This paper argues that cautious and participatory desegregation efforts yield less desirable outcomes than either sweeping, authoritative desegregation policies or no imposed effort at all. The author proceeds to support these claims by identifying 10 goals of school desegregation and examining the rules and consequences of incremental and democratic desegregation policies in the light of these goals. Investigating the rules of temporal, spatial, organizational, and analytical incrementalism, and citing supportive evidence, the author maintains that minorities in all cases, and sometimes whites, are the worst off when gradual or partial procedures are used. Similarly, the author explores the rules of democratic desegregation planning and concludes that while citizen participation and control are fundamental values, they are rarely effective in ending racial isolation; on the other hand, people with official roles can have an impact. Several policy options are suggested: (1) continue muddling along; (2) stop imposing desegregation against majority desires; or (3) proceed to full and complete desegregation. It is concluded that if the political and moral will to undertake desegregation properly are absent, alternative solutions for granting minority rights and satisfying citizen preferences ought to be pursued. (Author/MJL)
Incrementalism, Majoritarianism, and the Failures of School Desegregation

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ABSTRACT

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Conventional wisdom, policy analysis, and democratic theory all argue that incremental changes through democratic procedures are the best way to achieve complex and controversial policy changes. In the case of school desegregation, however, evidence shows that the opposite is true: participatory and partial efforts yield less desirable outcomes for both minorities and whites than either authoritative and sweeping changes or no mandatory desegregation at all.

I support this contention by 1) identifying ten desegregation goals, 2) examining temporal, spatial, organizational, and analytic incremental rules and their effects on desegregation goals, and 3) examining rules for citizen participation and democratic control and their effects on desegregation goals. The evidence shows that for each rule, minorities (and sometimes Anglos) are at least relatively and sometimes absolutely worse off than if either a total effort or no effort at all had been made to impose racial balance.

Finally, I examine three policy options: to continue muddling along, to stop imposing desegregation against majority desires, and to proceed full speed ahead to full and complete desegregation. I conclude that if we lack the political and moral will to do it right, we are better off to seek alternative solutions for granting minority rights and satisfying citizen preferences.
I. GOOD PROCEDURES VERSUS GOOD OUTCOMES*

The hoary old debates over majoritarian versus elitist methods of policy making and incremental versus synoptic policies take odd twists when one considers school desegregation in the United States. To be aphoristic, cautious and participatory desegregation efforts yield less desirable outcomes for both minorities and Anglos than either sweeping, authoritative desegregation policies or no imposed effort at all.

This assertion contradicts conventional wisdom several ways. Leftists and democratic theorists see citizen participation as necessary for good policy-making. Policy analysts often see small careful steps as essential to effective programs. And it seems self-evident that partial success is preferable to none. But in this case, participation and caution often fail, whereas autocracy and leaps of faith sometimes succeed; if we cannot have the latter, we may be better off without the former.

Let us examine each piece of this conundrum. First, consider the argument for taking political action in incremental steps, with everyone affected influencing the process. Incrementalists argue that although any new policy risks failure and displeases some people, incremental moves avoid disasters and gross offenses. Taking small steps also permits experimentation, feedback, and adjustment -- all without policy-makers having to agree on exactly where they want to go (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963; Lindblom, 1959). Policy analysts argue that programs are enacted only if everyone concerned helps to define them and reaps some reward; enacted programs are carried out properly only if implementors share program goals and helped to shape program means (e.g., Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980: 111-114).

* I would like to thank Robert Bradley, David Braybrooke, C. Anthony Broh, Daniel Monti, Richard Nathan, Paul Peterson, Christine Rossell, Clarence Stone and Stephen Wasby for their extremely helpful comments, all of which I considered carefully even if I eventually ignored them. Suzanne Cox was, as always, invaluable.
Philosophers agree with strategists. Whatever else it entails, democracy surely calls for citizens to design and control the institutions by which they live. Thus citizens, especially those most affected by an issue, should join in formulating the problem, choosing among alternatives, implementing, and policing the new program. Democracies set up lovingly detailed procedures to promote and channel citizen participation; some theorists even define democracy as extensive pluralism and fair procedures (e.g., Dahl, 1977: 10-13). Since citizens can control the direction and magnitude of small steps better than large leaps, the former accord more with procedural democracy than the latter.

However, elitist and synoptic arguments also have adherents: policy efforts succeed only if they entail substantial, even sweeping initiatives designed and executed by experts or strong leaders. Significantly to affect a serious problem, a polity must attack root as well as branch, and (to continue the metaphor) dig a large enough hole to encircle and hack out related problems (Moynihan, 1972). For such attacks to be possible and well-directed, we need charismatic leaders or experts -- or both -- to lead them.

Here too, philosophers concur with strategists. Whatever else it entails, a liberal democracy (as ours purports to be) must ensure citizens' freedom and equality. Ignoring the libraries devoted to defining those terms, I shall merely point out here that, however defined, these values require laws and institutions to create structures and opportunities for exercising one's freedom and equality. In classic liberal theory, people join a polity because it promises them more equality and freedom of action than they would have without it. Thus a liberal democracy must make good on a set of substantive promises to its citizens. Because the promises are large and far-reaching, the laws and institutions needed to fulfill them must also be large and far-reaching -- i.e., synoptic -- and may require expertise, strong leader-
ship, or even coercion in order to work properly.

Thus we have two loosely bound sets of arguments about policy-making and magnitude. Theoretically, majority rule and incrementalism need not always conflict with absolutism and synoptic policies, but often they do -- as in school desegregation. If most citizens use legitimate participatory procedures to endorse only small changes, and thereby constrain the substantive rights of others (as the latter but not the former define these rights), then liberal democracy faces a big dilemma.

Most whites and many blacks believe that desegregation policies should destroy overt barriers to minorities' freedom of choice and equality of opportunity, but should go no further. Through various democratic procedures -- Congressional legislation, state referenda, school board and mayoral elections, public opinion, demonstrations, withdrawal of children from public schools -- whites and some blacks have shown the limits of the changes in race policy that they endorse. But some citizens, ranging from Supreme Court justices to local judges, civil rights activists, and parents, define racial freedom and equality more broadly, and insist that schools must actually -- not merely potentially -- be desegregated for democracy to fulfill its promises. They seek major change, imposed from above if necessary.

Thus school desegregation presents a conflict between procedural democracy, which in this case endorses a few small moves, and substantive rights, which in this case requires autocratic imposition. In policy terms, popular support for incremental improvements in race relations confronts elitist methods for synoptic racial restructuring. Democratic procedures conflict with liberal outcomes -- truly an American dilemma.

But even this dilemma does not reach the heart of the matter. Proponents of sweeping change generally concede that a little movement is better than none, if those are the only choices. But a review of thirty years of desegregation suggests

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1 See Appendix A
that this bit of common sense is mistaken -- that incremental changes through democratic processes are worse than no changes at all. A little bit of desegregation leads to less freedom and equality for minorities than none. Conversely, opponents of sweeping change generally claim that a little movement is better than a lot, if those are the only choices. But a review of thirty years of desegregation suggests that this bit of common sense is also mistaken -- that sweeping changes through autocratic processes are better than slight, participatory moves. A lot of desegregation leads to less pain and disruption for resistant Anglos than a little bit.

Thus I make three assertions for the case of school desegregation: good democratic procedures lead to undesirable substantive outcomes; slight changes are worse than no change for minorities; and slight changes are worse than great change for resistant whites. If these assertions are true, and if we lack the political and moral will to fulfill liberalism's promises through school desegregation, we may be better off to abandon the effort and to seek some other means for granting racial freedom and equality. In conventional wisdom, half a loaf is better than none; in school desegregation, that appears to be unsound advice.²

Sections II and III show the grounds for these claims. Section II examines incremental policies to desegregate and their consequences; Section III does the same with democratic processes. Section IV addresses the implications of these findings.

II. INCREMENTAL POLICIES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

After defining "good outcomes" for school desegregation, Section II gives incremental rules for achieving those outcomes. It examines the results of following each rule, and concludes that -- in general and with all the proper caveats -- the more drastic the action, the better the outcomes. In some cases, furthermore, no action is preferable to a little.

² I am not now prepared to argue that this claim is true for all policy issues. It appears to be the case for tax policy (Witte, 1982; Hansen, 1983). It may not be true for welfare policy (Nathan, 1977).
Goals of Desegregation

Desegregation goals abound, from the minimalist -- "end de jure segregation" -- to the maximalist -- "equalize race, class, and power relations in the United States."
But a reasonable middle ground is Broh and Hawley's (n.d.: 2,4) seven reasons to support desegregation:

1. To end racial isolation within districts, schools, classrooms, and work groups;

2. To provide equal access to educational resources, positive teacher and administrative behavior, and due process;

3. To enhance minority self-esteem and self-confidence;

4. To improve academic achievement;

5. To improve race relations at the student-student, ... educator-student, and parent-parent levels;

6. To enhance the opportunities of students from low income backgrounds for improved economic and social status; and

7. To develop a society which provides an atmosphere of positive human relations and peaceful social change.

They also suggest three "negative goals" to indicate that on some dimensions even maintaining the status quo is praiseworthy, since many people expect some facets of a school system to deteriorate as a consequence of desegregation:

8. To ... maintain citizen and parent support for desegregation ...;

9. To avoid white flight to private schools or less desegregated schools; and

10. To minimize disorder in schools and the community.

These ten goals comprise a laundry list, not a coherent theory; they are intended, and I will use them, simply as benchmarks for deciding whether desegregation "works"
Temporal Incrementalism

The first two rules for incremental policies are temporal. First, such a drastic step as desegregation should be taken slowly, in several stages, with long lead times. This rule is justified by arguments ranging from the time schools need to buy buses (Hughes et al., 1980: 112) to the time parents need to absorb such new norms for their children's education. Wilkinson (1979: 75), for example, argues that the ambiguities of Brown II (1955) were necessary to outwit subtly the black belt and its allies. "All deliberate speed" in the hands of southern federal judges meant that tokenism, in one form or another, would provide the alternative to massive resistance for a few years to come. That, the [Supreme] Court sensed, was the safest way to breach the principle. Over time it turned the diehard into an empty and ludicrous posturer, not just in the eyes of his less crazed fellow Southerner but in the eyes of the nation on whom the Court would have to depend for southern compliance.

Northern cases involve perhaps fewer diehard crazies, but just as many opponents of mandatory student movement. Therefore both organizational constraints and political calculation argue for moving slowly and one step at a time.

However, research shows that such caution is unnecessary and possibly counterproductive. On the one hand, when forced, school districts can change with astounding speed and success. Kansas City, Missouri schools began to prepare for desegregating 54,000 students in 88 schools only two months before school opened. With a few exceptions, the district closed four schools, changed grade levels in thirty, and reassigned several thousand students "remarkably well" -- perhaps "better than anywhere else in the nation" according to Gordon Foster (Hirsch, 1982: 77) The Milwaukee school system restructured its educational offerings and desegregated 67 schools (one-third of its system, and 126% of its court-ordered requirement) in two summer months (Bennett, 1979). Apparently, once desegregation appears inevitable, __________________

3 Since researchers focus on, and desegregation strategies are aimed at, particular goals, I cannot systematically examine the effects on each goal of each incrementalist or democratic rule.
"actions [to desegregate] which would have been rejected as too innovative or too radical become simply necessary solutions to a problem which must be solved" (Kirby, et al, 1973: 136).

On the other hand, long lead times and phasing in desegregation over several years increases white flight (Rossell, 1978a; Armor, 1980: 195; Morgan and England, 1982: 15) since "phased-in plans usually publicize the ... next stages, alerting parents to their child's impending reassignment. Parents thus have more time to locate alternative schooling, housing, or jobs outside of the desegregating school district" (Rossell, 1982a: 35). Similarly, slow change permits white opposition to organize and solidify into protests (Clark, 1969: xxxi,xxxiii), electoral rejection of pro-desegregation school boards (Rubin, 1972), or simply diffuse media-enhanced anxiety and defensiveness (Stinchcombe and Garsh, 1980: 181). Furthermore, attitudes toward busing are partly contextual; that is, "interaction over this highly politicized issue induces some movement ... toward the position shared by the bulk of the people in a person's social environment." Thus the longer people remain among neighbors and opinion-leaders denouncing busing, the more they will agree; those who seek to "maximiz[e] compliance will do well to ... inhibit the appearance of seemingly unified ... opposition" (Weatherford, 1980: 758, 764). Resistance is not only inherently important, but it also increases white flight (Rossell, 1978a; Morgan and England, 1982), thus defeating several desegregation goals at once.

Finally there is the moral argument against delay: "It should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them," wrote Chief Justice Warren in Brown II (1955: 300). If desegregation is just, why postpone it and deny still more children its benefits and their rights? Theoretically, slow change could benefit all, but for

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4 The converse, of course, would hold for busing support; the longer pro-busers have to organize and influence their neighbors, the greater the community support for mandatory desegregation. But rabid proponents of busing are few and far between in white neighborhoods.
once evidence supports ethics; absent peculiar circumstances, a desegregation plan should neither be phased in nor have a long lead time.

The second temporal incremental argument addresses the age of children and the number of school grades affected, not the timing of implementation. Few plans affect all grades; most exempt kindergarten and many exempt primary schools from mandatory transfers. For example, following the Supreme Court's finding in Swann (1973: 30) that "it hardly needs stating that the limits on time of travel will vary with many factors, but probably with none more than the age of the students," the court in Dallas, Texas exempted kindergarten through third grade from its desegregation order. It ruled "sound in terms of age, health, and safety of children in grades K-3" the school superintendent's contention that "the children had not matured sufficiently to cope with the problems of safety and fatigue associated with significant transportation" (Tasby v. Estes, 1976). Furthermore, courts occasionally (as in Los Angeles and Dayton, Ohio) exempt high schools at least temporarily, on the grounds that it is educationally and psychologically disruptive to insist upon change among students so near the end of their public schooling.

However, here too slight movements cause problems that greater change could avoid. If students are transferred for only a few years, it is relatively easy for them to avoid desegregation by attending a private school during those years. In Louisville, for example, white enrollment appears to decline for those few years in which whites are reassigned and then to return almost to previous levels for years when whites are not reassigned. If, however, white student movement is mandated for many years, transfers to private schools or moves out of the city require a much larger investment of money and effort, and therefore fewer whites avoid the public schools. Furthermore, students who are transferred for only a few years have no incentive to develop loyalty to their new and temporary school, and parents and teachers similarly have less incentive for new commitments. If, however, a child's entire school career
will be in a desegregated setting, everyone's motivation to make it work is likely to be much greater.

This argument can be carried one step further to address the more clearly temporal issue of how long children should wait before being desegregated. "If there is one thing about desegregation that can be said with certainty, it is that the younger the student is when first desegregated, the better the outcome" (Hawley, 1981: 299). In terms of race relations, "the earlier a child is brought into contact with children of other races, the better" (McConahay, 1981: 43 and cites therein). In terms of academic achievement, "the positive effects of desegregation are almost completely restricted to the early primary grades -- desegregation is successful as an early childhood intervention" (Crain and Mahard, 1981: 76; see also St. John, 1981: 87). Conversely, "it is reasonable [and supported by case study and white flight evidence] to expect desegregation to pose greatest problems at the junior high level" (Hawley, 1981: 299) -- precisely when Tasby among many other plans mandated student movement. If only a few grades are affected, they are almost always in the middle and high school years -- the time that all the evidence agrees is the worst possible. More change is better than less, both absolutely and because of the grade levels that are likely to be excluded when only incremental changes are imposed.

The problem with desegregating the youngest students is that it violates another goal -- minimizing white avoidance. "Greater white flight [is] produced by elementary than by secondary school desegregation reassignments" (Rossell and Hawley, 1981: 170 and cites therein; Morgan and England, 1982: 14). Thus the grade level of desegregation illustrates on a rather mundane level the conflict between democratic procedures and incremental change on the one hand, and synoptic substantive outcomes on the other. The less drastic moves that white parents prefer (i.e., oppose least) are precisely those that are least successful and even counterproductive substantively. The bold step of moving all students, especially the youngest, has better
consequences for minorities and sometimes whites than the cautious step of moving only a few, generally during junior high school years. Brief, temporary (more popular) changes cause harm that long-term, permanent (less popular) changes can avoid.

**Spatial Incrementalism**

The next set of incremental rules for good policy are spatial. The first calls for reassigning students in only part of a school district and/or in geographically contiguous areas. As one handbook for desegregation avers, "The most desirable assignment patterns ... keep distances that must be traveled to and from school to a minimum; the least desirable require extensive travel in either time or distance" (Hughes et al, 1982: 53). The tactical reason for this rule is that the fewer changes the school district must make, the more it can concentrate on them and the fewer resources it must draw from other ("truly educational") purposes. Politically, the fewer people disrupted and the less they are disrupted, the greater the community acceptance. The district can even approximate, if not fully realize, neighborhood

5 Constitutionally, of course, if a plaintiff can prove that part of a school system is segregated, the burden of proof is on school officials to show that the whole system should not be desegregated (Keyes, 1973; Dayton, 1979; Columbus, 1979). Thus the issue of only part of a district being desegregated is relevant only in plans that are not court-ordered, or in which a court permits partial remediation.

6 One might say that the most desirable assignment pattern is the most incremental -- a voluntary plan in which only those who want to desegregate do so (perhaps with school system incentives). But voluntary plans have two problems. First, they do not work: they reduce racial isolation minimally if at all in districts with 30% or more minorities (Rossell, 1979). Second, to the degree that they do work, they are inequitable and possibly harmful to minorities. They place the full burden of movement on blacks, and they generate a small number of "outsiders" who "invade" a neighborhood school that was content with the status quo ante and that is dominated by white staff and students. That is hardly a formula for good race relations or high minority self-esteem. They also can be very expensive, as Los Angeles' Permit with Transportation (PWT) program shows.

Finally, either through self-selection or receiving school selection, voluntary plans cream the best and most motivated minority students, which may benefit those students but hurts the already fragile community of the inner city schools left behind. Voluntarism has obvious attractions, but only for whites and a very few minorities.
schools by busing students short distances to a contiguous school with students of a different race.

However, as early as 1966, Stout and Inger found that northern desegregation went better when all schools, rather than only a few, in a community were involved. The scanty research since then indirectly suggests that what was true for mostly-white suburbs also holds for mostly-black cities. There are several arguments. First, one of the best ways to improve students' achievement is to mix them with higher status (and generally higher-achieving) peers (Coleman et al., 1966; Bridge et al., 1979). However, contiguous neighborhoods often have residents of similar socioeconomic status, so minimizing distances for student movement is likely to mingle poor (and less successful) blacks and whites in some schools, and wealthier (and higher achieving) blacks and whites in others. Similarly, schools in poor neighborhoods are likely to have fewer resources and newer teachers; combining or trading among two such schools does little to improve educational facilities. Thus improved educational quality and student achievement -- deeply important goals to parents of desegregated children -- more likely will occur if low status students are mingled with high status students, who usually live farther away than the next block (Taylor, 1981: 26; Orfield, 1978: 143-148).

One can argue that minimizing busing distances is actually harmful, not only not helpful. Chances are that contiguous low status schools with different races are rivalrous to the point of hostility. Students in these schools may find it hard to drop their defenses and embrace their erstwhile enemies. In a classic of understatement, Ray Rist (1980: 127) points out that "the Boston desegregation effort should

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7 This finding has its skeptics, however; see Wolf, 1976: 107 and cites therein.

8 This discussion assumes that partial desegregation affects poor rather than wealthy students. Conceivably, only middle and upper class schools would be desegregated, thus avoiding the problems of mixing low SES students in poorly-equipped schools. Surely, however, if only some students are affected they will not be the children of the rich.
be instructive in this regard." (See also Rossell, 1977: 267, note 5).

Furthermore, parents now perceive that their children have no better facilities, are not learning more, are now classmates of their economic and social rivals, and (for whites) are in a school that is now "blacker" and therefore losing status. One response, given the economic means, is to move or to find a private school -- thus destabilizing the neighborhood and the school. Everyone agrees that stability of desegregated schools and neighborhoods is immensely desirable, but desegregating contiguous neighborhoods or only some schools is deeply destabilizing (Rist, 1980: 127). If, however, all schools were racially and economically similar, parents who remain in the public system could not gravitate toward the whitest (and presumably best) school ("School Segregation," 1980: 236). Indeed, "if a plan reaches all groups in the community, ... the success of the local school system requires the success of desegregation -- and all groups will have an interest in that outcome" (Orfield, 1981: 32).

Some research directly supports this line of reasoning. Parents do indeed see higher SES schools as better (Giles et al., 1975) and do expect, correctly, that black schools will be allowed to deteriorate (Campbell and Meranto, 1975). Excluding only a few schools in Charlotte-Mecklenberg (Lord, 1975, 1977), and "uneven desegregation" within Georgia districts (Clotfelter 1981: 8) produced residential instability, whereas equalizing school racial compositions across the district aided enrollment stability in Florida (Giles et al, 1976). Thus the slight direct evidence

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9 This line of reasoning can go one step further. Poor contiguous neighborhoods, one with a predominantly black school and the other a mainly white school, are probably on the boundary of an expanding ghetto. The white neighborhood is thus already seriously unstable, in the sense that at some point whites will try to move before their property values evaporate. (Whether or not such diminished valuation "really" occurs is beside the point, since enough people assuming that it will occur and therefore selling their home in a panic make it happen.) Potential buyers judge a neighborhood partly by its schools. If the school is "more black" than the neighborhood, whites will not move in and blacks will. Thus contiguous pairing of schools speeds up the ghettoization of transitional neighborhoods (See e.g., Orfield, 1981a: 202-208; Theodorson, 1982: Section IIA).
supports the rich indirect evidence that spatial incremental wisdom has deleterious effects for both blacks and whites.

Finally, equity requires including all students. Much white resistance derives from the (accurate) perception that the wealthy and powerful -- who often design and implement a desegregation plan -- are untouched by it:

The ... problem ... is not that Whites are forced to ... integrate their schools but that certain White people have to pay the costs of abolishing the ghetto, by having their children mixed into the ghetto. To minimize costs of transportation ... the people who are supposed to pay this cost are those who live near the ghetto ... White[s perceive] ... that they ... pay a new cost of increased risks of crime and lowered educational quality in order to solve a social problem that is not their fault ... Even if it is in the public interest, the costs of doing something about the ghetto fall very unevenly among White people (Stinchcombe and Taylor, 1980: 175. Italics in original).

The charge of unfairness is not only politically potent but ethically unanswerable (so long as we compare among whites only). Why exempt the powerful rich from a burden (as whites perceive it) that they impose on the powerless poor? This is not to say that whites need not desegregate with blacks; it is to say that if the worst-off should do so, all the more reason for the best-off to do likewise.

This whole discussion of spatial incrementalism within a district has been shadowed by the more profound issue of metropolitan desegregation -- reassigning students across school district boundaries so as to incorporate suburbs and city in one educational arena. All of the arguments for and against full within-district reassignment recur, mutatis mutandis, for metropolitan plans. The logistical problems of desegregating a large area -- with perhaps several dozen school districts and as many standard operating procedures -- are formidable. So are the political problems, given suburban outrage, Congressional fulminations, and resistance from now-redundant -------------------------------------

10 This discussion ignores the constitutional barriers to metropolitan desegregation. Milliken I (1974) made it legally difficult to impose a cross-district plan, but not impossible; courts in Indianapolis, Indiana and Wilmington, Delaware have found grounds for doing so. My analysis suggests that it is worth strenuous efforts to win metropolitan-wide court orders in other SMSAs. Furthermore, as Pettigrew (1978, 1981) points out, states and localities can themselves create a wide variety of metropolitan plans.
school administrators and boards. Metropolitan desegregation adds a new problem: the daunting prospect of "one mammoth school district covering the entire SMSA and more," with attendant "massive ... busing" and "unsur[p]ation of all local educational authority" (Pettigrew, 1981: 174).

But the arguments for metropolitan desegregation are even more powerful. Primary is Judge Roth's question during Detroit's trial: "How do you desegregate a black city, or a black school system?" (Miliken I, 1974: 728, n. 8). We increasingly face minority central cities surrounded by Anglo suburbs we must also face the fact that simple arithmetic requires us to involve metropolitan regions if we wish to end racial isolation.

Consider also other desegregation goals. First, achievement: if low status children achieve more when mixed with high status children (and the latter do not achieve less; see section IV), then mingling inner city and suburban students should, in general, improve the performance of the former without harming the latter. Similarly, giving poor minorities access to the better facilities and stronger staffs of wealthier suburban schools should enhance the quality of their education. Metropolitan plans do in fact "show the strongest [achievement] effect of any type of desegregation," followed by countywide school systems (a form of metropolitan desegregation), central city plans, and finally suburb-only plans (Crain and Mahard, 1981: 72-74; see also Pettigrew, 1981: 170; Green, 1982).

Second, residential and enrollment stability: the arguments for intra-district desegregation apply here also. Furthermore, to the degree that "implementation ... in a central city ith a high minority enrollment and surrounding white suburbs not included in the plan produces an accelerated white withdrawal from public schools" (Orfield, 1981a: 213; emphasis added), the solution is more change, not less.

"County-wide school districts have half the white enrollment decline of city school

11 Just one datum: only five of our twenty largest cities have public schools with an Anglo majority (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1979: 15).
districts" (Rossell, 1981b: 170; Farley et al., 1979; Armor, 1980; Raffel, 1980: 175-188). The least avoidance occurs in "urban school districts with full metropolitan desegregation plans, plans which put all children in predominantly white schools and leave no readily accessible all-white school districts to which to flee" (Orfield, 1981a: 213). In Florida, in fact, with full countywide desegregation, white enrollment in public schools is increasing (Armor, 1980: 201; see also Morgan and England, 1982: 20; Orfield, 1978: 411-413).

There are several reasons why more change avoids problems created by less. First, "the larger the percent minority in the school district, the greater the white enrollment decline" (Morgan and England, 1982: 20; Armor, 1980: 199-201; Rossell, 1981a: 32-34 and cites therein) but metropolitan plans can disperse minority (and poor) students below the "tipping point." Second, white flight seems to be unrelated to busing distances in countywide plans, even though it is related for central city-only plans (Rossell, 1981b: 173 and cites therein; Giles and Gatlin, 1980: 743). Metropolitan plans, but not city-only plans, apparently can keep the proportion of black students low enough and the quality of education high enough to outweigh whites' dislike of long bus rides.

Third, the very enormity of a metropolitan plan may promote stability. A partial or temporary change will not evoke commitment from reluctant participants. But a metropolitan plan is such a massive undertaking that it is bound to seem permanent,

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12 If it exists; see, for example, Rossell, 1981a: 32-34.

13 This finding may either decrease the force of the argument for widespread desegregation within a district, or increase the force of the argument for desegregation across districts. Which way one goes depends on whether one weights the preferences of whites or the outcomes for blacks more heavily.

14 Perhaps some of these "self-interested" motives do not explain opposition to busing (as distinguished from behavioral avoidance); general conservatism and racism may explain white disapproval more than the direct effect of desegregation on participants. (See Sears et al., 1980: Sears et al., 1979; McConahay, 1982; Gatlin et al., 1978). But whatever the reason, whites flee metropolitan plans less than intra-district ones.
and therefore may induce parents to dig in and try to make it work for their children rather than to resist or undermine it. More mundanely, the costs of moving far from job and friends increase as desegregation reaches further. At some point, the costs of exit exceed those of voice (Hirschman, 1970; Peterson, n.d.).

Finally, some evidence suggests that metropolitan plans enhance housing integration — surely the best way to desegregate schools. "By the late 1970's, the cities that had experienced metropolitan school desegregation were showing much more rapid desegregation of housing than their counterpart cities that had not experienced metropolitan school desegregation" (Pearce, 1980: 26). There are two explanations for this finding. First, where schools are segregated, real estate agents steer clients correspondingly, and buyers respond; where all schools are desegregated in a region, there is less racial steering. Second, a metropolitan plan in which integrated neighborhoods are exempted from busing sets up a new incentive system: "By ... encouraging housing integration, the white families in such neighborhoods ... reacquire a neighborhood school. For blacks, ... a move out of the ghetto ... both exempts minority children from busing, and by contributing to racial balance in their new neighborhood (which will eventually exempt the white children living there) makes them welcome there" (Pearce 1980: 42; see also Orfield, 1981b; Rossell, 1981a: 62-64).

Finally, there is equity. White city residents already feel unfairly burdened: "Now add the degree of perceived unfairness provided when the suburban residents near Boston and Los Angeles are exempt. Who caused the segregation? The suburbanites who fled the city, whose legislators refused state funds to the city, whose zoning pol-

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15 In Charlotte, NC, city and school authorities cooperate in locating scattered site public housing in white neighborhoods (Pearce, 1980: 43; Orfield, 1981c: 34). In Louisville, the Kentucky Human Rights Commission publicized school attendance zones that families could move into to avoid busing, and white neighborhoods began recruiting black families (Kentucky Human Rights Commission, 1977). Note, however, that we have much more evidence on the interaction between school and housing segregation than school and housing desegregation (See Taeuber, 1982 and cites therein).
cies kept blacks out of their towns, who consume the city's jobs and culture and widgets but not its public schools" (Liebman, 1981: 257). A constant and potent political attack against Edward Kennedy and Judge Garrity, among others, is that their children are exempt from the plans they generate or support. Again, to inner city blacks, who can charge whites as a whole with injustice, this lesser unfairness is irrelevant. But it is unanswerable to whites who "perceive school desegregation as another example of exploitation of the poor and the powerless by wealthy liberal suburbanites" (Rossell, 1977: 250; Cottle, 1976: 42-60).

Metropolitan desegregation even has surprising virtues that city-only plans may lack. It may actually reduce busing distances and costs, or at least make bus use more efficient (Pettigrew, 1978: 109-137; Orfield, 1978: 128-150). It could increase parental choice among educational options (Pettigrew, 1981: 172; 1978: 72-75, 103-109). It could decrease the size of the school district (Pettigrew, 1978: 77). But let us stop here; my purpose is theoretical, not programmatic. This analysis shows that policies with the furthest reach and greatest white opposition are precisely those with the best results for minorities and least disruptive consequences for Anglos. That is, spatial incrementalism -- desegregating only part of a district, minimizing busing distances, and halting at district boundaries -- generates the least initial resistance but the most neighborhood and school instability, the greatest racial hostility, and the fewest achievement gains for minorities. Incremental policies responding to majority preferences have at best mixed effects; sweeping changes which ignore procedural democracy have good ones.

Organizational Incrementalism

Consider now organizational incrementalism: school systems should make only a few changes at a time, and see the effect of those before charging ahead with new ones. It stretches resources, tempers, and abilities too far to disrupt all standard operating procedures at once; after all, the logistics and politics merely of reassigning students are awesome. As one of the fathers of incrementalism puts it, "Informed and thoughtful leaders and citizens ... believe that of any large sample of attempts at social problem solving, a large number will always turn out to have missed the mark or to have worsened the situation. They will prefer to see the political system act on the elements one at a time. Not that errors will be avoided, but each element will consequently receive greater attention and will be more carefully watched for feedback and correction" (Lindblom, 1979: 521).17

But once again, a few small steps achieve fewer desegregation goals than many larger ones, and generate problems of their own. At the systemwide level, specialty schools improve educational quality and community acceptance (if the improvements are actual and not merely rhetorical). Parental choice among types of schools diminishes white flight, and parental choice combined with a mandatory back-up decreases racial isolation (Rossell, 1979; Levine and Havighurst, 1977; Morgan and England, 1981). But magnets have drawbacks. They siphon resources and commitment away from the rest of the system and they skim the minority population -- thus leaving other schools absolutely as well as relatively worse off. They also can be a political tool to demonstrate to citizens, the court, and the federal government that the school system is working hard to desegregate even if few real changes are taking place (Metz, 1981; Dorgan, 1980; Powers, 1979; Los Angeles School Monitoring Committee, 1979; Foster, 1973).

17 The guidelines for the Los Angeles school board in preparing for desegregation included the following observation: "The success of the program ... will contribute to the acceptance of the desegregation plan ... Plans should, therefore, be implemented initially on a small enough scale so that available resources can be concentrated and observable benefits will occur" (Miller, 1977).
To obtain the virtues and avoid the drawbacks of magnet schools, more -- not less -- change is necessary. If the whole system is educationally reorganized, then distinctiveness, choice, and improved quality can characterize all schools for all students. Such was Milwaukee’s strategy -- to embed desegregation in a radical revision of its entire educational offering (Barndt, et al., 1981; Bennett, 1979; Thompson, 1979). Although blacks still bear excessive burdens, community support is high and achievement scores are improving.  

Courts in Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles, among others, have ordered educational improvements along with physical desegregation, sometimes with mandatory state financing and sometimes at the instigation of the school system itself. These changes, when implemented, have been welcomed and apparently effective. (See, e.g., Vergon, 1981: 20-27). Thus partial reorganization both enhances and hinders desegregation goals; drastic change solves many of the problems and retains the virtues of partial change. And for once, procedural democracy need not clash with desirable outcomes. Everyone supports improving the quality and variety of school offerings, 

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Although testimonials from school personnel should be taken with a grain of salt, those that combine specificity with enthusiasm are encouraging. After showing that both black and white students’ achievement scores have risen, for example, the assistant school superintendent of Hillsborough County, Florida, explained that:

the implementation of our desegregation plan provided an opportunity to do a number of things that we either did not have the courage to do beforehand, or did not sufficiently feel a need of doing, or did not feel it feasible to do. Some of these opportunities were:

1) Study and re-evaluate curriculum,
2) Re-study organizational patterns,
3) Institute special teacher training programs,
4) Implement training programs for administrators and support personnel,
5) Re-study our assessment instruments, and
6) Study our total educational delivery system.

The opportunity to do the aforementioned things contributed to the academic progress of our students in an integrated setting (U.S. Department of HEW, 1977: 124)
and whites are more willing to accept the costs of desegregation if they can perceive immediate educational benefits.

Within schools, the lesson is the same: more change is better than less. The following organizational changes, especially in combination, enhance student race relations and/or academic achievement:

1) generally equalizing power and status among minority and Anglo staff, and having particular examples of minority superiors and Anglo subordinates (Cohen, 1980; Mercer et al., 1980);

2) fully incorporating multiethnic programs into the curriculum, with explicit treatment of racial issues (Orfield, 1975: 328-332; Chesler et al., 1981; Forehand et al., 1978: 89; Forehand and Ragosta, 1976: 38-42, 94-98);

3) fairly designing, clearly articulating, and consistently applying discipline codes (Forehand et al., 1976: 200; Forehand and Ragosta, 1976: 53, 72);

4) providing extensive extracurricular activities that draw equally on the talents and interests of both races (Forehand and Ragosta, 1976: 29, 101-108; Schofield, 1981: 132-135; Crain, 1981);

5) changing symbols and customs of the school to put "new" and "old" students on an equal footing (Forehand & Ragosta, 1976: 104; Mercer et al., 1980: 303);

The only big fly in the ointment here is financing; really effective large-scale restructuring is expensive. But this problem simply illustrates the main point of this paper -- only if we have the political will to do it right can desegregation be truly successful.

It may be that organizational change must go even further, that desegregation will never succeed without radically restructuring the educational system to disrupt existing hierarchies of authority and socioeconomic class within the schools. In this view, any change that focuses only on improving individuals or marginally changing current school practices is doomed to fail (Monti, 1982). The argument is intriguing and theoretically powerful, but we have no evidence to support it other than evidence that many partial reforms have not succeeded -- findings which can be explained by less drastic theories.
6) reorganizing classroom activities to maximize cooperation and equal status relations across races and achievement levels (Forehand and Ragosta, 1976: 36-42; McConahay, 1981; Cohen, 1980; Epps, 1981: 99-103; Slavin, 1981; Schofield, 1981: 124-132); and

7) avoiding as much as possible tracking within schools and classrooms (Crain 1973; Orfield, 1975: 324-328; Simmons and Brady, 1981; Schofield, 1981: 118-122).

This list is not merely yet another call for better education; its purpose is more precise. Each item, when properly implemented, improves race relations and/or academic achievement even in "ordinary" schools. Absent each item, physical desegregation has had fewer good and more bad effects. Thus to make a few changes and wait for them to produce good results before undertaking others is exactly the wrong strategy. All of these organizational changes should be made at once in order to benefit as much as possible from any. Obviously, schools should avoid unnecessary confusion, but the disruption attendant upon changing as many facets of interracial behavior as possible is worthwhile, and may even be essential for the initial disruption of student reassignment to achieve any of its goals. Here too, procedural democracy and desirable outcomes can work hand-in-hand. The more parents perceive improvements in their children's education or race relations, the more willing they will be to stay in the system even if they have the economic means to leave. Thus the more upper-status students there will be, and the more educational achievement for all will improve. Cycles need not be vicious.

\[21\] Only two studies have systematically compared the effect on race relations of schools which maximize appropriate organizational changes and schools which do not. Lachat (1972) found white students almost twice as likely to hold positive attitudes toward blacks in a fully integrated school as in a desegregated one (71% to 37%). (The integrated school met all three conditions which Gordon Allport deemed necessary for racial contact to diminish racial prejudice: equal status, cooperation, and support from authorities for positive intergroup relations. The desegregated school did not meet these conditions.) In another school, informal racial mixing increased over time in the seventh grade, with heterogeneous and cooperative classrooms, and decreased over time in the eighth grade, with racially homogeneous and competitive classes (Schofield and Sagar, 1977).
Goal Clarification

One argument for proceeding incrementally is that policy actors need never specify, and thus can avoid futile disputes over, values and priorities:

The idea that values should be clarified, and in advance of the examination of alternative policies, is appealing. But what happens when we attempt it for complex social problems? ... Citizens disagree, congressmen disagree, and public administrators disagree. ... Agreement on policy thus becomes the only practicable test of the policy's correctness. And for one administrator to seek to win the other over to agreement on ends as well would accomplish nothing and create quite unnecessary controversy (Lindblom, 1959: 81, 84).

Once again, however, experience shows that for school desegregation, at least, incremental wisdom leads to policy failure. As early as 1954 (Williams and Ryan), districts fated with a clear statement of the law by authorities were more willing to comply with new mandates than districts with less clear instructions, and history continues to teach that lesson. The South desegregated once legal requirements become "unambiguous -- immediate and complete merger of the separate black and white schools," whereas the North has done less partly because "there has never been a clear and unambiguous set of principles of northern desegregation law" (Orfield, 1981c: 29-37). The literature on legal compliance consistently finds "the clarity and content of the law mandating the change" essential for policy implementation (Rodgers and Bullock, 1972; Wirt, 1970; Dolbeare and Hammond, 1971; Coombs, 1980: 887; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979: 487). In short, "hierarchically imposed rules can work ... [From] 1964 [to] 1974, the country did move closer to desegregation. The amassing of federal resources and the clarification of goals and strategies did have an enormous impact" (Yudof, 1981: 253).22

Within schools, recognizing conflict works better than repressing it. "Schools with good race-relations ... [are] very open to the subject of race," and "encouraging class discussions on race ... is by far the largest determinant of white

22 Yudof argues, however, that imposing a clear requirement works less well once the goals move beyond ending racial isolation. He calls at that point for strategies that look more participatory -- the subject of Section III of this paper.
Students' racial attitudes" (Forehand et al., 1976: 93, 193). Schools which systematically diagnose problems, discuss goals and evaluate progress toward them, and encourage conflicts to surface have much better morale and less racial tension than schools which ignore conflict (Forehand and Ragosta, 1976: 60-68, 83-93, 108-115). Discussions of race-related issues appear to affect whites' attitudes and behaviors more than blacks' (Slavin and Madden, 1979), but here at least some movement seems better than none. Thus specifying precise mandates and explicitly treating conflict improve desegregation prospects. Once again, bold and controversial action works better than caution and apparent consensus.

I shall defer the implications of these findings till the conclusion; here I merely reiterate that temporally, spatially, organizationally, or analytically incremental policies all work less well or even cause more harm than less popular synoptic policies. Too often incremental "recommendations lead to unanticipated and undesirable consequences because they are often necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for desired changes" (Cohen, 1980: 252).

III. MAJORITARIAN PROCESSES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

Philosophers and policy-makers alike endorse majoritarian democracy. Citizen participation, flexible responses to local conditions, democratic control — all seem the essence of political wisdom as well as liberal democratic virtue. And yet, following these tenets does little to promote desegregation goals and sometimes impedes them. Authoritative imposition, in the long run, works better.

Citizen Participation in Planning Desegregation

Consider first citizen involvement in designing the plan. Scholars and activists concur: "Decentralized Decision-Making That Includes the Community Will Enhance Acceptance of the Plan" is one heading in a set of desegregation principles written
for the Los Angeles school board (Miller, 1977; See also Broh and Trent, 1981). I
will not review the overwhelming literature on the virtues of citizen participation
in policy-making, especially education. Suffice it to say that no one who believes
in apple pie and motherhood decries, in theory at least, parents' involvement in
shaping children's education. 23

With some exceptions, however, community involvement does little to enhance either
the substance of a plan or community support for it. Citizen groups, even when spon-
sored by the schools, are generally ignored. In Chicago, for example, the report of
the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations in 1963, the Hauser Report in
1964, the Havighurst Report in 1964, Chicago Urban League reports in 1964, 1977, and
1979, the Redmond Report of 1966, a student-school board forum in 1969, the City-Wide
Advisory Committee reports of 1978, citizen and community group advisory committees
of 1981 -- all have had no impact on what continues to be America's most segregated
city. Chicago is typical; in all cities I have studied, the school board pays
precisely as much attention to citizen reports as it wishes to, while giving elabo-
rately supportive lip service. The consequences of this charade are usually "the
opposite of what the board hoped to achieve. The board was hoping for a feeling of
participation on the part of the community; in fact, it alienated a segment of the
community because its citizens' efforts were not recognized. They were simply a sham
committee put together to delude the community with a false notion of involvement"
(Hughes et al., 1980: 16).

23 One bibliography of "citizen participation in education," now a decade old, lists
400 items which "represent only a small percentage of the material that might have
been included even after the topic was narrowed and many potentially relevant
areas excluded" (Davies, 1973: x). The author notes that "most of the references
included are favorable ... to the concept of an increased role for parents and
other citizens in educational decision making" even though he sought out "a divers-
ity of viewpoints" (Ibid., xii, xiii).
As the quotation suggests, citizen planning groups may not merely waste time, but may inadvertently cause harm. First, they help schools to stall and thereby defuse desegregation demands. The board-created Community Task Force in Kansas City, Missouri, took over a year to propose a plan which was essentially formulated for it by the district's desegregation advisor at its inception; meanwhile, the district "decided to forego" even the partial desegregation and educational improvement plan it had already designed. "Creating the Task Force was a means of sidestepping the issue and postponing a decision by the Board" (Hirsch, 1982: 22).

Second, they may unwittingly be a political tool for desegregation opponents. In Kansas City, "the Task Force also gave ... anti-desegregation [Board] members time to lobby their colleagues and to work through political channels against desegregation" (Ibid.; see also Rubin, 1972). A citizen group "looks democratic and representative, ... thereby taking the heat off the board." It is especially valuable if it can be induced to put forth a plan which, even if initially formulated by the schools, then becomes the responsibility of the group rather than of the seemingly responsive and responsible school system (Rothenberg and Chesler, 1980). Public forums for "citizen input" may simply provide a chance for opponents to express and heighten their convictions. In Boston, for example:

Parents who had come eager to speak about specific problems in the District IX schools tried to come forward to testify. Time and again their attempts to speak were interrupted by jeers and yells from the group of ROAR Restore Our Alienated Rights supporters. The Chairman asked for order several times and once adjourned briefly. When the meeting resumed, the antics of some members of the crowd became more outlandish. Printed material that had been distributed was shredded with Afro combs and thrown around the auditorium. Signs protesting "Communist busing" were paraded in front of the ever-present TV cameras (van Arsdell, 1976).

Third, citizen groups may reinforce existing inequalities between lower status -- often minority -- members and the inevitable blue ribbon participants. In Boston, for example, minority parents faced problems of mistrust from educators, stylistic differences, day care and transportation logistics, less prior information, and
language barriers (Craig, 1976). Everywhere, whites unconsciously equate problems of desegregation with problems of blacks. Thus, in a depressing and ironic twist, the very effort to make citizen groups widely representative can exacerbate the problems they are intended to ameliorate.

Finally and most importantly, even when citizen groups do influence the plan and do generate support for it, minorities may have little to thank them for. The much-praised Dallas Alliance Plan,24 which was received enthusiastically by the judge and peacefully by the citizenry, left out eight of thirteen grade levels and 20% of the school system, all minority. Forty-one percent of the blacks in Dallas were to remain in segregated schools, and 68 schools remained one-race. Dissidents from this "prime example" (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1976) of desegregation success conclude that "the Anglo majority whose representatives dominated the planning had to deal with both a minority school system and with their own ... conservative, business-oriented views ... They made a few changes that would eliminate the more obvious problems but ... maintain the present power structure" (Beck and Linden, 1979: 381). Similarly, the Kansas City Task Force's structure and membership "confined black members to a negative, passive role as far as boundaries were concerned: they could not make proposals for their sub-districts but could only argue for or against proposals by the white representatives. The person who proposes a solution always has the advantage over the person who just says no: in this case, that advantage completely favored the white representatives" (Hirsch, 1982: 45). The Task Force finally split along racial lines over two plans, one leaving an all-black corridor through the city, and the other equally desegregating all schools. The former plan (which had been proposed by the district's desegregation advisor) was the basis for the final design; the latter disappeared without a trace as soon as it

24 The Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance was an elite group of seven Anglos, six blacks, seven Chicanos, and one Native American, who spent four months and 1500 hours designing the plan which Judge Taylor accepted almost intact.
was presented to the Board.

The only clearly relevant aggregate data on the effects of citizen participation support the case study evidence that such activity is irrelevant to desegregation goals. Morgan and England (1982: 19, Table 5) find, in a multivariate analysis that includes demographic variables, school district characteristics, political process variables, and amount of desegregation, that citizen participation has no effect on white flight ($b = -0.07$).

This conclusion -- that citizen plans are useless at best and harmful at worst -- has two important caveats which pull in opposite directions. First, community support for desegregation can be enhanced through carefully structured citizen participation. Dallas is one clear example; the citizen group which designed a plan that left out so many blacks also convinced hostile residents to accept busing of 17,000 students, one-third of them Anglos. That is no mean feat. Another is Milwaukee: the judge, special master, and school superintendent invited parents to

25 Two earlier aggregate studies support the stronger claim that citizen involvement is sometimes detrimental, not merely irrelevant, to desegregation goals. Controlling for demographic and political variables, Kirby et al. (1973: 67-77, 125-128) find that both civil rights activity and general white support have little positive effect on schools' general responsiveness to black demands ($b = 0.10$ for civil rights; $b = 0.11$ for general support). Civil rights actions have no impact ($b = 0.02$) on school system actions to desegregate. Inger and Stout (1968) find that "the less the public is asked for its opinion during the period of policy formation, the greater the likelihood that the public will accept the integration plan." However, we should be cautious in using these studies as evidence for my theory. Both deal with partial, even token desegregation plans, in largely white districts and/or in the South -- not with massive mandatory student reassignment in largely-black Northern cities, which is the type of desegregation discussed in this paper. Such quantitative differences are probably not so qualitatively great as to make these studies useless for my purposes, so it is worth pointing out that they support my thesis. But I cannot lean heavily on them.

26 And possibly a third: citizens who feel that they helped to shape the plan may support it more. On a general level, white respondents who feel efficacious -- who believe that "people like you" have "influence ... over school integration in this county" are significantly less likely to flee desegregated schools (Giles and Gatlin, 1980). Both whites and blacks who feel efficacious approve of the way desegregation was implemented (Gatlin, et al., 1978). On a more specific level, my own research shows that parents who work on planning and monitoring desegrega-
exchange views and information in special forums, to submit plans for implementing the court order, and to shape the details of desegregation in their subdistricts. The result was a large number of people participating to an impressive extent and peaceful acceptance of -- if not great enthusiasm for -- desegregation. Because reassignment was voluntary, however, the result also was not much student movement, all of it from blacks (Brandt et al., 1981). In short, if citizens become involved early enough, if leaders ensure that their work is relevant, and if everyone is convinced that their work is actually influencing the process, they may improve the plan and enhance community support. But -- a big constraint -- such involvement and support usually comes at the relative expense of minorities. Blacks probably do not end up worse off than they started when citizens design plans, but they always come out with more of the burden.27

The second caveat to the general finding that citizen planning is irrelevant or detrimental works directly against the first. We could improve outcomes for minorities through democracy, but at the cost of decreasing white support. That is, a truly egalitarian and majoritarian participatory structure could produce results that please previously powerless but numerous citizens (i.e., minorities), since blacks and Hispanics equal or outnumber Anglos in many cities. Such a structure might, for example, generate a plan to equalize the burden of busing, bring parents into school decision-making processes, and restructure the form and content of teaching -- all of which would lead local elites, white parents, and school personnel to resist.

tion often become strong supporters, even if they have little impact on it. The best analysis of the "small effects" of school system participation on citizen participants is Salisbury, 1980.

27 Furthermore, they probably bear more of a burden in citizen-influenced plans than in court- or federally-designed ones, although that is a hypothesis rather than a finding at this point.
These contentions are conditional because no such participatory structure exists -- it is too radical a vision of democracy for American education politics. The closest approximations to it that I know of are experiments in community control (which do little to end racial isolation), Racial-Ethnic Parent Councils in Boston (which are considered below), the Concerned Citizens for Omaha (a "mass outpouring of community concern and civic spirit" which is credited with peaceful implementation of Omaha's plan, but which did nothing to mitigate its greater disruption for blacks [Mihelich and Welch, 1981], and frequent assertions that an effectively desegregated school will "involve parents at the classroom level in actual instructional and/or learning activities" (e.g., Hawley, 1981: 301). Although many writers on desegregation call for revamping community power structures to generate real, effective citizen participation (e.g., Crowfoot and Chesler, 1981: 280-285; Leiner, 1975) none give us evidence that such profound democratizing has occurred. 28

In general, then, citizen participation does little to enhance and sometimes hurts desegregation goals. What about the reverse side of the coin, leadership. If democracy does not work, does authority? The answer, unfortunately, is maybe. Few observers disagree with the oft-quoted dictum of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1976: 39):

Perhaps the most important ingredient in successful school desegregation is leadership, both at the community level and in the schools ... The record shows that where ... leadership exists, desegregation is more likely to be achieved with minimal difficulty. Where it is lacking, on the other hand, segregation may be accompanied by confusion, anxiety, and ... disruption.

The analytic problem, however, is that whereas case study and qualitative evidence lend unanimous support to this pronouncement, some aggregate and survey data do not. There are good reasons for rejecting, or accepting, either type of evidence; I come

28 Some writers also argue that students should be fully involved in designing and implementing the rules by which they must live (Noblit and Collins, 1978; Forehand and Ragosta, 1976: 74-87; Chesler et al., 1981: 123-134). Monitoring bodies in Boston, Cleveland and Los Angeles have included students; their impact has been slight. Theoretically, however, the argument is unexceptionable.
down firmly in the middle and remain agnostic.

Let us examine the evidence, first that leadership can promote desegregation goals. I have already made the case for one form of leadership -- clear, explicit statements by the court or other authority of exactly what is required of a school system. Not surprisingly, backing up these requirements with threats of coercion, whether in the form of withdrawing federal funds, handing out contempt-of-court citations, putting the school system under the direct rule of the court, or something else, have the greatest effect (e.g., Bullock, 1976). We must to remember that many school systems have desegregated, almost none through grass-roots initiative. Thus at the most basic level, it is almost trivial to assert that authoritative leadership reduces racial isolation, given that nothing else does and that some desegregation has taken place.

But an analysis of the role of leaders must go deeper. Federal bureaucrats and judges generally determine whether and how a school system will desegregate; local leaders can affect how well it does so. I have no room here to cite examples; suffice it to say that case studies unanimously assert that "actions by public officials in support of law and order may prevent racial violence" (Greenblatt and Willie, 1981: 324; see also U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1976) and otherwise shape citizens' attitudes and behaviors.29

29 Studies of desegregation before 1970 must be suspect here, as noted in footnote . However, it is still worth noting that, for districts not under court or federal orders, the mayor's activity strongly affects both the school system's general response to black demands \( b = 0.27 \) and its specific actions to desegregate \( b = 0.25 \). Conversely, the more inactive and conservative the mayor is, the more white opposition there is. Civic elites' support for desegregation has a moderate effect on school system response to black demands \( b = 0.16 \) and a strong effect on schools' action to desegregate \( b = 0.27 \). The more active the civic elite is, the more it affects action to desegregate \( b = 0.20 \), although elite activity has a weak negative relationship to schools' general responsiveness to black demands. Community support for desegregation is greater and opposition is less when elites support the civil rights movement and when elites are active in the community (Kirby et al., 1973: 110-123, 128-132).
Some evidence shows that the actions of school personnel also affect community response to a plan. Simply providing extensive and accurate information to the media substantially increases community acceptance (Memphis City School System, 1978; Murphy, 1980; Meyer, 1980). In Georgia, white school officials' support for desegregation decreased the amount of coercion needed to desegregate their schools (Rodgers and Bullock, 1976: 59-65). In Florida, white parents' perceptions of school officials' attitudes toward desegregation were weakly but significantly related to their evaluation of "the way desegregation has been handled around here." For black parents, perceptions of school officials' views produce the strongest effect of any variable measured on approval of desegregation implementation (Gatlin et al., 1978).

Educators' leadership also affects the accomplishment of within-school desegregation goals. "Relatively more influence in the [desegregated] elementary school of the school board and/or the superintendent of schools is associated with [black and white] student achievement" (Forehand et al., 1976: 90-95). In addition, "All students of desegregation agree that principals play a key role in the effectiveness of desegregated schools;" and "what teachers do in classrooms is the single most important determinant of effective education" (Hawley, 1981: 301; see also Berman and McLaughlin, 1980; St. John, 1981: 94-96; Chesler et al., 1978; Schofield, 1981: 136-143; Broh and Trent, 1981: Orfield, 1975: 317-322). To save space, I report here only one more aggregate result and no case material: "the one single variable which seems to have the largest impact on students' racial attitudes is teachers'

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Nevertheless Gatlin et al. (1978) conclude that "our analyses lend only tenuous confirmation to the elitist assumption that public officials shape the target group's reactions to desegregation." A better illustration of the difficulty in interpreting leaders' roles would be hard to find.

But administrator control is also associated negatively with white students' perceptions of the school's racial attitudes -- perhaps because it upsets the "status quo' position favored by those with traditional views of schooling" (Forehand et al., 1976: 90-96).
racial attitudes," which are in turn related to the principal's racial attitudes. Other manipulable variables such as teaching methods and treatment of parents also affect both student race relations and achievement (Forehand et al, 1976).

Why should we expect local leaders to affect citizens' response to a desegregation mandate? Of the many reasons, I shall suggest only two. The first is affective:

The civic elite has power simply because it is an elite; it has the respect of large segments of the community and the ability to influence them. They are living examples of the local community's value system ... Almost by definition you [sic] are above partisanship. This position prevents elites from advancing extremist views. Therefore, when they endorse school integration it becomes accepted as a non-extremist program; it is legitimate (Kirby et al., 1973: 118).

The second is cognitive: citizens not moved by deference and emulation may be affected by rational calculation. "The violence occurring with desegregation so far has been surprisingly rational. That is, violence has generally resulted in localities where at least some of the authorities give hints beforehand that they would gladly return to segregation if disturbances occurred; peaceful integration has generally followed from firm and forceful leadership" (Pettigrew, 1971: 130).

Furthermore, if citizens are led to believe, as they apparently were in Boston, that court orders can be overturned by political action, then it makes perfect sense for them to resist. After all, we are all taught that public opinion does and should shape our laws; it takes careful education to teach the citizenry that the unfamiliar form of a court order is not subject to the same rules as an unpopular law.

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32 With the same cautions of footnotes and note that the earliest comparative study (Williams and Ryan, 1954) of desegregation success found school board and administrators' actions and attitudes crucial. Kirby et al. (1973: 89-103, 129) find the superintendent's leadership unrelated to schools' general responsiveness to black demands (b = -0.02) but strongly associated with specific actions to desegregate (b = 0.29). Superintendents are more active, in turn, when school boards are cohesive. Opposition increases with superintendent activity and with conflict within the school board. Conversely, opposition declines, and white support increases, with liberal school boards. All of these results indicate that school personnel can both promote and hinder desegregation goals -- in short, that leadership matters.
Both data and explanations seem clear, until we examine other evidence suggesting that local leaders have little effect on how citizens respond to a desegregation order. (Note again, however, that no one suggests that the basic mandate to desegregate comes from anywhere except authoritative leadership.) School board, superintendent, and local elite support for desegregation in the South, and Floridian parents' perceptions of elite support are all virtually unrelated to white flight (Morgan and England, 1982, Table 5; Giles and Gatlin, 1980: 738). Community elites' preferences are unrelated to the amount of coercion needed to desegregate Georgia school districts (Rodgers and Bullock, 1976: 59-64). In ten northern districts, local elite pronouncements on desegregation in the year before court-ordered implementation had little effect on community protest. In fact, citizen protest seems to have generated leaders' statements (usually opposing mandatory desegregation) more than leaders influenced supposed followers (Rossell, 1978b).

There are three possible explanations for the findings that local leadership is irrelevant to or even caused by citizen attitudes. Two directly oppose my thesis. First, peoples' perception of their local neighborhood environment may affect their attitudes more than local, never mind national, elites do (Rossell, 1978b; Weatherford, 1980; Hayes, 1977; Taylor and Stinchcombe, 1977). If this is the case, citizen participation does affect desegregation success -- albeit usually negatively.33

Second, the less white reassignment to black schools, the more positive were the statements of (mostly white) leaders. Thus "studies that find leadership support of school desegregation to facilitate peaceful implementation may be confusing the effect of leadership support with the effect of a token plan" (Rossell, 1981a: 10).

33 Note, however, that nowhere has citizen protest by itself caused a plan to be rescinded or even significantly modified. That too, has occurred only as a consequence of judicial decisions (as in Los Angeles) or federal action (as in elimination of Emergency School Aid Act [ESSA] funds).
The third possible explanation is less telling analytically; local leadership may have little effect because "there were few leadership statements one way or the other. Most leaders avoided the issue, and the only positive statements about social desegregation made by city leaders were in response to negative statements by other leaders" (Rossell, 1981a: 9).

What are we to make of these contradictory findings? Case studies can pick up subtleties of influence and control that aggregate and survey data miss, and their unanimity on the importance of leadership is impressive. But surveys and aggregate data are less subject to observers' politics and preconceptions, and their mixed verdict on the importance of leadership is cautionary. Surely local leaders are less authoritative than they could be, but surely it is also true that, at a minimum, "community leaders and elites ... have more impact on the school desegregation decision than do the masses" (Kirby et al., 1973: 16). My judgement, based on this information, is that leaders can promote a variety of desegregation goals, even though they obviously do not always do so.

The findings on citizen participation violate many of our most cherished beliefs. But thirty years and hundreds of studies show that, in general, democratic procedures do not lead to good substantive outcomes, whereas elitist ones sometimes do.

In sum, the issue of leadership is probably the most substantial gap in our understanding of desegregation. I found little systematic analysis of when leaders speak out, what they say, and what effect they have. Are local leaders influenced by their official position, the nature of the plan, the demography of their city, their place in the local power hierarchy, to name only a few variables? Is their influence on citizens affected by the same variables, or others? We have data in the form of cases, surveys, and aggregate statistics but scant theory to explain their mixed results. Let me emphasize once more the importance of this issue; the policy implications of finding that neither leadership nor citizen participation affects desegregation success differ profoundly from the implications of finding that leadership works even when participation does not.
Citizen Participation in Implementing and Monitoring Desegregation

If democracy does not work early, perhaps it does late, when the wheels have been set in motion and steering is more important than raw power. Calls for citizen involvement in implementation (e.g., Hawley, 1981: 301; Chesler et al., 1981: 95-143; Hughes et al., 1980: 134-136; Forehand and Ragosta, 1976: 45-53) and monitoring are loud and compelling. In the careful language of social scientists: "If quality integrated education with a high degree of citizen involvement is desired... then... a broadly representative citizens monitoring group... should be at the heart of the activities... Citizen monitoring can... help shift the focus of control of school systems... back toward the local community" (Laue and Monti, n.d.: 49-52). In the rhetoric of political activists:

Monitoring commissions' missions go well beyond the charges of the presiding judges, even beyond the desegregation plans themselves. Monitoring commissions are helping to fulfill the nation's basic, constitutional obligations... There is not a more noble contribution for citizens to make to their communities. The trial and error experiences with monitoring commissions are the beginnings of a knowledge base and a culture which can advance the citizen's capacity to find effective ways to cope with major social issues (in Carol, 1977: 15; see also Eisenberg, 1981).

However, Cassandra once again speaks; citizen participation in implementation and monitor rarely has any impact on school desegregation. Racial advisory committees have virtually no effect on students' racial attitudes and achievements, except for an occasional negative effect (Forehand et al., 1976: Appendix C). Case studies abound of citizen groups with excellent intentions and deep commitment, but little consequence (Gittell, 1980).35 In my own study of fifteen court-ordered citizen monitoring groups, I concluded (in general, see Hochschild and Hadrick, 1981 and cites therein):

35 Perhaps the problem here, as with citizen participation in plan design, is too little democracy rather than too much. We can speculate that citizens have had so little impact on implementation because they have had so little real involvement. Advisory groups can be hand-picked, placated, and ignored. If parents really had power to shape implementation they would, by definition, affect its course. However, that situation is not only conceptually tautologous, but also empirically nonexistent, to my knowledge.
1) These groups reinforce inequalities both within the group, and between it and the general public. Most members are white, middle or upper-middle class, professional, male, well-educated, suburbanites or without children in the public schools, and already leaders of civic organizations (Hochschild, 1982a). Minorities and lower-status participants sometimes feel at a disadvantage (as in Los Angeles) and the group itself may seem a bastion of upper class or professional domination (as in Boston and Cleveland respectively). Thus these groups grant more knowledge and power to elites -- perhaps an effective strategy, but hardly a democratic one.

2) Being politically (as distinguished from socially or economically) representative makes the body ineffectual. For example, Boston's Citywide Coordinating Council's (CCC) original 42 members represented all viewpoints on desegregation, and as a result spent virtually their entire year of service "retrying the case."

3) Assuming their mandate suits their means, monitoring groups of local elites (as in Dayton) or social scientists and lawyers (as in Cleveland) have the greatest success in reassuring the community, informing the judge, and improving schools' racial practices. These groups define other citizens' role as receiving information or at most identifying problems, not as shaping the nature or direction of their city's desegregation.

4) No matter how prestigious or professional, monitors are impotent without strong and consistent backing from the judge. They need court backing to extract information from recalcitrant or inept schools, court insistence on latitude for in-school monitors, and knowledge that their findings significantly contribute to the court's oversight activities. If the court will not impose its authority when needed (as in Dallas), the monitors simply cannot do their job and become a detriment to everyone, not least themselves.

However, "even Cassandra occasionally nods" (Taylor, n.d.). Citizen monitoring can inform the court and public, satisfy some grievances, increase the court's range.
of remedies and penalties, be an emotional and cognitive sounding board for judge, parents, and school personnel, and publicize school successes and failings. It provides an entree for civic leaders into the schools; it can make schools physically and informationally more open to parents; it can explicate and justify often-myste-
rious court orders; it can take political heat off of the court and draw resisters into solving -- not merely castigating -- desegregation problems (Hochschild, 1982a, 1982b). Thus citizen participation in monitoring need not be a waste of time, espe-
cially when the group has elite members and authoritative backing. The more participatory and democratic the group is, however, the less effective it is.36

The only case of trying fully to institutionalize democratic participation in an authoritative structure is Boston's uniquely ambitious monitoring system. Judge Garrity set up four tiers, with a racially and ethnically balanced parent council in each school, nine subdistrict groups, and two district-wide bodies. The system is generally seen as a failure. Battles over boundaries and power among the groups too often eclipse any focus on the schools or the desegregation plan, and most parents and school personnel ignore when they do not berate the monitors. However, the picture is not entirely gloomy; some school- and subdistrict-level groups have had notable success in involving parents and promoting changes in their schools. Given the Boston example, it is not utopian to seek widespread participation among previ-
ously powerless citizens of all races. But this example also suggests how extraordi-
narily difficult it is for such participants to accomplish anything worthwhile.

36 One feature of citizen monitoring -- the role of in-school monitors -- is valuable for democracy, albeit not for legal compliance or policy implementation. In Cleveland and Denver, for example, several hundred residents have been trained and deployed by the monitoring body to go into the schools and report back in system-
atic, verifiable form. The monitoring bodies, not to speak of the court and local elites, sometimes do not take this grass-roots action very seriously, but schools and participants do. Anecdotes and the scanty data available indicate that parent monitors often become deeply involved in school affairs and that their presence makes schools more aware of citizen concerns.
In short, Robert Wood (1982: 457), the former chair of Boston's CCC and former school superintendent in Boston, accurately sums up citizen participation in implementing and monitoring desegregation: "Some specific projects proved successful ... Still it is fair to say that the role of comprehensive oversight eluded us ... Good intentions abounded; and, as predicted, so did randomized behavior." Procedural democracy of this type does not fulfill liberalism's promises.

Decision-Making by Local Officials

Procedural democracy may call, not for direct citizen participation, but for indirect democratic control over decision-makers. In this view, policy-making should be decentralized because states -- and better yet, localities -- are more responsive to citizens, more attuned to local problems and idiosyncracies, and more flexible in new circumstances than the federal government can possibly be:

There exists no single formula, legal or otherwise, for successfully linking integration to the overall educational enterprise. If integration is to be something other than Justice White's "system of pains and penalties," it will necessarily depend upon the educational dynamics of the particular community ... Distribute money and establish minimum standards ... Beyond that, Washington can only encourage state and local educators, working within their own political frameworks, to resolve questions of race and schooling, ... adopting a course ... precisely tailored to local needs. These alternatives are sufficiently different to warrant leaving the specific choices in the hands of state and local institutions, whose grasp of nuance is necessarily better than Washington's (Kirp, 1977: 119, 126; see also Glazer, 1978).

The only problem with this argument is that it does not work. Again with a few exceptions, states and communities simply do not initiate desegregation, if (and it is a big if) one defines desegregation as positive action to rectify previous government-supported discrimination and not only as passive withdrawal of that support. School desegregation in the South proceeded with the speed of a meandering snail until the federal government buckled down in 1969; after that, the South desegregated with astonishing rapidity, so that its schools are now much more racially mixed than those of any other region (Orfield, 1982). Northern big cities have a more confused
history. But except for liberal university towns (Berkeley and Princeton) and a few others (Seattle), northern cities and states can hardly be described as the vanguard of desegregation activity (Orfield, 1981c: 30-38). (Neither, of course, can the federal government any longer, but that only means that very little new desegregation is taking place at all).

Systematic cross-sectional evidence confirms this reading of history. "Seven of the nine state governments represented here [in one set of case studies] played either a negative role in the implementation of desegregation or a negligible role" (Greenblatt and Willie, 1981: 337. See also Edelstein, 1977). "Federal penetration" explains desegregation change in the north between 1968 and 1972 better than any socioeconomic variable, district characteristic, or local political variables. Federal activity was also a strong, although not the strongest, actor in southern desegregation during that period (Fitzgerald and Morgan, 1977; see also Morgan and Fitzgerald, 1980). Even when local governments do impose desegregation, their plans reduce segregation only half as much as plans ordered by HEW or the courts in the same period (Rossell, 1981a: 3).

Philosophically as well as prudentially, federal intervention makes sense. Education is not an explicit constitutional right, but one can argue that since Brown it has taken on such a weight. After all, not only desegregation but also aid for handicapped, bilingual, poor, and college students are increasingly national issues. More importantly, quality education and equality of its provision are public goods, "inherently communal," and of "fundamental significance for mobility, opportunity, socialization, and acculturation." Thus policy trends for the past two decades as well as "our best and deepest ... constitutional commitments .. perhaps imply that we do now have something very close to a national right to education, enforceable by a deprived citizen against the local school authority, based on federal statute" (Liebman, 1981: 261-265; Kirp, 1982: e.g., 280-283). Finally, if anything can
eliminate the arbitrary unfairness of some cities and some whites being forced to desegregate and others not, it is federal laws universally enforced. The problems caused by the occasional poor fit of a universal standard to a particular circumstance are surely preferable, politically and ethically, to the problems of a controversial standard applied at random or with a class bias.

Decision-Making by Elected Officials

Democratic control over decision-making also calls for electorally accountable legislatures and executives, not insulated bureaucrats and courts, to shape policy. Procedural democrats argue that by 1970, bureaucrats in the Departments of Justice and HEW illegitimately reinterpreted the 1964 Civil Rights Act to require specific racial outcomes, not merely color-blind laws and policies. In doing so, they moved far beyond what Congress, most citizens, and even the Supreme Court wanted (Kirp, 1977: 107-116). Itself, and therefore district and circuit courts, have illegitimately reinterpreted Brown to blow it far from its original and constitutionally justified moorings (Graglia, 1976; Glazer, 1975: 77-129). Thus unaccountable policy-makers have so exaggerated their mandate that they have destroyed the consensus on civil rights that made the mid-1960's so impressive (Kirp, 1977: 123-133; Coleman, 1981; White, 1982), and have threatened the very nature of the judiciary (Jenkens, 1980: 214-240). Finally, critics argue, courts lack the capacity as well as the right to design and oversee sweeping social policies. The strictures of the adversarial process, legal training and constitutional tradition, the scant institutional support for a court, fragmentation across districts and between cases, judges' inabilit to interpret social science data -- these features and more make the judiciary peculiarly unsuited for policy-making (Horowitz, 1977; Wolf, 1976; Kalodner and Fishman, 1978; Fuller, 1978).

What we have here, to simplify a bit, are more unimpeachable arguments for democratic procedures running headlong into incontrovertable evidence about liberal
outcomes. If by desegregation we seek active remediation and not only a passive end to wrong-doing, we need courts and bureaucrats. Elected officials by definition respond to constituents; when they stop being responsive, they stop being elected officials. Regardless of their own beliefs, representatives of mainly white constituencies cannot afford to be in the vanguard of desegregation (Miller and Stokes, 1963). This claim is too strong, of course. Senators do occasionally defy public sentiments (Lowell Weicker's 1981 filibuster against anti-busing and court-limiting bills); state legislatures do sometimes pursue school desegregation (Massachusetts' 1965 Racial Imbalance Act [Levy, 1971]). But in general, elected school superintendents desegregate less often than appointed ones (Rodgers and Bullock, 1976: 59, 64); mayors and city councils avoid the issue (Royko, 1971: 133-158; Peterson, 1976), or even lead the resistance (Greenblatt and Willie, 1981: 323-328); Congress regularly proposes and sometimes passes legislation to deny federal funds or employees to aid mandatory desegregation (Orfield, 1978: 233-278). In short, despite courts' reluctance to intervene, court-(or federal agency-)ordered coercion

This is a big "if," of course, and deserves more than passing references. But this paper takes as its starting point the fact that desegregation policy has for over a decade aimed at active remediation; I am focusing on how to do it well, not whether to do it at all. I return to this problem of whether actively to desegregate in the conclusion.

Judges cannot be accused of eagerly rushing in where angels fear to tread. They are reluctant to take on desegregation cases -- one has publicly asserted that he would rather take on any other sort of case, and "dictators" such as Arthur Garrity often refuse to hand down orders for actions the school board or mayor should take responsibility for. The California Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in the Los Angeles case is quite clear:

In light of the realities of the remedial problem, ... once ... a school board has implemented a program which promises to achieve meaningful progress toward eliminating ... segregation, ... the court should defer to the school board's program ... [and] stay its hand even if it believes that alternative techniques might lead to more rapid desegregation of the schools ... In the absence of an easy, uniform solution to the desegregation problem, plans developed and implemented by local school boards, working with community leaders and affected citizens, hold the most promising hope for the attainment of integrated public schools ...
is generally necessary for school system compliance (Monti, 1980). If desegregated schools are to be an instrument for granting liberal rights, we must accept "intrusive" bureaucrats and "activist" courts (Dworkin, 1977: 131-149; Chayes, 1976).

The literature on courts' capacity, as distinguished from their right, to impose school desegregation is growing fast. It may be summarized by saying that, although courts are obviously not ideally suited to implementing and overseeing complex policies, they are rapidly becoming much better at it. They are learning to evaluate and use social science data (Levin and Hawley, 1975; 1978); they are appointing special masters, monitoring bodies, desegregation administrators, and court experts to help them design and enforce a plan (Aronow, 1980; Columbia Law Review, 1968; Alabama Law Review, 1981; Note, 1980); and perhaps they are doing nothing so new after all (Eisenberg and Yeazell, 1980; Cavanagh and Sarat, 1980. See also Brubaker, 1981; Wasby, 1981; Rabinovitz, 1982). In sum, the procedural democratic argument that only elected officials should and can desegregate schools has empirical as well as philosophical flaws. Minorities turn to courts because elected officials are, by the nature of majoritarian democracy, unresponsive to their demands. And no matter how imperfectly they respond, courts and bureaucracies are more successful than any other governmental body in actually using desegregation to grant liberalism's promises. 39

In those instances, however, in which ... a local school board has not embarked upon a course of action designed to eliminate segregation ..., a court has no alternative but to intervene (Crawford, 1976: 286).

Case study evidence suggests that synoptic court-ordered plans are better in many ways than those which evolve organically or emerge from political bargaining. A court-ordered plan may be more efficient than a board-designed one (as in Los Angeles); a court can order a state to finance educational improvements that the district cannot afford (as in Detroit and Los Angeles); a court can give school officials the power to do what they have wanted to all along, but could not for political or bureaucratic reasons. A court-ordered plan may (Armor, 1980) or may not (Rossell, 1981a: 36) increase white flight (depending partly on whether it includes mandatory white reassignments.)
In conclusion, majoritarian policy-making fares no better than incremental policies for the case of desegregation. Citizen participation and control are fundamental and unassailable values, but they are not desegregating our schools. With rare exceptions, citizen participation in designing and implementing plans has no effect on ending racial isolation and generating community support and/or has detrimental effects on minorities. Only when a powerful and charismatic leader (as in Milwaukee) or local elites backed by a court (as in Dallas before implementation and Cleveland afterward) shape citizen input, do people without official roles have much effect. In contrast, people with official roles can, if they choose, have an impact. The question here is authorities' volitions; the issue is whether we choose to solve the racial problem, not whether it has a solution. Generally, however, agencies most accountable to the public succeed no more than the public itself. Again with rare exceptions, the federal government (not states and localities) and courts and bureaucrats (not executives or legislators) initiate desegregation. If desegregation requires remediation of past wrongs, history shows that we simply cannot leave it up to the people to desegregate our schools.

IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CHOICES

Three possible prescriptions emerge from this analysis: continue muddling along, stop trying to impose desegregation on unwilling whites and ambivalent minorities, or learn from the evidence and fully -- in several senses of that word -- desegregate. Let us examine each possibility.

Muddling along is descriptively the most likely, but prescriptively the least desirable, future. We will probably continue to desegregate some students and schools in some places, with a few educational changes, and some flight, through a mix of federal and local elective and nonelective leadership for the same reasons
that we have done so up to now. Our policy-making process is fundamentally majoritarian and our policies are fundamentally incremental. By this I mean several things. First, our political processes are designed to give most interested actors some say in what will and -- more importantly -- will not happen: "the dispersion of veto powers throughout the political system ... make[s] even incremental moves difficult and insufficiently frequent. The same structure, moreover, makes drastic, less incremental moves even more difficult -- ordinarily simply impossible" (Lindblom, 1979: 520). Thus resisting white parents, teacher's unions, business and civic leaders, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the school board all win some changes and prevent others. Mandatory transportation is ordered but some parts of town or some children are exempted; faculty are desegregated but seniority rules remain intact; resources shift among schools and from the city to the schools, but hierarchies are undisturbed, and so on. Democratic politics lead to, at most, incremental changes.

Second, even this description of political process is naive in its assumption that all interested parties have roughly equal influence. "Participants do not in fact represent the variety of interests and values of the population. Instead they share dominant interests and values, and their relations with each other give the lie to those who claim to find in pluralism a healthy competition of ideas. In the extreme form, critics allege that policy is set by a ruling class with trappings of pluralist diversity" (Lindblom, 1979: 523). I, with Lindblom, "find it hard to deny a large core of truth in that criticism." I have bypassed the argument that the problems of school desegregation are merely a manifestation of all our racial antagonism, class conflict, power inequity, and social snobbery because those topics are too big to address here. But they underlie this entire analysis. Fully to desegregate would require elites to change their values and give up their political, social, and

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40 In fact, with the current mood of the electorate and the Reagan administration, even this prediction may overestimate future action.
economic dominance -- and "a once despised and still subordinated racial minority is not likely to succeed with that argument" (Bell, 1981: 200). Thus the unevenness of our democratic political structure reinforces the incremental nature of our policies. (See Monti, 1982 for the fullest expression of this argument.)

However, even setting aside the issue of who really rules, the citizenry in general does not envision the changes necessary fully to desegregate. Our "high degree of homogeneity of timid political opinions" (Lindblom, 1979: 521) keeps most people from imagining the range of possible forms of desegregation, never mind the ties between "school change [and] municipal finance, jobs, housing, social services, transportation, human rights, and all the other factors which determine the quality of life in local communities" (Chesler et al., 1981: 22). Our current mood of political retrenchment on top of our deepseated "ideological indoctrination," as Lindblom puts it, makes us very unlikely to tackle all of these problems simultaneously and in a coordinated fashion.

Fourth, our structure for enacting policies is so fragmented that it would be extremely hard for even a visionary and self-sacrificing elite -- or a participatory democracy -- to change simultaneously many facets of "the quality of life in local communities." Boundaries in several dimensions impede. Substantively, the Senate committee that writes court-stripping legislation (Judiciary) lacks jurisdiction over aid to public education (Labor and Human Resources) and neither can deal with urban blight (Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs). Politically, city governments often have no jurisdiction over how school systems raise and spend money, hire and direct employees, and design and implement policies. Geographically, federal courts control

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41 At the time OCR found the Chicago school system ineligible for ESAA funds because of its continued segregation, David Tatel, OCR's director proposed a task force to coordinate the flow of federal funds to Chicago. He hoped to use this mechanism to get various federal programs such as HUD housing subsidies, Community Development Block Grants, and Department of Labor vocational education aid to reinforce desegregation efforts. He was heeded neither in Chicago nor Washington. For similar recommendations, similarly ignored, see Education Commission of the States (1980).
only specific areas and, absent a suit in a community, no judicial action will take place there. And of course, there is the all-important boundary between city and suburban school districts, which constitutionally can be breached only under specific and unusual circumstances.

Finally, consider the particular nature of school systems. They are loosely coupled (Weick, 1974), which means that administrators cannot give a directive and expect it to be identically carried out in all classrooms. They are full of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980), which means that their captive clients are profoundly affected by employees making highly discretionary decisions under severe resource constraints and conflicting mandates. They provide a public good, which means that everyone must pay for them and everyone is affected by their actions whether they wish it so or not. And of course, they educate our children -- and few tasks can be more important and emotion-laden than that one. Thus many people will care strongly what happens in schools and no one can really determine what happens in more than one classroom. This is a recipe for small and cautious changes influenced by large numbers of participants.

Since these five features are deeply embedded in our political system, the best predictor of the future is the past. We know roughly the consequences -- slight decreases in racial isolation, slight improvements in minority achievement, both improvement and worsening of race relations, continued white and black middle class movement to the suburbs, and little real change in our deeply conflicted race, class, and power relations. Whether this outcome is intolerable depends partly on its alternatives.

One of the two alternatives is to listen to majority public opinion and stop trying to impose desegregation where it is not wanted. Quantitative and qualitative evidence clearly shows that Anglos deeply and increasingly endorse racial equality and abjure racial discrimination (Greeley, 1980), but also overwhelmingly reject...
"forced busing" (Miller et al, 1980: 176, 221).

For a pure procedural democracy, these facts suffice: if most people consistently and vehemently express a clear, achievable and morally acceptable policy preference, they ought to have their way. That, after all, is what majority rule means.

Even more significant in this view is that blacks themselves are torn. They do not unanimously support desegregation in general (see Appendix A; Bogue, 1967a); and their support for mandatory busing in particular is mixed and declining (Greeley, 1980: 138; Watts and Free, 1974: 109-111; Rist, 1980: 127; Bogue, 1967b: 167-169). Some blacks endorse instead community control of schools or an "Atlanta compromise" (Jackson, 1981). Others join middle class whites in fleeing to suburbs or private schools (Herbers, 1981; Grubb, 1980). We know less about Hispanics' preferences, but they apparently support busing less than do blacks (36% support in 1977, compared to 53% black support and about 12% Anglo support [Greeley, 1980: 137]). "In fact, in many Hispanic communities desegregation is seen as an impediment to equal educational opportunity rather than an aid" (Roos, 1978: 111; see also Lempert, 1982; Orfield, 1978: 198-229; Hanten, 1981; Fernandez and Guskin, 1981).

These data carry more weight both politically and morally than those showing white opposition to mandatory desegregation. Politically, as they see minority demands weaken, "many white people have grown hesitant to pursue desegregation efforts. Their rationale is clear: if the victims no longer believe remedies are feasible and, indeed, their victimization can be turned to their own benefit through the control of segregated institutions, then why seek desegregation?" (Rist, 1980: 127). Morally, in a liberal society, people denied their promised rights should count for more than the deniers. If large numbers of both have the same policy preference, then liberalism and procedural democracy unite in a call to satisfy that preference.

Another reason to stop imposing desegregation on a reluctant populace is the harm it causes. First, despite all the ruckus about degrees of and reasons for white flight, "the fact that white loss is associated with desegregation in some instances is not in dispute." Furthermore "the effect appears strongest ... [when there is a] substantial proportion of ... minority students, ... [a] central-city district surrounded by accessible white suburbs ... [and] a significant shift in the racial balance of schools" (Armor, 1980: 196) -- exactly the condition of the large northern cities where most desegregation will come in the future. Those who flee, those left behind, and society in general all suffer from this phenomenon. Family plans are disrupted; cities lose middle class taxpayers; schools lose supporters; feelings of community, efficacy, and trust are all eroded.

Mandatory desegregation can also harm race relations. Anecdotes abound of students and parents becoming more racist after hostile and inegalitarian classroom encounters; some systematic data (e.g., Schweitzer and Griffore, 1981) and psychological theory (e.g., Gerken, 1978) reinforce the horror stories. Voluntary plans do as much for achievement (Crain and Mahard, 1981: 69) and possibly black self-esteem (Epps, 1981) (of students who participate) as mandatory ones. Furthermore, harm occurs when schools must spend scarce resources on new buses, drivers, gasoline, security guards, and other "non-educational" functions. Even though these added expenses are generally much lower than school boards estimate them, and even though voluntary plans sometimes cost just as much as an extensive mandatory plan would, any new cost for increasingly unpopular schools in increasingly poor cities is a bad idea. And if whites blame higher taxes or larger classes on black demands, race relations suffer.

The greatest damage from desegregation, however, probably falls on minorities themselves -- thus violating the special consideration that a liberal democracy owes them. Black teachers and staff are disproportionately fired when schools are closed.

One can deem these dismal findings irrelevant; school desegregation as active remediation of past segregation is an incontrovertible mandate. We inhabit, not a majoritarian democracy, but a liberal democracy -- which means that majority rule or undesirable consequences cannot override certain rights. "Constitutional issues are, under our form of government, not resolved by public opinion polls or plebescites," and "segregation is itself the deepest educational harm because it is the result of institutional racism and a condition of state-imposed racial caste". (Jones, 1976). Calls for alternatives to desegregation merely "trade off constitutional rights for other, unspecified gains" (Taylor, 1978: 613). But one can make a respectable case for the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment, Brown, and the 1964 Civil Rights Act require only the end of de jure segregation, not official restitution that causes new harm. (See, e.g., Bell, 1976; Graglia, 1976; Kirp and Yudof; 1974: 281-489; Glazer, 1975: 77-129). The Supreme Court itself hedges its demand for desegregation "root and branch" with concerns over health and safety of bused students, de facto rather than de jure isolation, and -- above all -- historical boundaries between school
districts. Thus arguments from constitutionality may be at a stand-off, and may seldom require mandatory desegregation in the north.

In light of all this, I see two powerful reasons for not imposing mandatory desegregation. The first is minority preference. What if blacks and Hispanics insist that equal educational opportunity means improved educational quality -- with or without Anglos in the same classroom? What if what matters most to minorities is a setting in which to run their lives free from Anglo interference? What if desegregation itself seems a statement of black or Hispanic inferiority, a statement that students cannot learn unless seated beside an Anglo? Surely the many rich, sophisticated and considered arguments of this nature ought to matter. After all, democracy can be people creating and controlling their own institutions and rules; it is not necessarily majorities creating and controlling a community in which all must live.

The second powerful reason for not imposing desegregation addresses the interaction of race and class. Wealthy whites (and blacks) generally exempt themselves from burden; poor minorities and whites must redeem our unkept promises. But why should the poor -- or the doubly-disadvantaged minority poor -- suffer so that those who profit from their poverty can continue to do so? Even if mandatory desegregation benefits its participants in the long run, it causes problems and pain in the short run; if it did not, it would not have to be mandatory. Until the best-off must live under the policies they make, it is hard to see why the worst-off must do so.

Finally, consider the third alternative -- desegregate full-speed ahead. The constitutional arguments for remedying past wrongs are, I think, more profound than those that simply require us to stop the wrong-doing. As Lyndon Johnson said, merely removing the shackles from one runner leaves the race still unfair. But more to the point here is evidence about the benefits of desegregation. When fully and carefully carried out, desegregation does reduce racial isolation, increase minority achieve-

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43 For a discussion of the meaning of equality of opportunity -- and by extension, the possibilities for remediation of unjust inequality -- see Rae et al. (1981).
When fully and carefully carried out, mandatory desegregation does not harm (and may improve) white achievement (St. John, 1975: 34-36; Stephan, 1978: 228-232; Crain and Mahard, 1978: 18; Orfield, 1978: 121-126; Coleman et al., 1966; Green et al., 1982). It need not increase (and may decrease) violence in schools or the community (Orfield 1978: 126-128; U.S. Department of Justice, 1976; U.S. Department of HEW, 1978). It seldom significantly increases (and may decrease) the cost or distance of bus rides (Orfield, 1978: 128-150; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1976: 109-111). When properly implemented, busing itself causes no educational, physical, or psychological harm (Davis, 1973; Natkin, 1980; Xoloth, 1976). The more extensive the mandatory plan, the greater the interracial exposure, even when white flight is at its greatest (Rossell, 1982). Even the new forms of damage to minorities — lay-offs, resegregation, and push-outs — do not occur when the school district fully and carefully desegregates. Thus none of the prudential arguments against desegregation need be definitive.44 Note once more that I am not talking here about a Potemkin village. The evidence shows good results in districts varying in size, wealth, urbanization, region, proportion minority, and racial history. "Ordinary" school systems can desegregate fully and carefully, and can thereby achieve desegregation goals.

Consider two last empirical arguments for full and complete desegregation. First, long-term consequences for minorities: The evidence is thin, but suggests that even when not ideally implemented, desegregation improves educational and occupational opportunities for blacks. Controlling for SES, blacks who attended desegregated schools during the 1950's are more likely to attend college, to attend desegregated

44 Some philosophical arguments against desegregation do hold up, no matter how the plan is designed and implemented. Black or Hispanic cultural and political separation are, by definition, harmed by mandatory desegregation. So is Anglo "freedom of choice" (which does not exist anyway in segregated public school systems.)
colleges, to be in desegregated work groups, and to hold nontraditional jobs than blacks from segregated schools. Adults of both races who attended desegregated schools before 1960 more frequently live in desegregated neighborhoods, have children in desegregated schools, and have close interracial friendships than adults from segregated schools (McPartland and Braddock, 1981: 146-151; Braddock and McPartland, n.d.; see also St. John, 1981: 89; McPartland, 1978). Thus, as far as researchers can tell, even poorly implemented desegregation achieves at least one goal.

Finally, whites often support desegregation more after implementation than before. Psychologists debate whether behavioral changes induced by laws can change attitudes (e.g., Deutsch and Collins, 1958; Muir, 1967). The history of school desegregation suggests that they can.

'Short-term pane' studies of public opinion show mixed results. Wilmington parents' attitudes and perceptions of school quality declined significantly after one year of desegregation but attitudes toward desegregation improved (Schweitzer and Griffore, 1981). Fewer black, but more white, Georgian students found desegregation "serving a useful purpose" than supported it before it occurred (Bullock and Braxton, 1973: 137). Whit Louisville parents opposed desegregation more after one rather violent year of it than beforehand. But even among opponents, more agreed in the second year that "busing is the law and should be followed," and more were willing to "accept" it. Busing became less salient as a community problem after two years.

Whites with children in public schools supported desegregation more after one year than white parents of pre-school children (McConahay and Hawley, 1978; see also Ross (1973) for the same conclusion about Boston). Similarly, Abney (1976) found white

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45 In the interests of (already lost) brevity, I will not discuss blacks' perceptions of the consequences of desegregation. In general, a majority of blacks, although not all, are pleased with its consequences. See, for example, Sobol and Beck, 1978; McConahay and Hawley, 1978.

46 Students' racial attitudes and valuation of education and their school declined; they were not asked their attitude toward desegregation (Ibid).
parents of (unwillingly) desegregated children to support integration more after one year of implementation than beforehand, while whites who withdrew their children from public schools were less supportive (See also Serow and Solomon, 1979). Thus even over a very short and often violent period, in districts with controversial and often coerced desegregation; parents' attitudes in some ways change to match compliant behavior (See, in general, Rossell, 1981a: 48-59).

Students and school administrators demonstrate the same partial shift toward better race relations even in less-than-ideal desegregation circumstances. Forehand et al. (1976: 164-179, 207-240) find that 1) the longer the school is integrated, the better are parents, teachers, and principals at dealing with racial issues, and therefore the better are students' racial attitudes; and 2) length of integration has a greater effect (b = 0.34) on white students' racial attitudes than any other variable measured. Comparing the same desegregated schools in 1972 and 1974, they found students' racial attitudes improved, although white achievement had declined (perhaps due to white flight). Furthermore, in 1974 high school students' racial attitudes were associated with several 1972 characteristics — suggesting long-term benefits of desegregation that do not appear immediately. The only study of desegregation's effects on students over five years finds race relations almost unchanged (Gerard and Miller, 1975), although a reanalysis of their data "show[s] that the likelihood of an Anglo choosing minority students as friends and schoolwork partners increased somewhat" (McConahay, 1978: 93). Most black and some white Southern school officials who were coerced into desegregation felt five years later that it had improved race relations and student achievement (Rodgers and Bullock, 1976: 107).

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47 Note, however, that these are not comparisons of the same students and that there is no control group of segregated schools, so these results do not measure individual changes, and they cannot necessarily be attributed to the experience of desegregation.
National surveys show clearer post-hoc support for desegregation. It is "strange but true" that "the most dramatic increase in support for integrated education has come from the public of the very region (i.e., the South) that fought it most fiercely. Perhaps this happened because it is the only region that has had much experience with integrated schools in recent years" (Orfield, 1981c: 40). More precisely, "In the south, the greatest reduction in racial intolerance occurred between 1970 and 1972 shortly after the greatest reduction in school segregation (between 1969 and 1971) ... Moreover, the smaller reduction in school segregation in the North and West is paralleled by a similarly small decrease in racial tolerance" (Rossell, 1981a: 49, citing Taylor et al., 1978).

Finally, case studies show that parents, students, and staff alike are pleasantly surprised by some of desegregation's consequences. Principals in Washington, D.C. report that "our kids have actually started to understand and relate to each other on the human level -- instead of on the color level" (Middleton, 1977: Al). Students in Tampa, Florida report that "when I was young the blacks tended to be looked down upon ... In a newly desegregated high school, ... there seems to be more cohesiveness" (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1976: 35). Parents in Charlotte, North Carolina report that "it hasn't upset my child like I expected. And though I'm surprised to hear myself saying this, I think in years to come, we'll see that it's something that had to be done" (Barrows, 1972).

These data, testimonials, and moral arguments imply a third conclusion: school desegregation can and does work. It can fulfill the promises of liberalism and it can even generate, after the fact, the support called for by majoritarianism. How, then, should we choose among 1) continuing to take incremental steps through democratic procedures, 2) responding to majority preferences by halting the imposition of racial balance, or 3) responding to substantive values and the hint of eventual majority support by imposing full desegregation?
Desegregation seems to me a case of half a loaf being worse than no loaf at all. The most likely future -- continuing to muddle along -- is the least desirable. It helps some but hurts more (at least as participants see it) and strains the tenuous ties of community in our greatest but most needy cities. If we cannot muster the political will, therefore, to desegregate fully and properly, minorities as well as Anglos may be better off if we stop trying to do it at all through mandated public policy -- so long as we do something else instead.

I am bolstered in this conclusion by the fact that whites with many different political views and the greatest of black American thinkers, W.E.B. DuBois, concur. David Kirp (1977: 118) argues that

Questions of race touch upon almost all other issues of educational policy ...-- most importantly, the sensitivity of the institution to radically altered circumstances ... Whether racial balance (or some other formula) is achieved matters far less than the subtler and more far-reaching changes in the very nature of the education that the society makes available to its children and the civic order that makes possible this education.

Elizabeth Cohen (1975: 299) wishes that

decision makers would come to realize that trying to change the status order of an entire society by superficial change in the racial composition of an organization which traditionally has reflected faithfully the power and status order in society at large is not an easy thing to do either politically or practically.

And DuBois (1935: 335) said it first and best:

[T]he Negro needs neither segregated schools nor mixed schools. What he needs is Education. What he must remember is that there is no magic, either in mixed schools or in segregated schools. A mixed school with poor and unsympathetic teachers, with hostile public opinion, and no teaching of truth concerning black folk, is bad. A segregated school with ignorant placeholders, inadequate equipment, poor salaries, and wretched housing, is equally bad. Other things being equal, the mixed school is the broader, more natural basis for the education of all youth. It gives wider

What to do instead deserves at least another paper. One possibility is metropolitan desegregation imposed by courts where it is constitutionally permissible, or chosen by suburbs and states where it can be made politically feasible. Other possibilities are community control, "Atlanta plans," channeling resources into inner city schools, jobs programs, or new housing policies and practices. My point is that we ought to devote our limited resources to generating new ways to fulfill liberalism's promises rather than to futile efforts to desegregate using Detroit's 10% or Cleveland's 20% Anglo school children.

48
contacts; it inspires greater self-confidence; and suppresses the inferiority complex. But other things seldom are equal, and in that case, Sympathy, Knowledge, and the Truth, outweigh all that the mixed school can offer.

One danger of such an "all-or-nothing" argument is that we will literally choose "nothing" -- perpetuating our dismal pattern of race and class exploitation by telling ourselves either that reform is hopeless or that blacks and the poor don't want it anyway. Such a choice is morally unacceptable. The other danger is the demand for "all" -- retreating into a romantic but irresponsible struggle for a total transformation of society. Such a choice is politically impossible. What an all-or-nothing argument can do is specify the changes that must take place -- that have taken place in a variety of communities -- in order for us to use desegregation to fulfill our constitutional commitment to liberty and justice for all. Effective school desegregation is a question of moral and political will, not of either revolutionary apocalypse or better policy analysis. If we lack the backbone to do it right, we are better off seeking new ways to grant minority rights and satisfy citizen preferences.
Appendix A

(a) "In general, are you in favor of desegregation, strict segregation, or something in between?"

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<td>(83)</td>
<td>(263)</td>
<td>(290)</td>
<td>(271)</td>
<td>(213)</td>
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(b) "Some people say that the government in Washington should see to it that White and Negro/Colored/Black children are allowed to go to the same schools. Others claim that this is not the federal government's business. Have you been concerned about this question to favor one side or the other? (IF YES) Do you think that the government in Washington should see to it that White and Negro/Colored/Black children go to the same schools or stay out of this area (as it is none of its business)?

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<tr>
<td>Government ensure integration</td>
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<td>76.8%</td>
<td>83.1%</td>
<td>83.2%</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
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<td>79.5%</td>
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<td>3.9%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
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<td>9.1%</td>
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<td>(284)</td>
<td>(84)</td>
<td>(267)</td>
<td>(293)</td>
<td>(193)</td>
<td>(287)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

** Code distinction not made.

Note: declining black support for desegregation, majority white support for something less than full desegregation, minority white support for governmental assurance of desegregation, and declining support in both races for governmental assurance of desegregation. The data are from various ISR/CPS polls (Converse et al., 1980: 61, 90, 91).
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