A comparative analysis of values education in the United States, Germany, Japan, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Sweden, and Canada analyzed eight assertions: (1) No institution with education as its primary aim can be value neutral; (2) Countries differ in values which characterize their political cultures and in values which are taught in school; (3) None of the countries studied has had a uniformly high level of success in transmitting civic values; (4) The learning of values is strongly influenced by factors outside the school's control; (5) Educational policy has been somewhat effective in bringing about desired changes in values; (6) The learning of values in school is not limited to mandated programs of moral and civic education; (7) Several nations have developed curricular goals to promote common core values; and (8) Television and other mass media have an important and often negative effect on young people's values. It is recommended that coalition agenda be formed, providing a description of values that ought to be learned in school, together with the actions needed if these values are to be embodied in educational practice. (JD)
THE VALUES LEARNED IN SCHOOL: POLICY AND PRACTICE
IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

Judith Torney-Purta
University of Maryland

and

John Schwille
Michigan State University

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Many who see a crisis of values in the United States look to the schools for help. They find in the history of American education two main approaches to values education. One is the search for a common core of values that can be taught directly. Since the time of Dewey, however, this approach has been much criticized for its reliance on indoctrination and for its bias toward the status quo. As an alternative, critics have emphasized the second approach which emphasizes critical discussion of moral dilemmas. This approach has been condemned, in turn, for its lack of commitment to a well-defined moral code and for its lack of effectiveness in ensuring moral behavior.

In this paper, studies of values education in other industrialized countries are selectively reviewed. This analysis contributes, by comparison, to better understanding of U.S. schools and at the same time furnishes a list of promising practices that might be adapted to American aspirations. To these ends, eight assertions about values education are analyzed in light of research and development in moral, civic, and values education.

**Assertion 1:** No institution with education as its primary aim can be value neutral.

**Assertion 2:** Countries differ in the values which characterize their political cultures. Countries also differ in the values they seek to teach in school.

**Assertion 3:** No Western industrialized country has had a uniformly high level of success in transmitting civic values. Subtle incompatibilities between what may seem positive goals exist, and approaches stressing rote and ritual appear to be counterproductive.

**Assertion 4:** The learning of values is strongly influenced (sometimes in unexpected ways) by many factors which are outside the control of educators and educational policy-makers, such as national culture and subcultures, economic structures and unique historical events.

**Assertion 5:** Notwithstanding the importance of nonschool and nationally idiosyncratic factors, educational policy has been somewhat effective in bringing about desired changes in values.

**Assertion 6:** The learning of values in school is not limited to mandated programs of moral and civic education. Students also learn values (such as cooperation, rights of self-expression, respect for other persons, and respect for authority) from the ways that schools embody these values in organization, teaching, and social climate.

**Assertion 7:** A number of nations have developed curricular goals (and associated materials) to promote common core values. Goals in some countries give more importance to collective welfare, in others more to individual benefits (though no country completely neglects either). Some of these goals and materials are worthy of our consideration (e.g., those relating to teaching about internationally recognized human rights).

**Assertion 8:** In industrialized societies, television and other mass media have an important and often negative effect on young people's values. Educational programs could have a positive effect on student understanding and usage of media.

The Commission is urged to give extensive attention to values in its report—to do otherwise would contradict the assertions documented in this paper. In particular, the Commission is asked to put together a coalition agenda—a description of values that ought to be learned in school, together with the actions needed if these values are to be embodied in educational practice. Such an agenda would serve to stimulate dialogue and action among interested groups. A major issue for such an agenda, as for this paper, is how to reconcile striving for consensus with tolerance for dissent.
Introduction

Virtually everyone agrees that values are important in education. The agreement usually ends there, however, leaving many perplexing questions:

What values are learned in school? How much influence does the school have on values? Is it possible for the school to be neutral with respect to values? Are values best taught explicitly or can one count on implicit transmission? Is it feasible and desirable to make intentional changes (through national policy or otherwise) in the values transmitted through schooling? Are problems in values education best addressed by parents, teachers, school boards, clergy, or academic philosophers or psychologists? How can groups with disparate values best communicate on these issues? None of these questions have ready answers. Obstacles to answering them include not only lack of information and conceptual clarity, but also the fact that individuals interested in this problem hold their own values and hence phrase their questions in different ways. In short, reasonable people differ in their answers to questions about values education even when faced with the same information.

Thus, the truth of any generalization about values seems continuously open to debate. Consider, for example, what it means to say that there is a crisis in values. While there is widespread agreement that there is such a crisis, Langerak (1979) points out that there are no fewer than five contrasting views of it. For some the problem is one of motivating individuals to act on the values they hold. Others bewail the decline of support for traditional values. A third group blames the crisis on ignorance among individuals of the way in which values shape not only their behavior but that of others. A fourth group
attributes the crisis to rapid social and technological change which has made existing skills in analyzing values difficult to apply. Finally, some see the problem as one of remaining committed to one's own values while at the same time recognizing the pluralism of values in society.

According to Buells (1980), this crisis has been caused by an erosion of the civic values necessary to sustain a balance between cohesion and pluralism in society. Values which once supported the political community have become corrupted, he argues. For example, freedom has become anarchy: "No one can tell me what to do." Respect for privacy has become privatism: "No one can ask me to justify my behavior."

Empirical research also shows cause for concern. Sigel (1979) found that American high school seniors associated democracy almost exclusively with individual freedom and that for many it was little more than a slogan. Few students understood what it meant to apply democratic principles to solve political conflicts. Levine (1980), using Carnegie survey data from the 1970's, characterized this generation of college students as clearly more concerned for the individual than for the community. Hedonism and duty to self were the values shaping their behavior.

Opinions differ on the role that schooling has played in this crisis of values. Courses such as civic education and curricular objectives with strong values and moral components have long been an explicit part of school programs. Recently, there has been resurgent criticism of values education for being poorly practiced and widely neglected (Ravitch, 1980, to name only one). Colleges and universities have been condemned for their narrow concern with academic values (open-mindedness, respect for the past—see Maguire, 1982), and for being willing only to help students "grasp" or "scrutinize" values while shying away from "fostering", "shaping", or even "modeling" values (Langerak, 1979).
Two Approaches to Values Education in the United States

Historically, it is possible to distinguish between two approaches to values education: (1) the search for a common core of values to be inculcated and (2) the attempt to influence values indirectly, with emphasis on critical analysis and with avoidance of methods which might appear to indoctrinate.

Search for a common core of values. This approach has characterized American education for much of its history. According to Elson, the textbooks of the nineteenth century made no pretense of neutrality. They take a firm and unanimous stand on love of country, love of God, duty to parents, the necessity to develop habits of thrift, honesty and hard work . . . the certainty of progress, the perfection of the United States. (Elson cited in Yulish, 1980)

In the early 1900's character education was in vogue (Yulish, 1980). A 1911 report of the National Education Association gives a sense of the values the school was expected to impart: obedience, honor, trustfulness, cleanliness, honesty, self-control, justice, and patriotism. According to this report, true individual freedom could be realized only after society's values had been internalized.

More recently Edelman (1975) examined the educational mandates of the fifty states and found almost universal inclusion of loyalty and patriotism. He pointed to many anti-Communist and pro-free enterprise themes, and concluded that students in public schools still receive "an extended exposure to a civil religion . . . which cannot help but have a limiting effect on the possibilities for change in the belief system" (p. 98). In contrast, others have argued that the federal curriculum development grants in the 1960's were used to undermine traditional values and promote "secular humanism" (see Nelkin, 1977).

Two recent attempts to reinvigorate the teaching of a common core of values may be found in programs of law-related education and in publications
of the American Federation of Teachers. Educating students about the law as a common core of values is a long revered tendency in American social studies and history courses. About fifteen years ago several organizations comprised of both educators and lawyers began to develop programs called law-related education for students in elementary and secondary schools. Often cosponsored by state or local bar associations, these efforts have for about ten years been coordinated nationally by the American Bar Association.

A study group on law-related education in the U.S. Office of Education has defined the aims of law-related education as giving people an adequate base of knowledge and training about the law, the legal process, and the legal system that, as part of their general education, enables them to be more informed and effective citizens (USOE, 1979, viii).

It is not only intended that individuals become more knowledgeable about the law, but also that they develop appropriate respect for the law. A wide variety of methods including discussions, case studies, role playing and the analysis of news reports are used; and an equally wide range of topics are treated. Many programs stress aspects of the law which are closely related to citizenship (e.g., what it means for a society to operate under the rule of law, the nature of the U.S. Constitution, how laws are made and the role of judicial review). Other programs focus on technical aspects of law (e.g., what due process means) or on basic concepts such as authority and responsibility.

The American Federation of Teachers, critical of what it perceives to be a climate of increasing relativism in schools, has recently begun a series to "restore values in education"; this series takes a core values approach. Four supplements to the AFT publication American Educator will be issued, each suggesting the use of folktales, art, literature, and newspaper articles as starting points for discussion of four traditional values: responsibility,
honesty, courage, and compassion. For example, in the winter 1981 issue, excerpts from *The Bible*, *Of Mice and Men*, and *The Yearling* as well as the poem "He Ain't Heavy, He's My Brother" are recommended for discussion of the value responsibility. Bibliographies of other film and print resources are also given. This series echoes attempts in the early 1900's to use the study of literature to promote character development (Pietig, 1977).

The search for critical thinking without indoctrination. Two concerns about the inculcation of common core values are often voiced. The first is that students will be indoctrinated rather than encouraged to examine and choose values. What will happen, it is asked, if methods used successfully to impart agreed-upon values gradually become the means of indoctrination for other more questionable values? From this perspective, indoctrination is broadly and pejoratively construed (often without clear definition). The teacher who tells students not to cheat on examinations may be seen as indoctrinating. The second concern is that the values which are most likely to be identified as "common core" are those which support the political and economic status quo; obedience to authority and belief in free enterprise and the market economy are examples in point. These concerns are not new. John Dewey, in setting forth his ideas about moral education in the early 1900's, was reacting against what he saw as blatant indoctrination in character education and, in particular against requirements that students memorize creeds or slogans.

Dewey believed that moral education ought to stimulate students to reflective thought on problems of personal and moral significance (Hersh, Miller, and Fielding, 1980). The inculcation of virtuous traits, no matter how positive they might appear, could not be justified.

Rather than studying fixed rules of conduct or personal moral sentiments, students should explore the ways in which men are bound together. (Pietig, 1977, p. 175)
Dewey himself stated it this way, "The question is not what to do, but how to decide what to do" (Dewey, 1893, p. 56). Dewey also recognized the influence of what is often called the "hidden curriculum." No matter how often children are exhorted to support democracy and justice, if the organization of the school is authoritarian, Dewey argued, the moral education of students will suffer. Cooperative group activity and a strong sense of community, both inside and outside the school, are essential to moral education in his view.

Dewey has had a number of heirs. Prominent in the recent past are Kohlberg's theory of moral development (1976) and the movement for values clarification led by Raths, Harmin, and Simon (1978). Kohlberg's theory of moral development was initially conceived as a theoretical position in psychology without regard for its educational implications. Kohlberg was reacting against learning theorists whose view of morality—mere habit and anxiety in face of temptation—he thought too limited. In contrast, Kohlberg viewed the individual faced with moral dilemmas as progressing through hierarchically and sequentially organized stages of judgement. From this perspective, the individual at a lower stage judges an action as right or wrong based on expected punishment or reward. At the higher "conventional" stages, the individual is responsive to social definitions of right and wrong; at the highest stages individuals make judgments based on principles of justice which might even be in contradiction with societal mores or laws. Progress from lower to higher stages is thought to be irreversible and to be stimulated by exposure to a higher level of moral reasoning, one which conflicts with the individual's current level.

Kohlberg's theory has been translated into programs of moral education. Teachers have been encouraged to question students in order to stimulate complex thinking about moral choices and conflicts. The aim is progress through the stages of moral development, and the ideal method is a kind of Socratic dialogue.
grounded in respect for justice. Justice is thus a core value for Kohlberg, but one to be addressed indirectly. This approach to moral education has incorporated not only Dewey's concern for reflective thought but also his call for student practice in playing social roles. Kohlberg's programs often take place in what is called a Just Community School where decisions are made by students through direct democracy, accompanied by discussion of the everyday dilemmas in which value conflicts can be found.

Although many have found Kohlberg's ideas an admirable approach to moral education in a democracy, there have been criticisms both of the underlying theory and of its educational applications. In particular, Kohlberg's approach has been criticized for failing to distinguish right from wrong even in clearcut issues and for being too little concerned with the relation between moral judgement and moral behavior. Peters (1978) argues, for example, that when a wallet is stolen, the victim is rightly more concerned with the act itself and with the assailant's lack of adherence to conventional morality than with whether the assailant is able to justify his behavior in more or less rational fashion.

Educators have also criticized the approach because of difficulties experienced in training teachers to conduct moral discussions according to the theory; the frustration some teachers feel at being asked to create moral ambiguity and conflict in the minds of their students; the long period of time before change is observed in most students; and the lack of a clear relationship between discussion of problems and changes in behavior (Hersh, Miller and Fielding, 1980).

In his early work Kohlberg spoke very negatively about inculcating any "bag of virtues" and criticized almost all approaches other than his own as indoctrination. But more recently, he has recanted in part:
I now believe that the concepts guiding moral education must be partly "indoctrinative." This is true by necessity in a world in which children engage in stealing, cheating, and aggression and in which one cannot wait until children reach the fifth stage in order to deal directly with their moral behavior. (Kohlberg, 1978, p. 82)

Peters (1978), writing before this recantation, suggests that Kohlberg's approach would be more valuable in education if certain basic rules necessary for maintaining social life were also recognized and inculcated--keeping one's promises or contracts, preserving public and private property, not stealing, truth-telling and consideration for others.

Values clarification, proposed by Raths, Harmin, and Simon, represents an even stronger reaction against the teaching of specific values or virtues.

Classroom dialogue (often in the form of games) is used to help children, first, to recognize their own values; second, to examine these values; and third, to express commitment to those values which they have decided are "good for them."

The relativism of this approach has been welcomed by some teachers who felt uncomfortable advocating values for which community consensus was lacking (or perceived to be lacking). This approach has also appeared attractive to many who believe that values are mere statements of personal preference which cannot be justified by philosophic or scientific reasoning.

Recently Oldenquist in the Harvard Education Review (1979) has strongly criticized both the Kohlberg approach and the values clarification approach by comparing them unfavorably to the 2000-year-old views of Aristotle in the "Nichomachean Ethic."

[These recent approaches] agree that what they call moral education should be non-directive; it is all right to explore opinions or teach methods of moral reasoning, but nothing should be taught as right or wrong . . . .

I am fairly certain that Aristotle would complain that the ultimate effect . . . . would be to cause children to think that morality is merely a matter of undebateable personal feelings and that moral reasoning leads to
nothing but dilemma . . . The values clarificationists'
view of human nature is, I believe, actually dangerous . . .
for it can lead young people to think that what they
reflectively want is all that needs to be considered.
(p. 241-242)

Oldenquist redefines indoctrination in order to limit it to the following:

Teaching without presenting evidence for opinions or
indicating (as best one can) how they have been
arrived at.

Presenting a value position on which there is
disagreement as though it were generally accepted.

Teaching moral views without considering student
responses or allowing discussion.

Pretending that one is being objective or morally
neutral when one is subtly inculcating one's own
values. (paraphrased from Oldenquist).

In contrast to this sort of indoctrination, which he agrees to be undesirable,
Oldenquist proposes "directive moral education" which promotes personal virtues
such as courage, the willingness to work for what one wants, and moral attitudes
such as fairness, honesty, and the abandonment of violence and theft. These
values, he argues, are necessary if society is to be even minimally safe
and satisfying.

The recent history of moral education in the United States may thus be
viewed as a series of actions and reactions—indoctrination of moral content
and norms of behavior followed by a reaction which has attempted to avoid
indoctrination by emphasis on the process rather than the content of moral
reasoning, followed by a reaction which seeks agreement on at least a short
list of "virtues" perceived as necessary for the survival of society.

American educators are perhaps at a balance point. Many are attracted by
the notion of a search for some common social values, yet concerned about the
dangers of indoctrination. Many also find appeal in the idea of progress.
toward principle thinking, but are concerned that verbal justification may not lead to moral behavior. Hence, several current approaches discussed later in this paper are eclectic, calling for reflection, while accepting a short list of basic core values. This trend among those who write about education would benefit from more widespread debate among educational policymakers and practitioners.

The Timeliness of a Comparative Perspective on Values Education

International trade in educational ideas has been important at least since the Middle Ages. In the United States, as in other countries, education has been variously influenced by developments in other nations. Sometimes imports and national models have come to coexist, thereby increasing the educational diversity in which Americans take such pride. For example, the model of the German university in the late nineteenth century helped bring about the establishment of research universities in the United States. Today universities primarily devoted to basic research still share the field in the U.S. with other more indigenous institutions of higher education, such as the liberal arts college and the land grant university.

The educational practice of other nations in general and especially those segments which influence the acquisition of values can be viewed as a series of naturally occurring experiments—with variation in organization and variation in ideology, for example. Two specific results can be expected from an examination of this variation in values education. First is a better understanding of how values education in this country fits into a broader context. What, in our approach to values education, is surprising to persons from other countries? What is unusual about our approach? Are these unusual elements still valuable, or were they better suited to an era now past?
Second, one may hope to find promising practices in other nations which might be adapted to our use without damage to our cultural heritage.

A start toward seeing American education in this way can be found in American Education through Japanese Eyes, a book compiled from the observations made between 1966 and 1968 by three highly select groups of Japanese teachers who observed families and schools in the United States (Bereday and Masui, 1973). Whatever the school might do to produce a moral individual was of great interest to these teachers. Their observations suggest that the American school has distinctive features; in the words of one teacher:

I did not observe any instance when a teacher or principal administered discipline to a group as such. In Japan we start first with group discipline, teaching each child how to behave as a member of a group . . . . In Japan it is first the group, then the individual; in the United States it is first the individual, then the group. Do I understand correctly that if you discipline the individual, you do not need to discipline the group? (Bereday and Masui, 1973, p. 29)

These Japanese observers noted that American homeroom teachers paid very little attention to group solidarity but "behaved like a man in charge of traffic on the street" (p. 53). The Japanese were puzzled that, in a country already so diverse, the main attempt was to foster individualism and more diversity rather than to build a common spirit.

They were also surprised to discover that there was no specific plan in most schools for teaching values such as honesty, respect and kindness. Teachers with whom they spoke even seemed puzzled by questions raised regarding these matters; one conversation went like this:

How are you carrying out moral education in the school?

Well, we teach geography in the first year, the history of the state in the second year, and American history in the third year.

No, I do not mean that. I would like to know what kind of guidance are you giving, for example, in the association of boys and girls?
Oh yes, that is a problem for the family and we do not touch that in school.

But so long as you are engaged in education I suppose you consider desirable images of man, do you not?

Well, maybe. But each community may have different requirements which differ from school to school.

Do you not have anything like common objectives in education?

If you like, we might say that democracy is a common objective. (p. 34)

The Japanese teachers were especially frustrated by the inability of American educators to articulate an ideal image of society (other than that it was democratic and not socialistic) or an ideal image of the type of student personality they hoped to form. It was the experience of the Japanese that such an ideal image need not have a religious base but certainly should be articulated and consciously incorporated in the organization of the school and the actions of teachers.

These observations, while impressionistic, highlight certain underlying assumptions of American moral education (e.g., that it operates rather informally and that it stresses individualism). They indicate that a systematic examination of educational practice in other countries might well prove still more insightful. It is therefore important to ask how receptive Americans would be to this analysis.

For nearly one hundred years there was a considerable tendency among Americans to view our educational system's impact on civic or moral values as responsive to unique historic and cultural circumstances and to claim superiority for American methods of civic and moral education. Reform was not, therefore, thought to require serious attention to the practice of other nations. In 1899, the Committee of Seven of the American Historical Association conducted
a study of education in Europe. Although they identified some promising practices, they concluded that "German and French schools regard pupils as subjects rather than citizens, while English instruction was chaotic and entirely lacking in attention to civil government" (cited in Hertzberg, 1981, p. 13).

In fact, by the late 1800's two trends in the United States had made our schools different from those in Europe. The first was the spectacular growth of the free public high school under local control, financed by taxation, and open to all. This institution differed radically from the more centralized (often religiously controlled) schools in Europe, which provided one type of education for a minority of university and profession-bound students and quite another for the mass of workers (Hertzberg, 1981). The second trend was massive waves of immigration. Under the assumption that a family from a foreign (and perhaps hostile) nation was in no position to inculcate a common American value system, the school was given greatly enhanced responsibilities—both to "civilize" and Americanize. "Only with the laboring and immigrant young safely in class... would prosperity continue and freedom survive" (Hersh, Miller and Fielding, 1980, p. 17).

These differences between education in the U.S. and other nations have now considerably decreased. In the last thirty years the educational systems of Western Europe have been faced with strong demands for public secondary education equally available to all regardless of social origin. In most nations, the educational systems have responded to this demand with substantial growth in secondary school and university enrollments as well as longer periods of compulsory schooling.

Within the last twenty years, the countries of Northern Europe have also taken in many immigrants—especially "guest workers" from Southern Europe. Some schools in Sweden instruct students in ten different languages in addition
to teaching Swedish as a second language. In such cases, explicit attention has been given to problems of moral and civic education for the immigrants.

At the same time that problems of education in other nations have become increasingly similar to ours, Americans have become more and more dissatisfied with the values taught and not taught in school. As a result, we believe, there is now and will be for some time an increasing audience for studies of educational practice in other countries. In this paper, we examine several types of studies (both those comparing several other nations and studies within a single nation) as they bear on eight assertions about values education. This analysis is limited to the industrialized countries, especially Germany, Japan, Britain, the Soviet Union, Sweden, and Canada.
Eight Assertions About Values Education

Assertion 1: No institution with education as its primary aim can be value neutral (this assertion applies to institutions of higher education as well as to elementary and secondary schools).

No system has, in fact, tried to be value neutral except in very limited spheres of educative action. Western countries, like their ideological opponents in the East, have spent substantial portions of their budgets and devoted extensive attention in curriculum guidelines to social education with explicit value goals. The Council of Europe has characterized this social education as having cognitive aims (awareness of generally accepted values, norms, standards, and goals), affective aims (e.g., moral commitments to human rights and fundamental values such as tolerance, cooperation, democracy and justice), and behavioral aims (e.g., ability to take a stand and tolerate the views of others, ability to argue analytically).

But the school's role in teaching values is by no means limited to such explicit intent. Education by its very nature implies the taking of stands which are laden with values. Teachers consider some things worth learning and others not; some student behaviors constructive and others not; some pedagogical practices useful and others not. Even in the most concerted attempt to practice neutrality (as in the values clarification movement), values are assumed: these include, for example, the notion that discussion of values is good and has beneficial consequences and the idea that the values of the student are as worthy of consideration as those of the teacher.

Schools and teachers are neutral at times, but only in a circumscribed sense. In the United States, public schools have been constitutionally enjoined from teaching anything that would amount to an establishment of
religion. In France where teachers range from conservatives to communists, teachers are forbidden to discuss partisan matters in the classroom; at the same time elementary school educators, at least, are encouraged to teach loyalty to France's democratic institutions.

The enforcement of this double duty in France (or elsewhere) is problematical and the extent to which such a prescription is taken seriously varies. For example, one empirical study of French secondary schools found that teachers in the schools of less prestigious academic status (the colleges of general education or CEG's) were more likely to observe this neutrality than the teachers in the elite university preparatory schools (lycees).

For instance, we have observed violently anti-gaullist history teachers in the CEG's give lectures on the Fifth Republic which in no way suggested what their real political preferences were. Similarly, in a CEG located in a Communist stronghold, we saw the principal, a member of the Party, call the police to remove demonstrators who were carrying pro-North Vietnamese signs within a hundred yards of the school, because such an expression could not legally be done so near the school. (Schonfeld, 1976, pp. 38-39)

International studies (the IEA surveys) have shown that teachers differ from country to country and from issue to issue in what they consider acceptable to discuss in the classroom. Some moral stands were regarded as appropriate by a great majority of the teachers surveyed in nearly all the Western industrialized countries studied (West Germany, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States). For example, the idea that teachers should be free to speak out against racial discrimination in the classroom was endorsed by more than 80% of the teachers in each of these countries. On other issues there was considerable variation, as the following list indicates. Three percents are given—the country other than the U. S. with the highest percent of teachers saying a teacher should be free to engage in a particular activity; the country with the lowest percent; and the corresponding figure for the U.S.
Allow the distribution of free enterprise literature put out by the stock exchanges or national chamber of commerce and banking groups: Sweden, 96%; Italy, 56%; U.S., 94%.

Allow atheists to express views before school classes: West Germany, 95%; Ireland, 42%; U.S. 70%.

Speak out against Fascists and objectionable or unpopular political groups: Netherlands, 72%; Finland, 18%; U.S. 70%.

Argue against censoring of literature by those who feel it is controversial or immoral: Sweden, 74%; Finland, 26%; U.S., 63%.

Explain reasons for preferring one party over another in a national election: New Zealand, 36%; Sweden, 7%; U.S., 42%.

Speak out against the government: West Germany, 48%; Sweden, 8%; U.S., 42%.

Argue that labor unions should be further regulated or controlled by the government: Ireland, 44%; Sweden, 3%; U.S., 41%.

Speak out in favor of nationalization of large privately owned industry: New Zealand, 37%; Sweden, 5%; U.S., 30%.

Speak favorably about Marxist communism and circulate appropriate material: Netherlands, 44%; Sweden, 2%; U.S., 25%.

When responses to these issues were combined in a scale measuring the desirability of teachers discussing sensitive issues in the classroom, the results showed that Finnish and Irish teachers considered relatively few of these issues appropriate for classroom discussion whereas teachers in West Germany, New Zealand, the Netherlands and the United States were relatively receptive to the discussion of such issues.

Teachers in Sweden were unusual in showing wide variation from issue to issue. They reported very high willingness to allow atheists to express their views, to argue against the censorship of literature and to allow the distribution of stock exchange literature. They were less willing than
teachers in any other nation studied to favor explaining preferences for a particular political party, speaking out in favor of an industry's nationalization, speaking favorably about Marxist communism or speaking out against the government.

Student reports on whether they were encouraged to express their own opinions in the classroom tended to confirm these teachers' reports. Finnish students reported low levels of encouragement while students in West Germany, Ireland, New Zealand and the United States reported high levels.

Up to this point, our analysis in support of Assertion 1 has relied on the explicit aims of schooling and teachers' self-reported values. These sources of data do not take into account the extent to which the reality of schooling is different from its formal aims as prescribed by educators or others. The values actually taught frequently differ from the values ostensibly advocated. This point is particularly important when one looks at how education sorts people into high or lower statuses in society, in other words, when one considers schools as a factor which influences who gets what job. Schooling is part of a world in which some children become corporate lawyers and business executives while other children become auto workers and secretaries. Value acquisition is one aspect of this process; students gradually and more or less thoroughly learn values characteristic of the occupations they enter. In addition, they acquire some values which are shared more widely throughout society.

This process can be seen from two different perspectives. The school of thought called functionalism sees society best represented as a coherent, organic whole. Functionalists see schools teaching values which are widely shared and which are deemed useful in keeping social groups working together. In contrast, another school known as conflict theory sees
society as a field of contending groups with different interests and different values. This school of thought puts less emphasis on shared values. According to conflict theorists, the attempt to teach shared values is ordinarily an attempt to impose values which favor dominant groups. In an example of this sort of analysis, Anyon (1981) in a study of the treatment of labor relations in seventeen American high school history textbooks charges that the textbooks devalue confrontation and dissent and overemphasize the positive results of bargaining and union-management cooperation.

Whichever of these points of view one adopts, the school is viewed as a major factor in the teaching of values, whether or not the values taught are ones which differ from group to group or ones which are more widely shared. For functionalists, the process has positive consequences since the values learned contribute to the harmonious working of society. Conflict theorists emphasize the negative consequences, seeing the process as one in which disadvantaged groups learn to accept inequities. Neither side sees our society as one in which children choose their own values.11

Assertion 2: Countries differ in the values which characterize their political cultures.12 Countries also differ in the values they seek to teach in school.

Even among Western industrialized countries, there are important differences in the values of adults. For example, Hofstede (1980) has reported on a survey of 3000 adult employees from 40 countries:

In the U.S., Britain and other English-speaking countries, respondents stressed motivation by personal, individual success in the form of wealth, recognition, and self-actualization.
In Japan, German-speaking countries, Greece and some Latin countries, respondents stressed motivation by personal, individual security in the form of wealth and hard work.

In France, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Chile and certain other Latin and Asian countries, respondents were motivated by security and belonging; to them individual wealth was less important than group solidarity.

In Northern European countries (especially the Netherlands and Scandinavia), respondents were motivated by both success and belonging; they valued not only collective success but also the quality of human relations and of the living environment. (p. 376)

When ten thousand university students in eleven countries were sampled by Klineberg, Zavalloni, Louis-Guerin and Ben Erika (1979), three relatively distinct orientations were identified. The first or "nationalist" was characterized by opposition to limitations of national sovereignty, perception of the need for control of immigration and distrust of supranational organizations; it was most typical among Tunisians and Nigerians.

The second orientation, called "internationalist" combined attitudes favorable to immigration, the elimination of nationalism, and the establishment of strong international organizations; this orientation was most characteristic of Austria, Japan and Spain. The third orientation was somewhat intermediate; it included some hope for the elimination of nationalism along with some distrust of world government and some support for limitation of immigration; it was most typical of the U.S., France, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Australia. 13

A series of papers by researchers at Stanford University provides considerable information about the values that countries believe it important to teach in school. Their analysis is based on the explicit aims of education in approximately 130 countries as stated in the UNESCO World Survey of Education in 1955 and 1965. The aims of education were classified under
the following twelve categories: (1) national development (use of education to build an integrated and coherent nation), (2) economic development (use of education for collective economic and technical development), (3) individual development (use of education to help an individual reach personal goals for self-expression and self-development), (4) individual vocational development (helping an individual find a place in the economy), (5) advocacy of democracy (participation in the process of political rule), (6) furtherance of world citizenship (education aimed at world integration and appreciation of the international community), (7) promotion of equality and equality of opportunity, (8) cultivation of loyalty and patriotism, (9) the teaching of specific economic ideologies (such as socialism or communism), (10) advancement of religion, (11) promotion of local community cohesion, and (12) the use of education as preparation for elite positions. Economic development, national development and individual development were the most favored aims (appearing, respectively, in 57%, 52% and 39% of the 1965 entries). These frontrunners considerably outranked other plausible choices, such as loyalty and patriotism (27%), individual vocational development (26%), and democracy (24%) (Lanford and Fiela, 1981).

Weeren (1972) surveyed official statements of educational policy regarding moral education in the U.S., the U.S.S.R., France, Canada and Japan. Although these statements are now at least twelve years old, some of the broad comparative findings are undoubtedly still accurate. This researcher found considerable similarity cross-nationally—in the recognition that moral education is an important function of the public schools, in certain of the common values advocated (e.g., respect and concern for others), and in pedagogical approaches. However, there were also substantial differences:

The United States stresses individuality and freedom far more than the Soviet Union, which places much greater
emphasizes on service to the community. Quebec distinguishes itself from all the other societies by incorporating religious and Christian values into the moral objectives of the public school. (Weeren, 1972, p. 38)

Alex Inkeles (1980) has analyzed the political culture of the U.S. from a historical perspective. He argues that contemporary social science evidence strongly supports the continuity of distinctively American characteristics first described by such nineteenth century observers as de Tocqueville and Martineau. These qualities include pronounced pride in country, self-reliance and autonomy, willingness to engage in voluntarism, trust in others, sense of efficacy and optimism, innovativeness and openness to new experiences, mistrust of authority, and equality in rights before the law. Inkeles admits that there is no comparable body of evidence to say why there has been such continuity "despite massive changes in the size and composition of the population . . . levels of education . . . patterns of residence and . . . forms of work." However, he suggests that education has been important in sustaining these values:

My own research in developing countries, some of which are now at the stage of development the United States was in around 1890, shows clearly that attendance at a modern school is the most important single factor in inculcating in young people a sense of personal efficacy and of openness to new experience, a spirit of self-reliance, and a striving for independence from traditional authority—all of which we have identified as elements of the American national character. If this happens in less developed countries now, it very likely happened in American schools earlier. (Inkeles, 1980, p. 38)

It is important to note that Inkeles does not see continuity in all aspects of American national character: he finds in the U.S. increased tolerance of diversity and deviant behavior; a decline in the ethic of hard work, temperance and frugality; and a recent erosion of confidence in the country's institutions.
Assertion 3: No Western industrialized country has had a uniformly high level of success in transmitting civic values. Subtle incompatibilities between what may seem positive goals exist, and approaches stressing role and ritual appear to be counter productive.

Our evidence for this assertion is drawn from a ten-nation study of civic education conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) (Torney, Oppenheim and Farnen, 1975). This association is a consortium of educational research institutions in some forty countries. It has worked together since the early 1960's to conduct comparative surveys in a total of seven school subjects. The data for the civic education study were collected in 1971.

In designing this study, an international committee collected materials from participating countries describing the objectives of civic education. The reports from all countries put so much stress on attitudes and values that about half of the final instrument was devoted to these outcomes. All items were translated and back translated and extensively pilot tested (Oppenheim and Torney, 1974). The resulting questionnaires and tests were answered by 10-year-olds, 14-year-olds, and students in the last year of pre-university education in the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States (although not every country tested every age group).

The attitude scales for this survey were factor analyzed separately for each age group in each nation. The clustering of scales was very similar in each national group, forming three meaningful clusters. The first cluster was termed support for democratic values and included scales measuring anti-authoritarianism, support for women's rights, support for civil liberties, and support for equality. The second cluster focused on support for the
national government and included scales to measure evaluation of and perceived responsiveness of the national government along with sense of political efficacy. The third cluster was termed civic interest/participation and included scales measuring participation in civic activities, political discussion and interest in current events on television. This clustering can be interpreted as in the following example: students who were high scorers in anti-authoritarianism tended also to be high on other scales in the cluster concerned with support for democratic values; in contrast, knowledge of their scores on scales in that cluster did not allow an accurate prediction of how they stood on the scales in the other two clusters.

The countries were then compared on these three clusters in order to find out whether any of these educational systems was successful in fostering all three clusters of student attitudes. We found that there was no country in which students had an average score that was above the international mean on all three clusters, plus the civics knowledge test that was administered at the same time. Among 14-year-olds, the countries in which the average level of support for democratic values was above the mean for all countries turned out to be below the mean on support for national government and civic interest/participation. In other words, those countries which effectively educated children toward support for values such as tolerance, anti-authoritarianism, and equality were less effective in promoting support for the national government and interest in civic participation (and vice versa). For example, 14-year-olds in the Netherlands had the highest score on the knowledge test and a high level of support for democratic values. However, their interest in political discussion was low as well as their support for the national government. In contrast, U.S. students expressed strong positive feelings about the national government and its responsiveness to
citizens; they were interested in participation. But they had a relatively low level of support for democratic values (the lowest of all the countries in their support for women's rights, including the right to vote and run for office).

All the IEA studies used a regression analysis of student differences within the country to determine which educational practices were consistently related to high scores on cognitive and attitudinal outcomes. The predictors of group differences across countries were surprisingly similar. Home background (primarily socio-economic status) was a moderately powerful predictor of 14-year-olds' scores on the cognitive test of civics and of anti-authoritarianism scores in all countries. After the effects of home background, age, sex, type of school, and type of program had been controlled, a group of predictors which could be called learning conditions was examined. The encouragement by teachers of expressions of opinions in the classroom (a measure of classroom climate) was positively related to high knowledge scores and less authoritarian attitudes. In contrast, students who reported extensive practice of patriotic rituals in the classroom (e.g., saluting the flag, singing patriotic songs) were less knowledgeable and more authoritarian. Both of these practices (encouragement to express opinions and use of patriotic rituals) were similar, however, in that they were consistent predictors of greater participation in political discussion across countries. Finally, in several countries students who reported extensive use of printed drill materials were less knowledgeable and somewhat more authoritarian.

In short, school experience in these Western countries does seem to make a difference in civic education since these learning condition variables were significant predictors even after the effects of home background and type of school (academic or vocational) had been controlled.
Classrooms in the U.S. were especially likely to practice patriotic ritual (e.g., saluting the flag). American teachers were also more likely than those in other countries to believe that students should have active political experiences in school (e.g., discussion of issues, political debates and working for the political party of their choice as a part of a school project).

These findings suggest that the promotion of patriotic loyalty and acquiring the sort of knowledge measured on the IEA tests do not ensure that students will become supportive of democratic values in the sense of believing in equality and the rights of citizens to be critical of government. In fact, the data lead one to suspect that stress on patriotism may actually harm support for civil liberties.

There is a strong belief in American political culture that participation is a critical part of democratic citizenship. The lack of correlation between interest in participation and either knowledge scores or scores indicating that the government is responsive to citizen action is one of the most depressing findings of the IEA study. This finding may indicate that participation is engaged in as a kind of game or for reasons of sociability and not because the participant expects it to have much influence over government or knows what its influence may be.

Assertion 4: The learning of values is strongly influenced (sometimes in unexpected ways) by many factors which are outside the control of educators and educational policy-makers, such as national culture and subcultures, economic structures and unique historical events.

Japan. While Japan is increasingly known as a land of high achievement in reading, mathematics and other academic subjects (Vogel, 1979), it is
moral education that Cummings (1980) singles out as the outstanding feature of this educational system. In a country undergoing unparalleled technological development, this tradition of moral education remains a distinctively Japanese enterprise.

In the 1880's, after a short period of less emphasis during the initial development of Western-oriented reforms, moral education was reaffirmed as a preeminent concern of Japanese education. This concern was embodied in an Imperial Rescript, a revered text which thereafter all students had to memorize. The Rescript mandated virtues to which many would still subscribe: harmonious family relations, benevolence to others, diligence in the pursuit of learning, modesty and moderation. However, this text was also used to promote nationalism and unconditional loyalty to the state. Hence, after World War II, moral education was abolished as a separate subject: the occupation authorities and many Japanese thought that it had contributed to militarism and was hostile to democracy.

After years of debate, the Ministry of Education in 1957 decided to make moral education once again a separate subject, 45 minutes per week, in elementary and middle school. Cummings (1980), who spent considerable time observing this special class, admits to expecting the worst: "dull Confucian texts," "sermonizing."

Much to my surprise, the class had no text. Rather at the bell, one of the students turned on the television at the front of the classroom and for the next fifteen minutes we watched a short drama. Afterwards, the teacher and the students joined in a discussion to try to identify the moral lessons contained in the drama . . . . [The lessons] emphasized fundamental matters such as the value of life, the foolishness of fighting, the importance of friendship, the problems of old people. Actually, no drama conveyed a specific message. The lesson was developed through the subsequent dialogue of the teacher and the students. (pp. 115-116)
Cummings concedes that these classes by themselves would accomplish little while Shimahara (1979) claims that the moral education class is often preempted by academic subjects. But moral education pervades other school activities as well (Vogel, 1979; Cummings, 1980):

Expected standards of behavior are high, but explicit punishments are used less than quiet but clear expression of disapproval. Students, in their regular group sessions for self-reflection, are expected to talk about their inadequacies, as when they are insufficiently considerate of each other and of school. On matters considered to be serious, like smoking cigarettes, teachers are likely to visit the student's family or to call the parents into the school . . . ." (Vogel, 1979, p. 178)

Cummings asserts that Japanese families have become morally permissive in many respects, expecting the school and outside institutions to set standards for their children.

Could one expect the same results if one used similar moral education lessons in an American school or if one adopted the same moralistic approach to all the school's activities? The answer is almost certainly no, for the emphasis on moral education stems from and is congruent with distinctive aspects of Japanese culture and history. Though repeatedly strengthened over the past century by intentional borrowing from the West, this educational system has characteristics which are neither easily changed by Japanese policy-makers nor easily imitated by educators in other countries.

The emphasis on moral education, for example, is a manifestation of the Japanese preoccupation with correct interpersonal relationships and group solidarity. According to Reischauer (1977), the priority given to group affiliations is the most important cultural difference between the Japanese and Westerners. To be sure, the difference is part myth: Americans see themselves as individuals more than the facts would warrant; the Japanese do the reverse (Reischauer, 1977):
A group player [in Japan] is obviously more appreciated than a solo star and team spirit more than individual ambition. Where the American may seek to emphasize his independence and originality, the Japanese will do the reverse... Cooperativeness, reasonableness, and understanding of others are the virtues most admired, not personal drive, forcefulness, and individual self-assertion. (Reischauer, p. 135; see also Shimahara, 1979, chap. 2, "Group-oriented society")

In Japan's economy, the group orientation has been reflected in relatively low labor mobility among firms and in the practice of employment for life. Although not as widespread as Westerners have sometimes been led to believe, the latter practice has important consequences for education. To the extent that one's first choice of employers is definitive, lifelong employment increases the importance of education (and the values learned). In other words, education is enhanced as a determinant of who gets what jobs and what statuses.

The group orientation has roots deep in Japanese history; it exemplifies the extraordinary continuity of certain aspects of Japanese life. World War II was a rare break in this continuity. A country, which into the 1920's seemed on balance to be developing toward a parliamentary system on the Western model, turned instead toward military domination and foreign expansion as a response to the world economic crisis of the 1930's (Reischauer, 1977). The total defeat of Japan in this attempt was traumatic. Turning against the discredited wartime leadership, the Japanese were willing to cooperate with the occupation authorities. These conditions made possible educational and social changes discussed briefly under Assertion 5 below.

Canada. Canada is another country where cultural, institutional and historical factors have created an educational system which, though apparently similar to that of the United States, is different in important respects. Some of these differences result from a lack of a strong national
identity. Some would argue that Canada has one political culture, but others see two (French and English), ten (one for each province) or even more (for the different ethnic groups). The fragmenting pull from other countries is strong. From the south the United States exercises a great influence and inspires widespread resentment because of our economic dominance. Ties to Britain and France are also important due to the cultural affinities born of immigration and earlier colonial periods. Yet, here too, there is ambivalence arising from the desire to assert a distinctive nationality without having to give up ties.

Canadian schools reflect this slow-to-emerge national identity. The federal government in Ottawa has played still less of a role in Canadian education than the federal government in Washington has played in the U.S. Unlike American schools, Canadian schools have traditionally placed little stress on nationalism. As of 1974 Statt found that Canadian children were aware of their nationality, but less ideological about it than Americans. Churchill (1980), noting the existence in nearly every high school of a course on Canada and the U.S., concluded that "few know so much about their immediate neighbors and so little about themselves" (Churchill, p. 9).

Canadian ties to Britain and the United States have been documented in studies of children's political socialization. Studies of children's perceptions of political authority have found the Queen to be especially important. These studies also found that (as of several years ago) the U.S. President was more revered by the children of Canada than were members of the Canadian Parliament (Carroll, 1976). This latter finding speaks strongly for the importance of nonschool factors and particularly the media in influencing the political perceptions of children. Efforts by Canadian educators and educational policy-makers to overcome the fragmentation of
Canadian political culture raise issues common to other countries and dealt with under the next assertion; namely, to what extent can policy change aspects of the national heritage which may no longer be desirable?

Assertion 5: Notwithstanding the importance of nonschool and nationally idiosyncratic factors, educational policy has been somewhat effective in bringing about desired changes in values.

In this assertion, we are concerned with three interdependent issues: one is the efficacy of movements consciously directed toward social change and associated changes in values; the second is the contribution that education and educational policy make to these changes; and the third is the effect of foreign models on this educational contribution.

Japan. If Japanese policy-makers in the nineteenth century had decided that Western culture was so different from their own that they had nothing to learn from the West, the history of Japan and indeed the world would have been different. In little more than a century Japan has responded to contact with the West by changing from a primarily feudal country (certainly advanced in some respects, but without the resources of Western technology) into a prime contender for the planet's most technologically advanced nation. In this rush of change, the Japanese have developed a system of schooling which, by some important indicators, is the most successful in the world. These indicators include:

Strikingly high levels of academic achievement (the best record of any nation in comparative international studies of mathematics and science; see Husen, 1967; Comber and Keesee, 1973).

One of the lowest levels of illiteracy in the world (less than one percent); with an adult population that is unusually motivated to read for further learning (Vogel, 1979).
The highest proportion of each age cohort completing secondary school and university (Vogel, 1979).

This is not to say that all indicators are positive. Many observers have noted the exceptional level of dissatisfaction expressed by Japanese youth (age 18-24) in an international Gallup survey of eleven countries in 1972. In Japan 74% expressed dissatisfaction with their society as compared to (in the next highest countries) 36% in the U.S., 35% in Sweden and 34% in West Germany. But it is hard to know how seriously to take this dissatisfaction or how much to blame it on the schools. The percent of Japanese students expressing dissatisfaction with their schools was much lower though still substantial—45% (the next highest country in this case was France at 29%) (Cummings, 1980).

To what extent, one might ask, do these indicators reflect changes in values? For some the answer is that there has been little change. Shimahara (1979) emphasizes the continuity of Japanese culture throughout this period of technological change while Reischauer (1977) declares that Japan has been modernized, but not Westernized. Nevertheless, in our view, important changes of value and attitude have occurred. Cummings (1980), for example, argues that the Japanese have become more individualistic (e.g., placing higher value on personal satisfaction relative to worldly success), more egalitarian (e.g., in evaluating occupations) and more participatory (e.g., in challenging hierarchical authority). He supports his contention with survey data, especially certain questions asked at five-year intervals since 1953 and analyzed by comparing age groups.

Another striking change is that, in contrast to the values professed in prewar Japan, democracy is overwhelmingly accepted as an ideal by Japanese youth, and peace is even more strongly endorsed. This change in political values is reflected in the heroes of Japanese children. In the early 1900's
Japanese children saw the emperor, above all, and military men secondarily as the greatest men in Japan; in the 1960's children did not agree on any one hero, named no military men and to the extent that any one person led the list, favored a famous bacteriologist over the emperor and the prime minister (Massey, 1976).20

Our question then is whether unique cultural characteristics, irresistible social forces or uncontrolled historical experience adequately account for these changes in values and attitudes? Or must conscious use of educational reform and the importation of foreign models be taken into account? That is, would the same outcomes have occurred without the use of educational policy to further the ends desired by Japanese policy-makers?

Authorities differ in their answers to these questions. While Shimahara (1979) claims that "schools are not agents of social reform" and emphasizes failures of reforms which were not compatible with the Japanese tradition, Cummings (1980) cites Japan as an example of a "society that has been transformed by education." If one accepted either of these two extreme positions, one would run the risk of underestimating or overestimating the importance of foreign models for Japanese education and, in turn, the importance of education for Japanese society. Other experts take a middle position (e.g., Reischauer, 1977; Vogel, 1979; Bowman, 1981). Reischauer and Vogel stress the importance of education while emphasizing the extent to which educational trends have been consistent with Japanese social forces in general. However, in Vogel's words, "the resulting institutions more closely resemble foreign models than those of traditional Japan" (p. 5).

Federal Republic of Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany in the West and the German Democratic Republic in the East have both made ambitious attempts to change their political culture through education. In a country
where from 1871 to 1945 there was one Germany, two nations have been created—two states with opposing ideologies.

As in Japan, events and forces outside education have made change possible. The defeat of the Third Reich, the division of Europe into two opposing ideological blocs led the victorious powers to consider educational change not just desirable, but essential. In the West, the goals of this reform (as articulated in Bonn at the establishment of the Federal Center for Political Education in 1952) were ones widely shared among other countries of the emerging West European community. They included understanding of the democratic process, strengthening of democratic ideals, promotion of political participation, opposition to fascist and communist totalitarianism, fostering of cooperation among nations and, in particular, European unification (Schmidt-Sinns, 1981).

During the occupation, all the West German states instituted social studies courses, a break in the German tradition of not dealing with contemporary social and political issues in the classroom. In the early years of the Federal Republic, the political education given in these courses was rather conservative and idealized. Social studies textbooks of the early 1960's stressed the duty of the individual to find his or her place in the social hierarchy as well as the contribution of politics to protecting rather than changing the prevailing social order (Merritt, Flerlage, and Merritt, 1971 b). In 1967 the national committee planning the German component of the IEA study reported that "civic education in Germany has up to now presented an overharmonious picture of the problems of state and society and developed a model of democratic society which is far too peaceful and free from conflict" (Oppenheim, 1977, p. 37).
To the proponents of the latter point of view, conflict was an inherent and often positive part of political life. Since the mid-1960's debate has continued among three major schools of thought. A conservative approach stresses the traditional values of authority, discipline and preservation of the political order. A more liberal position emphasizes inquiry methods and the importance of conflict, but nonetheless searches for a set of shared beliefs on which political life can proceed. This consensus is not viewed as absolute and enduring, but rather as one which takes into account the particular interest groups that are in the political arena at a particular time. A third, more radical approach encourages students to question inequities in the distribution of power and to uncover social problems within the F.R.G. (see reviews by Kuhn, 1977; George, 1981). West German education has recently moved more in the conservative than radical direction.

In the midst of these political cleavages, adult and youth surveys have shown a steady increase in support for the key values of liberal democracy (Merelman and Foster, 1978). The IEA studies provide particularly dramatic evidence of this support inasmuch as they permit comparison with other countries (Torney, Oppenheim and Farnen, 1975; Oppenheim, 1977). In the measurement of democratic values, the West German students scored as follows:

**Anti-authoritarianism** (e.g., disagreement with statements such as "The people in power know best"): the F.R.G. scored higher than any other country in the study among 14-year-olds and were tied for second highest among students in the last year of university preparatory schools.

**Tolerance and civil liberties** (e.g., items such as "No matter what a man's color, religion or nationality, if he is qualified for a job he should get it"): the F.R.G. scored higher than any other country in both populations.

**Value of criticism** (e.g., "Citizens must always be free to criticize the government"): German students were the highest among the preuniversity students and equal to the highest among the 14-year-olds.
Women's rights (e.g., "Women should stand for election and take part in government much the same as men do"): German students were equal to the highest in both populations.23

These data (and others from adults analyzed by Conradt, 1981) suggest that support for democratic norms and values is high. George (1981) and Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt (1981) argue that only a small group of German youth and adults is basically dissatisfied with the political regime (and that this disaffection has been declining over the last 10 years). George, however, notes a recent increase (to about half) in the proportion of young people who say they are afraid to express their political opinions. Some concern has also been expressed recently about the increasing proportion of the German population who have strongly negative attitudes toward the numerous guestworkers (especially those of Turkish origin) (Der Spiegel, 18/1982).

The German students sampled by IEA in 1971 expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of citizen participation, ranking the average person as having less influence on policy-making than any other institution or official (in contrast, the ranking of the average person in the U.S. for 14-year-olds was sixth out of ten) (Torney, Oppenheim and Farnen, 1975). These tendencies toward cynicism were even stronger among the older German students who saw rich people as equal in policy influence to the prime minister while big companies were considered equal to members of the Bundestag. This finding was unique as in all other IEA countries the prime minister and parliament (or their equivalent) were ranked first and second in influence. The German students also believed that no political institution gave people "a chance to take part in decisions about their lives" or insured that individuals "would receive fair shares." Students in other nations believed that laws or elections performed these functions (Oppenheim, 1977).24
Recent data cited by Conradt (1981) suggest that German adults believe that participation is an important part of democracy; however, only about 20% believe that in their country citizens have sufficient opportunities for such participation.

The role of the schools in bringing about a relatively high level of support for democratic values, as well as support for the regime, has been a matter of considerable debate. We know from the IEA studies that, on the average, German students reported that freedom of expression was encouraged in their classrooms, including opinions which disagreed with those of the teacher. Moreover, the IEA regression analyses of one of the IEA scales measuring democratic values showed a notable school effect for the F.R.G. Among 14-year-olds, 11% of the variation in anti-authoritarianism was accounted for by learning condition variables once home background and type of school had been controlled—a substantial proportion for this sort of questionnaire research. Current enrollment in civics, teacher's specialization in the subject matter, reported encouragement of independent expression of opinion, lack of patriotic ritual, lack of stress on printed drill and absence of ability grouping within class were all predictors of more democratic attitudes (Torney, Oppenheim and Farnen, 1975). Although other interpretations are possible, in our view these findings suggest that schools helped develop democratic attitudes.

At this point in history then, the value outcomes of West German political education are generally in line with the direction set by educational policy since the beginning of the Federal Republic. As in Japan the fostering of democratic values in a country with a limited democratic tradition has been remarkable. However, the contribution of schools in bringing about these outcomes is impossible to disentangle from other social
forces in any definitive way. Available evidence suggests that German schools generally worked for, not against these outcomes and that they had some effect. It is likely, however, that some of these outcomes (such as perception of inequality) result from the implicit curriculum (see Assertion 6) or from forces outside the school, such as the mass media and political movements.

**German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.).** East Germany like its Western counterpart began the postwar period devastated by war and conquered by hostile forces who wanted to transform its social and political life. Within forty years it became again like West Germany, one of the most economically successful nations in its ideological bloc.

Politically, however, the G.D.R. is quite unlike the Federal Republic. The citizens are tightly controlled to achieve goals set by the government. Individual expression and individual rights are kept in check to a degree that most Westerners would regard as intolerable. Indeed, the whole country is viewed by its leadership as a vast school for socialist education and for development of the new socialist personality: a person who follows socialist morality, learns to the limits of capabilities, and feels responsible to use this knowledge for the good of the collective (Sontheimer and Bleek, 1975; Klein, 1980).

Education is intentionally uniform and tightly prescribed throughout the country. A ten-year comprehensive school open to all has been substituted for the traditional German segregation of elite academic schools from terminal vocational programs. In civics as in other subjects, Marxist-Leninism is considered the only correct way to view reality, and polemics against the opponents of this doctrine are encouraged (Klein, 1980). Teacher trainees, for example, have been advised to aid students in developing
"feelings of rejection, loathing and hate toward the enemies of our socialist fatherland" (cited in Hanhardt, 1975, p. 83). Schmitt (1980) declares that "political positions are not discussed in order to assess their normative or empirical validity but to give them a 'progressive' or 'reactionary' label" (p. 3).

The attempt to promote the values of socialism goes far beyond the civics class. Natural science is greatly valued not only for economic development, but also in the belief that scientific theory and the tenets of Marxist-Leninism are mutually supportive. Hence, all students take what by U.S. standards is a great deal of science (3 years of biology, 4 years of physics, 3 years of chemistry and 1 year of astronomy) (Klein, 1980).

Since the opposition between mental and physical labor is viewed as a defect of capitalist society, emphasis is put on polytechnical education—the merging of productive labor with formal schooling. In grades 7-10 this aspect of education consists of work-study in industries or special centers (4-5 hours per week for all students). It has a work component (e.g., making elements for electric lawnmowers) and a formal instructional component (e.g., basics of electrical engineering). In general, this polytechnical training is viewed as developing good work habits and a realistic view of the world of work as well as contributing to scientific education and the realization of communist ideology (Klein, 1980).

What are the results of this intensive effort to develop values which in some ways are consistent with those officially advocated in the West (e.g., value of science, importance of productive work) and opposed in others (e.g., extreme intolerance of political diversity)? The question is difficult to answer, given the risks of public dissent in the G.D.R. A substantial amount of empirical research has been conducted by East Germans on the effects of political education. Schmitt (1980) lists 20 surveys with 45,000 respondents from 1967-71 alone. Given the strong pressures to conform, it is not
surprising that there is not only considerable compliance in publicly stated attitudes, but also much nonconformist behavior in private. Such is the conclusion drawn by Schmitt, who notes that abstract questions in the surveys give a more positive picture than items dealing with concrete behavior and that "young people from the intellectual class (who can use the ideology in their own careers) conform more to the norms than the children of workers or farmers" (Schmitt, 1980, p. 6).

Assertion 6: The learning of values in school is not limited to mandated programs of moral and civic education. Students also learn values (such as cooperation, rights of self-expression, respect for other persons, and respect for authority) from the ways that schools embody these values in organization, teaching practice, and social climate.

In analyzing how this implicit curriculum shapes values, comparative studies are of special interest since many educational practices are more likely to vary between than within countries. By implicit or "hidden" curriculum we mean those school practices which are learned by students without being necessarily stated as goals of instruction. Analyses of the implicit curriculum are generally concerned with relationships among individuals in the school as well as the rules, norms, and modes of authority which govern these relationships. The term "hidden curriculum", especially when used pejoratively, often refers to practices which shape student attitudes in a way favoring the dominant political and economic groups in society.

This assertion could thus be the subject of a book in itself. We have chosen to discuss three issues which illustrate the consequences of what
teachers and administrators do to guide and limit student behavior: the first concerns the effectiveness of setting and enforcing consistent limits on student behavior; the second concerns the balance between competition and cooperation in the classroom; and the third relates to opportunities provided for student participation in discussion and decision-making.

**Teacher expectations for student behavior.** In the U.S. high but consistent teacher expectations for student behavior and personal interest in students have been demonstrated to be important aspects of the implicit curriculum. For example, the NIE Safe Schools study (NIE, 1978) assessed patterns of crime and violence using questionnaires, on-site surveys and case studies. Highly disciplined schools where policies were consistent and perceived as fairly enforced had low rates of violence in contrast to those where rules were perceived as arbitrary and discipline as unfair. The sense of impersonality in schools where teachers had contact with large numbers of students each week was another negative factor. The study also indicated that teacher authority could be pressed too far: students who reported they had little control over what happened in school were more common in the schools with high rates of violence.

The importance of clear expectations for student behavior, on the one hand, and a zone of tolerance in which variation in student behavior is allowed or even encouraged, on the other, is evident in studies from other countries. Rutter et al. (1979) in an extensive study of 10-year-old pupils in England indicated the importance of both expectations for responsible behavior and positive models of behavior provided by teachers (especially when they showed interest in students as individuals). An ethnographic study of an elementary school in southern Germany concluded:

The limits of behavior are clearly drawn, and punishments predictable, but within these limits a wide range of behaviors are tolerated. (p. 116)
The tasks were not only clearly structured, but the students were prepared to comply since they regarded the teacher's approval as important.

In the early years of Japanese education, Cummings (1980) found a teacher-centered and highly structured climate in which students were warmly and equally treated. The climate in these schools was intentionally manipulated in the interests of moral education:

The entire faculty develops a comprehensive view of the morality it wishes to convey ... and the entire school program is shaped so as to reinforce this vision. (Cummings, 1980, p. 278)

Cooperation versus competition in student interaction. In the Soviet Union as in Japan, the phrases "warm" and "teacher-centered" are frequently used to describe classrooms, especially those for young children. These characteristics are considered important in getting individuals to subordinate their own desires to the moral claims of the group. In the words of Dunstan (1981):

Discipline . . . should be based on the collective's perception of its common interests as awakened and guided by the educator, so that . . . the pupils become their own tutors and the individual voluntarily identifies his own desires with those of the group. (p. 194)

To achieve these aims a socialist pedagogy for teaching values has been elaborated as follows; where successfully implemented, this pedagogy leads to teacher-student and student-student interactions which differ substantially from those thought desirable and feasible in the West:

a. The behavior of each individual is evaluated primarily in terms of its relevance to the goals and achievements of the group. However, individuals are not considered interchangeable "cogs" but rather as persons who can make different and valuable contributions to the aims of the group.

b. The peer group under adult supervision, not the family, is considered the principal agent of socialization.
Competition between groups, not individuals, is the principal means of motivating students to achieve the goals set by adults. For example in school, records of conduct, cleanliness and achievement are kept by classroom row, not by individual.

Rewards and punishments are frequently given on a group basis (e.g., the entire row of students benefits or suffers as a consequence of the conduct of individual members).

As early as possible, responsibility for evaluating the behavior of individuals and of dispensing rewards and sanctions is delegated to members of the group.

Social control is chiefly a matter of public recognition and public criticism, with explicit training and practice in these activities. Each member of the group is encouraged to observe deviant behavior by his fellows and to report these observations to the group. This sort of reporting on one's peers is not only rewarded but is regarded as a civic duty.

Students are trained for self-criticism in the presence of their peers. Public self-criticism is regarded as a powerful mechanism for bringing about commitment to approved standards of behavior and for bringing deviants back into line. (Paraphrased from Bronfenbrenner, 1969, and Klein, 1980)

Research by Bronfenbrenner (1970) suggests that Soviet children are more willing than their Western European counterparts to help their peers (even when it goes against their interests) and that they engage in relatively little antisocial behavior. Nevertheless, among teenagers, group collectives seem somewhat less effective than for younger children (Cary, 1974).

In the United States, an evaluation of law-related education projects drew conclusions about classroom interaction which parallel those in other nations (Hunter and Turner, 1981). This evaluation of diverse LRE projects was based on knowledge and aptitude tests, interviews with teachers and administrators, behavior reports from students, as well as classroom observations at nineteen sites. Compared to control classes, some of the LRE programs achieved significant decreases in reported delinquency among
students. Such programs were characterized by effective teaching strategies for fostering interaction and cooperative work among students. These strategies inspired interest on the part of students and fostered changes in peer relationships—often breaking up incipient groups of students who reinforced each other's antisocial behavior. This finding is consistent with Johnson's (1980) review of many research studies in which students in cooperative rather than competitive situations showed increased ability to take the perspective of others and an enhanced desire to win the respect of others in positive ways.

The issue of competition is also important in assessing the climate of Japanese secondary schools. Competition is engendered primarily by the entrance examinations given by the different Japanese universities. These examinations put great stress on the university preparatory students and have had many effects on Japanese schools. For example, the secondary schools have become increasingly ranked and categorized in terms of how successfully they prepare students for these exams. Private cram schools offering supplementary instruction have flourished. Even in middle school, there is pressure on students to compete on examinations to get into those upper secondary schools which have the best record on the later university entrance examinations (Cummings, 1980; Shimahara, 1979).

All upper secondary schools are not equally affected, however. Shimahara's (1979) study of three schools is illustrative of the diversity in school climate that one can find, even among students in academic programs. One of these schools is relatively new and highly regimented. By the time of the study, it was increasingly viewed as a model for its prefecture due to its success on the university entrance examinations. This school has often accepted students who were unsuccessful in getting into more selective high
schools. Its climate was one of "self-denial, strict conformity to the group, endurance, prompt response to external expectations and acceptance of teachers as the source of moral and academic authority" (p. 97). Seniors in this school attended group drill sessions three hours per day in addition to regular classes. The second school was less regimented, but still highly competitive and prestigious. Its policy called for instructing students with 20% more than the nationally required curriculum. It, too, stressed intensive cramming, but allowed students more choice than the first school in how to use the time outside regular class in preparing for the exams (e.g., in selection of private cram school). The third school, though attached to a national university, was not so exclusively geared to preparation for the entrance examinations and therefore offered a more relaxed climate—a climate resented by some students who perceived themselves at a disadvantage in comparison with other schools.

The effects of this system are controversial and hard to gauge, given the limitations of the English language literature. Shimahara says that the system "coerces adolescents to cultivate uniformity, self-denial, perseverance and achievement for the sake of the entrance examinations" (p. 161). He even speaks of "psychological mutilation." The adolescent suicide rate is often cited as a consequence of the system, but according to Cummings (1980) it was already high before the examination system developed and has been declining since 1955 while examination pressures have remained high. In general, Cummings (1980) and Vogel (1979) downplay the negative consequences of the system. Vogel asserts that the desire to succeed on the examinations "maintains group solidarity and the motivation to study. In entrance examinations a student's competition is not with a small circle of intimate friends but with thousands of unknowns who want to enter the same institution" (p. 166).
Student participation in discussion and decision-making. In acknowledging the importance of teacher expectations and enforcement of standards for student behavior, it is important not to neglect the consequences of giving students more or less opportunity to discuss their own opinions and to participate in the making of school decisions. We have already discussed a relevant finding from the IEA civic education project: the extent to which teachers respected students' opinions and allowed them to be expressed was a consistent positive predictor of more knowledge of civics and less authoritarian attitudes (even when other factors, such as socioeconomic status, were held constant) (Torney, Oppenheim and Farnen, 1975).

In addition to this original analysis of nine countries, the IEA data have been reanalyzed in several countries to further investigate the importance of the implicit curriculum. Torney-Purta and Phillipps (1979), in an analysis of New Zealand data, have used more detailed measures and expanded the list of outcomes considered to include support for women's political rights as well as anti-authoritarianism and knowledge scores. This analysis has not only replicated the finding that student perceptions of encouragement to express their own opinions were positively related to civics knowledge and support for democratic values. It also demonstrated that schools where teachers reportedly were prepared to discuss controversial issues and where teachers were willing to involve young people in curriculum and disciplinary decisions had students with both low authoritarianism and high support for women's rights. Moreover, among New Zealand students, the perception that teachers were showing favoritism in class was related to more authoritarian student attitudes.

Using IEA data from the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, Nielsen (1977) analyzed indices of tolerance for dissent in political
life. He found the following to be the most significant predictors of high
tolerance for dissent in the U.S.: (1) students' report that knowing causes
or explanations of events was more important than memorizing names or dates in
their social studies class, and (2) students' report that they frequently brought
current events up for discussion in class. In the F.R.G. reported stress on
causes and explanations was the strongest predictor; the second most important
predictor was the scale measuring the extent to which independence of opinion
was encouraged by the teacher. Thus, all the analyses so far undertaken of
the IEA data corroborate research in the U.S. as reviewed by Ehman (1980)—
research which supports the advocates of an open classroom environment where
students are free to express their ideas on all types of issues.

In analysis of other data collected by IEA in Finland, Karpov (1974)
found that both students and teachers believed that schools gave few
opportunities for student participation. Schools where student participation
was higher were characterized by greater liking for school by students, higher
levels of achievement motivation and lower levels of alienation and
radicalism.

Using classroom observation and some of the IEA attitude scales, Hawley
(1976) conducted an in-depth study of classroom climate in nearly 80 fifth-
grade classrooms in the U.S. He found that teachers who paid attention to
the opinions expressed in class (as measured by both student perceptions and
observations) had students who expressed more interest in the ideas of others.
Students who had more opportunities to interact with others in class also
showed interest in the ideas of others and more tolerance for diversity.
Teachers characterized as especially fair in dealing with students were
likely to produce less cynicism than those who were more arbitrary or
authoritarian.
In the evaluation of LRE discussed earlier, a comparison of the more successful LRE classrooms with the less successful ones led the authors to advocate case studies in which controversial issues are discussed and in which positive and negative information about the legal system is presented:

The cases presented should not consistently depict the legal system as flawless and thus jeopardize the instructor's credibility; [on the other hand], the illustrations should not be unrelentingly negative (e.g., authorities disregard for citizen's rights) and thus undermine belief in the system (Hunter and Turner, 1981).

**Implications for teacher-student and student-student relations.** In brief, research on the implicit curriculum in a variety of countries suggests a middle-of-the-road course for teacher-student relations: this research indicates that warm relations with students and standards for acceptable behavior, with some allowance for student autonomy and initiative, are important in bringing about responsible behavior (however responsible is defined in these industrialized countries). Teachers who show personal concern for students, who do not play favorites, who are consistent in their expectations, who administer rules fairly and who stress cooperation among students are part of an implicit curriculum with such positive consequences as decreased violence and increased empathy for others. There are also indications that opportunities for students to make school decisions leads to decreased alienation. In social studies classes, from about age ten other positive effects (e.g., less authoritarianism, greater tolerance for diversity) appear to result from encouraging students to discuss a variety of issues in the classroom (including those which are controversial) and from stressing the causes of problems discussed, not merely requiring students to memorize dates or facts.
The implicit curriculum can also have negative consequences or consequences that are not anticipated. In Japan, for example, the effects of the college entrance examinations are a matter of considerable apprehension with a potentially large effect on school climate and the values learned in school. In Japan as in other countries, competition is a common means of motivating students toward greater achievement of school goals. However, it is clear from Japan and the Soviet Union that there are various ways of managing competition, each of which may have different consequences and a different potential for combining the benefits of both cooperation and competition.

Assertion 7: A number of nations have developed curricular goals (and associated materials) to promote common core values. Goals in some countries give more importance to collective welfare, in others more to individual benefits (though no country completely neglects either). Some of these goals and materials are worthy of our consideration (e.g., those relating to teaching about internationally recognized human rights).

A number of countries have put forth clearcut statements regarding values children ought to learn in school (along with substantial justification and, usually, safeguards against indoctrination). They have responded to the need for educational goals that are more specific than simply "promoting democracy."

**Sweden:** Among Western nations, Sweden has done the most to define the specific values to be promoted within its highly centralized educational system (where a National Board of Education formulates policy, specifies curricula and prescribes teaching methods). Sweden, it should be noted, has
been one of the most homogeneous of the industrialized societies although now, like most others, it has a substantial population of immigrant workers from diverse countries.

In *Schools and Upbringing*, a recent report issued by the Swedish Ministry of Education, a set of common core values was endorsed: tolerance, equality of rights, respect for truth, justice, and human dignity. This report forcefully argues that the school is responsible for inculcating these values in order to justify its existence and insure the survival of society. Each student, according to the document, should be free to explore a plurality of values. However, relativism—the idea that all values are of equal worth—is not appropriate for the school.

It is the task of the schools acting in cooperation with the pupils' families to communicate the values . . . that the Riksdag and government have agreed upon: equality of the sexes, community sense, solidarity and shared responsibility, attitudes to democracy, attitudes toward various kinds of societal deviation. (Borjesson, 1979, p. 104)

The Ministry of Education Report gives the following example:

Some immigrants may have values . . . which are incompatible with one of the most fundamental of our own values—e.g., the equality of men and women. In this case, instruction must be dominated by our own view, even if this conflicts with the opinion of a certain pupil and his family (p. 13)

Similarly, in the case of families which have long been Swedish, the report argues that the schools "cannot accept" degrading views of immigrants on the part of pupils from these families.

Freedom and independence are promoted in the curriculum not as ends in themselves but as the foundation for cooperation. Solidarity with groups at all levels from the local community to the world community is encouraged. Further, cooperative group experiences and participation in school rule-making are advocated as ways to stimulate moral growth.
It is the policy of the Swedish government that all major teaching materials which are produced by nongovernment sources for use in "social subjects" be examined for objectivity and their contribution to achieving national goals. A committee appointed by the National Board of Education can reject materials for reasons such as the use of misleading statements (e.g., a biased or outdated selection of factual material) and insufficient use of controversial issues to illustrate the gap between ideals and reality in society. Nearly two thousand pieces of material were examined between 1974 and 1979. About seven percent were not approved (Borjeson, 1979).

Some limited information on the effects of these practices is available from the IEA civic education study, in which Swedish preuniversity students participated. Swedish students ranked third among seven countries in average score on knowledge of civics. Their level of support for democratic values was very high. In particular, support for women's rights was stronger than in any other nation tested.

Human rights education: A number of European countries and Canada have recently formulated programs of values education which are closely tied to international standards for human rights. These programs take as their starting point the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted unanimously by the United Nations in 1948. A report from the Council of Europe notes that the idea of human rights as common core values may be especially helpful to teachers who are not strong in any particular religious conviction (or who are not permitted by law to promote religious tenets). A UNESCO report on moral and civic education noted:

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides a common ethical basis upon which to build respect and understanding of others and is likely to prove acceptable to people of all nations, because it has been generally adopted and is not linked to any particular religion or moral code. (UNESCO, ED/CONF 23/4, 1970, p. 2)
Federal Republic of Germany: A 1980 resolution of the German Bundestag supported by all political parties specifically promoted human rights education. This policy has been put into effect not only in civics and history, but also in religious education and German classes. The Federal Center for Political Education (Bonn) which designs teaching materials on a variety of issues (in periodical form circulated widely to schools) has produced several publications on human rights. This center was also a co-sponsor of a competition among teachers for curricula on human rights; a substantial cash prize was offered in 1980.

One of the best examples of a textbook focusing on these issues is that of Hilligen, Gagel and Buch (1978) who imaginatively use case studies, interviews, charts, and comics. According to the evaluation of a German colleague:

The values inherent in this approach are expressly stated. The textbook suggests "options" (meaning concrete alternative approaches) for the realization of human rights, for the dignity of man as the basis of all political decisions, for the equality of opportunity in our society, for more self-determination and participation, and for the development of alternative social institutions to cope with the changing world. Thus the approach is not neutral; it not only envisions a rational discussion of the stated issues but encourages students to develop their attitudes and behavior along these lines of political values. (George, 1981, p. 240)

The book deals extensively with social inequality and the less developed countries. It is used in the politically more liberal regions of West Germany.

Canada: In the past ten years there has been considerable new legislation on human rights, and human rights commissions have been established at both provincial and federal levels. In addition to conducting inquiries and conciliation, these commissions are mandated to promote human rights through education. University faculties of teacher education have also been active, resulting in one program for which some evaluation data exist. Huche (1990) contrasts two methods of dealing with human rights. In the first approach,
teachers led discussions of cases to make pupils aware of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Students were asked to consider the consequences if everyone engaged in certain cultural practices which were contraventions of the Declaration (e.g., slavery). In a second approach, students moved to "learning stations" at which articles from the Universal Declaration were written on large sheets of paper and at which newspaper stories describing contraventions of each article were available. A post-test evaluation showed the more active and self-directed group to be superior in their knowledge of international law.

There has also been considerable attention to moral education in Canada. A survey conducted by the Phi Delta Kappan, in comparing U.S. and Canadian teachers, found that stress on responsibility to others as part of moral education was higher in Canada than in the U.S. (where teachers were more likely to favor such approaches as values clarification) (Hersh and Pagliuso, 1977).

In the Canadian literature, Coombs (1980) stresses making students sensitive to "morally hazardous actions," situations where one must make a moral choice without being aware of it. He advocates that students be given practice in considering the consequences of what they do for others' well being (putting themselves in the position of one who might be hurt by their action and considering the results if everyone in society were to take similar action).

Extensive materials for moral education have been under development at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. In describing this project, Baek (1981) gives considerable attention to the philosophical basis for values education. The basic values he proposes for reflective consideration include (among others) survival, happiness, health, fellowship, helping others, wisdom,
freedom, and respect from others. Many religions and cultural traditions, he
argues, agree on the promotion of these values:

The reflective approach to values education does not presuppose humanism that stands as an alternative to or in opposition to religion. The basic human values which in the reflective approach provide a basis for values education are in turn influenced in part by the religious and cultural traditions (of which "humanism" may be one) from which the students come. (p. 197)

The approach of the OISE/Beck program is eclectic. It develops skills in values analysis and centers on problems of importance to students—friendship, punishment, bullying, work and leisure (among others).

In developing this program, Beck has confronted issues raised earlier in this paper. He criticizes indoctrination (defined as too little attention to reasoned analysis and insufficient openness to different opinions). He rejects Kohlberg's approach as paying too little attention to the affective and behavioral side of morality and relying too much on moral dilemmas which appear so difficult to resolve that they "discourage students from engaging in value inquiry or lead them to a highly relativistic view of value beliefs" (Beck, 1981, p. 193). He likewise finds values clarification wanting because it "maintains that right and wrong is just a matter of opinion" (p. 194).

Great Britain: Moral education in England has been greatly influenced by the work of John Wilson, who developed a theory of moral education (in contrast to Kohlberg whose theory of moral development was applied, mostly by others, to education) (Wilson, 1968; 1973). The components of this approach include concern for other people (including regard for them as one's equals), empathy with others' feelings, knowledge about the consequences of different actions, ability to formulate moral principles, and dispositions to take moral action. In one example, he speculates why a teenager might assault a Pakistani in London. The aggressor may not consider Pakistanis as people
(or at least as people equal to himself); he may not understand that others feel pain; he may act on impulse. According to Wilson each of these sources of "immoral action" can be addressed by education programs (at various levels including higher education) (Harrison, 1978).

McPhail (1978) has developed a program for British pre-teens called Learning to Care, which owes much to Wilson's theory. A number of instructional kits for this program have been extensively field tested in England. They stress learning to take others' point of view and to identify the consequences of action in situations which pilot research indicated were of interest to students. Rules and legal institutions are also included as topics. This program has been well received although it has also been criticized for a relatively narrow view of morality (i.e., its focus on consideration for others).

Another British program which has drawn up a short list of values is the Political Education project. Until about ten years ago, the English put their faith in implicit rather than explicit teaching about democracy (Stradling, 1981). The only students who received systematic civics instruction were those who chose to prepare for an examination in the British Constitution. The lowering of the voting age to eighteen (in 1970) and the raising of the school leaving age increased the pressure to include more political and social education in the secondary curriculum (Heater, 1977).

Thus a program of publications and teacher workshops was undertaken by the Politics Association. The concept of a politically literate person was the focus of the program:

Somebody who has a knowledge of basic political concepts and of how to construct analytical frameworks within which to judge political questions; can take a critical stance toward political information; has a capacity to try to see things from the point of view of other groups and persons; has the capacity to participate in and change political situations. (Lister, cited by Stobart, 1979)
This politically literate person would be able to recognize political
dimensions not merely in Parliament or political parties, but also in school
or on the job. Discussion of political issues, especially those on which
individuals disagree, are at the core of the program. Porter (1981) notes
that "political literacy does not purport to be value free, but . . . depends
on a particular set of attitudes, especially the naturalness of political
conflict."

One aim of this program is for students to become committed to five
procedural values—freedom, toleration, fairness, respect for truth, and
respect for reasoning. These values guide political behavior without, their
authors feel, limiting the content of beliefs in a narrowly ideological sense.

Materials developed by this project have been taken up by a number of
schools and evaluation has begun. The project has been both praised and
criticized. Some argue that it promotes the status quo in politics and
legitimizes the power of existing groups (Brown, 1975). Others fear that the
project will succeed too well in "stirring up the citizenry." Although the
model is still in a developmental phase, it deserves close attention
especially for its selection of procedural values and associated materials.

Soviet Union: "In the U.S.S.R. moral education is defined as education
which contributes to the good of society and which enables the individual
to fulfill his or her public duty (Dunstan, 1981). Short lists (and not so
short lists) of common values have been developed. For example, Dunstan
reports the following objectives as characteristic of the system:

To promote a personal awareness that the child is part of
society, dependent on it, and answerable to its demands;

To organize the child's relationships with the immediate
and wider collective in a spirit of mutual respect,
responsibility, and critical judgement;
To develop moral senses (conscience, honor, duty) and qualities (honesty, courage, consistency);

To inculcate a positive and creative attitude to labor, involving purposeful choice of job and the right use of spare time and the ability to resist incongruities.

(Dunstan, 1981, p. 194)

To achieve these aims, the Soviets advocate the conscious structuring of all aspects of the social environment, including the school. In this way, it is possible for the child to come to understand "one's dependence on society and the necessity to harmonize one's conduct with society's demands and interest" (Dunstan, 1981, p. 193). From this perspective, autonomy of individual choice does not represent a high level of morality, but rather is viewed as self-centered.

In regions where non-Russian groups live, education of the "new Soviet man" has meant discouraging many traditional ethnic practices. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union continues to be a highly diverse society with many multicultural traits, even in its schools. For example, nearly seventy languages are spoken by Soviet citizens. While bilingualism has been pursued as a means of gradually increasing the dominance of Russian, this policy has often turned into a stable situation which does not endanger the survival of the native language. Hence, schools in many areas and even some universities are conducted in non-Russian languages. To be sure, the importance of Russian varies greatly from minority to minority. Those minorities which are recognized as "nations" within the Soviet system (e.g., Georgia, Uzbekistan) have been able to maintain their languages. Among the Islamic peoples and in the Caucasus, even the urbanized speak the native language. Among minorities with closer ties to the dominant Russian ethnic group, however, decreasing use of the native language is the rule (Carrère d'Encausse, 1979, 1981; Silver, 196).
China: Many of the characteristics of classrooms at the pre-school and elementary level in the Soviet Union (described in the previous section and under Assertion 6) also characterize the People's Republic of China. Activities are adult-centered and directed; relationships between students and teachers are warm; from the early years children are given a sense of the importance of contributing to the group. Sidel (1973) describes the pervasiveness of moral lessons as part of the teaching of other subjects even in kindergarten. Children are encouraged to identify with heroic figures—not only national leaders, but also ordinary citizens who engage in acts of special courage. She notes that two distinct but complementary sources contribute to this unified concept of how children should behave—socialist ideology and traditional Chinese culture, both of which emphasize the importance of social responsibility (see Cagan, 1978).

From studies of Chinese in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and an American Chinatown, Wilson (1981) has developed a theory of moral development which illustrates the influence of the traditional culture. He lists three essential characteristics of highly developed morality—reciprocity (the ability to recognize the claims of others on one's behavior), empathy (the ability to put oneself in another's place emotionally) and individual responsibility for one's decisions and behavior. Chinese culture with its high degree of group centeredness and use of shaming produces strong group identification and conformity, expressed with high levels of reciprocity and empathy.

Sidel and Sidel (1981) attest to the result of this socialization as it is expressed in the concept of "revolutionary optimism" among mainland Chinese adults:

The belief in subordinating the feelings of individuals to the needs of the group of which they are a member.
The belief that individuals are part of something larger than themselves, the revolution . . . which will ultimately be victorious.

The belief that participation in an ultimately victorious revolution gives meaning and joy to life . . . even with personal sacrifice.

The belief in the infinite capacity of people to . . . remold themselves through faith in the revolution. (Sidel and Sidel, 1981, p. 315)

Solidarity as a common value. In some countries, the short list of common values to be fostered in school corresponds relatively closely to the values which appear to be emerging from a parallel search in the United States. Other countries discussed in this assertion (especially Sweden, the Soviet Union, and China) as well as countries described elsewhere in this paper (especially Japan) have made collective community loyalty or "solidarity" a more conscious focus than it has been in the U.S.

Cagan (1978), in summarizing a variety of this research, argues that American children would benefit if educators made more attempts to foster "a collective character—one based on altruism, cooperation, and concern for the welfare of others." Children would be less confused about standards and more likely to engage in positive behavior. She suggests more group-oriented activity in U.S. classrooms; more responsibility on the part of children for the welfare of others; more explicit modeling of moral behavior by teachers; more stress on heroic models in stories; more opportunities for dialogue concerning moral values between teacher and child as equals with the aim of developing greater reciprocity.

Oldenquist (1982) argues along the same line that greater attention to primary group loyalty and the common good, although it might clash with classic individualism, would reduce alienation among young people and contribute to a more positive social order. He argues forcefully that there
Assertion 8: In industrialized societies, television and other mass media have an important and often negative effect on young people’s values. Educational programs could have a positive effect on student understanding and usage of media.

Murray and Kippax (1979) have summarized a large volume of research conducted in many nations on the effects of television on values and behavior. The negative effect of television violence on values is well documented across the world by experimental and field studies as well as correlational methods.

Murray and Kippax note that television serves a variety of needs for the individual in addition to entertainment—for personal identity, for social contact, and for information about the social world (especially those groups or events with which the individual has little direct experience). Noble (1975), reporting research on British, Irish, and Canadian children, also maintained that television satisfies personal needs. In previous decades, living in a village society exposed children directly to an interdependent community, to the need for empathy, to social role performance which could be learned by observation. Television is one source used by children to obtain similar experiences today.

The rise of television must certainly be credited with part of the movement away from traditional values in the behavior of the young. Those who wish for a return to character education in school which could inculcate trustworthiness, obedience or similar virtues will surely be disappointed if
they fail to recognize the often contrasting effects of mass media. Some have suggested that television itself could be used to promote pro-social behavior if it included more models who behave in positive or altruistic ways.

About ten years ago UNESCO initiated a study of media education in twelve industrialized countries because of concern for the contrast between school values and those portrayed on television—violence, eroticism, and dependence on luck. The educational system in each nation gave attention to educating children to interpret the media (not limited to television but also including films, newspapers, etc.). Minkkinen (1977) was part of the survey team and also prepared a model for more explicit consideration of media in the curriculum (including sample lesson objectives). The results of this effort would be especially useful in the teaching of mother tongue, history, and social studies. One of the aims was to help children distinguish between reality as portrayed in documentaries and in fictional programs. Students were to be encouraged to consider how the author's or producer's beliefs might influence the program and to explore ways to use alternative sources of facts (in the case of documentaries). In another set of units, students were encouraged to take the mass media as a subject of study with regard to their sociological, economic, political and technological relationship to society. Who owns the major newspapers or television stations, students were asked, and how are they financed? How might this influence their presentations? What values are represented in various kinds of programs? What groups are most influenced by certain programs? How can citizens use the media for their purposes? These types of questions might be suitable only for more advanced students, but indicate a potentially useful approach to sensitizing students to media influences. The survey noted that this attempt to examine media's place in society and its influence on individuals was most prominent.
in Sweden, Finland, and the Federal Republic of Germany (among the countries surveyed).

Conclusions and Recommendations

Education which aims at excellence is not value free. Neither should it take a dogmatic stand, ignoring the multiplicity of values to which all students are exposed and prescribing the memorizing of creeds or the practice of patriotic rituals. In our view, an excellent education requires tolerance for the ideas of others (pluralism) while avoiding relativism (the notion that all values are equally valid).

Improvement in this aspect of education in the United States is too important to be blocked by arguments over questions that educators are in no position to resolve. Disagreement over religious issues has in the past raised such questions. Since our Constitution precludes basing the values taught in public schools on a particular religion, the values necessary to sustain and enhance social and civic life in the next generation must be grounded in some other way. To be sure, treating others in a responsible way could be justified in terms of several world religions (Beck, 1981). But it can also be justified independently as part of the search for human rights accepted by all peoples.

In the introduction, we noted how professional opinion in the United States has swung from support for the inculcation of certain values to discomfort with indoctrination and, as a result, to a call for critical discussion of moral issues. American educators have thus been sufficiently alerted to the dangers of the two extremes—indoctrination to the point of disregard for all other points of view and critical analysis to the point of absolute relativism. Hence, this could be an auspicious time for renewed
discussion of values education, especially if the discussion does not become polarized and if realistic proposals for improvement are forthcoming.

It is important for the Commission to give prominent attention to values, for it is in a particularly advantageous position to encourage substantive and nonpolarized dialogue on these issues. If the Commission does not acknowledge the importance of values, the readers of its report may conclude (contrary to Assertion 1) that schools can and should be value-free. They may also assume (contrary to Assertion 3) that slogans and patriotic rituals are a sufficient answer to the problems of educating a democratic citizenry. They might also decide (contrary to Assertion 5) that educational policy is unimportant in influencing the values learned in schools. They could conclude (contrary to Assertion 6) that little attention need be paid to the implicit curriculum of schools—the ways in which students learn about fairness from being fairly treated or about respect for others' opinions from a climate in which students and teachers are free to express opinions on a variety of issues. They could conclude (contrary to Assertion 7) that it is impossible for any truly democratic society to agree upon a common set of values. Finally, if the Commission fails to address this domain, readers may conclude (contrary to Assertion 8) that television is a medium to be bewailed rather than used toward positive goals.

The Commission should be straightforward in suggesting ways in which schools can impart values constructively while avoiding indoctrination (as defined by Oldenquist, 1979). As our comparative analysis of industrialized countries indicates, there are many models and approaches which schools might consider. It is therefore important for the Commission to make some choices and create an agenda for values education which will be a compelling basis for widespread dialogue. For convenience, let us call this approach the
establishment of a coalition agenda. By this term we mean a plan of action that would specify goals and needed changes in values education for American schools. Since broad appeal and compromise are both important parts of successful movements for change within our political system, the formulation of a coalition agenda would not depend on consensus (i.e., universal agreement on values), but rather on commitment to certain procedures and a limited number of social, political or educational actions.

Law-related education is an example of part of a coalition agenda. The law embodies values which appeal to diverse constituencies. The values of social order (including respect for the law, obedience to the law, and the appropriateness of punishment) are matters of concern to a conservative constituency threatened by fears of individual or collective irresponsibility and unchecked social conflict. The values of justice, to the extent that they are embodied in the law, have wide appeal among both liberals and conservatives. These values include, for example, the prohibition of arbitrary government action and the right of redress by the courts for people who feel they have been unjustly treated. Protection by the law of certain individual rights is also attractive to the large majority of Americans. In addition, the law incorporates a concern for collective well-being which broadens its appeal still further.32

We do not propose to include in an educational coalition agenda values which are so strongly held and inspire such conflict that accommodation appears impossible in the short run. Abortion, creationism, rights for homosexuals and prayer in the schools appear to us to be examples of irreconcilable value conflicts—at least within the context of American public schools at the present time. In building a coalition agenda, it would be important to develop procedures for dealing with issues that are polarized to the point
of demanding a policy of neutrality in the schools. Part of the present problem seems to be that in the absence of ways to pinpoint such irreconcilable value conflicts, the schools have tried to be neutral on too many issues.

In large part, what we have done in proposing a coalition agenda is no more than taking a label for a common way of doing things in American politics and applying it to values education. The setting forth of such an agenda, however, will have merit only insofar as it helps us to become more concrete about the course of action being advocated, the values embodied in the agenda, and its potential merits and deficiencies.

A vast array of individuals and groups with a stake in American education would be the potential critics and judges of such an agenda. Their judgement would not be a simple vote or expression of confidence or dismay. There would be debate, during which experts might criticize certain parts of the agenda for misrepresenting issues. Minorities might judge the agenda biased toward the interests of the rich or powerful. Once implementation has started, courts might find lack of conformity with constitutional provisions. Finally, a coalition agenda might simply fail to generate the interest anticipated.

How can the Commission take advantage of public concern over the inadequacy of current practice, draw up a viable coalition agenda and move toward excellence in values education? In our view, the following steps would be appropriate:

1. Set up a task force to examine programs and materials in other countries (e.g., Back's program in Ontario, McPhail's or Lister's materials from the U.K., Hilligen's texts and materials in the F.R.G., the Hinkkinen work in Finland, and Borjesson's analyses from Sweden). Values relating to law, altruism, human rights, civic literacy and a sense of community are among those which, in our judgement, warrant special attention.
Promote organizational links and dialogue nationally (and perhaps internationally) to stimulate development and testing of the coalition agenda. A wide range of individuals and groups should be asked to participate. Procedures for forming these links and conducting these dialogues will need to be carefully formulated to avoid their domination by any one point of view. In determining who will participate, claims based on knowledge and claims based on public support are both important. Organizations which might be invited include the National Council for the Social Studies, the Parent-Teachers Association, teacher organizations, the National Association of School Boards, Center for Global Futures in Education, the values education commissions in various states, organizations concerned with law-related education (as well as groups representing students and religious education concerns). These organizations (and many others) have expressed concern about values education. A coalition agenda would benefit from the give-and-take of formulating such a plan of action.

Encourage research in areas where serious gaps of knowledge exist—such as how the explicit curriculum interacts with the implicit curriculum and school climate, how teachers model values, and how to effectively mix pedagogies for different ages (e.g., by drawing on discussion, study of literature, role playing).

In building a coalition agenda, striving for consensus can and should be tempered by tolerance for diversity. We believe, for example, that this respect for diversity is a distinctive trait of American education which is enhanced, not diminished when we give serious attention to practices in other countries, however different the goals of their system may be.

A balance between advocacy of shared values and encouragement of controversy (or differences of opinion) should also characterize actions taken to implement the agenda. If we are to consistently respect diversity both in our democracy at large and in the implicit curriculum of our schools, students must have an opportunity to discuss controversial issues and to state, defend and examine a wide range of opinions. The teaching of shared values may appropriately be dominant during the early years of elementary school, but no later than junior high (in our view) there should be more attention given
criticism, to exploration of views which disagree with those of the teacher and dominant groups within the community. 33

Determining excellence in values education is difficult. Our experience with international studies has been that standards for other subjects are much easier to agree upon. Justifiable practice in the area of values is slowly and sometimes painfully developed. It begins with recognition of disagreement (e.g., through involvement of diverse groups and consideration of what is different about other nations) and proceeds through recognition of what is gained or lost in the pursuit of common goals. There is, we think, no viable short-cut in these steps toward the improvement of values education in the United States.
Notes

1. Values may be defined as "what individuals or groups believe or feel to be good or bad, right or wrong, moral or immoral, beautiful or ugly, better or worse" (Swedish Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs, 1979).

2. Three terms which need to be distinguished from each other are socialization, moral education and civic education. To use the term socialization indicates that the interest is in any values acquired as one becomes part of a particular culture. Many agents in addition to schools contribute to socialization. Some authors use the term socialization in a pejorative sense, focusing on the negative aspects of indoctrination. In our view, socialization can have positive, negative or neutral consequences. The expression moral education focuses on the process of making judgements about right and wrong and on the learning of particular values which some individual or other moral authority thinks students ought to learn. Civic education (or citizenship education) is frequently taught as a separate subject or unit within social studies. The aims typically include inculcating patriotism and a particular political ideology, as well as obedience to law and the acquisition of information about the structure of government.

3. For an excellent collection of papers on moral education, see Cochrane, Hamm and Kazepides (1979).

4. See the work of several state groups, including the Maryland Values Commission, for examples of such a list. See also Butts (1980) for further discussion.

5. Hurwitz and Burn (1982) in their paper for the National Commission on Excellence in Education are reluctant to draw policy recommendations from comparative analysis because of problems in transferring practices out of the context in which they were developed. In our view, these caveats should be kept in mind but should not constrain the discussion. Comparative educators have perhaps become too cautious in this respect, reacting to an earlier era in which borrowing was advocated without due consideration for the interplay of social and educational forces. At present, too much caution about transferring practices from one country to another may simply reinforce parochialism in education—the belief that what is done in one's own country, state or community is necessarily better for that collectivity than what is done elsewhere.

6. This type of education goes under many names (social science education, human sciences, political education, European heritage—to name only a few). It takes various forms: independent subject, a topic in several related subjects, a principle underlying all instruction, a premise for school policy (Dufty, 1980).

7. For further discussion of these points, see Hamm and Daniels (1979) and Oldenquist (1979).
8. "From the political point of view, the republican elementary school teacher, while cultivating a love of the Republic, must refrain, in teaching, from taking a partisan position" Code soleil, 1975, p. 34, our translation.

9. For more information on the IEA studies, see Assertion 3 and also Torney, Oppenheim & Farnen, 1975.

10. These percents are an unweighted mean of the published percents for Population II and Population IV teachers of civic education and social studies. See Torney, Oppenheim, and Farnen (1975) for further discussion of the definition of these populations and the sampling. The number of teachers in each case was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Population II</th>
<th>Population IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F.R.G.</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since there was an overlap of teachers from one population to the other in some countries, the total number of independent cases is not necessarily the sum of teachers from the two populations.

11. The conflict theories have their origins primarily in the works of Karl Marx and Max Weber while the functionalists owe much to Talcott Parsons and other American sociologists. For more extensive, but still introductory discussion of these issues, see Karabel and Halsey (1977), Murphy (1979), and Vanfossen (1979).

12. Political culture has been defined, in an influential work on this topic, as "the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings and evaluations of its population" (Almond and Verba, 1965, p. 13).

13. In considering these differences, it is essential to remember that they are the differences between statistical averages. For example, there are certainly Austrians who are nationalistic and Nigerians who are international in their orientations.

14. More than 30,000 students responded to survey instruments; more than 5,000 teachers replied concerning pedagogical practices, and 1,300 principals and headmasters described the schools. The schools were selected from nationally stratified frames with a probability proportionate to their student body size. In the second stage students were selected randomly from within schools with a probability inversely proportional to the size of their school. The Iranian data were later withdrawn from international analysis.

15. In contrast, many Japanese conservatives in the postwar period have contended that the Rescript was misinterpreted and misused in the prewar period.
16. Efforts at characterizing national culture or national character run a large risk of stereotyping. For Japan we have relied heavily on the most noted American scholar on Japan, Edwin Reischauer (1976), who states an important caveat: "Almost anything that might be said about Japanese in general would not be true of many and might be flatly contradicted by some" (p. 124). For other well-informed studies of Japanese youth, education and society, see Bowman (1981), Cummings (1980), Massey (1976), Shimahara (1979) and Vogel (1979). They differ significantly in their perspective and their interpretations. For example, the economist Bowman emphasizes individual choice while the anthropologically oriented Shimahara puts much more stress on the influence of group norms.

17. The security of lifelong employment exists mainly in large enterprises, has developed only in the twentieth century, may not be so much moral as pragmatic in nature, and faces an uncertain future (Bowman, 1981). Bowman's survey of students and their parents suggests that the norm of a lifetime commitment is widely accepted; however, she found that adherence to this norm was less firm and less pervasive among students than among older men.

18. Some negative aspects of Japanese education are well known in the West (e.g., examination stress). Others are not (e.g., problems of quality in higher education). See Assertion 6 for more discussion of the negative consequences of examination stress.

19. In contemporary Japanese social studies textbooks, Japan alone of the world powers has been portrayed as the peace power (Massey, 1976). As this paper was being written, the most recent Japanese history textbooks were under criticism for using euphemisms to characterize the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the "rape of Nanking" in World War II. This editorial revision of history has provoked much criticism from abroad as well as within Japan and even in the Japanese cabinet (see New York Times editorial, 25 August 1982).

20. It should be noted that in the postwar research reported by Massey (1976), the students were too young to have directly experienced the war; hence the high value they put on peace was not learned through direct experience with the horror of war.

21. The Potsdam agreement signed by the Western powers and the Soviet Union specified that "German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militaristic doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas" (quoted in Oppenheim, 1977, p. 17).

22. The term conflict is used here in the general sense of nonconformity (disregard of social conventions) and dissent (clash of ideas and ideologies) as well as violent war and revolution. See Nielsen (1977) for good summary of the literature on the importance of conflict for political life.

23. Fifty-seven percent of the 14-year-olds in the F.R.G. strongly agreed with the statement about women running for office whereas in the United States only 27% strongly endorsed this statement.
24. Oppenheim, one of the researchers who with Torney-Purta directed international planning for the IEA study, reviewed earlier West German research:

Most earlier researchers seem to confirm our findings concerning the skepticism and the nonparticipatory attitudes of German youth . . . However, the strong support we found for democratic values seems to be a relatively recent phenomenon. (p. 23)

For further discussion of these earlier German studies, see Oppenheim (1977) monograph.

25. It could be, for example, that the relationship between school characteristics and democratic values is due to a disproportionate tendency for students with certain political beliefs to live in areas where the schools are most likely to have the above characteristics.

26. The conclusion that schools helped develop democratic attitudes contrasts with German studies in the early 1960's which discounted the effects of schooling on democratic attitudes (Oppenheim, 1977). See Merritt, Flerlage and Merritt (1971b) for discussion of a subsequent swing toward optimism about the effects of curriculum reform.

27. Klein, spouse of an American diplomat assigned to the U.S. embassy in the G.D.R., was the first American given permission to observe students in a polytechnical center. She admits to the difficulty of generalizing from limited observations, but relies heavily on the asserted uniformity of East German education.

28. The importation of Marxist-Leninist ideology during military occupation raises a question similar to the importation of Western models into Japan. Perhaps whatever success these imports enjoy can be credited to preexisting values. Sontheimer and Bleek (1975) express this point of view:

The models of socialist behavior . . . are only socially effective to the extent that they coincide with attitudes which do not belong solely to socialist ideology, for instance a desire for order, for evaluating and recognizing achievements in work, for preserving the interests of the community in contrast to a pronounced individualism. (pp. 45-46)

Yet these West German scholars, without identifying the basis for their conclusions, also assert that the system has been persuasive in certain respects. In their view, most East Germans are convinced that their system has brought more social justice than in the West and that their educational system is superior to that of the Federal Republic.
29. Although the term "hidden curriculum" originated in the U.S., it has received extensive consideration recently by two schools of thought in Europe: the "new sociology of education" in Great Britain and the "critical theorists" in West Germany. These approaches rely on ethnographic studies of schools and classrooms as well as philosophical analysis contrasting the character of knowledge about society with knowledge of the physical world. For example, Edwards (1980) has analyzed the power relationships underlying classroom dialogue. Hunter (1980) has noted the lack of real decision making power given to students in British school councils. Willis (1981) has studied the ways in which the formal curriculum implicitly leads working-class boys to close themselves off from occupational advancement.

30. In a study of classroom climate in Israel, Klein and Eshel (1980) warn that an "open classroom" may have somewhat different characteristics in different countries. Israeli classrooms designated as "open" differ as follows from those more traditionally organized: amount of independent information seeking of students, freedom to move around and lack of stress on silence and on a fixed schedule. In contrast to the U.S. and Britain, open classrooms in Israel do not differ from the more traditional in the extent to which the teacher is used as a facilitator and resource person (rather than as lecturer and controller of the class).

31. Japanese content analyses of television programs found that although there are similar numbers of minutes per hour devoted to violent acts as in the U.S., the violence is much more likely to be presented in a way which creates sympathy for the victim (Iwab, Pool, and Hagiwara, 1981).

32. International human rights is another topic around which portions of a coalition agenda might be developed.

33. We considered including an assertion dealing with optimal timing and sequencing in values education, citing empirical research on developmental processes. We decided not to include such an assertion, both because of space limitations and because the majority of the research related to this issue has been conducted in the United States (and thus does not fit the focus of this paper upon other industrialized countries). An examination of the empirical research indicates the importance of middle childhood and pre-adolescence for education relating to a variety of value issues, especially those concerning human rights and attitudes to those in other nations. The period from about seven to twelve appears to be one in which children have the ability to take the perspective or point of view of others but have not yet become closed off (by excessive needs for conformity) to those who are not members of their own group. (See Torney, 1980 for a review of this research.) Toward the end of this period (ages ten to twelve) the presentation of controversial issues in the classroom appears to be especially useful as a way to help students develop their own values as well as encouraging tolerance for a pluralism of values among their contemporaries.
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