Prepared for a meeting of the Northwest Regional Exchange (NWRx) Advisory Board and its staff and consultants, this document first reviews nine reports' findings on nine hypotheses concerning the institutionalization of educational change or innovation, especially as institutionalization relates to the dissemination functions of state organizations in NWRx. For each hypothesis, supporting statements are provided from three or more of the reports. The nine hypotheses concern the role in institutionalization of the following incorporation or routinization of a project, a project's base of support and flexibility, location of administration, administrator involvement, contacts with influential persons and the public, leadership quality and type, relationship to current practices and values, political environment and funding changes, and training of practitioners in the new function. The document then summarizes each of the nine reports. The reports include a theoretical model of institutionalization, a practitioner handbook, studies of innovations' institutionalization in urban bureaucracies and in a U.S. Marine Corps human relations program, and five studies of federally funded educational projects, involving the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, vocational education, reading, the Research and Development Utilization Program, state education agencies' roles in dissemination, and 250 Massachusetts projects. (Author/RW)
INSTITUTIONALIZATION: How Can We Continue Good Practices and Functions When Funding Ends?

PART I: A Synthesis of Findings

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This synthesis had its beginnings earlier this year at a meeting of the Northwest Regional Exchange Advisory Board. At that time, Board members identified several special interest topics related to the building of state dissemination systems in the Northwest Region. Institutionalization was one of these topics.

It was recommended that Northwest Regional Exchange staff conduct an analysis of relevant information in this area and present it to the Board at a later meeting. From this request, a two-part developmental effort emerged.

The first part is represented by this product—a set of reviews, a synthesis and nine hypotheses. This information will be reviewed by the Northwest Regional Exchange Advisory Board, Exchange staff and two external consultants.

At the October meeting, a one-day interaction design will be used to engage this group in a focused discussion of the product, its implication for the region and for each of the six states. The discussion will be taped and synthesized to form the basis of the second part of the developmental effort.

It is expected that both products will be used as planning tools by the Northwest Regional Exchange Advisory Board members and Exchange staff in developing support systems in the six states and the Laboratory.

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been a spate of demands for educational improvement. Goals for change abound. In education there has been much hand wringing about poor readers; poor mathematicians; lack of equity in educational opportunity; inadequate, though costly, administration. Business and industry have bemoaned their decline in productivity and the poor quality of work life for employees. Numerous other woes have been added to the list.

Federal initiatives, in education particularly, have been taken to assist educational systems to make changes that will improve education in the nation. As a result, millions of dollars have been spent to finance a bewildering array of titles and grants and awards, all designed to make things better, however "better" is defined. Hundreds of projects have been approved, initiated, planned for and implemented. The projects, as is to be expected, varied in their degree of success. Many pounds of reports have been written and disseminated to their various audiences. Now many of the projects, at the end of external funding, are coming to (or have arrived at) the point of decision about what to do. Shall the project continue? What shall its status be? Who will be involved in it? Shall it be a "regular" part of the system? How will it be funded?

A major issue in any change effort is whether the change intervention--improvement--can be sustained over time. It can be, and is, argued that if a change is not incorporated into the system, does not "disappear" as a special project, it has not been entirely effective.

New practices emerge continually. A great deal is known about initiating, planning and implementing improvement programs. However, little study has been done about how new practices are incorporated into
the system so they become routine—a part of "standard practice" in the system. Although there has been much conceptualization and empirical study of what happens at all other stages of innovation, the stage of institutionalization has been neglected as an area on which to focus attention.

A search of the literature produced 187 titles. In screening these titles only those that were dated 1975 or later were considered. Also, only titles that seemed to deal with institutionalization, incorporation or routinization in some detail and quite directly were retained. Fifty-one documents were finally selected for closer scrutiny. Finally, nine titles were selected for review to form the basis for this synthesis. It is quite likely, if not probable, that a number of good studies have been missed in this process. Time constraints made it necessary to restrict the number of documents selected for review.

The nine documents can be characterized as follows:

- A theoretical construct of the phenomenon of institutionalization (Goodman, et al.).
- A handbook for practitioners (Teacher Corps) which is in itself something of a synthesis (Pankratz, et al.).
- A study of the degree of institutionalization of six innovations in urban bureaucracies (Yin, et al.).
- A study of the institutionalization of a Human Relations Program in the U.S. Marine Corps (Shepherd, et al.).

The review suggests at least nine hypotheses which should prove useful for a discussion of institutionalization as it relates to the dissemination function of state organizations in the Northwest Regional Exchange (NWRx). It is hoped these statements will stimulate a review of the issue and
result in a productive analysis and assessment of the degree to which the dissemination function is institutionalized in the states of the region.

In Pankratz, et al., institutionalization is defined as both a goal and a process. This definition may prove useful for the discussion. As a goal, institutionalization is the stage at which a new program or practice becomes a regular feature of the culture of the organization. As a process, institutionalization is a conscious and deliberate set of actions designed to improve the performance and operation of an organization. The authors further state that to attend to institutionalization as a goal without attending to its function as a process is an incomplete conceptualization of the phenomena, resulting in incomplete, if not failed, incorporation.

Before discussing the nine hypotheses, noting a concept of temporary systems as reported in the Pankratz document will provide useful background. The authors note that projects and efforts to introduce adoption of new programs take place in two distinct systems--a temporary system and a permanent system--each different in structure and purpose. Projects are temporary systems--they have a beginning and a closing date. Temporary systems can be useful vehicles for encouraging development, change, and the institutionalization of new structures, processes and behaviors. Efforts to institutionalize new practices most often falter as programs move from project operation status (temporary) to institutional adoption status (permanent). Without preparation, planning and support, programs and projects developed in a temporary system are often rejected by the permanent system.

Hypotheses

1. Institutionalization of projects and functions is unlikely if routinization and incorporation of the project or function are not explicitly made a part of the planning process from the outset, including plans for seeking additional funding for continuation goals.
2. Institutionalization is more likely when the innovation or function has a diverse and broad base of support and is responsive to the situation by being both flexible and adaptable.

3. Success in the institutionalization of new practices is related to where the project is located administratively. Projects placed in planning and research divisions are facilitated during planning, mobilization and implementation phases. The institutionalization stage is more likely to occur if the project is housed in a service division.

4. Active involvement of administrators at all levels in the system (particularly top administrators) in all phases of the development of a project (including institutionalization) is critical for eventual incorporation into the system.

5. Institutionalization is facilitated by early and frequent informal contact with influencers and image makers and by extensive public presentations about the project by persons directly involved in its development.

6. The kind and quality of leadership for the project is critical for its success. Loss or change of leadership endangers the prospects for institutionalization.

7. Institutionalization is blocked if the project or function is perceived as being significantly different from current practice or as being based on norms and values which are incongruent with the system.

8. A change in the political environment or a reduction or loss in funding may block institutionalization or cause the project or function to regress to previous practices.

9. Institutionalization is more likely and is enhanced when practitioners are provided thorough and continuous training in the new practice or function.

Before proceeding further the reader is encouraged to turn to page 19 and read the reviews of the documents selected.
WHAT THE FINDINGS SAY ABOUT PROPOSED HYPOTHESES
CONCERNING INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Hypothesis

Institutionalization of projects and functions is unlikely, or made more difficult, if routinization and incorporation of the project or function are not explicitly made a part of the planning process from the outset, including plans for seeking additional funding for continuation goals.

Six of the nine studies support this hypothesis. Illustrative statements include:

- A characteristic of institutionalized practices is that eventual institutionalization is included as a part of planning process from the outset (Berman).

- Institutionalized practices are characterized by increased mobilization efforts at the end of federal funding to pave the way for transition into key operations of the district (Berman).

- Efforts toward institutionalization and routinization began as early as the planning stages in adopted programs (Widmer, 1975).

- Successful application occurred because of visible command support (Roth).

- The process of institutionalization requires expansion of planning to include agency-wide dissemination (Royster, et al.).

- The process of institutionalization includes a general dissemination function increase, as shown by (a) general goal statements, (b) place on organizational chart, (c) budgeting for project activities both during and after the grant period (Royster, et al.).
Failure to institutionalize is caused, in part, by the problem of the failure of managers and planners to understand and plan in terms of the project as a temporary system in a permanent system (Pankratz, et al.).

Project planners and managers have generally been unaware of specific activities essential to institutionalization, and by failure to incorporate such activities into plans from the outset (Pankratz, et al.).

In sum, it is unrealistic to expect institutionalization if this is not an explicit and primary objective of the program (RDU, Abt Associates).

Hypothesis

Institutionalization is more likely when the innovation or function has a diverse and broad base of support, and is responsive to the situation by being both flexible and adaptable.

This hypothesis is supported by six of the nine studies. Statements illustrative of this support include:

- Effective strategies leading to incorporation include regular meetings of project members focused on practical problems and teacher participation in decisions (Berman).

- Sustaining change depends finally on the capacity and willingness of the system, not the project's resources and personnel (Berman).

- There was a great deal of informal contact with district image makers (Widmer, 1975).

- Adopted programs were able to secure, maintain and increase more support than non-adopted programs (Widmer, 1975).
Adopting districts tend to be more open, flexible, less rigid in their bureaucratic structure than non-adopting districts (Widmer, 1977).

While collaborative planning and flexible programs permit states to tailor their projects for independent system development, they may also foster a lack of understanding of the goals and means of a dissemination system (Royster, et al.).

Temporary systems initiated by regular members of the permanent system are more likely to have their products accepted by the permanent system. Persons from the permanent system who join a temporary system and then re-enter the permanent system are more likely to be accepted than are outsiders who attempt to enter the permanent system (Pankratz, et al.).

The more well-developed the support systems in the permanent system are for new practices introduced from temporary systems the greater will be the chance for adoption and institutionalization (Pankratz, et al.).

A minimal indicator of institutionalization is accurate identification and acceptance as a regular feature by ongoing members of the organization and by knowledgeable clients. (Pankratz, et al.).

Procedural rigidity, requiring strict adherence to formal, rather than informal, flexible relationships between managers and field commands complicated the implementation of the program (Shepherd, et al.).

**Hypothesis**

Success in the institutionalization of new practices is related to where the project is located administratively. Projects placed in planning and research divisions are facilitated during
planning, mobilization and implementation stages. The institutionalization stage is more likely to occur if the project is housed in a service division.

While this hypothesis receives explicit support in four of the studies, there is a sufficient degree of implicit support in other studies to warrant its inclusion. Also, it seems to be an eminently reasonable position to take.

Statements such as the following make the point:

- Factors in the states which affect institutionalization include:
  - Placement in an administrative unit enhances development of the system. Placement in a service unit increases delivery to clients and institutionalization by the system.
  - Initial targeting of services for use by particular clients assists system development. Institutionalization requires that the project move on to serve a more general clientele (Royster, et al.).

- Minimum, essential indicators that demonstrate the presence of institutionalization include:
  - Appropriate revision of the system
  - Provision for support in the allocation of regular resources
  - Pervasive, routine participation in the practice or use of the product by appropriate persons in the organization (Pankratz, et al.).
Among passages and cycles leading to routinization are found:

- Establishment of appropriate organizational status (passage)
- Changes in organizational governance (passage) (Yin, et al.).

Factors contributing to low level of incorporation include:

- The special status of the project as an externally funded contract and definition as both service delivery and research placed it in the wrong unit of the organization for eventual incorporation.
- Many organizations were willing to release some autonomy and control temporarily, but many resisted centralized control, resulting in a tension between the quest for local control and the quest for centralized management.
- A basis for collaboration was frequently not considered, resulting in systems which did not represent naturally occurring collaboration (RDU, Abt Associates).

**Hypothesis**

Active involvement of administrators at all levels in the system, particularly top administrators, in all phases of the development of the project, including institutionalization, is critical for eventual incorporation into the system.

Corroboration for this proposal was found in six studies. Supporting statements include:

- An internal condition leading to routinization is specific support of top agency administrators, since they are usually an essential part of the key decisions about innovations—
adopt it, to make staff available, to make funds available (Yin, et al.).

- Active support of SEA administrators (Chief State School Officers and associates) is crucial to all aspects of system development, including institutionalization (Royster, et al.).

- The most significant factor in the continuation of an innovation in a school building is the active support of the principal (Berman, et al.).

- From beginning to end, a supportive institutional environment was necessary for projects to be effectively implemented and to take root (Berman, et al.).

- The problem of sustaining change depends ultimately on the capacity and willingness of the system, not the project's resources and personnel (Berman, et al.).

- The principle that to institutionalize a program members of the institution (the Marine Corps) would need to become engaged... with a significant degree of motivation and training was applied successfully when there was involvement throughout the chain of command (Shepherd, et al.).

- Implication—that the State Educational Agency could play a much greater role in bringing about change throughout the state if it chose to plan and promote change systematically. Given the tenuous nature of federal funding and the years of experience with temporary programs, it might be timely to begin such efforts in areas where they have not already begun (Widmer, 1975).

- Adopting districts still assume that support of high levels of the bureaucracy is essential to survival (Widmer, 1975).
Hypothesis

Institutionalization is facilitated by early and frequent informal contact with influencers and image makers and by extensive public presentations about the project by persons directly involved in its development.

Four of the nine studies made explicit reference to this hypothesis. Statements in other studies point to support for the hypothesis, although there was no direct reference to this proposition as affecting eventual incorporation of an innovation.

- From the earliest planning stages and throughout the operation of adopted programs there was systematic dissemination about the project to and involvement of decision makers and opinion leaders (Widmer, 1975).

- Adopted programs tended to dilute opposition through involvement (Widmer, 1975).

- There is still a statistically significant difference between adopting and non-adopting districts in the use of systematic dissemination and the involvement of opinion makers (Widmer, 1977).

- As in 1974, the support of opinion leaders and decision makers was more important than needs assessment in program development.

- In 1977 political analysis of supporters and opposers is more significant than evaluation in persuading decision makers to continue the program (Widmer, 1977).

- Individuals who publicly indicate their approval of new work behavior become more committed to adopting and continuing new behavior than is the case where the behavior is kept private (Goodman, et al.).
Diffusion of the new work behavior to other parts of the system will work to counter negative comparisons and envy and increase the likelihood of institutionalization (Goodman, et al.).

Principle—the more participants in the temporary system understand the nature of both systems, the greater will be the effectiveness of the temporary system in helping participants develop new skills, attitudes and programs that can be installed in the permanent system (Pankratz, et al.).

Principle—the more effective the communication between the temporary system and the permanent system, the easier it is for members to move from one system to the other (Pankratz, et al.).

A minimum, essential indicator which determines the presence of institutionalization is endorsement and promotion by both formal and informal influencers in the system (Pankratz, et al.).

Hypothesis

The kind and quality of leadership for the project is critical for its success. Loss or change of leadership endangers the prospects for institutionalization.

Six of the studies reviewed addressed the issue of leadership in a direct way.

Some of the findings are:

A factor in projects that worked well and which influenced their continuation was the presence of an effective project director (Berman).

Among state factors that affect program success are the statements that:

-- Changes in agency leadership have generally negative effects which
are largely beyond the control of project staff.

-- Once energetic, entrepreneurial leadership is gone the process may become endangered.

-- Retrenchment may occur, e.g., projects in two states reported in the case studies as highly institutionalized, declined drastically when they experienced a change in leadership (Royster, et al.).

- Of three major factors in five case studies which influence eventual incorporation of a project as a state function the first one listed is the stability and entrepreneurial skills of key personnel in both the SEA and the project (Royster, et al.).

- In the improvisation stage of an innovation the project directors have the greatest need to simply accomplish the tasks and make on-the-spot decisions (Yin, et al.).

- An internal condition for routinization is the role of an innovator (or innovator-team) who develops support and establishes appropriate skills and resources for initially operating it (Yin, et al.).

- Adopted programs had directors with more expertise in project program areas (Widmer, et al.).

- Project directors for adopted programs were significantly more empathetic than in non-adopted programs. The ability to understand the difficulties which come with change helped the directors in their contacts with administrators (Widmer, 1975).

- The credibility of the initiator is more important for adoption than the role of the initiator (Widmer, 1975).

- Directors of adopted programs were seen by everyone as being more flexible, empathetic and open to
criticism, although less democratic, than their counterparts in non-adopted programs (Widmer, 1975).

- All program directors were seen as having strong management skill, but the directors of non-adopted programs had the most (Widmer, 1975).

- Sponsorship.
  - Once sponsorship is withdrawn the institutionalized act is evoked less frequently. Withdrawal may occur administratively (a supportive director may be replaced by an unsympathetic director, or the director may focus on other duties).
  - When the primary role of the sponsor is monitoring and controlling, the act will not be highly institutionalized.
  - When the sponsor’s role is to legitimate or support new behavior in times of crisis, the act will be more highly institutionalized (Goodman, et al.).
  - Some studies show that institutionalization is facilitated when boundaries of the new behavior are protected by a buffer representative (Goodman, et al.).

- Lack of commitment or inability to adapt the program resulted in perfunctory selection of Unit Discussion Leaders, leading to grossly inadequate leadership (Shepherd, et al.).

Hypothesis

Institutionalization is blocked if the project or function is perceived as being significantly different from current practice or as being based on norms and values which are incongruent with the system.
Eight of the nine documents addressed some facet of this hypothesis. Here are representative statements:

- The fit between the innovation and the organization's value structure...affects the level of institutionalization. The greater the consistency the higher the level of institutionalization. (Goodman, et al.).

- Principle—the greater the difference between life in the temporary system and life in the permanent system, the greater will be the problems of entry and re-entry, particularly if programs and practices developed in the temporary system are being considered for installation in the permanent system (Pankratz, et al.).

- The compatibility of the innovation with the values of the school system was seen to be perhaps the most important factor at all stages of development (Widmer, 1975).

- None of the surviving programs threatens the system by proposing innovations which are radical or unresponsive to the political needs of the district (Widmer, 1977).

- Fears of the (Human Relations) program caused many to resist it for fear of jeopardizing their careers, caused others to choose programs with more military respectability, and others resisted passively or actively, believing it to be in the best interests of the Marine Corps (Shepherd, et al.).

- Some (Marine officers) thought it demeaning to be trained by a subordinate. Some were opposed ideologically (Blacks would pull the Corps down). Some felt it would be futile to try to improve the behavior of the "low-grade" Marines then being recruited (Shepherd, et al.).
o Of the three major factors influencing incorporation of projects into the SEA as a function, the second is degree of congruence of the project's functions with SEA's structure and mission (Royster, et al.).

o Internal conditions leading to routinization include the statement that external assistance may be important if it follows local initiatives and matches local needs and agendas (Yin, et al.).

o The schools that were most successful in incorporating new problem solving practices were those that had had a similar previous experience with similar problem solving models (RDU, Abt Associates).

Hypothesis

A change in the political environment or a reduction or loss in funding may block institutionalization or cause the project or function to regress to previous practices.

Although this issue was stated explicitly in just three of the studies, it seemed another instance in which the issue was latent in other studies. Findings from the three documents are:

o Decisions to continue projects resembled earlier decisions to adopt innovations. Policy makers were more active than practitioners. Organizational and political matters often outweighed the project's educational merits. The outcome to continue, as the decision to adopt, could not accurately be described in rational terms (Berman, et al.).

o Problems inherent in absorption by bureaucracies include: (a) decreased efficiency because less defined as an entity or project; (b) less funding
makes the project less exciting—enthusiasm and vitality are lost; (c) enthusiasm for the project has to survive—competition for scarce resources (Widmer, 1977).

A factor affecting program success is that stringent state budgets have a generally negative effect which is largely beyond the control of project staff (Royster, et al.).

The institutionalized state of a project can change very rapidly with withdrawal of political support or with a drop in potential funds (Royster, et al.).

Hypothesis

Institutionalization is more likely and is enhanced when practitioners are provided thorough and continuous training in the new practice or function.

Four of the studies noted the effects of training in the innovation on institutionalization, as follows:

- Institutionalization of the key feature of the process (problem solving) did not happen very often because schools generally did not acquire the internal capacity to repeat a problem solving process as demanding as that used in the RDU process (RDU, Abt Associates).

- Lack of impact on capacity to solve problems is explained partially by the fact that most RDU deliverers put less emphasis on local problem solving capacity (RDU, Abt Associates).

- Internal conditions which lead to routinization include the presence of a group of agency practitioners trained to use the innovation, using it frequently in relation to regular practices as much as possible (Yin, et al.).
Among the passages and cycles leading to routinization are:
internalization of training program and promotion of personnel acquainted with the innovation (Yin, et al.).

Long-run persistence of the innovation depends on the degree to which occupants in a new role are trained. Insufficient training will block institutionalization. Failure to maintain the process over time to renew role behavior will contribute to a decline in institutionalization (Goodman, et al.).

The principle that members of the Marine Corps would need to become fully engaged in the (Human Relations) program to facilitate institutionalization was most successfully applied when highly qualified Marines were selected and trained as Unit Discussion Leaders (Shepherd, et al.).

Important factors in implementation strategies affecting the fate of an innovation included concrete, specific extended teacher training and the principal involved in the training (Berman).

To conclude, it appears that four general statements can be made:

1. The stage of institutionalization of an innovation is made immeasurably more difficult if it is not planned for from the start of a project, is not supported at all points by agency administration, and is not widely diffused in the agency. Otherwise, political forces and competition for scarce resources may block incorporation into the system.

2. Entrepreneurial, energetic, empathetic leadership is crucial to all stages of the innovative effort and needs to extend throughout the institutionalization phase.

3. Continuous and extended training in, and frequent practice of, new work patterns is crucial to both implementation and eventual routinization of the patterns.

4. Planning for the incorporation of educational change into the system will be more successful if it is not significantly different from current system practice and does not violate system norms and values. In other words, patience and support must be found to engage in incremental—rather than massive—change.

In this volume the authors describe processes by which six types of innovations in urban bureaucracies became routinized—how they became part of “standard practice.” The study was undertaken to increase understanding and knowledge about what is required to institutionalize an innovation. Life histories of the innovations were developed through case studies of the use of the innovations in 19 cities with corroborating evidence collected by telephone from 90 additional sites.

The authors made an original conceptualization of organizational change after determining that traditional approaches to the study of bureaucratic routinization were inadequate. They identified a series of ten organizational events which are critical in the life history of a particular innovative practice. The events are conceptualized as either passages (transition from one organizational state to another) or cycles (survival over periodic organizational events). The authors identified the following passages and cycles for the routinization (institutionalization) of innovations in bureaucracies:

- Equipment turnover (cycle)
- Transition to support by local funds (passage)
- Establishment of appropriate organizational status (passage)

The traditional approaches are Research, Development and Diffusion; Social Interaction; Innovative Organization; and Organizational Change. The authors provide a discussion of each of these approaches.
Establishment of stable arrangements for supply and maintenance (supply)

Establishment of personnel classification or certification (passage)

Changes in organizational governance (passage)

Internalization of training program (passage)

Promotion of personnel acquainted with the innovation (cycle)

Turnover in key personnel (cycle)

Attainment of widespread use (cycle)

The authors found that routinization occurs in a series of stages:

Improvisation Stage--the beginning of the life history, which includes exposing practitioners to the innovation, operating the innovation as consistently as possible, and flexible management of resources. At this point project directors have greatest need to simply accomplish the tasks and make on-the-spot decisions. No cycles or passages occur at this stage.

Expansion Stage--which provides for the first real tests of routinization. The first five passages and cycles are generally achieved during this stage. Innovations which expand without achieving these passages and cycles are not likely to achieve status as "standard practice."

Disappearance Stage--during which the final passages and cycles are achieved, leading to full incorporation of the innovation. That is, its "innovativeness" has disappeared.

The approach of the study to routinization included distinguishing among three degrees of institutionalization, since the point at which a practice becomes "standard" cannot be defined in any absolute sense. The degrees reflected the number of passages and cycles achieved, as follows:

0-3 -- marginally routinized

4-6 -- moderately routinized

7-10 -- highly routinized

---This item could perhaps be labelled "cycle" since it meets the author's criteria for cycles. R.E.
The study led the authors to the conclusion that the major conditions leading to routinization are internal to a specific local agency. External initiatives (e.g., federally initiated agenda) are either limited or designed with an inadequate degree of sophistication to result in routinization.

Internal conditions which emerged from the study include:

- Role of innovator (or innovator-team) who develop supports and establishes appropriate skills and resources for initially operating it.

- A group of agency practitioners trained to use the innovation, using it as frequently as possible, in relation to regular practices as much as possible—instead of as a special project.

- The perception of the innovation as a part of core agency practice. This condition is more powerful for routinization if the innovation systematically displaces an old practice, or when the innovation expands the array of services provided by the agency. The innovators should work for changes in agency governance, a perceptual shift as reflected in agency name or reviews of agency budgets.

- Increased gain of support by agency practitioners. Effectiveness of the innovation must be proven in terms of its use by individuals. The criteria determined by the users—convenience, reduced physical effort, increased sense of safety, elimination of distasteful tasks—are frequently not predicted as service payoffs by external evaluators.

- Specific support of top agency administrators, since they are usually an essential part of the key decisions about innovations—to adapt it, to make staff available, to make funds available.

- Although external financial and technical support are important, they were consistently found to be unrelated to the degree of routinization. External assistance may be important to routinization if the assistance follows local initiatives and matches local needs and agendas.

Routinization was found to be promoted most effectively by the following strategies:

- Get the practice operating on a daily basis early, even if it is necessary to limit its scope.

- Demonstrate that the new practice has concrete benefits for its users.
o Take specific steps to eliminate the old practice when the new practice displaces an old one.

o Expand the innovation to its fullest logical content so it will cease being perceived as a "special project."

o Start some activities (e.g., establishing personnel classification) early to ensure later routinization. This is important because the time required for achieving the various passages and cycles differs.

This paper sets out to fill a gap in organizational change literature. Current literature has little conceptual or empirical work on institutionalization. The goal of the paper is to develop a theoretical framework for and to identify factors contributing to institutionalization. It focuses on planned organizational change where the effort is to alter structure. It excludes a discussion of changing organizational behavior through training.

Institutionalization is defined as a behavior that persists over time, is performed by two or more individuals, and which is perceived as an external fact not dependent on any particular individual.

Institutionalization is conceived by the author as occurring in two phases: the individual phase and the structural or organizational phase. The individual phase includes a decision to adapt the new behavior and a decision to continue the new behavior. During the structural phase, the physical setting of the intervention, the social organization's norms and goals and the cohesiveness of the organization affect the institutionalization of the intervention.

The most pertinent parts of the paper for this discussion are found in the forces affecting the degree of institutionalization.

FACTORS AFFECTING DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PLANNED ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

Reward Allocation Systems

1. Type of reward.
   a. The greater the autonomy, control and responsibility experience in new work organization, the greater the level of institutionalization.

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b. Removal of negative outcomes (criticism for practicing new procedures) facilitates institutionalization.

c. Combination of rewards (extra pay plus increased responsibility) encourages persistence.

2. When a new type of work is adopted, it will persist until a discrepancy between expected and actual rewards occurs. If rewards fall short, the behavior will not persist. If additional rewards are not possible, a planned intervention may never become institutionalized.

3. Shifting expectations may affect persistence. When expectations of rewards outstrip actual level, interest and enthusiasm will decrease and the level of institutionalization will decline.

4. Unanticipated consequences of the intervention, some negative, increase costs of participation and work against persistence.

Sponsorship

1. Once sponsorship is withdrawn, the institutionalized act is evoked less frequently. Withdrawal of sponsorship may arise from organizational practices (a supportive director may be replaced by an unsympathetic director, or the supporter may focus on other duties).

2. If the primary role of the sponsor is monitoring and controlling behavior, the act will not be highly institutionalized if the sponsor is not present.

3. If the sponsor’s role is to legitimize or support the new work behavior in times of crisis, the absence of the sponsor should not affect the degree of institutionalization to the same extent.

Transmission

1. Failure to transmit information about work behavior to new members will decrease level of institutionalization. High turnover effect on institutionalization is affected by failure to develop transmission methods to socialize new members. Focussing only on “front end” of an intervention—getting it started—rather than on ways to keep it going block institutionalization.

2. Long-run persistence of an intervention depends on the degree to which occupants in new roles are trained. Both new and old members must be trained. Insufficient training in major roles will block institutionalization. Failure to maintain the training process over time in order to renew role behaviors will contribute to decline in institutionalization.

Group Forces

1. As individuals become aware of others doing the same work, see that the work is considered appropriate by the group, and as the
work is sanctioned by the group, the likelihood of institutionalization is increased.

2. The development of group identity—high level of interaction, many meetings, dispensing of rewards and punishments—is a force toward institutionalization.

3. Persistence is facilitated by minimizing group competition by group, instead of individual, evaluation.

Feedback

1. Feedback about individually valued results (e.g., pay) is more strongly related to institutionalization than feedback about organizationally valued results (e.g., quality).

2. The appropriate level of feedback—to an individual or to a group—is an important variable for routinization. Where an intervention requires collaborative group work, individual feedback may be inappropriate. Persistence may be increased on highly cooperative tasks with group feedback, while for divisible, noncooperative tasks individual feedback may enhance persistence.

Commitment

Individuals are more likely to persist at tasks to which they have a high degree of commitment.

1. Volition and planned change. Greater commitment and persistence can be expected to the extent that participants feel responsibility for the selection and content of new work behavior.

2. Publicity and planned change. Individuals who publicly indicate their approval of new work behavior become more committed to adapting and continuing the new behavior.

Diffusion

The extension and adaption of new forms of behavior in a system.

1. Since change targets are almost always focused on a specific work group, the special treatment provided will cause an envy phenomenon which will produce pressure to destroy the change effort.

2. Diffusion of the new work behavior to other parts of the system will work to counter negative comparisons and envy and increase the likelihood of institutionalization.
Internal Contextual Factors (the organizational context surrounding the change effort)

1. Congruence—the fit between the intervention structure and the organization’s value and structure—affects the level of institutionalization. The greater the consistency, the higher the level of institutionalization.

2. Character of the boundary conditions. Some studies indicate that institutionalization is facilitated when the boundaries of the new work behavior are protected by the presence of a buffer representative.

3. Intergroup dependencies. Planned organizational change takes place in a web of interdependencies. Failure to take into account the work groups related to the intervention can reduce the level of institutionalization.

External Contextual Factors (events outside the organization that affect the institutionalization level within the organization)

1. Nature of the environment. A highly competitive environment leads to great pressure on the work group, which in turn produces tensions which push in the direction of returning to former work patterns and a lower level of institutionalization.

2. Union/management. Union and management have conflicting goals and use power to achieve them in a scene of conflict—not cooperation. Most planned change efforts require cooperation. Your characteristics of management-labor relations have a bearing on institutionalization:
   a. Increased institutionalization should result in both parties perceiving new behavior as facilitating their goals.
   b. The greater the congruency of values and structure between the change and labor, the greater the institutionalization.
   c. Successful working out of management-labor issues over time facilitates acceptance of new behavior.
   d. Some change efforts may lead to increased conflict within the union, resulting in decreased institutionalization.
Between 1970 and 1975 the Marine Corps implemented a Human Relations Program intended to produce changes in the opinions, attitudes and behavior of Marines toward each other, particularly in the relationship between Blacks and Whites. This volume reports the findings from a study of that program. Three general conclusions were drawn from the five-year effort:

1. The training has a positive effect on Marines' opinions and attitudes, and possibly on their behavior.

2. Greatest impact of the training occurs when the program is well implemented and supported within a command, and when it is responsive to local conditions and requirements.

3. The viability of the program institutionally is good and will improve as the new training program (incorporated into the Comprehensive Leadership Program) produces improved discussion leaders, more knowledgeable managers, and general chain-of-command involvement.

Eight social-change principles formed the foundation on which the program was designed and were the basis for the study. Generally, the principles dealing with the psychology and technology of training were the most successfully implemented. The principles which addressed the structure and function of the military institution were less successfully applied.

In the final chapter of the volume the authors discuss conclusions that were reached about each of the principles. They present them in descending order of success. The first four principles discussed achieved a high degree of success, although each one had some problems that had to be resolved. They are simply listed here, since the four which experienced greatest difficulty of application have the most information for institutionalization.
Principle: That substantial improvement in human relations could be accomplished only by means of small group training in which personnel could perceive the positive norms espoused by the majority of their colleagues. That extremists would be brought under the social influence of the great majority of moderate, constructive Marines through the medium of public, small group discussion of a minimal, uniform set of issues.

Principle: That a program composed of uniform, cognitive training content, serving as a foundation for locally flexible experiential training, would lead to more institutional cohesiveness than loosely structured, topical programs.

Principle: That a mass program aimed at creating common philosophical understandings among disparate groups in the Marine Corps—officers and enlisted personnel, Blacks and Whites—would better resolve human relations issues than more specialized training for particular groups.

Principle: That only limited innovations could be introduced at a given time and that, until they had been absorbed, new requirements might jeopardize the whole effort.

As stated above, each of the principles just noted experienced complications and problems as they were applied. They each had their impact on the other principles, since they are all interdependent. However, for purposes of this discussion, a fuller treatment of the remaining principles may prove more productive.

Principle: That to institutionalize a viable program, members of the institution (the Marine Corps) would need to become engaged in each component of the program with a significant degree of motivation and training.

In those instances where this principle was applied successfully it was because of:

1. Visible command support
2. Involvement throughout the chain of command
3. Selection and training of highly qualified Unit Discussion Leaders
4. Timely implementation and maintenance of the experiential component of the program.
Problem areas emerged because:

1. At headquarters the number of Marines available was not sufficient to allow some to receive training while others "kept the store open."

2. At some field commands implementation of any new program is viewed with suspicion. Fears of the program: one, caused many to resist identification with it lest their career patterns would be jeopardized; two, caused some to choose to provide leadership in other programs perceived to have greater military respectability; and, three, produced active or passive opposition to the program in the belief that it was in the long-term best interest of the individual and the institution.

3. Where there was lack of commitment or inability to adapt the program as a leadership tool present in a command, problems like the following emerged:

   -- Selection of Unit Discussion Leaders was perfunctory, leading to grossly inadequate leadership

   -- Selection of participants for the program was equally perfunctory, resulting in low quality learning readiness.

4. Frequent personnel transfers made it difficult to produce the required proficiency and continuity for success.

5. Procedural rigidity, requiring strict adherence to formal rather than informal, flexible relationships between program managers and field commands complicated the implementation of the program.

6. Even the field grade officers, knowledgeable about the limits and constraints of the Corps, tended to be conservative in thinking about and proposing new developments, causing, for instance, a long delay in proposing a primary Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) for the Human Relations staff. (A secondary MOS was finally adopted.)

   **Principle:** That the high degree of structure and organization in the military, and particularly in the Marine Corps, would help to promote innovation throughout the Corps.

   This tradition has generally aided the institutionalization of the program. However, problems with uniform and consistent implementation brought to light the fact that the tradition is largely mythical in conception. The fact is that variations in local command and organization, together with wide variations in training and operational commitments, dictate great flexibility in local command implementation of
programs. Proceeding as if the tradition were a matter of fact and failure to check out the reality of the situation led to many errors of judgment and misunderstanding of the intentions of the program. This in turn led to cynicism, breakdown of the program, withdrawal from the program, or resistance to the program through fear of breakdown in discipline and erosion of small unit leadership.

**Principle:** That a single implementation model designed for the single largest or most typical component of the Marine Corps (ground divisions) could be readily adapted to other units.

Generally, this principle was implemented in units whose leaders fully supported the program and authorized the flexibility needed for adaptations.

Problems arose:

- When Marines in positions of leadership were opposed to the program on ideological grounds and resisted necessary changes. In some commands explicit and rigid implementation proved disruptive and counterproductive.

- In aviation units, where lines of production were based in shops, offices and sections (not fire teams, squads, platoons and companies). Marines were gathered from the various shops, offices and sections, usually as quota fillers. Productivity suffered because pilots couldn't fly and technicians couldn't provide needed support.

**Principle:** That if all the superiors were trained before their subordinates, opposition to program goals would be given to the implementation of both the cognitive and experiential training phases. Also, that leaders would be prone to participate in the discussions with their subordinates, as one means of lending such support, thereby enhancing program success by involving the chain of command.

This principle was implemented the least successfully of all the principles being applied to the program. There were a number of factors contributing to the difficulty of achieving the principles.

1. The Corps tried to comply with a Department of Defense (DOD) directive that all personnel be given race relations training a
minimum of 18 hours annually. In attempting to fulfill quotas in the allotted time, grouping errors were made (e.g., vertically mixed groups).

- Mid-level officers and staff non-commissioned officers (SNCO), too busy to take time, assigned subordinates to the training.
- Officers delayed their training for various reasons.
- Some thought it "demeaning" to be trained by a younger, immature subordinate.
- Some considered the materials and training approach (after cursory examination) faulty.
- Some were opposed ideologically (Blacks would pull the Corps down).
- Opposition to any training that took time away from more military or operations training.
- Some felt it would be futile to try to improve the behavior of the "low-grade" Marines then being recruited.
- Others objected because they saw its remedial education dimension as social welfare efforts inappropriate to a military organization.
This study is an examination of what was learned about innovations by the infusion of 20 million dollars to support 250 projects in Massachusetts. The summary reports show that the variables most strongly related to the adoption of innovations clustered in three areas:

1. Systematic planning, implementation and evaluation of objectives
2. Network building--early and widespread dissemination and involvement
3. Diagnostic inventory--needs assessment vs. support for an idea

What follows are some highlights from each of these areas.

Systematic planning, implementation and evaluation of objectives

Adopted programs:
- Met their objectives to a significantly greater degree
- Were more carefully planned; included pilot experiences
- Had directors with more expertise in project program areas
- Had objectives which were more realistic/achievable, compatible, tangible and visible

Changeability. Adopted programs stayed with their objectives. They needed to change their objectives less frequently in order to operate successfully than did non-adopted programs.

Evaluation. Adopted programs relied more on evaluation. Adopted programs relied significantly more on systematic evaluation than non-adopted programs. Leaders of adopted programs were more open to suggestion/evaluation and more flexible than directors of non-adopted programs.
Network Building--Early and Widespread Dissemination and Involvement

From the earliest planning stages and throughout the operation of an adopted program there was systematic dissemination about the project, involving decision makers and opinion leaders. A significant dimension was the frequent and early use of person-to-person contacts. There was a great deal of informal contact with district image makers. Project staffs of eventual adoptions tended to make more personal presentations than staff where the project was not adopted.

Adopted programs tended to dilute opposition through involvement while non-adopted programs tended to invite polarization through avoidance.

Adopted programs won district support early. Efforts toward institutionalization and routinization began as early as the planning stages. They were able to secure, maintain and increase more support than the non-adopted programs.

A related variable was seen in the fact that project directors were significantly more empathetic than was the case in non-adopted programs. The ability to understand the difficulties which come with change helped the directors in their contacts with administrators.

Diagnostic Inventory--Needs Assessment vs. Support for an Idea

Even though in ESEA Title III programs early diagnosis is in the form of a needs assessment, very few of the adopted programs actually began with a felt need in the school system. Most of the innovations, adopted or non-adopted, began because a few people thought the idea had merit.

Other commonly held beliefs contradicted by the study included:

- Early involvement of the director will increase adoption likelihood
- Involvement of large groups of school people is necessary for adoption
For success the superintendent needs to be the initiator.

Adoption is related to socio-economic makeup of the community and expenditure per child.

The study showed the credibility of the initiator to be more important for adoption than the role of the initiator. The compatibility of the innovation with the values of the school system was seen to be perhaps the most important factor at all stages of development. Radical innovations were not adopted.

The summary includes a section about leadership which may be instructive in a discussion on institutionalization.

Directors of adopted programs were slightly younger (average: 38 years) than non-adopted (average: 42 years) were less frequently male, had more experience in the subject area, and had a little more formal education.

Directors of adopted programs were perceived by everyone as being more flexible, empathetic and open to criticism, although less democratic than their counterparts in non-adopted programs. They also had more difficulty delegating responsibility.

Although all program directors were seen as having strong management skills, the directors of non-adopted programs had the most. They also rated highest in their persuasive abilities and selling skills.

The author of the study offers five implications derived from the study.

Implication I

That innovations can no longer languish as separate entities in one stage of development but adoption must be systematically planned from the start.

Implication II

That greater expertise in program development, dissemination and evaluation is necessary for an innovation to survive today. School systems are unwilling to tolerate loosely conceived and executed change efforts.

Implication III

That some procedures such as needs assessments, monitoring functions, etc., should be re-examined for their real contribution to the adoption of federally funded and nonfederally funded programs. Could other processes be employed more productively by state and local personnel in the initial phases of an innovation?
Implication IV

That there are differences between federal/state funded innovations and other planned change efforts (shorter start-up time, limited operation period, automatic cut-off of funds) which require somewhat different strategies.

Implication V

That the State Educational Agency could play a much greater role in bringing about change throughout the state if it chose to plan and promote change systematically. Given the tenuous nature of federal funding and the years of experience with temporary programs, it might be timely to begin such efforts in areas where they have not already begun.

The study concludes with a proposed adoption model derived from the findings:

THE MASSACHUSETTS MODEL

Phase I--Installation: Origin and Planning Period

1. Diagnostic Inventory--assess climate for change
2. Systems Analysis--program objectives
3. Diagnostic Inventory--test reaction to program
4. Dissemination--spread idea to key people
5. Network Building--secure needed support
6. Staffing--leader and staff
7. Diagnostic Inventory--secure needed state/federal financial support

Phase II--Trial Period: Operation of the Innovation

8. Temporary System--pilot activities, revise, refine as needed
9. Dissemination--involve key leaders, users, non-users; revise as needed
10. Evaluation--evaluate/revise/adapt
11. Routinization--movement from temporary to permanent system

Note: Stages 8, 9 and 10 may be repeated until trial is successful.

Phase III--Adoption Period

12. Routinization--final incorporation of program activities into system operation.
This study follows up the earlier study, *What Makes Innovation Work in Massachusetts*, and undertakes to see whether the variables significant at the time of that study (1974) were still relevant for 1977. There were a number of similarities, which include:

- Wealth or social status still not a factor for adoption.
- Still no difference in median income, professional climate, urban or suburban, amount of budget per pupil factors.
- Adopting districts still tend to be more open, flexible, less rigid in their bureaucratic structure, provide more professional growth opportunities.
- There is still a statistically significant difference in the use of systematic dissemination and involvement of opinion makers between adopting and nonadopting districts.
- Adopting districts still assume support of high levels of the bureaucracy is essential to survival.
- Just as in 1974 the support of opinion leaders and decision makers was more important than needs assessment in program development, in 1977 political analysis of supporters and opposers is more significant than evaluation in persuading decision makers to continue the program.
- None of the surviving programs threatens the system by proposing innovations which are radical or unresponsive to the political needs of the district.

Major dissimilarities between the 1974 and 1977 studies include the following:

- Evaluation has not played a major role in the decision to continue adopted programs. "Educational innovations are almost never installed on their merits." (Miles) "It is commonplace in education to assume that a school is a coordinated, integrated, problem solving mechanism that, confronted with an innovation, assesses its merits and, if it proves worthwhile, incorporates it. Such is not the case. The organization is, in fact, a combination of various departments and interest groups, all competing for scarce resources." (House)

- The changing economic scene has not made districts less open to change, but they have become more cautious, less willing to take up "will-o-the-wisp" ideas, less optimistic about trying something new "for its own sake."
There are changes in the "routinization" of programs between 1974, when they were still essentially "federal programs" and 1977. There are problems inherent in the absorption of innovations by bureaucracies which became apparent in the study, including:

- Decreased effectiveness because less clearly defined as an entity or project.
- Cutting back funding makes the project less exciting, therefore, some of the original enthusiasm or vitality is lost.
- Enthusiasm hard to maintain in the face of competing interests and needs.

The author concludes by offering a revised model.

THE REVISED MASSACHUSETTS CHANGE MODEL, 1977:
THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW PROGRAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Educational Agency</th>
<th>State/Federal Educational Agency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHASE I: INSTALLATION. ORIGIN AND PLANNING PERIOD OF A NEW PROGRAM</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Diagnostic Inventory Assess climate for change and decide on overall goals.</td>
<td>1. Diagnostic Inventory Assess climate for change and decide on overall goals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Diagnostic Inventory Test reactions to programs in school community.</td>
<td>3. Diagnostic Inventory Assess climate for change in school districts—degree of openness and professionalism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Dissemination Spread idea to key decision makers/opinion leaders.</td>
<td>4. Dissemination Establish and maintain contact with decision makers/opinion leaders.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Network Building Procure needed support from school system decision maker. Early diffusion.</td>
<td>5. Network Building Obtain needed support from state/federal decision makers/opinion leaders.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Staffing Select diffusion leader/staff.</td>
<td>6. Staffing Identify key staff and provide inservice training in areas of proven importance in the area of program development/adoptions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. **Diagnostic Inventory**  
   Obtain needed state/federal financial support.

8. **Temporary System**  
   Pilot/experiment with activities.

9. **Dissemination--Network Building**

10. **Evaluation**  
    Evaluate strengths and weaknesses of program.  
    Revise staff activities/objectives to conform to greater effectiveness model of performance.

11. **Routinization/Institutionalization**  
    Analyze needs of district.  
    Begin adapting program objectives/activities/staffing to meet those needs.  
    Plan for budgeting needs and begin obtaining local/state/federal help where necessary.

**PHASE II: TRIAL PERIOD: THE OPERATION OF THE NEW PROGRAM**

8. **Temporary System**  
   Assist school districts with technical/financial.

9. **Dissemination--Network Building**

10. **Evaluation**  
    Evaluate district innovation and suggest revisions.  
    Evaluate state/federal process and revise/adapt.  
    Assist districts with internal evaluation.

11. **Routinization**  
    --Assist districts with this phase.  
    --Provide guidance in national/state priorities and funding sources.  
    --Analyze needs of nation/state and begin identifying successful program practices which appear to meet those needs.  
    --Provide funds for the diffusion of these practices.

**PHASE III: ADOPTION PERIOD**

12. **Routinization/Institutionalization**  
    Continue activities of:  
    Network building with decision makers/opinion leaders; dissemination of program achievements to district, including appropriate analysis of political/constituent needs of district; adaptation of program goals to suit district financial, political, educational needs.

12. **Routinization/Institutionalization**  
    --Provide assistance/support to districts with network building dissemination, adaptation of program to fit district needs.  
    --Continue network building on a state/federal level to insure continued support.  
    --Provide funds to successful programs/components.  
    --Disseminate/diffuse successes to other programs.
--Obtain financial support; diffuse successes where possible
--Look to adapt/adopt other district successes where relevant and applicable.
This is the last of a series of well-publicized and widely read reports of a study of four federally funded change agent programs (Elementary and Secondary Education Act [ESEA] Title III, Innovative Projects; ESEA Title VII; Bilingual Projects; Vocational Educational Act, 1968 Amendments, Part D, Exemplary Programs; and the Right to Read Program). The study was conducted in two phases: first, a study of issues related to the initiation and implementation of the projects; and, second, an examination of what happened in the two largest programs—ESEA Title III and ESEA Title IV—when funding stopped. Volume VIII of the report summarizes the findings of both phases of the studies and, drawing on these results, describes the process of change at the local level—initiating, implementing and sustaining innovative projects. This review will focus on the part of the report which discusses sustaining innovative projects and implications for federal policy the authors recommend.

The authors of the report found all phases of an innovation—mobilization, implementation and institutionalization—to be interdependent. That is, a particular path during early phases of an innovative project forecast its continuation outcome. The linkage between the phases of innovation are conceptualized diagrammatically in the figure which follows.
In order to understand the processes of institutionalization it may be useful to start with a brief description of the processes of mobilization and implementation.

**Processes of Mobilization**

**Opportunism**—lack of effective support of entire system. Responsive to political demands or to acquire money, not central to district priorities. Superficial and pro forma planning focussed on compliance.

**Top-down**—central staff genuinely concerned but fails to secure support of school staff. Much planning by district, little planning involvement of user (principal, teacher). Directives met by resistance or indifference.

**Localized**—enthusiasm and efforts of "grass-roots" staff not matched at district level. Extensive planning in the school, little attention by central office beyond routine assistance from federal program grants manager. Isolated from the district.

**Broad-based**—project backed by all levels in the district. Seen as addressing a central educational need. Active steps taken to generate support at all levels of the system. Support not dependent on the source of the idea but involves participation at all appropriate levels in project planning.
Processes of Implementation

Nonimplementation--results from failure of a project to alter its setting or to adapt the project to the setting.

Cooptation--results when a staff adapts a project to meet its own needs without making changes in traditional institutional behavior or practices. Frequently smooth and trouble-free.

Mutual adaptation--results from change in both project and setting. Seldom smooth or trouble-free. Requires considerable support.

Processes of Institutionalization

When federal funding ends, the district must decide whether to continue the project and at what level of support. In their study the authors found the continuation decision distinctly resembled the earlier decision to adopt the project. Policy makers were more active than practitioners. Organizational and political matters often outweighed the project's educational merits. As in the adoption decision, the outcome to continue could not accurately be described in rational terms.

Moreover, a decision to continue did not guarantee the long run stability of the project. The continuation decision had to be implemented and this process was no easier than the project's original implementation. The difficulty of continuation is found in the organizational structure and operations of school systems. It is entirely possible for a district to promulgate a formal policy that is not followed by the teaching staff. On the other hand, teachers, principals and whole schools can subscribe to practices without the district's sanction or knowledge.

Specifically, the authors found four kinds of paths followed by projects when federal funding ended:

Discontinuation occurred when no one chose to continue project operation in any form. Sometimes an explicit decision was made; sometimes discontinuation occurred as a result of "benign neglect."
Isolated continuation resulted when district officials supported a project inadequately, if at all, but did not actively or explicitly turn the project off; however, in spite of this project, materials and methods continue to be used, usually in isolation. If the projects are dependent upon budget or support allocations, they are subject to curtailment.

Pro forma continuation is the result when the district establishes the innovation or some form of it as policy, but it is not used extensively by teachers. Sometimes, school staff simply did not use the innovation; in other cases it was used only in a ritualistic sense.

Institutionalized change occurred when the project became a part of the standard educational fare in the district at both district and classroom levels. Only a small portion of the projects in the sample were effectively institutionalized. These were characterized by:

- Successful implementation
- Teacher change
- Extensive use over time
- Eventual institutionalization as part of planning process from the outset
- Replaced an existing process
- Broad base of support
- Increased mobilization efforts at end of federal funding to pave the way for transition into key operations of the district.

The authors analyzed the characteristics of local projects that worked well and identified factors that determine the fate of an innovation. The characteristics and factors found are:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Findings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Educational methods</td>
<td>1. What project was mattered less than how it was done.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Project resources</td>
<td>2. More expensive projects are no more likely than inexpensive projects to be effectively implemented.</td>
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<td>Number of schools or amount of funding per student did not affect project outcomes.</td>
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<td>3. Scope of project</td>
<td>3. Ambitious innovations promoted teacher change without necessarily causing management or pupil achievement problems.</td>
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<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Findings</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ineffective strategies:</td>
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<td>- Outside consultants</td>
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<td>- Packaged management</td>
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<td>- One-shot training</td>
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<td>- Pay for training</td>
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<td>- Formal evaluation</td>
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<td>- Comprehensive projects</td>
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<td>Effective strategies:</td>
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<td>- Concrete, teacher-specific extended training</td>
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<td>- Observing similar projects</td>
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<td>- Regular meetings focused on practical problems</td>
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<td>- Teacher participation in decisions</td>
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<td>- Local materials development</td>
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<td>- Principal involved in training</td>
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<td>5. School organizational climate and leadership</td>
<td>5. Most significant—the active support of the principal</td>
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<td></td>
<td>High quality of working relationships among teachers</td>
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<td>Effective project director</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Characteristics of schools and attributes of teachers</td>
<td>6. None of the background or structural characteristics studied strongly affected outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change harder to obtain and continue at secondary level than elementary level</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Three teacher attributes—years of teaching, sense of efficacy and verbal ability significantly affected project outcomes</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. District management</td>
<td>7. From beginning to end, a supportive institutional environment was necessary for projects to be effectively implemented and to take root</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In a closing chapter the authors propose a series of implications for federal policy which may be useful in thinking about institutionalization. The basic assumptions on which federal policy has been based are, according to the authors, faulty. These assumptions are embodied in a research and development point of view which asserts:

1. Improving educational performance requires innovative educational technologies. The main problem is to disseminate new technologies.

2. Improving education requires the provision of missing resources to school districts. School districts will reform themselves if supplied with needed resources.

3. Improving educational focus requires a targeted project. Recipients of categorical programs are more likely to benefit, narrow change goals are more feasible than systemic change, change is best accomplished by attacking each problem independently since school problems are discrete and identifiable.

Even effectively implemented programs failed to satisfy federal goals for school improvement because (the authors believe):

1. The problem of sustaining change depends ultimately on the capacity and willingness of the system, not the project's resources and personnel.

2. Because of the "loose-coupling" of school systems, change in one aspect can occur without affecting other aspects.

3. Although proponents argue that a concentrated effort economizes on personnel and resources, federally funded projects created a demand for staff development which received inadequate support from both districts and projects.

The authors of the report believe there is a place for targeted projects, but only if they are supported by institutional, systemwide assistance. Federal assistance to build institutional capacity has been inadequate. With these criticisms in mind the report concludes with a set of operational premises which begins with the assumption that school districts are finally responsible for improving their own performance. They need short- and long-term aid to achieve this end. To this end the
authors recommend setting aside R&D assumptions and the consideration of
the following premises to formulate a new approach to school improvement:

1. Educational performance could be improved if more attention were
   paid to all stages of the local change process.

2. Educational performance could be improved with adaptive
   implementation assistance.

3. Educational performance could be improved if the capacity of
   school districts to manage change were enhanced.

This document is a monograph which was developed as a result of a project to document the experience of ten Teacher Corps Projects in New York as they planned, installed and institutionalized new programs and practices. The project was initiated in 1971 when it became apparent the new five-year Teacher Corps Program would require anyone interested to plan to continue projects beyond their funded life. The monograph addresses the concern that while planners, managers and communities have done well with the development and installation of new programs, they have not attended to the issues of developing the support needed to insure their continuation. The monograph is a kind of handbook of guidelines and principles which will increase the likelihood that new programs will be continued—that is, institutionalized.

The monograph addresses four reasons for the problem of failure of the Teacher Corps to institutionalize new programs:

1. Prior to 1978 projects were not required, as a condition of funding, to focus on institutionalization.

2. The unique character of a temporary, funded project has not been understood by project planners and managers. Thus, the project has not been used as an effective temporary system to facilitate institutionalization of new programs and practices.

3. In the past project managers and planners have been unaware of the requirements which lead to institutionalization, so realistic goals for continuation have not been set early in the life of the project.

4. Project planners and managers have generally been unaware of specific activities essential to institutionalization, leading to failure to incorporate such actions into plans from the outset.
Operationalizing the Local Project as an Effective Temporary System to Facilitate Institutionalization—a set of operating principles.

**Principle 1.** Temporary systems initiated by regular members of the permanent system are more likely to have their products accepted by the permanent system than are temporary products developed outside the permanent system. Likewise, persons from the permanent system who join a temporary system and then re-enter the permanent system are more likely to be accepted than are outsiders who attempt to enter the permanent system.

**Principle 2.** The more that participants in the temporary system understand the nature of both systems, the greater will be the effectiveness of the temporary system in helping participants develop new skills, attitudes and programs that can be installed in the permanent system.

**Principle 3.** The greater the difference between life in the temporary system and life in the permanent system, the greater will be the problems of entry and re-entry, particularly if programs and practices developed in the temporary system are being considered for installation in the permanent system.

**Principle 4.** The more effective the communication between the temporary system and the permanent system, the easier it is for members to move from one system to the other.

**Principle 5.** The more well-developed the support systems in the permanent system are for new structures, processes or behaviors introduced from temporary systems, the greater will be the chance for adoption and institutionalization.

**Stages Activities Leading to Institutionalization**

As a goal—the stage in the life of a change when the change becomes a regular feature in the culture of the organization. Stages which lead to this goal include: awareness; need or opportunity; acceptance of proposed change; preparation for implementation; limited installation; institutionalization. The relationship between the stages of institutionalization and the seven facilitative activities is demonstrated in the table on page 53.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilitative Activities</th>
<th>Awareness</th>
<th>Acceptance</th>
<th>Preparation</th>
<th>Limited Installation</th>
<th>Institutionalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defining Program or Practice</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Judging Institutional Potential</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning an Overall Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identifying Critical Events</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning Strategic Actions</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Documenting Strategic Actions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Verification of Change</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As a process—a set of actions consciously and deliberately taken to improve the performance and operation of an organization by impacting structures, processes or behaviors in the unit. Seven facilitative actions are presented as essential procedures. They are:

- Defining the program or practice to be institutionalized
- Judging the potential of the organization to adopt the innovation
- Planning overall strategy for the change effort
- Identifying critical events in the change process
- Planning strategic activities to influence critical events
- Documenting strategic activities and critical events
- Planning a system through which to verify change

Minimum, essential indicators that determine the presence of institutionalization are:

- Accurate identification and acceptance as a regular feature by ongoing members of the organization and by knowledgeable clients
- Endorsement and promotion by both formal and informal influences in the system
- Appropriate revision of the structure of the system
- Provision for support in the allocation of regular resources
- Pervasive, routine participation in the practice or use of the product by appropriate persons in the organization.

In this final report the authors describe how SEAs, using assistance provided by the National Institute of Education (NIE) have developed the capacity to operate dissemination systems. NTS Research Corporation, sponsored by the Research and Educational Practice unit of NIE's Program on Dissemination and Improvement of Practice, conducted a study of the State Capacity Building Project (SCBP). Data were collected from the capacity building projects twice in 1978 and in 1979. Case studies were made of five projects, NIE personnel involved in the design and implementation of the SCBP, and existing documentation was reviewed.

The findings in the report are presented as responses to three major research questions:

- Is dissemination capacity being built?
- What are the factors affecting the building of capacity? What helps and hinders achievement of program objectives?
- What program management and program design factors affect the building of capacity?

The authors found that increased capacity of the SEAs for dissemination is being achieved and that the process of increasing capacity follows several patterns, depending on state history and context, and that they reflect the flexibility allowed by the program guidelines.

Factors which affect program success which are pertinent to a discussion of institutionalization include:

**State Factors**
- Once energetic, entrepreneurial leadership is gone, the process may become endangered.
o Previous experience in dissemination activities is a helpful but not sufficient factor for institutionalization.

o Placement is significant. Placement in an administrative unit enhances development of the system. Placement in a service unit increases delivery to clients and institutionalization of the system.

o Initial targeting of services for use by particular clientele assists system development. Institutionalization requires that the project move on to serve a more general clientele.

o Active support of SEA administrators (Chief State School Officers and associates) is crucial to all aspects of system development, including institutionalization.

o Stringent state budgets and changes in agency leadership have generally negative effects which are largely beyond the control of project staff.

Program Design and Management Factors

o While collaborative planning and flexible program guidelines permitted states to tailor their projects to fit their contexts enhanced in state capacity for independent solutions to system development, they may also foster a lack of understanding of the goals and means of a dissemination system.

o Because objectives about the role of the dissemination system in other state school improvement efforts are not adequately specified, the potential for facilitating the use of new knowledge and practice for school improvement is only partially realized in many SCBP states.

Other Structural Factors

o In spite of continued fragmentation of the dissemination components in Federal programs, many states have made progress in coordinating dissemination efforts.

Based on their study, the authors of the report were able to describe systematically the process of institutionalization, as follows:

o Initial agency goal statements

o Planning that specializes in input to the project (e.g., role definitions and experience)

o Mechanisms for coordinating funding for dissemination

o Increased commitments for future funding

o Expanded project planning to include planning for dissemination agency wide
Increased dissemination function through "on-paper" commitments. These include general goal statements and a place on the organization chart. A specific agency line item results in specific state budgeting for dissemination which makes provision for project activities both during and after the grant period.

In 1979 the institutionalization scale used in the study showed that:

- Three states (of 29) are in a high stage of institutionalization.
- Thirteen states are showing steady and systematic growth
- Six states have done preliminary planning and have secured commitments for additional funding
- Six states are in planning stages
- Two states are growing in a less systematic fashion.

Retrenchment (loss of state support and/or on-paper commitments) was noted between 1978 and 1979:

- Six states went back to awareness, role definition or planning activities, probably signifying: one, that some steps had not been taken; two, that states "institutionalized" prematurely; or, three, that states had lost their political base.
- Two states, previously highly institutionalized, declined drastically. Both these projects experienced a change in leadership.

The authors of the report note that the institutionalized status of a project can change very rapidly with withdrawal of political support or with a drop in potential funds. Sudden environmental changes will change the status of institutionalization.

In the five case studies included in the report dissemination capacity has been institutionalized in varying degrees. Major factors which influence the project's success and eventual incorporation into the SEA as a function in these instances include:

- Stability and entrepreneurial skills of key personnel (project and SEA)
- Degree of congruence of the project's functions with SEA structure and mission
- Acceptance of project functions by top level SEA administrators
An Assessment of NIE's Research and Development Utilization (RDU) Program.
An inhouse report circulated by Michael B. Kane. National Institute of

In this report Abt Associates describe how the findings of a three-year
study of the Research and Development Utilization (RDU) Program can inform
policy choices for federal and state support of dissemination and school
improvement programs. The RDU program was designed as a demonstration,
intended to support dissemination activities that would lead to school
improvement at the local level.

RDU program objectives were to:

- Help schools alleviate specific, locally defined problems in basic
  skills and career education
- Help school and district personnel learn about the products of
  educational research and development
- Increase understanding of how the local program improvement process
  could be better managed and become more effective

Seven field designed projects were funded to develop structures and
procedures to:

- Organize a linkage system
- Apply research based products or ideas to school problems
- Develop a problem solving process in which schools would
  systematically identify problems and select and implement ideas

An unusual characteristic of the RDU program was its dual commitment to
the dissemination and use of R&D products and the development of local
school capabilities to solve problems through the use of externally
developed knowledge. Other programs have tended to concentrate either on
specific products or on building capacity for local problem solving.

The report is organized around what the findings revealed about six
policy questions:

- How effective is a dissemination strategy in fostering school
  improvement?
What activities should be supported in a dissemination strategy?

How much money needs to be given to local sites?

What are the prospects for schools becoming relatively self-sufficient in solving local problems?

How effective are targeting dissemination programs in addressing issues of educational equity?

How should networks supporting dissemination and knowledge use be designed?

Information gleaned from the questions concerning the likelihood of schools becoming somewhat self-sufficient in solving local problems and how dissemination networks should be designed includes some items which are relevant to a discussion of institutionalization. Before noting some of these findings, we will list a few other highlights which may have implications for institutionalization.

A well-designed dissemination strategy which emphasizes the provision of high quality information, technical assistance and small amounts of funds to local schools can be effective in promoting school improvement.

Local commitment, resources and energy are essential and critical elements for local improvement.

Local adaptation or development of innovations not as essential as previous studies indicate if (a) carefully selected by practitioner to match local needs and conditions, and (b) schools can readily obtain needed technical assistance and training in use of new products.

The array of existing R&D based and validated products is unexpectedly inadequate in scope and number to be responsive to the full-range of problems as identified by local practitioners.

What Are the Prospects for Schools Becoming Relatively Self-Sufficient in Solving Local Problems?

Institutionalization of key features of the process (e.g., reliance on external resources, use of problem solving teams with high levels of effort) did not occur very often. Schools generally did not acquire the internal capacity to repeat a problem solving process as demanding as that used in the RDU process.

Several factors highly predictive of other school outcomes had negative effects on the incorporation of the process. For instance, the involvement of external field agents tends to be positively
related to the particular knowledge that was used and new programs implemented, but negatively related to institutionalization of changes in the school's approach to problem solving.

- Explanations for lack of impact on capacity to solve problems include:
  - Most RDU services deliverers put less emphasis on local capacity building objectives.
  - The sites relied heavily on external help in RDU problem solving instead of developing internally funded personnel who had the skills and resources to support similar efforts, due in part to the vagueness of the problem solving objective.
  - Commitment to build an internal capacity for participatory problem solving must come from inside a central office or school building, so local site conditions are likely the most critical factors in determining whether this commitment will emerge. For instance, the schools that were most successful in incorporating new problem solving practices were those that had had a similar previous experience and some experience with similar problem solving models. Principal turnover and financial cutbacks also contributed to discontinuation of problem solving practices which were highly rated but not yet established.

How Should Networks Supporting Dissemination and Knowledge Use Be Designed?

- While effective in delivering services and information, the networks proved to be fragile and were not institutionalized.
- Factors contributing to low level of incorporation include:
  - The special status of the project as an externally funded contract and definition of it as both service delivery and research placed it in the wrong unit of the organization for eventual incorporation.
  - The tension between the quest for local control and ownership and the quest for centralized management. Many organizations were willing to release some autonomy and control temporarily, but many resisted centralized control.
  - The basis for collaboration was frequently not considered, resulting in systems which did not represent naturally occurring collaborations.
  - The three-year time period was not sufficient either to solidify a network built on an interpersonal foundation or to create the interpersonal linkages in which an interorganizational network can function.
  - In sum, it is unrealistic to expect institutionalization if this is not an explicit and primary objective of the program.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED FOR REVIEW


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