobs).

In addition to the fragments of the cognitive model sketched above, we now further assume that as soon as an opinion is more basic, and closer, to those emotionally based, 'threats', the more negative, the more firm and fixed, it will be. On less fundamental points, then, the opinions may be much less negative or even positive, and much more depend on contextual and personal differences. Indeed, we find that even in the relatively neutral or positive interviews, some provisos will always be formulated as soon as the fundamental aspects are concerned: scarce resources. People may well accept ethnic plurality, but will be very reluctant to accept the fact that they might not get a house or a job 'due to' the presence of (many) foreigners. Nobody would ever say, for instance, that overcrowding in this small country is primarily 'due to' the Dutch and their large families (as compared to other, surrounding countries), or due to the catholics who forbid anti-conception or used to favour large families. Nor would anyone argue that at least as many Dutch people emigrated to other countries (e.g. Canada, USA or
Australia), and their return would also be a threat of scarce resources. Although of course, as we have argued before, a part of the ethnic prejudice, at least with some groups of people, is properly racial, the fact that linguistically and culturally more 'strange' people like Turks and Moroccans are evaluated sometimes more negatively than black-people from Suriname, seems to indicate that the larger part of Dutch prejudice may be based on ethnic/cultural differences (threat of norms, values) and socio-economic competition, rather than on purely racial differences. In other words, the average Dutch is rather ethnocentric than racist in the strict sense. Indeed, as nearly all interviews suggest, if 'they' would adapt then we would have less problems, and 'sending them back' is an (extreme) opinion which nearly always is related to this kind of ethnocentrism and to the protection of scarce resources (houses, jobs) rather than to keep Holland 'white'. It should be stressed that this is a generalization: pure racism does occur, and many forms of ethnocentrism do involve at least some racial opinions, but it does not seem predominant or characteristic.

Let us, finally, examine some opinions expressed in a more or less neutral or positive interview. The interviewee is a 28 year old man, social worker, living in a non-contact, middle-class area (Concertgebouwbuurt) at the border of the inner city, with many professional people, doctors, university teachers, artists, etc. Typical for this kind of interview is their meta-nature. These subjects talk about discrimination, about discrimination by others, about the conditions of foreigners, etc.

1. Also in this neighbourhood there are some foreigners, in pensions, but they keep t-street 'white'.
2. I don't care at all whether we have many foreigners here.
3. I would not object having them as neighbours.
4. In this area there are many large houses, with Hindustani families.
5. The number of other Surinamese, and Turks and Moroccans lower here.
6. The others do not like to have the foreigners because of different cultural background, eating habits, etc.
7. Their children should have the same freedom as ours. If they go back, adaptation to us does not seem sensible.
8. Their children should (get to) know their own culture.
9. Often the foreigners have large families: maybe that bothers the people here too.
10. But these people have to live too, haven't they?
11. We must help the foreigners and give them information about practical things (like how the heatings work here).
12. Their children should study to get to know their own culture.
13. Their children should have the same freedom as ours.
14. If they stay here, they should adapt themselves.
15. For instance, their children should have the same freedom as ours.
16. And have often have a subordinated role.
17. They are very hospitable.
18. Comprehensible that Surinamese want to live together (in Amsterdam).
19. Here we have all kinds of social service.
20. We have helped Suriname.
21. Ok, if they now come and get that back.
22. But perhaps we could use the money there for development.
23. That seems to me to be better for them: they can have their own culture.
24. No problem with the younger people.
25. Criminality is the same in all groups.
26. But usually people here just generalize: they see them as 'pickpockets and knife-drawers'.
27. People are scared by the media.

As we see there are hardly any intolerant opinions in this interview, and discrimination by others is condemned. Many of the usual negative opinions (of others) are discussed and criticized: overgeneralization, large families, crime attribution, etc. Yet, this man also thinks that it would be better for the foreigners if they could stay in their own country -- if we would use the money for the development of their country. Also, it is Dutch colonial history which is called responsible for the arrival of immigrants, and immigration is seen as getting back what was once robbed. Typical, both in positive and negative attitudes, is the negative evaluation of the cultural difference of the role of women: although compared to other countries -- Dutch women are still largely housewives and in that sense 'dependent', most Dutch people cannot accept the subordinate role of, e.g., Turkish women, and the lack of freedom of Turkish girls. We also see that the interviewee knows many of the 'same facts' about foreigners, but the generalizations made by others or negative conclusions are not made. Rather, negative actions are excused by circumstances, or actions (like immigration itself) negatively interpreted by others receive positive explanation. Note, finally, that this kind of liberal stance about foreigners is just about as rare as the extreme racist position (both have an estimated 5% at each extreme of the attitude spectrum).
5.5. Conclusions

In this section we have surveyed some of the ethnic attitudes of Dutch people about minorities, and as expressed in interview contexts. We first found that many people interviewed agreed on some 'standard' opinions, such as adaptation to Dutch norms, resentment about preferential treatment in housing, dislike for cultural differences (food, dress, behaviour), and attributed crime and general deterioration of the city. These opinions are expressed both by women and by men, in contact areas and in non-contact areas and by people of all ages. Yet, negative opinions in non-contact areas are sometimes less extreme and have a different nature: they are more 'abstract' and 'general' and less based on everyday experience. Also younger people tend to have less negative opinions. The negative opinions, both in absolute amount for all interviewees, and as distributed for each interviewee, predominate: 63% of the people have predominantly negative opinions (prejudices) and only 24% neutral or positive opinions. Yet, also prejudiced people may have several neutral or even positive opinions: 53.6% of the opinions are negative, and 46.4% of the opinions voiced are neutral, and 6.4% are positive.

Following the discussion in the previous major section, we have tried to formulate an ethnic prejudice schema, that is an out-group schema for foreigners, articulated on the basis of categories such as origin, appearance, character, behavior, social class and inter-group relations. For each of these 'group' categories the subject may have a number of knowledge and belief items, evaluative opinions and normative opinions. Such a schema is a stereotypical, generalized prejudice frame, which also allows hierarchical organization. In order to model more personal attitude schemas about ethnic groups, however, we took the data from three interviews, one very negative, one moderately negative and one positive. It was shown that the negative opinions are similar on many points, but have a different orientation. Highly prejudiced people predominantly have generalized negative opinions; and will interpret each contextual action or encounter only as instantiations of such general opinions. Less prejudiced people will sometimes also do this, especially for groups or situations they do not know well, but for the evaluation of groups with which they have everyday contacts it may happen that they take interaction in a much more contextual, personal, way. They will more try to 'understand' what and why other people act as they do.

We have assumed, therefore, that there are basically two types of ethnic attitudes, which we have described in terms of episodically based and semantic memory based opinions. These may, in actual conversations, apparently be in conflict to the outside observer. This need not be so for the people themselves: they may like a Surinamese neighbour but have negative general opinions about Surinamese. This might imply that two kinds of social information processing takes place: First, perception, representation, and (possibly negative) evaluation on the basis of own experiences, and second the direct adoption by inference from general schemata or by communication of negative general opinions. Indeed, the latter will often appear in the interviews as generalized statements, occur often with people from non-contact areas, and have a much more stereotypical nature. They are so to speak conventionalized, both as social opinions and as rules for conversation: this is what, we as Dutch people, should find and say about foreigners. Of course, negative general opinions, in contact areas, may also simply be derived, by (over-)generalization, from personal experience.

We have been able to reduce the several basic themes of Dutch ethnic prejudice to two fundamental dimensions, viz.

A. Ethnic differences and conflict

B. Socio-economic competition

The first dimension accommodates the large number of negative opinions about different (and 'bothering') food smells, behaviour (treatment of women, included), living, etc. The second dimension organizes the many complaints about the lack of work and housing, preferential treatment and positive discrimination. The first dimension, we argued, rather seems ethnocentric than racial in the Netherlands. Factors like skin colour seem to be subordinated to such factors as keeping your house and street 'tidy' and way of dressing and eating. Dimension A, seems to underly
mostly the opinions about Turks and Moroccans. Dimension B also extends to Surinamese, who are not so much seen as having different culture—although different appearance in clothing, and at least some uneasiness with different colour is also present—but rather are seen as socio-economically threatening: they came in large groups, and are competitors for jobs and housing. A combination of A and B, then, can be obtained by such general notions as threat and fear, which also defined the typical 'crime' and 'deterioration' themes in the interviews. The general socio-economic situation is perceived to deteriorate, and many (older, more conservative) people also see a parallel deterioration in norms, values and morals; they see relatively more crime, more 'dirt', and abuse of social service, against the 'nice' atmosphere Amsterdam used to have. The media and informal conversations together will in that case provide the information which may lead to the general conclusion that large foreign groups must be one major reason for this general malaise, both culturally and socio-economically.

It should be added for perspective though that, in general, as we have seen earlier in this paper, the assigned to 'foreigners' is not very high. Rather housing and unemployment are seen as the major problems, but they are often explained in terms of the presence of many foreigners. Also, there are certainly groups in the Netherlands, such as squatters, which on both dimensions are valued even more negatively. These youngsters violate nearly all norms and values (of decency, sexual morality, dressing, etc.) and in addition are often unemployed and by force occupy (other's) houses. The mechanisms of opinion formation and concrete evaluation is however the same as for foreigners.

We have earlier assumed that a clear distinction should be made between opinions and the complex processes which determine their expression e.g. in conversations or interviews. Above, we saw indeed that some opinions seem to have an essential social and conversational nature: they tend to be stereotypical, phrased in similar terms and pertain to general cultural and social interests of the in-group. On the other hand there are opinions which may be much more private, personally variable, and based on personal experiences, although they may also be negative under the influence of the general, more socially based, attitudes. They two types interact, of course, as soon as people communicate their experiences to others: the interpretation, categorisation and evaluation of the personal experiences then may become socially normalized and be virtually indistinguishable from the social stereotypes. It will be the task of the next part of this paper to investigate the various processes which govern the expression of both kinds of opinions, and the communicative principles which underly 'talk' about foreigners in specific communicative situations. A more detailed analysis of the cognitive and linguistic processes underlying expression may at the same time provide further insight into the differences between various kinds of ethnic attitudes, into their organization, their affective basis, and their use.
Ethnic attitudes in discourse

6.1 Towards a model of discourse production

The ethnic attitudes of which we have described the cognitive structure in the previous section do not usually remain concealed in memory. More or less indirectly they will 'manifest' themselves in some of our cognitively based social behavior, that is, in social interpretation of persons, groups, actions and events, and in social interaction. In particular, they will often be 'expressed' in what we say or write, that is in discourse. In this section we will review some of the typical forms these expressions may take in non-directed interview and everyday conversation, gathered during our pilot fieldwork in Amsterdam.

However, in order to fully understand how ethnic attitudes and discourse are related, some more general, theoretical remarks are in order about the processes of production and about the various structures of discourse. Since social norms and values also regulate our verbal interactions, the expression of attitudes which are inconsistent with these norms will have to follow sometimes complex strategies, so that often only 'traces' remain of the underlying attitudes. It follows that a serious analysis of such 'prejudice markers' is possible only if we have a sound model for discourse production.

However, such a production model does not yet exist. Only fragments of such a model can be derived from current work in the psychology of discourse, which has paid attention above all to processes of discourse comprehension, and mostly of written or fixed discourse types, such as stories, and much less of spontaneous discourse, such as conversations.

Against the background of much other work in psychology and Artificial Intelligence, our actual model of discourse comprehension (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1981) has the following major features:

1. Discourse understanding is a strategic process, in which variable information inputs, both textual and contextual, are flexibly used in the gradual construction of a semantic, pragmatic and social representation ('interpretation') of the discourse meanings and functions in memory.

2. Input surface structures of discourse (intonation, morphemes, syntactic structures, paraverbal information) are linearly decoded and translated into a propositional semantic representation in short term memory (STM). The strategic nature of comprehension guarantees that this 'decoding' is both analytic (bottom up) and constructive (top down): surface structures are also constructed due to semantic and contextual expectations.

3. Propositions are organized into coherent sequences, which form the semantic 'text base' of the discourse. This coherence may be conditional (e.g. in cause-consequence or enablement relationships) or functional (e.g. in relationships such as general - particular, contrast, specification). Limitations on the storage and operation capacities of STM constrain the number of (complex) propositions, so that 'old' propositions must be stored in Long Term Memory (LTM) after the construction of coherence.

4. Besides these locally coherent proposition sequences, language users also construct more abstract, higher-level propositions, so-called 'macropropositions'. These represent the global coherence, the topic or gist of the discourse or discourse fragment.

5. The resulting 'macrostructure' of the discourse may be further organized by schematic 'superstructures', such as the conventional schemata of a story or argumentation.

6. Both the macrostructure and the superstructure provide the overall organization of the representation of the discourse thus gradually being constructed in STM, or rather in the 'section' of LTM usually called 'episodic memory' (EM) --which records all incoming information.
Both at the local and at the global level the semantic representation is matched with contextual information about the 'pragmatic' conditions of the discourse (such as the wishes, intentions or knowledge of the speaker and some of the social relations between speaker and hearer), thereby enabling the hearer/reader to infer the pragmatic function or 'speech act' being performed by the utterance of the discourse, or fragments of it, in the communicative setting.

All processes mentioned above are heavily controlled by the more 'permanent' cognitive systems of the language user, such as his/her knowledge, beliefs, opinions and attitudes. They provide the information which is not expressed in the discourse, but which is necessary to establish local coherence, to derive macrostructures ('themes'; global relevance), to construct schemata or to infer speech acts.

Similarly, the respective processes are controlled by more transient contextual information about the purposes (goals), tasks, interests or 'biases' of the language user.

Besides the more specific textual representation thus constructed in WM, the language user will activate and update previous episodic information about the same topic or world-situation, which will also help to construct the textual representation. In other words, understanding a discourse in many respects means understanding the world fragment the discourse refers to.

All further cognitive processing, such as retrieval and reproduction, e.g. in recall, question answering or recognition of textual information depends on the structures of the textual representation and the associated 'world model' in WM. Information 'high' in the hierarchy, such as macropropositions, will tend to be recalled much better than information 'low' in the hierarchy (e.g. local 'details').
This means that S not only has a 'context model', that is a representation of the communicative and interactional situation which provided the necessary information for the (speech) act, but also, as part of the context model, a model of the hearer -- featuring the presumed knowledge, beliefs, goals, wishes and action purposes of the hearer.

In case the pragmatic and semantic information to be expressed is assumed to be rather complex, that is too complex to be handled as a whole in STM, macroprocessing in production becomes necessary. In that case, S constructs a provisional intentional macrostructure or plan, both for the semantic content and for the pragmatic function of the discourse to be produced. Such a plan has a hierarchical structure of (macro-)propositions, defining the overall theme and the global speech act, respectively. The plan is the overall control information monitoring the production of local sentences and speech acts. Of course, the strategic approach to discourse processing allows for the possibility that local information may have feedback on this plan, and may eventually lead to the transformation of the plan. This will be particularly the case in everyday conversation, and in all those discourse types and contexts where feedback information from the hearer or the referential and pragmatic context are important. Sometimes, the production plan, e.g. in so-called 'unplanned' discourse, such as spontaneous conversation, may be very rudimentary, fragmentary or provisional, although some planning will always take place to monitor local semantic and pragmatic coherence. Therefore a distinction should be made between explicit and implicit planning. The first may be typical for complex written productions (of books, lectures, articles, etc.).

Our constructed in this way a complex semantic and pragmatic plan for the discourse, local execution may take place by the activation or construction of first propositions belonging to a given dominating discourse topic. This semantic local information, together with information about the context, are the input to the sentence generator, which again strategically constructs the appropriate syntactic structure after selection of the appropriate selection of lexical items, in case contextual information about the beliefs, opinions, mood ('emotions') of S and the social properties of S (gender, age, status, role, etc.) as well as of the hearer and the social context, are important for the stylistic monitoring of the ultimate surface structure. The same may hold for the application of rhetorical operations (e.g. alliterations, rhyme, metaphor, etc.) during sentence formulation, intended to enhance the effectiveness, and hence the acceptability of the discourse.

For certain discourse types there will be the possibility, both at the global and at the local level to plan and execute a superstructure schema, for instance in storytelling or argumentation. The overall schema in that case will be part of the overall plan, thus organizing the semantic and pragmatic macrostructures of the plan.

From these extremely simplistic summarizing hypotheses we at least get an impression about the complexities of discourse production. If we deal with notions such as 'the expression of prejudice', it becomes obvious that such an expression is in fact an extremely complex, strategic process, involving not only more or less permanent cognitive information, such as knowledge, beliefs, opinions and attitudes, but also an analysis of the communicative context and its goals, of the hearer, and a strategic execution of global plans at the local level. Many of these 'underlying' production processes, and hence the information taking part in them, may ultimately have a 'trace' or 'marker' in surface structure. Some of these traces are under control, others are more or less involuntary. Both are of course important to infer, both for the hearer and for the observer, aspects of this underlying cognitive or social information used in the production of the discourse.
In addition to the more or less general remarks about discourse production made above, some more specific hypotheses are necessary for the production of discourse in everyday spoken interaction, e.g. in spontaneous conversation. In this case, there is not a monologue to be produced, but --in turns--fragments of a dialogue, taken as a specific kind of social interaction. Although a conversation partner A may, well have some global semantic or pragmatic plan before or during the conversation (that is, he/she knows more or less what he/she wants to say, globally speaking), the freedom of the other participant, B, will be such that content, and function of the conversation turns of B do not contribute to the execution of the plans of A. In other words, most of the management and the control in conversation may be strictly local: depending on a turn of B, A will first of all have to attend to a proper 'reaction' and only then may try to execute some parts of a previous plan into the next turn. In other words, the strategic processes of production may be more geared towards local, interactional control --so that, sometimes possible (macro-)plans may not be executed.

Next, the immediate interactional nature of conversation also requires more direct influence of the social and communicative context. Each turn, thus, may become a specific move, that is a strategic step in a sequence of semantic-pragmatic-interactional actions: by an assertion we may 'contradict', 'help' or 'flatter' the hearer, or perform other socially-functional moves in the interaction. In question-answer dominated conversations; such as free interviews, we in addition have some specific turn-control and thematic control from the interviewer: he/she may determine the topic of conversation (e.g. by posing questions) and interrupt a turn of an interviewee. Especially in these cases of semi-controlled conversation, the speaker may well be constrained to produce semantic and pragmatic information which, according to the actual context model of S about H, is 'wanted' by the hearer, rather than the 'free' production of information which S wants H to know. According to the own wishes, interests, goals, and intentions of S. Since however even in semi-controlled conversations, such interviews, S still has a large amount of freedom, there will be a strategic decision process, in which own wishes, preferences and purposes are matched with those of the interlocutor. In rather general terms, thus, we will assume that S will produce and express all semantic and pragmatic information, when interacting with H, that satisfies the following conditions (i) it must be consistent with the own motivational structure of S, (ii) it must be an appropriate action according to the (assumed) motivational structure of H, (iii) it must be locally and globally coherent with the structure of the conversation thus far, (iv) it must be contextually relevant and appropriate, and (v) expressed meanings or performed pragmatic functions, and their surface or parafunctional manifestations should not provide information to H such that H might infer negative beliefs (opinions) about S which are inconsistent with S's self-representation and its basic norms and values.

It goes without saying that the latter points are crucial in conversations about any topic which from of social and personal point of view may be 'risky', that is, which may lead to negative contributions by H to 'character', 'opinions' and 'attitudes' of S. Talk about sex, ethnic groups, filling out tax forms are examples in point. The degree of self-disclosure, also in conversation, about such topics will depend on several factors, such as personal properties (uncertainty, etc.), properties of the hearer or of the relation between S and H (such as intimacy, role and status differences), and the nature of the communicative situation (home, pub, train, court, etc.). For this kind of discourse, communicative situation and topic were dealing with, we will therefore have to spell out in more detail what kind of possible constraints operate during production.
Against the background of our discussion about the cognitive nature of prejudice and about the processes involved in discourse production, we are now able to make hypotheses about the more specific ways ethnic opinions may be expressed in discourse. We have seen that prejudice, defined as an ethnic attitude, cannot manifest itself directly or fully in interaction or discourse. Prejudice organizes more specific and general opinions about ethnic groups or ethnic relations between groups, and these opinions -- and the associated beliefs and knowledge -- may become input for 'expression'.

Thus, the belief proposition 'Surinamese carry knives', being part of the 'criminal' branch of the prejudice-schema about Surinamese, may be expressed (or not) in various ways in discourse (see below).

But, evaluative beliefs are not activated and actualized -- due to the speech act of n, the topic of discourse or own intentions and the ensuing retrieval procedure -- 'ready-made' from STM. We do have stereotypical opinions, both particular ones and general ones, and these may be expressed more or less directly under specific conditions, but in many cases expressed opinions are constricted.

This is necessary to allow people to flexibly react to situation and interaction. In other words, the kind of opinion expressed should at the same time satisfy the specific constraints of the communicative context, that is constitute the semantic basis of an appropriate answer, take into account the social relation between S and n, and fit the other aspects of the situations (rules, formality, norms and values). On the one hand, this may mean that some opinion of prejudice schema P1 should be transformed in order to meet these constraints. On the other hand, a new opinion may be inferred from P1 and the information of previous discourse and context, e.g. by instantiation of a variable in a general opinion: $\text{All } x \text{ carry knives } \Rightarrow \text{John carries a knife.}$

A third source for ethnic opinions also has a more direct nature, viz. episodic experiences. We have seen that these experiences are the sometimes 'insufficient' empirical basis for the formation of general opinions and ethnic attitudes. Instead of activating these more general attitudes, it may be possible to activate relevant 'situation models'. That is, S, when (wanting or wanted) to talk about experiences of contact with ethnic minority members, may be 'reminded of' specific events, or series of events that have formed a 'situation model', e.g. 'shopping in the supermarket at the corner'. From these events stored in episodic memory, S may activate and actualize specific propositions, and produce these as part of a story.

Note by the way that situation models need not be the result of 'own' experiences, but may also be indirectly constructed on the basis of interpreted discourses, stories, of others. This will typically result, during conversation, in indirect, embedded, storytelling of the type: "Yes, my sister told me the other day that...". Thus, situation models, whether obtained by direct experience or from communicated experience, may function as, the evidence basis for specific or general opinions, e.g. as premises in an argument in which opinions are conclusions.

The same principles are involved in a fourth type of opinion generation, viz. in direct observation, again of events themselves or of reported events by some other speaker. In that case, the event (or event discourse) is represented also in episodic memory, and during processing in STM, matched with norms, values and attitudes about the actions or persons/groups involved in the event, thereby leading to an evaluation, that is to an opinion.

A fifth type of ethnic opinion formation takes place in the same context, namely when another person expresses an opinion, which is evaluated and accepted by S, which may lead to simple 'agreement' speech acts of minimal conversation turns (backchannel "hmhmhm's"). Note though that agreement speech acts need not unambiguously point to identification with, or acceptance of an opinion, but only that S
Mitigation. Another usual transformation is that of mitigation. In this case the evaluative predicate or referential expression may be changed by an expression conveying a less negative evaluation. Evidence for this transformation may be derived from repairs, false starts, the use of the non-mitigated predicate elsewhere in the discourse or by comparison to expressions in other discourses of S. Mitigation, then, is a typical substitution transformation.

Exaggeration. A similar substitution operation takes place into the other direction: S may want to express more forcefully than intended an evaluation, e.g. for rhetorical reasons and other contextual constraints mentioned below. Mitigation and exaggeration are typical 'rhetorical' operations, of which the various forms (understatement, overstatement, litotes, euphemism, etc. are summarized in these operations).

Metaphor and comparison. Among the other rhetorical operations applied in the transformed expression of opinions, metaphor and comparison play an important role. By substituting a referential concept or a predicate by a metaphor the expression becomes indirect and open to several readings --both mitigating or exaggerating, or neutralizing. The function of such a metaphor or comparison is usually to highlight a specific, stereotypical, property of some person, group or action.

Vagueness. Similarly, S may have recourse to a number of procedures which transform the more specific meaning of an expression into a much vaguer expression, which may be interpreted by H according to his/her own cognitive set.

Indirectness. Both semantically and pragmatically, S may convey information also indirectly --just as in metaphor and vagueness-- e.g. by expressing a proposition or performing a speech act from which the actually intended proposition or speech act must be inferred. Thus, an assertion may indirectly function as an accusation, or a question as an assertion.

Implication. In the same way, S need not only express proposition p but actually mean q, but also S may express p (and mean p) and assume that H will infer q from p by general or contextually allowed implication.
Presupposition. More specifically, S may express a proposition knowing that the truth or falsity of \( p \) (i.e., its contextual relevance) presupposes the truth or the acceptance of \( q \). This is one of the most typical ways of conveying information in an indirect way, because the presupposed proposition is not actually asserted, but left for the hearer to infer.

Permutation/Displacement. Another possibility to transform opinions is to assign the evaluative predicate, whether explicit or implicit in the ways mentioned above, to another but often related referent. Typical expressions of this, operations are e.g., ”Maybe I’m stupid, but...”, in which apparently the predicate ”stupid” is self-applied, but meant to be applied to someone else. Similarly, we may have it that some action, event or object associated with opinion-object \( A \) is negatively evaluated, thereby implying that \( A \) has a negative value, whether or not \( A \) is responsible for it (if \( A \) is a person).

This provisional list of operations, both semantic and pragmatic, on ”underlying” opinions already contains some indications about how the transformations themselves can have their traces in the discourse, or about other means to actually assess the presence of transformations. The psychological, philosophical and methodological aspects involved in this problem are of course important, because we have assumed above that people very often ”do not precisely say what they mean”. But unless we have more or less unambiguous traces of informations that confirm this assumption, it would on the other hand be methodologically, and in this specific research ethically, unround to make unwarranted conclusions about what people do mean when they do not mean what they say.

Below we will also show how the various transformations affect the actual pragmatic, semantic, conversational and surface structures of the discourse. For instance, implication or vagueness may appear not only at the sentence level, but also in linear sentence connection and macrostructure. Also small particles, intonation, pauses, etc. may be traces of (transformed) opinions.

The direct or transformed expression of opinions in discourse is subject to a number of textual and contextual conditions. In other words, in some discourse, or discourse turn, and in some context, such operations become more or less necessary, conventionally or by rather strict rule, or their application may enhance the success of the interaction or the effectiveness of the communication. Let us try to formulate, again hypothetically, some of these conditions which lead speakers to strategically adapt what they say to what they -- and the others in the situation -- do.

Among the textual conditions on opinion expression, we first have those (to be discussed further below) of local and global coherence. That is, opinion propositions, whether transformed in the ways mentioned above or not, may be expressed in lexical items, phrases and clauses of a sentence, but clauses and sentences do not come alone: they are connected with others in the discourse. This means, among other things, that the expression of a given opinion is always relative, viz. relative to other expressed cognitive content, which may be knowledge, beliefs, or other opinions and attitudes. Locally, this coherence involves conditional or functional relations between the propositions: a denoted fact --about which \( S \) has an opinion-- may be conditioned or consequence of another fact, or some opinion may be preceded or followed by another proposition which is a generalization, specification, example, contrast, or other functional relation. Of course, the coherence assigned to these propositions is the coherence relative to \( S \), that is subjective coherence. For \( U \), or for other social members, some consequence or some generalization may not hold at all. That is, opinions not only pertain to expressed propositions themselves, but also to the very coherence conditions of sequences of propositions in discourse. The same holds for global coherence as it is defined in terms of semantic macrostructures. Again, some opinion should be viewed relative to the overall theme of some discourse fragment, and this may well be an overall, global opinion. It may be the case that some opinion, when analyzed in isolation, is negative about some social group, but seen in the light
of the macro-opinion, such a local opinion may become rather positive. The converse is also true: a seemingly positive expression may within the perspective of the overall opinion expressed actually become a negative opinion expression.

Similar observations may be made for such textual phenomena as perspective, point of view or scope. For each proposition as expressed in the discourse, it is necessary to determine whether the implicit or explicit evaluation is that of S him/herself, or of people talked about. Interesting here is the fact that it may occur that some opinion is actually attributed to people talked about, but in fact express the own opinions of the speaker. Here, we have a well-known strategy of perspective displacement or at least of opacity. Similarly, expressions in a discourse may be 'under the scope' of some previous proposition or predicate, and their truth value, that is, in our case the consistency with own opinions, may in that case be different from scope-free expressions. Scope opening expressions may be modal, such as 'it is possible that', 'it is probable that', 'maybe', etc., or predicates such as 'I think, believe, that', 'it is well-known that...', 'you always hear that...', etc. Again, we may have displacement in those cases: what is asserted to be under some specific scope, e.g. 'they all say that...', may in fact be a proposition which is not under scope, that is, a proposition actually believed by the speaker.

These few general properties of discourse should be complemented with some that more in particular hold for discourse in interaction, viz. for everyday conversation or other dialogues. Whereas the general coherence conditions mentioned above may hold both within and across turns of respective speakers, we in addition have coherence conditions on the turns themselves. In a turn we not only have the expression of opinions of some speaker, but also the performance of some speech act(s), and the execution of some interactional move. Moves are the functional 'roles' of actions in action sequences, and hence defined relative to previous and following moves. In general each move must be interpreted as some 'reaction' to the previous move in the previous turn of the previous speaker, whereas the same turn of some S may continue with moves that condition moves of a next speaker. Question-answer pairs, and other so-called 'adjacency pairs', such as congratulation-thanks, greeting-greeting, or accusation-defense, are well-known examples of such (pragmatically defined) moves in respective turns.

For our discussion this means that in strictly spontaneous conversation and in somewhat more 'directed' free interviews, the expressions of some person A should always be seen not only as 'free moves', but as moves that are textually and interactionally bound to the moves of the interlocutor B.

If A makes an assertion expressing an opinion, such an assertion may function as a direct or indirect answer to an explicit or implicit question of B. Pragmatically this means first of all that A believes that B wants to know A's opinion, and that B does not know this opinion yet.

This is a standard case. But the structure of interactional moves in conversation -- and in interviewing -- may be much more complex. Thus, in spontaneous conversation some assertion or question of B may, for A, be an implicit accusation of A, and therefore A may feel obliged to defend him/herself, to make counter-accusations; or to provide justifications of his/her action(s) referred to. One step more complicated is the situation in which A assumes that some expressed proposition p may well not be acceptable to B, or may imply some proposition q about A's own beliefs or person, a proposition which may be inferred by B against the wishes of A. In that case A may anticipate dissent and already justify p against possible disfavor from B.

These are just some examples from the complex mechanisms of discourse and conversation constraints on the expression of opinions. We have seen that we cannot and should not identify let alone judge about 'isolated opinions': each proposition, each speech act, each turn, each move, should be analyzed in relation to others in the discourse.
Whereas the provisional suggestions made above about the production and interpretation of 'subjective discourse' pertain to the various dimensions or levels of the discourse, taken as textual sequences of propositions and as sequences of actions, there are also important contextual constraints. Among these contextual constraints we already have met some cognitive ones. We have seen above and in the previous section that beliefs, and hence also prejudice, do not stand alone. They are linked up with systems of personal experiences, knowledge, other opinions, attitudes, ideologies and emotions. We also have underlined that the production and understanding of discourse presupposes large amounts of knowledge and of these other cognitive types of information. It follows that in order to interpret a word, clause or sentence as the expression of an opinion, we should also see what the 'cognitive context' of that expression is --and not only the textually expressed cognitive information. Some opinion may imply or presuppose others, so that 'neutral opinions may imply negative ones, when seen from the point of view of prejudice analysis. Together, a series of expressed or implied opinions may exhibit an organized scheme of opinions, as discussed in the previous section. Understanding an opinion, thus, requires positioning of the opinion in larger attitude structures. As such some opinion may be identical for two persons who, on the whole, have completely different opinions and attitude structures. To wit, in politics, parties which are at the extreme end of the usual left-right dimension, respectively, may well on some concrete matter endorse the same opinion. Clearly, thus, we consider such opinions not to be strictly identical, because they have different functions in different attitude structures, and the expression of such opinions will therefore also be part of different interaction schemata, and hence have different functions. The methodological consequence of this important point is that simple 'survey research in which isolated opinions' are gathered and then put into a statistical framework of correlations and factor analysis-- is theoretically inadequate, and empirically misleading.

Another set of conditions on opinion expression may be formulated in terms of properties of the communicative and interactional setting, that is in terms of properties of the social context. In section 2 we already reviewed the general socio-cultural context of prejudices, that is the conditions of their formation and transformation and their overall functions in social structure and group interaction. These general social conditions are of course the further background for the more particular conditions that determine the expression of prejudice in discourse in some concrete situation. This distinction is important because situational factors may reinforce or weaken the influence of the general social conditions of prejudice confirmation. Conversation, interviews or other dialogical forms of discourse are subject to similar situational constraints as other forms of interaction. These constraints are highly complex and cannot be dealt with in detail here. They are to be formulated in terms of e.g. (i) the rules and conventions for (speech) interaction in some social context type (a conversation at the dinner table, in a bar or a dialogue in court have of course different rules), (ii) the various 'functions' of the speech participants, such as their roles, status, institutional functions, etc. (iii) the previous and following actions or action schemata in which the conversation is embedded-- including the motivations and the goals of interaction. Principles of cooperative interaction require us to be polite in certain contexts to other participants, to perform requested actions if possible, to answer in questions, to be coherent and rational or to justify apparent 'deviations' from such principles. Similarly, agents will have many strategies for not only making successful contributions to the ongoing activities, but also for combining an optimal self-image with an optimal display of other-evaluation. The expression of opinions in discourse, thus, on the one hand must satisfy the demands of face-keeping strategies and on the other hand must satisfy the demands of cooperative interaction.
such as answering questions of others about our opinions, not to 'hurt the feelings' of others e.g. by too open dissent or attack. In situations in which a general constraint exists on 'pleasant interaction' such demands may imply that speakers suppress or otherwise transform their 'real opinions'. In these general and vague terms this is all well-known, and for action in general micro-sociology has laid down a number of such interaction principles. We do not know yet, though, what the more specific principles are for the expression of opinions in discourse, apart from the few mentioned above. Clearly, these principles depend on the formality of the situation, the intimacy of the interaction and of the interaction participants, the status of speaker and hearer, and possibly institutional constraints (e.g. in court we may be forced to express 'true' opinions).

In those situations where the overall evaluation of a speaker already has been made by the hearer, the expression of opinions which, as such or in another situation, might imply negative attributions to the speaker, is less risky than in situations in which the speaker must still obtain a positive evaluation ('make a good impression') from the hearer.

Also, if the speaker knows that opinions are more or less coherent with those of the hearer, there will also be less control on their expressions, e.g. when we talk with our partners or friends. In the situation of our free interviews, the respective roles are more or less fixed; interviewer and interviewee do not know each other in most cases, there is no initial intimacy, but during the conversation the various factors may, of course, change, so that even an interview between people who do not know each other may become a more or less intimate conversation in which the speaker can to some extent 'freely' express his or her opinions.

This is possible also because S knows that H will not give evaluations explicitly, that the interview data are anonymous and that giving opinions 'freely' will count as a wanted and therefore positive contribution to the conversational interaction as such. That is, S need not fear negative evaluations of his/her opinions as such because there will no later interaction between interviewer and interviewee that might be influenced negatively by negative attributions.

It goes without saying that these few contextual constraints on the expression of discourse are closely linked up with the actual cognitive set -- including emotions -- of the speaker as well as with his/her more general 'personality', i.e. the 'schema of more or less context-free action categories preferred by some agent. Thus, trivially, an 'open', extrovert and ego-strong person will tend to express his/her opinions more readily than somebody who fears negative attribution, who is not sure about own opinions, or who for other reasons tends to 'close up'.

It should be stressed that such 'character traits' have limited value when isolated independently of the actual cognitive and situational context, also when the expression of opinions is concerned. 'Introverts' will also talk as soon as the other person can be trusted, if they have enough actual motivation and if the whole setting is encouraging. In general, then, the decision and planning to 'speak up' will be made on the basis of all the factors which have been discussed above, and the situation and actual cognitive/emotional set may override factors that otherwise would induce somebody to remain silent or evade specific questions (e.g. in situations of anger, frustration, fear and the recognition that 'expression' may somehow 'help').

This is all admittedly rather vague from a theoretical point of view, but it is not our aim in this paper to provide a precise contextual model for opinion discourse in interview situations. We do however take them into account, as they are, in the analysis and the interpretation of our interview data, and will specify at least some of the situational factors that are relevant.
b. Some properties of prejudiced discourse

7.1. Method

Against the background of the cognitive and contextual constraints on the expression of ethnic attitudes in discourse, we are now able to analyse some of the properties of prejudiced discourse. As our data base we have used the interviews with 30 people in Amsterdam, of which we have discussed the underlying opinions in the previous sections.

The general topic for these interviews was "Living in Amsterdam", and the interviewees were asked to formulate their own opinions about this topic: what did they like and what did they dislike about living in Amsterdam? In case the interviewees came up spontaneously with the topic of 'ethnic minorities' or 'foreigners', this topic was further discussed. If this was not the case, this topic was introduced by the interviewer in a more or less 'positive' way, viz. by referring to the international or cosmopolitan atmosphere in the city, and asking what the interviewee thought about 'foreigners' in the city. It was attempted to direct the interviews as little as possible. Only a few questions, e.g. about neighbourhood, work, children, or personal experiences were asked relative to the topic, leaving as much as possible the initiative to the interviewee. Interviewers were 4 male and 4 female students who, except one, did not have interview experiences, but who were extensively briefed during several sessions. It was shown how to avoid leading or biased questions and how to 'get people to talk' and keep them talking. As was mentioned earlier, the interviews were conducted in both contact and non-contact neighbourhoods in Amsterdam, mostly in public places such as parks, bars, shops, whereas some of the interviews were recorded in private contexts, viz. at the homes of the interviewees. The students announced that they did the interviews in the framework of a research group at the University of Amsterdam, of course without mentioning the topic and goal of their research. Permission for taping the interviews was asked for, and --except in one case-- always granted. Length of the interviews was between half an hour and an hour and a half.

7.2. Analysis of the interviews.

The interviews were partially transcribed and analysis took place on the basis of these transcripts. In this stage of the pilot study no further analysis was made of the spoken version of the interviews, e.g. to further investigate properties of intonation, stress, pauses, etc. Some of these though were taken up in the transcripts, e.g. hesitation, repairs, and marked pitch or loudness, whereas at several points subjective interpretations --such as ANGRY or DEFENSIVE-- were added as glosses in the margin of the transcript. This was necessary because these interpretations do not only result from the text itself, but also from intonation, gestures, face-work or other non-verbal cues. The transcriptions were done as literal as possible, including false starts and 'ungrammaticalities', but no sophisticated method for transcriptions, as developed in conversational analysis, was used.

The transcriptions were analysed at the following levels:

A. Thematical structures. Each fragment of an interview can be subsumed under one or more 'themes' or 'topics'. Theoretically, these are so-called semantic macrostructures, derived from sequences of propositions expressed or implied by the text. These topics were initiated both by the interviewer and by the interviewee. A thematical structure is a hierarchical structure of topics at several levels of generality. Interesting here are not only the topics that do come up (or which do not), but also their introduction and change: how do the interviewees go from one topic to another?

B. Local coherence. Whereas topics or semantic macrostructures are a description of the 'global' meaning of a discourse, we also want to account for the 'local' meanings. Such meanings are usually made explicit in terms of propositions. Sequences of propositions in a discourse are required to satisfy rules of (local) coherence, such as conditional relations between denoted facts, or so-called 'functional' relations between propositions (e.g. p may be an 'explication' of q). We have paid attention especially to these functional relations, because they seem to have the most obvious strategic role.
c. **Stylistic and rhetorical structures.** At the local level, interviewees may express their opinions in variable stylistic ways, e.g. by specific selection of words, or syntactic structures. Similarly, their expressions may be made more effective by the use of different rhetorical devices, such as repetitions, metaphors or comparisons. Both types of structure may indicate properties of the communicative context, e.g. (in-)formality, mood of the speaker, persuasive intentions, etc.

D. **Schematic structures.** Parts of the interviews, typically those subsumed by a topic (macroproposition) may have specific functions. Such functions will often have a conventional nature, and can be summarized in different categories. In our data, for instance, we may have narrative and argumentative structures, or combinations of these. Thus, narratives --with their own internal structures-- may, as a whole function as 'illustration' of some opinion or as a 'defense' for some bold statement, or as a premise in some argumentation.

E. **Conversational structures.** An interview is a type of dialogue, in our case only moderately controlled by the interviewer. In informal situations such interviews approached natural conversations, as soon as the interviewees spontaneously said what they wanted to say, took the initiative, changed topics, and asked the opinion of the interviewer. The difference with a real conversation however was, among other things, that the interviewer did not explicitly express personal opinions, or only expressed, rather vaguely, some consent with the intention to stimulate further expression. Interviewees, also in interviews, follow a number of dialogical strategies, and like the other structures mentioned above, these may give direct or indirect indications about the intentions or underlying opinions of the interviewees.

For obvious reasons of space limitations, we cannot possibly analyze in full the 30 interviews. For each structural dimension we will be able to give only some illustrative examples. Also, the interviews could be analyzed also along many other dimensions, such as local coherence (or incoherence), pragmatic features (speech acts involved), or non-verbal communication.

7.3. **Thematical structures**

The topics which come up in the interviews have been listed already in section 5 above. Roughly speaking some 70 themes are discussed in somewhat more detail, but only half of these themes are discussed by several people. Note that the topics which are mentioned most often were never as such introduced by the interviewers; they came up spontaneously. They were the opinions or 'grievances' which people had 'on their minds' in the first place when talking about 'foreigners'.

Let us consider first the topics in the interviews summarized above. The first of these, C6, the sixty year old woman with rather negative opinions, first starts with some general opinions about living in Amsterdam. She likes it, but "recently it has become a mess". In her part of town it is OK, but in the 'inner city, you don't feel safe anymore: "they just knock you over the head". Upon a why-question about the unsafety in the city, she then spontaneously introduces what she calls:"contradictory exemplars, foreigners, many of them...". In other words, the general topic of liking and dislike, is first specified with the topic of safety and crime (robbery) and the 'mess' in the inner city, for which the cause, among other things, is attributed to the foreigners. Changing from this crime theme she then, via some concrete examples (spitting and putting your legs on the chairs in the cinema), introduces the well-known adaptionist theme: in public they should behave according to our norms: Now, we are worth less than all this "import", who are cared for more than Dutch people, and "that is MY opinion". We see that this woman volunteers, readily, her opinion, and hardly tries to conceal it. The only hedging taking place in the first fragment is the explanation that 'this is maybe normal behavior in their own country' (using a proverb in Dutch equivalent to "When in Rome, do as Rome does"). The thematic structure, then, of the first passages, can be summarized as follows...
In the somewhat more 'moderate' opinions expressed, by interviewee E2 (see pp. 65-66 above), foreigners are introduced via the mention of foreign (chilean) neighbours. The situation in the rest of the neighbourhood, where there are many Surinamese, is judged to be less positive. The statements though are less categorical; it is stressed that one cannot generalize, that there are also many 'decent' people from Surinam. Much of what follows, then, is rather descriptive, though with a negative presupposition: large families, overcrowded apartments, etc. Turks and Moroccans are not wished as neighbours, mainly because of language and culture 'strangeness'; and in general contacts are avoided. Typically, each statement about foreigners which might be interpreted as negative is qualified by the assumption that the foreigners themselves do not like it here. Besides the repeated 'uneasiness' topic, there is also a general competition or 'envy' topic, including resentment about preferential treatment in housing, financial help, clothing and unemployment. Of each topic thus developed the interview provides a sort of 'conclusion' about policy: separate schools, financial aid to the other country, giving less money here, etc. Provisionally, therefore, one of the ways a topic is being developed, would be the following schema:

1. Response to interviewer about ethnic situation in the neighbourhood
2. Specification of details (neighbours, stories about contacts)
3. If 2. is negative: qualification of intentions and expression of norms: positive, or 'explanation' of 2.
4. Negative generalization (as exception to 3.)
5. Conclusion.

The topical development for negatively based interviews will of course vary among different subjects, will depend on questions of the interviewer, and perhaps some pure chance factors determining which topic is now being retrieved, but a schema like the one given occurs several times. Typical sequences are of the type:
1. Neighborhood is deteriorating
   or, for non-contact areas: Inner City is deteriorating
2. This is also because of all these foreigners
3. Because
   a. They make noise/are loud (at night)
   b. There is a lot of dirt
   c. They ruin their houses
   d. They get housing before we do
   e. They are aggressive/criminal (threats, robbery, unpoliteness)
4. But,
   a. We may not generalize
   b. There are also good ones among them
   c. It is their lifestyle
5. But,
   a. They should adapt
   b. We should not adapt to them
   c. We would also adapt in another country
6. So,
   a. If they do not adapt: they should go back
   b. I avoid all contacts
   c. We just accept it as it is
7. It is not good as it is now, because
   a. There are just too many
   b. They have too many children
   c. They neglect their children
   d. The women are not free/are subordinated
   etc.

Variations occur of course, but the topical development seems to follow such patterns. For the contact areas and negative attitudes we typically find variations in the list just given. In general, for such interviews, the most prominent topics are first negative personal experiences, such as being bothered by the neighbors (smells, noise/music, or aggression) or being involved in various conflicts. These are typically part of the situation model of these interviewees with respect to the topic 'living with ethnic minorities'. In non-contact areas and for the less prejudiced people, the typical sequence is:

1. There are no or few foreigners here
2. I do not care, I am not bothered
3. Would not mind if I had them as neighbors
4. If they would be decent people
5. But in general, there are too many
6. We should not allow ghettos

As an example, topic 2 or 3 could be illustrated by a story about somebody they know and whom they have very good contacts. The topics themselves, whether positive or negative, are however rather general. In the heavy contact areas, topical development starts at the level of personal experiences and therefore will exhibit stories, introduced by a general statement and concluded by some evaluation or moral. Most people, also the ones who express negative attitudes, however, are very well aware of the fact that the expression of negative opinions or the engagement in discriminatory behavior is against the norms and the law. Typically, this realization will be expressed by several expressions of the type "I'm not a racist, but..." or "I have nothing against foreigners, but...". Indeed, all would be OK, they say, if only we would not be confronted with... and then follows the list (or stories) with complaints. Later in such interviews, we will typically get the kind of opinions which are not or seldom based on own experiences, such as the opinions about cheating the social services, badly treating the women, etc. These opinions are typically activated from indirect experiences--stories from others-- and a more general negative attitude about foreigners. This attitude is stereotypical, and given some 20 basic opinions we can account for the larger parts of the prejudiced interviews, with slight variations in the instantiations for the particular personal situation.

Although further research is necessary, we will provisionally assume that the sequential structuring of the topics in a conversation is on the one hand a function of the context and the interview interaction, but on the other hand a function of the organization of the opinions in memory. Most relevant, and hence first in mention, will be personal experiences from the own situation, then some higher level 'control' (norms, values; evaluation), and
Finally a number of negative statements of a more general, stereotypical nature, drawn from long-term memory group schemata, also followed by an evaluation and a conclusion. Below, we will further analyse this 'functional' structure of the interviews. At this point it is relevant to note only that there are patterns in the development of ethnically relevant topics, and that these patterns may suggest underlying forms of cognitive organization, such as the distinction between episodic representations of personal experiences and general opinions, and the clustering of opinions about the most relevant social issues of a person or his/her social class or neighbourhood. Indeed, people not only give their private, ad hoc, opinions in these matters, but everybody feels addressed as a social member of a group ('we', 'Dutch') as opposed to 'them', and will formulate the relevant opinions accordingly: complaints may be shared complaints, and each interviewer may view him-/her-self as a spokesperson for the group. Hence the emphasis on the group norms and values for 'decent' behavior in the evaluation of the activities of foreigners. Purely personal 'dislikes' are also expressed, but much less than these general group norms.

As we have suggested earlier, themes or topics are higher level semantic structures, which, so to speak, 'summarize' lower level meanings of words and sentences in the interview. That is, some topic may be discussed in one long story, many turns in the dialogue. At this lower level, we may also look for the connections between sentences, turns or moves, and try to qualify the functional relations which we already met at the higher level.

7.4. Local coherence and functional relations

Under the general semantic control of topics, we said, discourses will exhibit also local coherence between sentences or propositions in sequences. Typically, this kind of local coherence can be defined in terms of conditional relations among the facts denoted by the respective sentences. Thus, $A$ and $B$ may be locally connected of $A$ denotes a fact which is a cause of the fact denoted by $B$.

Such coherence relations also hold in dialogues, but for the sake of our argument we will rather study another kind of local coherence, viz. functional coherence. In that case, $A$ and $B$ are coherent if either $A$ or $B$ has some specific function relative to the other sentence (or proposition, or move). For instance, $B$ may give an example of what has been stated in $A$, or may give a generalization or express some contrast.

We have analysed all interviews for this kind of local functional coherence, and have found very typical ways of conducting this kind of dialogues. Each sentence (or move) will typically have a function within the overall or more local goal (viz. explaining, arguing, defending, attacking, etc.). Such functional relations will therefore often have a rhetorical nature: they function as strategic devices for enhancing effectiveness in the attainment of dialogical goals. Besides the examples of functional relations mentioned, we may also try to assign a non-relational function of each sentence or move. We thus end up with some 30 semantic functions of local sentences, e.g.

1. Presupposition
2. Implication
3. Suggestion
4. Mitigation (understatement)
5. Exaggeration (overstatement)
6. Vagueness
7. Indirectness
8. Displacement
9. Generalization
10. Attribution to hearer
11. Apparent denial
12. Apparent admission
13. Negative loading
14. Hesitation
15. Attribution to other group
16. Contrast
17. Contradiction/inconsistency
18. Own experience
19. Positive emphasis
20. Correction
21. Empathy
22. Nord, value expression
23. Reasonableness
24. Differentiation of groups
25. Ignorance
26. Appeal
27. Competition
28. Exception to rule
29. Positive self-assessment
30. Identification of source
31. Distance
32. Generalization
33. Specification
34. Example
This list is still rather heterogeneous, involving binary and unary functions, as well as some rhetorical functions and types of reference and pragmatic functions. For the moment we have simply taken these together in order to be able to specify which functional contribution the statement has within the interview or within the own turn within the interview. Clearly, in this way, each expression can have several functions, viz. semantic function (meaning or reference), pragmatic function or rhetorical and schematic (superstructural) function. Below, we will more in particular consider the specific strategies used for the control of conversation. Of course, several of the functions mentioned here not only define local coherence, but also strategies of conversation. Let us now consider some typical examples.

(B1, 10-11) I don't think it (presence of foreigners) is negative, but (...) I am afraid that in this neighbourhood it is getting the upperhand...

(APPARENT DENIAL)

(B1, 25-26) ...not so much because I am bothered by it, but the character of the neighbourhood is disappearing...

(DISPLACEMENT)

(B1, 50 ff.) many contacts? No, not so many... because you know I have many friends, ... I have been away from here for some time... and one has difficult access to those people...

(EXPLANATION)

(B1, 90 ff) don't think that one of those people is trying to establish contact...

(ATTRIBUTION TO OTHER GROUP)

(B1, 112) (they do not look for contacts) because they terribly need their own community...

(EXAGGERATION) EXPLANATION

(B1, 133) they infiltrate (into that neighbourhood)

(NEGATIVE LOADING)

(B1, 144) they do not work, well, don't work, they just mess around with cars and sell them...

(CORRECTION)

(I, 3) I'm glad I have left (this neighbourhood)

(IMPLICATION)

(D2, 47) we couldn't sleep, and my husband works, and my neighbours don't, so they could have a party...

(CONTRAST)

(E2, 14) One cannot generalize...

(PRESUPPOSITION: Most are bad)

(B2, 81) Their (surinamese) daughter didn't like it either (being friends with my daughter)

(DISPLACEMENT)

(F2, 71) I used to help many people

(POSITIVE SELF-ASSESSMENT)

(F2, 145) sometimes it is a bit difficult

(VAGUENESS, NEGATIVE IMPLICATION)

(F2, 141) you hear those stories sometimes

(SOURCE)

(F2, 148) they are very nice people, but...

(APPARENT ADMISSION)

(G1, 24) a bit further there live some of them... I don't know them...

(IGNORANCE, DISTANCE)

(G1, 28) they don't feel at ease here

(EMPATHY)

(G1, 22f) you can't do that

(NORM)

(G1, 35) I completely agree with them

(AGREEMENT, POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION)

(I, 10) well; what would I think about them?

(HESITATION)

(I, 10) they are also people

(APPARENT POSITIVE EVALUATION)

(I, 11) we shouldn't have let them come

(NEGATIVE IMPLICATION)

(I, 86) (dirt in Central Station...) I don't say... they did not leave their name (there)....

(CORRECTION, FACE KEEPING, QUASI-DENIAL OF NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTION)

(I, 108) Surinamese are not inferior, Turks are not inferior, there are no inferior people...

(DENIAL OF PRESUPPOSITION, GENERALIZATION, VALUE)
From these few examples we can easily see what kind of functional role may be assigned to particular sentences or moves in the dialogue. On the one hand, each move is placed as a reaction to previous (own or other) moves and preparation for a next move, and on the other hand the major strategy is that of expressing own opinions without losing face. Thus, APPARENT DENIAL will typically be used to affirm positive attitudes, but will in general be followed by a negative statement, as in "I have nothing against them, but...". Then, instead of just plainly expressing that some situation is disliked, the negative evaluation is attributed to others in what we would call DISPLACEMENT: "I don't care, but my neighbours do...", or "They don't like it here themselves". Parallel to APPARENT DENIALS we also find APPARENT ADMISSIONS, typically expressed by sentences of the form "I think it is nice/beautiful/OK, etc., but...". HESITATIONS occur often when the speaker does not want to express negative opinions, and we therefore very often encounter expressions, such as "I don't know...", even if subsequent passages show that they really did know, and did have opinions. EXPLANATIONS are frequent as soon as own or other behaviour requires justification. Sometimes they are QUASI-POSITIVE, e.g. when negative behaviour is 'understood' in terms of "Maybe that is part of their lifestyle, but...".

In order to take away some of the harshness of the opinions, speakers will often resort to various kinds of MITIGATION, as in "They have to adapt a little", when the further text suggests that the speaker thinks they should adapt completely. Face-keeping strategies involve, among other things, that the speaker wants to display his or her own tolerance, and many expressions do make an appeal at REASONABLENESS, as in "They cannot expect that from us...". Similarly, the interviewee may appeal to the judgement of the interviewer, and indeed APPEAL with sentences like "didn't you ever see that...?".

There are many moves that relate to group differences and group conflict. A first one is the statement in terms of DIFFERENCE ("The are just different", "They have different habits"), or COMPARISON: "we wouldn't do a thing like that". The expression of CONTRAST may reveal opinions about competition and resentment with regard to preferential treatment ("We get a house right away, we have to wait for years"). Negative experiences of ethnic groups, such as discrimination are usually expressed in ATtribution moves, stating that it is their own fault, they shouldn't have come in the first place, they do not adapt, etc.

Even a superficial functional analysis of local coherence reveals many properties of prejudiced discourse. At the level of conversational interaction (to which we will turn in more detail below), it shows that each sentence/proposition or move is produced under control of the previous one and an evaluation of the conversational 'impact' of the previous move. Thus, if a previous statement is evaluated to be perhaps to harsh, we will typically find correction or mitigation. Similarly, organizing in advance the next statements, a negative statement will typically be preceded by (apparent) positive ones, such as direct positive evaluations, the denial of negative general opinions, etc. The overall strategy, then, is to find a balance between asserting one's own opinions -- and convincing the interviewer of the good intentions, reasonableness, and norm-abiding motivations 'behind' the negative evaluations about ethnic minorities. As we will see in more detail below, this means that much of the dialogical structure can further be accounted for in terms of argumentation.

At the same time though, local functional analysis reveals something about the organization and the use of opinions in (conversational) interaction. First, we see that practically no speaker will voice negative statements without expressing the general norm that discrimination is wrong, that (every) generalization is bad, and that we should judge people individually. In other words, the implied general opinions of each proposition are matched, during or sometimes after production, with general norms about expressing negative social judgments. Secondly, many negative judgements will be mitigated, qualified or 'explained away', or else extensive justification must be given in terms of own experiences, hearsay (sources), the media. Thirdly, negative opinions may be 'avoided' by displaying ignorance, lack of contact, or other forms of 'reservation'. Fourth, as soon as some form of positive opinion can be given about some individual, this will be done in exaggerated form. Fifth, negative opinions may simply be 'excused' when some form of attribution is possible.
Thus typically 'blaming the victim'. Sixth, if negative opinions are finally voiced, they will generally be motivated by the norm which others have to follow, usually by adaptation to Dutch habits and ways of life, or by giving examples of clear violations of 'universal' norms, such as those rejecting criminal behaviour.

We see that the expression of negative opinions from group schemata is controlled by higher level social norms of cooperation and tolerance, and that speakers will follow strategies to keep themselves 'in the clear' so that negative evaluation by the interviewer can be avoided. Besides personal positive self-assessment, this can also be done by representing the own group as the victim and the out-group as the villain: our tolerance, our decency, our norms and our goodwill is permanently threatened by the behaviour of the others. This suggests that out-group schemata do not seem to be independent cognitive structures, specifying perceived properties of that group. Rather, there is a permanent comparison with properties and actions of the ingroup, and a match between the goals and interests of the two groups.

7.5. Stylistic and rhetorical structures

Given a particular ethnic opinion, speakers may express the opinion in variable ways. A stylistic analysis accounts for such variations of expression. Usually, variation is defined relative to some hypothetical invariance, such as the 'meaning' or 'reference' of an expression. Thus, we may have as 'constant' the reference to some ethnic group, and variably refer to this group with expressions such as foreigners, Turks, they, these people, etc. In other words, lexical choice, syntactic structure and phonetic realization are typical 'surface structures' which may be varied on the basis of identical semantic structure such as an evaluative belief proposition (an opinion). However, this is merely the general approach to stylistic variation. It should be stressed that stylistic variations may imply differences in what was traditionally called 'connotation'. In our cognitive terms this means that different stylistic options, such as different lexical items, may well vary in evaluative implications. It is therefore not merely a value-free variation whether we use 'blacks', 'negroes' or 'niggers' to denote the same ethnic group. In other words, the referent may in this case remain the same, but the evaluative aspect of the meaning may well be different. In other words, there is also a partial variation in meaning involved.

Apart from variations in evaluative implications, stylistic variation also may 'signal' other aspects of the cognitive and social context. Thus, if a speaker is angry or happy, afraid or aggressive, will also 'show' in the particular style; or the set of stylistic choices made from the register (the stylistic possibilities) in case. Similarly, style will indicate aspects of the social context, such as the (in)formality of the social situation, the type of situation, the intimacy or hierarchical relationships between speaker and hearer, status, gender, age, or other social categories of the speech participants. In summary, the style of a discourse is the result of variable choices among available surface structures to express more or less the same meaning or denote the same referent (thing or fact) as a function of cognitive, emotional and social factors of the communicative context.
In the case of our interviews, part of this context is already given. It is a more or less informal dialogue between participants of more or less equal status who do not know each other from previous encounters (hence no initial familiarity). This means that the general style will be that of informal encounters between relative strangers, in a semi-formal context, viz. that of interviewing. This means that stylistic choices will be somewhat 'controlled', in the sense that for instance evaluative expressions may be less colloquial than when speakers would interact with their friends in completely informal contexts (and without the tape-recorder). In other words, opinions will in general be freely expressed --within the boundaries of the cognitive and conversational constraints mentioned earlier-- but the stylistic choices of e.g. evaluative nouns, adjectives and verbs may well be less negative. We lack data gathered from truly unobtrusive observation which would enable us to compare the differences of style for these different contexts.

In the same way as we may have stereotypical opinions, we may have stereotypical stylistic structures. These involve more or less 'fixed' ways of expressing the same opinion, such as formulae, proverbs or 'sayings' which are conventionally shared by the in-group. Indeed, participants not only share opinions and attitudes, but also stereotypical ways of expressing these in conversational interaction. One specific type of such stereotypical ways of expression are so-called topos, 'common places' which are used to communicate the same theme in a conventional way. Although they also involve some semantic stereotypical aspects, we mention them here because we first, of all see them as typical ways to express given meanings.

Let us give some examples of the kind of stylistic choices typically made in the course of the interviews. At this point, translation from the Dutch is sometimes awkward because precise English equivalents for the rather subtle variations and their corresponding evaluative implications are not always available.

**Topoi:**

(01, 28-33) A lot of old things disappear (the topos of the 'good old times')

(F3, 13) I have nothing against foreigners (the topos of tolerance)

(GL, 4-9) They do our dirty jobs (the topos of stereotypical occupation or role)

(12, 10) They are also people (topos of non-discrimination)

(12, 14) You cannot always lump all together (topos of non-discrimination)

More properly stylistic are the lexical choices made by the speakers. A first typical lexical choice is the use of pronouns when full noun phrases would be more precise. Thus, instead of saying Surinamese, Turks or Moroccans, we will typically find the generalizing they, and to refer to their countries, speakers will often indiscriminately say there.

The predicates expressed in adjectives and verbs, used to denote actions or properties of ethnic groups are another rich field of evaluative expression. Thus, the number of foreigners is said to get the 'upper hand' (01, 12-13), and they are assumed to 'infiltrate' into other parts of town (01, 12-13), whereas, houses and streets where minorities live are often described in terms of 'trash' (topos). On the whole, a more or less fixed expression is retrieved, despite its original 'technical' meaning to denote deterioration of the town, viz. "to pauperize" (e.g. by 01, 147). These expressions, as may be expected, all have negative evaluative implications. A different status or education of the interviewee, finally, of course shows in the choice of typical 'intellectual' words, such as 'it is economically unsound to have these people here', or 'it has been scientifically established that...'. Our data, however, have few of such interviews. Further research should however attend to the correlations between education, profession and status on the one hand and the style of prejudiced discourse.
Rhetorical structures

The field of stylistics may be said to be a sub-domain of or at least to overlap with, that of rhetorics. In addition to the stylistic variation mentioned above, we may distinguish a number of so-called rhetorical structures or operations. These are also ways of expressing some underlying meaning, but not in the form of variations in grammatical structures, but rather as 'additional' structures assigned to various levels of grammatical structures. Thus, we may find a repetition, which at the phonological level may involve identical sounds (as in alliteration or assonance) and on the level of syntax such an operation would yield a parallelism. Whereas stylistic variation is aimed at an appropriate expression or indication of cognitive and social context in the discourse, rhetorical structures are mainly used to enhance the effectiveness of the discourse. From the broad spectrum of rhetorical means to reach this goal, we will here limit ourselves to so-called 'figures of speech'. Part of these have already been encountered at the level of semantic functions. Thus, an opinion may be expressed in more or less 'exaggerated' or --conversely-- in 'mitigated' terms. These are typical rhetorical operations used to enhance the effectiveness of the meaning.

Let us give some examples:

(02, 27) Well, that is not precisely agreeable
(litotes: understatement of some more serious evaluation)

(02, 75) We had to get up early, and they would have parties late at night
(comparison, and contrast)

(02, 28) that did not happen once, it did not happen twice, it happened all the time
(enumeration, climax, exaggeration)

(02, 154) aahh, and dirty and rubbish and trash they threw on the staircase
(enumeration, repetition, exaggeration)

One of the most frequent rhetorical operations, already analysed at the semantic level, is the (apparent) concession, of the typical structure: "X is not bad/wonderful but yet...":

(02, 38ff) I happen to have an old acquaintance, a Surinamese boy, 
...well he is really NICE boy, but...

(03, 10ff) I have nothing against coloured people, but...

(03, 15ff) They never did me any harm, but...

(06, 193) you also have good ones among them, but...

(01, 100) all is OK, but...

It is not easy to give a precise interpretation of this kind of rhetorical operations. Yet, they do reflect interests, goals and specific opinions which must be expressed, sometimes indirectly, so that indeed the speaker can make the discourse effective in such a way that the hearer understand, accepts and eventually agrees with the expressed opinion. Thus, an understatement (litotes) will be often used in those situations where people do have a very negative opinion --as suggested by the rest of the text--
We do not want to resort to heavy emotional language, either because that kind of extreme negativism might make a bad impression, or simply because the understatement really underlines the seriousness of the event referred to. We may assume that this kind of understatement is typical for the semi-formal situation of interviews with unknown others. In informal situations much more swearwords and much more negative expressions would certainly be used.

On the other hand, as we have observed before, exaggeration will precisely be used to denote positive aspects of ethnic minorities: the one neighbour or acquaintance from a minority group they know is always "extremely kind, nice, lovely, etc."

And finally, comparison and contrast is the typical rhetorical figure used in conflict and competition situations. Thus, usual conversational strategies will be used so that the position of the in-group is represented in a more favourable (threatened, victimised, disadvantaged) light: THEY get a house right away, WE have to wait for years; MY husband works all day, THEY hang out and do nothing; WE have to clean our apartment when we deliver, but THEY leave a terrible trash... In general then, this stylistic/rhetorical device will express the oppositions underlying group conflicts.

7.6. Argumentation

Opinions typically require argumentation, and as soon as sensitive social issues, such as ethnic minorities, are discussed, such argumentation may become imperative. Each interview, therefore, will at least show several argumentative structures. Sometimes these will be of the simple kind of a (concluding) statement, followed by some ground, reason, or fact as a premise or illustration.

In spontaneous discourse, argumentative structures are not of the usual PREMISES-CONCLUSION schematic structure, but rather of the STATEMENT-JUSTIFICATION type, where the justification may be any kind of statement, or series of statements, which makes the earlier statement more plausible or defensible. At the end of such a series of arguments, we may well have a repeated conclusion: Simple explanatory sentences, following a given sentence, have already been studied above under the functions of local coherence. We here are interested in somewhat more complex argumentative structures.

Let us consider in somewhat more detail some of the interviews. Interviewee 01 is asked why he does not have many contacts with ethnic minorities, although living in a contact area. The reasons mentioned are the following, and can be taken as an argumentation for his lack of (avoidance of?) such contacts. (In our words):

(i) I have a tight, large group of friends, already 12 to 15 years
(ii) I have been living elsewhere for some years
(iii) I don't feel like seeking contact with Turks or Moroccans
(iv) Moreover, you have difficult access to those people (follows a story about a foreign coffee shop)
(v) Not one of them would try to establish contact
(vi) Maybe it is because they speak another language
(vii) They do speak Dutch, a little
(viii) They have another culture
(ix) I don't know, they perhaps feel better in their own environment
(x) I can very well imagine that.
The reasons given are mostly indirect, and eventually attributed to the minorities themselves. BI is honest enough to say that he doesn't like to establish contacts, but most of the reasons are sought elsewhere, such as situational factors (lived elsewhere, have many friends) not in 'dispositional' factors, such as own preferences. The argument of 'lack of access' is itself further elaborated by examples about the lack of communication from the other side, and it is this argument which is supported by the cultural and social norms of the other group (accepted by BI).

Interviewee E2 is asked about what she thinks about differences between foreigners and Dutch people. She then starts with an apparent admission (“In the first place I must say that among Dutch people also not everybody is hand in glove..., but...”). She then states that they (the foreigners) claim that we discriminate them, but adds: “But they do it themselves”, a statement which is not understood by the interviewer, who asks “Do they discriminate Dutch people?”. She then argues as follows:

(1) No, they discriminate themselves.
(2) Because they always think we look down on them and that we discriminate them.
(3) And now I’m going to do it, which I did not do before. The ‘logic’ of this argument is not immediately transparent. Apparently, what she tries to convey is that foreigners erroneously think they are discriminated against, and that is a form of self-discrimination. Having denied implicitly the existence of discrimination, E2 however announces that given her personal experiences she will now also start to discriminate, which may be taken as a practical conclusion of a series of arguments, repeated in the sentences that follow:

(4) Well, they have parties when other people are sleeping.
(5) Aaahh, and dirty, and trash and rubbish they throw on the staircase.

We see that one of the forms of argumentation is to displace the feelings of guilt about lack of tolerance to the behaviour of the Dutch group.
Of course, attributing possible reasons to the Surinamese to go back does not fully eliminate the feeling that defending such an option is fully OK and consistent with Dutch norms of hospitality. So, therefore she further argues that we would in addition have to pay, viz. use the (social security?) money spent in Holland, to be given as aid to Surinam (which she is 'ready' to let them have — expressed in the stereotypical expression: "dat gun ik ze toch van harte" — I would grant them that with whole my heart).

Whereas in the other argumentations we found that the speaker tries to attribute negative opinions or behaviour of the speaker to properties or behaviour of the out-group, we now find an argument in which possible negative behaviour (sending back) would be turned into a positive thing if initiated, for good reasons, by the out-group (going back to a nice country). The argument then becomes a piece of (quasi) 'good advice', a paternalistic (or maternalistic) suggestion 'for their own good'. Any implication that such opinions would be in the benefit of the speaker is attempted to be concealed with extensive enumeration of positive values and goals of the out-group and possible 'negative' things (offer for financial aid) for the ingroup.

Among the many other examples of argumentation, we finally mention a very revealing argumentation given by I2, living in a non-contact area, having a relatively high position (director of a small factory), and displaying tolerance in rather general terms. When the interviewer becomes more specific and tries to provoke a more personal opinion about the possibility that the town council would decide to build cheap houses for minorities in that (middle class) suburb, this man can no longer conceal his prejudiced attitudes, and argues as follows:

(1) That I would find, eehhh, WRONG.
(2) But, because those people would not have the right to live here.
(3) But, because, eeh, because... if you put these cheap apartment houses here, you would diminish the value of the houses that were built here before.
(4) And that is economically unsound
(5) And that is impossible, that need—not be, I wouldn't know why
I wouldn't know either why we would put industry in some neighbourhoods, if these are built for people who came to live here, who bought houses, who had their houses built, because it was intended to be a (garden) suburb. You can't put industry in a (garden) suburb. Impossible.

Interviewer: But sometimes you hear that the town council wants to 'spread' foreigners across the whole town.

I don't know. Then, you would, you would, you can't do it in the middle of such a neighbourhood, that is impossible.

I think, that eh then you let the town more or less pauperize.

If you go to, Be Bijlmer (a suburb with many Surinamese), eh, then you see, that eehh, I would say, yes, YES, THERE it is pauperizing

(...) Follow experiences about the deteriorated situation in De Blijmer.

In this passage, of which we have maintained also some of the conversational properties (for details about these, see below), we see how a speaker handles a conversational and an interactional 'problem'. On the one hand, he has to maintain a relatively tolerant image he has been displaying earlier in the interview. But confronted with a (rather provocative) assumption that ethnic minorities would perhaps also be 'spreaded' (the technical term used in Amsterdam for re-allocation of housing and neighbourhoods for different ethnic minorities, a policy heatedly debated but not carried out) to 'his' neighbourhood, the speaker on the other hand has to generate plausible arguments for rejecting such an idea.

He does so first by the obvious understatement (a rhetorical ploy) that he would find that WRONG (emphasized). Since such a statement may be interpreted as discriminatory, he first has to deal with such a possible interpretation, so that in (ii) he expresses the general norm that people of course have the right to live there. Such an expression of a general norm, however, is typically followed by a pragmatic connective but. The first argument, then, is that cheap housing would diminish the value of the existing houses, an age old myth also used by middle class people in suburbs in Amsterdam. Again, however, such a statement might be interpreted as an expression of discriminatory self-interest, so that a general principle, namely of economic irresponsibility is formulated. Thus, personal interests are concealed by making a claim of more general socio-economic interests. The next argument provides further justification for such a claim, namely by the rhetorical device of a comparison: one wouldn't put industry in a suburb either (he uses the term 'tuinstad', which is a 'garden-town', i.e. a suburb with a lot of green and parks).

The interviewer's intervention is countered with the quasi-ignorance device (I don't know), which means --conversationally-- that the speaker does not agree with the interviewer, which is a politeness strategy. The arguments then are hardly more than a claim to the 'impossibility' of such a policy. More or less hesitantly, the speaker when argues that the neighbourhood would 'pauperize'; the term often used to denote urban decay. And in order to substantiate that claim, he resorts to a description of another (new) suburb where there are many Surinamese, and which he qualifies in terms of dirt (follows a story about a recent visit).

He sees that argumentation in favour of an opinion takes the form of complex interactional problem solving, in which two conflicting goals are pursued, viz. conveying a tolerant expression and at the same time defending an opinion which might be interpreted as inconsistent with it. Nowhere in the argumentation however the speaker would simply say that he wouldn't like the to live with ethnic minorities in his suburb. Rather he will use general socio-economic arguments, and will try to substantiate these with rhetorical devices such as a comparison and an illustrating story.

If we reconsider the premises adduced in the various conversational argumentations analysed above, we see that the strategies make use of the following kinds of justification:

(i) Displacement of guilt or responsibility; e.g. lack of contacts is attributed to the inaccessibility of the out-group.

(ii) Beliefs about cultural differences.

(iii) Beliefs about the wishes of the out-group (motivational displacement).

(iv) Blaming the victim (attributing negative behavior).

(v) Countering possible negative interpretations.

(vi) Describing 'good reasons' for the out-group to do what is
In the interest of the speaker (interest displacement)

(vii) displaying goodwill, by offering 'rewards'
(viii) invoking general socio-economic principles or norms that would be violated by integrated housing
(ix) mentioning negative consequences while disclaiming negative (discriminatory) attitudes.

In all these cases, therefore, we witness a strategy in which the speaker will try to avoid negative interpretation by displacement of guilt, responsibility or goals to those of the ethnic group ("it would be better for THEM, if..."), or to that of the town or the socio-economic status quo in general. From subjective opinions the speaker tries to arrive at the construction of objective fact and general interests. Each negative opinion therefore is either indirect, or embedded in previous or subsequent moves in which the negative opinion is justified or de-personalised in terms of the interests of everybody.

7.7. Narrative structure

In interviews of this kind people will often tell stories. These will usually function as justification or illustration of an argumentative point. Indeed, the stories we have are always embedded in argumentations, and are most often intended to support a negative opinion. Stories in opinion dialogues at the same time provide information about personal experiences, and hence express what we called 'situation models' in the episodic memories of language users. We have seen earlier that most opinions either derive from general opinions which are part of ethnic attitudes, or are activated from such episodic situation models. Especially in contact areas, people will be able to come up with such narratives. Sometimes, these stories do not illustrate or support an explicit statement, but do so implicitly; it may be left to the hearer to draw the conclusion.

Just like argumentations, stories have a conventional schematic structure, that is a 'narrative superstructure'. Theoretically, such a narrative schema is a hierarchical organisation of conventional narrative categories, such as Setting, Complication, Resolution, Evaluation and Coda or Moral. These categories organise the semantic macrostructures of the discourse, that is the respective topics or themes, and assign a narrative function to them. Thus, a sequence of propositions, subsumed under the general macroproposition 'I was in Amsterdam yesterday', can have the narrative function of a Setting, whereas the macroproposition 'I don't go out at night anymore' can be the Coda or Moral of a story about street crime or a robbery, and draws the 'pragmatic conclusion' of the story for actual and future behavior.

Most of our stories do indeed exhibit this kind of narrative structure. Of course, as usual, some of the categories may remain implicit (e.g., the Moral). Unlike the monological stories of literature, myth or folktales, everyday stories told in conversation are developed conversationally and interactionally, just like the argumentative structures we analysed above. That is, the storyteller has to arouse interest in the hearer, and this interest must be granted, whereas similarly the various
stages of telling need feedback from the hearer, if only with minimal responses such as "uhhum, yes", evaluations such as incredible or narrative category announcers such as "what happened?"

Let us examine some of the stories of our data (rather superficially of course, detailed narrative analysis would require a paper on its own).

Sometimes the stories have a more descriptive than a properly narrative character. That is, they do present some problem and a reaction to that problem by participants, but the problem as such does not have the usual properties of unusualness or interestingness. Interviewee BI, for instance, tells about the situation in a neighbourhood he has lived in, after a question about his opinions regarding the fact mentioned earlier by himself, that more and more Turkish and Moroccan men have their families come over to live with them. BI then states that he indeed has some experience with that, and then starts to tell about the neighbourhood he used to live in. The major macrostructural themes resuming his sentences can be assigned the following narrative functions (I ignore the remarks of the interviewer):

1. I used to live in the Ali-street
2. A rich neighbourhood yes, but there is much infiltration there.
   2.1. Big houses
   2.2. Turkish and Moroccan families with 10, 12 children
   2.3. All very nice these children
3. But, many of these people do not work
   3.1. Well, they mess around with cars and sell them
4. So, that neighbourhood was pauperising a bit
5. Well, I don't mind
   5.1. They work hard,
   5.2. They are entitled to decent housing
   5.3. Especially when they have so many kids
6. But, the OTHER people living there, especially the older people, they get annoyed by all this

We see that only the first part of the story is given: there is an explicit description of the reactions of the people in the neighborhood, just a description of the situation of conflict and a complication. Implicitly, then, the Resolution would be that the people become prejudiced and resort to discriminatory actions. We have specified some details of this descriptive and 'explanatory' story because it at the same time exhibits some of the strategies analyzed earlier by which a speaker will try to convey a positive (tolerant) impression of himself. Negative opinions are attributed to others and are judged negatively, but on the other hand also explained and 'understood', and eventually even partially adopted by the speaker. In a sequel to this story, the speaker tells about sheephead he saw in the dustbin, and gives the real Evaluation and the Moral of the story: they should not do that and they should adapt 'a little' to the environment they come to live in.

As we already saw for the argumentative structures, we have again find that stories may be told about facts or events that imply or justify a negative opinion. At the same time, such negative implications are matched with more general norms of tolerance of the speaker. Thus, firstly the speaker will try to displace the negative opinion to those participants involved, and secondly appeals to the hearer/interviewer to agree with
the reasonableness of the complaints of the ingroup members. Interviewee B2 comes up with a more concrete story when she has to explain why she left the (contact) neighborhood and went to live in a suburb:

1. Well, they lived upstairs and I had a lot of trouble with them. Reason for action and announcement of story
2. Well, look, we had to go to work Monday morning at seven, and they were still having a party at five o'clock at night. Setting and complication
3. And that was not precisely amusing, isn't it? That occurred all the time. Evaluation of the seriousness of the complication
4. And when you then would go upstairs to ask politely if they could be more quiet, you risked to get a knife in your back. Resolution
5. I was sitting with my two children in the living room, in the middle of the night, because we couldn't sleep. Added specification of complication
6. And my husband works, and my neighbors don't, so they could have parties. Evaluation of the seriousness of the source of conflict

Again, the story is only fragmentary, and we might assign the different narrative moves to a Complication category (risk to be knifed included) because no specific mention is made of the Resolution in the sense of reactions to the threat, although going upstairs to protest is a Resolution to the Complication consisting of the noise threat. The Evaluation however is clear; the interests of the groups are mentioned to be in conflict, in such a way that own people are portrayed as 'being right' (having work) and the others as 'being wrong' (having no work and disturbing 'us'). Again, the Moral is left implicit, but becomes obvious when we consider the function of the story as an explanation of the reasons to move to another part of town.

Another story about a personal experience is told by B2. In the middle of an argument about why her daughter should not go dancing in her own (contact, Surinamese) area, the woman suddenly comes up with a story about an act of aggression in the supermarket:

1. Well, once I got slapped in my face in Simon de Wit (a supermarket chain). Summary, story announcement
2. Then, he went before his turn at the cash. Complication: negative act
3. And then he slapped me in the face. Setting: participant
4. And that was also a Turk or so, I don't know. Setting: Source of conflict
5. We were queuing up and then he said 'Me first'. Complication
6. Well, I said, I believe that you have to queue up as well, we are all waiting for our turn. Resolution: reaction
7. And he says 'Me first, me first'. Setting: Source of conflict
8. (And then I said) You need not slap me on my cheek, do you! Resolution: reaction to negative result
9. And then he wanted to hit me again. Resolution: reaction to reaction.

This is the typical everyday story about the typical kind of everyday conflict as perceived by our interviewees: assumed or real violation of rules of politeness and interaction and resulting verbal conflict and possible aggressive consequences. The story, here, is first announced by stating the central complicating event (being slapped in the face). Note, however, that even this short story is complex. We first have a complicating event such as jumping one's turn, followed by a Resolution (protest), which then functions as the setting for an embedded narrative structure, in which slapping in the face is theComplication, and a reaction to that is the Resolution. The order of presentation however is not chronological. After the summarizing announcement of the story, we first get the two negative acts of the other participant (jumping his turn, and slapping her in the face), only after that further information is given about the Setting, including location and participants, and the various Resolution reactions of the storyteller. The kind of relevance structure assigned to the story foregrounds the most important experiences of the storyteller. The schematic structure of the story allows the listener to reconstruct what actually happened, that is to figure out the setting, the complicating events or actions, and the resolving reactions of the storyteller. Again, an Evaluation and a Moral are lacking, but implicit in the framework of the argument (bad neighborhood).
These few stories give us an impression about the possible functions and contents of narrative in interviews. In general the stories are about negative or strange behavior of ethnic minorities (mostly men by the way), such as making their streets or houses dirty, cultural habits that take offense (slaughtering sheep, cooking), and acts of aggression. The major theme of the stories are about immediate contacts in the neighborhood and housing, followed by stories about aggressive behavior.

Stories are usually embedded in an argument of which some opinion is substantiated by telling personal experiences. As in the arguments, the general schema is that the minority members are portrayed as being offensive in some way, threatening Dutch norms and habits, whereas the in-group members (the storyteller in particular) is represented as the victim. In the moderately prejudiced subjects, negative conclusions from stories may often be qualified, e.g., by stating that the (negative) actions of the actors are understandable given the situation or their background. Besides this argumentative function of the story, at the same time has an interactional function: it makes an appeal to the listener (the interviewer) to accept the negative opinions of the speaker.

Since stories are about personal experiences, they will be told primarily by people from contact areas, which is indeed the case (two-thirds of the stories are thus "located"). Storytellers may be both men and women, although especially the older women will tend to tell stories. Typically, stories are told when the genders of the interview participants are different. This may be a coincidence of our data, but might also reside in the fact that interaction among different genders needs more "making an impression". Also the more informal context of the homes of the interviewees tend to lead to more storytelling.

As for many of the other discourse properties of the interviews, it goes without saying that these few superficial remarks about the structures and functions of the stories should be complemented with much more research about the role of storytelling in talk about ethnic minorities: they are the 'data base' of prejudice.

7.8. Conversational strategies

Interviews are not just sequences of monologues of people requested to give their opinion. Rather, as we have stressed before, they are complex forms of dialogical interaction, in which each move of one of the participants has a function in the interaction. Recent work on everyday conversation has provided much insight into the rules, principles and strategies of this kind of interaction. It has been established what the rules are that govern turn taking; how people get and keep the floor, yield it to other participants, and what strategies are used to make coherent contributions to an ongoing conversational encounter. In interviews these rules may be somewhat different. First, there is no equal distribution of turns, and no real conversational interaction. The interviewer has the right to 'give' turns to the interviewee, and the right to 'remain silent', thus letting the other speak. Also, the interviewer need not take active part in the exchange of experiences and opinions: the exchange may be one-sided in such a way that the interviewee gives much more information. The non-directed interview, thus, comes close to the kind of natural conversation in which an acquaintance just 'listens', to the problems of a speaker, providing only minimal own contributions but maximal support to the other to keep the floor and 'to go on'. Most of the turns of the interviewer, then, will be questions which ask for further information, such as details, consequences and opinions about some event mentioned before. Evaluation may be non-committal or just empathetical. Yet, the interviewee will be very much aware of the presence and hence the social evaluation of the interviewer.

It follows that beliefs and opinions are not just expressed in a straightforward way. There are many strategies which try to combine the goal of self-expression (of complaints, grievances, opinions) and the goal of social presentation of 'self'. Let us now finally examine how speakers manage to combine such often conflicting goals.
Although it is impossible here to evaluate all details of the strategies underlying the production of a large number of interviews (conversational analysis typically will describe some few turns of fragments of conversation), we will nevertheless try to isolate some of the typical strategic moves of interviewees in our data. The theoretical categories involved are for instance the following: the speaker may agree or disagree with what the previous speaker (the interviewer) has said, or may agree only apparently (yes, but...). Similarly he or she may mitigate or emphasize what the interviewer has said, may provide implications (negative or positive) of what the interviewer has said, or draw conclusions. The speaker may make an appeal to the interviewer, or try to implicate the interviewer (you know that...), may repeat what has been said, give answers (typically opinions) to questions, make sure by back-checking what has been meant, ask questions, accuse the interviewer, or defend himself or herself, etc. These are all typical interactional moves in a dialogical discourse.

At the same time however there are also moves which can be categorized with respect to the own previous or subsequent moves of the speaker, but which presuppose the presence and the evaluation of the interviewer. Thus, a speaker may initiate a move which clearly has the (defense) function of avoiding negative interpretations of the interviewer, or may avoid answering questions, provide justification in the form of explanations, explications, or specifications of earlier statements (actions we have met already in local coherence analysis). Then, finally, the speaker may correct him- or herself, hesitate or repeat and emphasize what has been said earlier by him- or herself.

These are only a few examples of the kind of functionally defined moves defining the strategies of interviewees. A move, thus, is each step in a sequence of conversational actions which contributes (or is intended to contribute) to one or more goals of the speaker (express opinions, give answers, make a good impression, be polite, etc.).

Such strategic moves need not always be conscious. If a speaker tries to conceal 'real' opinions or defends him- or herself against negative interpretations, this may well be a more or less unconscious strategy, or a strategy which has been automatized within routine forms of conversation and interaction. Interviews, to be sure, are as much not routine, but giving one's opinion in dialogical interaction is very much part of everyday interaction, and that aspect will be routine. Social control may be stricter in interviews, and that would account for the important role of strategies which are meant to realize the goal of making a good impression, and displaying oneself as a 'reasonable' person. Especially since the strategic moves involved are often beyond conscious control, the analysis of conversational data may reveal much of the underlying processes of opinion formation and expression. Let us analyze therefore some passages in which such strategies in our data are fairly typical.

Let us start with interview Bl (male speaker, contact area). After the question whether the interviewee thinks whether it is positive to have so many nationalities in Amsterdam, he first resorts to a 'making sure' move:

(Bl, 5) Whether I think that is positive?

which implies that the question is well understood, but leaves him the possibility of preparing an answer. Back-checking questions of this type typically are a strategy to 'stall' the course of the interview. He then answers, "well I happen to live among them", upon which the interviewer asks "among who?", and then follows the next turn of the speaker (approximate English translations!):

(Bl, 9-14) among all kinds of nationalities... (sighs) well, eh, I don't think it is negative but ehh I find it nevertheless a pity that it very much ehh I am afraid that it very much is getting the upper hand in this neighbourhood (incomprehensible). You know that...
Even this single turn already reveals many typical aspects of our interviews. First, there is a hesitation to actually name the minority groups involved, and the interviewee then uses the move to simply repeat the rather neutral designation (nationalities) of the interviewer. Sighing, he then start to construct an answer expressing an opinion, starting with the usual turn starter well (in Dutch: now), hesitation devices such as ehh and repetition of the first person pronoun. The actual opinion, as we observed earlier, is an apparent denial (do not think it is negative, but) which functions as a defensive move to avoid negative interpretation of the opinion to come. Follows the mitigating expression "think it is pity" which is followed by the repair "I am afraid...", which again is complemented by the understatement "getting the upper hand", concluded by the appeal to the interviewer "You know that". Similarly, some turns later, the interviewee explains that the "character of the neighbourhood is disappearing", and specifies as follows:

(B1, 29ff) and I I still think it is nicer to... yes... well, well not to deal with people of my own nationality not that, but ehh... well, from time to time I notice that some... ehh... yes, many, very many things disappear from this neighbourhood and instead of that... empty, empty, no those ehh other people, those other people, people of other nationalities.

On the whole the intonation, the repetitions, the repairs and the re-starting of sentences seem to express a lot of hesitation to express the negative opinion about the presence of the foreigners in the neighbourhood and the negatively felt consequences of this presence. Again, there is a protective or defensive move which intervenes in the intended proposition ('I like it more to deal with people of my own nationality'); this proposition is negated, again to avoid negative attribution, and he then resolves the problem by talking about 'objective facts' such as things that disappear in the neighbourhood, framing the opinion in hedgings and mitigation (being afraid that).

The interviewer then again introduces the positive aspects (in order to avoid negative bias in answering), and proposes that maybe the presence of foreigners also has some advantages, that there is some substitution for the things that have disappeared. The speaker then says:

(B1, 49 ff) There are also things that come instead of that, but I think that is ni-ice, sure, but ehh I think it is a bit getting too much...

Thus, we first find that B1 apparently agrees with the interviewer, and even gives a positive evaluation, but he reverses the argument by providing a negative evaluation, though formulated with the usual hedging (a bit).

Another strategy is that of self-correction: one statement is found to be too harsh, or perhaps too negative, and then is corrected, e.g. as follows:

(B1, 143 ff.) But many of those people they ehh, yes, they ehh, they, they do not work, that is to say do not work, they mess (Dutch: klooien) a bit with cars and sell them a bit, and... I thought that this caused that the neighbourhood was pauperising a bit...

The correction is necessary first because he knows (and later actually says) that many of the 'guest-workers' do work and work hard, and secondly because the accusation of 'not working' is a well-known negative stereotype about foreigners, so that the speaker prefers to choose the more 'active' verb 'mess (around)' with cars, although the verb in Dutch (klooien) has rather negative connotations. Notice again the hedgings (a bit) in this fragment. On the whole, this interview is characterized by many hesitation phenomena, such as corrections, repairs, hedgings, quasi back-checking (asking for clarification) and by many forms of quasi-agreement and apparent denials of negative opinions. The speaker has negative attitudes, but is aware of the fact that such attitudes may well not contribute to the goal of conveying a rather tolerant impression.
Another interviewee, D2, a woman living earlier in a contact area (and still working there) but who now lives in a suburb (also because of the foreigners), does not display this kind of strategic moves at all. She is most categorical in her statements and evaluations, and presents them without any hesitation. There are practically no repetitions, repairs, mitigating expressions, but only clear Yes'es and No's, and when asked what the government should do, she does replies "back" (with them, i.e. they should go back where they, the foreigners, come from). She volunteers, without specific question, examples of events in which she was threatened, and tells about crime in the neighbourhood, and on the whole has just one major goal: to express her negative opinions about ethnic minorities (especially Surinamese). In her case, there is not a single quasi-denial, no apparent admissions or the expression of tolerance norms, as most other interviewees do at least occasionally.

E2, the woman in the new suburb (Bijlmer) with many Surinamese, on the contrary also has negative attitudes and favours a solution of sending back the Surinamese (to their own, "beautiful country"), but --though less than D1-- also tries to mitigate her opinions, e.g. by the following conversational moves. Asked about foreigners in her neighbourhood, she first volunteers a mitigated expression ('not smashing') to evaluate the situation in another apartment building, and then, when asked, enumerates some of the groups:

(D2, 13 ft) 'Well, I find Surinamese quite a difference, you cannot all lump them together, because the Surinamese there are really decent, oh, really extraordinary, there is not a patch on it. But ehh, no, all that which belongs there; they just move in, if there is an empty apartment, hup, then you see another family...

Her strategy, then, is not so much to hesitate in many ways to express negative opinions, but rather to emphasize and even exaggerate the positive properties of a group (here Surinamese) first, and then to formulate, in rather mitigated terms, some negative aspect (here: large families, and 'just moving in' --which in Amsterdam is illegal). So, the earlier negative opinion (no so smashing) is qualified by a very positive, though stereotypically formulated, opinion as an introduction to the further explanation of why the situation next door is not so smahing. Similarly, she will later in the interview mention a number of negative opinions, but often followed or preceded by some concession, an excuse or 'understanding', such as "may be it is their background", "maybe they are not used to it", or quasi-empathy with the 'poor children'. Later in the interview she becomes more decided, and scorns about the fact that her husband has to go to work and 'they' hang around with their hands in their pockets. And then the schools: "Dutch children are discriminated against"; all is full of foreigners. She proposes separate schools. After the question of the interviewer what the advantage of that would be, she replies:

(E2, 233 ft) Well, one, one one has of course to live with all sorts of people who live here...(...)

Interviewer: EHH, EHH. Nevertheless for certain sorts of children it is difficult to have to deal with that sort of...sort of.

Interviewee: But what sort of children do you mean?

Interviewer: Well, ehh...ehh...I would for instance simply say Dutch children...ehh... Dutch... well Dutch, no, if I take my own children...

At this point the woman clearly has difficulty solving the problem that the reason for her proposal (for separate schools) can only be formulated in obvious racist opinions. More than before in the interview she then starts to hesitate, and finally resolves the problem by starting to talk about her own children.

A generalized expression of opinion, involving segregation, need no longer be given then, but the upshot is clear: the Dutch children are the victims at school.
Let us finally go back again to 12, the man who lives in a suburb and who is a director of a factory, and who is opposed to have minorities living in his suburb. Upon the question about his opinions regarding "foreigners" he first uses the back-checking strategy: "What do you call 'foreigners'? Tourists?", an interpretation which is possible, but in the light of the more or less current identification of the word 'foreigner' with ethnic minorities, such a question might be a strategy to play for time and prepare an answer. In a next turn, after clarification:

(12, 10ff) Well, what do I think of that? They are people. And ehh we have let them come. We shouldn't have done that. Those vast amounts.

Again, the answer begins with a form of self-interrogation, and then gives some generalities, first a general norm, then the standard reason given for the presence of foreign workers (we hebben ze hier naartoe gehaald, lit.: we have fetched them), and concluded by the negative opinion about them, followed by a justification (vast amounts). We observe again that answers will seldom be plainly direct when they involve negative opinions. They tend to be introduced by positive evaluations or 'objective' reasons for the actual situation. After the question what he would think of having minorities move into the suburb he provides the argumentation analysed earlier (p. 141-142).

At that point, more than elsewhere, he has a concrete problem to solve. General observations will no longer do, because the question is specifically about his suburb. In that case too, the answer begins with an apparent denial (not that they wouldn't have the right to live here), followed by a very much hedged expression of the negative opinion, though formulated in general socio-economic terms, not in terms of own likes or dislikes. In a story about a visit to De Bijlmer (the neighbourhood with many Surinamese people) he tries to argue for the fact that such new apartment houses for foreigners tend to become dirty, and he mentions the smell of urine in the staircases there. At each negative word, though, he will typically hesitate and as soon as possible try to generalize and neutralize the evaluation, e.g. by saying "yes, and... you have to accept that, if you want to accept that, and you can't do anything against that, then you have to build those houses, well, ehh, in neighbourhoods where that can be tolerated" (12, 74 ff).

Despite this generalization about tolerating (or not) such a situation, he then realizes that he presupposes that the situation is caused by the foreigners, and then draws back:

(12, 85 ff) Why that has to happen there, I don't know, and ehh, ehh, I don't say that ehh ehh.

There is no NAME written on it, I don't know who does it, there is no name written on it, I don't say that the Surinamese do it, or Turks, I don't know that, and it doesn't matter.

He uses the typical Dutch expression (er staat geen naam bij) to disclaim the attribution of guilt in situations where guilt was implicitly attributed to someone. He repeats this saying, and also repeats the negation of his presupposition, namely that foreigners cause the negatively evaluated situation, and concludes with the typical "it doesn't matter", used to emphasize the irrelevance of the identity of the actors.

As in many of the other interviews, we observe here a strategy where on the one hand negative opinions are given explicitly or implicitly, but the presuppositions or conclusions are matched with general norms, and then denied or quasi-denied. This is characteristic of this interviewee... He will use some rather general or hedged negative qualifications ('we shouldn't do this...') but will permanently formulate general norms of tolerance ('a Surinamese is not a less valuable person, A Turk is not less val... There ARE no less valuable persons...').

And if asked about unemployed foreigners, he sets up quite a long monological turn with arguments brought as facts ("we have fetched them" which however will usually be disclaimed ("if it is really so, that..."), it wouldn't be morally defensible to send them back, "but we will get problems"; especially housing, because their families will come, they will have (many) children, and normal construction programs cannot meet the demand.

"And that is impossible. So, that will go to pieces, it can't be different. To pieces, oh, yes I don't know how things are,
don't know there will be developments of course...". In other words, the strategy is to convince the interviewer to accept an opinion based on general economic and sociological "facts" and a personal conclusion ("impossible"), which however in its definiteness ("go to pieces") may come over as too negative, so that he feels the need to withdraw. The strategy, then, is to claim ignorance about the precise situation (I don't know).

In the few examples analysed so far, we have observed that the dialogical strategies are geared towards the solution of local interaction problems and puzzles. Direct opinions are asked and a normal component of interviews. Hence, that goal must be pursued in order to be a cooperative interviewee. On the other hand, many people are aware of the intricacies involved in expressing opinions about sensitive issues, and will therefore embed their opinions, if they are negative, within a framework which enables them to formulate a positive evaluation, to resort to face keeping and, generally, to make a tolerant and reasonable impression, acknowledging the general norms officially determining ethnic relations in the Netherlands. These conversational strategies, include, among many others, moves such as indirect speech acts, indirect or vague terms, avoiding direct answers, prefacing negative opinions with (sometimes exaggerated) positive ones, mitigating opinions, post hoc corrections, repairs in which less negative predicates are used, hesitation, avoiding concrete name designation, showing empathy, agreeing with interviewer (on positive aspects), making appeals to the interviewer to share an opinion or 'see a point, disclaim a (negative) conclusion of the interviewer, and so on.

A complete analysis of the interviews would be able to provide further details about the precise conditions of such moves, their specific locations, their possible orderings and frequencies, and maybe relationships with different classes of interviewees. The overall strategy of what we may call 'displaying norm (viz. tolerance) obedience', thus, is the major controlling process in the expression of attitudes as one of the many goals of (interview) interaction.

7.9. Integrative analysis

In the previous sections we have analysed some interview fragments at several levels of description: local coherence, general topics, stylistic and rhetorical structures, argumentation, storytelling and conversational strategies. It goes without saying that these levels, both in production and in comprehension, interact in complex ways. At several points, indeed, we have suggested how local semantic functions also have a conversational function.

How stylistic or rhetorical devices may be used in argumentation and how stories are embedded as justifications for opinions in argumentations, yet, the level-analytical approach, which is familiar in linguistics and discourse analysis, also has its drawbacks. It does not show how a speaker follows production strategies in which information at all levels is integrated. Therefore, one could also take just one fragment of an interview and show how the properties at the various levels are inextricably intertwined. Given the situational context (an interview), the local goals (giving answers to questions) and the global goals (cooperation and face keeping), the speaker needs to express fragments of experiences and opinions, or to provide new opinions about issues introduced by the interviewer. The production process, then, cannot simply be direct expression of opinions, but needs to realize several goals at the same time. This is a complex interactional problem. Precise lexical choice, sequencing of propositions, the use of hedging, setting up argumentation and narrative schemes, and rhetorical effectiveness, are processes that must go hand in hand. This will in general, as we have seen, not be a 'smooth' operation. On the contrary, there will be many hesitations, corrections, repairs, re-starts, false starts, etc. which signal the vast amount of information which must be controlled during execution of this complex conversational task. At each point, the speaker will get self-feedback and evaluates what has been said and how it may be interpreted. This means that corrections, denials, disclaimers, and generally mitigating moves may follow opinion statements.

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In an 'integral' analysis, then, it may be shown how all such forms of information cooperate within the contextual constraints of motivations and goals. Future work in this area will therefore have to reveal how the discourse exhibits all such interacting processes in production and comprehension.

7.10. Some Cognitive Implications

After the partial discourse analysis of the interviews, we now briefly have to return to the cognitive dimension. During our analysis we have repeatedly made assumptions about possible underlying 'meanings' of the respective textual properties. At some points these assumptions have been blatantly impressionistic, reflecting commonsense interpretations of what a speaker is doing or meaning when using some textual expression. Of course, given the cognitive assumptions made earlier about possible constraints on expressions, and given the fact that the textual properties are not ad hoc but characterise many of our interviews, we do have some grounds to formulate more serious hypotheses about the relations between cognition and discourse. What, then, are the cognitive implications of our discourse analysis? What underlying mechanisms and strategies are 'signalled' by the discourse? What can we conclude about the representation and use of ethnic opinions and attitudes?

Let us therefore resume the analysis of the various levels and see for each whether the provisional results allow such hypotheses.

Macrostructures. The analysis of semantic macrostructures, which represent the main topics or themes of the interviews, first of all shows us the more general cognitive principle of higher level organisation in the production of discourse. Macrostructures are necessary to be able to stay 'with' a topic and to organise each turn around a semantic 'point'. And conversely, in comprehension, which is an important component in communication and transmission of ethnic attitudes, macrostructures are the essential 'content' which for other social participants remain retrievable after taking part in a conversation about ethnic minorities. Details of style and subtle qualifications may get lost, and only the general 'themes' may be remembered: 'They have to adapt to Dutch norms', 'They are favoured in housing', 'They abuse our social security system', 'They are criminals'. These propositions are macropropositions. As such they need not at all be expressed in a conversation, but they may nevertheless be the 'upshot' of what is said, and it is this gist which is retrievably stored in memory, and with respect to which opinions and attitudes are formed. Indeed, negative opinions are part of rather general negative attitudes which have a stereotypical, schematic structure, and will always precisely concern these 'macropropositions'. These are indeed the topics the prejudiced conversations will be about, possibly expanded with local details and stories, which in their own right might be remembered as illustrations for the general topics.

Another cognitive implication of the macrostructural organisation of the interviews may be based on the sequencing of topics. Topics that are spontaneously initiated suggest underlying relevance structures in the attitudes. As may be expected within the socio-economic situation of the speaker, they will have a number of high level opinions, that organise their experiences and opinions at a more detailed level. In our case, these topics are e.g. preferential treatment in housing, street crime, deterioration of the city, unemployment, and cultural differences (food, clothing, religion). Other topics will come up only if situationally and personally relevant, e.g. education when the speaker has children at school. In general then we will assume that the macrostructure of the interviews reveals first of all the global 'contents' of the ethnic attitude, and secondly says something about their relevance structure and mutual links.

Local coherence. Propositions expressed by the discourse may have different functions relative to each other. We have seen that many of these functions are correlates of the cognitive transformations we have postulated in section 6.2. Thus, we have found that in many cases propositions are presupposed, mostly negative ones, which are not directly expressed; we have found that propositions can have negative implications,
can be vague, mitigate negative opinions or exaggerate positive ones or displace negative attributions to others, to the general situation or to the ethnic minorities themselves. Part of these semantic ‘transformations’ should be seen in the light of the interaction goals of the interviews. But precisely these strategic goals require that the speaker does not openly express negative opinions if these could be interpreted as being inconsistent with higher norms of tolerance. Hence, the speaker needs a whole battery of transformations which make underlying opinions less harsh or which explains them in a more favourable light. In this way each proposition can be ‘prepared’ by apparent denials or concessions, and may afterwards be qualified by corrections, mitigating or quasi-positive evaluations.

These assumptions not so much show how ethnic opinions are organised, but rather how they are used in actual processes of communication. Of course, the implied and the presupposed propositions, as well as the consistent form of conversationally relevant mitigation, also suggest what the ‘real’ opinions are. As soon as we find expressions of the type ‘It is POSITIVE, but NEGATIVE’, we may assume that the real opinion is negative and that the prefaced clause expresses an instantiation of a general norm. In the cognitive production process at the local level, this means that on the one hand general and more particular (experience) opinions are activated, but that under the control of the general norms of ‘tolerant’ behaviour, such opinions should be embedded in more neutral, positive or at least explanatory ones. And indeed, in local discourse planning and execution, these two sometimes conflicting goals will provide information which must be properly combined into one sentence or into subsequent sentences. Typically, then, the general norm will come first, in presupposed position (sometimes even in subordinate clauses), invariably followed by but or yet. We have seen that discourse production of this type can indeed be seen as a complex task, a problem to be solved, in such a way that different goals must be optimally realized, and this will require complex information processing in short term memory. As we will see also for the other levels, this means, as we have found, extensive hesitation, repair, ‘mistakes’, correction, and post hoc qualification.

Style and rhetoric. Stylistic variation in a more or less fixed context such as that of the interview situation will primarily indicate differences of a more individual nature. Thus, lexical choice may reflect of course differences in education and at the same time actual differences in emotional or personality ‘display’ or involvement. Thus, we saw that ethnic groups are often very simply referred to by pronouns, thus avoiding concrete identification of specific groups and a tendency to lump all together as one group of foreigners, as the out-group, THEM. Next, we have observed that mitigation also pervades lexical choice in the negative qualifications: very seldom the qualifying adjectives or verbs are colloquially ‘harsh’ (hardly any swear-words are used), as may be expected when talking to an unknown interviewer. These and other stylistic properties seem to point to the same cognitive principles mentioned above. Pronominal usage suggests a cognitive organisation in terms of US and THEM. Mitigating expressions again suggest that underlying concepts are lexically realised in more or less tolerant terms during processing. And finally, the frequent use of generalisations points to a strategic avoidance, during production, of personal opinions. Indeed, we will find many instances of neutral ‘one’ or ‘you’ as generic pronouns, also to signal consensus of the opinion expressed.

Related to the local semantic functions, we found that the rhetorical operations involved in these interviews, signal the underlying production strategies and the permanent interaction between conflicting goals. Rhetorical devices are used to effectively reach a communicative goal, in our case to express opinions in acceptable terms and, possibly, even to convince the interviewer. Perhaps the most significant figures of speech used in our interviews, then, are literal (understatement) and exaggeration (overstatement). Typically, nearly all negative opinions will be formulated in forms of an understatement, and the positive ones in an overstatement. The cognitive function of these operations is clear: it allows the speaker to express an opinion but to do so in a form which is sometimes non-committal, and which cannot be used ‘against him’, e.g. as a racist form of talk, whereas overstatement of positive evaluations first emphasizes the tolerance of the speaker and
secondly no, to speak neutralizes possible negative opinions expressed in the same context. Indeed, the cognitive implications we discuss here are not limited to production, but should also be seen from the point of view of comprehension: the hearer should construct not only a representation of the discourse and of the opinions of the speaker, but will also construct a model of the speaker, and the way the speaker expresses him- or herself will vitally contribute to the construction of this model ('le style c'est l'homme même').

Another rhetorical operation with interesting cognitive implications is contrast. Many of the interviews show a consistent tendency to construct actions, events and situations, not only around the focal group concepts (US and THEM), but also around the contrast, or even the conflict of goals, interests, norms, habits, values, behaviour of these groups. So, we will have it that explicitly or implicitly each property or behaviour of the outgroup is (negatively) compared to that of the ingroup: we work hard, they don't; we don't get housing, they do, etc. This operation seems to suggest, first, a binary structure in group schemata, involving the many points where differences or opposition in involved. Not so much the properties or the behaviour which is general or similar to that of US will be part of the typical group schema, but rather the 'deviant' information. Also, the rhetorical operation suggests - due to its essentially strategic and interactional nature - underlying processes in the use and the expression of opinions. If the speaker merely would express what the others do or not do, the effect is less convincing perhaps: stating that the others have late parties at night is certainly more negative as soon as it is combined with the information that we have to get up early in the morning to go to work. In conversation, thus, such a device nets off the difference and the conflict involved, and may therefore lead to corresponding representation of the problem in the hearer.

Argumentation Argumentation is primarily a cognitive schema assigned to discourse intended to show the truth or plausibility of a statement. This means that during production, a speaker may well find that the mere expression of an opinion is not convincing enough. Hence the need to supply facts, experiences, general norms and values, and in general reasons for the opinion. Cognitively, such argumentation is not only interesting from a persuasive point of view, whereby the hearer is provided further grounded for the comprehension and acceptance of a statement. Also it shows what kind of information a speaker uses to support an opinion or attitude. It shows how he or she views the social situation, which properties of ethnic minorities are taken as 'objective' ground for forming an opinion, and in general what the 'logic' is behind the opinions, attitudes, and the ways they are communicated. Indeed, the arguments used as premises are themselves often stereotypical: scarce housing, unemployment, cultural 'strangeness', and in general lack of adaptation are used as generalised premises to make a point about specific groups. And conversely, some few personal or indirect experiences with neighbours are taken as sufficient grounds for generalised negative opinions. The traditional characterisation of stereotypes and prejudice as 'overgeneralisations' can be substantiated in more detail if in effect we analyse in detail the argumentative strategies used by social members to present or to defend their opinions. And finally, the more concrete premises used as reasons for generalised opinions, show something about on the one hand the hierarchical relations between opinions (what follows from what?), and on the other hand indicates more specifically the salient contents of the situation models people have about their interactions with minorities. Concrete experiences, thus represented, will typically be activated as moves in a strategic argumentation.

Stories. This link between discourse structure and the contents of episodic memory is especially clear in stories used in the interviews. Nothing more convincing, and nothing better memorable than a 'good story'. Hence, a story will usually come up to make a point in an argumentation. If the general topic of housing is 'active', the general opinion they ruin their apartments' may be implicitly or explicitly expressed. As support for such an opinion a detailed picture may be sketched about what the speaker has seen with his/her own eyes.

Another relevant aspect of storytelling is the very structure
of stories. They conventionally should be about some interesting and 'deviant' event. Hence, deviant behaviour, such as aggression, conflicts, strange habits (slaughtering sheep in the back of a car), and the way people threaten our daily life, are 'excellent' complications for narrative structures. Most classically, the outgroup, or some outgroup member, can in that case play the role of the villain, and the ingroup (or we, or I), the role of the hero or the victim. Conflict, constraints, fights, and strange events are the dynamics of such stories. This seems to suggest that story structure also exhibits the cognitive organisation of opinions and attitudes. Social reality, indeed, can be represented as an ongoing 'play', with different roles; those of villains and heroes or victims, with classical conflicts and stereotypical actions. The scenario for events or interactions with ethnic minorities, thus, seems to be part of the situation model we have and perhaps even of the general attitude.

Conversational strategies. All the structures and strategies mentioned above are organised in the overall structure and strategies of adequate dialogue. We have repeatedly observed that the speaker has to perform such that two, sometimes conflicting goals are realised, viz. present opinions in a plausible but convincing way and at the same time present him- or herself as a reasonable, likeable and non-radical person. We have found that the local semantic functions, the style and the rhetoric, the argumentation and the stories all contribute to the effective enactment of the conversational moves that lead to such goals. More specifically, we found in the conversations that people have a real 'hard time' to perform the task 'on line'. They will hesitate, repeat, correct, repair, make false starts, etc. to find the precise formulation which satisfies both strategies. Indeed, the conversational procedures clearly exhibit some of the fundamental properties of production. The permanent hesitations indicate not just 'trouble' in formulating, but rather trouble in formulating the adequate and acceptable answer and hence signal social norms.

In cognitive terms, as we saw earlier, this means that propositions retrieved on-line from attitude schemata and from episodic models (concrete personal experiences or stories about these) are permanently monitored by representations of social norms and interaction norms, represented during the dialogue in the control system. In order to be able to participate in the dialogical interaction, we must also assume that speakers have a model of the current context and the current interaction going on besides of course a representation of the dialogue, otherwise post hoc mitigation and correction would be impossible, among many other things. This model of the current interaction will also feature a partial model of the interviewer and this will allow the speaker to formulate opinions in such a way that they are optimal moves in the complex action of 'convincing' the interviewer. As soon as a speaker would be engaged in an encounter with friends who share his or her opinions, this model of the other speech participant is much more complete. In that case the role of persuasion is much less prominent; stories about personal experiences with ethnic minorities or the expansion of opinions in that case serve the social function of maintaining the social links with other members of the in-group, or rather with the 'inner in-group', by confirming shared beliefs, opinions and values. Interactionally it is important in the interviews though that the speaker shows cooperation with the interviewer, and therefore, we indeed find several moves of apparent agreement. These are those propositions attributed to (and maybe in fact expressed by) the interviewer, to which the next move the BUT-move follows. Such strategic moves indeed suggest how production takes place as a function of an interaction of own opinions and beliefs of interviewers as represented in the model of the communicative context. Note that these cognitive hypotheses appear plausible in the light of our cognitive model of discourse comprehension and production, but that a full scale cognitive model of conversational interaction does not yet exist. We have only begun to grasp the complexity of the task of keeping track during processing of own and other's local moves, of the content of the discourse so far, of the speech acts, of the interactional moves and of
the whole communicative context. Here it is not only relevant that opinions are matched with general norms and values, but at the same time that talk about them must be matched with norms and values of cooperative and yet effectful conversational interaction.

8. Conclusions and open problems

8.1. In this preliminary study of the ethnic attitudes about minorities in the Netherlands and of the ways these are expressed in interviews we have sketched a cognitive model for the representation and the use of prejudice. This inquiry has been placed first of all within the framework of our earlier work on cognitive processes of discourse comprehension and especially on the role of opinions and attitudes in understanding. Secondly, it has been emphasised that such a cognitive model should be inserted in a more complex model of social interaction among groups. That is, it has been assumed that the ethnic beliefs of Dutch people are formed, transformed and used within the wider historical and socio-cultural context of colonial history, and culturally transmitted beliefs through conversation, text books and literature about ethnic group in the former colonies. More in particular it has been shown that ethnic attitudes in the last thirty years have been shaped in a socio-economic context of immigration of foreign workers and people from Surinam who are perceived, especially in the seventies, as competitors for scarce housing and job resources. Data from survey research about opinions regarding ethnic minorities suggest that at least half of the population has or less negative attitudes about at least some aspect of the presence of such minorities in the Dutch social structure.

Against this background elements of a model of social cognition were formulated, such as properties of the processes underlying the understanding of events and social actions, as well as the group schemata developed during direct or indirect interactions with ethnically different groups. Data drawn from non-directed interviews suggest what the opinions are about ethnic minorities and what the underlying relevance structure is of such opinions. More importantly, suggestions have been made about the ways such opinions are actually used in processes of evaluation, and how such opinions may be transformed during expression.
B.2. Next, we have sketched a cognitive model of discourse processing, and in particular of discourse production in dialogical contexts. It has been shown that discourse processing is a strategic operation in which three types of information are concurrently managed, viz. information from the ongoing dialogue (such as current macrostructural topic and previous moves), information from the social context and the communicative interaction, and presupposed beliefs, such as knowledge, opinions and attitudes.

A systematic discourse analysis of the interviews was given in order to highlight first of all the ways opinions are expressed in discourse and to show how they are sometimes autonomous constraints of effective and appropriate conversational interaction. Thus, we have reviewed how topics (semantic macrostructures) are introduced and connected, what topics are most relevant, and how such topics organise the lower level semantic information expressed in subsequent turns, moves, speech acts and sentences of a dialogue. Similarly, we have seen that local coherence is obtained by a number of principles in which each sentence or move can be assigned a specific function relative to previous or following sentences or moves (e.g. mitigation, presupposition, contrast, or displacement). Stylistic cues were analysed to show what the actual variation can be in the lexical and syntactic formulation of underlying opinions, whereas rhetorical structures were described in terms of their effectiveness in getting across such opinions (e.g. by operations of understatement and overstatement, quasi-hesitation, contrast, etc.).

It appeared that socially 'tricky' opinions such as those about ethnic minorities will often require argumentation, that is, the display of a number of reasons, facts, assumptions or other 'evidence' which makes opinion conclusions plauibe and defensible. Part of such argumentations, typically, constitute stories about personal experiences, in which the behaviour of ethnic minorities, conflicting interactions, grievances, and interpretations of the social context can be formulated in terms of personal experiences. And finally, all these structures are embedded within the complex framework of conversational strategies, in which there is competition between the goal of self-expression and the goal of cooperative interaction and positive impression formation. It has appeared that at all these levels of analysis similar underlying meanings and functions can be detected, from the choice of words and the conversational hesitations (reparies, corrections, pauses, errors, etc.) to the semantic functions of sentences, the stylistic and rhetorical devices, the macro-topics and their ordering, to the conversational strategies. Thus, we found a consistent pattern of leaving presuppositions implicit, being indirect, vagueness, mitigation and understatement, establishing contrast between US and THEM, of attribution of negative properties to others or to the social situation, of positive self-presentation (or self-victimisation), of awareness of socially desirable norms and values, and of denial of negative attributions, to name only these.

Secondly, we have tried to link all these discourse features with 'underlying' properties of the representation and the use of opinions, and we found some confirmation of the earlier hypotheses about the transformation of opinions during expression. We have found that opinions can be drawn from general attitudes as well as from situation models, and we have seen that during production the expression of opinions is permanently monitored by general social norms and values about ethnic attitudes themselves as well as about the admissible ways of expressing these in social situations. Thus, the social strategies of adequate cooperation in dialogue—and indirectly of coping with an important social issue ('living with ethnically different groups')—thus seem reflected in the interplay of a complex system of cognitive strategies: how can we express our opinions and at the same time come across as a reasonable person? The conversational structures are rather subtle indications of this underlying process of problem solving.
Within the larger context of studies about racism and prejudice, our study has perhaps suggested some new ways of dealing with some important components of these complex phenomena. More than in most other studies, even our preliminary analysis has gone into the details of a model of social cognition, by specifying the kind of cognitive units, forms of organisation, processes and strategies and general memory constraints which determine the transformation of group schemata, stereotypes and negative ethnic attitudes. Instead of doing experimental research about such cognitive processing, we have tried to find evidence for such underlying processes in the respective structures of interview discourse. That is, more than in other studies, we have analysed the details of the ways such personal (though socially shared and formed) beliefs become apparent and hence social. We thereby were able to get some insight into one of the important ways ethnic attitudes show up in (conversational) interaction, and how they can be "learned", spread and accepted in social groups.

Yet, these are only first steps. Even within the boundaries of our own theoretical purposes, perhaps more questions have come up than actually solved. As such, that is fine: this study is also meant to generate new ways of dealing with prejudice and racism, not only from a cognitive but also from a social point of view. Let us therefore try to formulate a number of problems which need much further research, both theoretical and empirical:

a. Ethnic attitudes are (trans-)formed in socio-cultural contexts. This means that a full understanding of prejudice in the Netherlands requires a more thorough, descriptive and theoretical, analysis of race relations--and their history--in this country. We know scandalously little about the history and actual forms of ethnocentrism, prejudice and racism in Dutch culture and society.

b. The data for this preliminary study were not socially based in the sense that interviews were systematically collected in different urban and non-urban settings or neighbourhoods, or among people from different social categories (age, gender, education, profession, status, income, etc.). In order to give a qualitative analysis of the interviews with people of different backgrounds, we may be able to provide the necessary deeper insight into variable prejudice structures and strategies of expression and "handling" than the (few) survey data we have.

c. Whatever recent work in psychology and AI has provided about structures and processes of discourse and the role of beliefs, there are still many white spots on the cognitive map. Our discussion about the organisation of opinions and attitudes, in particular those related to group schemata, is still very much tentative and incomplete. We simply do not have a full-scale model of person and group representation, and we know still virtually nothing about the internal structures and external relations of a system of (ethnic) attitudes.

d. Similarly, how attitudes and opinions are actually used during processing, e.g. in-discourse production, but also in the participation in social events, is a problem we only know some gross principles about. We only can guess about the precise strategies in which people handle (ethnic) opinions, discourse structures and communicative context information at the same time, and how they go about realising different, and sometimes conflicting goals during interviewing and, more in general, during conversation and interaction.

e. We have made some suggestions about the links between such a cognitive model of ethnic attitudes and a social model of prejudice and racism, e.g. by showing how the expression of opinions is an essential part of consensus formation, group solidarity and racist interaction, and by showing how social categories, such as persons, actions, and groups are cognitively represented, and thus determines all social interaction. However, these were mere suggestions. Representations of social context and structure are no more than skeletal, whereas we know barely nothing about the social conditions and constraints on opinion transmission in everyday interaction and talk. We still have to investigate when, where, and under what conditions people will typically talk about ethnic issues.
f. And finally, the very discourse analysis performed here is still very fragmentary. The various levels are known and have been investigated in some detail in more general terms in many previous studies, but we know very little about specific discourse types, such as interviews and dialogues about particular issues, such as ethnic experiences. At several points (such as in the analysis of local semantic functions) we simply had to invent a list of functional categories in order to relevantly account for our data. We may assume that similar functions also appear in dialogues about other topics. What we need, thus, is a theory of discourse analysis which is much more articulated in order to account for the kind of language data we are here confronted with. Such a theory cannot be monodisciplinary. We have seen that many of the discourse levels and categories investigated on the one hand appear to be linked to underlying cognitive structures and processes, whereas on the other hand they are simply instantiations of more general social principles of interaction. Discourse, cognition and social structure may up to a certain point be studied in their own right, but as soon as we have to deal with concrete issues such as prejudice, a strict multidisciplinary approach is imperative: social structure and interaction must be also assigned a cognitive basis and be studied in particular for its actual manifestations, e.g. as discourse, whereas on the other hand cognitions come about, are transformed and used in contexts of social interaction, often via discourse. The complexities involved, hence, can only be understood if our model of prejudice represents all these relationships. This study sketches only some outlines for such a model. Most of the work must still be done.

4. A final remark. Our study is very theoretical and descriptive. It sheds some light about prejudice in the Netherlands. But it does not provide even one suggestion how prejudice could be avoided or influenced in a more positive direction of mutual tolerance. From our study however it may have become clear that the (trans-) formation and social manifestation of prejudice is an extremely complex phenomenon. There is no way simple policies can change such intricate and deep-seated attitudes and racist ideologies. We have found further confirmation of the old insight that ethnic attitudes are closely related with emotional 'stuff' such as fear, anger and aggression related to socio-economic situations (housing, work, social security) everyday interaction (street, shops, neighbours) and cultural differences and conflicts.

Hence, in order to change prejudices we must change huge attitudinal and ideological systems, and to change these we need to change their social basis: the economical situation, everyday interaction, and so on. No wonder actual policy will often make the shortcut and impose norms (viz. 'laws') for action first, so that often attitudes will follow. This also holds for the Dutch situation. Without adequate anti-racist and anti-discrimination laws, without the thoroughly-implemented anti-racist organisation and actions of the institutions (government, parliament, local authorities) themselves, there is no hope that people on their own will let prevail social norms above the constraints of the sometimes difficult socio-economic situation.

In this light, though, our study is less distant from what really goes on in Dutch ethnic relations. We have come to know a little bit about how the autonomous people think and talk about ethnic minorities. This means that we have at least some educated guesses about how ethnic prejudice is socially formed, spread, influenced, shared, communicated and accepted. Obviously, the rest of the story has to come from analysis of the media, school text books and lessons, literature and comics books, and institutional discourse. Since in the Netherlands the latter are however seldom overtly racist, it is a sound hypothesis that prejudice spreads mainly through informal communication; the media in this respect are providing only the 'data' used in the actual formation of opinions and attitudes.

There is another point in which the study of prejudice and talk is relevant. Ethnic minorities suffer from many forms of discrimination, e.g. in finding jobs, housing and adequate service or by discriminatory interaction on the street, in shops or institutions. There can be no doubt that an important part of the discrimination felt by them comes from talk: the kind of topics, ways of address, politeness cues, speech acts, and
strategies of conversation, may all show—as we have seen—the underlying opinions and attitudes of the speaker. It is well known from the history of the study of racism that people very often do not do what they say, and conversely, simply because action is a function of much more than just 'isolated' opinions. Yet, discriminatory talk is action, and we have reason to believe that ethnic minorities suffer from it no less than from other kinds of discriminatory behaviour.
NOTES

In this study many issues and several disciplines are addressed and it is therefore impossible to fully account for all relevant earlier work. Therefore the references given in these notes have been limited to some essential studies providing the background of the discussion in this paper. The reader should consult these studies for further references.

1. Although it indeed seems the case that prejudice is usually assigned to individual persons, it does not mean that group-prejudice is not an everyday concept. Notably, the ethnic minority themselves will of course in this way rightfully use the term in order to qualify attitudes of the white Dutch majority. In everyday usage among members of this majority though, a distinction will be made between people who are more or less prejudiced and people who are not. We will see below that in a theoretical analysis it may become clear that prejudice, though individually variable in its forms and manifestations, is a group phenomenon.

2. The term 'social cognition' has been recently used more and more to denote the specific object of study of a 'cognitive social psychology'. (Carroll & Payne, 1976; Wer & Carleton, 1979; Kieser, 1980; Zeajc, 1968)

3. We use the word 'social attitude' here to emphasize that prejudice is not, or at least not merely, a 'personal' attitude. Most recent work on prejudice stresses this social dimension of prejudice, at least since Allport's classical study (1954), which is still the most comprehensive theoretical statement. See also Bettelheim & Janowitz (1964), and the surveys by Chesler (1976) and Anspore & Del Broca (1976) for details and further references.

4. For a recent review of work on the acquisition of racial attitudes (in children), see Katz (1976). There seems to be less work on the acquisition of prejudice by adults.

5. The role of discourse and communication in the (trans-)formation of prejudice has often been mentioned but little studied from a systematic point of view. If we disregard for the moment labora-

tory studies using texts in the experimental manipulation of prejudice especially textbooks and the media, have received attention, though, as possible communicative channels for the distribution of prejudice. See Hartmann & Husband (1974) for the methodology on prejudice in textbooks. The time on prejudice in textbooks is mostly of the content analytic type and does not investigate possible effects (for which we again refer to Katz's study, 1976).

6. Few classical studies seem to explicitly frame a theory of prejudice in terms of person and group interaction, and yet, most descriptive work on the everyday realities of racism precisely provide the data for such a theoretical framework. A clear group-interactional paradigm is the work of Tajfel, now collected in Tajfel (1981).

7. Though closely related to the problem of (inter-group) interaction, situations have not been systematically studied as 'contexts' for prejudice. For general and theoretical statements about the role of the situation on interaction, see Argyle, Furnham & Graham (1981).

8. That prejudice is systematically related to social and institutional structures has been shown in many studies, e.g. Allport (1954), Simpson & Yinger (1972); see the survey of Chesler (1976) and the recent introduction by Blalock (1982).

9. The relations between Dutch (colonial) history and the growth of prejudice and racism in the Netherlands have not yet been systematically investigated. For a number of historical remarks, see Bagley (1973).

10. For a brief comparison of the historical backgrounds of racism in Europe, see Kiernan (1982).

11. This statement requires some qualification. First, when we talk about adults, we mean those who grew up before the immigration of large groups of foreigners in the Netherlands (at the end of the forties until the seventies). Secondly, although socialisation might not explicitly have been in terms of ethnic group differences, contacts or conflicts, they may well have been more implicit attitude formation in family and peer groups relative to ethnically different groups. Thus, the media, literature and textbooks (see below) may well have had some feedback in primary socialisation practices, such as family talk about relevant racial issues. And finally, the very 'white' homogeneity of Dutch society until the 1950-ies must have created in more or less conscious self-image about Dutch and white ethnicity. That it was admitted and understood so late that, after immigration of hundreds of thousands of 'foreigners', the Netherlands in fact had become a multi-ethnic society, may be an indication of this deep-rooted feeling about this country as to be essentially 'white' and for Dutch people only. And it would be hard to believe that such a form of ethnic consciousness would not also have been formed during primary socialisation.

12. For a description of Dutch social structure and its reaction to ethnically different groups, see Bagley (1973). It should be emphasised however that this study, due to its comparative nature, gives a much too positive picture of Dutch prejudice and racism, even for the end of the sixties. Though the study of the 'fieldwork', Bagley's methods of research simply did not allow to fully grasp the everyday interaction and reality in the Netherlands. Even if the situation was, in some respects, more positive than in England, prejudice and everyday racism did occur frequently enough. For a more recent investigation, of Moluccans, see Veenman & Janmaat (1981).

13. See the remarks in note 11.

14. See Reinders (1969) for a historical study of the situation of Jews in the Netherlands, and for a critical assessment of the frequent lack of the often assumed tolerance regarding Jews in this country.

15. In another preliminary investigation within the larger research programme about "Ethnic Minorities in Discourse", we have analyzed
16. For a study of (children’s) literature and the portrayal of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, see Redmond (1980).

17. There has been little research into the issue of the representation of ethnic minorities in mass media discourse in the Netherlands. Bovenkerk & Bovenkerk-Teerink did a study about Surinamese and Antillians in the press, paying attention especially to the mention of ethnic/national background in crime reporting. See Bovenkerk (1970). In the framework of two courses we have done a more general study of the portrayal of ethnic minorities in the press. Except again for the mention of ethnic or national origin in crime news in some conservative and popular newspapers, we did not find forms of explicit racism, but more subtle forms of negative presuppositions, implications and suggestions, as well as general ignorance, in the moment of ethnic groups and their problems. In general, though it may be said that the average newspaper reader will, on the basis of the information, make associations between foreigners and a number of social problems, such as housing, work and general immigration policies. Results of these studies will be reported in a study now in preparation on "News in the Netherlands", in which also reporting of squatters will be analysed.

18. Of all issues related to ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, education is perhaps given most attention. There has been an extensive government policy statement (positive in intention, but criticised by minority groups, because of its lack of concrete - financial, and other - implementation). Publication in this area is extensive, but we will not try to mention all relevant reports, policy statements, and journal articles here. Much of this is at the level of practical every-day work with "hi-cultural" (as it is still often called) education in (primary) schools.

19. Despite the considerable number of studies about ethnic minorities and immigration in the Netherlands, there has been little work on discrimination and racism. Only in 1979, it was Bovenkerk who published a number of earlier studies by himself and his associates, to demonstrate everyday discrimination patterns in housing, work, police attitudes, etc. Some of this work is in a way now, but still far from comparable with e.g. the rich tradition in England in the study of discrimination.

20. A few riots with racial causes or context took place some years ago in a suburb of Rotterdam and in a well-known minority quarter in The Hague. See Bouw, Donselaar & Nelissen (1981).

21. There is a large number of small ultra-conservative and fascist groups in the Netherlands though. See Bouw, Donselaar & Nelissen for details. Especially one party, the "Nederlandse Volks-Unie" (Netherlands Popular Union), has received a lot of (critical) attention in the press and collected some thousands of votes, especially in The Hague. They never managed to get a seat in the Town council though, nor a seat in parliament in the last elections. At present there have been several lawsuits against the party, and its current competitor (Centrum-Partij). According to Dutch law they cannot be forbidden to participate in the elections (and they do so now on a nameless list), but in May 1982, a judge in Amsterdam ruled that their propaganda, in which frequent mention is made about the negative role of 'foreigners' in the Netherlands, is not allowed to mention 'true' facts, or facts "out of context" about ethnic minorities.

22. That prejudice is not a sufficient condition for discriminatory action, has been shown many times in the literature, after LaPiere’s initial study (1934). See also Kutner, Wilkins & Yarrow (1973/1952). Triandis (1974). For a more general treatment about the relations between attitudes and 'behaviour', see Cushman & McPhee (1980).

23. The important role of 'definitions of the situation' by social members has been stressed in much recent work in social psychology and micro-sociology. See Argyle et al. (1980: 36 ff.) for survey of this issue. See also Brittan (1973).

24. This mutual categorisation and evaluation of social members has received attention from several points of view, both in 'theories of inter-personal perception and attraction (see Eiser, 1980, for survey), and in micro-sociology (see e.g. Brittan, 1973).

25. For a detailed analysis of situational factors, see Argyle et al. (1981).

26. Especially in ethnomethodology it has been emphasised that social structure should be analysed in terms of members' categories. See e.g. Turner (1974) and Mehan & Wood (1975). These researchers however would certainly not engage in evaluative or critical research on topics such as prejudice and discrimination, but rather study the everyday mechanisms involved in dealing with others (and institutions).

27. The role of economic competition has frequently been studied as an important factor of prejudice and racism. For a recent survey, see Blalock (1982).

28. There is no systematic study of the role of the churches in The Netherlands in the ethnic situation. For more remarks, see Bagley (1973).

29. See note 21.
The legal situation of (anti-)discrimination in the Netherlands is somewhat confused. Of course, discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, or race in constitutionally prohibited, and the penal code also contains anti-discrimination paragraphs. Given the completely new ethnic situation in the Netherlands from the fifties onwards, however, no special laws have been made to counter racial or ethnic discrimination. A recent project for an anti-discrimination law was especially dealing with discrimination on the basis of sex or kinds of sexual orientation (e.g. homosexuality) and prohibits discrimination on the job and in services. Due to a concerted action of conservative forces in the church (which for instance want to keep the right to not hire homosexuals or unmarried people living together as teachers in religious schools), this law might eventually not make it in parliament (where the Christian democrats have decisive power). The current laws then, provide for cases of racial discrimination, but there is for instance not a possibility as required by the United Nations that racism parties should be forbidden. There is a fierce debate at the moment whether such parties should be allowed to participate in the elections. Decisions of various legal or administrative bodies have been ambiguous or conflicting in this matter. See Aras Aqul (1981).

It is well-known that the police, especially in the larger towns, such as Amsterdam, has been far from mild in the treatment of ethnic minorities, especially black suspects of crimes or misdemeanors. See Froomeijer & Hanning (1979) for the racial prejudices of policemen in Amsterdam.

The situation of the media regarding ethnic minorities is somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, Dutch newspapers and TV are certainly not openly racist, at least much less so than some English popular newspapers (see Hartman & Husband, 1974. Fowler et al. 1979). One popular newspaper, De Telegraaf, which is conservative, is well-known for mentioning the ethnic background of defendants in crimes of violence (see also Bovenkerk, 1978, for an earlier study of this issue). On the whole, however, newspapers will have a rather liberal stance regarding ethnic minorities, but will at the same time report the ethnic situation at least in terms of 'problems' (for the majority). These social 'facts' (e.g. of immigration), may well be used by readers as 'evidence' for the negative attitudes about minorities. A study about ethnic minorities in the press, conducted by a group of students and myself, will be reported shortly.

Also the attitudes of the unions about ethnic minorities has been ambivalent in the Netherlands. Of course they do not endorse racist positions, but in the light of growing unemployment their members will hardly allow extensive positive action 'for the rights of foreign workers.' See van de Velde & van Velzen (1970).

For a general picture of racism in the Netherlands, see Bovenkerk (ed.) (1979). Whereas terms such as 'prejudice' and 'discrimination' are generally accepted as expressions of ethnic attitudes and action, there has been some reluctance to accept a term such as 'racism,' which for many Dutch people is associated with fascism or South African 'apartheid,' or with small right wing racist parties. It is therefore understandable that even the smaller everyday actions of discrimination are part of a more general racial attitude as soon as they are based on colour differences.

35. For further data about immigration in the sixties and seventies, see e.g. WRR (1979), van Amersfoort (1974) and Schumacher (1980).

36. For studies about the language difficulties of children of foreign immigrants, see e.g. Aguoli et al. (eds.) (1980) and Verwee (ed.) (1981).

37. For the immigration and position of earlier groups of foreign workers, such as Italians and Spaniards, see Bagley (1973), WRR (1979), Schumacher (1980) and van Amersfoort (1974).

38. Immigration from Indonesia, the former Dutch East Indies, has taken place after its independence in 1948 and throughout the fifties. It has been especially the group of Moluccans, who always fought for an independent state of the South Moluccans, which has remained more or less socially separate in Dutch society. See Bagley (1973) for details, though he seems to underestimate, as elsewhere in his book, the prejudices and the discrimination towards Indonesians among the Dutch population. In the recent Lagendijk (1980) report, negative attitudes towards Moluccans are rather high. See also Veerman & Jansma (1981).

39. The cognitive approach to prejudice in social psychology has always been part of a larger study of prejudice, after the early example of Allport (1954). Notions such as attitude, categorization, stereotypes, and inter-group perception are typical elements of such a cognitive approach (see e.g. Jones, 1972). For the most consistent recent development in the cognitive social psychology of prejudice and racism, see Tajfel (1981).

40. The classical notions of cognitive congruence, balance, dissonance, etc. have often been used in the study of prejudiced attitudes. For general survey, see Abelson et al. (eds.) (1960). See also Rokeach (1960, 1973). Tajfel (1981: 136 ff.) uses the more general term of 'coherence' in order to stress the overall unity of norms and attitudes of groups. We also favour this term, since it does not exclude apparent inconsistency and may be defined in more rigorous terms than e.g. balance, congruence or dissonance.

41. The more traditional study of prejudice also deals with attitudes, and may also occasionally use the term 'cognitive,' but has a much more superficial link with cognitive representations. Thus, prejudiced attitudes in that research will typically be assessed by scaling techniques or factor analyses. For a recent study, see e.g. Bagley et al. (1979) and references given there.

42. Our approach has its roots in the 'information processing' paradigm, now well established for at least ten years in cognitive psychology. See e.g. Lindsay & Norman (1972) for an introduction, and Kintsch (1977) for further reading and references.
44. The notion of 'schema', originally introduced mainly in the seminal work of Bartlett (1932), has been picked up in much work in current cognitive psychology. See e.g. Norman & Rumelhart (1975). The more specific notion of 'script', due to Abelson, is studied in detail in Schank & Abelson (1977). See also Bobrow & Collins, eds. (1975).

45. There is a growing literature about the cognitive processes involved in the understanding of actions and events. Besides the already mentioned work by Schank & Abelson (1977), see e.g. Schmidt (1976) and Lichtenstein & Brewer (1980). See also several chapters in Hastie et al., eds. (1980).

46. The more general theory of action from which some of the notions used here are borrowed comprises a large body of studies, mainly in philosophy. See van Dijk (1977) for details and references.

47. The psychological theory of understanding action has been mainly developed along lines sketched by work in artificial intelligence. Especially the notion of 'goal' has been fundamental in such work (see Schank & Abelson, 1977; Wilensky, 1978).

48. The attribution theory of action understanding has been mainly a paradigm in social psychology and hardly in cognitive psychology. See Heider (1958), Kelley (1955) and Jones et al. (1971). Just like the artificial intelligence theory of action, this theory is about 'causes' of action, though not conceptualised in terms of goals, but rather in terms of intuitively assigned (attributed) internal (personality) or external (contextual) causes.

49. The notion of 'script' rather pertains to knowledge about stereotypical episodes, consisting of routine actions. See especially Schank & Abelson (1977), although Abelson (1973) originally used it for 'belief' schemata, e.g. as parts of political ideologies.

50. For person and group schemata and memory, see Hastie, et al., eds. (1980).

51. For studies of group perception and categorisation, see Tajfel (1981) and references given there.

52. The 'maximum difference' strategy is part of a more general process of polarisation. See Tajfel (1981).

53. One major social psychological approach to prejudice has indeed been the study of stereotypes. For some recent studies, see again Tajfel (1981), and also Taylor et al. (1976) and Hamilton (1976).

54. The notion of belief, opinion and attitudes have been of central interest in social psychology. See e.g. Fishbein & Ajzen (1975) for a recent survey and further references to a vast literature, which cannot possibly even be summarized here.

55. Current work in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence provides new ways for the study of beliefs, opinions and attitudes, e.g. after the seminal earlier work of Abelson (1973, 1976). See e.g. Carbonell, Jr. (1979). Van Dijk (1980) summarizes a number of earlier working papers on these notions, formulated in the terms of that paradigm.

56. The notion of 'relevance' has been repeatedly come up in recent work on discourse understanding. See van Dijk (1979) for a summary of the uses of this notion.

57. Besides the work mentioned earlier, we should at least recall here that there are many other approaches to prejudice and racial discrimination. See e.g. Blalock (1982) and Husband, ed. (1982) for two recent—and rather different—studies in this area.

58. Ethnomethodology, taken as the study of everyday life, cannot in principle assign negative evaluations to how people go about organising their social reality and interaction, but at most study, in such detail, how people go about categorising (also in terms of evaluations) other persons and groups. See Sundahl, ed. (1972), Turner, ed. (1974) and Mohan & Wood (1975) for readers and introduction.

59. Emotions rather than cognitions have been studied rather widely in classical work on prejudice, especially anxiety, aggression and fear. See Bagley & et al. (1979) for survey. See Cooper & Singer (1956).

60. Within this wider field of 'emotive' causes of prejudice, the psycho-analytical approach to (fascist, ethnocentrist or authoritarian) personality has been dominating for many years, initially mainly inspired by Adorno et al. (1950). See again Bagley et al. (1979) for further survey.

61. Cognitive theories of emotion are rather recent. See e.g. Bowl (1980).

62. Zajonc (1960) argues that affective evaluations may precede certain cognitive operations: we sometimes may 'feel' even before we understand.

63. The systematic study of values and norms in psychology has been dominated by the work of Rokeach (1960, 1973, 1979).

64. Despite a vast amount of work on ideologies in the political sciences, in philosophy and sociology, there has been little psychological, let alone cognitive, work on ideologies. As a conservative response to the Adorno school, Eysenck (e.g. Eysenck & Wilson, 1970) has tried to trace the personality factors of ideologies. Carbonell, Jr. (1979) provides a more explicit description, in terms of a computer program, of ideological belief systems, after the early seminal work of Abelson (1973).
65. It is often stressed (e.g. in Huband, ed. 1982) that prejudice and racism are intimately linked with western and capitalist attitudes, ideologies and socio-economic systems. This does not mean that prejudice and ethnic discrimination does or cannot occur in other societies, but that the intimate links between capitalism and colonialism form a predominant historical background for the nature and the development of racism and socio-economic power relations in the Western world (see Blauner, 1962, for a brief recent discussion).

66. We have limited our research to those minority groups in the Netherlands which at the moment appear to be in the focus of 'public awareness', and hence of negative attitudes, viz. Surinamese and foreign workers from Morocco and Turkey. Indonesians (except Moluccans) are very much represented and hardly considered a 'foreign' group. In fact, they are never mentioned in our interviews—which does not mean at all of course that they would not suffer from individual actions of prejudice and discrimination. The same holds for foreign workers from Italy, Spain and Portugal, who also already have integrated to a certain extent and not perceived as a primary target group for negative attitudes. In other words, we have isolated those groups which are generally discussed and perceived at the moment as the primary (and largest) minority groups, and it is not accidental that exactly those groups are racially and ethnically (culturally) different from other immigrant groups.

67. In our interviews, but also in our work, mentioned above, about the position of minorities in the press, it appers that the perception of the most negative attitudes existing at the moment in the Netherlands are directed against certain groups of younger people in larger towns, especially squatters. Those are 'deviant' not only because they are young, have different norms and values, but because they have militantly opposed themselves to the police and taken the serious housing problem in their own hands. See Cohen & Young (1981) for a collection of papers which highlight the special position of such 'deviant' groups for public opinion. It remains to be seen what the exact differences are between the negative attitudes and the discrimination against these groups and against groups of ethnic minorities.

68. The presumed ethnic prejudice of blue collar workers has been under constant debate. A constant correlation is reported in the literature between amount of prejudice and amount of education (that is, a negative correlation). This very rough correlation (which offers no explanation of course) is somewhat corrected by the finding that especially the 'next to lowest' groups, such as low level white collar workers, will show highest prejudice (see Council, 1976, for review). Competition and status differences play an important role in these processes. Wellman (1977) argues, on the basis of extensive interviewing, that the major factor involved is 'interest', and emphasizes that blue collar workers have negative attitudes against minorities only if such interests are involved; higher occupation and higher education only provides people with the possibility to better formulate and hide their ethnic prejudices. Note that the ethnic prejudices recorded in our research are strikingly similar to those found among class people in London (Thiaco, Miles, 1979).

69. Positive attributions to ethnic minority group members are usually explained, in attribution theory, by contextual (and not dispositional) factors (see Pettigrew, 1980, for discussion). A sound cognitive theory of the processes involved in such attributional processes is still to be developed, however.

70. The assumption that discrimination in the Netherlands is not primarily races needs extensive qualification. We have seen above, in note 66, that prejudice and discrimination is directed in the Netherlands, mainly against ethnically different groups. Already Bagley (1973) suggests that 'colour' does play a role in Dutch prejudice, but much less than in e.g. Britain. Our interviews seem to suggest also that especially cultural and social differences, as well as socio-economic competition, account for much of the negative attitudes as expressed. This does not mean, for example, that Surinamese are not being discriminated against also on the basis of their colour. It is difficult to keep these factors apart in the motivational structures underlying prejudice and discriminatory interaction. Our data, however, suggest that even if race differences play a role they certainly are not often consciously processed and verbalized, contrary to the feelings of socio-economic competition in housing, employment and social services. One could therefore assume that Dutch prejudice, generally speaking, is rather ethneincally (and culturally) than racially based, even if racial differences may play a role in group identification, perception and differentiation. The significant difference between 'brown' and 'white' elderly, between brown or black people from Surinam as regards everyday perception, evaluation and (negative) attitudes seems to substantiate this assumption. Instead of the wider term of ethnocentrism, we might speak of 'ethnicism' to denote this particular kind of racism (I am indebted to Philomena Basad for suggesting this term to me). Also it should be stressed that in a wider sense of the notion of racism, the particular kind of ethnicism we seem to find in the Netherlands would still be part of a 'racist' social structure.

71. See note 70.

72. In the last ten years many cognitive models of discourse processing have been developed. Unfortunately the bulk of this work has been based on study understanding (see van Dijk, ed. 1980 for references), and only little has been done in the area of dialogues or interviews. For introduction, survey and further references, see e.g. the following books: Meyer (1976), Just & Carpenter, eds. (1977), Freedle, ed. (1977, 1979), Sanborn & Garrod (1981), Halliday, ed. (1981), Ballotaet el al. (1981) and van Dijk & Kintsch (1983).

73. There is very little work on discourse production. Most work about the psychology of discourse processing deals with comprehension. The same holds in psycholinguistics in general (but see Butterworth, ed. 1981, for some work and references in this area). For strategies of discourse production, see Samuelsen (1981) and van Dijk & Kintsch (1983).
74. The last fifteen years has seen the development of a vast interdiscipline of discourse studies, including text grammars, conversation analysis and discourse analyses of various kinds. For survey, introduction and further references, see e.g. Coulthard (1977), van Dijk (1978), de Beaugrande (1980), de Beaugrande & Dressler (1981), Tannen, ed. (1982).

75. The coherence conditions of discourse mentioned here are further worked out in van Dijk (1977).

76. Perspective or point of view are technical terms which have received much attention in literary scholarship, especially in the study of stories. In more general discourse analysis, these notions have as yet received (too) little attention.

77. Conversation, due to its dialogical and interactional nature, has a number of further properties and constraints on coherence, involving relations between turns, or moves, and relations between speech participants. See Sudnow, ed. (1972), Turner, ed. (1974), Schenkel, ed. (1970) for relevant studies. A different approach provides Reicher (1981), who above all is concerned with the functional relations among moves in discourse. These functional relations will be one of the phenomena we will study in the interviews.

78. It goes without saying that discourse not only has its own or linguistic autonomy structural principles, but is governed by many factors of the social context, e.g. as exemplified in sociolinguistic research (inspired mainly by people like Labov, 1972). Specific social context study for discourse structures however is rare (cf. e.g. Schierer & Gillett, 1979). Much work is being done rather in anthropology, e.g. in the framework of the 'ethnography of communication' (Bauman & Scherzer, 1974; Grimsby, 1981). See also Halliday (1978).

79. As noted above, conversations are not just discourses but also pieces of interaction and therefore must satisfy the more general principles of adequate interaction. Besides the references given in note 77, we should mention e.g. Duncan & Fishke (1977) for such interactional principles.

80. We only have made transcriptions of the relevant passages of the interviews. This is of course a drawback because also the passages which are not about ethnic minorities may reveal important information about the knowledge and opinions of the speakers, e.g. their social background, which in turn may be relevant to understand their ethnic attitudes.

81. Another limitation is that we have not tried to follow the usual methods of transcription of conversational analysis (see the studies mentioned in note 77). Such transcripts however are extremely laborious and made especially for the analysis of sometimes very subtle properties of conversation. For one purposes a somewhat more 'readable' transcription will be sufficient. Later work in the project will pay more attention to the role of the more subtle properties of interview discourse (e.g. pauses, hesitations, false starts, etc.).

82. The notion of (semantic) macrostructure, as a theoretical reconstruction of notions such as 'theme' or 'topic' has been elaborated in detail in van Dijk (1977, 1978 and especially 1980).

83. Besides conditional coherence, defined in terms of conditional (e.g. causal) relations between the facts denoted by the respective propositions of a discourse, we have 'functional' coherence defined in terms of the roles of propositions within the discourse (e.g. B may be a specification or constraint with respect to A). Sometimes this notion is described in other terms, e.g. as 'rhetorical' relations, e.g. by Grimes (1975) and Mayer (1976), Neihman (1981) gives the most extensive analysis of such relations to date. The kinds of functional relation used here are ad hoc and more or less intuitively formulated for adequate analysis of our data. See van Dijk (1977, 1981) for a discussion about these kinds of coherence.

84. The field of textual analysis is large and confused, ranging from rather traditional literary studies, applied rhetoric and linguistic (mostly quantitative and later sociolinguistic) stylistics. For a useful survey in application (in a psychological study of persuasive effects), see Sandell (1977). See also Plett (1975).

85. The notion of 'topos' also originates from literary scholarship, in which there has been called a 'toposforschung', which is a historical study of the continuity and change of fixed themes through Western literature. The classical study in this domain is Curtius (1941). Of course, there is similar work in anthropology as soon as 'general cultural themen' are concerned, e.g. in storytelling (see the work by Lévi-Strauss), but there is hardly any recent work in the social sciences or discourse analysis in which such fixed themes or topos are studied in discourse.

86. As we have already remarked about stylistics, also the field of rhetoric is vast and confused. On the one hand there is the continuation of classical rhetoric (documented most extensively by Hauserg, 1960), and on the other hand there are several attempts to establish a 'new rhetoric', e.g. applying insights of modern linguistics or argumentation theory (see Bueing, 1976, for introduction).

87. For various approaches to argumentative structures, see e.g. van Emmeren et al. (1977). For practical applications in the analysis of argumentation in discourse, see Kahane (1971).

88. Narrative theory, in several disciplines, is vast and of the many thousands of references, we can only mention some selected recent ones. For the structural analysis of narrative, see Communications 0 (1966), and Goëlich & Rabbe (1977). For the current debate on narrative grammar in psychology and AI, see van Dijk, ed. (1980), and further references given there.

89. Narrative in conversation in addition has a number of typical interactional principles (such as turn taking, keeping the floor, arouses interest, etc.). See Polanyi (1982), Ehlich, ed. (1981) and Quasthoff (1980).
The conversational strategies we analyse are not those usually studied in the conversational analytic work mentioned in note 77, e.g. those for turn taking. Yet, inspired e.g. by Goffman's work on strategic interaction (e.g. Goffman, 1969), we can find scattered remarks about the strategic moves in conversations in order to reach specific goals or to dissimulate own opinions. De Beaugrande & Dressler (1991: 171 ff) give some examples of strategies in discourse.

Interviewing as a method of social research is governed by normative principles about the adequate verbal and non-verbal actions of the interviewers (see e.g. Bradburn & Sudman, 1975). From our point of view, however, interviewing is also a form of social interaction which can be described and analysed in its own right.

Our approach to prejudice assumed indeed that much of the ethnic attitudes in the Netherlands must be learned through informal everyday contacts and conversation. This dimension of 'mass communication' has received much interest since the classical book by Katz & Lazarsfeld (1955), although it can hardly be said that there are specific opinion leaders or gatekeepers who 'formulate' and then influence others with specific prejudices. See Shihutani (1966) for such an approach to rumours, and Rogers (1971) for a survey of the tradition. Much of this work is about the influences and the motivations for the use of mass media and hardly pays attention to more independent forms of interpersonal communication.

See our remarks in note 70.
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