Eight papers focus on a variety of themes concerning the character of citizenship and the nature of education in modern society. For example, one paper explores the thesis that the traditional basic categories in which the requirements of citizenship have been conceived—ruling and authority, obedience and loyalty—have already broken down and that fresh categories are emerging under the growth of democracy and its equalitarian demands. The argument of another paper is that citizenship education has been dominated by models of rationality which have placed it in opposition to its traditionally proclaimed function of educating students to develop and maintain a viable democratic society. Other papers focus on teaching citizenship for an ecological age; encouraging citizen participation in world affairs; reforming the school environment to help students attain positive and reflective ethnic, national, and global identifications; socializing the young to prosocial conduct in the negative environment existing in the post-industrial society; urging institutions to alter the reward structure so that citizen participation will be increased; and changing the structures of the public schools so that students become better citizens. (RM)
CITIZENSHIP AND EDUCATION IN MODERN SOCIETY

CHADWICK F. ALGER
JAMES A. BANKS
ABRAHAM EDEL
HENRY A. GIROUX
WILLIS D. HAWLEY
WILLIAM OPHULS
ROBERTA S. SIGEL
EDWARD A. WYNNE

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PREFACE

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The papers in this volume were prepared for a symposium on the character of citizenship and the nature of education in modern society, held at the Mershon Center, Ohio State University in April 1980.

The symposium was dedicated to Richard C. Snyder, until recently Director of the Mershon Center. During the 1970's Professor Snyder provided distinguished and powerful leadership for the community of scholars associated with the Mershon Center. The character of citizenship and the challenge of promoting citizen competence remain primary concerns of both Professor Snyder and the Mershon Center.

The symposium was conducted as part of the ongoing activities of the Mershon Center's Citizenship Development Program. As the Program has conducted research and development activities over the last several years, two observations have emerged. First, citizenship has been neglected by many intellectuals, social scientists and educators as a phenomenon not worthy of rigorous conceptual analysis and empirical research. Such neglect has come at a time when the growth of governmental functions, global interdependence and increasing social complexity have made the citizen role more problematic than ever. Second, many of our prevailing efforts at promoting citizen competence have been premised on poorly examined assumptions about the process of education in American society.

In response to these needs, our goal in organizing and co-chairing the symposium was to bring together social scientists, philosophers and educators to discuss eight specially commissioned papers dealing with two basic questions: (1) What is the character of citizenship in modern society? and (2) What is the character of the educational system in modern society? The papers and their authors are listed in the table of contents.
We will make no attempt here to present an official record of the very rich symposium discussions. We can testify, however, that the discussions once again demonstrated that "citizenship" refers to phenomena and problems that are multi-dimensional. Among key dimensions of citizenship that were considered through the symposium papers and discussions were the following:

--Citizenship clearly involves the development of an association or identity with multiple, simultaneous communities. A person's relationship with a set of collective human entities is central to citizenship.

--Citizenship involves participation in the governance of such communities. Perhaps participation in the shaping and sharing of a community's value outcomes.

--The citizen's participation in community governance must entail both effective advocacy of one's own interests and sensitivity to community welfare.

--Beyond participation the citizen must develop a critical facility for the appraisal of community values--such appraisal requires the development of independent standards against which to assess political processes and performances.

Further, the discussions clearly indicated that these, and other, dimensions of citizenship create tensions and conflicts among themselves which complicate both the practice of citizenship and the tasks of education for competent citizenship. Examples of such conflicts considered by the symposium were:

--conflicts between competing values of different communities in which people participate,

--conflicts between self-interest and community welfare, and

--conflicts between participation in and affiliation with a community and the psychological distance often required for appraisal.
Enough has been said to indicate the richness of the papers and discussions. Reading of the papers will reveal not only an elaboration of the above themes but also a host of related concerns.

Funding for the symposium was provided by the Mershon Center and the Danforth Foundation. Both organizations have a tradition of interest in and support for citizenship education, and we gratefully acknowledge their assistance. Finally, we wish to thank Lee Anderson and Charles Hermann for their good advice and assistance in planning the symposium.

Howard Mehlinger
Richard C. Remy

Co-Chairs, Symposium on Citizenship and Education in Modern Society
CHAPTER 1

THE GOOD CITIZEN, THE GOOD PERSON, AND THE GOOD SOCIETY

Abraham Edel

University of Pennsylvania
ABSTRACT

This paper explores the thesis that the traditional basic categories in which the requirements of citizenship have been conceived—ruling and authority on the one hand and obedience and loyalty on the other—have already cracked and that fresh categories are emerging under the growth of democracy and its equalitarian demands. These fresh categories are taken to be participation and responsibility.

Starting with Aristotle's formulation that the excellence of a good citizen coincides with that of a good person only in the good state, we are led to examine the transformation in categories from an interdisciplinary standpoint. This is seen to involve: the character of the state in relation to society, the theory of virtues and roles and whether citizenship should be conceived as a role or brought under some more fundamental structure, and the impact of the rise of democratic equalitarianism. With respect to the condition of the emerging categories we examine: the present state and prospects of participation, the importance of the rational as against the ideological in participation, the need to center on institution-building and reconstruction rather than simply preferential (voluntaristic) decision, and the basic place of our understanding of individual and community.

In the light of such explorations it becomes possible to focus on pivotal virtues for contemporary citizenship, spanning both moral attitudes and intellectual qualities and their bearing upon both national and international concerns. This part—with topics from respect for persons and their liberties to the interpretation of patriotism—is set in the matrix of contemporary problems. Some educational implications are then considered, dealing particularly with the broadening of educational opportunities, a basic reorientation in intellectual education, and a rethinking of moral education.
The present inquiry has been put as "the requirements, status and nature of the citizen role in modern society," with some consideration of educational implications. This is clearly an interdisciplinary endeavor, drawing on political theory in its focus on the citizen and the state, on moral philosophy in its theory of virtues and the good man, on sociology in its invocation of status and role theory as well as the matrix of society, and on history in pointing to modernity.

In his Politics Aristotle raises the interesting question whether the excellence of a good man and that of a good citizen are identical or different. 1 We are not surprised at his answering that it depends, and that what it depends on is the constitution or structure of the state. In an ideal state they are identical, in a less than ideal state they are not. Furthermore, even in the former, the qualities of the good man are more pertinent to the ruling statesmen, and other qualities relevant to obedience. But he has hesitated in moving to this conclusion because in the thoroughly ideal form men rule and are ruled in turn.

As often, Aristotle has given us the preliminary dimensions of the problem, and hinted at different lines of answer and what they rest on. The basic categories, at least to our day, are ruling and obedience. The authority of the ruler and the loyalty of the obedient—and the qualities embedded in each—reflect the character of the society. The hesitation comes from not knowing what will happen when a thorough-going democracy comes into being. Aristotle, of course, was not recommending democracy. He saw his contemporary struggles of oligarchy and democracy as basically the conflict of the arrogant rich and the desperate poor and he recommended the mean of a middle class or good citizens who would hold the balance toward the public good.
By our day there is vast historical experience with the advance of
democracy and its problems, with the character of ruling and authority
and with the complex issues of obedience and loyalty, with the forms of
wealth and its confident arrogance and the impasses of poverty and its
despair (to use the features Aristotle singled out), and with the impact
of factors--technology is only the most outstanding--that Aristotle could
glimpse only in myth. Can we draw clear lessons from the experience, and
can we do so not only for the general character of our past but for the
needs of our present?

In this paper I shall explore the thesis that the basic categories
in which we have traditionally conceived the requirements of citizenship--
ruling and authority on the one hand and obedience and loyalty on the other--
have already cracked and fresh categories are emerging under the growth of
democracy and its equalitarian demands. It looks as though the fresh
categories are participation on the one side and responsibility on the other.
Many who look only on the past can see only the twilight of authority and
the degeneration of loyalty. Yet even those who look to the future may
not yet discern the forms of society and statehood, of leadership and
cooperation, in which participation and responsibility can take shape. On
the other hand, the dilemmas arising from the changes are clearly discernible
all around us. The Vietnam war posed the issue of basic citizen disagree-
ment with government policy and the limits of loyalty. The Watergate affair
taxed the limits of trust in rulers. The Supreme Court has been struggling
with the rights of the media in investigative reporting. Both government
and private enterprise are uneasy about what to do with whistle-blowing:
is a whistle-blower to be regarded (from without) as a public hero or (as
so often from within) viewed with all the opprobrium moral tradition
has attached to the informer? We need not continue the list. Such issues
are not marginal cases; they are growing in scope and intensity and lead us often to question the basic assumptions of a profession or a cooperative enterprise.

If we are to assess the requirements of citizenship in our present world, we have to probe deeply into the contributions that the several disciplines can make to our inquiry. The present paper falls into three parts. Our first concern is with specific facets of state and society, virtues and roles, and some historical aspects of the democratic idea; in these we see how the older categories broke down. The second part looks toward the changing character of citizenship under the emerging categories—the state and prospects of participation, rationality and ideology, institution-building and reconstruction, individual and community. The third part deals with pivotal virtues required by contemporary citizenship and some of their educational implications.

STATE AND SOCIETY

If, as Aristotle has it, in a less than ideal state the excellence of a good person and that of a good citizen are not identical, we cannot consider the requirements of the citizen role without reference to the nature of the state. A person might have to be a bad person to be a good citizen in a very bad state. Indeed, the divergences may be even more far-reaching than Aristotle envisages. He takes it for granted that the goodness of the person combined with the goodness of the state yields good citizenship, at least for some. But may it not be the case that the goodness of a state requires the badness of the individual? Take, for example, Mandeville's argument in The Fable of the Bees that private vices yield public benefits, that human weaknesses such as the love of
luxuries stimulate trade and production, and were a people completely virtuous doing with little, the society would remain at a primitive level. And that scarcely would be a thriving state. Another example: does the goodness of the CIA depend on the readiness of its members to behave at times as a bad person would? Aristotle would say that although they did acts that a bad person would do, they need not do them in the way nor in the spirit that a bad person would. Plato, of course, had argued (in the Republic, before embarking on the genesis of the state) that if people did not desire luxuries there would be no need of a state to begin with, people would lead a simple life and society get along with largely informal cooperation. Finally, perhaps the clearest (and most outrageous) instance of the claim to be a good citizen, properly doing evil actions in a bad state, was the defense of obedience presented by the Nazi defendants in the Nuremberg trials.

In the history of modern political theory this problem is complicated by the fact that a good half of the roster of theories of the state describe it in a way that makes its objectives less than good, if not fully evil. In that case citizenship has two strikes against it from the outset. The older liberal theory regarded that state as best which governed least. The Marxian view defined the state as the executive arm of the dominant class, exploiting the mass of the people, but withering away in a socialist world. The anarchist view saw the state as the embodiment of power, which corrupts; it cannot be reformed but has to be abolished. These are not simply past portraits of the state, ancestral theories hung in the gallery of political thought. They are living forces. The older liberalism repeats itself today in the surge of neoconservative libertarian attempts to limit the range of state activities. The Marxian definition remains part of the daily
attitudes to "imperialist countries," even while the socialist states in less than a socialist world remain strong and centralized and show no sign of withering away. The anarchist motif, especially during the 1960's, with a phoenix-like vitality encouraged cooperative organization and communal efforts without reliance on the apparatus of the state. In all these cases, if citizenship be taken to be a relation between the individual and the state, the implication is almost that citizenship compels action inimical to the people.

These threats to the integrity of citizenship can be somewhat defused by diminishing the paradoxical elements in the theories. The liberal theory of former times, it could be said, applied to governments in former conditions when life was simpler; perhaps it was easier to be self-sufficient. Nowadays, great organization of multiple governmental function is indispensable for the good society, and the so-called evils when they do not issue simply from mistaken policies are part of the price of human advanced civilization—just as accidents are part of the price of an industrial civilization. Effort should go not to abolish industry but to improve its safety; and something similar holds for bureaucracy and governmental callousness and high taxes. (This is the traditional philosophy, if somewhat shopworn, of reform movements.) The Marxian theory, similarly, in distinguishing between exploitative state activity and non-exploitative administration, expects the latter to continue in world socialism. Hence, if organization, with even minimal coerciveness, is required in any complex society, we may think of the theory as directed against exploitative states rather than states as such. As for the anarchist theory, it might be countered with the claim that not all states are bad, that states are conceivable which limit themselves chiefly to what Ivan Illich, in a genial nomenclature, calls convivial institutions, those that serve the public without coercion—
post office, telephone and other communication systems, even possibly minimal automatically operative support systems. The increase of such institutions and the diminution of coercive ones becomes increasingly possible when peace and international economic bonds are developed, and this is equivalent to state activity.

Such arguments, whatever their strength, would rescue citizenship from being represented by such activities as going to war, paying taxes, accepting prison systems, acquiescing in bureaucracy and in the games of "politics"--as if these and the qualities of people involved were essential to the nature of good citizenship. No doubt being a citizen has its costs, but what the costs are depends on the kind of society that has the political organization. What citizenship is like may depend on what the state is like, but what the state is like depends on the society that uses political institutions. It is well to recall that even Hegel distinguishes between civil society and the state, whatever the exalted role the latter is given as the synthesis of the society in its historical development. Democratic conceptions of society tend to see the state as a political mechanism for meeting the needs and problems of the society. Hence citizenship, though cast in terms of the state, has the task of seeing through the state to the social requirements and actually developing an appropriate attitude toward the political institutions themselves.

That this is not a trivial point but one of the highest importance may be seen by an illustration in which the appropriate attitude of the citizen to government was the pivot for momentous consequences. In his The Fear of Freedom (1951), Francis Biddle raises in a very practical way the problem of citizen loyalty to government. He had served as attorney-general of the United States at a time when the idea of a list of subversive organizations was introduced, to be used (initially) in
judging the loyalty of government employees. The list played a serious part in the growing political hysteria that made guilt by association a sinister feature of the M.CCarthy period. Reflecting on the current atmosphere and the lessons of his experience, Biddle raises the question how it is possible to ask that the citizen be loyal to the government when government is conceived in a democracy to be the servant of the people and not the people to be the servant of government. It is rather government which should be loyal to the people. Recalling Royce's philosophical analysis in his The Philosophy of Loyalty, Biddle agrees that ultimate loyalty is to ideals, not to instruments, and in effect that the freedom of the individual in relation to ideals has a vital place in the idea of citizenship. It is hard to see how he could have reached such a conclusion if citizenship had remained bound to the political relation with its traditional intellectual apparatus of ruler and ruled, authority and obedience.

VIRTUES AND ROLES

Suppose we were able to specify the requirements of a modern society and the place of the political within it. Could we then go readily from those requirements to the role of the citizen, and from that to the virtues of a good citizen? (The question also remains to compare those to the virtues of a good person.) Certain conceptual minefields lie in the way. Is the identification of virtues an easy matter or are there complexities in ethical theory which stand in the way and which, if not considered, will make our analysis end in superficialities? Is being a citizen a role in the same sense as being a doctor is a role, or is it something more than a role? How does being a person differ from enacting a role, and if it does, are the ideas of being a good person, being a good
citizen, being a good doctor, strictly parallel? To answer these questions, we have to consider the notions of virtue, role, person.

Virtues

The theory of virtue is one of the most difficult chapters in moral philosophy. And yet the matter seems simple. Why not canvass the virtue clusters that are to be found on the face of history and select those appropriate to contemporary citizenship? There are, for example: the Spartan virtues of courage, tenacity, obedience, loyalty, bluntness, taciturnity, devotion to strength and physical fitness; the traditional Christian virtues of humility, resignation, faith, hope, charity, brotherly and sisterly love, spirituality; the pagan virtues of honor, pride, kinship bonds, friendship, confidence in capacity and power; the Calvinist or puritan virtues of thrift, abstinence, justice, chastity, industriousness, success; the bourgeois virtues of prudence, calculation, accumulation, good management; the liberal virtues of initiative, independence, intellectual confidence, rationality; the nationalist virtues of patriotism, group pride, self-sacrifice; and so on in intricate patterns of self-formation. Does citizenship in today’s world call for an intransigent national patriotism or a tolerant cosmopolitan outlook, for a readiness of self-sacrifice or a rational self-regard, for a prompt obedience or a critical spirit? Is our task to analyze carefully the circumstances of social harmony and national well-being, to frame a realistic conception of the national interest, and in its light to weave a virtue-pattern from the available assortment that history has handed down to us?

Unfortunately, the history of moral philosophy suggests that we have to do more than pick a bouquet of virtues. We need a unified moral theory of the good, or at least a depth analysis of virtue. This is not a
recent discovery but a recurrent theme. For example, in Plato's Laches Socrates riddles the simple view that courage lies in sticking to your post. (It is offered by the general Nicias, who incidentally later lost the Sicillian war for Athens.) Does not the general have to call a retreat on occasion and will not courage lie then in abandoning your post? It soon appears that some knowledge is always required to differentiate a virtue like courage from sheer obstinacy, a virtue like piety from mere ritual, a virtue like justice from mere rule-following. The Socratic view that all virtue is knowledge, is well known. Equally well known are the difficulties and paradoxes it gives rise to, for it makes a puzzle of knowing one's duty and not doing it. In contrast, Kant regarded virtue not as knowledge but as essentially a conscientiousness in following the path of duty. Since virtue lies in a certain consistency of spirit in respecting the moral law, it cannot be parcelled into separate virtue-traits.

In contemporary thought, psychologists from different schools add to the lesson that the surface catalogue of virtues is misleading. In the 1920's Hartshorne and May studied honesty in the conduct of children and found that it had no uniform behavioral pattern; what people did depended on the situation, the domain, the interests. This is familiar enough in ordinary experience. People who will rip-off a corporation or chisel on income tax would not dream of picking a pocket or not returning a purse that had a name in it. Students will cheat on examinations, but not on one another; some will be ready to help others during examinations but not necessarily to take help. Some people will tell lies to enhance prestige but not for direct financial gain; some will lie to spare feelings but not to exploit. The psychoanalytic literature amply exhibits the different depth meanings of the same surface
virtues: for example, Fromm points out that industriousness may be a realistic trait or a keeping busy out of basic anxiety, and love is often found to be an emotional dependence rather than an authentic relatedness. Kohlberg, working in the Piagetan tradition, looks rather to a moral development through stages than a collection of virtues. His currently fashionable schema ends in Kantian principledness as the summit of morality.

We must be careful not to end up in a one-virtue establishment. Whether it be knowledge or conscientiousness or whole-heartedness or principledness, if it is treated as just one virtue it has, in its lone splendor, to face the competition of the other virtues; moreover, such a view reopens the problems which prompted us to go beyond the virtue list to either a more unified picture or a deeper analysis. The historical career of sincerity should teach us that lesson. In the old dogmatic days, no respectable inquisitor would be satisfied if the inquisitivee told him truthfully that he had tried as hard as humanly possible to believe the doctrine he was blamed for disbelieving, that he had followed all the prayers and rituals and disputes in a willing spirit, but it had not "taken." Heresy was error taking hold of the person, and the more sincere he was in his heretical belief, the greater proof of inner corruption. Luther's "Here stand I, I cannot otherwise" would then be a confession of corruption, not an affirmation of noble commitment. With the rise of liberalism and the victory of fallibilism in the theory of knowledge and science—and who would question that nowadays?—sincerity became a supreme virtue. There are still many who would echo Voltaire—"I despise your belief but I will fight to the death for your right to proclaim it. The Roycean conception of loyalty goes on to analyze all virtue as a form
of loyalty to loyalty, which involves strengthening and spreading the occurrence of loyalties. This is an extreme form of a liberal individualism of sincere commitment.

The liberal approach retains a strong hold in a democratic intellectual milieu today. Its merits as contrasted with concepts of heresy are obvious. It is not simply a selection of an attractive virtue, but a sober judgment of how inquiry can best proceed in human affairs and what openness is required to avoid stagnation. In recent times, problems have multiplied with experience of bizarre causes that have won absolute devotion. The obvious case is Nazism. Recent history of what we may call "moralistic terrorism," that is, a commitment to a cause that is even ready to use terrorism as a means to its advancement, intensifies doubts. Sincere commitment still has recognized moral strength but it no longer has the moral height, much less the moral monopoly, that it seemed to possess in traditional liberalism. Whatever happens in the attempt to overcome the superficiality of a collection-of-virtues approach, it cannot be achieved by installing one virtue as supreme.

Roles

The concept of role is used to analyze aspects of interpersonal relations, to set expectations and (correspondingly) claims and obligations. A person expects a doctor to go about curing him of his ailment, not to experiment on him, nor to be intent primarily on making money. The relevant role, in short, is as a doctor, not a medical researcher nor a businessman. Sociologically, institutions have often been analyzed as patterned sets of roles. In psychological development, a role is internalized and role commitment established through the activity of the self in organizing its aims and values in its activities. But selves are
originally shaped and developed in the complex process of coming to regard ourselves in the way that others selectively look at us, so that self-expectations and self-steering already incorporate the expectations of others.

In this way of treating interpersonal relations and personal activity, roles become detached, analyzed, and then stand ready—in almost a reified fashion—to be reattached to people, carrying with them all the expectations, claims and obligations that emerged in the analysis. The idea is an old one; for example, the ancient Stoics introduced the notion of an "office," which carried the idea of both a role and a duty, and then proceeded to explore various social offices. (This work had a serious influence on the development of Roman law.) A person's moral problem in a difficult situation was to find his appropriate office in that situation and firmly carry out its obligations.

The role formulation, however, raises two questions: first, whether the obligations of the role are clear enough, and second, whether there is always only one pertinent or primary role for a given situation. On the first question, since roles are identified by tasks and offices, obligations should have an initial clarity, although the detail of application may remain vague. Yet clarity is usually achieved only for the central core of the role; there is always a fringe in which the attachment of the obligation to the role may be uncertain. In the case of the doctor, if he substitutes an experimental treatment with the consent of the patient, is he not still carrying out the medical role or is he playing two different roles? If a social worker helps organize the poor to secure their welfare rights, is that not conceivably part of...
of his work? (Who defines the roles?) Clarity at the fringes may often be secured at the cost of multiplying roles. In the recent case of the F.B.I. Abscam operation, Attorney-General Civiletti attackèd those who had leaked the operation and brought notoriety to persons not yet indicted. He suggested that legal penalties might be appropriate for a government worker who did this, since he had presumably taken an oath of confidentiality. Asked whether reporters who published the story were similarly vulnerable, he replied no, for their job was to get the news.

On the second question, the conflict of roles in a moral problem is a familiar dilemma. The jockeying of roles in moral deliberation is in effect looking for the values or obligations that are to be assigned a basic place in the moral economy. A psychoanalyst discovering that a patient is a murderer, or a priest making such a discovery in the confessional, has the problem of weighing the obligations of the medical or priestly role against the obligation of a citizen role. Scientists, bewitched by a fact-value dichotomy which assures a value-free science, have often insisted that when they advocate a social policy they do so as citizens, not as scientists. I have elsewhere suggested that if they embark on such a role differentiation they ought to be more scientific about it, and announce—say in recommending the suspension of nuclear energy within a given time-span—that they are doing it x% as scientist, y% as parents, z% as intellectuals, w% as citizens, etc. They would thus make clear both the sources of relevant information which they regard as persuasive and the different value standpoints involved in their commitment. But the crucial point would be the weight given to a particular standpoint. Is a doctor or a scientist or a priest primarily that? Or is he or she primarily a human being? In recent literature of the women's
liberation movement, some make the sex role primary. Or is one primarily one's self, that is, a person or an individual?

These questions raise the problem of the relation of the role to the person: whether being human or being a person should be conceived as a role at all. A similar issue is whether acting as a moral agent is a role performance; this would invite the question whether the moral role should be preferred to the citizen role or the parental role. Dorothy Emmett cites the epitaph on a Scottish tombstone: "Here lies the body of Tammas Jones, who was born and died a grocer." We turn then to the consideration of the person. It will help us to determine how far being a citizen should be seen as carrying out a role.

Persons.

Plato and Aristotle assume that man as such has a function. Aristotle says: "Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these?" If we follow the clue of Greek usage here I think we can resolve our problems. The Greek idea of virtue is literally that of excellence or fitness. A knife has sharpness as its virtue—the quality which enables it to perform well in the enterprise of cutting. The idea of virtue therefore stays closer to function and to job or enterprise than the idea of role. The view that man has a function need mean no more than that there are enterprises central to human life by reference to which the standards for character, that is virtues, are to be established. This is why Aristotle's is basically a human-nature ethics; he builds it up from
the natural desires and objectives of human striving. Still, he gives it a fixed direction through the content of human nature that he specifies. Taking man to be a rational animal, he assigns a contemplative rationality as the supreme end of life, which only a few can fully attain. As we know, others saw the nature of man differently, and different pictures of the human good emerge in the ancient and medieval and even modern teleologies. In the long run, the evolutionary account dislodged the teleological view of human nature, recognized change and some of the patterns of change, opened the way to a clearer realization of the part played by social tradition in determining directions of human striving, reconstructed the view of reason as an evolutionary instrument in the struggle for survival. In the end it made the task of ethics much more complicated than they had been when the good was attached to a presumed fixed direction of human nature.

Logically, it would not matter too much if being a man is regarded as a role, provided that the content of the role were kept wide open, being a role permitted change and development in the content, and room was left for creativity and fresh potentials at almost every point. Such a notion of role would stretch over a human nature that changes, and even the denial that there is a human nature—for example Sartre’s assertion that the individual at every moment is making a free decision though within a framework of the human predicament and basic human problems. But such a conception would make the idea of a role fairly useless in its essential task of analyzing interpersonal relations into strands and establishing the pattern of specific institutions. Given, too, the constant tendency of people to lapse into essentialism and brand people as types, there are good policy reasons for limiting its
uses. Let us, therefore, conclude that we get into too much trouble if we apply the role concept to a human being, a person, or a moral agent.13

The important lesson in this brief sketch of the relation of role and person or moral agent is that the concept of role is always limited. Behind any role is presupposed a person who is engaged in many enterprises or who is enacting other roles as well. Hence any obligations assigned on the basis of a single role in a given situation either assume this plurality is not relevant in that situation or else have to reckon with it in reaching a decision. Where there is a conflict of roles, the decision may sometimes invoke an established principle about which has priority, and other things being equal the analysis can stop there. But if the situation is complicated enough and the conflict of roles is serious enough, there is no shortcut: deliberation about the situation becomes recognizably that of a moral agent, and the analysis may have to go so far as to render explicit and invoke a picture of the good life.

Is it then enlightening or confusing to think of being a citizen as enacting a role? If being a doctor is clearly enacting a role and being a person or moral agent is not, then being a citizen appears to have an intermediate position. At one end of its activities, it is explicitly role-enacting: a citizen votes, may hold office, has the right of residence in the country without special permission, is entitled to certain protection and benefits, and so on in a whole range of well-recognized and often carefully defined lines of conduct. At the other end, however, being a citizen has the complexity and involves the integrative moral judgment that often requires reference to the good life.
Such an intermediate position is not an unfamiliar phenomenon in moral philosophy. When we are asked whether liberty is a means or an end, we find the categories too restrictive. Certainly liberty is a means to a kind of life, but it is more; it is a constitutive part of a good life. If we are asked whether virtuous conduct is a means toward happiness, many philosophers become unhappy at a mere means-end construal; virtuous conduct is a constitutive part of happiness. If we are asked whether basic rules of justice are an end or a means to the good life, we are inclined to draw a distinction between rules that are administrative or efficacious in securing the good life and rules that are themselves constituents or structural features of the good life. The usual analogy is between rules that tell us how to win in chess, and rules that define the moves. The distinction between laws enacted by the legislative authorities and provisions of the constitution seems to be of the same sort; the latter express the kind of society that is envisaged as good.

Now if being a citizen were conceived to be a role only at one end but a constitutive part of something at the other, what could that something be? Since we have seen the tie-in of citizenship to the state and through it to the society, we can conclude that being a citizen is a constitutive part of being a member of a community. In the history of political theory this seems to be the sound core of the idealist theory of the state in its battle against contractualist theories. We should not allow the exaggerated attempt to assign real personality to the group or a real will to the community to deny the insight that citizenship is conceptually tied in with some form of community relations of persons. It involves some pattern of interpersonal relations or transactions tied to a view of the good life. And to that extent, being
a person rather than enacting a role. And whatever the vision of the good life that may guide the community, a basic minimal agreement today would be on respect for all persons, which gives every individual a part in the society and an opportunity to develop and express his capacities in the life of the community; and on the development, with advancing knowledge and experiment, of institutions that make this kind of life possible.

In general, the good society in the contemporary world is thought of as a democratic society in which wide individual participation is desirable. Such a minimal conception of the good society is not far-reaching, but it may do as a start.

SOME HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEA

The significant historical thread here is not the vast changes in conditions of life which give shape to our modernity. Our concern is rather the history of the democratic idea and the gradual clarification of layer after layer among its constituent values and ideals. These set the problems in terms of which the character of citizenship is to be determined.

We focus on the disintegration of the categories of ruler and ruled, authority and obedience; in short, we are concerned with roles, virtues, powers and attitudes. In predemocratic times these were sharply etched. We have only to think, in British history, of the doctrine of divine right of kings; Locke spent one of his two treatises, Of Civil Government, attacking it. The divine right of kings leaves little room for doubt about what are the appropriate virtues of citizenship, though there could be dispute about whether the royal person should emphasize firmness or mercy or some judicious combination. If we want to see the sharpest break with the aristocratic tradition, though not with the categories of rule and obedience, we should do well to turn back to Hobbes who presents 20.
a thoroughly naturalistic theory of sovereignty grounded in his picture of material and human processes. Critical is the basic place he gives to equality. The usual view, engendered by the battle slogans of liberty versus equality in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, often leaves the impression that equality is a latecomer in the surge of the masses directed to a general levelling and threatening the central liberal ideal of liberty. But Hobbes already gives an important place to equality both in his account of initial conditions and in his listing of the laws of nature. In both cases it is on minimal grounds of maintaining the safety of society, its peace and order—the minimum conditions for any person pursuing his interests on which alone Hobbes is constructing the state and in the recognition of which reason establishes the laws of nature. In the initial conditions, that is the state of nature, Hobbes says that men are equal and no man is so much more powerful than that another could not poison him by guile. Once the enterprise of generating laws of nature is underway, several characteristics of—we may say—good citizenship are specified, beginning with the eighth law of nature. The eighth says that no man should "by deed, word, countenance, or gesture declare hatred or contempt of another." The breach of this law is labelled contumely. This law is justified by the initial equality of men and the fact that all inequality has been introduced by civil law and so rests on consent. Hobbes goes on to argue that if nature made men equal it ought to be acknowledged; or if nature made men unequal, still men think of themselves as equal and so will not enter into conditions of peace except on equality. (We may recall that Aristotle found the sense of inequality to be the major source of revolutions.) Hobbes accordingly gives us the ninth law of
nature as "that every man acknowledge another for his equal by nature."
The break of this is labeled pride. Two other laws follow rapidly:
the tenth, "that at the entrance into conditions of peace, no man
require to reserve to himself any right, which he is not content
should be reserved to every one of the rest" and the eleventh, that if
a man be trusted to serve as a judge he deal equally between men, a
law labelled equity.

If such equalitarian principles for the mutual relation of citizens
did not immediately provoke a revolutionary overturning of society,
it was obviously because the empirical assumptions of the time did not
lead them on to far-reaching institutional changes. The history of
the next three centuries can be read as the application of the
principles in area after area, and liberty, so far from being antithetical
to equality, is often simply the name applied to the consolidation of
equality in a given area. Intellectual liberty or freedom of thought
and inquiry, freedom of conscience, the career open to talent, the
right to vote, the right of revolution are all equalities of effort
and action advanced at times to remove special discriminations and at
times to broaden systematically the range of opportunities for
individual decision. Milton offers a critique of censorship; Locke
a limited defense of religious tolerance; Paine widens it to rule out
governmental interference; Jefferson rests freedom of thought on natural
rights, while Mill rests it on empirical considerations of long-range
utility. Locke defends the right of revolution as the last appeal of
the individual to heaven when all other remedial recourse is closed
to him; Hobbes, more diffident, allows the individual to be released
from political obligation only when the ruler's effective provision of
order has utterly broken down, or when the individual has nothing more
to lose as when he is being led to the gallows. But Hobbes is a minimalist and does not expect any constructive contribution from the mass of people; his free association for "people" is "tumult."

The almost inexorable march of equality, however, is toward expansion and consolidation of gains. It is a slow march nevertheless and even its noblest sentiments are accompanied by harsh reservations. This is clearest in the right to vote. That every man should have a vote is proposed by the Levellers in the mid-seventeenth century when in Cromwell's army they exchange arguments with Ireton and the leadership in the Putney debates. As Colonel Rainborough puts it, "for really I think that the poorest he that is in England has a life to live, as the greatest he." Ireton answers that to give those who do not have a property stake in the kingdom a vote will lead to attempts of the havenots to take away from the haves. (Compare The Federalist X on the need to have checks and balances so that the unification of factions should not lead to the largest faction, the propertyless, making inroads on the propertied, the substantial citizens of the country.) The Levellers, of course, are not Diggers, they disavow communism, and even on the vote they do not intend it for women nor indentured servants. Locke, nearly half a century later, ignores the question of extending suffrage. James Mill, in the early nineteenth century, does not care whether a property qualifications for the vote is maintained or not; he says it makes little difference since the workers will in any case follow their middle class masters as a model. His son, John Stuart Mill knows better—after the Chartists, the beginnings of trade unions, and the Communist Manifesto; he wants the broadening of the franchise, the vote for women, and even considers proportional representation. He is thoroughly aware of the class struggle, but believes that if the opposing forces are
balanced, the liberal thinkers on both sides will sway social policy. On the other hand, the American reformers who meet to plan the abolition of slavery give no thought to (and reject overtures from) women who begin to demand equal rights; and a century has to pass before, at the end of World War I, their right to vote is secured.

Equalitarianism in the twentieth century takes both liberal-reformist and radical shape. For the greater period the ideal of equal opportunity with its meritocratic underpinnings remains dominant. The advances of a social welfare program are largely seen as providing minimal conditions for realistic as against purely formal opportunity. The major cleavage between socialist and non-socialist has been about the empirical questions of the degree of state control and common property ownership required to ensure opportunity and about the collateral costs of centralization in controls over individual freedom. After World War II, however, equalitarian theory generates a wider program. Practically, it calls for active redistribution as well as unleashing of production. Theoretically, it challenges meritocracy. A good illustration of the latter is John Rawls' formulation of the principle that equality is only to be departed from in institutional measures that are not merely for the greatest good but also bring increased benefits to the most disadvantaged; natural gifts are not a moral basis for special reward. It is not surprising that defenders of the older meritocratic position have attached this approach as a new equalitarianism of results, and see it in its various forms—whether in policies of educational expansion, enhanced economic welfare, or affirmative action—as the unleashing of the predatory in the masses. Casting it as the extreme of equalitarianism, they interpret it as the transition from a sober democracy to ochlocracy—in a spirit not unlike Plato's criticism of democracy as license.
The focus of political theory, in the twentieth century prior to the 1960's and 1970's when the more extreme egalitarianism came to a head, continued to be on the problem of political obligation. The basic categories of authority and obedience were still in the ascendancy, but justifications for them became more precarious. Old questions continued, such as whether political obligation to obey rested on contract, purpose, or custom, or some mixture of these elements. Hard-boiled realists, particularly in the self-styled Machiavellian tradition, translated all issue of relation of ruler and ruled into power and charisma. In line with Lasswell's title of his well-known book, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, politics studied influence and the influential, the interactions of the elite and the mass, with the elite getting the available values of deference, income and safety to the greatest extent. There was little place for egalitarianism here. Indeed, ideals of any sort entered into the reckoning largely as bases for power over social groups, as ways of manipulating controls. On the other hand, those dissatisfied with the power emphasis in political science shifted to a focus on political decision and the variety of social decision modes. Others moved back to older ideas of natural rights, or other classical ways (whether ancient philosophical or religious-based) of establishing an explicitly moral basis for political obligation, for legitimate authority (as distinguished from sheer power) and for justified political obedience.

Within the theory of democracy as such, the first half of the century witnessed an internal struggle between those who took it to be government by consent of the governed, and those who wanted to give some operative meaning to the notion of government by the people. The former were generally contractionist in tendency: governing is a
specialized business involving knowledge, experience, and constant attention; the most that the public generally can do is have a veto at election time over its rulers, and either reelect or select others depending on its judgment of their performance. Such judgments in some cases will be sophisticated and serious; in most it will be impressionistic and cursory, or the result of political persuasion. Mostly it will be determined by immediate and special interests. The opposing view called for inventive increase of participation by people generally in the operations of government. It was governed less by a romantic "faith in the people" than by a conviction that the public could learn by experience, and only a broad and continually active public interest could support policies of public welfare; otherwise government would be the preserve not of specialized knowledge of the good, but of special interests of the powerful.

The last two decades in the United States have somewhat put this conflict in the shade, though not as a theoretical conflict. The battle over the Vietnam War and then the Watergate episode roused popular forces. Even without such special events it is likely that the complex problems since World War II, the political changes throughout the world, the expansion of production and technology, the growth of education and the phenomenon of rising expectations for material and cultural programs would themselves have supported greater endeavors to influence public affairs by larger and larger segments of the public. To all these were added—or perhaps as part of them—the successive liberation movements, equalitarian movements against all forms of discrimination. The ideal of participation, even in such more radical forms as participatory democracy, has taken greater hold. The use of political techniques, such as initiative in California, or non-formal organizations such as
consumer and ecological movements, are only indications of the experimentation that is now going on in government-by-the people. Perhaps this should be seen not as government-or ruling in the old style so much as a wider phenomenon: the determination of policy has now become a much wider social endeavor breaking the bonds of the narrowly political.

This historical view of the development of the democratic idea suggests that the powerful equalitarian impetus has to be reckoned with. It is either a good idea to respect for all people and their fulfillment, or a necessary ground for any fertile human advances. We have seen this problem reflected in twentieth century theoretical discussions of authority and obedience, of power and influence, and indicated how the pressure of growing complexity and changed conditions of life were on the verge of breaking through these traditional categories. I suggest that these categories of citizenship have now reached a critical point, in the strict scientific sense of that term. The question is no longer who will command and who will obey, who will rule and who be ruled. The character of authority and obedience is being transformed into some kind of broader participation in resolving urgent problems and reconstructing institutions. If this blossoms into a full-fledged categorical replacement, participation and its correlate, responsibility, appear to be the leading candidates. Hence to deal with the character of citizenship as a moral problem is to consider what attitudes set in what value-orientations, this shift will entail. And to trace the educational implications is to see what changes are required in educational theory and policy in such redirection.

II

If we have correctly analyzed the situation as one in which there is a democratic dissolution of the categories of authority and obedience...
and a movement toward their replacement by participation and responsibility, under the impact of equalitarianism in the changed conditions of life, then what is the moral warrant of that equalitarianism?

The ultimate warrant would be a whole critique of present life, the failure of the older categories as a structure and the possibilities of the new. It is not a case of jumping on the bandwagon of history and saying equalitarianism is good because it is invincible. Equalitarianism has a possible moral appeal insofar as it seems to actualize the old dream of human brotherhood and sisterhood of people. But it has many a criterion of practicality, enhancement of life, acceptability, comparison with alternative paths, to satisfy before it can be allowed to guide the requirements of citizenship and give free rein to the new categories. The least that could be said for it—and that is a great deal—is that the faith in it has grown to such proportions, with increasing strength, that it has to be given a chance to show what it can do. The signs of the shift are all around us in the scope of the critique of institutions that has permeated our life. In part it represents a judgment that the institutions have not functioned to cope with human problems; in part it is a mistrust of their past uncontrolled authority. This is, of course, a thesis I am proposing about its nature. For an opposing thesis, that the shift represents the sheer breakdown of authority and that in place of obedience there is sheer inner lawlessness, the eclipse of tradition, the release of inner bonds, an emergent narcissistic hedonistic materialism, there are many advocates. A good sample is Robert Nisbet's *Twilight of Authority*; if we wish to consider the tradition from which it issues there is the litany of fears from Edmund Burke to Michael Oakeshott.
The dimensions of these contrasting theses will emerge as we tread our way through the several aspects of the problem before us.

THE STATE AND PROSPECTS OF PARTICIPATION

I suggest that at the present time we are at a choice point in democracy, in which we can either turn back to elitism or go forward with fuller participation, that the first path will bring chaos and that the second is a better bet for social experiment. This does not mean that differences in social policy will cease to exist; they will instead take the form of different proposals within an equalitarian framework, just as in the general history of democracy a point was reached where all fruitful political theory began to center within the democratic framework rather than in the conflict of anti-democratic with democratic.

About the phenomenon of the breakdown of authority and respect for authority there has been little disagreement—from the spread of revolutions to the milder American phenomenon of a disillusion with politics. What seems to me to be overlooked is the extent of explicit critique. It may be easier, with many academic analyses of the student movements of the 1960's, to dismiss them as irrational outbursts. But they were practical critiques of our institutions, in the sense that they did not merely violate traditional standards but attempted alternative reconstructions. There is a significant moral difference between affirming an institution with its values and obligations, say the family, while violating them on the side, and experimenting with new forms for which the moral qualities of affiliation and love are claimed. The professions--law, medicine, psychiatry, social work, education, even technology--have been challenged, not only for inhuman violation of their inner
standards on the part of their practitioners, but for the shape that the standards themselves have taken. For example, law—particularly in the Watergate episode—was criticized for its amorality, and a strong movement of public legal service emerged. Medicine has been charged, in spite of technical progress, with devoting itself to the well-to-do instead of the health of the public, with a callousness to the human side of medicine, as well as of course with a calculated self-interest. Psychiatry has been charged with building the values of the establishment into its own concept of mental health, social work with doling out palliatives for an unjust system of distribution. We would have expected education to be invoked as an ally for social reform. Instead, people have accused it of coordinating its human raw material for obedience and resignation and not even successfully teaching the elementary skills. The student revolts charged higher education with processing students for the industrial and military purposes of the society and not doing its job of developing the life of the mind and creative abilities. Perhaps the most devastating critique of technology came from within its citadel, in the extreme form of the first Club of Rome report that almost predicted doomsday with the loss of resources and choking of pollution, if the present technological and economic course were maintained—and this when we might have expected science and technology to be invoked for the development of saving techniques. Nor should we omit the major critique of politics for harnessing all energies for war, for maintaining rather than alleviating the existent oppressions. This issued in the liberation movements, most notably of Blacks and women, and the obvious near insurrectionary movements of the Vietnam war story.
Now significantly in all these events from the point of view of our inquiry, both the resort and the appeal was to a greater participation of people in the affairs of the institution or profession or general reconstruction. For example, the rights of the patient and the doctrine of informed consent and the readiness to charge malpractice are only part of the attempt to bring the patients as a class into participation in medical affairs. In social work there have been powerful movements to organize the "clientele" and develop community action on welfare rights. In education student rights and student participation in the governance of educational institutions emerged as serious, practical issues, while movements for local control of the schools have taken new forms in urban centers. In science and technology, the old conception of a value-free science has been swept away and the demand for responsibility and the participation of people in the determination of technological uses has been evident in, for example, the popular movements on questions of ecology and industrial pollution. I note only some highlights; a full study with the techniques of political science would, I think, be overwhelmingly revealing. Nor are these phenomena only critiques stemming from political radicalism. Demands for accountability are very respectable today and issue from the political right as well, for example in urging the accountability of teachers and the accountability of the government for its taxation. Indeed, critique has been impartially directed upon business and labor, on conservatism and socialism and liberalism and marxism. If I read it right, the movement of critique is a general and sweeping demand for the reconstruction of institutions to meet modern problems, based on the need for wide participation and responsibility rather than authority and obedience.
The responsibility so far considered has been demanded from those who lead in all fields, and the participation is that of specific groups or the public generally. But what about the responsibility of the people themselves? This is the crucial point at which the elitist tradition faults the democratic process. The claim, from Plato to Burke to contemporary laments of the twilight of authority, is that democratic liberty without restraint is license, while the conflict of self-regarding interests can only yield chaos and an incapacity to act. How permeating this fear can be, especially in critical situations, may be illustrated from the fact that a sober and learned conservative-liberal like Walter Lippman wrote a little book in the 1930's entitled *The Method of Freedom*, in which he toyed with the suggestion that Congress give up its right to propose legislation and retain only the right to vote on legislation proposed by the Executive. This was on the ground that congressional proposals represented diverse and conflicting interests, not general well-being. Now that problem is far from done with. Witness the arguments about Congress in the present period on the question of energy legislation. Note, however, the import of the argument: the claim of dispersive self-interest of groups is not merely being attached to the people, but to the representatives of the people. Can it stop short at the doors of the Executive chambers? The conflicts go on within the Executive, and the history of the Department of Energy in relation to Big Oil is not encouraging as an exemplar of Executive knowledge of the Good versus popular dispersive Will. In short, the problem of the conflict of Rationality and Voluntarism which underlies the whole tradition of Elitism and Democracy is inescapable at even the present moment. We might phrase the democratic problem of citizenship in a Kantian vein as: how, when the people participate, is a
responsible public possible? There is no avoiding what we may technically call the epistemology of citizenship.

RATIONALITY AND IDEOLOGY

The issues of rationality and voluntarism are well-worn in the conflict over democracy. Aristocracy and elitism insist that politics is a science like medicine: there are some who can know what is the public good, and they are the appropriate leaders. As Plato put it in getting this tradition started, they are the ones in whom reason is strong and establishes inner controls over appetite and passion. But of course these were only ideal rulers, and so Aristotle made a move in the direction of democracy: While it would be nice to have such rulers, human beings are too capable of corruption, and even the doctor can be bribed by my enemies to destroy me. Hence let us have a government of laws, not men; the people, precisely because of diverse interests, can be good critics and collectively wiser. In this history of political theory, that move was, however, but a detour to the struggle over who makes the laws. The mainstream of democratic theory, perhaps unwilling to rest its case on the corruption of the wise, appealed to the will of the people. The issue of reason vs. will was fought in gigantic proportions in the late medieval and early modern battle as to whether God's reason or God's will was primary. It looks as if Okham's voluntarism fitted well into the aspirations of the national state in the battle with the papal universalistic control; it scarcely, therefore, yielded a democratic theory but at most a move away from its opposite. In any case, voluntarist underpinning of democracy carries us to a theory of the will, and so to a psychological question: It is doubtful whether the debate in moral philosophy in our century, with its technical formulation whether moral terms are to be given a
cognitive or an emotive (or prescriptive) interpretation, gets far beyond the medieval battle by substituting a linguistic for a theological formulation as a way of begging the psychological questions. The question is whether democratic theory in its notion of the will of the people is doing more than rejecting the elitist-aristocratic view of sovereign wisdom. Of course there is the whole history in which democratic liberalism prescribes a mediating process from will to wisdom: for example, Bentham's view of the impact of individual egoism producing collective egoism which is public welfare, Adam Smith's, and the economists' faith in self-interest producing through the market mechanism, the public welfare, and so on. Perhaps only as such defenses wear thin, the conservative attack on the will of the people as a cover for anarchic conflict of interests gains strength again. Or perhaps this reflects simply the intensity of social problems.

In spite of this unresolved conflict, the theory of ideology—the self-conscious critique of theories in relation to specific interests—has made progress. This sociology of knowledge itself has gone in two opposing directions. In one direction it ends with simply the relativistic conflict of theories that have no ulterior rationality. The situation is then simply that there is conflict of social interests and each generates or adopts the theories that serve it best. On the opposite view, the conflict of ideologies is itself grist to the mill of growing self-consciousness, and criteria of the rational accumulate in the process. Granted that there is no philosopher's stone for the instant certification of a social theory, there can be an accumulation of knowledge, methods and techniques in a retail, not a wholesale
fashion. The first time a social theory comes swashbuckling on the historical stage, it may—to adapt Marx's quip on Napoleon I and III—come as tragedy, the second time as farce. Perhaps this is a bit too hopeful, but at least by the third time people may have learned better. On such a conception of rationality it can in the long run penetrate ideology. Rationality is not a pure method but embodies the whole careful and cumulative procedure of science and knowledge. It is not pure knowledge versus pure will. The will of the people, properly conceived in the light of our historical experience, need not be chaotic conflict; it can be the result of the learning by experience and collective reflection of the peoples of the world, adding to their knowledge by the lessons of their institutional experience. It is a growing body and so the concept of rationality is a growing cutting edge.

It will not have escaped the reader that the way indicated in the unnecessarily forced antithesis of objective reason and arbitrary will is precisely the way in which science goes about building up knowledge—the surrender of absolute claims, the long hard process of accumulating experience, the critical questioning of hardened belief, the use of imagination in constructing theory and the constant search for alternatives, the cooperation of many in diverse fields to build a coherent framework. It has taken much longer to project the utility of such procedures in questions of value and morality and social policy. And it will no doubt take much longer to carry these attitudes into practical steps of practices and institutions.

Take, for example, the current use of polling and their publicizing. The questions usually asked are how people, in effect, do or would vote on an issue. The polls are a barometer of instant wish or will, they are

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not usually an inquiry into people's reasons or arguments for or against. They are repeated at smaller and smaller intervals, in the hope of depicting accurately the swings or locating the tides of opinion or will. They seldom pay attention to their own effect on people generally, that is how they shape public opinion, nor their effect on policy makers who are prompted by fears of bucking tides to pay more attention to the "votes" than to the argument about reasons and soundness. In brief, the present tendency of polls is thoroughly voluntaristic. And yet there is no reason in the world why social scientists and responsible media should not develop a polling which is more rationally oriented. We are beginning to question, in the field of educational testing, the effects of the short answer tests: arbitrariness is installed, a limited view of ability is standardized, and creativity, imagination and a sense of alternatives is thwarted. The same could happen in polling—unless it be that the social scientists and the media really despise the public.

INSTITUTION-BUILDING AND RECONSTRUCTION

Because of the traditional veneration of tradition and the conflicts about paths of social change, we tend to overlook the slow process of practical change and institution-building that takes care of some of our problems. Even where people have been unable to do anything to alleviate their lot, they have been inventive in myths to relieve the spirit. But even here techniques and devices play a part: there is no doubt a lesson to be learned from Houseman's couplet, "Malt does more than Milton can, to justify God's ways to man." Technological devices are evident enough, but we are less attentive to institutional techniques and devices. Take, for example, the growth of insurance. It had precursors in intricate forms of partnership and patterns of assumed risk that spread...
the possible losses. (Indeed, such patterns became early grounds for admitting usury.) With the mathematical development of statistics, emerged as a powerful social tool. It has collectivized risk-taking and disposed of many of the problems that thwarted the theory of justice concerning distribution of losses and burdens. Sociologists (for example, Maclver) have sometimes distinguished between civilization and culture, stressing the cumulative character of social techniques as defining the former, and the freedom of spirit as the essence of the latter. Certainly a more developed history of such "civilization" would be enlightening. Take property, for example: when we regard it as a constant concept, we overlook the changes in incorporeal forms, corporate development and its techniques, vested rights and tenure rights, collateral effects of pension plans and union contracts, governmental monetary practices, all of which determine the flow of moneys and their distribution. The net result is to alter the concept of property, certainly beyond the recognition of an older landed society. The same point could be made about political institutions, national and international; about economic institutions which are transformed while remaining disguised under the hardened rubric of capitalism and socialism; about familial institutions, under the acceptance of divorce and contraception and changing child-parent relations.

In general, the direction in social life is from resigned acceptance to intermittent intervention in situations of stress and distress, and from intermittent intervention to the conscious forging of institutional instruments for social progress. The outlook here converges with that of growing rationality.
In many ways the relation of individual and community is, as suggested earlier, at the heart of the nature of citizenship. Let us pose the problem in its worst light, in the elitist and aristocratic tradition in which the people are taken to act in terms of individual interests and passions without the capacity for developing firm common purposes. It is not enough to show that actual aristocrats and elites do no better; this leads to a universal pessimism. The evidence for such pessimism is by no means weak. Practically every good device or instrument has turned into its opposite. Idealistic revolutions, whether French or American or Russian, have evaporated into politics-as-usual. Idealistic labor movements have often turned into myopic unions. Promising scientific discoveries have often been converted to profit and war. The liberating promises of education have often ended in alienated students. And the hopes of state action for well-being have led to disillusioned citizens. If we remain on a general level and expect a wholesale cure of our modern malaise, perhaps we are left, as in Nisbet’s recent lament, with a call to pull ourselves up by moral-religious bootstraps. If we think rather of the remaking of institutions, with or without the central focus on the state, we rely to some degree on an underlying sense of human nature and its processes which would allow for common purposes. And such a perspective has to come to terms with the view of the individual and the community.

I suggest that historically the moralities of isolated individualism justifying all policies in egoistic terms and the group cohesion that rides roughshod over individual well-being are best regarded as deviations from the moral mainstream. There has always been a strong component of affiliation and mutual aid, with ready cooperation and
assistance, with focus on respect for the individual. I do not enter here into the technical questions: Whether this component is a late product that emerges when societies become more unified or whether it is inherent in interpersonal relations; whether it is primarily a reaction to existent evils or a positive operation in ordinary life when not distorted by difficult social conditions. But the fact is that there is a present cleavage between individual and community. And this, we can see, has been powerfully promoted by the institutions of the last few centuries in which the competitive and the aggrandizing have been normalized as a mode of life and people driven apart into isolated individualism or have reacted into overriding cohesion. In our view individuality and the capacity to share experience require interpersonal and group cultivation, and the sense of community can be expected to be the normal outcome of supporting harmonious institutions. Different moral theories when they neglect this mainstream cooperative morality will show by the way they seek to justify themselves that they have not looked away from this basic reference point. The isolating egoism attempts to derive, whether by the guiding hand of Providence or the computations of decision theory on a minimax strategy, a viable social ethic. The overriding cohesion theory attempts it by coalescing the general well-being of individuals with the collective policies.

Whatever be the case, it is obvious that we cannot in the modern world be called back to a morality that neglects the individual or leaves the individual on his own; and that the longing for community is a powerful motivation in contemporary morality.
Having completed our analysis of the shifts that require a transformation in the character of citizenship today, we can now go directly to the pivotal virtues for contemporary citizenship without the fear that we are simply culling superficial traits assembled without grounding. Our remaining topics concern these virtues and their educational implications.

PIVOTAL VIRTUES FOR CONTEMPORARY CITIZENSHIP

The virtues of contemporary citizenship are mainly those of equality, responsibility and participation. They have several different aspects; they span both moral attitudes and intellectual qualities, and bear upon both national and international concerns.

The most familiar aspect of respect for persons is overcoming the major discriminations of our time. A contemporary moral citizen takes his equalitarianism seriously and supports the achievement of equality for minorities (e.g., Blacks in our country) and submerged majorities (e.g., women). I do not mean that there will not be disagreements among moral citizens about what policies best serve such ends. For example, controversies about bussing and affirmative action and the equal rights amendment are real ones; but there is all the difference in the moral character of citizenship between those who oppose such measures and offer alternatives that move toward the goals and those who oppose such measures and are ready to put off achievement to an indefinite future or oppose them in order not to achieve equality.

A different aspect of equalitarianism is the concern for people throughout the world, not merely those in one's own country. This taps the serious issue of the relation of the national and the global.
morality has had an implicit concept of what constitutes its moral community analogous to the congregation of a church, i.e., those who belong and who are possible participants. It is a commonplace in moral philosophy, as well as in sociology, that the moral community has grown from the kin and village to the country and beyond, and that since the eighteenth century universalism has moved from a dream to a partial reality. This does not mean that there are no differences in degree of attachment or priorities or special obligations (just as a parent owes more to his children than to a stranger). It does mean that the well-being of other countries becomes part of the reckoning of national policies. This is not a purely speculative matter nor purely a matter of sentiment. It is critically practical in a world in which what one country does to land or water or weather or river flow to further its prosperity may mean the dessication or pollution or starvation of a neighboring country; in which the cornering of oil or national resources or their wasting may upset the production or economy of other countries. Interdependence today is too familiar to require recounting. Now as international agencies—whether intergovernmental or non-formal or centralized—arise and are consolidated, the global aspects may be given greater strength and begin to affect the quality of national citizenship. Conceivably people engaged in the international aspects may be moved from guaranteed special status to international citizenship (Cf. present dual citizenship even with its ambiguities). Indeed, the desirable universal character of science might even encourage international citizenship of scientists, not unlike priests in medieval times. In any case, the practical problem of contemporary citizenship in this context is to achieve a coherent interrelation of national and global concerns appropriate to the present day dynamic relation of countries in a growingly
integrated world. It is a matter of balance in a complexity of considerations and circumstances which cannot be determined by a single rule or simplified principle.

A familiar, and in liberal countries a traditional, mark of good citizenship is strict adherence to the preservation of others' liberties particularly in situations where they differ with majority policies. Though often cast in terms of their rights to their liberties, it is clearly a lesson of the contemporary world: as Mill argued in his *On Liberty* more than a century ago, the losers in repression are the majority since the minority may be correct or partially correct in their views. Certainly in the contemporary changing world there is a need for the free consideration of alternatives. This is not a purely academic matter; we should recall the periods of national hysteria after World War I, again in the McCarthy period, and once again during the Vietnam War. Some today view the last as if it were simply a national spiritual depression which tied our hands thereafter from strong action in international affairs. This obscures the fact that the disagreement about national policy was a profound one in which we suffered through repressing alternative ideas and drove people into near-violence.

A further element in a contemporary morality of citizenship is a balanced attitude toward past and future. It may be recalled that the Jeffersonian period revolted against the ties of the past; obligations to the future were not discussed. The world, Jefferson argued, belongs to the living. We can understand why "the dead hand of the past" was unacceptable in a time of revolution. We can also understand why in our own century economically underdeveloped countries have been forced to
focus on the future; for their present generations paid the cost of sharp social change, even apart from sufferings of war and battles for freedom. In the industrially advanced countries, too, the problems of utilizing resources and the spectre of overpopulation have focused attention on the future. Moral philosophers have debated the abstract question of the rights of future generations, but they have also raised the economic question of the percentage of national income that should be devoted to savings and investment for future restoration and replenishment. And strong social movements have grown for preservation and ecological balance. The fact is that such concerns, whether to maintain the best of the past in nature and human life or to plan for a good future, cannot be separated from the critique of the present character of life and its ways, from an evaluation of the extent of waste and recklessness or of wisdom in household and national management.

Such considerations lead to a sense of responsibility as an integral part of citizenship. The sense of responsibility need not be simply general, but can be directed in terms of what we may call the central problems on the agenda of national life. The greatest ones will usually be clear: no one can deny the importance in our time of peace, of avoiding an overpopulation that is a harbinger of starvation, of addressing dangers of pollution, of guarding against the exhaustion of vital resources. Such concerns are basic to all people, whatever the variety of values. Hence whatever other moral disagreement there may be, a specific concern with such problems is a mark of rational contemporary citizenship. To be concerned with such issues, to be ready to engage in cooperative action with respect to them, to be ready for rational sacrifice in meeting them, are therefore present requirements of sober citizenship. The current problem of energy has dramatized this kind of consideration.
Other large issues have not achieved that kind of agreement but appear critical to different groups of citizens. Some take the conflict of capitalism and socialism to be the problem underlying all others; some formulate the problem politically rather than economically and see the issue as democracy against collective dictatorship. In all such questions the responsibility of contemporary citizenship calls minimally for a critical examination, not necessarily adherence to one side or another nor even acceptance of a particular formulation of the problem. These are individual decisions, but the obligation not to let ideologies take over and close minds is a common one. It is easier to do this in dealing with others' problems than one's own. For example, the concept of the national interest has governed a great deal of policy decision throughout this century, and yet it has tacitly been identified with military strength and the power to have our way, without reckoning the effects on other countries or even the desirability of their autonomy in our national interest. (Controversies about the covert operations of our intelligence agencies sharply raise this question.) The relevant requirement of moral citizenship is, at a minimum, to resist ideological blinders in the use of concepts such as national interest, for they typically block full moral and social considerations.

A consequence of several of the aspects considered is an attitude to change. A rational attitude to change is not, of course, an adulation of change as such. It involves a critique of the need for change and an acceptance of the fact that in modern life change will often be desirable or else inevitable. We may then have to be reconciled to it, although we may work to make its shape more congenial to basic values that endure. Some tendencies have to be checked—for example, that
everything technology invents has to be used (Cf, the controversies which occurred over supersonic air transportation and research in recombinant genetics). This will be a constant issue, as possibilities that now belong in science fiction become technical realities. In brief, citizens may expect harder decisions, closer to basic moral issues, for whole ways of life. It is a far cry from the early part of the century, when the central issue may have been protection or free trade. With the growth of genetic knowledge and technology, we may have to decide on what kind of descendants to have, or whether not to decide at all. In any case, the acceptance of large changes in human life involves a critical as against an all-or-none attitude, and a special tolerance to varied ways of life. The latter will have reverberations in parent-child relations since the new ways of life will take hold of the new generation more directly.

Most of the points discussed bear on responsibilities. But, assigned responsibility without participation (like taxation with representation) invites manipulation or exploitation. Hence the requirement of participation is the very hub of the morality of citizenship today. What differentiates it from older forms, however, is the necessity for an active, inventive attitude, both in criticism and construction. Participation that is simply blind following is no more than obedience, and we have suggested that obedience is giving way as authority has diminished. To sway under charisma is the frequent intermediate posture; charisma often gives the sense of choice. The current need is to complete the passage to fuller participation. We shall see shortly that this has the most serious implications for education.
Finally, a sharpened concept of patriotism and love of country has not lost its place in the roster of qualities of contemporary citizenship. Altered as it is by the individualistic aspects of criticism and inventiveness, by the interpenetration of the global with the national, infused as it can be by the fuller understanding of the relation of individual and community in a world such as ours is today, love of country still remains a natural human phenomenon, a significant outcome of particularity of setting, association, education, ambient culture. A shaping of these natural impulses under the categories of authority and obedience has in the past provoked the conflict of patriotism versus conviction which led to such condemnatory comments as "Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel" or to different interpretations of "Our country, right or wrong." Decatur's toast to our country in 1816 includes the hope that in her foreign relations she may always be right, before adding "but our country, right or wrong." Carl Schurz, after the century's experience, which includes the growth of imperialism, changes the perspective. His further addition (1899) is: "When right, to be kept right; when wrong, to be put right." In brief, the patriotism that makes a responsibility of participation is quite different from that which insists on thoughtless (though affectionate) obedience.

There are no doubt other qualities of citizenship to be traced in a fuller treatment; I think that those stressed above are the ones that emerge most sharply from the conditions and problems of the contemporary world. There is, however, one final point—the recognition of the limits of citizenship. The sense of this issue has haunted the history of political theory in both its religious and its secular forms. Perhaps
the clearest formulation within political theory has been controversy about the right of revolution. It obviously cannot be put into the constitution or the law, for that would be granting the individual legal permission to violate the law. It will, therefore, have to find its place in reflections about the nature of the law. In legal positivist theory, with its identification of law and positive law, there can be an external moral critique of the law or its decisions. In natural law theory a positive law that violates natural law can be declared not to be law at all, just as a law that goes counter to divine law has no proper legal status. In Hobbes, we saw, the rational purposes that generate law are no longer operative for the individual who is being led to the gallows, and he has no obligation to obey. In Locke, the right to revolution has a dignified centrality (and should it not, for he is justifying the bloodless revolution of 1688?) as the appeal of people to God when they have exhausted all social appeals against the trampling of their natural rights. The Declaration of Independence follows the same line. Now whether the appeal to revolution be seen as the appeal to genuine citizenship or the transcendence of citizenship by weightier values, is akin to the issue we discussed as to whether citizenship is a constitutive part of the good life or only a limited role. The historical trend of democracy has been to domesticate protest by including it in the rights of citizenship and, therefore, to render revolution less necessary. Examples are: guaranteeing the rights of protestors to present their case and to organize for democratic change, extending freedom of conscience to include even individual conscientious objection to military service. One can even read a continuity between revolutionary action and the many ways in which techniques exist in the law for departing from its rules. In an
interesting book, *Discretion to Disobey*, Mortimer R. Kadish and Sanford H. Kadish explore the variety of situations in which (starting with juries) it is acceptable for officials and for individuals to deviate lawfully from the law. Of course to recognize the continuities does not deny the limits. When a union of public workers strikes although it is forbidden to do so, mediation may still continue and the matter be settled, including the withdrawal of an injunction; and something similar may happen in the aftermath of race riots. But organized revolution or in our own day acts of deliberate terrorism are across the line. The great scope that a genuinely democratic society offers for action in disagreement thus enables it to draw the line of citizenship more sharply. Whether it can rule out the occurrence of revolution as a citizenly act depends on causes and content, not on form and method. In the classic revolutions in which a whole new type of society is in the making, those who are in revolt, may think of themselves as the citizens of the coming society rather than of the one that they see as passing.

**SOME EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS**

If we have correctly discerned the requisites of contemporary citizenship in knowledge and inquiry and attitude, then marked changes are overdue in education. They can be indicated briefly in three directions: the broadening of educational opportunities, a basic reorientation in intellectual education, a rethinking of moral education.

The broadening of educational opportunity simply carries further the movement of the last few decades toward the expansion of secondary and higher education through schooling and outside of schooling. All citizens are to be provided with the knowledge that a contemporary needs. The momentum for expansion already exists in spite of economic

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difficulties. The crucial question is more likely to lie in the upgrading of quality to the point sufficient to meet the requirements of contemporary citizenship. To take one important example: is the understanding and ability to handle computers requisite for the citizens of the very near future. If so, should mathematical education become as general as we have sought to make reading and writing? Three questions are here involved—the necessity, the ability to manipulate, the basic understanding.

Reading in many places has been a legal requirement for voting. But it is quite possible, as India did, to have voting for different parties by symbols, even simply color differences, and information could be transmitted by sound. In one respect, then, the reading requirement can be relaxed, and has been in some places. If, however, the requirement of citizenship includes careful reckoning with ideas and proposals, it is hardly likely that this can be done in the advanced industrial countries without reading. Even apart from the necessity for reading in the ordinary business of life, it has therefore remained as a basic element in the education of citizens. Now this argument about reading has been offered only to prepare us to consider mathematics. Do we need only ordinary arithmetic or more advanced mathematics? It is likely that computers can be so constructed that little understanding is required but only learning the rules of manipulation. Should our instruments of calculation and information storage simply be then the abacus of the new civilization?

Perhaps we can learn a lesson from our experience with statistics. Statistics are quoted in many discussions about public policy, and they are regarded as vital links in the proofs of likely consequences and thus desirable policy. Now it is a commonplace among scholars and scientists that an unenlightened use and acceptance of statistics is
most dangerous and can be most misleading. A basic understanding of what is going on in the process is required at least for critical caution. The same point can be made by considering work in psychology or education. Researchers have sometimes mastered the tools of statistical research and used formulae and indices but without understanding the theory of the construction of their tests and the limits within which they are to be interpreted. The results are sometimes sad, and often harmful.

I suggest that from an overall perspective we need a public grounded in a basic education that furnishes understanding and not merely control of the instruments. How this is to be accomplished and how far it can be carried is a problem of detailed and inventive educational research. A cleavage of direction is apparent in educational theory; while some cling to the idea that only a small part of the population can go far in difficult learning, others define the differences among individuals not as capacity and incapacity, but in the time it will take people to learn and the effort and motivation and ingenuity of teaching required. I suggest that the latter is the path that a democracy has to try out in the contemporary world if it aims at an enlightened citizenry, especially as an enlightened citizenry is the requirement of the contemporary world.

The basic reorientation in intellectual education is a more far-reaching matter. It is generally recognized that most of our schooling has taken the form of imparting information and, even where it cultivates insight, of getting the learner to see the point as the teacher and established thought see it. In many respects it is parallel to the situation we have seen in political and social life. Teachers are the authority, students have the task of adequate obedience; the more gifted the students are, the more quickly they can be expected to acquire the
insights, master the theories, and organize their knowledge as the teachers are conveying it. The shift required in the light of the transition we have discussed from authority and obedience to participation and responsibility has its intellectual counterpart, and it is a drastic one. It is not merely the much desired shift today from deemphasizing fact-gathering (which treats knowledge in the style of the TV quiz shows as knowing and remembering factual items) to a grasp of theory and a cultivation of insight. It goes much farther and wants the student to confront alternatives, develop the habit of looking for and working out alternatives, and cultivate the imaginative and the inventive. This holds for culture as well as science. Ordinarily today this aspect is raised only in graduate work and only for those who are to engage in research. Even here the habit of entering a school of thought and following it out is the method of training. It furnishes depth, but not creativity.

A reorientation has to start at the beginning, not wait for graduate school. In reading, it is not sufficient to ask for the meaning, but to investigate different possible meanings. In school assignments it is not sufficient to ask the child to look up something in the encyclopedia and give the correct answer, defined as what the teacher had in mind. Why not send children on simple inquiries for which the teacher openly does not have an answer and awaits the child's construction of the problem? We all know the tests in which children are shown a complex and asked to find a pattern, whether it be a more or less hidden figure in a picture or a formula in a set of numbers or the obvious curve in a graph, or the rule of action in a series of situations. Invariably this test ends with the bright student getting "the correct answer." Why should not the student after getting this be asked to suggest or seek out alternative patterns from the same data or picture or situations?
Is it only because such tests could not be automatically scored? Or is it that we are implicitly using a model of obedience to authoritative answers rather than of participation in the processes of advancing knowledge? Once again, the working out of the reorientation in terms of educational techniques is a difficult professional undertaking. But the direction seems to me to be warranted by the conditions of contemporary life: the need for the constant advance of knowledge, the need for deeper appreciation and participation in the understanding and processes of knowledge, and the goal of an enlightened community.

The rethinking of moral education is a more difficult question in its theoretical aspects. Our culture has had a narrow view of the scope of morality, limiting it to individual attitudes in the individual situation and in the treatment of others. It has not seen large problems of social policy as basically moral; thus it has rarely understood the medieval concern with "just price" as a moral problem, or the treatment of usury in ancient and medieval works. We are, however, under the pressure of contemporary problems and large-scale contrasts of different societies as well as the magnitude of evils and the issues of responsibility, beginning to see the larger aspects of morality and the interrelation of the good society and the good person. We are thus coming to see the moral character of institution-building and reconstruction. All of this has to be conveyed in education. Insofar as the schools are small communities with ordered relations of persons and institutionalized ways of doing things, they can be a laboratory for moral learning and the character of student participation. A minimal change in the right direction would be to alter the frequent practice of preaching democracy and brotherhood in a functioning atmosphere of authority and punishment. In general, there is no contradiction between cultivating
reasoning in moral matters and maintaining an explicit moral order in the way people treat one another and in the distribution of rights and opportunities. Nor is there a contradiction between, on the one hand, cultivating a place for the individual in criticizing the existent order and justifying proposals for reconstruction, even on the school level, and, on the other hand, working out cooperative ways of decision that are not simply voluntaristic. Nor is there a contradiction between even special teaching dealing with moral problems and the recognition that in the deeper sense they can be developed and dealt with in every corner of the curriculum from literature to sport to mathematics. Perhaps the mark of success would be the extent to which students come to see and feel morality as a process of self-making and society-making. This would be a remarkable preparation for citizenship.

Perhaps the primary lesson of our inquiry has been the extent to which apparently simple questions of the character of citizenship under present conditions turn out to have roots and ramifications in basic philosophical ideas and require for their answers not only philosophical clarification but also the bringing together of inquiries and answers from the whole range of social disciplines. The answers we have suggested are, of course, hypotheses for theoretical inquiry and exploratory practice. The important issue is, of course, to decide on basic directions.
NOTES

1 Aristotle, Politics, Book III, Chapter 4.


3 Plato, Republic, 369-74.


12 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, Chapter 7.

13 For a clear statement of this problem, see R.S. Downie, Roles and Values (London: Methuen and Co., 1971), pp. 128-34.


22 Schurz said this in an address to an Anti-Imperialistic Conference in Chicago on October 17, 1899.

CHAPTER II

CRITICAL THEORY AND RATIONALITY IN CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Henry A. Giroux
Boston University
The argument put forth in this paper is that citizenship education has been dominated by models of rationality which have placed it in opposition to its traditionally proclaimed function of educating students to develop and maintain a viable democratic society. The models of rationality that have dominated citizenship education have resulted in its failure to develop an adequate theory capable of understanding the inter-relationship between state, schooling, and social and cultural reproduction. Consequently citizenship education has been tied to normative and political principles which have blinded it to its own ideology and its role in reproducing the status quo. I argue that if citizenship education is going to free itself from its own intellectual and ideological history, it will have to situate its basic principles in a new mode of rationality, one that is explicitly political, critical and visionary.

In putting forth this argument, I draw heavily upon basic tenets of critical theory in defining three modes of rationality. I then examine the political nature of these different types of rationality and point out how they roughly characterize a number of existing traditions in citizenship education. Thereupon, I outline a theoretical foundation that attempts to integrate the more progressive dimensions of the modes of rationality examined in the paper, and finally, I outline a tentative program which illustrates pedagogical practices that are politically consistent with such an approach.

INTRODUCTION

In the classical Greek definition of citizenship education, a model of rationality can be recognized that is explicitly political, normative, and visionary. Within this model education was seen as intrinsically political, designed to educate the citizen for intelligent and active participation in the civic community. Moreover, intelligence was viewed as an extension of ethics, a manifestation and demonstration of the doctrine of the good and just life. Thus, in this perspective, education was not meant to train; its purpose was to cultivate the formation of virtuous character in the ongoing quest for freedom. Therefore, freedom was always something to be created, and the dynamic that informed the relationship between the individual and the society was based on a continuing struggle for a more just and decent political community.

If we were to use citizenship education in the Greek sense against which to judge the quality and meaning of civic education in this country, I think a strong case could be made to argue that, for the most part, it has been a failure. This is not meant to suggest that liberal democratic theory has not supported noble ideals for its citizens, for it has; it is simply to assert that such ideals have not found their way, in general, into the day-to-day practices of schools, either historically or in more recent times.

The role that schools have played historically in reproducing the rationality of social control and class dominance has been extensively developed and need not be repeated here. But there is one interesting note that is worth mentioning. Prior to the advent of the twentieth century and the rise of the scientific management movement that swept the curriculum field, there was no pretense on the part of educational leaders as to the purpose and function of public schooling. Schools,
with few exceptions, were training grounds for character development and economic and social control. Unlike the notion of social control later articulated by Dewey in which schools would provide non-coercive forms of persuasion in order to develop intellectual growth consistent with psychological development in students, the educators of the early republic equated social control with obedience and conformity. Edward Ross captured the nature of this sentiment when he referred to education as an inexpensive form of police. Moreover, the language of justification in nineteenth-century public school rationales made the intent and purpose of schooling quite clear. In other words, there was no "hidden curriculum" during this part of the history of American education.

...For much that is today called a hidden function of the schools was previously held to be among the prime benefits of schooling. A society newly in conflict over its own identity could respond to such an appeal. Education continued to be justified more as a means of social control than as an instrument of individual betterment. The quest for the one best system precluded any acknowledgement of local differences and aspired instead to a uniformity of experience. In 1891 the Commissioner of Education, William Torrey Harris, frankly admitted that a major purpose of schools was to teach respect for authority, and that forming the habits of punctuality, silence, and industry was more important than understanding reasons for good behavior.

The comparison between the Greek and early American notions of citizenship reveal telling differences in political ideals. At the same time, the interaction between schooling, politics, and citizenship is quite clear. The visibility of this interaction was lost, however, when educational theory and practice in the twentieth century shifted the philosophical basis of schooling from the political to the technical. Schooling was no longer justified in terms of political values and concerns; the theoretical pillars upon which a new rationale was constructed were efficiency and control. With the age of scientific management came the celebration of a new rationality and the removal of "the political" from the terrain...
of schooling. William Lowe Boyd in his study of curriculum policy making captures the essence of this stance with his observation. 

...since the reformers believed that there was 'no Republican or Democratic way to pave a street, only a right way,' the business of running a city or a school system was viewed as just that, a business matter and not something appropriate for politics. The prompt, business-like dispatch of the decision making tasks facing school boards...was facilitated by their view that a wide range of educational questions were essentially technical matters beyond the capacity of the laity to decide. 

This philosophical shift in the purpose and function of schooling not only abstracted schools from the context of the wider society, it also ushered in a mode of rationality that relegated the political nature of schooling to the anteroom of educational theory and practice. Citizenship education became entwined in a "culture of positivism," one that displayed little interest in the ways in which schools acted as agents of social and cultural reproduction in a society marked by significant inequities in wealth, power, and privilege. 

This paper argues that if citizenship education is going to revitalize itself in the interest of creating a more noble and just society, it will have to free itself from the burden of its own intellectual and ideological history. In doing so it will have to develop a new rationality and problematic for examining the relationship between schools and the wider society. Questions of technique, objectivity and control will have to give way to a rationality based on the principles of understanding and critique; likewise, within this rationality a more critical problematic will have to be developed, one that generates new categories and raises questions that could not be raised in the old rationality. 

At the core of this new rationality should be a serious attempt to reformulate citizenship education by situating it within an analysis which explores the often overlooked complex relations among knowledge,
power, ideology, class, and economics. Such an appraisal would have to use and demonstrate the importance of social and political theory for its analysis of schooling and citizenship education.

In approaching this task, I will first begin by examining what can be termed the 'American ideology;' next I will examine the political nature of different types of rationality. Then, I will examine how these particular forms of rationality roughly characterize a number of existing traditions in citizenship education. Next, I will outline the foundation of a more radical rationality, one that attempts to unravel the relationship between the educational system, the economic system, and the class structure. Finally, I will explore how these rationalities might be integrated into a set of radical educational practices which might be used as a foundation for developing a more viable theory of citizenship education.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS IN EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE

Any notion of rationality has to be defined not only in regard to the truth claims commanded by its major assumptions and ensuing practices, but also by its relationship to what might be called the dominant rationality of a given society at a particular moment in history. This methodological approach is crucial because it illuminates the interconnections that exist between a dominant rationality and the institutions that function in a given society to reproduce it. Such interconnections politicize the notion of rationality by calling into question how its ideology supports, mediates, or opposes the configuration of existing socio-political forces that use the dominant rationality to legitimate and sustain their existence.

Rationality

By rationality, I mean a specific set of assumptions and social practices that mediate how an individual or group relates to the wider
society. Underlying any one mode of rationality is a set of interests that define and qualify how one reflects on the world. This is an important epistemological point. The knowledge, beliefs, expectations, and biases that define a given rationality both condition and are conditioned by the experiences into which we enter. Of crucial importance is the notion that such experiences only become meaningful within a mode of rationality that confers intelligibility on them. Modes of rationality 'bind' in a non-mechanistic way. As Althusser points out, "it is not the material reflected on that characterizes and qualifies a reflection,... but the modality of that reflection, the actual relation the reflection has with its objects." The importance of the notion of rationality becomes clear when its definition is extended to include the concept of the 'problematic.'

Problematic

All modes of rationality contain a problematic which is a conceptual structure that can be identified both by the questions that it raises and the questions that it is incapable of raising. The concept of the problematic suggests that any mode of rationality can be viewed as a theoretical framework, the meaning of which can be understood by analyzing both the system of questions that command the answers given as well as the absence of those questions that exist beyond the possibility of such a framework. Boyne captures the importance of this dialectical concept with his comment:

A word or concept cannot be considered in isolation; it only exists in the theoretical or ideological framework in which it's used; its problematic...is centered on the absence of problems and concepts within the problematic as much as their presence.... The notion of absence indicates that what the problematic excludes is as important as what it includes. The problematic defines the field of the visible within which errors, oversights, and individual blindness are possible, and can be corrected. At the same time it defines the boundary of the invisible, the correlate of the visible, the realm of the necessarily absent.
This invisibility relates crucially to the production of problems; within any problematic there are problems which cannot be posed. 14

A mode of rationality, and its given problematic, represents a response not simply to its own internal logic, but also to the objective struggles, tensions, and issues posed by the historical times in which it operates. The limits of a mode of rationality, particularly one that poses as being universal, become evident when we realize that the intelligibility of its claims cannot "speak" to the issues or questions that threaten to undermine its basic assumptions. This often happens when what had been given as a solution is now posed as a problem. For instance, this happened when it became clear to Lavoisier that Priestly's new gas was not "dephlogisticated" air but oxygen; or more recently, when the new sociology of education rejected the notion of "objective" curriculum knowledge and argued for a curriculum theory based on a recognition of the social construction of knowledge and the negotiation of classroom meaning. 15

THE AMERICAN IDEOLOGY

Before analyzing the different modes of rationality that dominate citizenship education, I want to provide a brief description of the rationality that appears to dominate American social science, 16 the curriculum field and the social studies field in particular. 17 By focusing on the dominant rationality in American society, it is possible to get a better understanding of the nature of schooling as a societal process. This approach is not meant to deny the invaluable contributions of numerous traditional studies of schools as socialization agents; it is simply a matter of acknowledging, I believe, that these studies have generally failed to lay bare the complex relationships
between ideology and power in the dominant society and the related, though far from mechanistic, use of knowledge and power at the level of school organization and classroom practice.

Social and Cultural Reproduction in Schools

The recognition that schools are agencies of socialization is an assumption shared by all proponents of citizenship education, but this assumption is incomplete in itself as an analytical tool for unraveling the societal functions of schooling. A more analytical approach, studied in much of the socialization literature, analyzes the socialization process as a vehicle of economic and cultural reproduction; that is, as a process which mediates the social practices and cultural beliefs necessary to maintain the dominance of certain groups and power structures.18

A more recent reconceptualization of the socialization process embedded in schools is echoed in Jean Anyon's comment that:

What is important about school socialization is what school practices and assumptions it entails, and conversely, what those school assumptions and practices reveal about the society in which the schools are embedded.19

If the perspective advocated by Anyon and others strips schools of their innocence, the more traditional studies on socialization enshrine such innocence in a position that suffers from what Nietzsche once termed "the dogma of the immaculate perception." In the latter views, school knowledge is either treated unproblematically or the focus is limited to how different forms of knowledge, usually what is narrowly termed moral knowledge, is acquired in school settings. Talcott Parsons and Robert Dreeben stand out as examples of this tradition.20

A more fundamentally political and critical approach to school socialization would begin with the premise that one of the critical elements in the power of a dominant class resides in its ability to
impose, though not mechanistically, its own set of meanings and social practices through the selection, organization, and distribution of school knowledge and classroom social relationships. The conceptual basis for investigating such an issue requires a more precise definition than educators generally have of how power functions in distinct and interrelated ways in schools and the wider social order. One promising focus of investigation has been articulated by Michael F.D. Young in his argument that there is a "dialectical relationship between access to power and the opportunity to legitimate certain dominant categories, and the processes by which the availability of such categories to some groups enables them to assert power and control over others."21

The importance of the above perspective, largely articulated in radical critiques of schooling, is that it not only situates the relationship between schools and other social institutions in a basically political framework, it also makes problematic the very nature of citizenship itself. It provides the basis for analyzing how a given conception of what it means to be a citizen is conveyed through the dominant rationality in a given social order. Thus, it calls into question not simply what the school claims it does, but what in fact schools may unintentionally do as institutions that exist in a particular relationship with the state.22 The nature of their relationship, of course, is contained in one of the fundamental questions at the heart of any notion of citizenship education. Kant has said it as well as anyone with his proclaimed principle that students "ought to be educated not for the present but for a better future condition of the human race, that is for the idea of humanity."23
Dominant Rationality

The dominant rationality that presently permeates American society appears to be incompatible with Kant’s suggestion. The democratic labels and slogans that are echoed so cheerily at sports events, and in early morning school pledges belie the reality that hides behind them. Furthermore, one finds in the practices of systems management, inquiry learning, back to basics, and other curriculum approaches a different set of messages that appear to dissolve the human subject and the promise of critical thinking and action into what Sartre once referred to as the "bath of sulphuric acid."

H.T. Wilson has referred to the dominant rationality as "the American Ideology." This is worth reproducing in full.

The American ideology is composed of the following elements:

1) an anti-reflexive and anti-theoretical bias already noted which in more "liberal" times extended to virtually all intellectual activity; combined, paradoxically, with 2) a more recent concern for accumulating 'knowledge,' understood as exploitable observations (or observations in principle) having immediate application and 'relevance'; undergirded jointly by 3) a false commitment to 'objectivity' in the absence of the object being aspired to, derived from scientific rationalism with its unreflexive notion of neutrality, scepticism, and freedom from values and interests; and by 4) a vision of social and political processes as the product of a 'piecemeal,' trial and error approach concerned with procedural legitimacy for its own sake and prone to value a reformist posture toward social change understood as a set of activities played out within the rules of a game which sociological and political knowledge (and knowing) must emulate and thereby 'legitimize; 5) a derived contemporary view of this 'open' society as eminently exportable, a negation of this very openness which justifies itself by invoking economics, sociology and politics as disciplines which demonstrate a coming convergence of world societies and cultures and the supremacy and longevity (not to mention permanence) of the American-type Western society.24

The central issue is not to explore how this rationality permeates and functions in American society. The literature on this issue is abundant. Rather, I will examine how this type of rationality is
embedded in the rationalities that characterize major traditions of citizenship education. I will then examine how the problematics raised by these rationalities are incomplete and will then focus on a newly emerging rationality that, I believe, holds more promise for building a theory of citizenship education. Before articulating the meaning of these rationalities, a few points must be clarified. Though the models of citizenship education discussed below represent ideal types that are described in distinct terms, this should not suggest the absence of variation and subtle differences among teachers and other educational workers who might combine any one of a number of them. Moreover, simply because I have asserted that the essence of any approach to citizenship education can, in part, be unravelled by examining its relationship to the dominant societal rationality that is not meant to imply that any rationality simply mirrors the imperatives of a dominant ideology; instead it suggests a particular relationship to the latter. Finally, it is important to note that the relationships and distinctions among the forms of rationality to be outlined below should not imply that any one of them should be universalized to the exclusion of the others. The important task is to pick out what is progressive in each of them and to develop a higher level of synthesis where the limitations and possibilities of each become clear.

THREE MODES OF RATIONALITY

Most models of citizenship education can fall under what can be termed three modes of rationality: the technical, the hermeneutic, and the emancipatory. Each of these rationalities represents different processes of social inquiry and is determined by specific knowledge interests. Each one of these will be explained briefly, along with the models of citizenship education that correspond to them.
Technical Rationality

Technical rationality is linked to principles of control and certainty. Its knowledge constitutive interest lies in "controlling the objectified environmental world." Technical rationality takes the natural sciences as its model of theoretical development and rests on a number of assumptions which underlie its views about knowledge, human values, and the methodological nature of social inquiry. Similarly, it contains a number of interrelated assumptions which, when translated into educational theory and practice, take the following forms.

First, educational theory should operate in the interests of law-like propositions which are empirically testable. A major assumption here is that theory should contribute to the mastery and control of the environment through a set of deductively derived operations aimed at discovering the regularities that exist among isolated variables under study. In this case, theory becomes enshrined in the logic of the formula, and observation and technique become starting points for theoretical practice. This is an important point because the mediating link between theory and practice not only appears primarily as a technical one, i.e., mastery, the foundation for such an approach also points to an epistemology in which "knowledge starts from the concrete and is raised to general propositions through a process of abstraction/generalization." Marcuse captures the essence of this assumption in his claim that "as a result of this two-fold process, reality is now idealized into a 'mathematical manifold:' everything which is mathematically demonstrated with the evidence of universal validity as a pure form (reine Gestalt) now belongs to the true reality of nature."
Second, knowledge, like scientific inquiry, is regarded as value free. Thus, knowledge should be objective and described in neutral fashion. The assumption here is that knowledge can be reduced to those concepts and 'facts' that exist a priori, and then translated to operational definitions and precise meanings. Thus, the hallmark of knowledge and theoretical inquiry become steeped in a notion of objectivity, one that measures strength of its meaning against the degree to which it is objectively testable. "Hard" data becomes the focus of explanation and discovery, while other forms of knowledge such as those which cannot be inter-subjectively universalized are banished to the realm of mere "speculative" wisdom. The application of this assumption in educational theory is well stated by Suppes when he argues that educators "do not need wisdom and broad understanding of the issues that confront us. What we need are deeply structured theories of education that drastically reduce, if not eliminate, the need for wisdom."

Third, causation in this approach is linked to a notion of prediction which makes the process a linear one. That is, since knowledge of the social world is objective and consists of isolated and distinctly separable parts that interact according to law-like regularities which simply have to be discovered, then the relationship among these variables is an empirical one that can be reduced to predictable outcomes.

Finally, there is the belief that educators themselves can operate in a value-free manner by separating statements of value from the "facts" and "modes of inquiry," which must be objective.

Technical Rationality and Citizenship Education

Two traditions in citizenship education which are strongly wedded to the basic assumptions of technocratic rationality include the Citizenship
Transmission Model and the Citizenship as Social Science Model. While it is indisputable that there are basic differences in orientations between these two models, there appears to be a nucleus of ideas that link both to the principle of technocratic rationality.

**Citizenship Transmission.** The citizenship transmission model represents the oldest and still most powerful tradition in citizenship education. Historically, it can be seen in the writings of Mann, and many of the early proponents of the curriculum field in general. It appears to have reached its heyday in the hysteria of the McCarthy period, and with the demise of the innovative curriculum and social studies movements of the sixties, it once again is gaining expression in the current back to basics movement.

The essence of this model is captured in the concept of transmission. Knowledge, in this view, is situated above and beyond the social realities and relationships of the people who produce and define it. It is fixed and unchanging in the sense that its form, structure, and underlying normative assumptions appear to be universalized beyond the realm of historical contingency or critical analysis. Appearing in the guise of objectivity and neutrality, it is rooted in the precious adulation of the fact or facts, which simply have to be gathered, organized, transmitted and evaluated. We get a better sense of the implications this model has for citizenship education if it is viewed as not simply a pedagogical veil for incompetent teaching or teacher "mindlessness," but as a "historically specific social reality expressing particular production relations among men." That is, if we view how this model defines notions of power and meaning as expressed in its treatment of knowledge, human beings, values and society, we get a more accurate idea of what its political and pedagogical commitments might be.
Knowledge in this perspective resides in a notion of objectivity and detachment that renders questions concerning the production and legitimation of its form and content irrelevant. Consequently, it supports a notion of knowing that ignores that facts have to be mediated, that they are never accessible in their immediacy. The question of who legitimizes "the facts" of a given social order, in this case is removed from the context of classroom pedagogy and discussion. This is an important point because such a posture violates one of the basic preconditions of all freedom of thought: the necessity for the mental space and reflection one needs to see "beyond" the arbitrary constructs of a society in order to understand the source and genesis of their historical development and the interests they support. The importance of this issue for a more radical notion of citizenship education is captured by Herbert Marcuse in his claim that "if 'education' is to be more than simply training for the status quo, it means not only enabling man to know and understand the facts which make up reality but also to know and understand the factors that establish the facts so that he can change their inhuman reality." 

Not only is knowledge objectified in this rationality, it is usually reduced to the mastery of technical decisions for ends already decided. Ends are affirmed rather than explained as a social reality. In the name of transmitting cherished beliefs and values, this model of citizenship education ends up reproducing through its methodologies and content support for behavior that is adaptive and conditioned, rather than active and critical.

The reification of knowledge and the flawed epistemology that characterizes this approach finds its practical counterpart in the passive model of human behavior it supports in classroom social relationships. A pedagogical model built on the transmission of a given body of
information, values, and beliefs does not ask whether the latter are warranted; it asks under what conditions can they be maintained. Teachers and students within this context are expected to be either passive consumers or transmitters of knowledge, rather than negotiators of the world in which they work and act. Built into these pedagogical relationships are a series of messages and norms that constitute a hidden curriculum, one that in its unexamined body of knowledge and social relationships concretizes and legitimizes human powerlessness. Some critics have argued that the real significance of this approach has more to do with what it leaves out than what it includes, and they point out that what it really teaches, through omission, is a form of unrealistic civic education.36

The citizenship transmission model expresses the core of its ideology and relationship to the dominant rationality in its view of change and stability in the wider society. Wedded to a Parsonian notion of functionalism, this model supports a notion of consensus and role socialization that downplays both the notion of social conflict and the underlying contradictions that characterize the existing society.37 The roles and relationships that are worthy of attention, in this view, are those that are functional for the present social order. As one functionalist puts it:

functionalism...seeks to do no more than assay the place of a particular element of culture or societal institutions in relation to other elements. The question may then be posed as to whether an institution leads to or assists in the perpetuation of the social entity in which it appears.38

The functionalist dimension in the citizenship transmission model not only closes its "eyes" to the falsehoods perpetuated in many social studies textbooks, falsehoods that present students with a view of society that is as saccharine as it is ideological, it also supports a

73.
The model of role socialization which, in fact, is a "refinement of role conformity,"\footnote{39} the existential reality of teachers, students, and others in the world of schooling and the social forces that both constrain and shape the reality are lost in this model.\footnote{40} In its place stands the compromised language of "integration" and harmony.

Beneath the "Olympian" harmony of the citizenship transmission model, stands a perception of teachers and students whose roles are relatively fixed and permanent. This becomes particularly evident in much of the educational research in the educational field. That is, the economic, social, and political forces that bear on pedagogical theory and practice disappear in this research, which focuses almost exclusively on the individual and the study of cognitive processes framed within the narrow boundaries of educational psychology.\footnote{41}

Finally, an important failing in this citizenship education model is that it neither recognizes nor responds to social and structural dysfunctions; instead, social and institutional failings are translated into personal ones. This is manifest in those educational research studies which conjure up categories that arbitrarily absorb structural failings under a pseudo-scientific litany of semiotic mystifications. As Jean Anyon puts it:

This concept of individual culpability...is embedded in educational evaluation and psychological findings that attribute to 'lack of student interest,' 'low ability,' 'different or deficient family language or culture,' or to 'teacher indifference,' what may in fact be economically compatible failure to provide all groups or social classes successful pedagogy and/or 'complete personal development.'\footnote{42}

**Social Science Model.** What is paradoxical about the citizenship education as social science model is that on one level it attempts to rescue students as active and
critical thinkers; yet, on a more significant level it falls prey to certain presumptions about knowledge and meaning that results in its simply recycling, albeit in a more sophisticated package, the very assumptions it tries to redress.

Emerging in the United States in the 1960's, the social science model was heavily influenced by Jerome Bruner's structuralist notion that the essence of learning lie in understanding the basic principles governing the structure of specific academic disciplines. Learning in this approach is based on students mastering the basic ideas and body of knowledge that represent the "deep" structure of a particular discipline. Though initially designed for science curricula, Bruner's structuralism readily found its way into the social science field. In part, by attempting to situate social studies curricula in the "rigorous" foundation of the social science disciplines, the "new" social studies provided a more sophisticated epistemological framework than the rather "crude" rationale provided by the transmission model of citizenship education.

Attempting to free social studies knowledge from the theoretical strait jacket of the "transmission" thesis, advocates of the new social studies put forth a number of assumptions which supported their claims to an improved approach to citizenship education. These include:

a) a claim to high status knowledge and equality with other academic disciplines based upon a firm commitment to the social sciences; b) a claim to the "truth", based upon a view of social science knowledge as "correct" in a relatively unproblematic way; c) its support for an epistemology based on a reflectionalist notion of learning in which the mastery of specific social science knowledge and skills would offset the half truths and mystifications inherent in "common sense" knowledge; d) its support for a
hierarchical view of knowledge and a concomittant view of social relationships. Experts provided the knowledge, and teachers and curriculum developers "helped" students to "discover" the answers to predesigned curricula and the problems they posed. 45

While this approach to learning was a significant improvement over the transmission model, it failed in a number of ways to live up to its claim as a pedagogy for improved citizenship education. Since this position has been extensively criticized elsewhere, I will limit my criticisms to some of the more relevant points. 46

What counts as valued knowledge in this perspective is grounded in a notion of objectivity that results in a pedagogy that celebrates inquiry, concept discovery, and various other forms of inductive thinking. While this may appear at first to make this model of citizenship education compatible with the tenets of technocratic rationality, such is not the case. By celebrating not the production of meaning but the consumption of "objective" meanings sanctified by experts, inquiry and skill orientation belies its own intentions. What appears to be discovery learning ends up as a series of pedagogical methods in which knowledge is depoliticized and objectively "fixed." Containing limited possibilities to question the conditions under which knowledge is socially constructed, the social science model of citizenship education ignores both the social constraints that distort knowledge as well as the connection between knowledge and social control. Cleo Cherryholmes raises this issue in his critique of one inquiry model.

...as interesting as it is in many ways, (it) does not illuminate the issues involved in citizenship education for the simple reason that the wrong question was asked. The appropriate question is, what knowledge and skills do students need in order to make predictions that will increase their individual and societal effectiveness in a democratic society? 47
It is by studying the contradictions of daily life that the mediations between individuals and their society take on meaning and set the stage for political action. The first step in developing a pedagogy that makes this possible is through forms of analysis that see knowledge and social reality as a human product. Both the transmission model and the social science model of citizenship education are trapped in a problematic which separates facts from values and by doing so canonizes the very knowledge it should be questioning. To view knowledge as the priestly domain of warrior scholars is to forfeit the possibility for questioning the normative and political nature of the knowledge and social interests they legitimize. What we often find in these approaches is a gross insensitivity to the experiences and 'history' that students bring with them to the classroom. As a result, this model of citizenship education often ends up substituting general concepts for social concepts and then "hawks" the importance of 'analytical' skills as the answer to critical thinking. What usually results is a process whereby the judgments made by author's who use these methods are not put into question. Instead, concepts are used along with "inquiry skills" that eventually elicit confirmation from students on problems governed by answers that can barely be challenged. Tom Popkewitz in analyzing Edwin Fenton's Comparative Political Systems: An Inquiry Approach found:

The instructional approach uses concepts of leadership, ideology, and decision making to compare different political systems. However, investigation of the text reveals that judgments are already made by the authors. The purpose of children's 'analytical' work is simply to make the teacher's answers plausible... For example, a dichotomy is established between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States. The personal characteristics of the U.S. political leaders are characterized as energy, tact, ability to tend to many things as once, ability to operate effectively under tension and so on. On the other hand, a Soviet leader is described as one "not given to resistance, who is a little above average in energy and intelligence and below average in imagination." Under the guise of 'social theory,' a
dichotomy is established which seems to prevent critical scrutiny rather than nurture it.\textsuperscript{48}

Critical thinking not only "slips away" in this approach, so does the concept of social conflict. This model of citizenship education easily fits Adorno's critique that: "social concepts are taken 'as such' and then classified according to general concepts. In the process social antagonisms invariably tend to be glossed over."\textsuperscript{49}

Lost in these two citizenship education models are the normative, political and historical landscapes that give them meaning. In spite of all the clatter about the importance of student choice-making in these models, the latter are reduced to a faint echo that does little to illuminate how dominant values work through and are mediated by teachers, students, and curriculum materials. Lacking any vestige of critical theory, these approaches to citizenship education fail to break through their own false objectivism and critically examine the assumptions that wed them to the precepts of technocratic rationality and the "American Ideology."

Hermeneutic Rationality

Paraphrasing Alvin Gouldner, I think it is accurate to argue that every rationality has within it another problematic struggling to get out.\textsuperscript{50} The "caged" problematic that represents the Achilles heel of technocratic rationality is the very notion of meaning itself. For it is in the struggle to unshackle the concepts of "meaning" and experience from the "fossilized" notion of objectivity that hermeneutic rationality is grounded.

Hermeneutic rationality does not take as its starting point the production of monological knowledge; instead, it has a deep-seated interest in understanding the communicative and symbolic patterns of interaction\textsuperscript{51} that shape individual and intersubjective meaning.

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Rather than focusing on or taking granted the a priori forms of knowledge, its constitutive interest lies in understanding how the forms, categories, and assumptions beneath the texture of everyday life contribute to our understanding of each other and the world around us.

Meaning in this mode of rationality is not removed from the worlds of the social actors themselves who constitute, shape, and live within its definitions. Instead, it is seen in its most crucial form as something which is constantly negotiated and renegotiated by human beings as they mutually produce and define the constitutive rules which shape their interactions. Central to this form of rationality are the concepts of appropriation, intentionality, and intersubjectivity. Human beings are never seen as passive recipients of information. Hermeneutic rationality is sensitive to the notion that through the use of language and thought human beings constantly produce meanings as well as interpret the world in which they find themselves. Therefore, if we are to understand their actions we have to link their behavior to the intentions that provide the interpretative screen they use to negotiate with the world. Thus, as Geoff Whitty has argued, this form of rationality rejects the wider culture of positivism and is based on an epistemology in which:

crunch and objectivity are seen as nothing but human products and man rather than nature is seen as the ultimate author of "knowledge" and "reality." Any attempt to appeal to an external reality in order to support claims for the inferiority of one way of seeing over another is dismissed as ideological. Knowledge is inexplicably linked to methods of coming to know and any supposed dichotomy between them is, therefore, fake.52

Hermeneutic rationality has generated a number of important concerns for educational theory and practice. First, it has challenged many of
the common sense assumptions that teachers, students, and other educational workers use to guide, structure, and evaluate their day-to-day pedagogical experiences. Second, it has refocused attention on the normative and political dimensions of teacher-student classroom relationships. Third, it has established a relationship between epistemology and intentionality, on the one hand, and learning and classroom social relationships on the other. In other words, knowledge is treated as a specific social act with its underlying social relationships. Finally, hermeneutic rationality has played a significant role in helping educators unravel the latent and manifest dimensions of classroom knowledge and classroom relationships.53

Reflective Inquiry Approach

The tradition in citizenship education in the United States which has been influenced by this type of rationality falls under the general label of the "reflective inquiry approach."54 This approach relies heavily upon what has generally been called decision-making in a socio-political context. The importance of the stress on decision-making is further defined by pointing to the unique burdens this process imposes in a "democracy." "The assumption is that democracy imposes a unique burden; we cannot escape the requirement of making decisions. Sometimes decisions relate to the making of legislation or the selecting of legislators; that is, of course, an inherent part of our government--what it means to live in a self-governing, democratic society."55

In contrast to the positivist assumptions inherent in the transmission and social science models previously mentioned, the traditions that fall under a hermeneutic rationality stress negotiation, participation and the importance of values in citizenship education. For instance, various supporters of this position invoke the general trinity of knowledge,
participation in decision-making, and values/attitudes as the basis for citizenship education. The pedagogical approaches following from these assumptions have been recently outlined in detail by a number of theorists and only need brief mentioning here. 56

There is a strong emphasis in this approach on the social construction rather than imposed nature of classroom knowledge. Consequently, students are encouraged to explore their own values and either to define problems within the context of their experiences or to relate social problems to the day-to-day texture of their lives. 57

The epistemological rigour of this approach appears to be in its insistence on methodological sophistication in the problem-solving process. The only absolute value in this pedagogical approach appears to lie in the decision-making process itself, best summed up by Shirley Engle's remark that "the orientation of the social scientist is that of research." 59

Reflective inquiry suggests a number of useful and constructive insights, and makes important contributions to an analysis of the meaning and purpose of citizenship education. But in the end it is trapped in a problematic that is defined less by what it advocates than by what it ignores. As a theory that attempts to situate the meaning of schooling in a wider context, it appears as a well-intentioned, but, in the final analysis, a naive and incomplete mode of rationality.

On one level some of its weaknesses can be traced to the very nature of its epistemology. In celebrating the notions of intentionality in the exploration of human behavior, it has failed to move beyond a relativistic notion of knowledge. That is, though this position sees through the arbitrary division between objective and subjective forms of knowing posited by technocratic rationality, it does not
analyze the history of this division or develop a form of critique which is capable of revealing the ideology embedded in it. As Cherryholmes has pointed out, there is in this view "no clearly identifiable position regarding knowledge claims." 60

By focusing on the subjective intentions of the individual while simultaneously encouraging the importance of the social construction of knowledge, this position fails to understand how such meanings are maintained or how they might distort rather than comprehend reality. Moreover, such a posture tends to overlook how ideological and structural constraints in the larger society are reproduced in schools so as to mediate against the possibility of critical thinking and constructive dialogue. Thus, by reducing power and democratic action to the level of an epistemology that supports a form of subjective idealism, the reflective inquiry approach emerges as a one-sided theory of citizenship education which has "miraculously" abstracted its social epistemology from such troublesome concepts as ideology, power, struggle and oppression. As a result, the basic nature of existing social arrangements in the wider society go unquestioned or are questioned in relatively narrow terms. The limits of this position are partially identified in Elizabeth Cagen's remark that:

While liberal reformers intend to use education to promote equality, community, and humanistic social interaction, they do not confront those aspects of the schools which pull in the opposite direction. Their blindness to these contradictions may stem from their class position: as middle class reformers they are unwilling to advocate the kind of egalitarianism which is necessary for a true human community. 61

I am not so sure that middle-class reformers act as intentionally as Cagen suggests they do. Instead, I am inclined to believe that they are taught within a rationality that "blinds" them to the nature of their
own ideology. This, I believe, can be partly demonstrated by looking at how the reflective inquiry approach deals with a theory of the state and the concept of pluralism.

Harold Berlak has pointed out that few educators have come to terms with the notion that schooling in America takes place in a society with one of the most powerful industrial capitalist states in the world, one that is characterized by an enormous concentration of political and economic power. In spite of this, the relationship between the state and public schools is often articulated in simplistic and one-dimensional terms. While it is stressed repeatedly in the rationales of reflective inquiry advocates that schools can and must educate students to participate in the shaping and running of the state, they say practically nothing about how the state affects and reproduces the ideology of dominant social and economic interests in the schools. A number of social theorists have raised questions about the particular relationship between schools and the wider society that puts in high relief the complex relations that exist between schools and the state.

Nicos Poulantzas has argued that schools are part of an ideological state apparatus that both reproduces and mediates the social divisions of labor and the dominant ideology which supports it. Schools by the very nature of their position in a class-based society are politically and structurally bound to a relationship with the state and its ruling interests. This relationship must be understood if we are to be clear about what schools actually do in this society. The broader nature of this relationship has been explored by Althusser who claims that schools produce the modes of consciousness, "know-how, and ideological dispositions necessary to function in a capitalist economy." On the other hand,
Bowles and Gintis stress the importance of specific structural features of schools, the classroom social relationships, in reproducing the social relations of production.65 Bernstein and Apple have argued that the principles involved in both the structure and content of curriculum, pedagogy, and evaluation constitute specific message systems that are ultimately dependent on the allocation of power and resources of a dominant class.66 Bourdieu and Passeron take one dimension of this analysis a bit further by arguing that schools institutionalize through the rules and meanings that constitute the day-to-day working of classroom experience, the dominant cultural capital.67 Cultural capital, in this sense, refers to those systems of meanings, linguistic and social competencies, and elements of style, manner, taste, and disposition that are permeated throughout society by the dominant class as being the most legitimate.68 In this analysis, schools play a crucial role in producing the unequal distribution of cultural capital.69 Instead of providing compensatory education to the students with different cultural capital, the school, while appearing neutral, asks them to think and perform in a way that is quite alien to their own background. If Bourdieu is right, and there is a significant amount of evidence to suggest he is, classroom knowledge has little to do with the negotiated outcomes and critical thinking skills that the reflective inquiry rationality sees as the essence of schooling; instead, its essence lies in the imposition of meanings and specific modes of behavior by the school. Of course, there are modes of resistance and contradictions in the schools. There are also ideologies that are ethnic, gender, and community specific that mediate and alter the dominant ideology.70 But what results in the absence of political action are piecemeal and minor victories, which leave the constitutive rules of the dominant ideology unchallenged.
I believe that this mode of citizenship education is wedded to a one-sided notion of determination. It argues that schools can educate students to exert political influence on the state, but it ignores how the state places constraints of a specific political, ideological and structural nature on the school's. This becomes most evident in the support for pluralism found among advocates of this group. Arguments of this sort reveal their own ideology by denying the very condition that make the struggle for pluralism imperative. Pluralism as a philosophy of equality and justice is a noble political idea. But when the ideal is not measured against a society that rests on fundamental inequalities in wealth, power, and participation, it tilts over into ideology or empty formalism, one "that presupposes that society is without those antagonisms that are of its essence." This concept fits badly into a view of citizenship education that is based on democratic principles of justice and political participation. Pluralism ignores the tension between political democracy and economic inequality. That is, it fails to acknowledge that equality of opportunity and the importance of human reflectiveness may be impeded by particularistic private interests in the economic sphere that use the state to impose severe constraints on certain segments of the population. The limited pedagogical insistence on decision-making skills that emerge from this position are inherited from a priori assumptions about the existence of a pluralistic society. What is missed is the way the "invisible" hand of dominant political and economic interests affect the nature of what is to be decided. Peak and Zeigler in their critique of "unrealistic civic education" illuminate this issue with their argument.
Pluralists have taken a hard-headed approach in insisting that the only legitimate datum is the decision... By focusing entirely upon the process whereby highly contested decisions are reached, pluralists ignore... the more mysterious "non-decisions"... which are of more importance upon the overall political style of a community than the more spectacular and tangible decisions.73

What this suggests is that there is a "hidden curriculum" which functions to favor the reproduction of the dominant society by establishing the boundaries within which conflict can take place and questions can be raised. Of course, the emphasis on critical thought in the world of the moral development advocates under the reflective inquiry approach points to the hidden curriculum as something to be overcome in order to promote critical thinking. But by defining critical thinking as a psychological characteristic reduced to matters of cognitive developmental psychology, we are left with a perspective that lacks the benefit of critical sociology or political theory.74 Questions about the hidden curriculum which would ask how the nature and structure of social relationships in the wider society are revealed in the political structure of classroom life and schools are missing from this perspective.

In brief, I would argue that the problematic that characterizes the reflective inquiry approach fails to examine the nature of its own ideology and in doing so has not been able to raise fundamental questions about the nature of the relationship between the state and schooling, the mechanisms of ideological and structural domination in schools, or how the relationship between class, culture and ideology in schools serves to reproduce the institutional arrangements of the status quo.

The dialectical relationship that interconnects the dynamics of the state, economics, and ideology with the concept of citizenship education demands a theoretical framework grounded in a rationality
that truly challenges the existing American ideology. The foundation for such a rationality can be found in what may be called emancipatory rationality.

Emancipatory Rationality

Though hermeneutic rationality has disposed of the illusion of objectivism, it has failed to develop an analysis which unravels how the relationship among power, norms, and meaning function within a specific socio-historical context to promote forms of self-misunderstanding as well as to support and sustain modes of structural domination. The central question the hermeneutic mode of rationality does not ask is: "How is it that a social system steeped in domination can legitimize itself through a set of meanings and practice which prevent the development of an open, self-critical community of inquiring citizens?"

The issue here is that emancipatory rationality does not renounce the primacy of intentionality and meaning central to hermeneutic interests; instead it attempts to locate such meaning and action in a societal context in order to explore how the latter might place specific limitations and constraints upon human thought and action. Sharp and Green illuminate the problematic at the heart of emancipatory rationality.

The correct perspective should enable one to ask the question 'Under what historical conditions can men break through the structure of determination?' Such a perspective retains the model of man as active, with intentionality, while socially locating him within a context which may resist, block or distort his projects. To realize his values as an acting subject who seeks to control his situation, he forces the constraining effect of others in this situation, the institutionalized consequences of his and others' actions, the sanctions that can be used against him, and the condition of his non-social environment.75

Emancipatory rationality, in this context, is based upon the principle of critique and action. It is aimed at criticizing that
which is restrictive and oppressive, while at the same time, supporting action in the service of individual freedom and well-being. This mode of rationality is construed as the capacity of critical thought to reflect on and reconstruct its own historical genesis, i.e., to think about the process of thinking itself. More specifically, the capacity to think about thinking itself points to a mode of reasoning aimed at breaking through the "frozen" ideology that prevents a critique of the life and world on which rationalizations of the dominant society are based. Similarly, emancipatory rationality augments its interest in self-reflection with social action designed to create the ideological and material conditions in which non-alienating and non-exploitative relationships exist. This suggests a view of citizenship education based on a different view of sociability and social relations than those that presently exist.

Sociability will have to be rescued from the limited notion of "closeness" it presently occupies. In other words, sociability is defined solely in terms of family images and relationships, against which it is difficult to conceive of strangers as social, will have to be viewed as a position at odds with a democratic notion of citizenship. In addition, citizenship education based on an emancipatory form of rationality will have to reproduce and stress the importance of social relationships in which men and women are treated as ends and not means. Both of these positions represent ethical principles linked to the development of radical needs and the ideological and material conditions needed to support them.

Emancipation Rationality and Citizenship Education

A number of radical educational theories have developed under this mode of rationality that either directly or indirectly speak to questions

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relevant to citizenship education. All of these theories share a
critical stance toward the existing social order, and support, though
in different ways, what may be called theories of reproduction and
transformation. Madeleine MacDonald captures the focus of these
theories in her comment.

The assumptions underlying most of the 'reproduction' theories
is that education plays a mediating role between the individual's
consciousness and society at large. These theorists maintain that
the rules which govern social behavior, attitudes, morals, and
beliefs are filtered down from the macro level of economic and
political structures to the individual via work experience,
educational processes and family socialization. The individual
acquires a particular awareness and perception of the society
in which he lives. And it is this understanding and attitude
towards the social order which constitute his consciousness.
The concept has therefore taken on particular significance
within the context of theories of social and cultural
reproduction....By acquiring an awareness both of the nature
of social conditioning and the potential for acting upon
it, the individual or groups of individuals in a social
class, it is argued, can learn not only to formulate alternatives
but also to bring about change. The different emphases placed....
on social order or social change, on macro levels or micro
processes, on structural or interactional features derive from
a variety of conceptions of the ability or inability of
individuals and social classes to act in and upon the
social world. In the context of educational strategies
for change, these theories have different implications, for
in each a particular relationship between schooling and
society is postulated.78

Two broad traditions can be abstracted from this radical mode of
pedagogy, neither one of which by itself is adequate to lay the theoretical
foundation for a form of citizenship education based upon an emancipatory
rationality. But by combining elements of the two traditions, the
possibilities for such a project can begin. Since it is impossible here
to outline in full the basic components of both traditions,79 I will
simply describe each briefly, and then outline in more detail the
theoretical guidelines for an emancipatory mode of citizenship education.
The first tradition will be arbitrarily called the political economy
position, and the second will be labeled the culturalist position.

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consciousness to a mere reflex of the mode of production. Culturalists have attempted, in part, to explain how human action within the grip of structures such as schools escape, resist, and transform the effects of the latter.

Summary

In simplistic terms, both positions if dialectically related provide the possibility for understanding how schools function as institutions roughly determined by the structural requirements of the imperatives of a capitalist state. On the other hand, schools can be studied as cultural realms, which exist in a particular, nonmechanistic relationship with the wider society. This means focusing on the complex way in which schools mediate on a daily basis the ideological and material forces that are produced directly from within the contexts and sites in which they exist. The implications this has for developing a theory of citizenship education can now be explored.

NOTES TOWARD A THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

I think it is important to point out that what I am putting forth in this section does not pretend to represent a final program. What I will do is concentrate on larger comprehensive issues that provide the foundation for establishing a theory of citizenship education that is more adequate than those that presently occupy the field.

The major struggle to develop and implement such a theory rests, in fact, with overcoming the rather dreadful legacy that has shaped it over the last century. Notions about citizenship education are complex and rather unwieldy. Citizenship education cuts across disciplines and is rooted in a myriad of political and normative issues. Unfortunately, it has been largely influenced, as I mentioned previously, by the culture
Political Economy Position. The political economy tradition focuses its attention upon macro-structural relationships, and how these both interconnect and mediate to reproduce the class relations in a given society. In this analysis, modes of social and cultural reproduction are traced back to the political economic structural configurations that govern them. Studies of this sort tend to concern themselves with the organizational features of institutions and how they function to produce certain roles, affect social mobility, and structure social stratification. In many of these studies, specifically those of a functionalist and structuralist nature, the object gains primacy over the subject, and structures tend to be given a more fundamental role in shaping human behavior than social processes explained through the intentions and consciousness of human actors. The structural analysis that emerges from these studies do us a theoretical service by focusing on forces that affect human behavior but cannot be traced by referring solely to the immediate context or consciousness of the human subject. While this position helps to throw into high relief, the "deep" structures that influence and "bind" human action, it treats the day-to-day workings of institutions such as schools as if they were "black boxes" and does little to illuminate how people negotiate and define their daily activities.

Culturalist Position. Culturalists, on the other hand, focus their attention on the experiences of subjects, and how notions of consciousness, ideology, and power enter into the way human beings constitute their day-to-day realities. Culturalists have done a great deal to rescue human behavior from the tendency of radical functionalist accounts that would reduce
of positivism with its underlying technocratic rationality. Hence, educators have generally retreated from engaging its most complex issues and have reduced theorizing about this issue mainly to questions of technique, organization, and administration.

Changing Society

A theory of citizenship education will have to redefine the nature of educational theorizing as it presently exists. In its place, it will have to construct a view of theory that integrates the artificial constructs that separate the academic disciplines. It will have to draw upon a more dialectical structure of knowledge in order to establish a theoretical center of gravity that provides a comprehensive analysis of what the nature and conduct of education is all about. Hence, as I have previously indicated, such a theory will be by its very nature political and social. This becomes clear if we engage citizenship education at what has to be the starting point for any further theoretical development. That is, citizenship education's own problematic must begin with the question of whether or not this society should be changed in a particular way or should it be left the way it is. Regardless of the answer, the core of the issue is fundamentally political and normative; it speaks to the need to confront assumptions concerning the aims of education, assumptions regarding who is going to be educated, and assumptions about what kinds of knowledge, values, and social relationships are going to be deemed legitimate as educational concerns. These questions are not meant to be simply abstractions; their significance is linked to both the history as well as the existing social-political conjuncture that gives them context and meaning. Educational theorists, and more precisely, a theory of citizenship education, will have to be a combination of historical
critique, critical reflection and social action. It will have to recover the political determinants of what citizenship education has become, and then decide what it does not want to be before it can emerge as a more viable mode of theorizing. In part, I have traced its history, and indicated what it has become. If it is going to provide both vision and hope for citizens of this country, it will have to be redefined so it can work in the interest of changing this society. In other words, it will have to measure the promise against the reality and then demonstrate the viability of such a struggle. This may not be an easy task, but it is certainly a necessary one.

Teacher Consciousness

In addition to being committed to building a better society, the next step in developing a notion of citizenship education that focuses on schools will have to address its concerns to expanding the theoretical perceptions of teachers and other educational workers. That is, teachers rather than students should represent a starting point for any theory of citizenship education. Most students exercise very little power over defining the educational experiences in which they find themselves; it is more appropriate to begin with those educators who both mediate and define the educational process. This is not meant to deny that students represent an important concern in both the development and effects of such a theory; in fact, it is precisely this concern that demands that we construe a theoretical framework that gives teachers and others involved in the educational process the possibility to think critically about the nature of their beliefs and how these beliefs both influence and offset the day-to-day experiences they have with students. Similarly, it is important that teachers situate their own beliefs, values, and
practices within a wider context so that their latent meanings can be better understood. This dialectical situating, so to speak, will help illuminate the social and political nature of the structural and ideological constraints that teachers face daily. What is needed then is a more comprehensive theory of totality; it is to this that I will now turn.

Theory of Totality. A theory of totality would avoid the pitfall of treating schools as if they existed in a political and social vacuum. Instead, schools would be analyzed, both historically and sociologically, in regard to their interconnections with other economic and political institutions. In concrete pedagogical terms, this means that educators need to situate the school, curriculum, pedagogy, and the role of the teacher within a societal context that reveals both their historical development as well as the nature of their existing relationship with the dominant rationality. Central to this analysis is that teachers view the evaluation of schools and school practices as part of a historical dynamic, one in which different forms of knowledge, social structures, and belief systems are seen as concrete expressions of class-specific interests. Of course, this is not meant to reduce schooling to a reflex of the imperatives of certain powerful groups. Such a characterization ignores the active nature of resistance in human beings and often flattens out the complex relationship between schools and the dominant society. What is at stake here is the need to provide a theoretical focus for developing more critical categories that can be used to understand the linkages between how a society is controlled and organized and the principles that structure school experience. Inherent in this approach is the notion that schools act as agents of social.
and cultural reproduction. But if the concepts of reproduction and the notion of totality are to move beyond a "radical" functionalist account, it will be necessary to develop a more comprehensive analysis of the interconnections between culture, power, and transformation.

On one level this means that if the notion of totality is to be defined as more than a science of interconnections, it has to illuminate how the ideological and structural dimensions of existing school practices can be traced back to their social, political, and economic determinants in the wider society. This approach not only helps us to see educational practices as historical and social products, it also raises questions as to how these determinants reveal themselves in the common sense perceptions of teachers, in the social relations of the classroom, and in the form and content of curriculum materials. In a society marked by the pervasive presence of social class and inequality, the relevance of such questions to a notion of citizenship education concerned with economic and social justice is no small matter. Sharp and Green cite the importance of developing a notion of totality specifically related to the concept of transformation. They write:

(We) want to stress that a humanist concern for the child necessitates a greater awareness of the limits within which teacher autonomy can operate and to pose the questions: 'What interests do schools serve, those of the parents and children, or those of the teachers and headmaster?' and 'What wider interests are served by the school?' and, possibly more importantly, 'How do we conceptualize interests in social reality?' Therefore instead of seeing the classroom as a social system and as such insulated from wider structural process, we suggest that the teacher who has developed an understanding of his (or her) location in the wider process may well be in a better position to understand where and how it is possible to alter that situation. The educator who is of necessity a moralist must preoccupy himself with the social and (economic) preconditions for the achievement of his ideals.
Hence, schools can be seen as part of the universe of wider cultural meaning and practices. This perception becomes a powerful heuristic and political tool for a theory of citizenship education only if we rescue the concept of culture from the depoliticized status that it now occupies in mainstream social science theory.

Politics of Culture. In short, a reform of citizenship education involves a reform of educators as well; this is a political task, the purpose of which is to make educators better informed citizens and more effective agents for transforming the wider society. It also points to and increases the possibility for helping students develop a greater social awareness as well as a concern for social action. An important step in realizing both of these tasks is to politicize the notion of culture. This is a critical imperative for a theory of citizenship education. When culture is stripped of its political innocence and seen as one form of political domination, the opportunity exists for educators not only to understand the normative dimensions of their own classroom experience, but also to trace such normative underpinnings back to structural determinants and values in the wider socio-political sphere. Moreover, the politicization of culture provides teachers with the opportunity to develop a pedagogy that is sensitive to the dynamics of the hidden curriculum and the biographies of their own students.

Traditionally, mainstream social theorists have defined culture simply as a people's total way of life, i.e., the entirety of those goods, services and labor produced by human beings. While this definition may have some general validity when used in elementary school primers, it tilts over into a blank check that endorses the status quo when it is
reduced to this level of explanation. In the latter case, not only does culture become a concept that is less than critical, it serves to reflect reality rather than comprehend it. Divorced from notions of class, power, and conflict, it ends up as an empty social science category that hides more than it reveals.

A less mystifying approach to this issue would acknowledge that the distinction between power and culture is a false one that needs to be abolished. A critical analysis would demonstrate how social power can manifest itself in schools as "class cultural control." But the beginning of such an analysis demands a redefinition of the relationship between society and culture. In this case, culture would be subsumed within the category of society itself. Rather than viewing culture as the general expression of the entire society, culture would be defined in terms of its functional relationship to the dominant social formations and power relations in a given society. Hence, in a class-specific society the dominant culture becomes an expression of the dominant interests and is revealed as a legitimating, motivational structure. In this case, secondary cultures have to be defined in their particular relationship to the dominant culture. Culture as a political phenomenon then refers to the power of a specific class to impose and distribute throughout society specific meanings, message systems, and social practices in order to "lay the psychological and moral foundations for the economic and political system they control." Within the dominant culture meaning is universalized, and the historically contingent nature of social reality appears as self-evident and fixed. Of course, there are conflicts within the dominant cultural capital just as there is resistance from classes who stand in opposition to the dominant view of the world; but this should not be interpreted so as to either relativize the different forms of
cultural capital or to underestimate the significance of the dominant culture as a moment "in the process of social domination and capital accumulation."83

As a heuristic tool for an emancipatory form of citizenship education, the politicization of culture provides the opportunity for teachers to reformulate the concept of power both in terms of its meaning and in terms of its use as a vehicle of domination or praxis.

Power as a form of cultural domination has been captured in Gramsci's concept of ideological hegemony, a concept that helps to reassert the centrality of the interconnection among politics, culture and pedagogy. Carl Boggs explains Gramsci's notion of ideological hegemony as:

...the permeation throughout civil society--including a whole range of structures and activities like trade unions, schools, the churches, and the family--of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc., that is in one way or another supportive of the established order and the class interests that dominate it to the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalized in any society, therefore, it must operate in a dualistic manner: as a general conception of life for the masses, and as a scholastic program or set of principles which is advanced by a sector of intellectuals.84

The implications this concept has for teachers become clear if I qualify the notion of culture as ideological hegemony. Hegemony does not simply refer to the content found, for instance, in the formal curriculum of schools. It is that and much more; it also refers to the way such knowledge is structured. In addition, it refers to the routines and practices embedded in different social relationships; finally, it points to the notion of social structures as natural configurations which both embody and sustain forms of ideological hegemony. If we translate this insight into specific forms of pedagogy
for citizenship education, the following theoretical practices for educators could be developed.

**School Knowledge and Citizenship Education.** Teachers would have to analyze school knowledge as part of a wider universe of knowledge and try to determine to what degree it reflects class interests. For instance, Anyon's work points to "a whole range of curriculum selections (which) favor the interests of the wealthy and powerful." Next, school knowledge must be analyzed to determine to what degree its form and content represent the unequal presentation of the cultural capital of minorities of class and color: that is, how does classroom knowledge embody modes of language, systems of meaning, and cultural experiences so as to directly or indirectly invalidate other forms of cultural capital. This suggests that educators who assign a false equivalency to "all cultures" may be falling into the trap of cultural pluralism. That is, they depoliticize the notion of culture by abstracting the concept from the societal formations that give it meaning. The real issue to be raised focuses less on the equivalency of all cultures than on the question of how the dominant culture, as a form of power and control, mediates between itself and other secondary cultures. This kind of inquiry focuses on questions aimed at understanding what kind of reproductive functions exist between the dominant culture and the culture institutionalized by the schools. Questions which emerge from this type of analysis may take the following form: Whose culture gets distributed in schools? How is it legitimated? How is it distributed? How do its meanings relate back to assumptions in the wider social parameter? What are its social, economic, and historical origins? In what ways does this culture distort or reflect the realities of other cultures?
Teachers must also attempt to unravel the ideological principles embedded in the very structure of classroom knowledge. As a social construction, curriculum materials consist of specific form and content. The internal organizing devices that go into their assemblage must be uncovered to lay bare the ideology they embody. Wexler argues that teachers must learn to identify the structuring concepts that lurk silently within a text, film, or any other form of curriculum material. These materials must be decoded not only in terms of their content, but their form and composition as well. Basil Bernstein, for example, points to the way curriculum knowledge is classified and insulated. He argues that the rigid boundaries between categories of knowledge and different forms of knowledge carry messages of social control by reducing ways of knowing to static and seemingly unrelated representations of reality.

**Hidden Curriculum and Citizenship Education.** The dominant culture is not simply embedded in the form and content of knowledge. It is also reproduced through what is called the hidden curriculum. The hidden curriculum in schools refers to those underlying norms, values, and attitudes that are often transmitted tacitly through the social relations of the school and classroom. Bowles and Gintis and others have pointed to the hidden curriculum, particularly its stress on rule conformity, passivity, and obedience as one of the major socialization forces used to produce personality types willing to accept social relationship characteristics of the governance structures of the workplace.

It must be emphasized that the hidden curriculum is not removed from the Gramscian notion of ideological hegemony, it simply represents another dimension of it. Sharp and Green illuminate this point in their claim that cultural domination:
...is produced not simply through ideas but in the everyday practices in which people are involved. An approach to curriculum which does not give equal emphasis to the forms and social practices involved in the transmission of knowledge has failed to develop the heuristic potential of the Gramscian concept of hegemony.

If teachers are going to implement a more comprehensive notion of citizenship education they will have to understand the linkages that exist not only between the hidden and formal curricula, but also the complex connections that exist between both curricula and the principles that structure similar modes of knowledge and social relationships in the larger society. We can illuminate the nature of these complex linkages through an ethnographic portrayal of citizenship education in a kindergarten class analyzed by Ray Rist. This is worth producing in detail.

Mrs. Caplow, the teacher, as part of her unit on citizenship has appointed a student to be the "sheriff" for a trip her kindergarten class was to take. Caplow told Rist that the point of the lesson was to get the children to learn "respect for the law." Frank, one of the students, willingly accepts this role, and literally pushes, shoves, and yells at other students who step out of line. Frank, happens in this case to be a middle-class student, while the other students are from the "lower class." Rist interprets this in the following way. "When the rhetoric of 'learning respect for the law' is stripped away, it is obvious that middle-class children were learning how to shuffle in the face of superior power." The ideology underlying this notion of citizenship education should be clear. But the interrelationship between the classroom social relationships that Mrs. Caplow had established and the message she wanted to reinforce come into sharper focus in this exchange between her, another student, and Frank.
"David, can you tell Mr. Rist why you are wearing the star?" David responds, "Cause I'm the sheriff." Mrs. Caplow continues, "Can you tell him how you got to be the sheriff?" "By being a good citizen." "David, what do good citizens do?" "They check up on others." Mrs. Caplow: "Well that is not all they do..." Caplow repeats the question for Frank. Frank stands and says, "Good citizens obey the rules." Mrs. Caplow responds, "Yes, that is right, Frank. Good citizens obey the rules, no matter what they are."

This suggests that if teachers are going to be able to analyze the nature and degree of distributive injustice in schools, they will have to pay close attention to those basic, tacit, constitutive rules that establish the more obvious factors that structure classroom choices. It is the constitutive rules that silently structure and make impervious the conditional nature of the grouping, tracking, and labeling that goes on in schools. The nature of these rules must be analyzed in light of the political choices they reflect. For this type of analysis to emerge, teachers will have to pay close attention to the type of rationality that shapes their own assumptions and how it mediates between the "rules" of the dominant culture and the classroom experiences provided for students.

Power and Transformation. Finally, an analysis of power and transformation must be an integral part of a theory of citizenship education. Teachers must attempt to understand the meaning of the contradictions, dysfunctions, and tensions that exist in both schools and the larger social order; moreover, they must focus on the underlying conflicts in both schools and society and investigate how these can contribute to a more radical theory of citizenship education. Too often, radical theorists have portrayed the use of power in schools in strictly negative and one-dimensional terms. This easily slips into an Orwellian nightmare in which students readily and passively submit to the imperatives of the dominant culture. This not only distorts the reality of schools, it ends up being a more "radical"
version of management ideology which sees human beings as infinitely malleable. Power in the service of domination is never as total as this image suggests. Richard Johnson writes insightfully about the dialectical nature of domination and resistance in schools. He argues:

typically, under capitalism, schools seem to reproduce instead of the perfect worker in complete ideological subjection, much more the worker as bearer of the characteristic antagonisms of the social formation as a whole. Schools, in other words, reproduce forms of resistance too, however limited or 'corporate' or unselfconscious they may be.

Neither students nor teachers resemble the "social puppet" image that emerges in the writings of the reproduction theorists. Both teachers and students demonstrate forms of resistance in the context of cultural hegemony. Willis and others have provided research on how the informal culture, for instance, of working-class students consistently rejects the sum of the messages and values embedded in the formal and hidden curricula. Likewise, there is a great deal of evidence pointing to the wide scope and degree of worker resistance that takes place at the site of production itself. The similarities in the different modes of resistance should be studied both historically and sociologically to see how they have been diffused in the past and to determine how their radical potential can be developed for the future. The crucial question is how do these contradictions offer the possibility for raising the consciousness of both teachers and students? In other words, how can they be used to reveal the workings of power and domination in the school culture.

Madeleine MacDonald puts the question another way when she argues that educators must develop an:

...understanding of how stability occurs despite conflict, how order is maintained over and above the face of change. Any system of reproduction in so far as it operates within a cultural hegemony must be struggled for, won and maintained in the context of opposition. The nature of the victory is uncertain unless we can define the source and the force of the opposition.
It is clear that much of the opposition in both schools and the work place represents forms of symbolic resistance, i.e., its struggle is thereby limited to the world of cultural symbols of dress, taste, language, etc. In order for it to move to a more effective level of action, it will have to be extended into a form of resistance linked to political action and control. That is, citizenship education will have to help students become aware of the political roots of their opposition; they will have to learn to identify the political nature of the contradictions that demanded rebellion in the first place. It should be noted that this is not simply a call for classroom consciousness-raising. Subjective intentions alone pose little threat to the concrete and objective structures of domination that underlie the existing socio-political order. Social action is needed, but it must be preceded by those subjective preconditions that make the need for such action intelligible. Thus, social awareness represents the first step in getting students to act as "engaged" citizens, willing to question and confront the structural basis and nature of the larger social order. It is also an important step in teaching students about the complex nature of power itself. Power in this case is extended far beyond the subjective confines of thought itself. As Foucault puts it "the problem is not one of changing people's 'consciousness' or what's in their heads; but the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of 'truth.'" 97

Hence, conflicts and contradictions must be studied and analyzed by teachers as issues to be problematized and used as points for classroom discussion and vehicles for connecting classroom practices to larger political issues. As mentioned, these contradictions exist not only in the competing forms of cultural capital unevenly distributed in schools,
but also in the daily practices and life experiences of different classes outside of schools. These contradictions must be linked and used as an integral dimension of citizenship education. Such an approach would take more seriously how students and teachers define their experiences within specific classroom settings. It would be more sensitive to the nature of their discourse, their own views of school activities, their modes of resistance, and the way in which they serve to reproduce and sustain the dominant ideology. Within this theoretical framework, citizenship education would be better able to highlight how specific institutional practices both restrict as well as offer possibilities for citizenship growth and action.

In conclusion, citizenship education must be grounded in a reformulation of the role that teachers are to play in schools. As I have suggested, a new theoretical model must be developed that includes a theory of totality, a redefinition of culture and power, and a more insightful understanding of the contradictions and mediations that lie beneath the surface of educational theory and practice. Needless to say, these theoretical elements only become meaningful if they are wedded to a firm commitment to the development of economic and political justice in both schools and the wider social order. I now want to turn briefly to some classroom practices that follow from the above theoretical assumptions.

Classroom Pedagogy and Citizenship Education

If citizenship education is to be emancipatory, it must begin with the assumption that its major aim is not "to fit" students into the existing society; instead, its primary purpose must be to stimulate their passions, imaginations, and intellects so they will be moved to challenge the social, political, and economic forces that weigh so heavily on their lives. In other words, students should be educated to display
civic courage, i.e., the willingness to act as if they were living in a
democratic society. At its core this form of education is political, and
its goal is a genuine democratic society, one that is responsive to the needs
of all, and not just to a privileged few. Agnes Heller illuminates the
meaning of civic courage in her comment:

...one should think and act as if one were in a real democracy. The fundamental bravery of this way of life is not military
heroism but civic courage. Whoever says no to the dominant
prejudices and to the oppressing power, and when necessary
(and it is often necessary) to public opinion, and practices
this throughout his life and in his life-conduct has the virtue
of civic courage.98

In more concrete terms, students should learn not only how to weigh
the existing society against its own claims, they also should be taught
to think and act in ways that speak to different societal possibilities and
ways of living. But if the development of civic courage is the bedrock
of an emancipatory mode of citizenship education, it will have to rest
on a number of pedagogical assumptions and practices that need to be
somewhat clarified.

First, the active nature of students' participation in the learning
process must be stressed. This means that transmission modes of pedagogy must
be replaced by classroom social relationships in which students are able
to challenge, engage, and question the form and substance of the learning
process. Hence, classroom relations must be structured so as to give
students the opportunity to both produce as well as criticize classroom
meanings. Under such conditions, knowing must be seen as more than
a matter of learning a given body of knowledge, it must be seen as a
critical engagement designed to distinguish between essence and appearance,
truth and falsity. Knowledge must not only be made problematic, stripped
of its objective pretensions, it must also be defined through the social
mediations and roles that provide the context for its meaning and
distribution. Knowledge in this sense becomes the mediator of communication and dialogue among learners.

Second, students must be taught to think critically. They must learn how to move beyond literal interpretations and fragmented modes of reasoning. Not only must they learn to understand their own frame of reference; in addition, they must learn how the latter has both developed and how it provides a 'map' for organizing the world. Depending, of course upon grade levels, students can learn to juxtapose different world views against the truth claims that each of them make. In an age when thought is being reduced to its technical dimensions, i.e., the operatives of technocratic rationality, it is crucial that students are taught how to think dialectically. That is, rather than being enslaved to the concrete, to the fact, they must learn to move beyond viewing issues in isolation.

Facts, concepts, issues, and ideas must be seen within the network of connections that give them meaning. Students must learn to look at the world holistically in order to understanding the interconnections of the parts to each other. As Maxine Greene puts it, students must learn an epistemology that allows them to draw from different subject areas and to 'engage in new kinds of questioning and problem-posing appropriate to an overly dominated human world." 99

Third, the development of a critical mode of reasoning must be used so as to enable students to appropriate their own histories, i.e., to delve into their own biographies and systems of meaning. This means that a critical pedagogy must draw upon the cultural capital that students bring to the classroom. The possibility to act and think must begin by acknowledging the politics of the concrete. That is, it must provide the conditions that give students the opportunity to speak with their own voices, to authenticate their own experiences. 100 The will to act precedes the need to act. When the will is deadened, questions about...
critical thinking become empty chatter. Once students become aware of the dignity of their own perceptions and histories, they can make a leap to the theoretical and begin to examine the truth value of their meanings and perceptions, particularly as they relate to the dominant rationality.

Fourth, students must learn not only how to clarify values, they must also learn why certain values are indispensable to the reproduction of human life. Moreover, they must comprehend the source of their own beliefs and actions. Furthermore, they also must learn how values are embedded in the very texture of human life, how they are transmitted, and what interests they support regarding the quality of human existence.

Fifth, students must learn about the structural and ideological forces that influence and restrict their lives. Geoff Whitty speaks to this issue when analyzing the role social studies can play in addressing it.

A radical conception of social studies starts with the recognition that social processes, both within school and outside it, influence and restrict the life chances of many students. What social studies can do is to help them become more aware of their assumptions and more politically articulate in the expression of what it is they want out of life. This can direct them towards an active exploration of why the social world resists and frustrates their wishes and how social action may focus upon such constraints. 101

Inherent in Whitty's suggestion are a number of valuable insights that can be used here. Students must be taught how to act collectively to build political structures that can challenge the status quo. Fred Newmann has both actively pursued this line of reasoning and rightly criticized other educators for ignoring it. 102 Moreover, this kind of pedagogy must be infused by a passion and optimism that speaks to possibilities. Too much of the literature in the citizenship education field borders on despair; not only does it lack any vision, it seems "frozen" by its own inability to dream, imagine, or think about a better
world. The endless studies on the sad state of citizenship education and the existing political consciousness of students are paraded before us as if there was nothing that could be done. These should be treated as starting points and not as terminal commentaries on the state of the nation's health.

CONCLUSION

The vitality of any field is measured, in part, by the intensity of the debate that it wages about its most basic assumptions and goals. Citizenship education is in dire need of such a debate. The price to be gained goes far beyond the merits of intellectual dialogue and insight. What appears to be at stake at the present moment in history is the ability of future generations of Americans to be able to think and act in ways that speak to age-old precepts of freedom and democracy. The task of developing a mode of citizenship education that speaks to this challenge appears awesome. But when one looks at the consequences of not meeting this challenge there appears the possibility of a barbarism so dreadful that we can do nothing less than act as quickly and thoughtfully as possible. It is in the spirit of what is just, necessary and possible that we will have to move forward to meet this challenge.
NOTES


4. The notion of social control is an ambiguous term and its usage needs to be qualified. Social control is not always a negative phenomenon, particularly when it is seen as an inherent part of any social system. A more precise definition of the term would focus on whether it was used to maximize democratic and economic rights in a country or if it were used to further the privileges, power and wealth of one social group at the expense of other groups. It is in the latter sense that the term is being used in this essay. For an elaboration of this issue see Walter Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric: The Intellectual Foundations of Twentieth Century Liberal Reform (New York: John Wiley, 1975); Barry M. Franklin, op. cit.; Herbert J. Kliebard, "The Drive for Curriculum Change in the United States, 1890-1958, 1-The Ideological Roots of Curriculum as a Field of Specialization," Journal of Curriculum Studies, 2 (1979): 191-202; Henry A. Giroux, "Teacher Education


21 Young, op. cit., p. 8.


23 Cited in Herbert Marcuse, Counter-Revolution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), p. 27.

24 H. T. Wilson, op. cit., p. 15.


27 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, op. cit.

28 Laclau, op. cit., p. 66.


Michael F. D. Young, "Curriculum Change: Limits and Possibilities," Educational Studies, 1 (June 1975); 129.


Anyon, op. cit., p. 52.


47 Cherryholmes, op. cit.


53 In the United States this type of work is probably best represented by a number of traditions ranging from the Free School Movement of the early 1960's, the Open School Movement, various offshoots of which support a Freire-like approach to education, and various branches of humanistic pedagogy. An analysis of these traditions can be found in Henry A. Giroux, "Beyond the Limits of Radical Educational Reform: Toward A Critical Theory of Education," Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, 2 (Winter 1980): 20-46.

54 Barr, Barth, and Shermis, op. cit., p. 64.

55 Ibid., p. 64.


58 The enthusiasm for this approach sometimes appears to reach dizzying heights. For example, Metzger and Barr seem to believe that the essence of citizenship education lies in a combination of positive political attitudes in students and the support the latter receive in open school environments which encourage decision making and participation. The concept of false consciousness and the notion that student participation may take place within narrowly defined parameters of power appear to disappear in these studies. See Devon J. Metzger and Robert D. Barr, "The Impact of School Political Systems on Student Political Attitudes," Theory and Research in Social Education, 6 (June 1978): 48-79.
59 Shirley Engle, "Decision Making: The Heart of Social Studies Instruction," Social Education, 24 (November 1960): 301-304, 306. The positivist nature of this assumption, that rational decision-making should assume higher priority in the social studies than Verstehen and social reconstructionism, compromises much of the hermeneutic rationality underlying this mode of citizenship education.


65 Bowles and Gintis, op. cit.


67 Bourdieu and Passeron, op. cit.


73 Peak and Zeigler, op. cit., p. 122.


Agnes Heller, Theory of Need in Marx (London: Allison and Busby, 1974).

Madeleine MacDonald, The Curriculum and Cultural Reproduction, op. cit., p. 60.


Sharp and Green, op. cit., p. x.


Jean Anyon, "Ideology and United States History Textbooks," op. cit.

Wexler, op. cit., p. 19.


Ibid.

Sharp and Green, op. cit., 41-42.

91 Ibid., pp. 146-150.

92 I have analyzed the work of a number of these theorists in Henry A. Giroux, "Beyond the Correspondence Theory..." op. cit.; see also Eric Bredo and Walter Feinberg, "Meaning, Power and Pedagogy," Journal of Curriculum Studies, 11 (1979): 315-332.

93 Richard Johnson, op. cit., p. 52.

94 Paul Willis, op. cit.


101 Gleeson and Whitty, op. cit., p. 102.

102 Newmann, op. cit.
CHAPTER III

CITIZENSHIP FOR AN ECOLOGICAL AGE

William Ophuls

Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science
and Urban Affairs
Northwestern University
ABSTRACT

Citizenship worthy of the name does not exist today. Citizenship is not merely enjoying the dubious-protection of the state; but rather being actively involved in public affairs--i.e., in the process of self-governance. This is no longer possible, because we are the heirs of the unfortunate choice, made during the earliest days of the Republic, to pursue the political vision of Alexander Hamilton instead of Thomas Jefferson. We can now see the implications of this choice: the selfishness that is inherent in a Hamiltonian polity eventually reaches self-destructive proportions, as the drive for self-liberation in all spheres undercut the social infrastructure needed to prevent a Hobbesian war of all against all; genuine participation is also systematically discouraged by a developed Hamiltonian polity's institutions, which are too complex to understand and too remote to control, so that the citizen is turned into little more than a political consumer. To use Rousseau's language, Hamiltonian man is a subject, not a citizen. The ecological predicament into which we have stumbled raises these issues in even starker form; the necessity to cope with the exigencies of ecological scarcity are forcing us to choose a future that is totally participatory lest it be utterly authoritarian. To avoid this latter fate, we must transform our world view to accord with ecology, adopt the political values of frugality and fraternity that are consistent with it, and construct a neo-Jeffersonian polity that reflects these principles. Toward this end, the current system of ecological miseducation must be scrapped and a new ecologically informed educational structure and curriculum installed. Only in this fashion can citizenship be salvaged for ourselves and our posterity.

* A revised version of this paper also appears as "Citizenship and Ecological Education," in Teachers College Record, 82, No. 2 (Winter 1981): 217-242.
INTRODUCTION

To state the point badly, there is no longer any such thing as citizenship in the modern industrial world. It is true that the dictionary definition of citizen—"A person owing loyalty to and entitled by birth or naturalization to the protection of a given state"—is fulfilled by all of us, because there is no longer any escaping the "protection" of the state. According to this definition, then, anyone who holds a passport or pays taxes is a citizen. But is this really citizenship? Not according to the usual connotations of that work. It seems that few in modern industrial society—indeed, perhaps none at all—truly enjoy the status of citizenship, along with all its attendant rights, duties, and privileges. The vast majority simply go along for the ride. One must, therefore, ask, "What happened to the original American ideal of citizenship? To the idea that a group of self-reliant individuals sharing a common set of elevated political ideals would be actively involved in governing themselves?"

The answer to these questions is, of course, quite complex. However, it will not be too much of a distortion to say that, at the time that they achieved their independence and established their constitutional machinery, the American people stood at a fork in the road. They had a choice between two very different visions of the American future—one held up by Alexander Hamilton and the other by Thomas Jefferson. The former led in the direction of commercial complexity and national power; the latter toward agrarian simplicity and individual virtue. As is well known, the Hamiltonian vision won out—so decisively that, as President, Jefferson was helpless before its momentum; he was even obliged to further its progress by many of his official acts, such as the Louisiana Purchase.
An old story, you may say. These issues have been decided once and for all; it is no use regretting the choice we made or hankering to change it. But I believe, to the contrary, that it is essential for us to take a fresh look at that choice to see quite clearly what the costs attached to it were. It may well transpire that these costs were unacceptable. I, therefore, wish to raise the questions, "Did we Americans take the wrong fork in the road? Should we have chosen the Jeffersonian path instead? If so, what should we do about it now?"

These questions will appear even more poignant and pressing if we understand that, as a people, we are again standing at a fork in the road—the fork of ecological scarcity—that reraises the old choice in a peculiarly acute form. This time the choice is between two very different visions of twenty-first century America. One vision is of the post-industrial society exemplified in Herman Kahn's capsule description: a future world in which man is "everywhere . . . numerous, rich and in control of the forces of nature." The other is perhaps best exemplified in the title to the book by E.F. Schumacher: Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. So we face an updated version of the old choice, in which Kahn is the heir of Hamilton, Schumacher of Jefferson (via Gandhi, whose roots can be found in both Jefferson and Thoreau). But the choice today turns out to be even more dichotomous, even more momentous than the original one.

In what follows, I shall describe briefly what seem to me to have been some of the most pernicious consequences for citizenship of travelling the Hamiltonian road. I shall then analyze the nature and implications of the current choice. Finally, I shall discuss education in this context.

...
HAMITONIAN CITIZENSHIP

What follows is a highly abbreviated and selective discussion meant to be indicative rather than conclusive. However, enough will be said to show that citizenship in a Hamiltonian regime has some serious built-in contradictions that go far toward explaining why citizenship is problematic in modern America.

Hobbesian and Lockean Roots

To appreciate fully the implications of the Hamiltonian view of politics, we must trace its roots in the political thought of his philosophical mentors, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. According to Hobbes, there are no natural communal ties that bind one man to his fellow human beings. Instead, atomistic individuals exist in a state of nature in which they owe nothing to anybody but themselves. This was a radical break with the ancient tradition in which, according to Aristotle, man was an inescapably "political animal" for whom life outside the polis was inconceivable. Using more modern terminology, we can say that before Hobbes all political philosophy rested on the innate biosociality of man. Thus, the fact of citizenship was a given; only the form needed to be determined. With Hobbes and his followers, however, even the fact of citizenship has to be established and justified.

As is well known, the basis Hobbes found for political association is self-interest. Since existing in a contractless state of nature is exceedingly inconvenient, individuals give over their natural rights to do anything and have anything to the commonwealth, the better to achieve their ultimate selfish aim of gratifying their passions. Thus citizenship for Hobbes has a negative cast: The individual grudgingly consents to be a member of the community, and the political institutions stand in relation to him as the policeman stands in relation to the potential miscreant.
Although Locke (for reasons that will be explained later) moderated the absolutism of Hobbesian authority, he too retained self-interest as the basis for political association. (Locke also amended Hobbes in another important respect by assuming the existence of a natural social association upon which the merely political association rested; we shall return to this critical point below). Similarly, in The Federalist Papers—drafted by Hamilton and his two philosophical alter egos, James Madison and John Jay—we find not only that self-interest is made the basis of political association, but that it must be the exclusive basis, lest dreaded factions devour the body politic.

A corollary to self-interest as the basis of the political order is the position taken first by Hobbes and then reiterated by Locke and those who follow him that it is not the duty of the state to decide matters of principle, but only to referee the competitive struggle among self-interested individuals to see that it does not get out of hand. The reason for this agnostic position is that there is no revealed standard of virtue or truth. Individuals are, therefore, free to decide these matters for themselves and to use the political machinery to make their values triumphant in the society—in procedurally fair ways, to be sure. One aspect of this is, of course, free speech, religious toleration and a host of other positive developments.

Although the absence of even the notion of some standard of right and wrong might seem problematic; enlightenment thinkers were not much concerned with the loss of traditional canons of virtue, for they believed that "science" would fill the gap, replacing "superstition" with firm knowledge of what was "natural" for man.

Thus, along with self-interest went value-freeness, and these two were to have profound future ramifications, to which we shall now turn.
The Problem of Liberation

Liberalism is a political doctrine of liberation of the self from externally imposed constraints on one's thought and behavior, provided the latter stops short of direct and immediate harm to others. Liberation has such profoundly positive connotations for us that it is all but impossible to see the hidden, darker side of this doctrine, in particular its inherent contradictions. Let us explore some of them.

Liberalism rests on core premises that, when stated baldly, seem distinctly anti-social:

--atomistic individualism;
--innate selfishness;
--a natural right to do anything and have anything
--the absence of any positive standard of virtue;
--government as mere referee in the ensuing political struggle.

A mere glance at this list of premises indicates that it is a prescription for conflict—as is quite apparent in Hobbes's description of the war of all against all in the state of nature that renders an all-powerful sovereign essential to keep the peace and to make it possible for selfish individuals to pursue happiness. The question, therefore, arises: "Why was a political theory that was so inherently self-destructive in theory not only not self-destructive in practice, but actually quite successful (if not always benign)?"

One major reason will be discussed in somewhat greater depth below: The discovery of the New World, the take-off and rapid-growth phase of scientific technology, and the existence of abundant ecological resources all conspired to create an abnormal era of abundance that made libertarian self-aggrandizement possible.
Another important reason has already been mentioned. Locke's correction of Hobbes in recognizing the prior existence of a stable society that underlies and nourishes the polity was astute. By "society," Locke meant family, custom, religion, and all the other non-political elements of social existence that were pre-existing and, or so Locke thought, relatively independent of merely political society. Because these things are the pillars of community, Locke discerned little danger in allowing political life to be based on principles that apparently sanctioned a self-interested lack of concern with the community as a whole in the political realm. Even if the political association collapsed, it would be an inconvenience rather than a disaster, because society would always be there to keep some measure of order, to be the safety net against anarchy.

Unfortunately, we can now see that Locke's understanding was seriously defective in several important respects. In the first place, most of those things that Locke neatly lumps under the heading of society were all inherited by the modern world from a medieval world founded on utterly different premises. Liberalism has, therefore, been living off the moral capital generated by past ages, and this legacy was bound to decay. However, such deeply rooted institutions are not easily eroded, so that the triumph of the liberal world view has not been complete until our own day (of which more later). Since liberalism has never been concerned with morality, but only prudence, it has no remedy for this built-in tendency of a Lockean (and Hamiltonian) society toward moral entropy.

Second, Locke rather ignored economy and its potential impact on politics, both directly and through its impact on society. But Locke implies Adam Smith; economic liberalism necessarily followed from
political liberalism. Thus, self-interest began to occupy more and more of life; society's ambit and role became more and more constricted. Indeed, economy began to destroy Locke's society. As is ably documented by Karl Polanyi, economic man had to be created; until "organic society" had been liquidated, the so-called laws of economics simply did not exist. But once economic man had been created, at an enormous cost in human misery, then the values of social man—an emphasis on being instead of having, the exaltation of the spiritual over the material, and so forth—were ultimately destined to be eroded away.

Third, Locke relied on "reason" to reinforce the dictates of society. Men and women would naturally see that some self-restraint was necessary, lest selfishness run rampant. In order to ensure that individual self-interest would indeed be enlightened rather than demonic, Locke counted very heavily on the process of education to turn innately selfish individuals into reasonable chaps desirous of getting along with their fellows and capable of controlling their appetites accordingly. Reason thus became the substitute for the traditional morality that was incompatible with the principles of liberal polity. Unfortunately, without the social foundation for reason broadly defined, it is all too likely to turn into a narrow nationality that debunks all values. Thus, to reiterate Edmund Burke's famous judgment of liberal society, wisdom and morality were discarded along with superstition, and a new class of amoral "sophisters, economists and calculaters" came into dominance. Thus as society became more and more rational, education became the vehicle for the subversion of values, including the very reasonableness that Locke believed would be its fruit. The further result has been such a radical devaluation of values themselves that we find ourselves without any principled basis for making
public policy on issues that raise, at least for some people, important moral questions—such as, pornography and abortion. Indeed, we have so little communal consensus on values at present that not everybody agrees that English should be our national language, either in the schools or in the voting booth! Thus, the very freedom for the individual to assert his own values erodes shared values—and without such a shared basis of values in a political community there can be no citizenship worthy of the name.

In sum, Locke failed to recognize that his world view contained inherent contradictions that made it ultimately self-destructive. The drive for liberation in all spheres has undercut the social basis that Locke relied upon to contain and constrain the evils of selfishness. We are the legatees of this failure.

The women's liberation movement symbolizes the triumph of the liberal world view.* Until recently, woman's role in liberal society was quite anomalous: she was to renounce selfishness and be the custodian of traditional values, to speak for the heart against the head, and to incarnate the warmth of home and hearth in a coldly masculine world that openly despised such unmanly values. In short, the self-sacrifice of multitudes of women was part of the social and emotional glue that kept what would otherwise have been a dog-eat-dog world from actually going to the dogs. But, of course, this situation could not last—the miracle.

*Although I shall not be able to deal with it here, the positive side of women's liberation should not be passed over. The change in women's values has already had a considerable effect on men's values and behavior, and much more can be expected in the future. Many, in fact, foresee women bringing into the social mainstream repressed "female" or "matriarchal" values as necessary correctives to a civilization that they diagnose as suffering from an excess of "male" or "patriarchal" values. Future historians may well see women as the revolutionary class in the transition to the age of ecology.
is that women accepted this kind of spiritual exploitation for so long.

Now women too have increasingly become good liberals looking out for
Number One, which erodes further what little basis for emotional stability
and community feeling exists in liberal society. However, one cannot
blame women—or anybody else for that matter—for acting in accordance
with good liberal principles, because liberalism, if it means anything
at all as a social and political doctrine, means liberation of the self
from all social restraints except the necessity to keep the peace. When
push comes to shove, it means getting what one wants regardless, and if
behavior in accordance with this doctrine has become contradictory or
perhaps even self-destructive, then the doctrine itself rather than
the behavior must be called into question. It seems that we must
question our myth that liberation equals freedom: to the contrary,
beyond certain bounds, more liberation creates chaos rather than freedom
and undercuts the very basis of citizenship in a Hamiltonian regime founded
on Lockean principles.

The Problem of Participation

The other problem area for Hamiltonian citizenship today is the lack,
or even the impossibility, of genuine participation. Let us explore how
the performance of public duty is systematically discouraged by the liberal
paradigm and significant participation is rendered futile by the scale
and complexity of the social institutions that inevitably result from
following the Hamiltonian path.

Privatism is a corollary of liberalism. According to liberal principles,
the ends of man are private ends—that is, ends that are privately determined,
privately attained, and privately enjoyed. The community is seen as little
more than a necessary evil, nothing but an arena for ego's quest. To take
a hypothetical example, if it were conceivable for a man safely to enjoy all that he wanted while others suffered extreme and irredeemable destitution, little can be found in liberal doctrine itself to say him nay. That is, since men only consent to the establishment of the commonwealth to serve their convenience, they have no other interest in it. Thus, rights will be tenaciously defended, while duties will be avoided, if not evaded. (That this inherent tendency has only become a serious social problem—in welfare, taxation, conscription, etc.—during the last two decades is another indication that the liberal world view was not finally triumphant until our own time.)

A more technical way of stating this is to say that the public goods problem, in which everybody tries to let Jack do it while still reaping the benefits of Jack's work, necessarily dominates the relation of private and public in a liberal polity. What this means in part is that when the men and women of a liberal polity do participate in public life, there is a strong tendency for them to turn their participation into a vehicle for the pursuit of private ends. Again, it is during our own time that this development has reached somewhat worrisome levels: political parties, which used to buffer government from excessive demands, have for a whole complex of reasons fallen into desuetude and the polity has come to be plagued by "single-issue constituencies" or "hyperpluralism." Even so-called public interest groups, like those defending consumers and the environment, seem to find it hard to avoid sliding into an uncompromising, zero-sum-game mentality—"bloodymindedness" in British parlance. As the public arena comes to be dominated by the politics of organized selfishness, the scope and meaning of citizenship is thereby reduced. Organized

*This is my colleague Robert L. Lineberry's apt rubric for this phenomenon.
selfishness is but a genteel form of the Hobbesian war of all against all, and Hobbesian man is no citizen.

However, even if someone in a developed Hamiltonian polity is seized with the desire to be a good citizen and participate altruistically in public affairs, he encounters enormous obstacles. A highly urban, commercial, industrial order is inevitably grandiose in scale and grossly complex. The socio-political side effects of this are many.

First, anomic and anonymity are rife in such a gigantic impersonal world. Community is a feeling, and it is difficult or even impossible to have such a feeling in a megalopolis or suburb. Indeed, we thought that the individualistic pursuit of happiness would bring us ease and contentment, but it turned into Philip Slater's "the pursuit of loneliness" instead. Thus, in the memorable words of Alexis de Tocqueville, American democracy "throws (every man) back forever on himself alone, and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his own heart." But a citizen is, by definition, a public person and citizenship is, therefore, negated by such lonely solitude.

Second, the important political action takes place at such a distance from the citizen that he cannot really come to terms with it efficaciously. One major element of this problem is spatial. In a highly interdependent world, events occurring elsewhere, perhaps even halfway around the world, are often decisive for local affairs. Worse, the potential citizen's knowledge of these events is a simplified and secondhand knowledge channeled to him through media that systematically distort reality (however hard they try not to). Still worse, knowledge of the political leaders whom the citizen must, in the absence of jurisdiction or reliable firsthand knowledge of events, choose to be his surrogates is likewise a simplified and secondhand knowledge channeled
to him through the media--but this time even more systematically distorted, because to media bias is added deliberate image manipulation by the politicians themselves. Moreover, the major issues have become so awesomely complex, even esoteric--witness the nuclear power controversy or the dispute between Keynesians and monetarists over economic policy--that only dedicated specialists can hope to understand them (although the lack of agreement among such specialists does not inspire much confidence that even these worthies really understand what is going on). By constantly growing larger and more complex, a Hamiltonian regime, thus, progressively destroys the basis for real understanding that is an essential prerequisite for the responsible exercise of citizenship.

Third, the net result of this is that individuals have been demoted to hapless consumers in the political marketplace as well as the economic. The most meaningful public act in which Mr. or Ms. Average can be involved today is not casting a ballot in an election, but instead being selected as a respondent in a sample survey conducted by one of the major polling organizations, for policies and politicians alike are now marketed like any other product, as more and more effort and expertise is expended in making elections but a pro forma ratification of the success or failure of the politician's marketing strategy.

Fourth, given the costs of participation, it is no longer "rational" for harried individuals in modern liberal society to want to do more than passively participate in politics. Already burdened by a lack of time to maintain and enjoy his possessions, the political consumer soon runs up against Robert Dahl's "Criterion of Economy," which operates more and more strongly as social pace, scale and complexity increase. Simply put, the difficulty is that genuine participation takes time, with the
time required increasing disproportionately with the difficulty and complexity of the problems; today, this is more time than all but a few professionals can spare, so that there is inevitably little exercise of informed citizenship by the individual.

To sum up, pursuing the Hamiltonian vision of politics seems ineluctably to lead to great size and complexity which isolates individuals from each other and from the community and which seems to engender a sense of loneliness and alienation; both of these in turn inhibit the participation that is a requisite for the exercise of citizenship. Should the individual still seek to participate despite this, he soon encounters the "polyarchic" institutions of Robert Dahl's "Democratic Leviathan"; these have no particular need for his involvement (to say the least!), and consequently he is not allowed to participate except as a political consumer. Besides, the individual lacks sufficient knowledge to participate intelligently and effectively in public affairs, even if the institutions were to permit him to exercise his citizenship. All in all, then, the level of genuine participation—and therefore, of genuine citizenship—is appallingly low in modern liberal society. Moreover, when the individual does abandon his private world for public action, it seems only to be in the pursuit of organized selfishness.

**Citizenship and the General Will**

We have seen above that liberation has paradoxical results and may not necessarily equal freedom; also that liberal society has little place for meaningful citizen participation. This should be no surprise, for these are scarcely new problems. Indeed, they form the core of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's still unexcelled critique of the basic institutions of
liberal society. It is worth reexamining that critique to see if it does not contain a message for our time.

Addressing the classic problem of achieving the "common interest," Rousseau says that man is caught in a political-psychological trap. We can all agree that, were we to put aside our selfish individual points of view, we would all be better off if serious political evils like major inequality were eliminated. This determination of what would necessarily be in the common interest Rousseau calls the General Will. Naturally, having arrived at the General Will, we should next do its bidding and actually bring about equality, justice, and so forth. In short, we should set about creating what most would be pleased to regard as utopia, a society without the political ills that typically exercise reformers. Of course, in the real world we only partially and grudgingly do the bidding of the General Will under the best of circumstances, for it requires constraints on us that go against our egotistical desires. Thus, in this imperfect world the General Will is overshadowed or even usurped by the Will of All, that is the mere aggregation of our selfish particular wills. All politics are, therefore, more or less corrupt.

It follows from this analysis, still according to Rousseau, that the liberty to express our particular will in the polity is not freedom at all, but is in fact detrimental to it. Genuine freedom would paradoxically arise out of obedience to the dictates of the General Will. Rousseau's shocking and often misunderstood solution to the trap is that to overcome our deep psychological resistance to the General Will, we must be "forced to be free." That is, we must be obliged to make political choices that will confer long-term benefits, even though they may entail short-term
sacrifices by ego. In practice, this requires a carefully designed system of political education and social conditioning in favor of behavior that promotes the General Will. Only thus can freedom transcend mere liberty.

Does this then mean that Rousseau wants a Brave New World? On the contrary, Rousseau states that the freedom conferred by the General Will arises from the citizen's participation in shaping it. Even the most utopian policies, if decided by the few and inflicted on the many, would not therefore constitute the General Will; if individuals do not have a hand in making the decision, then it is not the General Will at all, but simple tyranny. The essence of the General Will is precisely that it arises from the considered decisions of citizens who have put aside their selfishness in order to choose freedom over liberty. This being the case, Rousseau is inevitably led to the doctrine, expressed obliquely in his more philosophical writings but quite explicitly in his schemes for constitutional reform in Poland and Corsica, that the polity must be kept small enough and simple enough to permit direct individual participation in politics.

For Rousseau, therefore, only direct democracy is a morally valid political system; since this requires a particular socio-political setting, then we must create such settings, lest we be tyrannized. But as previous discussion has indicated, Hamiltonian principles engender precisely those political settings that are antithetical to this concept of citizenship; by Rousseau's standards, the men and women of a modern liberal polity are subjects, not citizens.

ECOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP

Rousseau's position is, of course, an extreme one but it does seem that the Hamiltonian concept of citizenship contains inherent contradictions.
and produces long-run results that are at variance with certain of its own political ideals to say nothing of those of alternative traditions. On the basis of the preceding analysis, therefore, one might well wonder if Jefferson, the American version of Rousseau, deserved to lose. This tentative conclusion is reinforced if we examine the ecological predicament into which a Hamiltonian regime founded on industrial growth and commercial wealth has stumbled. 11

The Political Challenge of Ecological Scarcity

Ideas do not exist alone, in splendid isolation from their social and physical environment; still less can political doctrines survive independent of suitable environmental circumstances. Unfortunately, we are now experiencing the erosion of environmental support for our received political doctrine. This will come as a shock, for it is usually believed that the political values we hold most dear—individualism, liberty, laissez-faire, the pursuit of happiness, and so on—spring from our unique virtue as a people. We alone had the common sense, etc., to conceive and establish our non-pareil, etc., political system.

In fact, these political boons were bestowed on us by a bounteous providence along with the abundance of what has been called the Great Frontier. The discovery of the New World broadly defined, coupled with the rapid-growth phase of science-based technology, on top of a wide margin of ecological reserve to accommodate the so-called side effects of economic development all made it possible for our "paradigm" of politics to arise and flourish. 12 But we are now in the last days of a four-century long economic boom unprecedented in human history (although there are disquieting parallels to the decline of certain previous civilizations that exhausted their ecological base). It was these boom
conditions that permitted John Locke, Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton and their ilk to be so sanguine about unleashing selfishness. Thanks to the natural cornucopia of the Great Frontier, there was more than enough to go round; in such favorable circumstances, the Hobbesian struggle would not be intense enough to require an all-powerful sovereign; it was, therefore, possible to allow individuals to pursue happiness in a basically laissez-faire fashion. Thus, American political institutions are almost totally predicated on growth and abundance. The rapid emergence of multiple environmental limits and constraints—in short, of ecological scarcity—is, therefore, a major challenge to a set of political institutions that knows how to do only one thing—divvy up the spoils of an ever-growing economy.

One problem in particular deserves careful attention—the so-called tragedy of the commons. This phrase describes the plight of all who use common property resources, like the environment. The tragedy is that it is always rational for individuals to abuse the commons even when they are fully aware (and they rarely are) that this will cause long-term ruin. The reason is simple: if an individual exploits, he stands to receive all the gain, but others absorb most of the resulting environmental damage; on the other hand, if he abstains, he exposes himself to the risk that others will exploit the commons for their own gain and thereby force him to suffer environmental damage without any corresponding benefit. Being damned if he doesn’t, the individual typically decides to do, even if this involves eventual damnation, because he gets at least some benefit along the path to perdition.

The reader versed in political theory will quickly see that the tragedy of the commons is the ecological analogue of Hobbes’s state of
nature, in which a voracious minority compels the reasonable majority to take part in the ceaseless struggle of power after power whether they wish to or not, leading to a war of all against all that can only be ended by the external intervention of a sovereign. What the Great Frontier did was to make available an ever-new commons for exploitation when the old was worn out; and the frontier pattern--move into new land, cream off the best resources, and then decamp to the next territory--typifies American history. Eventually, of course, there was no more new land, but for a while growth in technological productivity served the same function (and was often called the "new frontier"). But limits to this technological frontier are now apparent in declining resources, diminishing technological returns, and ecological degradation. So we are thrown back on the starkly Hobbesian dynamics implicit in the tragedy of the commons: if individuals continue rationally to pursue their material self-interest unrestrained by some authority that upholds the common interest, the eventual result will be mutual ecological ruin. We, therefore, need political institutions which will uphold the General Will as against the Will of All that tends toward this ruin; we must indeed by "forced to be free" of a liberty that would destroy us. The implications of this analysis are likely to upset many Americans.

It hardly need be said that these conclusions about the tragedy of the commons radically challenge fundamental American and Western values. Under conditions of ecological scarcity the individual, possessing an inalienable right to pursue happiness as he defines it and exercising his liberty in a basically laissez-faire system, will inevitably produce the ruin of the commons. Accordingly, the individualistic basis of society, the concept of inalienable rights, the purely self-defined pursuit of happiness-liberty as maximum freedom of action, and laissez-faire itself all become problematic, requiring major modification or perhaps even abandonment if we wish to avert inexcorable environmental degradation and eventual extinction as a civilization. Certainly, democracy as we know it cannot conceivably survive.
To this disquieting political predicament, there seems to be but one answer. To avoid the external coercion of a Leviathan that would force us to be free, we need to adopt a paradigm of politics that is not based, as ours is, on selfish individualism—that is, a paradigm of politics with fundamentally different premises than the Hobbesian-Lockean-Hamiltonian one that has dominated our political history thus far and that is driving us toward ecological ruin.

It might be objected that technology will surely save us by expanding the commons indefinitely and allowing us to carry on with the old paradigm. However, even apart from the ecological impossibility of continuous technological escalation, the political price to be paid turns out to be unacceptable. In fact, nothing would lead to Leviathan faster than resorting to so-called hard technology solutions, for even some of the chief exponents of the "technological fix" candidly admit that future technology holds out only a "Faustian bargain" that takes us in the technocratic direction envisioned in Aldous Huxley's dystopic Brave New World.

In sum, after a brief hiatus of several centuries during which it was possible to have our cake and eat it too, we are about to re-encounter a situation of scarcity that calls into question every premise of a political system predicated on the assumption of perpetual abundance and re-raises all the toughest issues of classical politics.

A Neo-Jeffersonian Response: Frugality and Fraternity

We thus have a convergence of contradictions. As a result of following the Hamiltonian path, we are threatened with the near abolition of our citizenship and the virtual destruction of our ecology. From the preceding analysis, it is clear that the solution cannot lie in reforming
the Hamiltonian paradigm so that it works better—for the better it works, the sooner it will abolish citizenship and destroy the environment—but only in exchanging this paradigm for one that is better suited to foster citizenship and ecological preservation. It was earlier suggested that Jefferson's ideas were appropriate to the former objective; it now seems that they are well suited to achieving the latter as well. Thus, I propose a neo-Jeffersonian political solution founded on the twin principles of frugality and fraternity.

It was stated above that ecological scarcity is leading to the resurrection of classical politics. This will in turn oblige us to rediscover the truth of certain principles that were thrust aside during the time of the Great Frontier. One of the foremost of these time-tested principles of classical politics is self-restraint. To use the words of Edmund Burke, "Society cannot exist unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere, and the less of it there is within, the more there must be without." In short, one has a choice between self-restraint and external restraint.

An ethic of frugality is essential to promote such self-restraint. We now overload both our political environment and our physical environment with excessive demands in the mistaken belief that happiness follows from the acquisition of more and more. In truth, as we may now be in a position to appreciate, contentment seems to lie in being satisfied with a modicum. It therefore appears that Henry David Thoreau's *Walden* will be one of the Bibles of the age of ecology: his assertion that a "more experienced and wiser savagry" is the only way to make civilization a blessing seems to speak to the needs of our time. (It was said by one observer of American Indian life, for example, that the Indian seemed to have a leg up in

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the pursuit of happiness precisely because he would not race.) The choice before us is, thus, whether we shall opt for a simpler and more frugal life, thereby reclaiming both our lost citizenship and our vanished harmony with nature, or for the more complex and superficially richer existence promised us by the post-industrial prophets, thereby condemning ourselves to be permanent subjects in a degraded artificial environment.

The second great principle of classical politics is that there is indeed a common interest greater than the sum of the particular interests comprising the polity—and that it is essential to support it with appropriate values, practices and institutions. Toward this end, selfish individualism would have to be checked by an ethic of fraternity. Clearly, under conditions of scarcity, such an ethic is essential to promote the common interest, for we can no longer afford the free play of selfishness in a polity governed by the Will of All instead of the General Will.

Fraternity is rooted in a sense of kinship with others, a feeling that the interests of others are at least as important as one's own. At present, this feeling is almost totally absent with respect to nature, which tends to be regarded as nothing but a storehouse that we are free to plunder at will—restrained, if at all, only by prudence. And with respect to our fellow human beings, why they too tend to be treated as though we did not have to weigh their interests at all seriously, much less on a par with our own. Thus we subject both polity and ecology to organized selfishness in pursuit of ego's ends. We, therefore, have another very clear choice between adopting a more fraternal mode of existence in the interest of social and ecological harmony or continuing along the path of socially sanctioned selfish individualism toward the extinction of both our citizenship and our environment.
In short, the solution to the twin problems of citizenship and ecological scarcity would seem to lie in the direction of a frugal and fraternal polity founded on neo-Jeffersonian principles. Obviously, much more needs to be said about the values, practices and institutions of such a polity. However, because my present focus is on the relationship of citizenship and education, let me leave these questions to future debate and turn now to the epistemological revolution that follows from the adoption of an ecological world view, for it is only by understanding this that we shall see clearly what an ecological education is, and this in turn will tell us more about the character of ecological citizenship.

The Epistemological Revolution: Ecology As Master Science

The ecological crisis is in large part an epistemological crisis. Because they have been strongly socialized in an anti-ecological paradigm, people today are simply unable to see their connection with nature. Obviously, then, the resolution of the crisis both physically and politically will require a fundamental transformation of world view, an epistemological revolution. Yet, to describe this revolution is even more difficult than to talk about a fundamentally different politics; the problem of communication across the gap between differing paradigms becomes harder as one approaches the core of the paradigm, and nothing is closer to the core than epistemology, which establishes what "reality" is. Thus, I can only suggest what some of the key elements of the new world view will be in a linear fashion—even though the new world view, despite being every bit as "scientific" as the old, is in some ways closer to what we think of as poetry or mysticism. The reader will have to use his or her imagination to envision what the world would look like seen through the spectacles of the new ecological paradigm.
I shall go about this by contrasting physics and biology—or, actually, the Newtonian, celestial-mechanical physics that has been the master science underlying our current paradigm and the systems ecology that will be the new master science. A master science might be thought of as the paradigm of paradigms, the basic mold of thought that all other theories will reflect or imitate—as in the Enlightenment when philosophes stumbled over each other to render homage to Newton and imitate his celestial exactitude, a spirit that is not entirely dead today (even though the character of physics has changed radically in the interim, of which more later).

First, Newtonian physics deals with dead matter, so that the age of physics has been a materialistic age, conceiving of even living entities in a mechanistic fashion. Thus, biology is often done today in a very "physical" fashion, because biologists too have accepted physics as their master science. As in science, so in society, meaning that our age has been materialistic both in ends and means. By contrast, ecology deals with living beings. Thus, the ecological age will be life-oriented; one wants almost to say a vitalistic or even an animistic and pantheistic age were it not that these adjectives have been totally discredited by physics-based science. In fact, some chemists and biologists have begun seriously to put forward the "Gaia hypothesis" (Gaia being the Greek Earth goddess) as a scientifically respectable way of formulating this idea, the understanding that the earth is a living being. 16 Thus, the new epistemology will postulate—and therefore see—not a dead, mechanistic, clockwork universe, but instead a vitally alive, pulsating, dancing, energetic one.

Second, Newtonian physics is deterministic. This follows from the basic mechanical nature of the paradigm: to every force there is an equal
and opposite reaction; each cause produces a clear effect; and so on. Given this aspect of the master science, in the socio-political sphere as in the scientific, prediction and control are important issues; some thinkers even profess to see a direct connection with political authoritarianism, either in the form of the Sun King or the Democratic, Leviathan. Even if one does not want to push the point this far, it must be admitted that the dominant image of man is mechanical, even robotic, and that this must have socio-political consequences. By contrast, ecology is not at all deterministic, only stochastically lawful. Thus, although there is an overall predictability to nature, there is never a precise determinism—only open-ended and evolving processes, patterns and tendencies. The social impact of this shift in world views is likely to be paradoxical: there will be more fluidity and greater freedom from narrow determinism, but it will be combined with greater obedience to the ultimate laws (the design criteria) that sustain the system; it will be the kind of freedom enjoyed by human beings as contrasted to robots. Thus, the world will be seen not as mechanical, but as organic—and therefore freer and more humane, despite the necessity to respect natural limits.

Third, Newtonian physics deals with phenomena by reductiorism—dissecting matter into smaller and smaller components and studying them in controlled isolation from each other, with molecular biology being a kind of ultimate expression of this thrust. The parallel to this was obviously atomistic individualism as the basis for society—along with the lonely solitude alluded to previously. By contrast, ecology espouses holism. It seeks to understand nature by studying the interrelationships that make up the system to see how all the parts are connected into the greater sum of the whole. The social parallel is likely
to be less concern for atomistic individuals per se and greater attention to these individuals' connection with others to form a community. This need not mean that the parts are devalued; only that they will be valued within the context of the whole, instead of apart from it as at present. Thus, an ecological world seems likely to be considerably more fraternal in spirit and practice than our own—with the relationship of self to other, rather than the self alone, being of paramount concern.

Fourth, Newtonian physics approaches knowledge from the standpoint of naive empiricism. The phenomena are supposed to speak for themselves, either directly or through relatively simple instrumentation (e.g., a dial pointer with its clear and unambiguous reading); and any person in possession of his or her faculties should be able to make the observations (vis., Galileo's pathetic plea to his inquisitors just to look through his telescope). Thus, knowledge is public and exoteric, in theory if not always in practice. The social implications of this conception of knowledge are clearly democratic: knowledge (and therefore the ability to decide) is potentially available to all. By contrast, understanding in ecology is far from straightforward. It comes only after painstaking systems analysis supported by a large measure of intuitive insight. The relationships that are the ecosystem—for example, energy flows—are not surface phenomena, but deep structures of the system. They are not, therefore, apparent to the superficial or untrained observer. (Paradoxically, however, the seemingly most ignorant and backward among us—the surviving "primitives"—are usually superb ecologists, because their life requires them to be acutely observant and to develop their intuitive faculties to a high pitch; by contrast, most "civilized" folk are ecologically blind.) Thus,
knowledge, although still public, is much more esoteric or intuitive than before—available not to every man in the street, but only to those who have taken the trouble to develop their faculties appropriately. It is not entirely clear what the ultimate social implications of this will be, but if the world is not such a simple place after all, our conceptions of democracy, equality and education are among those things that might have to be rethought. In short, perhaps Plato was not entirely mistaken.

It is important to understand that all knowledge is steadily becoming more ecological in the above senses. The reason for this has been stated by Walsh.

Scientific investigation in any field usually begins with the study of simplified isolated systems. Usually the effects of one or a small number of selected independent variables are tested and all others are excluded or ignored, as are interactions with other systems and dynamic processes. These few selected variables are usually those which account for the greatest portion of the variance.

With increasing experimental sophistication and sensitivity, the effects of formerly excluded variables intrude more and more and must eventually be taken into consideration. Yesterday's confounding variable becomes today's independent variable. The total amount of variance accounted for continues to increase, though usually at asymptotic rates since independent variables tend to be investigated in decreasing order of potency. With increasing numbers of variables, interactions and interdependencies become increasingly apparent until eventually it is recognized that all variables, including the state of the observer, exert multiple effects. A complete understanding requires no less than a consideration of all variables, i.e. of the entire universe.

At this stage the original model of an isolatable limited system breaks down and is recognized as an illusory artifact. The scientific model has led to its own annihilating edge and the inherently holistic, indivisible, interconnected, interdependent, infinitely overdetermined and dynamic nature of the world is recognized. Such a perspective as this obviously transcends traditional models of causality resulting in an omnideterminism in which all components are seen to mutually determine all others. The state of any part reflects the state of the whole.
Thus, says Walsh, as science in general becomes more ecological—whether
in quantum-mechanical physics, psychology, the neurosciences, or what
have you—nature (and our knowledge of it) become more and more:

— nondualistic as opposed to dichotomous.
— a unitive whole as opposed to unrelated parts.
— interconnected as opposed to comprised of separate and
isolated components.
— dynamic and in continuous motion or flux as opposed
to static.
— impermanent and ephemeral as opposed to lasting and
permanent.
— empty (largely constituted by non-solid empty space)
rather than solid.
— acausal (but not anticausal), i.e., transcendent to
traditional models of causality, since every component
enters into the determination of every event
(omnideterminism).
— foundationless and self-consistent in that, since all
components and mechanisms are interconnected and
interdependent, none are ultimately more fundamental
than any other—hence the universe is inexplicable
in terms of a limited number of fundamental
mechanisms.
— statistical and probabilistic instead of certain.
— paradoxical rather than ultimately intellectually
comprehensible, codifiable, and communicable.
— intextricably linked with the observer.¹⁹
To return to the specifically social-political consequences of the old world view, it is clear that the analogue of celestial-mechanical physics as a master science in the social sphere has been economics. Politics was pushed aside in favor of political economy grounded in the market— an impersonal and ultimately inhumane mechanism that dealt with people as if they were cogs in a deterministic machine ordered by the iron "laws" of economics, not living beings who ought to be treated "as if people mattered." Economics also isolated one portion of human life and crammed even the rich economic world into simple linear boxes within a ceteris paribus framework that ignored ecological interrelationships within the economy. Thus, human life was reduced to economics, and economics itself was handled in a reductionistic fashion. (Worse, the other social sciences, and even many of the human sciences, increasingly began to treat their own fields in an economic fashion.) Moreover, economics prides itself on being a very hard-headed, down-to-earth science whose basic principles are self-evident to any thinking person. In addition, the market itself is very democratic: one dollar, one vote. And so on.

To sum up, there is an obvious congruence between the dominant master sciences. Under Newtonian physics, economics was enthroned; the political process got reduced to economics in a materialistic, individualistic, democratic age based on the myth of the social "contract" (itself an economic concept); the whole issue of policy choice was abandoned to the invisible hand or the Will of All in the political marketplace. By contrast, the social master science corresponding to ecology is obviously politics, the tradition of thought that has always been concerned with the problem of achieving the General Will, rather than the mere Will of All, in a world that cannot be understood in any simple, reductionistic fashion, but only by becoming something of a philosopher. Although more could be
said about the congruence between ecology and politics, it might be best at this point to move on to a description of the implications of all the above for education, for this will at the same time illuminate some of the larger political meaning of the impending changeover in master sciences.

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY EDUCATION

The question thus is, "What role does education have in fostering ecological citizenship?" Let me begin by examining the flaws of the current system of education.

The Ecological Miseducation of Today

It is difficult to imagine a system of education more pernicious than our own for training ecological citizens. The industrial system needs technocrats and bureaucrats the way armies need cannon fodder, and our educational factories are by and large engaged in training and certifying students for positions in the industrial army. Since one of the most important qualifications of the good organizational soldier is the unwillingness—or, better yet, the incapacity (as in Orwell's "doublethink")—to entertain any questions that might be fundamentally subversive of the system, it follows that current education must be narrowly economic and technical in its content and methodology.

You will, of course, protest that (1) you certainly don't teach in a narrowly economic and technical fashion, (2) students are required to take at least one humanities course, and (3) I have already said that one of the problems associated with education in a liberal society is precisely that it does subvert institutional values.

The answer to these objections is that

(1) of course you don't, but when what Ivan Illich calls the 'hidden curriculum' of the educational establishment is geared to the requirements of the industrial order, what any given teacher does has relatively little impact compared to the determining influence of the system as a whole;
(2) students may have to take Shakespeare or Music Appreciation, but again within a context that devalues the worth and real meaning of the humanities and turns them into but one more credit to be passively consumed along with all the rest on the way to being graded and certified as fit to take up a role in post-industrial society;

(3) teaching on the value-free model subverts not only traditional values, but all values--indeed, the very idea of value itself--so that the only values left are--surprise!--those very values of economical rationality and technical efficiency that have brought on our ecological predicament and the crisis of Hamiltonian citizenship.

After this somewhat tendentious beginning, let me address this very serious problem in a more analytic fashion. As previous discussion indicates, understanding the requisites for living in the age of ecology requires an epistemological revolution. Since the current educational system is rooted in the old physics-based paradigm instead of the new ecology-based one, it could hardly be suitable for educating ecological citizens. What are some of its specific failings?

First, the curriculum is inappropriate to the requirements of living in an ecological age. This is true for education at all levels, although the problem is clearly much worse at the highest levels of the system, which are dominated by those most heavily socialized in the old paradigm. Students are taught to take a materialistic, reductionistic, specialized, and linear approach to knowledge and life--in short, to have the attitudes and aptitudes suitable for "economic man." But, as we have seen, economic man does not make either a good citizen or a good ecologist.

Second, the structure of the system reinforces the curriculum. Especially at the higher levels, instead of an integrated program of study, the student "majors" in one specialized discipline that has its own "literature" (and often its own language as well), and fills up the rest of his place from the smorgasbord of elective courses offered by the typical undergraduate college. There is thus no real attempt to provide the common
basis for social and political discourse that is necessary if citizens are to talk intelligently to each other about the issues facing them.

Third, the current system of education promotes passivity. The student, as a result of "going along with the program" for twelve or more years, is inculcated in basic attitudes that fit him to be a passive consumer of values, rather than an active creator of values. It is a rare student who attempts to take charge of his or her own education, in large part because the system is not adapted to this end. This passivity is not unrelated to the phenomenon previously noted of passivity in the political arena, in which actual voting has come to count for less than the public opinion surveys that politicians use to market both themselves and their policies. But this kind of passivity is the antithesis of citizenship.

Fourth, the current system is theoretical and academic in the worst sense of these words. It used to be that most people grew up on farms or in other environments that inculcated "common sense," but no longer. Students thus tend to graduate with a purely theoretical understanding of the world—full of secondhand knowledge, empty of practical know-how. They have what Thorstein Veblen called a "trained incapacity" to see beyond their theoretical blinkers. But the good citizen is a kind of junior-grade philosopher whose possession of common sense enables him to deal with difficult issues sensibly, even though he does not possess great expertise. By contrast, the theoretical expert often makes an inferior citizen, so that in promoting expertise at the expense of common sense, the system produces poor citizens who have little real connection to their environment.

Fifth, current education is addressed to only one tiny part of the whole human being—the left hemisphere of the brain that specializes in linear
or economic rationality (the digital mode in computer parlance). Both the right hemisphere of the brain, which knows things in a holistic and intuitive fashion (the analog mode), as well as the rest of the body, which connects us sensorially to the world in which we live, tend therefore to be atrophied. To put it another way, the systematic training that students receive in linear rationality is not balanced with training for other human faculties that are equally important for a full appreciation of the world in which we live—for example, intuition and imagination. As a result, we turn out graduates who are almost literally blind to major aspects of reality—worse, to what some of the wisest human beings have said are the most important aspects, particularly if one wishes to understand the world ecologically. Again, our current system seems not to provide the perceptual basis needed for people to be good ecological citizens.

Lastly, our current system virtually neglects character development. Because we take the position that values are for each person to determine by and for himself—unless, of course, he happens voluntarily to belong to some "religious" group—we as educators have nothing to say about what constitutes a good life, for we have no cultural ideals. (Indeed, as noted, we are not even certain that we are within our educational rights to make students learn standard English.) But citizenship requires character for its exercise, and character in turn depends on the existence of uplifting cultural ideals that individuals can aim at. Since the current system transmits no ideals—and fails therefore to educate students in character—it not unnaturally turns out poor citizens.

The Ecological Education of Tomorrow

To promote responsible ecological citizenship, our educational institutions need to be radically transformed in the following specific
directions, implicit in the above critique:

(I) The new curriculum must reflect and inculcate the ecological world view;

(2) The new educational structure must seek to turn out not disciplinary specialists, but "specialists in the general"—that is, holists who possess the ability to conduct specialized investigations without losing sight of the whole;

(3) The new system must actively involve the individual as auto-didact in the process of his or her own self-education;

(4) The new system must de-emphasize the purely theoretical in order to achieve a balance between the practical and the theoretical, a balance essential for developing the common sense needed by the citizen;

(5) The new curriculum must direct itself to the education of the whole person—not just half the brain—so that individuals are as at home in the feeling, sensation and intuition functions described by Carl Jung as they are in thinking;

(6) The new system must aim at the character development that is necessary for individuals to live responsibly in harmony with the earth and their fellow beings.

Obviously, the above principles will require much clarification followed by a great effort to translate them into concrete institutional form. Since this goes beyond what I can attempt here, let me simply suggest some useful ways that one might begin thinking about the problems this task entails.

First, what I am calling for is remarkably Platonic. You will recall that in The Republic, Socrates says that would-be philosophers need to be educated in three things—music, including poetry (right brain); gymnastic, including the arts of war (body); and mathematics, including logic (left brain). As suggested above, the good citizen is a junior-grade philosopher, so that this Platonic curriculum—suitably adapted to modern needs, to be sure—would also be most appropriate for the would-be citizen in an ecological age.
Second, the three thinkers upon whom I principally rely in the above analysis—Rousseau, Jefferson and Thoreau—all had interesting things to say about education and can therefore serve as basic philosophers in the area of ecological education as well as ecological politics.

Third, one futurologist has identified "the learning society," an ecology-age version of the Greek ideal of paideia, as the overall social goal to which we should be aspiring.21 This vision has roots in various traditions, ancient and modern, ranging from the "perennial philosophy" to "humanistic psychology," that will also need to be incorporated into the new eco-educational synthesis.

Fourth, B.F. Skinner has a valid point: social conditioning being both inevitable and all-pervasive, one has only the choice of doing it well or badly, of doing it in the service of noble ends or base ones.22 A judicious use of our psychological knowledge, if only to avoid the most nefarious consequences of the many current forms of coercive conditioning, might therefore be wiser than our current stance of pretended innocence, in which we ignore this distasteful responsibility so that we can continue to preserve our illusions of freedom.

Finally, there are utopias that have rather successfully envisioned at least some aspects of such an ecological educational system. These too can serve as inspirational guides.23

To conclude, the education needed for ecological citizenship seems to resemble education in the antique mode. Without what is essentially a philosophical education, it appears that we cannot be responsible citizens of the polity or trustworthy stewards of the earth. Clearly, it will be no easy task to design and implement such a radically different system of education, but it is not impossible. Indeed, of all the
institutions in our overdeveloped Hamiltonian society, the educational institutions are the one place where the flame of ancient learning yet flickers, however feebly. It is time to feed that flame and make it burn brightly once again.


10 Ibid.

11 What follows is largely a condensed restatement of the argument in Ophuls, op. cit.


13 Ophuls, op. cit., p. 152


15 Cited in Ophuls, op. cit., p. vi.


19 Ibid.


CHAPTER IV

ETHNICITY, MODERNITY, AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

James A. Banks

University of Washington
Citizenship education should help students to develop the knowledge, skills, and values needed to participate in political action that will promote the nation's democratic ideals. To develop clarified, reflective, and positive commitments and identifications with their nation-state, the ethnic groups within a nation must perceive themselves as legitimate groups that are structurally included into the national society. Ethnic groups that are excluded from full participation in their nation-state have conflicting national identifications and often focus on particularistic concerns and problems rather than on the universal goals and problems of the nation-state.

The assimilationist assumes that ethnicity and the particularistic concerns of ethnic groups can be eliminated by creating a just society in which ethnic groups will gain inclusion and equality. An analysis of the assimilationist position indicates that it does not adequately explain the nature of ethnicity in complex, modernized, and democratic nation-states. Ethnicity persists in modernized nation-states not only because of the exclusion of ethnic groups but because it helps individuals and groups to satisfy important psychological and sociological needs that are left unfilled by the 'thin' culture of modernization.

To foster effective civic education, the school should promote social class and cultural democracy and legitimize the cultures of ethnic groups. Historically, the American public school has practiced cultural imperialism and fostered an Anglo-conformity conception of citizenship. Assimilation into Anglo-Saxon culture became viewed as an essential requisite for civic education. This conception should recognize that individuals who are members of diverse ethnic and cultural groups are American because they endorse the overarching values of the nation-state.

Traditional educational literature and conventional wisdom have fostered the idea that the school has promoted democracy and enabled ethnic and poor youths to experience social class mobility and equality. In recent years, revisionist historians and economists have rejected these views and argued that the schools perpetuate and reflect the social class and racial stratifications in society. An analysis of the revisionists' arguments and grand theories indicate that their positions are not so much wrong as they are incomplete, overdrawn, and sometimes misleading.

Ethnic minorities retain an unshaken faith in the school's ability to help them attain equality and social class mobility. The school remains a cogent factor in the lives of many youths who are members of excluded ethnic and social class groups. Consequently, the total school environment should be reformed so that it will help students to attain clarified, positive, and reflective ethnic, national, and global identifications, and the skills and commitments needed to help close the gap between the nation's realities and ideals.
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

Citizenship education should help students to acquire the knowledge, skills, and values needed to make reflective public decisions consistent with American democratic ideals. The effective citizen within a democratic nation-state has a commitment to the overarching and shared national values and the skills, competencies, and commitment to act on them. The effective democratic citizen also takes actions to promote the shared and idealized values of the nation-state. A major goal of civic education in a pluralistic, democratic nation is to help students acquire the values and the competencies needed to engage in successful and humane social and political action.

ETHNIC GROUPS AND NATIONAL VALUES

To develop clarified, reflective, and positive commitments and identifications with their nation-state and its overarching values, the diverse ethnic groups within a culturally pluralistic nation such as the United States or Canada must perceive themselves as legitimate groups that are structurally included into the fabric of the social, economic and political institutions in society. Individuals and groups who have clarified and reflective national attachments and identifications understand how these identifications and attachments developed; and are able to thoughtfully and objectively examine their nation, and understand both the personal and public implications of their national identifications. Individuals and groups who have

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An ethnic group consists of people who share a sense of group identification, common values, political and economic interests, behavior patterns, dialects and languages, and a social and cultural heritage. Anglo-Americans, Italian-Americans, as well as Jewish-Americans and Afro-Americans, are members of ethnic groups. James A. Banks, Teaching Strategies for Ethnic Studies, 2nd Edition. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1979), p. 10.
clarified and reflective national attachments and identifications understand how these identifications and attachments developed; and are able to thoughtfully and objectively examine their nation, and understand both the personal and public implications of their national identifications. Individuals and groups who have positive national attachments and identifications evaluate their national identifications highly and are proud of their national attachments and affiliations.

Many members of ethnic groups within modernized Western nation-states, while deeply loyal and patriotic citizens, have conflicting attachments to their nation-states and often experience political alienation and anomie. Groups such as the Chamorros in Guam, the French and Indians in Canada, and Blacks and Puerto Ricans in the United States often feel alienated because their contributions to their national cultures have not been sufficiently recognized or legitimized and because they have not been given opportunities to fully participate in the institutions of their nation-states, or to fully share in the benefits of modernization and high technology. These alienated ethnic groups often feel that they do not have a stake in the dominant societies of their nations or territories. Their shared sense of alienation and deprivation helps to maintain tight ethnic boundaries and ethnic communities.

Groups that are excluded from full participation in the nation-state in which they are legal citizens and from the mainstream societies in which they live are likely to focus on particularistic concerns and goals rather than on the universalistic needs and problems of the nation-state. Politically powerless and lower-status ethnic groups within a society, such as the Puerto Ricans and Indians in the United States, the North Africans in France, and the West Indians and Asians in Great
Britain, are often so engrossed by their own problems of powerlessness, alienation, poverty, and institutionalized racism, that they devote little attention to the overarching problems of the nation-state that are shared by all groups in their societies.

Ethnic groups that are structurally excluded, politically marginal, and that experience institutionalized discrimination within their nation-states are likely to interpret both domestic and international events from particularistic perspectives, especially if the ethnic group has experienced a Diaspora, still has attachments to its original homeland, perceives its members as marginal citizens, and has a distinctive ethnic culture and a cogent sense of peoplehood.

Jewish, Cuban, and Mexican citizens of the United States often interpret world events that affect Israel, Cuba, and Mexico from perspectives that are influenced by their ethnic affiliations and sense of kinship with their original homelands. Members of these groups often experience psychological conflicts when they believe that the interests of their original homelands and those of the United States are inconsistent. Jews are citizens of many nation-states throughout the world. Consequently, Jewish Americans are likely to be concerned about the human rights of Jews in nations as far apart as Brazil and the Soviet Union.

ETHNICITY AND CITIZENSHIP WITHIN A DEMOCRACY

I have stated that structural exclusion of ethnic groups within a nation-state is likely to promote and support ethnic group attachments, strong ethnic boundaries, and to foster particularistic and primordial

*By primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the "givens"—or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed "givens"—of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the giveness that stems from being born (continued p. 4)
concerns among ethnic group members. What are the implications of primordial and ethnic attachments for citizenship and citizenship education within a modernized, democratic nation such as the United States? Can and should ethnic attachments coexist with modernity in a pluralistic democratic nation such as the United States? Should the school curriculum within a modernized or a modernizing democratic nation-state recognize, acknowledge, and legitimize the ethnic attachments and identifications of ethnic youths? These complex questions are raised by the coexistence of ethnicity and modernity within Western democratic nation-states. I will explore these questions in this paper. Within the last decade, the expressions of ethnic affiliations and primordial attachments increased significantly, thus making the question of the coexistence of ethnicity and modernity within society even more complex.  

THE ASSIMILATIONIST AND MULTIETHNIC ASSUMPTIONS

The assimilationist assumes that the most effective way to reduce strong ethnic boundaries, primordial attachments, and ethnic affiliations within a nation-state is to provide excluded ethnic and racial groups with opportunities to experience equality in the nation's social, economic, and political institutions.  

As they begin to participate into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 259.
more fully in the universalistic or mainstream society and its institutions, argues the assimilationist, lower-status ethnic groups will focus less on particularistic concerns and more on national issues and priorities.

When ethnic groups experience equality, suggests the assimilationist, ethnicity and primordial attachments die of their own weight. Individuals who endorse a multiethnic or bicultural ideology believe that equality will not eliminate ethnicity from modernized democratic societies but that ethnicity will take new forms within an equal society and that ethnic traits will become part of the universal culture shared by all. Ethnic characteristics within an equal society would become universalized. All ethnic groups, according to the multiethnic ideologist, share power and have equal-status interactions in an equal and just society. The assimilationist views the ideal society as one which has no traces of ethnicity. All groups would share a common Anglicized culture. The multiethnic ideologist believes that the ideal society is characterized by equal status among ethnic groups and a universal culture that consists of universalized ethnic characteristics.

THE ASSIMILATIONIST FALLACY

Apter, while acknowledging that he is an assimilationist and a pluralist, calls the assimilationist position the "assimilationist fallacy." Political pluralism is the name applied to those political doctrines, ranging from extreme to modest claims on behalf of group interests in society, which assert that certain groups (i.e., family, church, union, local government) embody important social values prior to and independent of their authorization or approval by the state. The scope of pluralism is not usually interpreted as including anarchism or revolutionary syndicalism because, unlike such theories, most pluralists retain for government the functional responsibilities of compulsory citizenship and taxation, and admit the necessity for an inclusive governmental authority transcending group associations to regulate, direct, or coordinate, inter alia, the domestic economy, personal liberties, national security, and foreign affairs.

fallacy. This position holds that as modernization occurs, ethnic groups experience social, political, and economic equality, enlightenment eventuates, and commitments to ethnic and primordial attachments weaken and disappear. When modernization arises, ethnicity disappears and vice versa. Assimilationists see ethnicity and primordial attachments as fleeting and temporary within an increasingly modernized society. They view modernity and ethnicity as contradictory concepts. Ethnicity, argues the assimilationist, promotes divisions, exhumes ethnic conflict, and leads to the Balkanization of society. Assimilationists such as Patterson also argue that groups promote group rights over individual rights and that individual rights are paramount in a democratic pluralistic nation. He writes: "The defense of pluralism not only neglects individuality; much worse, an emphasis on group diversity and group tolerance works against a respect for individuality. This is what I call the pluralist fallacy, which originates in the failure to recognize a basic paradox in human interaction; the greater the diversity and cohesiveness of groups in a society, the smaller the diversity and personal autonomy of individuals in that society." (Emphasis added.)

Assimilationists see the continuing expressions and existence of ethnicity within modernized democratic nation-states as a "pathological condition." Ethnic affiliations and cultures still exist in modernized societies, argues the assimilationist, because political and economic equality for ethnic groups such as Blacks, Indians, Mexican-Americans, and Puerto Ricans, have been only partially attained. Thus, the assimilationist ideal is viable and possible but has yet to be completely realized. This will happen when inequality and structural exclusion of ethnic groups, such as Blacks and Mexican-Americans, ends. Include ethnic groups into the structure of society and enable them to experience
political and economic mobility, and ethnicity will, for all important purposes, disappear. Some symbolic forms of ethnicity might remain within the equal society, such as St. Patrick's Day and Chinese New Year, but ethnicity will not be an important social, cultural, or political force in society. This is the assimilationist's argument.

As Apter perceptively states, the assimilationist vision and ideal is not so much wrong as it is an incomplete and inadequate explanation of ethnic realities in modernized pluralistic, and democratic nation-states. Writes Apter:

Clearly [modernizing] historical forces are at work. There is a widening of universalistic and pluralistic beliefs. However, primordialism is at work too. It pops up where we least expect it, in Scotland, Wales, and Quebec, and among the Basques, Catalans, and Bretons. Old primordialisms can fade away and yet revive. The reasons why are puzzling to pluralists and liberals, who have not expected it or have considered it to be of passing significance.8

A central fallacy of the assimilationist position is the assumption that when the "high culture" of modernization develops within a nation-state, primordial and ethnic affiliations disappear into thin air and are no longer a "problem" for mainstream political leaders and modernizers. States Apter, "The enlightenment myth on which the assimilationist fallacy rests is that modern history is moving in a single direction away from provincial and local attachments and toward a greater common consciousness of the world."9 However, as the ethnic revitalization movements of the 1960s and 1970s made dramatically and sometimes poignantly clear, ethnic attachments and identifications can become cogent forces within a modernized democratic society when particular political, social, and economic events develop. The ethnic revitalization movements of the 1960s and 1970s caught mainstream social scientists almost completely by surprise and without the conceptual frameworks to either understand or adequately
interpret these movements. When they emerged, most established social scientists still accepted some form of Robert E. Park's notions about ethnic groups in society. Parks believed that race and ethnic relations proceeded through four inevitable stages: contact, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. 10 When the Black civil rights movement of the 1960s and the consequent Black Power movement emerged, it was clear that Park's conceptualization inadequately explained ethnic relations in modernized democratic nation-states.

ETHNIC REVITALIZATION MOVEMENTS DEVELOP AND SPREAD

Ethnic attachments and movements are more likely to develop among structurally and politically excluded ethnic groups than among ethnic groups who perceive themselves as included within the fabric of society and as beneficiaries of technology and modernization. Blacks led the ethnic revitalization movements in the United States because of their historic and profound discrimination in this nation and because of their rising expectations caused by social and political events in the 1950s and 1960s. However, shortly after the Black-led ethnic revitalization movement arose, ethnic groups such as Mexican-Americans, American Indians, Puerto-Ricans, and Asian-Americans echoed concerns similar to those raised by Blacks and started their own ethnic movements.

Ethnic revitalization movements then spread like a chain reaction among White ethnic groups such as Italians, Poles, and other Slavic-American ethnic groups. The rise of White ethnic movements was signaled by the publication of Michael Novak's book, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics. 11 This book was a sign that the time had come for ethnic expressions in modernized America. Some writers argue that the White ethnic movement is not genuine or legitimate and that it arose as a
racist reaction to the civil rights movement led by Blacks. It is
designed, some argue, to divert attention from the plight of non-White
ethnic groups. However, Judith Herman states that the movement is both
genuine and authentic:

[It] has been described as reactive, as "me too," and essentially
opportunistic and false. For some, it may have been. But for
many, especially the new generation of ethnic leaders, it was
a real response. It was in part a sense that the requirement
for success in America seemed to be an estrangement from family
and history; that for all its rhetoric about pluralism, America
didn't mean for ethnicity to go beyond the boundaries of food,
a few statues or parades honoring heroes, of colorful costumes
and dance.

Many members of White ethnic groups who had in the past perceived
themselves as full beneficiaries of modernization and high technology
organized ethnic movements to fight for more political, economic, and
cultural rights. Ethnic expressions became strong in White ethnic
communities in Boston when court-ordered desegregation took place there
in the 1970s. The ethnic attachments and feelings of Anglo-Americans
heightened as other ethnic groups attached their values and behaviors
and blamed them for the national mentality which resulted in the
Vietnam war tragedy, the destruction of the nation's environment, and
for perpetuating institutional and cultural racism which victimized
other ethnic groups. Jewish expressions of ethnicity became more cogent
in the 1960s and 1970s when tensions developed between Jews and ethnic
groups such as Blacks and Puerto Ricans over issues such as affirmative
action and bilingual education, and as Israel's position in the world
seemed to many Jews increasingly precarious.

These examples of ethnic movements and behaviors indicate that both
ethnicity and modernity can and do coexist within society and that various
political, social, and economic events influence whether members of par-
ticular ethnic groups act universal or primordial within particular times,
settings, and cultural contexts. These examples also illustrate that ethnic attachments not only exist within ethnic groups that have been historic victims of institutionalized racism such as Blacks and American Indians, but that highly acculturated ethnic groups, such as Irish-Americans and Anglo-Americans, often act ethnic and express ethnic attachments and affiliations. Ethnicity and assimilationism coexist in modernized democratic nation-states. Writes Apter, "The two tendencies, toward and against primordialism, can go on at the same time. Indeed, the more development and growth that take place, the more some primordial groupings have to gain by their parochialism."  

ETHNICITY AND THE NEEDS OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS  

Ethnic attachments and assimilationism coexist within modernized and modernizing societies for a number of complex reasons, some of which social scientists do not understand. They coexist, in part, because of what the assimilationist calls the "pathological condition," i.e., ethnic groups such as Blacks and Mexican-Americans maintain strong attachments to their ethnic groups and cultures, in part, because they have been excluded from full participation in the nation's social, economic, and political institutions. However, members of these ethnic groups, as well as members of ethnic groups such as Poles, Italians, and Greeks, maintain ethnic affiliations and ethnic attachments for more fundamental psychological and sociological reasons. It helps them to fulfill some basic psychological and sociological needs which the "thin" culture of modernization leaves starving. Apter comments insightfully on this point: "...[P]rimordialism is a response to the thinning out of enlightenment culture, the deterioration of which is a part of the process of democratization and pluralization... Assimilationism itself then
vitiates the enlightenment culture. As it does, it leaves what might be called a primordial space, a space people try to fill when they believe they have lost something fundamental and try to recreate it."¹⁷

Ethnic individuals also hold onto their ethnic attachments because they help them to satisfy communal and personal needs. Ethnic group membership provides individuals with a bond that enables them to consider themselves a group that is distinct and unique from other groups.¹⁸ Ethnic group members share a culture that binds them together. This shared culture equips individuals with a sense of belonging. Within a complex and impersonal modernized society, ethnic group identification and membership provide individuals with a "familiar and reassuring anchor in a climate of turbulence and uncertainty."¹⁹ Ethnic group membership also provides individuals with a foundation for self-definition, a sense of belonging, of shared traditions, and a sense of interdependence of fate.²⁰

SCHOOLING, CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION, AND ETHNIC MINORITIES

I have argued that ethnic groups that are structurally excluded from society often focus on particularistic issues and concerns rather than on the universal concerns of their nation-states. One implication of this observation is that the school, order to support effective civic education for all youths, should promote equality and should itself become a democratic institution which promotes social class, economic, and cultural democracy.

However, my analysis also suggests that structural inclusion and equity will not eliminate ethnic affiliations and primordial attachments. Ethnicity and modernity coexist in pluralistic democratic nation-states. Apter uses the analogy of the pendulum to describe the relationship
between assimilationism and primordialism in modernized democratic nation-states. The pendulum between universalism and ethnicity continues to swing back and forth.  

My analysis of the nature of ethnicity within modernized democratic nation-states suggests that the school, in order to foster effective civic education for all youths, should recognize, legitimize, and respect the ethnic attachments of students and practice cultural democracy. Ethnic affiliations and attachments help students to satisfy important psychological and sociological needs caused by the thin culture of modernization. Civic education should also help ethnic youths to attain the commitments and skills needed to participate in reflective and humane political action designed to reform our nation so that ethnic and racial groups in the United States will experience justice and equality.

**ANGLO-CONFORMITY AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION**

Historically, our nation, using the schools and other public institutions as its agents, have tried to shape its diverse racial and ethnic groups into one nation with shared characteristics, values, and goals by a policy of Anglo-conformity.  

The goal of this policy is to eradicate the ethnic attachments and characteristics of individuals and groups and to force them to endorse Anglo-Saxon values, characteristics, and behaviors. Within Anglo-conformity, ethnic youths experience the desocialization of their ethnic characteristics and the assimilation of Anglo-cultural characteristics. This process of Anglicization became known as "Americanization," since "American" was perceived by those in power and by those who controlled the public schools as the same as "Anglo-American."

Anglicization was perceived as consistent with modernization, whereas the ethnicity of non-Anglo ethnic youths was viewed as inconsistent with modernization and dysfunctional within a modernized democratic
nation-state. Assimilation into Anglo-Saxon Protestant cultural became viewed as a necessary and essential condition for effective civic participation in the United States. "American" became defined as "Anglo-American." Groups with non-Anglo-Saxon languages and cultural characteristics were viewed as un-American and often as unpatriotic and disloyal. Nativistic sentiments became especially pervasive and cogent when the nation faced a real or imagined threat—such as during the turn of the century when masses of Southern, Central, and Eastern European immigrants were entering the United States, and during the two great world wars.23 A suspicion and distrust of all foreigners became rampant and widespread near the turn of the century. Occasionally, extreme events took place. In 1891, eleven Italian-Americans were lynched in New Orleans during the height of American nativism, after being accused of murdering a police superintendent.24 Immigrant groups were not only suspected of being disloyal and un-American, but of being radicals and communists.

The outbreak of the Great War in Europe in 1914 increased the suspicion and distrust of immigrant groups in the United States and further stimulated nativistic feelings and groups. After the United States entered the war against Germany in 1917, the loyalty of German-Americans to the United States was seriously questioned. German-Americans became the victims of verbal and other forms of public and private abuse.

During World War II, the Japanese citizens of the United States were victimized by nativistic sentiments after Japan attacked the United States naval forces at Pearl Harbor in 1941.25 Historical scholarship now reveals that most Japanese-Americans were loyal and
patriotic citizens during the war and that none were found guilty of engaging in fifth column activities. However, the Japanese were interned because they had physical and cultural characteristics inconsistent with the image of the "One Model American" held by the nation's military and political leaders and because they were perceived as stiff competitors by agribusinessmen on the West Coast. To the powerful military and political leaders, the Japanese-Americans did not "look" like Americans but like "foreign enemies." Most American citizens remained conspicuously silent as 110,000 Japanese-Americans were sent off to internment camps.

The attempt by the nation and the schools to shape a unified nation with shared values and characteristics by a policy of Anglo-conformity has to a large extent succeeded in the United States. Most European Americans, who constitute the largest immigrant-descendant group in the United States, consciously see themselves first as Americans and not as Irish, Welsh, German, or Swedes and then as Americans. Individual members of these ethnic groups tend to have weak ethnic identifications and strong national identifications.

Because of the cogency of Anglicization in American life, most members of European heritage groups in the United States are culturally Anglo-Saxons. They are members of the Anglo-American ethnic group, even though they may have a German or Swedish biological heritage or surname. Ethnicity, in its most important forms in a modernized society, consists of behavioral characteristics and psychological identifications, and not of biological traits and physical characteristics. Groups with the same or highly similar physical traits are members of both the same and very different ethnic groups. Individuals that most people in the
United States would regard as Black, White, and racially mixed are all part of the Puerto Rican ethnic group in cities such as New York City and Chicago.  

However, the Anglo-conformity approach to shaping a nation with shared values and characteristics has been only partially successful. Some ethnic groups in the United States, for a variety of historical, cultural, economic, and biological reasons, have been unable and/or unwilling to become identical to Anglo-Americans in their values, behaviors, and cultural characteristics.

The experiences of some ethnic groups, such as Blacks, Indians, and Mexican-Americans, have been and are characterized by societal contradictions. Anglo-Saxon cultural characteristics and values are presented to them as ideals to attain, yet they have been denied, sometimes through legal means and caste-like institutions and practices, the opportunities to acquire the behaviors and characteristics needed to become culturally like Anglo-Americans. The cultures of these ethnic groups have often been harshly condemned in the nation's history, yet they have been and still are frequently denied opportunities to acquire alternative cultural characteristics and values. Throughout most of the nation's history, groups such as Blacks, Indians, and Mexican-Americans, have tried to acquire Anglo-Saxon cultural characteristics. They realized that their skin color prevented them from becoming identical to White Anglo-Saxon Protestants. They also realized that they needed to hold onto important aspects of their cultural heritages and identities in order to satisfy many of their sociological and psychological needs. These ethnic groups began quests for ethnic pride and ethnic cultural components. They highlighted the positive and substantial contributions which cultural diversity makes to a pluralistic democratic nation such as the United States.
THE NEED FOR A BROADER CONCEPTUALIZATION OF AMERICAN

We need a conception of American in our nation that is consistent with the ethnic and cultural diversity within our nation and world. The Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture is only one of the cultures in American society (albeit it is politically and economically the most powerful ethnic group in the United States). Other ethnic groups, such as Blacks and Mexican-Americans, are just as American as Anglos, even though these groups have a wide range of cultures, dialects, languages, values, and behaviors. Jack Forbes, the noted student of American Indian cultures, argues compellingly that American Indians are in some ways the most American of the groups which make up the United States. One can refute Forbes's claim. However, ethnic groups such as Indians, Blacks, and Puerto Ricans are American because they are legal citizens of the United States and because they share the overarching values and ideals of the nation-state. This is true even though these ethnic groups often focus on particularistic concerns and issues and sometimes experience conflicting allegiances when they believe that their ethnic group interests and what are described as the universalistic interests of the nation-state are in conflict.

Many Afro-Americans, for example, could not enthusiastically support President Carter's campaign for human rights in other nations because they feel that they do not have full human rights in the United States. Many Blacks see human rights at home as a priority to human rights in other nations. Thus, many perceived President Carter's call for human rights in other nations as a political charade. Other ethnic groups in the United States, who feel that they are experiencing a high level of human rights in the United States or who are concerned about the human rights of their ethnic kin in other lands, such as Jewish-Americans
and Polish-Americans, were more enthusiastic about Carter's human rights campaign.

THE SCHOOL AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION:
TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS

To help ethnic youths to attain structural inclusion and to develop clarified, reflective, and positive identifications and commitments to the nation-state, the school itself should promote cultural, ethnic, and social class democracy. The school should be a micro-democratic community that is just and that promotes social change consistent with American Creed values such as equality, justice, and human rights. Educational historians have traditionally described the American public school as a citadel of democracy that promotes democratic ideals, values and social justice. This statement by Arthur Lean reflects the traditional view of democracy and public education.

Like the democracy of which they are a manifestation, public schools have justified the faith of the American people; like other institutions, they are not perfect; like any institution, they have shortcomings. But their contributions have been significant and lasting. The United States would not be so democratic, so prosperous, so satisfying to the individual, and so strong in mind and spirit as it is today were it not for the nation's record in developing and supporting public schools.32

Educational historians near the turn of the century, such as Cubberley and Monroe, saw the American school as a democratic institution which helped mold immigrant children into responsible adults who had democratic political attitudes, and the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to experience upward social class mobility.33 They viewed the school as the major institution within society which enabled immigrant and other poor youths to experience social class mobility and to become effective democratic citizens of the nation-state.
THE REVISIONISTS' CRITIQUES OF SCHOOLING

In recent years, a number of revisionist educational historians and economists, such as Michael B. Katz, Colin Greer, Martin Carnoy, Samuel Bowles, and Herbert Gintis, have strongly attacked traditional interpretations of American schools, such as those written by Cubberley and Monroe. These writers argue that rather than promoting social class mobility and cultural and political democracy, the schools reflect the social class stratifications of society and teach students political apathy and to fit into the class structure of society. The schools, they argue, educate for political apathy and not for political and social reform.

The revisionists argue that the public school was designed primarily to reinforce the status quo, to legitimize the position of those in power, to perpetuate and reinforce the social class stratification that exists within society, to make students politically passive, and to perpetuate myths about lower class and minority groups in order to make them content with their social and economic conditions in society. Writes Carnoy: "Rather than building independence and self-reliance among the poor in America, schools are used to ensure, as much as possible and apparently with some success, that those in the worst economic positions do not rebel against the system which represses them and identify with leaders who would work within the framework of action set by the dominant ruling class . . . Schooling as a colonial institution attempts to make children fit certain molds, to shape them to perform predetermined roles and tasks based on their social class." 35

Bowles and Gintis also argue that the schools teach political apathy and reinforce the social class stratification in society. "...[E]ducation
helps defuse and depoliticize the potentially explosive class relations of the production process, and thus serves to perpetuate the social, political and economic conditions through which a portion of the product of labor is expropriated in the form of profits. Schools legitimate inequality through the ostensibly meritocratic manner by which they reward and promote students, and allocate them to distinct positions in the occupational hierarchy. Greer calls the belief that the schools promote social justice for poor and minority youths "the great school legend" that has harmful consequences for today's minority students. If the schools helped European immigrants to experience upward social class mobility and is not helping groups such as Blacks and Mexican-Americans today, then groups such as Blacks and Mexicans must have genetic deficiencies. This is how, according to Greer, the great legend results in reasoning that harms today's ethnic minority youths.

HOW VALID ARE THE REVISIONISTS' CRITIQUES OF SCHOOLING?

The interpretations of schools set forth by writers such as Carnoy, Greer, Bowles and Gintis, and Katz contrast sharply with traditional educational literature about the nature and purpose of schooling and with popular conventional wisdom about the public schools. Katz, for example, argues that the schools of a century ago, and that schools today, were and are "universal, tax-supported, free, compulsory, bureaucratic, racist, and class-biased." Traditional educational literature and popular beliefs about schools suggest that they are democratic institutions that help poor and minority youths to experience social class mobility and equality.
The revisionist historians and economists have stimulated thoughtful and creative dialogue about traditional assumptions about schools and about the power and willingness of the school to promote social class and political democracy. However, the revisionists have not escaped criticism and rigorous analyses. Diane Ravitch has written a book-length critique of their arguments and positions. She argues that the revisionists have oversimplified history, have been too purist and ideological in their interpretations, and have not acknowledged the extent to which the public schools have helped poor and minority youths to experience economic mobility. She writes, "Because the demands on them are simultaneously liberal and conservative . . . The continuing strength of the schools is due to the fact that they have at least partially fulfilled the expectations of their differing constituencies." (Emphasis added.)

How accurate and valid are the revisionist critiques of schooling? Because the school is only one of the educational institutions within society, and because of the complex variables which influence student learning, occupational mobility, and political participation, it is very difficult for social scientists and historians to resolve complex questions such as the extent to which the school helps to bring about social and economic equality for minority youths. Because schools are social institutions which reflect the values, attitudes, and beliefs of the culture and society of which they are a part, the arguments and analyses of the revisionist historians and economists have much validity. Public schools are usually controlled by leaders in the business and professional communities. They are also tax-supported. It is logical to assume that the schools reflect the values and attitudes of the
peoples and groups who control them. Thus, in a society that is capitalistic, class stratified, and racist, it is reasonable to assume that its public schools will, at least to some extent, also be capitalistic, class stratified, and racist. Schools do not exist in a vacuum. They are social institutions which reflect the values and goals of the social systems of which they are a part.

However, the important question is not whether American public schools are capitalistic, bureaucratic, class stratified, and racist, but to what extent can American public schools be so characterized. The influences upon the public schools within a democratic society are complex, diverse, and conflicting. Our nation consists of realities such as racism and class stratification. However, as Myrdal points out in his massive study of race relations in the United States, the "American Creed" and the values inherent within it, such as liberty, equality, justice, and fair opportunity, is a cogent ideal that is articulated by most institutions within the United States. 40

Because the "American Creed" is institutionalized within our society, it is reasonable to assume that the ideals of the Creed are, to some extent, perpetuated in the nation's public schools. They are reflected, at the very least, to the extent that they are often taught in textbooks, with patriotic songs, legendary stories about national heroes, and with national symbols and myths. Thus, the revisionists are not wrong when they say that American schools are class stratified, capitalistic, and racist. However, they are misleading when they state or imply that the schools can be totally or completely so characterized.
The schools are racist and class stratified, but they, at least to some extent, also teach students American Creed values and ideals, such as equality, justice and human rights. Consequently, the influence upon the schools are multiple and conflicting rather than singular and consistent as the revisionists often imply. The values which public schools teach, or try to teach are contradictory and conflicting. Children are often asked to read stories and sing songs which reflect American Creed values within a classroom setting that is racist and economically stratified. One could argue that the non-democratic environment in which students are taught about American Creed values makes it impossible for them to inculcate democratic values and ideologies. However, my hunch is that students learn both democratic and anti-democratic values in the public schools. This may result in the phenomenon which Mydral calls the "American dilemma," i.e., with students inculcating conflicting values related to justice and equality. Myrdal writes:

The "American Dilemma" ... is the ever-raging conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations preserved on the general plane, which we shall call the "American Creed," where the American thinks, talks and acts under the influence of high national and Christian precepts, and, on the other hand, the valuations on specific planes of individual and group living, where personal and local interests; economic, social, and sexual jealousies, considerations of community prestige and conformity; group prejudice against particular persons or types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits dominate his outlook.

THE PROBLEMS WITH THE GRAND THEORIES USED BY THE REVISIONISTS

The revisionists, such as Bowles and Gintis and Carnoy and Katz, use grand theories to explain and interpret the American public school. Grand theories are all-embracing, unified explanations of events and phenomena. Bowles and Gintis use a Neo-Marxist theory to interpret American schools; Carnoy uses a "colonial domination" theory. He writes, "The domination
of one people by another has taken place throughout history...This domination has been exercised for its own ends by a powerful group or class in a particular society."\(^{43}\) One of the problems with social science grand theories is that researchers usually feel obligated to interpret their findings in ways that will support their theories.

The theory must remain intact. Observed phenomena and behavior must be interpreted in ways consistent with the theoretical framework used by the researcher. While grand theories are useful because they help the social scientist to order the universe and to explain and interpret relationships, they are also limiting because they often force researchers to depict extremes in order to make their observations and their theoretical frameworks consistent.

Merton discusses the problems of social science grand theories and the advantages of middle range theories. Middle range "theories consist of limited sets of assumptions from which specific hypotheses are logically derived and confirmed by empirical investigation."\(^{44}\) Merton believes that sociologists are not ready to develop grand theories because not enough preparatory work has been done. He states that grand theories cannot be developed until "a great mass of basic observations have been accumulated."\(^{45}\)

When they are guided by grand theories, social scientists often formulate theories or use existing ones and then make their empirical observations. Consequently, their findings are described in ways that will fit the theory. This often results in descriptions of events and institutions that are extreme, and that are characterized by an inattention to details that the grand theory does not explain and by explanations that are incomplete and/or misleading.
The revisionist interpretations of public schools by historians and economists are not so much wrong as they are overdrawn and incomplete. Schools are racist, bureaucratic, social class stratified, and capitalistic. However, as Sowell, Ravitch, and Clark have pointed out, the public school can and does help many minority youths to escape poverty and to experience social class and economic mobility. Most minority parents retain an unshaken faith in the power of the public schools to help their children attain upward social class mobility. While their faith in the public school may be overly optimistic, perceptions are enormously important in determining behavior. Blacks and many other ethnic groups perceive the public school and formal education as one of the few means by which they can escape poverty and attain the benefits of a highly technological society. The important question before us is how can we reform the American public school so that it will become socially, culturally, and economically democratic and will help all youths to experience social class mobility and consequently become more effective and productive citizens of the nation-state.

CULTURAL DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

The most effective way for the schools to help students to develop the attitudes, values, and commitments needed to function effectively within a democratic nation-state is for the school to structure a total educational environment which enables students to experience democracy. Civic education involves the total school, as Mehlinger states: "Civic education is a process permeating the entire school. It exists in many planned and unplanned ways through extracurricular activities, the pattern of school governance, and the informal school culture."
A public-issues curriculum and social action and participation activities can help students to develop the knowledge, skills, and commitments needed to function within a democracy. However, because many ethnic youths have unclarified and conflicting national commitments and allegiances, the school should also help these students to develop clarified commitments to the nation-state. However, this can happen only when structurally and economically excluded ethnic and racial groups feel included in a society and view themselves as legitimate citizens of the nation-state. The school can help this occur.

As the works by Jencks and Coleman indicate, the schools are probably limited in what they can do to help ethnic minority youths to attain structural inclusion into society and upward social mobility. However, the school is a very important institution from which students learn many values, attitudes, and views of their ethnic groups and their cultures. The school can play a significant role in legitimizing the cultures, values, and life-styles of minority groups and in helping them to gain a sense of inclusion into the fabric of society. If the school accepts and legitimizes the culture of ethnic minority youths, this will also affect the knowledge and attitudes of majority group children, many of whom will be policy- and opinion-makers in the future society. Consequently, the school's legitimization of the cultures of ethnic youths may very well have an impact on the norms and values of future institutions.

To legitimate, accept, and respect the cultures of ethnic minority youths, the school will need to practice what Julius Drachsler called "cultural democracy." Cultural democracy "posits the right of ethnic groups in a democratic society to maintain their communal identity and their own subcultural values ... [p]olitical and democratic values prescribe free choice not only for groups but also for individuals." However,
much evidence indicates that the school usually practices Anglo-conformity and cultural imperialism rather than cultural democracy. It usually forces ethnic youths to become alienated from their ethnic groups and to assimilate Anglo-Saxon cultural characteristics and values. Writes Castaneda:

American public education has seriously jeopardized one of the three major features of American democracy. While American public education has continually attempted to keep alive the principles of political and economic democracy, it has been antagonistic to the principle of cultural democracy, the right of every American child to remain identified with his own ethnic, racial, or social group while at the same time exploring mainstream American cultural forms with regard to language, heritage, values, cognition, and motivation.

ETHNIC, NATIONAL, AND GLOBAL IDENTIFICATIONS

The school can legitimize the cultures of ethnic group youths by helping them to develop clarified, reflective, and positive ethnic identifications and attachments. This means that the school will help all students to develop an understanding of their ethnic group identifications, to objectively examine their ethnic groups, to better understand the relationship between their ethnic group and other ethnic groups, and to learn the personal and public implications of their ethnic group identifications and attachments.

The school should also help each student to acquire a clarified, reflective, and positive national or American identification and related cross-cultural competencies. Each American should develop a commitment to American democratic ideals, such as human dignity, justice, and equality. However, we should not equate an American identification and the American culture with an Anglo-American culture and an Anglo-American identification. Individuals can have a wide range of cultural and linguistic traits and characteristics and still be reflective and effective American citizens. Individuals can have ethnic allegiances and characteristics
and yet endorse overarching and shared American values and ideals as long as their ethnic values and behavior do not violate or contradict American democratic values and ideals. Citizenship education should recognize and reflect the multiple identifications that students are developing.

It is essential that citizenship education help students to develop clarified, reflective, and positive ethnic and national identifications. However, because we live in a global world society in which the solution of the earth's problems requires the cooperation of all the nations of the world, it is also important for students to develop global identifications and the knowledge, attitudes, skills, and abilities needed to become effective and influential citizens of the world community. The President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies writes cogently about the need to help students to develop global interests and perspectives and about the lack of global education in the nation's schools. 54

THE NEED FOR A DELICATE BALANCE OF IDENTIFICATIONS

Nagayo Homma states that ethnic and national identifications may prevent the development of effective global commitments and the cooperation among nations that is needed to solve the world's global problems. 55 He points out that nationalism and national identifications and attachments in most nations of the world are strong and tenacious. Strong nationalism that is non-reflective will prevent students from developing reflective and positive global identifications. Non-reflective and unexamined ethnic identifications and attachments may prevent the development of a cohesive nation and a unified national ideology. While we should help ethnic youths to develop reflective and positive ethnic identifications, students must also be helped to clarify and strengthen their identification as American citizens—which means that they will develop and internalize
American Creed values such as justice, human dignity, and equality.

Students need to develop a delicate balance of ethnic, national, and global identifications and attachments. However, in the past, educators have often tried to develop strong national identifications by repressing ethnicity and making ethnic Americans, including many Euro-ethnic Americans, ashamed of their ethnic roots and families. Schools taught ethnic youths "shame," as William Greenbaum has so compassionately written. 56 This is an unhealthy and dysfunctional approach to building national solidarity and reflective nationalism and to shaping a nation in which all of its citizens endorse its overarching values such as democracy and human dignity, and yet maintain a sense of ethnic pride and identification.

I hypothesize that ethnic, national, and global identifications are developmental in nature and that an individual can attain a healthy and reflective national identification only when he or she has acquired a healthy and reflective ethnic identification; and that individuals can develop a reflective and positive global identification only after they have a realistic, reflective, and positive identification. 57

Individuals can develop a clarified commitment and identification with a nation-state and the national culture only when they believe that they are a meaningful and important part of that nation-state and that it acknowledges, reflects, and values their culture and them as individuals. A nation-state that alienates and does not meaningfully and structurally include an ethnic group into the national culture runs the risk of creating alienation within that ethnic group and of fostering separatism and separatist movements and ideologies. Students will find it very difficult, if not impossible, to develop reflective global
identifications within a nation-state that perpetuates a nonreflective and blind nationalism. Citizenship education within a pluralistic democratic nation-state such as the United States requires reform of the total school environment so that it will facilitate the emerging ethnic, national, and global identification quests of students and help them to develop the knowledge, skills, and values needed to function effectively within their nation-states. To promote effective civic education, the American public school should be radically reformed so that it will not only reflect political and economic democracy but cultural democracy as well.
NOTES


7 Apter, op. cit.

8 Apter, op. cit., p. 60.

9 Apter, op. cit., p. 61.


12 Patterson, Ethnic Chauvinism, op. cit., pp. 158-159.


16 Apter, op. cit., p. 65.

17 Apter, op. cit., p. 75.


19 Ibid, p. 15.

21 Apter, op. cit., p. 89.


35 Carnoy, op. cit., p. 18.
36 Bowles and Gintis, op. cit., p. 11.
37 Katz, op. cit., p. xviii.
38 Ravitch, op. cit.
39 Ravitch, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
43 Carnoy, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
44 Merton, op. cit., p. 68.
45 Merton, op. cit., p. 46.
51 Gordon, op. cit., p. 263.
53 This section is based on material in my forthcoming book, James A. Banks, Multiethnic Education: Theory and Practice (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1981).


57 I discuss this hypothesis in considerable detail in Banks, Multiethnic Education: Theory and Practice, op. cit.
CHAPTER V

ENHANCING THE EFFICACY OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Chadwick F. Alger
Mershon Center
The Ohio State University
Over the past decade the approach and content of my teaching, in the university and community, have undergone great change. A brief account of how this change came about will help the reader to understand why certain choices have been made. Since 1972 I have spent much of my time, in collaboration with a number of Mershon Center colleagues, compiling information on the international connections of the Columbus metropolitan area, sharing this information with local people, learning from their feedback and working with them in local community organizations that developed out of this feedback. I now teach a freshman course on "You and Your Community in the World," in which students learn about and interview local people involved in international affairs--from banks, transnational corporations, voluntary organizations, ethnic groups and hospitals.

I teach a graduate seminar on "Linkage Among Human Settlements" in which students write papers on subjects such as the foreign policies of Ross Laboratories (producer of Similac), the Office of International Trade of the State of Ohio, local voluntary organizations involved in development projects in the Third World, and the international activities of the Ohio State University.

Before 1972 I spent much of my time doing research on the United Nations system and teaching about the United Nations system. Many months were spent at UN headquarters in New York and also at the European headquarters of the UN in Geneva--reading many documents but also spending much time interviewing and talking to participants from throughout the world in lounges, corridors, dining rooms, cafeterias, and bars. I have often told students that the United Nations was the greatest university I ever attended. It liberated me from the blinders imposed by the vast and wealthy media systems of a big and powerful country--preoccupied.
With self, able to handle only one or two international issues at a time, seeing the world through its own roving reporters who all converge on the same place at the same time. It also led to contacts with fellow scholars throughout the world that liberated me from the provincialism of much of United States social science. This experience led to extensive collaboration with social scientists from a number of countries, out of my growing conviction that a transnational social science community is an indispensable element in activities that could move toward solution of global problems. I became convinced that knowledge developed solely within national societies and organizations could not enable scholars or practitioners to cope with problems that encompass a broader geographic domain.

From a surface examination of changes in my activities, it might seem that 1972 brought a tremendous disjuncture in my professional life. But in a deeper sense there were continuities that led me from one stage to another. Sometimes oversimplification helps in making a critical point: my work at the United Nations and in transnational social science activities put me into orbit on spaceship earth—a world of global issues, global institutions and soaring thoughts about alternative futures for humanity. But something happened to me on the road back home from the United Nations. I discovered that spaceship earth was inhabited by a small band of national and international officials, scholars and visionaries—speeding into space—further and further away from the experience and perceptions of most of the people of the world. Is it possible to enable people in Columbus to get aboard the spaceship earth that exists in the minds of cosmopolitans? I am trying to find out.
In retrospect, I now believe that three experiences played a particularly important role in lighting my path from the United Nations to Columbus—one a challenge to my role as a scholar, one to my role as teacher and one to my role as citizen. While undergoing these experiences I did not perceive how they were to become linked—nor did I understand that the ways in which I had separated these roles had contributed to dissatisfactions in fulfilling each.

First, as a scholar I became increasingly dissatisfied with the domain covered by the professional study of international relations. At first this dissatisfaction was directed toward the tendency for international relations research in the United States to be preoccupied with conflicts among a few powerful governments—in contrast to the great array of issues and governments in the world. Gradually my attention was also extended to the international relations of a great diversity of nongovernmental activities, in science, religion, education, labor, medicine, the professions, etc. There have always been a few people concerned with these kinds of phenomena, but they have never been part of the mainstream—nor recognized by the prevailing paradigms. I became increasingly dismayed that my quantitatively rigorous colleagues continuously asserted that nation-states (they really mean politico-military organizations in a few national governments) are the most important actors in world politics. But they have never found it necessary to test this proposition nor to offer operational definitions of "important." Although headlines are devoted to transnational corporations, PLO, students holding hostages, a surge of Moslem identity that cuts across Africa, the Middle East, the Soviet Union and Asia, this ideological statement is still made in most international relations textbooks and in many otherwise rigorous scholarly works. What is the
impact of this ideological bias on the contributions of scholarship to education and to citizenship?

Second, as a teacher I became increasingly dismayed by the declining interest of students and people in my local community in international affairs. Interest had always been limited to a rather small minority but even this was growing smaller. How could this be possible at the same time that people were increasingly involved in global processes, as consumers of imported electronic equipment, oil and minerals, as consumers whose bread and meat prices were influenced by global markets, and as workers whose jobs were made possible by exports, wiped out by imports of goods or eliminated by movement of plants abroad? Why was increasing involvement in global processes not accompanied by increasing desire for international education?

Third, as a citizen I was fearfully challenged by the Vietnam War and by the outrage against it that generated intense domestic conflict. For me a catalytic event occurred the night I stood arm in arm with fellow faculty members at Northwestern University protecting the mathematics building (also housing the ROTC office), facing chanting students with torches who threatened to burn the building. How had it come to pass that I had come so close to violent conflict with students whose views on the war I largely shared? Why were they threatening violence now, when they had been uninformed or apathetic for so long? Could their behavior be related to how I performed my roles on this campus as teacher and scholar? I have seen those faces and torches many times since, while thinking about gas shortages, hostages, inflation, unemployment and other events that have international implications. What will happen if people cannot find informed and sustained ways for participation in issues of these kinds in the future? If, as in the
case of the Vietnam War, they find out that vital interests are being threatened too late to do anything but lash out in rage, might they be willing to follow charismatic leaders who offer simplistic, xenophobic solutions to complex international problems?

THE ROOTS OF APATHY

Only after several years' experience in investigating the international links of Mid-Ohio, disseminating this information to local people and working with them in voluntary organizations that have evolved out of this activity, did I come to understand how these three experiences were interrelated. To put the matter in very simple terms, scholarly research has primarily focused on the international activities of a few national leaders, particularly those in the superpowers. Because this research provides the basis for teaching, we have primarily taught international relations as a "spectator sport"—as activities of distant, powerful people in a world detached from the everyday lives of most people. Thus the seeming contradiction is not a contradiction at all. Why should people want this kind of international education? How is it related to their everyday lives?

Most of us who teach international relations are not prepared to concretely portray the international dimensions of everyday life. Given the lack of opportunity for international education that seems relevant to people in their local communities, how can they become competent to participate in policymaking on international issues before cataclysmic events in their lives (the draft, battle deaths, gas lines) bring them to the streets in rage? Until that time there is a cycle of apathy (Figure 1):
Figure 1: Cycle of Apathy

No education → No knowledge → No need to know → No participation → No education
People have no knowledge, therefore they do not participate.

Since they do not participate, they have no need to know.

Because they have no need to know, they are not interested in international education.

Therefore, they have no knowledge...

This cycle of apathy is widely accepted, sometimes out of understandable despair caused by failure of international educational programs to attract students. Acceptance is also supported by widespread belief that most people are not competent to understand international issues--these issues are believed to be too complex and difficult for most people.

The myth about incompetence is supported not only by research-teaching views of the world but also by traditions in foreign policy-making and implementation. In all countries of the world--whether they be rich or poor, large or small, democratic or authoritarian--foreign policy is handled by a small elite that is presumed to possess a very esoteric competence through which they are able to divine the "national interest." Special procedures have been developed for conducting foreign policy that discourage public participation and even participation by democratically elected legislators. Important to British-United States tradition is John Locke's notion of "Federative Powers" (i.e., foreign policy) which "must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those hands it is in, to be managed for the public good." This tradition contributes to the cycle of apathy. Because the people are not expected to participate in foreign policy-making they have no need to know, hence, they do not learn and, therefore, they are often unable to cope with specific issues. But this is because of
education and socialization and not because the mass public does not have the intellectual competence to deal with international issues.

An example can usefully demonstrate how the myth of incompetence works. With the support and approval of President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hay in July 1903, a few Panamanian businessmen, agents of the Panama Company, and United States Army officers met in New York City and planned for the secession of Panama from the Republic of Colombia and lease by the U.S. government of the Canal Zone in perpetuity. The people did not play a role in this momentous chapter in United States imperialism. For seventy-five years the government, schools and media told the people that this was right and necessary in terms of the national interest. Meanwhile, colonial empires were dismantled, and new norms for big power intervention evolved. Again, without prior consultation and participation of most people, a few leaders in the United States government decided that they should evolve out of this interventionary situation because it was increasingly untenable under changed conditions. The new policy was sold without consultation and participation because most people were considered incompetent to take part. Proof that they were incompetent was that most believed what the government had told them years earlier, a perspective that had become a part of most school histories and part of a mystique about the special responsibilities of the United States in the Western Hemisphere.

Many cosmopolitans fear that a truly democratic foreign policy process would produce a xenophobic, ethnocentric, sabre-rattling foreign policy. But they seem not to understand that this possibility is not because most people have less wisdom than they. The "wisdom" of cosmopolitans comes primarily from participatory experience that has
freed them from more provincial forms of nationalism and given them a diversity of opportunities for playing efficacious roles in global systems. Most people do not have these opportunities. The most salient role to which they can aspire—or in which they have served—is military service. Is it surprising then that so many people envisage a military response to recent events in Iran or Afghanistan? What else is thinkable?

Might reactions be different if the public clearly understood from the beginning, as most cosmopolitans know, that the Iranian hostage issue is essentially a human rights issue? The Iranian students are asking for the same human rights vis-à-vis their government, and interventions by the U.S. government, that most people in the United States wish for themselves. These are the same rights defined in the Convention for Civil and Political Rights drafted in the United Nations. This convention has never been ratified by the United States. Why has it not been possible for the people of the United States to take part in an effort to institutionalize, through a political process, the central core of their nationalism? Why can the President "go to the people" with requests for draft registration and increased military spending but not feel able to "go to the people" for support for human rights conventions?

Research and teaching in international relations and foreign policy have largely accepted the elitist tradition in foreign affairs. Almond's classic, The American People and Foreign Policy, captured its spirit when he wrote in 1950 that he saw no "quantity" market for information about foreign affairs but did discern an "important quality market." He observed that "little more than self-intoxication results from a grass-roots campaign in Middletown, Ohio, 'to relate Middletowners to the world in which we live'.\textsuperscript{3} It is startling to note the degree to which research and teaching in democratic theory and participatory democracy largely
ignore international relations and in turn to note how international relations theory ignores theories on democracy and participation. This reflects the strong impact of nation-state ideology on research, teaching and practice. Democratic theory and practice had been adapted from the city-state, to small nations to even larger nations and eventually to multi-nation states. But nation-state ideology seems to have made it unthinkable that democratic processes could cross national borders. Is direct election of representatives to the European Parliament an omen of more changes to come?

There is yet another dimension to the cycle of apathy that research and theory concerned with citizen competence in world affairs must address: the power over global processes that is exercised by giant corporations. While not specifically addressing implications for international relations, Charles Lindblom and Robert Dahl have addressed this issue in separate volumes. Lindblom concludes his Politics and Markets with this sentence: "The large private corporation fits oddly into democratic theory and vision. Indeed, it does not fit." Robert Dahl has probingly analyzed the way in which "the illusion of free enterprise" limits democratic governance, concluding that "nothing could be less appropriate than to consider the giant firm a private enterprise." Writing in 1970 he noted that GM had gross receipts equal to the GNP of Sweden, as many employees as the population of New Zealand, and outlays larger than the central government of France or Germany. He concluded that General Motors is as much a public enterprise as the U.S. Post Office, advocating it more appropriate to think of it and other large corporations as public services.

This dimension of citizen competence requires creative consideration free from polarized arguments about "free enterprise" and "communism." Dahl rejects bureaucratic socialism as a useful path toward participatory democracy, largely because of "its fascination with the nation-state." Instead, he brings to bear the principle of "affected interests" as a
basis for determining who should participate in corporate decision-making. He considers both interest group management (e.g., Leonard Woodcock's appointment to the board of Chrysler) and self-management, preferring the latter because interest-group management would likely not change the structure of power inside the firm. Certainly self-management in most corporations would greatly extend opportunities for participatory learning in world affairs, given the growing importance of world markets, world sources of materials and world labor costs to most business enterprises.

COPING WITH THE CYCLE OF APATHY IN COLUMBUS

The Columbus-in-the World (CITW) project has experimented with methods for liberating people from the cycle of apathy through participatory learning experiences based upon increasing knowledge of their personal links to the world and those of other people and institutions in their local community. The assumptions of the project are reflected in simple terms in Figure 2.

Perception of local international linkages enables people to move from unconscious involvement to self-conscious involvement;

Once people are self-consciously involved in international activities, a base is created for personal evaluation of these involvements;

This provides the basis for responsible participation in international activity;

Participatory learning through this process eventually makes it possible for people to set foreign policy agendas that are responsive to the international dimension of their daily lives, rather than simply be responsive to agendas set by powerful institutions.

These assumptions dictate a different strategy than many approaches to international education: (1) We do not say: "We must get more people
Figure 2: Moving the Public from Perception to Self-Conscious Action
involved in international affairs." Rather, we say: "Everybody is involved in international affairs. We must help them to perceive it."

(2) We do not say: "We must help people to acquire international awareness or international understanding." We do say that "we must help people to become responsible participants, by growing out of a condition of non-aware involvement." (3) We do not say: "We must bring prominent international experts to our community who can help us to overcome our provincialism." We do say that "we already have an abundance of international expertise in our community. It is vital that we identify this expertise and use it."

The first step in this approach is the acquisition of information on linkages between a local community and the world. Beginning in the fall of 1972, we obtained this information through systematic interviews with seventy people highly involved in international activity, more informal interviews with many others, mail questionnaires and scattered documentary material from reports of governmental, business and voluntary agencies. From these materials, we developed reports on the international dimension of a number of sectors of community life: travel, voluntary organizations, religion, exporters and importers, service industries, university faculty, foreign students, military, arts, agriculture, ethnic groups, sports, health and medicine. Few people were interested in these lengthy reports so we boiled each down to a packet of brief pamphlets that were shared with interested citizens.

Our inquiry generated considerable interest from people in the community. The network of relationships that evolved out of inquiry was to lead us into unforeseen involvement in the community. Initially this consisted primarily of presentations to a number of community groups. This led to the production of slide-tape shows, offering vivid visual images in our presentations. The
reaction of a number of people already involved in international activity was: "Our community is much more involved in the world than we realized. This suggests that there is far more potential for international programming in this community than we had realized." At least for a small, but very important, group, a changed image of the community's place in the world did have action implications!

This reaction led to strategy meetings with the International Relations Committee of the League of Women Voters and with a group of voluntary agencies concerned with international education, exchange and aid. The League was particularly useful in linking in "downtown" activities--business, newspapers and government. The voluntary agencies were helpful in defining common needs of their organizations that might be provided by a community-wide approach to international affairs. After many meetings these two streams of concern merged and produced the International Council of Mid-Ohio in November 1975 "to facilitate and stimulate growth and coordination in internationally oriented activities; and in appropriate ways, to focus interest on local community relationships to world affairs; and to that end, to compile information useful to individuals and organizations with international concerns."

It is highly significant that CITW involvement in activities that led to the creation of the Council was responsive to implications that citizens perceived in our research.

In the early stages of community involvement there were strong tendencies for the evolving new organization to be located in the university, partially because we were providing services--minutes of meetings, typing and duplication. There was also a tendency to turn toward university people for leadership. From the beginning we believed it very important that the organization be community-based and community-led, thus we avoided leadership positions and tried to develop a community base for the organization.
We took this position because of the belief that broad-based community participation in international activity requires organizations based in the community.

INTRUSION OF NORMS AND STRUCTURES OF THE LARGER SOCIETY

Our experience in the International Council, and with other community activities, makes it very clear that programs that would enhance citizen competence in international affairs require more than educational materials and strategies. They must also contend with widespread societal norms and social structures. Very debilitating is the prevailing belief that international issues are very complex and difficult and that only very special people—located in distant places—are competent to cope with these issues. This point of view affects voluntary as well as governmental organizations—we might call it a "national office complex" with respect to international issues. In the same way that most people defer to a few governmental leaders on foreign policy issues, they also defer to a few leaders in the national offices of voluntary organizations on the foreign policies of these organizations. This is true of churches, unions, service organizations and even professional associations. Thus, with respect to the participation of the mass of people in foreign affairs, society is organized in a pyramid, in which virtually all foreign policy decisions are made and implemented at the top—in the Washington or New York "foreign office" of union, church and service organizations. This authoritarian rule in foreign affairs has generated a cycle of apathy in local communities because local people are deprived of participatory learning opportunities.

This intrusion of norms and structures of the larger society into local communities contributes to four closely intertwined factors that inhibit strong local programming in international affairs:
Fragmentation of local effort.

Low visibility of local activity.

Low aspiration of those involved.

Low sense of responsibility by cosmopolitans to the local community.

Fragmentation is strongly influenced by the ties that local organizations have to national organizations to whom local leaders look for legitimization and rewards. Local organizations often measure success in terms of what is achieved by their national organization, or by achieving more locally than a local chapter of a competing organization, rather than by what is achieved overall in their local community. Success for individuals is often measured by invitations to hold office or to participate in national organizations rather than by improvement in the quality of international life in the local community. Without joint efforts among local organizations, either to publicize their activities or to collaborate when goals are similar, their activities have low visibility and hence do not reach many potential participants. Thus members of each international voluntary organization tend to view themselves as a small band in a vast alien sea of humanity. This feeling produces low aspiration: "We have tried, but you can't achieve any more in a provincial place like this."

But this belief is belied by "cosmopolitans" in our local communities who are influential members of global systems--officers in headquarters and branches of multinational corporations, exporters and importers who continually girdle the globe, and researchers who bring home data from all continents and also sell their services around the world. But for the most part there is a lack of a sense of cosmopolitan responsibility to local communities, i.e., lack of a feeling of obligation to share international expertise with the local community and lack of a feeling that.
people in the local community should know what local institutions are doing around the world.

DEVELOPING LOCAL TOOLS FOR ENHANCING COMPETENCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

As CITW became immersed with local people who had responded to our new image of the community, we attempted to overcome these four limiting factors. The International Council of Mid-Ohio has been an important laboratory for testing these ideas, through a number of activities that are eroding fragmentation, enhancing visibility of international activity, increasing aspiration and increasing cosmopolitan responsibility:

(1) A unified quarterly calendar of international events (arts, ethnic, business, religious, educational, voluntary organizations).

(2) A language bank, accessible by phone twenty-four hours a day, for emergency translation services, with access facilitated by posters in transportation terminals, and information in department stores, hospitals and police cruisers.

(3) A handbook for international visitors, aiding the visitor and helping the host to cope.

(4) A handbook of international services and opportunities for service in the local community (banking, trade, ethnic groups, voluntary organizations, education, foreign language church services, etc.).

(5) Resources International: Over two hundred local international experts have made their services available as speakers and consultants to schools and voluntary organizations.

(6) Youth Education Committee: Developing curriculum handbooks and teacher workshops on methods for using the local community as a resource in international education.

(7) Symposia built largely, although not exclusively, on the expertise of local people.

(8) Undergraduate and graduate courses on the place of Mid-Ohio in the world. (Part of this network of activities, although completely under university control.)

A common thread in these activities is identifying, publicizing and utilizing local resources. At the same time, they extend perception and
understanding of the international dimension of local community life and create opportunities for wider participation in these activities. Each activity is a laboratory for learning how a community can become self-conscious about its place in the world and self-reliant in participating in the world:

(1) A unified calendar of international events contradicts the "cosmopolitan's" complaint that nothing international is going on around here. Important in the seemingly "provincial" community are programs of ethnic groups through which local residents can directly share in apparently distant worlds. These events tend to be hidden because non-members don't know how to look for them and because members sense that the local climate does not approve or is not interested in ethnic variety.

(2) A language bank adds unexpected participants to the network of people involved in international activity. The Mid-Ohio Language Bank now has instructions for accessing emergency language services in police cruisers, in hospitals and in department stores. This is not a result of a master plan, but evolved out of need for emergency language assistance.

(3) A handbook for international visitors helps the non-cosmopolitan to acquire competence in hosting visitors from other countries thereby enhancing the possibility that new people will be added to the network of local people involved.

(4) The handbook listing international services in the community extends the visible network of involved organizations. Very important are the international committees of groups whose prime purpose is not international. Linking these people into the international network strengthens their international programming and gives the international network broader outreach.

(5) A program like Resources International teaches cosmopolitan responsibility to the local community as people make their expertise available to schools and voluntary organizations. Evaluation of the Columbus program reveals that many people serving as resource people had not been involved in community service before.

(6) Youth education based on local links with the world diminishes the likelihood that efforts to "internationalize" local education will polarize the community between "isolationists" and "internationalists." From one perspective this kind of education is simply an enrichment of education about the local community.
Symposia and other events that frequently use local people—whether they be from business, agriculture, university or voluntary organization—dramatize local involvement and illuminate models for extension of local participation.

Graduate and undergraduate courses link students into networks of practitioners in the community. The students learn of local possibilities for international participation, are stimulated by participatory models demonstrated by local people, do research papers useful to local people, and sometimes become volunteer workers after the course is over.

These arenas for empowering local people for international participation are not presented as a detailed model for all communities. Rather, they exemplify how local resources can be inventoried and aggregated in response to local needs and interests in activities that will reveal new possibilities for participatory learning. Nor is it claimed that we have enhanced the international competence of a great number of local people. But we have changed the perceptions of many people about the place of their community in the world, and we have cooperated with community people in creating a network of laboratories through which we can explore the potential for using linkages to the world as occasions for participatory learning directed toward efficacious participation in world affairs.

A collaborative relationship between university and community has been a critical factor in these achievements. From one point of view CITU was a catalyst. By providing evidence that the local community is far more involved in the world than most people had thought, we have challenged local people to raise their aspirations and extend their efforts. From another point of view, our university program has been catalyzed by people in the community who have made demands on us to demonstrate what these international linkages really mean to those who would strengthen local activities with an international dimension. Each program has been developed
in cooperation with community people and each is carried out through the work of community volunteers. Potential for community involvement is enhanced because programs are located in the community, with our university program now only one of a number of participating individuals and institutions.

RESPONSE FROM OUTSIDE COLUMBUS

Response to our approach from outside Columbus suggests a widely felt need, in education of all ages, for approaches to world affairs that encompass the local community. David C. King and Charlotte Anderson have adapted the CITW approach for a unit in a fifth-grade social studies textbook. James Becker, at the Mid-America Center for Global Education, has spawned a series of workbooks for secondary school teachers in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota and Ohio that use the state as the local unit. (Secondary school teachers have also developed curriculum materials in Peoria, Illinois and Minneapolis, Minnesota.) The Alger-Hoovler manual for undergraduate college students has been adopted at some 20 institutions. Professors have used the approach for student research projects in communities such as Albany (New York), Boulder (Colorado), Buffalo (New York), Lincoln (Nebraska), Memphis (Tennessee), Oshkosh (Wisconsin), Richmond (Virginia), St. Peter (Minnesota), Scranton (Pennsylvania), Spokane (Washington), and Syracuse (New York). Other researchers have also replicated and sometimes extended CITW research. Norman Palmer, University of Pennsylvania, has produced extensive work in Philadelphia, as have M. Lal Goel (University of West Florida) in Pensacola, Florida, and Carolyn M. Stephenson (Colgate University) in San Diego, California. Work has also been done on Fukuoka (Japan), Hamilton (Ontario, Canada), and Gorizia (Italy).
Voluntary organizations have also found the CITW approach responsive to their needs and interests. In their Anthros Project, American Field Service is experimenting with a program in which teenagers are investigating links to the world in some twenty local communities in the western tip of New York state. The results will be shared with people in each community. This is a complement to the teenage international exchange program of AFS. The national YMCA has developed an adult program, "Around the Corner/Around the World," in which adults investigate the international activities of their local community as a part of a program for internationalizing local YMCAs. The CITW approach has been featured in publications of the Adult Education Association, the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs, Center for War/Peace Studies, Global Perspectives in Education, Inc., the Union of International Associations, and in a book distributed by the National Council of Churches.

These responses are not part of a centralized effort to organize activity in other communities and educational institutions. For this reason, they reflect an intense need for means through which local people of all ages can be helped to perceive, evaluate and begin to cope with the growing international dimension of everyday life. They may turn to CITW not so much because it fully satisfies their needs, but because "it is the only wheel in town."

LOCAL ROOTS FOR A PARTICIPATORY SOCIETY

Some readers may be concerned, or even frustrated, that thus far we have discussed citizen competence and participation in world affairs in isolation from citizen competence and participation in national, state and local affairs. Is citizen competence and participation not a severe problem in these other territorial domains as well? Yes, but there are at
least three justifications for approaches focusing on world affairs: (1) In order to generate interest on the part of world affairs specialists in citizen competence and participation; (2) In order to interest specialists in citizen competence and participation in other territorial domains (e.g., urban and state politics) in the world affairs dimensions of policies in these domains; and (3) In order to encourage general theorists in citizen competence and participation to take into account the intrusion of global systems into all communities. As specialists in these domains break down the barriers that separate things international from concern for citizen competence and participation, the separate concern for world affairs manifest in the earlier parts of this paper will be unnecessary.

There is much compatibility between CIITW emphasis on the local community as an arena for participatory learning and the conclusions of numerous probing analysts of participatory democracy. In Size and Democracy, Dahl and Tufte conclude:

very small units seem . . . necessary to provide a place where ordinary people can acquire the sense and reality of moral responsibility and political effectiveness in a universe where remote galaxies of leaders spin on in courses mysterious and unfathomable to the ordinary citizen.22

Carole Pateman, in Participation and Democratic Theory, has consulted a rich array of works by political philosophers and empirical researchers in an effort to explicate conditions that would make participatory democracy possible.23 Concluding that participatory democracy can become a reality only in a participatory society, she finds present practice in Western democracies to be closer to Bentham and James Mill's notions of "protective democracy." In suggesting strategies for achieving a participatory society there are three critical roots to her analysis: (1) Rousseau as the "theorist par excellence of participation,"24 particularly his belief in
the educative function of participation—a belief shared by J.S. Mill.

(2) The belief of J.S. Mill and G.D.H. Cole in the importance of participation in the governance of the workplace. This is not only because a participatory society would be impossible if people could not participate fully in an activity that takes a large portion of their waking hours. It is also based on spillover into political activities more narrowly defined, as asserted by Cole and as confirmed by empirical research of Blauner and Argyris: "An individual's (politically relevant) attitudes will depend to a large extent on the authority structure of his work environment." (3) Evidence that people who have a feeling of political efficacy are more likely to participate than people who don't, as supported by empirical work by Campbell's electoral studies in the U.S.A. and Almond and Verba's studies in five countries.

As a result of her review of works by philosophers and empirical researchers, Pateman concludes that the foundation stones for a participatory society are participation in local government and in the workplace. In this way she sees a strategy for dissipating the debilitating cycle of low socio-economic status, low feelings of political efficacy and participation apathy. I have taken the liberty of summarizing her main points in Figure 3.

Participatory experience in these two domains leads to feelings of efficacy, with two important mediating factors: education that comes through participation and the reduction of alienation, or integration into society, that comes with participation. It is expected that an initial bit of efficacy will feed back into increased participation. It is also expected that
Figure 3: Pateman's Model for Creating a Participatory Society
efficacy, and the accompanying education and integration that occurs on issues initially local in scope, will then be applied to arenas of wider geographic scope, such as a local region or a nation.

Our experience in Columbus, and insights offered by the literature reviewed by Pateman, persuade me that democratic participation in world affairs must be based upon participatory learning in local communities. Our experience in Columbus also suggests the addition of a third laboratory for participatory experience not included in Figure 3: activities in an array of nongovernmental associations that are not necessarily targeted at governmental policies. Churches, unions, voluntary foreign aid activities, professional associations and service groups offer tremendous potential for participatory learning about world affairs.29

Pateman's approach is also consistent with present criticism of national development strategies in Third World countries over the past two decades. Increasingly it is argued that the professed goals of development—improvement of conditions of life of most people—has not taken place in the context of national development strategies directed by national and international planners. These strategies for "national development" have primarily benefited a small Westernized elite clustered in major cities. It is asserted that the goals of development can only be achieved with a high degree of local participation (self-reliance and autonomy are frequently used synonyms) in defining goals, in policy-making and in implementation.30 Challenge to elite control of international processes and institutions in both industrialized countries and the Third World suggests that participatory learning in world affairs could have profound consequences for global politics.
CREATING INVENTORIES OF PARTICIPATORY OPTIONS IN WORLD AFFAIRS

While Pateman and the diversity of scholars she cites are very helpful in delineating the possibilities for a participatory society, they are not very helpful with insight on how this might lead to a participatory world. Their participatory societies never cross national boundaries! In contrast to Pateman, Dahl and Tufte are concerned about problems created by the rise of units spanning larger and larger territory. They believe that theories of participatory democracy have never been adequate to the challenge of larger and larger units. Rather, theorists have acted as though theories applicable to small communities (e.g., the Greek city-states) could be adapted, with minor adjustments, to units of increasing size:

Theory, then, needs to do what democratic theory has never done well: to offer useful guidance about the appropriate relations among units... Rather than conceiving of democracy as located in a particular kind of inclusive, sovereign unit, we must learn to conceive of democracy spreading through a set of interrelated political systems, sometimes, though not always arranged like Chinese boxes, the smaller nesting in the larger. The central theoretical problem is no longer to find suitable rules, like the majority principle, to apply within a sovereign unit, but to find suitable rules to apply among a variety of units, none of which is sovereign.31

Dahl is concerned about the number of units to which a citizen could competently relate and the need to offer the citizen comprehensible pictures of these entities. This is a severe challenge once we move beyond the simplicity of the nation-state system. The complexities are exhibited in Figure 4 which selects only six territorial differentiations--community, city, state, country, region (multi-country) and globe. (For simplicity the diagram is limited to governmental examples only, omitting nongovernmental organizations reflective of each of these territorial units.)
### Linkage of Equivalent Units

#### Table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Council</th>
<th>City Council</th>
<th>State (Prov.) or region</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Region (Multi-Country)</th>
<th>Globe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Mayor's Cabinet</td>
<td>Any community in city (some City Councils)</td>
<td>Any community in state</td>
<td>Any community in country</td>
<td>Any community in region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Governor's Cabinet</td>
<td>Any state in country (e.g., National Congress of Mayors)</td>
<td>Any city in region</td>
<td>Any city in region (e.g., European Union of Local Authorities)</td>
<td>Any city in world (e.g., International Union of Local Authorities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor's Park</td>
<td>State support for city highways</td>
<td>Any state in country (e.g., U.S. Senate)</td>
<td>Any state in region</td>
<td>Any state in world</td>
<td>Any state in world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National government project</td>
<td>National government support for city police</td>
<td>State of Ohio relations with Japanese trade ministry</td>
<td>President's Cabinet</td>
<td>Any country in region (e.g., OAS)</td>
<td>Any country in world (e.g., UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Aid to Local Schools</td>
<td>State Aid to Local Schools</td>
<td>National government support for city police</td>
<td>National government support for city police</td>
<td>President's Cabinet</td>
<td>Any region of globe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National government project</td>
<td>National government project</td>
<td>National government project</td>
<td>National government project</td>
<td>OAS relations with African Liberation Committee</td>
<td>OAS relations with African Liberation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP Community Development Project</td>
<td>UNDP Community Development Project</td>
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<td>WHO Health Services Project</td>
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<td>UN Peacekeeping</td>
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<td>UN Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Advisory Committee on Coordination</td>
<td>UN Advisory Committee on Coordination</td>
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<td>UN Advisory Committee on Coordination</td>
<td>UN Advisory Committee on Coordination</td>
<td>UN Advisory Committee on Coordination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4:** Potential Linkage Between Units in Complex Global Polity.
examples in the cells of the diagram dramatize the incompleteness of the world viewed only as a set of interacting national governments. Governments in each of the territorial units interact in some way with each of the others, and each has relationships with its own kind of unit in other parts of the world. The fact that some kinds of relationships may now be considered insignificant is not highly important for our concerns. The issue is, where can we find possibilities for yet unrealized participatory learning and still unfulfilled potential for achieving policies more consistent with human needs.

A brief discussion of the matrix can dramatize the difficulty of Dahl's challenge and also offer examples of untapped potential for participatory learning. The part of the matrix above the diagonal portrays linkage between equivalent units. For example, Cells 23 and 24 represent linkages central to the nation-state model. Cell 23 represents relations among all countries in a region, such as occurs in the Organization of American States. Cell 24 represents relations among all countries on the globe, as exemplified by the United Nations. But the nation-state model tends to ignore meetings of all states (provinces) in a region, such as those that take place between representatives of the New England states and the eastern provinces of Canada (Cell 17). Likewise, it ignores potential linkages between all cities in a region, such as the European Union of Local Authorities (Cell 11), and all cities in the world, such as the International Union of Local Authorities (Cell 12).

The portion of the matrix below the diagonal portrays the linkage of non-equivalent units, for example, a community development project supported by a national government (Cell 19) or a European Community development project (Cell 25). In this portion of the matrix, there are also ten cells with links that cross national boundaries; Cell 21, Cells 25-28, and
Cells 31-35. In addition, Cells 19 and 20 could involve international links (between national and local community governments and between national and city governments) although these links could also be within nations. For example, a local community development project in Columbia supported by the US Agency for International Development.

The diagonal of the matrix reflects linkage between units in the same territorial domain. For example, a Mayor's Cabinet (Cell 8) contains functional experts—roads, police, sewage disposal, etc.—each responsible for their function within the same local community or city. In the same way the UN Advisory Committee on Coordination (Cell 36) is made up of the executive heads of UN agencies that are each responsible for the global activities of their functional agency.

While the entire matrix may be an interesting intellectual puzzle to the scholar, its primary value is as a generator of options for people who wish to cope with global processes in a specific local context. For example, people may not know how to cope with the problems presented by the intent of a large transnational corporation to build a plant in their city. Should they keep them out? Under what conditions might they be allowed in? In many cases these people will find the traditional sources of advice and support, state government (Cell 14) and national government (Cell 20) already allied with the transnational corporation. The matrix suggests other possibilities, such as international regional organizations like the Organization of African Unity (Cell 26) and the Information Center on Transnational Corporations of the United Nations (Cell 32). Cells 9 to 12 also suggest the possibility of turning to other cities, individually or through organizations such as the International Union of Local Authorities, from around the world. Heightened awareness of these possibilities could eventually stimulate exchange of information among all cities in which a
specific transnational corporation operates and eventually even the development of common policies on matters such as tax abatement, pollution standards, etc. Of course, this might also lead to common policies for applying sanctions against those cities who do not adhere to these common policies.

A checklist of nongovernmental actors can be generated from the same kind of matrix. For example, religious organizations range from the community (parish) church to organizations with wider and wider territorial scope that eventually cover the globe. A national council of churches, i.e., a council in which a number of national churches are represented, would be located in Cell 22. A fraternal worker that is sent by a local church in one part of the world to another local church in another part of the world would be located in Cell 6. World Council of Churches' assistance to a development project administered by a church group in a local community would be located in Cell 31. In the same fashion the matrix could be used for outlining organizational possibilities in labor, agriculture, fraternal organizations, the professions, etc.

There are many instances in which local labor, consumer and fraternal groups establish relationships with similar groups in other countries (Cell 5 or 6). This is sometimes in the context of a sister city program or a program developed by the national headquarters of a nongovernmental organization, but it is sometimes done strictly at the initiative of a local ecological, youth, or women's group. Unfortunately, this activity is often not as effective in achieving its goals as it might be because those involved do not have access to the intellectual resources that scholars are providing to national governments. Likewise, those involved do not acquire the participatory insight and satisfaction that might lead toward sustained and increased activity because they do not have awareness of the actual
and potential importance of this kind of activity. They look upon their activity as peripheral and insignificant in comparison to the development program of national governments which is made so visible by research of scholars, reporting of the press and self-proclamations of national governmental officials. Yet, in the aggregate the impact of local initiatives is not necessarily insignificant and is likely of tremendous significance with respect to the participatory learning about global process gained by those involved.

The matrix can also be used to portray linkages between governmental and nongovernmental units. This could be done by letting the columns apply to nongovernmental units and the rows apply to governmental units. In this case development assistance made available to a rural community through cooperation between a local government and the Association Internationale des Maison Familiales Rurales (AIMFR) would be located in Cell 6. Development assistance made available by OXFAM (a U.K. nongovernmental organization) to the government of Ghana would be located in Cell 22. A contribution sent directly by a local youth group to UNICEF would be found in Cell 31.

FROM COLUMBUS TO THE UN: MAPS FOR GLOBAL PARTICIPATION

Perspectives generated from Figure 4 could be employed in the creation of new kinds of maps and charts that would illuminate participatory opportunities for more people. What might a prototype of such a map look like? The basis component would be Figure 5, showing three options through which a person can participate in policy-making. First, they might try to directly influence the government, as suggested by Route 1. This might
Figure 5: Basic Component of Map for International Participation
occasionally be effective, for people with personal contacts, and for issues of modest import. Normally, however, governmental policies can only be affected by working in an organized way with other people, as suggested by Route 2. There is a third possibility, as indicated by Route 3. People may decide to organize to directly achieve a specific objective, without any involvement of government.

Figure 6 demonstrates how this basic unit can be applied in the creation of a map that indicates alternative routes through which a citizen can approach a specific problem—i.e., through local, state (province), national and international organizations. Of the thirteen routes presented, only the three national routes (8, 9, and 10) would be generated out of the traditional paradigm for the nation-state system. In some countries a few people do attempt to affect national foreign policies by directly approaching members of the executive or legislative branches of government, in person or through written communications (Route 10). Normally, however, they depend on the national offices of nongovernmental interest groups to influence government for them (Route 9). The problem with this approach is that the mass membership of national organizations tends not to participate very widely in the formulation of the foreign policy of the organization. Believing that international affairs require very special competence, most people defer to a small elite in the national office on these matters. As a result, the "foreign ministers" of national interest groups tend to be as distant from the rank and file as foreign ministers of national governments.

Increasingly, sub-national territorial governments are involved in world affairs. For example, state governments in the United States are
Figure 6: Map of Routes to International Participation
actively involved in encouraging foreign investment. Some citizens may wish to support such policy in the hope of getting a job but others may wish to resist it because of objection to local ecological impact of manufacturing plants built by foreign firms. Routes 6 and 7 suggest the possibility of efforts to affect the foreign policies of state (provincial) governments, and Route 5 suggests that a state (provincial) nongovernmental organization may wish to take direct action against local investment by a foreign firm—perhaps by direct efforts, through persuasion or demonstrations that would dissuade a firm from building a local manufacturing plant.

Local governmental and nongovernmental organizations often are active in the promotion of tourism from abroad and in developing hotels and recreation areas for tourists. Whether in industrialized countries or non-industrialized countries, local people are rarely consulted with respect to these activities which determine what kinds of jobs will be available, how public funds will be invested and how local land that might be used for agriculture or industrial purposes will be utilized. Routes 2, 3, and 4 suggest that local people can organize for participation in these decisions.

It is not uncommon to hear it asserted that bodies such as the General Assembly of the United Nations reflect global public opinion. But international governmental and nongovernmental organizations are extremely distant from the self-conscious experience of most people. Nevertheless, every year hundreds of sub-national groups directly petition the United Nations for assistance with respect to grievances against their national governments (Route 13). Also, in some countries citizens voluntarily tax themselves a percentage of their annual income and send it directly to the United Nations, because of their belief that their rational government does
not provide adequate financial support to the UN. Those who support an international nongovernmental organization such as the International League for the Rights of Man in its lobbying efforts at the UN are using Route 12. People who work for the rights of political prisoners through Amnesty International often use Route 11, attempting to influence policies of national governments (other than their own) through the direct action of an international nongovernmental organization.

Finally, Route 1 is a reminder that it is not only powerful international figures that can directly have an impact on conditions outside their own country. Direct individual international activity includes a great variety of activities such as letter writing, financial support for relatives and friends abroad, ham radio operators, subscription to foreign magazines, direct financial support for revolutionary movements and volunteering for service in foreign armies.

Maps portraying alternative routes for participation can increase possibilities for local control over international processes that now tend to be controlled by elites in a very few cities, often from one primate city in each country. For example, if the objective is to increase local production of food which will be consumed by local people, alternative and complementary strategies might range from direct efforts to acquire UN technical assistance (Route 13), to individual local efforts to convert from cash crops for export to production of food for local consumption (Route 1).

Readers may already be thinking that the separation of international, national, state and city routes unrealistically closed off additional routes. This was done for clarity in presentation of the basic route structure. A combined local-national route is employed when a local Amnesty International group endeavors to influence the policy of their national government toward another country in order to bring pressure on that country to free a
Local groups in the United States are bringing pressure, some successfully, on city councils to pass resolutions urging conversion of industry from military production to production that serves human needs. It is hoped that this will bring pressure on the national legislature to transfer money now spent on arms to civilian production. These examples indicate that options for participation are far more extensive than is usually assumed. But people need help in the development of concrete participatory options, in the context of territorial and non-territorial groups with which they identify, for specific issues that they deem important.32

This map is now being used in an exercise for undergraduate classes that appears in our manual on "You and Your Community in the World."33 Each student is asked to select a global problem and to indicate nine strategies for addressing this problem: a direct individual approach, and approaches through both governmental and nongovernmental institutions in city, state, nation and the United Nations. The exercise then asks students to select the three strategies which they believe would be most efficacious and to rank them, along with a justification for these selections. This leads toward Dahl's objective of offering the citizen a comprehensible set of options. It also helps the student to begin to confront choices about which territorial units are relevant to which kinds of problems and acquaints students with possibilities for local participation in seemingly distant global issues.

CONCLUSION

What kind of a world might emerge if citizens, teachers and researchers in local communities throughout the world seriously attempted to enhance the efficacy of citizen participation in world affairs? There would certainly be a dramatic change in a great number of local institutions. No
longer would international specialists be concentrated in national and international institutions. They would be found in regional and local offices of churches, unions, service organizations, professional associations, etc. There would be an international dimension throughout the curriculum of primary, middle and secondary schools and throughout the curriculum of virtually all disciplines and professional schools. Local media would reflect the wide ranging international concerns of the local community. Local governments would have international experts in a variety of fields. Local election campaigns would include international issues.

What consequences would this have for global organization as a whole? Would it look like the highly centralized structures which have often been proposed by world government advocates? Would it consist of a loose federation of functional agencies? Would increased local participation tend to fragment the world? It would be very difficult to foretell what would emerge. Indeed, a prime purpose for enhancing the efficacy of citizen participation in world affairs is to find out. For the first time we would acquire practical insight on forms of global organization that would serve the needs of ordinary people. No global thinkers have yet given serious attention to what a participatory world might look like. No provision yet has been made for mechanisms through which the needs of the people of the world can be expressed. These missing links in world order schemes cannot be provided in the United Nations, Washington, Moscow, or Tokyo, but must come from laboratories in Hamadan, Penang, Potosí, Fukuoka and Columbus.
NOTES


Examples of materials produced from these efforts are:


The following monographs have been prepared by the Philadelphia Transnational Project, under the direction of Norman Palmer, University of Pennsylvania:

"Philadelphia as a Transnational Actor."

"Interviewing Philadelphia's Internationalists."

"The International Dimensions of the Bicentennial in Philadelphia."

"International Legal Activity in Philadelphia."

"International Activities of the University of Pennsylvania Faculty."

"Culture and the Arts in Philadelphia: The International Dimensions."


The following papers have been prepared by the Pensacola in the World Project, under the direction of M. Lal Goel, University of West Florida:

Emma Brossard and M. Lal Goel, "International Students at the University of West Florida and Other State University Campuses."


M. Lal Goel, "A Survey of International Linkages of the Pensacola Community."


Joji Watanuki, "International Dimensions of Fukuoka, Japan," Institute of International Relations, Sophia University, Tokyo, 1976.

Gorizia, Italy - Raimondo Strassoldo, Institute for International Sociology, Gorizia, Italy.


19 "One City's Links With the World: A Case Study of Columbus, Ohio," Intercom 78 (Center for War/Peace Perspectives, 1975).


24 ibid., p. 22.

25 ibid., p. 30.

26 ibid., p. 53.


29 Chadwick F. Alger and Robert B. Woyach, "Building Local Competence in World Affairs," International Studies' Notes, 6, No. 1 (Spring 1979) reports on efforts by a few organizations.


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CHAPTER VI

MODERN SYSTEMS THAT AFFECT SOCIALIZATION TO CITIZENSHIP

Edward A. Wynne
College of Education
Chicago Circle Campus
University of Illinois
ABSTRACT

"Prosocial conduct" is designated as the principal component of good citizenship. The term signifies acts of immediate assistance to persons around us, and which require some degree of restraint or sacrifice by the actors. It encompasses conduct characterized by terms such as generosity, tact, solicitude, loyalty and courage. The proposed definition (a) may be contrasted with terms which focus on actors' motives (as compared to immediate acts), and (b) obviously places a much higher evaluation on persisting public engagement, as compared to sporadic, private, (and perhaps ego gratifying) voting.

The variables which stimulate prosocial conduct in the young are identified, and long range trends in the prevalence of these factors are described and analyzed. In part, that analysis reveals that the vitality of systems for socialization to prosocial conduct in America has gradually eroded over the past fifty to two hundred years. Evidence is also adduced to show significant changes in the activities and attitudes of American adolescents over the past twenty-five years. These changes are related to (a) the data about changes in our material and social environments, and (b) other changes in adult conduct.

Finally the general significance of the preceding developments for the vitality of our society is considered, and a variety of ambitious corrective proposals are summarily outlined.
The word citizen is derived from the Latin root *civis*, meaning a member of a community. To the ancients, as well as to later users of the term "civility," community membership signified an acceptance of duties and forms of conduct associated with a persisting and organized group. Thus, Milton discussed the need "to inbreed and cherish in a great people the seeds of virtue and public civility." *1*

Milton's noble aims can be redefined in terms more appropriate for any audience (but less evocative) through the phrase "prosocial conduct." Prosocial conduct means acts undertaken which (a) are immediately helpful to others, and (b) require some sacrifice, effort or act of restraint by the actor--or "donor." Obvious examples might include charitable contributions, helping an injured person across the street, or acting as a tutor for a slow learner. At a more subtle level, prosocial conduct can include words which soothe or gratify others, or even refraining from certain remarks to please others, though we are tempted to utter them. The person donating the conduct may or may not be paid, or otherwise reinforced for their conduct. The less the reinforcement, the more significant the conduct. But the first point of attention is not the donor's motives--but simply whether his acts (or restraints) help or please others. *2*

*The concept and definition of prosocial conduct has been discussed by other writers--and some of them have applied definitions which differ from the one just propounded. For example, Bar-Tal has stressed the issue of the donor's motivation. However, his discussion goes on to implicitly demonstrate the ambiguities generated by reliance on such a vague and abstract definition; on the other hand, a definition such as I propose, focussing on immediate effects, has much greater operational value.* *3*
Pre-social conduct is simply a synonym for Milton's "virtue and public civility." The introduction of the term can stimulate us to consider the matter of citizenship—and learning and practicing it—in a cross-cultural light. Not all human societies have been concerned with socializing their children and young to be good community members. And, at a conceptual level, their views of what constitutes such good citizenship have many common themes. Essentially, their definitions of good citizenship have required their youths to practice prosocial conduct towards other community members. The particulars of such conduct often varied, depending on local conditions, their systems of production and distribution, and the structures of family and hierarchical relationships which prevailed. But still, in the "community," as the adults defined it, maturing youngsters were expected to be relatively obedient, honest, helpful, courteous, brave, and dedicated. In other words, to observe the general principles traditionally articulated by groups such as the Boy and Girl Scouts.

The principles of prosocial conduct were not always observed, either by adults or the young. The simplest evidence of such failures was the persistent and almost universal reiteration of the importance of "virtue and public civility" through folklore and cautionary tales. Indeed, all cultures have discovered the need for systems of constraining and monitoring potentially selfish conduct, and their devices have ranged from police forces to reliance on threats of exile, or retaliatory duels. But the persistence of community requires more than the suppression of evil. Such avoidance only leaves us a passive and essentially barren environment—like people traveling together in a subway car. Community signifies an active engagement. To the question, "Am I my brother's keeper?"
community answers, "Yes." However, just as evil must be suppressed, prosocial conduct must be cultivated—for without cultivation, the pervasive weeds of selfishness and ignorance may stifle its growth. It may be too bad that prosocial acts do not simply grow like wildflowers, but this is not cause for despair; imperfection is the stuff of life, and our obligation is to do the best we can with our inherent human limitations.

In sum, there is a vast body of tested wisdom as to how young persons should be socialized to citizenship—and by citizenship, I mean prosocial conduct. And the practices recommended by this wisdom are relatively consistent: The community must apply a comparatively uniform body of standards for appropriate conduct; and, indeed, such "uniformity" is one of the hallmarks of a community. The young should be in touch with the adult community that they are expected to join. True, there are often "secrets" deliberately kept from their eyes, but perhaps 80% of adult life should occur in their presence. And, even when they are excluded from some occasions, their interest and understanding is still engaged through tales, personal anecdotes, and firsthand contact with various preliminary activities. Most adults, and adult institutions, understand that they must integrate the young into their activities (making allowance for their physical limitations). The sphere of contacts surrounding the young should be relatively intense but circumscribed. Even when a child (or youth) lived in an urban environment, contacts were often limited to members of a particular social class, ethnic group, or extended family (Romeo and Juliet, though both were portrayed as potential citizens of the city of Verona, were expected to principally mix among their relatives). Such constraints permitted the persistence of community—which is derived from the concept of "commonality."
The model environment I have sketched may seem parochial. But we should recognize that many of its characteristics reflect major themes in the proposals of broad-gauged persons such as John Dewey, who explicitly recommended the formation of vital communities in schools.\(^5\) (Unfortunately, that prescription was obscurely articulated, and oftentimes distorted in its application; however, there is no doubt as to the sincerity of Dewey's aim.) In any event, it would be simplistic to describe traditional youth/adult communities as parochial.

In such traditional communities, due to the comparative proximity between children and adult life, children and adolescents were exposed to a variety of activities, and sometimes given minor roles as participants. The proximity not only provided the children with information, but also subjected them to varied emotional demands—how should you act at a funeral, what do you do when a hog is slaughtered, how do you bargain for small purchases in the market place? The environment was also heterogeneous in terms of the variety of adult activities which were visible, since most traditional societies had only moderate levels of specialization. Due to this lack of specialization, many of the processes of manufacturing, agriculture and marketing might occur in a narrow circumference—like the village blacksmith (surrounded by admiring children) portrayed by Longfellow. In other words, a small village might actually have more diversity in easy view of a child than many modern towns and cities.\(^6\) Finally, traditional environments were age heterogeneous. Younger children, and older neighbors and relatives, were all part of such communities, and became engaged with children and adolescents in their own particular ways.\(^7\)

The model portrayed did not always exist. There were inevitably variations in local circumstances. Thus, Sam Rayburn, who served many
years as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, recalled the isolation of his early turn-of-the-century life on a rural Texas farm, where the excitement of the week occurred on Sunday, when people sat on the porch to see if a wagon could be seen coming over the horizon. But we have to recognize a number of implicit qualifications to Rayburn's essentially critical anecdote. Rayburn—in the light of his later achievements—was obviously a person with exceptional intellectual power, who might need significant stimulation. Furthermore, different techniques of farming might generate different forms of social contacts. In many parts of the world, farmers lived fairly closely together (for example, in the early New England settlements) and their fields spread out from their homes grouped together in the town. Again, the work discipline generated by farmwork subjects farm youths to varied prosocial demands—requiring them to display endurance, patience, and solicitude. If Rayburn was bored on his family's isolated farm, we can also find bored youths today in suburbs, ghettos and school classes. There is no perfect environment that will gratify all children all of the time—especially if they are persons of unusual energy and perceptions. Such persons partly have to pursue their own community.

Ultimately, I might counter the Rayburn story with another rural anecdote. I heard this story from a woman who recently spent several years in an area in Ireland out of reach of the television. During winter evenings, when pressures of farmwork were low, the inhabitants of the community congregated in a local hall. There, they took turns entertaining each other by each performing their own specialty—singing a song, telling a story or joke. The gatherings were a classic example of prosocial activities. Some of the performers were excellent, and others less so. Still, the understanding was that it was desirable
to encourage everyone to contribute. Thus, all listeners were socialized to encourage each other. Despite this acceptance, the natural tension of being on stage, and the regular presentation of good role models—the more effective performers—would inevitably tend to raise the competence of all participants. Further, the content of the stories and songs, as is typical in folklike material, would tend to portray and praise desirable conduct patterns. Young persons, through participating in such activities, might learn civilizing traits such as: tact, a sense of humor, how to both listen and talk, the pleasures of social life, and a commitment to the values of their adult community.9

LEARNING CITIZENSHIP IN TRADITIONAL AMERICA

The "foreign" patterns just portrayed were once also an important part of socialization patterns which surrounded young Americans. A typical instance of such activities is found in William Herndon's first hand description of the story-swapping exchanges which engaged Abraham Lincoln during his career as a circuit-riding lawyer in rural Illinois in the 1850's. Herndon mentioned that Lincoln met two other lawyers widely admired for their story-telling talents.

[In rural areas] the people loved the beautiful as nature furnished it . . . Newspapers were scarce, and the court-house, with its cluster of itinerant lawyers, dissembled much of the information that was afterwards broken into smaller bits at the pioneer's fireside . . . .

I have seen the country tavern where these three were wont to meet after an adjournment of court, crowded almost to suffocation with an audience of men who had come to witness the contest among the members of the strange triumverate. A crowd also filled the doors and windows. The yarns they spun and the stories they told would not bear repetition here, but many of them had morals which, while exposing the weakness of mankind, stung like a whiplash . . . . Every recital was followed by its storm of laughter and chorus of cheers. I have known these storytelling jousts to continue long after midnight. I have seen Judge Treat, who was the very impersonation of gravity itself, set up till the last, and laugh until, as he often expressed it, 'he almost shook

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him ribs loose. The next day he would ascend the bench and listen to Lincoln in a murder trial, with all the seeming severity of an English judge in a wig and gown.  

Herndon's vital description makes no mention of the role of children or young persons as witnesses to the "contest." However, regardless of whether children were watching at the tavern windows at twelve at night, we can recognize that the general character of the environment he portrayed—the widespread interest in hearing and telling good stories, the philosophical cast of many of the tales, and subtle admixture of pleasure with responsibility—inevitably affected the prosocial attitudes of young persons. 

The exact nature of the civility—or citizenship—that was taught in such environments can be suggested by recalling a famous historical episode. Stephen Douglas was one of Lincoln's friends during his mixed career in politics and law. Herndon even described their mutual participation in a self-improvement and discussion group. The race between Lincoln and Douglas for election to the U.S. Senate from Illinois, which occurred in 1858, set the stage for the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates. These seven debates, which occurred in scattered locations, stimulated the contestants to take positions on slavery which had immediate and long-run repercussions for their careers, and the history of our country. The debates attracted enormous crowds, and all were published in full in the daily Chicago papers. One biographer concluded that "Each candidate showed respect for the other, and the discussions were conducted on a high plane, albeit with a deadly earnestness." We gain further appreciation of the richness of these discussions if we consider several pages from the transcript of the debate, which I have included as an Appendix.

Ultimately, the complete 320 page text of the debates was published in 1860 in a book which sold 30,000 copies. If we make allowances for
population increases, this would be equivalent to a contemporary circulation of 210,000. We should also realize that the comparative costs of such a book would be much higher than during our era. Furthermore, according to the 1850 Census, only 47.2% of the U.S. population between the ages of 15-19 were enrolled in schools; the equivalent figure in 1970 was 90%. Finally, the average number of days in school attendance by each student in 1850 was 78, compared to 161 in 1970. For complex reasons, in 1850 many American citizens, despite their comparatively low general level of formal education, were evidently prepared to hear and read serious discussions about important and intricate issues.

I contend that there was a reinforcing pattern which persisted between the oral and interactive traditions of rural and small-town life, the high plane of the debate, and the widespread serious public attention it received. Essentially, Lincoln and Douglas treated each other civilly because they were members of a community, which socialized its citizens to act in such a fashion. They debated because the community would have scorned politicians who pettifogged to avoid confronting another over serious issues. And the debates were listened to—and read—because persons who took the stage in appropriate circumstances—whether they told jokes or discussed important issues—were entitled to attention.

I cannot avoid drawing some distressing parallels between traditional and contemporary norms (about citizenship and listening) in these matters. Our contemporary equivalent to the Lincoln-Douglas debates may be the typical anti-what-have-you demonstration. As in the debates, large numbers of citizens may travel for long periods to reach a site where they will gather to hear speeches discussing a complex issue, e.g., should we build nuclear plants? There are certain elements of sociability to

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to either the debates or modern demonstrations--traveling together, joking, singing (drinking, using dope?) until the speeches begin. But, then the parallels dissolve. The speeches at a modern demonstration are usually boringly similar: at about the intellectual level of cheerleading. The idea of a true debate would be treated as sacrilegious. No one would ever dare to publish, or read a book of such speeches. The audience for the demonstration probably has four times as much formal education (measured as days in school or college) as that of the 1850's. And, sometimes, the modern audience ends up either actually breaking the law (by trespassing) or at least actively considering lawbreaking (the audience of the 1850's were consciously considering proposals about how the rule of law should be extended).

In many ways, the anti-intellectual elements of the modern demonstration have significant parallels with the modes of discourse necessarily followed in schools--where one unconfronted teacher or professor presents a perspective to students. The validity of this unfortunate analogy is further demonstrated in the so-called "teach-ins," where the implicit understanding is that there will obviously only be one side seriously considered.

Of course, there is no sense in teachers presenting students with the pros and cons of algebra, or whether the world is round. However, the justifiable areas of dogmatism which exist in many areas of the curriculum promote an intellectual climate in schools which necessarily juvenilizes intellectual analyses. In traditional societies, these forces of juvenilization were moderated by the inherent complexity of ordered adult life, which formed the principal socializing environment for the young.

I believe my analysis of the socialization patterns which proceeded and surrounded the Lincoln-Douglas debates has application to many other youth environments. For instance, I once interviewed the respected
psychologist Dr. Nevitt Sanford on the topic of childhood socialization. He told me he had been raised in a rural area in Virginia in the early 1900's. During the winter, he would go to town with his father, and watch the adults sit around the stove in the town store, and discuss theology--biblical texts and interpretations. He said that from those experiences, he learned, "How adults can differ strongly with each other about complex issues, discuss the issues, and still maintain decent relationships." Dr. Stanford was a gracious and thoughtful interviewee and has been a productive and insightful researcher. While the preceding discussion has been about rural life, I do not believe there has always been a sharp dichotomy between rural and urban patterns of socialization to prosocial conduct. Or, to qualify this point, I would say that the dichotomy has tended to become more distinct as our society has evolved.

During earlier eras, many cities were essentially comprised of networks of neighborhoods or subcommunities. And these environments often had many of the characteristics of traditional rural environments: considerable age and occupational diversity in walking distance; street life which was visible to the inhabitants (including the children); stores and small industries scattered among homes; and a common body of community (or ethnic?) values. For instance, cockney is (or was) a dialect spoken by the inhabitants of the East End area of London. And the existence of such dialects signifies that the inhabitants of particular areas had such constrained patterns of contacts (even though they lived in a large city) that they ended up copying each other's speech, rather than evolving a "London" dialect.

LEARNING CITIZENSHIP IN POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

Gradually, the economic, social and technical forces which sustained rural life declined in vitality. Thus, the proportion of persons living on

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farms and rural areas shrunk: in 1880, 43% of our population lived on farms; in 1930 the equivalent figure was 24%; and in 1978, it was 3.7%. 16

In cities, the quality of neighborhood life has been undermined by a variety of forces. The proportion of females in the work force has increased: in 1947, females comprised 28% of the labor force; the equivalent figure in 1978 was 41%. 17 Due to this change, there are fewer mothers around to oversee children playing in the streets (and thus the children are sent out of the community to be cared for). The improvements in mass transportation, the use of the automobile and the appeal of economics of scale has diminished the variety of stores and other local business which provided the young with areas for constructive and informal adult/youth interaction. The gradual intensification of age segregation in our housing (both through the development of old age communities, and the movement of older persons out of their younger relatives' homes) has deprived children and youths of many significant prosocial learning demands. There has been a steady long-term growth of real per capita income: in constant (1972) dollars, per capita income has increased from $3,517 in 1950 to $6,341 in 1978. 18 The increase means that children are less engaged by household chores, since many of these are now handled by mechanical means, e.g., dishwashers, washing machines, automatically fueled furnaces, carrying home the shopping in a car. This decline in chores has restricted the subject matter of parent/child exchanges, i.e., the parent is less frequently compelled to subject the child to relevant significant demands that they display prosocial conduct.

Increased affluence, and other shifting social forces, has also meant that people are better able to afford living in privacy, or smaller household units: thus, average household size declined from 5.55 persons in
1850 to 3.37 in 1950, and 2.81 in 1978. The larger averages typical in earlier periods signified that a diversity of persons--boarders, servants, other relatives--often were collected under one roof. This diversity heightened the learning potential of such households for their young inhabitants.

Average size has declined, and the children born in families are grouped more closely together in age. The shrinkage and age grouping has occurred partly because (a) medicine has dramatically diminished infant and childhood deaths: as a result, families no longer "need" to have five children spread over ten years to insure they will rear three adults; three children in six years will produce the same effect; (b) there is less economic value to children in modern urban environments; conversely, they are more of an economic drain on adult resources; and (c) adults with more education choose to have smaller families. The decline in family size has lessened the variety of interactive demands made on children. The comparative age homogeneity means that older children will not be enough older than their siblings to be given significant child care (i.e. prosocial) responsibilities. The increase in specialization throughout the society means that many chores formerly done in the home--which involved the children, or occurred in front of them--are done away from the home, and only the completed product put before the family. These "contracted-out" activities include food processing, cleaning clothes and sewing (it's often cheaper to buy new clothes than repair worn garments). In a way, much of the life of the world still goes on as before--but it has become progressively more diffuse, segmented, and remote from the lives of children and adolescents.

My catalog of changes must also consider the effects of the mass media--television, and also the easy availability of print media. As for print...
media, literacy has long been widespread in America. However, books and newspapers were usually relatively costly. As a result, their variety was limited, purchase decisions were made more deliberately, and what was bought (or borrowed) was read. These constraints tended to generate a pool of common information (among readers) which made books partly topics of conversation--tools for conviviality--as well as stimulants for withdrawal and privacy. As for television, its obvious tendency to reinforce simplistic withdrawal are all too evident.

The influence of suburban growth in youth socialization has also been important. The data about this recent growth are simple: in 1950, 27% of our population lived in the portions of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas designated as non-central cities; in 1978 the equivalent figure was 39%. We are now largely a suburban society.

Suburbs are not an historically new development. However, modern suburbs are unique environments. And, by "modern suburbs" I essentially mean those developed after World War II, and whose layouts assume that shopping, visiting and travel to schools will all be largely done by motor vehicles. The character of these developments is sometimes evinced by their failure to include sidewalks.

Modern suburbs are unique largely because of the technological base from which they spring. That base is comprised of automobiles, telephones, school busses, air conditioning, television, and comparative affluence. Due to these advantages, suburban families can reside in dispersed low density communities, which are removed from schools, stores, business and industry. They also can amuse, inform and comfort themselves while staying inside their homes, or through driving elsewhere for shopping, work or pleasure. Furthermore, the mass-produced tract system of development (plus the effects of zoning codes) makes it likely that the residents...
In any modern suburban area will be comparatively homogeneous in terms of their socio-economic class and their stage of life, e.g., married and rearing children, retired. While suburbs have always existed, the previous, low level of technology usually meant that they had to be more self-contained communities (e.g., railroad-based), with more variety in walking distance, and more engagement among neighbors.

The auto-based suburb is an especially barren experiential environment for children, since (a) there is generally a low level of population density in walking distance, (b) the population surrounding most homes is relatively homogeneous, (c) the households are not obviously interdependent, and (d) many activities, which were found in city neighborhoods and small towns, are not in walking distance of suburban homes. Furthermore, the institutions which service auto-based suburbs are likely to be larger than those found in traditional city neighborhoods, e.g., shopping centers versus mom-and-pop stores. These large entities, with their mass market merchandising, are less likely to stimulate casual, persistent and vital interaction among children and salesclerks. This does not mean that the clerks are unpleasant; but it does mean that the clerks will usually not have enough continuity of contacts to know children (and their parents) who come to such stores. When children are quite young, many of the factors just listed provide the children with at least some measure of around-the-home security. But, as they get larger--after four or five--they are inevitably stimulated to pursue more complex activities. And, in general, they can only find such activities by being ferried in the family car(s) (or, in some places, at some times, through biking). This ferrying process greatly inhibits the character of their exploratory learning.
Incidentally, I am not contending that all suburbs are like Quaker Heights or Scarsdale. I am simply saying that the proportion of our population living, and rearing children, in better suburbs has grown. In fact, even the existence of the "blue collar suburbs" tends to assist my "case," since blue collar suburbs are usually less accessible to white collar ones than are blue collar city neighborhoods to better neighborhoods.)

Some of the abstract suburban deficiencies I have outlined may be crystalized by a story told to me by a young adult reared in an older suburb. In this railroad-based community, adolescents used to hang-out in the town soda store. The hang-out was governed by a series of implicit reciprocal conventions. The youths had to buy a certain level of products. They had to maintain an appropriate level of decorum, so as not to drive away other customers. And, from these understandings a certain degree of rapport evolved among the youths, the regular adult customers, and the proprietor and his clerks. Eventually, a large shopping center was developed on the edge of town partly due to the enlarging pool of customers generated by spreading developments. The soda store went out of business, because of the shopping center's competition (assisted by its convenient and free parking). The adolescents discovered that, when they tried to cycle to the shopping center, its highway layout even precluded people from cycling in. (I do not know whether keeping out the cyclists was deliberate, but such deliberation was possible. Mass market stores might decide that the business resulting from cycling adolescents is so unprofitable that they might as well keep them out.)

I do not contend that contemporary suburban adolescents never "hang-out!" I do believe that the forms of hanging-out now applied are less subject to careful adult surveillance and engagement, and are more likely to involve self-destructive and other-destructive acts.
THE ROLE OF FORMAL EDUCATION

Throughout our history, Americans have always assigned a uniquely important role to education as a civilizing device. This attribution is partly due to the relationship between the attainment of our national independence and the Enlightenment: the great emphasis that the Enlightenment gave to human perfectability, and the role of education, undoubtedly helped to develop a powerful American mind-set. The attribution is also due to our three hundred year history of frontier expansion. From the earliest days of the Plymouth Plantation, our forebears and predecessors concluded that only through schooling could our unstable, westward pushing wilderness communities transmit civilizing values to their children. This basic—and perhaps correct—perception was reinforced by our historically unique problems of socializing successive waves of emigrants from non-English cultures to a civilization significantly grounded in English parliamentary traditions.23

Thus, the level of American investment in education is now very near its historic high: in 1950, 3.3% of our Gross National Product was invested in formal education; the comparable figure for 1978 was 7.1%.24 Our level of investment, as a proportion of our GNP, compares favorably with all other societies. The only other large society whose level slightly surpasses ours—the Soviet Union—has a high proportion of undereducated and foreign speaking citizens, and thus has much greater catch-up costs than we do.25 Our current educational activities not only demonstrate costly economic investment, but also increased citizen enlistment in learning. In 1870, 2% of our 18 year olds were high school graduates;26 the comparable figure for 1970 was 75%. The proportion of our population age 23 with bachelor's degrees has increased from 1.9% in 190027 to 22.3% in 1970. And the average number of school years completed by persons 25 years of age and
over increased from 8.6 in 1940 to 12.4 in 1978.28

Americans are not the only people who value learning. There is a widespread historical tradition of education being perceived as a civilizing force: the tradition ranges from Plato and Milton through Jefferson and Paulo Friere. However, this tradition should not be simplistically translated into a reflexive approval of contemporary American educational policies. Many of the earlier educationalists existed in environments where schools were rare occurrences, and other "civilizing" forces--e.g., community responsibilities, diversified intergenerational contacts--were routine occurrences. Other educationalists, though they used the term "education," had in mind relationships more akin to mentorship or tutelage, as compared to pupils being "processed" through twelve to eighteen years of bureaucracy.29 Finally, almost all educationalists, up until well into the twentieth century, assumed that character development and civic responsibility--stimulating prosocial conduct--were the central aims of educational systems.

Our current educational situation is historically unique--not only in quantitative terms (we have more education), but in qualitative ones. Thus, the fact that a student has been graduated through American educational systems for sixteen years--they have a college degree--provides us with no clues as to their probably level of prosocial conduct. We cannot assume that any teacher, counselor, or fellow student can say, with assurance, whether the graduate is kind, tolerant, honest under pressure, or capable of commitment to important causes (beyond immediate self-interest). This pattern of ignorance of the vital matter of prosocial conduct is historically unique.

The pattern is the product of a variety of interacting forces. Twentieth century American education at all levels--including colleges and universities--
has been affected by a distorted vision of the institutional modes
generally prevailing in industrial and post-industrial society. This
vision has stimulated a naive reliance on (supposed) economies of scale.
Thus, between 1932 and 1970, the percentage of public school districts
diminished by 92%. The size of the average high school increased 180%,
and the size of the average elementary school increased 48%. These
figures contain certain inherent deficiencies: the shifts in school and
district size are probably more at both ends of the numerical spectrum
(the extinction of many small schools and districts, and the development
of a small number of very large schools). But the figures still support
the contention that the systemic and school building arrangements around
most pupils have steadily changed in the direction of greater size and
institutional complexity. The shifts in size have been accompanied
by an emphasis on specialization among both faculty and students,
and the concurrent preference for formalistic criteria to measure both
faculty and pupil performance.

As a result of such policies (a) schools, universities and "educational
systems" have become larger, (b) faculty members have increasingly tended
to become subject specialists, delivering discrete bits of knowledge to
appropriately grouped students, (c) students are grouped and regrouped
as they move through departmentalized schools and colleges, without serious
regard for the effects of this process on their desire to participate in
vital collective activities, (d) faculty/salary raises and promotions
are based on formalistic criteria which are comparatively unrelated to the
quality of their effects on students, or their commitment to each other or
their school or college, (e) student progress is increasingly determined
by performance on limited, essentially cognitive oriented criteria, as
opposed to broader (and more subjective) measures of personal development.
and (f) the increasing size of these institutions and their comparative remoteness from their pupils' homes, undermine their cohesion and legitimacy, and make them less able to confront their maturing pupils with a medley of coherent and vital prosocial demands.

The developments I have just described have little to do with the level of economic resources dedicated to education. We are spending, on a per capita basis, more than ever: the national pupil/teacher ratio has steadily improved, from 25.7 in 1960 (for public elementary and secondary schools) to 19.9 in 1977. Pupils are spending more days per year in school, and are (on the average) attending school and college for more years. The key issue is not the level of resources, but the structure through which they are transmitted. To put it simply, assume a hall in which two thousand adolescents and one hundred adults, were vibrating around in a form of elaborate, randomized interaction.

The adolescent/adult ratio is 1:20. Suppose we increased the proportion of adults to 1:10: a one hundred percent increase in costs. That change would be interesting. Still, we could not automatically conclude that it would have much of an effect on adolescent/adult relations. On the other hand, suppose we stopped the randomized interaction, and compelled one adult to stay with twenty youths for four years. Costs would stay the same, but we could guess that something might begin to happen in these groups. That "thing" might be good, it might be "bad"--but it would be different than what was happening in the randomized interaction.*

*The metaphor I have, of randomized interaction, has some parallels to the characterization of high schools as "aging vats," which was a figure of speech proposed by the National Panel on High School Education. But, technically speaking, aging vats are environments for the purposeful structuring of phenomena: we should not assume our schools are managed with quite such equivalent sensitivity.
I confess that my metaphor is coarse, but it does make an important point: the issue is not the amount of resources, but the context in which they are delivered. It is true that "education" has existed for thousands of years and has been tested by time, and in a sense "worked." But modern educational systems are qualitatively different from our previous modes. We are unwise to treat them as simply a continuation of early trends, and to evaluate them solely in terms of the level of resources they receive.

Education was once a creative and constructive appendage to the everyday life of historical and traditional societies. And there was a constructive interaction between formal education and this real-world life. At the present time, "real world" life has become increasingly remote from the activities of many young Americans. Concurrently, education has both enlarged and changed its traditional format. The changes have made it less helpful to the young—at the very time when their exclusion from adult life has even intensified their needs for a sense of community in their educational institutions.

Perhaps the final irony is that, as the "real" world has become more remote from the young—as suburban and around-the-home life has become more sterile—schools have been increasingly asked to make up for the deficiencies of these other entities. In sum, schools (and colleges) have become less effective (at communicating prosocial conduct) than they were in the past, at the same time they are asked to do more than ever.

THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY

We cannot ignore the influence of philosophical currents on the ecology of childhood and adolescence. America has always had a powerful tradition of individualism. However, perceptive observers such as
Tocqueville have noted that this tendency was moderated by our concurrent sympathy for vital voluntary comparative action.\textsuperscript{35} Tocqueville especially noted these patterns in social and community service activities; however, he undoubtedly would also have admitted there were parallels in our abilities in developing large business enterprises. All of the cooperative patterns increased the general level of prosocial conduct, despite our proclaimed individualism.

One reason for the appeal of collective volunteer activities was undoubtedly the pressures of scarcity generated by frontier and early industrial society.\textsuperscript{36}

As relative affluence has increased, it has become progressively more possible for us to afford to do what we have often said we would like to do--live alone, and escape encumbering personal alliances. We do not need children to help with chores, we need not trade favors with our neighbors (since we can afford to buy with money the services we need), we can bear the extra per-unit costs of private housing arrangements, and (as average numbers of hours of paid work has declined) the society can continue to be productive without each of us spending long hours associating with fellow workers. We are freer than we have ever been to escape interaction and the stress of prosocial life. And we simultaneously receive fewer prosocial acts from others.

These shifts in adult norms have had spillover effects on our youth environments. They have created a vocabulary which glorifies an arrant individualism. They have provided the foundations for a variety of judicial decisions and educational patterns which heighten the drive for self-fulfillment in contrast to reinforcing collective concerns. And they have lessened the legitimacy of adult demands on the young for prosocial conduct.
A concrete instance of the effect of these individualistic drives is presented via the squabbles which have been reported about the forthcoming White House Conference on the Status of the Family.37 At this moment, a controversy is predicted at the conference--between the left and the right wing participants--over the definition of a "family." The right has proposed that the conference adopt an explicit definition; the left is opposed to any form of definition. This matter is a dynamic issue, and a definition may still be adopted, or some people may change their minds. But the controversy is a true epiphany. Being called "a family" is presumably a desirable status. Thus, many groups want to have their constituencies included in such a definition. Indeed, economic benefits might flow from such definitions, such as tax benefits, or grants from assistance programs. Furthermore, many public and private institutions may find their budgets affected by the definitions adopted.

It is literally correct that one of the definitions of "family" includes all persons living under one roof. Thus, an unmarried male and female couple "living together" for as long as suits their convenience might technically be called a family, as well as two cohabiting homosexuals, or an adult and a live-in servant. I cannot believe that most Americans would choose to call such relationships "families." I assume the reason some potential conferees do not want the word family defined is because the groups they want to receive the benefits of familyhood would find themselves excluded by any definition passed by a politically-related conference. As a result, the current strategy of the left—whom the New York Times called the "moderates"—is to fight against any definition.

This anecdote appears to simply portray an interesting (or amusing) controversy. However, I presented it, after talking about individualism, because it has greater significance. It is obviously very hard to develop
good family policies if we cannot define what a family is. Traditionally, families were given special consideration because they were the entities which bore and reared children, and provided for the continuity of the entire society. Presumably, some people feel the "traditional" family is threatened, and want to try to protect it. Those efforts to help the family are, in a sense, a form of broad-aged prosocial conduct. The presumption is that by helping families, who produce our future, we are helping society. However, certain groups and institutions really want to be non-familial—to avoid the obligations of being traditional families—and still receive the approval and special incentives granted to families. If their efforts to broaden the definition of family (by not defining what a family is) succeed, there will then be less incentive for people to engage in traditional familyhood. "Why bother! We can get the goodies without all the work!"

These desires to have the benefits of familyhood without its obligations are, in a sense, understandable. Why not try to get something for nothing? Still, I am surprised at the frankness with which such goals are expressed. But this frankness has considerable implications for the socialization of our young to prosocial conduct. The personalistic views revealed through such efforts "say" to the young that the obligations of marriage and childrearing are an extraneous bother. If you want a "family" when you grow up, set one up, and if you don't like the way it's going, set up a different one next week. When we are told that all lifestyles have equal merit, then we are instructing the young to pursue that style which is least obviously costly. And that style will inevitably tend to stress self-gratification and indifference to others. And if that style turns out to be too demanding, it can be changed—since lifestyles, by definition, are transitory (a "style" is an ephemeral phenomenon).
The traditional connotations of family stress prosocial conduct—hence the term "family obligations." The precise definitions of family are, of course, culturally mutable. But any definition that excludes the concept of a vital, socially recognized persisting commitment is antithetical to the views of all cultures. The fact that the idea of the "noncommittal" family has gotten so far as it has is quite revealing.

Another philosophical development we cannot ignore is the current intense intellectual sympathy with egalitarianism. Like individualism, there is a strong American traditional support for this concern. The concern is articulated in the Declaration of Independence, and has often been reiterated throughout our history. But, like individualism, this belief, too, has had its previous effects muted by various social, political and economic forces. In analyzing the shifting appeals and definitions of egalitarianism, I believe that, in our era, egalitarianism has achieved a higher intellectual status than in most other periods in our past. This contemporary sympathy for egalitarianism has had important implications for socializing the young to prosocial conduct.

Citizenship had always been perceived as a form of excellence. Thus, there have been good and bad citizens, and finally citizens who display unique merit. Indeed, one might conclude that the distribution of prosocial talents (or conduct) probably matches the famous normal curve of distribution. This conclusion is most clearly correct if we conceive of citizenship not as merely voting—a bimodal act; one either votes or does not—but as a broad panoply of helping and engaging acts. But, if we wish to encourage such varied prosocial conduct in the young, we should be prepared to offer a variety of incentives to stimulate and reward it. And, inevitably this will lead to different levels of reward or recognition—either in schools, or in other youth-related activities. In a highly egalitarian environment,
it is difficult to proffer such rewards, since many adults will be opposed to such differentiation. They see it as invidious.

To offer a concrete example, over the past twenty years, schools and colleges have moved from numerical grades to letter grades, and in some instances, pass/fail grades. It is also notorious that grading has generally softened, and other policies have been developed which have lessened the stimulation of students to pursue academic excellence. The example of grades is not directly related to prosocial conduct, but the parallel is evident. If we are reluctant to reward cognitive learning, we are similarly less likely to give students conspicuous praise (or blame), gold stars, pins, badges, scholarships and other indications of merit in recognition of significant prosocial conduct. Indeed, I am sure that some of my audience may even have been troubled by the point of view which I implicitly express through the preceding comments. But what's wrong with rewarding such conduct? After all, how many professors would want to teach freshmen classes where only pass/fail grading was allowed? Or, if they taught such classes, how much learning would they expect? And, if we are prepared to put pressure on students to help them learn cognitive skills (which we believe to be important), why should not we similarly pressure them to learn prosocial values, which are important not only to the students, but to the rest of our society?

In any event, intellectual values about egalitarianism have shifted, and this shift has had its effect—for better or worse—on our youth environment.

THE EFFECTS OF OUR CURRENT YOUTH POLICIES

It is sometimes difficult to disentangle the effects of our youth policies on our overall level of civic conduct. First, if we define civic conduct as prosocial acts—as compared to only voting—it is hard
to identify reliable long term indicators of changes in such conduct. Then, if indicators are identified, we have to show their relationship to some of the explicit and implicit policies relating to our young.

Still, once these qualifications are accepted, we must recognize that we are not totally lacking in evidence bearing on these issues. On the broad question of changes in adult (and youth) attitudes and conduct, some popular and serious authors have contended that there has been a significant increase in the general level of narcissism exhibited by Americans.\(^39\) Obviously, if the evidence for such a trend was accepted, it would demonstrate a real decline in prosocial conduct. Going beyond this problematic (but perhaps plausible) contention, we must also recognize that there is considerable objective evidence of substantial changes (for the worse) in the conduct and attitudes of young Americans over the past twenty to thirty years.

These changes are evinced by increases in the reported rates of youth deaths by suicide and homicide, and of illegitimate births to adolescent females. These increases are all demonstrated by relatively hard data, and the systems of tabulation are corrected to allow for changes in cohort size. Thus, between 1955 and 1977 (and 1977 is the most recent year for which data are available), the statistics reveal increases in annual rates ranging from 130\% to 270\% (among white adolescents) in these phenomena. (The deaths due to homicide are evidently due to the criminal acts of other white adolescents.) The increases are portrayed in more detail in Figures 1, 2 and 3. Although data on illegal youth drug use are not collected in such long term or precise forms, it is still safe to say that, during the years in question, we have seen a vast increase in levels of such use—and, while this increase has stabilized, there is no sign it has significantly abated.\(^40\)
Figure 1: CHANGES IN THE RATE OF DEATH BY SUICIDE
WHITE MALES, 15-24
1914-1977
(WEIGHTED TO ALLOW FOR CHANGES IN
POPULATION OF AGE GROUP)

Source: Death Rates by Age, Race and Sex,
United States, 1900-1953, Suicide, 43(30),
August 1956), p. 471; Suicide in the United
States, 1950 - 1964, Series 20, no. 5 (August
1969), p. 17; and Personal Communication,
NCHS, 1980.
Figure 3: CHANGES IN THE RATE OF ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS
WHITE FEMALES, 15-19
(WIGHTED TO ALLOW FOR CHANGES IN
UNMARRIED POPULATION IN AGE GROUP)

Source: Vital Statistics of the United States, 1973,
Natality I (Rockville, Md: NCHS, 1977)
Table 1-30; Monthly Vital Statistics Reports,
Advance Reports on Natality Statistics,
1974 and 1975, 24(11) and 25(10); and
Personal Communication, NCHS, 1980.
Figure 2: CHANGES IN THE RATE OF DEATH BY HOMICIDE
WHITE MALES, 15-24
1914-1977
(WEIGHTED TO ALLOW FOR CHANGES IN
POPULATION OF AGE GROUP)

I have already presented a detailed interpretation of these distressing developments elsewhere. As a result, my discussion at this point will be quite summary. Essentially, the data suggest there have been important, harmful and persisting changes in the environments around our young. The changes began before Vietnam or Watergate became issues, and have persisted up to the present. It seems highly likely that the young persons displaying these related levels of self-destructive and other-destructive conduct are poorly equipped to engage in significant prosocial conduct. Indeed, we may conclude that the decline in prosocial conduct is a form of epidemic disorder. For various reasons, some youths stop being nice to others--e.g., they encourage younger adolescents to use drugs, they make other unmarried adolescents pregnant, or commit violence on their peers. The victims respond with a mix of withdrawal and counter-aggression (on whatever other victims are available), and the acceleration goes on.

Still, while the mediate causes of this distressing adolescent conduct are usually the acts of other adolescents, the more profound causes are the policies adopted by adults: the policies have essentially removed adolescents from the control and direction of responsible adults, or adult-supervised adolescents, and left them to the tender mercies of their lonely and poorly socialized peers, or exploitative adults. The effects of these policies have obviously been disastrous. It is time we set about changing them--in the interests of our young, and of the society which they will help to shape.

**SOME PROPOSALS**

Many of the correctives for our current distressing situation are implicit in the previous sketch I have presented about evolutionary changes in our youth environment. Furthermore, a variety of reports
and studies have made proposals which, to a greater or lesser degree, are congruent with the analyses and criticisms I have proposed. Still, there may be some value in listing some appropriate general considerations— if we recognize that such a list will necessarily be incomplete and sketchy.

1. Since it has taken us decades to get where we are, we must be prepared to carry out a steady, incremental process of correction that will last from ten to fifty years. We must get started, but there are no quick fixes.

2. Questions of definition are important. The proportion of adults who vote are of small relevance in assessing our level of "citizenship": some authoritarian states have high levels of voting. The true issue is not whether people vote, but the level of responsibility they bring to the process. Further, if there was a high level of citizen participation in local community activities, I personally would not become deeply concerned with a decline in voting: I would assume that such vital local participation would, if necessary, be reflected in more effective upper level decisions. Again, if we accept voting as a key measure of citizenship it provides us with few ideas about how to socialize our youths to citizenship—all we are then trying to do is teach them to push a lever. A sterile activity. But, if our goal is to increase prosocial conduct, it is easy to envisage a large variety of activities which can and should be stimulated.

3. We must recognize that most of the corrective steps necessary conflict with a variety of existing interests and semi-popular ideologies. There are professional associations (with their various gatekeeping functions), federal and state agencies and programs, real estate developments created to serve certain apparent market needs, many adults with their aspirations vis-a-vis their career and marriage roles, and our
notorious national tendencies to evaluate most activities in terms of levels of economic investment and economies of scale. We should not assume that vital corrective steps will occur unless (a) some institutions shift their current ideologies, or (b) new institutions are created.

4. Our changing policies should aim to (a) improve the quality of teacher/student and student/student relations in formal education, and (b) increase the variety and quantity, and improve the quality, of youth/adult and youth/youth relations away from schools.

5. The changes may not require an increase in the level of our GNP invested in formal education; indeed, they may even bring about a lessening of that level. However, the total amount of adult time (compensated or otherwise) spent in engaged contact with the young should probably increase.

6. The policies fostered should, ideologically speaking, lower our current levels of egalitarianism and individualism, and increase our dedication to excellence (or meritocracy) and communitarianism. In other words, more will be given to adolescents who "give" more, but their giving should be aimed at immediately enhancing the welfare and gratification of the community—and not their narrow self-interest.

7. Operationally speaking, we should aim to increase the average amount of time children and adolescents spend (daily or weekly) in prosocial conduct by—let us say—perhaps 200% to 400%. At least half of these activities should be occurring during school hours, or under formal school sponsorship. The activities should be organized so proper role models are provided, defineable goals are articulated, good performance is identified and rewarded, and apparently useful effects are caused by the conduct fostered. Some of these activities should be compulsory for all,
some should be the result of forced choices from a "menu" of varied alternatives, and some should be the outcome of purely voluntary choice, or even invitation.

8. The appropriate role for our national government in fostering such activities should be (a) removing guidelines and funding patterns (and funds, per se) which stifle local initiative and responsibility, (b) collecting and disseminating data, and (c) generally recognizing that the true strength of our society is largely due to the vitality, adaptability and diversity of our local entities, and that we have gone a long way in compromising that strength.
APPENDIX

Chicago, Illinois
July 10, 1858

MR. LINCOLN--Now, it happens that we meet together once every year, sometime about the 4th of July, for some reason or other. These 4th of July gatherings I suppose have their uses. If you will indulge me, I will state what I suppose to be some of them.

We are now a mighty nation, we are thirty--or about thirty millions of people, and we own and inhabit about one-fifteenth part of the dry land of the whole earth. We run our memory back over the pages of history for about eighty-two years and we discover that we were then a very small people in point of numbers, vastly inferior to what we are now, with a vastly less extent of country,--with vastly less of everything we deem desirable among men,--we look upon the change as exceedingly advantageous to us and to our posterity, and we fix upon something that happened away back, as in some way or other being connected with this rise of prosperity.

We find a race of men living in that day whom we claim as our fathers and grandfathers; they were iron men, they fought for the principle that they were contending for; and we understood that by what they then did it has followed that the degree of prosperity that we now enjoy has come to us.

We hold this annual celebration to remind ourselves of all the good done in this process of time, of how it was done and who did it, and how we are historically connected with it; and we go from these meetings in better humor with ourselves--we feel more attached the one to the other, and more firmly bound to the country we inhabit. In every way we are better men in the age, and race and country in which we live for these celebrations. But after we have done all this we have not yet reached the whole. There is something else connected with it. We have besides these men--descended by blood from our ancestors--among us perhaps half our people who are not descendants at all of these men, they are men who have come from Europe themselves, or whose ancestors have come hither and settled here, finding themselves our equals in all things.

If they look back through this history to trace their connection with those days by blood, they find they have none, they cannot carry themselves back when they look through that old Declaration of Independence they find that those old men say that "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal," and then they feel that the moral sentiment taught in that day by the Declaration of Independence that links the hearts of patriotic and liberty-loving men together, that will link those patriotic hearts as long as the love of freedom exists in the minds of men throughout the world.

[Applause.]

Now, sirs, for the purpose of squaring things with this idea of "don't care if slavery is voted up or voted down," for sustaining the Dred Scott decision [A voice--"Hit him again"], for holding that the Declaration of Independence did not mean anything at all, we have Judge Douglas giving his exposition of what the Declaration of Independence means, and we have him saying that the people of America are equal to the people of England. According to his construction, you Germans are not connected with it.

Now I ask you in all soberness, if all these things, if indulged in, if ratified, if confirmed and endorsed, if taught to our children, and repeated to them, do not tend to rub out the sentiment of liberty in the
country, and to transform this government into a government of some other form. Those arguments that are made, that the inferior race are to be treated with as much allowance as they are capable of enjoying; that as much is to be done for them as their condition will allow. What are these arguments? They are the arguments that kings have made for enslaving the people in all ages of the world. You will find that all the arguments in favor of king-craft were of the same class; they always bestrode the necks of the people, not that they wanted to do it, but because the people were better off for being ridden. That is their argument, and this argument of the Judge is the same old serpent that says you work and I eat, you toil and I will enjoy the fruits of it. Turn it whatever way you will—whether it come from the mouth of a king, an excuse for enslaving the people of his country, or from the mouth of men of one race as a reason for enslaving the men of another race, it is all the same old serpent, and I hold it that course of argumentation that is made for the purpose of convincing the public mind that we should not care about this, should be granted, it does not stop with the negro. I should like to know if taking this old Declaration of Independence, which declares that all men are equal upon principle and making exceptions to it where will it stop. If one man says it does not mean a negro, why not another say it does not mean some other man? If that Declaration is not the truth, let us get the statute book, in which we find it and tear it out! Who is so bold as to do it! [Voices—"me," "no one," etc.]. If it is not true let us tear it out! [cries of "no, no!"] let us stick to it then, [cheers] let us stand firmly by it then. [Applause.]

It may be argued that there are certain conditions that make necessities and impose them upon us, and to the extent that a necessity is imposed upon a man he must submit to it. I think that was the condition in which we found ourselves when we established this government. We had slavery among us, we could not get our constitution unless we permitted them to remain in slavery, we could not secure the good we did secure if we grasped for more, and having by necessity submitted to that much, it does not destroy the principle that is the charter of our liberties. Let that charter stand as our standard.
NOTES


11 Herndon, Lincoln p. 151.


15 Wynne, Growing Up, p. 44.


276.
19 Census, Statistical Abstract, 1979, p. 41; Census, Historical Statistics, p. 44.
29 See, e.g., Meyers, Education, and Cohen, "Schools."
36 Wynne, Social Security.


CHAPTER VII

THE COST OF ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP--IS IT TOO HIGH?

Roberta S. Sigel
Douglass College
Rutgers University
Democratic citizenship theory as enunciated in the United States calls for active participation by all citizens in the affairs of state. Current trends—probably not as novel as sometimes assumed—point in the opposite direction, toward increased privatism. The thesis is here advanced that privatism is a logical outcome of the small rewards offered the mass public for participation. It is argued that many significant institutions far from encouraging or rewarding citizen participation actively discourage it.

To increase participation citizens have to become convinced that participation will bring desired results, that is that the benefits warrant the costs incurred by participation.

Not only must the reward structure be altered for that to occur, but citizens also need better preparation for effective participation. The school is offered as an example of an institution which could provide such preparation.
THE PARTICIPANT CITIZEN

We have physicists, geometers, chemists, astronomers, poets, musicians, painters [but] we no longer have citizens.1

The general lack of political awareness revealed in this report must make depressing reading for anyone who is concerned about the future of our representative democracy and the prospects for greater participation by the public.2

The two just cited laments have a familiar ring to us. They are variations of the alarm sounded regularly by journalists, politicians, pollsters, and other pundits. With monotonous regularity such punsters-claim that the American citizen has lost interest in politics, concern for the common weal, and the willingness to participate in it which he allegedly displayed so abundantly in earlier times. The two alarms, however, were not sounded by our contemporaries. The first one is two hundred and thirty years old and was sounded by the champion citizenship theorist of the modern age, Jean Jacques Rousseau. The second was sounded a few years ago in Great Britain and forms the conclusion to a report--sponsored by the Hansard Society--on the political competencies of young British citizens.

All of which leads me to wonder whether citizens here or abroad ever did behave the way the theorists of Athenian democracy stipulated that they ought to behave. It further leads me to wonder whether in fact we ought to demand that they behave in this exemplary manner given the political system in which they must spend their all-too-brief days on earth.

Frankly, until I accepted the invitation to participate in this conference I had not thought very much--if at all--about the nature of
citizenship. Apparently I was not alone in this shocking lack of concern. To wit, aiming to get a handle on the topic, I proceeded to follow the advice I tend to give my undergraduate students, namely I went to the last edition of the *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* to discover what the experts in the field understood by the concept. My search was in vain. Christianity was followed by City with no room in-between for citizenship. Undaunted I went to the first edition, published in 1930. There citizenship found a home between Christianity and the City. And yet, the years which followed this first publication were the ones during which we witnessed a Second World War, nuclear warfare, fascism in its many forms, genocide, as well—as the more cheerful side—as the birth of new nations and with it new citizens. Yet the topic of citizenship had vanished from the pages of this important reference work. All of which suggests that the Mershon Conference seems to have chosen a topic most urgently in need of resurrection and reexamination.

At the outset let me make clear that when I refer to the concept of citizenship, I do not have in mind the legal one which refers to a man’s or woman’s nationality or legal status within a given territorial political unit. Embedded in that notion, of course, is the one that citizenship entails certain obligations on the part of the citizen in return for rights and protections legally guaranteed him/her by the state. The concept of citizenship or, more specifically, of political citizenship to which I refer is usually associated with modern liberal democracy. To make clear what I understand by the concept let me cite from the work of Dennis Thompson, one of the most systematic modern explorers of the topic.

"Citizenship" is not meant to suggest merely those rights possessed by a passive subject by virtue of residing under a particular territorial jurisdiction.
Nor is it meant mainly to connote patriotism or loyalty to a nationstate. "Citizenship" as used here refers to the present and future capacity for influencing politics. It implies active involvement in political life. This idea of citizenship naturally evokes the ideas of citizenship in the traditions of thought extending back through Rousseau and Machiavelli to the ideals of Athenian democracy. However, citizenship in twentieth century democratic theory in two respects suggests more than the Greek idea of citizenship. First, according to the modern idea, all individuals are to engage in the activities of citizenship. Second, modern citizenship suggests that citizens are in their political activities to express not only public but also the personal interests of individuals and groups.

Citizenship and participation thus become inseparable in Thompson's definition. Citizens participate in government not for ceremonial reasons but for purposes of controlling it. He makes, however, two important qualifications: Citizens can participate for selfish or private-regarding reasons as well as for public-regarding ones. Secondly, democratic citizenship has to be grounded in political equality. Equality and liberty thus are the two cornerstones of democratic citizenship. Without them, according to Thompson, democratic citizenship is unthinkable.

T.S. Marshall in his famous 1949 Marshall lecture on "Citizenship and Social Class" is even more explicit in spelling out the connection of liberty and equality on the one hand and citizenship on the other. He is at his most explicit when he emphasizes the need for genuine equality. To him citizenship is composed of three parts or elements which have developed historically rather than logically. The first two (products of the eighteenth and nineteenth century respectively) are civil and political citizenship, and they are meant to guarantee liberty. Civil citizenship guarantees what we call the Great Freedoms, most of which found expression in our federal Bill of Rights. Political citizenship is guaranteed by the right to participate in the exercise of political
authority, either directly or indirectly. By the social element he means:

...the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.6

Social citizenship is a product of the twentieth century and the advent of the welfare state. Through compulsory education, social welfare, and other equalizing institutions the ability of the mass public or the common man to exercise his citizenship in a meaningful way was to be made possible. Where lack of economic resources (in time, wages, transportation, etc.) or intellectual resources (literacy and other skills of articulation) once made the gift of civil and political citizenship among the poor and not so poor a hollow gift, Marshall and others hoped that with greater social and economic equality, civil and political citizenship could become a reality for all and not just for the more advantaged in society. For Marshall's schema to participate in governance constitutes the essence of modern citizenship. Schema such as the above are, of course, modern versions of what we have come to call classical democratic theory.

Eighteenth and 19th century democratic theorists had a slightly different version. They visualized the citizen as a public spirited, highly rational individual who stood alone vis-a-vis the marketplace of political goods, watching it keenly but independently (not as a member of a group) and making his decisions according to his own best judgment. More importantly

...traditional democratic theory assumed, in addition to the 'sociological nakedness' of the individual, that each member of the electorate would be interested in the issues, motivated by principles, aware of all the pertinent facts, and capable of choosing rationally.7
Clearly we no longer subscribe to the notion of democratic man in "his sociological nakedness." We have become far too conscious of the degree to which we are, feel, and think as do the group(s) with which we most closely identify. We have even gone so far—as the lengthy Thompson excerpt suggests—as to concede that citizenship need not only be exercised on behalf of the public interest but that the exertion on behalf of private or group interests is also a legitimate goal of democratic citizenship. Still, when all is said and done, the basic model remains: man (and woman) is not only capable of understanding politics but is interested in it and willing to make the effort to participate actively and persistently. Obviously this model, while not a carbon copy, bears a strong resemblance to that of Athenian citizenship which looked upon politics as a vocation, if not an out-right passion.

To be sure doubting the public's passion for politics is not a twentieth century invention. No one expressed it more trenchantly than did Plato, but I prefer to cite a slightly more contemporary, less august source. I always recall with some fondness one of John Adam's letters to his wife in which he blithely comments that the average American cared first about his stomach, next about his girl, then about his amusement (frolic, I believe was his word) and hardly ever about the politics of his country. Other observers now and then have reached similar conclusions, but not until the advent of the sample survey technique did we gain insight into the extent and depth of man's indifference to politics. The picture of political man which emerged from these surveys was a far cry from the model democratic citizen described by classical democratic theorists. Survey results conclusively showed large proportions to be politically uninterested, uninformed even about the most pressing issues.
of the day, having no opinion on many topics, and doing little else other than voting now and then. The predictable reaction of citizenship theorists was one of dismay, disappointment, and an occasional fear for the future of democracy. The quotation from Michael Walzer shall stand as an example of many similar reactions:

For most of our citizens, politics is no vocation. They think it a duty to vote but they have no deep commitment to a creed or party, and only about half of them bother to vote. Beyond that, they are wrapped up in their private affairs and committed to the orderliness and proprieties of the private realm.

It is not the intent of this paper to join the chorus of those who have declared the realization of democratic citizenship impossible. Quite the contrary, I do think democratic citizenship is realizable and efforts to realize it ought to be given priority. But I also think—and hope to document it in this paper—that this model in the current state-of-affairs cannot find many practitioners. What we currently observe—frequently referred to as consumerism, privatism, or alienation, to name but three popular terms—is very much in keeping with (1) our political culture, grounded as it is in the Lockean—Benthamite tradition; (2) our capitalist market economy and the institutions it fosters, and (3) certain universal human tendencies. The thesis of this paper will be that basic changes in our social and institutional arrangements need to take place before it becomes functional or rational for a majority of individuals to practice what democratic theory preaches.

In the section which follows immediately I shall address myself briefly to each of these three points (but in reverse order). In the second and third sections I will focus on the public school system and its potential for citizenship training. The second section will review some of the recent observations and recommendations; the third
section will support these with data collected by Professor Marilyn B. Hoskin and myself.*

**MAN, GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMY**

Man as "Political Animal"**

Aristotle is often erroneously quoted as claiming that "man is a political animal."*** The famous attribution notwithstanding, a strong argument can be made that man is first and foremost a private and not a political animal and will become involved in politics only under certain conditions. If we can assume that individuals at a bare minimum have some desire to actualize themselves, then development and protection of the self rather than the polity will be the paramount goal. A first step in such self-actualization is looking out—spiritually and physically—after oneself, certainly a demanding task, involving minimally looking after the well-being of the self and those dependent on oneself. Taking care involves physical survival (the first law of all human beings), usually thought to include the need for food, clothing, shelter, and protection. But it also involves intellectual, social, and emotional survival, as expressed in man's need for companionship, love, recognition, and enlightenment. 10 Judging from the empirical literature, meeting

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*These are data collected on one thousand high school seniors. In the sections which follow, I shall on occasions refer to them as "the one thousand young people" (or a variation thereof). Details will be found in Roberta S. Sigel and Marilyn B. Hoskin, Adolescent Political Involvement (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1980, forthcoming).

**Parts of this section are found in more elaborated fashion in the forthcoming Adolescent Political Involvement.

***Aristotle never said that man is a political animal but rather that he ought to be a social one and realize his full potential in the polis.
that these needs occupies the greater part of man's waking hours. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that most people would actually engage in more public-spirited concerns if both the time and opportunity were available to them. Public opinion polls conducted here and in Western Europe have shown repeatedly that when asked about their most pressing concerns and hopes, even well-off individuals tend to ignore political issues in favor of more personal pursuits. In the United States particularly, personal happiness (expressed as a desire for love, friendship, or a good family life) and for secure, rewarding work all but eclipse other concerns. Even when asked specifically about their concerns for peace, national prosperity and security, and similar political issues, very few citizens rank them as important as their own lives. During the height of the Vietnam War, young American males in two small towns frequently failed to mention war or the draft as a major concern in their own lives.

The essentially private nature of American citizens' concerns was vividly illustrated a few years ago. Reporters monitoring the televised March 1977 telephone conversations between President Carter and the American public marvelled at the essentially private nature of most callers' concerns. Citizens inquired about military and Medicare benefits, the rising cost of coffee, and other matters which could only be said to be less than critical to the national welfare or security. By comparison, reporters asking questions at a Presidential press conference queried about Israel's borders, strategic arms, and the federal deficit, but virtually ignored the kind of bread and butter issues raised by the public earlier the same day. Granted that it is a reporter's task to inquire into matters of state, one still cannot
help but be amazed how little concern for the state of the nation was reflected in the public's questions. The non-political nature of the questions bears out the empirical literature's assertion that the mass public's engagement with enduring questions of government and politics is episodic at best and minimal at worst.

I observed much the same phenomenon among young Americans to whom I spoke during other crisis periods in our history. I have done interviewing immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy, after the race riots in Detroit, during the years of the anti-war protests, and finally (with Professor Hoskin) during the Watergate period. It was always the same story. Life is experienced and plans are forged as though no outside event, no governmental action could ever touch one's life. The dreams people dream are essentially private dreams. No one capsulates the private, snug-harbor dream better than a young girl from a working-class family who anticipates rapidly rising above her current status:

My idea of what my future will in all likelihood be like is to have my own little house, a good husband working at a steady, not too boring job, and three or more kids. I want a good income, comfortable life, but I don't want to be rich. I want my children to have more than I had and to be better off than I....

Asked if anything might prevent this dream from coming true, she can only think of personal inadequacies which might stand in her way. She never thinks of systemic obstacles in spite of the fact that her family may have experienced prolonged periods of unemployment, separations because of military service, etc. It is the citizen as individual, as achiever, and as consumer which features in her view of the future. Politics simply is not intrinsic to it.
Given this state-of-affairs, how do we explain why and when large segments of the public become politically involved? Stated in its most general form, one has to conclude that individuals become politically involved when they see the relevance of politics for themselves or for goals they deem important. Involvement is most likely to occur when the benefits of it are apparent. To put it another way, political involvement is meant to meet human needs. When political authorities threaten to frustrate these needs or promise to facilitate need fulfillment, political involvement is likely to occur. This definition makes it clear that political involvement is purposive, benefit-seeking behavior. It is apt to occur if government is the appropriate agent for need fulfillment or need frustration. To wit, government is not the appropriate agent to coerce offsprings to love their parents, but it could conceivably be the appropriate agent to coerce them to support their indigent parents. Pressuring government for filial love, therefore, would be an act of futility, pressuring for ADP (Aid to Dependent Parents) by contrast might pay off. In short, the motivation for individual political involvement is the reaping of benefits, and it is immaterial for our purpose here whether these benefits be private-regarding, whether they be short-term benefits (securing a government contract) or long-term (adding an amendment to the federal constitution).

It is impossible to speak of benefits without also speaking of costs. Costs can be cognitive (the cost of seeking information), affective (having to deal with noncongenial people) or material (costs of time, money, and effort incurred in seeking a certain benefit). Above all, involvement may be risky, causing one to suffer loss of friends, respect or even employment, and—at its very riskiest—loss of liberty and life.
Hence the benefits must be commensurate with the costs or must exceed them. Let us cite an example. A citizen dealing with a building inspector may become convinced that the man is both incompetent and corrupt. He knows that if he notifies the housing bureau to that effect, the chances are high that the man will be relieved of his duties. His initial sense of civic duty suggests that he do so. But he also knows such a step will delay getting the housing permit while if he offers the inspector a small bribe, he will get the permit immediately. In this case, he may offer the bribe, considering the cost of civic virtue simply too high. Not all our cost/benefit calculations need be that crass, of course. For example, a person who works making his state "dry" may get no personal benefit from succeeding (he may be a teetotaler) but he may get the psychic satisfaction of having protected others from the Demon Rum. Whatever the benefit to be gained, (if my assumption of the essentially private nature of human beings has any validity) the costs of political involvement must not exceed the benefits politics has to bestow. Since I don't believe we can alter human nature very much, we must think of ways of increasing the benefits and/or decreasing the costs of involvement if we are serious about wanting to raise the current level of political involvement.

The Liberal-Democratic Tradition of Citizenship

Participants in this conference need not be reminded how much of American political thinking and practice is derived from 18th century political thought, most notably from the work of John Locke, however much we may have misunderstood him. It may, however, be appropriate briefly to reiterate here how much we owe to Locke in our emphasis on individual rights and in our "conviction that public interests must be
conceived in terms of private well-being.\textsuperscript{16} The significance of this emphasis for our purposes is that government or the state is seen merely as a means to an end, the end being the satisfaction of man's individual needs and desires, however defined. If government has any justification, it is derived from the fact that it protects and facilitates the satisfaction of such individual wants. The "Idealization of individual rights"\textsuperscript{17} frequently, at the expense of the public good, was grounded in a "fundamentally egoistic...explanation of human behavior. It ran in terms of pleasure and pain...."\textsuperscript{18} The parallel to my discussion on human nature is obvious.

The 19th century Utilitarians carried this latter notion even further by "making the criterion of the good society the maximization of individual utilities, and made the essence of man the desire to maximize his utilities. Man was a bundle of appetites demanding satisfaction."\textsuperscript{19} Man was a consumer of utilities. From this it follows that the good government is one which best satisfies private wants. One may call this disparagingly, as MacPherson has done, a theory of "possessive individualism"\textsuperscript{20} or one may look upon it as an important step in freeing man from a repressive, authoritarian state, but one cannot deny that the "idealization of individual rights" has had a strong hold on the American imagination. So has the notion that the state is there to serve the needs of the individual--rather than the reverse--and that it be judged according to the efficiency and fairness with which it accomplishes this. Our list of needs these days may go well beyond the relatively "petty" need to acquire property, so central to Locke's thought, but it is undeniable that the American version of citizenship is infused with a strong dose of private self-centeredness or, as Sabine would say, "individual egoism."\textsuperscript{21} From this emerges, although not inevitably, a model of negative citizenship which permits (in fact demands) that the government protect the individual from
enemies within and without but denies government the right to make significant claims* on his individual psychic and material resources. Jefferson's eloquent statement "that government is best that governs least," today is echoed in the slogan "get the government off my back." The liberal-democratic tradition of negative government and negative citizenship, perhaps because it accords so well with man's "nature,"†† undoubtedly has developed sturdy roots in our national consciousness—so much so that one may feel justified in referring to it as part of our cultural heritage.

To illustrate this point, let me cite a few typical excerpts from the interviews with the same one thousand young Americans. Asked what they most admired about our form of government, they replied:

You see, it's like this. I can pick the friends I make. I don't have to belong to a youth group. They can't send me to the country to work. I choose my job. But most of all it's I can do what I want, live where I want, marry who (sic.) I want and stuff like that.

And yet another one declares he is proud of our country because of its freedom and because;

You have your own property and no one can take it away from you. You just can live your life the way you want, just do whatever you want.

Democracy in fact to many means negative government and not much else. There seems very little doubt that these young people see the United States as a country of individual freedom where citizens not only enjoy freedom of speech and worship (also frequently mentioned) but where above all the government interferes but minimally in their private pursuit of

*The major exception to this sweeping statement is, of course, military service in times of war. But even here the ultimate justification is the protection of the citizenry.

†Not that I wish to imply that liberal democracy gained acceptance in the United States because it was "the natural thing to do."
happiness. How frequently did we hear them mention the freedom to travel where they choose, pick the type of work that appeals to them, settle where they see fit, and other instances of purely private, non-political choice. In essence, government's virtue is seen to lie in the fact that it does not interfere with private pursuits.

It is on behalf of these goals that the obligation to participate enters. Good citizens participate in government in order to control it, so that it does not encroach on their freedoms and so that it offers them and their property adequate protection from foes within and without.

The slogan "freedom is everybody's business" reflects that logic. It is in this individually-oriented sense that we must understand American advocacy of citizen participation, rather than in a collectivity-oriented sense. There is no fusion here between public and private life. I doubt that many of the young people we interviewed would have comprehended what Pericles tried to convey in his famous Funeral Oration in which he attributed "the greatness and the glory of Athens" to the fact that the Athenian made but scant distinction between his private and his collective or public life. "We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as harmless, but as a useless character...." (Italics added.)

Strong though the hold of the liberal democratic tradition seems to be in the American population, observers have detected traces of yet another tendency, one which has become particularly pronounced in the twentieth century, especially with the advent of the so-called welfare state. Although this tendency goes under a variety of labels, we shall

*I am indebted to John V. Reynolds for admonishing me not to ignore this development.
refer to it as the tradition of "private entitlement." In the United States it is customary—although probably erroneous—to associate it with the advent of the New Deal. Public opinion polls persistently show that the major social and economic services introduced by the New Deal are widely accepted. The public has become so habituated to them that life without them seems unimaginable—almost as unimaginable as life without cars or television. In short the public feels entitled to them.

We only need to remind our clues how badly Senator Barry Goldwater suffered in his bid for the Presidency when the public perceived him—probably wrongly—to be opposed to social security. Public opinion poll data suggest that he was deserted even by generally staunch Republicans and that the social security issue contributed to the desertion. The irony, however, is that although all of us have in one way or another become clients of the vast bureaucracy which administers and dispenses these benefits, most people resent the bureaucracy ("big government" is the phrase most often used). If the polls are any indication, people do not mind accepting social security benefits, student loans, federally subsidized mortgages, and the like, but they challenge the right of the bureaucracy to regulate the conditions under which such benefits can be dispensed. Nor do many citizens feel an obligation to pay with their taxes for benefits designed to assist segments of society other than their own. In a curious way the 20th century tradition of entitlement has

*One pollster, whose identity I cannot recall, refers to this as the new American credo that the government should keep its hands out of my pockets, but it is all right for it to have them in everybody's else's pockets. Thus social security benefits are widely approved; aid to "welfare mothers" condemned by those not on welfare—to cite but one example.
never replaced the Lockean notion of negative government but has combined with it. To that extent it offers proof of my notion that, unless socialized otherwise, men tend to be intent on maximizing private benefits rather than collective goods—a tendency which probably would have met with John Locke's approval. The young people we interviewed were examples of this mixture. They praised government for a variety of services rendered them and their parents (notably free public education) but condemned current levels of taxation as being too high. Absent from the enumeration of public accomplishments was praise for governmental efforts to attain equality for all citizens. Nor was the system faulted for its failure to attain it. Even when asked to define democracy, fewer than 2% mentioned equality. I would conclude from that that it is not the redistributive aspects of our social policy to which young people respond but rather that they remain wedded to the notion of government as the maximizer of private wants or utilities.

Institutional Obstacles to Participant Citizenship

Finally, I come to my third explanation why citizenship has not assumed the stature of a vocation in our society. My third one is an institutional one. Put very simply, I hold that many of our most significant institutions frequently act as barriers to the widespread practice of citizenship. Herein lies the answer why different social segments participate differently. Persons will participate in those institutions in which their chances of getting a favorable response are at least equal to those of other people. In short, they must be convinced that effective equality of opportunity to participate prevails. To be sure, our official credo proclaims that it does exist. It is my contention, however, that in practice the credo is violated more often
than it is honored. Many of our major institutions do not grant access on equal terms and thereby make the cost of participation prohibitive or pointless for some but easily affordable and rewarding for others. They have become barriers rather than facilitators for the widespread practice of citizenship.

This development has been all but unavoidable because of the fusion of liberal democracy with capitalism, on the one hand, and the nature of modern industrialized society (whether capitalist or not), on the other hand. To address myself to the problem of capitalism first. In the United States the spirit of individualistic liberal democracy has become all but synonymous with the spirit of capitalism. Capitalism or the market economy with its emphasis on competition has made of inequality not only a fact but actually a virtue. Inequality is seen as a form of reward for differential efforts and/or talents. Those who are rewarded more; i.e. who are successful, are admired; those who fail often are scorned. Success in turn frequently is measured in economic terms rather than in contributions to the collective good. More importantly, however, economic success tends to bestow power, prestige, and status. By bestowing these resources differentially, capitalism also gives individuals—whether intentionally or not—unequal resources with which to approach the political process. So much so, that Marshall holds that "it is clear that, in the twentieth century, citizenship and the capitalist system have been at war." It may be an exaggeration to hold that a state of war exists, but it is no exaggeration to assert that although de jure inequality may have been largely eliminated, de facto political inequality has remained very much a fact of life.

James S. Coleman in an article suggestively entitled "Loss of Power." argues that individuals will participate in corporate enterprises
(of which politics is one instance) because they anticipate advantages to accrue from participation. When the anticipation fails to materialize "reduction of interest in public affairs" will follow: "In effect; it implies all that is meant by the psychological term, withdrawal: a withdrawal from interest in public affairs, from collective action.... It means a reinvestment of resources in activities one can directly control."  

Lack of direct personal control is the rule rather than the exception in most modern industrialized institutions (not just in government). It is a function of size and organization. The very size of modern enterprises, the separation of management from ownership and both from the workforce, the automation and routinization of much of our work—to name but a few—all have the potential of contributing to a person's sense of insignificance, to his feelings of lack of control. The modern factory is but one example. Here the individual worker is little more than a number who has no or insignificant control over the workplace. Is it any wonder that work itself loses meaning and dignity for the worker, that it is merely a paycheck, i.e. a means to an end? In addition most large scale enterprises are hierarchically organized and permit very little or no participation by those on the lower rungs of the hierarchical ladder. This fact contributes even further to people's consciousness of inequality and impotence. This phenomenon holds for almost all large-scale enterprises whether they are economic, political, cultural, religious, or even charitable.

Of late this state of affairs has lead to protests, internal struggles, and even minor skirmishes within organizations. To cite but a few examples: in some localities the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church finds itself confronted with parishioners' demands for more of a voice in parish matters;
minorities demand more and more favorable coverage in the mass media; welfare clients accuse the bureaucracy of gross indifference, and university students level the same charges against their faculties. These demands for a voice are relatively new, whereas the phenomena of voicelessness and inequality in the workplace, the marketplace, or the church and school are old. The large scale of modern organizations may have made our feelings of powerlessness more acute but what really is aggravating is our own level of expectations. The emphasis on democracy and individualism, lead us to expect more control over situations and institutions which affect us deeply. We are asking for a share in decision-making since only we "can tell whether the shoes pinch and where."25 Citizen theorists advocate increased participation in all spheres of life—in addition to politics—not only because it can bring substantive relief (in this case from shoe pinching) but because they see it as valuable practice and preparation for political participation. The skills acquired in decision-making at one level, they argue, are transferable to decision-making in the political process. Carole Pateman, an advocate of workers' participation in the factory goes so far as to say "industry occupies a crucial position in the question whether a participatory society is possible."26 Besides, participating successfully in decisions affecting one's life bestows feelings of self-confidence and personal efficacy which facilitate self-actualization. Participation at lower levels thus contributes both to the functioning of democracy and the well-being of the person. When demands for participation are resisted—and I suggested in the beginning of this section that a capitalist industrial society is likely to resist such demands—feelings of lack of control will in all likelihood give way (as Coleman suggests) to withdrawal from most public affairs.
Feelings of lack of personal control over the larger environment may not have seemed very crucial to the individual citizen so long as he/she fared reasonably well under it. Until very recently this was the case; some notable exceptions notwithstanding. In 1960 Joseph Tussman, while condemning us for our lack of civic-mindedness, could nonetheless write: "We prosper. More people have more things and give thanks in more churches than ever before. Our complex political institutions operate. This, at long last, seems to be it." To be sure, even then there were critics who charged that our system was not working well; that government was not sufficiently responsive to the needs of the many, or that it was too responsive to them. In general, however, criticism was quite muted. President Eisenhower scornfully referred to the critics as "prophets of doom and gloom." Most Americans agreed and thought their government performed well in meeting individual and national needs—as well as most countries and probably better than many. Citizens' relative indifference to citizenship tasks was, therefore, widely interpreted as a sign of satisfaction with governmental performance, giving no cause for alarm. Some observers, in fact, considered the relative withdrawal by the many as an asset contributing to political stability. Because they held to the belief that those who did participate were also better informed and more democratically inclined, they became known as elitist democratic theorists.

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*Last year was the first year in the history of polling that large segments of the U.S. population lacked faith that their own standard of living would be improved in the future or could even stay the same.
In 1980 it is considerably more difficult to believe—as Tussman did in 1960—that "we prosper" and that our institutions operate well. The specter of inflation is causing majorities of Americans to be very concerned indeed about their own personal futures. Polls indicate that they are beginning to wonder what has happened to the Great American Dream, since they are working more than ever before but standing still economically or sliding backward. Even more ominous, ever since Watergate—if not slightly earlier—Americans are also showing signs of losing confidence in our government's ability to solve vital problems abroad and at home. The President seems to be unable to control inflation, to avert a permanent energy crisis, or combat a rising crime wave. The public doubts that he has a solution for any of the domestic problems plaguing us and wonders if anyone else has the answer. To this gloomy picture must be added the loss of American power and prestige in the world. As I write this, fifty Americans are still being kept captive in Teheran in our own embassy. They were to have been released three hours ago but once again they find themselves the victims of a power struggle within that far-off country. Our government apparently can do nothing about it at the moment but wait and hope for the best. Teheran, however dramatic, is but one example of the steady erosion of our position as leader of the free world. It should not be surprising, therefore, that many Americans begin to feel engulfed in a sense of national as well as personal impotence. What pollster Louis Harris observed immediately in the wake of the Watergate revelations probably holds to an even greater degree today.

Public confidence in most Government institutions...has declined drastically in the past six years...the American people's loss of confidence in their government has reached severe—even majority—proportions today. Americans want [their] system to work well, certainly much better than they think it has recently.
The fear cannot be dismissed, therefore, that Americans will turn ever more inward, opting for "civil privatism" (Haberman's terminology). They will concentrate even more exclusively than ever before on familial and other private pursuits and will reject responsibility for governing themselves, since they have given up whatever expectations they once might have had that such participation will yield the desired results. Oddly enough, however, this withdrawal from public life has not diminished their sense of entitlement, the sense that the government apparatus owes them a variety of social and economic services and benefits. But as the bureaucratic apparatus gets ever larger and ever more unapproachable (or so its clients think) satisfaction with its delivery drops also. The logic for withdrawal from public life hence becomes further enhanced. Not so long ago alienation was a word used only by intellectuals, sociologists, and Marxist dialecticians. Today it has entered our common vocabulary.

I have no idea whether alienation has indeed become a fact of life—personally I rather doubt it—but there is no denying that political as distinct from personal alienation is growing and with it the unwillingness to get involved. But is this an irreversible trend? Again, I rather doubt it. I think it is not without significance that in the past decade a series of articles and several major books have been published aimed specifically at attacking this trend. The tenor of many of them is to take the offensive against the elitist model of democracy and to urge us to practice democratic citizenship as it should be practiced. They put major emphasis on the importance of citizens to participate in all phases of the political process and not just in the electoral one. They warn us that if we fail to do so "it is altogether possible that we may drift increasingly in the direction of ritualistic democracy." Some citizenship theorists, like Bachrach, Lowi, and Pateman,
would even go so far as to say that if we fail to increase the current levels of participation, democracy itself will fail. To them it has become

...clear that neither the demands for more participation, nor the theory of participatory democracy itself, are based, as is so frequently claimed, on dangerous illusions or on an outmoded and unrealistic foundation. We can still have a modern, viable theory of democracy which retains the notion of participation at its heart.32

Many of our institutions as currently constituted are not suited for grassroots participation. To create a climate conducive to participatory democracy many far-reaching changes need to be made in them. Here and there we have already seen some changes taking place. I refer, for example, to the use of citizen advisory committees, co-determination, etc. These, however, are still the exception and not the rule. Moreover, their effectiveness has frequently been questioned. For endeavors of this type to become fully effective, yet another task needs to be undertaken. That task is to prepare citizens for effective rank-and-file participation in the socio-political life of the nation. Participatory citizenship is not something that "comes naturally" to very many people. Participatory skills are partially learned skills. But it is a habit one can acquire if given appropriate training and practice. Without adequate preparation for participation, participation often will be sporadic, idiosyncratic, and worse, ineffective. No reflection on the future of citizenship, therefore, should ignore the effectiveness with which various institutions discharge that preparatory task. In the remainder of the paper I want to single out one such institution, namely the public school. Specifically I want to examine the conditions most likely to promote participatory inclinations in adolescent citizens. I am singling out the public school system--aside from the fact that it fits in well with the scope of this conference--because it well illustrates the duality of mission, the conflict
which so often prevails in the United States because of our simultaneous espousal of the spirit of the market economy and the spirit of liberal democracy.

One of the school's official tasks, in keeping with the spirit of liberal democracy, is to prepare young people for effective political participation. Hence, one would assume that it would dedicate itself to stressing all those techniques which develop an individual's capacity to make independent and critical judgments, to take the initiative, and to attempt to gain control over his/her environment.

The education of children has a direct bearing on citizenship, and, when the State guarantees that all children should be educated, it has the requirements and the nature of citizenship definitely in mind. It is trying to stimulate the growth of citizens in the making. The right to education is a genuine social right of citizenship, because the aim of education during childhood is to shape the future adult. Fundamentally, it should be regarded, not as the right of the child to go to school, but as the right of the adult citizen to have been educated.

Because education and citizenship are so intimately linked, such training must be given on a basis of equality in a genuine democracy. Dahrendorf considers equal opportunity education a civil right and writes: "Equality of educational opportunity is a basic right of every citizen because education is both a prerequisite and a dimension of full social and political participation."

But the public school system also has a second mission. The market economy, in addition to some entrepreneurs and professionals, needs a large and somewhat docile labor force, willing to perform many tasks which require a good deal of labor, frequently manual, but a minimum of initiative and

*The principle of equal opportunity education tends to be more honored in principle than in practice. The very system by which we finance public education--to cite but one example--has the tendency to promote high quality and well financed schools in prosperous communities and less well endowed schools in the poor ones. Recent court decisions have attempted to "legislate" against these practices via judicial decisions. For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Richard Lehne, The Quest for Justice: The Politics of School Finance Reform (New York and London: Longman, 1978).
independent thought. Compulsory public education was to meet this need as well since it was recognized—at least as far back as the 19th Century—that the modern industrial complex simply cannot function adequately with an uneducated, let alone, illiterate work force. In the twentieth century the American school system proclaims dedication to both these tasks. Hence my assertion that it has a dual mission which frequently contains the seeds of internal conflict. The spirit of liberal democracy calls for the training of rather assertive, loyal citizens; the spirit of the market place calls for the training of more acquiescent if not exactly passive, loyal citizens. Both missions may strive for the development of citizen competency but they are referring to two different kinds of competencies. The question is: Does one mission seemingly take precedence over the other? Before exploring that question with the help of some data collected by Marily B. Hoskin and myself, let me briefly review some previous findings on the topic.

SCHOOLING AND CITIZENSHIP

Review of Previous Findings

Remy and Turner define "citizenship competence as the quality of a person's participation individually and with others in processes related to group governance such as making decisions, protecting one's interests, or communicating effectively with group leaders." Many observers of the outcome of schooling are inclined to think the schools fail rather dismally in this task. A year ago that venerable American Institution, Walter Cronkite, reflected sadly on the lack of political interest and knowledge among those under thirty years of age. To him this suggested "that there is something innately wrong with the younger generation, and I think we all have a good idea what that is: they aren't being taught very well,
either to read or to think." To his credit, he does not lay all the blame on the schools, but thinks the mass media too should attempt to "improve the schooling for our future citizens." 36

Blaming the American public schools for the public's insufficient political knowledge, low voting turnout, and general lack of political involvement is, of course, nothing new. On the contrary, it is a time-honored American sport. Periodic evidence of lack of civic competence tends to be followed with equally periodic regularity by commissions or public boards taking a critical look at citizenship education. These critical examiners usually conclude their tasks with a report that contains a long list of recommendations for remedying observed shortcomings. Now and then textbooks are written bearing these recommendations in mind, but otherwise instruction continues pretty much unchanged. Then a few years or a decade later another commission sets to work on the same task—frequently making the same complaints as the previous one and drawing up yet one more list of recommendations. Pre-World War I recommendations tended to visualize the good citizen (note that they were concerned with the good citizen) as the good person (hardworking, honest and cooperative) and as the loyal, patriotic citizen who obeyed the law and had a sound knowledge of the structure of our government and its history. Gradually, especially after World War II, participatory qualities were also stressed although the emphasis on the old "virtues" remained an integral part. Commission after commission recommended that the imparting of actual knowledge be supplemented by stress on comprehension of political processes. Fostering of critical thinking was advocated as another important tool for citizen competence.

*It is rare indeed that a commission reconvenes after a suitable interval to evaluate what has happened to its recommendations.
Recommendations, however, seldom seem to have been followed by the appropriate practices—if we are to judge from the never ending flow of critical reports. Nine years ago the American Political Science Association's (APSA) Committee on Pre-Collegiate Education severely indicted the public schools for failing to provide effective political education. Let me summarize ever so briefly their main objections to the prevailing practices of citizenship education: (1) Schools give a "naive, unrealistic, and romanticized image of political life which confuses the ideals of democracy with the realities of politics;" (2) Undue emphasis is placed on institutions and events and not enough on political processes. Consequently, students fail to develop the "capacity to think about political phenomena in conceptually sophisticated ways" and to develop "the capacities and skills needed to participate effectively and democratically in politics." (3) They are further handicapped in their political development because highly controversial topics are excluded from the curriculum, and so are the unpleasant facts of American life. "On the whole, American schools emphasize docility and conformity on the part of students rather than activity and critical thinking." The committee reached these bleak conclusions on the basis of examining textbooks, curricula, and programmatic statements. They did not examine—nor was that their task—the impact of such materials on students. This is the task I have set for myself for the remainder of the paper. The question I seek to answer is: Do students indeed lack the competencies conceded to be important for effective citizenship?

*This report is not restricted to citizenship education but includes political science education as well. Some recommendations apply more to the latter.*
The Pennsylvania Study

For evidence, I shall rely mainly on a study Marilyn B. Hoskin and I carried out in 1974. In that year we conducted a large-scale personal interview program with one thousand randomly chosen seniors during their last few months, in twenty-five (again randomly chosen) Pennsylvania high schools. The topic of our investigation was the political involvement of eighteen-year old, newly enfranchised citizens during a politically painful period in our history, the so-called Watergate Period. For the purposes of this discussion I shall concentrate only on those findings which bear on the acquisition of citizen competence and specifically on the propensity for becoming a participatory citizen. In keeping with my general framework, I shall advance the proposition that the schools can play a part—albeit not the only one—in developing such propensities as long as students recognize that the acquisition of participatory skills has utility for them. To accomplish this, students have to be made aware of the link between their own well-being and social policies; they have to gain cognitive awareness of the principles which govern the political process; and they have to become acquainted with effective ways of making an input into the process to meet needs they deem essential. Finally, practice in pre-political or quasi-political participatory acts can be used to accelerate their inclination to participate in genuinely political acts as well. My basic proposition then is that students who see the relevance of politics, understand its operation and principles, and get some practice in self-management will develop an inclination to become participant citizens. In the sections which follow I will offer some empirical support for the proposition. The data in their present form, unfortunately, do not always constitute the most direct or felicitous
test of it since they were originally collected with other purposes in mind. Nonetheless, I do think they offer at least suggestive evidence for the proposition just raised.

Making Politics Relevant.* Our findings show that students exposed to political controversy in the classroom are likely to become politically involved both behaviorally and cognitively, i.e., they have more political information and participate more. The findings also show that the willingness to participate goes up as the student becomes conscious of benefits to be derived from taking action.

In general, seniors were hesitant to participate. For example, when they were asked whether they would take action if the government embarked on a harmful (unspecified) course of action, the possibility of participating engendered very little enthusiasm. As for running for political office at whatever level, a resounding 82% rejected the notion, and only 7% expressed positive interest (the rest were undecided). Young women, alas showed the least political inclination and were even firmer in their rejection of political office.

The picture changes drastically though when these apolitical young people are presented with three hypothetical situations in which it was crystal-clear that governmental action or inaction was hurting them personally. When few spectators remained. Letter writing invariably was the first participatory mode they suggested. Collective efforts were the choice of a minority, although it was a substantial one (varying from 35-

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*The first situation involved the revocation of drivers' licenses for all under 21 years of age; the second a factory whose pollution constituted a serious health hazard but met with no opposition from the City Fathers; the third a Congressional statute to punish government criticism by sending offenders to labor camps.
50% depending on the situation). One may be permitted to wonder if the schools make much of an effort to acquaint high schoolers with the value of concerted collective actions or if they stress voting and letter writing at the expense of all others. In all fairness it must be added that the willingness to become active and to employ a greater variety of political actions increased with the perceived threat of the situation. Some students exhibited considerable sophistication in their choices of behaviors, suggesting boycotts, protests, and unfavorable publicity in the case of the polluting factory, force or emigration in the case of the prison camp. To the majority, however, only highly conventional behaviors seemed acceptable. This finding confirms my initial suspicion that the schools do not expose students to the most effective means of influencing government.

Political involvement is further stimulated by the discussion of political controversy in the classroom. Students who recalled that the controversial issues and topics of the day were openly aired during class periods—including the Watergate issue—were not only better informed generally but considerably more willing to contemplate participating and/or had already participated. Involvement levels rose yet higher when students in addition enrolled in a larger number of social science-related courses. This last finding seemingly contradicts earlier findings by Langton and Jennings who found students gained little from additional courses. They, however, measured change mainly in terms of information. In addition their measure was strictly the number of courses taken and did not weigh the way in which students were taught the material. Regular, routinized civics instruction may well have
minimal impact on youth--just as Langton and Jennings suggested--but controversy apparently enhances interest in politics and might bring it closer to students' experience. Above all, we must bear in mind that we focused on participation as well as information and not on information exclusively as did Langton and Jennings.

We found political discussion, whether in school or at home or among peers, to be a strong predictor to participatory propensity. Our general work has lead us to conclude that an environment rich in political stimuli is one of the best predictors for current and future participation levels. A young person who finds himself in an environment charged with political stimuli apparently absorbs the notion that politics is important and cannot be ignored. We moreover found that no single agent alone predicts as well to participation as does the cumulative effect of a variety of agents. If further research should substantiate these findings, it would suggest that the schools could play a very vital function in reinforcing other agents in the environment for those young people who already live in a stimulus-rich environment. But their most important service could be rendered to those youngsters who lack such stimulation at home and in the peer group. Here the school could fill a real vacuum and render important service in citizenship preparation. Since students from stimulus-rich environments tend to come slightly more frequently from upper status homes, the schools here could contribute greatly to equalizing educational opportunities by directing additional efforts to youth from lower status homes.

Several inferences can be drawn from the above findings. First of all, controversy apparently heightens interest in politics and the
Table 2. Political Participation and Its Relation to the Politicized Environment

(Pearson's r)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Participation and</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of Controversies in School</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Social Studies Courses</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall School Impact</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer Discussion</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Discussion</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Environmental Impact</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
willingness to become involved. Secondly, involvement is likely to follow when politics seems relevant for one's own well-being, and thirdly, the likelihood of political action is dependent on acquaintance with effective methods of making an input into the political system. Many items discussed in civics instruction fail to meet these criteria. The age of Senators, the number of congressional districts or federal courts are unlikely to create a sense of relevance. To do that, instruction needs to relate itself to student experiences with the "real world," experiences which admittedly are somewhat limited. I wonder how many teachers and textbooks or visual aids seriously try to illuminate the link between a student's everyday concerns and the relevance of politics for the solution of such concerns? I am inclined to think they fail the students in this vital area in that they fail to explain that it is reasonable to expect political answers to many seemingly private problems. For example, when a student dislikes the taste of the local drinking water, does the teacher attribute the taste mainly to an ungenerous nature, or does he/she explain how governmental action might remedy this (or might actually have contributed to it)? Does he/she also enlighten the student of ways to approach government in order to remedy this? I have heard by word-of-mouth of one school which built "finding faults" and doing something about them into its curriculum. The program was successful, the students became so knowledgeable and effective that the city fathers saw to it that the program was discontinued the year after! It is programs like these I have in mind when I plead for bringing politics into the student's orbit.

For students to be inclined to participate in politics, they also need to have certain cognitive skills and to have internalized democratic norms of citizenship and of decision-making. Again I shall
cite two sets of data.

The Model of the Good Citizen. Recommendations to the contrary notwithstanding, the old and rather passive model of the citizen continues to prevail. Our students share with those of earlier generations the nations that good citizens are patriotic and law-abiding, honoring country and flag. They are equally convinced (and some more so) that the good citizen has to be a good person—hardworking, friendly, and cooperative. As in previous times conformity and obedience to law are seen as the hallmarks of the good citizen. Politics pure and simple does not occupy nearly as central a position in their image of the good citizen. Not that the notion of the citizen as the politically active person is scorned. John V. Reynolds, who is his dissertation focused specifically on citizenship norms, noted that substantial numbers of seniors willingly subscribed to the idea of the good citizen as a participant who voted, was active in causes, and worked for community improvement. Rarely, however, was participant citizenship seen as the essence of the good citizen. To cite but one example, whereas 60% thought it "very important" to obey the laws and 40% to be friendly, only 18% thought it very important to influence governmental decisions, and 41% actually either held a negative view of the latter activity or had no opinion at all.* Now I certainly do not wish to censure the schools for instilling respect for law and order in young people, but I cannot help but feel that the schools seem to stress it at the expense of other, more assertive citizen

*Reynolds was unable to have students rank order these traits because our interview was not set up that way. Inasmuch as students merely had to indicate (on a five point scale) how important they held a certain trait to be for good citizenship, many students simply opted for all three types of behavior. All the more significant that he did obtain the above described differences.
characteristics. * A few years earlier when I did a pilot study in several small towns, I found an even more decisive rejection of the assertive citizen mode and almost exclusive concentration on law-abiding and neighborly virtues (goes to church, helps his neighbors, mows his lawn). Judging from these results, I would say that the textbook emphasis on "docility and conformity" (to which the APSA Committee referred) has paid off.

John V. Reynolds was able to demonstrate that those students who subscribed most firmly to the participant version also practice what they preached. They had already established a more substantial record of political participation than their peers--having participated in partisan affairs, community activities, and even protests. Moreover, they also intended to be more active in the future and less willing to suffer political inequality passively. For our purposes the importance of these findings lies in the fact that it permits us to suggest that greater emphasis on the citizen as the controller of government and de-emphasis on allegiance might conceivably lead to a more participatory citizenry in the long run.

Comprehension of Democracy. Decision-making is not unrelated to comprehension of democracy. Much as I had suggested earlier, students will make appropriate choices--appropriate from the democratic point-of-view--if they have a solid understanding of the concept of democracy and its implications. Those who lack such understanding make inconsistent and

*Ten years earlier Levinson was able to document that parents and teachers valued the good person and the allegiant citizen above the participant one whereas pupils were more amenable to the latter.
Idiosyncratic choices. Hoskin and I were able to demonstrate that students with the clearest comprehension of democracy were also the ones most likely to participate and the least willing to suffer in silence. They also could think of a great number of appropriate ways of influencing government. Students scoring high in democratic comprehension, in addition, had less trouble applying democratic solutions to conflict situations, recognizing the need for a multi-party system and for political conflict, etc.

Practicing Participation. Cognitive skills, however important in themselves, also need to be supplemented with practice. It is here that the school has a golden opportunity—an opportunity it all too often fails to exploit. To be sure, the schools in our sample offered students a great variety of organizations with which they could become affiliated, and over two-thirds did. A smaller but still substantial proportion also ran for office and frequently obtained the office of their desire. Whether officer or not, a majority of students claimed to be very active in these organizations. Many of the organizations had little or no relation to politics but were recreational, athletic and similar organizations. All the more remarkable that affiliation did produce greater general political involvement.

Participation in student government—allegedly the training ground for excellence for future political citizenship—in itself was no more conducive to political involvement than any other affiliation. If we single out the most affiliated group (those belonging to four or more school organizations) we find that 72% already are involved in political and communal activities outside the school. It is numbers of affiliations that count, not the type of school affiliation, so it would seem.

*Our basis of evaluating the quality of their comprehension was based on students' own definition of democracy. We were able to establish five levels of comprehension ranging from no comprehension to a fairly sophisticated comprehension. Results were far from encouraging. Even with general coding procedures, only 16% could be classified as demonstrating good mastery of the concept.
Table 4. Democratic Dilemmas

A. Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) An election is held in town. A majority of the citizens elects the town drunkard as mayor of the town. Should the director of elections refuse to swear him into office and call for a new election?</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) In broad daylight a man kills another at a busy street corner. There are 3 witnesses to the crime, and the attacker confesses his guilt. In spite of the confession and the witnesses to the crime, should the man have a regular trial even though this delays sentencing and costs the taxpayer money.</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) A speaker from a revolutionary group has been invited to talk to the current events club in your school. Do you think such a speaker should be allowed in your school?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. By level of Democratic Comprehension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of comprehension</th>
<th>Preference for democratic procedure*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrong</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More complex</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophisticated</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=407</td>
<td>n=359</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Summed index for 3 items in Part A
In passing we might remark that school affiliation performs a particularly crucial role for girls. Although the female student body as a whole is less interested in political participation, highly affiliated girls are more politically involved outside the school. Since, in addition, girls tend to be more affiliated in school than are boys, here is another chance for reaching young women and drawing them into the realm of active citizenship.

When we contemplate the profile of those active young participants—whether male or female—we are struck once more by the school's failure to compensate for the social inequality existing in the outside world. Members of school organizations, especially the officers and the highly affiliated ones, come disproportionately from middle class and upper middle class homes, especially from professional and managerial ones. Since selection to office is not solely determined by popularity but also is affected by endorsement from the school authorities, one cannot help but wonder whether teachers and administrators really go out of their way to draw students from lower social strata into the important affiliative life of their schools. If they do not, they certainly by-pass an opportunity for equalizing opportunities among the social strata.

To do a systematic overview of the significance of extra-curricular affiliation, our data should also have examined the types of decisions students are allowed to make and the degree of freedom they have with respect to them. Unfortunately we have no data bearing on this important question, so we have no way of knowing whether student "powers" were largely ceremonial or whether students did indeed have some discretion in self-management. Unless the latter was the case, they failed to get the practice in democratic participation to which they were entitled. Ceremonial practice offers no real training because no real costs are involved.
The focus of this conference has led me to use the public school system as a case in point. I can off-hand not think of a persuasive reason why citizens would not profit equally if other institutions broadened their participatory structures and gave their members more voice in controlling their own affairs or at least that part of their affairs which is amenable to member control. Decision-making requires practice. Too few citizens get a chance to practice it except now and then in the electoral process. They may be forgiven if they attribute only minor importance to it.

I have no way of knowing how seriously we as a nation are committed to becoming a genuinely participatory policy. The year 1980 with all of its dismal, seemingly insoluble tasks is a hard one for contemplating the question. But I do know nothing is going to change much unless we increase the incentive for citizens to participate. To do that, changes need to occur in some of our institutions. I am not suggesting that we write a new constitution, abolish the capitalist system, or abandon private pursuit. But I am suggesting that we give some thought to ways in which we as citizens (1) can make our educational institutions—such as the mass media and the schools—give us the cognitive tools for becoming more intelligent, informed citizens and (2) can convince major institutions—unions, corporations, factories, bureaucracies—to let us share in some of the decision-making which affects all our lives.
NOTES


11. Gallup and other public opinion surveys conducted both here and abroad persistently document that the amount of time spent on public endeavors is miniscule.


14. The Gallup Polls periodically inquire into respondents' major concerns and fears and find that health and private economic concerns usually outrank all others. See for example the *Gallup Poll Index, 1973*, report #100.


17 Ibid., p. 540.

18 Ibid., p. 529.


21 Sabine, op. cit., p. 529.


23 T.S. Marshall, op. cit., p. 121.


25 A.D. Lindsay as quoted in Thompson, op.cit., p. 17.


28 One of the earliest theoretical statements of the elitist school can be found in the concluding chapter of Berelson, op. cit.


31 Tussman, op. cit., p.106.

32 Pateman, op. cit., p. 111.

33 Marshall, op. cit., p. 89.


36 Remarks by Walter Cronkite delivered at the American Newspaper Publishers Association Convention, New York City, April 25, 1979 (mimeo).


38 Ibid., p. 5.

39 Ibid., p. 15.


Table 1
Preferred Influence Strategy in Three Hypothetical Situations
(By Percentage of Student Offering The Strategy)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGY</th>
<th>License Revocation**</th>
<th>Air Pollution**</th>
<th>Abolition of Free Speech**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONVENTIONAL BEHAVIORS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Behaviors:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write to my representative or official</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit an official in charge; Get a VIP to intercede</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote and campaign for people who feel like I do</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get informed about the issue</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Behaviors:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous pressure group activities</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNCONVENTIONAL BEHAVIORS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Behaviors:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave the state or country</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrate</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petition drives</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycotts</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Behaviors:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disobey the law</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage the violence or other illegal acts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DO NOTHING</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER ACTIVITIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=1000

*Spontaneous replies to the following questions: 1. "Suppose there was no fuel shortage, and the governor decided to call in your driver's license (if you don't have one, suppose you had one) because he was going to raise the age for operating any motor vehicle to 21 years of age. The new ruling will affect only people under the age of 21. How would you feel about it?" 2. "Here is a second situation. Imagine that the city health commissioner finds that a local toy factory is polluting the air so much that it is a health hazard. He therefore asks the company to install anti-pollution equipment. The factory owners say that the equipment is not necessary and is too expensive. The mayor and city council seem unwilling to force the company to install the equipment. How would you react to this?" 3. "You may know that in some countries the government punishes people who criticize it by sending them off to forced labor camps or by putting them in mental institutions. Suppose that our government were considering a policy like that. How would you react?" Note: Percentages add up to more than 100 because each respondent could give multiple replies.
CHAPTER VIII

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP
AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Willis D. Hawley

Vanderbilt University
INTRODUCTION

Charles Schulz, the creator of Peanuts, may be one of America's most cogent observers of political learning. Consider the following scenario:

Lucy has just received from her art teacher a wire coat hanger sculpture to which is affixed the grade of C. In apparent dismay and moral outrage, she argues that grades stifle creativity and that, in any case, the evaluation of art is subjective. The wire sculpture disappears and then returns with a grade of A. Lucy turns to the reader to make sure we understand at least one of the political lessons she has learned and observes, "The squeaky wheel gets the grease."

The purpose of this paper is to examine the hypothesis implied by Schulz and to suggest how the changes in the structures of schools might lead to more democratic citizenship lessons students learn from teacher behavior. More specifically, the paper has four general objectives:

1) To increase awareness of the importance of teachers in citizenship education.
2) To assist in the development of theory about the relationship between what teachers do and the values and beliefs students learn that takes into account the background of the student—including the values they come to school with and their attitudes toward schools, the social climate of the school, the community context, and the structural properties of the school ranging from authority structures to curricula.
3) To identify teacher behaviors associated with the acquisition of democratic values.
4) To suggest how schools could be restructured so as to attract and retain teachers that foster democratic values and to assist teachers in altering their behavior in the desired direction.

Those who have identified political aspects of the everyday life of the school are legion. Most of this writing focuses, while predicting or implying dire consequences, on the anti-democratic character of the lessons children are taught (cf. Morgan, 1977). This literature deals with a range of school characteristics including curricula, texts, authority structures, and teachers, and is concerned with both the explicit lessons taught and with what John Dewey described as the "hidden curriculum." The picture that emerges is a dreary one,
particularly as it relates to the implicit lessons being taught. Do such lessons, however, impact on children in the way the advocates of the hidden curriculum thesis suggest? Obviously not with the power that school reformers claim else we would be a nation filled with fascists and political cripples. But the question is not easily resolved because there is surprisingly little research that might provide direct answers. Thus, before reviewing what research there is and reporting on my own study, let me give that work some context by identifying some of the theoretical assumptions upon which one might hypothesize that teacher behavior affects political learning. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that one of the continuing problems associated with purposively manipulating educational environments that will not be resolved here is that there is no comprehensive theory of human learning and little satisfactory research on theories about aspects of learning that has been conducted in social settings (e.g., classrooms). Most efforts to specify the process by which political learning occurs turn out to be definitions of different types of processes or statements about simple correlations rather than explanatory—much less predictive—propositions.

The Process of Political Learning: Overview of Theory and Research

The theoretical framework that underlies this research is an eclectic one. It sees children develop, from a series of rather concrete experiences which they are motivated to explain, a set of descriptive abstractions that help to provide a prescription for both effective and proper social behavior, i.e., ways of relating to those in authority and relevant others who for various reasons are seen as people with whom one must deal. Children develop the ability to undertake more general and abstract thinking at different rates and both the coherence of their abstractions...
and the facility with which they use them to organize new information or transfer existing knowledge to new contexts or problems will vary (cf. Rosenau, 1975). Such variations are rooted in cognitive development and capacity as well as in the nature of the political information they receive, the practice they get in using such information, and the intensity and consistency of the affective meaning with which it is "loaded."

Thus children are constantly formulating both the capacity for political learning and the normative bases for the content of their political beliefs. This study focuses on the learning of politically relevant values though it seems likely that capacity for learning and content are related (cf. Harvey, 1970; Kohlberg, 1971; and Bositis and Miller, 1979).

As children grow older they acquire a greater set of experiences and a greater cognitive capacity to integrate those experiences. The more congruent these are, the more likely they will be to provide a set of understandings about how things are and should be that is well articulated.

Incongruency that poses problems for behavior is treated as dissonance and is assimilated or dismissed. Not all of our current beliefs are seen as relevant to present or future decisions and thus we develop complicated patterns of politically relevant dispositions. We do not force consistency but we resolve those inconsistencies we need to when action requires resolution.

Essentially, people learn things because doing so meets their perceived or unconscious needs. The needs one has tend to change over time and to differ in response to variations in the social context or physical environments one finds oneself at any given period. The contextual character of our needs means that we can
learn things that are somewhat inconsistent or contradictory since most of us do not lead tightly integrated lives. For example, on the job we may expect certain kinds of rewards for doing something that we get intrinsic satisfaction from doing in our homes. Or, we may respond to a football coach very differently than we respond to a social studies teacher even though both may "teach" the importance of leadership. And, parents often seem to be surprised that their children behave in school differently than they behave at home. This means, of course, that social learning involves a complex set of processes and that the more heterogeneous and complex a person's experiences are, the more complicated it will be to explain the sources of their attitudes and behavior.

The growing recognition that family effects leave considerable room for the influence of other sources of political learning, coupled with the growing belief that the process of political socialization is an on-going, life-long process, brings attention to how little we know about the relative importance of different socialization agents at different stages of a person's life cycle. To say, as one can, that the depth and stability of early socialization depends on such factors as the background of the individual, the "fit" between the values or attitudes to which one is being socialized and existing dispositions, the importance to the individual of the socializing agent, and the congruence or consistency of the political lessons one experiences over time, does not take one very far.

Figure 1 represents a very speculative attempt, based on inferences one might draw from the existing socialization research and learning theory, to suggest the relative importance of different sources of
dispositions that significantly shape political choices and the amount of new political learning that goes on at different stages of personal development.

Let me emphasize the problematic and necessarily tentative properties of Figure 1. I offer it here for its possible heuristic value and because it serves to draw attention to the importance of schools in the formative stages of political socialization. As will be seen, the research reported below focuses on children at an age when the impact of schools on political learning should be at its height.

Figure 1: Impact of Various Sources of Political Learning by Age

Amount of Political Learning; Values and Attitudes

Key

--- Parents
----- Teachers
------ Peers
-------- Community
.......... Media
THE ROLE OF SCHOOLS AND TEACHERS IN POLITICAL LEARNING: A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

It follows from the notion that learning is fundamentally a response to needs, that those people or organizations in a position to provide us with rewards or penalties can not only affect what we learn, but--because many of our needs are learned--they can shape our needs.

Clearly, teachers have such sources of influence. They can provide us with recognition that is both privately and publicly rewarding, they can embarrass us, keep us from doing what we want to do, structure our opportunities to interact with others, and, through their role in the grading and certification processes, they can shape what happens to us outside the school.

We also may learn from teachers because we see their ideas and behaviors as valued by our parents, friends or the larger society or because what they do is consistent with things we have come to need or value ourselves. For example, the needs being satisfied may involve the need for direction. Thus, we use teachers as models we seek to imitate or emulate or we may see their behavior as confirmation so that teachers teach through implicit reinforcement of dispositions. The student's readiness to imitate or assimilate aspects of teacher behavior and attitudes depends also on the student's own feelings for the teacher and for school in general. Teachers who are liked by students or who are otherwise respected--because they meet student expectations, are seen as helpful, or whatever--are more likely to shape student learning, other things being equal, even though such learning may not substantively
be what the teacher thinks he or she is teaching. For example, math teachers who expect students to do well and are accordingly supportive may have more impact on teaching the importance of kindness and concern than in teaching math if for some reason the student devalues math or is not ready for the concepts being taught.

Teachers Do Make A Difference in Learning

As I will indicate, the empirical literature on the impact of teachers on political learning is limited and inconclusive. Before reviewing that research, it is worth briefly noting that there is considerable evidence that variations in teacher behavior—when such variation is adequately identified—has been found to shape both cognitive and affective learning (Brophy, 1979a; Good, Biddle and Brophy, 1975; BTES, 1978). While most research on teaching effectiveness deals with rather narrowly defined cognitive development, there seems to be a growing awareness that efforts to "teacher-proof" education through curriculum reform and educational technology are not the keys to learning breakthroughs. An important reason for this is that affective and cognitive learning are linked and teachers can play the adaptive role necessary to the utilization of such interaction (Krathwohl, 1971; and Jones, 1968).

As a number of studies have shown, the expectations of teachers are important in motivating student learning (Brookover, et al., 1979; MacQueen and Coulson, 1978; and Good, Biddle and Brophy, 1975). Using the same data employed in this study, I have shown that teachers play an important role, over and above the stimulus children get from their parents, in shaping the level of effort children give to school work (Hawley, 1976b). And Harvey (1970), in a review of affective
dimensions of learning, shows how the structure of teachers' belief systems influence the dispositions of students to be cooperative with and supportive of others, more participative in class, and more capable of abstract thinking.

In short, it seems safe to say that the experiences children have in school importantly shapes their attitudes and capacities and, to the extent this is true, it is largely because of what teachers do in their interactions with students. Let me return, then, to the research which focuses most directly on the process of political socialization: Teachers and Political Learning.

Much of the literature on the role of schools and teachers in political learning has tended to focus on curricula and other artifacts of the educational experiences children have and to assume that those things affect learning outcomes (see, for example, Saario, Jacklin and Tittle, 1973; and Bowles and Gantes, 1976). Fortunately, there is a growing body of research that does examine the impact of teacher behavior and classroom structure on political learning. The results of these studies can be summarized as follows:

1. Opportunities to discuss controversial issues results in a greater sense of political efficacy (Langton and Karns, 1969 and Button, 1974) less authoritarianism and more discussion of political issues (Torney, et. al., 1975) and greater tolerance of dissent. Grossman (1974) and Ehman (1969) also find this relationship, as well as impact on positive attitudes toward participation and citizen responsibilities, but perhaps only when the classroom environment is supportive and open.

Similarly, opportunities to participate in class discussions and challenge authority in school increase confidence in the capacity to affect government decisions (Almond and Verba, 1963). Jennings, Ehman and Niemi (1974), however, find no significant relationship between teacher attitudes toward in-class expressivity, or the handling of controversial issues and a range of student orientations.

One possible explanation for their "deviant" finding is that they apparently assessed teacher attitudes rather than student perceptions of teacher behavior, and the latter
(as the data in the next section of this paper will show) is undoubtedly more consequential. Slavin and Madden (1979), however, show that classroom discussions about race relations, in themselves, have little impact on students' racial attitudes.

2. More student-centered "open classrooms" seem to be associated with more positive attitudes toward teachers and with more positive attitudes toward authority (Allman-Snyder, May and Garcia, 1975; and Graham, 1946).

3. Teacher interest in the ideas of students, as reflected in encouragement of "independence of opinion" and a deemphasis on role memorization as a learning strategy, seems to increase both knowledge of how the political system operates and support for democratic values (Torney, et al., 1975).

4. Providing students with opportunities to share in classroom decision making and responsibilities reduces the likelihood of conformity and of student alienation from school and others, and increases self-esteem and a sense of social responsibility. (Lippitt, et al., 1967).

5. The effects of providing students an opportunity for involvement in school-wide (as opposed to classroom) decision making are unclear. The absence of such opportunities was found to be related to disruptive behavior and negative attitudes toward authorities (Morgan, 1977). Similarly, Anderson (1973) finds that school environments emphasizing "status maintenance" and "behavior control" encourage student alienation. On the other hand, Jennings and Niemi (1974, 406-408) found that student perceptions of the degree to which they could influence school affairs were not systematically related to political learning.

6. Students' perceptions that they are treated fairly in school enhance feelings of personal and political trust and have a small positive impact on a sense of political efficacy (Jennings, Ehman and Niemi, 1974; Jennings and Niemi, 1974).

7. The effects of teacher attitudes (as opposed to perceived behavior or student perceptions of attitudes) on political learning is unclear. While Hess and Torney (1967) find increasing congruence between teacher and student attitudes, Garcia (1972) found that attitudes of twelfth grade students toward social responsibility do not seem to agree with teachers' values any more than do the attitudes of ninth graders. But in neither case does the methodology employed allow a fair test of the implicit hypothesis. We are not told, for example, whether teacher attitudes differed from the attitudes of parents of students or how
they relate to the larger community. In Garcia's research, the student samples are quite small in each school. In neither study are direct links between students and their specific teachers explored. The most significant study of this question is that of Jennings, Ehman, and Niemi (1974). They found little correlation between the political attitudes of high school students and their social studies teachers except where teacher attitudes and parent attitudes were homogeneous. In these cases student attitudes seemed strongly affected in the direction of the homogeneity.

8. The personal characteristics of teachers (sex, race, training, etc.) in themselves seem to have little impact on various student political orientations (Jennings, Ehman, and Niemi, 1974; Liebshutz and Niemi, 1974; Torney, et al., 1975).

Despite considerable speculation that teacher behavior and classroom structure comprise important lessons for political learning, there is, as I have noted, limited research on the topic, especially at the elementary school level. The balance of the evidence suggests that the general idea is correct, but the substance and magnitude of the specific lessons students learn under different conditions are far from certain.

The research on political learning is plagued by the same kinds of problems that undermine the credibility of most studies of human behavior. Few studies are longitudinal, control groups or quasi-experiments are almost never employed, the factors that might explain variations in findings within the sample or which would allow comparability across studies are seldom adequately identified and specified, and sample sizes are often quite small. Nevertheless, the evidence mounts that teachers make a difference in both cognitive and affective learning. At the same time, the factors that condition that impact and the processes through which it occurs are not well understood.
As Larry Cuban (1979) observes:

We know very little about exactly how a teacher's verbal and decision-making skills, personality, text, and other tools impact upon either groups of children or individuals over the course of a half-hour, a day, or a year. The mysterious interplay among teacher, skills, tools, children, and time continues to elude researchers. Without much basic understanding of the technology of teaching, no solid linkage can be made between what is done and what happens. Cause and effect continue to play hide and seek with one another. And without that linkage, uncertain outcomes will often frustrate observers and practitioners.

One serious shortcoming of the existing research on political learning is that in referring to the impact of the in-school environment on political learning, most scholars conceptualize the environment in terms of some school-wide practices or the "average" beliefs or behaviors of all teachers in a school or, at best, all teachers with whom the student has had courses (cf., for example, Ehman, 1969; Garcia, 1972; Langton and Karns, 1969; Hess and Torney, 1967; Grossman, 1974; Jennings and Niemi 1974; and Torney, et al., 1975). Jennings Ehman and Niemi (1974) do tie students to particular social studies teachers, but not to other teachers with whom the student has contact. 3

It seems unlikely, however, that most students have a consciousness of authoritative school-wide norms or practices that is different from the impressions they receive in the classrooms they attend. Since teachers in most public schools are likely to be noticeably different in attitudes and style, aggregating their beliefs or behavior misstates the students' experience. Similarly, to ask students to describe, in effect, the political climate of the school, much less the averaging of these responses, may well be creating a myth—a picture of a set of experiences with which no student actually has contact. In any case, this aggregation of teacher attitudes, behavior or student perceptions
of classroom climates has the consequences of weakening the statistical relationships between these factors and specific political lessons learned.

Similarly, it seems important to differentiate the "intensity" of the behavior of individual teachers as well as the salience of each as a referent to the students. For example, for student athletes, coaches may have far more impact than social studies teachers. Indeed, to limit one's inquiry to the impact of social studies teachers--as some scholars do--is to exclude important elements of teacher influence. It seems useful to remember that high school and junior high students seldom spend more than 15 percent of class time in social studies classes, and often they spend much less. It seems likely that the classroom dynamics, if you will, of courses such as literature, history, family life, and speech, would be similar to those in civics or social studies classes.

Other Sources of Political Learning in Schools and the Relative Influence of Teachers

Teachers, of course, are not the only sources of political learning in schools. Curriculum, peers, and, perhaps, the behavior of administrators and staff and political events involved in school board elections and educational controversies are other sources of political socialization. The relative impact of these different influences is not known in part because few studies deal with more than one or two of them at the same time and in part because of the methodological inadequacy of the research generally.

One can piece together the extant research and theory and conclude that as children grow older peers become relatively more important with
a big increase in peer influence coming for most students at ages 12-14. Teachers are probably much more important in shaping student values in grades K-6 because of the growing importance of peers thereafter and because most junior high school students experience a substantial number of teachers in any given school year.

Another reason why this period may be so important is that teachers may put more of themselves into their interactions with students. Biddle and Adams (1967) found, for example, that sixth-grade classrooms were less structured and subject-matter oriented than first or eleventh grade classes. In other words, in the late elementary grades, teachers are not yet subject-matter specialists, they still know their students well and yet the basic skills learning and classroom structuring activities that dominate the primary grades may be less pressing.

At the same time that teachers are loosening up, children generally become more aware of the world around them and begin searching for ways to locate themselves in it. The teacher is seen more as a person with discretion who may be a helpful source of understanding how issues of authority and interpersonal relations might be dealt with. These assumptions about the likelihood of greater self-consciousness vis-a-vis the social environment and transfer of social learning in preadolescence are admittedly speculative. However, Joan Lipsitz's recent (1977) summary of the research on the character of personal development among early adolescents provides substantial evidence that this formulation is generally correct.

Most studies of the effectiveness of conventional curricula suggest that variations in the content of specific courses and
instructional materials is not significantly related to variations in student learning (Langton 1969; and Slavin and Madden, 1979). On the other hand, several studies of experimental efforts to influence political learning in particular directions suggest that the formal curriculum can be an effective, if not always powerful, socialization mechanism (Tapp and Kohlberg, 1971; Patrick, 1972; Zellman and Sears, 1971; Cox and Cousins, 1965; Mainer, 1963; Button, 1974; and Guttentag and Bray, 1976).

These findings give sustenance to those who seek to improve political learning through curriculum reform, but a word of caution is in order. Knowing that experiments like these succeed, many of which involve only a small number of students, may tell us more about the consequences of being part of an experiment than about the impact of the substance of the new curricula. The widespread implementation of teaching reforms and an analysis of their impact over time is necessary before we become too optimistic. Liebschutz and Niemi (1974), for example, found that an experimental project aimed at increasing personal efficacy of blacks had a short run impact on political efficacy but that once the students left the program this effect dissipated.

Almost all studies of the impact of curricula ignore an obvious mediating factor: the nature and quality of instruction. This shortcoming seems quite important in light of research which shows that teachers play a considerable role in determining the effectiveness of specific curricula (cf. Jones, 1968; and Guttentag and Bray, 1976). Moreover, instructors—in effect—modify the curricula they teach by undermining, omitting or adding elements and by giving emphasis, consciously or not, to particular issues or topics (cf. Hawley, 1976b; and Gallagher, et al., 1970). Not only does the content of "standard"
curricula vary from teacher to teacher but, especially where effective involvement of teachers and students in the subject matter is more likely (e.g., social studies as compared to math), students within the same classroom with different values and learning styles are likely to experience a different curricula.

Summary

If someone interested in changing the content and effectiveness of the political socialization that takes place in schools were to turn to the available research for specific guidelines on how to proceed, that person would find little help.

It seems likely that peers have a significant impact on dispositions toward politics and on politically relevant attitudes. But, how one could manipulate school or classroom environments and activities to attain specific goals is far from clear. While some experiments with civics curricula seem to have had at least short run consequence, the bulk of research suggests that textbooks and other learning materials in themselves have little impact. The research on the role teachers play in shaping political orientations and behavior is not extensive though it does seem to bear out the widespread belief (or fear) that what teachers do and say affects political learning.

As the previous discussion implies, the most serious weaknesses of existing research on the role of schools in politically socializing the young have to do with the failure to capture in measurable terms what goes on in schools. In particular, the present research, at its best, presents only a partial and oversimplified picture of student-teacher interaction and the various dimensions of the politically relevant environment of classrooms and schools.
THE IMPACT OF TEACHER BEHAVIOR ON THE LEARNING OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

Let me now turn to the tasks of empirically demonstrating that teachers affect political learning and to enlarging our understanding of the processes through which this occurs. The next few pages present the results of research I conducted on the extent and nature of teacher influence on a number of general values and predispositions that, taken together, seem to be at the foundation of democratic behavior. Their being learned by young people, therefore, seems essential to the health of a democratic polity. These beliefs—which I like to think of as meta-values--include interest in the ideas of others, a commitment to fairness and due process, belief in the political equality of women and blacks, and the idea that the political system will be responsive to one's needs if one participates in politics. These are not, of course, the only beliefs that are important to a democratic society, but they represent a range of convictions usually associated with democratic political behavior. For purpose of this paper, I will present the results of this research as it relates to the rule of teacher behavior in shaping the interest students have in the ideas of their classmates. The findings with respect to this value are consistent with the findings relating to the impact of teachers on the other types of beliefs studied though there are some interesting variations among the different beliefs that are related to the sex and race of the students. I will discuss these differences briefly in the conclusion of this section in terms of their implications for theories of political learning.
Interest in the Ideas of Others--The Dependent Variable

I assume that an interest in hearing what others have to say, especially about one's own ideas and about political issues, is an important aspect of democratic behavior. Such an interest presumably increases the likelihood that conflict and misunderstandings centered around the allocation of values can be minimized. In addition, it increases the likelihood that one's political choices will be personally rational since it may illuminate alternatives and provide information about the probable costs and benefits of contemplated political action. Further, especially as I have operationalized the notion here, interest in the ideas of others may well be a measure of one's willingness to tolerate diversity and to value and respect individual differences. Teaching students to be tolerant of the ideas of others is a very modest goal. Tolerance, in itself, implies passive behavior rather than overt acceptance and, in practice, tolerance of the differences of others may be seen as indifference if not hostile reservation. In interpersonal relationships, the absence of confirmation and reinforcement may be interpreted as rejection.

I measured student "interest in ideas" with a series of six questions which comprise a reasonably reliable scale. The scale, which is reproduced in Appendix A, includes items like: "Kids who have strange ideas should keep quiet in class discussions;" "I think I can learn something from what other students say during class discussions;" and "When we talk about government or current affairs in class, I wish students had more chances to say what they think."
The data show that student interest in the ideas of others is greatest among whites, females, and children with better educated parents. The black-white difference is related to some degree, but not entirely to the greater concentration of blacks in families where the adults are less well educated. But the focus of this paper is not on the distribution of political values but on the factors that influence them. Thus, I will explore the possibility that student interest in the ideas of others increases the more teachers: (1) show respect for students' ideas, (2) encourage students to express opinions, (3) provide opportunities for student interaction, (4) discuss political issues in class, (5) express their own opinions in class, (6) emphasize the importance of civil liberties and free discussion when they discuss the functions of government.

The Sample. The 2,142 fifth grade students studied come from 79 randomly selected classrooms from schools in the Piedmont region of North Carolina. An effort was made to reflect a variety of racial compositions, family incomes, and geographic (e.g., urban-rural) contexts in the sample.

All tables and equations employing parents' education as a control involve a minimum of 1,625 cases because other students indicated they did not know their parents' educational background. This reduced sample has roughly the same proportion of males and females and blacks and whites as the total sample. One might expect, however, that those who fail to report parents' education are disproportionately from families with lower educational backgrounds.

As implied above, the fifth grade was selected because other research suggests that children ages 10-12 are experiencing an important period in the development of their political attitudes.
and because most students have relatively intensive contact with only one teacher through the sixth grade. Once children enter junior high school, they may have seven to twelve different teachers in a given year and tracing the linkages between teacher behavior and student attitudes and beliefs becomes very difficult indeed. The classrooms studied included "open classrooms," multi-aging and other variations on the self-contained classroom. But in every case students spent the bulk of their day with one professional teacher whom they would identify as their teacher.

All the school systems studied profess to be pursuing the goal of desegregation. There are no all-black classrooms--though there are two all-white classrooms in the study--and we were advised that children were assigned to classrooms without regard to their academic achievement or socioeconomic status.

**Research Methods.** Students' attitudes and some measures of teacher behavior were derived from responses to a questionnaire read to students by observers they knew at the end of the school year. The teacher was not present. Teacher behavior was assessed by students and by carefully trained observers (former teachers) who employed a variation of Flanders' interaction analysis procedures which I call the Politically relevant interaction Measure (PRIM). This instrument will be discussed briefly as the data from it are analyzed. In addition, teachers completed a pencil-paper questionnaire and these data are used to describe teacher attitudes and characteristics. Finally a content analysis of instructional materials was done to determine whether they differed on issues and events that might relate to the development of student interest in the ideas of...
others. To the extent that the goal of promoting such interest is dealt with, the material is bland and did not differ substantially from one classroom to the next, and thus we will put aside the possibility that variations in the formal curriculum account for variations in student values.

Teacher Respect for Student Ideas

To the extent that learning occurs through "modeling" or imitation, one might expect that students who perceive that teachers value their ideas and encourage them to express themselves will in turn value the ideas of other students. I have attempted to measure the degree to which teachers respect the ideas and encourage expression and initiatives of individual students in two ways: (1) students' perceptions of teacher behavior in this respect, and (2) observers' record of the way teachers solicit student involvement in class and respond to student initiatives and reactions.

Student Perceptions of Teacher Interest in Their Ideas. This perception is measured by each students' responses to five statements and questions on the student questionnaire. Examples of these items, which are presented in full in Appendix A, are: "Our teacher respects our opinions and encourages us to express them"; and "My teacher gives me things to do that really make me think rather than things just to copy or look at."

As Table 1 indicates, there is a clear relationship between the teacher's interest in and respect for student ideas and students' interest in and tolerance of the ideas of others. This relationship holds when controls are applied for students' race, sex, and parental education.
Table 1

Impact of Student Perception of Teacher Interest in Ideas of Students and Student Interest in the Ideas of Others Controlling for Race, Sex, and Parents' Education (High Score = High Interest)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teacher Interest in Student Ideas</th>
<th>All n=2105</th>
<th>M n=1055</th>
<th>F n=1050</th>
<th>B n=569</th>
<th>W n=1522</th>
<th>Parents' Education**</th>
<th>Low n=449</th>
<th>Med n=648</th>
<th>High n=528</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>51.10*</td>
<td>48.70</td>
<td>53.10</td>
<td>46.20</td>
<td>52.55</td>
<td>46.80</td>
<td>50.70</td>
<td>54.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med</td>
<td>41.90</td>
<td>40.95</td>
<td>42.85</td>
<td>35.30</td>
<td>44.05</td>
<td>40.85</td>
<td>41.95</td>
<td>44.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>35.35</td>
<td>34.45</td>
<td>36.50</td>
<td>28.60</td>
<td>38.30</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>35.50</td>
<td>37.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regression analysis yields a similar set of conclusions. Taking into account the effects of parents' education level, and the effects of race and sex when appropriate, the coefficients in Table 2 characterize the impact of teacher behavior on student interest in ideas of others.

Table 2

Effects of Teacher Interest in Student Ideas (As Perceived by Students) on Student Interest in the Ideas of Others

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regression Coefficient</th>
<th>All n=1573</th>
<th>Black n=398</th>
<th>White n=1175</th>
<th>Male n=809</th>
<th>Female n=764</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.3396</td>
<td>.3699</td>
<td>.3292</td>
<td>.3278</td>
<td>.3530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Standard Error         | (.0233)    | (.0473)    | (.0268)      | (.0330)    | (.0329)      |

As one can see, the regression coefficients are large and highly significant statistically.
Teacher Interest in Student Ideas—Observed Behavior. The scheme for recording student-teacher interaction used in this study is a modification of the widely used classroom observation system developed by Ned Flanders (1970) and is called the "Politically Relevant Interactions Measures" (PRIM). Any classification scheme must focus on certain dimensions of behavior and ignore others. PRIM concentrates less on formal teaching than on behaviors that reflect the authority structure and general socio-political climate of the classroom. To implement the system, a carefully trained observer classifies the predominant teacher-learning behavior that is occurring at any given time in the classroom as being most accurately described by one of fourteen possible types of activity. Observers tally the coded behaviors in a column, preserving their sequence at the rate of twenty tallies per minute.5

Three observers, all trained elementary school teachers, observed each classroom on three separate occasions over a two-month period. Each observer worked in the same classroom on all three assessments and administered the student and teacher questionnaire on a fourth visit. Classroom observers recorded at least three types of behavior one might expect to be relevant to the development of an interest in the ideas of others. One of these behaviors is the teacher's acceptance and encouragement of student interactions with the teacher. This involves both verbal and non-verbal approval and other forms of positive feedback suggesting that the idea is worth consideration, elaboration or is otherwise useful to the teacher, the student or the class. A related behavior is a teacher's negative assessment of student responses: designation of student interactions as unacceptable, stupid, etc. without an encouraging follow-up. Little of this
strongly disapproving teacher behavior was found in the classroom studies. While one would expect teachers to stay away from harsh behavior toward students when observers are present, it is significant that the average student seemed to receive so little direct stifling of the ideas and opinions they do have a chance to offer.

Another way teachers might encourage the development of an interest in the ideas of others is by the kinds of student inputs they encourage. Thus, teachers may ask questions that demand a factual response or otherwise leave little room for student opinion or initiative or they may solicit student ideas and opinions which ask students to be creative, synthetic, or subjective. The latter presumably shows students that there is not always a simple or obvious answer to problems and that it is useful to hear and discuss what others have to say.

I have combined these three types of behavior into a measure of teacher interest in student ideas by summing the proportions of time each classroom is characterized by (1) the solicitation of ideas, and (2) the encouragement of ideas through positive or supportive responses to student talk minus the proportion of time characterized by negative responses to students.

Overall, as Table 3 indicates, this index of teacher interest in student ideas is associated with student interest in the ideas of others. However, when the data are broken down by parental education, as I do in Table 4, a complex and somewhat confusing picture emerges. Generally, males respond to teacher behavior in the predicted ways, especially white boys. But there is considerable variation in the response of girls. The classroom situation teachers create seems to have a much greater impact on girls than it does for...
Table 3

Relation Between Observed Teacher Interest in Student Ideas and Student Interest in the Ideas of Others with Race and Sex Controlled (High Score = High Interest)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teacher Interest</th>
<th>Male Black</th>
<th>Male White</th>
<th>Male All</th>
<th>Female Black</th>
<th>Female White</th>
<th>Female All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>33.30</td>
<td>40.50</td>
<td>38.55</td>
<td>37.65</td>
<td>46.30</td>
<td>43.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=133</td>
<td>n=356</td>
<td>n=389</td>
<td>n=139</td>
<td>n=355</td>
<td>n=394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>37.40</td>
<td>45.95</td>
<td>43.75</td>
<td>38.20</td>
<td>49.45</td>
<td>46.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=141</td>
<td>n=410</td>
<td>n=551</td>
<td>n=149</td>
<td>n=395</td>
<td>n=444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4

Relation Between Observed Teacher Interest in Student Ideas and Student Interest in the Ideas of Others with Race and Parents' Education and Sex Controlled (High Score - High Interest)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teacher Interest</th>
<th>Male Black Parent Education</th>
<th>Female Black Parent Education</th>
<th>Male White Parent Education</th>
<th>Female White Parent Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo 32.65 n=38</td>
<td>High 34.45 n=63</td>
<td>Lo 39.60 n=74</td>
<td>High 40.65 n=204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Lo 42.30 n=82</td>
<td>High 47.45 n=250</td>
<td>Lo 31.60 n=25</td>
<td>High 40.90 n=77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High 35.35 n=64</td>
<td>High 37.40 n=82</td>
<td>High 47.45 n=250</td>
<td>High 46.15 n=87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

boys though the effects of that influence seem different for girls with less well-educated parents, at least for black girls from such families.
One might imagine that these differences between girls of different family backgrounds are related to the possible discontinuity between more authoritarian childrearing practices experienced by students with less well educated parents and the non-authoritarian behavior of teachers. Further, teacher behavior of this type may be supportive but it also, creates demands which such students may be unprepared to meet. Either of these situations could lead to alienation and uncertainty. But these explanations are undermined by the absence of a similar pattern among males. Perhaps, girls are so much more concerned about their relationship with their teacher that the theories I have suggested "work" for them but not for boys.  

The results of regression analysis for all students for whom data on parents' education was obtained indicate's that when education, race, and sex are taken into account the coefficient describing the relationship between student interest in the ideas of others and observed teacher behavior is .113. This relationship is significant at the .95 level of confidence.

Opportunity for Interpersonal Interaction

One might expect that students' interest in the ideas of others would be increased when teachers allow and encourage students to interact in classroom settings. Such interaction presumably increases exposure to the ideas of others. More importantly, this interaction is approved of by the teacher and may even be assigned value as a way of learning and/or problem solving. In other words, by creating opportunities for student interaction in the classroom that are associated--implicitly or explicitly--with goal attainment, teachers may teach students that the views of others are interesting and useful and should be considered in decision-making. I have measured student interaction in two ways: (1) student perceptions that teachers encourage such interaction, and (2) classroom scores on that element.
of the "politically relevant interaction measure" that records pupil-to-pupil talk.

Student perceptions of interaction with peers. Students were asked a series of questions to determine the extent to which they had an opportunity in class to work with others. This five item scale is set out in Appendix A.

As Table 5 indicates, students to whom teachers afford substantial opportunity to interact with others while performing school work are more likely than those without such opportunities to express interest in and tolerance of the views of others and this is true regardless of the student's race, sex and parents' education.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunity to work with others</th>
<th>All n=2103</th>
<th>Male n=1053</th>
<th>Female n=1050</th>
<th>Black n=567</th>
<th>White n=1522</th>
<th>Parents' Education n=1625</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>48.00</td>
<td>46.30</td>
<td>49.45</td>
<td>41.45</td>
<td>50.50</td>
<td>44.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med.</td>
<td>42.25</td>
<td>39.60</td>
<td>44.75</td>
<td>35.30</td>
<td>44.50</td>
<td>39.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>38.85</td>
<td>38.05</td>
<td>39.85</td>
<td>34.25</td>
<td>41.15</td>
<td>37.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regression analysis confirms these findings. The coefficient reflecting the relationship between student interest in the ideas of others and student opportunities for interaction is .243 for all students and, taking into account effects of parents' education and the student's race and sex where appropriate the effects of such opportunities are consistent regardless of the race and sex of the student. There is less than one chance in a thousand that these relationships are the result of chance.
Pupil-to-Pupil talk. Classroom observers recorded the amount of pupil-to-pupil talk utilizing the PRIM system. There is no relationship between the amount of such talk and student interest in the ideas of others.

Thus, in general, students' own perceptions of the classroom situation are more closely linked to their attitudes than are the pictures developed by the observers. Nevertheless, it is potentially important to note that the measure of student perception just discussed records teacher-sanctioned interaction that was presumably task-related. The PRIM record includes all types of verbal interaction including "idle" conversation and talk about things totally unrelated to the teacher's classroom agenda. If this distinction in the substance of what is being measured is the source of the different results of the two measures used, the notion that teachers can significantly affect a student's political learning is further strengthened. In other words, it is not the student interaction in itself, but the teacher's role in structuring and approving such interchange that fosters greater interest in and tolerance of the ideas of others. One reason this may be so is that interaction which the teacher shapes to some extent is more likely than student initiated interaction to involve students with different ideas and/or to engage matters the substance of which allow different ideas to surface. Further, preadolescents are frequently quite concerned about saying things their peers do not expect. Teachers, in effect, can create situations which require, free from peer sanctions, discussions of different ideas.

Teacher Discussion of Controversial Issues

One might hypothesize that classroom environments characterized by relatively open discussion of political and social issues that might be considered controversial would encourage an interest in and respect for
the ideas of others. Presumably, the opportunity to engage controversial issues is stimulating and the willingness of teachers to permit such discussion gives it legitimacy and reflects the teacher's own interest in facilitating such political discussion. To assess the classroom environment in this respect I have used a scale developed in the International Education Association's study of political socialization. Teachers were asked to indicate whether each of ten types of issues should or should not be discussed in the classroom. The issues to which teachers are asked to respond reflect both left or "liberal" concerns (e.g. the basic tenets of communism, why people join unions or the nationalization of industry) and right or "conservative" perspectives (e.g. free enterprise and anti-American radicalism). The fact that teacher responses scale with considerable reliability (Cronbach's alpha = .66) suggests that this measure assesses the teacher's willingness to tolerate, if not encourage, open discussion rather than the teacher's own political preferences or interest in indoctrination. The full scale is listed in Appendix A.

The data indicate, however, that the teacher's views on whether political issues should be discussed in the classroom has little relation to student interest in the ideas of other students.

Before we rule out the notion that controversial and open discussions of political and social issues in class might shape student willingness and interest in sharing ideas, it should be noted that saying one should discuss potentially controversial matters and actually sharing one's thoughts with students are two different things. According to the records of interactions made by my observers in their use of the PRIM system, only one-third of the teachers observed expressed opinions or personal judgments of a subjective nature more than one percent of the time they interacted with students. Even so, teachers do differ widely in their willingness to share their
beliefs and opinions with students. The possible consequences of this variation, however, to student interest in the ideas of others is negligible. Perhaps the reason for this finding is that fifth grade students do not distinguish between opinions and authoritative assertions so that teacher opinion giving—depending on the style with which it is done—may preclude student input or be seen as the right of the teacher because of her position. More likely, however, one might conclude that since teachers seem to shun controversy like the plague, most students have little experience in dealing with controversy in school. Thus, whatever effects such experience might have cannot be realized.

Teacher emphasis on freedom of expression as an element of the democratic creed.

No commentary on the teaching of social studies or "government" fails to note that curricula give little attention to the role of free speech and the importance of speaking one's mind in a democratic political system. Teachers do, however, differ in the extent to which they emphasize free expression and that may shape student attitudes. The teachers who participated in this study were asked: "When you teach about how our system of government operates, what two or three major ideas do you try to get across?"

Teachers were grouped into two categories in terms of their response to this query. References to such things as (1) the utility and propriety of free speech and maintaining a critical perspective toward government, and (2) the importance of due process, civil liberties, and respect for others, are classified as more supportive of free expression. About 40 percent of the teachers in our sample can be classified in this way as emphasizing freedom of expression.

As Table 6 indicates, students with teachers who are more supportive do tend to be more tolerant of others' views but the differences are not significant. It is potentially interesting to note that whatever differences
in student attitudes are traceable to teachers' professed emphasis on free expression are found only among girls. This adds to evidence already presented that girls are, overall, more readily influenced by teachers than are boys. Controls for race do not alter these findings.

Table 6

Teacher Stated Support for Free Expression and Student Interest in the Ideas of Others
Views by Sex of Student
(High Scores = High Tolerance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Boys</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Support</td>
<td>42.70</td>
<td>44.35</td>
<td>41.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=128)</td>
<td>(N=630)</td>
<td>(N=642)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Support</td>
<td>43.50</td>
<td>46.25</td>
<td>41.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=847)</td>
<td>(N=423)</td>
<td>(N=414)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The absence of clear support for the hypothesis may be due to the relative insensitivity of the measure used or to the possibility that teachers who say they provide support for various aspects of free expression are not seen by students as doing so.

In their administration of the PRIM system, observers were asked to identify and record all explicit references to students' responsibilities to each other including the obligation and/or propriety of respecting the views and rights of their peers. As it turns out, however, only a few teachers expressed this "need for citizenship" with any degree of frequency. The average teacher in my sample engages in such interactions about one-fourth of one percent of the time (to the extent that the PRIM system has allowed me to capture teacher emphasis on citizenship). This "emphasis" (such as it is) is unrelated to students' interest in the ideas of others. It seems to me, however, that the very small amount of time that teachers in this study actually spent advocating citizenship does not permit a fair test of the possible consequences of more extensive advocacy. But even if
such admonitions for respect and tolerance were more frequent it seems likely that they would be effective only if they were consistent with the way teachers themselves treated students.

Conclusion
The data from this study suggest that teacher assessments of the appropriateness of discussing controversial issues and teachers' professed emphasis on the importance of guarding the rights of others in a democracy do not seem to affect political learning in a significant way, though it is not clear that this study provides a fair test of these possibilities. The evidence presented here does indicate that more or less specific types of teacher behavior, namely (1) teacher expressions of interest in, respect for, and encouragement of student ideas, and (2) the provision of opportunities for student interaction that are tied to class objectives, increase the likelihood that students will express interest in, respect for, and tolerance of the views of others.

In short, the theory that teacher behavior influences student values is confirmed. Other analyses of the data used in this study examine the relationship of these and other aspects of teacher behavior to other student attitudes, including a belief in due process, political cynicism, racism and political equality for women (Hawley, 1976a; Hawley, 1976b; Hawley and Rossell, 1979). All of these investigations come to the same basic conclusions. However, depending on the student attitude or value being studied, the effects of teacher behavior on students of different social backgrounds, race and sex vary. This is not the place to explore all of these variations but two seem to have particular importance to understanding the role of schools in political socialization.
One of these findings is that, in general, teachers have a greater influence on the attitudes and values of girls than boys and blacks rather than whites. The finding with respect to girls of this age seems to be generally consistent with other research on school effects on students (McDill, et al., 1973). Evidence about school effects on blacks, however, is mixed and there is no widely agreed upon theory which would help sort out this uncertainty.

While teachers studied here generally have more impact on girls and blacks, this is not always the case. Two of these exceptions seem worth brief discussion. First, Christine Rossell and I (1979) have found that teachers influence the political sexism of boys more than of girls. One potentially significant explanation for the invulnerability of girls' attitudes about political sexism to teacher influence might be found in cognitive developmental theory. Kohlberg's (1971) theory of sex role acquisition would lead one to expect that by the time children reach 10 or 11, they have developed pretty clear ideas about their own sex, but less clear notions about issues that relate to roles and images of the opposite sex. Because young children are egocentric with regard to their own self-concept and because the role definitions facing young girls in the mid-1970s were substantially more ambiguous than the role signals experienced by boys (Frieze, et al., 1978), girls are more likely than boys to have a well developed idea about the appropriate role for women in politics. In other words, for various reasons, girls of age 10 or 11 may be more likely than boys to have developed what Piaget calls a schemata incorporating social issues affecting females. Thus, their ideas are more grounded and less susceptible to influence.
This does not mean that girls do not change their sex roles or that they do not vary among themselves in the stability of the roles they possess. The strength, clarity, and consistency of the "inputs" children receive that are relevant to sex roles can change them. Assuming all this is so, it becomes possible to reconcile our findings with those of Guttentag and Bray (1976) who found girls more responsive than boys to a well articulated intervention to change sex role stereotypes. In short, to alter girls' attitudes may require more intense and directed stimuli than the more subtle and indirect behaviors focused on in this study.

My earlier analysis (1976a) of the influence of teachers on political cynicism suggests that whites are much more affected than blacks by teacher fairness, openness and provisions of opportunities for self-direction. A reasonable explanation for this finding, which coincides with other research on the political cynicism of blacks (Abramson, 1977) seems to be that black children who were born in the early 1960s, experienced considerable discussion at home, in the neighborhood, and the media about social injustice and the fact that they experienced a disproportionate share of it in our society. Teachers, no matter how democratic and just, are unlikely to influence attitudes so firmly grounded in personal experiences external to school. The way to change student attitudes in this case is to work for social justice.

Taking the findings of the analysis presented above along with other similar results from other examinations of these same data, we can reasonably expect that teachers will promote democratic values if they respond to individual student's learning needs, encourage student expression of ideas and self-direction, and are fair in the administration of the classroom and the distribution of rewards. For the time being I would like to label this set of interrelated behaviors "responsive flexibility." Let me turn now to the problem of how we can encourage teachers to behave in these ways, which,
while they seem to sound reasonable in the abstract, place considerable
demand on teachers who must ply their trade in schools with increasingly
heterogeneous student bodies.

IV

THE PERSONNEL AND STRUCTURE OF SCHOOLS:
STRATEGIES FOR THE CHANGE THAT WOULD FOSTER DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

If we want teachers whose behavior can be characterized by responsive
flexibility, how do we get them? There appear to be three general options:

1) Recruit teachers with the necessary disposition and skills,
2) Train teachers to behave in the desired ways,
3) Create organizational environments and incentive systems which
   encourage and reward responsive flexibility.

These are not, of course, mutually exclusive. In this section I will
look briefly at the first two of these approaches and give greater attention
to the third.

Recruiting Teachers Committed to and Capable of Responsive Flexibility

Teachers, or would be teachers, may fail to manifest appropriate
behaviors because they do not know what to do. Certain types of pre-
service training is one way, then, to promote responsive flexibility.

Preservice training is important not just because it provides knowledge
and skills (though how well this is done by most colleges and universities
is problematic), but also because it probably helps shape role expectations
and attitudes about teaching, especially if such expectations and attitudes
are not explicitly disappointed or rejected when the teacher takes his or
her first job.

*I'm grateful to Thomas Heath who assisted me in the preparation of this
part of the paper.*
Preservice teacher training programs tend to rely heavily on the practice-teaching period to teach specific skills and techniques. Interviews with teachers suggest that this "field experience" is often seen as the most valuable part of their teacher training program, though most programs fall far short of their potential. Although practice-teaching generally involves feedback both from an education department instructor and the cooperating teacher, the experience is largely an unsupervised one. Student teachers, placed in a kind of "sink-or-swim" situation, may involuntarily revert to a less "democratic" teaching style in an attempt to insure that no discipline problems arise. Indeed, several studies have shown that practice-teaching experiences can actually encourage the development of dictatorial teaching behavior (cf. Borg, 1975, and the sources cited there). There is an apparent need to develop preservice programs that focus on particular teaching skills and provide trainees with an opportunity to practice these skills with a maximum of feedback and a minimum of anxiety (Borg, et. al., 1970). Interaction analysis training, mini-courses, and protocol material programs represent attempts to adapt educational curricula to the problem of developing specific teaching skills that would provide would-be teachers with the capacity for responsive flexibility.

Interaction Analysis Training. In 1960, Ned Flanders developed a system for objectively describing and analyzing classroom behavior. He was particularly concerned about the negative effects which apparently arose from traditional teaching styles and sought a new means of assessing the nature of the interactions between a teacher and his students. The system, interaction analysis, identified several teacher behaviors which could be summarized into one of two groups--either direct or indirect. Direct behavior could be loosely defined as "teacher-oriented" and would include such actions as lecturing, giving instructions or commands, asking questions which
require simple memorization of facts, directing criticisms and administering punishments.

Although research on the influence and effectiveness of interaction analysis training is far from extensive, the findings thus far generally support the efficacy of the approach in facilitating responsive flexibility. Education students who receive training in interaction analysis tend to be evaluated by their supervisors as more effective in subsequent practice-teaching experiences than those who had not received such training (Hough and Amidon, 1967). More specifically, interaction analysis-trained teachers tend to lecture less, give fewer directions and criticisms, give more praise, commendations, and recognition to their students, elicit more spontaneous student participation, and have lower ratios of teacher talk time to student talk time than non-interaction analysis teachers (Kirk, 1967; Lohmann, Ober and Hough, 1967).

Moreover, it appears that these behaviors, assuming the environment is not antagonistic to this approach, continue even after the student teacher has graduated and been employed.

Interaction analysis training is, however, both expensive and time-consuming. Kline and Sorge (1974) found that student teachers could be trained to increase the proportions of indirect verbal behavior to direct verbal behavior as a result of receiving feedback (primarily written) from observers who had been trained in interaction analysis.

Microteaching and Use of Protocol Materials. Two responses to the apparent revival of demand that preservice training deal more effectively with the development of teaching skills and the understanding of learning processes are the minicourse and the protocol materials approaches. They are illustrative of the kinds of programs which tend to vest teachers with the confidence and capability to behave with responsive flexibility. Although differing in a number of important aspects, both programs rely
on the same fundamental approach by focusing on specific teacher behavior, relying upon models to describe the behavior to the student, and using repeated drills to help the student recognize the behavior and develop teaching patterns of his own which incorporate the behavior.\textsuperscript{8}

Although the programs differ in their complexity and cost of implementation, the existing research suggests that both programs have been quite successful in modifying or molding specified behaviors. The minicourse, for example, has been shown to be significantly better than traditional training methods in developing various teaching behaviors which reflect responsiveness and adaptiveness. Minicourse students were modified in their teaching behaviors so that they spent less time talking, allowed their students to talk more, asked questions which required more thought or expression of opinions, and were more encouraging in response to student responses and comments (Saunders, et. al., 1975). Protocol materials programs were able to elicit similar teacher behaviors (Borg and Stone, 1974). Most importantly, the little extended research which has been done indicates that very little regression occurs over time and that the effects of both programs on teacher behavior can be viewed as lasting (Borg, 1975).

The use of behavior-oriented teacher training programs appears to hold a great deal of promise with regard to policy makers' attempts to foster particular teacher behavior in a classroom.

Selecting for Responsive Flexibility.

One significant problem in securing teacher commitment to be open to student initiatives and supportive of student self-expression is that a preference for contrary behavior may be deeply rooted in one's personality and/or grounded on extensive experiences that would lead one to believe that responsive flexibility is inappropriate to one's definition of one's role as a teacher or is an ineffective way to promote learning. To the extent
that beliefs in the inefficacy of responsive flexibility is rooted in personality or firmly held attitudes, the possibilities for changing beliefs decrease (cf. Kiesler, Collins and Miller, 1969). Thus, a first step in securing teacher commitments of the sort being discussed here is to deny people who hold contrary beliefs the opportunity to teach while recruiting and retaining teachers who have the commitments we want them to have.

Schools of education could be of considerable help in such screening processes in at least two ways. First, by emphasizing the importance of responsive flexibility and by providing training contexts in which such behavior is rewarded, preservice training could increase the likelihood that prospective teachers without the commitments we want them to have will screen themselves out. Second, teacher training programs could fail to certify students who did not manifest responsive flexibility or could, at least, evaluate them on these and other characteristics related to teacher competencies. Of course, given the present institutional incentives at universities and colleges and declining enrollments, it seems unlikely that policies which discourage enrollments will be adopted.

In any case, school systems could aggressively utilize their practice-teaching, employment screening and probationary periods to evaluate prospects on this dimension. The behaviors we are after can be specified and discussed and, at least within acceptable boundaries, it is possible to know such behavior when one sees it.

Of course, the problem of recruiting teachers committed to and capable of responsive flexibility is related to the number of such persons who want to be educators. It seems reasonable to assume that there is a shortage of such persons aspiring to a teaching career and that this is related in part in their perceptions that school systems do not facilitate and reward people with their dispositions and needs. I will return to this issue later.
in this section when I deal with the organization of schools.

The point is, simply, that recruitment of enough of the kind of teachers described above depends on changing the structure of public education.

This emphasis on the importance of selecting teacher candidates whose behavior is consistent with the behaviors we want to find in our teachers is warranted by two things. First, it is difficult to determine through attitudinal measurements how deeply rooted a disposition like responsive flexibility really is, even if it is measurable whether particular individuals can act accordingly in a classroom. Second, very little is known about how to bring about attitude change in work settings, and what is known suggests that such change is not easy to bring about, especially when people do not work—as most teachers do not—in groups.

The task of recruiting teachers who will implicitly teach democratic values and attitudes would be greatly facilitated if further research could (1) clarify the nature of the behaviors that are associated with specific educational goals, and (2) identify characteristics of teachers who behave in the desired way.

In Service Training

Most teachers who will be influencing the political learning of the next generation of Americans are already on the job. How can we help them learn new skills? I believe, and the data in this study just discussed support this view, that large numbers of teachers believe—or believe it is wrong not to believe—that they should be responsive to students and respectful of their individual needs and interests, etc. It may be, however, that other values dominate these teachers, and they are often unable or unwilling to act out this belief!
Providing Information on the Effects of Behavior. Before adults will learn a new idea, they usually must believe there is a problem the learning will solve. This is particularly true in the context of jobs which people feel are very demanding. The data developed in this study, indicating that teachers hold values that they do not act out, suggest that one reason why more teachers do not manifest responsive flexibility is that they do not realize that their perception of what they should be doing is different than their actual behavior. For reasons we will discuss more fully in the next section, the complexity of the activities teachers must perform and the pressures they experience may lead them to stereotype and overgeneralize student needs and capabilities and to otherwise adopt routinized and standardized modes of student interaction. They need, in such cases, to have feedback that makes them aware of the gap between their goals and their performance. Most teachers, however, get virtually no feedback of this sort aside from occasional, often tension-producing, comments by reluctant principals or supervisors (Lortie, 1975). Research on the utility of feedback in changing teacher behavior suggests that outside consultant and colleague feedback of a non-threatening sort, that is feedback which helps teachers see their behavior in relation to their goals rather than identifying their weaknesses, can be effective (Good and Brophy, 1974). Gage and his associates (1963) found that student feedback could be used by teachers to alter their own behavior. Indeed, Tuckman and Oliver (1968) compared the relative effectiveness of feedback from supervisors on the one hand with students on the other, and found that the latter is substantially more useful and that the former, in fact, may involve negative consequences. Studies have also shown that
teachers are willing to respond to suggestions of colleagues whom they respect and of outside consultants, if such feedback takes the form of non-threatening, non-judgmental reflections on teacher behavior that put teachers in the position of evaluating what to do with the feedback (cf. Good and Brophy, 1974). This research, along with information about the effects of protocol materials and mini-courses discussed earlier, indicate that teachers can develop specified behavior patterns more or less on their own if they are taught to think behaviorally and are reminded which behaviors do not seem to meet the goals that they hold.

In-Service Training for Responsive Flexibility. Behaving with responsive flexibility requires the constant gathering and processing of new information. Moreover, since the needs and even the capacities of students change over time, the addition of new skills and virtual retirement of others will be required.

Clearly, the approaches suggested for providing student teachers with a capacity for responsive flexibility are appropriate to strengthening teachers already on the job. But most in-service training seems to be less well received than it might be because it does not respond to the needs of teachers as they define them and tends not to be directed to specific problems teachers see themselves as having.

As I have already implied, the capacity of teachers—once they perceive a gap between their goals and their performance—for self-improvement is probably much greater than supposed. The Teachers' Center movement suggests how badly this potential for educational change has been underestimated.
Creating the rich information field necessary to provide a predisposition toward adaptiveness will serve to reduce some search costs for those interested in being more effective. Most teachers know a lot more about education than they tell others. Part of this is because of time constraints; part of it is because norms relating to information sharing are not firmly established; and part of the problem is that formal structures for multiperson problem-solving are seldom extant.

Administrators and teachers can learn to see themselves as resource people who, once they are aware of the needs and interests of individual teachers, can refer persons and provide materials to them. Within schools, it seems possible to develop informal experts who acquire a reputation—and thus an incentive—for keeping people informed about their field (cf. Schaefer, 1967).

Facilitating and Encouraging Responsive Flexibility through Adaptive Organizations

As almost all people who seek to describe the character of schooling in America agree, there is a kind of sameness to what is happening and to the structures in schools (Goodlad, et al., 1974; Hawley, 1975; and Lortie, 1975). No doubt these judgments oversimplify the diversity in schools but there is some consensus that teachers who are responsive and flexible as effective teaching requires are not the modal type. If this is so, at least part of the reason must be because most schools are not structured in such a way as to attract, motivate and retain the kinds of teachers we would like to have.

For a number of reasons, schools—most especially those serving low income and socially heterogeneous populations—too often seem to be characterized by "organizational rigidity." The reasons for this, which I

This section draws heavily on Hawley (1376c).
and others (Hawley, 1975; Lipsky, 1980) have explored elsewhere at length, have to do with the nature of incentive systems, the diffuseness of organizational goals, the difficulty of measuring goal attainment, the inadequacy of leadership patterns, the high cost of "exit" from public to private schools, the absence of mechanisms for effectively expressing dissatisfaction in the absence of crises, and the psychological stress that teachers and administrators often experience. Responsive flexibility is unlikely to prosper in the presence of these conditions. Thus, if schools are likely to foster responsive flexibility—and thereby attract and retain individuals with such dispositions and capabilities—they must become "adaptive" organizations. Adaptive organizations are likely to be inhabited by creative problem-solvers whose behavior is shaped by their diagnosis of the problems and the resources—both human and technological—that they can bring to the task. It must go beyond reaction to demands, flexibility or responsiveness to behavior that is aggressively creative, proactive or proformist.

A successful organizational strategy for achieving adaptiveness in teacher behavior depends on demonstrating that the benefits exceed the costs and on creating conditions which diminish costs and enhance benefits. Thus, an organization must consider three sets of factors for attaining adaptiveness:

1. Factors affecting the perception of a gap between one's performance as a teacher and the objectives one values. This gap depends on both performance and objectives, and the organization might seek to provide information about either or both.

2. Factors affecting costs and the possibilities that these can be minimized. These would include consequences of being adaptive as well as sanctions that might be attached to an inability or unwillingness to behave adaptively.

3. Factors affecting benefits including those benefits which involve material, status and social rewards as well as those that promote self-esteem or self-actualization.
If an organization can acquire the capacity to affect perceptions in the suggested direction and either reduce costs or increase benefits, or--ideally--reduce costs and increase benefits simultaneously, it will increase the adaptiveness of its members. However, bringing attention to a gap between performance and valued goals without increasing the net benefits one will obtain from adaptiveness will be counter-productive and result in frustration, low morale, defensive behavior, and other unhappy consequences for the children the teacher encounters. Which is to say, self-awareness and high goals do not necessarily result in better teaching.

The remainder of this section examines these three sets of factors in more detail in order to suggest the organizational directions one might pursue in order to foster the learning of democratic values through more adaptive schools with the primary goal of attaining adaptiveness and, thereby, responsive flexibility among teachers.

Perceiving a Need for Adaptive Behavior

Adapting one's behavior and staying adaptive depends, as I suggested above, on the recognition that there is a gap between the goals to which one aspires and one's present capacity to achieve them.

Goal Setting and Adjustment

If goals are to play the role suggested in inducing a predisposition for adaptiveness, they must be explicit and must be personalized vis-a-vis students--or at least groups of students. The literature on teacher behavior suggests that, while teachers generally aspire to certain idealized objectives such as academic excellence, creativity, and self-esteem for all their students, many find it difficult to sustain a multiplicity of goals, and they tend to narrow their operating objectives to those that appear within reach.
The comparison of the goals of the organization—or of its leadership—to those of a given teacher can be employed as a strategy that can induce reconsideration of goals. The adjustment of individual teacher's objectives can be encouraged by involving teachers in key decisions concerning how resources are to be utilized and what curricula are to be adopted. When such involvement takes the form of group decision-making, it is likely to facilitate a willingness to consider new alternative modes of behavior, assuming, of course, that the group is seeking answers to how the learning environment can be enhanced.

The problem, then, is to create a setting in which teachers are helped to clarify their goals and made aware of outcomes for their students that they had not considered or had ruled out as impossible for them to work toward. This can be accomplished by structuring and enriching the interactions teachers have with administrators, peers, parents and students, and through professional information (journals, coursework, etc.).

**Professional Information.** I refer here to information about what is going on in other schools or new research that might be relevant to the teacher's general responsibilities and professional interests.

**Interaction with Parents and Students.** Teachers often shape the goals they have for students without any input from parents or students. It is true, of course, that many parents and children are not very precise or assertive about their hopes. But the capacity to articulate goals can be learned, and the expression of aspirations can be encouraged.

Parental and student discussion of goals not only helps the teacher understand the values the student is likely to attach to particular learning opportunities, it may also suggest targets the teacher had not considered or had valued inappropriately. This interaction will not occur of its own accord, however. Many parents do not see themselves as sufficiently knowledgeable to raise questions about the goals teachers have for their children.
Establishing the notion that such behavior is appropriate and welcomed is important, and the demeanor of the teacher, who may also be threatened by such interaction, can determine how parents will behave.

**Interaction with Peers.** A number of writers have pointed to the fact that teachers have little opportunity to interact professionally or to observe their peers and that this contributes to resistance to change (Goldstein, 1972). Nevertheless, several studies show that their colleagues are the single more important source of information that teachers have about teaching (cf. House, 1974).

Increases in professional interaction among teachers require at least two things: (1) time and structures which allow it to happen and (2) norms and established processes that reduce the personal costs and establish task-oriented discussion of teaching problems and successes as a professional responsibility.

**Participation in Formal Goal Setting.** As virtually all studies of organizational adaptiveness or change show, meaningful participation in goal setting—and the determination of means to achieve the goals—enhances the individual's commitment to change. It also tends to reduce alienation from work and thus increases individual effectiveness as it applies to teaching. Moreover, such participation seems to clarify purpose and enhance the influence of peers. Many beliefs are held because they are thought to reflect group norms. If this assumption is found to be incorrect, the attitude can be changed more easily. Many times, however, group norms about educational goals remain latent or are not felt with much intensity. This is, in part, because most schools do not have mechanisms for arriving at, clarifying, and collegially reinforcing group goals. Increasing the role of teachers in decision-making generally would tend to increase the
salience of group norms. The recurrent collective review of key educational objectives would serve to clarify and give weight to common values.

Relating Performance to Goals - Feedback and Evaluation

The same processes of interaction that serve to facilitate the consideration of alternative objectives and the sharpening of one's purposes also provide information on performance. Exchanges with administrators and peers provide the opportunity for subjective evaluation and interpersonal comparisons. These interactions, as well as those with students and parents and with professional information, encourage self-examination either by (1) raising the possibility that alternative ways of accomplishing certain objectives exist or (2) indicating that existing strategies are ineffective.

But the most direct and perhaps most persuasive information on performance should come from objective evaluation of the teachers' contributions to the rate at which children in their classes develop cognitively and affectively. Note that the feedback discussed earlier differs from evaluation in that the former seeks to describe teacher behavior not student outcomes. The two can, of course, be secured concomitantly, but feedback is easier to provide and more readily received. For such evaluation to be motivating, it must have at least two characteristics:

1) It must focus on the goals the teacher values, and

2) The measures of performance upon which evaluation is based must be seen by the teacher as adequate and appropriate.

If these two conditions are met, teachers are likely to take evaluations of their performance seriously since the two major rationalizations for dealing with dissonance that evaluation can cause are not available.
Nonetheless, evaluation that holds the threat of external sanctions on the individual or the organization is likely to be resisted, which is one reason why so little evaluation derives from the interests of teachers and administrators (Wildavsky, 1972).

This means that adaptive organizations should emphasize that the internal purposes of such activity should be to develop the capacity of individuals and the group to meet organizational goals. Can evaluation in the absence of formal sanctions induce change or otherwise motivate? The importance of social acceptance by peers and the desire most people seem to have for professional and personal goal attainment should provide the appropriate leverage if the objectives involved are actually valued by the group or the individual. (Berman and McLaughlin, 1978) The characteristics of adaptive schools are likely to encourage commitment to organizational goals. In any case, evaluation efforts should be individualized or at least tied to readily identified subgroups. Such a strategy would include the identification of individual or team objectives and the specific measures and types of evidence group members agree are appropriate ways to know whether objectives they value have been achieved.

A focus on the group, coupled with reluctance to punish short-run individual failure, may encourage the group itself to be concerned with contributing to goal-related effectiveness of its members. Moreover, there is evidence that individuals draw satisfaction from the success of the group which, in turn, encourages cohesion and collaboration (Shaw, 1960). And emphasizing group performance in evaluation processes may provide a base from which intergroup competition can be induced. Administrative responsibility for personal evaluation in effect screens the individual from environmental threat. There are two reasons why this is important: (a) to encourage the individual to interact with clients and to develop
task-related commitments outside the work group, and (b) to facilitate evaluation of individuals over time so as to encourage personal growth and permit a time perspective that can reward adaptiveness in terms of long-term, rather than short-run, impact.

As noted earlier, the logic of adaptive schools will be undermined by evaluation that focuses on process rather than the development of children. Product objectives are those derived from organizational goals, as contrasted with various means that might be seen as advancing such goals.

Summary and Comment

This section argues that a predisposition to behave adaptively depends on the recognition that one is not performing to the standards one values. I have argued, in effect, that information-intensive school environments, which focus attention on the possibilities of new goals and/or new processes for achieving old goals foster adaptiveness.

Fostering an awareness that one might be more than one is and that progress toward the fulfilment of one's role expectations can be achieved is a motivational process similar to that which Argyris (1964) and others believe releases and sustains the individual's contribution of psychological energy to the attainment of organizational goals. This process, of course, produces tension, and the stress a person experiences can lead to dysfunctional behavior and not to adaptiveness depending on the individual's assessment of the relative costs and benefits one will incur in becoming and staying adaptive.

The higher the costs and the lower the benefits, the narrower the gaps between perception of one's present performance and one's expectations should be to avoid low morale, frustration, passivity and other forms of counter-productive activity. It is difficult to predict how wide the achievement gap should be to induce adaptive behavior; the ability
to deal creatively with tension apparently varies with certain personality characteristics such as self-esteem, authoritarianism and assertiveness.

Potential Costs of Adaptiveness

Adaptiveness requires the development of a repertoire of various approaches to teaching, the recurrent assessment of the needs and capabilities of individual students, the selective application of techniques on an individual basis, the evaluation of the effectiveness of these applications, the reevaluation of one's abilities and the assessment of ways those abilities that need strengthening can be enhanced. The costs involved in achieving and maintaining such behavior can be thought of as technical and psychological. Technical costs are those associated with the development and renewal of the ability to do these things. I use the term "psychological costs" here very loosely to include perceived loss of social esteem, status, and power, loss of self-esteem or self-confidence, frustration and the like.

Technical Costs. As noted earlier, being adaptive requires the constant gathering and processing of new information, and I have discussed ways to reduce the costs of acquiring such information in the previous section.

Potential Psychological Costs.

Role uncertainty.

People vary in their ability to tolerate ambiguity, but most of us seek to minimize uncertainty in our relationships with others and in our perception of the tasks for which we are responsible. The absence of such definition can lead to internal tension and to group conflict. In adaptive organizations, tasks would be various, diffuse, and changing, while goals are often multiple and general.
Responsibility.

Adaptive schools would necessarily provide the individual teacher with considerable autonomy, but also with considerable responsibility for the attainment of organizational goals. When teachers play a central role in determining the character of the school and what goes on in the classroom, the "failure" of students to meet the teacher's expectations can only be assigned to students or to themselves. Often teachers feel the failure personally.

The willingness to act, particularly to take new initiatives, is related to one's sense of competence (Argyris, 1964). Thus, broadening the scope and depth of one's responsibilities, even if desired by the worker, could result in a conservative approach to work and a sense of importance. The more serious the individual believes the consequences of possible failure to be, the more likely it is that he will avoid coming to grips with the problem he faces. This avoidance of responsibility can take many forms. First, it may result in efforts to reduce autonomy—such as centralizing authority, establishing standard operating procedures, insisting on stronger leadership, and losing professional confidence and self-esteem. Second, it may focus attention on those aspects of the jobs where success is most readily measured (Thompson, 1967), such as securing classroom discipline. This, in turn, may trivialize quality control and encourage routinization, denial of one's feelings, ritualization of tasks, narrowing of responsibility and specialization, transference of initiatives to others, and denial of personal effectiveness (Menzies, 1960; and Lipsky, 1980).

Adaptiveness requires individual treatment of students, and this may lead to a heavy identification with students. Personalization of teaching coupled with excessive aspirations can lead to frustration and anxiety.
Professional Embarrassment.

What teachers do in their classrooms is only vaguely known by other teachers. Deviant practices or special interests are generally known, but the nature of interaction with students goes largely unobserved and unreported. Adaptiveness, however, requires considerable interaction, frank discussions of problems, observation by others and feedback on effectiveness. Thus, efforts to organize so as to secure and sustain adaptiveness will expose teacher behavior to the scrutiny of others. Teachers who are least secure about their abilities and those who are in fact less effective may experience professional embarrassment.

Threats to Authority by Parents and Students.

Teachers can assert authority and seek control of their classroom by denying the legitimacy of demands of others and by so structuring classroom events that acceptable student behavior is well defined and readily determinable. Adaptiveness requires that teachers grant students, as well as parents, the right to suggest objectives and question teaching strategies. For some teachers this will increase their sense of vulnerability. Students in adaptive classrooms will see various standards and emphases applied to their peers and should experience less authoritarian behavior. Some students may interpret a teacher's responsiveness to student preferences, and the opportunity to question why they are asked to do things, as a breakdown in authority. Adaptive teachers do, in effect, surrender some power to students.

And, it seems likely, at least in the short-run, that adaptiveness will undermine methods of student control employed in many so-called traditional classrooms. Of course, if teaching effectiveness reduces disruption and nonpurposive behavior, adaptiveness will not be costly in this sense. Authority in this case will derive not from position per se but from the contributions teachers make to student development.
Reducing Psychological Costs

Many of the costs identified with adaptiveness can be resolved by the same mechanisms we would establish to keep people open to the possibility that there are problems to be solved. Feedback and developmentally-oriented evaluation together with opportunities for interaction and support and resources for solving perceived problems seem to hold the answers. In the concluding pages of this section, I will identify some additional factors relating to the role of leaders and the nature of the organizational structure that should help either to minimize the costs of adaptiveness or to facilitate adaptation to potential sources of stress.

Potential Benefits From Adaptiveness

Potential Rewards Deriving From the Effectiveness of Adaptive Schools.

In section III, the case was made for the link between adaptive teaching and student political learning. In the final section of the paper, I will indicate that adaptive teaching—or responsive flexibility—is related to cognitive learning as well.

Teachers benefit in several ways from their own effectiveness: (1) it enhances their self-confidence and self-esteem, (2) it is likely to bring social approval of colleagues, (3) it enhances the prestige of the teachers among parents and other "lay parents," (4) it carries the reward of having achieved a highly valued goal, and perhaps, (5) it reduces tension between students and teachers and the likelihood of disruption. Further, a teacher's sense of his own professional competence seems to be more flexible and open to change.

All of this depends, of course, on: (1) the teachers awareness of (or faith in) their own success (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971), and (2) others having knowledge of (or belief in) that success. This, in turn, depends on the nature of the evaluation system and the linkage of
incentives to them. I will return to these very complex issues below.

Rewards Deriving from Structural Characteristics of Adaptive Schools. Adaptive schools will be characterized by certain organizational arrangements and leadership styles which I will outline below. These characteristics offer rewarding opportunities over and above their impact on teaching effectiveness. Such opportunities include: (1) access to colleagues and social approval, (2) increases in one's role in decision-making, and (3) professional discretion in the development of teaching approaches and classroom management.

Implications for School Organizations and Educational Administration

There are certain general implications of the foregoing analysis for how schools might be organized and for general directions that educational administration should take so as to secure maximum adaptiveness. As before, I have constrained this analysis to the motivational field which teachers experience directly, and the following discussion is also subject to that constraint. Important issues like the role of school board politics, the impact of superintendents and their staffs, inter-organizational competition, the incentives principals have to be adaptive, and the policies of other governments will go untouched here.

The Role of Teachers in the Governance of Adaptive Schools. The available literature suggests that organizational environments which are most effective in motivating people whose jobs require them to deal creatively with uncertainty and to respond flexibly and spontaneously to a variety of problem-solving demands generally provide these people with (a) a role in the development of organizational policies relevant to their work, (b) some autonomy in setting individual goals and substantial freedom in determining the means to achieve those goals, and (c) opportunities for professional interaction.
It follows from these conclusions and from research on the traits of motivated and effective teachers (Jackson, 1968: Ch. 4) that adaptive schools should:

1. Be organized so as to provide teachers with substantial opportunities for making key decisions within the school.
2. Minimize status differences within the school and avoid formal differentiation of staff authority (Cohen, 1975).
3. Minimize organizational constraints on the individual behavior of teachers.

Guidelines for Leaders. It should be clear from previous discussions that conventional models of asservice, take-charge leadership are not appropriate to adaptive schools. The leadership role should be that of the facilitator rather than coach or taskmaster.

As suggested above, evaluation of individuals seems best carried out and least likely to be resisted if rewards or sanctions are not directly associated with it. Such rewards or penalties are best administered by persons who are not members of the immediate organization or subunit, or, at least, who do not have responsibilities for faculty development.

The clearer one's goals, the greater the likelihood of adaptive behavior. Administrators should, therefore, be concerned with assisting teachers, individually and collectively, to clarify and assign priority to their own objectives and to specify goals for their students. Administrators who take this responsibility seriously will be in a position to facilitate the interaction of teachers with similar objectives.

The propensity of teachers to avoid goal specification and readjustment might be reduced if leaders (1) seek to identify differences in the objectives of individual group members and to raise questions about their compatibility, and (2) foster continual feedback of both subjective and
objective information about the capacity of both individuals and groups

to meet their stated objectives. One relevant norm that leaders can help

group develop is the desirability of self-assessment and recurrent

evaluation by peers. Another is the inherent value of participation and

of defiant ideas to group decisions. This norm is particularly important

when there is status incongruence in the group. Finally, as Blau (1955)

suggests, it is possible that organizations can develop ideological com-

ments to seek out and achieve new goals. This can lead to the view that

change is good in itself, but if emphasis is placed on the consequences of

the change, rather than rewarding changes in processes themselves, this

problem may be uncontrollable.

Leaders should discourage the notion that they have the answer, however

attractive it might be to be thought of as the source of wisdom. They

should foster, instead, norms which support openness, the right and

obligation of each member to observe and comment on the work of others,

the distribution of leadership tasks to more than one member of the

group, and the desirability of power-sharing on an ad hoc basis.

As implied earlier, leaders need to manage the levels of tension

that result from the identification of what I have called performance gaps.

But how? As Deutsch (1968: 272) observes, the results of studies dealing

with the effects of tension are not definitive, but "The safest

generalization seems to be that mild stress often improves group

performance and increases cohesiveness while severe stress often has the

opposite effects." What is needed is what March and Simon (1958) call

"optimum stress." The problem, of course, is to predict the point of

diminishing returns. Among the factors that might determine how much

stress can creatively be dealt with are: (1) the turbulence of the

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environment, (2) the self-confidence and cohesiveness of the group, (3) commitment to organizational goals by group members, (4) the nature of technical demands of the tasks that must be performed, (5) organizational resources (including teacher skills), and (6) the personality of individual group members.

V

CAN WE HAVE IT ALL?

Apparent Dilemmas and Conflicting Priorities

If we were able to (1) define the set of behaviors I have called responsive flexibility, (2) have teachers capable of behaving that way who are predisposed, in principle, to acting accordingly, and (3) structure schools to facilitate and encourage adaptiveness, we would still have to deal with teacher beliefs that other goals they give higher priority to than citizenship goals require behaviors and structures that are different than those associated with responsive flexibility.

This is not a hypothetical concern. While most teachers would probably agree with the need to promote democratic values, they appear to see two other goals as being more central to their role: the learning of "basic" academic subjects, such as reading and mathematics (Rohrkemper and Brophy, 1979), and the maintenance of orderly, non-disruptive schools and classrooms. No doubt most parents agree with them (Gallup, 1979).

The issue we need to resolve, therefore, is whether classroom discipline can be maintained and reading, writing and mathematics can be taught with the same structures and behaviors that seem to promote the internalization of democratic values.

*Mark Smiley assisted in the preparation of this section.
Recent Research on Effective Teaching and Classroom Management

Spurred by studies such as the so-called Coleman Report (1966) and Inequality (Jencks, et al., 1972) that undermined the secular faith in the importance of schools and educators, foundations and government agencies gave birth to a significant body of research on school effectiveness. The results of the dragon-slaying efforts now show, beyond much doubt, that schools and teachers do, indeed, "make a difference."

It is not, however, easy to summarize this new research on school conditions and teacher behaviors that promote academic achievement and good classroom management. Such efforts at synthesis have been made, but they have been limited thus far to lists of propositions. We do not have comprehensive models that suggest how structures and processes interrelate most effectively and how such relationships might vary by the age, previous achievement, social background and sex of the children involved. Moreover, not all of the propositions that can be derived from this research are consistent with each other.

Nonetheless, this literature seems to emphasize the importance of structuring student learning situations so as to maximize time spent in learning well defined lessons, teacher control of the classroom and the need to minimize disruption (Brophy, 1979b; Bloom, 1980; Stallings, 1979; Berliner, 1979; Esty, 1979; Coulson, 1977; Soar and Soar, 1979), strong administrative leadership (Austin, 1978; Brookover and Lezotte, 1979; Coulson, 1977; Kean, et al., 1979); and the low "productivity" of most individualized instruction (Stallings, 1979; Kean, et al., 1979; Brophy, 1979b). There are, however, different assessments of the effectiveness of individualized instruction (cf. Coulson, 1977) that may reflect differences in the definition and in its implementation (BTES, 1978).
On first consideration, these characteristics of effective schools seem to be contrary to those I have associated with responsible flexibility. But the differences may be more apparent than real. Teacher control is surely preferable to the laissez faire or disruptive classroom, and the leadership patterns that are suggested by this research, while not well specified in most studies, suggest that principals who actively support teachers, rather than "take charge," are most effective in facilitating the academic achievement of students.

Conditions Fostering Academic Achievement That Appear to Support the Development of Democratic Values

This is not the place to work through the new literature on school and teacher effectiveness and classroom management in an effort to reconcile it with the thesis of this paper. Let me, instead, highlight some conclusions from some of these studies that suggest that academic achievement and effective classroom management require conditions that seem likely to foster the learning of democratic values.

I want to focus here on academic achievement so let me briefly deal with the literature on classroom management by citing from a recent synopsis of this research by Jere Brophy (1979b). Brophy argues that a comprehensive approach to classroom management must include attention to relevant student characteristics and individual differences, preparation of the classroom as an effective learning environment, organization of instruction and support activities to maximize student engagement in productive tasks, development of a workable set of housekeeping procedures and rules for conduct, techniques of group management during active instruction, techniques of motivating and shaping desired student behavior, techniques of resolving conflict and of dealing with personal adjustment problems, and orchestration of all these elements into an internally consistent and effective system.
This prescription sounds rather like a list of many of the behaviors we would expect of teachers who are responsive and flexible.

With respect to conditions that the research suggests fosters academic achievement, the following seem to be consistent with responsive flexibility on the part of teachers and the organizational characteristics of schools I have argued would support such behavior:

- A combination of teaching techniques with the mix depending on the subject matter, grade level and the diversity of students (Kean et al., 1979; Coulson, 1977; Brophy, 1979b; BTES, 1978).

- An emphasis on equality of educational opportunity (Coulson, 1977).

- Sustained interactions between students and teachers that require students to be active learners (McDonald, 1976; Stalling, 1979).

- Creation of a classroom environment which is warm and democratic (Berliner, 1979; Haertel, 1979) wherein students take responsibility for the classroom and work together to attain common academic goals (BTES, 1978; Slavin and Madden, 1979).

- Acceptance of the concept of accountability and a willingness on the part of teachers to take responsibility for outcomes (Brookover and Lezotte, 1979).

- Fairness in classroom administration and distribution of rewards and penalties (Haertel, 1979; Soar and Soar; 1979).

- Individualized (Brophy, 1979a) or small group feedback and reward systems that help avoid stereotyping (Slavin and Madden, 1979) and provide students with opportunities for success (BTES, 1978).

- Opportunities for teachers to try new things and to experience professional interaction and joint problem-solving (Austin, 1978).

- High teacher expectations for students regardless of their ability level, race, sex or socioeconomic background (McDill and Rigsby, 1978; Brookover, et al., 1979; Coulson, 1977; BTES, 1978).

Conclusion

It appears that there are a broad range of activities that contribute to academic achievement and orderly classrooms which either reflect or support responsive flexibility among teachers. To be sure, this argument would be more convincing if the various behaviors and conditions just reviewed could be integrated into a dynamic model of teacher activities and school organization. And it would be useful to examine the effects of
this model on academic achievement and democratic values simultaneously. While little of the research cited above explicitly deals with affective learning, there is growing evidence that different approaches to what is called "cooperative learning" have positive effects on both achievement and race relations (Slavin and Madden, 1979).

In short, while it seems rather pollyanna to say it, there appears to be a body of knowledge which, if developed further and translated into specific practices teachers can implement, will allow us to have it all. The key to having it all seems to me to depend on the extent to which we better understand the role of teachers in education. If that seems an obvious thing to say, why have we been unwilling to devote the resources and commitment necessary to improve teaching effectiveness? Instead, educational reform efforts invariably ignore or understate the need to improve the quality of teaching. Educational reformers—whether their focus has been on curriculum development, desegregation, sex equity, school finance, attacks on teenage unemployment, or citizenship education—have treated teachers as background variables or as problems to be overcome.

I have tried to stress the importance of recognizing that if students are to learn more democratic values in school—and, by implication learn other aspects of citizenship—we need to find ways to encourage appropriate teacher behavior. And that, as I have argued, will require significant changes in schools.

The way teachers behave, along with the subject matter taught, the structure of schools and the way they are governed form the nation's civics curriculum. Others have referred to teacher behavior as "the hidden curriculum," but it is no more hidden to children than it is to its labelers. If teacher behavior results in political learning, and the research reported here shows that it does, it would seem warranted to devote at least as much attention to shaping the content of that behavior.
as we have to shaping the content of textbooks and other learning materials. Indeed, whatever the actual model state of affairs is in the nation's classrooms, it seems reasonable to conclude that those concerned with the future of democracy are likely to have less reason for concern about the content of the explicit or formal curriculum of any given school system than they will have about the potential political content of teacher behavior.
NOTES

1. This notion is similar to the idea that the child's relationship with his or her parents affects imitation. See Albert Bandura and Aletra C. Huston, "Identification as a Process of Incidental Learning," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 63 (1961); 311-318; and Robert Lane, "Fathers and Sons; Foundation of Political Belief," American Sociological Review 24 (1959); 502-511. The idea that affect toward school affects the responsiveness of students to teacher influence finds support from McPartland and Epstein.

2. Ehman (1969) also finds that supportive environments and open discussions decrease cynicism in whites but increases it in blacks, a phenomena not easily explained and worthy of further inquiry. Grossman (1974) reports that students in closed environments were more tolerant of dissent though his discussion indicates that he does not trust this finding, and the scale employed seems to encompass more than openness and to mix classroom and school-wide experiences.

3. Ehman (1973) has conducted a series of experiments using undergraduates to teach specific lessons to ninth graders. His findings are quite mixed and his methodology causes us to resist treating the findings as evidence on the effects of "professional" teachers on children in their own classrooms.

4. Persons interested in a more detailed description of the PRIM system and the procedures and criteria used for establishing the system's reliability may obtain such information by writing the author.

5. The PRIM system seems characterized by a high degree of reliability among the three observers describing the same classroom and for the same observer describing the same classroom environment at three different points in time. This instrument seems to focus on characteristics of the classroom environment which remain relatively stable over time. Attention was given to assure that the lessons observed dealt with social studies or a closely related topic (such as literature) to minimize variability in teacher behavior to different topics being taught. Presumably some teachers would teach math differently than social studies, and it seems very likely that the constancy of the interaction patterns we perceived from observation to observation does not characterize the classroom environment all of the time. More observations are desirable, and it would be interesting to know what factors account for variations in the dominant interaction pattern. The limited time we spent in each classroom is, nevertheless, the most extensive systematic record of teacher behavior and classroom structure employed in a large-scale study of political socialization.

6. I should acknowledge, in general terms, that the theoretical basis for controlling parental education is not well established with respect to the particular aspects of political learning being investigated here. As noted above, the linkage between political attitudes and values of parents and their children is more tenuous than earlier investigators thought, and the correlation of particular political beliefs to variations in levels of formal education is, on most issues, weak (cf. Stephens and Long, 1970).
7. Schools are not the only agents of socialization in which such discontinuity is found, of course. The family is an obvious example, as are work organizations.

8. Brief descriptions and evaluations of each of these approaches can be found in: Borg and Stone (1974); Borg, et. al. (1969); Saunders, et. al. (1975); and Wagner (1973).
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APPENDIX A

SCALES FROM STUDENT AND TEACHER QUESTIONNAIRES

STUDENT SCALES

Student Interest in the Ideas of Others

1. When we are learning about government, I wish the teacher would just tell us the right answers instead of asking everyone's opinion.

2. Kids who have strange ideas should keep quiet in class discussions.

3. When we talk about government or current affairs in class, I wish students had more chances to say what they think.

4. When I have a new idea, I like to find out what other students think about it.

5. I think I can learn something from what other students say during class discussions.

6. I enjoy listening to what other students say during class discussions.

Reliability = .51 (Cronbach's alpha coefficient)

Teacher Interest in Student Ideas

1. Our teacher respects our opinions and encourages us to express them.

2. Does your teacher let you express an opinion different from hers?

3. How often does your teacher let you explore your ideas and try out new ways of doing things?

4. My teacher is interested in my ideas.

5. My teacher gives me things to do that really make me think rather than things just to copy or look at.

Reliability = .64 (Cronbach's alpha coefficient)
Opportunity to Work With Others

1. Are there times when your teacher lets you work in small groups?
2. How often do different students get to be class or group leaders?
3. Does your teacher let you talk quietly in small groups?
4. How often do you have time during which you can move about in your classroom?
5. Does your teacher have you help each other in class?

Reliability = .53 (Cronbach's alpha coefficient)

TEACHER SCALE

Teacher Discussion of Political Issues

1. Explain to the class reasons why people prefer one party over another in a national election.
2. Explain why atheists believe as they do.
3. Argue in class against the censoring of literature by those who feel it is controversial or immoral.
4. Speak out in class against political groups you consider to be anti-American or radical.
5. Explain to the class the arguments for the nationalization of large privately owned industry.
6. Allow the distribution of free enterprise literature put out by the Stock Exchange or the National Chamber of Commerce and banking groups.
7. Describe to the class the basic tenets of Communism.
8. Speak out in class in opposition to discrimination against women.
9. Explain to the class why some people join unions.
10. Speak out in class against racial discrimination.
11. A teacher should feel free to tell her students how she personally feels about important public issues.

Reliability = .66 (Cronbach's alpha coefficient)
Encourage Student Interaction

1. Students have to get permission from the teacher to talk to another student.

2. Should a teacher let students talk quietly in small groups?

3. How often should students have time during which they can move about in their classroom?

4. A teacher should encourage students to help each other in class.

Reliability = .69 (Cronbach's alpha coefficient)

Response alternatives for items in Most Student Scales and Teacher Scales are, depending on which is grammatically correct, as follows:

1. Almost Always
2. Often
3. Sometimes
4. Seldom
5. Almost Never
   or
1. I strongly agree
2. I agree
3. I am not certain
4. I disagree
5. I strongly disagree