Building on previous research indicating that among first, third, and fifth graders, older children expect affective expressive behavior to be regulated, a study was made of children's beliefs about rationales for and consequences of regulated affective expressive behavior. Children's beliefs were examined in conjunction with their parents' (1) attitudes towards children's expressive behavior, (2) perception of their own self-monitoring, and (3) perception of their families' "social climate." Participants were 32 children in grades 2, 5, and 8 from an urban West Coast parochial school and their parents. Children were individually interviewed using as stimuli four photographed scenarios of children involved in conflicts in which the target child in the scenario could respond with a facial expression that was discrepant from internal affect. Two questions posed referred to the scenarios and a third referred to the child's belief about his or her own emotional experiences. Parents individually responded to an author-developed questionnaire, the Parent Attitude toward Child Expressiveness Scale (PACES); to Snyder's Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS); and to Moo's Family Environment Scale (FES). Affective expressive behavior sampled in PACES includes anger, distress, fear, anxiety or nervousness, interest or curiosity, happiness, and disgust. Data were analyzed by stepwise regression analyses for each child variable: 11 predictor variables were entered in the equation. Results are discussed and a schematic model of the developmental differentiation of emotional experience is appended. (RH)
Suggestion and Expectancy in Emotional Socialization

Carolyn Saarni
Sonoma State University
California

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Children clearly develop expectancies about emotions, that is, beliefs about what to feel in assorted situations and beliefs about how and whether to show what one feels to others. What is remarkably missing from the research on affect development is how these beliefs are acquired. One can glibly respond with, "oh, it's all due to social learning, you know." But is it? Perhaps a cognitive developmentalist would respond with "an expectancy is a generalized scheme, and therefore its developmental course would be similar to the acquisition of any other cognitive scheme." Finally, a hypnotherapist might assert "suggestions are internalized as expectancies only when they stimulate the child's imaginal involvement and appear to offer useful ways for coping." I am not about to argue the relative merits of these three or other possible positions on how expectancies are developed in children about emotional experience; however, I am intrigued by some of the notions that hypnotherapy might provide us in trying to understand how outside 'influence' does indeed become influential and is eventually internalized as a personal expectancy. Attribution theory has also much to offer in this regard, although little work has been done with children wherein the very process of expectancy formation was examined.
It might be useful at this point to try to distinguish three related concepts, expectation, suggestion, and expectancy, especially as they may be related to emotional development. Somewhat arbitrarily, I am going to propose that, expectations be thought of as having their source outside the child. For example, mother expects Mary to feel angry at her when daddy is asked to move out of the house or, less extreme, mother expects Mary to inhibit her disgust at Grandma's unappetizing-looking casserole. If the expectation is experienced by the child, that is, attended to, it becomes a suggestion. Thus, expectations are held by others about Mary, but only if she responds to the expectation as a credible perspective for making sense of her experience, will the expectation be responded to as a suggestion. The point in interjecting the notion of suggestion here is to emphasize that others' expectations are often not attended to, not processed, so to speak. Obviously children and adults also resist and defy others' suggestions, but such rejection means that the expectation was first comprehended, appraised as a suggestion, and then rejected. An invalid expectation is experienced as simply irrelevant or tangential; it is not credible. The individual neither assimilates nor accommodates to it. (The maturation of attentional processes, especially within interpersonal contexts, may well be involved here as well.)

If the suggestion is accepted, the process of expectancy formation begins. I will propose that the formation of an expectancy, which is essentially an internalized suggestion, is an accommodative act,
whereas once the expectancy is 'in place,' it functions assimilatively, i.e., via generalizability to novel, albeit similar, situations. But how does a suggestion become internalized as an expectancy? What accommodative process does the child go through?

To clarify this murk, I examined the hypnosis literature and was impressed with the work done on therapeutic metaphor (cf., Gordon, 1978). What a number of hypnosis researchers have proposed is that the hypnotist's suggestion stimulates a "transderivational search" within the subject. What this means is that we respond to the suggestion by checking through our recall of experiences to find something that seems to fit the suggestion, at least in part. We may indeed find something in our memory that is related to the suggestion, thereby rendering the suggestion credible and valid, but we can still reject, resist, or defy the suggestion. For the suggestion be to accepted, it would have to be motivating: it would have to offer some notion of gain, of improved coping, of mastery, or of self-validation; and so forth. The acceptance of the suggestion as being a credible and valid perspective for making sense of our current and anticipated experience and that we want to hold this perspective means that the suggestion has been internalized. It now has become an expectancy, which guides our belief structure and subsequent attributions.

How Expectancies May Be Acquired in Adulthood

Looking at the 'end product' in adulthood, so to speak, may be a suitable way to generate hypotheses or reinterpretations of child data
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for how expectancies influence subsequent emotional experience. From the attribution perspective, Jones and McGillis (1976) have suggested that expectancies are formed with different rationales. They specify the following classification of expectancies, which are in the context of attributions about another's behavior or about one's own.

1. Category-based expectancies, which means that the inferential generalizations attributed to the target person (self or other) stem from their membership in a social category, e.g., gender, ethnic group, or astrological sign.

2. Target-based expectancies, which refer to the inferences attributed to a target person (or self) that are based on particular information about the target person or self that one has had access to.

Relative to self-directed expectancies, Baumeister and Cooper (1981) extend Jones and McGillis' classification by hypothesizing that the more an individual perceives an expectancy as unique to him or her, i.e., target-based, the more likely he/she will fulfill the expectancy. Likewise, if membership in a category is perceived to be a function of choice, e.g., choosing to be a member of a political party, then an expectancy based on this intentionally-chosen category will also be more likely to be fulfilled. More specifically, Baumeister and Cooper examined how expectancies could be manipulated in order to determine whether the public expectation of an emotion 'caused' the emotion subsequently experienced. They suggested to subjects three
different expectancy rationales regarding why they would experience inhibition (i.e., anxiety) in their subsequent singing performance. There was also a fourth control group which received no suggestions about emotional experience. What was manipulated here was the rationale for the expectancy of inhibition: (a) personal knowledge about the subject that would be likely to produce inhibition (target-based expectancy as earlier defined), (b) knowledge about others who are similar to the subject, which would be likely to produce inhibition (intentional category-based expectancy), and (c) information about one's coincidental, non-intentional membership in a category that would allegedly produce inhibition (i.e., one's birth order was the 'basis' for the expectancy of inhibition). Their results indicated that only the first two expectancy manipulations resulted in a significant effect on emotional response, namely, experiencing inhibiting anxiety over their singing performance.

Baumeister and Cooper reasoned about their results that expectancy rationales that implied that the person's own actions or personality were the justification for the expectancy were most likely to affect the individual's subsequent emotional behavior. Thus, if someone attributes to you an expectation for some particular display of emotional behavior and also indicates that something about you (or people like you), over which you have some volitional control, is the alleged basis for the expectation, then the circumstances are most likely created in which you will indeed experience the subsequent
This sounds remarkably like a "transderivational search" wherein we search our experience for something that relates to the suggestion, in this case, an attribution, and if something fits, which is also under our control, we are most likely to internalize the suggestion as an expectancy. The motivational source here may be the prospect of self-validation or self-confirmation. Baumeister and Cooper state "subjects were presumably best able to identify with an image of themselves having the expected emotional response when this image was supposedly based on their prior choice behavior" (p. 58, 1981). Their interpretation seems congruent with a self-validation motive for accepting the suggestion as a credible and valid perspective for anticipated emotional response.

Children's Acquisition of Expectancies about Emotional Experience

If my model for how expectancies are formed from internalized suggestions is assumed for the time being as adequate for adults, how do we account for children's acquisition of expectancies about emotional experience? Several studies clearly document that children have such emotional expectancies. For example, Barden, Zelko, Duncan, and Masters (1980) studied grade-school children's consensual knowledge about the most likely occurring emotions to assorted situations (the latter provided by the authors in vignette form). They concluded "children four years of age and older show numerous consensuses in their expectancies regarding emotional responses to a wide variety of \( \text{emotional behavior.} \)
experiences. Furthermore, the consensus reached regarding such expectancies is a function of the nature of the experience category considered as well as the age of the child" (p. 975).

From a somewhat more complex perspective about emotional expectancies, Saarni (Note 1) asked children (grades 1, 3, and 5) about when they would expect (a) to mask or hide their feelings, (b) to dissimulate them by substituting other affective expressive behavior, and (c) to allow their feelings to be openly expressed. The results from that study indicated significant age effects in that older children clearly expected affective expressive behavior to be regulated. All children could cite instances when masking and dissimulation would occur in their emotional experience, and older children's proposed situations and rationales for such emotional regulation were predictably more subtle and more numerous.

In terms of the origin of these expectancies or beliefs about emotional experience, we need to examine where and how suggestions for emotional experience originate. These suggestions can stem from interpersonal relations, via verbal and nonverbal communication. I will now also propose that with the acquisition of self-awareness and some degree of skill at affect labeling that suggestions can also be generated by the self about the self. (Thinking about the self as both agent and object may be useful here.) However, these self-generated suggestions will only be transformed into genuine self-expectancies if the conditions of credibility, validity, and desirability are met. I think it also
likely that self-generated suggestions for how one is to feel emerge later than responding to externally-communicated suggestions about how to feel and may represent internalizations of the earlier external suggestions but more integrated with the psychological needs and developmental level of the child.

I have drawn heavily on Michael Lewis' work on affect labeling by mothers of their toddlers' responses to separation and reunion (Lewis & Michalson, 1982) and on his work on the development of the self (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1978) to substantiate my hypothesis that self-suggestions about affective responding require (a) prior exposure to external suggestions about emotional experience, (b) some lexical and conceptual skills at affect identification and labeling, and most critically, (c) the development of self-awareness. The reader is referred to those sources.

At this point you may be asking "well, what about the fact that young infants can have their affective displays fairly reliably conditioned well before either lexical skill at affect labeling or self-awareness have developed, and isn't this tantamount to an expectancy?" I have proposed elsewhere (Saarni, 1978) a model for the differentiation of emotional experience, which is reproduced as an appendix to this paper. I am addressing at this time consciously intentional self-generated regulation over affective experience that probably does not appear much before the onset of the second year. Prior to that, in the first year, affective states and expressive behavior provide cues as to
what is significant in the infant's experience and may well "constitute the primary medium of communication and meaning" (Demos, 1982; p. 81). It is also likely that young infants' emotional experience is initially reflexively activated but rapidly becomes part of an interpersonal context with all the attendant richness of reinforcing contingencies that that implies.

Current Research on Children's Expectancies about Emotional Experience

I would like to move beyond early childhood at this point and describe a recent study with children ages 7 through 13 years which examined their beliefs about rationales and consequences of regulated affective expressive behavior. It was assumed that rationales and consequences for regulated affective expressive behavior, which are presumably also correlated to some degree, could be related to internalized expectancies held by children (or adults, for that matter). Such internalized rationales and consequences of an action were also presumed to be more readily traced back to expectations and (accepted) suggestions communicated by socializing agents.

The children's expectancies were also examined in conjunction with their parents' (a) attitudes towards children's expressive behavior, (b) perception of their own self-monitoring, and (c) perception of their families' "social climate." This study was limited to a descriptive and inferential approach in attempting to investigate parental influence on children's internalized expectancies. Such parental influence was assumed to be communicated via verbal and
nonverbal behavior, which in turn functioned in a socializing manner by means of expectations/suggestions and social learning mechanisms.

Finally, developmental differentiation, as indexed by age, was presumed to have a major impact on how children made sense of rationales and consequences for regulated affective expressive behavior. However, the effects of the parent variables were hypothesized to contribute further unique information about children's beliefs about these aspects of emotional experience, over and beyond that which is explained by development alone.

Sample

The participants were 32 children in grades 2, 5, and 8 from an urban west coast parochial school and their parents. Age and sex distribution were nearly equal in this sample. All subjects gave written informed consent for their participation. No deception was involved.

Procedure

For children, The children were seen individually and interviewed using as stimuli four photographed scenarios of children involved in conflicts in which the target child in the scenario could respond with a facial expression that was discrepant from internal affect. This procedure had been followed in an earlier study (Saarni, 1979) and yielded significant age differences in reasoning about the dissociation of affect and expressive behavior. In the present study
the children were additionally asked about (a) the rationale or justification for the target child's regulation of expressive behavior, (b) the interpersonal consequences of regulation of expressive behavior (i.e., what would the interactant think about the target child's expressive behavior in the scenario), and (c) the child's own rationale for how s/he personally figures out the balance between showing or not showing her or his real feelings to others. (These variables will hereafter be referred to as (a) justification, (b) consequences, and (c) balance. Note that the first two refer to the child's responses to the photographed scenarios, and the last refers to the child's belief about her/his own emotional experience.)

For parents. The parents individually responded to the author-developed questionnaire, Parent Attitude toward Child Expressiveness Scale (PACES), to Snyder's Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS; Snyder, 1974), and to Moos' Family Environment Scale (FES; Moos, 1974).

A score on PACES provides a measure of the respondent's degree of permissiveness - control allowed toward a child's hypothetical emotional expressive behavior. All items begin with "if my child . . . ," with the intent being to elicit the parent's expectations about their response to their own child's expressive behavior. The affective expressive behavior sampled in PACES includes anger (4 items), distress (3 items), fear (3 items), anxiety or nervousness (3 items), interest or curiosity (3 items), happiness (3 items), and disgust (1 item). A copy of the PACES Scale has been appended to this paper with a cover sheet indicating
test-retest reliability and inter-rater reliability of the weights assigned to the multiple choice options.

The other two measures, FES and SMS, are either commercially available (FES; Moos, 1974) or frequently used research instruments (SMS; Synder, 1974, 1979). Their reliability is high, and their construct validity may be considered adequate, although challengable. The SMS yields a single score indicating the degree to which the respondent monitors her/his interactional behavior, including expressiveness. The score appears to index both the facility and motivation with which the individual manages her/his impression on others.

The FES subscales used in this study were Expressiveness, Independence, and Control. Higher scores indicate relatively greater salience of these dimensions in the family's "social climate." Control is somewhat negatively correlated with the other two subscales (r = -.27 and -.26), while the other two subscales are somewhat positively correlated (r = .28). Moos defines these three subscales as follows:

"Expressiveness: The extent to which family members are allowed and encouraged to act openly and to express their feelings directly.

Independence: The extent to which family members are encouraged to be assertive, self-sufficient, to make their own decisions, and to think things out for themselves."
Control: Assesses the extent to which the family is organized in a hierarchical manner, the rigidity of family rules and procedures, and the extent to which family members order each other around." (Moos, 1974)

Results

Coding of child data. The first variable examined, children's justification for the scenario target child's regulation of expressive behavior, used the four categories of justification developed in the earlier study (Saarni, 1979). These four categories, when ranked, indicate increasing subtlety and implicitly increasing complexity of social perspective-taking. In order of increasing complexity the children's justification responses were rated as follows:

1 = trouble-avoiding set (e.g., "she doesn't want to get caught");
2 = qualifying factors of a relationship (e.g., "he doesn't want to hurt his aunt's feelings by showing he doesn't like the gift");
3 = maintenance of self-esteem (e.g., "she doesn't want to look dumb in the other girl's eyes");
4 = maintenance of norms (e.g., "it's not polite to react that way").

The children's justification ratings were summed across the four scenarios yielding a final score.
The second variable, children's expectations about the interpersonal consequences for the target child's having regulated his/her expressive behavior, was coded by means of five ranked categories. This consequences variable was also intended to indicate increasing subtlety and perspective-taking with higher ratings. The category ratings are as follows:

1 = child says s/he does not know or gives a tangential response;
2 = child says there can be no dissemblance in expressive behavior, despite interviewer suggestions to the contrary;
3 = child contends that the facial expression adopted by the target child will not influence the interactant's reaction to the target child;
4 = child says that the target child's intent in dissembling is congruent with how the interactant interprets the facial expression (i.e., the sender is successful in achieving his/her purposes and is taken at 'face value').
5 = the child thinks that the interactant is likely to see past the dissemblance and realize that the target child's facial expression is a 'false front.'

This variable was also summed across all four scenarios yielding a final score.
The third variable examined children's beliefs or expectancies about how they personally 'decide' when to reveal their genuine feelings or not. This variable, labeled balance, was coded according to the following ranked categories:

1 = child does not know or gives a tangential response;
2 = child cites a concrete instance in which s/he concealed her/his feelings but does not generalize (e.g., "once I fell off my bike and it hurt bad but I didn't cry");
3 = child gives an unelaborated response that it depends on the situation, or they just use common sense as to when they show their feelings or not;
4 = child gives an elaborated and generalizable response, either situation- or relationship-oriented, with which s/he balances revealing or not revealing feelings (e.g., "I wouldn't show my feelings when people are in a bad mood. I'd show my feelings if people are in a good mood and feel like listening and talking to someone.");
5 = child gives an elaborated and generalizable response about relying on own self-perception of how they feel about the feeling itself and on other-perception of how another person may evaluate the 'appropriateness' of these feelings if they are revealed. For example, "well, it would depend on how important the feeling was to me and how I'd think the people I was with would react to my showing how I really felt. Probably if I felt embarrassed about the feeling, I wouldn't show it, or I'd try to smile.")
Buss' discussion (1980) of private and public self-awareness is relevant here: this last category was reserved for children's responses that integrated both private and public self-awareness. Clearly this variable also indicates greater subtlety and complex perspective-taking with higher ratings. Since this question about balance was asked only once (i.e., "How do you figure out for yourself the balance between when to show your real feelings and when not to?"), there was obviously no summation involved as compared to the other two variables.

Results

The data were analyzed by means of stepwise regression analyses for each of the three child variables. The acceptable p value was set at .005, due to the number of multiple comparisons. Eleven predictor variables were entered: child's age, mother's PACES, father's PACES, the three FES subscales for mother and for father, mother's SMS, and father's SMS. The outcome for each child variable will be discussed in turn.

Justification. Two of the predictor variables contributed significantly to the variation in this child variable. Age, as expected, accounted for the most variation ($r = .40$), but additionally father's Self-Monitoring Scale was a significant contributor. Together they accounted for $.26 (R^2)$ of the variation in children's justification responses.

Consequences. Again age was the major significant predictor of this child variable ($r = .70$), but father's Self-Monitoring and father's
PACES also contributed significantly, yielding an $R^2 = .65$. Interestingly, the two father variables obtained negative regression coefficients, suggesting that lower scores on father's PACES (i.e., more permissive) and on father's SMS (i.e., less concerned with self-monitoring) were associated with higher, more complex and subtle child perceptions of the interpersonal consequences for regulated expressive behavior.

**Balance.** Predictably, age was again the major contributor to this child variable ($r = .74$). In addition, three maternal variables proved to be significant contributors to the variation in this child variable. They were (in order) mother's Self-Monitoring, mother's PACES, and mother's FES Expressiveness. Together all four variables obtained a robust $R^2 = .74$. All regression coefficients were positive, in contrast to the finding for the two father variables in the regression analysis on the consequences variable.

**Correlations between child variables.** The correlation between the balance and consequences variables was the only substantial one obtained, $r = .59$. The other coefficients were $r = .32$ for justification and balance and $r = .36$ for justification and consequences. This pattern seems largely due to the degree to which developmental level (age) contributed to these variables. Relative to the justification variable, both balance and consequences had substantial variation contributed by age in their respective regression analyses.
No sex differences were found for the child variables, which is consistent with the outcome of several studies on children's comprehension of emotional experience (e.g., Barden et al., 1980; Saarni, 1979).

Discussion and Conclusion

The data from this study appear to extend the findings obtained by Johnson and McGillicuddy-Delisi (1983), who found that maternal affective feedback behaviors predicted preschoolers' high-level rationales for understanding rules and conventions. In the present study, grade-school children's higher-level rationales for their understanding of the balance or integration needed in showing one's feelings or not were also significantly predicted by their mothers' affective attitudes (as opposed to the affective behaviors that affected the preschoolers). The maternal affective behaviors that predicted higher-level rationales for preschoolers were in fact negative in tone and typically oriented toward 'correcting' their young children. In the present study two of the maternal attitude measures also indicated that increasing control towards children's expressiveness (PACES) and increasing concern with self-monitoring (SMS) predicted higher-level rationales. However, the FES Expressiveness scale adds another dimension in the above prediction in that it, too, was associated with higher-level rationales. Thus, although the mother professed more controlling attitudes, she also perceived a greater degree of expressiveness in her family. Perhaps the two more
controlling measures derive from the mother's perception that since there is a high degree of family expressiveness there is likewise a higher need for regulation and monitoring of affective displays, which she expresses both attitudinally (PACES) and by being concerned with a higher degree of personal self-monitoring (SMS).

The fathers' attitudes towards children's expressive behavior and their own impression management (SMS) would appear to have contradictory effects compared to the mothers'. However, I think this seeming contradiction can be resolved by emphasizing the differences between the two variables, consequences and balance, that are differentially affected by the parents. First, the consequences variable is about hypothetical characters in a story that the child is asked 'to reason out loud for.' The balance variable refers to the child's own beliefs about how s/he personally integrates showing or not showing her or his feelings. Second, the consequences variable seems to represent an orientation toward how others think about others, while the balance variable emphasizes a self-reflective differentiation. Both variables imply increasingly complex perspective-taking with higher ratings, but the perspective-taking is oriented outward for the consequences variable and inward for the balance variable.

What I will suggest here is that fathers whose attitudes about affective expressive behavior are more permissive--toward children or their own behavior--probably also tend to be less constrained by
conventional masculine role stereotypes regarding the importance of maintaining the stoic front. Such fathers, being more feeling-oriented, may also communicate more within their families about how they feel, how others reacted, how subsequent emotional interactions were affected, and so forth. The inference here is that such fathers make more salient for their children interpersonal affective transactions. Fathers who are at the opposite end of this spectrum, i.e., controlling or restrictive toward children's expressiveness and espousing greater concern for their own self-monitoring, would presumably then not facilitate this salience and differentiation of interpersonal affective transactions for their children to the same degree. Interestingly, fathers' PACES scores correlated fairly strongly with their FES Control scores ($r = .52$), and it should be recalled that the Control subscale was oriented toward describing a family's social climate in terms of its rigidity of rules and procedures, the extent of ordering one another around, and by its degree of hierarchical organization. (Mothers' PACES scores correlated $r = .33$ with their FES Control scores.)

It is harder to understand why only the maternal attitude variables affected the children's expectancies about revealing their own feelings. I am not entirely comfortable with the polarization argument that mothers represent the expressive or autocentric pole in a family while fathers represent the instrumental, allocentric pole (cf., Guttmann, 1965; Lueptow, 1980; Weitz, 1977; Zelditch, 1955).
However, this viewpoint may be implicated in the present pattern of results: fathers mediated expectancies about others' responses whereas mothers mediated expectancies about personal responses toward emotional experience.

In conclusion, the data presented here appear to confirm in part the argument advanced that expectations held by others eventually do influence the formation of expectancies held by the individual. The role of suggestion as mediator of this process of internalization can only be hypothesized at this point and awaits further empirical (probably observational) research. The notion that emotional socialization may be quite sensitive to others' expectations rather than being primarily or only shaped by observing models of regulated emotional behavior also receives support in this study. Such a perspective has also been argued by Chapman (1981) with regard to children's behavioral conduct and by Lueptow (1980) about sex-role socialization.
Reference Notes


References


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Appendix A

Differentiation of Emotional Experience: Schematic Model

(Reprinted from C. Saarni, Cognitive and communicative features of emotional experience, or do you show what you think you feel. In M. Lewis & L. Rosenblum (Eds.), The development of affect. New York: Plenum, 1978.)

I. Biology of affective experience.

A. Primary and global affects are reflexively activated. They are accompanied internally by physiological changes and are externally expressed in facial, vocal, and postural channels.

B. These expressive channels show considerable, perhaps spontaneous, behavioral variation, which suggests a physiological competence for their expression, but the competence is not yet linked to specific affective criteria for their consistent performance.

C. Biological synchrony with others in some expressive channels is observable.

D. Gradually the reflexively-activated affects are partitioned into an assortment of simple affects that become activated by increasingly specific situational releasers. An operant connection between expressive pattern and internal sensory feedback may also be part of this gradual partitioning.

II. Coordination of affect and expression.

A. The infant develops self-awareness.
B. As the infant's evaluation of incentive events becomes differentiated, there is also a simultaneous increase in the range and kind of affective experience.

C. As the infant becomes increasingly active in its impact on its social and physical environment, affective criteria are linked to and coordinated with encoding specific expressive patterns.

D. The infant now expressively signals his affective experience to others in order to effect their behavior toward itself.

E. Constructing, maintaining, and synchronizing communicative exchanges becomes a goal in itself.

III. Representational elicitors of affect.

A. The development of symbolic schemes allows for a fluid extension of experience forward and backward in time. Now the child can anticipate incentive events as well as store memories of past incentive events. This allows the young child to anticipate his/her emotional experience, based on memory of how s/he responded affectively in the past.

B. The young child's fantasies (e.g., nightmares) can become the incentive events for eliciting changes in affect.

C. Representation-mediated anticipation of others' psychological and behavioral reactions toward the child can elicit affective experience (e.g., anxiety, happy excitement).
D. Representation-mediated anticipation of others' psychological and behavioral reactions begins to influence the child's expressive behavior (as with display rules).

E. Communication with others extends and elaborates the child's evaluation of incentive events.

F. Communication with others extends and elaborates the child's consciousness of what s/he is feeling.

IV. Cognition about affect and affect, as an elicitor of affect.

A. Deliberate manipulation of expressive behavior for social-communicative goals is now readily accomplished.

B. The child can infer that the affective experience and expressive behavior of others is influenced by their anticipation of his/her own psychological and behavioral reactions to them.

C. The child can begin to step outside of his/her affective experience and objectively reflect on it.

D. The child begins to develop affect cycles: affective experience A becomes an incentive event for affective experience B (e.g., an individual compounds his fear of some event, for example, an important examination, with anxiety about feeling the fear, because of its possible deleterious effect on his test performance. Another example is typically found in many adults' sexual dysfunction: the individual is aware that his or her performance anxiety negatively affects
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his/her sexual performance. When s/he then becomes conscious of again feeling performance anxiety, s/he compounds the affective experience with a secondary anxiety about feeling the performance anxiety.)