Journalists play a central role in U.S. presidential debates, but their exact role is unclear. Unlike the news conference or interview, the situation of a debate does not favor an adversarial role because journalists who assume this role tend to shift attention away from the main issues and reduce exchanges between the candidates. To insure true debate, journalists must pose well-defined questions that set the discussion agenda, focus on a point of opposition, and clearly imply a debate resolution. With this idea in mind, the panelists' efforts in the two 1980 debates between Ronald Reagan and John Anderson and between Ronald Reagan and President Jimmy Carter can be examined in terms of seven criteria: (1) brevity, (2) single question, (3) continuity in follow-up questions, (4) focus on an area of disagreement between the candidates, (5) freedom from bias, (6) tone of goodwill rather than hostility, and (7) call for explanation and justification of significant policies. Results of this examination revealed that there were significant weaknesses in both of the 1980 debates, but that the panel for the Reagan-Carter debate performed much better than the panel for the earlier debate between Reagan and Anderson. The success of this later panel resulted from its ability to remove itself from the center stage, thereby allowing more exchanges between the candidates. (JL)
The Panelists as Pseudo-Debaters:

An Evaluation of the Questions and the Questioners

in the Major Debates of 1980

Jeffrey M. McCall

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Jeffrey M. McCall

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)"
The journalists making up the panels for political debates have major roles in determining the success of the event. As a result of the formats negotiated for the debates by the League of Women Voters, the journalists had virtually exclusive control over the topics that the candidates would be asked to discuss. Although the candidates in 1980 could (and occasionally did) deviate from the stated questions, they could only ignore the questions at the peril of appearing evasive and untrustworthy. In their assessment of the Carter-Ford debates, Lloyd Bitzer and Theodore Rueter commented that "These panelists -- all well-known reporters or columnists -- could be expected to influence the character of the debates to some extent simply because of their unique personalities and interests." The 1976 panelists had the not inconsequential "responsibility for establishing a debate agenda of significant questions and topics." In the 1980 debates, journalists again found themselves at the vortex of the most important events of the presidential election. Indeed, the extent to which the voters obtained an accurate view of the presidential candidates and the campaign issues in 1980 can be measured in large part by how well the panelists served their purpose. Simply considering the time taken up in the program by the questioners (over thirteen minutes in the Reagan-Carter debate, for example), it can be seen that the journalists were much more than interested bystanders in the debate.

This essay, then, will assess the effect of the journalists/panelists on the two major presidential debates of 1980. It will examine the quality of the questions posed, the value of the topics chosen by the panel for debate, and the impact of the debate format on the journalists' role.

Before analyzing the quality of the questions, it is essential to examine a key issue: should the panelists' questions be designed to extract new
insights on the candidates and their policy positions (thereby cutting new ground in the campaign); or should the questions be designed simply to set the topics for discussion -- leaving it to the candidates to argue the merits of their respective policies through their debate exchanges? If the panelists take it upon themselves to "corner" the candidates, they take an adversarial role. There is a tendency for the panelists to assume this role. Milic remarked in his study of the 1976 debates: "Because politicians are professional rhetors and journalists are professional inquisitors, the debates in fact provided, for those who could observe it, the spectacle of a fascinating linguistic struggle between natural antagonists."2

The matter then becomes whether the panelists should take on this adversarial role in debates which supposedly are designed to have the candidates square off with each other. The 1976 debates provided many examples of antagonistic questions, which prompted Bitzer and Rueter to contend that, "both the argumentation and the hostility embedded in many questions demonstrate the adversary role assumed by the panelists. The candidates' antagonist frequently proved to be the panelist, not the other candidate."3 It should be pointed out that the format of the 1976 "debates," which was more like a dual press conference, probably helped to promote this adversarial relationship.

A number of problems exist for the journalist who assumes the antagonist role in the debate. First, in order to effectively force the candidates to take positions on "new" topics (subjects not previously covered in the press), the questions will more likely deal with peripheral or minutely specific issues. The problem here is that these are not normally the types of issues which are fundamentally important to voters. Indeed, the potential voter might well gather new information from what the reporter considers an old question. After all, most
voters do not follow the campaign with the dedication of a journalist. Further, it is unlikely that truly new insights can be gained by the press on candidates' positions on the major issues, since the candidates have firmed up speeches on those topics by that point in the campaign. Thus, the questioner is likely to just frustrate himself by "going for the jugular," and only furthers the stereotypical image of the skeptical and negative journalist. Moreover, in providing a major challenge to one candidate's qualifications or views, the panelist in effect becomes an ally of the other candidate. This problem is especially acute in debates that occur late in the campaign. On the other hand, debates during the primary campaigns better serve the function of bringing to light new or previously undeclared stands on key issues by a wider range of candidates.

In order to corner a politician into making a new policy statement the panelists usually must list several lengthy (and not necessarily agreed upon) premises, before asking a particular question. This tends to steer attention away from the discourse of the candidates, and instead, places it on the interpretation of the panelist's premises, and the exchange between the challenged candidate answering to the panelists, rather than to his political opponent.

When panelists assume an adversarial role, they demonstrate an unwillingness to take the role they are asked to play in the debate. This approach shows a lack of goodwill, and further adds to the journalists' image in insensitivity, and desire only to "create a news story." When journalists become the antagonists in the debate format, they become part of making the news, rather than just reporting it. Bitzer and Rueter stress these deficiencies when they say that the adversarial tone of the 1976 debates was a "very serious defect."

From a journalist's standpoint, a good question for a presidential debate should be much different from a good question in a news conference or in a field
The latter situations allow repeated follow-up questions, and require that the journalist challenge the politician's answers, since the other candidate is not present to serve that function. Because the real opponent is present at the political debate, the journalist need not feel responsible for this role.

If a true debate is to be realized, the journalists must pose a well-defined question which sets the discussion agenda, and clearly implies a debate resolution. Then the panelists must leave the burden of debating to the candidates themselves. Birzer and Rueter explain, "A debate requires starting points consisting of issue statements, questions, or propositions selected and phrased to elicit informative exchanges and arguments between candidates." Essentially, a panelist's question should imply a resolution on a topic where the candidates disagree. Once this point of opposition, or stasis, is identified and brought forth, a candidate's self-interest is best served by justifying his own policy, while also indicating weaknesses in the opponent's policy on the issue. A clash of views can hardly be realized when both candidates agree with the resolution implied in the question. Good questions can be submitted from a non-adversarial standpoint, and such questions can assist in directing the debate better than poor ones.

Seven criteria can be specified for phrasing good questions for political debates. After setting forth and justifying each criteria, they will be applied in evaluating the efforts of the panelists in the 1980 presidential debates. These criteria are: 1) brevity; 2) single question; 3) continuity in follow-up questions; 4) focus on an area of disagreement between the candidates; 5) free of bias; 6) tone of goodwill rather than hostility; 7) explanation and justification of significant policies.

1) Questions should be brief. Only a limited amount of time exists for each debate. When the panelist takes too much time asking a question, he or she
unnecessarily puts himself or herself in a more prominent role, and takes time away from the candidates. A time limit of thirty seconds was established for panelists in the 1980 Reagan-Carter debate to pose their questions. That same arbitrary time limit had been the goal of panelists in the third presidential debate of 1976. This appears to allow too much time for panelists to ask their questions. By allowing up to thirty seconds per question, debate sponsors did little to encourage succinct wording by panelists. Even if the panelists in the first half of the Reagan-Carter debate had adhered to the time limitation (which they did not), a full twenty percent of the total time would have been devoted to panelists' questions. The continuity of clash between the candidates is harmed when the panelists assume so large a part in the format. But even with this generous thirty second time allotment, many of the questions still went overtime.

The average length of a question posed by the Reagan-Carter panel was thirty-three seconds. Six of the eight original questions were over the thirty second standard. Harry Ellis of the Christian Science Monitor asked the longest questions, averaging thirty-eight seconds to pose his original and follow-up questions. William Hilliard of the Portland Oregonian asked the most succinct questions; all of his original and follow-up questions were under thirty seconds, for an average of twenty-six seconds. Four of the eight follow-up questions posed by the panelists were over thirty seconds. Harry Ellis asked the longest single question of the Reagan-Carter debate, taking forty-seven seconds to ask about the development of energy sources. He could have approached the same issue more quickly by simply asking, "How can the United States best become energy independent, while maintaining environmental safeguards?" Instead, his question rambled for over one hundred words. The panel for the Anderson-Reagan debate, however, was even more verbose in its wording of questions. While the panel for the Reagan-Carter
debate averaged about ninety-five words for each original question, the Anderson-Reagan panel averaged one hundred and fifteen words per original question. While sheer measurements of time are not necessarily indicative of wordy questions, the panelists' lengthy questions in both debates reflects a failure to phrase remarks concisely, and a lack of appreciation of their limited role in the debate.

2) **Panelists should pose only a single question in each particular round.** Multiple questions (delivered under the guise of a single question) create several problems in the debate format. Such questions allow the candidate to choose which of the questions he or she will address. Hence, the candidate gives the impression of responsiveness, but avoids the more dangerous parts of the multiple question. In addition, multiple questions frequently ask the candidate for more than he can possibly answer in the allotted time. This difficulty can prompt the candidate to fall back on previously prepared non-spontaneous statements. Such "worn common places," to use Bitzer and Rueter's term, rarely advance the debate because of their generality and ambiguity. Such multiple questions are a key weakness in the questioning practices of many journalists. This weakness may occur because journalists' questions to newsmakers are seldom published or broadcast. Frequently, only the source's responses are disseminated in news accounts, and journalists can continue their "shotgun" method with no one being the wiser as to the poor technique.

This problem was particularly severe in the 1980 presidential debates. In fact, exactly half of the original questions of each panel contained multiple queries. A typical multiple question in the Anderson-Reagan debate came from Charles Corddry of the Baltimore Sun, when he asked the candidates to outline how they could build up current military forces, and if they would reinstate the draft under certain circumstances. Corddry even used the term "questions" when
beginning his request for candidate response. It is worth noting that Reagan chose not to answer the second question. One of the multiple questions in the Reagan-Carter debate came from Barbara Walters of ABC. In the first part of the debate, her multiple question asked the candidates for a policy to deal with terrorism, and to assess what had been learned from the experience of the Iran hostage crisis. The unhappy result of this multiple question was that Carter answered the first question and ignored the second question, while Reagan dwelt on the topic of the second question and overlooked the first question. Consequently, the candidates discussed separate topics until Reagan made the last response in the sequence, and indicated that he had "no quarrel" with coordinated worldwide efforts to control terrorism. This type of exchange hardly represents "debate."

Multiple questions discourage focused debate. Panelists may feel that they help prompt debate by submitting a variety of questions under the guise of a single question. But they actually accomplish the reverse. First of all, the candidate can choose to answer the question that he is best prepared and willing to discuss, while still appearing to be responsive. In addition, even if both questions are important and well-focused, it is impractical to ask a candidate to deal with more than one question during the limited response time of two minutes or less.

One aspect of the questioning format in the 1980 debates that did aid in focusing the discussion was the excellent innovation to have the panelists repeat each main question verbatim to each candidate. This practice, which was not used in the 1976 presidential debates, helped (except, perhaps, in cases of multiple questions) to avoid situations where the candidates talked on different subjects rather than debating the same subject.
3) If used, follow-up questions should be directly related to the initial question. A solid follow-up question should be designed to expand or clarify the initial response. It should not introduce a new area, promote redundancy, or pursue a diversion created by the candidate's initial response.

Follow-up questions were only used during the first half of the Reagan-Carter debate; they were not permitted at all in the Reagan-Anderson debate. Although the press had criticized the lack of follow-up questions in the Reagan-Anderson debate, the quality of such questions in the Reagan-Carter debate was mixed at best. For one thing, most of the follow-up questions were so carefully phrased that they must have been composed in advance of the debate. Thus, these questions did not spontaneously react to the answer. Hilliard's follow-up questions on the future of our multi-racial society are examples (p. 17). Exactly the same follow-up question was presented to each candidate (even though they had presented quite different answers) and the follow-up question was only remotely related to the original question. Obviously, Hilliard did not react to the candidates' specific answers in developing his follow-up. Instead, he was actually posing a second question.

Barbara Walters of ABC News had similar flaws in her follow-up questions. For example, she asked Reagan what types of political regimes the United States should support (p. 17)—quite a tangent from her original question which asked about policies for dealing with terrorists. On the other hand, Ellis' follow-up question to Reagan was an effective one. Ellis asked for an expansion and clarification of Reagan's plan to cut spending and asked exactly which areas could feasibly be cut (p. 16). Marvin Stone of U.S. News and World Report also demonstrated an effective use of follow-up questioning. In response to Stone's question on the use of military power, Carter discussed his role as a deliberate,
careful military leader, while implying that Reagan would more likely disrupt world peace. Stone's follow-up grew directly out of the initial question, when he asked Carter exactly when it would be necessary to commit troops to a crisis in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Iran, or Pakistan (p. 16)—a specific instance of military policy.

4) The question should focus on an area of disagreement between the candidates. A true debate cannot be realized when the candidates are asked to discuss an issue on which they agree. Obviously, such questions fail to differentiate the candidates for the voters. The question should point to key disagreements, and should ask the candidate to clearly defend his position, while contrasting it to the opponent's position. It is not sufficient to raise questions, even on topics of major relevance to the audience, unless they prompt the candidates to discuss their contrasting goals, or perhaps, their differing avenues for achieving their goals.

The Anderson-Reagan panel had difficulty in asking the candidates to discuss opposing views. An example of this problem was evident in the question by Charles Corddry of the Baltimore Sun. The question asked the candidates to discuss how they would "fill the understrength combat forces with numbers and quality without reviving conscription," and whether they would propose a draft if it became necessary (p. 10). The problem with this question (besides being a multiple question) is that Anderson and Reagan were in basic agreement that the armed forces could be built up by providing greater incentives and rewards for service. In setting up the question, Corddry even pointed to the basic agreement between Anderson and Reagan on the need for stronger defense, and their mutual opposition to the draft. There was virtually no clash between the candidates during this section, except for when they disagreed on the need for the MX missile in the last exchange—a topic only distantly related to the original question. Had the
original question focused on the MX proposal, a vigorous debate might have ensued.

Similar problems occurred in the questions from Jane Bryant Quinn of *Newsweek*. She asked whether the candidates would publish their inflation forecasts within two weeks (p. 11). Of course, both Anderson and Reagan answered "yes." Fortunately, the debaters took it upon themselves to seek out the area of disagreement. Reagan contended that inflation could be controlled while at the same time cutting taxes. Anderson, on the other hand, argued that a tax cut would not be immediately appropriate.

It is likely that the Anderson-Reagan panel had more trouble prompting the candidates to debate each other, because of the absence of Jimmy Carter. Anderson and Reagan were perhaps more anxious to launch a dual attack on Carter, than to debate each other. But it should be the role of the panelists to focus on the candidates actually in attendance. Certainly, the panel in the second debate had less trouble in finding areas of disagreement between Carter and Reagan.

One technique that can effectively outline the point of disagreement for the candidates is to briefly outline their respective stances on an issue, or by outlining realities of a situation that call for response in the candidate's answer. Marvin Stone of *U.S. News and World Report* did this very well when he raised the issue of arms limitation. Stone indicated that while both candidates sought to end the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union, their methods to accomplish the goal were "vastly different" (p. 17). Carter endorsed SALT II, while Reagan wanted to negotiate a new treaty. The candidates were then asked to explain why
their policy would work. Stone effectively outlined the disagreement for candidates and audience alike.

5) The question should be free of bias. It should not work to the benefit of one candidate over the other. This area provides a fine example of how a good question for a political debate differs from a good question in another journalistic setting, such as a news conference, studio interview, or field interview. A good debate question must challenge each candidate equally, whereas a question in a typical journalistic setting can be more pointed, and directed toward weaknesses of the particular candidate being interviewed.

While it would be difficult to prove that any of the debate panelists intentionally injected bias into their questions, it was apparent in several cases that a question was worded so that one candidate had an advantage. A comparison of the Anderson-Reagan panel to the Reagan-Carter panel is instructive. Of the six questions presented by the first panel, three were phrased so as to work to the advantage of Anderson. An example would be the first question of the debate, asked by Carol Loomis of Fortune magazine. At one point, Loomis asked, "What politically unpopular measures are you willing to endorse...?" (p. 10). This question played into the hands of Anderson. Throughout his campaign, Anderson claimed that he was the only candidate willing to propose potentially unpopular solutions in order to do what was best for the country. The question easily allowed the independent to attack the proposed tax cuts of the major party candidates, and to introduce the fifty-cent gas tax that Anderson had frequently used as an example of the type of sacrifice the American people would need to endure. In addition, the question implied that politically unpopular measures are needed to reduce inflation, in effect countering Reagan's plans to reduce inflation through stimulating higher production. Anderson was again favored in the very next question.
when columnist Daniel Greenberg asked the candidates to outline changes they would require in the American lifestyle to save resources, particularly energy. He also referred to "campaign lullabies about minor conservation efforts and more production" (p. 10). This question amounted to dismissing Reagan's arguments before the candidate even spoke, since "minor conservation efforts and more production" were precisely the measures Reagan endorsed. The environmental issue brought up by Greenberg also was unfavorable to Reagan, since the easing of environmental standards was another Reagan position. Anderson was well set to take advantage of the question by saying at one place, "I agree with what I think is the major premise of your question," and suggesting that Reagan had "a total misunderstanding of the energy crisis..." (p. 10). Questions such as these are not defective because they challenged Reagan's policies, but rather because they did so without providing a similar challenge to Anderson.

The Reagan-Carter panel, on the other hand, more skillfully phrased their questions to avoid bias and to challenge each candidate equally. Two questions tend to favor Reagan, perhaps, because they were based on current problems that developed during the Carter administration. Those two questions were Ellis' question on inflation (p. 16), and Barbara Walters' question on a policy for dealing with terrorism (p. 17). Neither of these questions, however, gave a major advantage to Reagan. For one thing, both matters would need the attention of the next President, regardless of who won the election. Each candidate faced an equal burden in outlining his future plans for handling these problems. Also, both questions were devoid of such emotional catch-phrases as "campaign lullabies" which suggested bias in one candidate's favor.

6) A question should reflect a tone of goodwill rather than hostility. In the highly formalized structure of presidential debates, antagonistic and
snide approaches to questioning become quite inappropriate. Such approaches
draw attention away from exchanges between the candidates and divert it in
the direction of the panelists. Such approaches also show a basic lack of re-
spect for the individual candidates. While the candidates and their views
should be scrutinized closely, it is important that it be done in an atmosphere
of goodwill. It would be interesting to study how the audience's sympathies are
influenced during an adversarial exchange between a panelist and candidate, but
that topic will not be considered here.

The first debate panel (Anderson-Reagan) showed glaring deficiencies in
terms of the tone of the questions. Five instances of inappropriate antagonism,
or hostility occurred. The panel for the second debate (Reagan-Carter) only had
four such instances, despite the fact that the panelists played a larger role
in a longer debate.

In two cases, members of the Anderson-Reagan panel took it upon themselves
to serve as referees—a role they were not asked to play. Greenberg at one
point chastised the candidates for "repetitions of your campaign addresses,"
while ordering them to be responsive to the questions (p. 10). Sama Golden of
the New York Times joined in later by taking it upon herself to point out the
tax exempt status of churches (p. 11). These editorial remarks were clearly be-
yond the proper role of a panelist, and indeed, made the panel a third side in
the debate.

Another example of an unnecessarily adversarial tone came from Jane Bryant
Quinn of Newsweek when she threateningly announced that she would call on Anderson
two weeks after the debate for the inflation forecast which he promised (p. 11).
This tone not only suggested a hint of doubt that the forecast would be forthcom-
ing, but set the stage to carry on this antagonistic encounter beyond the debate.
Other pleas by panelists for the candidates to "be specific" or "commit yourself
here, tonight" simply indicated a journalistic paranoia that candidates would not answer completely, and reflected cynicism about what the candidates did say.

Barbara Walters of ABC was responsible for all but one of the inappropriate panel remarks in the second debate. The most obvious example of an obnoxious question came when Walters asked the candidates to explain their opponent's "greatest weakness" (p. 18). The question was similar to some heard at press conferences used to promote boxing matches. Chances are slim that the candidates will actually "slug it out" in response to such a question. In spite of several jabs during the debate, the candidates were obviously avoiding the sort of mud-slinging Walters apparently tried to provoke. The discussion in response to the question rambled far and wide, from party traditions to nuclear weapons, to government interference, to the "misery index," to equal rights for women, to deregulation of industries, to the working man, to Southern heritage, and on and on.

Perhaps some of the panelists have a misguided notion that it is their responsibility to provoke a debate, or worse yet, that they should debate the candidates. But their job should be only to raise the propositions for debate. The candidates must themselves make the effort to debate, and clash over the issues. The journalists may want to cut new ground in the campaign, but they can better serve their function in political debates by removing themselves as the candidates' adversaries.

7) Questions should call for the explanation and justification of significant policies. First, the question should be significant from a topical standpoint. The topic of a particular question should concern central issues of the campaign, and again, deal with areas in which the candidates differ. It is the panel's responsibility, as a whole, to see that topics of concern to voters are put forth. Perhaps the greatest topical failure of the Anderson-Reagan panel was the omission of any question dealing with foreign policy. This oversight seems more grave when
you compare the foreign policy topic to several that were introduced. For example, Soma Golden's question on religion in politics, while timely, seemed somewhat peripheral as a major campaign issue, in comparison to the number of foreign policy problems at the time. In addition, Jane Bryant Quinn's question repeated the inflation topic, already approached in the question by Carol Loomis of Fortune.

Looking at the second debate panel, one must question the significance of Walters' question on candidate weaknesses. Supposedly, the candidates had already pointed out their opponent's weaknesses in their responses to the previous ten questions in the debate. Also, the question seemed to imply that no other substantive issues remained for discussion. For example, several midwest politicians criticized the panel for not eliciting the candidates' views on agricultural policies and the use of American farm production in foreign policy—a topic of some importance given the candidates differing policies on the U.S. grain embargo to the Soviet Union. Overall, however, the Reagan-Carter panel did a credible job of keeping the debate centered on important issues. Even though both of Marvin Stone's questions dealt with military matters, separate crucial issues in this area were raised—the use of military power in certain circumstances, and the future of arms limitations talks.

The response called for in the question should provide the candidates suitable opportunity to explain their ideas. For example, Loomis and Greenberg of the Anderson-Reagan panel asked the candidates to deal with the problems of inflation and energy, but restricted the candidates in their solutions to "unpopular measures" and "changes in lifestyle" (p. 10). These questions ask the candidates to deal only with one aspect of a complex problem. Had the candidates limited their responses to those parameters (which they did not), only a small portion of their arguments for their policies would have been presented.
The question should require a sophisticated response on the important issue. Such responses include analysis, evaluation, or prediction. Simple, closed questions are seldom significant because they require little insight on the part of the candidate, who is really only being asked to say "yes" or "no." "Yes-no" questions frequently call for what would be an obvious answer. For example, Ellis asked the candidates in the second debate, "...can inflation in fact be controlled?" (p. 16). Walters asked, "...do you have a policy for dealing with terrorism?" (p. 17). Obviously, neither candidate will risk hurting himself politically with a negative answer. Hence, the question should be phrased so as to require each candidate to justify his policy. Walters complained that neither candidate outlined a specific terrorist policy, but she only asked whether they had such a policy; she did not ask them to outline it.

This analysis reveals that in the 1980 presidential debates, the second debate panel performed much better than the first debate panel. The success resulted from the ability of the Reagan-Carter panel to remove itself from the center stage. Their questions were shorter, had less of an adversarial tone, more clearly identified areas of disagreement between the candidates, and were more significant on a campaign-wide basis. Although other factors came into play, it is noteworthy that questions in the second debate provoked more exchanges between the candidates. Finally, there is a pragmatic reason for journalists to take a low profile in the debate: if the candidates fail to engage in stimulating debate, the journalists on the panel are less likely to shoulder the burden of the blame, leaving only the candidates to account for their own reluctance to participate in a candid public discussion.

Political candidates prepare for debates by devoting several days to research and the study of previous political debaters. It would be fruitful for the panelists to prepare similarly by researching what the public's concerns are in the campaign,
by identifying key disagreements between candidates, and by studying the strengths and weaknesses of questioning by previous debate panelists. In the wake of the 1976 and 1980 presidential debates, journalists are serving in hundreds of campaign debates at all electoral levels—from U.S. Senate races to local city council contests. Some of these debates are televised, others are on radio, and still others occur only before a live audience of interested voters. In all cases, however, the debates can be enhanced by the quality of the journalists' questions. By applying the types of criteria suggested in this essay to the selection and phrasing of debate questions, a more focused and valuable exchange between the candidates can be realized.
NOTES


3Bitzer and Rueter, p. 60.

4Bitzer and Rueter, p. 41.

5Bitzer and Rueter, p. 53.

6Bitzer and Rueter, p. 57.

7Since original questions were repeated nearly verbatim to each candidate, only the first recitation will be examined.

8"Transcript of Campaign's First Presidential Debate, With Reagan vs. Anderson," The New York Times, September 23, 1980, Section B, p. 10. Subsequent quotations from this debate will be indicated by a page number in the text.

9"Transcript of the Presidential Debate Between Carter and Reagan in Cleveland," The New York Times, October 30, 1980, Section B, p. 17. Subsequent quotations from this debate will be indicated by a page number in the text.