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ABSTRACT

*Preliminary data from a study-in-progress support the view that public information campaigns may have greater efficacy than shown by previous research. To evaluate the public impact of the Advertising Council's "Take a Bite Out of Crime" campaign, which was aimed at promoting greater citizen involvement in crime prevention activities, data were derived from a national survey of 1,049 adults concerning their reactions to the campaign and from a panel sample examining changes in citizen crime prevention, orientations, and behaviors as a function of campaign exposure. Results indicate that the campaign of public service announcements (PSA's) had marked and consistent influences on citizen perceptions and attitudes regarding crime prevention and on their taking of specific, preventive actions. Campaign exposure was significantly related to increases in how much respondents thought they knew about crime prevention, how effective they thought citizen prevention efforts were, and how confident they felt about being able to protect themselves from crime, as well as to increases in six of the seven specific, preventive activities most emphasized in the PSA's. Analyses are being conducted to determine the factors involved in these changes. This report includes a 2-page bibliography, the PSA storyboards, and 14 data tables.
(Author/LMM)

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"TAKING A BITE OUT OF CRIME":
PRELIMINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE INFLUENCES OF A
PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGN¹

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(ABSTRACT)

"TAKING A BITE OUT OF CRIME":
PRELIMINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE INFLUENCES OF A
PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGN

Recent studies of the impact of public information campaigns indicate they may have greater efficacy than the research of previous decades suggested. This paper presents preliminary data from an ongoing study-in-progress which supports that view. Summarized are results of an evaluation of the public impact of the Advertising Council's "Take a Bite Out of Crime" campaign, aimed at promoting greater citizen involvement in crime prevention activities.

The data are derived from a national sample survey of public reactions to the campaign, as well as a panel sample examining changes in citizen crime prevention orientations and behaviors as a function of exposure to the campaign.

The findings suggest that the Advertising Council's Take a Bite Out of Crime PSAs had marked and consistent influences on citizen perceptions and attitudes regarding crime prevention, as well as on their taking of specific preventative actions.

Individuals exposed to the campaign exhibited significant increases over those not exposed in how much they thought they knew about crime prevention; how effective they thought citizen prevention efforts were; and how confident they felt about being able to protect themselves from crime. The PSAs also appeared to have a strong impact on the taking of crime prevention actions by citizens. Exposure to the campaign was significantly related to increases in six of the seven specific preventative activities most emphasized in televised PSAs. Particularly noteworthy were campaign-related increases in neighborhood cooperative crime prevention efforts.

Taken at face value, these findings go far in refuting many of the hypotheses and assumptions concerning campaign efficacy posed in earlier decades. And, they tend to support more recently suggested views of the media having the potential for more substantial, persuasive effects. Currently underway are analyses which will attempt to explain the perhaps more important considerations of "how" and "why" the influences occurred.

While public service-oriented media campaign effects research has a long tradition going back to now-classic field studies of the 1940s and early 1950s, the area went through a period of relative dormancy until fairly recently. At least partly at the root of that dormant period in the late 1950s and 1960s were inferences from the previous research that media campaigns were apt to have few if any effects, and when they did occur they were likely to be among particular segments of the population who were primarily seeking reinforcement of their already existing attitudes and behaviors (cf. Star and Hughes, 1950; Hyman and Sheatsley, 1947; Klapper, 1960). Such "limited effects" hypotheses were by no means peculiar to campaign research; indeed, early studies of media effects on such diverse activities as childhood socialization, aggressive behavior, and voting behavior generally reached the same kinds of conclusions.

However, research endeavors into these same areas over the past decade have led to substantially revised conceptions of the kinds of effects media are capable of having on individual and social behavior. Perhaps the two most notable examples have involved: (1) Examinations of the effects of violent media portrayals on the aggressive behavior of audience members; and (2) The effects of political media content, especially during election campaigns, on citizens' political cognitions, attitudes and behaviors. In both instances, while the gravity and extent of the media influences are open to argument, the empirical evidence is clearly supportive of the media having the potential for doing more than simply reinforcing a psychological status quo among audience members.

The increased potential for media influence in contemporary society should not seem overly surprising. While the underlying social processes remain largely open to inquiry, it is clear that mass media have taken a far more visible role as sources of information, and perhaps influence as well. The predominance and immediacy of television undeniably plays a part in all this, but also important are changes in the social and political structure of the society itself. For various reasons, social and political institutions and processes are not as stable as they appear to have been in the 1940s and 1950s. Greater geographic mobility, the

changing makeup and role of family, and a lessening of the impact of traditional social ties and values, to name a few things, have perhaps led to somewhat greater reliance on more "impersonal" sources of information and influence, such as mass media.

While research on the persuasive effects of public information campaigns was in the forefront of the media studies of three decades ago, there have been only few and widely scattered efforts in recent years (cf. Atkin, 1979; Douglas et al, 1970; Farquahar, 1977; Hanneman and McEwen, 1973; Maccoby and Solomon, 1981; McAlister, et al, 1980; Mendelsohn, 1973; O'Keefe, 1971; Salcedo et al, 1974; Schemeling and Wotring, 1976). However, the collective findings from these studies suggest rather strongly that such campaigns may have noteworthy effects on audiences. Perhaps the most striking data, as well as conceptual elaborations, are found in the multi-year community heart disease prevention project underway at Stanford University (cf. Maccoby and Solomon, 1981). Those results suggest rather salient effects of mass media messages per se on public cognitions, attitudes and behaviors concerning heart disease prevention.

One difficulty found throughout the recent research on campaigns has been a lack of consistent conceptual or theoretical perspectives to guide problem development and design. However, as more data-centered evaluative studies continue to contradict the earlier limited effects-related hypotheses, more elaborate models will surely be developed. And, they are likely to be based upon assumptions that it is critical to investigate the contingencies under which different media messages result in different effects for different kinds of people under different circumstances and at different points in time. That is, media effects are unlikely to be found en masse, or to be attributable to any one set of factors. Rather, it may be more important to determine which factors are most operative in given communication situations involving given audiences.

The purpose of this paper is to report rather preliminary data from an ongoing study-in-progress, which we feel even at this early stage has several strong implications for the way in which we look at the efficacy

of public information campaigns. It is intended as a somewhat informal summary of results to date, and is more descriptive than inferential in nature. More comprehensive and detailed background information on the project are available from the author (O'Keefe, 1982a; b) and in a final report scheduled for spring 1983.

BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

The campaign in question is the Advertising Council's "Take a Bite Out of Crime" public service advertising campaign, produced under the sponsorship of the Crime Prevention Coalition. The campaign has been running since December 1980, and has attained, by the Advertising Council's standards, an unusually high degree of gratis placement in the nation's media channels. The campaign is aimed at promoting citizen involvement in crime prevention efforts, mainly through increased burglary self-protection, and, most notably, through neighborhood cooperative efforts among citizens.

By most critical accounts, the campaign caught on in terms of media placement because of the soaring concern over crime in recent years, and its use of a rather clever cartoon dog, "McGruff," arrayed in trenchcoat and admonishing citizens to follow the example of "real people" prototypes who through various means helped "Take a bite out of crime." From a research perspective, the campaign unfortunately presents several obstacles to well-controlled evaluation of its effects on citizens. For one, while the investigators, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Justice National Institute of Justice, received the full cooperation of the Advertising Council and Crime Prevention Coalition in examining the campaign's design and strategy, little was possible in the way of pre-campaign research input. Secondly, the national-scale dissemination logistics of the campaign negated any ability on our part to "control" the dissemination for evaluative purposes.

The campaign in total incorporates the more obvious media campaign utilizing public service advertisements, and perhaps less obvious but potentially equally important community projects in hundreds of locales all over the U.S. The localized projects are highly diversified and dependent

upon individual community needs and resources. The media campaign serves as something of an umbrella for these, providing a shared identity and rationale. Our concern in this study at this point is almost exclusively with the impact on the public-at-large of the media campaign. Nationwide, the public service advertisements were, as of November 1981, by far the most visible aspect of the campaign, and the aspect of it with the greatest potential for impact on citizens overall as of that time.

The public service advertisement format renders placement of specific ads within specific locales over the country quite haphazard and dependent upon the willingness of media outlets to incorporate them as space and time permit. Moreover, the design of the campaign made no allowance for attempted dissemination of the PSAs in particular communities while withholding the messages from others, making classic "treatment versus control community" field experiment designs impossible. Thus our overall research effort is based upon the "next best" design options available: (1) The use of a national sample survey to determine the reach or penetration of the campaign over the nation as a whole and within various kinds of citizen subgroups; and to examine citizen self-evaluations of the impact and effectiveness of the campaign; and (2) The incorporation of a panel survey in which respondents interviewed in 1979 prior to the campaign's release would be reinterviewed in 1981, for the purpose of examining changes in their crime prevention orientations and attempting to trace those to exposure to the campaign.¹

The national sample survey, subcontracted to the Roper Organization, was conducted with a standard multi-stage probability sample of 1,200

¹Such panel designs are somewhat flawed in the ability to remove interactive "threats" to the external validity of the inferences, most notably test interaction, when used in rigorous testing of hypotheses (cf. Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Cook and Campbell, 1979). However, they can be quite appropriate in pointing to general trends insofar as campaign exposure and effectiveness are concerned. This is particularly true given the added advantage of comparing the campaign-related changes found in the panel with respondents' own self-reports and interpretations from the national sample.

adults interviewed in their homes for approximately 45 minutes during November 1981. The questionnaire included unaided and aided recall measures of exposure to the campaign PSAs and extensive self-report measures of their perceived impact upon the respondents. Other items focused upon citizen cognitions, attitudes and behaviors concerning crime and its prevention; media habits in general, and demographic indicators.

The panel survey encompassed a probability sample of 1,049 adults initially interviewed in person in Buffalo, Denver and Milwaukee in September 1979, three months prior to the campaign's onset. The three locales were chosen to provide diversity in regional characteristics and crime rate profiles, while assuring an adequate media mix for at least potentially moderate distribution of the McGruff campaign PSAs. The second round of interviews was carried out by telephone in November 1981, with 426 of the original respondents (41 percent) being successfully reinterviewed. Respondents' self-reports as to whether they recalled having been exposed to the PSAs served as the basis for separating the sample into an "experimental" group (those exposed) and a control group. Potential effects of that exposure in terms of changes in orientations toward crime and crime prevention were examined by means of simple before-after group comparisons, and by more stringent multivariate control procedures.

RESULTS

While our major concern in this paper will be with an overview of the findings on the campaigns's effects, it is useful to begin by briefly summarizing the results concerning the rather sizeable extent of exposure to the McGruff PSAs.

The national sample analysis found that over half (52 percent) of the respondents recalled having seen or heard at least one of the Take a Bite Out of Crime PSAs, primarily over television, and a third of the sample had encountered them more than 10 times. The campaign also appeared to be reaching a highly diversified audience demographically, with little indication that persons in any particular social or economic strata were beyond the scope of the PSAs. (Something of an exception was age level, with younger

persons decidedly more likely than older ones to report exposure; nonetheless, a third of respondents over age 64 could recall the McGruff ads.) Persons who regularly either watched more television or listened more to the radio were likelier to have come across the ads, having of course greater opportunity to do so.

The panel (48 percent exposed) supported the inference drawn from the national sample that the campaign reached a broad-based population demographically. Moreover, while there was a tendency for persons perceiving themselves as less knowledgeable and prevention measures as more effective to have been exposed, the PSAs appear to have reached goodly numbers of individuals with widely varying perceptions and orientations regarding crime and its prevention. However, attentiveness to the PSAs was much less uniform, with greater attention to them being paid by persons previously more knowledgeable and confident regarding prevention, and those more concerned about protecting themselves. Individuals engaged in more prevention activities were also more attentive, as were those who anticipated that more information about prevention would benefit them. Thus selective exposure was found to be only a minor factor here, perhaps not surprising in an age of ubiquitous television commercials. However, selective attention proved far more prominent.

While, with a few exceptions, exposure rates do seem relatively homogenous across the sample, this should not of course imply that the messages were perceived in the same way by persons with varied orientations to crime and prevention, nor that the messages were as effective for some individuals as for others. But the findings do testify to the strength of dissemination of the campaign, as well as to the impact of its themes and appeals, in allowing citizens with many varying dispositions toward crime and prevention to at least have had the opportunity to hear the message.

Campaign Effects on Crime Prevention Orientations

The panel sample analysis of the effectiveness of the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign focused on several components of citizen responsiveness vis a vis crime prevention. The campaign in general, and the public service

advertisements in particular, presented citizens with a rather diversified range of appeals, content areas, media formats, and suggestions for actions. Here, we will consider those crime prevention orientations and behaviors which the campaign would seem to have had the greatest potential for influencing during its first two years.

Background

In the most general terms, we view the campaign as having been largely concerned with effecting increased citizen competence in helping to reduce crime. The term "prevention competence" serves as an organizing rubric encompassing several kinds of orientations and behaviors through which citizens may demonstrate their ability in the crime prevention arena. Prevention competence is likely to increase among citizens to the extent that they:

- (1) Are more fully aware of effective prevention techniques;
- (2) Hold positive attitudes about the effectiveness of citizen-initiated prevention activities, and about their own responsibility for getting involved in prevention;
- (3) Feel capable about carrying out actions themselves to reduce their chances of victimization;
- (4) Are concerned about protecting themselves and others from crime; and
- (5) Actually engage in actions aimed at reducing crime.

Thus prevention competence includes the same general constellation of dependent variables often found in communication effects and persuasion studies. With varying degrees of conceptual sophistication, persuasion is usually apt to be seen as at least a four-step process involving: (1) The building of awareness or knowledge; (2) The inducement of attitude change; (3) Motivating individuals toward behavior by generating interest or concern; and (4) Finally effecting behavioral change (cf, McGuire, 1969; Percy and Rossiter, 1980; Cialdini et al, 1981; Solomon, 1981).

While this sequence of potential campaign-induced events has a nice logic about it, rarely can even well-designed and carefully targeted media campaigns be expected to successfully induce changes on their own along all of the above dimensions. For one thing, the degree to which persuasion may occur is highly dependent upon existing audience dispositions concerning the

topic or issue at hand. Some issues are simply more change-resistant than are others. And, when media campaigns in of themselves are effective to any degree, it is likelier to be in terms of providing increased knowledge, or, perhaps, in changing attitudes. As Bandura (1977) has cogently theorized and as Farquhar et al (1977), Maccoby and Solomon (1981), and McAlister et al (1980) have demonstrated empirically, people are more likely to act on information acquired from mass media sources when appropriate social and environmental supports are present. There are indeed several ambiguities and problems in interpreting the specific types of changes, and the processes underlying them, which may be influenced at least in part by public information campaigns.

Moreover, it is also possible that media messages may induce action-taking without necessarily effecting congruent cognitive or attitudinal changes. This would seem particularly true of actions requiring little rationalization, cost or effect (Ray, 1973).

It is also important to note that the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign, particularly insofar as the PSAs are concerned, was aimed at "the public" in a highly diversified manner. A reasonable possibility exists that the campaign would have scattershot influences on various types of people depending upon their already existing orientations toward crime and prevention--perhaps simply informing some, changing selected attitudes in others, making still others more concerned, and perhaps triggering some into action. For example, if a particular citizen is already concerned about crime, and already feels that self-prevention techniques may be effective, the campaign may have provided information about specific prevention techniques and how to use them, prompting "action."

Prevention Orientation Effects

Persons exposed to the campaign showed significant changes in three of the five crime prevention orientation dispositions. Campaign exposure was associated with: (1) Increases in how much respondents thought they knew about crime prevention; (2) More positive attitudes about the effectiveness of citizens taking action to help prevent crime; and (3) Greater feelings of personal competence in protecting oneself from crime. The campaign appeared to have no impact, however, on feelings of personal

responsibility for helping prevent crime, or on personal concern regarding crime prevention. These findings held even when controlling for the several possible intervening variables.

Tables 1 and 2 detail these results.² Taking the relationship between campaign exposure and self-perceived prevention knowledge in Table 16 as an example, we see that the simple regression analysis yielded a beta value of .09, indicating a positive and significant relationship between campaign exposure and perceived knowledge in 1981, controlling for level of knowledge in 1979. (One-tailed significance levels are used for these analyses, since we are predicting that campaign exposure will result in a change in a specific direction for each dependent variable, e.g. we expect "more" rather than "less" knowledge.)

The hierarchical regression analysis in the lower part of the table indicates that the relationship between exposure and perceived knowledge

²The analyses of the panel sample effects data require not only a simple comparison between campaign-exposed and unexposed groups to find out if the exposed group "changed more," but also the control of extraneous variables which may have interactively influenced either campaign exposure, or the change measure over time, or both simultaneously. While it is impossible to constrain the influence of all potential extraneous variables, we can make some good judgments about what kinds of variables would be most likely to intervene, and control for them accordingly. Toward that end, our analyses utilize a rather stringent hierarchical multiple regression control procedure.

The most obvious potential intervening variables appeared to be: (1) Respondent encounters with crime prevention campaigns other than McGruff; (2) Exposure to crime-related mass media content; and, of course, (3) Direct encounters with crime, or having been victimized. Measures of each of these stimuli were inserted into the regression equation as a block immediately preceding the campaign exposure measure.

As a more conservative device, we also chose to include in the equation as control variables a block of five demographic indicators which appeared most closely associated with campaign exposure and prevention orientations, including age, sex, education, income and neighborhood social status. These were included as a block prior to the above one. It appeared likely that any unidentified extraneous variables tending to influence the change scores would do so unevenly across at least some of those demographics, and thus "controlling" for the demographics should help minimize their impact. It was also hoped that this would help minimize any effects based upon interaction between the pre-campaign interviewing round and exposure to the campaign or other intervening stimuli.

remains significant (beta = .08) when the other potential intervening variables are controlled for.³

The regression analysis for prevention knowledge also indicates that exposure to other prevention campaigns was also associated with gains in knowledge over the two-year period (beta = .10), and that men gained more in knowledge than did women (beta = .08). The possibility that those or other variables may have interacted with campaign exposure so that they acted in combination to affect prevention knowledge will be considered later in the study.

Table 1 also indicates that campaign exposure was not associated with changes in prevention responsibility (uncontrolled beta = -.02; controlled beta = -.03), but that exposure was related to more positive attitudes concerning the efficacy of personal prevention behaviors. And, Table 2 reveals that changes in prevention confidence, but not concern, were related to exposure to the McGruff campaign.

These findings are strongly supportive of (and in turn are reinforced by) self-reports of respondents in the national sample according to what they said they thought they had gained from PSAs.

The lack of impact of campaign exposure on concern about protecting oneself from crime lends itself to some ambiguity in interpretation. On the one hand, a goal of the campaign is to make citizens concerned enough so that they will act appropriately, but not so concerned as to unduly frighten them. Given a finding that concern about prevention in the 1979 data was substantially correlated with heightened perceptions of crime in one's own environment, and greater personal vulnerability, it may actually

³Specifically, the 1979 knowledge score (Time 1 or "T1") was entered as the first block of the regression equation, allowing it to explain as much of the variation in the 1981 (Time 2) knowledge score as it could. In the second block of the equation, the demographic indicators were entered as a "generalized" control on unspecified extraneous variables. The third block consisted of the three factors--apart from McGruff campaign exposure--most likely to directly affect prevention knowledge: (1) Victimization experience; (2) Attention to news and entertainment media crime content; and (3) Exposure to other prevention campaigns. Finally, exposure to McGruff was entered as a dummy variable in the fourth block, with that beta value reflecting the singular impact of campaign exposure on knowledge, with the effects of the other variables on knowledge "controlled out."

be a "plus" for the campaign that it did not significantly increase such concern. Indeed, the PSAs, by emphasizing the most positive approaches to crime prevention, appear to have built more positive citizen dispositions--knowledge, sense of efficacy, and confidence--while at the same time minimizing potentially more negative orientations toward prevention.

Crime Orientation Effects

Before moving ahead into discussing the effects of the campaign on preventative behaviors, it may be helpful to take note of the campaign's potential for affecting citizen's orientations toward crime per se. It could be argued that while the campaign was having positive influences on certain prevention dispositions, it may have been doing so at the expense of making individuals more fearful of crime or seeing themselves as more vulnerable to it.

The panel sample respondents were asked in both waves of the survey: (1) Whether they thought the crime rate was increasing or decreasing in their neighborhoods; (2) How safe they felt being out in their neighborhoods at night; (3) How dangerous in terms of crime they saw their own neighborhoods as compared to others; (4) How likely they thought it was that their residences would be burglarized; and (5) How likely they thought it was that they would be attacked or robbed.

The findings presented in Table 3 suggest that the campaign had virtually no impact on respondents' perceptions of crime within their immediate neighborhoods. No meaningful changes in perceptions of crime rate, sense of personal safety at night, or comparative neighborhood danger were found to be associated with exposure to the campaign. However, Table 4 suggests that the campaign was having some effect on perceptions of likelihood of victimization, and in a curiously inverse way at that. Persons exposed to the McGruff PSAs significantly lowered their estimations of likelihood of being burglarized. But, campaign exposure was also related to modest increases in perceived probability of being a victim of violent crime. (The uncontrolled relationship was significant at the .01 level; with controls the association dropped to just below significance.) One working hypothesis at this point might be that, since the most prominent features of the campaign dealt with household

protection against burglary, the exposed respondents may have felt somewhat assured that what they got out of the campaign would help diminish their chances of burglary. On the other hand, the overall theme of "crime" in the PSAs may have also heightened their general concern about it, channeling that concern more into thoughts about violent crime, which most of the PSAs dealt very little with.

It also appears that attention to media crime content in general is strongly related to many citizen orientations toward crime, particularly their perceived vulnerability. The previous tables also picked up a positive relationship between media crime attention and prevention concern and the perceived effectiveness of citizen prevention techniques. While more fully developed analyses of this relationship are beyond our scope here, they will be more fully considered later in the study.

Campaign Effects on Prevention Activities

The most stringent test of an information campaign's effectiveness is whether changes in people's actual actions or behaviors can be traced to their exposure to the campaign. In the national sample, nearly a fourth of the campaign-exposed respondents said they had taken preventative actions as a result of having seen or heard the McGruff PSAs, and they typically gave such examples as improving household security or helping their neighbors in prevention efforts.

Panel respondents were queried in both 1979 and 1981 as to whether or to what extent they were engaged in each of 25 prevention activities aimed at protecting themselves and others from victimization. To the degree that the campaign was effective in stimulating behavioral change, it was expected that persons exposed to it would have been likelier than those unexposed to have either adopted or begun "doing more of" specific kinds of activities.

As others have alluded to (Lavrakas, 1980; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981) and as we will detail in the final report on this project, categorizing the full set of prevention activities is a complex undertaking due to their diversity. Moreover, some activities may be seen as functionally equivalent to others, and some have greater relevance to certain kinds of people in certain situations. For organizational purposes here, we will tentatively arrange the activities into several discrete groups, building on the

groundwork provided by Lavrakas and Skogan and Maxfield. We have generally attempted to order them according to the degree of "cost" involved in implementing or practicing them.

We begin with the most effortless behaviors of locking doors or leaving on lights when out, moving to more effortful actions such as asking neighbors or police to watch the house, to cooperating with neighbors or joining prevention groups. We conclude with more costly actual "purchases" such as buying burglar alarms, theft insurance and the like. We also include under purchases any employment of professional prevention resources such as having police do a household security check. Even though usually "free of cost," the effort can be quite time-consuming.

Obviously, some individual actions are going to be relatively easy for some people while costly for others, and we do not offer this schema as a uniform "scale" of difficulty. Rather, it is a way of organizing a wide range of diverse actions in a reasonably coherent manner. Moreover, we have discriminated within the "behavioral" actions and the "purchase" actions by noting ones associated with target hardening, deterrence, surveillance, personal precaution, loss reduction, and cooperation with others, borrowing heavily from Lavrakas and Skogan and Maxfield.

Our full array of preventive actions is as follows:

PREVENTIVE BEHAVIORS

Target Hardening

Locking doors in the home, even when only leaving for a short time.
Keeping doors locked, even when at home.

Deterrence

Leaving on indoor lights when away from home at night.
Leaving on outdoor lights when away from home at night.
When away for more than a day or so, using a time to turn on lights or radio.

Surveillance

When away from home for more than a day or so, notifying police so that they will keep a special watch.
When away for more than a day or so, stopping delivery of things like newspapers or mail, or asking someone to bring them in.
When away for more than a day or so, having a neighbor watch your residence.

Precaution

When going out after dark, going with someone else because of crime.
Going out by car instead of walking at night because of crime.
Taking something along with you when going out that could be used
as protection against being attacked, assaulted or robbed.
Avoiding certain places in your neighborhood at night.

Cooperative

(Keeping an eye on) what's going on in the street in front of
your home.
(Contacting) police to report a crime or some suspicious activity
in your neighborhood.
(Being a part of) a community group or organization in your neighbor-
hood that tried to do something about crime in your neighborhood.

PREVENTIVE PURCHASES

Target Hardening

(Having) your local police do a security check of your home.
(Having) special locks put on your doors or windows.
(Having) an operating burglar alarm system.

Deterrence

(Having) outdoor lights for security.
(Having) anti-theft stickers on doors.
(Having) a dog at least partly for security.

Personal Precaution

(Having) a peephole or window in your door.
(Having) personal security devices such as a gun, tear gas, etc.

Campaign-Relevant Activities

A "test" of campaign effects on prevention action-taking is made even more difficult because of the varying degrees of emphasis placed on specific activities within different components of the campaign. While the televised PSAs focused on a fairly discrete set of activities, print ads covered a much broader range of recommendations, including at one point or another nearly all of those the panel respondents were asked about.⁴

⁴There is an additional problem in that local prevention groups may have used the McGruff logo, whether sanctioned or not, as a tie-in to their own campaigns. While we know, for example, that buying or carrying "protective devices" such as guns or tear gas were never advocated in the PSAs or in any other formal aspect of the campaign, we may be less certain as to whether such actions may have been implied by prevention interest groups perhaps using the campaign as a springboard. Furthermore, we have no assurance that some individuals who were prompted by the campaign to view individual action-taking as more effective "translated" that disposition on their own into such behaviors as weapon purchasing.

Thus we might argue that "positive" changes, i.e. in the direction of "doing more," in any of the prevention activities among those exposed to the campaign provide some evidence of its impact on behavior. But also, we may have more concrete assurance of the effectiveness of the campaign if more changes are found among those activities that were clearly advocated in the specific PSAs to which respondents were more exposed. Since 71 percent of the respondents said they saw the ads most often over television, it seems reasonable to expect that, to the extent that the campaign was having an impact, it would be best discerned among those activities specifically recommended in the three televised PSAs. (The storyboards for these PSAs are appended.)

Consequently, we might expect the most likely changes to have been in:

- * Locking doors when out of the house ("Stop a Crime" PSA)
- * Leaving outdoor lights on ("Stop a Crime")
- * Using timer lights indoors ("Stop a Crime")
- * Having neighbors watch the house ("Stop a Crime")
- * Keeping a watch on the neighborhood ("Gilstraps," "Mim Marth")
- * Reporting suspicious incidents to police ("Gilstraps," "Mimi Marth")
- * Joining with others to prevent crime ("Mimi Marth")

In terms of emphasis, the first four of the above actions were mentioned in the original "Stop a Crime" PSA, but the latter three served as the overall themes for the two more recent ads, "Gilstraps" and "Mimi Marth." As for the other activities, no other specific behaviors (police security checks, not going out at night alone, etc.) were mentioned or alluded to in the televised PSAs, nor were any of the prevention purchases recommended.

Prevention Activity Effects

Out of the seven prevention activities the campaign would seem most likely to have influenced, significant changes associated with exposure to the campaign were found in six. No changes traceable to campaign exposure were found in any of the other activities, save one--having acquired a dog at least partly for security purposes.

This striking finding strongly suggests a marked and consistent influence of the campaign on citizens' crime prevention activities. Moreover, the one

case in which a significant campaign effect was expected but not found was that of more frequently locking doors when leaving the residence. Here, there is strong evidence of a "ceiling effect" precluding measurable change, since 75 percent of the respondents in the first wave of interviews reported "always" locking up to begin with. And, the only significant result found among the "less expected" activities--that of acquiring a dog--is obviously tied to the campaign's overall theme. We turn to the findings in detail.

The analyses follow the same pattern as described earlier for the prevention orientation effects. In Table 5 we see that neither of the target hardening behaviors--locking doors when out of, or when in, the residence had changes significantly associated with campaign exposure, with or without controls inserted. On the contrary, campaign exposure was significantly related to leaving on outdoor lights and using indoor timer lights with greater frequency, both of which were advocated in the "Stop a Crime" televised PSA (Table 6). No significant campaign effects were found for leaving on indoor lights per se, nor for the surveillance behaviors of having police do a security check, nor for stopping deliveries when out of town (Table 7). However, persons exposed to the PSAs were significantly likelier to have asked a neighbor to keep an eye on their homes when they were out, as recommended in "Stop a Crime."

None of the changes in the taking of personal precautions when out of the house were related to campaign exposure (Table 8); nor were they mentioned in the televised PSAs. It might be noted that exposure to campaigns other than McGruff was significantly related to changes in three of the four precautionary measures, indicating that there was some publicity given to those actions among the panel cities.

The strongest relationships between McGruff exposure and behavioral changes occurred among the cooperative action-taking steps, which also received the heaviest emphasis in the "Gilstraps" and "Mimi Marth" PSAs. Campaign exposure was significantly correlated with increases in "keeping a watch" outside one's home (beta = .11), reporting suspicious events to the police (beta = .13), and joining crime prevention groups or organizations (beta = .09) (Table 9.) The strength of these relationships is particularly noteworthy given that these can be regarded as fairly "costly" actions to take in terms of time and effort--at least certainly moreso than, say,

locking up or leaving on lights. As with the precautionary actions, exposure to prevention campaigns other than McGruff was also significantly related to positive changes in cooperative behaviors, again suggesting community-based campaign efforts advocating such in the panel locales.

On the whole, the PSAs appear to have been most effective in promoting cooperative behaviors, followed by certain deterrence and surveillance actions.

Purchasing Activity Effects

The campaign overall generally downplayed the need for citizens to spend money on property protection by purchasing such things as burglar alarms, theft insurance and particularly, weapons. We have also included under "purchases" activities which require effort in terms of contacting and enlisting the help of professional crime prevention agencies, including having police do security checks, obtaining property I.D. materials, and the like. While some of these latter steps may have been recommended in other components of the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign, they were not dealt with in the televised PSAs.

The panel findings clearly indicate that campaign exposure was generally unassociated with such purchases made during the period between the two surveys (Tables 10 to 13), with the notable exception of getting a dog "at least partly for security purposes." While the campaign never specifically advocated or remarked on the value of canine acquisitions, apparently the ambiance of the McGruff character and its general identification with "watchdogs" and "taking a bite out of crime" sparked in some respondents a desire for a dog for protection. This result may have been abetted by the rather strong positive audience appeal of McGruff noted among national sample respondents.

Purchases of new locks and anti-theft stickers were significantly associated with campaign exposure in the simple regressions, but the relationships did not hold with the controls in place.

Percentage Changes in Preventive Activities

Despite the strength of the above relationships, it should be kept in mind that the campaign of course did not impact all persons encountering it, or even necessarily sizable majorities. The findings may be seen in a

somewhat more "pragmatic" light by examining the net percentage changes in Table 14. The activities shown are those for which a significant campaign-related effect was found. In the first column, we report for rough base-line purposes the percentage of respondents consistently taking actions in the pre-campaign wave of interviews. In the remaining columns, the net change in frequency of activity between the first and second interviewing waves are presented, for the campaign exposed and unexposed groups. (The net change represents the percentage of respondents doing the activity more frequently at Time 2 minus the percentage doing it less frequently at Time 2.) We see, for example, that the net change in using outdoor lights between Time 1 and Time 2 for the exposed group was 29 percent, while for the unexposed group it was only nine percent. Similarly, use of timer lights "gained" in the exposed group by 18 percent, while it actually declined in the unexposed group by 13 percent, and so forth down the table. Thus we see that in most instances the actual percentages of respondents involved in these campaign-associated activity changes is quite substantial.

Collaborative Findings from the National Sample

The panel data supportive of the impact of the campaign are further corroborated by these general findings from the national sample survey:

**Among those exposed to the Take a Bite Out of Crime PSAs, over a quarter said they had paid a great deal of attention to them, and three-quarters reported paying at least "some" attention. Eighty-eight percent were able to verbalize a main point of the ads, with nearly a third of those mentioning cooperation with other people to help prevent crime as a main message.

**A strong majority of those exposed perceived the ads as effectively conveying their message, and said they found the information contained in them worth passing on to other people. The reactions were consistently favorable among all population subgroups, although younger persons tended to rate the ads more positively.

**Nearly a quarter of those exposed said they had learned something new from the PSAs, and 46 percent said they had been reminded of things they'd known before but had forgotten. Younger persons and women were likelier to report having been reinforced in this way.

**Upwards of half of the respondents recalling the ads said they had made them more concerned about crime and more confident in protecting themselves. Over half said the PSAs had made them feel more responsible about preventing crime and in perceiving citizen group efforts as more effective.

**Twenty-two percent said the ads made them more fearful of being victimized, with women being likelier to report this than men.

** Nearly a fourth of the exposed sample said they had taken preventative actions due to having seen or heard the ads, including improving household security and helping their neighbors in prevention efforts. Women were likelier to have reported doing so than men.

DISCUSSION

All in all, the findings suggest that the Advertising Council's Take a Bite Out of Crime PSAs had marked and consistent influences on citizen perceptions and attitudes regarding crime prevention, as well as on their taking of specific preventative actions.

Individuals exposed to the campaign exhibited significant increases over those not exposed in how much they thought they knew about crime prevention; how effective they thought citizen prevention efforts were; and how confident they felt about being able to protect themselves from crime. The PSAs also appeared to have a strong impact on the taking of crime prevention actions by citizens. Exposure to the campaign was significantly related to increases in six of the seven specific preventative activities most emphasized in the televised PSAs. Particularly noteworthy were campaign-related increases in neighborhood cooperative crime prevention efforts.

Taken at face value, these findings go far in refuting many of the hypotheses and assumptions concerning campaign efficacy posed in earlier decades. And, they tend to support more recently suggested views of the media having the potential for more substantial persuasive effects.

Currently underway are analyses which will attempt to explain the perhaps more important considerations of "how" and "why" the influences occurred. At this point we conclude that the rather "scattershot" dissemination of the campaign resulted in a wide range of effects across a wide

range of people. While the impact of the key themes of the PSAs--improved home security and cooperation with neighbors and police--were clear and prevalent throughout these findings, it is also apparent that some parts of the messages hit home with some citizens but not with others. The reasons underlying such differences are doubtlessly bound up in a host of interacting personal dispositions and social and environmental considerations. *

Preliminary findings from analyses currently being carried out suggest that the distribution of campaign effects was by no means uniform across the population. For example, the PSAs appear to have stimulated far greater attitudinal change in men than in women, as well as increases in somewhat individualistic behaviors, e.g. acquiring a dog and reporting incidents to the police. On the other hand, women exposed to the campaign seem considerably more likely to engage in increased cooperative prevention activities with their neighbors. And, while in many instances the PSAs seemed most effective among individuals previously more competent in terms of prevention (supporting a "reinforcement" hypothesis), substantial changes were at times found within less prevention-competent cohorts as well.

Subsequent analyses will focus on such issues as the role in campaign influence of citizens' prior dispositions; selective attention; prior informational need; prior perceived utility of prevention information; and opinion leadership. Moreover, we will examine the relationships among changes found in cognitions, attitudes and behaviors, within pre-campaign levels of each.

The final goals of the project include not only documentation as to how effective ongoing crime prevention strategies may be and policy recommendations for the future, but also more refined models of how public information campaigns in general may affect the public.

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APPENDIX

"Take a Bite Out of Crime" Television PSA Storyboards




TAKE A BITE OUT OF CRIME

Crime Prevention Coalition


© 1979 The Advertising Council, Inc.

"STOP A CRIME"

Public Service Announcements
Available in :60, :30, :10 Versions
60 SECONDS




(SFX: DOOR OPENING)




DOG: You know what I think? I think you forgot to lock your door.



It's a funny thing. A lot of people do that...they forget.



That's too bad, because all crime needs is a chance. Don't give it a chance.




Like...light up your doors. Lights make burglars nervous.




And make your windows secure.




Say, I understand you're goin' to Peoria next week.




While you're gone, have a neighbor keep an eye on your house.



You know, pick up your mail, keep the place looking lived in.



And use a timer, to turn lights on and off.




Fudge brownies! And me on a diet.



Oh, you don't know me, see. It's my job to teach you to protect yourselves.




Make it your job to learn. Write to Box 6600, Rockville, Maryland.



Oh, and one more thing. Lock your doors. That's an easy way to, ahh...



Take a bite out of crime.



Volunteer Agency: Dancer, Fitzgerald, Sample, Inc. Volunteer Coordinator: Edward W. Dooley, Citibank, N.A.
NCP-9160/CNCP-9130/CNCP-9110





The Joneses. They know.
JONES BOY: Dad, aren't the
 Gilstraps in Toledo?



MR. JONES: I think they're
 being robbed. Should we call
 the police?
MRS. JONES: Call the police.




DOG: See, the Joneses know,
 if they don't tell the cops
 now,



the Gilstraps'll have to tell
 them, later. (**MR. JONES:**
 Hello, this is...)



DOG: Meanwhile, these fel-
 lows are eating lunch—oh,
 about a block away.



Hey, hot pastrami! That looks
 very good.



COP: 10-4.



DOG: How 'bout that!




TAKE A BITE OUT OF CRIME

Crime Prevention Coalition

© 1979 The Advertising Council, Inc.



McGRUFF: Hey, McGruff here.



See that guy — he's stealin' that bike.



Now — see that lady — she's callin' the cops.



This is Mimi Marth, part of the Eyes and Ears Patrol of Hartford, Connecticut.

"MIMI MARTH"

Public Service Announcements
Available in :60, :30, :10 Versions
60 SECONDS



There's 126 of 'em — regular people like you and me, workin' together against crime.



Here's another one: Albert Bell. Yesterday, it was his turn to patrol.



Halfway down the block, Albert sees a strange man nosing around the Barnett's basement window.



So, Albert calls the cops. Fast.



And the cops pick the guy up. Fast. Way to go, Albert!



Y'know, when it comes to preventin' crime,



people like Mimi and Albert really make a difference.



So could a person like you. Find out more.



Write to Box 6600, Rockville, Maryland.



And help, ahh...Take a bite out of crime.



TABLE 1

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF PREVENTION KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES

BY CAMPAIGN EXPOSURE AND CONTROL VARIABLES (n=426)

<u>Simple Regression</u>	<u>Prevention Knowledge</u>	<u>Prevention Responsibility</u>	<u>Prevention Effectiveness</u>
Campaign Exposure (T1 control only)	.09*	-.02	.07*
<u>Hierarchical Regression</u>			
(Block 1)			
T1 variable	.25**	.14**	.18**
(Block 2)			
Education	.08	.03	-.01
Age	-.01	-.03	.13**
Income	.01	.06	.05
Sex	.08*	.03	-.01
Neighborhood Type	.01	-.04	.03
(Block 3)			
Victimization Experience	.03	-.05	-.01
Media Crime Attention	.06	-.03	.12**
Other Prevention Exposure	.10*	.00	.04
(Block 4)			
Campaign Exposure	.08*	-.03	.08*
(R ²)	(.08)	(.01)	(.05)

*p < .05 (one-tailed)

**p < .01 (one-tailed)

TABLE 2

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF PREVENTION CONCERN AND CONFIDENCE

BY CAMPAIGN EXPOSURE AND CONTROL VARIABLES (n=426)

<u>Simple Regression</u>	<u>Prevention Concern</u>	<u>Prevention Confidence</u>
Campaign Exposure (T1 control only)	.01	.12***
<u>Hierarchical Regression</u>		
(Block 1)		
T1 variable	.30**	.25**
(Block 2)		
Education	-.05	.02
Age	.02	-.16**
Income	-.03	.03
Sex	.02	.15**
Neighborhood Type	.15**	.02
(Block 3)		
Victimization Experience	.04	.00
Media Crime Attention	.11**	.05
Other Prevention Exposure	.05	.06
(Block 4)		
Campaign Exposure	.02	.08*
(R ²)	(.10)	(.14)

TABLE 3

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME ORIENTATIONS

BY CAMPAIGN EXPOSURE AND CONTROL VARIABLES (n=426)

<u>Simple Regression</u>	<u>Crime Rate</u>	<u>Night Neighbor- hood Safety</u>	<u>Compar. Neighbor- hood Danger</u>
Campaign Exposure (T1 control only)	-.04	.01	.03
<u>Hierarchical Regression</u>			
(Block 1)			
T1 variable	.26 **	.45 **	.29 **
(Block 2)			
Education	.03	-.09	.01
Age	.05	.13 **	-.02
Income	-.01	-.12 **	-.12 **
Sex	-.06	-.19 **	-.07 *
Neighborhood Type	.04	.02	-.08 *
(Block 3)			
Victimization Experience	.07	-.01	-.05
Media Crime Attention	.07	.08 *	.08 *
Other Prevention Exposure	.04	.06	-.03
(Block 4)			
Campaign Exposure	-.05	.02	.00
(R ²)	(.06)	(.38)	(.14)

TABLE 4

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF PERCEIVED VULNERABILITY

BY CAMPAIGN EXPOSURE AND CONTROL VARIABLES (n=426)

<u>Simple Regression</u>	<u>Burglary Probability</u>	<u>Violence Probability</u>
Campaign Exposure (T1 control only)	-.05	.10**
<u>Hierarchical Regression</u>		
(Block 1)		
T1 variable	.33 **	.19 **
(Block 2)		
Education	-.04	-.07
Age	-.02	.00
Income	.06	.02
Sex	.01	.01
Neighborhood Type	.04	-.04
(Block 3)		
Victimization Experience	-.02	-.11**
Media Crime Attention	.15 **	.12**
Other Prevention Exposure	.05	.06
(Block 4)		
Campaign Exposure	-.08*	.07
(R ²)	(.13)	(.07)

TABLE 5

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF TARGET HARDENING BEHAVIORS

BY CAMPAIGN EXPOSURE AND CONTROL VARIABLES (n=426)

<u>Simple Regression</u>	<u>Lock Doors When Out</u>	<u>Lock Doors When In</u>
Campaign Exposure (T1 control only)	.02	-.01
<u>Hierarchical Regression</u>		
(Block 1)		
T1 variable	.28**	.30**
(Block 2)		
Education	-.03	-.12**
Age	.01	.10*
Income	-.02	.07
Sex	.05	-.18**
Neighborhood Type	.09*	.02
(Block 3)		
Victimization Experience	-.03	-.03
Media Crime Attention	.07*	.00
Other Campaign Exposure	.05	-.03
(Block 4)		
Campaign Exposure	.02	.01
(R ²)	(.08)	(.15)

*p < .05 (one-tailed)

**p < .01 (one-tailed)

TABLE 6

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF DETERRENCE BEHAVIORS

BY CAMPAIGN EXPOSURE AND CONTROL VARIABLES (n=426)

<u>Simple Regression</u>	<u>Indoor Lights On</u>	<u>Outdoor Lights On</u>	<u>Timer Lights</u>
Campaign Exposure (T1 control only)	-.00	.12**	.07*
<u>Hierarchical Regression</u>			
(Block 1)			
T1 variable	.31**	.28**	.35**
(Block 2)			
Education	-.06	-.05	.02
Age	-.02	.03	.06
Income	.04	.06	.12**
Sex	-.04	-.08*	-.05
Neighborhood Type	.01	.06	.08*
(Block 3)			
Victimization Experience	-.07	-.02	.00
Media Crime Attention	-.00	.01	-.01
Other Campaign Exposure	.03	-.04	-.01
(Block 4)			
Campaign Exposure	-.02	.12**	.09*
(R ²)	(.08)	(.08)	(.17)

TABLE 7

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF SURVEILLANCE BEHAVIORS

BY CAMPAIGN EXPOSURE AND CONTROL VARIABLES (n=426)

<u>Simple Regression</u>	<u>Police Check</u>	<u>Stop Deliveries</u>	<u>Neighbor To Watch</u>
Campaign Exposure (T1 control only)	-.03	.05	.08*
<u>Hierarchical Regression</u>			
(Block 1)			
T1 variable	.33**	.12**	.13**
(Block 2)			
Education	-.04	.03	-.06
Age	-.07	-.03	-.00
Income	.15**	.08*	.17**
Sex	.01	-.07	-.07
Neighborhood Type	-.05	-.03	.02
(Block 3)			
Victimization Experience	.05	.01	.10**
Media Crime Attention	.05	.01	-.06
Other Campaign Exposure	.04	.10*	.04
(Block 4)			
Campaign Exposure	-.05	.03	.10*
(R ²)	(.12)	(.03)	(.05)

TABLE 8

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF PERSONAL PRECAUTION BEHAVIORS

BY CAMPAIGN EXPOSURE AND CONTROL VARIABLES (n=426)

<u>Simple Regression</u>	<u>Go Out/ Someone</u>	<u>Go Out By Car</u>	<u>Take Device</u>	<u>Avoid Places</u>
Campaign Exposure (T1 control only)	-.04	.03	.01	-.00
<u>Hierarchical Regression</u>				
(Block 1)				
T1 variable	.25**	.25**	.25**	.25**
(Block 2)				
Education	-.08*	-.02	-.04	-.10*
Age	.12**	.05	-.04	-.02
Income	-.01	-.05	-.05	-.09*
Sex	-.29**	-.28**	-.12**	-.13**
Neighborhood Type	-.05	-.07	.08	.02
(Block 3)				
Victimization Experience	.03	.04	.02	.03
Media Crime Attention	.08*	.10**	.07	.08*
Other Campaign Exposure	.05	.08*	.09**	.12**
(Block 4)				
Campaign Exposure	-.04	.00	-.01	-.03
(R ²)	(.25)	(.22)	(.08)	(.13)

TABLE 9

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF COOPERATIVE BEHAVIORS

BY CAMPAIGN EXPOSURE AND CONTROL VARIABLES (n=426)

<u>Simple Regression</u>	<u>Neighborhood Observing</u>	<u>Police Reporting</u>	<u>Organization Joining</u>
Campaign Exposure (T1 control only)	.11**	.13**	.09**
<u>Hierarchical Regression</u>			
(Block 1)			
T1 variable	.19**	.20**	.31**
(Block 2)			
Education	-.08	-.02	.08*
Age	.04	-.15**	.02
Income	.15**	.09*	.06
Sex	-.02	.01	-.14**
Neighborhood Type	-.04	-.02	-.01
(Block 3)			
Victimization Experience	.04	.22**	.07*
Media Crime Attention	.04	.01	-.03
Other Campaign Exposure	.14**	.10**	.11**
(Block 4)			
Campaign Exposure	.12**	.08*	.09*
(R ²)	(.08)	(.13)	(.13)

TABLE 10

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF TARGET HARDENING PURCHASES

BY CAMPAIGN EXPOSURE AND CONTROL VARIABLES (n=426)

<u>Simple Regression</u>	<u>Security Check</u>	<u>New Locks</u>	<u>Burglar Alarm</u>
Campaign Exposure (T1 control only)	-.01	.08*	-.03
<u>Hierarchical Regression</u>			
(Block 1)			
T1 variable	.17**	.35**	.34**
(Block 2)			
Education	-.05	.03	-.16**
Age	.11*	-.08*	-.03
Income	.01	.09*	.04
Sex	.01	.02	-.01
Neighborhood Type	.05	.01	.07
(Block 3)			
Victimization Experience	.06	.01	.04
Media Crime Attention	.02	.12**	.03
Other Campaign Exposure	.07	.05	.04
(Block 4)			
Campaign Exposure	.02	.04	-.03
(R ²)	(.03)	(.15)	(.12)

TABLE 11

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF DETERRENCE PURCHASES

BY CAMPAIGN EXPOSURE AND CONTROL VARIABLES (n=426)

<u>Simple Regression</u>	<u>Outdoor Lights</u>	<u>Anti-Theft Stickers</u>	<u>Dog for Security</u>
Campaign Exposure (T1 control only)	-.05	.06*	.08**
<u>Hierarchical Regression</u>			
(Block 1)			
T1 variable	.20**	.46**	.56**
(Block 2)			
Education	-.06	-.03	-.09*
Age	.02	.01	-.12**
Income	.07	.09	.07*
Sex	.06	-.01	-.02
Neighborhood Type	.01	-.08*	.07*
(Block 3)			
Victimization Experience	-.01	-.01	-.01
Media Crime Attention	.02	.01	-.04
Other Campaign Exposure	-.06	.02	.01
(Block 4)			
Campaign Exposure	-.04	.06	.06*
(R ²)	(.03)		

TABLE 12

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF LOSS REDUCTION PURCHASES

BY CAMPAIGN EXPOSURE AND CONTROL VARIABLES (n=426)

<u>Simple Regression</u>	<u>Property ID</u>	<u>Theft Insurance</u>
Campaign Exposure (T1 control only)	.04	.04
<u>Hierarchical Regression</u>		
(Block 1)		
T1 variable	.39 **	.33 **
(Block 2)		
Education	.06	.02
Age	-.03	.01
Income	.07	.12 **
Sex	.08 *	.07
Neighborhood Type	.02	.05
(Block 3)		
Victimization Experience	.01	.02
Media Crime Attention	.01	.03
Other Campaign Exposure	-.00	.08 *
(Block 4)		
Campaign Exposure	.03	.04
(R ²)	(.16)	(.16)

TABLE 13.

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF PERSONAL PRECAUTION PURCHASES

BY CAMPAIGN EXPOSURE AND CONTROL VARIABLES (n=426)

<u>Simple Regression</u>	<u>Peephole In Door</u>	<u>Protective Devices</u>
Campaign Exposure (T1 control only)	.04	-.00
<u>Hierarchical Regression</u>		
(Block 1)		
T1 variable	.33**	.44**
(Block 2)		
Education	-.02	-.14**
Age	-.01	-.16**
Income	.07	.10**
Sex	-.01	.09*
Neighborhood Type	-.03	.08*
(Block 3)		
Victimization Experience	.10**	.04
Media Crime Attention	-.01	.05
Other Campaign Exposure	.07	.06
(Block 4)		
Campaign Exposure	.04	-.03
(R ²)	(.11)	(.28)

TABLE 14

NET PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN KEY PREVENTATIVE ACTIVITIES BY EXPOSED
AND UNEXPOSED GROUPS

	Percent "Always" or "Yes" Time 1	Percent ¹ Net Change: Exposed Group	Percent ¹ Net Change Unexposed Group
Outdoor Lights	41%	+29%	+9%
Timer Lights	30%	+18%	-13%
Neighbor Watch	62%	+26%	+11%
Neighborhood Observing	82%	+4%	-1%
Police Reporting	33%	+5%	-5%
Organization Joining	13%	+10%	+1%
Dog for Security	42%	+19%	+11%
	(n=426)	(n=204)	(n=222)

¹Figures represent net percentages of respondents in each group changing in the frequency with which they carried out each activity. (In the case of "Dog for Security," the net percentage changing dog ownership status is represented.)