This document records the proceedings of a conference on the effects of collective bargaining on school administrative leadership. The conference brought together participants from two areas of research that usually operate independently—research on collective bargaining and research on school administrative leadership. The conference was divided into three sessions. The first, dealing with the effects of collective bargaining on educational policy, focused on the formal statements on matters of policy being written into teacher contracts. Presentations were made and discussed concerning the increasing inclusion of policy provisions in contracts and the reluctance of administrators to take assertive stances regarding policy interests. The second session, on the effects of collective bargaining on personnel relations, concentrated on the informal relationships between administrators and teachers through which policy is actually implemented. Special attention was paid to the work relationships of elementary school principals. The final session looked at the effects of collective bargaining on teaching conditions and included presentations on and discussions of three research projects. These projects studied the time allocation patterns of teachers with and without collective bargaining, the sensitivity of teachers to salary benefits, and changes in teachers' work attitudes caused by collective bargaining.

(PGD)
THE EFFECTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERSHIP
Proceedings of a Conference held on
July 9-10, 1982
at the
Center for Educational Policy and Management

Edited by
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Preface

This volume is a record of the proceedings of a conference on "The Effects of Collective Bargaining on School Administrative Leadership," held at the Center for Educational Policy and Management, University of Oregon, on July 9 and 10, 1982. The conference was supported in part by funds from the National Institute of Education. It marked the culmination of three years' research at the Center on collective bargaining and addressed the agenda of the Center's research program on administrative leadership. The theme of the conference grew out of a paper presented at the Center's 1981 Conference by Susan Moore Johnson of Harvard University, and CEPM staff were happy to have Dr. Johnson back this year as a reactor.

The conference brought together a heterogeneous and stimulating group of participants. This heterogeneity reflected the independence of research on collective bargaining--often conducted by labor relations experts, lawyers, economists, and political scientists--and that on school administrative leadership--usually conducted by professors of education. Results of the conference's efforts to juxtapose and cross-fertilize these fields of research were encouraging.

In addition, the conference provided a setting for discussion between researchers in general and people working in collective bargaining and school administration. Panels included a school superintendent, a representative of both NEA and AFT, and a negotiator for a state school board association.

The conference was divided into three sessions dealing with the effects of collective bargaining on educational policy, personnel relations, and teaching conditions, respectively, because those are three foci of school
administrative leadership. A final session summarized and compared the assertions made by presenters and suggest directions for future CEPM research.

The proceedings were compiled from transcripts of participants' remarks. The editors wish to thank Terri Williams and Linda Lumsden for their assistance in preparing, editing, and abridging the copy. In addition, we are grateful to CEPM faculty Ellen Kano, Jane Arends, and Richard Carlson for chairing panels. Credit is due Eileen Raymund-Wooten, Randy Wardlow, Mary Ann Rees, and Glen Giduk for helping to organize and manage the conference. Finally, the continuing support of Robert Mattson, director of CEPM, and Gail MacColl, CEPM's institutional monitor at NIE, has been essential to the conference's success.
Session I

Effects of Collective Bargaining on Educational Policy
This session focused on the formal statements on matters of policy that are being written into teacher contracts. In the opening address, "An Overview of the Evolution of Collective Bargaining and Its Impact on Education," Steven M. Goldschmidt, professor of education at the University of Oregon, presents evidence of the increasing inclusion of educational policy provisions in collective bargaining contracts. Further, Goldschmidt suggests that unions will increasingly make policy demands.

The reluctance of school administrators to take an assertive stance regarding policy interests is a theme advanced by two other CEPM researchers, Don Brodie, professor of law at the University of Oregon, and Peg Williams, also a lawyer and research associate at CEPM. Brodie and Williams have analyzed symptoms of faulty contract language in the records of arbitration hearings to develop guidelines for writing contracts that will, in Brodie's words, "contain the policies that the parties want...in a way that is useful in day-to-day administration, in the grievance mechanism, and in the next round of negotiations."

Discussants of these presentations were Sondra Williams, an organizational specialist who works out of the National Education Association office in Burlingame, California, and Lorraine McDonnell, social scientist at the Rand Corporation, whose 1979 report (with Anthony Pascal) "Organized Teachers in American Schools" was a precursor of the present Goldschmidt study.

Williams argued that policy clauses in contracts represent the legitimate interests of teachers in educational governance. Furthermore, where such clauses seem to restrict the discretion of the school principal, this may (contrary to Brodie and Williams' assertion) represent the strategy of the district superintendent rather than that of the teachers.

McDonnell turned the discussion to the likely shift of the locus of policy making from district contract negotiations to state legislation. She argued that the remedy to the problem identified by Goldschmidt lies not in placing restrictions on the scope of collective bargaining but in opening up the policy questions to the political process at the state level.
An Overview of the Evolution of Collective Bargaining and Its Impact on Education

Steven M. Goldschmidt
Professor of Education, University of Oregon
Current Research: Effects of Collective Bargaining on the Education of Handicapped Children

In the following remarks, I would like to:

1. Review the reasons for the rapid growth of collective bargaining in education and its success in remedying several concerns that cause teachers to organize;

2. Identify the extent and impact of bargaining over matters of educational policy;

3. Review the competing theoretical arguments in support of and against teacher policy bargaining;

4. Describe the linkages between policy bargaining outcomes and effective schools, based upon very tentative findings of research we are conducting; and

5. Discuss implications for future research.

In the course of the remarks, I will draw on my present research, with colleagues Max Riley, Bruce Bowers, and Leland Stuart, that investigates the effects of teacher collective bargaining on programs for the education of handicapped students. We have completed a detailed analysis of one-half our national sample of eighty current contracts. This sample was drawn from districts with a pupil enrollment of 15,000 or more and stratified according to the affiliation of the teacher union (National Education Association, American Federation of Teachers, or Independent) and the legality or illegality of teacher strikes in particular states. We have
identified provisions with both direct and indirect impact on the education of handicapped students. We believe that those with indirect impact may have far-reaching implications for the general student population. To date we have conducted only pilot interviews with personnel from districts with contracts containing interesting provisions. These interviews indicate that contract provisions do, in fact, influence educational practice and administrative work.

I. The Reasons for the Growth of Collective Bargaining

It is appropriate to begin our discussion with a review of the reasons for the growth of collective bargaining in education, for William James (1934) said, "We live forward, ... but we understand backwards." Though currently widespread, teacher collective bargaining laws are recent origin. The first public sector collective bargaining laws were enacted in New York and Wisconsin in 1959 and 1960. By comparison, private sector workers have had bargaining rights guaranteed since the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. Once enacted, collective bargaining legislation allowed the organization of public employees to proceed at a pace far outstripping the rate of organization among private sector workers. Presently, the combined NEA and AFT membership accounts for 90 percent of the public school teachers in the United States, although only 64 percent of these teachers bargain--i.e. teach in states which mandate or permit bargaining. Teachers are more extensively organized than either the steel or construction industries (Kerchner et al. 1981).

The recent development of collective bargaining in education may be explained by a number of reasons including:
1. Modification of the sovereign immunity doctrine.

2. Threats to teacher job security coupled with inflation's effect on salaries.

3. Increased teacher concern over their access to and influence over educational policy decisions.

4. Changes in social conditions and work force demographics.

None of these reasons is more important than the judicial and legislative modification of the sovereign immunity doctrine. As it applies to labor relations, sovereign immunity refers to the government's power to fix, through law, the terms of its employees' employment. In the case of public schools, the people are sovereign but have delegated their governing powers to their elected representatives—the school board. The school board is responsible to the public. The school board acts in trust and historically could not redelegate its power to set conditions of employment to labor organizations. Therefore, contracts between school boards and teacher unions represented an illegal delegation of sovereign constitutional powers. The sovereign immunity doctrine attempted to maximize the public's right to make all public policy decisions. This constitutional concept had the effect, and still does in a number of states, of prohibiting public employee collective bargaining.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity was modified when state legislatures and courts decided that it was appropriate to allow citizens to sue their state and local governments for personal injuries. Once modifications to the doctrine were made, teacher unions along with other labor organizations applied political pressure and persuaded public bodies—state legislatures in particular—to allow employees to bargain over
terms and conditions of employment. As a result, rights granted to teachers have increasingly approximated those obtained by private sector employees under the National Labor Relations Act. There are, however, several reasons in addition to modification of the sovereign immunity doctrine which explain the development of teacher unionism in recent years.

Importantly, for example, organization among public employees during the 1960s represents a response to the fact that their economic position—when compared to private sector workers—had eroded over the fifteen years following World War II (Shaw and Clark 1977). By the early 1970s, organized teachers had recouped their losses and, having done so, were reasonably pleased with their position (Orr 1976). But, if teachers felt secure, their sense of security undoubtedly wavered by the late 1970s, as their positions were threatened by declining and shifting enrollment and their salary gains began to be offset by inflation.

Teachers' concern about effectively influencing educational policy decisions also encouraged organization of the work force. Teachers perceived themselves to be excluded from important decisions affecting their employment while other interest groups, such as taxpayer leagues, civil rights organizations, censorship groups, and the "moral majority," organized and attacked the efforts of schools and questioned teacher effectiveness. In response, teacher organizations provided a means for enhancing teacher involvement in educational policy decisions.

Changes in social conditions and work force demographics also facilitated the growth of collective bargaining. By the mid-1960s, the average age of the teacher work force had declined, the proportion of males had increased, and more men and women from varied occupational, racial, and
ethnic backgrounds had become public school teachers. They entered the profession amid a decade of protest that began with the civil rights movement and crescendoed with the Viet Nam War. In context, then, teacher organization and militancy represented only a small portion of the national energy devoted to expression of interests and the critique of social and political deficiencies.

Furthermore, we who have barely managed to survive more than a decade of pop psychology may too readily forget that the previous generation was raised on literature critical of organizations. The decade began with The Lonely Crowd (1950) and ended with Growing Up Absurd (1960). In between, there were rebels, organization men, and flannel suits. And a future President of the United States sketched life profiles that lauded courage of conscience in the face of popular rule or even party discipline.

Simultaneously, public employees grew to represent more than one-fifth of this country's work force while teachers and other educators grew to represent almost one-half of the public employee work force. This growth made it clear to teachers and teacher organizations that they were potentially a significant political force—a fact no longer contested.

These changes in work force demographics and socio-political conditions, teacher concern over professionalism and their role in educational policy, and threats to salary and job security all joined to facilitate the growth of teacher unionism—a growth which, as Jerry Wurf (1976) has said, can only be described as "spectacular" when compared with the decline in private sector unionism. Even more important, however, is the evidence which suggests that teacher unions have in fact remedied many of the concerns that caused teachers to organize.
As the subtitle of one recent research study indicates, unionism now pays (Baugh and Stone 1982). Although the precise level of improvement is difficult to establish, Baugh and Stone indicate that in 1977 teachers represented by labor organizations increased their salaries between 12 and 21 percent more than teachers who did not bargain. Further, all teachers taught fewer students. For example, between 1971 and 1978, a time when student enrollment in public elementary and secondary schools declined by 7.6 percent, the number of public school teachers increased by 6.2 percent. This decline in the numbers of students and increase in the number of teachers lowered the pupil-teacher ratio from 22.3 in 1971 to 19.4 in 1978 (Grant and Eiden 1981). According to Eberts and Pierce (1982), teacher unions negotiated even lower teacher-pupil ratios.

Though the influence of organized teachers may be important in areas of salary and working conditions, their increased participation in educational policy decision making is more striking still. In fact, the incidence of teacher policy bargaining has increased more than research to date has indicated.

In 1979 McDonnell and Pascal published their important work detailing the incidence of bargaining over selected issues in large American school districts from 1970-1975. Evidence from the study we are now conducting suggests that bargaining over many of the issues examined by McDonnell and Pascal has increased substantially since the period they studied. Among these issues are reduction-in-force, involuntary transfer, class size, student discipline, and the use of grievance arbitration. Further, considerable bargaining now takes place over voluntary transfers, inservice training, and professional development, topics that McDonnell and Pascal
found almost nonexistent in their sample.

Our current research also indicates that whenever new policy issues are introduced in education, teachers will attempt, with marked success, to bargain over them. Apparently in response to recent federal and state legislation, significant percentages of teacher unions and school boards have negotiated policy provisions that directly affect programs for the education of handicapped students. Contracts now mandate teacher participation in decisions to place, transfer, and evaluate handicapped students; restrict the size of special education classes; regulate the number of mainstreamed handicapped students; and assure that special education professionals have discretion over the curriculum.

This expansion of policy bargaining accommodates teachers' desires for meaningful participation in significant workplace decisions and the management of public education. Simultaneously, however, the traditional political structure of school governance is distorted because policies derived through collective bargaining are no longer subject to the traditional influences of other interested community groups. To the extent that increased teacher influence is achieved at the expense of community involvement and/or support, the tensions and anxieties generated by the process of bargaining may be as significant as the resulting contract language. Therefore, it is important to review the competing theoretical arguments on teacher policy bargaining and consider the possible means for reconciling, or, if necessary, rationally selecting one theory on which to base the public's policy on teacher policy bargaining.
II. Competing Theories and Arguments on Teacher Policy Bargaining

A. Industrial Democracy

None of the forces discussed earlier—even in combination—would explain the rapid development of public employee organization, if such organization ran counter to some fundamental social value. But, as Mr. Justice Brandeis testified more than sixty years ago, "both democratic principles and the necessity for human dignity require that we recognize industrial democracy as the end toward which we must move." (Brandeis 1915). Certainly, there is no reason to believe that democratic practices are less important in schools than elsewhere. Likewise, teachers are no less vulnerable than other employees to the impersonal forces of bureaucratic specialization and separation.

Even Wellington and Winter (1971) acknowledge that public employees may make most of the same claims for collective bargaining that private sector workers make. Teachers may argue additionally that their training, their status as professionals, and the fact that they bear the brunt of public dissatisfaction and disregard, entitle them to workplace recognition (Moskow and others 1970). If teachers can be assumed to benefit from participatory opportunities, to need opportunities to practice democracy and not simply lecture about it, and if public school systems must rely upon teachers to exercise sound professional judgment and demonstrate strong commitment to their work, then it is obvious that collaboration between school boards and teachers in the area of educational policy is both desirable and necessary. This is particularly true since there is such strong public interest in maintaining harmony and continuity in public education services. So, why the tumult? Why should the idea and the practice of teacher collective bargaining force so many questions and
anxieties to the surface? Why would collective bargaining be listed in a recent survey as the primary concern of school board members and school administrators (Newby 1977)?

Some observers express concern that teacher salaries account for too great a proportion of school budgets and that teacher salaries represent the largest portion of the salary budget. As salary and benefit costs push toward 90 percent of public school budgets, that argument is understandable. Administrators fear loss of flexibility to develop curriculum, manage personnel, and assign students. Parents may complain about reduction in the length of the school year or school day. Bargaining, particularly when contracts are negotiated annually, takes a great deal of time and for some school districts may be the single most time-consuming function. Finally, some school managers simply disapprove of the process because they feel themselves overpowered, and as Kenneth Newby (1977) pointed out in a recent study, "No one likes an activity in which he thinks he will lose."

Ultimately undergirding much of the concern with collective bargaining is a dissatisfaction with how decisions are reached. Public employee collective bargaining rights are an extension of the private-sector workplace ideals; however, these rights have been granted to solve problems related fundamentally to employer-employee relationships. If collective bargaining also results in a distortion of the political process and a changed relationship between the public and its institutions, then questions are certain to be raised about the efficacy of the process.

B. Legal-Political Theory

Legal-political theorists have challenged the wisdom of fully
extending private sector concepts of industrial democracy into the public sector on the grounds that fundamental differences exist between public and private enterprises (Wellington and Winter 1971). The most important differences stem from the goals of the employers (Summers 1975) and from the interest of the public in the goods and services provided (Wellington and Winter). Management in the private sector is disciplined by market forces. In the event of an interruption of private goods or services, people's demands can contract for a time or they may find competitive substitutes elsewhere.

However, public services management is chiefly responsive to political forces and, as Clyde Summers (1975) has said, is influenced by "a whole culture of political practices and attitudes as to how government is to be conducted, what power public officials are to exercise, and how they are to be made answerable for their actions." Furthermore, public demand for public services is comparatively stable, and substitutes for public services are not readily available, at least not to families of only moderate economic means (Wellington and Winter 1971).

Therefore, Summers, Wellington and Winter, and others argue that while it is consistent with notions of industrial democracy to bargain teacher salaries and working conditions, allowing policy issues to be determined at the bargaining table threatens the integrity of the political process and inappropriately extends industrial democracy beyond its historical private sector application. They offer several propositions in support of their position.

First, decisions made at the bargaining table do not result from or have the advantage of the open multi-sided discussion of a public meeting.
School boards must bargain with teacher unions in good faith and reach either agreement or impasse. This process gives teachers special access to board members or their representatives, including the right (most often) to conduct negotiations alone and behind closed doors for as long as it may be necessary to reach agreement. The school board may not establish the agenda or any other particulars of the process. There is no question that a contract will result; the only question is how long it will take to reach agreement. In contrast, other citizens must approach the board in open public meetings and there be confronted by competing interest groups, including the teachers' organization. Access, for these other groups, merely means the right to make a presentation. There is little certainty of success.

Second, since management must commit its negotiated agreements to writing, the traditional prerogative of a governing body to reconsider its decisions in the light of new information is compromised. Any changes in working conditions or matters of educational policy covered by a contract must be negotiated with the union, thereby limiting the school board's responsiveness to changes in local conditions.

In most states, for example, a change in bus schedules that increases teacher contact time with students would require the district to bargain with teachers over the effects of that increased contact time. However, commitments made by the school board to other interest groups may be rescinded unilaterally. A school board could reverse a school closure decision or change a decision on the site for construction of a new school without meeting the requirement to negotiate the effects of such decisions on parents or other interest groups.

Third, Summers (1975) argues that the teacher union, as the
employees' exclusive representative, is able to speak from a more unified and authoritative position than other community groups with an interest in the educational process. The union has the resources and the manpower to respond effectively over time while community interest groups tend to operate on a volunteer basis and organize around single issues.

What is clear, then, is that teacher organizations have gained a particular and special capacity for influencing educational policy and practice. These special powers derive from the collective bargaining process. Of course, teachers also possess all the influencing mechanisms available to any other group as well: attendance at school board meetings, the election of school board members, the lobbying of administrators, and ultimately the ability to effectively influence state and federal governments. And though teachers may claim that their education, training, and experience warrants special consideration, one may also reasonably wonder whether full extension of private sector collective bargaining practices to public sector policymaking is appropriate.

Both the arguments that favor full extension of industrial democracy into schools and the arguments of democratic theory that question such an extension rest upon solid theoretical ground. Both positions are supported in law; each rests upon an important value. Unfortunately, however, the ramifications of selecting one position over the other are too important to permit arbitrary or doctrinal decisions.

Recent papers by Lorraine McDonnell (1981) and Charles Kerchner and others (1981) suggest possible means of reconciliation and demonstrate the persistent interest in the questions raised by the extension of industrial democratic practices into the public sector. McDonnell expresses concern
that the very nature of collective bargaining makes it resistant to citizen access and influence, and she has no confidence in proposals to open up the process, proposals that include "sunshine bargaining," citizen members at the bargaining table, and disclosure before, during, and after bargaining. She sees teacher gains coming at a slower rate than in the past—a position with which I take exception—and suggests the possibility that teacher organizations, interested in survival, may see it in their best interests to respond sensitively to community needs and desires. She indicates that "the alternative bureaucracy of teacher organizations can be used as a positive force in school districts." Failing the exercise of responsiveness, in those instances where teacher interests simply do not coincide with the interests of other groups, she favors the acceleration of the movement of decision-making to the political arena, rather than at the bargaining table.

McDonnell is aware, however, that what she suggests will have the important, unintended consequence of reducing local control over education. To the degree that teacher organizations are required to operate in the more open, traditional political arena at the state level, and thereby allow citizens to recapture a sense of control, decisions will be removed from the local level. Thus, according to McDonnell, in order to regain participatory opportunities we may simply have to discard many long held conceptions of local control of schools.

Kerchner and his associates looked in a different direction—at parents rather than teachers—and found different grounds upon which to resolve the clash between unions and citizen participation. Like McDonnell, they acknowledge that collective bargaining restricts and even prohibits participation; also, they agree that there is no reason to believe that
opening up the bargaining process to citizens will resolve the issues raised by legal-political theorists. However, rather than focus their attention primarily upon the process of participation, Kerchner and his colleagues suggest that participation is not so important as long as people get what they want from schools.

As they draw a distinction between participation and influence and examine the results of 18 months of field observation in eight school districts, Kerchner and others point out that although citizens are removed from the bargaining process, they may still use traditional means to influence educational policy. They may approach the school bureaucracy to influence implementation of policy. They may, through the election process and the recall process—or the threat thereof—cause school board members to change positions, obtain new school board members, or change, through those threats, administrative implementation of policy. It is in everyone's interest, Kerchner and others argue, to be responsive to parent and community needs.

Taken together, the Kerchner and McDonnell analyses accomplish at least two important functions. First, they remind us that avenues do exist for citizen expression and influence. Second, they remind us just how much may have been lost because policy bargaining flourishes. McDonnell prepares us for some additional loss of local control. Kerchner and others tell us that unless we can approach the bureaucracy, we must look to dramatic remedies like school board elections and recall. This willingness to accommodate the apparent consequences of bargaining may be appropriate if and only if the outcomes of bargaining are consistent with the development of effective schools and maintenance of the capacity to create effective schools.
over the long run.

Nearly the entire body of research and comment on public sector collective bargaining addresses means rather than ends, including our own research, which links the bargaining process with contract outcomes. What is overlooked is that while contract outcomes may represent the ends of the negotiation process, they remain only a part of the means by which schools carry out the education of students. In order to make it possible to decide whether public schools can afford a fully extended concept of industrial democracy or must insist instead on the basic tenets of democratic decision-making in the policy arena, bargaining outcomes must be linked to the experience of students in schools.

As a step in this direction, I would like to review our analysis of several important contract provisions and suggest their tentative relationship to the effective schools literature. Specifically, I will speak to contract provisions on teacher selection and assignment, reduction in force, teacher evaluation, and class size.

III. Linking Bargaining and Instructionally Effective Schools

A. Staff Selection, Assignment, and Reduction in Force

Staff selection, assignment, and reduction in force are clearly potent issues in most school districts in this country today. Contract analyses reveal that a fairly consistent strategy for bargaining teacher assignment, transfer, and reduction-in-force policies has developed. Teacher unions in large school systems regularly bargain contract provisions that call for the use of seniority and certification as the reduction-in-force criteria. Various types of pools are established for purposes of teacher
reassignment. These include pools of teachers requesting voluntary transfer, excess teachers from reduced or eliminated programs, teachers involuntarily transferred from a school or program, and teachers laid off in the previous 12 to 60 months. Seniority and certification determine reassignment from the pools to the classroom. Such provisions appear in more than three-fourths of the contracts studied.

Commonly, the pools are prioritized through negotiations. School administrators seeking to fill instructional vacancies are required by contract to select from the highest priority pool the most senior teacher who meets minimal state certification standards for the vacant position. If there are no minimally certified teachers in the first pool, the administrator looks to the second priority pool, and so on. Only after administrative personnel have determined that no teacher in any pool meets certification standards for the position (and this decision is normally subject to the grievance procedure and binding arbitration) may a teacher new to the district be considered.

In a review of the research, Murnane (1980) concluded that teacher characteristics positively correlated with student achievement include high verbal I.Q., the quality of the college the teacher attended, and high expectations for students. In addition, he reported that some types of teachers work better with some types of students. The implications for practice are clear. If the effective schools research is any good (and we have some questions about it) then we ought to be following these prescriptions in our efforts to develop effective learning environments. However, in practice, the commonly negotiated criteria of seniority and certification will control. Research findings will not be terribly relevant.
Consider for a moment the implications of such contract provisions. Assume that in response to resource limitations a school district eliminates its drivers' education program—the effect of which is to lay off a teacher with 20 years of seniority who has taught driver education for 20 years. Further, assume that our teacher is certified to teach science and is senior to the fifteen-year teacher who is currently teaching advanced high school science courses. And finally, assume that our driver-education teacher has never taught science before. The senior teacher who has never taught science will be allowed to "bump" the incumbent. The incumbent will go into the RIF pool and await a science opening, unless of course the fifteen-year science teacher is certified to teach physical education and, although never having taught physical education, "bumps" the teacher who has taught physical education for ten years. While some will argue that my example is an extreme, variations on the same theme are increasingly common.

Having said this, I want to be clear in stating that seniority has a value. Its use may be more rational than vague assessments of merit and competence, particularly since school district teacher evaluations often do not provide a basis on which performance can be differentiated. Likewise, a commitment to seniority protects teachers from arbitrary administrative action and employment decisions. However, the effect of a seniority/certification standard for teacher retention and assignment is difficult to reconcile with what practitioners believe (and some researchers think they know) about effective learning environments. This may be particularly true when a contract combines a restrictive evaluation program with a seniority certification RIF standard.
B. Evaluation

According to the research, teachers in effective instructional settings have clear objectives, high expectations, and receive feedback about the quality of their performance. Traditionally, principals in effective schools have monitored and evaluated teachers (Brookover and Lezotte 1979; Kean and others 1979; Wellisch and others 1978). As I indicated a moment ago, principals have a declining part to play in teacher selection and assignment. It also appears that policy bargaining reduces the principal’s capacity to provide instructional assistance.

Our research identifies bargained agreements that are not congruent with recommended practice. Preliminary findings suggest that more than 90 percent of large American school districts bargain over the procedures principals may use in evaluation. More than 50 percent limit the criteria for evaluation to a single list of factors that must be used in all classes, at all levels of instruction, at all times. We find districts in which principals may formally evaluate teachers no more than once in every three, four, and even five years. In fact, almost half the bargained agreements restrict the frequency of evaluation of tenured teachers.

Further, there are prohibitions against unannounced classroom visits. Principals in some districts may enter classrooms without advance notice only in emergencies. Of course evaluation procedures, criteria, and frequency, once bargained, are almost universally subject to the grievance procedure and binding arbitration by a neutral third party. Therefore, even if the research findings on effective teacher characteristics and principal behaviors are confirmed, it is doubtful that administrators in large school districts will be able to put the information to use. As suggested earlier,
severe limitations on evaluation coupled with seniority/certification RIF provisions make it difficult for administrators to assign students to the teachers most able to facilitate achievement.

C. Class Size

The effective schools research reports that class size may make a difference under some circumstances (Hanushek 1972; Murnane and Phillips 1979). About 75 percent of large school district contracts contain class-size provisions. Careful analysis of contracts reveals that class-size bargaining falls into three significantly different categories. First, some class-size provisions, which appear on cursory examination to set class-size limits, are merely guidelines for desirable class sizes that the school board may follow at its discretion. They may appear to place limits on class size but they are not subject to the grievance procedure, binding arbitration or unfair labor practice actions and therefore cannot be enforced. Second, there are class-size provisions that prescribe a limit on class size with the proviso that, should the school district elect to exceed the limit, some form of compensation, such as money, aide time, or instructional material will be granted the teacher. Neither of these categories of provisions restrict school board discretion in determining student assignment and therefore do not rise to the level of policy.

However, provisions that place absolute limits on class size and subject them to binding grievance arbitration raise the class-size issue to the level of policy bargaining. Only in this instance is the board's authority restricted to the extent that important educational policy concerns are determined through the bargaining process.
The effective schools research demonstrates that when class size is reduced to 20 students or fewer, significant differences in student achievement in primary grade reading and math may be expected. However, class sizes of between 20 and 35 students have not been differentiated in terms of student achievement. Most class-size bargaining is concerned with class sizes between 25 and 40 students, not between 10 and 20. Therefore, contrary to the assertions of some, class-size bargaining is not normally related to student achievement. In short, in many instances, class size is not an educational policy issue. Rather, it is an economic issue.

What remains to be said about class-size bargaining concerns the expense associated with reducing class size. Is it warranted? To answer this question, one must weigh the alleged effect of such a reduction on teacher morale against the potentially enormous financial implication of decisions to reduce class sizes from, for instance, 35 to 30 students.

D. Other Examples

Beyond teacher selection and assignment, teacher evaluation, and class size, there are numerous other examples that demonstrate the relationship between negotiated contract provisions, effective schools, and appropriate educational policy. Our research suggests that teachers increasingly influence curriculum decisions through contract negotiations. In some school districts, teacher-administrator joint committees have the authority to make binding decisions on curriculum. We also see teacher-controlled committees that must approve any changes in district testing programs or any newly proposed curricula before such matters are considered by the school board.
In addition, we see large numbers of provisions directed at professional development and staff training. Most provide teachers with the right to make recommendations in this area. However, many are beginning to give teachers decision-making authority over staff development programs and their implementation.

Another example of the relationship between contract provisions and effective schools concerns is represented by Eberts and Pierce's (1982) recently completed study that finds that "the net effect of collective bargaining on teacher time is to reduce time spent in instruction by three percent during a typical day." The implication is that the potential time available for students to be on task is reduced. Therefore, such contract provisions may be inconsistent with the effective schools research. Since about one-half of this lost time is used for preparation time and parent conferences, I am not sure I agree that this connection between contracts and effective schools research is particularly powerful.

We have been more interested in the fact that bargaining fixes the way teachers spend their time and, hence, formally restricts administrators in their efforts to facilitate the development of effective learning environments.

E. The Effects of Collective Bargaining on Administrative Work

The primary effects of collective bargaining on school administration are concentrated at the school site. Kerchner (1979) tells us that collective bargaining has caused school district decision-making to become formalized, specialized, and centralized. The impact of these changes at the building level is only beginning to be described, but we believe that erosion
of the status and authority of school principals has occurred.

Under collective bargaining, school system decision-making is centralized in order to insure uniformity. Only by centralizing considerable decision-making authority once delegated to principals can the district hope to achieve the levels of consistency and equity required in the bargaining relationship and the contract management process.

Similarly, decision-making is formalized. Administrators must be more aware of the need to be able to defend decisions on rational grounds. They must know what the contract says and be prepared to defend deviations from contract prescriptions. Consideration of the individual circumstance and allowance for the exception becomes a luxury in the context of grievance arbitration. Administrators making gratuitous exceptions may be placed in disfavor with supervisors.

Finally, decision-making is more specialized. As more administrative decisions are subject to review for compliance with bargained rules and procedures, labor relations specialists, most without experience in education, assume more importance in the organization. Not only major decisions, but previously routine administrative activity may be grieved. Therefore, administrators learn it is safer to consult with or defer altogether to labor relations personnel. And so one hears the tired old song: "I can’t do anything until I check downtown." The song may be sung even when a teacher wants to volunteer for an activity. If the labor relations person is not in for a day or two, the opportunity may pass.

As noted earlier, building administrators may have also lost substantial capacity to select, assign, and evaluate personnel. Mitchell and others have pointed out that administrative discretion to assign teachers to
noninstructional duties has diminished or been eliminated. Similarly, attendance at inservice workshops and faculty meetings outside of the school day is voluntary. Moreover, other everyday matters once routinely handled by principals have become more complicated. If, because of a flat tire or sudden illness, a teacher is not able to meet a class on time, a principal may no longer simply assign someone to fill in for an hour or so until a substitute arrives. Instead, a principal must ask for volunteers and may have to arrange for compensation.

What implications do these bargaining outcomes have for administrative work? Clearly, one result is that the work of principals has become more rationalized. Mitchell and his colleagues (1981) conclude that principals are no longer able to use the free-wheeling, personality-based style so long associated with educational leadership. The effect is not universal, of course. Susan Moore Johnson (1981) reports the existence of charismatic principals who manage to hold the allegiance of teachers and are able to convince teachers to put forth the effort, whether required by contract or not, to get the job done. Yet, for the merely average or technically competent principal, the effects of bargaining may amount to what Perry (1979) calls "serious if not unsurmountable barriers for management."

It is ironic, I think, that the role and capacity of the principal would be so heavily influenced by collective bargaining at a time when the "old principal" is considered critical to the creation of "new effective schools."

IV. Directions and Implications for Future Research

We have considered only a few of the policy issues that school boards
and teachers are bargaining. Contrary to the prognostications of some, we believe policy bargaining will almost certainly increase in the future. Therefore, it will be necessary to continue our consideration of the public-policy questions associated with the tension between traditional democratic decision-making and concepts of workplace democracy.

To understand why policy bargaining will increase, we need simply consider the parties to the process and the social context in which bargaining takes place. Teachers want to bargain policy. Like other professionals, they expect to have authority to set the conditions under which their services are rendered. Further, in a society that places great value on expertise and generally defers to experts, teachers expect the public to defer to them in matters of educational policy.

These values and attitudes among teachers are not new; teachers have held them for years. The new variable is teacher unions. Unions are organizations and, as such, they aim to survive. For unions, survival means increasing, or at least maintaining, membership. In order to recruit and hold membership, unions must continually demonstrate their ability to achieve teacher goals, including the bargaining of policy decisions.

Bargaining, however, does not take place in isolation, and we may expect the social context to exert pressure on the process. Consider, for example, the role of the legislature in the state of Washington. In response to salary gains by teachers, legislators established a statewide salary schedule, thereby putting a lid on salaries and effectively removing salaries from consideration in local bargaining. With salaries removed from the table, unions may be expected to focus even more attention on achieving control of educational policy decisions in order to retain the support of
their members. School boards and administrators, required by law to bargain in good faith and prevented from giving ground on salaries, will experience increased pressure to make concessions on teacher policy demands.

Further, the economic environment has substantially affected bargaining in states like Oregon. Faced with 13 percent unemployment and large budget deficits, the unions are unable to bargain large salary gains. With economic items effectively removed from the table, the union and management have little left to discuss except the manner in which the educational program will be operated.

School board members will successfully resist union demands only to the extent that voters support such resistance. When the issues on the table are economic, voter opposition may be easy to generate since large wage increases can often be tied to large tax increases. However, when the issues are incremental, as in advancing union control over policy decisions, voter support for resistance, especially when faced with the inconvenience caused by a teacher strike, may quickly evaporate. The issues are often not well understood by the voters at first. Only later, when citizens realize they have lost the ability to influence a particular policy decision because it is determined by the teachers’ contract, is the public likely to react. School board members may therefore find themselves having to choose between either immediate or deferred voter displeasure. The long-term dissatisfaction will come if they trade off policy. The result may be similar to that in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, when suddenly the community realized that it wasn’t going to get any response either from the school administration or the school board on issues of school discipline and desegregation (Levine 1969).

In short, we may expect that educational policies will be
increasingly determined through negotiations. Therefore, we must continue our efforts to understand the effects of such bargaining on initiatives to develop more effective schools.

Certainly, there are perspectives other than ours and questions to be asked and answered that are different from the ones we find interesting. Nonetheless, for policy research to establish links between collective bargaining and effective schools, we offer the following recommendations and suggestions.

First, some definitions of policy will be more helpful than others. A definition that fails to connect to educational outcomes may misdirect. An example is the definition of policy included within the Center for Educational Policy and Management's paradigm—"the ongoing process of integration of purposes and intentions espoused by the variety of social groups and agencies possessing power over school operations" (Duckworth 1981). We believe that our definition—"the set of decisions that direct the development and implementation of educational programs"—has proven more useful. It is based upon decisions of Employment Relations Boards and Appellate Courts (Sutherlin Ed. Ass'n v. Sch. Dist. 1976), but we could be convinced of the need for modification. It might be helpful if a number of us shared a reasonably common definition. Ours need not stand.

Second, we have been reading contracts, and we think it is a very good idea to do so—not much fun, but a good practice. The most significant effects of policy bargaining cannot be understood by conceiving of collective bargaining agreements as loose aggregates of provisions that affect individual educational programs or by focusing on single provisions such as class size. Collective bargaining agreements can also be viewed—and reading
contracts in their entirety makes such a view inevitable—as expressions of school district commitments to particular educational strategies. Earlier I provided an example of this by linking contract provisions on selection and assignment of personnel, reduction in force, and personnel evaluation.

These educational strategies in districts can be identified and should be compared with factors identified in the literature as important to the creation and maintenance of effective schools. Research that establishes this relationship is necessary before collective bargaining can be linked directly to student achievement.

Having indicated that educational policy bargaining has increased, having argued that it will continue to do so, having suggested that we ought to spend some time defining policy, having questioned whether the principal we thrust forward to lead us into effective schools is a person who ever was or ever will be, I would like to conclude by offering two final observations:

First, policy research and research on the implications of collective bargaining are likely to be significant insofar as they relate to what goes on in individual school districts. Large comparative studies, such as the one we are conducting, are limited in their usefulness. School administrations, school boards, and particular communities need research that will enable them to make choices about what they are presently doing, what others are doing, and how their policy decisions are likely to affect student outcomes. Fundamentally, there is no reason to believe that citizens will be interested in either participation or influence unless they also understand that educational policy decisions matter.

Second, it seems that nearly all descriptions of collective bargaining processes indicate that local histories, relationships, and
particulars matter. McDonnell and Pascal indicated they were "dominant" (1979). I observe that it is "spozed" to be that way. I think that research might make it possible for communities to retain their capacity for diversity and experimentation. Wouldn't it be fine if, after all, work emanating from centers of educational research reminded people, in Whitehead's phrase, of "the aims of education?"
List of References


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In our project, Peg Williams and I first looked at a series of arbitration decisions involving school contracts. Later, we went back and looked at the contracts themselves and the way their language might be interpreted. Our basic premise was not to go into the theoretical aspects as much as Steve Goldschmidt did, but rather to look at a contract as something to be lived with. We considered the probable interpretation of a contract in order to inform people who administer the contract or who are involved in litigation or arbitration over the contract.

Our point of view, then, is that the contract is a working document to be used as such. Not everybody agrees with that point of view. For some, the contract is simply a document to be signed and gotten rid of as soon as possible. However, if you assume the contract is a working document, there are certain goals that you are going to seek to achieve through that document.

I would identify essentially four goals for the contract that would affect how you are going to attempt to bargain and how you are going to interpret it. First, and probably most important from the administrator's point of view, is that the contract seeks to achieve certain policy objectives. Whatever leave programs or reduction-in-force programs you negotiate, you will attempt to achieve certain substantive objectives so that personnel decisions can be made on a rational basis through the contract.
Administration of the contract is a second goal; hopefully, the contract will be written so that people at the building level have a document which allows them to read, understand, and interpret the policy objectives. Of course, if the contract is not readable or understandable at that level, then at least by our definition it is a bad contract. (Naturally, there are other definitions of a "bad contract.")

Another goal is that the contract will survive the grievance mechanism—mainly arbitration—in a way that is useful to whichever side is arguing the contract. From the school management side, this would be a contract that an arbitrator will interpret in a way that is consistent with policies adopted by the school board.

Our final goal would be a contract useful in future bargaining sessions. Ideally, each bargaining session does not go back to a clean slate and start over, but rather builds from the original document or the prior year's contract. By our definition, then, a good contract is one that contains the policies that both parties want and contains them in a way that is useful in day-to-day administration, in the grievance mechanism, and in the next round of negotiations.

Our project's task was to describe how to reach those goals. We've written maybe tens of thousands of words on that task, and one volume is published and hopefully another one will be. And if they aren't useful as descriptions of contracts, they're bound to be the nearest cure for insomnia.

In general, there are two ways to achieve those goals for contracts. One is to say a little, and the other one is to say a lot. Lots of people—adherents of the reserved rights theory—think that the best contract is a contract that says the least. On the other hand, if you are attempting
to achieve any of those goals, you are going to have to spell them out at some length in the contract. The less you say, the more trouble you may be in on certain topics. It is important to recognize that this is a negotiating process.

Now, it seems to me if you take the position that you want to say a good deal in the contract, then you come down to some of the considerations that we have been looking at:

What are the effects of certain kinds of language?  
What are the effects of leaving certain things vague?  
What are the effects of using numbers in certain ways?  
What are the effects of references to external law?  
What are the effects of using examples in various ways?

If you take a goal-oriented theory of the contract, then you would attempt to achieve these goals through the various provisions of the contract by using either specific language or no language at all, as the case may be. One of the things we looked at in the arbitration studies was the types of dispute that occur most frequently, as indicated in a report of arbitration decisions. And by way of the world's fastest summary of a couple of hundred pages of the book, the four most frequent areas of dispute turned out to be leaves, extra duty, transfer of assignment, and evaluations, in that order of frequency.

Whether those problem areas reflect the reality of day-to-day school operations is a different question. We studied only those arbitration cases reported by the American Arbitration Association so there can be all kinds of questions about the sample. Indeed we raise a number of questions in the book itself. But if those four are the problem areas, then those are the areas of the contract where you want to be particularly careful about the
language you use, the way you use it, the examples, the use of numbers, references to external law, and a variety of other things that go into making the contract.

My last point is that you should be realistic about the contract you have and the forum in which it is being used. The forum we looked at most was arbitration. Arguments have to be used very carefully in arbitration. The arbitrator lives in a world of reason—not in a world of day-to-day crisis, but in a world where things can be explained. The arbitrator lives in a world of substance and not procedure. Where the school district relies in arbitration on procedural defenses, I think that they are asking for defeat in at least half if not the vast majority of those cases. The arbitrator lives in a world defined by his or her own system. Arbitrators view themselves as professionals in the same way that lots of other folks do, and that has to be taken into account.

The arbitrator lives in a world of precedent, not first impressions. If anything warrants more study, it is that precedent is becoming an extremely important—perhaps the ultimate—criterion so far as arbitration is concerned. Arbitrators like to promote the notion that each case is unique. It turns out that the cases are not that unique in many respects—they can be predicted with a certain amount of accuracy.
I would add three observations to those Don Brodie has made from looking at contracts and contract language trends. First, running throughout many of the areas covered by the contract, I see a distinction between the substance or criteria of a personnel decision and the procedures used to make a personnel decision. Procedural rights are often found in the collective bargaining contract. They include such things as the right to notice and the right to a statement of reasons. An example would be advance notice of the date for evaluative observations and the right to respond or object to an evaluation. Procedural rights are also common in transfer provisions and, to some extent, in the discipline area.

To some extent, the contract also addresses the criteria and standards by which decisions are reached. Typically the substantive personnel decision is left to management, and management wants to see it left that way. Consequently, contract language often specifically excludes the criteria or standards for decisionmaking from review by the grievance mechanism in the contract.

There are, however, three ways the contract may address the criteria for decision making. First, the contract may indicate things that may not be used as criteria for evaluating a teacher. Second, the contract may indicate when an administrator might find a teacher to have satisfactorily performed his or her work. This is not an absolute statement of the standard, but it gives the administrator one possible way of finding the employee’s work performance to be satisfactory. It does not bind the administrator to use the criterion but simply offers it as one measure of satisfactory performance. Third, the contract may call for a joint meeting between the
administrator and the teacher over teaching objectives. Objective setting allows the teacher to have some input into the standard for review or evaluation. The achievement of objectives, set by the administrator and the teacher, may later become a part of the teacher's evaluation.

My second observation is that there is a tendency to view the contract as a group of employee rights and employer responsibilities. The contract then becomes something for management to resist. Managers primarily view the contract as an added responsibility and employees view the contract as a way to gain rights and benefits. I do not think that it is necessary to view the contract solely in that way. It is possible to add both management rights and employee responsibilities to specific sections of the contract. An example of an employee responsibility would be contractually to require teachers to help improve teacher aides' performance within their classrooms if necessary.

My last observation relates to the controversy over whether it is better for management to write contract language or to avoid writing contract provisions. Many management negotiators I interviewed in Arizona, California, and Oregon dig their heels in the ground and resist writing contract language. They are taking what I view as a defensive posture. They react against what the employee proposes. I think this is unfortunate. Collective bargaining appears to be here to stay. It would behoove management to take a more active position at the table. There are ways that managers can use the contract to their own benefit. For example, management may propose contract language which specifically indicates what is not to be included and covered by the contract, particularly by limiting the definition of a grievance under the contract. In the area of teacher evaluation, why
not include in the management proposal the requirement that the procedure to evaluate a teacher may be reviewed through the grievance mechanism if necessary, but that the substance of the evaluator's decision is not to be reviewed?

Lorraine McDonnell
Social Scientist, The Rand Corporation
Current Research: Emerging Political Strategies of Teacher Organizations

I would just like to make a couple of comments about Steve Goldschmidt's presentation and then present a slightly different picture of organized teachers. First of all, Steve was stressing the importance of making collective bargaining outcomes consistent with effective school research. He seemed to be chiding me for putting so much emphasis on procedure, which I do. I am a political scientist and we always put process over substance. But I do want to justify that. The reason I was so concerned about looking at procedure and equal access for other actors in the educational system as well as for teachers is because of the lack of consensus about educational values in our society. You only need to look at desegregation and the arguments about equity versus quality of education. It is very difficult to say we ought to base our decisions on some kind of substantive agreement when it isn't there. That's why I put the emphasis on open access and the importance of having procedures which let all actors into the system.
I would make the same argument about the effective schools research. I think it is much too early for us to try to tie collective bargaining outcomes to the effective schools research. That research is very promising, but I think it may be ten years before we really can causally link it to collective bargaining. That is another reason why I put the emphasis on procedures. And now that I have argued my way out of that I will move right on.

I think I would stress again the importance of looking not just at contract provisions but also at their implementation. I agree completely with Steve and Susan Johnson that there are some contract provisions, such as reduction in force and involuntary transfer, that will tend to be implemented much as they are stated in the contract. But that isn't the case for many provisions that Steve calls the results of policy bargaining. This is true not just at the district level, but also at the state level. We were amazed to see some districts bargaining well below the mandatory scope of bargaining while other districts were bargaining way above the permissible scope of bargaining. There is a big implementation gap, especially when you have a system where enforcement is the responsibility of the two parties. If the parties have a basically harmonious relationship, there isn't the incentive to bring grievances at the local level or to file an unfair labor practice complaint. So it is really important to look at implementation, particularly when we are talking about things like teacher participation in school-level policy committees and so on. Usually, if the school has the right climate, participation is going to happen. In other schools, you can have the strongest contract in the world, but if the teachers and the principal aren't so predisposed, participation is not going to happen.
That brings me to another point that, as Steve mentioned, I have been talking about--organized teachers as alternative bureaucracies in their own districts. Now that sounds awesome and frightening. But I think it has a very positive side. In many districts, particularly the largest ones, the teacher organization has more people than just those who are involved in membership services or in bargaining. The organization also has people who, in a sense, hold parallel positions to those in the school district. I met someone who had been the federal program director for the district and now was federal program director for the teacher organization. I think this alternative bureaucracy works in a very effective and positive way in many circumstances.

As I mentioned, where there is a good relationship between the district and the teacher organization, there is an incentive to settle grievances at as low a level as possible. You also see this in program implementation. We have been working in a number of districts faced with desegregation plans that required involuntary teacher transfers. If the teacher organization had not been willing to work in an informal, positive way with the district, there would have been a lot more trauma than there was. From research, we know the importance of teacher participation, and it applies to policy implementation. So I would argue that when we are looking at the effects of teacher organizations on coping with fiscal retrenchment, we should look at this alternative bureaucracy. It is very important not just for implementation of the contract but also for responding to externally induced pressures on the district such as fiscal retrenchment.

I agree with Steve that there will be more policy bargaining in the future. Tony Pascal and I did not see it because we were in the field too
early. There wasn't a need to trade the apples of money for the oranges of policy. I fully expect that will happen now.

But I also would like to point out that there are other things going on with organized teachers that we ought to look at. They may be taking place far from the school, but they will have implications for the school. Too often, we focus on the process of collective bargaining itself—sitting at the table in the local district. But, in addition to being an alternative bureaucracy, teachers also are a political interest group. In the bad economic times education now faces, collective bargaining at the local level becomes much less important than it was in the growth years of the 60s and 70s. I think that we know that political action is not a new strategy for teachers. However, it has been studied much less than collective bargaining.

In the early 1970s NEA and AFT both began to realize that there were real limits on the future of collective bargaining—teachers had to complement local collective bargaining with an explicit political action strategy. Both organizations had raised funds to support political candidates through their various political action committees. And teacher influence, as you know, comes from the fact that they're strategically located in all congressional districts and vote in higher-than-average numbers. Teachers are willing to man phone banks and have very sophisticated lobbying operations both in Washington and the state capitals.

Both Chuck Kerchner's study and our study found that the payoff for local-level political action is much lower than we as researchers were expecting. However, if you look at the state and national levels, the payoffs for political action by organized teachers have been very
significant, particularly in the area of school finance and collective bargaining. In Oregon, for example, you have many teachers in the legislature.

Over the past five years, political action has been supplemental and, for the most part, secondary to local collective bargaining. However, the situation is changing. One of the byproducts of fiscal retrenchment has been greater state control over educational funding and related policy decisions. In most of the country, states are paying a greater proportion of the costs of education. This is coming at a time when there is a lot of pressure on state governments to try to improve educational quality. In fact, quite a few states in the country have initiated their own state programs to do precisely this. So more and more of the decisions about how much should be spent for education and how it should be spent have moved to the state level. Therefore, if organized teachers are to maintain their past gains, they need to move more and more to political action.

I think that the effect of this will be to redress what people like Steve see as an imbalance of power or influence that has taken place as organized teachers have become stronger. As he said, the political process is much more open and teachers will have to form coalitions that change over time. Unlike collective bargaining, in which you have sole representation and teachers speaking with one voice at the local level, in political action you have the well known split between the NEA and the AFT on a number of critical issues. So I think it is a much more open process. When teachers go into the political process, they win big and they lose big. Think of California where in one year teachers won the right to have collective bargaining but a few years later these same teachers—as one of the primary
forces—could not stop Proposition 13. Think of New York which has a very strong union with a lot of influence but also has the Taylor Law with very punitive sanctions for strikes. So it is a more open and competitive process when teachers move into the political arena.

For those of you who are concerned with redressing the imbalance of influence, I think that the political arena is one place where it will happen. We also have to think of the tradeoffs that Steve mentioned. One effect of moving issues off the bargaining table and into the political arena is that it is likely to shift more decisions from the local district to higher levels of government. So it is important to keep looking at local collective bargaining. We know a lot about it and there is remarkable consensus among those who have studied it from various points of view. I think, however, that we should pay more attention to teachers as political interest groups because political action is probably going to become much more important. Collective bargaining will remain important because it is the way teachers can legally protect themselves, but the payoffs are limited there and political action is going to become more necessary.

Sondra Williams
Organization Specialist, National Education Association

From my point of view, collective bargaining is like the "Virginia Slim" woman; it has come a long way from the collective begging it used to be. I first got involved strictly as a researcher for a negotiations team
because my male colleagues were afraid that negotiations with a woman at the table wouldn't be taken seriously by the all-male administration team on the other side. For the past fifteen years, I have spent most of my time at bargaining tables. I am more aware of the process, the context in which bargaining happens, and the influences there—why proposals get made—than someone would be who looks only at the results in the contracts.

I am not going to make any claim to being objective about the process. I am definitely an advocate for it. I became involved in it as a classroom teacher through sheer frustration with the management of the school district—the inability of teachers to have any meaningful influence on the way the district was run. If I had to identify a moment of epiphany for what happened, it was when as a second- or third-year teacher I was selected by my school to be on a district-wide curriculum committee. I had the audacity to take issue with premises asserted by the assistant superintendent. The committee was disbanded and reconvened a month later sans one member. The die was cast right then on my future in education. But it took me about five more years to realize it was definitely going to be on one side as an advocate rather than continuing in the system itself.

I think that I can certainly assert that collective bargaining is here to stay despite the continuing challenges to its legitimacy by district-level management, school-level management, and even some research. It is true that it is changing. Public education is changing. Who funds it, and who runs it, are changing daily. I find Lorraine's comments very insightful in terms of shifting from a local collective bargaining mode to a much more political process.

There are some ramifications of the situation that both sides need to
look at. While the political process supposedly is much more open than collective bargaining, the influences of unions and coalitions are going to become much more significant than they ever were at the local level. I know that from the administrator's point of view the big NEA or the big AFT or the state organization are seen to carry a lot of influence with their local classroom teachers, but it has been my experience that this is a misperception. There is a lot more control asserted by local leaders and local teacher groups than state and national groups, whose influence is minimal at the local level. In a bigger political arena, however, that state and national influence is going to increase.

The process of local-level collective bargaining is important. Let's stop fighting it and start looking at it as an effective tool to create effective schools, which I think everybody wants. It is going to take commitment from both sides to use the process to maintain a high degree of local control, albeit shared control.

There is one thing that hasn't been mentioned here, and I haven't seen it in my limited reading in terms of looking at the effects on school-level management of collective bargaining. If it is true that the status and authority of the principal--middle management, whatever you want to call it--has been eroded, I don't think this has been all the design of the teachers. I have been involved in a lot of bargaining where top management was more interested in curbing principal power than the teachers were. A lot of what turns up in contracts can come from that side. You don't see that when you read the contract, but I think it is something that needs to be looked at.

Also, anybody who thinks that collective bargaining is a threat to
the democratic process that supposedly runs our schools has sat in far fewer board meetings than I have in the past fifteen years. There needs to be a lot more questioning about who has been setting school policy. Has it been elected leaders or has it been professional management? My impression is that it has been far more the latter with the school board being, nine times out of ten, a rubber stamp. I think that is changing now and needs to be looked at in the context of collective bargaining as well. There is also a question about how democratic the management of schools is. Who are the board members? Whom do they represent, and how many people in a community actually elect them? How great is the impact of community attitudes? My experience in collective bargaining is that a lot of the policy items in contracts got there because teachers had the support of parents against the administration. Part of that has to do with the context in which we find schools right now. These are tough times; the teachers are "allowed" to decide who gets chewed up among them--teachers often refer to it as "cannibalism."

Some of the policy items that are getting into contracts now are a result of teachers attempting to hold on to quality programs when the administrators who have to deal with the current economic situation are trying to cut them back. I have seen this happen particularly in special education in California. They have had some fine programs with special funding. Under those circumstances, special education teachers weren't much interested in the contract and the few items that covered them. Now those programs are being destroyed because of lack of funding. More people are raising questions about the legitimacy of spending large sums for the handicapped while the regular students go without. And special education
teachers now are very interested in the contract. They have gotten involved in the organization and they have made proposals, where before they were generally the nonmembers, the nonjoiners. So I think that is another facet to be looked at in terms of why policy-relevant items are getting into contracts when they may not have been there in the 70s.

It has been my experience, too, that collective bargaining can be a really effective problem-solving approach when you get beyond an adversarial relationship. I have been involved in some contract bargaining where the administration has desperately needed a means of dealing with transfers. Their problems were aggravated by the variety of contract interpretations, a shrinking enrollment from school to school, and the inequities and morale problems that resulted. They were as much interested as teachers were in coming up with a contract item to make the transfer policy consistent and able to handle shuffling around large numbers of long-term teachers. They have successfully worked together with the teachers' representative to maintain consistency but also flexibility to keep the overall program from being damaged.

If research indicates that improved morale results from collective bargaining, then unions can function as mechanisms for stability in trying times. If there may be a correlation between a strong contract and the effectiveness of the school, then it behooves the players in the bargaining process, as well as researchers, to work toward creating effective school policy. Stop worrying about whether the contract makes policy and consider whether the contract is a good tool that serves both parties well. Don't worry so much about scope—that is the fodder that lawyers get rich on. Collective bargaining is a process that can do a large part of what's needed
in public education today. Hopefully, research will find where it works well and why, and where it breaks down and why. If we can turn the latter into the former, we can give whole public school systems the kind of boost they need.
Session II

Effects of Collective Bargaining on District and School Personnel Relations
Session II turned from the emphasis on formal policy, discussed in Session I, to the informal relationships between administrators and teachers through which policy is implemented. The major address was by Dan Lortie, who described "The Complex Work Relationships of Elementary School Principals." Lortie, professor of education at the University of Chicago and author of the well-known book Schoolteacher, provided evidence that the principal's "core relationship" is with teachers and that central office personnel are seen more as uncertain sources of support to principals than as superiors in the district organization. In line with this assertion, Lortie remarked that the district's teacher contract as such was seldom mentioned by principals in talking about their work.

This point was echoed by Judith Warren Little, of the Center for Action Research, Boulder, Colorado, who described her research on staff relationships in successful schools. Norms of collegiality and experimentation are characteristics of such schools and seem to override potential restrictions imposed by the teacher employment contract. Conversely, where such norms are lacking, contract language is powerless as a substitute.

The apparent contradiction between Session I's emphasis on contracts as restrictive documents and Lortie's and Little's emphases on informal cooperation between principals and teachers was resolved by the thoughtful analysis of Michael Murphy, professor of education at the University of Utah. Summarizing the literature in labor relations, Murphy argued that administrator-teacher relationships at the district level are likely to be characterized by distrust and a market-exchange model. In contrast, relationships at the school level are more conducive to trust and reflect a social-exchange model. Hence one should have different expectations of administrative leadership at these two levels.

This point was illustrated by James Jenkins, superintendent of schools in Gresham, Oregon, in his account of a district's effort to restore a cooperative relationship with teachers following a breakdown in collective bargaining and a resultant strike. Jenkins reported that the restoration of communication between striking and nonstriking teachers could be attempted only at the school, not the district level.
The Complex Work Relationships of Elementary School Principals

Dan Lortie
Professor of Education, University of Chicago
Current Research: Work Relationships of School Administrators

What I am going to talk about today is part of a larger research project that looks at elementary school principals and their relationships within school districts. I am going to be talking about certain central tendencies today rather than about differences. The research project itself, which is currently being written up, deals with a lot of sources of variation like social class, school size, principal gender, and the rest. Today I will discuss the modal tendencies I have observed in interviews with 113 randomly selected principals from the suburban ring around Chicago. The Chicago ring is ethnically and economically quite diverse, so these school districts range from almost upper-class private districts to districts that look a lot like the inner city in terms of population, resources, and the rest. They do not, however, cover the full gamut of size because suburban districts rarely exceed the modal size of about six schools. We are not talking, then, about large districts.

I am going to argue that there is a structure that lies behind the principal’s role, and I am going to deal with certain role relationships that emerge from that structure. Very quickly, let me make a reference to the origin of the role. The principalship grew out of direct instructional contact. The superintendency grew out and away from the school board. The first public-school principal we know about was somebody who headed up the
Quincy School in Boston in 1836. The role emerged at that time as schools went from being single-room establishments to being multiple-room establishments. As most of you probably know, during the middle and latter part of the 19th century, there was something of a struggle between the conception of a principal with a local school board and the conception of a very large school district. The second conception won out and the principal became an employee of the larger unit called the school district. I think the etiology is not unimportant. The principalship came out of instruction—direct contact with chalk, kids, parents, and the rest. The superintendency came out of boardrooms.

There is another interesting fact about the principalship that dogs us today. If you think about jobs as being specified or residual, the principalship emerged and continues to be that role in the school to which everything falls that has not been previously assigned. The principal can delegate the teaching and the custodial work. In some of these systems, there also are rather complex specialists. But the principal is the possessor of residual obligations. What doesn’t get specified to others falls to him. Now of course as specialization has increased in these elementary schools—and, frankly, I was astonished to see how many specialists were around—his coordinating load increases. He gets more and more people who report directly to him. The specialist tends to report directly more than the classroom teacher. ("Reporting" does not describe too well what classroom teachers do to the principal.) In any event, it is a residual role.

Finally, the central task—teaching, dealing with the children—of the unit that the principal heads is done by other people. To the extent
that the principal experiences a sense of achievement, it is dependent upon the work of others. These are obvious points, but I learned years ago that we tend to overlook the obvious, and almost always the obvious is important.

Today the principal is an employee of the school district; he heads a unit which is fiscally dependent upon another unit called the school district. He is dependent for legitimation, policy, and the rest upon a unit larger than his. As an employee, he has no private or separable funds of any consequence and no separable legitimation. However, the principal heads up a discernible key unit called the school which figures prominently in the American imagination. As the head of that unit, the principal is seen as a powerful figure by children. He is seen as the key official that you take your gripes to. And he is the boss for the teachers. So there is an ambiguous duality built into this role. On the one hand, this person is a junior official in a larger unit called the local school district; on the other hand, the same person is very much the senior official in the unit that he or she heads. (Statistically, I would say "he" in all but 16 percent of the cases, but I have never been able to do that verbally. I hope you will understand that there are some women, but as you know they are limited in number.)

The third point I want to make at the outset is that principals were previously socialized to be classroom teachers. To become principals they had to be resocialized to that role. Now all adult socialization is limited in the sense that becoming a teacher does not replace all of one’s prior socialization. It adds some things and alters some things. In the same sense, the resocialization from teacher to principal is not complete. There are little odds and ends of being a teacher left over, so to speak—little
parts that have not been replaced by whatever being a principal means psychologically. Moreover, principals live five days a week with teachers and must constantly interact with them and understand their perspective. Therefore, the teacher part of the principal gets continual reinforcement in daily interaction. This suggests another duality. There are two selves for the principal—myself as teacher, myself as principal. In many respects the sentiments principals express and the values they espouse are very similar to those of classroom teachers. In other respects, they are different.

Now let me turn to the role relationships that I perceive in the elementary school principalship. I am going to talk about my primitive theory. (Primitive theory is the "in" term. I like it because it suggests that I have a theory, but don't push me too hard.) My primitive theory derives from Merton's role-set theory. Those who are familiar with that work will see that I have taken some liberties with it.

The first observation to make is that the principal is positioned in the midst of a complex web of relationships. He maintains relationships with several people in the central office. (It is interesting that principals differentiate their interactions with superintendents, assistant superintendents, directors, and secretaries.) He is also caught in a series of relationships with faculty members. As you know, not all faculty members are alike. They could be subdivided categorically into first grade, second grade, third grade, etc.; men and women; old and young. And, as I said before, there are an increasing number of specialists: psychologists; social workers; librarians; etc. Some have very special lingos and orientations of their own; staffs are getting more complex and more differentiated.

Principals have relationships to custodians which I gather are not always
that easy. They also have relationships with children and parents. How do principals sort this out? You could map their relationships with a whole lot of lines. I could draw a very complicated chart without violating the reality. How do they sort it out? How can we sort it out in trying to understand how principals feel about their work and how these feelings influence the way in which they behave?

I am going to start with the distinction between "core relationships" and "subsidiary relationships," defined from the perspective of the principal, not from any outside view. I am going to specify in my primitive theory that core relationships have two dimensions. First, they involve the achievement of valued rewards. Secondly, core relationships are complex and demanding, and they are problematic in ways that are not readily or automatically solved. My thesis is that the attitudes, sentiments, or expectations that principals have of persons in subsidiary relationships derive from and grow out of their concerns with such core relationships.

Preoccupation with dealing effectively with core relationships predicts the expectations that principals will hold for others. The expectations or sentiments of principals reflect their efforts to receive rewards, primarily derived from core relationships, and/or to remove obstacles to those rewards. All of this is done within the context of principals' beliefs. So this primitive theory brings together two sets of ideas: the power of rewards and the power of the phenomenological screen through which people operate. Today I am going to concentrate on psychic rewards. I haven't worked out the analysis to the same extent on material or career rewards.
Core Relationships

Let's turn to the data. What are the rewards that principals seek in their work? That is not an easy question to answer. One must attack such a question in a variety of ways. The first is a simple-minded one. You ask principals, "What are the main kinds of satisfactions that you get from your work?" What fascinated me when I pooled the responses is that 75 percent said their main satisfaction was tied to the achievement of students. Surprise, surprise! Just like school teachers. But when you ask, "Can you tell me something you feel proud about?" such pride is expressed not in terms of activities with particular classes or individual students, but in terms of something that happened to the organizational unit, the school. The dominant theme is, "Last year, in some way, I improved my school." Thirty-five percent felt proud of introducing or improving programs. The improvement of staff relationships was a source of pride for 12 percent and administrative accomplishments were listed by 8 percent. Seven percent stated, "I upgraded the school," or "I turned the school around." Improvement of the school as an instructional tool is the most satisfying accomplishment. But there is a second one that is also interesting--serving as the protector of the school, the knight gallant with the shield: "I warded off threats"--20 percent. "I prevented something that was going to endanger my school last year."

Another approach to the question is to ask about short-term rewards: "What makes a day good or bad?" A day is good for principals when two kinds of things occur. First, "I am involved with teachers and students and see good things happening." Second, "There are no major disruptions." Here, too, there is strong similarity to what school teachers say when asked the same question. What is particularly interesting is that there exists a similar underlying tone of uncertainty and a wish for reassurance. They want
to feel something good is happening out there.

Agenda completion is another characteristic of a good day—getting things done and having good interactions with teachers and students: "I solved a problem that had been bothering me a long time." Compliments from others also contribute to good days by providing reassurance that "I am doing OK." We asked a more light-hearted question: "What are the tasks that are really fun in your work?" This one I suspect you have all guessed—60 percent of the mentions go to kids. Children are perceived as the main source of fun. Eighteen percent of the mentions go to teachers and refer to happy or beneficial interactions with teachers. No principals mentioned contacts with the central office.

To summarize then, principals, like teachers, get visible rewards from feeling that students are achieving and that they have something to do with it. They introduced a program, for example, or they initiated a staff relations improvement project.

Now let us turn to some of principals' key beliefs and some of their expressed preferences. If they are going to get that sense of achievement, there is a job to be done. I asked them, "What do you need to get the job done? What are the most important resources you have to get your job done?" The answers were overwhelmingly "people" answers. They hardly mentioned things—buildings didn't get much mention. Books and artifacts didn't get mentioned. Thirty-six percent of the mentions went to their own staffs. Twenty percent went to superintendents and central office. Thirteen percent went to other principals, and twelve percent went to outside sources of ideas—the reading they did and the conferences they attended. So their critical resources are the people who work for them, the people for whom they
work, their peers, and ideas outside that conventional circle. Principals depend primarily on interpersonal interactions, particularly with their own staffs.

I was curious about how they think they go about improving instruction, because they said that that is a big part of what they do. I found that they emphasize two different kinds of interactions with teachers. First, 40 percent said they confer with teachers on how to work with students. That was the primary way they thought they could improve instruction—through interpersonal influence over teachers. Second, 34 percent said they provide resources, services, and support—a facilitative response to teachers. The other items on my list, including inservice training, were seldom selected. I should mention one interesting variation by social class. The lower the socioeconomic status of the school, the more the emphasis was on providing resources.

Another question had to do with their interdependencies, about the kinds of reputations they would like to have with those in counter-roles: central office, other principals, teachers, kids, and parents. I asked them to give a brief description. Principals would like to have a reputation with teachers for warmth (45 percent), reliability (28 percent), and being in charge (22 percent). They would like a reputation with students for being fair but friendly, caring but firm. Principals’ concepts of their desired image with the students is really very similar to those of classroom teachers. When I asked the principals which of these reputations was most important to them, 41 percent of the mentions went to teachers and 30 percent of them went to students. Then there was a drop to 14 percent for the central office, 10 percent for parents, and 5 percent for other principals.
What would principals like to do more or less of? They would like to
tour classes more and have greater student contact. And they would like to
supervise teachers more. They want to do less paperwork and have fewer
interruptions, discipline problems, and "administrivia." When I asked them
specifically how they would like to spend an additional 10 hours, 39 percent
of them said they would like more time with students. The central office was
given the lowest percentage. The thrust then is into the school, not upward;
they place the most value on relationships with teachers and students. It
would appear that teachers and students are the best candidates—in terms of
rewards and dependencies—for designation as core relationships.

You will recall that core relationships are not only connected to
rewards but are also the more complex relationships. Principals perceive the
complexity of their relationships with teachers and students to be different.
I presented the principals in the sample with five potential dilemmas in
their relationships with teachers. One concerned including teachers in a
wide range of decisions versus the costs in efficiency and rapidity that this
involved. Seventy-eight percent said that they should include teachers in a
wide range of decisions. I am not sure that they do that, but in any event,
they feel that there is a normative constraint. Another dilemma concerned
whether they should provide detailed technical supervision of teachers in
their classroom work or give teachers a lot of latitude. Ninety-two percent
chose the option of giving latitude. Now these, I think, show important
normative constraints in their relationships to teachers, constraints they do
not feel with students. Principals do not feel they should confer with
students on a wide range of decisions and principals do not feel that they
have to give wide latitude to students.
The principals were asked, "What's your most difficult task?"

Fifty-eight percent of the mentions rated the evaluation and supervision of teachers as most difficult. They found it difficult because of technical uncertainty: "What is the right way to evaluate teachers and how do you know what is the right way to do it?" Principals said they learned in the beginning years as administrators from observing teachers that there is more than one way to do it. Another reason it is difficult to evaluate and supervise teachers is that even if a principal thinks one way is right, it may be difficult to get the teacher to agree. However, principals feel that it is their job to evaluate the teachers. The central office rides them hard on it, and the principal feels caught between central office demands--organizational and administrative demands--and his awareness of how teachers feel about their autonomy. The principal is fully aware of the tension in such a situation. He was a teacher himself and now he feels that, in some respects, he has to violate his understanding of teacher needs. But he does it.

Complexity in core relationships occurs where one is likely to make mistakes. I asked the principals to identify one thing they had done in the last year that they ought not to have done, or something they ought to have done that they didn't do. Forty percent of the responses dealt with hiring and firing teachers and with supervision. They made the most mistakes with faculty members. The next highest category--13 percent--involved mistakes made with parents.

I asked a whole battery of questions about conflict and types of conflict that occurred. I asked about different groups that principals dealt with that had the highest level of internal conflict and required most time
from the principal. Students were mentioned 64 percent of the time and 
teachers were mentioned 55 percent of the time. I also asked which group 
required their greatest attention in intergroup conflict. Their responses 
(45 percent) indicated that the conflict between parents and teachers 
required the most attention. The conflict between teachers and students was 
second (29 percent), followed by the conflict between teachers and central 
office (13 percent), and conflict between the principal and the central 
office (12 percent).

Principals' relationships with teachers are, on balance, more complex 
than their relationships with students. So, if we define the core 
relationship as one in which there are not only important rewards, but also a 
high degree of complexity, I deduce from this that the principal's 
relationship to teachers is the core relationship.

**Subsidiary Relationships**

I have alleged that core relationships affect how principals are 
going to perceive subsidiary relationships. I don't want to make any 
superintendents mad. I refer to principals' relationships with central 
office as subsidiary because they aren't core relationships and this is 
phenomenological analysis—how things look from the principal's perspective.

First, we have to take a look at what they perceive to be the 
authority relationship in the school district. We asked these principals, 
"To what extent do you feel that you are controlled by rules and directives?" 
Also, "To what extent do you feel that you are controlled by being watched 
for the results of what you do?" On rules control, the mode was low; the 
principals reported experiencing a low degree of traditional bureaucratic
control. They felt on the other hand, that central office exerted a moderate amount of control by watching results. (When you break this response down according to socioeconomic status, the principals in high-status schools are much more likely to report high results control. I can just hear the conversation—the superintendent turns to that principal: "With your kids, damn it, you should produce results.") But the main point is low control by rules and medium control by results. That does not, it seems to me, add up to a perception of being highly controlled. These principals do not see themselves as marionettes or automatons. I get the impression that in their view they have a considerable degree of discretion.

Another way of tackling this control issue is to ask principals, "How do you think central office evaluates your performance?" and "How do you evaluate your performance?" In regard to their own assessments of their performance, principals rated indicators in the following order: my observation of and feedback from teachers (28 percent); observations of or information about student achievement, their attitudes, their performance, and their test results (22 percent); parental and community feedback (19 percent). Then I asked them what they thought the central office watched. Public reaction was the big one (64 percent), then teacher reaction (48 percent), the school’s compliance to the rules (39 percent), the absence of waves (33 percent), and student achievement (27 percent).

Principals, then, see themselves as more concerned with the internal events of the school, with what is really happening there. And they assess themselves in light of information about that. They see central office as more concerned with public image.

Let us turn now to what principals want from the central office.
First, I asked them how central office helped them get their own work done. Seventy-six percent of the responses were what I am calling provider responses. First, they said central office supported them psychologically, politically, and interpersonally. Second, central office provided them with ideas and good advice. The other minor ones included things like, "Central office is helpful in the way they handle procedures; they save my time" (eleven percent). This refers either to handling paperwork in the least offensive way or not calling too many meetings. It really has to do with time disposition and the conflict the principal feels between being senior officer in an organization that requires a lot of time, and junior officer in another organization that seems to require a lot of time, and it is evident he prefers to spend time on his own. Some mentioned that the central office granted them enough autonomy and discretion or that they communicated clearly.

They were also asked how central office could help more. Responses included, "They could provide me with more and better resources." The second one is interesting: "They could know my school better." Now I infer from this that they are really saying, "If those idiots knew more about my school, I could get some of these stupid rules out that don't apply," or, "I wish they would really recognize how well I am doing with these kids."

Incidentally, superintendents in and around Chicago don't visit the schools much. There are many meetings in the central office, and a lot of business is conducted over the phone. On the average they visit the schools once a month. When asked, "How can central office hinder you or obstruct your work?" principals responded that they could make excessive demands, increase control, reduce resources, or administer badly (procrastinate, be
inconsistent or inefficient). They could fail to provide support, communicate poorly, show little awareness of the schools, exclude principals from decisionmaking. I think we are beginning to get a sense now of what "good" and "bad" mean. Good means providing; bad means intruding.

I don't want to overstate the case because I am not going to allege that these principals are really all that hungry for autonomy. In fact, when one takes the obvious step of asking them in which areas of work they would like more autonomy, 41 percent said they had enough. What is fascinating about responses from the remaining 59 percent is the high consensus about where they wanted autonomy: curriculum and instruction (23 percent); hiring and firing staff (12 percent); evaluation of staff (10 percent); monetary (9 percent); staff supervision (6 percent); more authority over teachers (4 percent); more say in collective bargaining (2 percent). Fifty-seven percent of all mentions were very closely related to teaching. So they want autonomy where it bears on their core relationship. They want discretion in that relationship which is most directly related to their reward dependency and which they perceive as most complex.

Implications

In the context of this conference, one should mention collective bargaining. To the extent that principals perceive any particular contract as crimping their relationship with classroom teachers, they are going to dislike that contract. If the contract is perceived by them as introducing new complications in what they already perceive as their most complex relationships, they are going to resist it. Now, somebody this morning—I guess it was Susan Johnson—said, and I couldn't agree more, "They don't want
an adversarial relationship with their teachers, they don't want to sit at that bargaining table on the opposite side of their teachers. But they sure would like to have some say about what goes into the contract." There I think their attitudes are quite clear. At the same time, I must in all honesty say that in these 113 interviews (which lasted an average of two-and-a-half hours), they had lots and lots of opportunity to talk about all aspects of their work. They talked very little about collective bargaining. And 90 percent of them are unionized or have contracts, so it doesn't seem to me that bargaining is a very big part of their day-to-day life.

Let us turn to other implications. It would seem as far as principals are concerned, that the major expectation they have of the superintendent and central office in general has to do with provisions, with resources, support, ideas, and the like. There is an inference that I would like to draw from the data. There's a double theme running through here--this notion of interpersonal influence or autonomy and the notion of facilitation. What I think is happening, but I can't really document it satisfactorily, is that the principal is linking these two notions in his mind. He feels his interpersonal influence is dependent upon his ability to facilitate and support teachers. In that sense, there is an oddly reciprocal relationship between the principal's view of his own capacity to assert leadership and his view of the superintendent's ability to provide him with resources. The principal says, "I can be a leader, if that is what you want from me, to the extent that I can provide, and that depends on you guys downtown." Now if the principal's leadership is dependent on the central office, there must be some interesting psychological consequences in the
readiness of principals to adhere to the superintendent's leadership. If she or he perceives the superintendent as an ample, effective provider, this becomes a resource of the superintendent and wins positive points with the principal. Perhaps some superintendents have trouble getting policy implemented simply because they are not perceived as adequate providers. That is an hypothesis.

Another implication for practice has to do with the balance of claims of the two organizations—the school and the district. If I ever were a superintendent, when I made claims on a principals' time, I would want to ask myself, "Is that time that is going to my unit worth it when I call a whole series of extra meetings, or when I issue 14 questionnaires that need to be answered next Tuesday?" Incidentally, there is an incredible range in the number of written reports expected in these suburban districts. They go from something like one a month to a 50 a month. But the mean is around ten. And the districts are not all that different in size. Central offices apparently vary enormously in the requests that they make for paperwork. In any event, superintendents making demands on principals' time are competing for a scarce resource valued by the principal.

Another implication has to do with this business of 'knowing my school, the particularities of my school." I think that this is the way in which principals are making a plea for fewer constraining or inapplicable rules—the fewest rules possible, so that whatever rules do come up will not hamper but help. Their expressed wish for more ideas from central office and their appreciation of the ideas that they do get suggest to me that perhaps superintendents are underestimating their potential for intellectual leadership. These principals really do sound kind of hungry for ideas. And
superintendents who would like to increase their leadership might have here a
resource that is currently underestimated--expertise of various sorts that
helps principals get their job done.

Comments by Panel Members: Judith Little, Michael Murphy, and James Jenkins

Judith Little
Research Associate, Center for Action Research
Current Research: Staff Development in Successful Schools

Dan Lortie talked about primitive theory. I am going to talk about
hunches and give you several grains of salt to apply as well. What I am
about to do, partly out of my enthusiasm for the work and for what we have
discovered, is to make some large claims for a relatively small piece of
work.

I make the large claims for a couple of reasons. One is because I
think the findings are consistent with findings being produced elsewhere.
The other is that as we struggle with principals and districts, and as
teachers apply some of the findings, we find that the ideas are taking hold,
that people are making some changes and gaining some benefits.

We set out a couple of years ago, with NIE's blessing and money, to
discover the influence of staff development on school success. We were not
studying the role of unions in schools or collective bargaining in schools.
We heard very little about contracts or unions. When I give my little spiel
in a workshop with district administrators, the first question I hear is,
"What's the effect of teacher unions on all that?" When I am out in school
buildings, I rarely hear that. I hear it from district people. In Dan
Lortie's terms, the core relationships for district people are bound up with the union and the negotiation of the contract. But the core relationships in buildings are not.

The times when we heard about the contract were very interesting times, but they were few. We heard about the limitations of the contract in buildings where things were not going well, where the principal and teachers were not working smoothly together. In the buildings where things were going smoothly and where achievement gains were being registered, and where people were putting in enormous amounts of time to improve their work, we just didn't hear about the contracts. And, for the most part, the terms that were included in the union contract for the district we studied were not very important in the day-to-day work of teachers and principals. Furthermore, the schools that were good didn't necessarily go beyond the contract, they simply fully exploited the contract.

I will give you an example. In the district we studied, principals had the right, if they wished, to use an hour each week, in addition to faculty meeting time, for purposes of staff professional development. In only one of the six schools did the principal do that. In the other five, principals said they did not want to risk offending teachers by putting too heavy a time burden on them. So they did not use that hour. In the one school that showed the most gains and where teachers were most committed to the principal and the school—where people just worked their tails off—they used that hour every week for professional development. They fully exploited the terms of the contract.

But for the most part, the interactions that counted the most—teacher evaluation and observation, inservice time, instructional
practices in the classroom, and the curriculum—either weren’t covered or were marginally covered in the contract. People simply did not worry about it. The things that they worried about that were covered in the contract were the same things that Susan Moore Johnson found—job security, the number of noninstruction-related duties that they had to fulfill, and class size. Other than that, the possibilities for negotiated work relationships were pretty wide open.

I want to tell you about four teacher practices that distinguished the more successful schools in that district—schools that had better achievement scores, better staff morale, fewer discipline problems, and better attentiveness of kids in classes. (I roamed the classrooms looking at kids’ performance, getting a crude sense of criterion-referenced achievement from work sheets, and I found that kids in those schools were outperforming kids from other schools on a day-by-day, moment-by-moment basis.) Remember, the more successful and less successful schools were all operating under the same contract.

First, in the more successful schools teachers talked to each other about teaching. They talked about the business of instruction. That sounds obvious, but in unsuccessful schools that is not what the teachers talked about. They talked about the failings of students, about who had just thrown a chair through the window, about why the parents were not backing them up, about what the district was doing to them now, and about the unfortunate demands of society. But they did not talk about instruction. In the successful schools they did, and they talked about it frequently and very precisely. In order to have that kind of "shared technical culture" that Dan talked about in Schoolteacher, they had to have the time together over a
period of two or three years to learn to talk the same language about instruction—for example, about homework assignments. They could talk with a wide range of other teachers and in a wide variety of places.

Faculty meetings were not just administrative in those buildings. Now, if your contract says you can have so many faculty meetings a month, fine. In these schools, they didn't necessarily call any more than the contract stipulated, but they used them differently and they included discussion about instruction. I watched an elementary principal go in and say, "Hey guys, I just finished reading a summary of research on cooperative learning, I think it is something we need to take a look at." And he put up four major findings on the board, illustrated each of them briefly, and made certain that teachers knew how to get the articles. And the teachers did get the articles. So there is talk about instruction among teachers, supported by the principal.

Second, they observed and were observed. You can't talk precisely about instruction and about curriculum and all the rest unless you see it happen. In these buildings principals were not invisible. In the unsuccessful schools, the word that we heard, and I think it came out of the early days of desegregation in that district, was that principals "spent the day in the bathroom." In the successful schools principals spent their days in classrooms. They did paperwork before and after school. They were very rarely in their offices. There was also a distinction there between the principals who simply roamed the halls and were a symbolic presence, and those who spent a long enough time in the classroom to give useful feedback to teachers about their teaching.

Third, teachers planned and prepared together in these buildings.
They reduced their planning burden by planning with others. This again was managed by the principal who arranged time in the course of the work week for that joint planning. The inservice hours that the one principal used were not used for lecturing. There were maybe 15 minutes for presentations of new material, whether by one of the teachers, the principal, or a district staff development person. The remaining part of the time was spent in grade-level teams preparing lesson plans or materials together, applying what they had just heard. You could walk the halls of that school an hour after the work day was over and find small groups of teachers around battling over something or other—you know, practice sheets for third grade math. Whatever it was, they would be developing them together.

And, fourth, they taught one another the business of teaching. There wasn’t that taboo that you could only give help if you were asked. People would go charging into a meeting or into the lounge saying, "Hey, guess what I learned last night. You guys have got to hear about this." And somebody would pipe up, "Would you teach us?" There were formal workshops the teachers conducted for each other.

So there were these four classes of practices that sound like common sense, but they really did distinguish one group of schools from another within the same district. That is just baseline information. We interpreted those practices as prevailing norms for teacher work in those buildings. We called them norms of collegiality and experimentation. I want to warn you, however, that in the successful schools, collegiality was not the only norm that prevailed. There wasn’t just the expectation that we are a group and work together as a group. There was the complementary norm of experimentation or continuous improvement; that everyone participated and the
principal helped to foster it. Where you only have collegiality, that sense that we are all in it together and we are a group, you sometimes have a very smug, self-satisfied faculty that is quite closed to any newcomers, to the influence of the principal, and to staff development. A new idea hasn't got a prayer of getting in that door. It took both norms together. They were workplace norms. They were built by principals who really didn't talk to us much about the contract but who were knowledgeable about the contract. They knew what the provisions were.

Principals did four things too. They set explicit expectations for collegial work toward continuous improvement in the building—high standards if you will. And they voiced them explicitly. In a lot of the stuff on effective principals you see that clear expectations are important, but what does that mean? You ask a teacher what that means, and he will say, "He tells us we have got to sign out, we have to be here on time, we have got to sponsor student activities." Now some of these activities are governed by the contract. So "within the limits of the contract," he has got this list of expectations. In the buildings where things were perking along—the buildings that we kept looking forward to going back to—there were additional expectations. They ran like this: "As a team, we are going to work on at least one major project to improve the quality of instruction in this building." It was that kind of expectation, in the area of curriculum and instruction, that goes beyond the contract.

Second, the principals practiced what they preached. They acted like colleagues, they acted as though they were knowledgeable or at least curious about instruction. They worked in teams with teachers on new ideas. They asked teachers to evaluate the principal's performance since they were
evaluating teachers! Now that is not specified by the contract. But what impressed the faculty of those schools was that the principals practiced what they preached.

Third, they sanctioned teachers' performance and teachers' effort. I use the word "sanction" rather than "reward." Rewards were the most powerful thing. In this, our work and Dan's mesh very much. And principals do control a lot of rewards for teachers. Obviously, they don't control salaries, promotions, transfers, or a whole lot of other things. But, as one teacher said to us, "I will settle for fame." Principals can control fame. When a principal was asked to go to a conference, the principal said, "You don't want me," and sent some teachers. Or the principal invited visiting teachers in to observe. Principals celebrated teachers' accomplishments. They used what resources they had to reward teachers. But they also did not tacitly reward behavior if it wasn't good teaching. That meant that they went into the classroom of the teachers that they didn't want to watch teach. It meant that they stood up in faculty meetings, after three years of trying out a new set of ideas and finding it worked, and saying, "OK guys, it's been tried in math and English, and here are the results. I helped these teachers do it; now the rest of us are going to do it." They said their stomachs were knotted when they did it. It never got easier, but they went ahead and thought through how the rewards and the punishments had to go and they acted that way.

And, last, they defended teachers from external as well as internal strains. They defended them from external strain by protecting teachers who had a reputation for being innovative from being asked to participate in six projects at once. That happens a lot—the same people get asked over and
over. So they protected them from that. They prevented polarization within the schools. And if a group of teachers wasn't getting the kind of quick results they expected with new practices they were using, principals didn't just succumb to the excuse that, "It's just a matter of style." They defended effective practices on their merits, and supported serious, rigorous trial of those practices in classrooms.

So there were those kinds of things going on. They let people know they valued certain kinds of behavior. They practiced what they preached. They sanctioned teacher behavior. And they defended and protected the efforts of the people who were really trying hard.

Now sometimes they had assistance in doing these things, particularly in activities like staff development, teacher evaluation, or supervision. When their needs ran up against contract items, they fully exploited the contract provisions that they had, and there were times they went beyond them. I think the dilemma for principals is that in order to get rewards from people like us—the researchers who will say, "Hey, these are really good schools"—or to get rewards from the people in the district, somehow they have to go beyond the contract. That is a very funny statement to make. Contracts may make it very hard for principals to be good administrators.

The question that has to be asked is, To what degree does the existing contract value effective practices, reward principals and teachers for using such practices, assist people in knowing how to use them well, and defend them when they do?

For example, we know that the only way that you can effectively assist someone to improve their classroom practice is to be knowledgeable enough about it to talk about it, observe it enough to comment on it, and be
there enough to assist with it. But look at the requirements for teacher evaluation and supervision in the contract. Once a year? Once every four years? If that is what the contract provision is then that is what's implicitly valued as sufficient for teacher supervision. Now a lot of people go beyond that, it is true. But it is important to know what is in the contract, because the contract is a public, symbolic, formal document for saying what the district values in teacher–principal work relationships. The question is, Are the things that we know about work relationships in effective schools—schools that are moving up in achievement and have fewer discipline problems, high teacher curiosity, and high commitment to improvement—reflected in the statements of what is valued and called for as a job obligation in the contract?

Michael Murphy
Professor of Education, University of Utah
Current Research: Comparative Studies of School Labor Relations

Let me just say that there is a fascinating book written by Alan Fox, a British sociologist, called Beyond Contract: Work, Power, and Trust Relations. It lays out, in the industrial relations setting, many of the things we have been talking about. I will try to cover some of the high points of Fox’s work and views of problems inherent in contracts as we know them.

I’d first like to give you a little background. A colleague of mine
in Great Britain and I met for the past three weeks at the Anglia Regional Management Centre outside of London to conceptualize a major comparative research effort to look at the effects of teacher unions and collective bargaining in Britain, the United States, and one other European country, probably Denmark. Those of you who have had experience with school systems and teacher unions in other countries realize that the operation of those systems is very different than in the United States. In fact, on the basis of the U.K. experience I have had, I would question nearly all the generalizations that we made this morning about the effects of collective bargaining and teacher unions on the behavior of people in the schools and school management positions. Great Britain’s teacher unions are very well organized and very powerful. Yet there is no tendency, that I can discern, to centralize decisionmaking. Headmasters—the equivalent of our principals—seem to remain very powerful, very autonomous, and not encumbered by the behavior of the teacher unions or their collective bargaining activities. I won’t go any farther with that generalization except to say that my comparative base leads me to wonder if the generalizations we are drawing are not culturally biased. We need to back off a bit and look at them.

In trying to decide how to go about setting up this study from a conceptual point of view—that is, how on earth are we going to decide what kinds of questions to ask, what kinds of data to gather about the three systems—we began a search of the literature in the two countries, Britain and the United States. As we began to read this literature, it became very clear that we just didn’t have very much. There is very little conceptual literature describing or dealing with the problems of teacher negotiations
and labor relations in the educational sector. It is an extremely weak literature.

In our conclusions we point out major problems with this education literature. One is that it is completely divorced from the mainstream of literature dealing with labor relations and collective bargaining. There is an exciting literature that dates back to the 1880s and 1890s and the Webbs of Great Britain, on to John R. Commons and Selig Perlman and some people in the United States early in the 20th century and on to current thinkers like John Dunlop, Walton and McKersie, Alan Fox, and others. These people work in the area called industrial relations. We have not attached ourselves to that literature, partly because we have wanted to claim that educational bargaining is a unique phenomenon—so completely different that we have to invent our own literature.

Another problem is that many findings of collective bargaining research are disquieting. John Dunlop pointed out that most policymakers and students of public policy find bargaining inconsistent and often in open conflict with their policy aspirations. Policymakers are controllers, designers, and architects of future events. Collective bargaining is a very complex system that accommodates conflict, goals, and values. It is strategic and iterative rather than deductive and singular and often appears irrational though it usually is not. It defies simple explanation and always complicates the relatively simplistic models used by policymakers and policy analysts. Our thinking about the organizational phenomena of education has been influenced primarily by economics, political science and sociology. These disciplines and the policies that spring from them have generally viewed employees in organizations as things to be manipulated and controlled,
or as producers of goods and services with economic value. Little theoretical attention has been given to the collective interests of employees and therefore we have very little basis for understanding the phenomenon of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is especially frustrating to those who prefer a unitary view of the world.

The notion that seems to work best for organizing research is that of Dunlop's industrial relations system in which collective bargaining is a process of rule-making in the workplace. It is part of the larger system of rule-making in organizations and industries. There are many sources of rules, regulations, and policies that govern behavior in schools. Collective bargaining is only one. I would argue that those people who look at collective bargaining outcomes and conclude that systems become rule-bound under collective bargaining have missed the fact that in many cases you could find the same contract clause—maybe not in the exact same words, but the same policy statement—embedded in a pre-bargaining rule.

Let me take class size as an example. Most school districts have an implicit, if not explicit, rule about class size. You all remember that in the 1950s school districts had formulae and they would send out another teacher if a second grade class exceeded 32 kids. If it got to 33, the class was split, and a new teacher was sent out. That is a class-size policy. It isn't any different than the clause in a collective bargaining agreement which says that class size may not exceed 32 kids. It is a matter of transferring the regulation from one document to another.

The Webbs and Commons have pointed out that collective bargaining sets common rules—the basis for preventing exploitation and for governing the terms on which properties can be exchanged. All of us have control of
certain properties: e.g., time, money, and energy. The collective bargaining agreement controls the terms on which properties can be exchanged. It sets a minimum, if you will. It says that I cannot pay you less than $4.00 per hour even if you’re willing to work for less. That’s to prevent an employing organization from using a surplus work force to keep employees at a lower salary level.

The Webbs noticed that there is a distinction between a labor agreement and a contract. An agreement sets minimum standards, the minimum terms acceptable. A contract is an agreement between an individual and an employer. Those who defend collective bargaining in public education by saying that, if a school district can contract for transportation services, it can also contract for labor services, are mistaken. The fact is that labor unions don’t contract for labor services, and teacher unions don’t supply teaching services. They establish rules through collective bargaining under which a contract can be made. Hence, it seems to me that, from a legal and theoretical point of view, that argument doesn’t hold up.

Dunlop says that the outcome of an industrial relations system is a web of rules. The rules may come from collective bargaining, they may come from governmental agencies, or they may be imbedded in tradition, custom, and practice. There are three actors in an industrial relation system: the managers and the managerial hierarchy, the workers and their hierarchy, and specialized governmental agencies and other private agencies that may be set up and legitimized by the organizations themselves. An industrial relations system also has an ideology that binds together the employer and employee hierarchies as well as linking to the governmental or specialized agencies.

What Fox really did in Beyond Contract: Work, Power, and Trust
Relations was to specify the ideology. Taking the polar cases, he said there are two basic views of organizations relative to labor management relations. One is a unitary view in which the organizational logic of the enterprise is seen as pointing towards unified authority and loyalty structures with managerial prerogatives being legitimized by all members of the organization. This accords with the emphasis placed on accepting the common objectives and the common values which unite and bind together all participants. In a unitary view, it is assumed that both employees and employers accept the same values and the same view of reward distribution. When both the employer and the employee hold unitary views, there is no conflict within the organization. Management's right to give directions, to determine reward structures, goes without challenge. Fox labels this kind of organization a "traditional" organization. An interest is shared and any assertion to the contrary is not legitimate. This is a condition that we saw, I think, in public education in the 1950s and 1960s. Management's definition of roles and rewards was fully legitimized.

Fox argues that it is possible that employees will begin to question this unitary frame of reference. If they do and management holds on to the traditional unitary view, then in fact you have a situation that Fox calls "classical conflict." Unions begin to say that it is legitimate for employees to have views different from management about how things ought to be done in the organization. You can imagine what that does to management, if they hold a unitary view and believe any counter-viewpoint to be illegitimate. The reaction of management is to try to spin a web of tighter and tighter controls around employees. And so Fox would not hold for laying blame for an increased web of rules and less discretion in work on unions.
What happens is that management spins that web as they see employees pulling away from what they believe to be a commitment to their values. This in turn sends messages to the employees that say, "We don’t trust you. We don’t believe that, left alone, you will pursue our goals and objectives or that you will have a commitment to the organization. As a consequence, we have to make it impossible for you to veer away from the organizational goals that management has set." Hence, the kinds of rules we see coming out of that situation are rules that reduce discretion.

There is a possibility of a pluralistic viewpoint on both sides. We find, in a system where there is common trust, that differences are legitimate and that, overall, goals and objectives can be negotiated and understood and that both parties will live by those goals. As a consequence, the need for constricting rules is diminished. In that kind of an organization, the constraining nature of the contract will be lessened.

Fox talks about two kinds of exchange systems. These aren’t original with Fox. One is a what he calls a social-exchange system in which an individual gives property or exchanges a favor with another individual with no clear knowledge that the favor is going to be immediately reciprocated. We do that with our families and with people we know. We say, for example, "Sure, I will help you move," without any definite understanding that, "You are going to do something for me in return." But I do know that sometime in the future, since I have helped you move house, you are going to do something for me when I need it. That is a social exchange system. It is a system of very diffuse rules as opposed to very explicit rules. It is also a system involving very high trust. I am not likely to help somebody do something if I don’t trust them to help me when I need help.
The second kind of exchange system Fox calls economic exchange. That's a system of exchange when there is no trust, a market-exchange system. When I get to the market and believe that the person I am dealing with is trying to do me out of something, then before we make any exchange I am going to write down or at least get explicit agreement on the terms of that exchange. If you buy a house on the open market, you engage in that kind of exchange because you believe that the strangers who are selling you the house are out to get as much out of you as possible. They in turn believe you are out to get the house for the least that you can. So you write a contract. A written contract is an expression of lack of trust. I don't trust you to do something for me; therefore, we are going to write down exactly what we have agreed. The difference between social and economic exchange relationships is really a difference in trust.

My observation about education today is that we have a systematic difference in the level of trust. We see at the district level a system organized around a lack of trust, which means putting out explicit contracts and trying to define precisely the terms of the exchange. "Look, you give me 6-1/2 hours, and I will give you this much money, based on this schedule, based on these kinds of conditions." That is a low-trust relationship. "I don't expect you as a school district to give me anything, because I think you are out to do me in." And the school district is saying, "I don't trust you either. You are lazy, not basically interested in educating kids, all you want to do is get in and get out." That is the message. Fox says that will lead to an ever-larger, ever-more-explicit contract.

At the school level, what we see is a different situation in which teachers and principals are building up or have built up a trust
relationship. The principal says, "Look, you have a dental appointment; I know the contract says you have to take the whole day off; but go ahead and I will cover your class. You don't owe me anything for that." In this trust relationship the parties say, "When I need your support you will give it back to me." I think we can explain the two types of labor-management behavior as the school operating on a trust-based, social-exchange kind of system and a district operating on a no-trust, market-exchange kind of system.

James Jenkins
Superintendent, Gresham (Oregon) Public Schools

First, of all, I would like to say I will be glad when somebody else has a strike in Oregon so I am no longer the resident expert. I was called upon to explain what it is like to have a strike. Nobody wins at a strike. I have got a picture on my door of a very thin, bedraggled dog or coyote, and it says, "Gosh, it has been a good year." Nobody wins in a strike, and I hope nobody else has to go through that. If they do, I think we can ensure you that we are now able to cope with that type of thing, live through such an experience.

There are two areas of research I would like for you people to consider that would help us in the field. One is the community. I think we have done a pretty good job of dealing with what happens with the teacher and the kids, but I am not sure we have taken a look at what impact it has on the community. Another area that should be looked at is the effect on other
employees: aides, secretaries, custodians, cooks, and bus drivers. Those people are absolutely torn apart in that kind of conflict. I don't think that we practitioners know how to deal with that very well and we need help. So hurry up and do the research so that we can put what you say into practice.

I am going to talk very briefly about a model that we have used in Gresham to bring the district back together. For us it has worked very well. The model is that of Irving Goldaber, who is from the East Coast. Some of you have heard about it. What it says to do is to get a sponsor, somebody who will look at both management and labor and say, "You have a problem--let's see if we can't do something about it." Get both sides to buy into a communications lab. We did that in Gresham. We used the ministerial association, invited ten members of the management team (board members, central office people, principals), and asked the teacher union president to select ten teachers. We then went to Mt. Hood Community College with a neutral facilitator. We went into a room where we sat in 20 chairs with no furniture in between. The facilitator explained the ground rules. Then we were asked to go into separate rooms and to write single issues on single pieces of butcher paper--what we thought was wrong with the other side. That took about an hour-and-a-half. We came back and posted all these things on the wall. We then flipped a coin and talked about one particular issue until nobody wanted to talk about it again.

The first flip was won by the teachers' side. Guess what their issue was? "We don't trust the superintendent." I was really looking forward to that discussion. That particular topic took 5 hours and 35 minutes. Once we had talked it through, then we "x"ed that off and went over to the other side
and talked about how "We can't trust labor unions," or whatever. Anyway, we stayed there until we had talked about all of these issues—until we were talked out. We started at 8:00 in the morning and went to 1:35 a.m. in our first meeting.

When you deal with conflict I think there are four stages that you have to go through. First of all, you have to ventilate: "I hate the superintendent," "We hate the teachers," etc. Next you have to clarify what each of the roles is. Then you have to develop some empathy for each other. Finally, you problem-solve.

We have used this model now once a month. On the second Wednesday of every month, we come together from one o'clock to five o'clock in the afternoon—ten teachers and ten members of the management team. We go into our separate groups, we put topics up on the wall, we talk about them until they are exhausted. We have made a lot of progress. As a result of it, we are now talking to each other and working together. The interesting thing is that now when we go into separate rooms, a lot of times we come back with the same issues, which indicates that we are understanding each other better.

The one weakness in this after the strike was that the teacher's union president did not select any nonstriking teachers to participate. Those folks were left out of the process and they felt very hurt.

In addition to the district-level meeting, I meet once a month with the principal and five teachers from each building and we use the same process. Before, I listed what are really district problems. Here we get at the building problems. Here is where we are able to attack the problem of the nonstriking teacher.

I believe this process should be used before a strike. I learned
about it on a Saturday, and we went to strike on a Tuesday. I honestly believe that if we had had this process in effect in our district, we would have eliminated a lot of the problems that we have. We need to learn how to talk to each other again. I never thought I would be quoting a union president, but Al Shanker maintains that if we are to survive in public education, we have to form a friendly coalition. Teachers are not going to go away and board members and superintendents are not going to go away. You may change personnel, but the positions are always going to be there. Teachers, management team members, and parents need each other if public education is going to survive. I really believe that.

In our district, only two out of every five voters is a parent. We run the real risk this fall of having to shut our schools down. We have two elections left. One is a mail-in ballot on September 21. The other election is in November. It is a general election and the 1-1/2 percent limitation is going to be in there. So if we don’t form a coalition, if we don’t get the support, then I think we will have to shut our schools down. We need each other and we need to support each other. It is time to get back in the same room and talk with each other and have common concerns again. If you’d like to know more about this model, call me in Gresham and I would be happy to send you this study.
Session III

Effects of Collective Bargaining on Teacher Work Conditions and Behavior
Session III included presentations of three research projects and two commentaries. The research presentations focused on changes in teacher behavior and work conditions that may be attributable to collective bargaining.

Randall Eberts, professor of economics at the University of Oregon, described the different time allocation patterns of teachers with and without collective bargaining. The central finding of his research was that teachers under collective bargaining shift their efforts slightly away from direct classroom instruction and towards preparation for instruction and participation in school governance activities.

Following Eberts, another University of Oregon economist, Joe Stone, and his co-researcher William Baugh, professor of political science, presented findings that teachers have accomplished salary gains as a result of collective bargaining and that teachers are as sensitive to the financial advantages of leaving teaching as are other types of workers contemplating job switches.

Charles Kerchner, professor of education at Claremont Graduate School, returned to the theme of Session I as he described his research on the stages of collective bargaining. Kerchner, like Brodie and Williams, sees administrators taking an increasingly active role of in policy bargaining, but he fears that, in the minds of many, the prevailing characteristics of teaching may have shifted from those of a profession or craft to those of rationalized labor. He predicts, further, that forthcoming contract developments may place new restrictions on teaching as a result of this shift.

Discussants were Bruce Cooper, professor of education at Fordham University, and James Yinger, president of the Morgan Hill, California, Federation of Teachers. Cooper presented several methodological criticisms of the Eberts and Baugh-Stone studies. He also described how principals are responding to the conflict between district administration and organized teachers by forming their own unions and joining teachers on the picket line. Yinger voiced a fear that conflict between administrators and teachers would be suicidal in the present withdrawal of public support for the schools. He called for consensus on policies important for school effectiveness and an aggressive political strategy for restoring public support.
The study that I have been conducting with Larry Pierce looks systematically at the long-run effects of collective bargaining on the quality of education. Whenever researchers talk about quality of education I am sure people are quietly asking themselves, "How can anyone completely account for all aspects of quality?" Quality is a broad term and we do not offer any new insights into the problem of quantifying educational quality. But there is some consensus lately in the literature about certain key factors that will produce a quality school or increase the effectiveness of a school. These include class size, the characteristics of the teacher, and the amount of time teachers spend in various activities. Teacher participation in school policy formation, peer groups, student characteristics, and family support are also very important in determining the quality of education.

What we propose to do, then, is to isolate those variables that collective bargaining can affect, show the effects of collective bargaining, and finally link them to student test scores. Presently, we are examining the effects of collective bargaining on a variety of educational factors. Next year we will attempt to make the link between collective bargaining and student test scores.

I want to talk today about the effects that we find collective
bargaining has on the class size, the characteristics of teachers, and the
time teachers spend in various activities. I will also mention why it is
very difficult to take that next step to look at the effect collective
bargaining has on student test scores, how we have some confounding results
that have to be reconciled by using a very systematic approach.

Collective bargaining affects the determinants of educational quality
in a number of ways. The first way is by changing or increasing the salaries
of teachers. Now in most cases today we have fairly constant budgets; it is
hard to pass any levies under present economic conditions. So an increase in
wages in education mean that there will be concurrent reallocation of
resources. And as a result of reallocating the resources, school districts
might no longer be able to hire as many teachers, or at least as many new
teachers. They have a harder time laying off teachers. Because of this we
might find that class size is becoming larger. If class size is a major
determinant of test scores, then collective bargaining will have a
significant effect on the quality of education as measured by this criterion.
Joe Stone and Bill Baugh have summarized the research on unionism and wages
and found some new evidence that collective bargaining does significantly
increase the wages that teachers receive.

The second way collective bargaining affects determinants of
educational quality, and one that we looked at in particular, is through the
language of the contract. We looked at specific provisions in the contract
that address class size, teacher participation, and the time teachers spend
in certain activities, and we can begin to see whether or not those
provisions actually do change teacher time allocations or the composition of
teaching staffs in particular school districts.
The findings we have to date indicate that a variety of things are going on. We used a national sample of about 5000 teachers in over 250 school districts across the country. It is a fairly representative sample. For class size, we find that collective bargaining significantly increases the number of teachers per student in the school district. Hence, collective bargaining decreases class size. To the extent that class size is significantly related to student test scores, we can say that collective bargaining is likely to affect student test scores if everything else is held constant.

We next looked at characteristics of teachers. We find that teachers who are covered by collective bargaining are more educated and have more experience. Now there is disagreement about whether the education level and experience level increases student test scores or the quality of education. Some people say that it does, other people claim that it does not, and still other people claim that it did earlier, before graduate education became more a way to higher salaries than to better teaching skills. So there are some contrasting results there.

Regarding time allocation, we looked at the amount of time teachers spent in five separate activities: (1) instruction, (2) preparation; (3) administrative and clerical tasks, which included participation in certain decision-making processes as well as doing dittos and a variety of things like that; (4) meetings with parents; and (5) other activities, especially after-school.

Our examination yielded a surprising finding. We found that teachers covered by collective bargaining in this national sample reduced the amount of time they spent in instruction by about ten minutes a day. Ten minutes a
day might not seem long, but if you extrapolate this into a 180-day school year it equals about a full week of instruction. So if you are at the bargaining table and you are wondering whether to shorten the school year or increase it, you might consider the fact that collective bargaining has already reduced the amount of instruction time. It does become significant when you look at it over the whole year.

We found that this ten minutes per day of instruction was reallocated in a variety of ways. Teachers spent more time on preparation. They increased the amount of time they spent in administrative and clerical tasks (this included the amount of time they might have participated in some type of decision-making role). And also they spent a little more time meeting with parents, for reasons we are not quite sure of. The increase in meeting time came to 1.4 minutes per day. People ask how we can measure that. Remember, teachers don't necessarily meet with parents every day. There might be a few more meetings throughout the month, or a few more parent-teacher conferences over a longer span of time.

In terms of teacher participation, we found that teachers covered by collective bargaining did not participate in decision making any more or less than teachers not covered. However, when we broke the contract down into provisions that address certain types of participatory activities, there was a difference. If there was a provision in the contract that allowed teachers to help decide staffing and student assignment, then their participation increased, obviously. So there wasn't an overall behavioral difference in the sense that teachers covered by collective bargaining always participated more. It was the fact that if the contract gave them responsibility for deciding about student assignment, teacher assignment, planning course
content, or budgetary planning, then teachers did participate more in those areas.

There are other important determinants of educational quality which we have yet to consider. Allow me to cite some of the literature that may provide clues to the various effects. Take administrative leadership, for example. There is disagreement about the effect of collective bargaining on administrators. Some people feel that school building administrators, by having a contract, now have more freedom from the central office to pursue their own policies. They don't have to check with the central office to see whether it is all right to do something. It is already written into the contract. They have those rules with which to operate. However, other people, looking at the same principals, might say that now principals have their hands tied because they have to follow the contract to the letter. All they do is enforce rules with which they may not even agree. So how collective bargaining has influenced administrative leadership is a confusing issue.

As they now stand, our results present an ambiguous picture of how collective bargaining affects the quality of education. When you go down the list of findings that I have just talked about, the effects go in different directions. For example, we found that collective bargaining reduces the amount of time teachers spend in instruction but increases preparation time. The final result of this alteration of activities is unclear. If the ten-minute loss in instruction can be offset by more effective use of instructional time as a result of better teacher preparation, then perhaps the quality of education is not affected at all. However, if preparation time has no effect on student test scores, and we find instructional time has
been reduced, then student achievement may have been reduced by collective bargaining. We also have to look at the reduction in instructional time in light of the change in the composition of teacher faculties, decreased class size, and increased teacher-student ratios. Until we can put all these together in a systematic way, it is impossible to figure out exactly what the final effect of collective bargaining is on student achievement. During the next year we will look at all these determinants together by incorporating them in an educational production function. In this way we can see the contribution of each particular element to variation in student test scores.

Let me put in perspective what our type of research can say to the administrator or the teacher who is busily negotiating things that seem perhaps more important at the time—things like reduction in staff, class size, and salaries. Obviously our research will not address all the differences in the characteristics of districts represented by people in this room. What our research does is look at the average trends in education, what collective bargaining has done to education in general in this country. And so when you look at our results, you don't necessarily have to see your own school district described there. Perhaps, in your district, collective bargaining has reduced instructional time; but through improved instructional leadership, or better participation of teachers, your school district has overcome that and still provides a quality education.

What our research does do, however, is to alert administrators and teachers to certain conditions that could exist in their school districts. If those conditions do match the average conditions that we see in our sample, then the long-run effect could be to reduce or increase the quality of education. I think we do play an important part in informing
administrators and teachers of what the trends might be. As I mentioned at the beginning, administrators and teachers are very busy trying to put out the fires that are blazing right now—whether that involves negotiating wages or reduction-in-force provisions. There are still very important consequences of collective bargaining that if let unattended or unnoticed would change the entire structure of public education.

William Baugh
Professor of Political Science, University of Oregon
Current Research: Educator Labor Market Studies

In our project, Joe Stone and I tried to find out how sensitive teachers are to economic concerns in making career decisions. We began by addressing the question, To what extent does teacher unionism pay in the contemporary world? We found in common with almost all the published research based on the data of the late 1960s or early 1970s that there was essentially no significant union wage premium for that period. But when we looked at the late 1970s we found that there seemed to be substantial wage gains by unionized teachers relative to their nonunionized colleagues. To obtain these results we used two complementary types of research design—wage level regressions and wage change regressions. We can conclude from this that by the late 1970s the differential in wages between unionized and nonunionized teachers had reached a level of from 12 to 22 percent. And over
the period between 1974 and 1978 the real wages of unionized teachers, correcting for inflation, increased slightly while those of nonunionized teachers declined fairly significantly. I will summarize very briefly how we obtained these results and try to explain what we think they mean for teachers and school administrators. If you would like additional details, I will send copies of the reprint of an article setting out these results which appeared in the spring, 1982, Industrial Labor Relations Review.

The wage level regression is a fairly standard technique which we used to look at a national sample of teachers. We controlled for as many things as we could think of that might otherwise cause wage differences among teachers, including race, experience, sex, education levels, whether teachers were in urban or rural areas, and the kinds of assignments they had— that is, secondary, elementary, or kindergarten teaching assignments. The data that we used for this was drawn from the Current Population Survey (CPS) by the U.S. Census Bureau; the CPS is a stratified random sample on a national basis of some 56,000 households. During the month of May each year the Census Bureau concentrates on essentially labor-economic issues and they collect data on wages and union membership. The survey also has some very nice properties that allow researchers to follow people from year to year. We found a weak indication of about a 7 percent wage differential between the unionized and the nonunionized teacher in 1974, and a 21 percent wage differential by 1977. In the CPS we can also look at the same individuals from one year to the next. We were able to obtain two samples in which we had matched individuals between 1974 and 1975, and again between 1977 and 1978, which meant that we could apply a different type of research design and do wage change studies. This is a much stronger kind of design because we
were actually able to look at teachers who in one year were not union members and in the next year were.

We cannot control everything with this technique, but we can control a lot more than we could control with wage level regressions. These people might possibly have changed school districts but they still have to be living in the same house because the Census Bureau gears everything to the respondent's residence. So these are people in the same residence for two successive years who joined the union between the first and the second year. We are able to look at how their earnings were affected. This wage change technique is a more stringent test than the wage level regression.

For the first pair of years in the early and mid-70s there was no significant wage change. But for the 1977-78 period, we found a 12 percent shift upward in wages for those who joined unions during that year. So these two approaches seem to suggest that the union wage premium for teachers is at least as large as the union wage premium in the economy at large.

Now why might this be the case? This is clearly a little more speculative, but we have suggested several possible explanations for this. In the first place, over the period from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, existing unions may have matured and consolidated their power to negotiate, thereby producing favorable contracts.

Second, there clearly was during this period a continuation in the growth of state legislation that was favorable to teacher collective bargaining. In 1973 there were some 24 states with laws on the books that permitted or encouraged teacher collective bargaining and were stronger in character than just 'meet and confer' laws. By 1978, five years later, seven more states had passed legislation or strengthened enabling legislation.
permitting or encouraging teacher collective bargaining.

Third, we note that in general during periods when there is an excess labor supply, there tends to be an increase in the union/nonunion wage differential. I think we are all painfully aware that the 1970s were a period of excess labor supply in the teacher labor market, which would suggest that the union/nonunion wage differential would be increased. So we had a period during the 1970s of high inflation which led to a strong downward pressure on real wages of teachers (correcting for inflation) but did not put any truly comparable pressure on their nominal wages.

These results, of course, are based on the CPS national sample, but they are also quite consistent with results based on Oregon data from a different database. Some of you are familiar with the fact that the State Department of Education does a census of all certificated personnel each fall. This provides a very rich data source for labor market information. We have data that allows us to track individuals over time regarding their earnings, teaching assignments, and experience levels. The state officials do no studies of this data over time. They do annual summaries and stop there. We have used that data to track individuals over time and follow the mobility effects, the kinds of things that cause teachers to choose to move among districts or to enter or leave the profession.

As part of that work, we have looked in considerable detail at four districts spanning quite a range of enrollment changes, from decreases to substantial increases. We looked in some detail at Portland, Eugene, Bend, and Redmond for the period 1971 through 1978. What we see in each of those districts in that period is what seems to be a conscious policy of maintaining essentially constant real wages over time. Real wages,
correcting for inflation, didn’t seem to fluctuate by more than 1 to 3 percent in any of those districts.

So what we see overall is that nationally the real wages of all teachers had declined over the 1970s, while the real wages of unionized teachers had increased by as much as perhaps 1 percent. That is fairly consistent with the Oregon data.

This seems to suggest two things. First, teachers are concerned about real income. That concern is also revealed in the studies of teacher mobility that Joe is going to tell you about. Second, our results suggest that unionization has provided a vehicle that has enabled teachers to maintain essentially constant real wages over the recent highly inflationary period. These results in combination with mobility studies suggest very strongly that any myth to the effect that teachers are less sensitive to economic concerns than people in the economy at large is only a myth. Teachers are at least as sensitive as everybody else to economic concerns, which is perhaps the primary message for administrators in our work.

Joe Stone
Professor of Economics, University of Oregon
Current Research: Educator Labor Market Studies

I would like to address the issue of whether teachers are sensitive to economic incentives in making career decisions, or, stated differently,
whether teachers have their shoes nailed to the classroom floor.

In presenting this research I usually get two basic reactions, and the size of the groups expressing these reactions appear to be approximately equal. One group says, "The answer to the question seems obvious. Of course teachers are pretty much like any other workers and do respond to economic incentives in making their career decisions." The other group says, "The answer to that question is obvious. Teachers are somewhat different from other workers in how they make their career decisions." While I will confirm one group's opinion, I will only contradict but not necessarily change the opinion of the other.

In the last decade or so, neither educators nor economists have fared very well in public opinion. As both an educator and an economist I feel slightly paranoid. And since presumably we all here share some sympathies as educators, another small task I hope to accomplish today is to polish, at least a little, the reputation of economists.

There is the old story of the physician, the engineer, and the economist debating over which is the oldest profession. The physician says to the other two, "If you look at the very first chapter of Genesis you find that God decided to improve on the first model when he decided to create Eve out of one of Adam's ribs, and clearly this is the accomplishment of a master surgeon." And the engineer responded by saying, "Ah, but if you look in the very first verses of Genesis, you find that in the beginning there was nothing but darkness and chaos, and God created the universe in six days. Surely, this was the work of a master engineer!" To which the economist responded, "I am sorry, but you are both wrong. Who do you think created the chaos?"
I will deal basically with the issue of teacher mobility—teachers who leave teaching or move from one district into another. I think there are four serious questions.

The first question is, Are teachers responsive to wage differentials between jobs and alternative occupations in deciding whether to leave teaching for other employment? For example, are teachers looking at what possibilities there might be in real estate? (They aren't looking very hard right now!) Are teachers sensitive to movements in the differential between what they are getting in the classroom for teaching students and what they might get in some alternative occupation, given their skills, training, and aspirations?

Well, Bill Baugh and I used the Current Population Survey to look at the issue of movement out of teaching into other occupations, controlling for a number of demographically related factors. We basically were interested in responsiveness of the individual teacher to the difference between his or her actual wage in teaching and the potential wage in the economy as a whole. We computed a hypothetical potential wage based upon certain characteristics—the education level, experience, and things of that sort. And what we found is that teachers are at least as responsive as other workers to changes in that differential. If it looks as though teacher wages are falling behind those in other occupations, teachers respond by leaving teaching in about the same degree as other workers do in moving across occupational lines.

The second question that we address is, Are teachers responsive to wage differentials within the teaching field in deciding to leave one school district for employment in another? To look at movement among districts, we
used Oregon data. We matched up individual teachers from year to year, 1971-72 through 1978-79. Again we controlled for a number of different factors, and we concentrated on the difference between the teacher's actual wage and the wage received on the average in another district in Oregon. We computed the hypothetical potential wage in another district based on educational attainment, experience, and other factors. Our conclusion was again that teachers do respond significantly to such wage differentials. As teachers begin to see wage differentials opening up between what they get in one district and what they might potentially get in another district, there is an increased inclination to change districts.

The magnitude of the responsiveness, however, appears to be somewhat smaller for the interdistrict movement than for movement out of the field. That could be the result of one or two basic factors. It could be that the teachers in Oregon are somewhat different from teachers on average in the rest of the United States in responding to economic incentives. The other alternative is that, in responding to economic incentives, teachers may be responsive to what is going on among friends and neighbors in other occupations in their local economies rather than moving, for example, to Antelope (Oregon) to teach school.

The third question that we ask is, Are teachers responsive to differences in nonsalary components of the job environment in deciding to change districts? Nonsalary components might include whether or not there are secondary teaching assignments or opportunities for extra-pay assignments. And what we found was that, for example, some teachers left districts to seek extra-pay assignments. That is, extra-pay assignments apparently were not available in the districts they left, but they were
available in the districts to which they moved. And the expected presence of the extra-pay assignments was significantly related to the fact that they did move. We found a similar relationship for secondary teaching assignments.

On the other side of the coin, we found that some teachers left districts to avoid such assignments. So if assignments are a matter of policy, if a particular teaching assignment carries with it an extra-pay responsibility, some people view that as a burden and some people view it as advantage. And those differences tend to retain or push teachers across district lines.

The last question we asked was, How do trends in district enrollment affect the responsiveness of teachers to economic incentives in moving across district lines? What we found, I think, adds some additional depth to the earlier questions. In declining enrollment districts in Oregon, only teachers with a negative wage premium—that is, only teachers paid below the average of other teachers with identical measured characteristics—were sensitive to this differential in deciding to remain in or leave a district. But the people with positive wage premiums in declining enrollment districts were not sensitive at all to the size of the wage differential. In increasing enrollment districts, it was the other side of the coin; teachers with positive wage premiums were sensitive to the size of the differential in deciding to remain or leave the district.

In retrospect, this was somewhat more obvious than it appeared when I first looked at the results. That is usually the way with theoretical analysis. It is always much more obvious after you have looked at it. You see what is actually going on. What happened in the two types of districts is that the wage of an average teacher in Oregon who starts out at the
average wage in year one will increase slightly over time (this is nominal level, not real). But the teacher who has an average wage discount--someone who's paid below the average wage--can expect, in an increasing enrollment district, a larger salary increase than our average teacher. So a teacher with a negative wage premium in an increasing enrollment district can expect to catch up over time. However, a teacher who has a negative wage premium in a declining enrollment district will not tend to catch up.

Now consider teachers who have a positive wage premium. If they are in an increasing enrollment district, they start out ahead and they tend to stay ahead. So that if you have a positive premium, and then if you are in an increasing enrollment district, you are in pretty good shape. But if you have a positive premium and are in a declining enrollment district, you will have a trend that is only weakly positive over time.

So the basic reason why teachers with negative wage premiums in declining enrollment districts and teachers with positive wage premiums in increasing enrollment districts are the ones who really respond to the economic signals being given them is simply because they are have the most to gain or lose. The other two sorts of people, people who are underpaid in an increasing enrollment district, or overpaid in a declining enrollment district, have offsetting trends. In an increasing enrollment district, they will have salary increases around 2 percent higher than average, 2 percent higher than in the declining enrollment district. So even though the wage premium they have may erode slightly, the district salaries generally keep going up. For further details of this analysis, I would refer you to our article in this summer's Economics of Education Review.

Our basic conclusion is that, contrary to the opinion of one group I
have encountered, teachers do tend to be aware of other alternatives and will be influenced by a comparison of these alternatives to their current positions in making career decisions. It does not appear, after all, that teachers have their shoes nailed to the classroom floor.

Charles T. Kerchner
Professor of Education and Public Policy, Claremont Graduate School
Current Research: Labor Relations and Definitions of Teacher Work

Douglas Mitchell and I, with our two associates, Gabrielle Pryor and Wayne Erck, have been privileged over the last three years, with the assistance of the National Institute of Education, to take an indepth look at some 72 school districts in California and Illinois. Let me first say a couple of things about school districts before I talk about the nature of teaching and draw a relationship to some comments that were made yesterday.

There are three points I want to make about school districts and labor relations. The first point is that we are talking about stages of development, similar to Gail Sheehy's metaphor in Passages. There are, indeed, stages in the development of labor relations, and to consider those stages may help you understand what labor relations are like in your own district.

Second, the nature of political intervention in districts is episodic. That is, if on a given Tuesday morning you go and look for a relationship between the district polity—the parents, the citizens, or
whatever—and how labor relations run, you may not see it because there may not be any active relationship. However, if you study the district over time, you will see the activation of important coalitions at crucial times in which the nature of labor relations passes from one generation to the next.

And the third point I want to make about school districts is to agree with Steve Goldschmidt and Sondra Williams that there is indeed a trend toward the use of collective bargaining as an explicit policy vehicle. The interesting part is that the impetus there comes not from the union but from management. That is, at a point management changes its mind about the scope of collective bargaining and it introduces policy concerns into negotiations.

My colleagues and I break the development of labor relations into three distinct generations, separated by periods known as the First Intergenerational Conflict and a period known as the Second Intergenerational Conflict.

I use some metaphors for these generations that you may recognize from your own school districts. On the other hand, you may say, "This man doesn't know what he is talking about," which is entirely possible.
The First Generation is what we call the "meet and confer" generation. What happens in that period are the kinds of things that Mike Murphy talked about yesterday when he described a unitary value system—people basically believe the same thing. Then, at some point, teachers come not to believe the same thing, they act on their beliefs, the level of conflict increases and we have here what is known as the First Intergenerational Conflict—a crisis of legitimacy. Teachers are always led at this point by a radical and the superintendent is always a bastard. As soon as the administrators progress to being able to say, "Well, he is a radical, but he is our radical," and the teachers say, "Well, he is still a bastard, but he is our bastard," then you can enter what is known as the Second Generation, which we call the era of "good faith" bargaining. In that era, apropos to what was said yesterday, administrators come to believe that the shortest contract is the best one, and there is a diminished level of conflict because neither side can tolerate constant, high, disruptive conflict. Conflict tends to go down, but the teacher's organization is now considered to be legitimate.

The conflict goes down quite markedly in the second part of the Second Generation. This is when some of the kinds of things which have been reported to you in the last day or so tend to take place. The richness of accommodative relationships starts to grow. Principals and teachers work things out; superintendents and labor relations directors work things out. We call this "management around the contract." That is, they figure out some way to selectively enforce or not enforce certain provisions of the contract. One would think, and indeed a good bit of the early industrial sector labor history suggests, that that would be the end of it. Labor relations would
remain in this happy state having moved from conflict to cooperation. The process would be basically one of social accommodation. Our data suggest otherwise, and it suggests otherwise for a very important reason that has to do with the polity of schools.

Public schools are nested in a political arena. One of the things that happen is privatization. That is, some people become experts in labor relations, and the game becomes one that is played only by experts. Eventually, the general public starts feeling left out. (Previously, the teachers felt left out, for reasons that were obvious.)

The public raises one of two charges against the school district. One charge is that the school district isn't very good anymore, and it is someone's fault. The "someone" must be the people who are running it--it must be this nice relationship between the school teachers and the administration. The second charge leveled is that of economy and efficiency: "It sure does cost a lot to run this place." And what we can document fairly well in this period is electoral turnover. New people run for school board offices and they, in the classic sense, either change the superintendent's mind or the superintendent. It is at this point that management becomes the moving party in terms of using the contract to explicitly manage the district, suggesting that some of the trends that were noted in contract analysis from the study yesterday tend to fit with our findings.

Now, let us talk a little bit about teaching work. Most of the conversations about teaching work have focused on questions of authority--that is, who has the right to do what and to whom. I want to talk about the nature of work, as opposed to who has authority. The important
question is, What is it that you want teaching work to be like? In order to talk about work I have to do a little paradigm sketching.

All work has two characteristics. First, somebody decides what it is that is going to be done and defines tasks. Second, someone oversees the work and decides when it is done properly.

Now, to refine the paradigm a little, for some people's work, oversight is direct; it is accomplished by inspection of work while it is being done or of the product. Other people's work is inspected by licensure; that is some authority—the state or an association of workers—decides what it is that marks a good worker, and that usually takes place before the work begins. With regard to task definition, some kinds of work tasks are preplanned. That is, what is to be done is known before the work starts. Other kinds of work are adaptive. That is, the worker is supposed to figure out on the job what it is the work is supposed to be about. If we draw lines around the distinctions in task oversight and task definition, we get the wonderful four-celled table so dear to the hearts of all academics. In the cells we have four different kinds of work. We call work that is inspected and preplanned, labor. We call work that is indirectly overseen—that is, where the worker gets a license and goes out and does it, but someone else decides what is to be done—craft. We call work that involves certification or licensure but where the worker is supposed to be adaptive to situation, profession. And we call work that is inspected but highly adaptive, art.
Now, all real jobs are a mixture of all four of those "ideal" types of work. Neurosurgery, which is something we would commonly consider to be a profession, is labor when the doctor gets called in on Sunday morning by the hospital administrator, who says, "If you don't fill out your charts, you are going to lose your operating room privileges on Monday." The work is preplanned, somebody is going to check it out to make sure that it gets done, and there is very little ambiguity about what it is that happens in the process.

Let me talk a little bit about each of the four ideal types. In labor, management defines and oversees the work. Management is responsible for the outcome. And the key mark of a good laborer is the lack of insubordination. You want your laborers to be loyal, but if the outcome isn't right it is not their fault, it is management's.

The key mark of a craft worker is competence. You want good craft work, and you get that by looking at the quality of the work that a craft worker is capable of doing, before he or she enters into the performance of the craft. It is pretty tough for the layman to tell shoddy craft work from good craft work. Therefore, you have plumbing licensure and teaching licensure, where people who supposedly know the craft inspect the worker before the work begins.
The key in professional work is judgment. That is why the concept of malpractice for a professional is not just whether the professional uses the right technique, but whether he or she made the right guesses. And what happens in occupations that we view as professional is that there is a public withdrawal of judgment. The public says, "We don't know enough about this, you go do it."

And with art, of course, what we want is engagement. You find a lot of criticism in art, and authority is an important aspect of art. There is a conductor of a symphony orchestra, a dance master, a principal architect, and there is strenuous external criticism—not always appreciated but always listened to and extremely potent.

Now, let me very quickly close the circle to talk about labor relations by way of an assertion of which you can decide whether or not it applies at your institution. The assertion is that through contracts, in social relationships, and in the political activities of labor relations, there is a tendency to emphasize the labor aspects of teaching work. Note the words, tending to emphasize, as opposed to transforming teaching or anything like that. There are some structural aspects of teaching that would be very difficult to change, regardless of what you do. I have a colleague who is an anthropologist, and he maintains that by listening to the language and discourse in any country in the world he can tell you whether you are in a school room or not.

Remember, that labor work tends to be preplanned and tends to be directed. In contracts, the hours and duties provisions thereof, the separation of regular and extra duties, and the existence of long chains of procedural rules, have tended to reinforce management's drive to rationalize
and preplan the work. That is, if teacher time is now a scarce commodity and if there are more stringent limitations on teacher time, the inclination is to try to regulate that time, to try to specify what goes on.

Teacher work tends to be more inspected partly because of the grievance process. The requirements for the enforcement of standards of practice and the evaluation clauses suggest that if you are going to evaluate a teacher you'd better have behavioral data. Hunches and judgments about what makes for good teaching won't suffice.

Turning to the social system, there is the dual loyalty that was mentioned yesterday, and a certain homogenization of work rules. It is easier for a teacher union to deal with teachers as a single group. It is relatively more difficult to negotiate special deals for special types of teachers, and so there is a tendency to rationalize teaching by making the rules identical for all.

The sociopolitical system also engages both parties in occasions for inspection of work. One occasion is the demonstration of each party's influence. Not all interactions between teachers and administrators are just interactions between teachers and administrators; not all grievances are just grievances. There is a brilliant little book by James Kuhn at Columbia about what a grievance really is, that doesn't have anything to do with education—it grew out of his observations at a tire-and-rubber plant in Akron. But it is a marvelous example of the politics of the grievance. Each side was trying to make a point vis-a-vis another side that had relatively little to do with what the grievance prima facie was about.

Another occasion is the breakdown of what Brian Rowan calls the logic of confidence. The logic of confidence occurs when you say, "Cooper here is
all right." Now, you haven’t got the slightest idea of what it is that Cooper does, but you say, "Cooper is all right," and Cooper in turn says, "This place in Oregon must be all right." He doesn’t really know what goes on in this place in Oregon but he says it is all right. That’s known as management by the logic of confidence. By extension, the school boards clearly don’t really know what the superintendents do, superintendents really don’t know what principals do, principals really don’t know what teachers do, but they are willing to attest that everybody’s doing a wonderful job.

When confidence breaks down you get inspection of work. And when confidence breaks down between school systems and the polity, you tend to get some very strong signals for explicit policies from the polity itself.

* * *

Let me close with this: We have had several wonderful, reinforcing events as we have gone through the research, and we have listened to these little signals from the environment. The last one was in the form of a message inside a cookie at a Chinese restaurant. It said, "You will have an insight." But then there was a distressing little semicolon and then it said, "but it won’t be any better than the last one."
Comments by Panel Members: Bruce Cooper and James Yinger

Bruce Cooper
Professor of Education, Fordham University
Current Research: Collective Bargaining for School Principals

I have got three things I want to say. First, about five years ago I was invited by the National School Boards Association to a meeting similar to this where they were talking about collective bargaining and the research. And it was interesting that at that meeting the research paradigm everyone was talking about was why collective bargaining was occurring, in terms of causes—what were the reasons in terms of status problems of teachers, the changes in the laws, shifts in the economy, shifts in the labor force. In this conference, five years later, we have almost flipped the paradigm around. We are assuming the existence of collective bargaining. I mean it is out there, and now we are trying to figure out what impact collective bargaining is having. And this morning we talked about wages, we talked about teaching time, we talked about the impact on school organizations, and so on, and ultimately the next conference four years from now, if we all live so long, will probably get to the ultimate question, which is really, What is the impact on achievement and what schools are designed to do? That is sort of everybody’s research agenda. So I thought I would throw that out just to give you some idea of what the field looks like in terms of history and development.

Second, I want to talk very briefly about the two papers that were presented this morning—Bill and Joe’s paper on the changes in the core structure and then Randy and Larry’s on the changes in time allocation. And
my reanalysis of those and my gut reaction to them is that I don't accept their findings at quite the same level that they have presented them.

Basically, some of the problems with the cost studies is the finding that bargaining increases the premium from between 12 to 21 percent during this period. In that analysis, in my opinion, they left out some critical variables. For example, what would have happened if a teacher had been working as a part-time substitute or even as a paraprofessional in a school district, and, five years later, was living in the same house in the same district and therefore in the same longitudinal study? Suddenly that teacher has moved up in terms of salary. Whether the bargaining had shifted during that period or not is not clear. So there are a number of variables that they left out which I could go into. One has to do with how they gathered the data. The other one has to do with a number of variables that were left out of their models. A big one would be opportunity costs in the region. In other words, we don't know enough about the school districts to tell whether those costs have simply increased, not because of collective bargaining, but because of other situations that, within the school district, were influencing the rise in the costs. So I would argue that the rise probably has been somewhere around 4 percent and not 12 to 21 percent when other conditions are controlled for. That would be my comment on that paper.

A brief comment on the other paper: this 3 percent change in time amounts to about 1600 minutes out of the total of 64,500 minutes that a teacher spends in the classroom in a year. So it is just a reduction of 1600 out of 64,500. It is difficult to argue that that is going to make very much difference, particularly if you look at other kinds of schools, like schools in other countries and private schools, where they spend much less time in
the classroom but where achievement results are equally high or sometimes higher. My guess is that this 3 percent change will probably help to improve and not really depress the work. Any of you who has taught in public schools knows that after six hours of teaching you are completely exhausted. I used to sort of have a complete collapse about three times a year because I was going six hours a day. (I teach about an hour a day now and I am worn out.) Anyway, to reduce this six hours by nine minutes may be an interesting finding, but I really question the total impact of that on the quality of education.

The third thing I want to say has to do with my own research and it has nothing to do with these other two things but it is something that is important to figure into the equation.

The stuff that I have been looking at for the last four or five years is not collective bargaining among teachers but collective bargaining among administrators. And the most recent survey shows that about 21 percent of the principals, assistant principals, directors, and coordinators—the middle management—are themselves independently engaging in collective bargaining activities. And I am trying to figure out why school principals, the sort of bastion of respectability and authority throughout the history of education, like their compatriots the teachers have begun to engage in collective bargaining. And again, I have identified a number of variables that are similar to what the teachers have gone through. Professor Lortie yesterday talked about the problem of being a middle administrator—of being the senior executive on the job and the junior executive in the school district—and the kind of tensions and problems that administrators are facing. What difference does administrator bargaining make in terms of the way the school
district operates? I have been looking at the impact on things like principals' wages and activities. I, too, have not been able to link administrator bargaining to the quality of education. That, again, is a question for the next research generation.

You may want to know that currently there are 2200 school systems in the U.S. that have recognized independent administrator unions or groups of principals. In 21 states the laws permit them to bargain. And in an additional seven states—Ohio and so on—while there are not state laws, local school boards have voluntarily decided to bargain with their principals. Then there are a number of states that outlaw it, like Oregon—although your good neighbor to the north, Washington, protects the rights of principals to bargain. And then there are a whole slew of states in the South and the lower Midwest where no bargaining occurs—teachers don't bargain and neither do administrators.

This is a movement that has been going on very quietly. There is now an AFL-CIO union of administrators in New York City, sort of the counterpart to the AFT. It is called the American Federation of School Administrators. It is small and growing. It has got about 80 locals, including San Francisco, New York City, Philadelphia, and Chicago. This movement is sort of paralleling very quietly the teacher unionization movement. So when we begin to build our paradigm as to what impact unionization is having on schools, one of the things that should be looked at is not only whether the teachers are bargaining, but also whether the principals and administrators are bargaining, whether they are affiliated with the AFL-CIO, and whether they have been out on strike, because in a number of cities the principals have hit the bricks with the teachers. You have principals on picket lines...
now in a number of cities.

So there has been a radical change in the way the management team has been conceived of. Now the management team is no longer unified. Some of the same things Chuck Kerchner talked about—when you have this rise in anxiety about agreeing with the mission of the organization—have been going on among the administrators as well. They no longer feel that top management (superintendent, school board) care a darn about them, and they perceive top management is selling out the administrators in order to buy off the teachers. You get that kind of impression.

James Yinger
President, Morgan Hill (California) Federation of Teachers

First of all, I would like to say that I am suffering from the logic of confidence problem here. I think what has been going on at this conference is all right, but I am not sure.

I should tell you a little bit about myself. I am the president of a local union of 380 teachers, 75 percent of whom belong to the AFT voluntarily. We don't have an agency shop. Our district has about 8600 students. My job there is as program specialist in special education. I am also one of 20 vice-presidents of the California Federation of Teachers.

I want to make some comments about all these presentations because I think there are some common themes running through most of them.

I don't think that the increase in wages and the allocation of funds
within the districts is too much different than it was before collective bargaining. I would like to say, yes, it is 12 to 22 percent higher, but I think the increased ability to be heard is the important thing to come out of bargaining.

As far as reduced time spent in instruction, I agree with Mr. Cooper. It is the old argument of quantity versus quality. I think there is importance in preparation time.

I support what Judith Little said yesterday about the kind of inservice staff development, communication, and creative energy that the education community at a local site can put together, especially when led by the principal—the successful kind of principal who uses that inservice time correctly. I should also say that teachers want to have principals, they want to have leaders, they want to have leadership, and they want to have a superintendent who exhibits quality educational leadership. At no time has collective bargaining in education ever intended to take over the entire school system. I think that from a teacher's point of view at the local site, the principal is the key factor.

Of course, there are issues that cause teachers to organize—for example, the concept of seniority. Somehow we have made the assumption that senior teachers are poor teachers and that just because they have been around a long time we ought to get rid of them and replace them with younger people. Some districts say that "While we must lay off people in this economy, we have to keep these old, GI-Bill-trained teachers." I don't think this is correct thinking. Senior teachers provide the profession with the wisdom of experience. I don't think we should make broad generalizations about length of service.
In regard to the changing of careers and responsiveness to wage differentials, I believe that teachers have the same attitudes as workers in other fields. The important factor about changing from one district to another is that once you get beyond the third or fourth salary step and you move to another district, you are not going to maintain your place on the salary schedule. You must drop back on the salary schedule and lose a lot of money. A good example of this problem can be seen in the forced changes that occur in special education. As the responsibility for offering special education programs is shifted back to local districts, teachers are getting closed out of county-operated programs. Many of the special education teachers can transfer with the program but at a loss of $2,000 to $5,000 a year. School districts allow credit for no more than four or five years' service. Also, county offices of education have traditionally been funded at higher levels for special education programs than local districts. By the way, I see constant parallels in collective bargaining and the application of special education legislation.

I would agree with Mr. Kerchner that the trend toward collective bargaining in policy matters is a result of management impetus. I am a little reluctant to negotiate policy issues where my constituency has such sharp differences. Oftentimes boards will publicly say, "You have collective bargaining and you are just talking about bread-and-butter issues. Do something about the children, do something about the system." Or when they need a political advantage, they will say, "Those issues are management prerogatives" or use the contract to hold off discussing policy matters of any substance.

Both with collective bargaining and with special education laws,
teachers and parents went in with very high expectations. The image of what could be accomplished through negotiations and what could be offered in special education programs, however, did not match the fiscal reality that confronted us. There is a big gap there. I think we bit off a lot more than we could chew in both instances, especially with special education.

We have talked about the difference between arbitration for grievances and compulsory arbitration used in settling contract negotiations. I am not sure that anyone should be compelled to settle a contract by forced arbitration. A compulsory statewide salary schedule is another idea that gets tossed around. These plans take away local control from both labor and management.

I think everyone wants to keep things local. Yesterday Mr. Jenkins said that open communication should have occurred before the strike in his district. I can say that in our district, and hopefully in others, that kind of discussion is going on at the bargaining table and away from the table. There is access to the superintendent at all times. There is ongoing discussion. There are issues that are being discussed that may or may not relate to collective bargaining, but there is participation. It is a shared management in a sense, a model of the quality-circle concept that is coming out of Japan in business and spilling over into education.

The attacks being made against education are not a result only of collective bargaining. There are a variety of other causes. We are no longer dealing with an immigrant public that accepts education and is generally not as well educated as teachers. The parents we deal with on a day-to-day basis are looking straight across at teachers; so you have a natural loss of respect. That respect is something that all educators need
to find a way to bring back. Parents tell you that they can educate their kids better at home. In public education we run a system that educates everybody from A to Z. On the one hand you have the gifted kid whose parent is a doctor and calls you from surgery to tell you how to teach math. On the other hand you have the kid who doesn't care if he comes to school at all. Overall, I think we suffer from the problems we have created by successfully educating people. We find ourselves in an atmosphere of attack; collective bargaining may add to that but certainly can't be blamed as the sole cause of it.

There are attacks on education that we all need to be aware of, like the refusal to support schools financially. The June election in California put the final nail in the coffin with the propositions that were defeated on that ballot. The results simply show a lack of public understanding that, if there is no money, there cannot be quality. The public professes to believe in the value of a quality system of public education but at the same time refuses to support the funding needed to achieve a quality system.

We have managed to teach everyone how to explain what their rights are. Even kindergarten children can tell you what they have a right to do. We don't add to that a lesson on responsibility that must go hand in hand along with rights.

I can talk about due process hearings in special education. Many of the cases have involved parents that want their children educated in private placements at public expense. I am involved in those hearings. They cost our district between $10,000 to $15,000 per case. We hire an attorney because we are too scared to do it on our own. The sad point is that we allow parents to think they have a right to such things. I am saying, Why
should we allow this law to become a voucher plan for a parent to send a kid to a private school?

The biggest fear that educators have about collective bargaining is the outsiders—the labor management specialists, the lawyers, the people that are brought in to the table. We had a negotiator from the national AFT with us the first time we negotiated our contract. He had a silver briefcase and a silver tongue and he scared the hell out of me. It takes some time to get away from that need to have the big guns around. The district had negotiators at the table but dismissed them. We are all doing a much better job on our own. We are opening up communication much like that described here earlier this morning.

That fear of outsiders is nothing compared to the fear caused by what I call the "carpetbaggers" in special education. There are numbers of people out there running around trying to get their hands on the public dollar. Private entrepreneurs are convincing well-meaning parents that their child is more "learning disabled" than the school suggests. This kind of attitude is more of a threat than collective bargaining ever could be.

We do need to be aware of coalitions. We have to understand that the first thing to do when we are threatened from the outside is to join together. Stop the internal fights, stop trashing each other, and unite together. That includes the NEA and AFT, administrators, and school boards. None of these internal political fights are going to make a difference if we are going to end up losing education altogether.

An interesting example was a school board member who ran in our district. He was just a real son-of-a-gun who fought the whole system and campaigned on how rotten the district was. He got elected with the highest
number of votes. Six months later we have "the best district in the state of California" because he is now a part of the system. Nothing changed, nothing is different, but his attitude changed.

The makeup of the school board is another of my fears. People are running for boards on one issue, and often the issue is related to the candidate's own children. Board members don't have a concept of the general governance of a district. They have a narrow view. They make a decision and the public who elected them take an equally narrow position of dissent and says "What the hell, you guys aren't doing what we wanted you to do." So a recall election is held. The result is instability within school boards. I would rather have the superintendent and the administration manage the school district. After all, that is their job. The boards are often taking over the management role. They are moving away from their policy-making obligations and trying to run the central offices. As much as I sometimes disagree with the management of my district, I would much rather get together with them on day-to-day educational issues.

School board members must renew their traditional commitment to community service. They must become guardians of the right to teach and the right to learn. They must become defenders of public education against single issue political constituencies.

I don't think any of the education groups can go it alone. In the state of California we are members of statewide coalitions in Sacramento. We are together with CFT, with people on the school boards (CSBA), with ACSA, with the PTA. As an example, the Educational Congress of California meets every month to discuss educational issues and serves as a forum to bring us together. I am on the Voucher Education and Research Committee that meets
to discuss the idea of vouchers. We work together on many issues. Maybe that is the model we need to implement at lower levels. I think collective bargaining has helped us all to see that more can be accomplished by working together and has given us ways to help overcome our insecurities and confront the image the society has given us in an open and honest manner.
Session IV

Summary and Suggestions for Future Work
In the final session, five panel members tried to pull together the diverse arguments heard in the course of Sessions I, II, and III. Participants also suggested topics for future research and for making research useful to school administrators.

Richard Carlson, professor of education at the University of Oregon and session chair, commented on the contrast between researchers on labor relations and researchers on school administration, referring in particular to the latter group's comparative reluctance to connect the effects of collective bargaining to student achievement.

Robert Doherty, Associate Dean of the School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, took the point further in reminding conference participants that collective bargaining's purpose is to provide a modicum of democracy in the workplace, not to increase productivity. He suggested focusing on the implications for teacher incentives of decisions made under contract requirements, such as discretionary pay increases.

Susan Moore Johnson, research associate at Harvard University, also recommended giving more attention to both district- and school-level flexibility in implementing contract requirements. She stressed the importance of minimizing potential damage to instruction from the contract, especially under fiscal duress.

Dale Mann, professor of education at Columbia University, was less sanguine about the prospects of avoiding such damage. From his experience with the attempts of New York City's schools to apply principles from research on effective schools, he warned that direct instruction and frequent student testing could encounter teacher opposition, regardless of their merits for student learning. Hence, if school administrative leadership is judged according to the achievement of students, such judgment may well come into conflict with teachers' collective interests as negotiated into employment contracts.

Finally, Gerald Martin, Director of Labor Relations for the Oregon School Boards' Association, recounted his experiences as a teacher negotiator, an administrator, and a representative of school boards. His comments indicated the political complexity of the world of collective bargaining and dispelled any remaining illusions that there are simple solutions to the administrative problems posed by collective bargaining.
Richard Carlson
Professor of Education, University of Oregon

One of the things we have done is to use a lot of words. I am surprised that I didn't learn any new words. There seems to be no esoteric language involved in collective bargaining. Standard, ordinary English holds sway. I don't know what this means. Most areas of research have complex conceptual frameworks and terms with special meanings. That seems not to be true of collective bargaining. The labor movement in general has contributed marvelous terms to our language—"scab" for example. I don't see that kind of language being used to discuss collective bargaining in education. So I don't know what that means either, but there is some rather inelegant language about some of the things that go on. We have heard something about "hanging it out" as a description of something or other. And we heard about "back off" and "go for," "selling out," and "hitting the bricks" and those kinds of things.

We have a large flow of words, and I think that the language is very ordinary English. We have listened to two kinds of conversations about collective bargaining. One conversation has focused on things rather distant from schools and, more specifically, from classrooms—contracts, ready-made data at the district and state levels, and district-level salary schedules. So that the analysis of collective bargaining to some degree has been at a distance from classrooms. It seems that the people who have worked from this distance are the people who have made the connections to outcomes. If you look at the outcomes, they had to do with preparation time, class size,
salary improvement, the length of the work day, and so on. It is unclear to me what meaning those kinds of connections have. I can understand the wage connection, which is fairly direct, but the other kinds of connections to education elude me.

The other conversation has involved people working closer to the schools. Some of the language used by the people who describe the closer, non-ready-made data included work structure, careers, organizational structure, and social relations. People with that kind of a focus didn't say much about either district-level factors or outcomes.

The result is a number of mixed messages about what should be examined. One plug was made for contracts as the thing to examine. "If you don't study contracts then you won't know the impact of collective bargaining," Somebody else says, "Not true, what you need to examine is the negotiation that takes place in the smoked-filled room. Then you set some kind of context, some kind of meaning for that language." Somebody else said, "You know, that is not true at all, what you need to do is to study implementation, the extent to which the contract is implemented." This follows the notion that it doesn't matter what the contract says; it matters what gets implemented in day-to-day life.

I have a final comment. Our language has a whole variety of admonitions about action being too early or too late. Most of them involve being too late. Someone is "a dollar short, a day late;" or it is "too late to worry;" or it is "too little and too late." There was a remark made during the conference that we should follow. And that was, "It is too early." Most of us never hear that word. It is always the other way, it is too late. The remark was, "It is too early to study the connection between
collective bargaining and school outcomes." I would like some attention given to that.

There are four people who are now going to make suggestions about research directions or specific research. They come from different kinds of traditions in regard to research on collective bargaining and I am sure that those traditions will shape very much what is suggested.

Robert Doherty
Associate Dean, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University
Current Research: Merit Pay Policy in Universities

I intended to talk about educational production functions and the effect collective bargaining may be having on the allocation of our human and economic resources. But I am not going to do that because it has already been covered, really more than adequately. Moreover, I have published some work in this field trying to make some assessment, though my "research" was not marked by any highly-refined methodological approach. It involved sort of contemplating my navel and sucking on my thumb and reflecting on experience rather than doing any keen analysis or collecting large amounts of data. Indeed, the two pieces I have published in this field have been roundly denounced by a spokesman for the AFT, a spokesman for the NEA, a school board member, a chief school officer, a school superintendent, a person who represents a number of large school districts in the Chicago area, a fellow "neutral," and someone who like myself has certain scholarly
pretensions. Their comments are in print, unfortunately, as are my original comments, so future generations of critics can have at me after I am dead and gone.

My only comment about the relationship between bargaining and effective schools is a reminder that the primary purpose of collective bargaining is to get the boss to change his mind, to do something that he would not do without the coercive power of the union. That is why people join unions, pay dues, and do what union members do. The consequences of that collective bargaining is of some concern, of course. But the assumption held by some that collective bargaining will produce a higher-quality enterprise, or a lower-quality enterprise, seems to me somewhat misdirected. Al Shanker put it very well when he said (I will paraphrase because I don't have the quotation in front of me) that some things that happen as a result of collective bargaining may be good, and some things that happen as a result of collective bargaining may be bad. But that is the way things are. We didn't pass the Wagner Act to improve the production functions of American enterprise. No one thought that when the UAW sat down to bargain for the first time that we would have better Chevies, Plymouths, and Chryslers as a result of that bargaining. Collective bargaining has another purpose to serve, and that is to provide a modicum of industrial democracy for workers.

It is up to the employer—whether it is a private employer or a school district—to determine whether a particular provision is appropriate or inappropriate, given the sort of aims and goals of that enterprise. If it is indeed inappropriate, the employer's choice is to talk the union out of it somehow or other, or, failing that, take the consequences of not being able to talk them out of it.
I say this because I do believe there are some tensions between the goals of efficiency and accountability and the very positive value of industrial democracy. And that is about as much as I have to say about bargaining and effective schools which is not a great deal, but you have at least been spared from listening to about a third of my remarks.

Let me suggest to you one area of research that I think ought to be pursued. Then I will briefly talk about an area that interests me currently, although it doesn't deal directly with collective bargaining in public education. I trust, however, that it will be of some interest to you.

In the first instance, I am referring to the role of neutrals: mediators, fact finders, and interest arbitrators—people who handle representation rights and interests disputes. I tend to believe—and I think now as a member of their community of "neutrals"—that the neutral role is a rather important one. We now have at least three states that provide for the arbitration of so-called interest disputes. I distinguish interest disputes, which are disputes over the terms of a new contract, and rights disputes, which are disputes over the meaning of that particular contract once it has been implemented. If it is indeed the case that neutrals are going to assume a greater and more important role, we ought to know more about what they think and why they think as they do, why they do as they do, how their thinking has changed over time, and what those changes portend.

I draw upon my experience at Cornell as a so-called trainer of neutrals for the remarks that immediately follow. Ever since the passage of the Taylor Law (it will be 15 years old this year) our institution, the School of Industrial and Labor Relations, has served as a training ground for the ad-hoc mediators, fact finders, and interest arbitrators who serve on the
administrative agencies' neutral panel. It has been my chore to provide these people with case materials and exercises where they have to make judgments as to what they would do under given circumstances. We have been doing this for several years, and one cannot come away from those experiences without a very strong feeling that with most neutrals settlement really is the name of the game—that all they have to do is to assess which of two parties is the stronger and make sure that the lion gets the lion's share. Otherwise, that settlement will not fly since strong people do not customarily surrender to the weak. So what neutrals frequently do is ascertain the stronger of the two parties and award whatever one can to that party, bobbing and weaving their way toward settlement. The neutral needs those settlements psychologically. Most neutrals would rather pass a kidney stone than walk away from a dispute that has not been settled.

There is another aspect of neutralism that doesn't quite fit anybody's outline (I trust nobody sees sufficient worth in these remarks to bother making an outline). There has grown up—clearly in the private sector and it seems to me also in the public sector—a labor relations community that includes management reps, union reps, and neutrals. And they are rather close. They meet at professional meetings and other kinds of meetings and there tends to be quite a bit of gracious exchange among those communities. The last time I attended such a meeting I was reminded of a comment from Adam Smith, who wrote in The Wealth of Nations:

"When people of the same calling gather together, even for the purposes of relaxation and merriment, it is not long before the gathering turns into a conspiracy against the public."
I have begun to share that suspicion. Another point is that neutrals are particularly reluctant to plow new ground, to include in a settlement anything that one side has proposed that departs substantially from tradition or that has not been generally accepted in that particular area or region. For that reason it is sometimes very difficult to use the collective agreement as an instrument for positive change, either from the Union's or the Management's perspective.

I tested this out one time by providing a group of neutrals a case in which the union had proposed something about the salary arrangement that looked on the surface to be very interesting. The proposal might have been of great benefit, not only to the union members, but also to school districts. But it was different. It wasn’t the old grid, lock-step method of compensation. We gave all sorts of argumentation on both sides. It should have been a close call but of roughly 100 people who responded to this particular exercise, only three were willing to give the union the time of day on the proposal. It went outside of what had been done before. This was the reaction, even though the proposal may have been advantageous, not only to the members, but to the district as well.

We have all heard the bargaining unit expression "give backs" or "pay backs" or "buy backs" or "get backs." This is a very important development in New York State right now. Employers are coming up with a number of demands for negotiations that say, for example, "OK, if you want that 6 percent (or whatever the wage demand might be), we have got to have these things out of the contract. They are creating great mischief for us." In another training program we provided neutrals with a case in which the issue was a maintenance-of-standards provision, a provision that causes many
employers a great deal of mischief. We deliberately gave the argument to the employer, who was able to demonstrate that many unpleasant and unfortunate things had happened to the district because of this provision. When we asked the fact finders to rule on it, about 12 out of 100 ruled for the employer. When we asked them why, they responded, "Because it's been there all this time." The contract thus becomes a sort of sacred turf. It takes an extraordinary amount of evidence to get a particular contract provision dislodged once it is there. Neutrals prefer the status quo.

My own view is that the neutrals are going to have to play a more important role as time goes on, particularly if legislators opt for interest arbitration over the strike. In our neck of the woods, anyway, public sector unions themselves have been arguing for binding arbitration of disputes for quite some time, mostly, I think, because they know they are too weak to carry out a strike. As unions begin to lose some of the economic muscle that they have enjoyed in the years before, there will be very strong pressure for the arbitration of economic disputes. They have very little to lose. That means we ought to be able to take a pretty good look at what the neutral thinks and does. If we are going to have neutrals formulating a goodly portion of our public policies, including virtually all of our personnel policies, it is extremely important that they have the background and the smarts to be able to discern which side is the lion.

Let me move on to something else. I am currently working on a project dealing with higher education—more specifically, the trends in the granting of discretionary salary adjustments. That is a fancy way, I guess, of saying merit pay, which, as you know, is the characteristic method of wage payments in most universities particularly those research universities which
have traditionally exercised discretion. If the board of trustees decrees that there is going to be an 8 percent increase on the wage bill, that means that some people might get 0 percent or 2 percent and other people might get 15 or 16 percent. I have been interested for quite some time in wage payments, why we pay people what we pay them, and methods of payment.

That interest became particularly sharpened two years ago, when I was asked to serve as the acting dean of the School of Industrial and Labor Relations. One of my first chores was to make the salary adjustments for about 80 fellow colleagues. That role was difficult since I wasn't all that highly regarded by my colleagues even before I started deaning. Some said that my role as a neutral had disqualified me as an effective dean. Not everybody agreed with that; some of them felt that certain genetic failings might make me incapable as well. Be that as it may, I was able after a lot of anguishing to make those judgments, even to give very modest salary adjustments to people who were some of my very closest friends. I later reflected on that and still don't know whether that was an act of courage or whether I had a tendency to hang around with other low achievers.

Anyway, my experience has prompted me to do some research in this area. And as happens in so many research endeavors, I have discovered that others have been there before. Probably the most interesting work has been done by Professors Blitz and Tang at Vanderbilt University. The practice around the country, according to Blitz and Tang, is that about 13 percent of all institutions use merit as the only criterion for salary increases. In other words there is an absolute exercise of discretion. There is no guarantee of any minimum wage adjustment. About 16 percent of colleges and universities around the country have across-the-board salary increases;
everybody gets the same percentage or the same dollar amount. The remaining 71 percent combine the two procedures—some across the board, some discretionary—but the data did not tell us how much of the adjustment was discretionary. If it is an 8 percent bill, is it 7 percent across the board, 1 percent discretion, or are these figures reversed? Nor did the data tell how the salary plan was implemented when it got down to the departmental level. In other words, the policy at the upper level may be, say, 4 and 4 out of an 8 percent salary increase, but the department chairman might decide that everybody is equally worthy.

The standards that are used ought to come as no surprise to anyone who has worked in academia. In the older universities where discretion is exercised, the standards include publications and scholarship, followed by teaching and, finally, by institutional and public service. And when you ask those responsible for implementing these plans how much they award publication and how much for teaching, I get the impression that, for most, publications would account for 60 to 70 percent of the increase with the remainder being a mixture of teaching and public service. Those of you in the audience who might be undergraduate students no doubt believe that is a terrible thing to do. Why should we give professors good money for writing all those dull books and articles? I am sometimes persuaded to agree with that notion, but that is beside the point.

The tendency to reward mostly for scholarship may be changing. Every April or May the AAUP publishes salary data on every college and university in the country, and those data suggest that a substantial compression is taking place. There seems to be an increasing amount of uncertainty or uneasiness on the part of those people administering the salary programs. We
may be leaning more towards an egalitarian kind of salary adjustment than in the heretofore. This is due in part, I think, to inflation, since to give someone less than the average wage increase is really imposing a penalty. And some argue that there is an egalitarian mood abroad in the land, and the colleges and universities are merely reflecting that mood. We no longer take kindly to a meritocratic kind of society. We feel maybe our values are all askew and that sense of uncertainty is now being reflected in higher education and its salary plans.

As I traveled around the eastern part of the country meeting with union people who represent the college and university faculties and with some people who work on the administrative side, I asked a number of people, "Are the goals you have for exercising discretion being met?" In other words, does that extra $1000 or $2000 provide the kind of inducement you want? Or is the prospect of a big salary increase indeed an inducement at all? Do people work any harder or smarter because they think there might be a reward at the end of the year? Or do good people just work hard anyway while lazy and dumb people work lazily and dumbly irrespective of threats and promises. Many people who are on the management side seem to think that there is an inducement. Most people on the union side seem to think there is not that much of an inducement, and they argue that meritorious salary adjustments can come at the time of the promotion or the appointment, not year by year as a reflection of a particular professor's accomplishments or lack thereof. Many people on the administrative side, while admitting that discretion may not work as well as they would like, still cling to merit plans because they operate in a labor market. If they don't give Professor X a $3500 raise, he is probably going to go elsewhere, and the institution needs Professor X
because he contributes mightily to the prestige of the place.

I asked a number of people in big universities that bargain--Rutgers University, the State University of New York, Boston University and the University of Delaware--"What is the effect of collective bargaining on discretion?" I also polled a number of other institutions where there is collective bargaining. Boston University is a particularly interesting place because it is the only place I know of where an individual faculty member can grieve his or her salary adjustment. In Boston, the grievance can go to arbitration and the arbitrator will determine whether Professor so-and-so was underpaid and is deserving of a greater salary increase.

I noticed that I have exceeded my time and that those scheduled to follow me at the podium are getting anxious. I close by observing that as far as collective bargaining is concerned, there are forces out there that are running at cross purposes. It just isn't possible to simultaneously accommodate the security interests of employees and the employers' interests in innovation and flexibility. The trick is to get those interests running along parallel tracks as frequently as circumstances will allow. I think the speakers who follow have enough smarts and experience to help us accomplish that feat.
I really have just three things that I want to talk about. One is what I think I have learned about collective bargaining from research I have done and from talking with people who are doing research. The second is what I think my work implies for the kind of research, if any, that we ought to be doing. And, third, I want to talk about some work in collective bargaining I have done recently, that I think is useful to schools.

First, I would say that the most powerful finding in my research was that collective bargaining did not come prepackaged with a set of outcomes. There is an assumption held by many that if you are bargaining, certain things will inevitably follow. And it is true that there are some typical consequences—teacher rights are defined, administrative discretion is limited—but there are many things that don’t follow, that aren’t fixed, that aren’t determined by the fact that two parties are bargaining. I found remarkable variation in the process and effects of bargaining—in what is bargained, how it is bargained, and how it is administered. I found differences within districts in what principals and teachers do with the contract. Many of you heard about those findings last year. It’s interesting that though we acknowledge this variation, we, as researchers, practitioners, and citizens, still ask, Is it going to be good? Is it going to be bad? as if somehow that outcome is determined by the fact that two sides are bargaining.

It is important to sort out the issue of time that has been raised here several times. If the district has been bargaining longer, is it going
to mean that they will be in a later generation rather than an earlier one on Chuck Kerchner's graph? Lorraine McDonnell and I have both found that there were districts that had been bargaining for years and had what you would call a weak contract from the union's perspective, and there are other districts where the teachers had bargained once and had gotten it all. The passage of time is roughly correlated with certain bargaining and contract characteristics, but I wouldn't say it is predictive. Chuck's roller-coaster graph characterizes the experiences of certain districts I have seen, but I can also think of exceptions. We need to go beyond that and ask, How do Illinois and California compare with other states or districts that have different kinds of experiences?

While it is helpful to see what generalizations we might make about the effects of collective bargaining, it is very important not to believe that the ends are fixed. I don't think that the variation I observed is simply a case of outliers, as Randy Eberts suggested this morning. We are talking about a very wide variation. Collective bargaining has clearly made a greater difference in some districts than others, but I know that the effects of that difference have been both good and bad. In virtually every district I have ever seen, people will tell you what the good side and bad side are, and both the most anti-union people and the most pro-union people recognize that the results are mixed.

Another finding that is very important is the one about implementation. The word "slippage" is ugly but I think it is descriptive. There is no clean match between what is supposed to be happening—what it says on paper—and what happens. You don't find this match between the scope of bargaining as defined by statute and the scope of bargaining that actually
functions within the district. There is a relationship, but there is a lot of variation there.

There is no certainty that language once negotiated will be implemented or enforced by the teachers. Either side may in fact fall short of what the contract says. You have no certainty that a committee called for by contract will be formed, that it will function, or that anyone will do anything about the findings of that committee. You have no certainty that merit-based layoffs, once negotiated, will be carried out by anybody. This is not just union opposition, this is administrative and school board opposition. A district contract says that teachers will be laid off by performance, but you go to the schools and find out that performance has nothing to do with layoffs. Contracts are adapted to local conditions and the contract language is simply not decisive. I don't want to underestimate the fact that it matters. But it sets minimum standards or voices expectations rather than describing actions and outcomes.

We also need to remember that, despite all our talk about how similar bargaining in the public sector is to that of the private sector, collective bargaining in schools has something special about it. The relationships of teachers to their work and the relationships of teachers to administrators change the way collective bargaining works. In order to talk about the effects of collective bargaining on schools, it is essential to understand schools and their structure. You have to know what a preparation period is, how people use it, and how contractual changes in preparation time might affect instruction. You have to know what it means for school management when teachers aren't required to do lunch duty anymore. You have to understand how student assignment processes work so that you don't assume
that class-size language prescribes assigning particular students to teachers. It is also important to understand the social structure of the school. There are allegiances and dependencies—the kind of core relationships that Dan Lortie spoke about yesterday—that are fundamental to understanding how the contract operates within the school.

It is also important to understand the priorities of teachers as teachers, to recognize how much they value their autonomy. They do not just want to be autonomous in relation to the administration, they also want to be autonomous in relation to the union. They will go to the union to represent their interest when they feel it is necessary. But they will also withhold support from the union when they feel that it isn't representing their interests. They believe in collegiality. They would like to make it work with the administration, and they will go a very long way in cooperating informally before sitting down on the opposite side of the table.

They are ambivalent about being union members. This was brought home most clearly to me when a teacher in a very strong AFT district in Massachusetts said to me that her greatest fear was that her obituary one day would read, "AFL-CIO member dies." I have heard individuals say over and over, "I really wish that we didn't have to do it this way. This is not my style. This is not what my parents would approve of. This is not why I came into education. But the administration and the school board have done things so badly that we have to go this way." So I think that the kind of difference between what the contract says and what is possible in schools has a lot to do with the people who work there and how they view themselves as professionals.

This morning Jim Yinger pointed out the importance of understanding
that within any bargaining unit there are very big conflicts over what should be bargained, how far to go, what the tradeoffs should be, and how big salaries ought to be. Any union is continually trying to reconcile those kinds of differences. I found that there isn’t usually a truly unified union position unless things get nasty and teachers become convinced that they must set aside their differences for a time.

I would hope that research might inform and direct policy and practice. In this area, particularly, the notion of basic research is hard to deal with, because it is hard to know what the relevant basic research would be. It might be seeking to understand the school norms, or it might be understanding more about the process of negotiations generally. But the research that we do should be helpful to schools. As the financial situation in this country gets worse and worse, there should be more pressure on those who do research to be of use to those people who work in schools. The challenge is to sort out what kinds of differences we should make and what kinds of things we are able to say to practitioners.

We can’t say conclusively that collective bargaining is good or bad. Many people continue to try to answer that question and I think it is a mistake. There are gains and losses, and in some cases the losses are more than the gains. We can’t define the ideal scope of bargaining that will produce the ideal scope of contracts. I am not saying that we shouldn’t talk about the issue, but I don’t think we can come up with a final answer and say, This is it. We can’t write a model contract. I used to think that I would make a million doing that, but I don’t believe it is possible. I have seen too clearly how the contract must be tailored to fit local conditions. We cannot predict with any certainty that if parties agree to specific
language at the bargaining table, some particular consequence will follow—either on tests or in corridors or in college admissions. I feel very strongly that we shouldn’t be presumptuous about that.

The expectations of researchers in this area should be modest and they should be realistic. We should be very cautious about making causal inferences about what we find. I was interested that the people who are closest to the school talk the least about the outcomes. I think the reason is that once you get in very close, you realize that it is very complicated terrain. This is not to say that we shouldn’t be constantly thinking about outcomes, but I think we have to be very careful about attributing a cause where it may not exist. We shouldn’t presume to understand more than we do.

When I was a college freshman, I had an English professor, a grand old British woman. I turned out the obligatory weekly papers and they, like Gaul, were always divided into five parts; I put everything in fives and made my ideas fit. It was very dull and I always had, as I imagine most of you do, a piece that didn’t quite fit the pattern or argument and I would try to downplay it, minimize it. Finally she said to me, "You have to feature your weakness, Miss Moore." Well I think what we should do here is to feature the complexity. Feature the variation. Pay attention to the pieces that don’t fit our expectations. We shouldn’t try to reduce what is very complex to something that is very simple. When we do that, I believe we say things that are wrong, that simply don’t describe what is out there. I suggest reading Charles Perrow’s recent article in the Phi Delta Kappan about the limits of rational research. I think we can help people understand the range of strategies that are being used in labor relations, the options available to them, and what the outcomes might be. As Sondra Williams said yesterday,
"When it works, why does it work? When it doesn't work, why doesn't it work?" Researchers can provide a perspective that ranges across many districts, across many states, across many schools. What we can say is, "This is what happened here, that is what happened there, and this is what I make of it." But we shouldn't try to reduce it all to a simple formula.

We have been struggling to understand the effects of collective bargaining. In seeking to come out with some answer on a dotted line we have been trying to generalize about many aspects of labor relations. I believe, though, that the research will be most productive to the extent that we focus it on particular things. Some, but not all, research can center on contract language. Other people need to look at alternatives and negotiation styles, to focus on bargaining itself. Other people need to look at how money gets allocated in particular districts as a result of collective bargaining. Someone else needs to consider who uses the grievance procedures and what differences they make. I would like to know more about the role of the arbitrators in setting school policy. There has been a lot of concern expressed at this conference that policy making gets taken out of the hands of the school board members and placed into the hands of negotiators. I would suggest that it also gets taken far out of the hands of the district when some things get arbitrated. We need to know more about the role of strikes and the aftermath of strikes, as we heard yesterday. We have to know what happens when a union gets ready to strike in a district that is very financially distressed, and how that changes who does what. We need to know about the political effects of unionism—at the local, state, and federal levels. And I think we need to know a lot more about the principals' bargaining Bruce Cooper described—what effect does that have on teacher
bargaining and ultimately on school organization?

Researchers should focus on these particular questions and then try to speak more generally, instead of trying to take a global perspective on the whole issue of collective bargaining and come up with some yes and no answers. We are going to continue to find that a practice here is good, and that a similar practice there is bad; that there is this tradeoff, and that that compromise seems to work. The more that we can describe such effects accurately, then the more we can be useful to people in schools and to people who negotiate and administer contracts. Such research can change the conversation and the assumptions about what collective bargaining is. For the most part, school officials are not expecting to be told whether or not to bargain. In districts that have been bargaining for 10 to 15 years, they cannot look at research findings and conclude, "Well, we will no longer bargain collectively." That is an option in the South, but it is not an option in the big cities of the Midwest and North. Taking bargaining as given, though, we can change practitioners' and negotiators' assumptions about what is possible, what is inevitable, and what the choices are. We need to view collective bargaining in the context of other things that are happening in this country--federal policies, fiscal and enrollment decline. It is meaningless to talk about collective bargaining as if there were no other forces at work.

We should continue to draw people's attention to the long-term effects of any particular choice, to the extent that we know what those effects are. I like Steve Goldschmidt's idea of maintaining capacity within the district. That is ultimately what you want to continually be able to do--to allow the teachers and the administrators to redirect things and not
be bound by the contract.

I was working for the Principal Center at Harvard this spring. As some of you know, we in Massachusetts have been contending with Proposition 2-1/2, which was passed after Proposition 13 in California but had its effect much more quickly. The districts have encountered a tremendous number of staff layoffs and cuts. I was interested in finding out how people dealt with those layoffs in the districts and trying to figure out ways of assisting local people in dealing with that problem. I had done some work previously, that you may have seen, about performance-based layoffs. Basically, I found that districts really couldn't make them work. This was not simply because of union opposition. It was just a very, very difficult procedure to carry through in any but the tiniest districts. So I was pretty sure that at least the larger districts in the state would be relying on seniority to lay off teachers. I wasn't sure that seniority was so bad, but I was very aware of the kinds of drawbacks Steve raised yesterday. If you have a very strict seniority system where the least senior teacher gets laid off and there is this continual sequence of bumping through the system, and if teachers choose to teach in their second areas of certification without recent experience or additional training, then the consequences for schools are potentially pretty serious. So the question that I asked was, is it possible to structure seniority reduction-in-force provisions in ways that would minimize those kinds of effects?

I studied RIF procedures in four districts and read lots of contracts. (Contrary to what somebody said yesterday about contracts being boring, I have begun to really enjoy them.) I read about 80 contracts from all the biggest districts in the state and tried to sort out the alternative
ways to accomplish layoffs. I won't go into the details here, but I've written a paper that sets them forth.

There are ways of structuring things so that you have more guarantee that the people who are teaching the courses are going to be qualified. And it has to do with how you structure the layoff and transfer processes. These things were accomplished in contract provisions that have been negotiated by very strong unions in districts that have been bargaining a long time, where union influence and practices were well established. These were not naive little places. They were places where someone said, "We have got to make this work a little bit differently because what is good for General Motors may not be good for schools."

I. Those districts I saw that the whole process of collective bargaining undergoes a kind of fundamental change when there is a tremendous decline in funds. The old assumption about bargaining is that if you are the union negotiator, then the person across the table from you has what you want and also has the power to make the decisions and seal the deals. But that was not true in these districts. There was someone outside who had made a big decision for them by enacting Proposition 2-1/2 and it was not just one person—it was the whole state. The whole labor-management relationship changed quickly in that case and there was no longer a clear union position, because these kinds of cuts quickly reduce themselves to issues that pit teachers against teachers. Someone is going to win; someone is going to lose. But the losers are all going to be union members. It is not only the management that is going to lose in those circumstances. The districts that had negotiated the most creative responses to teacher layoffs had done it in anticipation of enrollment declines and had done it cooperatively. I don't
know where they would fit on Chuck's Kerchner's graph but I am really interested to know. These districts had worked cooperatively, recognizing that the problem was more complex than the process they traditionally used for resolving it. So they worked it out in subcommittee, but it was a cooperative kind of thing. They recognized that if they didn’t resolve the problem, both sides would lose. The economy and the decline in public education and public support are going to have a big effect on collective bargaining. That it is well worth attending to, it is worth documenting, and it is worth reporting back to the people who are dealing with it. I think that is what research should be doing.

Dale Mann
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Current Research: Instructionally Effective Urban Schools

I have been delighted at the ability of the University of Oregon to marshall a very wide range of resources and to grasp a topic in ways I think are interesting and exemplary from university perspectives. I am pleased at that. I am engaged in doing a study for the National Institute of Education about the instructionally effective school. The problem of the instructionally effective school is twofold. First, it is an attempt to measure the underlying pedagogy—the state of the art of teaching and learning—especially with those poor children who have low school achievement. After we have taken stock of the current state of the art of
pedagogy in such instructionally effective schools, we are trying to understand what the policy implications of that research might be.

The definition of effective schools that we are using is threefold. First, we are looking only at instructional outcomes. We are not looking at vocational outcomes. We are not examining lifetime income, social status, or post-graduation employment, not because those things are unimportant, but because those things are not controlled by schools. The fates of the child and the economy are not within the reach of the school principal. We are looking at within-school effects.

Second, "effectiveness" is defined in our research only in terms of standardized achievement test scores that exceed what one would otherwise predict, given knowledge of the biosocial characteristics of the student. Biosocial characteristics include gender, race, social status, and family status. We admit a practice as effective only if there is evidence in standardized achievement test scores showing that the practice has made an incremental contribution over and above what one would otherwise predict.

The third part of the test of an instructionally effective school, in this line of inquiry, is that we are looking only at "alterable variables." For example, I am convinced that I could improve the reading scores in any community by going into the homes and pulling the plug on the TV from 6:00 to 9:00 at night. I don't think this society is going to allow me to do that. When Bud Hodgkinson was the director of the National Institute of Education, he estimated that the number of students with learning disabilities in the United States could be reduced by 40 percent with the introduction of two changes: (1) accurate prenatal diagnosis, and (2) adequate prenatal nutrition. The point is not whether or not somebody should do it; clearly
someone should. The point is whether or not the school should do it—whether or not it is feasible for the school to do it. In our research, we are concentrating only on within-school practices, manipulable variables, and things which are within schools' existing resources of authority and money. The question isn't, If you had extra bucks, could you do extra things? Rather, it is, Can you achieve this kind of pedagogically powerful institution within the existing configuration of resources and authority?

Put baldly—maybe badly—the nature of the problem is, Can compensatory education compensate? And the answer to that question for about 15 years has been pretty melancholy. I heard Steve Goldschmidt say yesterday that he had considerable doubt about what the answer to that question is. I share that doubt. We are now about halfway through the analysis. The evidence that we now have is both considerable and questionable, but one of the most intriguing things about it is that there is some astonishing unanimity about the set of factors that seem to characterize the top end of practice in those schools which work best for those children under whom there is no other "safety net."

The cluster of factors which in New York City has now been reduced to an acronym, FFT, or "five factors theory," shows a configuration that many researchers working independently on all kinds of data seem to be coming up with. The factors are

1. administrative characteristics
2. teaching characteristics
3. school or organizational climate characteristics
4. curriculum, instructional emphasis, or "academic press" (Rutter)
5. evaluation

If you combine the teaching characteristics with the climate characteristics, you discover that in some of the studies of the instructionally effective schools, teachers are less happy. The schools are more productive and the teachers are less happy. The fourth characteristic is something about the curriculum—by curriculum we mean not the procedural side of things, but rather the artifact, the textbooks, the scope and sequence, the topics, the way in which the curriculum is carried out or encapsulated. The best term for curriculum is in Michael Rutter's marvelous study of London schools. It is called an "academic press." And finally, the research in progress seems to be indicating that the instructionally effective school has a particular set of evaluation characteristics which are largely diagnostic and prescriptive in nature.

In my brief remarks, I want to relate three of those five characteristics to the question of collective bargaining. Steve Goldschmidt said that two policy areas that are most commonly encountered in contracts are curriculum and testing. First, with respect to curriculum, I think that the current position is best summed up by Dave Tyack's nice aphorism—"no one best way." That is enormously comforting to a teacher working within the sanctuary of a classroom, who must make personal judgments about an overdemanding and underrewarding situation in which there is a weak technology. If there is a weak technology and somebody says to you there is no one best way, then that may be a license to behave in very particular kinds of ways (and the emphasis is plural) and to exercise an enormous amount of professional discretion.

But that is the issue—the weakness of the technology. And it is
entirely likely that, in the instructional effectiveness research now going on, we are going to end up discovering that most effective curricula are the hardest to teach, the most work, the most constraining, and the most highly structured concerning the teacher's role. Teachers already complain, and with good reason. In New York City, the refrain goes, "Kids, kids, kids, 6 hours and 20 minutes a day." Now if we end up concluding that in order to meet one of the major social goals of the school, the prescribed curriculum is both harder to teach and more effective, then it is going to make a lot of difference who decides what the curriculum of the school is to be. It will make a lot of difference what has been bargained into or held back from the contract.

Currently, schooling research, at least that segment of it that deals with the properties of the artificial base of the curriculum, indicates that there is a big premium on direct instruction, on whole-group instruction, on an academic press, and on large amounts of what Berliner calls "academic learning time," which is very precise. Academic learning time demands behaviors of the teacher that depart rather dramatically from the view of the teacher as a benign custodian of a social-emotional climate in which the teacher is the student's buddy and the premium for the student is surviving until he or she gets old enough to drop out. In the research, the emphasis is on instruction first, on the child as a learner first. The rest of the "smokes and jokes" definitions of the business come second if at all. There is very little seatwork. There is very little time spent in classroom management, which is a euphemism for taking ten minutes to pass out the rexographs, five minutes for getting the coats hung up, and another seven minutes for lining up for recess. Then there is a line to the bathroom and
all the rest of the stuff. There is a premium on direct instruction and that is a lot of work for the teacher.

That is curriculum. The second policy area which Goldschmidt finds being included in contracts is testing. It is fairly clear, in the analyses to date of effective schools, that those schools best serving the children who most need public schools are testing what is taught, are testing frequently, and are testing close to the child. In those schools, testing is not used as tests are typically used now simply to determine the child's subsequent placement. It is not an annual post-mortem event. Those test results are used in a two-fold way. Test results are used to govern what the child learns next and what the teacher does next. If you look at any of the good diagnostic, prescriptive, basic reading support systems, the micro-teaching analysis which is provided to the teacher governs what the teacher is to do next with groups of children and with very great precision.

Now the problem is that a diagnostic-prescriptive database that supports the management of instruction by the teacher, while a good thing and much to be desired, will also support personnel management decisions by the administration. The five-factor theory is something I have been interested in for a couple of years. In New York City, I am a member of the Regents' Advisory Committee on Education. I have spent some time trying to put together a coalition of people in New York who are interested in the question of the instructionally effective school. The United Federation of Teachers, which needs a track record, which needs to be able to make a demonstration of its contribution to the children of the city, is supportive of the five-factors theory up to the fifth factor. And at that point, they get a little concerned because of the potential for the abuse of the database. And
the abuse might come if one were to sort out effective and ineffective teachers under otherwise comparable conditions and then pay accordingly. However, unless we have data about instruction at the school level, which is used not only to inform teaching, but also to guide the management and leadership of a school, we are unlikely to ever get an instructionally effective school.

Those are my views on curriculum and testing. I am reminded of the story, probably apocryphal, about Walter Lippman at the Yale Law School. He was required to take Admiralty Law, but he never bothered to read anything about Admiralty Law. Eventually he was required to take a final examination about a subject of which he knew nothing. For the examination, the professor had concocted a problem to be solved involving a whale which had been found in international waters and simultaneously harpooned by a Portuguese boat and a German boat. In the course of the dispute between the two countries that had harpooned this whale, the carcass of the whale floated into Icelandic national waters. The question was, "Who owns the whale?" Lippman, knowing nothing about Admiralty Law, decided to write his entire final examination from the point of view of the whale. And since I know about collective bargaining what Walter Lippman knew about the Admiralty Law, and since I have a lot of sympathy with the situation of the harpooned whales, I would like now to talk about administrators.

In the IES (Instructionally Effective Schools) research, everybody is unanimous about the first of the five factors. The first factor has to do with the principal's leadership. The characteristics of that leadership are interesting. They are as much assertive as they are enabling. They are as much direct as they are anything else. I happen to think that we are on the
brink of a whole rethinking of democratic assumptions about school administration. Despite our rhetoric, teachers and administrators have different interests, those interests differ legitimately, and thus it is a bad idea for lions and lambs to lie down together. By the way, I do not make any easy assumptions about which is which these days. Some lambs have a terrible bite.

The research says that, in instructionally effective schools, the principal spends more time on instructional management than on business management. In many schools today, however, there is far more attention given to the business management side of the principal's role. Let me give you an example of time distribution that departs a little bit from the picture that Dan Lortie was drawing yesterday. Willower and Martin's study of secondary school principals in the United States indicates that secondary school principals spend only 20 percent of the day on instructional management. Eighty percent of the time is spent on business management. That is crazy.

How do we get to a set of prescriptions about the way a building ought to be led in instructionally effective schools? In Lortie's study, 41 percent of the principals did not want more autonomy. Yet it is clear that in the instructionally effective school, the principal needs a great deal of autonomy and a great deal of freedom and flexibility. Yet more than 40 percent of the principals in Lortie's study do not want more autonomy. I think I understand why. They don't want more autonomy because they don't want more accountability. They would have to be accountable for that which they believe cannot be produced, student achievement, especially achievement that runs upstream against social class. They don't want more autonomy
because they don’t want more accountability for something that exceeds the state of the art of schooling, or so they believe. I am reminded of the kamikaze pilot who on returning from his tenth mission was asked to explain his remarkable record. He said, "Well, I am involved, but I am not committed." From the principal’s side it is simply not prudent to be responsible for producing something that exceeds the state of the art of the business. When Dan asked principals how they wanted to be box-scored and they gave five criteria that they would accept in evaluating their own performance, fifth of five was student achievement. I think that is remarkable. I also think it is accurate as an assessment of where most people feel we are with the existing pedagogy.

Let me give you another New York City example. I have been interested in school-site budgeting and in three-tier bargaining. In New York City, the average high school is an intimate neighborhood environment that has got about 3000 kids in it, about 150 teachers, about 40 or so other staff, and a $3 million budget. In one such average, close neighborhood social circle, we took the principal and the books of the school and tried to figure out what was the discretionary budget with which the principal could steer a $3 million operation. That is a big factory, and clearly you would expect that the chief executive officer of such a factory would have some bucks to spend to do different kinds of things. Well in New York City, classes are formed and teachers are deployed according to contract. In New York City the budget is allocated by the Chancellor’s regulations which are delivered by pick-up trucks. When we added the consequences of contracts and laws and decisions made elsewhere to the impact of the principal on a $3 million budget, we found out that our principal (and this is a live person)
had a discretionary budget for a single year of about $1500, the excess on the postage meter. And that discretionary budget went to buy t-shirts or to do any of the other kinds of things that a visiting professor would recommend that principal should do to steer the school.

Now everybody agrees that administrative leadership is quintessential for an instructionally effective school, but in these circumstances it is a joke. That is why so far the politics of education has been about adult working conditions--it has never been about children's learning conditions. There is no reason to shift from a melancholy obsession with adult working conditions to children's learning conditions unless there is a pedagogy, a production function, some reliable relationship between the way valued inputs are put into the school, configured, applied to children with predictable, reliable--and positive--outcomes.

As pedagogy changes, I think that the politics will change rather dramatically. One way to think about the IES question, especially about its political, legal, and ethical consequences, is to imagine that we have a learning pill. Imagine that Bayer or Miles Laboratory started making a learning pill. If you had this pill and you were to give it to a child, that child would learn what was taught for the next 45 minutes. Now if we have a pill, or rather an instructionally effective pedagogy that will reliably cause certain children to learn certain things under known conditions, can teachers say things like the following?

I won't use it.
I don't believe it.
It won't work in my classroom.
I will only give it some kids.
I will only give it for mathematics and not for reading.
I will only give it for science but not for math.
There is a general relationship between the increasing power of the school to educate, an increasing power of pedagogy, and the increasing importance of questions about things like collective bargaining.

I have been musing, since Steve so nicely set us off on a theoretical and normative direction, about how we are dealing here with the relationship between pedagogy and politics within a larger class of problems—a clash of norms between democracy and merit, between the school which is a technical institution but which is also a public and political institution. In that kind of a world, educators—both teachers and administrators—can legitimately control their own institutions, absent the public, to the extent that they can deliver reliable services. But the questions are, How expert are we? How reliable is what we do in schools? How able are we to meet the social missions which are handed to us? How good are we as educators?

Gerald Martin
Director of Labor Relations, Oregon School Board Association

I will try to tie my remarks in with those made by others at the conference. Dick Carlson’s concern, remember, was about plain words—why it is that collective bargaining hasn’t attracted its own jargon. I need to share with you my background a bit so you know where I am coming from.

I started my life on a dirt farm five miles from running water or electricity back on the plains of Nebraska and put myself through college felling and bucking timber. I have come to observe that there are different
classes of people that use words in different ways. I have learned that largely farmers and woodworkers and people in the White House use profanity when they have an ample vocabulary to say what they want to say. I have noticed that with educators, the less they know about the subject, the larger the words they use in describing it.

It occurred to me when Bob Doherty was speaking of "neutrals," that if we took all the neutrals in this country and put them end to end, we would probably have a pretty good thing. And when Susan Johnson jumped up there, I kept thinking about how we are always talking about applied research. And I remember coming out of the Korean mess making a vow to myself that I would never listen again or attend again to spectator versions of war, and yet here I am. Oh incidentally, there are districts in this country who have used competency and merit as a basis of reduction in force where they had full collective bargaining rights. I don't want that to go untested.

To tell you that I represent school boards is about a half truth unless you know that, not that many years ago, I was the incoming president of the Oregon Education Association. I was probably viewed two ways by school administrators in the state. The first was that if I was not the most militant teacher in the state, then I had good traffic with them, but I also had a reputation as one of the most competent negotiators in a state where collective bargaining was unlawful. I want to come back to that several times in my remarks with you, because I believe it is central to the dissatisfaction that you feel, if you are a practicing educator, in the state of collective bargaining. People, for whatever reason, and I have heard it here during the entire conference, do not seem to distinguish between "negotiation" and "collective bargaining." They have largely nothing to do
with each other.

The first teacher contract that I negotiated was in 1962. I said "negotiate" because at two o'clock in the morning, the superintendent and the board observed that as president of the Medford Teachers' Association, I had just presented the most persuasive argument, an excellent presentation. (I had shown that Campbell's beans had gone up a cent-and-a-half, you know, and that Jane's rent was $37 instead of $36 last year.) They said, "Why haven't teachers been businesslike like this before and come to the table?" Then the superintendent walked over and picked up the 496 teacher contracts, that had to have been printed before five o'clock in the afternoon, because that was when the print shop closed. Those were the contracts I would give to my teachers next morning. That frustration led to an aggression which was read by others as being militancy. But I came pretty well prepared to this field because, as I said, I grew up on a ranch. One of the things that we did there as a vocational thing was hunting coons, and early in that process my dad encouraged me not to stand between a dog and a tree, and I felt that that had helped me more in this group than anything else. A lot of frustrations that I hear these days come from people who simply didn't get to kill coons.

I believe Oregon has the best collective bargaining law in America. I don't believe a collective bargaining law has any ability to help kids learn unless it has the full rights of collective bargaining, which our state has. I use as evidence the fact that this state has negotiated over 4000 contracts. It has had either nine or eleven strikes depending on who you talk to. I personally lived on site through all but one of those strikes, so I have some view of it. But compare that with states where collective
bargaining is unlawful. The distinctions between states with and without collective bargaining laws weren't discussed too clearly here. I was talking with a lady from Colorado earlier about the Cortez incident and Denver's experience long before that. It is my view, and I don't know if this has been researched, that the states where collective bargaining is unlawful have a much higher incidence of conflict and subsequent aggression than states where it is lawful.

Consider some examples. Pennsylvania, the last time I checked, had 531 teacher strikes in a three-year period. This happened in a state where strikes are not quite lawful. New Jersey had 123 strikes in the same period. Michigan had more than that put together. Where strikes are quasi-lawful, you still see the judge admonishing local Michigan teachers.

I don't think you can take a very objective view of research about collective bargaining and its impact on schooling or learning unless you take a look at the participants. I would want everyone who is going to deal with a teacher union or with a school board about to react to that union to read Saul Alinsky's Rules for Radicals. That is the basic Bible of that process, and I get the feeling that a lot of us have not taken time to do that. The AFT and the NEA machines have attracted and hired largely militant teachers, like myself, who come by nature with a knee-jerk reaction. Of course I learned a long time ago as a teacher leader that to keep teachers going in any one direction for 72 hours was a literal impossibility. Even keeping a teacher psyched up for that period of time is impossible. I remember being trained to recognize when something had gone right and to take credit for it. If it went to hell, I was to say, "I told you so," so that I would be listened to the next time when it could go right.
Steve Goldschmidt talked about something that was tangential but I wanted to just touch it and go on: "The contract won't let me do this or that." You know, I tutored a lot of young administrator aspirants. I have often said to them that there are a couple of things you ought to learn well: the school law and how to operate in spite of it. I now would tell them the same thing about collective bargaining and grievances. One of you people said many good administrators work right around the contract. And I think those are the good administrators. I will go home and start using the term, "management around the contract," because it has meaning for me.

I think the effective administrator is one who breakfasts with his teachers regularly, gets them into the decision-sharing process regularly, puts them on advisory committees, mixes them with parents, students, and himself whenever he can, and the union takes care of itself. And it usually ends up in a defensive position on those particular occasions. Administrators who I work with, however, are usually blind to the fact that the union has a life all of its own. Its needs may or may not be congruent with the needs of its teacher members. Unless you know that and are comfortable with that, you end up with a high frustration level.

You need to know that the union's needs usually come first. Having represented teachers in negotiations for many years, I think the union has two main goals that school boards are often blind to. The union always has to go for low salaries and small class size. I saw someone say "high" (salaries), but I mean low. The history is all in place. We have had this fight going on since 1946. What else would motivate proposing a salary schedule that starts your members at the lowest competing wage among all professionals and requires you to wait 18 years to make a living wage? There
is a simple reason. Since dues are based on head count and since dues are $276 multiplied by one million, which makes my union a $276 million operation—the second largest union in the world (and if we could ever publicly heal our wounds between AFT and NEA it would be the largest)—to double that salary would cut the income of the union in half. I think we need to remember that.

We are seeing that now come head on in the conflict over RIF. It is the first time it has really gotten nasty. Terry Herndon said that there would be 100,000 teachers laid off in the United States in one year. I think he was half right. In watching the layoffs in this state, for the first time, those two needs are really in conflict. We have seen situations where the union comes in and says "We need X and Y." We have said, "If we give you X and Y, it is going to mean that 26 of your 200 people have to go out the door." And we have said "Is that your position?" "Yes." "You take that back to your membership in a secret ballot and we will see you Thursday night." Thursday night, we went to where the money would provide for 200 folks.

Small class size is the same issue. I am really impressed about how ignorant I am about what makes a difference in student learning, because I used to think I was a student of that. I am pleased that small class size has been shown to be relevant for first, second, and third graders in math and reading. I used to stand up in a room not too far away from here training school administrators and offering them a night in Salishan with dinner in the Gourmet Room if they could show me anything that affected student learning. And I always told them that so they would feel comfortable defending anything they were doing on the basis that it was improving student
learning. I was sure if you couldn't show what did, you couldn't show what didn't. Now I am going to be a little confused because small class size may.

I will tell you something else that small class size does. All the specialists and auxiliary teachers we have created also increase the head count for union dues. If class size were to double, you know what the effect of that would be. We used to say that nothing made a difference. Now we are saying that high verbal IQ, the college attended, small class size, and the five-factor syndrome make a big difference. That is becoming a central issue in collective bargaining, at least with some people who represent school boards, and it will become an issue with people who represent teachers.

It comes down to this. If you ask on the basis of your own child, Would you rather have your child with a mediocre teacher in a class of 20 or with a master teacher in a class of 40, it will be self-resolving. And if your answer is my answer, then you are going to want to know the difference in the verbal IQ and the college attended of people who are paid an average of $36,000 instead of $18,000. It wouldn't cost one cent more to make that conversion.

That comes from some work that I did when I was here in 1976 that showed two things that really concern me still. For whatever reasons, public education as a profession at that time was reported by the U.S. Office of Education, in its annual statistical materials, to be attracting the lowest 10 percent in terms of verbal IQ of college students going into education. I right away ran out and got a flag and said I am an exception to page 128. I became a teacher without knowing that. Then I read down the page and I found that one out of every two public school teachers leaves the profession within
the first three years, and I think this was true as late as 1978 and 1979.
Now, I hope you are saying, "Well doesn't he know those are all the poor ones? I would hate to think it was people with a verbal IQ high enough to figure out that there are other professions that are paying more than $14,000."

As for the sub-issues that you deal with in collective bargaining, I have not read much about them; I have learned them by being there. Unions deal regularly with something called RIF, but they shouldn't, because no teacher wants anything to do with RIF. What they want is layoff and recall instead. Then there are are evaluations, complaint procedures, just cause, and student discipline. Those five issues in a labor agreement with school teachers are really one issue in terms of the union. And that is, you (the teacher) couldn't have your job if we weren't here to keep it for you. I may get no agreement from any other school teacher, but the thing I resented the most as a school teacher was tenure. I got darn tired of being told by those in other occupations that the only reason I had my job was because I couldn't lose it. I always wondered who would teach their kids if I and all my peers were not there. But those bargaining issues are over provisions that say basically, in my mind, security.

Another thing that I would like to share with you is the constant mixing up between negotiations and collective bargaining. Collective bargaining and negotiations are worlds apart. Negotiations are like when you go down to the car lot and you want to buy a car but you don't agree with the guy. What do you do? You walk away, right? Collective bargaining is exactly the opposite. You may not take the white Cadillac, but you can't leave the lot until you pick one of the cars. Collective bargaining is blind
to effective negotiations. And I think teachers are so much more effective in negotiations than they are in collective bargaining. They ought to spend a lot less time on collective bargaining. I believe teachers have been, at least in Oregon, so much better at negotiating at the state level. You know, fooling around with 10-days' sick leave and a labor agreement in Eugene seems to me terribly ineffective when you could get it for everyone in Salem. Fooling around with layoff and recall procedures seems terribly ineffective when you could get language in state legislation that surpassed any local agreement. In 1979, when we told teachers that evaluation was outside the scope of bargaining—it was a permissible subject—they went up to the capital and got that language for every school district in the state through mandate.

I would also like to share something with you that a fellow I hired out of Michigan shared with me; it has let me sleep much better. He said, "Jerry what you're got to be comfortable with is that, in the human condition, frustration breeds aggression." That has laid a lot of things to rest for me. When teachers were under that insult, infer, and cuss law, their frustration led to your four-phase collective bargaining law.

Now, I am concerned that, in Salem, the teachers are receiving an 8-to 13-percent increase in their salaries (after cutting it by 4 percent, depending on who you talk to); but the school board also said that administrators will get no increase this year: "After all, why talk about it, they don't have collective bargaining, etc." I am thinking about the man who used to be Salem's negotiator. In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, he just finished negotiating a contract with elementary principals and other supervisors after an administrator strike. And one result that would have pleased me as an
elementary principal is that elementary principals are now paid a salary of $53,103 for 200 days work, which is different from what they are paid in Oregon. When I went to McMinnville, Oregon, as assistant superintendent in 1969, my starting salary was set at 1.65 times the highest teacher salary. I was there less than four hours when they gave me one of my first big assignments. I was asked to decide what the highest teacher salary should be. They gave me three choices and I impressed them because it took me about 20 seconds—"What's next?" I would like to work for a school district that says "Hey, administrators, as of November, we are thinking of giving school teachers an 8-percent increase. However, for every half-percent we settle under that, administrators in this district will get a two-percent kick." What a difference that would make. That is done all the time, incidentally, in the private sector.

Well I want to close with just two comments. First, I think we fear the unknown. Collective bargaining is the unknown for far too many school managers. Second, the basic question faced by each school district in America really comes down to, "Are our schools going to exist for teachers to teach or for boys and girls to learn?" And once that question is answered you will be able to manage your decision-making process. One sometimes gets the impression, from listening to collective bargaining, that students are a convenience to the need to teach. I often ask, and I don't often get an answer to the question, "What does this particular proposal do for kids?" Education remains the most important pursuit for man. Let us not be the ones to turn that pursuit over to the elite through our inability to balance greed with need.