Legitimating Education Policy: The Use of Special Committees in Formulating Policies in the USA and the UK.

Using examples from the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (U.K.), the authors investigate the use of special or expert commissions in government policy-making in education. They analyze such commissions' impacts, the criticisms made of them, their role in political legitimation, and some alternative instruments for policy formation. After a brief introduction the paper presents past and present opinions in the U.S. and the U.K. on commissions (chiefly noneducational ones) and their utility. The authors then look in detail at the role of three U.S. and five U.K. educational commissions of the 1960's and 1970's, examining their reports and the results of their recommendations. The U.S. reports are the California Master Plan on Higher Education, the Bundy report on New York City, and the Kerr report on higher education; the U.K. documents include the Robbins, Plowden, James, Auld, and Taylor reports. The paper's following section places educational commissions within the larger context of political policy-making and discusses the extent to which commissions are legitimated and the extent to which they legitimate particular policies. The final section considers such alternatives to commissions - such as legislative committees, think tanks, one-person studies, political parties' research groups, and academic studies. (RW)
Project Report No. 82-A17

LEGITIMATING EDUCATION POLICY:
THE USE OF SPECIAL COMMITTEES
IN FORMULATING POLICIES IN THE USA AND THE UK

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July 1982

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The research for this report was supported by funds from the National Institute of Education (Grant No. OB-NIE-G-80-0111). The analyses and conclusions do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of this organization.
The Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance is a Research and Development Center of the National Institute of Education (NIE) and is authorized and funded under authority of Section 405 of the General Education Provisions Act as amended by Section 403 of the Education Amendments of 1976 (P.L. 94-482). The Institute is administered through the School of Education at Stanford University and is located in the Center for Educational Research at Stanford (CERAS).

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Abstract

In the United States and in the United Kingdom, a range of devices is used to solicit expert opinion about matters that affect government policy in education. The classical blue-ribbon committee patterned on the British Royal commissions has been expanded to include single-person inquiries, "think-tank" reports, recommendations of self-appointed groups of prestigious figures (often supported by private foundations), and mainstream academic inquiry. Each of these devices has its uses, even as politicians become more assertive in establishing their own policy preferences in a period of diminishing national consensus; "expert" opinion is still sought as one means of legitimating educational policy, but differently depending on the purpose.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We wish to acknowledge the help given us in this study by colleagues in the Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance, Stanford University and particularly Dr. Henry Levin, the Institute's Director, and Dr. Hans Weiler. Both were instrumental in helping us to develop the general plan for this work.

One of us was fortunate enough to enjoy the academic hospitality of the Center for the Study of Higher Education, University of California at Berkeley for a period of three months when much of this paper was written. Particular gratitude is due to Professor Martin Trow, the director of the Center, who created the sympathetic environment in which the work could proceed and provided many valuable insights into the nature of the American educational experience. The British author of this paper also expresses appreciation for the hospitality extended by the School of Education, Stanford University.

Grateful acknowledgement is made to Mrs. Sally Harris, Department of Government, Brunel University whose expert administration and secretarial services made much of this study possible.
The crisis of legitimation in society and in educational policy has affected the ways in which certain traditional instruments of government are used. In the United Kingdom and in the USA, Royal Commissions, special committees and commissions, and the so-called 'blue ribbon' committees, have had a venerable history. Their purposes and functions are now in doubt.

The purpose of this paper is first to analyze the extent to which commissions have in fact had an impact, the criticisms that recently have been made of them, and distinctions that might be drawn between committees and other institutional devices that are emerging in the development of educational policy. The classic Commission of Inquiry was developed in the nineteenth century and became a device common in education policy formulation (and many other fields) not only in Britain but also in most of the British commonwealth countries, the United States, and, perhaps most effectively of all, in Sweden. It must now compete with the such developments as think tanks, Congressional and Parliamentary Committees, specialist bodies that assist legislatures such as the General Accounting Office and Congressional Budget Office, the
single-person study, and the different varieties of ombudsmanship and other forms of equity audit in many countries.

In examining the changing fortunes of blue-ribbon enquiries and committees, and in thinking about additional or substitute ways in which those involved in educational governance seem to be able to improve their knowledge and their ways of operating, we have attempted to identify some of the factors in contemporary education that seem to be hastening the development of new mechanisms. Traditionally, government has been expected to be stable, reliable, and equitable. Political figures were expected to articulate the norms of the society that they served and search for policies that would reflect the broadest identifiable consensus. These desiderata have not been entirely dissolved by contemporary turbulence and the challenge to conventional modes of legitimation. But parallel, if not conflicting, impulses demand that government also be receptive to a far wider range of interests and groups than those who have traditionally been regarded as stakeholders in educational policy. It must be encompassing rather than discrete, expressive and even declamatory, and not solely analytic. In the concluding sections of this paper, we will return to these considerations to see which devices might meet new conditions in the United States and the United Kingdom as both nations develop new modes to illuminate and legitimate policy.
The use of special committees in education during the last twenty years reveals much about the processes by which educational policies become identified, expressed, legitimated, promulgated, and tested. There are also, cutting across the main structural themes of how norms are set and the mechanisms by which they are translated into policy and action, such issues as the changing relationship between political initiatives in policy making, intuitive as they often are, and the more self-conscious efforts of social scientists, particularly as reflected in work for commissions, in making sense of the world that politicians and practitioners inhabit.

What follows is an essay based on a modest enquiry into the use of committees within the very different policy contexts of education in the USA and the UK. It is based primarily on the examination of secondary sources although, particularly in the case of the UK, some interviews with main actors were conducted. Between them, the authors have also drawn upon some first-hand experience of membership and staffing of such committees.

Recently, the literature on commissions has altered in its perspective considerably. It is both more scholarly and more skeptical than hitherto. Much that was written between 1930 and 1960 assumed that commissions could discover undisputed facts, make usable judgements based upon the consensus of able and impartial people, and thus beneficially
affect governance. In the last two decades, however, the literature has emphasized increasingly that commissions either wrongly assume consensus or themselves reflect conflict between those who formulate policy and those who are affected by it.

Our first general impression is that everything that has been written about commissions is true. They reflect reasonably well the changing degrees and patterns over time for the legitimation of policy. Their own legitimacy has weakened, however, commensurately with that of other forms of decision making. Our second observation is that while both the USA and Britain have experienced major changes in educational policy making and practice—and in many ways in a similar direction—they remain different. British schools still place a premium upon institutional continuity. There is great strength in the prime institutions—schools and colleges—which ensures such continuity. There is remarkably slow turnover at the very top of the system, except at the highest political levels. Officials in the Department of Education and Science, for example, are typically recruited young and reach the top at Deputy Secretary level or Under Secretary level after, perhaps, 20 or 25 years, and thus many of the same people may have contributed to the development and maintenance of policy for a whole generation. Similarly, the interest groups who confront government also make remarkably few changes in their leading personalities.
We must not, however, exaggerate the lack of capacity for change within the British system. Indeed, some of the major reports that we will discuss--Robbins, Auld, and Taylor--introduced and legitimated important change. The British scene is no longer calm and continuous. All the same, in comparison, the American scene is volatile. Of course key institutions, particularly major interest groups such as the American Federation of Teachers, display continuity. But policies at the federal, state, district, and school level are far more susceptible to changes in the general polity, and, it has been suggested, are subject to great changes of fashion at short notice. This, indeed, may account for the importance of the private foundations when compared with governmental bodies in formulating educational policy within the USA. They at least need not feel the need to move with the political mood although they, too, often put their influence behind rapid innovation.

In Britain, before the 1944 Education Act, the commissions dwelled approvingly upon the best features of educational development and continuity as they arose from practice within the schools. At the same time, they added a quotient of technical knowledge on, for example, current theories of child development in the Hadow Reports of the 1930s.

The commissions are as important for what they reveal about modes of legitimation and assumptions about policy process as for the direct impact that some may have had upon policies being forged. Essentially,
they codified and expressed rather than created norms. Exactly how, is a topic for more detailed treatment in the final sections of this paper.

This report follows the following plan. First (Section II), we examine the state of the art concerning general and mainly noneducational fields of policy. In both the USA and the UK there is now a substantial literature on the use of committees and commissions, although little on education commissions as such in either country. We then examine the more limited literature on committees primarily concerned with education (Section III). On the basis of the general and specific literature we formulate, in Section IV, the extent to which commissions are themselves legitimated and how far they legitimate policies when viewed within the larger policy-making system. Finally, in Section V, we venture into the field of summation and prescription and seek to exploit our analysis for purposes of future policy development.
II

THE STATE OF THE ART - GENERAL COMMITTEES

There is a large literature on commissions of enquiry concerned mainly with substantive areas other than education. Over time there has been a shift in emphasis in this writing from mainly historical and approving descriptions of such traditional models as British Royal Commissions (e.g., Clokie and Robinson [1937], Mansergh [1965]) to sharp critiques of the ways in which it is alleged that American Presidential and city commissions on race riots, or violence, or pornography (e.g., Platt [1971], Komarovsky [1975], Lipksy and Olson [1977]) have contrived to assimilate social discontent into the consensus-seeking procedures of a society wrongly assumed to be pluralist.

The consensual assumption was generally strong in the traditional literature. In the view of Sir Arthur Salter (Vernon and Mansergh [1940]): "The proper use of Advisory bodies is the right answer of representative democracy to the challenge of the Corporate State." Such a claim would now be refuted directly by those who see these instruments as a collusive and confirmatory instrument of The Establishment.

"Radical changes are usually initiated from outside the Government service and, on all the more complicated and social problems, exploration by a Royal Commission is the usual preliminary to legislative action...In social change, inquiry is so generally a preliminary of legislation as
to have become almost a part of the legislative process." These developments, Salter thought, might affect beneficially the very processes of government: "The utilization of advice from outside... does involve the introduction of a new element as a part of official technique. The consideration of outside opinion is a means of effecting a continuous penetration of the machinery of government by the spirit of democracy."

Other, all earlier, American authors (e.g., Clokie and Robinson, 1937) referred to the Royal Commission in such terms as "a notable example of the wise combination of fact finding and policy forming in the state." They also concluded, however, that "the Golden Age of Royal Commissions is passed and that new devices and processes are rapidly superseding them." There is Hanser's view that the Royal Commission is "the best of its kind ever developed... its findings of fact are accepted by the knowledgeable as definitive; its policy directives almost invariably guided societal evolution" (1969). From Britain, there is Pinker's observation of how, in the years following the Poor Law Amendment Act (1834), "a growing number of social investigations led to the accumulation of a body of evidence on our social conditions. This evidence provided the substantial basis of what is now termed 'blue book' sociology." Many have remarked how Marx himself made exhaustive use of many of the major reports that were prepared by the great social
investigators of the early and mid 19th centuries and that he paid
testimony to their value:

Although the impact made by Commissions is a matter for dispute,
they have certainly not been an art form neglected by policy-makers.
One recent British work (Kogan and Packwood, 1975) analyzed the operation
and consequences of twenty-eight Commissions and committees in education,
and had to draw quite severe boundaries around the subject area for many
more could have been included. Similarly, Rhodes (1975), in coping with
the same subject over the whole field of governmental action in Britain,
after anxious thought about how to define his subject, restricted his
study to 170 committees or commissions appointed by the central
government between 1959 and 1968. In the USA, between 1945 and 1968,
Presidents appointed 66 advisory commissions. "By a somewhat broader
classification, fully 132 boards and commissions were appointed to advise
the President, Congress and various executive agencies in the
three-and-a-half-year period from 1965 through the summer of 1968."
Johnson ("The Great Commissioner") appointed Presidential Advisory
Commissions at the rate of four a year. (Lipsky and Olson, [1977],
Chapter 3).

Some of the earlier evaluations were more skeptical than those
quoted above. Beatrice Webb, virtually a lifelong Royal Commission of
her own, was critical of the consensual and pluralist assumptions (Our
Partnership (1948). Rhodes (1975) aptly sums up his own analysis by quoting one report as follows: "The practice of instituting special enquiries or commissions into matters affecting the Highlands and Islands has become a Scottish tradition of great antiquity and occasional utility" (Report of the Committee on General Medical Services in the Highlands and Islands, 1967). Rhodes, whose study is a notable attempt to make sense of a difficult area, notes how many of the observers and critics of commissions applauded the notion of commissions of inquiry in general, but found little good to say about particular examples of them. Harold Laski, while eulogizing them (1938), asserted that, on the average, in the British system, it took nineteen years for the recommendations of a unanimous report of a Royal Commission to assume statutory form; and if the commission was divided in its opinion, it took on the average about thirty years. Harold Wilson thought (quoted by Chapman [1973]) that Royal Commissions "take minutes and waste years."

The moderate and traditional view of them is summarized by Rhodes. They enable a problem to be looked at in depth by others than those officially concerned with the issue. The independent outsider carries more weight when proposing change. If they help to focus on a policy issue it is not because of what they recommend but, in Vickers' (1965) view, the way that they focus or change the appreciation of an issue. Rhodes sees them as part of a policy-making process which is gradual and
Reexamination of policy rarely takes place out of the blue. There will almost certainly be in any given situation pressures for a change in policy, weak or strong, internal or external, which have to be accommodated in the perpetual process of policy making." He recognizes their implicitly negotiative and collusive nature. In some, "the representation of interests and the element of negotiation are as prominent, if not more so, as the element of enquiry." Rhodes reports the now familiar criticisms, made more trenchantly in the American literature, about "the close connection between the membership of committees and the purposes which they are designed to serve. Others, again, have been sharp about their methods. One committee (Shonfield, 1969) were "victims of the pragmatic fallacy, [and] expected to plunge into the subject of investigation and find out what was significant as they went along." They lacked "any investigative arm." A particularly mordant American view of the Plowden Committee's research typified it as wrong in its conclusions and as a committee which turned its back on inconvenient evidence (Acland, 1980).

Rhodes also confirms other views that the acceptance of reports might predicate a predisposition towards the proposals on the part of Ministers who create and receive the results of a commission's work. The UK case of the Robbins Committee on Higher Education (1963) stands out here (Boyle and Kogan, 1971). The government assumed that higher
education should be greatly expanded. Another instructive point emerges from Robbins. The government accepted the Committee's recommendations on access to higher education and the general social and economic arguments for expansion. But nothing was done to pursue the recommendations on curriculum and course organization. Nor did government like to be told how to govern: the proposals about departmental responsibility for higher education—Robbins wanted a separate Ministry—were soon abandoned. Impact and acceptance might thus be analyzed in terms of the type of issue raised. In education it is possible to differentiate among educational content and curriculum; social issues and access; organizational and structural issues (such as selection for secondary education); and the degree of control of government itself in an area of policy. Receptivity of a report will depend on the dimension of education to which the study and recommendations are directed. Some issues are hugged close to the bosom of Whitehall or the White House and recommendations on them are not welcomed.

More recent perspectives.

Recently, critical sociological eyes have been focused on the subject. Katz (1965), in a review of the assumptions underlying British educational reports, maintains that they carry forward without challenge the assumptions that comprise the core of the British educational tradition. They avoid the resolution of uncomfortable dilemmas. Katz'
critique is based on a sensitive reading of the reports, although others (Kogan and Packwood, 1975) believe that he underestimates the extent to which they were ahead of the schools in the "traditional" doctrines which they communicated. Smith and Stockman (1972) attempted to clarify the extent to which the official reports "propose a description of the world" and "embody a causal model", and the extent to which the causal model may be consistent and supported by evidence. In 1980, Burton and Carlen asked, "Why do government reports take the form they do?", and make excursions into what their publishers describe as "linguistics, psychoanalysis, and Marxism" in an effort to produce a "theoretical reconstruction and elaboration of a specific ideological practice." They subjected British enquiries into police and judicial procedures to an analysis which can be taken as representing the extreme of the critical statements about enquiries. They asserted how in the nineteenth century commissions were developed to help meet the "requirement of the ascendant capitalist class to control the social contradictions produced by an unstable and potentially revolutionary situation..." Their main function was to provide and to publicly propagate knowledge of social conditions that would shape the technology of social engineering... " a clearly dual function of not only creating information but manipulating its proper reception..." They were "a pedagogy of reform based on inductive enquiry and public propaganda." "They are seen as representing
a system of intellectual collusion whereby selected, frequently judical, intelligentsia transmit forms of knowledge into political practices." Burton and Carlen declare enquiries to be "affirmatory texts that announce the professional functionaries' competence" and that they are concerned with the "exoneration of the system." These authors thus raise points, in an extreme form, which many other observers concerned with issues of law and order make, if with more recourse to evidence.

Virtually the whole of recent American commentary on the use made of committees of enquiry has been critical, perhaps because much of it has been concerned with commissions on deeply distressing and divisive events in recent American history: race riots, violence, the growth and potential control of pornography. The appraisals are virtually silent on the mass of Presidential and other enquiries, often instigated by philanthropic foundations, which are nearer the predominant British mode in assuming that consensually minded people will examine a problem ruminatively and on the basis of evidence, or negotiate differences through the committee medium.

What are the main points made in the American political and sociological analyses? First, those with a governmental origin are assumed to obey what Popper (1970) called "the iron law of presidential appointment" in that "representatives of major sectors of American society participate collectively in arriving at consensus on policy."
To some extent this is the predominant British view, but it will be recalled that both Laski and Salter thought British commissions helped policies to be tested and changed by non-official intervention, and Graves thought they were an antidote to bureaucratic dominance. The allegations about inbuilt conformity, made sardonically and without too much care for facts in such writing as Elizabeth Drew's *On Giving Oneself a Hot Foot: Government by Commission*, (1968) have been refuted by Martha Derthick: "If presidential commissions articulate a consensus, the common denominator of opinion about the nature of a social problem, then they serve an important political function" (1971). Indeed, Robert Nisbet's complaint that the Commission on Campus Unrest was not good social science but merely "pieties" misses the whole point of committees that have anything more than a merely technical remit: they are appointed to form judgments and not to produce academic treatises. In fact, the critique of committees as consensus assuming is contained in the very title of a leading book on the subject: Lipsky and Olson's *Commission Politics*, which is subtitled "The Processing of Racial Crisis in America," (1977).

The second general finding concerns the different ways of using data. In particular, social scientists have been interested in the role of social science in these exercises. At minimum, many of the data collected have been thought useful for students of the subjects covered.
But the use made has varied. The Committee on Obscenity and Pornography (Larsen in Komarovsky, 1975) "had more input from sociologists and other social scientists than any other commission in government history. . ."
But, Larsen thought, if there is a movement to adopt the commission's findings, it will not be won by reference to the data collected or the logic created. In another case the Commission decided to include one and exclude another social science contribution and thus biased the findings. Larsen felt that the Obscenity and Pornography Commission was too scholarly. It should have made empirical studies of the policy options which could then have shaped the scholarly contributions. The Commission on Population Growth and the American Future (Westoff) made use of social science on demography and fertility which greatly affected its findings. But it avoided the far more value-saturated issues that might have been generated by studies of social structure. And, then, there is the ambivalence of social scientists on whether they should draw close to the policy setting system. American commentators feel that many social scientists do not share the willingness and ability of the lawyers to come in without demur and make decisive recommendations with little analysis of philosophical assumptions.
Thirdly, as part of the consensus setting function, the commissions develop different degrees of public display. Some members cannot tolerate the discretion and quiet that reflective and impartial work
might demand and break loose of the collective discipline. Other commissions deliberately engage in what Solsnick (in Komarovsky, 1975) calls "a form of theater." The Commission on Obscenity and Pornography adopted the first course and Katzenbach's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice the latter. On issues of extreme distress and division, some commissioners see themselves as using theater in a therapeutic fashion to allow the afflicted and the concerned to have their say and thus assure the world that there is study going on which will bear their problems in mind. As we will see later, the use of publicity can be a deliberate means of enhancing impact, as in the Kerr Commission.

Apart from these issues of purpose and general modes of operation, the studies all probe the fashion in which commissions operate and the impact that they have. But the generalizations on impact and their norm-setting functions are weak.
What has been the role of committees in educational policy? For the most part, we will approach this issue by applying some of the questions derived from previous work, both general and specifically educational, to the particular cases which we have examined in more detail. The US and UK cases that receive most of our attention are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of Enquiry</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Instigating Body</th>
<th>Substantive Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California Master Plan on Higher Education</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>State of California</td>
<td>Comprehensive planning of state higher education system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnection for Learning: A Community System for New York City (Bundy Report)</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Mayor J. Lindsay &amp; Ford Foundation</td>
<td>Local community controlled schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priorities for Action: Final Report of Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (Kerr Report)</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Carnegie Foundation</td>
<td>The future of higher education based on 21 special reports and studies leading to 8 publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Report of the Committee on Higher Education (Robbins Report)</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Prime Minister (UK)</td>
<td>Access, Institutional structure, curriculum and governance of higher education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
USA Examples

In turning to American examples we must first note that with the exception of one article (Longanecker and Klein, 1977) references to the role of commissions in legitimating educational policy are scattered through more general works on educational policy-making (e.g., Bailey and Mosher, 1968; Summerfield, 1974; Milstein and Jennings, 1973). There is no single monograph on the subject, and the gap was noted by Bailey and Mosher: "Advisory councils are the No-Man's Land of federal agency activity. They need far more analytic and normative attention than they have received from scholars and legislators." But the American lack of general studies of educational commissions is more than offset by studies

| Children and their Primary Schools (Plowden Report) | 1967 | Secretary of State for Education & Science (UK) | Primary education in all of its aspects, and the transition to secondary education |
| Teacher Education and Training (The James Report) | 1971 | Secretary of State for Education & Science (UK) | Sequences and content of teacher education |
| Report of an enquiry into the William Tyndale Jr. and Infant Schools, London (the Auld Report) | 1976 | Inner London Education Authority (UK) | Attempts by teachers to create radical curriculum free of local authority control |
| A New Partnership for our Schools (The Taylor Report) | 1977 | Secretary of State for Education & Science and Secretary of State for Wales (UK) | Reform of governing bodies of schools |
of legislative and political process, in statements of models of policy-making, and in detailed studies of particular commissions. The Carnegie Commission and Foundation, for example, provided dispassionate analyses of their own ways of working (Kerr, 1980; Pirer, 1973) and, most helpfully, published summaries of the criticisms made of its reports (1980). We will first analyze the American cases of Bundy, Kerr, and the California 1960 Master Plan for Higher Education (and its 1973 sequel). Our first main case, the Bundy Report on New York's decentralization of schools, is documented in a torrent of richly auto-ethnographic and often wildly biased participant and observer discussion.

**USA: Bundy**

The Bundy panel on the decentralization of New York schools is an example of a blue-ribbon commission that faced sharp political conflict from the outset. Its members were attempting to adjudicate issues that actively engaged eloquent contenders for the control of schools. It was thus thrown into a battlefield where the classic forms of legitimation were being seriously challenged. Bundy was appointed by the due process of a formally authorized political system and consisted of a few highly placed individuals whose credentials would have been regarded universally as impeccable only a decade before.

To make sense of our discussion, we must give a brief account, possibly one of the few brief accounts, of the main issues and events. From 1954, the year of the Supreme Court's Brown decision, the New York Board of Education had been required to reduce racial segregation in their schools. Their many critics regarded their attempts as "halting
and confused" (Milstein and Jennings, 1973). In 1961, the state legislature required the Board to strengthen the local school advisory boards and consult community groups when planning for neighborhood schools. The neighborhood schools were the mode proposed for ending desegregation.

In the meantime, the United Federation of Teachers had won the right to be the sole bargaining agent for the City's teachers. It gained increased power over the rules governing teacher supervision, promotion, and transfer. These changes would reduce the power of principals and supervisors over teachers. They would also reduce the flexibility of the Central Board in devising arrangements for decentralization. In the end they brought "the UFT into direct conflict with community groups as decentralization became more of an issue."

The issue of community control was strongly associated with the issue of desegregation. The City attempted to curb desegregation by voluntary open enrollment. There are different views of how far this succeeded—Nathan Glazer, for example, believes that it was on the way to success—and who was responsible for its eventual failures. In any event, in 1964 the State proposed to replace junior high schools with integrated middle schools. This plan was not carried out and by 1965 the black political leadership was turning away from integration as a directly obtainable objective and towards community control.
pattern of segregation could not be broken, blacks would seek teachers and curricula considered appropriate for all-black schools.

In May 1967, Mayor John Lindsay responded to a State mandate for greater parent and community participation by appointing George Bundy, President of the Ford Foundation, the Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City Schools. Six months later, the Panel produced Reconnection for Learning. A Community School System for New York City. The Panel describes "the essence of the plan which we propose" to be "that the present centralized system should be reformed by a clear grant of new authority to community school boards, partly chosen by parents and partly chosen by the mayor and a central agency. We believe the school board should have the power to appoint and remove community superintendents. Together the community board and the community superintendent should have a new and wider authority over curriculum, budget, personnel, and educational policy in the schools of the district."

But the Bundy Report and its reception are inextricably tied to many other complex movements that were taking place in New York schooling at the time. In the same year, the School Board, aided by the Ford Foundation, had established three experimental projects in decentralization and local board operation at IS201, Two Bridges, and Ocean Hill-Brownsville. While the School Board regarded them as
experimental schools, Ford designed them as self-governing school complexes. By August 1967, the Ocean Hill-Brownsville parents had already elected their governing body even though the City Board had not yet approved the scheme for a local governing body. They then went on to select school principals. The City Board did confirm most of the appointments, but teacher anxiety had been mounting and they increasingly withdrew cooperation from what they feared to be attempts by local activists to dominate the schools. A UFT-led strike for better wages and conditions brought with it the first open conflict between community groups and the teachers' unions. The Ocean Hill governing body brought in parents to replace the striking teachers. It also claimed the right to evaluate, transfer, and dismiss teachers as it saw fit. The UFT regarded this as a direct attack on the rights of teachers to bargain with the City Board. In 1968 Ocean Hill's governing body dismissed 19 teachers whom it believed to be sabotaging community control, and teachers then went on strike. Eventually the City Board took over the administration of Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

It is in this highly charged and complex setting that the Bundy panel was appointed and published its plan. It called for 30 to 60 legally autonomous districts with power to establish curricula and to hire and assign personnel. The Central Board would be concerned with long-term planning only. The City's distinctive requirements for
teachers' certification would be abolished. These plans, as modified by Mayor Lindsay, and later by the Regents, were all rejected by the legislature. After many other attempts in which various legislators tried to reach compromises, the Governor stepped in to use his majority Republican power to provide for 30 to 33 semi-autonomous districts, each with a locally elected governing board. Teachers would be selected by the local board from a qualified list, but subject to the contract agreed with the unions for inter-district transfer. The local boards would have control over expenditure within budgets approved by the City. On this basis, decentralization of a kind proceeded.

This somewhat sparse account of complex events needs to be turned up for both tone and volume in order to appreciate the actual setting in which the Bundy panel worked. Even at this writing, fifteen years later, the many books written on the subject convey a level of fervor, anger, and determination to enforce radical change rarely to be found in histories of local politics. The Bundy panel represented one segment of the liberal establishment, appalled at the state of the schools in a great city in which the Foundation's own offices sat, appointed by a liberal mayor with the support of progressive Republican governor. It tried to resolve problems which seemed incapable of yielding to compromise. The blacks and other ethnic minorities wanted definite
change towards desegregation and towards a greater control over their schools, whether or not desegregation came.

The teachers, as always, operated at several levels of action and belief at once. At the local level, many were sympathetic with the demands of community control until it became plain, if not to individual well-meaning teachers then to the UFT, that local lay groups would now challenge the contractual powers and privileges won through negotiation with the Central City Board. Other, even uglier, features of the conflict between teachers and their clients at the local level became evident. Many of the teachers were white. Many of the whites were Jewish. There were certainly many forthright anti-Jewish statements made in the heat of the battle. One British report (New Society, 28 November 1963) refers to the dispute as being concerned with "a predominantly black locality (trying) to get rid of its most incompetent and (coincidentally) Jewish teachers". Black leaders felt compelled to protest that they were not anti-Semitic.

Teacher unions seem strongly inclined to central rather than local control. This preference is not idiosyncratic to New York. For example, the Swedish teachers' unions are hostile to decentralization of power from the center because it is in Stockholm that they have most leverage. The Taylor Report (1977) which proposed stronger powers for the governing bodies of schools was opposed by the British National Union of Teachers
on the grounds that it was "a busy bodies' charter". In this vein, Albert Shanker (Urofsky, 1970) said "I'd say that the one issue that runs through it was the question of whether we're going to have a decentralized system where local groups are still subject to state law, union contract and whatever rules and regulations are established by the central authority, or whether we were going to have total community control, which is a new name for what the Southern senators used to call states' rights, that is, the right of any local group to decide that the broader society can go to hell because they've got the right to treat individuals as they see fit."

The City authorities were hemmed in by traditions of their own predecessors' making. No outsider reading the provisions of teacher certification, as described by Bundy, can fail to appreciate how "a halo had become a noose", and how attempts to keep the school appointments free of local patronage had been converted over time into restrictive admission practices. The educational administrators were also constrained by the agreements negotiated with the teacher unions. No doubt, too, there was the central bureaucracy's desire to keep power on the grounds that standards, both pedagogic and administrative, would become forfeit to amateurism, local political pressure, and deviant practices if community control became strong. At the same time, however, there were attacks on the behavior of the school superintendent
throughout this period, although the Bundy Commission was at pains to suggest that there are no heroes and no villains in the piece. In fact, they paid tribute to the dedication of the City staff.

Before considering some of the conflicting concepts of participation and control underlying the battle and the extent to which the Bundy Panel was influential, some of the strong criticisms of the Bundy exercise need to be recorded. In one view, when power is handed to parents and other members of the community, particularly when they are poor and uneducated, the "participatory democracy" leads to predictable results. The schools fall into the hands of small and powerful oligarchies, oriented chiefly to gaining greater power. A small fragment of the black leadership, some believe, wanted to transform the schools into an ethnic patronage system, rather than strengthen the quality of education. This group contributed substantially to the near destruction of the New York City public school system, some believe. In such a view, Bundy contributed to the decline of the New York City schools rather than to their improvement.

The same view is advanced by such bodies as the Council of Supervisory Associations of the Public Schools of New York City (1968). They believed the Bundy plan was based on a questionable assumption that small school districts in New York City could function like those of similar size in suburban communities. The 30 to 60 districts in the Bundy plan were artificially created areas, and few had the
characteristics of true communities. It was a poor use of funds because it created administrative and functional duplication. Children transferring from one district to another would encounter different curricula. Competitive merit exams would yield to selection processes open to bias and influence. And the School Board would not be accountable because once a member was selected there would be no machinery for removal.

Bundy and the experimental districts raised conflicting concepts of participation and control. There was conflict, according to Schraft and Kagan (1979), between community control, decentralization, and parent-school collaboration. In their view, community control "is not used by communities that already have power, but rather by parents who have been shut out of the system and seek a redistribution of power." Decentralization, they assume, is "administrative decentralization in producing no new participants but, instead, shuffling the role of professionals or, more than likely, merely changing titles". These are not, to our minds, definitions but opinions about what they thought happened. To Schraft and Kagan the ultimate good is not community control or decentralization in themselves, but the creation of a forum for parent-teacher collaboration. They thus seem to ignore the Bundy attempt to have the schools decentralized in such a way that parents and other members of the community share power with a central authority in
order to place the strongest power locally and thus, eventually, to create responsive school-teacher collaboration and other conditions for beneficient education. They are right to assume that decentralization could lead to the reimposition of authority far closer to the teaching site. But there is no logical necessity for such an outcome. It depends on the provisions made. They offer no analysis of what happened in the schools as they were eventually decentralized.

There are also issues concerned with the process of appointing the Bundy panel. George Bundy already knew Lindsay at a social level when he left the federal government to become President of the Ford Foundation. He had had discussions with him about what the Foundation might do. Mario Fantini, then a project officer at Ford, had briefed Bundy on what his commitment might be to urban schools, and particularly to New York schools and their emerging problems. The pressure on the system was becoming increasingly evident, and within Ford an informal group established itself. Fantini, together with Mitchel Sviridoff, Mayor Lindsay's first Commissioner of Human Services, and others discussed what might be the informal position to be taken on IS 201. The State then created its legislative mandate for more parental participation in the running of the schools. Bundy was familiar with the issues when Lindsay made his first overture, through Sviridoff, to Ford. There were several meetings between Bundy, Lindsay, and Ford officers. There was a fair
wind in the legislature for something to happen and Governor Rockefeller
gave his moral support. The team set to work on these issues within Ford
included Fantini, Marilyn Gittell, and Dick Maggott, a senior Ford
Officer.

But the Ford Foundation was reluctant to assume the burden implied
by the appointment of the Bundy Panel. Mario Fantini (Orovsky, 1970)
relates how in the fall of 1966 Bundy was approached by the Board of
Education to head a task force which would examine issues of
decentralization. The first indications were not encouraging. Fantini
talked with the group that was negotiating for a governing body for IS
201, and they did nothing to encourage him. "In essence, the community
group said to me: 'You may have good intentions, you're missing the
whole point. We really don't need a middle-man task force; we don't need
somebody coming in to solve our problems. We are searching for our own
legitimacy; we want to sit across the table with the parties and
negotiate ourselves...Call off this task force, which is the conventional
way of going about trying to solve problems.'" He received much the
same message from the United Federation of Teachers, the Superintendent
of Schools, and members of the Central Board of Education. He advised
Bundy not to head the task force. And Ford became an agent trying to
talk to all the parties and getting the parties to talk to each other.
They were prepared to be an invisible task force. The demonstration
districts were formed. It was, however, the 1967 State legislature requiring the Mayor to develop a plan for decentralization that led to the creation of the Bundy panel. But all were aware of the difficulties inherent in that role.

There was, then, an informal network of influential liberals. There was hardly, however, a single elite but rather several elite connections. The Ford-Lindsay-Rockefeller connection might be that of the powerful Liberal establishment, but no political, moral, or other connection can be discerned between them and other influential parties like the President of the Board of Education for the City of New York, or Dr. Bernard Donovan, the Superintendent of Schools, or the trade union leadership. The initiating body, namely the Mayor, was moved to appoint a committee by the need to have powerful and articulate substantiation for opinions that he probably already shared with those whom he appointed. Neither the Ford Foundation nor the Mayor and his advisers could have thought other than that the bureaucratic structure, and its strong relation with the unions, needed major revision and that a decisive scheme for decentralization must be argued and proposed in detail.

What does the membership of the panel tell us about the implied processes of legitimation? The panel included the then president of the Board of Education, Alfred Guardino, who eventually refused to sign the
report; Francis Keppel, the former U.S. Commissioner and president of General Learning Corporation; Antonia Pantoja, professor of social work and community development at Columbia University, also a leading member of the Puerto Rican community and an advocate for their rights and development; Mitchel Sviridoff, the chief administrator of the Human Resources Administration; and Bennetta Washington, director of the Women's Job Corps, a black, whose husband became the mayor of Washington, D.C. The appointers decided not to attempt to create a "representative" panel that would lead to an endless process of selection and addition. They decided on the blue-ribbon panel instead. The mayor and his advisors made the decisions on membership. Fantini's own preference would have been to include the Superintendent and the union leadership. Fantini gives testimony to the fact that the panel was not "stacked" in the sense that while decentralization was in the air, "at the time of the Bundy panel nobody knew what we were talking about regarding decentralization." The Bundy Report was the first attempt to conceptualize big city decentralization. The members all had different perspectives and priorities which were played out through their membership.

The panel did seek to consolidate its position by consulting different groups. The United Federation of Teachers was consulted as were many others. "Literally hundreds of parties were consulted."
Fantini agrees that they did attempt to legitimize their report "if by legitimize you mean that through contact we increased the chances for fuller understanding of the plan...However...we could not possibly include everything any one group advocated. To this extent, this would appear to militate against the process of legitimization."

The Panel believed that the plan had been a "political quantum leap to make." It knew that it was going to be controversial. The Community School District had been retained by the legislature. The notion of disconnection among the parties of interest, especially the parents, was made salient. The Panel brought out fully the alienation of the different groups. It created decentralization as something available to those communities that wanted it. But Fantini points out how words took on different force over time. At the time that it was first used, "decentralization" was the "hard" word. "One mention of decentralization and people would buckle." Today, decentralization is becoming more of a mild term and "community control" is the harsh one. As radical notions of change became accepted they were succeeded by new ones. Both concepts, he thought, were manifestations of the participatory movement. In spite of these doctrinal complexities, Fantini was clear that the panel made a big difference. If he were to start again he would want somewhat different methods of working, but in view of subsequent events the Bundy Report was radical and really did attempt to make change.
"What the Bundy Report did was to trigger a very serious dialogue on the very serious question of reorganization, on the whole notion of participation and public interest, that had to be taken seriously...This report had to be taken seriously because of the political framework in which it had emerged. A political process was in operation. The union had every right, given the reality, to oppose this plan if it did not meet its interests. They did and they ultimately defeated it. That's the name of the political game."

What Fantini is pointing to here is that any commission that has an impact at all does not necessarily have a place in any linear scheme of decision making. Proposals may be put forward that have effects through reaction. Bundy might have compelled the teachers to make far more manifest their position on the rights of parents and of the community. So a commission may not induce change, but it may at least help make public the reasons why change will not happen. In the case of Bundy, however, there is general testimony to the fact that it was the first commission to expose the notion of decentralization to public examination. And both the notion and the policy became a reality in several cities of the United States.

The Bundy intervention was challenged from several and divergent quarters. We have already given the view of those committed to a system which they felt, despite its faults, had preserved reasonable quality and
equity in the New York schools. Other and more radical accounts such as Miriam Wasserman (The School Fix NYC USA, 1970) presented an angry picture of both action and intention. In her opinion, Lindsay's reputation was affected by his appointment of Bundy who was "one of the architects of America's Vietnam policy, and the fact that he was chairman of the Ford Foundation did not help either." ("We all know old union-busting Henry Ford," said a representative at a UFT delegate assembly.) Wasserman feels that "the Plan...is another of those evidences we Americans keep producing of our silly belief that power relations can be altered in favor of the powerless by public relations scholars seated in fine offices overlooking lush, hothouse gardens. The Bundy Plan attacks some internal contradictions of the system...but it deliberately fails to consult the issue of power and status in the system...Watching McGeorge Bundy before a meeting of the UFT delegate assembly, I personally sensed him to be innocent rather than disingenuous. I thought that he did not understand that unlike material wealth which, when subdivided and shared, can generate more wealth all around, the kind of authority and responsibility which confer status no longer confer status when they are shared. So the acquiring of authority and responsibility by those of lower status does indeed rob other parties of the very kind of authority, status authority, that is most valued in the school system." She thought that the Ford Foundation's "scholars"
misunderstood the relationship of schools to society, and the possibility of using the school as an instrument of social change. "While the Bundy Plan was either innocent or hypocritical in respect to power relationships at the level of the school, the teacher, and the parent, it recognized the possibility of power struggles at the district and city levels, and created ingenious devices as a protection against direct democracy. "So do the aristocrats yield to pressures from below by setting up a simulacrum of popular control whose complexity is a defense against serious assaults on ongoing power arrangements....the Bundy proposal was a bundle of elaborate administrative rearrangements designed to rescue a bankrupt operation before the depositors started a run on the bank."

The Board of Education assumed that it was fully legitimated because of its statutory base traceable to the ballot box. Hence, the sense of grievance with an outside panel brought in to discover values and to respond to them.

Several conflicting concepts of legitimation seem to have been at work in New York City.

The intentions of Mayor Lindsay, also backed by the State's gubernatorial and legislative powers, were equally legitimate. He wanted the status quo to be tested, and changed, by stimulation from outsiders. He did not believe that the ballot box of itself aggregates and
articulates the wishes of all with a stake in the schools. Implicit in Lindsay, Rockefeller, and State Superintendent of Schools Allen's actions, therefore, was a modified ballot box model. The argument stated that we cannot trust ourselves and others in power, including the professional educators working under our control, to read the signs of want and discontent. Professional knowledge is not a sufficient license for social prophecy. We must therefore mobilize other forces, objective outsiders, to help. The radical critics might have produced crude and distorted views of the real motives and competences of the Bundy panelists. The adversaries of centralist and ballot box legitimacy provided no clear model in its place. The objection to communitarian popularism is that it atomizes issues and interests that need to be held together, that social cohesion diminishes because there is no attention to the need to reduce interests, to call a closure to debate, so that work can be done. The communitarian popularists may have lodged an accurate critique of the status quo, while also venting despair and distrust with the running of a school system that seemed unresponsive to the changing wishes and norms of the society. However, the model of legitimacy that they espoused was strong on expression, on instant and immediate legitimacy, and weak on effective ways of producing new forms of localised legitimacy that could work.
Finally, there is the position of the teachers. The model of legitimacy to which they subscribed was the first, that of a ballot box, which conferred legitimacy on their exercise of expertise. But they themselves helped that concept to collapse as, in common with teachers everywhere, they began to behave in ways previously considered unthinkable—with strike action which robbed them of credibility as dispassionate advocates of educational progress. In the end, their legitimacy came to rest not on popular sanctioning of professionalism but on their industrial power.

Given these concepts of legitimacy, where did George McBundy and his colleagues stand? First, they could lay claim to government sanction. In the end, the Governor's decision to bring in a version of their decentralized scheme, after all of the compromises, is evidence of the enduring power of the ballot-box model. Bundy affected that decision without determining it. Secondly, they gave voice, in measured, liberal, and academic terms, to the demands that had so far been heard only in the accents of Harlem or the Bronx. Just as the medieval church burned the heretics and adopted the heresies, so the many contenders seemed to note and absorb new concepts. Bundy's protagonists felt that many of their arguments and concepts rapidly became cliche and taken for granted.

The Kerr Commission
Bundy had to face issues associated with deep and sharp conflict. Kerr, by comparison, presided over a commission of such majesty and competence that, though it was associated with its share of dissent and criticism, sailed on through the conflicting shoals of fish—shark and sardine alike—as might a trans-Atlantic liner of the Queen class. In a series of carefully timed reports and special studies, the Commission attacked themes which underlay the major problems and prospects of US higher education.

The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1967-73) and the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies (1974-79) concentrated on six areas. Three were accorded most prominence: the advancement of social justice, financial resources, and academic programs and content. They were also concerned with the provision of high skills and new knowledge, the adequacy of government; and the purposes and performances of institutions of higher education.

In assessing the working, impact, and legitimating functions of these reports we are able to rely on careful documentation by Kerr himself, by the President of the Carnegie Foundation, and by external critics whom the Commission itself summarized and published. We will take the self-evaluation first and then consider two sets of criticisms. Allan Pifer, President, Carnegie Foundation, speaking in 1972, recounted how in 1911 the Foundation was established "to do and perform all things
necessary to encourage, uphold, and dignity the profession of the teacher and the cause of higher education in the United States." The Foundation, at its origins, never doubted the ability of the written word to affect policy and practice. The Foundation first decided to finance a study of the financing of higher education but readily agreed to Clark Kerr's proposal that there was no point in studying finance without looking more broadly at the structure and functions of higher education. In assessing the achievements, shortcomings, and impact of the Commission, Pifer acknowledged that it will be some time before the ultimate impact becomes clear. But its achievement had been to take under review "the entire, vast, diffuse enterprise of American higher education in virtually all of its multifold aspects... Conceptually, this has been a remarkable feat." It had contributed enormously to the literature on the subject. In so doing, the Commission "has been dispassionate, objective, fair-minded, factually-based, and imbued with a sense of pragmatic realism."

Carrying out its study in a period when higher education itself was in a state of turmoil... "the Commission might easily have joined the chorus of emotional critics or die-hard defenders of the academic enterprise. But it has resisted these temptations." There has been wide press coverage, although Pifer acknowledges that this does not mean that teachers or students have read the report. The Commission became subject
to enormous governmental pressure to provide data and offer counsel. But Clark Kerr and his colleagues apparently kept to their own logic and were not diverted from their own agenda.

Pifer addresses some of the criticisms. One was that the Commission reflected a big-business point of view. In fact, however, he argues that only three industrialists were members of the Commission and these were also university or college trustees. The final membership of 19, including the chairman, was predominantly from the ranks of college or university presidents or other academics. Later additions, significantly, were the deans of two predominantly black law schools, and the president of a four-year state college, thus reflecting the changing mood of the time.

The question of the Commission's legitimacy, to which we will return, is faced head-on by Pifer. Carnegie had, after all, organized the study by Abraham Flexner that led to the reform and modernization of medical education. It commissioned the Myrdal study of the American Negro that was influential in the ultimate rejection of the separate but equal doctrine. Pifer observes that in one sense there is no valid issue of legitimacy because the Commission had no power to act on its own. "It can only through the quality of its work, inform, enlighten and persuade those who do have the power to act. The legitimacy of such activity is firmly rooted in the constitutional right to freedom of speech."
Commissions are, however, bodies established to operate in the public interest and must therefore answer to the public at large. They have to inform the public what they are doing. Other criticisms which Pifer refutes is that it has been too influential in the formulation of public policy. This is, Pifer thinks, "based on the false premise that it should not be influential." It has been criticized for being wedded to the status quo. But he believes that reports, especially *Less Time, More Options*, the reports on medical education, on campus reform, and on instructional technology will refute this charge. Certainly, the Commission's recommendation that federal support to students should be mediated directly to students and not to institutions, a policy eventually adopted, was greeted with much hostility by the whole of the higher educational establishment (Summerfield, 1974). He thought it true that the Commission had not really met directly the question of the content of undergraduate education and the "disaster area" of liberal education.

Kerr's own assessment is even more dispassionate. In considering both the Commission and the Council reports, he points to definite public policy results. His analysis of effects serves to help us with a study of the impact of other reports and is as follows:
A. Public policy results proximate in time and content. The Health Manpower Act of 1971 became law after the report on Higher Education and the Nation's Health was issued. The Higher Education amendments of 1972 were passed after release of Quality and Equality. The Council report on youth in 1979 preceded a recommendation to Congress of a $2 billion increase in expenditures on youth.

B. Public policy results dispersed in time and content. Open-Door Colleges was often cited in state planning documents and community colleges spread across the nation in the form recommended. From Isolation to Mainstream was used by the black colleges to support their retention at a time when others called them an anachronism. Selective Admissions in Higher Education eventually was paralleled by the majority position of the Supreme Court in the Bakke case.

C. Introduction of new practices by institutions. Time variable with degree programs were proposed and extended widely. The Doctor of Arts degree was adopted by about 40 institutions.
D. Early alerts to new problems. The inadequacy of the student loan program and reluctant attenders as problems. Certain unfair practices on campus and demographic depressions and the effect on the internal life of the campus were all highlighted in different reports.

E. Presentation of different points of view. The Commission maintained that student unrest was not a result of institutional failures but the result of public policy and especially the Vietnam war. It contested the conventional wisdom that troubles within higher education in the early 1970s were due to restricted finance and maintained that the 1970s were better for higher education than commonly assumed.

F. Contributions to broad understanding. Kerr believes that Carnegie reports inform campus administrators how their situation related to that of others.

G. Extension of the framework for the study of higher education. The whole "Carnegie shelf" of publicly created networks of teachers and scholars changed teaching and research, and
brought in foreign scholars to place American higher education within an international context.

H. Presentation of portraits at moments in time. Special studies presented snapshots of critical aspects of the changes as they were taking place; for example, the Carnegie surveys of faculties and students in 1969 and 1975/6.

I. Provision of new information. Many of their reports provided new information or new ways of looking at old information.

J. Creating a running commentary on developments within higher education. "This commentary sought to rely on competently analyzed fact, to discuss problems in constructive ways, to avoid apocalyptic judgments, to give a sense of assurance that what was being done was worth doing and had a future, to reaffirm basic academic values, to state that higher education was not just a helpless victim of forces beyond its control, to set a civil tone for argument, to hold out some hopes and set forth many possibilities for action, and to fortify the sense of purpose of higher education."
This summary of Kerr's claims for his own Commission is substantiated by many external critics. Longanecker and Klein (1977) read and analyzed nine reports concerned with higher education. They approached a group of 49 "peer" leaders to establish the impact of commissions. They noted how the determination of cause and effect is elusive. Who would have expected that the 1947 Truman Commission Report on Higher Education would become so much a part of the higher education programs in the 1960s? They believe that the Carnegie Commission reports focused national attention on certain issues, stirred up debate, nudged public policy thinking in certain new, broadly defined, directions. The prestige behind their efforts and the volume and quality of their research commanded attention. Their work on health care and the econometric models in the report of the National Commission on Financing contributed new data and important questions, and demonstrated new analytical tools. Their report, *Quality and Inequality*, helped derail certain legislative schemes by pioneering the argument against institutional grants and for individual student aid. They changed the law. Their respondents believed the Carnegie reports were largely responsible for the Basic Educational Opportunity Grants programs of the higher education amendments of 1972 and certain aspects of the Health Manpower Act of 1971. And other examples are quoted as well.
Their study supports Kerr's own account of the reasons for the success of the Carnegie Commission. It was unique. Nothing like it had existed for over two decades. It was well financed, independent of its endowing foundation, and highly prestigious. Its sheer volume and overall excellent quality must be responsible for its considerable influence. So, too, must the strategy and detailed tactics of the Commission and its chairman. It deliberately secured as much public visibility as possible. It was astute in attracting news coverage and in maintaining open lines of communication with the press. It had supportive editorials in prestigious newspapers and journals. Members and staff were not reluctant to lobby for their recommendations. They established connections with policy makers. They chose their timing for publication well. Where they failed it was because they rehashed old conclusions. Longanecker and Klein believe this to be true of Carnegie's work on University Goals. But although in general it did not produce weak and homogenized conclusions, it insisted on consensus. It had a homogeneous membership that made this possible. And there had to be unanimous agreement on the best alternatives available.

Other reviewers are usefully summarized by Carnegie itself (1980). Many of the criticism made the points already mentioned here (e.g., Embling, 1974). Mayhew (1973) notes that Carnegie "adopted the posture that higher education is a very large, complicated enterprise that can be
moved only slowly and with some consensus on the part of the various elements of leadership. Thus most ... of the reports ... are only critical to a degree and generally reflect optimism that some changes can be made. It is as though members of the Commission have agreed not to alienate purposely or to antagonize any major element in higher education in the hope of gaining support. ..." Newman speculates, accurately, that its significance will depend on how far it has sensed well the direction of education thinking and shaped and given focus to powerful although sometimes latent social tendencies. It did not seek to create a society or institutions anew. With these reservations, Newman pays high testimony to the great success of the reports because of their quality.

Wren, addressing student readers, writes, "I am sure that it is viewed as a very liberal outfit by some, and by others as a mouthpiece for the powers that be. ... [But] I find myself in agreement with many of its proposals ... [it] should ... contribute to an expanded student knowledge base. ..." A surprisingly critical account is given by Sir Eric Ashby, a commissioner and distinguished British academic. He pays homage to the general achievement but asks, "What about synthesis? ... Reams of print about how to expand the system and how to pay for the expansion; hardly a pamphletful of print about what the system is for. The reports convey an air of bland consensus." But, he says, there are two reasons for this. "American commissions do not permit a spirited
note of dissent. Most of the issues are not contentious. They are not philosophical treatises but frankly political documents without high-falutin' rhetoric or Utopian scenarios... But congressmen in Washington and representatives in state capitals do not care for eloquence or passion; as for iconoclasm, they detest it. They want simple homely recipes..." Another Briton, Niblett, in a view shared by T. R. McConnell (in a conversation with one of us), also criticized the Commission's emphasis on the performance of higher education rather than its purposes or content. Richardson, a community college president, criticized the Commission for seeking to reach consensus so that "the results often unsuccessfully seek to chart all new directions while at the same time preserving all of the established practices." Reinert, president of a Catholic university, supported the bulk of their recommendations but felt the Commission was prepared to sacrifice diversity to equality of opportunity.

The sociologists' criticisms, however, were sharper. Wolfe thought the assumptions underlying the report came from the failure of the Commission to be theoretical and to place themes in their political context. It accepted the present political and economic system as a given and sought only to tamper with its least essential aspects. "Given the close corporate connections and ruling-class ties of the commissioners it is no wonder that they never lay the blame for the
problems with capitalism itself or go into great detail about who is responsible for the system's failures." (Neither, for that matter, does Wolfe give evidence of such connections.) Bernbaum also criticized the lack of social context in which higher education functions as part of the Report on the somewhat opaque grounds that it overlooked the tension between the economic and political functions of education in a democracy. Yet he thought the whole enterprise worthwhile. MacDonald criticized the work from the viewpoint of traditional liberal education. It did a strictly social science job, he wrote. "They climbed all over it, counting, measuring, describing, gauging..." It devoted most of its energy and attention to the arrangements and circumstances rather than to the educational itself within higher education. It reveals no coherent theory of nature, of knowledge and higher education. This leads the Commission into at least three serious errors: the confusing of the effects of higher education with its purposes; the grossly over-simplified and thus misleading way in which it presents the "contending philosophical views"..." and the intellectually and operationally unsatisfying ways in which it tries to deal with the relationship between the institutions of higher education and society." The critics were perhaps missing Kerr's point; American higher education did not need generalized aphorisms about the purposes of higher
education. There were issues to be tackled rather than philosophies to be identified.

The contrasts between Carnegie and Bundy are clear. The Kerr Report was successful in the production and promulgation of knowledge and views on higher education. It had an impact. That it will continue to have an impact as scholars and publicists and policy makers dive back into relevant literature to meet succeeding policy problems also need not be doubted. It remains for us, however, to attempt to characterize Carnegie within the terms already discussed here for Bundy. First, it did not seek the full-blown legitimacy of Bundy. It was not to be judged against concepts of ballot-box democracy, for no President of the United States or governor of a state, or mayor of a great city, with electoral mandates behind them, appointed it. Instead, it emanated from a private foundation whose only legitimacy is that it must satisfy the public, by virtue of its trusts, that it is working responsibly and within its publicly declared terms of reference. Its legitimacy was thus that of the independent voice whose word must stand on its own merits and not on the coercive power of public authority endowed by the electoral process. Second, it sought legitimacy through the overwhelming power of knowledge. In some version, those of the sociologists quoted above, it might, indeed, have attempted to overwhelm the public it addressed by producing study after study rather than reflecting upon deeper
dialectics, problems, and the place of higher education in society. This may be thought, skeptically, to be the complaint of sociologists who find it more comfortable to elaborate macro-theories of society rather than to describe what actually happens. Inasmuch, however, as social science description, analysis, and enquiry can confer legitimacy, Carnegie did it and had it. Third, in an indirect sense, Carnegie tapped into the latent legitimacies of American society. It assumed, without a blink of doubt, that higher education was a self-evident good which must now, through the agency of the Commission, show pragmatically how that good might maintain itself, extend its operational purposes, and thus meet its charter functions. On that premise, it felt that those who participated in the whole complex enterprise of higher education needed most of all to take stock of their consensus, to identify causes of dissent and needed modification, and then promote the resulting conclusions at the political level. It did not assume, as did Bundy, that it must come into a system that inevitably needed reform and reordering. It did not feel it necessary to change fundamentally the governmental patterns of higher education or the balance of power between sponsoring bodies such as government or trustee, faculty, students, and other client groups. On these terms, legitimacy could be taken for granted.

Here we see marked resemblances between Carnegie and the traditional British Royal Commission. The British Royal Commission, established by
Government, felt able to summon up the best and the true from society, articulate elegantly, produce evidence substantiating their conclusions, and rest happy and legitimate on their findings. In Carnegie there is a finer nervous quality than one sees in the British Royal Commission. It knew trouble when it saw it. It faced the problem of student dissent, of increasing government power, of declining student enrollment, of the savagely explosive and absolutely justifiable demands for greater educational equality. But not for one moment did it have to feel that it was celebrating a system fit for demolition. In a sense, it was the great and good of a great and good set of institutions getting its own house in order and demonstrating that order to the wider society. The criticisms at a more serious level have always been that it assumes too much consensus, that by not entering into the details of the curriculum and of the underlying purposes, its analysis was concerned with function or with the social engineering associated with higher education.

There are few first hand reflective accounts of the internal dynamics of commissions and of how they affect ultimate impact. We are fortunate to have a statement by a member of the Carnegie groups. She thought it gained strength because members quickly moved out of their everyday roles when attending Council meetings. They seemed to have strained consciously after concepts of the common good and the national interest and to these ends were prepared to accept propositions not
necessarily compatible with the kind of statement that each might make publicly. Their thoughts might not be far different from those of their less distinguished contemporaries in their ordinary places of work, though almost always more effectively stated. More than most individuals working in a collective enterprise they were able to reach out rapidly and accurately to a wide range of contacts for tests of fact or judgement. Their places within networks thus substantiated their ability to assume that they would reach good conclusions. They all respected hunches that something did not sit quite right; the intuition of an individual colleague as much as careful scholarship could be the basis for judgment. They were always aware that they were working within a limited frame. Events, perceptions, reactions changed under their eyes and they had to constantly keep themselves upright on a fast moving escalator. Finally, this member, at least, learned that it was difficult to get things right and that highly experienced and senior colleagues also found it difficult to be certain that they were right. (Interview, Margaret MacVickers).

Of these behavioral characteristics, perhaps the first two are the most important in conveying legitimacy. As everyday actions fall away and more general value-laden issues are discussed, common aims might emerge which enable a group to come to opinions that in their turn will meet the wider needs of those later reading the report. The process of
report writing compels the authors to move from the operational to the
normative. And norms are more universal in their nature than are
everyday actions.

Master Plan for Higher Education in California (1960)

If the Bundy Plan had the legitimacy conferred by the ballot box,
and the Kerr Plan had no formal legitimacy beyond that conferred by the
elite position from which it was formulated and the weight of science
behind it, the Californian State Plan for Higher Education of 1960 was
yet of an entirely different order. The document opened with a formal
letter addressed by the President of the University of California and the
Superintendent of Public Instruction to the President of the Senate,
members of the Senate, Speaker of the Assembly, and members of the
Assembly. It is "respectfully submitted." Both the University and the
State Board were requested to report to the Legislature within a set time
limit. The report was to be an executive document submitted for formal
action by the Legislature. But legal authority was not the only
component of its legitimacy. There was enormous pressure already being
felt by the State's institutions of higher education and there was a
need to make a useful plan within financial limits. A Liaison Committee
created a Master Plan Survey Team which in its turn created many
technical committees which provided much of the basic information of the
Master Plan Survey. If not fundamental research, the Plan was backed by
exigent technical studies and the chairman, Clark Kerr, carried the authority of both his own reputation and the presidency of the premier, public educational institution in the State. The Plan was virtually wholly implemented. It became famous world wide as an example of a system stratifying itself according to well defined principles. By September 1973, a new Master Plan was produced (Report of the Joint Committee on the Master Plan for Higher Education. California Legislature. September 1973). The 1973 Plan was concerned not to overturn the tripartite system of the 1960 version but with issues of coordination, overlap, and governance. In other words, the Master Plan of 1960 in all essentials had stood the test of time, and 1973 largely confirmed it.

We can now note a spectrum of legitimacies. The Kerr Commission had no legal formal status and its legitimacy derived from its own modes of behavior and the elite connection to which it could have recourse. It became legitimate, as did its recommendations, both through social connection and the quality of the message. The Bundy panel was appointed by the legitimate authority of the City of New York on mandate from the State of New York. But there was virtually a reciprocal relationship between the legitimacy of its origins and the moral or expressive legitimacy denied to it by those who took a different view of the issues. It created important concepts ("decentralization") which were accepted in
many school systems. It also helped stimulate alternative thinking from those who did not share its conclusions. Its provocative role was as important as its substantive contribution. The California Master Plan, however, was legitimated to the hilt in two distinct forms. The first was that of law and executive power. The second was that of the power of evidence and technical planning. Both the 1960 and the 1973 groups who prepared the Master Plan summoned a vast array of evidence from those with a stake in higher education's future and a mass of technical data.

The British Cases

British commissions have been the subject of monographs about their organization and effects more than have American. For this reason, it has not proved necessary to describe our British examples in as much detail. Instead we have relied on secondary sources for the analysis of their substantive content and have concentrated on gathering judgments about their impact and their place in the wider policy making frame of reference through recent interviews which one of us has conducted with fifteen participants in educational and other commissions.

We are not primarily concerned in this paper with comparing the American and British experiences but note here some of the differences in the use made of commissions in the two countries. First, the British commissions have been almost wholly the result of central government initiatives. The Royal Commissions of the 19th Century, the consultative
committees that produced reports before the 1944 Education Act, the Central Advisory Councils for Education, which replaced them and the ad hoc government appointed committees were all the result of decisions by ministers to determine terms of reference and to remit them to people whom they appointed. However, some of the more important recent British reports, such as the William Tyndale Inquiry (1976) and the studies now being financed by the Leverhulme Trust Fund on higher education, are either non-governmental or produced by a local authority. American Committees are far more various. There are enquiries deriving from different levels of government: federal, state and city. There are blue-ribbon panels established by the prestigious private foundations. There are reports stemming from committees of the legislatures. Britain slowly moves towards a wider range as Parliament seeks to assert its authority over the executive, and as government itself abandons its statutory duty to appoint Central Advisory Councils. In both countries, moreover, mechanisms other than that of the blue-ribbon committee, including such technocratic devices as think tanks, and modes of public audit, are becoming more prominent. In essence, however, both the operations and the criticisms of committees concerned with education are similar in both countries.

Our enquiries have centered on only a few of the British councils and committees. They include: the Robbins Report on Higher Education
(1963), The James Report on Teacher Education and Training (1971), the Taylor Report on School Government (1976), the Plowden Report on Primary Education (1967), and the Auld Report on the William Tyndale School (1976). The range of subjects covered by these committees illustrates another feature of the British scene. Since the early 1930's, and indeed before, there has hardly been a zone of educational policy not subjected, and some more than once, to committee enquiry. Not only the main areas of primary and secondary education, but higher education, further education, adult education, special education, the salaries of teachers, the governing arrangements for further education, all have been subjected to formal enquiry. Yet, as we write, there is plainly a change in government policy on the use of such devices. This might be interpreted as the consequence of several, sometimes conflicting, attitudes. Currently in Britain there is impatience with anything that can be regarded as an extension of government's activity. Whereas governments used to be prepared to seek out policy needs and initiatives, there is now an active policy of disengagement from many areas of social policy. At the same time, however, alternative devices for the development of educational and other policies emerge. The use of such think tanks as the Central Policy Review Staff, or the Policy Studies Institute, although barely extending into the area of educational policy, has tended to displace the more traditional mode of the Departmental
Committee. The development, too, of Parliamentary investigative machinery through the specialist committees on education has inevitably drawn attention away from the advisory committee mode. Government has also appointed single persons to enquire into, for example, the working and future of the Schools Council and, somewhat more surprisingly, the patterns of school examinations.

In reporting conclusions of our studies undertaken, mainly through interviews, in Britain, we will address questions that have already arisen when discussing the American examples. First, there are the assumptions about why government appoints a committee. Government, it is assumed, appoints a committee that will confirm its own thinking or collaborate with it. This, it has been further assumed, has meant that committees are given membership and responsibilities which themselves reveal a predisposition on the part of the appointers towards policies that the committees are likely to recommend. The Robbins Committee was appointed because government was already thinking of expanding higher education (Kogan and Packwood, 1975), although it made many recommendations the government did not invite and did not accept. The Plowden Report on Primary Education had one of its starting points in the fact that the government already wanted action to remove the inflexibility in the age of transfer between primary and secondary education and was already worried about such issues as educational
deprivation (ibid). One of the senior former officials put the point stringently: "If you haven't a clue about the answer, don't set up a commission." This point does, indeed, conform to the realities that policy makers have to face. In British government, no government committee can be set up without prior consultation with the Treasury, and the Chairmanship must be approved by the Prime Minister. It would be foolhardy for the Department of Education and Science to establish a committee which was likely to recommend increased expenditure or other policies which will contradict the policies already established in the central organs of government.

An associated assumption is that governments appoint committees to generate normative support from outside themselves for policies that it wishes to implement. For example, the Houghton Report on teachers' salaries (1977) was the result of a ministerial decision by Mr. Reg Prentice to give teachers large increases in salary. He could not have moved to make these important changes, which some believe to have been the start of runaway inflation of salaries in the public sector, without some form of external sanction of what he wanted to do anyway. In the case of the Robbins Report again, the Minister of Education of the time, Sir David Eccles, had said three years before the committee was set up, in the House of Commons, that higher education expansion must come. But such a major change affecting not only public expenditure but also the
attitudes and work of British universities needed to be legitimised by recourse to an authoritative body. "The commonest function of a committee is not to produce a basic solution to a problem, the outlines of which are often understood in government, but to assess the market for emerging ideas, and to mobilise support for them." A further function is of the opposite kind. If many committees are set up to confirm what government knows and believes, some committees are set up to do work that government definitely cannot do on its own. Quasi-judicial committees concerned with, for example, the review of disciplinary issues perform functions outside those of policy making and resource allocation, and test managerial judgments about behavior or rewards which need to be confirmed or refuted in another and more forensic forum.

The clearest example of this genre of commission was the William Tyndale Junior and Infant Schools' Public Inquiry conducted by Robin Auld, QC at the request of the Inner London Education Authority (1976). Auld was asked to make a public inquiry into the teaching, organization and management of a junior and infant school in north London. Auld was appointed as a one-person inquiry because difficulties had arisen in constituting for the required period a committee that had already been appointed. But a further difficulty arose from having a committee "composed of members of the school's sub-committee". There was thus a deliberate intention to bring in the independent outsider.
Between 1973 and the autumn of 1975, distressing developments had taken place in the junior school which were also affecting the adjacent infant school. After a new head had been appointed and completed his first two terms, the school was said to be in great disorder, the quality of teaching was causing serious alarm to many concerned, discipline had broken down almost completely, the school's teaching staff was divided, the head and some of the members of staff had lost the confidence of certain of the school's managers and of many parents of children at the school, and relations generally had seriously deteriorated. Matters came to a head when teachers at the school refused to be inspected by the local authority's inspectors following complaints about the lack of discipline and the conflict with the managers. The Auld Report made a meticulous examination of the events in these two years but also stands out not only as a report that led to decisive results—eventually teachers were dismissed and the Chairman of an important committee in the Inner London Education Authority resigned—but also as an affirmation of principles concerning the government of all British schools. In particular, Auld made it plain that while British local education authorities seek to allot a great deal of freedom to schools, the ultimate responsibility for the school rests with the local authority, and it must not fail to take effective action when signs of distress appear. He also analyzed not only the roles of managers (now called
governors) but also the ways in which they are expected to behave, namely, in a restrained and corporate fashion and not as individuals establishing themselves as critics or interventionists in schools. The Report is important for its local results but also as a statement of general principles. It is probably the best source in British literature about the respective roles of local education authorities, inspectors, governors, teachers, and parents.

There were important instrumental aspects of the Auld Inquiry which distinguish it from the working of more general education committees. The ILEA first intended to appoint a committee but eventually decided to appoint a single individual. Robin Auld sat for five months and reported in the sixth month. Ruminating upon the experience, Auld noted that his report had dramatic and urgent events as its starting point, but that these proved the occasion for a deep examination of issues concerning the way in which the schools are run and governed. He did not feel himself competent to deal with some of the central technical issues about the nature and value of different forms of education but gathered expert evidence on them while reserving his own original efforts for discussion of the main structural and governmental issues. Auld also noted that the acceptability and credibility of his report were probably enhanced because he came to the issues as an impartial outsider, and this was particularly significant at a time when politicians in general were
losing credibility. American observers have noted how the profession of law in Britain maintains a stronger independence of reputation and status than does its American counterpart, particularly in terms of its independence from political appointment and pressure.

The issue of predisposition of members to a policy that might be advocated, or the opposite (as with Auld), relates to the question of the composition of committees. The dominant British assumption has been that members are not appointed to represent known interest groups or to act as negotiators. Instead, they are appointed on a spectrum of competence that ranges from the scientific or technically expert member to those capable of representing "the man in the street". Lord Robbins, it is understood, explicitly was against members being appointed or acting from particular interests. But another member and observer of one of the committees referred to the "Noah's Ark" principle by which there must always be such couplings as the trade unionist and the employer representative, the proper quotient of women as against men, Welshmen as against Englishmen, university as against school interests, and so on. Individuals, of course, display different degrees of independence. Practicing teachers, in particular, may be making their first appearance on such a body and take time to adjust to the fact that there is a secretariat that is supposed to serve them and that they have equal voices with others on the committee. In any event, committees end their
work differently from the way they begin. Members may go in as representatives of different groups, whether overtly or latently, but they become associated with the final product, and there are strong tendencies towards consensus and mutual socialization. This does not, of course, inhibit members from producing minority reports or notes of extension or dissent.

The British reports have increasingly used the results of research, mainly social science, in formulating their findings. All reports display a mixture of the normative or value judgment and the data-based or technical appraisal. In British reports, there is always reference to scholarship, often that possessed by members of the committee itself. In more recent years from the Early Leaving Report (1954) onwards, research or systematic enquiry of one sort or the other has been put on display. The Crowther Report (1959) on education between 15 and 18 made extensive use of material describing the relationship between the ability of young people and their social class and schooling experiences. In this case the main data derived from material collected by the army in testing national servicemen which was known to the assessor from his own previous work in this field. The Robbins Committee (1963) by contrast, was headed by a leading economist who recruited a team of social scientists who were to confirm and enhance major reputations on the work performed for the committee. The use of social statistics in particular was strikingly
successful. They were used to attack the notion of a fixed reservoir of
talent and to pave the way for the policy that all qualified applicants
should be admitted to higher education. The Plowden Report (1967) on
primary education commissioned the largest amount of external research of
any committee up to that point, and although it has been criticised from
both the conclusions drawn from the research and for the selective use
made of it (Acland in Bulmer, 1980), many of the policies, such as its
recommendation for parental participation, were based upon the
conclusions that it drew from research. The James Committee on Teacher
Education (1971) was sui generis inasmuch as its membership were released
full-time for a year from their normal duties in order to study all of
the available research and thus obviate the need to commission new
studies. They have been criticized, however, for relying upon their own
judgments rather than upon the empirical and other data that were
available to them.

There is, indeed, quite a deal of skeptical testimony about the
balance struck by committees between the use of their own knowledge and
judgment on the one hand and evidence and research on the other. We have
already quoted some of the ambivalent evidence on the subject in the
American context. Research was greatly favored in British government in
the 1960s. There was both genuine belief in it and something of a
peacock display of evidence at that time. There were also, by virtually
all committees, visits to individuals, institutions, and settings which might throw light on the issues being analyzed. The American literature on the use made of committee display has been referred to above. One of the few comments that we have collected on this point is that visits might be ritualized expressions of belief in wider participation in a committee's deliberations without really being used to affect the issues. The opposite point might be made, however, that the Plowden Report's recommendations on educational priority areas were certainly affected by visits made to the USA.

In both countries, as well as elsewhere (for example Sweden), social science had a major contribution to make towards educational committees. In the USA the Coleman Report (1966), and the Robbins and Plowden Reports in the UK which we have already cited, assumed that disciplined enquiry could yield data and concepts upon which judgments could be made. Our evidence on more recent committee work is more limited, but a generalization can be attempted here. In both countries, there is less reliance on social science for the broader functions of social critique and the conceptualization of general social states. Instead, social science is being encouraged and financed to make "short order" analyses. These take up the known characteristics of the social problem, order the data, and move quite rapidly towards solutions that might be of use to policy makers. This is the type of function allocated
to the think tank or the legislative committee agency rather than to the academic department or long-standing research unit.

The changing attitude and skepticism towards the use of social scientists has been related by the leading scientific adviser to the Robbins Committee in the following terms: "There was a honeymoon after the War, especially in the 1950s, with regard to the use of policy-oriented social sciences. But the scene could not be more transformed in the United Kingdom now. Social science is very much out of favor. Ground has been lost dramatically, especially in education. Education is of low priority now. There are two reasons for the decline in belief in social science. First, the country's economic policies are disastrous, and they coincide with a greater use made by government of economists. Secondly, the activities of radical sociologists have sapped confidence in the reliability of the contribution that the social scientists can make" (Interview with Claus Moser, 1981). At the same time, however, many social scientists working in the field of education (for example, Dr. William Taylor) believe that educational policy is badly lacking in usable paradigms for action. The paradigms associated with increased opportunity, economic growth, and an extended educational system are now outmoded. Paradigms for the age of economic and social uncertainty are, it is argued, fit work for contemporary social
scientists who might thus contribute towards future educational policy making.

Finally, we can make some generalization about the impact of committee activity on British educational policy. We have already mentioned the systematic predisposition on the part of those appointing committees towards the policies that they are likely to recommend. To us, the Robbins Report, the Houghton Report, and the Plowden Report are the best examples, although it should not be taken for granted that any of these reports influenced government policy on all or even the most important of their recommendations. Secondly, however, acceptance depends on the nature of the recommendation. In Britain there have been two characteristics of educational government which must influence the effectiveness of committees. The received wisdom has been that the curriculum belongs to the schools and to the local authorities. That being so, reports such as the Plowden Committee might well affect the ethos of primary education, but the impact will be the result of a recommendation that must be either implemented or rejected. In Lady Plowden's view, her report did give a spur to the use of informal methods in education, to the point where some teachers who were incompetent to adopt them took them on too readily. But the Robbins recommendations on the curriculum were not accepted by higher education institutions. Robbins wanted a move away from what it considered to be over
specialization in education. Here, however, it was facing the classic power of basic units in higher education to set their own norms on content and educational organization. Government keeps away from these issues in Britain because it knows that institutions can safeguard their autonomy over content. By the same token, the reports of committees are not likely to penetrate these autonomies.

A second set of issues where committees are likely to have little impact are in the province of central government itself. The Robbins recommendation that there should be separate ministries for higher and schools education was eventually abandoned by the government in spite of the strong feelings of the Vice-Chancellors. The Robbins recommendation that colleges of education should come within the province of the universities and thus leave behind the control of local education authorities and denominational bodies was not accepted either. These recommendations affected the powers and organization of central and local government. Both out of jealousy for control over its own operations and because it responded to the pressure from other levels of government, notably the local authorities, the central government did not feel it need pay attention on those issues to a committee which itself had set up.

Much as education reports might have contributed to British policy making, it should be noted that their most dramatic and radical proposals
have been those that are likely to secure consensus. There was a great groundswell of opinion in favor of extending higher education to other groups in the society upon which the Robbins Report could rely for support. On the whole, however, the education reports make no recommendations that fly in the face of controversy. Thus the Crowther Report, we have been told, avoided the whole issue of whether the schools should become comprehensive. The Chairman thought that there could be no agreement, and he did not want his other recommendations blunted because of lack of consensus.

Effects need not always be positive. A member of the James Committee has pointed out that there was insufficient support in the teaching profession and in government for their most important proposal, namely, that much of the weight of teacher education should be placed upon in-service rather than pre-service programs. It was an important function of the James Committee to evaluate the case for such a change and to thus test opinion on this key issue. There was no objection to what they said, but there was no action either. That is significant in itself.

Again, results can be obtained when committees approach issues other than directly. Quasi-judicial enquiries have been among the most important in establishing broad issues well beyond the starting point of their enquiries. We have already observed how the Auld Report on the
William Tyndale schools thoroughly evaluated the ways in which local authorities, governors, and teachers in schools must be expected to act when faced by controversy over educational issues. Partly because the report is of exceedingly high quality, both in argument and in the evidence collected, but partly as well because it was addressing issues of general importance through the example of a particular case, the Auld Report is likely to be the standard point of reference and the starting point for further thought in this field for many generations. The Houghton Report on Teachers Pay not only recommended major pay awards but also stated views on teachers' professional behavior which tend to be quoted whenever government is locked in battle with the unions over their conditions of service and their professional obligations.

Finally, the long British experience, starting with its prestigious 19th century government commissions and ending with the virtual abandonment of the device by present governments, makes it plain that no systematic impact or results can be expected from activities which are primarily concerned with summoning evidence and intuitions and affecting the norms and consciousness of the larger public as well as government on educational policy. Indeed, in our view, the word "impact" implies too strong a relationship. It assumes a linear relationship between a report and its effects. The consequences of reports might be those which are perceptible in the short term, when a report may be accepted and acted
upon, or in the longer term as it affects the fields of practice and of the way in which systems are run. Those more insidious and long-term effects are not likely to be obtained by the application of edicts laid down by committees of enquiry. They are the result of changing norms and values and competence among widely diffuse groups of practitioners and professional leaders. Those norms, values, and practices are, however, intimately connected with the values, norms, and practices of society and of government institutions as a whole. For that reason, we now turn to place the role and functioning of committees alongside the development of other kinds of instruments for reflective enquiry into policy within the changing social and intellectual climate of our day.

IV. PLACING EDUCATIONAL COMMISSIONS WITHIN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF DECISION MAKING

Two main issues of legitimacy arise from our analysis of the American and British educational commissions. First, what legitimacy is conferred on a particular form of commission? Secondly, what legitimacy do they themselves generate? Our answer to the first question is that there is a range of legitimacy. There is the overt, legal, and formal legitimacy of a Royal Commission or the California State Plan Committee, deriving from the fact that those who appoint them have been elected to
public office through the electoral process. At the other extreme, there is the self-appointed panel or panel organized by a group who seek to influence norm-setting in the society by the avowed disinterestedness and by the quality of the evidence and arguments that they bring forward. This is the legitimacy of, for example, the Kerr Commission.

The second question is more difficult to answer. For one thing, it is easy to confuse legitimacy with impact. The fact that, for example, the authors of the Master Plan had impact, or that Carnegie is thought to have had impact do not, in themselves, mean that the schemes that they have advocated or influenced have legitimacy in terms of all of the constituencies whom they affect. To take an obvious example, neither Kerr nor the authors of the 1960 California Plan would be accorded expressive, or popularist legitimacy by present-day Chicano radicals. Increasingly, therefore, we have to reckon with concepts of restricted or limited legitimacy. And we might hypothesize that the more formally legitimate a conclusion the less legitimacy it will be accorded by those groups in the society who are alienated from it, who seek radically to change it. It is, moreover, assumed by radical critics of the consensual mode of decision making that dissent has stronger moral legitimacy than does consensus or the traditional and ballot box modes of securing legitimacy. This would bring us into the whole issue of how far majoritarian policies are legitimate. Our own biased view is that the
legitimacy accorded by a majority is bound to have a stronger moral claim than the legitimacy given by a minority, always saving moral feelings about majority legitimacies that oppress minority opinions or actions.

Commissions and General Models of Policy Making

We can now try to locate the educational commission within the studies of policy making generally. Commissions and committees of enquiry hardly find a place in the main studies of policy making and power in educational policy at the federal, state, or city levels. Studies of Bundy are sui generis and start not with reflecting on Bundy but reflecting on the political context within which Bundy worked. In writing of educational policy making in general, Summerfield (1974) refers to the recreative policy process in which there is a defined structure with accepted participants within which the dynamics of policy process take place. Summerfield thinks of the roles active in the process as "nodules of power." "A nodule is a point at which surrounding vibrations or activities converge... each is a point of convergence and to and from each flows information." Within the framework, therefore, established by the Presidency, the two Houses of Congress, and the bureaucracies around them, reform lobbies press for a change in the status quo and "see themselves as change agents, ranging from gadflies to revolutionary students." By advancing social, technical, and organizational changes in education they hope both to redefine the goals
of the schools and get the educational system to do its job better. And
the large foundations have led this group. "Befitting their
institutional autonomy, the foundations have decided to act as gadflies
in the status quo in American education. Foundation officials identify
proposals which they feel are significant... Summerfield recounts how
higher education progressives led by Frank Newman received money from
Ford and produced The Report on Higher Education which became an
important document in the drafting of the 1972 Higher Education
Amendments. They lobbied and caused changes but "the true relation of
foundation money to the policy process is never clear because men like
Newman are independent scholars who argue their points based upon their
own collected wisdom." But he reckons them to be an important source of
influence within the policy process. Here we must note a comparison with
the United Kingdom. There is, indeed, an educational establishment and
it is mainly liberal. But, for the most part, they act less in the
gadfly role than within the inner consensual mode.

Use of Task Forces

Summerfield (1974) discusses how the Task Forces established by
Presidents act as reactors to forces or ideas imposed on the
Administration. If the President requires problems and their possible
solutions to be identified, a task force might take its place with other
sources of advice from within the bureaucracy or external research.
Kennedy and Johnson were assiduous in pushing forward task forces in education, and Johnson, in particular, lent his authority to their work. Nixon created a task force under Allan Pifer on the federal role and on problems of educational opportunity and racial integration. James Allen, the U.S. Commissioner of Education, assumed that Pifer would be followed, but was in fact ignored by Nixon.

There are also formal or informal seminars that transcend institutional barriers. Some of them are actually extended conversations among influential people. Keppel and Howe helped to shape progressive education reform at the federal level for a decade.

Johnson received at least 12 formal task force reports, which, together with more informal sources of advice, influenced the work of those with the real power.

In this account of the policy process we see that the notions of legitimacy and power are not necessarily coterminous. The President and a Commissioner such as Keppel had every right to act and to draw on whatever advice they saw fit. But the exercise of power was directed by their own sense of what was proper and they were influenced by people whose individual legitimacy consisted only of that conferred on them by those in power.

Bailey and Mosher (1968) also refer to ways in which "scholars and pamphleteers, often working with funds provided by major private
foundations, address themselves with increasing fervor to the patent inadequacies of the educational system..." (page 5). Task forces on education took their place among 14 created by President Johnson in his creation of the Great Society program in 1964. He set distinctive guidelines for the groups. The task force on education was composed of 13 members, most of them from outside government, and had as its chairman John W. Gardner, then president of the Carnegie Corporation. It worked closely with the Commissioner of Education, Keppel, who himself acted as a tireless intermediary with the Senate Committee on Education. It acted as a "drum-beat summons" to Congressional action. Its messages became incorporated as terse sentences appearing in the State of the Union Address, proclaiming a huge legislative agenda on federal funding for schooling, the inclusion of parochial students in federal programs, the respective responsibilities of different levels of government, the special problems of the urban schools. The reform of educational practices were "negotiated in a pliable interest group milieu." There was a wide range of views held and this enabled compromises to be sought. "The process of implementing ESEA ... involved an administrative dialectic—a series of promulgations from USOE which were preceded, accompanied, and followed by improvements and feedbacks from affected clienteles."
Within this construct of the powerful President bringing together norm setters from the wider society negotiating solutions and reaching decisions, Bailey and Mosher, unusually in the literature, find place for a normative statement about the nature of bureaucracy. The enormously complex process of stocks taking by several elements of the political and administrative system is fully recognized. "It is one thing for political theorists to reify policy-making by muddle. It is quite another thing to expect the managers of large, complex, and increasingly technological systems . . . to relax in the face of (from their point of view) irrational gusts of political influence which can topple their best-laid plans. A major compulsion of the public administrator is to achieve the presumed rational goals of law by rational techniques based upon a rational information system . . . The public administrator . . . has the support of those who are politically oriented in the society and who at the same time accept the value premises of the law in question... Both assume that . . . given certain value premises, administrative rationality can hasten and improve political decision-making." Here, then, emerges a further element in our consideration of legitimacy. The bureaucrat appeals to rationality, a decent analysis of the ends, and a decent fit between means and ends. As a result, administrators can accept the assumptions of commissions that do not seek to be revolutionary but that do act as stocktakers and gadflies. This does not
mean that the interaction at the federal level in the Johnson years
simply meant more of the same. In Bailey and Mosher's views,
"Bureaucracy is not inevitably sodden. Inertias can be overcome;
dysfunctional structures can be modified or replaced; 'iron-poor' blood
can be reinvigorated; major shifts in policy can and do stimulate
relevant shifts in an agency's way of doing business."

And what was the effect of commission or task force or conversation
activity on all of this? We can assume that the Keppels and others who
were in power felt legitimated, refreshed, and substantiated by hearing
those other voices, or at least hearing their own voices echo back to
them, within that setting. Similar conclusions are drawn by Milstein and
Jennings from their two New York cases (1973). The governor was
prominent as a decision maker. He had the power. Legislators and
interest groups interacted. Their statement of decentralization in New
York schools is placed within a general systems framework. They,
however, are also concerned with dynamic interplay. But given all of the
unknowns, "the authority, hierarchy and the formal government
sector...appears to exhibit a remarkable continuity and format."
Educational commissions in both the United States and the United Kingdom are less in favor now than in previous decades. Even in Sweden where they have been a virtually indispensable part of policy formation there is no longer universal acceptance of their ability to ensure wide enough participation in policy making. The committees as a device are less the victim of their own deficiencies than of the far more complex political and social environment in which they now operate. There is a lack of consensus about educational policy, about, for example, egalitarianism or the efficacy of education in enhancing the economy or advancing social reform. Officially appointed committees as an outcrop of the public administrative system share the lack of faith in government which is also a universal phenomenon and which has led to the election, by large majorities, of governments with declared anti-statist policies. "Disengagement" is a slogan of the times. There is, as well, as we have remarked, a decline in confidence in the power of disciplined enquiry to identify problems and help solve them. Within public bureaucracies there is a sapping of the self-confidence of permanent officials which reflects a deterioration in the relationships between permanent civil servants and their elected masters. There is, most potently of all, and associated with the lack of consensus about policy and lack of faith in the elected political and appointed administrative system, the growth of new forms of political action, often to be found at the community level, causing or
agitating for change, as in our New York City example, or raising demands for different modes of social control and resource distribution as in the areas torn in 1981 by riots in Britain, all claiming not only a legitimacy for their actions but denouncing the lack of legitimation of the authorized political structure.

There is also reduced faith in the power of social science to identify and solve problems. Government in the 1950s and 1960s was prepared to pay for research and other forms of systematic enquiry which would not only produce immediately usable data but also sometimes fundamental criticism of society and comment on its functioning and its dysfunctions. Increasingly, governments now ask the scholarly community to undertake short-order enquiries that will provide precise information in answer to questions of limited dimension. Hence government might be prepared to finance short-contract research or think-tank operations but not the longer term inquiry that allows much scope for the academic unit.

The reasons for disenchantment with social science are not too difficult to find. Some social scientists have directed criticism at the authority of scholarship and of higher education at large. Other social scientists seeking to be helpful to society have been associated with some of its most serious blunders: high rise flats which have divorced families from their original communities; highway systems that emphasize
mobility rather than continuity and recreation; developments in the
theory of deviance which have seemed to undermine the rightness and
possibility of forms of social control; unsuccessful attempts to predict
and manage economic behavior. The list can be long. Perhaps it is
unfairly drafted. Compared, however, with the relative certainties of
medicine or engineering, the social scientists' debut into the world of
practical affairs in the 50s and 60s is not considered by many observers
to have been highly successful.

Yet government, if limping a bit on its uncertain legitimacies,
still seems to need resources for reflection and critique outside itself.
So, far from there being a foreclosure on alternative instruments and
modes of analysis, there has been a proliferation of them. We will
enumerate what they are and their potentials. First, however, we list
some of the purposes for which paragovernmental or non-governmental
devices might be used. Some of them are, indeed, traditional and
constitute the main arguments for educational committees. Thus, a
government may feel the need to legitimize the more advanced components
of its own thinking by summoning a group or an individual who can assess
a position that government itself is preparing to enunciate. It may, as
well, want a committee to be not so much an independent group as a group
of representatives of interests negotiating their positions, so that
government can take the appropriate intermediate point between them in
developing a policy. These are the commonplaces of educational committee functions and are not likely to be displaced completely even if they are at present somewhat in decline.

Again, government may have turned its back, for the time being, on longer-range alternative thinking, on conceptualizations that might undermine existing policies or cause them to be seen in an entirely different light, but it still sanctions and pays for ad hoc scientific work which can help it with the problems that it perceives as immediate. It is a fact, however, that there is always a regression in science from the solving of proximate problems to a deeper level of enquiry because nothing worth saying is all that immediate or ad hoc. Reflection and theory will again come creeping in, and sponsors of consultancy will probably pay for it.

There is, more recently, the development of a whole cluster of paragovernmental functions that can be grouped under such titles as audit, monitoring, and counter analysis. Audit traditionally has been concerned with financial regularity and probity. Increasingly, in both countries, it has extended itself from issues of probity and regularity to issues of efficiency, and the definitions of efficiency have become broader as such bodies as the U.S. Government Accounting Office and the Congressional Budget Office have moved into more sensitive questioning not simply of the mechanical application of policies but of their
rationale and of their wider effects. In Britain as well, the Exchequer and Audit Branch, which serves the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, has moved from questions of simple probity into quite wide issues of efficiency. In the USA, the Bureau of the Budget has given way to the Office of Management and Budget, the intention of the change being evident from the change of title. Even more significant, however, from our point of view, is the extension of the whole concept of audit from that of probity, efficiency, and the management of resources towards "equity audit". In Britain and in many states of the USA there are now different forms of ombudsmen. They challenge cases of administration to verify whether due and equitable process has been applied. There are already cases in British administration of conflict between probity audit and equity audit in which a government department seeking to apply rules rigorously and therefore with probity, thereby failed to use its powers equitably.

So far, we have been sketching the broadening of functions which has taken place within the arena of government, or through the use of academic or analytic capacities outside government, but funded by government. There are other non-governmental groups, however, that are not part of the main-line system. Thus, minority groups may not only campaign on behalf of their programs but also back their cases by research and enquiry. It has been remarked that some of the
"monosyllabic" pressure groups acquire some of the sharpest expertise in their areas. Such organizations as those representing consumers, including consumers of education, may apply systematic enquiry to particular grievances, may identify problems and promote programs.

There has therefore been a growth of counter analysis, and a range of instruments that might pursue it. We briefly enumerate some of them before concluding with some thoughts on the relative legitimacy of each.

First, we have already remarked that it is unlikely that committees and commissions will simply fade away. The criticisms made of them do not automatically dispose of their merits, and in many countries, for example, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Sweden, they remain a strong and important part of the policy-making process.

They have been displaced in part by institutions that are not all that different. In Britain, for example, the specialist committee on education, a committee of the House of Commons, has developed more effective modes of enquiry into policy zones. The model is that of the U.S. Congressional Committee, although British Parliamentary Committees have no power to block or modify budgets. The education select committee relies upon its ability to summon witnesses, mount enquiries, and publish reports which can then stimulate debate on the floor of the House of Commons. It is developing stronger relationships with the Department of
Education and Science in mounting its enquiries, and it uses more sustained methods of enquiry than its predecessor sub-committees of the Expenditure Committee. The earlier committees lasted for one Parliamentary session only; the present committee, initiated in 1979, continues throughout the life of a Parliament. Its main limitation is that its membership consists only of MPs. MPs possess, of course, a particular legitimacy and strength of their own. But they cannot draw in, as could the DES in appointing central advisory councils, the whole range of expertise that might be needed. The committees consist wholly of back benchers. In the past, ministers never appeared before them but only their senior officials. That has now changed. Although the present Chairman, Mr. Christopher Price, has declared himself against "traditional" academics, he does employ a staff of academics, presumably all non-traditional, and other consultants who will presumably, like the staff officers to Congressional committees, begin to develop styles, and policy orientations, and institutional memories of their own.

A third developing instrument is that of the think tank. In Britain there is no such institution for educational policy alone. Within the Cabinet Office there is the Central Policy Review Staff established by a Conservative Prime Minister in 1970. Its job is to examine current policy issues which either cut across departmental boundaries, or are in danger of being overlooked by the departments, or are simply thought to
need a second view beyond that of the department. The term "think tank" is used somewhat casually. As we understand it, it is an institution for systematic enquiry, which can be either long term or short term, related to policy. In the USA, the most important think tanks are in fact independent of government, although some of their money might come from public sources in return for work deemed useful, or the private foundations. In the USA, different think tanks have acquired different political orientations and followings. In Britain, too, there are politically related analytic groups. For example, the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Centre for Policy Studies is associated with Conservative policy making. Others, however, such as the Policy Studies Institute are studiously impartial and are likely to produce policy analyses for education that have no particular political orientation.

We referred earlier to single-person enquiries. These have developed in the last two years under the Conservative government in Britain and embody recent assumptions about the value of external enquiry. In the USA such one man studies as those conducted by James Conant in the 1950s and 1960s were not officially commissioned but were, all the same, important contributions to public opinion on the American high school. In Britain, the present government selects individuals to undertake enquiries because of some impatience with the slower and more consensual model embodied in the education committee style. The
appointment of a single person assumes, indeed, that the central value judgments are already made and do not need, therefore, the process of vetting and agreement among a disparate group with legitimate interests in the issue. Instead, the individual can go straight from assumed value positions to technical judgments on such subjects as the organization of the Schools Council, or the efficiency of the civil service, or the usefulness or otherwise of "quangos" (Quasi Non-Governmental Organizations--mainly committees set up by government departments to advise them).

Again within the traditional mode, in both countries there are enquiries mounted by private foundations. Enough has been said in this paper in connection with the Carnegie and Bundy enquiries to show how important they might be in the American context. In Britain, there have been few of these in education although some of the more famous general social enquiries such as those financed by Rowntree at the turn of the century (into poverty) were outstandingly important contributions to policy formation. More recently, the Leverhulme Foundation has aided an initiative in collaboration with the Society for Research in Higher Education and Lancaster University creating a policy formulating seminar on higher education policy.

A particular form of one man enquiry is the forensic tribunal of the kind best exemplified by the Auld enquiry. The forensic enquiry
illustrates the way in which no particular mode of public investigation
has simple effects. The single person sitting in judgment on the
behavior of teachers in a particular school reaches conclusions about
which management might take action. It is, therefore, quasi-judicial and
the singleness of the judgment is, indeed, the equivalent to that of a
judge in court. At the same time, however, again like judges in court,
the single-person enquiry will produce obiter dicta which might prove to
be significant discussion of matters of wide policy importance. This was
patently the case with the Auld enquiry. The motives of government in
choosing between committees and single person enquiries are, therefore,
varied and are likely to produce varied results.

Finally, the political parties have increasingly provided themselves
with tools for analyzing policies. In Britain, the starting points are
historic. The Fabian Society for a long time provided an analytic
capacity for the Labor Party. The Conservative Research Office furnished
the post-1945 Conservative government with an entirely new approach to
the welfare state under the guidance of some of its most prominent and
able politicians. All parties now have their research departments but,
more significantly, they also have policy committees which put together
the outlines of policy that will be approved by party conferences and
will form the basis of party manifestoes and, perhaps, legislative
programs when the parties are in office. Somewhat separately from these
internal procedures are the activities of political advisers who are associated with ministers once they are in office. These were used much more generally by the recent Labour government than by the present Conservative government in Britain. The political advisers, it should be noted, were not necessarily expert in the substantive policy issues but were just as likely to be competent at giving advice on political tactics and helping with the contacts between ministers and their supporting groups.

Acting within this range of institutions or as individuals, there are the contributions of the academic community. The government machine at many levels, and in both countries, has been able to derive knowledge and concepts relevant to policy from the work of academics. In educational policy, for example, in Britain, the creation of selection examinations at 11+, and their abolition, were both the products of academic work. The arguments for the expansion of higher education were forged in academic workshops before and during the lifetime of the Robbins Committee. The theories selected by ministers and their advisers in steering the economy in both countries are the products of academic economists. These contributions of social science to educational policy making have, however, come from what one might call the free range academy. Tenured academics have had freedom within which to develop studies and to lead research teams that might be financed by government.
In recent years the contribution of academic institutions to policy formation has become more strongly institutionalized. Major research funding has come from both Washington and Whitehall to universities and to research institutes. And many leading universities, particularly in the USA, have responded by taking contracts and producing work. At the same time, interchange between government and the academic world in the USA has been vigorous since the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt and has grown in Britain where the economists since the 1910s have been recruited by government for short-term appointments.

We have already observed that the longer-range work of academics is now in less favor by government, at least as far as policy issues are concerned. In education in both countries there is a turning away from the results of research. The more short-term findings of academics still, however, find their place and again, as we have observed, this may well lead to a resumption of relationships on longer-term research before too long.

What might be the conditions under which any or all of these devices are regarded as legitimate? We might observe, first, that legitimation has dual characteristics. Legitimacy remains predominantly based upon the power of elected government in both the United States and the United Kingdom. Those devices that are created by government to help it reflect upon its own policy developments are legitimated by virtue of their
dependence upon the democratically appointed system. But, as recent history has shown, the criticism of government is that it will too comfortably listen to the echoes of its own voice and appoint those to advise it who will share its own preconceptions. Legitimation is thus denied by those in opposition to government to those forms of analysis which are not able to start from different perspectives and represent groups other than those in power. This denial of government legitimacy has become all the more potent as the life of government becomes shorter, as has been the case in so many western European and third world countries. At the same time, the continuity of ruling ideologies has been weakened. The changes in policies between one government and the next are now extremely wide. So the groups which are characterized as disenfranchised can say, with some justification, that what is deemed legitimate by the ruling system in one year may find itself in opposition in the next.

To achieve legitimacy where there can be no consensus among different groups in society requires, therefore, particularly strong efforts. The devices adopted for norm setting must be more open to more groups in society, or there must be a sufficiently wide number of them so that, in all, they will be capable of exploring a desirable range of opinions and methods.
The first of these possibilities has not proved useful in the past. What has been referred to earlier as the "Noah's Ark" device, whereby every member of a committee represents some interest and is matched with a contrasting partner from some opposing interest, is thought to create a mode of indecisive negotiation producing a weak and camouflaging consensus rather than useful analysis and progress. The other possibility, of using the whole of the range that we have described, is what we in fact prefer. But if that were to happen, it must be assumed that government is prepared to be open and eclectic in that which it is prepared to encourage. Governments must be prepared to sponsor, and therefore pay for, its own antibodies or counter analysis. If they do so, however, a new set of difficulties will arise. Donald Schon in Beyond the Stable State (1971) observed how "outsiders" who become engaged in decision-making then become, unsurprisingly, the insiders.

We ought not to leave our subject before indicating some of the different uses to which the different devices might be put. Some issues require relatively long reflection with a corresponding lead time for research and enquiry and reflective deliberation leading to consensus. This kind of operation, exemplified by the work of the traditional education committee, might particularly apply to areas which are not sharply contentious but where the time is ripe for action. In Britain,
the recent Warnock Committee on special education (1978) is a good example.

Issues which have political potency but which also need an authoritative collation of multiple opinions are suitable for the legislative style of enquiry. No other group has the authority with which to challenge, for example, a government's plans for revamping a higher education system. The short term, expert, perhaps forensic or managerial style enquiry is best suited to work by the single person. In such a case, we have remarked, government has made up its mind on the basic policy and needs help with elucidating the operational consequences. The think tanks are, potentially, the most flexible of the instruments. They can respond, because of their contractual conditions for their staff, to short-order requests for analysis. In the USA, however, some of them have produced quite fundamental work on methods of social enquiry. They are not, however, value setters. They are as able as the legislative enquiry or the blue-ribbon commission to pick up the range of opinions from the larger society and help confirm or change the norm. They are essentially technocratic institutions, whereas the Parliamentary or Congressional committee exploits technocratic work for the purposes of determining values. Some think tanks, it is true, which are directly associated with political ideologies, will start with the
affirmation and elucidation of a value position before moving on to the technical problems of its implementation.

In concluding this paper, we note how the study of legitimation in education, as exemplified by the record of the education committees, has led us to contemplate the whole range of consultative, advisory, and analytic bodies in education. Many of the components of the total system of which they form part cannot be treated here: legislative activities, or the ways in which individual practitioners in the schools might improve professional practice, for example. But we hope we have produced enough evidence to show that legitimation does not automatically or permanently adhere to any particular device. For that reason we urge the need to sustain as many options as possible in the ways in which educational policies can be created, refreshed, and changed.
APPENDIX: MAIN SOURCES CONSULTED

U.S. SOURCES ON EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING


(Allusions to educational commissions can be found in many of the works listed above.)


SOURCES, U.S. AND BRITISH, ON BRITISH GENERAL COMMISSIONS


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Maurice Kogan and Tim Packwood, *Advisory Council and Committees in 

Guy Neave, (1973), "R and D for Education in Britain and Sweden", 
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Paul.


UK EDUCATIONAL REPORTS REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT


Report of the William Tyndale Junior and Infant Schools Public Inquiry,


Tenth Report from the Expenditure Committee, "Policy Making in the
Department of Education and Science" (Fookes Committee Report)
HMSO, 1976.
INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED OR CONSULTED FOR PURPOSES OF THE STUDY

Robin Auld, QC, Chairman, Inquiry into William Tyndale Schools.

D. G. O. Ayerst, Former HMI and Assessor to many Central Advisory Councils for Education.

Professor George Baron, formerly Professor of Educational Administration, University of London, and member of the Taylor Committee.

Professor Tessa Blackstone, Professor of Educational Administration, London University, and previously a member of the Central Policy Review Staff.

Geoffrey Caston, Secretary General, Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, formerly Registrar, University of Oxford, Under Secretary, University Grants Committee and Joint Secretary, Schools Council.

Lionel Elvin, formerly Director of the London Institute of Education and member of the Robbins and other committees.

Mario Kantini, Dean, School of Education, University of Massachusetts, formerly Ford Foundation.

Marian Gade, Center for the Study of Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley.

J. A. Hudson, formerly Deputy Secretary, Department of Education and Science.
Dr. Harry Judge, Director, Oxford Institute of Education, member of
Donnison Committee on Public Schools and James Committee on Teacher
Education.

Professor Richard Layard, Professor of Economics, London School of
Economics. Member of Robbins Committee Research Team.

Margaret MacVickar, Department of Physics, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology.

Dr. T. R. McConnell, formerly Professor of Higher Education, University
of California, Berkeley.

John Mann, Secretary, Schools Council for the Curriculum and
Examinations.

Marjorie Martus, Ford Foundation.

John Meyer, Department of Sociology, Stanford University.

Sir Claus Moser, formerly Director of the Central Statistical Office,
Chief Social Science Adviser to the Robbins Committee, previously
Professor of Social Statistics, London School of Economics.

Mrs. Ann Page, Governor William Tyndale School, formerly member of the
Greater London Council and Inner London Education Authority.

Lady Plowden, formerly Chairman of the Central Advisory Council for
Education and Chairman of the Independent Broadcasting Authority.
William Plowden, Director General, Royal Institute of Public Administration, formerly a member of the Central Policy Review Staff.

James Porter, Director, Commonwealth Institute, member of the James Committee.

Christopher Price, MP, Chairman of the Specialist Committee on Education, House of Commons.

Clive Saville, Assistant Secretary, Department of Education and Science, previously Assessor to the Taylor Committee.

Sir Harold Shearman, formerly Leader of the Inner London Education Authority and member of the Robbins Committee.

Professor Malcolm Skillbeck, London Institute of Education.

Dr. William Taylor, Director of the London Institute of Education, formerly Adviser to the Department of Education and Science.

Professor Martin Trow, Center for the Study of Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley.

Sir Toby Weaver, former Deputy Secretary, Department of Education and Science.

Professor Gareth Williams, Professor of Education Research, University of Lancaster.
1. Salter greatly overstates the case here. As Rhodes (1975) points out, the use of UK commissions has been patchy. There have been many on education, but few on, for example, social security, housing, or the nationalized industries.

2. They must mean "legally trained" rather than "judicial."

3. An example of a breakdown in consensus is the report of the science and technology panel of the President's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties. There was conflict between those who wanted to involve the public in the management of science and technology and others who were concerned about "the negative impact of public regulation." A dissenting statement by J. Fred Bucy, Jr., President of Texas Instruments, complained that the phrase in the title "Promises and Dangers" typically overemphasized the dangers. He did not want government to affect action by, for example, selecting bureaucratically centers of excellence and instead wanted a decentralized, self-correcting structure encouraged by government. The very process of the commission was unacceptable to Bucy. Individual views were lumped together instead of fully debated. Balance in membership meant that major constituencies


5. Nathan Glazer believed that the voluntary plan was successful; over 100,000 moved in response to it in a short time. It was killed not because it was unsuccessful but because it was politically unacceptable to the black militant desegregationists at that time.

6. Part of this account is drawn from the literature footnoted in 4 above. We have also benefitted from a brief conversation with Mario
Fantini and from others observing the events, although not directly involved, such as Marjorie Martus and Martin Trow.