A discussion of the two predominant theories of power (the juridical-liberal and the Marxist theories) notes the limitations of the two theories, the historical reasons for their common grounding of the analysis of power in terms of repression/sovereignty, and why the theory of sovereignty persisted as an ideology and organizing principle of all major legal codes. An analysis that reverses the trajectory followed by these two theories is presented. The paper defines Chicano-logy ("an elusive yet systematic hegemonic discourse that expresses and actualizes Anglo domination over Chicanos"); Chicano discourse ("a diffuse, subjugated knowledge resulting from the struggle against Anglo power"); and Chicano Studies ("a specific discursive practice within Chicano discourse which attempts to acquire power by claiming academic validity"). Chicano discourse is mapped in terms of (1) the specific discursive and non-discursive (i.e., institutional) power relations which gave rise to it; (2) the status given to individual speakers of Chicano discourse; (3) the concepts to which it refers; and (4) the strategies that define its struggle with Chicano-logy. Chicano Studies' discourse is discussed, focusing on the "micro-mechanisms by which the discourse of Chicano scholars is appropriated and robbed of its power in order to deflect its impact on public policy." (MQA)
POWER, CHICANO STUDIES DISCOURSE
AND
PUBLIC POLICY

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i assail you
and
question seriously
all that you espouse
in
the way of civil rights
and
other power projections

for
i know that the people
will never know
what it is
that they must know
in order
to not only survive you
but to live...

world,
you come into the barrio
(ghetto)
and promulgate
means of better
capitulation
from those you oppress...

and i know
that you shall ever
fear
to extend the knowledge
that shall free us....

Ricardo Sanchez
Why is it that "the people will never know what it is that they must know in order not only to survive (the Anglo) but to live..."? Why the "fear to extend the knowledge that shall free us..."? This is not only a poetic flight. Similar statements about the difficulty to know what we must know is found in academic writings. Thus, Mario Barrera states:

...the politics of the Chicano community can be expected to revolve around both class and colonial divisions in a complex manner whose outlines we can only dimly perceive in the current period of confusion and redefinition.  

Based on the writings of Michel Foucault, in the following essay I contend that the difficulties that we --poets, scholars, working men and women-- encounter are based on a misunderstanding of power: what it is, how it is exercised. I will discuss the two predominant theories of power and offer what should be considered highly tentative hypothesis, suggestions and methodological guidelines for a different, perhaps more adequate analysis of power. Next, I will discuss the power/knowledge relationship manifested by and within Chicano discourse in general and Chicano Studies discourse in particular. Finally, I will describe the techniques and mechanisms through which Chicano discourse is robbed of its power, that is, its influence on public policy. May the following words serve, if for nothing else as "una lágrima que rompe el silencio en el cenó del cocodrilo (a tear that breaks the silence in the heart of the crocodile)".
There are two major systems of approach to the analysis of power; both of these share a common point of what may be called an "economism" in the theory of power. First, there is the juridical-liberal conception of power according to which power is taken to be a right which one is able to possess like a commodity, and which one can transfer or alienate, either wholly or partly, through a legal act or through some act that establishes a right, such a contract. Power is that concrete power which every individual holds, and whose partial or total cession enables political power or sovereignty to be established. This theoretical construction is essentially based on the idea that the constitution of political power obeys a model of a legal transaction involving a contractual type of exchange. The other approach, the general Marxist conception, sees power in terms of the role it plays in the simultaneous maintenance of the relations of production and of a class domination which the development and specific forms of the forces of production have rendered possible. On this view, the historical justification of political power is to be found in the economy.

We need to ask the following questions from these analyses of power: With respect to the juridical-liberal: Is power modeled upon the commodity? Is it possessed, acquired, ceded through force or contract that one alienates or recovers, that circulates or voids in this or that level? With respect to the Marxist conception: Is power always in a subordinate position? Is its essential end purpose to serve the economy? Is it destined to realize, consolidate, maintain and reproduce the relations appropriate to the economy and essential to its functioning?

Even if we allow that it is the case that the relations of power
remain profoundly enmeshed in economic relations and participate with them in a common circuit, what means are available to us today of we want a non-economic analysis of power? We can begin with the assertion that power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised, and that it only exists in action. Secondly, power is not primarily the maintenance and reproduction of economic relations but above all a relation of force. The questions to be posed then would be these: If power is exercised, what sort of exercise does it involve? In what does it consist? What is its mechanism? The immediate answer by many contemporary analyses is that power is essentially that which represses. Power represses nature, the instinct, a class, individuals. So should not the analysis of power be the analysis of the mechanisms of repression? Another answer is that if power is the way in which relations of force are put into effect and given concrete expression, it should be analyzed in terms of struggle, conflict and war.

In these terms, let us compare the two major analyses of power. In the first place there is the old system found in the philosophes of the eighteenth century. This approach is based on the conception of power as an original right that is given up in the establishment of sovereignty, and the contract as a broker of political power. A power so constituted risks becoming oppression whenever it goes beyond the contract. Thus, we have contract-power, with oppression as its limit, or rather as the transgression of this limit. On the other side, we have an approach that no longer tries to analyze political power according to the schema of contract-oppression but in accordance
with that of war-repression. On this view, repression no longer occupies the place of oppression in relation to the contract; it is not abuse but the mere effect and continuation of a relation of domination. Repression is none other than the play of a continuous relationship of force — warfare under the illusion of peace.

This notion of repression, however, seems inadequate for capturing precisely the productive aspects of power. In defining the effects of power with a law which says no, power is taken above all as carrying the force of prohibition. If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but say no, would anyone be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourses. But there is a historical reason for the acceptance of the analysis of power in terms of repression — power as mere limitation of liberty.

The more or less centralizing monarchies that appeared during the Middle Ages brought a measure of order and peace to the mass of warring forces that preceded them, by a system of delimited territory and hierarchized authority. That authority was embodied in the sovereign and his law. From the Middle Ages the exercise of power has always been formulated in terms of law. Of course, there are times such as seventeenth-century England or late eighteenth-century France when monarchical authority was identified with arbitrary role, with the exercise of power above the law. But despite attempts to free law from monarchical rule and politics from the juridical, the
representation of power is still caught up in this system. Whatever criticism the eighteenth-century jurists made of monarchy in the name of the law, they never questioned the principle that power must be formulated in terms of law and exercised within the law -- a principle that had been established with the monarchy. The nineteenth century saw a more radical critique of political institutions; not only did real power operate outside the role of law, but the legal system itself was a form of violence, a weapon to be used to reinforce political and economic inequalities. But even this critique was based on the postulate that power should be exercised according to a fundamental right. Despite differences of objective from one period to another, the representation of power has remained haunted by monarchy. In political thought and analysis we have still not cut off the head of the King. Hence, the importance still given, in the theory of power, to the problems of right and violence, law and illegality, will and liberty and, above all, the state and sovereignty (even if sovereignty is no longer embodied in the person of the sovereign, but in a collective being).

Let us briefly pause on the question of the role of the state before we continue with this discussion of the two major theories of power. To pose the problem presented by the analysis of power in terms of the state means to continue posing it in terms of sovereign and sovereignty, that is in terms of the law. If one describes all phenomena of power as dependent on the state machinery, this means grasping them as essentially repressive: the Army as a power of death, police and justice as punitive instances, etc. This is, of course,
not to say that the state is not important, but that relations of power (and the analysis that must be made of them), necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state. This is so in two senses: first, because the State for all the might of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and secondly because the State can only operate on the basis of other already existing relations. Thus, after reviewing several theories of the State and the terms of their applicability to the Chicano experience, Barrera states:

The Marxist structuralist perspective appears superior in that it better accounts for the imperfect control of the state by the dominant class, on the basis that this control is primarily exercised indirectly through the structure of the state rather than through direct control. And he expresses his frustration (perhaps unwittingly) for the inadequacy of the existing analyses:

...the most satisfactory formulation may be one that sees the most particular interests of capitalists satisfied through the interest group process and through placement of their own members in state positions, while the general interests of capitalists as a class are attended to through the mechanisms stressed by structuralists. (my emphasis)

We conclude that current difficulties in the analysis of power arise because from medieval times onward, the essential role of Right (the laws and the complex of machineries, institutions and regulations responsible for their application) was to fix the legitimacy of power.
That is to say that the essential function of the discourses and techniques of Right has been to erase the domination intrinsic to power and to present power under two different aspects: 1) as the legitimate rights of the sovereign, and 2) as the legal obligation to obey it. Thus, power becomes legitimized to the same extent that it becomes less visible, to the extent that it becomes codified in terms of the Law.

Under these circumstances, we must escape from the limited field of juridical sovereignty and State institution and instead base our analysis of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination. We must show how Right is the instrument of domination, of course, but most importantly, we need to show the extent to which and the forms in which Right transmits relations that are not relations of sovereignty but of domination. By domination is meant not the way in which it is exercised by one individual over another or one group over another, but the manifold forms of domination exercised within society. One must focus on the fact of domination to expose its latent nature and its brutality. More specifically, an analysis of power along these general lines would include the following methodological guidelines:

1. The focus is not on the regulated and legitimate forms of power in their central location with the general mechanisms through which they operate and the continual effects of these. The focus is on power at its extremities, in its more regional and local forms and institutions; the main concern is the point where power surmounts the rules of Right which delimit it and extends itself beyond them, invests itself in institutions, becomes embodied in techniques and equips itself
with instruments and eventually even violent means of material inter-
vention. In other words, one should try to locate power at the ex-
treme points of its exercise, where it is less legal in character.

2. The analysis of power should not concern itself with power at the
level of conscious intention or decision; it should avoid questions
such as "who has power and what has she or he in mind?" or "what is
the aim of someone that has power?" It is a case of studying power at
the point where its intention, if it has one, is completely invested
in real and effective practices. What is needed is a study of power
in its external expression, at the point where it is in direct relation-
ship with what can provisionally be called its object, its target, its
field of application. Let us not, therefore, ask why certain people
want to dominate, what they seek, what is their overall strategy. Let
us ask instead how things work at the level of on-going subjugation,
at the level of those continuous processes which subject our bodies,
govern our gestures, dictate our behavior, etc.

3. Power is not to be take as a phenomenon of one individual's
domination over others or that of one group or class over others.
What should always be kept on mind is that power is not that which
makes the difference between those who exclusively possess
it and retain it, and those who do not have it and
submit to it. Power must be analyzed as something which circulates,
or rather as something that functions in the form of a chain. It is
never localized here and there, never in anybody's hands, never ap-
propriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is exercised
through a net-like organization. And not only individuals circulate
between its threads, they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power not its point of application.

4. The important point is not to attempt some kind of deduction of power starting from its center and aimed at the discovery of the extent to which it permeates into the base, of the degree to which it reproduces itself down to the most molecular elements of society. One must rather conduct an ascending analysis of power, starting from its micro-mechanisms and then see how these mechanisms of power have been invested, colonized, utilized, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended, etc. Anything can be deduced from the general phenomenon of the domination of the bourgeois class. What needs to be done is quite different. One needs to investigate historically, and beginning from the lowest level, how mechanisms of power have been able to function. We need to see how these mechanisms of power, at a given moment, and by means of a certain number of transformation, have begun to become economically advantageous and politically useful. It is only if we grasp these techniques of power and demonstrate the economic advantages and political utility that derives from this in a given context, for specific reasons, that we can understand how these mechanisms come to be incorporated into the social whole.

5. It is quite possible that the major mechanisms of power have been accompanied by ideological production. There has probably been, for example, an ideology of education, mechanisms of the monarchy, of parliamentary democracy, etc. But these cannot be said to be ideological. It is much more and much less than ideology. It is the
production of effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge: methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses of control. All these mean that power, when it is exercised through these subtle mechanisms, cannot but evolve, organize and put into circulation a knowledge, or rather mechanisms of knowledge, which are not ideological constructs.

Various investigations based on these methodological guidelines indicate that power has undergone a transformation during the last three hundred years. As long as a feudal type of society survived, the problems to which the theory of sovereignty was addressed were confined to the general mechanisms of power, to the way in which its forms of existence at the higher level of society influenced its exercise at the lower levels. It was a sovereign-subject relationship. But in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries we have the production of an important phenomenon: the invention of a new mechanism of power based on highly specific procedural techniques, completely new instruments, quite different, in fact incompatible with the relations of sovereignty (See Chart I). This new mechanism of power is more dependent upon bodies and what they do than upon the Earth and its resources. It is a type of power which is constantly exercised by means of surveillance rather than a discontinuous manner by means of a system of levies or obligations distributed over time. It presupposes a tightly knit grid of material coercions rather than the physical existence of a sovereign. This new type of power, which can no longer be formulated in terms of sovereignty is one of the great inventions of bourgeois society; it has
Chart I. Despite differences between Feudalism and Capitalism, power is conceived in terms of sovereignty. This conception serves to conceal the increasing invasion of procedures of normalization into the domain of procedures of Law. Thus, the advance of the social sciences is a result of this new distribution of power, not a refinement of their scientific techniques.
been a fundamental instrument in the constitution of industrial capital. This non-sovereign power is disciplinary power. Yet, the theory of sovereignty has continued to exist as an ideology of Right, and also to provide the organizing principle of the legal codes which Europe acquired in the nineteenth century, beginning with the Napoleonic Code.¹³

Let us clarify this point. The question is why has the theory of sovereignty persisted as an ideology and organizing principle of all major legal codes? There are two discernible reasons. As noted before, it has been a permanent instrument of criticism of the monarchy. At the same time, however, the theory of sovereignty, and the organization of a legal code have allowed a system of Law to be superimposed upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures. It hides the element of domination inherent in its techniques and guarantees to everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the State, the exercise of individual rights. In other words, the juridical systems have enabled sovereignty to be democratized through the constitution of a public right based on collective sovereignty, while, at the same time, this democratization of sovereignty was fundamentally determined by, and grounded in mechanisms of disciplinary coercion. These two limits define the arena in which power is exercised and also the conditions which gave rise to the social sciences. While it is commonly accepted that the social or human sciences have advanced on the basis of increasingly scientific techniques, what we see here is the production of disciplinary discourses.¹⁴
Hence, these two limits, a right of sovereignty and a mechanism of discipline in which power/discourse is exercised. Modern society, then, is characterized by manifold relations of power which permeate and constitute it, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and sanctioning of a discourse. Power never ceases its interrogation, its inquisition, its registration of truth; it institutionalizes, professionalizes and rewards its pursuit. In the last analysis we must produce truth as we must produce wealth, indeed we must produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first place. We are also subjected to truth in the sense in which it is truth that makes the laws, that produces the true discourse which, at least partially decides, transmits and itself extends upon the effects of power. In the end, we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the bearers of the specific effects of power. The discourse of disciplines has nothing in common with that of law, rule or sovereign will. Although the disciplines may well be the carriers of a discourse that speak of a rule, this is not the juridical rule derived from sovereignty but a natural rule, a norm. The code they come to define is not that of Law but that of normalization. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience). It dissociates power from the body: on one side discipline forms it into an "aptitude", a "capacity", which it seeks to increase; on the other side, it reverses
the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and
turns it into a relation of strict subjection. If economic exploi-
tation separates the force and the product of labor, disciplinary
coercion establishes in the body the constricting link between an
increased aptitude and an increased domination. Consequently, dis-
ciplinary normalization comes into conflict with the juridical sys-
tems of sovereignty. In other words, against the transgression of
disciplinary mechanisms, against the ascent of a power tied to scient-
ific knowledge, we find that there is no solid recourse available to
us today, except that which lies in the return to a theory of Right
organized around sovereignty.

We have come full circle in the examination of two main theories
of power, the juridico-liberal and the Marxist and noted the limitations
of their conception of power. We discussed the historical reasons
for their common grounding of the analysis of power in terms of
repression/sovereignty and presented an analysis that reverses the
trajectory followed by these two theories. The methodological guide-
lines led us to the discovery of an exercise of power which simultane-
ously increases the forces of domination and improves the force and
efficacy of its techniques of domination. This is made possible by
the appearance of mechanisms of discipline concealed under a theory
of Right. These mechanisms of power refer to disciplinary discourses
--the human or social sciences-- which, behind a constant pursuit of
scientific truth, mask their inherent domination and begin to invade
the domain of the Law. In the final analysis, knowledge is not so much
ture or false as legitimate or illegitimate for a particular set of
power relations. At this point we need to explore the relevance of the analysis of power here presented to the Chicano experience or rather, to Chicano discourse.

CHICANO DISCOURSE AND THE ANALYSIS OF POWER

In the previous discussion we analyzed power in terms of a political economy of truth which is characterized by five important traits: Truth is centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions that produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political manipulation (for economic production as well as for political power); it is object of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through systems of education and information); it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic systems (university, media, military, writing); lastly, it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation (ideological struggles). Now we need to ask the following questions: In a specific discourse (i.e. Chicano discourse) what are the most immediate, the most local power relations at work? How did they make possible these type of discourses and conversely, how were these discourses used to support power relations? How is the action of these power relations modified by their very exercise? and finally, How are these power relations linked to one another according to the logic of a great strategy?

A clue to the direction that must be followed is provided by Edward W. Said in his study of Oriental Studies --Orientalism-- which is based, with minor modifications, on the analysis of discourse.
Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient --dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it; in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage --and even produce-- the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period. Moreover, so authoritative a position did Orientalism have that I believe no one writing, thinking or acting on the Orient could do so without taking into account of the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism. In brief, because of Orientalism the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought or action. This is not to say that Orientalism unilaterally determines what can be said about the Orient, but that it is the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on (and therefore always involved in) any occasion when that peculiar entity "the Orient" is in question. 17

Here is, then, an ethnic studies discourse, Oriental Studies, which expresses the relations of domination between East and West. Is there also a Chicano Studies discourse that plays a similar role with respect to the power relations between Anglos and Chicanos? To be sure, there is a stereotyped image of the Chicano present in literature, social science, movies, education, television, newspapers, magazines, textbooks, and many other systems of information, an image, moreover, that has been traced to the sixteenth century. 18 In the early twentieth century we find an academic discipline, sociology, which played a similar role: it too defined Chicanos in terms of a Traditional Culture, as a people
who were not free subjects of thought or action. Similarly, Americo-
Paredes in his search for the folklore of the Anglo Texan finds instead
what he calls "the Texas Legend" which he attempts to categorize as
either folklore, fact or "something else." Echoing the statements
that have operated since the sixteenth century, the Texas Legend basically
states that "the Mexican is cruel by nature... cowardly and treacher-
ous... as degenerate a specimen of humanity as found anywhere... he de-
cends from the Spaniards, a second rate type of European, and from the
equally substandard Indian of Mexico... and the Mexican has always re-
cognised the Texan as his superior." Paredes is puzzled to find this
legend not in cowboy ballads, the play-party songs or the folktales of
the people of Texas. Paredes concludes that this legend is pseudo-
folklore which, disguised as fact, still plays a major role in Texas
(we might say Chicano) history. Yet, implicit in this conclusion we
see the relation of the legend to two sources of power where the legend
appears; that is "the written works of the literary" (where power/
knowledge is exercised) and "among a class of rootless adventurers who
have used the legend for their own purposes" (where raw, physical power
is exercised). This illustrates the contention that power is tolerable
only on the condition that it mask a substantial part of itself; its
success is proportional to its ability to conceal itself.

But stereotypes, academic disciplines, legends or pseudo-
folklore disguised as fact, do not quite fit the role of a "corporate
institution that manages or produces Chicanos politically, sociologi-
cally and imaginatively" that Said finds in Orientalism. Yet, we know
that such hegemonic power/knowledge, such discourse exists because
we live under it, struggle against it, analyze it, and write about it. How can such a discourse go not so much undetected as unnamed in its totality? This is no mystery, however, but the expression of the power relationship between Chicano and Anglos. Thus, this Chicano discourse has an equally elusive object of study, namely, the Chicano as "a forgotten people", "a minority nobody knows", and "the invisible minority". Or, once "discovered" Chicanos are defined as Latinos, Mexican Americans, Spanish Americans, and so many other names that no single definition is possible. This highly diffused discourse that appears as stereotypes, social science, legends, pseudo-folklore disguised as fact, is in effect a politicized science of Chicanos, a logos that gives statements about Chicanos the status of truth, a Chicanology that serves as a fundamental tool of domination. Paraphrasing Said, we can say that Chicanology is the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on any occasion that that peculiar entity "the Chicano" is in question, that no one writing, thinking or acting on the Chicano can do so without taking into account the limitations on thought and action imposed by Chicanology.

It is precisely the expression of power intrinsic to Chicanology that engenders a Chicano discourse, understood poetically as "that which we must know in order to survive," a knowledge, more specifically, which in the politics of truth of Anglo America is never allowed the status of truth. Without the status of truth, Chicano discourse cannot invest its statements on decisions, institutions and practices, that is to say, it has no access to, nor impact on public policy; it is a subjugated knowledge. A subjugated knowledge is defined as the historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or
formal system. Secondly, it is the whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate or insufficiently elaborated. It is popular knowledge, though not common sense; it is a particular, local, regional knowledge, a heterogeneous knowledge incapable of unanimity and which owes its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it. Subjugated knowledges are concerned with a historical knowledge of struggles. Thus, in the specialized areas of erudition as in the disqualified, popular knowledge we find the memory of hostile encounters which even up to this day have been confined to the margins of knowledge. In the context of a power relationship between Chicanology as a discourse of dominance and Chicano discourse as a subjugated knowledge we can see the conditions for the appearance of Chicano Studies as we commonly understand the term. Chicano Studies is a specific form of struggle, a praxis within Chicano discourse which stands in antithetical position with respect to Chicanology. In effect, the claim that Chicano Studies is an academic discipline (that it is based on a logical structure and that therefore its propositions are the outcomes of verifiable procedures) is really the attempt to invest it with the effects of power which have been attributed to science since Medieval times. The important point is that this is not a battle "on behalf" of truth but a struggle "about the status of truth" and the economic and political role it plays. Until this is clearly understood, there is the possibility that Chicano Studies may be appropriated by Chicanology.

We have defined Chicanology as an elusive yet systematic hegemonic discourse that expresses and actualizes Anglo domination over Chicanos;
Chicano discourse as a diffuse, subjugated knowledge resulting from the struggle, the resistance against Anglo power; and Chicano Studies as a specific discursive practice within Chicano discourse which attempts to acquire power by claiming academic validity. Several questions remain, however, regarding the content of Chicano discourse and the techniques by which Chicano discourse is dominated.

CHICANO DISCOURSE AND PROCEDURES OF CONTROL

We stated that Chicano discourse, as a subjugated knowledge, owes its power precisely to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything that surrounds it. A popular statement of this power can be helpful to clarify the scope and configuration specific to Chicano discourse and also to define the procedures by which Chicano discourse is dominated. In April 13, 1972, Ricardo Chavez Ortiz, a Mexican national, skyjacked a Frontier Airlines plane with an unloaded gun. According to the Los Angeles Times, his request was "live broadcast time in which to voice the frustrations of a man who feared the world would not listen to his problems, and those of his people, under any other circumstances." Addressing himself to Anglo Americans, he stated:

I have felt an obligation to do this bad deed but not only for the situation of my family but...it is much more delicate and dangerous for the new generation than you can imagine...I (told) myself: ask for what you need and make them realize that we are also the children of God...I wanted to attract the attention of everyone in this nation and to say to everyone once and for all, what type of human beings we are...What I need to say to you and that you need to pay very close attention to (is that)
on the path we are following, there are going to come very dis-
astrous and terrible days... All you do is let the days go by and
maybe tomorrow, maybe the next day, there will be a chance, there
will be a new governor or a new president, yakkity, yakkity...

Don't always think about your good clothes and having enough to
eat and your good friends... The Americans (Anglos) go and send
rockets to the moon. Yes, go ahead and do whatever you want to
do while we become rebellious...

All I want is for Mexicans to know that this is Mexican land and
always will be... This land that we are working on was a divine
gift... I would not admit to any son of a bitch that my nation is
for sale or in servitude...

I was held in captivity for two years and all I had was the right
to search through garbage cans for something to eat. I also
worked for two years without being paid one single cent... Where
was justice at that time? Where were the authorities?... I
have a great fear of going out into the streets because
I am afraid that at any moment a policeman will take his pistol
and shoot me... 26

Thus, in thirty-five minutes of air time, bought with the violation of
a federal law, Chavez Ortiz revealed to the world the harshness that
surrounds Chicano discourse. This collection of observation and accusa-
tions, however, are not only the "frustrations of a man" or an example
of individual alienation; it is that and much more. These, we might
say pronouncements, indicate the regularity of the basic statements of
Chicano discourse that have been in operation since the United States
invaded the Southwest: 1) an assertion of the basic humanity of the Chi-
cano with reference to god, 2) Anglo indifference to social justice and
emphases on materialism, 3) empty political promises, 4) the land grab, 5) a nationalistic attitude, 6) the imposition of a colonial labor system, 7) police brutality and the desperate need to disseminate the knowledge about the living conditions of Chicanos. Of course, it is not so much a matter of knowledge, the truth is known, it just is not given any political status. At any rate, these same basic statements appear at different levels and at different times, more clearly delimited and localized, depending on the specific relations of power at a given time. (See Chart II) Needless to say, as it is in the case under discussion, the statements of Chicano discourse, no matter their level of articulation, appear under the implicit or explicit threat, or actual practice of violence.

There is another series of statements made by Chavez Ortiz that indicate, either by what they oppose or by what they assert, procedures for the control of Chicano discourse.

I could very easily force this plane to go to Mexico and I could have demanded three or four million dollars...and I assure you that I would have been able to avoid capture there...I am a pretty smart person. And I know how to use my intelligence so I can get along well with my family.

You are the ones that make the laws and elect the governments. Well what are you doing, what kind of governments are you electing? What kind of society are you making?...I want...a clean society, not a filthy traitorous society like the one we are presently living in...If that is what the laws are like, then the laws are for the protection of the capitalists or, in other words, to protect the government.
Statements that put into operation the same regularity, but one more delicately articulated, more clearly delimited and localized through the appearance of new notions, discoveries, technical improvements, and conceptual transformations.

GOVERNING STATEMENTS
1. Put into operation rules of formation of discourse in their most extended form.
2. Present the most general possibilities of characterization.
3. While constituting a strategic choice, leave room for the greatest number of options.

Chart II. Diagram of the regularity of Chicano discourse
There is a Mrs. Bañuelos, another proud product of the society of which we are talking (U.S. Treasurer)...She has trampled on a lot of people and because of this she is a son of a bitch...only very capable people and good hearted with good intentions...have the right to obtain positions like these...

The children that I have...have attended school for many years and they know absolutely nothing...27

This series of statements also belong to the discursive regularity of Chicano discourse; it refers to points of struggle between Chicanology and Chicano discourse: 1) the question of intelligence, 2) the ambiguous nature of the law as applied to Chicanos, 3) the status given to speakers of Chicano discourse --or Chicanology, and 4) educational institutions and processes. As specific points where power is exercised, these statements indicate the techniques, mechanisms and procedures by which Chicanology selects, organizes, and redistributes Chicano discourse in order to deflect its power, to neutralize its impact on public policy. 28

The last part of this essay will describe these specific mechanisms of domination, but before doing so, it is important to note how the skyjacking event ended. Chavez Ortiz's only logical defense was, to the chagrin of his supporters, based on "diminished capacity", not being "mentally competent and criminally responsible". He was convicted on charges of air piracy, given a life sentence and released in 1978. 29

The most obvious form of exclusion is prohibition. Throughout Chicano history we find many examples. There is the prohibition to speak Spanish under penalty of bodily punishment or suspension from school; in the late nineteenth century it was prohibited in some parts,
to sing corridos about Chicano bandidós; the practice of red-baiting was in effect a prohibition against speaking up for better wages and working conditions and it caused the demise of unions such as the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union (CAWUI) and organizations like the Congreso de Hable Española during the 1930's; certainly Ricardo Flores Magón felt the effects of prohibition around the turn of the century: he was incarcerated nine times for speaking or writing radical political doctrines.

There is a somewhat more subtle technique of intervention in the control of discourse and that is based on the contrast between Reason (usually on the side of the dominant power) and Insanity (usually on the side of those who are subjugated). Thus, Chicanos have not only been overrepresented in mentally retarded classes, but their cultural characteristics have been categorized as deviancy. A revealing example of this practice is the statement made by the Texas historian Walter Prescott Webb in reference to the Plan de San Diego of 1915. Webb does not believe that Mexicans wrote the plan because "...the disturbances had behind them a purpose, an intelligence greater than that of the bandit leader or of his ignorant followers." Similarly, Commodore Sloat, who took over Monterey Port in 1846, could not understand why Chicanos were planning to rise against him.

Truly this procedure is more that of insane people than of persons in their right minds, because if they had common sense they would understand that I am too strong to allow myself to be forced to give up what I have acquired.
At a different level, in American fiction, there are numerous Mexican characters who suddenly and inexplicably, go temporarily crazy. One thinks for example of "Spanish Johnny" in Willa Cather's The Song of the Lark and Danny in Steinback's Tortilla Flat.  In this light we can better understand Chavez Ortiz' assertion of his intelligence.

But there is an even more insidious technique to deny validity, that is the status of truth, to a given statement or discourse, namely, the contrast between Truth and False. As noted several times before, the types of statements which are accepted as true, the mechanisms which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the techniques and procedures that are considered valuable for the acquisition of truth and the status of those charged with saying what counts as true, all these elements are subjected to a politics of truth or what we term Chicano. Chicano history reveals the manipulation of the Law, the established truth, to benefit specific interests and to deny Chicanos their discourse. The list is endless but it includes: the violation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the blurring of what is justice and injustice in the second half of the nineteenth century, the exclusion of Chicanos from labor unions and schools, the manipulation of immigration laws, deportations, the zoot-suit riots, and today the charges of "reverse discrimination".

Even in academic disciplines we find procedures of control in the production of truth. Disciplines allow us to build a discourse but within a narrow framework; they are defined by groups of objects of study, methods, a body of propositions considered to be true (the literature), the interplay of rules and definitions, of techniques and
tools. In order to speak the truth within a discipline, one must obey the rules of some discursive policy that takes the form of a permanent reactivation of a set of rules. It is precisely the resistance to these rules and regulations that gives rise to a Chicano Studies discipline. The first generation of Chicanos who entered academia found that history, political science, sociology and other academic disciplines were somehow detrimental in their search for that knowledge "that we need in order to survive". Through the establishment of a Chicano Studies these scholars hoped to validate their discourse but this validity was contained by restrictions in terms of material support. Chicano professors were denied tenure, Chicano studies courses were not required, programs were funded with "soft" monies, journals would not publish articles or books by Chicanos, and many that were published, soon were out of print. There are, of course, exceptions, but the rule is that "what we need to know in order to survive", that slippery truth desperately sought in hundreds of dissertations, studies and research projects has been rendered ineffective in terms of its impact on public policy.

In addition to these procedures of exclusion of Chicano discourse, there are various methods to limit the number of individuals who are given the charge of speaking the truth. One of this methods is the establishment of the status of the speaking individual through 1) the criteria of competence, 2) systems of differentiation and relation with other individuals or groups with the same status, 3) the function of this status in relation to society in general and the Chicano community.
in particular, 4) the institutional sites that lend legitimacy to their statements and, 5) the various positions occupied by the speaking individual in the information networks. This allocation of speaking individuals comes under the influence of the politics of truth, thus, we find ourselves in a very uncomfortable position when we realize that our demand for more Chicanos in positions of authority has not been realized in terms of the acquisition of power. Rudy Acuña refers to this development as the rise of the Chicano bureaucrats, a system of power brokers which function as agents of social control. And this is precisely what Chavez Ortiz denounced in very harsh terms.

A rather different function is performed by fellowships of discourse, whose role is to preserve or to reproduce discourse, but in order that it should circulate within a closed community, according to strict regulations, without those in possession being dispossessed by this very distribution. For example, the Anglo Texans in 1832 and 1835, borrowing a technique from their revolutionary forefathers, formed municipal committees of safety and correspondence. These committees, which brought citizens together outside of legal channels, became an important vehicle for bringing on the declaration of independence of Texas. Chicano organizations such as mutualistas and groups such as the Penitentes also fall in this category. It may even be that the act of writing as it is institutionalized today, with its books, its publishing system and the personality of the writer, occurs within a diffuse, yet constraining fellowship of discourse. But there are many others, functioning according to entirely
different schemes of exclusivity and diaclosure. One has only to think of the forms of diffusion and circulation of technical and scientific secrets, medical discourse and political and economic statements.

At first sight doctrine (religious, political, philosophical) would seem to be the reverse of a fellowship of discourse; for among the latter, the number of speakers were, if not fixed, at least limited, and it was among this number that discourse was allowed to circulate and be transmitted. Doctrine, on the other hand, tends to diffusion: it is the holding in common of a discourse on which individuals, as many as possible, can define their reciprocal allegiance. In appearance, the only requisite is the recognition of the same truths and the acceptance of a rule of conformity with these truths. If it were a question of just that, doctrines would be barely different from scientific or academic disciplines and the control of discourse would bear only on the form or content of what was said. But doctrines involve both the speaker and the spoken. Doctrines involve the statements of speakers in the sense that doctrine is, permanently, the instrument and the manifestation of an adherence to a class, to a social or racial status, to a nationality or an interest, to a struggle, a revolt, resistance or acceptance. In short, doctrine links individuals to a certain type of statements while consequently barring them from all others; it brings about a dual subjection, that of speaking individuals to discourse and that of discourse to the group of individual speakers. The restriction imposed by doctrine is illustrated by Jose Antonio Villareal R., author of Pocho. Referring to the effects of the
"doctrine", we might say, of the Chicano Movement on Chicano Literature, he states:

What resulted then is that an unwritten set of standards began to take form. Codes for Chicano literature were explicit. First and foremost was the fact that we could never criticize ourselves as long as we followed this developing pattern.39

On a much broader scale there is education --the social appropriation of discourse. Education is the instrument whereby every individual can gain access to any kind of discourse. But we well know that in its distribution, in what it permits and in what it prevents, it follows the well-trodden battle lines of social conflict. Every educational system is a political means of maintaining, or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and powers that it carries with it. Of course, these forms of control of discourse --the status given to individual speakers, fellowships of discourse, doctrinal groups and social appropriation-- are linked together, constituting a corporation that distributes speakers among the different types of discourse and which appropriates those types of discourse to certain class of individual speakers. What is an educational system after all, if not the allocation of discourse to specific individual speakers, if not the constitution of a diffuse doctrinal group, if not a distribution and appropriation of discourse with all its learning and powers? Thus, the control of Chicano discourse, the reason why "the people do not know what it is that they must know in order to survive," is to be found, in its most fundamental form, in the educational process. And this is why, Chavez Ortiz' children and the vast
majority of Chicano children "have attended school for many years and they know absolutely nothing."

These are, then, the techniques, procedures and mechanisms by which that corporation of truth that we found to be an elusive Chicano-logy, appropriates, organizes, rearranges and distributes Chicano knowledge to deflect its power. There are the methods by which the politics of truth in Anglo America gerrymanders the political territory of Chicano discourse and renders it incapable of affecting public policy: the people don't know what it is that they must know because Chicano discourse (and its inherent power) is either forbidden outright, considered insane or irrational, declared an un-truth, a falsehood, or it is restricted by academic disciplines; furthermore, individuals who articulate this discourse are restricted by the manipulation of the status given to them, fellowships of discourse, doctrines or more generally, through education.

To reiterate the thrust of these discussions, what is being proposed here is an analysis of discourse that includes both erudite knowledge and local memories in order to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today. Discursive analysis is not a return to a more careful or exact form of science; this does not mean that it calls for a lyrical knowledge or or the right of ignorance. What it really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledge against the claims of a unitary body of theory which filters and orders them in the name of true knowledge and some politically
motivated idea of what constitutes science. The focus of this analysis, then, is on the insurrection of knowledges that are opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of science, but to the effects of the centralizing powers that are linked to the institution and functioning of an organized scientific discourse.

My plan of study, then, is to map Chicano discourse in terms of 1) the specific discursive and non-discursive (i.e. institutional) power relations which gave rise to it, 2) the status given to individual speakers of Chicano discourse, 3) the concepts to which it refers, and 4) the strategies that define its struggle with Chicanology. In terms of this struggle, it is very important to note that the articulation of the Chicano discourse/Chicanology opposition is presented in terms of a dialectical relationship only for the sake of clarity. It is not as if all Chicanos speak from within Chicano discourse and all Anglos speak from within Chicanology. Power functions in terms of manifold relationships that are determined by specific conditions. Thus, depending on the particular struggle under investigation, we may find Chicanos making statements dictated by Chicanological discourse and, conversely, we may find Anglos obeying the rules of Chicano discourse. It is precisely the purpose of discursive analysis to reveal the specific, ever shifting relationships of power and its micro-mechanisms. Secondly, I plan to focus my investigations on Chicano Studies discourse, in particular the micro-mechanisms by which the discourse of Chicano scholars is appropriated.
and robbed of its power in order to deflect its impact on public policy.
Footnotes


4. Ibid., p. 28.


9. Ibid.


11. Ibid., p. 96.


15. Ibid., p. 93.


21. Ibid., p. 16.


23. Ibid., p. 85. Foucault makes this statement with reference to Marxism and psychoanalysis, I believe it also applies to Chicano Studies.

24. Note that the power of this statement (in the sense that it commanded international attention) does not derive from its academic or scientific validity but from the illegality of the act and the threat of violence; the same statements can be found in academic texts yet they do not carry the same power.


27. Ibid.


34. Ibid., pp. 222-224.

35. This problem is common to all non-Western areas of study, see, Charles R. Larson "The growing problem of 'out-of-print' books," *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (October 10, 1978), p. 23.

