The political dynamics surrounding the adoption of an open admissions policy at the City University of New York (CUNY) are discussed. Analysis of the case of CUNY also provides a basis for considering the politics of structural change in American higher education. It is suggested that when Chancellor Albert Bowker took office in 1963, he followed a systematic policy of rapid institutional expansion. In view of the fact that CUNY's traditional constituency, the Jewish population, was declining, Bowker hoped to increase enrollments by incorporating the Black and Puerto Rican communities into the CUNY coalition. Bitter conflict ensued over the pace of change: for many of the increasingly militant minority population, it was too slow, while for many White ethnics, it was too fast. The seizure of the South Campus at City College in 1968 presented Bowker with an opportunity to capitalize upon widespread fear of racial insurrection to break an admission stalemate between Blacks and Jews. He was able to use the mobilization of the City's Blacks and Puerto Rican masses to realize his objective of adopting a policy of universal access to CUNY. The open admissions policy ended the battles over places in the freshman class and also meant that the university's resources would increase. It is concluded that, above all, open admissions constituted a solution to a distinctively political problem faced by the university. As long as the demand for places in the university far exceeded the supply, the issue of admissions would have been one of conflict. Any attempt to expand opportunities for minorities at CUNY at the expense of other groups would have aroused great opposition. The substantial size of the City's growing minority populations required that they be incorporated into the CUNY coalition. (SW)
The Politics of Structural Change in American Higher Education:  
The Case of Open Admissions at the 
City University of New York

Project on Politics and Inequality in American Higher Education

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Of the numerous reforms introduced into American higher education during the 1960s, perhaps none did more to reduce inequality of educational opportunity than the adoption of open admissions by the nation's third largest institution of higher education--the City University of New York (CUNY). The sheer magnitude of the expansion and redistribution of opportunity brought about by open admissions is illustrated by the enrollment figures. From a freshman class of fewer than 20,000 in 1969, first-year enrollment at the City University surged in 1970, the first year of open admissions, to more than 35,000 (Board of Higher Education, 1974: 19). Compared to previous enrollees in the City University, the new students were considerably more likely to be from minority backgrounds; between 1969 and 1971, the proportion of the freshman class that was Black and Puerto Rican rose from 19.7 percent to 29.6 percent (Gordon, 1975: 242). Further, open admissions meant that many students who had been tracked into non-academic programs in secondary school--a disproportionate number of them from minority or low-income backgrounds--were able to attend college for the first time; in 1970, 67 percent of high school graduates with vocational diplomas and 50 percent of those with general degrees enrolled in college, most of them (80 percent) at CUNY (Trimberger, 1973: 33). Open admissions, conclude the authors (Birnbaum and Goldman, 1971: 69) of a careful longitudinal study of New York City high school graduates was "the sole
factor responsible for increasing the college-going rate in New York City to 75.7 percent -- an astoundingly high figure, especially when compared to the national average of approximately 55 percent.¹

The large-scale expansion and redistribution of valued public resources rarely takes place without struggle, and the case of open admissions to the City University of New York is no exception to this general rule. The objective of this paper will thus be to identify the political dynamics of this struggle. The examination of open admissions at the City University will, it is hoped, also help more generally to illuminate the politics of structural change in American higher education, for conflicts which elsewhere have remained latent became dramatically manifest in New York in 1969. An analysis of the case of the City University will thus be worthwhile not only in its own right, but also as an example of what happens when the racial and class tensions that always simmer below the surface of American life overflow into a domain that is only rarely the scene of overt political struggle -- the domain of higher education.

University and Society: A Relationship in Flux

When Albert H. Bowker became chancellor of the City University in 1963, he inherited an institution in which the demand for places chronically far exceeded the supply. Indeed, at the time that Bowker took office, the City University was -- considered as a whole -- arguably the most selective public system of higher education in the nation; the high school average required for admission to the senior colleges had risen
from 80 to 85 between 1950 and 1961 (Holy, 1962: 71), and even the community colleges, elsewhere generally open-door institutions, maintained stringent entry requirements (Gordon, 1975: 91-92). Moreover, there were currents within the University that felt that it was not exclusive enough; in 1961, for example, a special faculty committee investigating admissions procedures at CUNY's four senior colleges concluded that the prevailing admissions process was not selecting the best students and that, accordingly, it should be replaced with a procedure placing more emphasis on standardized tests, particularly the SAT (Heil et al., 1961). And a year later, the authors of a major planning document submitted to the Committee to Look to the Future of the Board of Higher Education (BHE) concluded that, if anything, their own enrollment projections should perhaps be revised downwards because non-whites, who promised to be an ever-larger proportion of the population, had less of a "college-going propensity" than the middle-class whites they were replacing (Holy, 1962: 93-95).

At a time when other public institutions were expanding at breakneck speed, CUNY was inching forward at a snail's pace; indeed, between 1952 and 1961, the size of the senior college freshman class systemwide had actually declined from 8,859 to 8,563 -- a drop in its percentage share of the high school graduating class from 17 to 13 percent (see Table 1). Under its conservative Board of Higher Education Chairman, Gustave Rosenberg, what CUNY had done, however, was continue to fulfill its traditional function of educating a small minority of the City's high school graduates, most of them Jewish
Table 1

New York City High School Graduates Related to New College Admissions to the City University, 1952-1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>High School Graduates</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent in</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Day</td>
<td>Evening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>52,778</td>
<td>8,859</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>59,480</td>
<td>9,194</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>49,780</td>
<td>8,131</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>52,140</td>
<td>7,785</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>51,221</td>
<td>7,553</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>50,473</td>
<td>8,322</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>53,508</td>
<td>7,775</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>57,050</td>
<td>7,550</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>66,425</td>
<td>9,601</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>65,888</td>
<td>8,563</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Holy et al. (1962: 125).
and in the top segment of their graduating class. Yet this sub-population --
the source of CUNY's renown as a ladder of upward mobility for the City's
talented and ambitious poor -- was rapidly declining by the early 1960s.
For the City's huge Jewish community, which once provided the City
University with perhaps as many as 95 percent of its students (Glazer,
1973: 76), was increasingly abandoning the City for the suburbs; further,
of those who remained, a not insubstantial number took advantage of the
growing number of scholarships available at elite private institutions
that had, under the banner of meritocracy, recently relaxed their ethnically
exclusionary admissions practices (Wechsler, 1977; Synnott, 1979).

The decline in New York City's Jewish population was part of a
set of larger changes in the ethnic and racial composition of the City --
changes with ominous implications for the City University. Between 1950
and 1960, New York City had witnessed the exodus of well over 800,000
whites (see Table 2), most of them middle class, and the arrival of an
almost equivalent number of Blacks and Puerto Ricans, many of them impover-
ished and poorly educated. Yet despite the growing importance of the minority
population, the proportion of non-white college-age youth attending CUNY
had remained constant at 6.2 percent (see Table 3); in contrast, whites, who, in 1950, already attended CUNY in more than double the proportion of
non-whites (13.8 percent), increased their advantage to triple (20.7 percent)
by 1960.

Thus when Bowker became chancellor, he was taking the helm of an
institution that, in its stubborn maintenance of highly restrictive
admissions practices, was clinging to a declining constituency -- the
Table 2

Estimates of New York City population by ethnic group, 1950-1970
(Numbers in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1950-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,892</td>
<td>7,782</td>
<td>7,895</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>6,880</td>
<td>6,053</td>
<td>5,302</td>
<td>-12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negro and other races</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>149.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: 1950 and 1970 population for White and Negro and other races, excluding Puerto Rican estimated. According to the Bureau of the Census, 92 percent of New York State's Puerto Rican population was classified as white in 1970; this factor was applied to the New York City data for 1970. In 1960, 96 percent of the New York City Puerto Rican population was classified as white; this factor was applied to the 1950 data.

Table 3
Undergraduate Enrollments for the City University of New York for 1950 and 1960.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th>NON-WHITE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NYC College age group (17-20)</td>
<td>Attending City University %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>366,175</td>
<td>50,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>322,628</td>
<td>66,846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

City's diminishing Jewish population -- at the same time that it was failing to serve the most rapidly growing sector of New York City society: the burgeoning minority community. An astute administrator, Bowker knew that this situation could not long endure in a public, tax-supported system of higher education, especially at a time when Blacks were actively challenging their historic exclusion from the nation's major social and economic institutions. Indeed, in his inaugural speech, Bowker (1963: 3) noted "changes in the ethnic composition of the City's population and laid out two major themes that were to run throughout his administration: that the City University has to reach out to the children of the "newer migrations" and serve for them, as it did for the immigrants who preceded them, as avenues of upward mobility at the same time that it adapts itself to the rapidly changing "employment profile" of the City (1963: 6-8). 8

In his introductory statement in the 1964 Master Plan for the City University of New York, Bowker made explicit his concern that the changing racial composition of the City might, in the absence of positive action by CUNY, threaten vital institutional interests, for it raised the specter of an actual decline in University enrollments. Noting that the percentage of Whites in the City's public schools had declined from 68 to 57 percent during the previous six years, Bowker concluded that:

The Board of Education has recently made public figures which classify the public school students as Negro, Puerto Rican, and "other." These figures indicate that the percentage of "others" has declined from sixty-eight percent to fifty-seven percent in six years; the future is anyone's guess; but it may well drop to fifty percent in the period covered by this plan. Such trends have important implications for the City University, which draws eighty-five percent of its students from the public high schools. (The other fifteen percent come from non-public high schools, primarily parochial.) If we look
at the areas of poverty in the city, we find major erosion of the schools. We find high schools with only twenty or thirty graduates with academic diplomas, and other factors which could lead us to say that higher education is an unrealizable aspiration for many and that our projections should be revised downward accordingly. Nothing could be more destructive for the City of New York and for the individuals involved.

For Bowker, as for any other university administrator, declining enrollments posed a direct threat to institutional interests, for they implied reduced budgets and hence fewer resources under administrative control.

But the most immediate threat to CUNY posed by the rapid demographic changes then taking place in the City were above all political. For as long as the demand for places in the University far exceeded the supply -- and in 1964, CUNY had to turn away two-thirds of its applicants -- the issue of admissions would remain a volatile one. Any attempt to expand opportunities for minorities at CUNY at the expense of other groups would, it seemed clear, arouse fierce opposition. At the same time, however, the sheer size of the City's growing minority populations required that they be incorporated into the coalition of groups supporting CUNY -- a task that, in turn, could hardly be accomplished without increasing non-white enrollment far above the 5 percent level where it had remained during the decade from 1952 to 1961.  

Bowker's attempted solution to this dilemma was the swift expansion of the number of places in the freshman class, with special emphasis on rapidly increasing the enrollment of Blacks and Puerto Ricans. That he followed this path was hardly surprising, for by 1964 leaders of the Black community were already raising pointed questions about the paucity of minority students in the City University (Gordon, 1975: 173-174). Bowker's first
step toward increasing minority enrollment was at the community college level, where he sponsored the development of College Discovery -- a program which in 1964 and 1965 enrolled 760 students, over 40 percent of them Black and about 25 percent Puerto Rican. At the senior college level, the state legislature in 1966 established the Search for Education, Elevation, and Knowledge (SEEK) -- a program demanded by black legislators (see Gordon, 1975: 196-200) and covertly sponsored by Bowker. By 1967, 1,256 students were enrolled in the SEEK program at CUNY's senior colleges (Rosen et al., 1973: 60). Finally, in 1968, the Chancellor's Office developed still another scheme for admitting more minority students -- the Top 100 Scholars Program. Under its auspices, any student ranking among the top 100 graduates of each City high school would, regardless of actual grade point average, be offered admission to the City University. Since, however, many eligible students had already been admitted to CUNY or some other college, the 100 Scholars Program actually yielded only 154 additional students, 72 percent of them Black or Puerto Rican (Wechsler, 1977: 275-280).

These programs, though not nearly drastic enough to satisfy the increasingly militant minority community, did succeed in alienating much of what remained, despite its numerical decline, CUNY's most important constituency: the white middle class. For just at the moment that the minority-oriented College Discovery and SEEK Programs were expanding, the cut-off point for students admitted through the regular admissions procedure was actually rising. Indeed, between 1967 and 1968, the grade-point average required for admission to the City University's senior colleges increased substantially (Gordon, 1975: 204). The University did,
to be sure, note that CDP and SEEK students gained admittance in addition to -- rather than in place of -- regular acceptances, but to many white students excluded from the University despite having higher GPA's, this argument was something less than compelling.

In August, 1968 -- in the wake of the widespread urban upheavals that followed Martin Luther King's assassination and in an atmosphere of acute racial tension in New York City -- the Board of Higher Education requested that the Chancellor report on progress toward "the end that minority groups shall be represented in the units of the University in the same proportion as they are represented among all high school graduates of the City." In a preamble spelling out the urgency of the new action, the Board cited:

The existence in our City of a condition of social emergency involving deep social inequities and injustices and of massive individual and group frustrations with resultant inter-group tensions and resentments...

The need of New York City high school graduates from economically, socially and educationally deprived neighborhoods and homes to be provided with equalized opportunity for post-high school education is increasingly urgent, and itself represents a social danger requiring our immediate consideration, deliberation and action...

Quite clearly, a key factor in moving the Board to take such drastic measures was the prospect that aroused fear among liberal reformers throughout the City -- the specter of violent insurrections in the City's sprawling ghettos.

The enunciation of the objective of proportional representation of minority high-school graduates in the units of the City University -- to the Board a matter of elementary social justice as well as political...
necessity -- was, from the vantage point of much of the City's white population, an outrage. The Jewish community, in particular, was profoundly upset by this declaration, for it saw in it the reappearance of the very device that had been used to restrict its opportunities in the past -- the hated racial quota. Well aware that Jews were disproportionately represented in the University, Jewish organizations made known the intensity of their opposition to any scheme that would, in their view, use racial rather than "merit" criteria in determining who was to gain access to the University (Gordon, 1975: Wechsler, 1977).

Thus, by the fall of 1968, Bowker's plan to expand minority access to CUNY, and thereby to incorporate the City's growing Black and Puerto Rican population into a broadened coalition of support for the University, had arrived at an impasse. On the one hand, some progress had been made, but not nearly enough to placate the more militant and vocal members of the minority community. On the other hand, the rather modest attempts to increase minority enrollment that had taken place had been more than enough to arouse the hostility of the City's increasingly restive white majority. For an individual as politically astute as Bowker, the lesson must have been clear: no plan that expanded opportunities for Blacks and Puerto Ricans at the expense of the City's white ethnic groups would provide the University with the broad base of political support that it needed. Yet there was, perhaps, still one path out of the apparent impass, if only Bowker could find a way to follow it: to open the University to everyone and, in so doing, to decisively end the zero-sum character of the struggle for access.
The Struggle at City College: Crisis and Opportunity

When, in the spring of 1969, more than 150 Black and Puerto Rican students seized eight buildings at the City University's flagship institution, the City College (CCNY), they did so in a setting of seething racial tension. Indeed, at the very time of the crisis at City College, public opinion polling data revealed that a substantial proportion of the City's Afro-American community agreed that "Blacks need to use violence to win rights" (See Table 4). Interestingly, this sentiment was most pervasive among college-educated Blacks.

In such a context, the very location of City College -- at the edge of the huge ghetto community of Harlem -- seemed to carry with it the very real possibility that trouble on the campus might well spill over into the neighborhood, thereby provoking a citywide racial conflagration. For at a time when the notion of community control of public institutions enjoyed widespread support among Blacks, the City College remained an overwhelmingly white institution. Indeed, as late as 1968, minority representation had reached only 9 percent -- hardly an impressive figure in an almost exclusively Black and Puerto Rican neighborhood, especially in an institution supported by the taxpayers' money. Quite clearly, something drastic had to be done about minority underrepresentation.

The changes demanded by the militant Black and Puerto Rican students at City were, however, unacceptable to all but a small minority of the City's powerful white liberal community. For what the militants
Table 4

Blacks Need to Use Violence to Win Rights: Blacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Don't Need</th>
<th>Must Use</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Blacks</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-34</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th grade</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Harris and Swanson (1970: 52)
Initially proposed—that future entering classes at City College reflect the racial composition of the City's high schools—had the unmistakable ring of "quota" to it. Yet if the demand for racially proportionate representation in CUNY was decisively rejected, the policy finally adopted—that of open admissions—was in many ways more radical than anything ever proposed by the Black and Puerto Rican militants. In order to understand the specific concatenation of circumstances that made this paradoxical outcome possible, however, we must move beyond the University to an analysis of the rapidly shifting political alliances in the City itself. It is to this task that we now turn.

A. Class, Race, and New York City Politics

The accession to the mayoralty by John Lindsay in 1965 augured the beginning of an era of extreme instability in New York City politics. A reform Republican in an overwhelmingly Democratic city, Lindsay won the election by a narrow margin and with considerably less than a majority of the vote. That he was able to win at all was due in good measure to the substantial support he had received from the City's reform (i.e. anti-machine) Democrats. Since, however, these reform Democrats adhered to quite liberal positions on many issues, responsiveness to their demands threatened to alienate the large number of regular Republicans who, despite the Conservative Party candidacy of William Buckley, had voted for Lindsay. The coalition that had brought Lindsay to power was thus not only weak, but also inherently unstable (Bellush and David, 1971).
Looking toward 1969, Lindsay must, accordingly, have realized that a failure to make inroads into additional sectors of the electorate would almost certainly prove fatal. The logical target group was the City's rapidly expanding minority population (David, 1971). By incorporating them into his coalition, Lindsay would not only solidify his alliance with liberal-reform Democrats, but also endear himself to the highly influential segment of the City's corporate community that recognized that its prosperity depended upon the continued possession of an increasingly rare commodity—domestic tranquility.

In a city in which ethnic and racial differences correspond, to a striking degree, to class distinctions (see Table 5), Lindsay's attempt to build an alliance between liberals (mostly Jewish and Protestant), on the one hand, and racial minorities, on the other, was, in the final analysis, an effort to construct a coalition of the top and bottom of the City's class structure against the middle. In his first year in office, Lindsay made a dramatic gesture toward the City's Blacks and Puerto Ricans by strongly advocating the retention of a controversial Civilian Review Board (CRB) whose function was widely perceived to be the investigation of complaints of police brutality against minorities. The CRB was submitted to a referendum in 1966 and was overwhelmingly defeated: 1,313,161 to 765,468. Ominously for liberals, the returns revealed a crack in the City's previously solid minority-Jewish alliance: while Blacks and Puerto Ricans favored the measure by substantial margins, most Jews opposed it. And within the Jewish community itself, class cleavages became starkly visible: whereas the affluent and better-educated Jews favored the retention of the CRB, their less privileged
Table 5

Occupational Structure by Ethnicity (Males Only)

New York City, 1963-64

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Professional/technical %</th>
<th>Managerial %</th>
<th>Clerical/sales %</th>
<th>Craftsmen %</th>
<th>Operators %</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negro</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Catholic</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Protestant</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native-born Jewish</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born Jewish</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

brethren decisively rejected it (Rogowsky et al., 1971: 72-75).

The crack which had appeared in Black-Jewish relations in 1966 had, by the summer of 1968, become a massive fissure. Though the Lindsay administration can hardly be held solely responsible for this growing cleavage, it would be hard to deny that many of the policies that it had pursued in the hope of incorporating the City's minority groups into a new liberal coalition headed by the Mayor had the effect, if not the intent, of exacerbating tensions between Blacks and Jews. These policies were pursued in a number of domains, including housing and welfare, but the one policy which aroused more hostility between the two groups than any other took place in an arena that had been a traditional Jewish stronghold--the educational system. This policy was, of course, the promotion of school decentralization and community control, and its pursuit was to bring the Black and Jewish communities into a head-to-head confrontation.

Supported by a peculiar--if, for the Lindsay administration, characteristic--alliance of affluent whites and ghetto Blacks, community control was bitterly opposed by the City's predominantly Jewish teachers' union. What union members feared--especially in a climate in which Black nationalism was on the upsurge--was that race would begin to supersede "merit" as the criterion by which teachers and administrators would be hired and promoted (Gordon, 1975: 203). The depth of their fear was vividly demonstrated by the militance of their response to an attempt on the part of the Black community to gain control of the schools in the Oceanhill-Brownsville district: a city-wide strike in the fall of 1968 which closed the schools for more than two months. While the union--and the middle- and lower-middle class community of which it was a part--
was victorious in this particular battle, the City's Blacks and Puerto Ricans continued to struggle vigorously on other fronts.

In a sense, the struggle over community control symbolized what had become of politics in New York City during the Lindsay administration. An alliance of sorts had emerged between the upper and lower classes of the City's minority population. What this alliance had failed to do, however, was to provide any benefits of note or any sense of participation to the City's white ethnic middle and working classes--Italian, Irish, and Jewish. By the spring of 1969, the consequences of this policy had become apparent: if the Mayor wished to win reelection in the fall, he must somehow find a way to deepen his support among his highly volatile minority constituency while, at the same time, doing everything possible to avoid further alienating the City's beleaguered white middle and working classes.

B. The Road to Open Admissions

In such a racially charged atmosphere, the demands of the Black and Puerto Rican students at City College in the spring of 1969 presented Chancellor Bowker with both a crisis and an opportunity: a crisis which, if handled badly, could cause CUNY's fragile coalition of support to unravel, but also an opportunity which, if handled well, could lead to the attainment of one of Bowker's most cherished objectives: the opening up of the City University to 100 percent of the City's high school graduates. Aware from the moment he took office that the future of the University depended in considerable part upon its success in incorporating
the City's growing minority population, Bowker soon realized that this goal could not be accomplished at the expense of other groups. In 1966, in an important move toward resolution of this problem, Bowker succeeded in putting in the Master Plan the goal of providing a place in CUNY for all high-school graduates by 1975 (Board of Higher Education, 1966:viii). Yet it was not until the crisis at City College in the spring of 1969 that Bowker had an opportunity to accelerate the rather remote target date of 1975 and, in so doing, to put an end to the increasingly ferocious annual struggle over admissions—a struggle which, in its palpable ethnic and racial implications, posed a grave political threat to the University. Thus, the very gravity of the crisis at CCNY served to present Bowker with an opportunity to accomplish a task that fulfilled fundamental organizational interests: in his own words, "to remove admissions as a political issue in New York City."19

The initial resolution, however, of the conflict at CCNY—the adoption by the City College administration and the demonstrating students on May 23 of a dual admissions scheme which would admit half of each entering class by the traditional criteria and the other half by virtue of residence in designated poverty areas "without regard to grades" (Wechsler, 1977:281)—threatened instead to consummate the estrangement from CUNY of what was still its most important constituency: the City's Jewish community. The reason was simple: Jews had by far the most to lose from such a policy and, at a more general level, felt profoundly threatened by a scheme which clearly constituted—in practice, if not in formal appellation—a quota system. Had there been any lingering doubts that the dual admissions scheme might nonetheless be viable,
they were rapidly dispelled by the enraged reactions of all the major candidates then running for mayor: Procaccino, Wagner, Badillo, Marchi, Scheuer, and, finally, Lindsay himself.²⁰ By May 29, even the strongly liberal City College Academic Senate—which only a few days before had been perceived as so desperate for a settlement of the dispute that it would, despite misgivings, endorse the dual admissions scheme—voted it down by a margin of 42 to 30.

Rejection of the dual admissions scheme did not, however, solve the underlying problem—a problem by this time so intense that it threatened not only the fundamental institutional interests of the City University, but also the short-term political survival of Mayor Lindsay himself. Yet if the abortive dual admissions plan did nothing to bring the increasingly bitter struggle for places in the University to a halt, it did provide a most favorable context in which Chancellor Bowker could present the plan that he had favored long before the South Campus seizure: a program of "open admissions" that would provide access to CUNY for 100 percent of the City's graduating seniors. The appeal of such a plan was immediately obvious to all the concerned parties, for by ending the zero-sum character of the conflict over access, it offered the possibility of massively expanding opportunities for Blacks and Puerto Ricans without further alienating the City's aroused white ethnics.

In a sense, then, open admissions was not, as some Marxist analysts have suggested (Davidson, 1974:66), extracted from Bowker by insurgent students as a "concession"; instead, the demonstrations at CCNY presented Bowker with an extraordinary opportunity to use the threat of an impending racial explosion in the City as a means of gathering support for an open
admissions policy that served the City University's own organizational interests in building a broad coalition of support. Indeed, one University administrator close to Bowker claimed that the Chancellor had favored open admissions from the moment he had come to CUNY:

Bowker was for open admissions in 1963. He waited until he had enough public pressure to push for it. It was an internal (within the University) decision, not a function of the demonstrations, or the politicians. That is...he waited until he had a demonstration big enough he could get support from. It wasn't the demonstrations that changed us; we'd weathered demonstrations before (Rosen et al., 1973: 65).

Timothy Healy, CUNY's Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, put the matter even more graphically. For it was his impression that:

Albert Bowker decided two years before the shit hit the fan that open admissions would be a good idea and waited for the external causing agent to surface so that he could say: "See, they're forcing me." And then persuaded his own staff and effectively did the decision himself. 23

The South Campus seizure, occurring in the midst of a period of Black-white relations so tense that even minor incidents seemingly could ignite a city-wide racial conflagration, provided Bowker with the momentum he needed. Moving rapidly to capitalize upon the widespread feeling that the time was ripe to end the dangerous impasse over access to CUNY, Bowker offered his own dramatic solution: to let everyone in. Even the radical students, it is worth stressing, had never proposed anything as drastic as this. Yet Bowker had sound organizational reasons for putting forward such a plan: open admissions promised not only to end the quasi-war over admissions between Blacks and Jews that had threatened to destroy CUNY's fragile political base, but also to provide the University (and the University administration) with budgetary resources of a magnitude
Bowker and the Mobilization of Support for Open Admissions

A consummate politician, Bowker was successful in mobilizing a formidable array of forces on behalf of open admissions. Already, during the early stages of the crisis at City College, he was busy laying the ideological groundwork for universal access; at his urging, the Board of Higher Education, at its meeting of May 4, passed a resolution noting that the revised Master Plan of 1964 had committed the University to a policy of "open enrollment" and that the earliest realization of this goal was "a matter of the first priority."24 By May 25, the idea of open admissions had already entered the realm of public debate, having been endorsed by former Mayor Wagner (then a candidate for mayor) as an alternative to the dual admissions scheme then still under consideration at City College. According to a CUNY administrator close to Bowker, however, the idea was not Wagner's own but had instead been suggested to him by the Chancellor. Bowker was also instrumental in persuading the faculty union, the United Federation of College Teachers, to endorse a policy of "total open enrollment" on May 29, 1969.25

From disparate and previously embattled sectors of civil society in New York City came a loudening chorus of support for open admissions--a chorus conducted, it must be said, to a considerable extent by the Chancellor himself. Once the very idea of universal access had been raised, open admissions did, to be sure, arouse a substantial amount of spontaneous enthusiasm among certain social groups--above all, the minority community, which may have viewed it as the only politically
viable way of increasing its representation in the University, and the faculty, a major part of which viewed it as an act of social justice as well as a means of insuring expanded enrollment. Further, there was a real logic to open admissions, for it was perhaps the only way to accommodate minority demands for massively expanded access without totally estranging both the University and the Lindsay administration from the City's restive white majority. Yet this said, it is nonetheless striking that no group or organization had espoused open admissions prior to its advocacy by Chancellor Bowker.

A. Organized Labor: A Pillar of Support

One of the most critical groups mobilized by Bowker in support of open admissions was one which the City University had traditionally failed to serve very well--the City's predominantly Catholic, white working class. As the struggle between Blacks and Jews for places in CUNY grew ever more intense during the 1966-1969 period, the City's white working class came to feel increasingly neglected by the City University--as they did by many other municipal institutions during the Lindsay years. Indeed, according to Board of Higher Education Vice-Chairman Francis Keppel, a "bloody row" would have resulted by 1969 from further efforts to expand opportunities for Blacks and Puerto Ricans without increasing opportunities for whites as well. Bowker's solution to this dilemma was to promise the labor movement a large chunk of the expanding CUNY pie and, in so doing, to convert these deep-seated feelings of neglect into a powerful commitment on behalf of open admissions.
In this effort, Bowker was notably successful, for in June the City's highly influential Central Labor Council unanimously endorsed open admissions. At the special meeting of the Board of Higher Education on June 16, speaker after speaker from the Central Council expressed organized labor's unequivocal support for the University's plans to open its doors to everyone. The remarks of these speakers revealed considerable sophistication about the ways in which the educational opportunities of the children of unionized workers were restricted by their class position; as several of them noted, the offspring of union members generally possessed neither a GPA high enough to qualify for admissions under regular standards nor a family income low enough to qualify for College Discovery or SEEK.

The strong support for open admissions provided by the New York City labor movement--by all accounts a crucial factor in its ultimate acceptance by City and state politicians—proved to be a genuine expression of the predominantly Catholic rank-and-file's objective interests. For the main beneficiaries of open admissions turned out to be neither Blacks nor Puerto Ricans, but Catholics. Indeed, more than one-third of all CUNY accepted by virtue of open admissions were of non-Hispanic, Catholic background (see Table 6). Thus, while the mobilization of the City's labor movement on behalf of open admissions may have been a reflection of an essentially defensive posture (e.g. no more benefits for the City's underclass in the absence of concessions to hard-pressed working men), it nonetheless played a key role in making CUNY more accessible to a constituency that it had long neglected: the City's huge white working class.
### Table 6

Percent of All Beneficiaries in 1970 Belonging To Each Group At:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Senior Colleges</th>
<th>Community Colleges</th>
<th>All of CUNY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanics</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lavin et al. (1979:66)
B. The Jewish Community: Class Cleavages and Political Divisions

If the support for open admissions of the Central Labor Council is readily explicable, the same cannot be said for the endorsement by several major Jewish organizations of Bowker's policy of universal access. After all, it was the Jewish community that had played a decisive role in blocking the "dual admissions" plan at City College, and it was the Jewish community that had by far the most to lose from any radical change in CUNY's admissions process. Yet, in the end, the official Jewish organizations were to embrace open admissions, firmly if not passionately.

In a way, the very intensity of Jewish resistance to the "dual admissions" scheme had made it exceedingly difficult for Jewish organizations to oppose open admissions, especially when it became clear that it was perhaps the only viable solution to the seemingly never-ending struggle over access. The bitter conflict at City College had, leaders of the Jewish community were well aware, done much to inflame the tense relations that already existed between Blacks and Jews in New York City, and it was, accordingly, imperative to make every effort to avoid any acts that might further fan the flames of racial discord. Further, the central argument that Jews had used against the "dual admissions" scheme—that it would deprive qualified students of a place in the University—had no applicability to Bowker's open admissions plan. Indeed, to oppose open admissions was to appear to object not only to Black students taking the seats of white students, but also to Black students sitting next to white students. As a member of the Ad Hoc Committee for City University put it, the climate of the times was such that "after a while, you began
to feel like kind of a louse if you weren't for open admissions" (Rosen et al., 1973:65).

Despite these political and ideological pressures, support for open admissions in the Jewish community was by no means unanimous. While such "establishment" Jewish organizations as the American Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Committee endorsed open admissions, less respectable Jewish organizations such as the Jewish Defense League and the Queens Jewish Community Council opposed it.31 If there is an underlying pattern to this split, it is one that basically corresponds to class cleavages within the Jewish community.

While direct data on the attitudes of New York City's Jewish population toward open admissions is notably lacking, more general evidence on Jewish attitudes toward Blacks at this point in time corroborates the existence of sharp internal class divisions. Indeed, polling data gathered at the very moment when the tensions surrounding the events at City College was at its peak--the period between April 25 and May 20, 1969--show that while a majority of Jews believed that blacks wanted more than they were "entitled to," such sentiments were much more widespread among low-income and less educated Jews (see Table 7). Similarly, college-educated Jews were much more likely to believe that Black demands were justified than were their less educated--and more directly threatened--counterparts (see Table 8). Thus, though no polls were ever conducted on the specific issue of open admissions, the available evidence does suggest that the class cleavages so visible in Jewish attitudes toward Black demands in general were, in all likelihood, replicated by class divisions on the particular question of open admissions.
Table 7
Blacks Want More Than They Are Entitled To: Jews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>Do</th>
<th>Don't</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $10,000</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000-$15,000</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over $15,000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Grade</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Harris and Swanson (1970: 62)
**Table 8**

Blacks in New York Are Justified in Demands: Jews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Are (%)</th>
<th>Are Not (%)</th>
<th>Depends (%)</th>
<th>Not Sure (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>8th Grade</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Harris and Swanson (1970:60)
Not surprisingly, then, organizations dominated by more affluent Jews—Jews who, it should be noted, were no longer dependent on the City University for their class reproduction—were willing to endorse open admissions. Sensitive to charges of racism and interested in maintaining good relations with those gentile elites which saw in persistent Black-Jewish tensions a threat to the social fabric of the City, the respectable Jewish organizations in the end lobbied on behalf of Chancellor Bowker’s program of universal access to CUNY.

The hard-pressed Jewish lower-middle class, however, saw in open admissions a threat to the value of the CUNY degree—a degree which, given the rapid decline of opportunities for self-employment then taking place in New York City, was for many Jewish families their only means of maintaining their relative class position. A split of sorts thus emerged in the Jewish community between "elite" and "grass-roots" organizations over open admissions. Yet in the last analysis it was the former organizations, possessing both more resources and greater respectability, that had a much stronger impact on the deliberations of the Board of Higher Education on the matter, despite the fact that the latter groups may well have more accurately reflected the attitudes and anxieties of the majority of the City’s Jewish population.

C. The Corporate Community and the Preservation of Domestic Tranquility

With the most powerful Jewish organizations expressing solid, if not warm, support for universal access, Bowker had succeeded in incorporating one of open admissions’ potentially most formidable opponents into his expansionist coalition. Yet there remained another key group that potentially
constituted a serious source of opposition to so costly and radical a scheme--the City's small but influential corporate community.

But why would the City's upper class--and the immensely wealthy and powerful corporate community of which it was an organic part--support open admissions, a policy that some must have felt would provide the City's future employees with much more education than they could possibly need? The answer, it seems, is inextricably intertwined with the apparent gravity of the threat of racial insurrection in New York City at that time. Not long before, it must be remembered, massive racial upheavals had swept across Detroit, Newark, and numerous other American cities. With the focal point of the recent crisis over admissions at City College--an institution located at the edge of the immense ghetto community of Harlem--the struggle for access threatened to ignite in New York City a race riot far worse than any that had hitherto been seen. Thus, when Bowker came up with a plan that held out the hope of preserving domestic tranquility at a time when it was an increasingly rare commodity, the City's worried business elite was predisposed to embrace it.

In addition to the belief that universal access might help defuse the racial tensions that had accumulated during the prolonged and bitter struggle over admissions to CUNY, members of the corporate community had another powerful reason to support open admissions: it promised to strengthen a social order in visible crisis by serving as a vehicle of upward mobility for the City's increasingly militant Black and Puerto Rican underclass. In a period of widespread elite fears concerning the spread of radicalism among the ghetto masses, this argument--which implicitly promised the construction of a Black and Puerto Rican middle class--must have been an
appealing one indeed. And if the sheer cost of such an undertaking might, in bad times, have aroused the hostility of the business community, the late 1960's were years in which the economy was still booming.

Yet if the corporate community was willing to go along with universal access, it must be said that a careful evaluation of the available evidence yields the conclusion that big business was more noteworthy by its absence in the process leading to open admissions than by its presence. Indeed, not a single individual interviewed pointed to the City's large corporations as playing a significant role in the battle surrounding open admissions. CUNY officials did, to be sure, frequently seize the opportunity to declare that the City University would adapt itself to the employment profile of an increasingly complex local economy and thereby help match the training of the labor force with the changing needs of employers, but these appeals were targeted as least as much to the practically-minded politicians who controlled CUNY's budget as to the corporate community itself.

It is thus a serious distortion to claim, as have some Marxist analyses (Davidson, 1974:64), that the factor that "weighed most heavily" in the adoption of open admissions was the "changing nature of the New York City job market." Instead, it would be closer to the truth to way that the "manpower argument" was used to provide legitimation for a policy of rapid expansion which the University had decided upon for basically organizational and political reasons. If the promise of trained manpower convinced some businessmen of the utility of universal access to higher education, then so much the better. But for open admissions to become a reality, what was needed was not the active support of the corporate
community, but its acquiescence. And in a context in which the crisis at CUNY posed a grave threat to the preservation of domestic tranquility, such acquiescence was not hard to come by.

D. The Board of Higher Education: Institutional Survival and Social Justice

Formal power to approve—or to reject—Bowker's proposal to move to open admissions resided with the New York City Board of Higher Education. Composed of members appointed by the Mayor, the tradition-bound Board was, at the time Bowker took office, the unquestioned power center of policy-making for public higher education in New York City. Yet by 1966, with the help of liberal new members nominated by a "screening panel" of prominent citizens and selected by Mayor Lindsay in consultation with Bowker himself, the power of the Board had diminished and the Chancellor, in cooperation with his full-time professional staff, had established his supremacy. And by 1969, with Lindsay appointees approaching majority status on the BHE, it might truly be said that the Board was Bowker's "own" (see Gordon, 1975:225,246).

At the time of the crisis at City College, the Board of Higher Education reflected, to a considerable degree, the alliance between the City's upper class and minorities so common during the Lindsay years. Headed by a patrician Chairman and Vice Chairman, and including among its twenty members five Blacks and Puerto Ricans, the Board was deeply committed to improving the lot of the City's disenfranchised minority poor. To them, as to Bowker, the bitter conflict at CCNY was both a crisis and an opportunity: a crisis which, in its potential for large-scale violence threatened the very survival of CUNY, and an opportunity, which in its
dramatization of the urgency of the demands of the City's increasingly militant Black and Puerto Rican communities, provided momentum for moving forward decisively to make long overdue reforms designed to democratize the University.

Francis Keppel, Vice Chairman of the Board at this time, recalls that the period was one of high hopes for using education "as an instrument for social reform." But fear as well as hope was a central element of the atmosphere of the times:

The phrase that stuck in my mind is what I learned from Jim Conant, who wrote a book about the slums and the suburbs...the image was that of dynamite with a short fuse. 42

Henry Paley, then the University's exceptionally effective lobbyist with the New York State Legislature, 43 uses rougher, but equally evocative, language to capture the climate of fear in the City at that moment:

Maybe we didn't see good, concrete scientific evidence that the shit was gonna hit the fan, but boy, we felt an awful strong odor. 44

In this atmosphere, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the obtaining of approval for open admissions from a Board that reflected the same spirit of liberal reformism exemplified by Bowker himself was little more than a formality.

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E. Politicians and the "Forcing" of Funding

With the approval of the Board, open admissions still awaited the endorsement of Mayor Lindsay who, only a few weeks earlier, had vigorously rejected the "dual admissions" plan. In an election year, however, such support was not hard to come by, for neither Lindsay nor any of the other mayoral candidates could afford to oppose a policy that promised so much
to so many different groups. Indeed, for Lindsay, far more than for Procaccino or Marchi (the candidates of the Democratic and Conservative parties, respectively), support for open admissions was a question of sheer political survival. Increasingly dependent upon his constituency in the minority community, Lindsay simply could not afford to come out against a policy that enjoyed massive popular support among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. Further, Lindsay was genuinely concerned about giving the minority poor "a chance to join the mainstream" and found appealing the idea of using CUNY as an instrument of upward mobility.  

Governor Rockefeller was a somewhat more difficult case, for he was privately opposed to open admissions. Bowker's strategy vis-a-vis Rockefeller was to present him with a fait accompli—a policy that had been approved by the Board of Higher Education and the Mayor and that was already scheduled to go into effect the following September. Rockefeller, facing a tough reelection fight just over one year hence, was in no position to express opposition, for Bowker had succeeded in mobilizing on behalf of open admissions all the major interest groups in a city including within its boundaries almost half of the state's population. And though Rockefeller remained convinced that open admissions cost far more than it was worth, the apparent plentitude of fiscal resources available at the time made it impossible, at a moment when the threat of ghetto riots seemed imminent, to deny funding.
Organizational Interest, Popular Mobilization and Structural Change

From the moment he took office as Chancellor in 1963, Albert Bowker set out on a systematic policy of rapid institutional expansion. Acutely aware of the fact that CUNY's traditional constituency—the City's Jewish population—was a declining one; Bowker hoped that massive increases in enrollments would succeed in incorporating into the coalition of groups supporting the City University, the City's burgeoning—and increasingly restive—Black and Puerto Rican communities. In addition increased enrollments would necessarily mean, Bowker knew, a larger budget for the University and hence more resources—for faculty, for new programs, for staff, for the overall health of the institution—under his control.

Realizing that the changing racial composition of the City threatened, in conjunction with the deplorable state of inner-city schools, to force CUNY in the not-too-distant future to revise its enrollment projections downwards, Bowker immediately set out to increase minority representation. Yet if increasing the number of minority youths at CUNY promised to accomplish the crucial objective of bringing the Black and Puerto Rican communities into CUNY coalition, the way in which this was being done threatened to alienate the City University's still crucial white ethnic constituency. Bitter conflict ensued over the pace of change; for many members of the increasingly militant minority population, it was too slow whereas for many white ethnics, it was too fast. Trying desperately to keep both Blacks and white ethnics in the pro-CUNY coalition via a combination of special programs for minorities and an increased number of places in the freshman class, Bowker seemed by 1968 in imminent danger of losing them both.

In this content, the seizure of the South Campus at City College presented Bowker with an opportunity to capitalize upon widespread fear of racial insurrection to break an admission stalemate between Blacks and Jews that was,
in the menace it posed to the very core of the CUNY coalition, threatening vital organizational interests. In attempting to realize his long-cherished objective of opening the University to all the City's high school graduates, Bowker realized that he had at his disposal a valuable resource in the specter of a race riot. That he did not hesitate to use it is demonstrated by his testimony (1969) before the New York State Legislature:

"In 1967 the nation was swept by wave after wave of riot and destruction in the streets of our cities. In 1968 the scene of action -- of dissension and disruption -- shifted from the streets of the cities to the campuses of the colleges and universities of our country.

The City University endured much less than many other colleges in the nation, but we had our share. And we could see, if we chose to look, that unless we moved to break down or at least to diminish the discriminatory barriers of our selective admissions systems, we would be stoking up explosive forces which we might not be able to contain.

Thus, Bowker was, in a sense, able to use the mobilization of the City's Blacks and Puerto Rican masses to realize an objective that had hitherto eluded him: the virtually immediate adoption of a policy of universal access to CUNY.

The adoption of open admissions not only meant that the increasingly divisive battles over places in the freshman class would come to an end; it also meant that the University would be provided with resources on a scale previously unimaginable. And, in fact, between 1968-1969, the year in which open admissions was adopted, and 1972-1973, the third year in which open admissions was in effect, the University budget rocketed from 198.2 million dollars to 439.8 million dollars (see Figure 1).

Above all, however, open admissions constituted a solution to a distinctively political problem faced by the City University. A public institution that was basically failing to serve the Black and Puerto Rican population at a time when it could no longer afford to do so, CUNY had little choice but to find a way to incorporate the City's minorities into the coalition of groups supporting it without at the same time alienating its traditional
City University of New York Funding

Fiscal Years 1968-69 thru 1974-75
Source: City University Archives

Total Funding In Millions

<table>
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<th>Fiscal Year*</th>
<th>67-68</th>
<th>68-69</th>
<th>69-70</th>
<th>70-71</th>
<th>71-72</th>
<th>72-73</th>
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<tr>
<td>74-75</td>
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<td>1000</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>1150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Fiscal Year begins July 1st in the years mentioned above and ends on June 30th of the following year.

(---) Dotted line signifies constant dollars controlled for inflation.
(-----) Dotted line signifies actual dollar amounts for said.
constituencies. Open admissions--an ingenious solution that at once served vital organizational and public interests--was the result.
Footnotes

1. This figure is even more remarkable when one considers that the disadvantaged are overrepresented among New York City high school graduates; thus, whereas only 43 percent of high school graduates nationwide came from families which in 1970 earned under $10,000 a year, at least 60 percent of high school graduates in New York City came from such families (Trimberger, 1973:33).

2. For admission into a transfer program at a community college in the early 1960's, students were required to have taken the same courses that had to be taken for entry into a senior college and to have obtained a 77.5 grade average. Requirements for entry into career programs were somewhat more flexible, but records for this period show that almost all matriculated students at community college--career as well as transfer students--had received academic diplomas in high school (Gordon, 1975:91).

3. In attempting to classify various ethnic groups according to their "college-going propensity," the Committee was uncertain whether Puerto Ricans should be placed with whites or non-whites (Holy, 1962:93).

4. The general tenor of Rosenberg's traditional and unimaginative chairmanship of the Board of Higher Education from 1957 to 1966 is well described in Gordon (1975). On Rosenberg's clash with--and ultimate defeat by--Bowker, see as well Weschler (1977:265-274).

5. Gorelick (1975), in a study of City College (CUNY) during the 1880-1924 period, has unearthed some interesting new evidence concerning CCNY's famous role as a ladder of social mobility for immigrants. First, Gorelick argues, Jewish mobility, especially in the first generation, tended to bypass the credential system altogether and to occur via success in the world of small business. Second, she points out, at no time during the first decades of this century did more than a tiny fraction of Jewish immigrant youth ever gain entry to City College. And finally, Gorelick claims that Jewish students at CCNY, while hardly affluent, were in fact from the more privileged strata of Jewish working class.

6. While no exact figures are available, all analysts agree that the number of Jews residing in New York City, long estimated at approximately 2,000,000 (Glazer and Moyniken, 1970), had declined significantly by 1960. By 1979, according to the American Jewish Year Book, only 1,228,000 Jews remained in New York City, with an additional 605,000 living in Nassau and Suffolk counties and 165,000 more residing in Westchester.

7. It should be noted that the non-white category in this table does not include Hispanics.

8. These two objectives, it is worth noting, were seen by Bowker (1963:8) as complementary, for it was precisely the children of the "newer migrations" (i.e. Blacks and Puerto Ricans) who were expected to "rise" to fill the growing number of jobs requiring two, but not four, years of college.
9. This figure is based on estimates provided by Holy et al. (1962:99).

10. In reality, the "grade-point average" used as a shorthand for admission to CUNY was a composite score consisting of high-school average and scores on the SAT (converted to a scale similar to high-school averages).

11. From the Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Higher Education of August 1, 1978.

12. For an interesting brief history of the use of quotas by elite colleges to restrict the number of Jewish students, see Steinberg (1971). See also Weschler (1977) and Synnott (1979).

13. Academic "merit" is not, of course, randomly distributed in New York City (or, for that matter, anywhere else). Among 1970 high school graduates, for example, 49.6 percent of white students, but only 16.1 percent of the Black students had GPA's over 80 (Birnbaum and Goldman, 1971:59). Since income is also highly correlated with grades in New York City and since Jews are among the more affluent of the white ethnic groups (see Glazer and Moynihan, 1970), it would seem fair to infer that the gap between Jewish and minority-group grades was considerably greater than the gap between white and minority-group grades. Further evidence for this inference is provided by the very fact that Jews were much more likely than Catholics to be eligible for senior-college entrance in the period prior to open admissions (see Glazer, 1973).

14. For years, the City College had been a virtual preserve of the City's large Jewish population; indeed, from the early part of the century until the 1960's, Jewish students constituted between 80 and 95 percent of CCNY's graduates (Glazer, 1973:76). By 1969, their numbers had doubtless diminished, but they were probably still a clear majority of the student body.

15. Predominantly upper-middle class, many of them employed by the City's large corporations or by the firms that serviced these large corporations, the reform Democrats would not have their interests directly encroached upon by the entrance of the poor into the political system (David, 1971:50). This was not the case, however, with the middle- and lower-middle class bureaucrats whose agencies the reformist Lindsay wished to rationalize. Indeed, according to Martin Shefter (1977:106-107), Lindsay's alliance with the blacks was doubly useful because it "could be used to legitimize the administration's efforts to seize control of the [union-dominated] bureaucracy" and because it "provided the administration with shock troops with which to attack the bureaucracy from below.

16. See also the figures on income presented in Hacker (1975:39-42).

17. Gittell (1971:149), who has written a full-length study of the conflict over community control, notes that "the decentralization alliance united the city's upper class, who had long despised the school system and long been leaders in the school reform movements, with the city's underclass, who had, as clients, little faith in the schools." In cementing this alliance, the funds provided to community groups by upper-class dominated foundations played an especially critical role.
18. It would be a mistake, however, to infer from this that the City's Jewish population was united behind the teachers' union. For here, too, the Jewish community was split along class lines. Nathan Glazer's (1973: 89) trenchant characterization of the situation may not be far off: "More prosperous Jews, for whom being a schoolteacher was not a big thing, and younger, more radical Jews supported the community control forces against the working-class and middle-class Jews and against the official Jewish organizations, which on the whole supported the teachers, the teachers' union, and due process." For corroborative evidence, see Harris and Swanson (1970: 143).


20. Fearful of offending the black community, Lindsay had first declined to comment upon the dual admissions scheme, saying that he needed "an opportunity to review it in detail" (New York Times, May 26, 1969). Sensing the outrage of the City's white population, however, on May 27 Lindsay stated in reference to the agreement reached between the CCNY administration and the demonstrating students: "Having examined it, I believe it is a quota system and I am opposed to it" (New York Times, May 28, 1969). Of all the candidates for the mayoralty, only Norman Mailer favored it, stating that "we have to take a chance on it and learn" (New York Times, May 26, 1969).


22. It should be noted, however, that Rosen never names this source; caution is therefore called for in assigning weight to this particular statement.

23. Interview with Timothy Healy conducted on October 23, 1978.

24. From the Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Higher Education on May 4, 1969.


26. In view of the general tendency of university faculties to favor the maintenance of traditional academic standards and admissions criteria, the liberalism of the CUNY faculty is particularly noteworthy. In February 1969--well before the South Campus seizure--the City University Faculty Senate actually criticized the Board for not carrying its reforms far enough. The problem with these reforms, said its report, "is not that they would admit large numbers of students with educational deficiencies, but rather that they largely ignore the necessity for concomitant changes in the colleges, to meet the needs of these students" (The University Senate, 1969: 9). Further evidence of the liberalism of the CUNY faculty is provided by the results of interviews conducted in 1971; at that time, a year after open admissions went into effect, 87 percent of the faculty members in CUNY senior colleges agreed with the statement that "open admissions is a good idea because it equalizes opportunities for higher education (Rossmann, 1975: 126). One possible source of this unusual degree of support for extending
educational opportunities to minorities may reside in the predominantly Jewish character of the CUNY faculty; according to a 1969 national survey (Ladd and Lipset, 1975: 160) Jews were the only religious group to report a majority agreeing with the statement, "more minority undergraduates should be admitted even if a "relegation" of regular academic standards is required" (53 percent among Jews vs. 40 percent among Catholics and 38 percent among Protestants). At the same time, however, it should be noted that support for open admissions was far from unanimous among City University faculty members and that, in fact, some of the leading citywide spokesman for the opposition were professors at CUNY.

27. Interview with Board of Higher Education Vice-Chairman Francis Keppel conducted on December 11, 1978.


29. From the Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Board of Higher Education on June 16, 1969.

30. This conclusion is based on interviews conducted with Albert Bowker, Julius Edelstein, Joseph Meng, and Timothy Healy.

31. On the opposition of the Jewish Defense League and the Queens Jewish Community Council to open admissions, see the Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Board of Higher Education of June 16, 1969.

32. By a remarkable coincidence, the seizure of the South Campus at CCNY occurred on April 22--just three days prior to the beginning of the data gathering.

33. For an illuminating discussion of the role played by education in the strategies of class reproduction of various social groups, see Bourdieu et al. (1973).

34. Perhaps themselves susceptible to the myth of "Jewish intellectualism" (see Steinberg, 1974), leaders of those Jewish organizations most closely linked to the Jewish lower-middle and working class seem never to have considered the plausibility that Jews, too, might benefit from open admissions. There is a certain irony in this, for enrollment figures during 1970, the first year of open admissions, demonstrated that there were far more low-achieving Jewish students than anyone had imagined. Indeed Jews were the second largest beneficiaries of open admissions (see table 6). False consciousness, it seems, knows the boundaries of neither class nor ethnicity.

35. According to Bellush (1971: 127), a similar split within the Jewish community between "grass-roots" and "city-wide" leaders occurred over housing policy. And, as was indicated earlier, class cleavages among Jews were also visible over the issues of the Civilian Review Board and community control.

36. It is crucial to remember in this regard that the feeling was widespread at the time that New York City was long "overdue" for a riot, and that only the reformist policies of the Lindsay administration--and at times only the personal intervention of the Mayor himself--had kept the ghettos calm at a time when seemingly less volatile communities in other cities had gone up in flames.
37. This was, in fact, a major theme of every CUNY Master Plan since Bowker took office.

38. The screening panel was headed by Alan Pifer, President of the Carnegie Corporation, a graduate of Groton and Harvard and a core member of the upper-class Protestant status groups that played such an important role in the reformist politics of New York City during this period. For discussions of the character and functions of the screening panel see Gordon (1975).

39. For a lucid account of the struggle between Chancellor Bowker and the Board chaired by Gustave Rosenberg, see Wechsler (1977: 268-274).

40. See Hodgson (1976) for an incisive discussion of the nature of this alliance.

41. Porter Chandler, Chairman of the twenty-member Board, was a graduate of St. Marks and Harvard, and had attended Oxford University before attending Harvard Law School and going on to a career as a prominent Wall Street lawyer. Francis Keppel, was a graduate of Groton and Harvard, and a member of the Cosmos and Century Clubs. Both are listed in the Social Register, the standard indicator of membership in the upper-class used by social scientists.

42. Interview with Francis Keppel conducted on December 11, 1978.

43. Paley's efficacy as a liaison between the City University and the State Legislature was mentioned in interviews by Juluis Edelstein, Francis Keppel, and Timothy Healy.

44. Interview with Hanry Paley conducted on October 30, 1978.

45. Interview with Peter Goldmarls conducted on October 24, 1978.

46. Interview with juluis Edelstein conducted on December 29, 1978.

47. Henry Paley, who had been lobbying in Albany for CUNY prior to the crisis over open admissions, expressed certainty that the University would have been unable to obtain the resources it ultimately succeeded in getting in the absence of the sense of acute urgency produced in 1969 by the events at City College and their aftermath. As he put it, "Nobody asks how much the fire engine is going to cost when the fire's in progress. Get the fire engine there, and put the goddam thing out or it's going to spread!"
References


Healy, Timothy S. "Will Everyman Destroy the University?" *Saturday Review* 20 (décembre 1969).


The University Senate, Report of the Special Joint Committee on Admissions New York, CUNY, 1969.

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