A comparative analysis of the process by which conflicting interests are implemented in the higher education systems of the United States, England, Sweden, and France is presented. Attention is also directed to differentiation in these systems, and to the systems' receptiveness to such differentiation (i.e., splitting up existing functions, or adopting new, distinct roles for higher education). Although focus was on the varied roles of the state with respect to differentiation, consideration was given to the power relations of groups and the ways in which particular systems promoted the access of certain groups to the policy-making process. Implementation of the sometimes conflicting interests of social justice, competence, academic freedom, autonomy, or accountability is basically a matter of relations between the higher education system and society. The key to the flexibility of the system, to its receptiveness to differentiation, appears to be the balance of the relationship (or the power differential) between the academic profession and the laity. In addition, the commitment of the academic profession to challenging interest interpretations and emphases introduced from outside the higher education system is important. The contrasting cases of Sweden and France reveal that state intervention is sometimes necessary to ensure the responsiveness of higher education to market demands. A strong legislative branch in government seems to be especially conducive to the openness of the system to access by lay groups, particularly in the policy-making realm. (SW)
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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

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Introduction

Social justice. Competence. Academic freedom. Autonomy or accountability. Decentralization or centralization. These are major interests at stake in national systems of higher education throughout the world. And within each system trade-offs are effected between these interests. An overriding emphasis on one interest often interferes with the pursuit and realization of other interests. What ensues is a comparative study of the process by which conflicting interests are implemented in the higher education systems of the United States, England, Sweden, and France.

In examining the process that leads to the effecting of certain trade-offs we will relate the important variables that emerge to the "receptiveness" of the system to a particular sort of innovation, functional differentiation. Smelser (1959:2) defines such differentiation as "a process whereby one social role or organization ... differentiates into two or more roles or organizations ... The new social units are structurally distinct from each other, but taken together are functionally equivalent to the original unit." In higher education this could apply to the differentiation of the teaching and research
functions into structurally distinct institutions. Indeed we find such a separation in France, where there are research institutes (with their own research staffs), distinct from the universities and grandes écoles in which undergraduate and graduate teaching takes place.

Examples of potential dimensions of differentiation are legion, but we need not detail them here. What is important is to distinguish between a general notion of change or dynamism, and this specific concept of functional differentiation and the receptiveness of higher education systems to it. A system could experience change which would have virtually no impact in terms of promoting functional differentiation. Various curricular additions would constitute this sort of change: e.g., the development of additional methodology courses in graduate departments of social sciences, or additional undergraduate courses within existing disciplines.¹

Moreover, a system could be characterized by its dynamism yet not be realizing increased functional differentiation. While dynamism might exist within the system at the individual institutional level, there might be convergence at the level of the system as a whole. For instance, many state colleges in the United States seek to upgrade their standing by offering more advanced programs and degrees. And in seeking institutional upward mobility they tend to emulate existing elite institutions. A system in which such "academic drift" is occurring is comprised of dynamic institutions, but it is if anything becoming less differentiated.

Of course, the reverse can hold as well. A system might be highly differentiated and yet be stagnant. When institutions', or sectors', distinct functions are fixed there is likely to be little if any dynamism at this level. Neil Smelser (1974) describes just such a system in examining the
three-tiered, functionally differentiated California system established by the state's 1960 Master Plan. Recognizing this latter possibility we concern ourselves not simply with the system's degree of differentiation, but with its receptiveness to further differentiation as well.

Clearly, our interest is in differentiation in terms of splitting up existing functions, or adopting new, distinct roles for higher education, and setting up distinct institutions geared to these. And we are adopting a systemic focus, considering differentiation within the system as a whole rather than the condition of individual institutions. It is important to recognize not just the scale and type of innovation we are concerned with, but the scale of our unit of analysis as well.

How does this relate to the five interests delineated above? Shifting interpretations of these five interests, and shifting emphases on certain of them, contributes to functional differentiation, and even to the system's adoption of new functions (e.g., redressing social injustice). So in looking at the process by which these interests are defined, and by which trade-offs are effected between them, we are looking to discover what social structures, forces, and or groups are facilitative of, or are impediments to, functional differentiation.

And what might such a focus hope to contribute to the literature? Well, for one thing it can redirect attention to human actors in the system, balancing what has been a principal focus on structural characteristics of higher education systems. The five national interests have diverse meanings and interpretations, depending on what individual or group of individuals are defining, specifying, and operationalizing the interests. The very denotation of something as a national interest in higher education indicates that persons
are committed to and acting upon a particular interpretation of that interest as a value to be embodied within or addressed by the higher education system. And while there may appear to be some unavoidable conflicts between these interests, and trade-offs to be effected between them, as Ralph Turner (1961) pointed out in the case of value conflict, we must distinguish between logical incompatibility and incompatibility in application. This is especially important in comparative work if we are to understand the process of social action and struggle by which trade-offs are effected. Thus, we turn to the particular interpretations and applications that are advanced by actors.

In so doing we alert ourselves to the following. First, equal importance is not generally attached to these five interests. Rather, they are organized in hierarchies. Second, people often reconcile objectively conflicting values by maintaining that they apply only to certain situations or institutional sectors, or that when in conflict one is more applicable than the other.

We need also recognize that the diversity of interests' meanings may sometimes correspond at a general level to national differences. The very parameters of these interest definitions may be constrained by national conditions. It is an awareness of this which led us to label the five national interests as we have. Competence is perhaps more familiarly referred to as excellence. We prefer the term competence, as it is more inclusive and less value laden than the concept of excellence, which tends to connote a particular sort of excellence (i.e., academic excellence). The same may be said of social justice, used instead of the common term equality. It is more inclusive of the two, and is less likely to be misinterpreted.
in terms of nation-specific connotations. The first three interests are pretty common to the higher education literature.

The latter ones are also fairly common, but somewhat problematic. First, there is possible confusion of dimensions of systemic governance (the relation between higher education and external society) versus the internal organizational structure of systems. Autonomy/accountability refers to system-society questions of political governance: viz., how and to what degree are institutions and systems of higher education autonomously controlled by academics, and how, and to what extent, are they accountable to external lay officials and bodies. Decentralization/centralization, on the other hand, refers to the internal structure of higher education. This continuum relates to what Clark (forthcoming) has denoted (horizontal) sectors and (vertical) hierarchies, as well as to how these are administered - viz., centrally or in decentralized fashion.

The second point of potential confusion is that autonomy and accountability are actually two ends of one continuum, as are decentralization and centralization. Some nations, or groups, will tend to positively value one end of each of these continuums while others will positively value the opposite ends. To look at just one end of the continuums would be to stress the interests dominant in a certain country or within a certain group. Taken alone these interests are simply not inclusive enough. So the continuum is employed.

Group versus structural focus. We suggest that the key to understanding functional differentiation in systems of higher education lies in examining the nature, belief systems, and power of, and the relationships and struggles between, the various groups which have input (either direct or
indirect) into systems of higher education. Such a focus gets us beyond classifying and explaining systems of higher education principally in terms of their public or private nature, in terms of whether they are highly centralized "State-controlled," or decentralized "market driven," systems. One may take the traditional view very much akin to laissez-faire economics that innovation and responsiveness is the result of the uninhibited operation of natural market forces, and that systems of higher education administered by centralized State bureaucracies are rigid and inflexible. Or one may stress the import of strong and consistent State involvement in the planning and implementation of educational policy, as have some English authors (see Burgess and Pratt, 1970, 1971; and Donaldson, 1975). But in either case the focus tends to be on rather broad and vague conceptualizations of States and markets and how they work. We remain suspended at the structural level, examining systems in terms of the prevalence of one sort of structure versus another, and identifying the correlates of systems characterized by these structures (whether in terms of their efficiency, the effects on academic freedom, their ability to provide mass higher education, or the quality of their output). At some point we need to detail just how these structures operate, to examine more carefully the social processes and forces operative within them. And to do so we need to incorporate an analysis of the human actors in these structures.

Such a focus encourages us to search for precisely the sort of phenomena Burton Clark (1977) discovered in Italy. Examining what at first glance appeared to be a highly bureaucratized, seemingly State-controlled system of higher education, Clark uncovered a persistent profes-
sorial oligarchy that ruled the system. Italian professors had effectively parlayed local power into national power, establishing themselves as a stronger force than bureaucrats or non-academic politicians. They had, as Clark describes elsewhere (1978; forthcoming), coopted the state machinery, which was in his words a "mock bureaucracy" behind which senior professors have had primary power. And, as he points out, "state systems may be as much guilded as bureaucratized, professionalized, or politicized. The observer will not know how much until he looks behind the bureaucratic mask" (forthcoming, Chapter 5). We might add that a failure to look at the groups behind the mask can lead one astray when attempting to draw "lessons" from the experiences and problems of other national systems of higher education.

To propose a focus on specific groups rather than principally on structures is not to deny the importance of structure. It is quite clear, for instance, that the nature of the political process (how policy is formulated and implemented) is important. It profoundly affects the interests that are advanced and trade-offs that are effected within the State. For example, the nature of external group involvement in Sweden - i.e., representation of corporatist groups like trade unions and business associations in consultative decision making - makes for the involvement of groups very different than those which have input in the United States or England. In a similar vein, the existence of local administration or implementation of broad but somewhat flexible directives - as in England in contrast to France, at least recently - promotes the input of certain groups, and thus the definition of interests in a certain fashion.

The importance of these political structures, then, is the influence they have on what groups have access to policy making and implementation.
But this influence can be limited and indeterminate. The very same groups can sometimes effect the same degree of influence through vastly different processes and structures.

In discussing structures, however, we must not limit ourselves to political institutions and processes. In fact, our concentration on groups naturally promotes a focus on social structure (classes and status groups) and the very structure of the academic profession. It is very similar sorts of concerns that Ben-David and Zloczower (1962) brought to their study of "Universities and Academic Systems in Modern Societies." In this investigation they related the innovativeness and functional variety of national systems of higher education to the extent of centralization of universities (e.g. in Paris or Oxbridge), and to the relationship of the universities to the different classes of society. As shall become evident, we share the concern with the centralization of academic life. And, though we cannot adequately develop the point here, we share a focus on social groups, though we would attend less the purely material conditions of these classes than to the belief systems (which are related but not derivative of material conditions) which guided their actions. Finally, it is critical that Ben-David and Zloczower believed that competition was the key factor facilitating change, but that this had more to do with the "openness" of society - viz, of the class structure - than with the existence of a strong central State. Though we look to the advancement of new interpretations of national interests, and shifting emphases on certain of them, rather than to competition, the same point holds for us. "Openness" has more to do with the social structure than with the existence of a strong central State.

A group focus can therefore refine our understanding of State control
(and its possible effects), and it can also enable more precise treatment of demand forces, or the "market." This has long been the bane of market competition theories. It is not only that there are many markets, and that there are several types of market systems (see Lindblom, 1977). Such models have failed to detail exactly how the market mechanism operates. They have simply assumed that it works. Unfortunately, the "unseen hand" remains as yet not only unseen, but unexamined as well. Albert Hirshman (1970) makes just this criticism of market models with respect to the precise modus operandi of what he refers to as the consumer's "exit option." And, as noted above, Ben-David and Zloczower, among others, have indicated that competition may not be the panacea mechanism some have thought, since even in the absence of "artificial" State interference it sometimes is not operative. An adequate competition or market model must develop some study of social action, and of power distribution between "the market forces." We suggest that attention needs to be directed to specific groups: to the particular sorts of demands they articulate, as well as to the ways groups within institutions "reacting" or "responding" to these demands are selectively attentive to them and even distort them. And we need to consider influences that might affect "consumer" decisions (in the economy this would include the effects of advertising; in higher education it would include the prestige and achievement cultures children internalize as they pass through the school's system).

Propositions derived from a comparative view. On the basis of a review of developments within the American, English, Swedish, and French systems of higher education in the past few decades, and of the process
by which conflicting interests have been implemented, we submit the following propositions for consideration. (I) So-called State-controlled systems are sometimes those most "market-driven." (II) The State has often initiated and preserved functional differentiation; and yet it has also contributed to and even encouraged "academic drift," and it may be said under certain circumstances to constitute a major obstacle to further differentiation. (III) In the course of examining material from which the above propositions were generated we find two factors integrally related to differentiation: (a) the power of the academic profession; and (b) the openness of the political system to access by lay groups - specifically, the stronger the legislative branch, the more access the lay population has. We suggest that struggles in higher education are not so much between government officials and the academy, as between the laity and the profession (viz., the academy). The State is often simply the arena in which this struggle is played out. Thus (c) the receptiveness of the higher education system to differentiation will largely be an inverse function of the power differential between the laity and the academic profession.

The remainder of the paper is organized into sections corresponding to these propositions. Within each of these sections discussion of the process by which interests are implemented will be discussed.

HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE "MARKET"

In examining whether State-controlled systems can be as "market-driven" as systems characterized by relatively less State control a few initial points are worthy of note. First, we must specify the kind of market and demand being considered. Generally, reference is to either student demand
or labor market demand. Yet it could also be to the cultural and political demands and needs of the nation, or even of the local region or state. These markets and demands do not necessarily overlap or correspond. For instance, Lex Donaldson (1975) decries the subjugation of polytechnic planning in England to short-term student demand. According to him, the demands of the local area, the country and even of employers, are sacrificed to student demand. Responsiveness to student demand may actually counteract and undermine the system's responsiveness to and "fit" with the labor market. An example is students' continued demand for liberal arts education even after the labor market demand for these kind of graduates has declined. This is one factor contributing to college graduate unemployment, a problem which now plagues the United States, England, and France.

A second consideration is that market responsiveness varies within systems of higher education as well as between them. Different sectors within the same system can be differentially responsive to different markets. In the United States community colleges are generally more responsive than universities both to student and local labor market demand. They are, largely, demand driven institutions. So much so that it may be said that it is local communities which have put the "community" in community colleges (which formerly were junior colleges). Two recent articles in the Journal of Higher Education (see Zoglin, 1981; and Zusman, 1978) demonstrate the ways in which members of local communities have impacted on that institution in significant ways, in terms of the colleges' evolution, innovation within it, and maintenance of certain programs and functions even in times of retrenchment. Zoglin in particular takes some important steps in narrowing
down and refining the conceptions of "market" and "responsiveness," delineating various constituencies within the community as well as within the institution, groups which have a differential impact on different segments of the community college.

Similarly, in England in recent years it tends to be the non-university institutions which are most responsive to labor markets and demands, local, regional, and national. There are those who regard this notion of the so-called "public-sector" of English higher education as being more "responsive and "relevant" as a myth of sorts. In particular, the idea that Local Educational Authority control is equated with social responsiveness can be questioned. The very nature and makeup of LEAs demands that in discussing responsiveness we identify the particular group making demands on the education institutions, and that we not confuse that demand with general and/or pure market and social demands. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that in terms of differentiation and the adoption of new functions for higher education - e.g., in the provision of various sorts of vocational and technical training - there can be little question that the public sector has been the source and the locus of such developments.

Even within the private sector of higher education in the United States there is differential responsiveness. The weaker and less prestigious institutions, particularly small liberal arts colleges, are often so dependent on tuition (and thus on enrollment) that they are student demand driven (to the point of even actively searching out potential student demand). For the most part, the more prestigious private institutions are not so dependent on and responsive to markets and demands.

It is not at all clear in this case whether responsiveness to student
demand is related to differentiation, to the type of innovation we are concerned with. In some situations it certainly has been, since it has meant reaching out to new clientele, and thus changing the character and function of higher education (the Open University, and its correlates in the U.S. - from its four "transplants" to various projects and experiments in "distance learning"). But when J.B. Lon Hefferlin (1969) correlated unstable student enrollment with much curricular change it was not at all plain whether this bore any relationship to differentiation.

However, the results of a recent survey reported by Richard R. Johnson (1978) do pose some interesting questions about the relationship between institutional prestige and potential for differentiation. In a representative sampling of about one-fifth of all higher education institutions in the U.S. two questions relevant to our purposes here were asked. (1) List the five institutions which have the most influence at the national level (i.e., asking for leading institutions in terms of prestige). (2) List the five institutions which are the most innovative (in terms of the frequency with which they generate new ideas or programs. What is fascinating is that while there was widespread agreement on the question of prestige, these same institutions were not listed as "leaders" in terms of innovation. In fact, respondents from all types of four-year institutions cited liberal arts colleges more than other types of institutions when asked about innovation. Respondents from community colleges, on the other hand, tended to cite other community colleges. This suggests that national prestige, and proclivity towards innovation may be disparate dimensions. Yet it should be noted that most of the liberal arts colleges mentioned were in the Carnegie subcategory 3.1 - labeled "selective" in admissions or "leading"
in baccalaureate origin of PhDs. Perhaps, then, being market dependent or market driven is not a correlate of innovation. What this means with respect to differentiation we can only speculate.

Private institutions in other countries (e.g., Catholic institutions and private grandes écoles in France, and the College of Business Administration in Stockholm, Sweden) are often so linked to limited constituencies that while they have been responsive to a particular group's demand, they are not necessarily responsive to broader markets and demands. This is also somewhat true of certain private colleges in the U.S. as well - e.g., women's colleges, black colleges (not all of which are private), and denominational colleges. It would probably be more accurate to characterize such institutions as being "constituency-driven" rather than "market driven."

Just these few opening remarks suggest that State-controlled systems may be as "market-driven" as those characterized by relatively little State control. In pointing to the need to specify markets and demands in terms of what they are and how they are articulated, particularly with respect to groups, it should be clear that the State might effectively serve as the instrument which articulates certain market demands. And in pointing to the differential responsiveness of different sectors within the same system it was clear that the publicly controlled institutions were sometimes the most responsive. Accountability may have an important part to play.

In considering accountability we stress that it should not be confused or equated with centralization, or with a strong centralized State. As we relate the cases of Sweden and France (and even briefly the U.S.) it will become clear why such equations are misleading.
Accountability. Robert Berdahl's (1971) work on state coordinating agencies in the United States substantiates the view that accountability bears an important relation to responsiveness even in a system believed to be marked by the extent to which it is "market-driven." Three types of state coordination are detailed by Berdahl: voluntary coordination; statewide coordinating boards; and single governing boards. While the latter two provide for public representation through external, lay membership, the first type involves only institutional members. Berdahl notes the often-stagnating effect of voluntary coordination, citing Glenny's (1976) statement that voluntary coordination tends to preserve the status quo. He concludes that it is those coordinating boards with public majorities which are most capable of taking a fresh look at higher education.

Perhaps no better example of institutionalized accountability in higher education exists than in Sweden. A substantial measure of accountability has long characterized Swedish higher education. Premfors and Ostergren (1978) state that universities and colleges have there more than elsewhere been regarded as another branch of administration. And in comparing Sweden to France and the United Kingdom, Premfors (1980) indicates that the major corporatist interest organizations of labor and capital were significantly more involved in higher education politics in Sweden. This includes in particular the LO (blue collar workers), the TCO (white collar workers, mostly salaried), and the SAF (employers). This relatively recent development - dating back to 1965 - makes for a far broader degree of public accountability, extending it beyond the confines of the central bureaucracy. As Dietrich Goldschmidt (1978b) maintains, no other industrialized country accords such weight to nonacademic interests in academic affairs.
Thus, in Sweden the process by which national interests in higher education are defined and traded-off between incorporates lay involvement in the form of lay corporativist groups. Such lay input is a regular and legitimate part of the consultation and planning process.

The recent trends towards decentralization and increased participation have, if anything, made for a greater degree of accountability. In a system that was once characterized by a top-bottom model of power (i.e., central government and professoriate) in which professors had a great deal of power and influence, the shift towards decentralization and increased external representation on institutional decision making bodies has decreased the power of academics. Corporativist groups were already represented on the governing board of the central agency for higher education. Reforms in 1969 and 1977 extended their representation to local and regional boards. The institutional governance reforms of 1969 further diffused power within institutions among a broader set of interests. Decentralizing authority to regional and institutional levels in 1977 further increased non-academic representation, this time on the newly empowered governing bodies.

Interestingly, what Swedish academics fear is decentralization, not centralization. Within the centralized system they were able to maintain their influence. Indeed, Premfors and Ostergren (1978) go so far as to say that at one time central administrators were merely auxiliaries to academics. As Pederson and Hunter (1980:25) state: "(S)cholars may have had more direct control over policies under the old regime because they could seek to persuade a single centralized authority of the soundness of a particular approach."
faculties and the central administration which provided professors with persuasive control over decision making. It is certainly revealing that the 1964 reforms, which strengthened the bureaucracy to improve efficiency, did not generate significant opposition among academics. In fact, the commission which proposed the measures consisted of professors as well as bureaucrats.

The French system provides an interesting, and somewhat complicated, contrast. It is a contrast which illustrates quite nicely the distinction between accountability and centralization (though clearly the Swedish system is still considerably more centralized than either the American or the English system).

Dietrich Goldschmidt (1978a) denotes the French system of higher education "administrative centralism," characterizing it as the most centralized national administration. But others have pointed to the fragmentation minus integration. For as Alan Bienayme (1978: Introduction) states, in indicating that the French system is not as centralized as it seems, "In France, the theory of how decision making should occur corresponds only weakly to the reality."

Much of this fragmentation is grounded in French higher education's diversified internal structure, a direct contrast to the Swedish trend towards a comprehensive system of higher education. So, although John Van de Graaff and Dorotea Furth (1978:56) describe French central ministry with extensive powers, they go on to state:

However, the coordination of policy for higher education as a whole remained difficult, for the (university) faculties, the IUTs (University Institutes of Technology), and the CNRS (National Center for Scientific Research) were all under distinct
bureaucratic divisions of the education ministry, to say nothing of the grandes écoles which come under other ministries.

Some grandes écoles, for instance, are administered by the Education ministry. Others are administered by ministries as diverse as Defense, Industry, and Agriculture.

The situation is further complicated by the existence of three national advisory bodies: the Consulting Committee of the Universities (CCU), the National Council of Higher Education and Research (CNESER), and the President's Conference. Full professors exercise considerable influence on high-level decision making via the first two bodies.

Despite this fragmentation, the French system is still more centralized than the Swedish when it comes to the authority of individual institutions vis-a-vis the central administration. Over the past decade and a half France has experienced a trend towards decentralization, but the implementation of these reforms, and the realization of this goal falls far short of the Swedish condition.

While decentralization has not proceeded as far in France as in Sweden, the same holds true with respect to efforts to promote increased participation - and thus increased accountability. The 1968 Orientation Act for Higher Education aimed to broaden participation in governance (thereby increasing accountability) and to promote decentralization by strengthening the universities vis-a-vis the central administration.¹⁸ But these reforms have been regarded by most as a relative failure, at least if evaluated in terms of their stated goals. In fact, Michelle Patterson, in answer to the question she posed of, "French University Reform: Renaissance or Restoration?", concluded, "restoration." Even Ladislav Cerych (1980), who has maintained
that in some respects the 1968 law was a "watershed" for French higher education, acknowledges that in terms of the law's original goals it has been virtually a complete failure. The universities have not attained a significant measure of independence vis-a-vis the central administration, and participation in governance has not been significantly increased.\footnote{19}

It is true, as Premfors (1980) points out, that top organizations of labor and business have permanent representation on the National Council of Higher Education and Research (CNESER), and that they have been consulted with respect to higher education on an ad hoc basis. But academics have the power in this body. And, as Premfors (1980:49) also notes in comparing Sweden with France, "the Swedish pattern implies a relatively greater role for the parliamentary arena and for the top organizations of the economy, in particular the labor unions."

External involvement in France is less regularized, and perhaps less legitimate than in Sweden. In attempting to explain this, Premfors stresses the high level of conflict and politicization characterizing the implementation process in France, phenomena which in his words (1970:89) "furnished French governments and their supporters in academia with a strong rationale for a conservative interpretation of the 1968 reform." The increased activity of so-called "extreme" groups provides the government with a justification for increasing centralization and limiting participation.

We must remind ourselves, in considering recent reform efforts in France, "that most of them, like the 1968 Orientation Act, did not apply to the grandes ecoles, the most prestigious institutions of French higher education. The internal administration structure of the grandes ecoles has not in recent years been subjected to efforts at promoting decentralization..."
and broadening participation.

What we find in France relative to Sweden, then, is a more centralized system in many respects, but one which is also characterized by less accountability. This underscores our point about the importance of distinguishing between the two dimensions. It also alerts us to the possibility that centralization is not necessarily a correlate of a high degree of accountability.

In ensuing sections we examine what the results of these contrasting situations in France and Sweden are, as well as why they exist.

"Competence" and the market in Sweden. In asserting that the Swedish system of higher education is more accountable than the French we are not simply referring to fiscal accountability to a central state, but rather are speaking of the extent to which lay interests are regularly involved in higher education policy making. Accountability is a matter of these groups influencing the evaluation and definition of a higher education system's "competence." It is a question of whether and to what extent lay interests play a part in determining the broad functions and purposes of higher education, and the populations it should serve (all of which are encompassed in determining the national interest of a higher system's competence). We are thus employing a notion of accountability somewhat similar to what Dan Levy (1980) has denoted "academic" accountability, to be distinguished from notions of financial and what Berdahl (1971) has denoted "procedural" autonomy and accountability.

What is concomitant with this broad accountability in Sweden? A system which, though it must be characterized as a State-controlled system in current terminology, is "market driven" in terms of the labor market. And we suggest
that it is the existence of broad accountability which contributes to this. Including the input of lay groups profoundly influences the definition of the national interest of competence. In Sweden there is a tendency among the lay groups to define the higher education system's competence in terms of its "product's" (i.e., graduates) "fit" with labor market needs. This is probably compounded by the fact that lay group involvement in Sweden is through corporativist groups organized on the basis of occupation—viz., unions representing blue-collar workers, white collar workers, employers, and even professionals. This might promote a workforce orientation to higher education. At any rate, competence is specified and operationalized in such a way that we might label it "vocational" competence.

While most acknowledge that Sweden is unsurpassed in its pursuit of social justice in higher education, as Premfors and Ostergren (1978) indicate, it also stands out in terms of its demand that all higher education should aim at teaching students some kind of vocational skills. The Swedish system is, as Goldschmidt (1978b:80) states, "more strongly oriented than in other nations toward the requirements of the labour market."

The so-called U68 reforms, which focused exclusively on undergraduate education are a perfect example. As a result of the reform measures the undergraduate curriculum is now organized around study programs rather than disciplines. There are close to one hundred of these programs grouped in five sectors determined by reference to the structure of the labor market (see Pedersen and Hunter, 1980). The system's degree of accountability, and the centrality of labor market concerns in the definition of competence, are quite plain in the make-up of the program committees to which the study programs are subject. These committees are comprised of one-third teachers,
one-third students, and one-third representatives from the occupational sector toward which the program is directed. National planning is also organized around (five) labor market sectors.

In terms of its linkage to the labor market, the Swedish system of higher education is "market driven" in a fashion and to an extent unparalleled in the United States, which has generally been regarded as the most market driven system of higher education in the advanced industrial world. In the case of Swedish higher education it has been the "fine-tuning" action of the State which brought about vocationalization of higher education and has promoted a close connection between workforce needs and higher education output. And it has been the involvement of lay groups in the process which has contributed to fine-tuning of this sort.

"Competence" and the market in France. In considering the case of France two initial points are worthy of note. First, the most elite sector of French higher education - the grandes ecoles - has not been subject to the reform efforts described in Sweden aimed at linking education more closely to the labor market. However, the grandes ecoles are already efficiently training the country's elite. They are suppliers of leading personnel to different vital sectors of French professional and governmental activity. And this is evident particularly in the difference between instruction in the grandes ecoles and that in the universities.26

Yet this view of the grandes ecoles must be qualified. For there are those who would argue that the grandes ecoles do not provide specialized vocational training, but rather are credentialing institutions. Ezra Suleiman (1974), for instance, found that the French higher civil service's
training and expertise were attained largely on the job. Michael Crozier (1964) reiterates this point in examining how the French educational system reinforces bureaucratic patterns of action—though his comments are relevant to the system as a whole and not just to the grandes écoles.

Of this system Crozier (1964:239) says,

> It is also bureaucratic in the content of the teaching, which is rather more abstract and divorced from actual life requirements than instruction in other industrial countries, and, finally, because it generally aims as much, or even more, at selecting people for entering definite social strata than at training them for their future productive functions.

Vocationalization of higher education in the sense in which it has been advanced in Sweden may not characterize grandes écoles education.

A second point is that in other sectors of French higher education there have been reform efforts similar to those taking place in Sweden. In fact, one of the relatively successful ones was the establishment of University Institutes of Technology, geared to provide intensive, short-cycle programs to train middle-level personnel in technical and administrative fields. But on the whole these efforts to vocationalize certain sectors of higher education, to link them more closely to the labor market, were unsuccessful. A major reason is the power of French academics: power that they successfully wielded in resisting a redefinition of the purpose and function of university education, in resisting the application of a vocational interpretation of university "competence."

French academics have been more successful than the Swedish in maintaining their power within a State-controlled system. Van de Graff and Furth (1978) describe the power structure in terms of professorial autonomy.
and ministerial authority. And while there is general agreement that in the past decade and a half power has shifted towards administrators, nevertheless the French professoriate retains relatively more power than does the Swedish professoriate. In Premfors' words:

Since it was first observed in Chapter Two that the major 'corporativist' interest organizations of labor and capital were significantly more involved in higher education politics in Sweden than in either France or the United Kingdom, this has developed into a major theme of this book. With regard to all policy dimensions, there has been a clearly identifiable relationship between ideas and interests of the LO (blue collar workers) and the TCO (white collar workers, mostly salaried) in Sweden and the formulation and contents of higher education policy. This has, in combination with a relatively greater influence of politicians and bureaucrats, meant that the role of academia has been significantly reduced in national policy-making.

An example illustrating the ability of the French professoriate to exercise their power in the realm of defining the universities' function lies in the fate of the so-called second-cycle reform of 1976. The reform was intended to promote professionally and vocationally oriented programs leading to diplomas after three and four years of university study. It also represented an attempt to bring university programs more into line with employment prospects, to develop a more adequate link between universities and the labor market. In describing this poor linkage, Roger Geiger (1977:7) says with respect to government reform efforts, "The attempt to bring university programs more into line with employment prospects - the second-cycle reform of 1976 - was more than justified; in fact, it was long overdue." To remedy this situation the diplomas to be awarded after the third and fourth years of university study were to be coherent and complete.
one year programs with definite vocational or professional ends. And one-third to one-half of the members of the "technical study groups" which would evaluate the program descriptions compiled by universities were to come from the relevant vocational area.

Geiger (1977) and Bienaymé (1978) cite a number of opposition themes to the reform. From the left came opposition to turning the university over to businessmen. This was regarded as a serious threat to academic freedom. Thus, it was not just purely academic definitions of competence and institutional purpose which underlay resistance to vocationalization. Moreover, students feared depreciation of the diplomas (especially the license), since defining them as vocational and terminal one year programs would demean their cultural prestige. And junior and senior faculty opposed the vocationalization and professionalization of the traditional curriculum, denoting and denouncing the new programs as "narrowly professional." French university academics vigorously defended traditional academic definitions of competence and institutional purpose. As Van de Graaff and Furth (1973) note, the traditional attitudes of many university teachers and students as to what higher education should be and what its "just" organization is, constitute a significant barrier to change.

In the case of the second-cycle reform university academics were relatively successful in defending their definition of competence. Despite extensive strikes, the official laws were passed. But due to some critical concessions won by professors the reform was virtually nullified. Geiger (1977:12) describes these concessions and their effect.

Foremost among these was the assurance that present programs offering fundamental training in a discipline would be automatically authorized to continue. This obliterated in one
stroke the possibility of a curricular revolution of the professionalization of the university. It consequently left no redeployable resources that could be diverted to new programs. It has also become clear that the technical study groups will be largely a window dressing, with no significant influence over the content of degree programs.

The ministerial circular of May 13, 1976 which offered the universities the possibility of retaining "existing fundamental programs" effectively revised the reform's original intention, which was to force curricular reform through reallocation of resources (since supplementary funds were not to be released to facilitate curricular changes), and allowed continuation of the status quo.

What we find in this instance is a State-controlled system which was not responsive to labor market demand. But it was not state-control which caused lack of articulation between university output and the labor market. In fact it was the State which was attempting to create a better "fit" between the two. Rather, a major impediment to the French universities' responsiveness to the labor market was the professoriate. And the student played a similar role. These academics prevailed in preventing the application of a redefinition of university function. At least in this case, blocking university responsiveness to the market impeded differentiation.

The contrasting cases of Swedish and French higher education suggest that market responsiveness is not a function of State-control or centralization of internal administration, structure, or planning, but that it is rather related to accountability as well as the power of the academic profession. They also provide some clues as to why State intervention may sometimes be necessary to promote market responsiveness. In the following section we examine this issue. We close this one with the conclusion that
State-controlled systems of higher education apparently can be the most market driven.

Hindrances to "normal" operation of the market in higher education. Market models are ultimately dependent on the operative dynamic of competition, and on the existence of a body of independent, well-informed, "rational" consumers. There are two sets of problems in applying such a model to higher education systems. The first set relate to the institutions which provide higher education, as well as to the academic professionals themselves. The second set relate to the consumers of higher education, the students.

In the economy the "bottom line" of business is basically uniform. But in higher education institutions are often competing for different things. Some institutions in some countries compete almost exclusively for students, others compete in terms of meeting labor market needs, and just about all in some sense compete in terms of prestige and quality. Inherent in the latter orientation is acceptance of certain understandings of what quality higher education is. Such understandings, or interpretations of competence, often work directly against responsiveness to various markets. And they inhibit differentiation by engendering resistance to the pursuit of other interpretations of competence. It is quite natural for businessmen to operate their enterprises in response to the market. But it is not at all natural for academic professionals within institutions of higher education to attempt to run those enterprises accordingly.

What is going on in the struggle over how responsive an institution, an institutional sector, or a system of higher education is going to be to market demands (or whether they will be responsive at all) is a struggle
over the definition of certain interests and over what trade-offs between them should and should not be made. In part, of course, it is a battle over autonomy versus accountability. But it goes beyond this to the question of how the competence of a system or institution of higher education is to be defined.

We would expect, then, that institutions, sectors, or systems of higher education in which there are independent, strong, and pervasive definitions of their purpose and function would be less responsive to market demand. Such bodies will be committed to an agenda of their own. Indeed, it is likely to be construed as a violation of the norms and values of academics and institutional leaders to allow their course to be determined by external pressures and market demand, to the fads and whimsies of the day. The more their purposes are defined by prevailing academic norms and values the less likely they are to be responsive to market demand. Prestige is likely to be associated with integration into the academic community's prevailing definitions (as well as, of course, the institution's or sector's standing in terms of their achievement, evaluated on the basis of prevailing criteria). Thus, market responsiveness is likely to be positively related to the low status of an institution or sector.

What we find in Sweden is an academic profession, particularly in the universities, largely resistant to what they regard as the vocationalization of higher education. They regard as unhealthily the domination of higher education by the labor market structure. And they decry the effect of the U68 reforms on the quality of teaching, due in part to the probable decline in research excellence (since the quality of teaching and research, as the
traditional academic maxim maintains, are so closely intertwined). In their view the recent emphasis on higher education's vocational competence has been undertaken at the expense of teaching and research competence, at the expense of quality, of academic excellence, which is the interpretation of competence they adhere to.33

The same sorts of criticisms were leveled by academics from other advanced industrial societies34 in their examination of recent Swedish educational reforms for the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1981). Their remarks revealed that it is not just a matter of protecting academic autonomy, or academic freedom, of opposing their trade-off for accountability. It is a matter of how to define competence, of what the agenda of higher education should be. Thus, while noting that in Sweden it has for years been acknowledged that the goals of the university are defined by the university community and by agencies of the State, Pedersen and Hunter (1980:61) conclude:

The university has historically served two paramount goals: the transmittal of knowledge and the nourishment of creative research. These goals are not often discussed in the political arena and there is growing evidence that specific political goals desired by a majority may only coincide in part with the traditional purposes of the university.

In their evaluation of the effects of recent reforms they repeatedly express reservations about the adverse affects they will have on "quality teaching" and "basic research." Maxims concerning the connection of teaching and research, and the need to protect disciplines and basic research, are invoked. And with respect to at least one recent trend in Swedish higher education Pedersen and Hunter (1980:52) state:

The presence of many outsiders, as well as representatives of blue-
and white-collar employees, on the governing boards of the university may not in the long run provide an atmosphere conducive to adjustments reflective of developments in the international research community.

Swedish university academics were and are clearly tied in to an international community of scholars, and to at least some of the norms and values of that academic community. These, they felt, were being violated by the U68 reforms and the resultant vocationalization of higher education. It is this independent professional identity and commitment which can inhibit higher education's responsiveness to the market.

Yet while this resistance exists in Sweden, it has thus far been more than counterbalanced by the broad accountability which marks the Swedish system. It took lay interests, working through the State, to effect major redefinitions and reinterpretations of various national interests in higher education, and thereby to promote differentiation.

Recent events in France further substantiate the view that it is often the professoriate which constitutes a principal barrier to market responsiveness. In that context this group was even relatively successful in countering State efforts to promote a certain sort of market responsiveness.

One opposition theme advanced by French university students as well as teachers highlights an additional consideration in this regard. Resistance to market responsiveness and linkage to the economy may stem not just from a commitment to a professional identity (and all that encompasses), but from a distinctive way in which academic freedom is interpreted. Recall that some of the most determined academic opponents raised the specter of the "business takeover" that would be effected through the second-cycle reform. American and not a few British observers might be inclined to dis-
miss this as an ideological response. But this ignores and obscures the fact that a "pragmatic" commitment to the virtues of linkages between business and higher education is grounded in a world-view and ideology of its own. At any rate, this notion that academic freedom is compromised by connection with and control by private interests, and characteristics of general world-views about competition, public interest, etc., are important considerations when examining the market responsiveness of institutions, sectors, and systems of higher education. It is, after all, not so much different from disdain towards vocational, training education, and applied research.

The fact that students also opposed efforts to link higher education more closely to the labor market, in Sweden as well as in France, is somewhat more difficult to understand than the resistance of academic professionals. And it brings us to a second basic problem with market models: that is, their assumption consumers are independent, well-informed, and "rational." The mechanism of competition can only operate effectively if such a body of consumers exists.

In case of prospective students we are dealing with a body of consumers which throughout most of the Western world has expressed a marked preference for "liberal arts" education. They apparently are not "rational" consumers who examine labor force forecasts and select schools and programs of study purely on that basis. At least we can say they are not clamoring for technical and vocational education, and they certainly are not inclined to make such higher education their first choice. The demand for liberal arts education is so strong that we sometimes find evidence of it among students in technically oriented institutions of higher education.
Even when it seems clear to "objective" observers that job chances are better for those who go through a more vocationalized curriculum, we find cases of students opposing curricular reform geared to these ends. The attempted second-cycle reform of French universities is a case in point. As noted earlier, this reform aimed to improve the employment prospects of university graduates by promoting an improved linkage between the university and the labor market. This was to be accomplished through the reform of course programs. The promulgation of this reform set off the largest student protests since 1968. As Bienaymé (1978) and Geiger (1977) indicate, opposition centered on a variety of themes. Students opposed reintroduction of the principle of selection (for the maîtrise); and they opposed the form of selection (by criteria other than their degree), which they felt would undermine the equality of national degrees. They also feared that the pre-professional programs would be "dead ends" which would eliminate for many the possibility of advanced studies.

A number of sociological and/or psychological factors could be introduced to explain why students sometimes act against what we believe to be their economic interests. One that might be particularly interesting for those involved in the study of educational systems would be the effects of different sorts of secondary schooling. It seems likely that to pass through a highly selective secondary system which "tracks" different sorts of students in distinct directions socializes the university bound students in such a way that they prefer certain sorts of education and adopt certain prestige hierarchies with respect to different types of education. It is not that much unlike the effects of advertising: viz., the internalization of certain tastes or desires. The pool of higher education students in some
countries may be characterized in certain respects by the same tastes (e.g., proclivity to do disciplinary work, to do "basic" research, or a distaste or disdain for vocational education). But whatever the factors are, they act to distort the operation of the market.

**Conclusion.** In examining the operation of market dynamics, then, one should not ignore the participants, either the consumers or the providers of the product. Attending to such factors in Sweden and France leads us to conclude that there is no reason to believe that institutions, sectors, or systems of higher education which are controlled by an integrated and powerful profession, which are well integrated into prevailing academic norms and values, and which are not academically accountable to a range of lay interests, will be responsive to market demands. Indeed, it apparently sometimes takes the "artificial" interference of the State (through which external forces act and impinge on the higher education system) to promote market responsiveness. This is not to say that we can point to a system where State action has created a perfect fit between market demand and higher education. But the country which has gone farthest in that direction with respect to labor market demand, and which has undertaken the most concerted effort in this regard, is Sweden. And there it has been State action which as attempted to ensure market responsiveness, and to link higher education to the labor market. Such action must sometimes override the "natural" tendencies of certain participants in the higher education arena not to operate according to market demands.

If we are to understand the responsiveness to markets and demands of institutions largely governed by academic professionals, in systems greatly influenced by academic professionals, we must first look to the very basis...
of professionalism. In addition we must look to the pervasiveness of professionalism in society, and to the extent to which academic norms and values (e.g., about what quality higher education is) are shared by prospective students, politicians, bureaucrats, employers, parents, etc.

Professionals seek to develop a monopoly over their work process, especially over the nature and definition of their work. In an excellent analysis of professionalism Magali Larson (1977) describes this process, referring to the efforts of professionals to establish "cognitive exclusiveness," or a monopoly of competence. To respond to external directives and demands as to what their work should be, to in effect operate on the basis of someone else's agenda, is to violate the most basic precepts of professionalism. Receptiveness and responsiveness to new interpretations of certain national interests - relating to what higher education's work is and how it should be evaluated - is not to be expected. It would not be "normal." For in this respect G. Bernard Shaw (1913:Act I) was right when he said, "All professions are conspiracies against the laity."

This is largely consistent with Ben-David and Zloczower's remarks about the negative relationship between the centralization of the university system and competition. It also points to the necessity of considering the dimensions of what Clark has denoted "academic oligarchy." 39

Finally, we can say that not only can State-controlled systems be the most "market driven" in some respects, but that in systems characterized by entrenched academic professionals State intervention may be necessary to promote the operation of market forces. 40
THE STATE AND FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION

Our second proposition is that the State can under certain conditions constitute a major threat to further differentiation, but that it can also initiate and preserve functional differentiation. The State is a conduit for the introduction of broader societal interests. Potentially it is also a conduit for the introduction of innovative interpretations of national interests into higher education. If a strong academic profession defines national interests in higher education and acts to protect those definitions, and if much differentiation is contingent on the reinterpretation of some of these interests or of the emphasis that they should be given, then we can expect that it will sometimes be left to the State to act as a "trust-buster." The State can introduce new and distinct institutions or sectors of higher education which are based on new definitions and emphases of interests. It may also introduce reforms within existing institutional frameworks. Such innovations may be organized around new interpretations of what the student pool should be, that is, questions of access which depend on interpretations of social justice. Others may embody new understandings of higher education's function in modern society, that is, reinterpretations of competence. Or they may be the result of the application of certain interests to an institutional realm once thought to be rightly free and independent of such contaminating concerns and processes. Such is the case with demands for democratic control of the academy. Lest we mistakenly assume that no impetus for innovation comes from within the academic profession itself, it should be noted that the State can sponsor professionally initiated innovations as well.41 The State also at times acts to prevent innovative, functionally
distinct programs (within existing institutions), institutions and sectors of higher education from "drifting" back to the traditional forms and functions of higher education. As we shall see, this is the most difficult, and often the least successful of its tasks. In our concluding section we examine why.

At the same time there is a danger inherent in such State intervention. The danger lies in the potential skewing of interest definition. While this can generate a significant transformation of higher education, it can also contribute to the crystallization of a rigid system resistant to further differentiation. The constellation of interest definition and trade-offs might become embedded in a new but inflexible configuration. The advancement in future of innovative interpretations of interests or emphases on certain interests, would be blocked.

This is not to be confused with a situation in which the State acts to prevent the blurring of boundaries between formerly distinct sectors with distinct tasks. Impeding the "drift" of institutions from one sector to another is not always the same thing as blocking differentiation. In fact it often ensures the continuance of some measure of differentiation within the system. The danger rests in the long-term monopolization of interest definition, a situation in which efforts to introduce new interpretations emphases are effectively stymied.

Alexander Pope, in his Essay on Man (1950 ed., Epistle II, lines 131-2), wrote, "One master Passion in the breast, like Aaron's serpent, swallows up the rest." Herein lies the potential for the State to act as generator and/or facilitator, or as inhibitor, of functional differentiation in higher education. To the extent that it serves as a conduit for the intro-
duction of challenging, competing, alternative definitions and trade-offs of interests it acts as a promoter of differentiation. But to the extent that it contributes to the perpetuation of one "passion," of one interest configuration, then its effect is to block future differentiation. We examine in the ensuing pages, State action in both of these roles.

United States. State intervention can take many forms, and can be effected through different sorts of mechanisms. In the United States, for instance, involvement is virtually haphazard, particularly at the federal level. It is intermittent and sometimes indirect, especially compared to State involvement in higher education systems in the rest of the industrialized world.

But despite the fact that it has acted in piecemeal fashion it has had great impact, particularly in promoting the dominant concern of equality of access. And in recent years State action has reflected and promoted a change in the definition and application of social justice. Federal policy shifted from promoting the access of "all who are able" (as set forth in the 1958 National Defense Education Act) to "all who can benefit."43 It aimed at increasing the entry and retention rates of nontraditional students in all segments of public higher education.

The varied role of the American federal government in higher education is evident in government involvement through financing mechanisms. Chester Finn (1978) describes these in some detail. They range from the mechanism of student assistance, to institutional funds for specific projects and programs, to tax credits. The first policy, funding students rather than institutions, is indirect in one sense,45 and federal funding has in fact shifted in this direction in the past decade (see, for example, Green, 1981b).
But the second policy is quite direct. Project and program specific institutional funds have conditions and limitations attached to them. Such funding is to be distinguished from the block grants of many other systems, aimed at supporting entire institutions, and responsible for the institutions' composite welfare. It is not only more restrictive, it also is more directly controlled by non-academics. Suffice it to say, then, that the American federal government's involvement, while haphazard, sometimes indirect, and relatively less extreme than that of England, France, and Sweden, can in some ways be quite intrusive.

One can point to certain national legislative acts which have impacted on higher education in the United States. Such federal involvement can be traced from the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Higher Education Act of 1965, all the way back to the Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890. Each in its own way promoted reinterpretation of national interests. The first three promoted access - through Upward Bound and College Work-Study programs -, prohibited discriminatory practices in federally supported programs, and stated egalitarian objectives for American higher education. The two Morrill Acts also advanced egalitarian interests, promoting the regeneration and expansion of a public sector in higher education - through the land-grant college movement - and using federal funding as a weapon to enforce compliance in the area of discrimination. The first Morrill Act effected change in more than just the area of social justice concerns. It influenced the definition of competence, promoting a new sort of higher education not just in terms of its clientele, but in terms of its function. As Eldon L. Johnson (1981) indicates, these land-grant colleges were part of a national network - formal and informal - and had
themselves rather than the traditional private colleges as their reference group. What they had in mind was an alternative ideal of higher education.

The power and active role of the legislative branch in the U.S. is notable. These pieces of national legislation were not instances of a virtually impotent legislature rubber stamping executive initiatives. On the other hand, there is no comparison between this scattered federal legislation and the comprehensive educational legislation one finds in the case of Sweden and France in particular. Green (1981b) characterizes the federal role as supporter and underwriter of expanded access to participation in higher education as "carrot and stick" funding. Such program incentives are aimed at achieving certain national objectives, such as equality of educational opportunity. But they do not seek to completely reconstitute higher education systems and sectors as is sometimes the case in Sweden, France, and even England to some extent.

This somewhat haphazard, yet intrusive, federal role in the United States is also evident in regulatory activity at the federal level. Chester Finn (1978) identifies three categories of regulatory activity: allocation of funds (incentives); use of funds (regulations and conditions applied to funds); and social regulations. Drawing a contrast between the American and European systems, Finn notes that there is in the United States no special government agency (except at the state level) which oversees higher education. Regulation results from the normal activity of diverse federal agencies.

Yet despite the diversity, and often the lack of central coordination, such regulatory activity can often be very direct, intrusive, and effective.
Clark (1978a:26) has written:

We have already bowed to the quaint notion of taking away federal moneys flowing to an institution when it fails to obey a particular federal rule. Such an approach characterizes the sternest type of relationship between government and higher education in democratic countries with national ministries of education.

And to illustrate the increasingly supervisory role adopted by federal officials, Clark refers to a speech made by Joseph Califano (Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare at the time) at the American Council of Education's 1977 meeting.

In front of an audience of hundreds of university and college presidents, he pointed out that since a recent bit of legislation opposed by academics was now national law, they would have to "comply," and he would have to "enforce." (1978a:26)

Federal intervention can thus be quite direct even in systems which lack large central bureaucracies overseeing higher education. And whether one regards such federal controls as "quaint" and objectionable, or as quite justified, the fact remains that the federal government has had a tremendous impact on American higher education. Through efforts like Title III programs it has promoted diversity (see Green, 1981b). In addition, it has encouraged higher education's adoption of new functions, as well as its adaptation to new student populations. Here we should note the similar impact, particularly with respect to the latter development, of the third governmental branch, the courts. As Green (1981b:93) states:

The history of the minority quest for equality of educational opportunity has generally placed the states against federal government: litigation is the most frequent method of redress...

It is still the states, however, which play the dominant role in Amer-

There is no question that the role of the federal government in American higher education has in recent years increased. In describing the levels of academic organization in the U.S. Clark (1978d) indicates that until recently the national level was virtually nonexistent. Yet at the same time that he refers to an increasing amount of indirect manipulation by various bureaus and central councils of the federal government, Clark (1978d) states that American universities are not really part of a nationally administered system. He points to the state level as the key one in the United States, for education is a responsibility of state government.

What is important is not simply the fact of state involvement, but the nature of it. For instance, in examining the different sorts of state coordinating agencies Berdahl (1971) notes that there has been an increase in public versus institutional membership. While a slight majority of coordinating boards include some institutional members, only two states (California and Minnesota) have coordinating boards with a majority of institutional members. And how are these persons appointed? Berdahl (1971:53) describes a process which facilitates lay influence.

The public members of formal coordinating agencies are nearly always appointed by the governor, usually with the consent of the state senate. Nevada's Board of Regents . . and Michigan's State Board of Education . . are elected by the people, the candidates in Michigan being selected by the state's party conventions. Members of the New York Regents are elected by the legislature. Under Utah's new law creating a consolidated governing board, the leader of each legislative house is responsible for naming three members, and the governor
for naming nine.

One finds in the case of state-level coordination a situation which oftentimes allows for the incorporation of lay concerns as well as generating responsiveness to lay interests. Recent work on "program review" has referred to this. Richard Dumont (1980:405-6), for instance, speaks of "The cry for increasing accountability raised by interested publics and elected officials (which) has been heard within the higher education community." His work is a case study of one effort to develop performance funding as a complement to the conventional enrollment-based formula for state allocations to higher education. The aim was to find a way to base funding on outputs or products rather than on inputs or process (e.g., enrollment). Doing this could easily lead to a reevaluation of the purpose of higher education, to a reinterpretation of how a higher education institution's, sector's, or system's, competence should be defined.

Similarly, Green (1981a) describes a changing state role in higher education in the last decade and a half, to which there has been a corresponding change in the program review process. Here it is worth noting that Barak and Berdahl (1978) have documented a 105% increase in the number of states with higher education coordinating or governing boards that have program review authority over both new and existing programs. Green indicates that although program review has traditionally been geared to assess quality, newly articulated concern for access and equality along with fiscal accountability have led states to look beyond traditional measures in evaluating their support for and investment in higher education.

All of this suggests that despite state concern for quality in higher education, the program review process is really propelled
by regulatory concerns and their financial consequences. Considerable evidence supports this conclusion: Of the major issues mentioned in the annual reports of state higher education agencies, appropriations and comprehensive planning top the list, while quality-related issues are cited only about a third as often. Barak and Berdahl's survey of state program review practices also indicates that economic issues have priority over academic issues of the review process. (Green, 1981a:75-6)

Program reviews focus not principally on traditional criteria of quality, but on productivity, costs, and the compatibility between program and institutional mission.

This latter focus is particularly important for our purposes. Some state master plans, like California's, set up different sectors of higher education, or at least were geared to the promotion of functionally distinct goals in higher education. The existence of program review committees, often set up by the state legislature, which ensure adherence to original institutional and sectoral missions, reveals that the state can not only promote differentiation, but can also act to protect or preserve these innovations. Not only the proposal, but the maintenance, of new interpretations of national interests in higher education can be carried out through and by the state.

The case of the community colleges illustrates the significance of state involvement which promotes responsiveness to lay interests. As noted earlier, Zoglin (1981) has provided an excellent discussion of the mechanisms by which responsiveness to lay concerns is ensured. Zoglin points out that California community colleges' curricular change process is governed by statutes (in the Education Code) and regulations (in the Administrative Code).
These codes delegate responsibility for initiating courses and programs to the local institutions, and at this level one of the critical committees is the citizens advisory committees. Citizen participation is provided a formal channel, especially in decisions concerning what Zoglin calls the community/general and occupational curricula.

An article by Zusman (1978) reveals the importance of the legislative branch in providing for lay involvement. Zusman discusses state officials' efforts to cut adult education in the community colleges. He first details proposals of the Department of Finance and the Postsecondary Education Commission to reduce and/or put a "cap" on state funding for adult education. He then describes the legislative opposition which prevented a substantial reduction in the size and scope of adult education in community colleges. The basis of this opposition lay in public support and lobbying of local legislators by the individual community colleges. Zusman states:

Because the community colleges provide educational access to local youth and adults and vocational training geared to local businesses and industries, legislators generally are quick to support and protect "their" community college.

The legislative representation provided lay - and in this case less prestigious academic - interests with a direct channel of influence, one not so direct and operative in systems dominated by the executive branch.

However, the extent of lay influence, even in America, should not be overestimated. For instance, Berdahl (1971) stresses that even when coordinating agencies consist principally of public members a tremendous amount of influence resides in what may be considered academics: viz., those agency staffs composed of persons who have an academic background and who are dedicated to educating the lay members to their jobs. Berdahl finds
that half of the governing boards and two-thirds of the coordinating boards responding to a questionnaire said that they departed but "seldom" from staff recommendations.

Moreover, it should be noted that states tend to adopt the criteria for defining and measuring quality that are developed by educational researchers - e.g., student credentials, faculty qualifications and research productivity, and peer review (see Green, 1981a; and Barak and Berdahl, 1978). In demonstrating the extent to which traditional measures of equality have been accepted in the state program review process Green (1981a) quotes a 1973 policy statement of the New York Regents which proclaims that:

The attributes of (the) quality of a program are widely known and accepted. Among these are the level of faculty research and scholarship; the effectiveness of and attention to teaching and counseling by the faculty; the caliber of students; the caliber of dissertations; the adequacy of laboratory, library, and other related facilities; the presence of supporting and related programs.

(Regents of the University of the State of New York: 17-18)

Further evidence of shared criteria is to be found in the proposals of the New York (Bundy) Commission on Private Higher Education. Direct institutional grants were urged, to be apportioned on the basis of the degrees awarded by the institution: six times as much went for Ph.D.'s as for B.A.'s and M.A.'s.

Nevertheless, it appears that in the United States there are a variety of channels through which lay groups can effect a significant influence, and can challenge and even change interpretations of certain national interests. There is perhaps no interest more energetically safeguarded by academics than academic freedom. But at least in California lay groups have been relatively successful in redefining the parameters of that concept. Disclosures of academicians reaping profits from their research have promoted official
and unofficial investigations as well as several lawsuits. And closed meetings between university presidents and corporation heads on the topic of university-industry cooperation have evoked criticism from various lay groups, ranging from labor unions to consumer, minority, and environmentalist groups. Some legal action, stemming from this sort of activity, has had an impact. One example is the work of Al Meyerhoff, an attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. Representing the California Rural Legal Assistance organization in 1981, Meyerhoff petitioned the state Fair Political Practices Commission to pass a regulation requiring UC academicians to disclose their ties with private industry. The commission approved a compromise version of the CRLA's request. An interpretation of academic freedom which incorporates public disclosure of research funding ties is certainly a significant change.

In the long run, such a reinterpretation, along with other shifts, could conceivably have an impact on the functions and purposes to which research is put, as well as on the type of research which is done. Indeed, it may already be having such an impact. For instance, John A. Worthley and Jeffrey Apfel (1978) have described the efforts of state governments to generate the mobilization and gearing of university resources for solving practical problems in the state.

At any rate, we may conclude that government involvement in the United States, at both the federal and state level, has allowed for and even promoted reinterpretation of interests and a shift of emphasis on certain of them. In the process it has helped to contribute to and preserve the system's differentiation.

We should note, in passing, one of the dangers Robert Berdahl (1971)
has stressed with respect to State involvement through planning. According to Berdahl, most State planning and coordinating agencies are preoccupied with short-range allocative planning. Moreover, the pseudo-science of planning is generally preoccupied with short-term quantitative problems; there is often a preoccupation with numbers. While the dangers this presents in terms of constraining future interest definition and emphasis may not yet have been realized in the United States, the situation presages imminent dangers we might discover in other national systems of higher education.

United Kingdom. State involvement in the U.K. has been much more continuous and comprehensive than in the U.S., though less so than in Sweden and France. While British higher education is commonly characterized as a binary system, a distinction being drawn between the so-called public sector and the university sector, institutions of both sectors are publicly financed. The great preponderance of higher education institution budgets are government funded, whether through Local Education Authorities, or by the University Grants Committee with government approved and appropriated monies. The Department of Education and Science constitutes a considerable central administrative body, staffed by top university graduates and increasingly taking on the characteristics of a Continental European educational ministry. Salary scales are nationalized. There is concerted control over the standards and numbers of entrants to higher education. There is an evolving standardization of financial and administrative procedures. And in the past two decades the State has helped found nine new universities, ten Colleges of Advanced Technology which were soon after designated universities, and thirty polytechnics in the public sector.

Nevertheless, a great deal of power resides in the academic profession,
both at the institutional and the national level. Indeed, of the four national systems under consideration the British constitutes the closest approximation to an "autonomous" system characterized by academic control. And it remains so despite recent trends toward increasing political and bureaucratic control.

There was a time when British universities were characteristically quite open to lay influence, particularly at the institutional level, through their large majorities on courts and councils, the institutional governing bodies. But academic control increased, beginning with the establishment of academic senates. And from the turn of the century on, the senates acquired formal and customary decision making rights (see Van de Graaff, 1976). Moreover, as Halsey (1962) notes, the rising financial importance of the academic dominated UGC helped to cushion the universities from the interference of local laymen on the governing bodies.

The dominance of the academic became such that in describing the "traditional British mode" Burton Clark (forthcoming, Chapter 4) stresses the subordination of the ministerial superstructure to a powerful understructure. The latter inheres in strong faculty guild authority at the bottom plus some authority at the middle (institutional) levels of coordination. Whatever national coordination existed was provided by academic oligarchs.

In recent decades central forms of authority have been strengthened at the national and the institutional level. However, considerable measure of academic control still characterizes the system, whether it is exercised through the UGC, the CNAA, the Research Councils, or the general influence of the academic view in policymaking. And it may still be said that at the institutional level the university is a "tempered oligarchy," or as Moodie
and Eustace (1974) described it, a "republican democracy," with senior academics exercising basic control. It must be emphasized that such academic influence is not characteristically present in the public sector, where government control is more direct, and control by administrators at the institutional level is more ferocious.

Recent trends notwithstanding, the English ideal of the university (as Halsey and Trow describe it) remains an institution governed by academic democracy. It is an ideal which greatly influenced institutional governance in the past, and continues to do so today. The experience of the CATs, as they realized institutional mobility and became universities, illustrates this. For in the course of their development academic democracy and control was instituted and increased (see Burgess and Pratt, 1970). Even today, with increased administrative staffs on campuses, especially the well-documented rise of the Registrar, it continues to be academics who remain largely in control. British academics spend an enormous amount of time on administrative matters, to the point of serving on committees concerned with routine administrative and maintenance matters. The full-time university administrators who constitute the bureaucracy truly are the civil servants of the faculty.

The professional identity of these administrators has not advanced to the extent that it has in the U.S. And often the full-time Pre-Vice Chancellors are academics in the harvest stage of their career. Moodie and Eustace's (1974) point that one must distinguish between the administration and the bureaucracy, and their emphasis on the involvement of academics in the former and the low status of the latter group, are observations that could still be made today.

It is most important to recognize that despite an increased interest in
the accountability of higher education lay access to policy making is extremely limited. This is true even at the institutional level of universities. University councils act virtually only on the recommendation of and assent of the academic senate, and are very limited in terms of direct action. They are not at all like the governing bodies of polytechnics. A section of the 1975 OECD report on educational development strategy reveals at least part of the reason for this lack of external involvement. Commenting on long-term strategy, and citing an anti-social engineering climate in the U.K., the report states:

In Britain it is the habit of most people, high and low, to refer to "the long history" behind any social practice under scrutiny . . . It is meant to suggest that a society has organic qualities, that abstract schematisms cannot be imposed upon it without running great risks, and that if institutions are to be managed successfully, they must be approached from the inside not the outside, felt in their concreteness and particularity, and understood as arrangements which people have worked out in the course of a common experience and which accomplish purposes too subtle to be written into a master plan. Accordingly, it is best for people inside an institution to decide what to do with it, and it is always dangerous for outsiders to meddle . . . It has been in these terms that the British constitutional tradition has largely evolved, and that the British conception of limited government has been formulated. (1975:25)

So although the U.K. is considerably decentralized, the system does not promote outside participation. And outsiders are generally defined as non-academics or non-professionals.

Indicative of the lack of public participation are delineations of "legitimised" and "non-legitimised" interest groups in educational policy making. In various places Maurice Kogan (1971; 1975; 1978) speaks of legit-
imized and non-legitimized interest groups, as well as of "educational establishments." Of the latter, in discussing the DES Kogan (1971) has indicated that the education department works within a particularly strong and long-lived professional constituency which might be called the "old educational establishment" (referring particularly to local authorities, teachers, and their organizations and institutions). He then describes what he refers to as a "new educational establishment."

During the 1960s a new educational Establishment also developed. From Eccles' administration onwards, both educational journalism and the Ministry's own Information Division grew in strength. Such writers as Stuart Maclure, Tyrrell Burgess, Anne Corbett, and Brian MacArthur are read and taken seriously by policy makers. The journalists were part of a wider network that grew in the 1950s and 1960s. The impact of the sociologists - Floud, Halsey, Michael Young - and the economists, led by John Vaizey, has already been mentioned. And social scientists have become far more numerous and powerful in the last decade. Economists have always been employed in the Treasury. Other Departments, including the DES, now have them on the staff. (1971:46)

It is from these "establishments" that most policies come.

In other contexts Kogan (1975, 1978) discusses the main interest groups that have legal or conventional rights to be consulted about policy change. And in connection with this he considers the process by which local concerns, desires, proposals, etc., are aggregated, coming to the conclusion that the setting of system objectives is implicit and unsystematic.

It is not clear how aggregation of practice takes place. Local examples of good practice, or perceptions of obsolescence, are not well mediated. The DES denies it has the power to aggregate or lead yet it plainly does so. So we have a situation in which
power is not explicit, in which criticism and discontent have no clear outlet, and in which parental opinion still has no adequate way into the system. Effective public review is non-existent. (1975:238)

We would add that the setting of objectives is largely carried out on the basis of accepted interpretations and emphases.

Other authors have made similar observations about the British system. For instance, in comparing planning, government, and administration in the California and U.K. university systems Geoffrey Caston (1979) contrasts the relatively discreet procedures surrounding allocations in the U.K. with the long public argument and deliberation which characterizes the allocation process in California. Rune Premfors (1980) has made this a major point of contrast between the U.K. and Sweden, stating that the differential composition of policy making committees and ad hoc groups (dominated in Britain by academics) was an excellent indicator of differing conceptions of who the legitimate interests in higher education politics were. And the 1975 OECD report commented on the very private and informal nature of planning in the U.K., perhaps best typified by relations between the UGC and DES.

There has certainly been an increase in government power in the U.K. But it has been an increase in the power of executive bodies. Indeed, this is another major point of contrast between the U.K. and the U.S. Legislative committees in the U.K. do not have the same powers that they do in the U.S. And lobbyists do not work on people in Parliament as a means of blocking executive actions, as Americans do with their legislators. As Kogan (1978) says in drawing out the contrast, the legislature is very strong and the Departments and the bureaucracy are submissive. This is significant for a couple of reasons. First is the question of the makeup of Britain's
executive bodies. Research has demonstrated that a considerable majority of the members of not just the DES, but of top civil servants in general, as well as of the Cabinets and leaders of the major political parties, are graduates of the more elite institutions of higher education. And this sort of composition extends even to the upper tier of the Local Education Authorities, the Directors of Education. Local control in this case is not control by the local population, but rather control by local elites, and educational elites at that.

But it is not merely the social composition of these bodies. It is the networks they have in common with academics, the contacts, the identity of civil servants in terms of being generalists providing "service" to professionals, and the common interest emphases and interpretations they share, (as to what a quality degree is, and the importance of standards, for example). The growth of the executive is also important in terms of what groups have access to the executive branch. The policy making process has still not been opened up to formerly illegitimate outside groups. And a look at policy reveals that the central government really lacks a grand vision as to what higher education should be; at least it is not implementing such a policy. A look at the policies of the last few decades reveals the pervasive and continuing influence of academic interest interpretations and emphases. This is clear both in the recent cuts of the system, and in the reforms advanced in recent years which have generally been subjected to "drift" back to traditional educational forms.

Higher education to the Thatcher government is pretty clearly more a cost than anything else. Policy is financially grounded, and even at that is very vague. The system is simply told to make due with less money. The
specifics as to how it is to be distributed are left up to professionals. So while the present government may make claims as to promoting closer links between industry and higher education, and promoting "useful science," there appears to be no design by which to carry this out. And the selective cuts that have been implemented appear to have been made on the basis of entirely different criteria. There is some difference of opinion as to the rationale or specific criteria utilized by the UGC in coming to a decision as to which institutions should be cut, where, and how much. But it appears to be more than coincidence that in terms of institutions being cut, there was a close relationship between the "prestige" of an institution and the cuts it was "asked" to absorb. Like so many other governments, this one has left the specifics of policy implementation to the educational establishment. Practice is thus guided by unstated, common interest interpretations and emphases - e.g., as to what a "quality" institution is, or even as to the assumption that a premium should be placed on traditional academic and institutional excellence rather than the promotion of access or of new sorts of higher education.

In recent decades the major reforms of higher education in Britain have been sponsored by the State. And these reforms have been related to the advancement of new interest interpretations and emphases, whether it has been the promotion of open access through the Open University, or the promotion of technical and/or comprehensive higher education through the CATs and the polytechnics. Yet each of these reforms have either been constrained by traditional academic interest interpretations and emphases in their original implementation, or have in the course of institutional practice experienced academic drift.
In the case of the Open University its very success was dependent upon the assurance and demonstration that "academic standards" would be maintained. As Woodley (1981:8) points out, "The University would have its own administrative centre . . . and, although in the early stages it might be necessary to operate under the aegis of an existing university, it would confer degrees in its own right. Great stress was placed on the fact that academic standards would be carefully safeguarded." In discussing the present state of the reform Woodley evaluates the achievement of goals as follows. In terms of the size and cost, as well as the enrollment, of the Open University it has far exceeded expectations. It has not, however, been so successful in increasing working class participation in higher education. Despite the original implicit goals of the university, however, this was consistent with existing academic understandings of social justice in higher education. The Admissions Committee of the Open University does not engage in positive discrimination. For in the U.K. this tends to be regarded as slightly immoral. Opening up access means opening up the system to those talented individuals who were passed up the first time around. Access is to be opened up to the meritorious, to the talented, for it is understood to be a privilege not a right to pursue higher education.

If ever there was a higher education reform in the U.K. initiated by political decision it was the Open University. But the innovation was from the start constrained - through various mechanisms - by academic interest interpretations and emphases. As Cerych noted in the introduction to Woodley's study, an innovation that is radical in one area (in this case a change in the admissions system) must in order to succeed be counterbalanced by a strict adherence to prevailing values in others. And that is precisely what the
Open University did. In Cerych's words; "In several other respects, the University rigorously maintained conventional rules and criteria, particularly in regard to academic standards, its charter and governance, the qualification of teaching staff, and even, to a large extent, its educational content." (1981:ix)

Much the same has been true of the CATs and polytechnics, though the constraints tended to become operative in the course of institutional practice rather than from the institutions' origins. Moreover, the drift which these institutions have experienced has been generated by a number of different factors, ranging from the aspirations of those within the new institutions to the influence of university academics to the demands of students. And yet despite the efforts of the State to set up institutions and sectors with distinctively new functions and purposes, or perhaps because of systemic practice once the institutions were created, academic drift has largely counteracted pursuit of the original missions of these new institutions and sectors. The case of the British system at one and the same time reveals the role of the State as sponsor of innovation and differentiation, and the difficult and often unsuccessful role the State plays in seeking to preserve differentiation.

Burgess and Pratt (1971) have described how the British government has taken the initiative in some of the most important developments in technical education. In an effort to promote the development of technical education, a tradition and conception distinct from the scientific education of universities, the British government established the National Council for Technological Awards to administer a new degree award, the Diploma in Technology. And it proposed a hierarchy of local, area, and regional colleges, topped by
ten colleges of advanced technology. In a decade the latter had drifted significantly towards traditional university form and were in fact designated universities. Lower level and part-time work and students were shed, the range of coursework was expanded, and the ex-CATs were before long junior universities.

A number of factors have been cited to explain this drift. Burgess and Pratt (1970) point to staff and student pressure and aspiration, as well as to the ambition of local authorities. But most of all they blame the government's failure to specify in detail how its objectives were to be achieved, or to create a monitoring and control system of sufficient stringency. Indeed they even suggest that government actions encouraged drift. Whether it was practices that effectively punished lower-level and part-time work and students, or induced the staffing of CATs with traditionally trained staff (through NCTA standards) with aspirations to research, or rewarded institutions for following the traditional pattern of development, Burgess and Pratt stress the divergence between policy and practice. And they see the same mistakes being made in the case of the polytechnics.

The (thirty) polytechnics were set up as a distinct sector from the universities in order to preserve the technical college tradition, as well as to give professional and technical education a high status, and to give opportunities to part-time students. They were not to be subservient to the image of the traditional universities. And they were not only to provide a new kind of education, but to produce social mobility as well. It should be noted that the polytechnics represent a case of the government confirming, nurturing, and seeking to protect and sponsor an innovation which in part already existed (though the government did reorganize it into a new
and distinct sector, and sought to imbue it with a measure of esteem). For as Donaldson (1975:13) said, "The policy for the polytechnics was as much an attempt to contain, regulate and justify developments which were extant as it was an attempt to carefully lay down the future."

It was not long before the polytechnics were experiencing the same sort of drift the CATs had. And it was for much the same reason. Payscales and other institutional rewards and mechanisms encouraged higher level work and research and full-time students. The CNAA compounded this as it became an arbiter of standards in the public sector seeking to demonstrate the parity of its degrees. Staff and student aspirations also contributed to the situation. Eric Robinson (1968) has blamed the ambiguity of the role designated for polytechnics, which left them no effective alternative but to aspire to the university ideal. And that is exactly what they did.

Lex Donaldson (1975) has formulated a theory of such drift in Britain which encompasses a number of the factors discussed above. Denoting the phenomenon "pluralistic drift" Donaldson attributes it not just to the lack of government specification of policy, but to the pluralistic, loose decision making and administrative system of the U.K.

There is an evident stress on actions based on consensus-building, on agreements with the existing interest groups (e.g., local authorities, professional bodies, universities and college staffs) as the way of making decisions about the polytechnics. This is institutionalized as the formal co-optation of these groups in the formal regulatory bodies such as the Council for National Academic Awards and the Regional Advisory Committees. The interaction of the interests (both material and ideal) of these existing groups within this administrative control system is such as to severely constrain the trajectory of development of the polytechnics and deflect it from the policy targets. (1975:18)
So the aims of the polytechnic policy are incompatible with existing administrative practices.

This shows how very difficult the State's role as preserver of differentiation can be. Preserving the original intention of reforms can involve overhauling some existing administrative practices. And this in turn involves transforming and reinterpreting prevailing interest definitions and criteria.

France. In the section on higher education and the market we discussed in some detail the process of interest implementation in France, as well as some of the reforms introduced by the State. Thus we confine ourselves here to a very brief description of one innovation introduced by the State which has been somewhat successful, though perhaps in unintended ways.

University Institutes of Technology (IUTs) were created by the government in 1966. According to Van de Graaff (1976) it was economic concerns which lay behind their creation. They were geared to provide intensive, short-cycle programs to train middle-level personnel in technical and administrative fields (in production, applied research and services). The aim was to replace the overspecialized tertiary system of higher technical education with a system of preparation for broader vocational categories, one which with university status would avoid the low prestige fate of other short-cycle education. In addition, there were supposed to be a substantial number of slots held open for those without the baccalauréat.

Promoting something of a new notion of what competence higher education should be geared to, and setting up a sector with a special status and relationship to the central ministry, the State was generating further differ-
entiation of the French higher education system. But in a number of respects the IUTs have not realized their original objectives. And in fact they have experienced a considerable measure of academic drift. Enrollment has fallen far short of the original goal of 50% of first-cycle students. They are less vocational than originally intended - a complaint commonly voiced by employers' groups who believe that closer links with the university have lessened the emphasis on practical/vocational aims. There are not as many teachers from industry as intended, and teachers are demanding and getting research opportunities. And while IUT courses were intended to be terminal, over one-third of IUT graduates go on to higher education. Finally, 95% of IUT entrants have baccalaureates (see Premfors, 1980; and Van de Graaff, 1976).

Perhaps the most important characteristic of IUTs is that a major outcome achieved is the provision of a channel of upward mobility for the lower class, more so than any other sector of French higher education. While they have not admitted many non-bacheliers, they have admitted a number of technician baccalaureates (this used to be a dead-end track). Further mobility is made possible given the unplanned transfer function the IUTs have taken on.

But this innovation is far from redefining the national interest of social justice. IUTs are selective. In fact their secondary industrial departments get better qualified students than other university sectors. And the lower-class students who make it are generally quite gifted. As in England, meritocracy - defined in terms of criteria set by academics - is the defining principle. Again we see the promise and the difficulty of the State's role in promoting differentiation.
Sweden. As with France, the details of the Swedish system have been delineated in an earlier section of the paper. So we will restrict ourselves here to a brief statement concerning the State's role in implementing conflicting interests in higher education. In particular we address the potential obstacle State involvement can pose with respect to further differentiation.

The case of Sweden alerts us not to the problematic role of State as preservers of differentiation, but to the danger of the crystallization of innovations which have been implemented. The Swedish experiment of promoting what Agneta Bladh (1982) calls "a close dialogue between higher education and the labor market" is as yet in its infancy. It is perhaps too soon to judge the effects of transforming Swedish higher education into vocational education. But it is not too early to suggest that there is a danger of interest interpretations and emphases in Sweden being permanently skewed towards what some would regard as a myopic cost-benefit analysis of higher education which subordinates educational and other concerns to the yardstick of practicality in terms of linkage to the labor market and job training.

It is not simply a matter of the size of the central State, or the extent of State involvement in higher education. Rather it is a question of the potential monopolization of interest interpretations and emphases. For to permanently fix these in a particular configuration is to effectively block much potential for future differentiation. We have noted earlier how the tyranny of collegium, of complete academic control can present a significant obstacle to the introduction of new interest definitions and emphases. The tyranny of a certain sort of lay control would be no less restrictive in this regard.
As Bladh (1982) notes, some of the major lay interest groups which have realized such direct access to the educational policy making process in Sweden endorse the continuing vocationalization of Swedish higher education. The TCO is a case in point. They assert the compatibility of vocationally oriented and research related education. In their view the traditional "Bildung" ideal of the acquisition of general knowledge and values is too narrow, and must put working life in the focus of attention. And the same is true with regard to those aspects of education directed towards personal development. Paraphrasing a booklet published by the TCO on the interaction of education and the labor market Bladh refers to the view that "All vocational education should also include items to develop critical attitudes, so as to enable students to influence and transform working conditions." (1982:30)

To the extent that lay representation allows for the introduction of new interest interpretations and emphases into Swedish higher education it will provide for the ongoing transformation of the system. But to the extent that it makes for the pursuit of one "passion," both to the exclusion of other existing values and functions as well as future alternatives, this lay representation may act to permanently fix the Swedish system in a particular conformation. It should be noted here that the latter possibility is derivative not of lay involvement, but of the domination of policy making by a particular set of interest interpretations and emphases. It is entirely conceivable that alternatives to these could be provided by other lay groups, or by a shift in existing groups' concerns.
CONCLUSION: PROCESSUAL FACTORS RELATED TO DIFFERENTIATION

In the preceding pages we have examined the process by which sometimes conflicting national interest are implemented in the American, English, Swedish, and French systems of higher education. And we have related this discussion to differentiation in these systems, to the systems' receptiveness to such differentiation. Particular attention has been directed to the State's role in this process, with a focus on two substantive issues. First we looked at the State-controlled systems of Sweden and France, and their responsiveness to the market demands. Second we looked at the varied roles of the State with respect to differentiation: the State as sponsor and promoter of, as protector and preserver of, and as an obstacle to differentiation. In this context we considered the American and British systems, and referred back to the systems of France and Sweden.

Though we focused on the State we also undertook to adopt a focus on specific groups, and the interest interpretations and emphases they advanced. Treating the State as something of a conduit through which new interest interpretations and emphases are introduced, we concerned ourselves with the power relations of groups and with the ways in which particular systems promoted the access of certain groups to the policymaking process.

Two factors emerged which we feel are integrally related to systemic receptiveness to differentiation. The first is the power of the academic profession. In an institutional realm deeply influenced if not dominated by the academic profession we found repeated instances of the profession's stiff resistance - sometimes successful and sometimes not - to a variety of reforms which should have effected differentiation. In fact the contrasting cases of
Sweden and France revealed that State intervention is sometimes necessary to ensure the responsiveness of the higher education to market demands. Thus the somewhat paradoxical proposition that so-called State-controlled systems are sometimes those most "market driven." This is explained by the commitment of the academic profession to certain interest interpretations and emphases, and by an identity grounded in a self-determination of these. Innovations which involved the imposition of new interest interpretations and emphases were thus not well-received.

The second factor we identified was the openness of the system to access by lay groups — particularly in the policy making realm. A strong legislative branch in government seemed to be especially conducive to this, as the cases of the U.S. and Sweden indicated. And as revealed in the U.S., the judicial branch of government constituted another important channel of lay access.

Reform struggles were often largely organized along the lines of the laity versus the academic profession. This was due in no small part to the fact that innovations often involved the introduction of broader social concerns (whether of social justice, economic productivity and development, public accountability and democracy) into institutional realms where they had not previously been pursued. It is a process common to other institutional realms, such as private enterprise. Businessmen protest the subjugation of their once "private" realm — and their "private" property — to social concerns and attendant government regulations. The pursuit of profit and productivity is their bottom line, their purpose, and they object to having to temper that function with the pursuit of social justice or other social goals. Similarly, in the name of academic freedom and autonomy academics often oppose the sub-
jugation of their private professional realm, their domain of expertise, to broad, externally defined social concerns. And they argue that the pursuit of such concerns detracts from the achievement of what they believe to be the basic purposes of the system (e.g., that affirmative action reduces standards).

Consequently, we suggest that the receptiveness of a higher education system to differentiation will largely be an inverse function of the power differential between the laity and the academic profession. However, having considered in Sweden the potential threat to future differentiation that lay involvement can pose, this proposition should be amended. It is not simply the factor degree of lay involvement that is important, it is the types of groups involved, and the interest interpretations and emphases they promote. For domination by certain lay groups, or domination by particular lay interpretations and emphases, can also inhibit differentiation. The importance of the political structure lies in the sort of groups it provides access to. But it is also important to consider the influence of the general social structure on the nature of these groups and their interests.

Two other interrelated points require at least some development here. The first concerns the notion of the State as a conduit through which interest interpretations and emphases are advanced. The second is the conceptualization of the power of the academic profession.

The State is not simply a conduit, an arena of struggle. It is permeated by interests of its own. But as has been evident in the case of Britain in particular, administrative practice is often guided by certain unchallenged assumptions which greatly affect policy implementation. They may be assumptions about what criteria should be used to determine quality, or how part-
time versus full-time students and courses, and different levels of work should be rewarded - viz., on what basis and by what formulas allocations should be made. What is important is that to a great extent central ministries and other executive bodies tend to adopt academic interest interpretations and emphases. And this commonly contributes to academic drift, for due to these shared understandings the State's role as protector and preserver of innovations is counteracted. The State becomes instead a force encouraging the cooptation and assimilation of the reforms into the existing system. Indeed, one of the unchallenged assumptions may be that academic drift is a positive phenomenon, indicative of growth within the system, growth to which the government should accommodate rather than seek to prevent.

Herein lies an important dimension of the academic profession's power. It is not simply a matter of academic oligarchy by virtue of academic control of certain national committees and bodies, though this is certainly significant. It is also the influence that academics have as the trainers or socializers of the governmental elites, and the influence that they have on the belief systems of individuals in other sectors of society. Academic power lies not only in academic dominated committees and bodies, but in the ability of academics to shape minds and perpetuate a certain ideology.

In looking at governmental regulatory and administrative bodies one must always examine the relationship between the regulators and the regulated. The history of government regulation of private enterprise in the U.S. certainly alerts us to the possibility of cozy relations between the regulators and the regulated. This need not be a matter of corruption, but can be a function of shared understandings, understandings which guide administrative
practice in accordance with certain academic interests. Consideration of the ideological influence of academics should extend beyond governmental elites to students. For as J.B. Lon Hefferlin (1969: 14) has noted, the educational system is vertically integrated.

Many institutions of higher education operate in the tradition of a cottage industry - independently doing piecework as part of a larger system, but with few options open to them. They must receive students, care for them, educate them, and send them along in good condition to the next stage of the process. This certainly characterizes the selective secondary schools of some European countries, which are simply preparatory schools for the next rung on the ladder. Prospective students are thus socialized into certain understandings, greatly influencing the impetus of student demand. In this sense many student markets are fixed, for the understandings and aspirations of students have been greatly influenced by the educational institutions they have passed through. Again, the mechanism here need not be direct instrumental control, but can be indirect ideological influence.

A further dimension of the academic profession's power is that profession's unity, its integration. Of the four systems we have considered this dimension is perhaps most evident in the U.K. Thus, in describing the structural diversity within the British university sector, Kogan (1980) also refers to an academic normative uniformity. Perhaps it is a common socialization and training process which generates a sometimes unconscious unity of view on certain academic interest interpretations and emphases. But whatever the reason, it is largely staff aspirations which generate academic drift in Great Britain. These aspirations are a compelling force operating from within and at the lower levels of the higher education system which
perpetuate certain interest interpretations and emphases. The lesser degree of the profession's integration in the U.S. may account in part for the rise in the U.S. of differentiated sectors of higher education with distinct and enduring functions.

Social justice. Competence. Academic freedom. Autonomy or accountability. Decentralization or centralization. The implementation of these sometimes conflicting interests in higher educational systems is at its most basic level a matter of relations between the higher education system and society, between the academic profession and the laity. The key to the flexibility of the system, to its receptiveness to differentiation, appears to be the balance of the relationship (or the power differential) between the academic profession and the laity; and between the academic interest interpretations and emphases, and challenging interest interpretations and emphases introduced from outside the higher education system. And the latter, in turn, the very nature of challenging interpretations and emphases, are conditioned by the material and ideal conditions of the types of lay groups which get involved.

We would like to close by proposing that in examining this process researchers might find it useful to consider both the broad effects of the profession on society (in terms of lay groups' beliefs about higher education), and the effects of the social division of labor and of the basic cultural system on the higher education system and the academic profession (e.g., in terms of the differential values that are placed on different sorts of labor and different functions). This means attending not just to policy struggles themselves, but investigating the ideological effects of and influences on the academic profession, effects and influences which structure the parameters of particular policy struggles.
FOOTNOTES

1) Yet it is not simply a matter of being curricular change, for there are certain sorts of curricular developments which could be classified as functional differentiation. If, for example, a new curriculum geared to vocational training or to community service were developed, either within an existing institution, or split off in a distinct institution, this would qualify as functional differentiation.

2) It is true that much work on change in higher education has examined the increasing power of groups like administrators and government officials, but less attention tends to be devoted to distinctive characteristics of administrators and government officials than to documenting the trends of centralization and bureaucratization, and enumerating its effects (a notable exception is Mattei Dogan's 1975 work).


4) Ibid.

5) Thus, systems can be marked by: a high degree of accountability and decentralization; a high degree of autonomy and relative centralization; or a high degree of autonomy and relative decentralization.

6) State control is generally treated in terms of a continuum. For the systems we are examining the continuum would run from the U.S., with the least measure of State control, to England, to France and Sweden with the greatest measure of State Control. See Clark (1978b; and forthcoming).

7) Academic drift refers to the widespread tendency of functionally differentiated lower status institutions to become more and more like the forms of prestigious institutions, shedding and taking on forms as a means of achieving institutional mobility.
8) See John A. Worthley and Jeffrey Apfel (1978) for an example of the latter - regarding the state government and its needs for expertise as a market. Their article is an examination of university and state government linkages geared to promote this use of university expertise in various states of the U.S. Also see Clark (1978b; and forthcoming) for a discussion of "institutional" markets and "power" markets.

9) Some might argue that England's new universities of the 1960s were a response to student demand, and that the curricular innovations and governance changes constituted significant differentiation. In response it should be noted that the curricular innovations in the direction of interdisciplinarity have been largely illusory (in terms of curriculum the new universities are very much like the older universities). The same might be said of changes at the lower levels of governance since, for example, schools and boards of studies, which were to replace faculties and departments and thus promote interdisciplinarity, often conduct themselves more like faculties (and are either superdepartments or made up of sub-departments) than is supposed (see Perkin, 1969). Moreover, there are those (Beloff, 1970; Perkin, 1969, 1972) who maintain that the creation of the new universities was not principally an enrollment or market driven phenomenon, that educational experiment was a prime consideration. Whatever the case, they were State foundations, and as such were unique in the English university sector.

10) On the issue of responsiveness Beryl Tipton (1973) provides an excellent case study of how public sector educational institutions sometimes are guided by staff aspirations more than by student demand or official policy. In fact, he describes situations in which such aspirations lead such institutions to defy official policy and ignore salient student demand. We must be careful, then, even, and perhaps particularly, in the case of such public sector institutions, not to regard their course as being entirely externally determined.

11) There are, of course, exceptions: institutions which though relatively secure in their position still actively move to meet demands and perform
service functions (University of Southern California could be cited as a case in point).

12) See Roger Geiger (Private Sectors in Higher Education, forthcoming) for a discussion of private sectors in Western European systems of higher education.

13) Berdahl's work is on state rather than federal government, but the point about accountability still applies.

14) See Clark (1977), and Clark's article on "levels analysis" (1978c).


16) Even some students and junior faculty, who have benefitted from the democratization of academic authority, oppose the increased external participation at the institutional level, for it diminishes their newfound suffrage.

17) For treatments of fragmentation and internecine struggles within the French bureaucracy in general see Ezra Suleiman (1974) and Michael Crozier (1964).

18) It was also geared to promote interdisciplinary cooperation. See John Van de Graaff and Dorotea Furth (1978) and Michelle Patterson (1974).

19) And Cerych states with respect to the third aim of the reform that the universities are actually less multi-disciplinary today than before 1968.

20) It should also be noted, however, that in some respects the Swedish system is the more centralized one. For example, in terms of the number of sectors and hierarchies Sweden's unitary policy (promoting the development of a single, "comprehensive" sector of higher education) has made for a more centralized system than the highly differentiated French system (with its grandes ecoles - an extremely heterogeneous
sector itself -, universities, and independent institutions.

21) Levy actually focuses on autonomy (the reverse of accountability). And there are some differences of usage. Our concern is with broader definitions of educational purpose and function, rather than with influence over specific curricular offerings and exams, etc. The same point holds with respect to specific requirements. External input which helps define the general parameters within which specific requirements are set would constitute, in our usage, a significant example of accountability.

22) The notion of financial accountability is self-explanatory (though see Levy, 1980:7 for an operationalization of it). Berdahl's concept of "procedural" autonomy refers to routine administrative matters, and is to be distinguished from what he calls "substantive" autonomy, referring to substantive goals of the system. It is the latter we are concerned with.

23) It does appear that this concern with the immediate and tangible practicality of higher education, with it being demonstrably "relevant" to a nation's labor needs, is characteristic of lay populations throughout the industrialized world.

24) See Premfors (1980) who indicates that Sweden has the most thoroughly unionized work force in the world (and one which typical of Nordic countries and virtually unique to them, includes an organization of professionals and people with academic degrees).

25) Program committees are distinct from the faculty boards with which deal with postgraduate training and research (see OECD, 1981; Pedersen and Hunter, 1980).

26) In some respects grandes ecoles are more like a lycee than a university. See John Van de Graaff (1976: in passim) for a discussion of the "school-like" instruction (i.e., 32 hours/week, obligatory attendance, contin-
uous grading and assessment, all quite in contrast to university instruction which runs only up to 12 hours/week with no obligatory attendance, and which grades on final exams).

27) See Van de Graaff (1976) for a discussion of both the political and economic bases and reasons for establishing the IUTs, as well as for a consideration of some of these institutions' paradoxical features and outcomes.

28) The second-cycle refers to the third and fourth years of university study, after which one obtains a license and then a maitrise. In actuality the number of years taken to complete these degrees is not uncommonly more than this.

29) See Bienaymé (1978:31) for a description of the strikes which paralyzed over two dozen universities.

30) Such competition takes place whether it is within a national or international community, or within particular national sectors or subgroups of institutions. Of course some consideration of each of these bases of competition, albeit to different extents and according to different proportions, characterizes most institutions.

31) Unless, of course, that definition of purpose promoted responsiveness (e.g., defining an institution, sector, or system in terms of responsiveness to community needs) and/or innovation. But even in this situation it is likely that professionals within the institution will advance and protect their view of what form this responsiveness should take.

32) See Geiger (forthcoming) for a discussion of the importance of this dimension (viz., integration into the national academic community) in determining the behavior of colleges and universities. This dimension is said by him to be more important than that of public/private institutional character.
33) There are, then, trade-offs within as well as between the five national interests. The pursuit of one interpretation of competence may be considered by others to detract from and impede the pursuit and realization of another interpretation of competence.

34) The U.K., the Netherlands, West Germany, and Norway.

35) While we have concentrated almost exclusively on the interest of competence in this discussion, battles were also raging over the interests of social justice and academic freedom, as well as autonomy/accountability and decentralization/centralization - not only over their definition, but over whether the higher education system was the appropriate place to pursue them.

36) There are, of course, exceptions. E.P. Thompson's Warwick University, Ltd., and articles by David F. Noble and Nancy E. Pfund, and Al Meyerhoff, each deal with the connection between private industry and higher education, and the potential threat of such links to academic freedom.

37) One finds the same tendency among French university students, though perhaps it is not as characteristic of those attending the grandes écoles and IUTs.

38) See Becher, Embling, and Kogan (1978), Burgess and Pratt (1970), and Donaldson (1975) for a discussion of this in the case of the U.K.

39) See Clark's (1978b:74) triangle of types of coordination, organized around State Authority, the Market, and Academic Oligarchy.

40) This kind of State-controlled "market-driven" system is a category that might be added to Clark's (forthcoming) categories of "Market State Systems." It is distinct from "controlled competition," "state-subsidy of markets," and "power markets and competitive bureaucracy."
41) The new universities of the U.K., which were largely a professionally induced experiment in interdisciplinarity, are but one example. The point is that innovative groups which lack the resources to engage in what Margaret Archer (1979) calls "substitution" must in State systems rely on "political manipulation." Sometimes this is even necessary for certain professional groups.

42) What Clark (forthcoming) calls "controlled competition."


44) See Green (1981b) and F. Rudolph (1962) for more detailed discussion of these acts.

45) It is indirect vis-a-vis institutions, but is a very direct way of dealing with access.

46) Even in 1959 Robert Berdahl stressed that to much should not be made of the differences between earmarked and block grants in the U.K. This is perhaps all the more true today as the post-Robbins UGC has acted to provide much more "guidance." And some might fear that with the DES' intention of giving guidance to the UGC (as revealed in a letter by Sir Keith Joseph to Dr. Edward Parkes) this distinction is virtually meaningless, that any professional autonomy inherent in the concept of block funding has been lost altogether. Nevertheless, in contrast to American project-specific funding, specific allocations in the U.K. remain in the hands of academic professionals. As a recent THES editorial pointed out, "No Government, not even this Government, is ever likely to interfere in detail with the UGC's advice or allocation to individual universities . . ." (1982, July 23:24).

47) That is, members of the higher education institutions being "coordinated."

48) See Folger (1977), Moss and Gaither (1976), Bowen and Glenny (1976) and Bowen (1974) for other treatments of state government and accountability.
49) But in order to ensure continuance of the college's original mission
new courses that are outside of existing programs, and completely
new programs, require state-level approval.

50) Indeed they very often come from positions in institutions of higher
education. Yet there is a decline of executive officers with institu-
tional ties - though institutional representatives in coordinating
agencies are presidents, not faculty members. And, according to
Berdahl (1971:71): "in nineteen coordinating agencies only nine have
staffs at least half of whom hold or are working for the doctoral
degree, and the figures for governing boards are even smaller."

51) It is not clear if the lay population as a whole shares these.


53) Also see Meyerhoff's (1980) article.

54) See Maurice Kogan (1971) for a discussion of some of the changes in the
1950s which altered the balance of power between central and local
government.

55) See Halsey and Trow's (1971) discussion of the basic characteristics
of the British system.

56) One exception to this might be the manual and non-manual unions within
universities, which are becoming more powerful.

57) See Rune Premfors (1980) and Harold Perkin (1977a, 1977b). In some
areas the dominance is not just of university graduates, but of
Oxbridge graduates.

58) It may be said that elected government's sometimes have articulated
and expressed public discontent (e.g., as it may be said Thatcher did
with respect to the negative feelings the population had towards

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public servants). But this is only a very indeterminate and indirect means of influence.

59) It is worth noting here that the designation of CATs as universities was quite consistent with the recommendations of the famous Robbins Report, drafted by a committee consisting largely of academics.

60) See Van de Graaff (1976) for a detailing of the commissions and persons involved in preparing this reform.

61) As Van de Graaff (1976) notes, IUTs have a special status in universities. There is greater control by the central ministry. They are directly funded. And though they are linked to universities they are actually more like grandes écoles.
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Private Sectors in Higher Education. Forthcoming


