The emergence of a modern or "new" rhetoric has been characterized by its attempt both to recover and reexamine the concepts of classical rhetoric and to define itself against that classical tradition. The distinctions that are persistently drawn between classical and modern rhetoric fall under four related heads: images of man and society, logical argument, speaker-audience relationship, and persuasion versus communication. The first two distinctions, which view the classical image of man as a rational being and the logical proofs as supreme, discount classical rhetoric as too rationalistic. The latter two, which present the speaker-audience relationship in classical rhetoric as antagonistic and unidirectional and its goal as persuasion, discount classical rhetoric as being too dependent upon emotional manipulation and coercion. These distinctions reflect two major problems: (1) a failure to relate Aristotle's "Rhetoric" to the rest of his philosophy, and (2) serious, persistent misunderstandings about the nature and function of the "pisteis" and of the "enthymeme" in Aristotelian rhetoric. A much more accurate way to describe Aristotle's concept of the goal of rhetoric is as an interactive means of discovering meaning through language. Such an approach demands that rhetoric be reinstituted at the center of the curriculum, as the art of using language in the creation—and sharing—of knowledge and belief. One way to begin this task is by eschewing the false distinctions that have been drawn between classical and modern rhetoric and by building instead on their powerful similarities. (HOD)
On Distinctions Between Classical and Modern Rhetoric

Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford

The tentative emergence of a modern or a "new" rhetoric has been characterized both by the attempt to recover and reexamine the concepts of classical rhetoric and to define itself against that classical tradition. The works of Richard Weaver, Richard McKeon, Kenneth Burke, Donald Bryant and, later, Albert Duhamel, Chaim Perelman and Edward P. J. Corbett helped draw attention to major tenets and values of the classical system. Daniel Fogarty's important Roots for a New Rhetoric (1959) stands at a metaphorical crossroads, affirming the continuing need for a viable rhetoric and sketching in the broad outlines of a "new" rhetoric that would meet that need:

[The new rhetoric] will need to broaden its aim until it no longer confines itself to teaching the art of formal persuasion but includes information in every kind of symbol-using...; it will need to adjust itself to the recent studies in the psychology and sociology of communication; and, finally, it will need to make considerable provision for a new kind of speaker-listener situation...

The years since 1959 have witnessed numerous attempts to define modern rhetoric more fully--attempts that consistently have rested on distinctions drawn between classical rhetoric and an emerging "new" system. We believe that focusing primarily on distinctions between the "old" and the "new" rhetoric has led to unfortunate oversimplifications and distortions. Consequently, our purpose in this essay is to survey the distinctions typically drawn between classical and modern rhetoric, to suggest why
these distinctions are inaccurate and, most importantly, to note the compelling similarities between classical and modern rhetoric. These similarities, we believe, can help clarify the features essential to any dynamic theory of rhetoric.

Although stated in widely varying terms, the distinctions persistently drawn between classical and modern or "new" rhetoric fall under four related heads. Images of man and of society provide one area frequently cited as distinguishing the two rhetorical periods. According to many definers of new rhetoric, the classical tradition, and especially Aristotle, defined man as a "rational animal" who dealt with problems of the world primarily through logic or reason and who lived during a time characterized by stable values, social cohesion, and a unified cultural ideal. In contrast, modern rhetoric defines man as essentially a "rhetorical" or "symbol-using" or "communal" animal who constitutes the world through shared and private symbols. And this modern man is said to live not in a simple, cohesive society but in an aleatoric universe in which generally agreed upon values and unifying norms are scarce or non-existent. In such a universe, it is argued, the bases of classical rhetoric are simply inadequate.

The second distinction often drawn between classical and contemporary rhetoric—that classical rhetoric emphasizes logical while modern rhetoric stresses emotional (or psychological) proofs—is closely related to the
first. Young, Becker, and Pike argue, for example, that Aristotle's image of man as a rational animal had a direct influence on his rhetoric: "Underlying the classical tradition is the notion that although men are often swayed by passions, their basic and distinguishing characteristic is their ability to reason... [Thus for classical rhetoricians] logical argument... was the heart of persuasive discourse." According to Douglas Ehninger, this preference for logical proof is also evident in classical invention which, he believes, focuses on the analysis of subject matter at the expense of a concern for "the basic laws of human understanding." As a result, Ehninger notes, a successful classical orator had to be "an expert logician," while the modern speaker or writer needs, in contrast, to be "a keen student of practical psychology."7

A third often-cited distinction between the two periods concerns the rhetor-audience relationship, a relationship said to be characterized, in the classical period, by manipulative, antagonistic, one-way or unidirectional communication.8 The new rhetoric is conversely said to posit not an antagonistic but a cooperative relationship between rhetor and audience, one based upon empathy, understanding, mutual trust, and two-way or "dialogic" communication.9 In Rhetoric: Discovery and Change, for instance, Young, Becker, and Pike reject what they see as the classical model of "skillful verbal coercion" and introduce instead a "Rogerian rhetoric" of "enlightened cooperation."10 In his 1967 and 1968 essays describing systems of rhetoric, Douglas Ehninger labels the
new rhetoric "social" or "sociological" and argues that it is an "instrument for understanding...."[11

The final distinction often drawn between the two periods is inextricably related to the rhetor-audience relationship just described. This distinction results from identifying the goal of classical rhetoric as persuasion; while the goal of the new rhetoric is identified as communication. In his widely influential 1936 study, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, I. A. Richards articulates this view:

Among the general themes of the old Rhetoric which he associates with Aristotle is one which is especially pertinent to our inquiry. The old Rhetoric was an offspring of dispute; it developed as the rationale of pleadings and persuadings; it was the theory of the battle of words and has always been itself dominated by the combative impulse.

Wilbur Samuel Howell, whose works on 16th, 17th, and 18th century rhetoric have become standard texts, also identifies persuasion as the goal of classical rhetoric and specifically argues that the "new" 18th century rhetoric explicitly embraced exposition and communication as goals. [13 Recent articles by Otis Walter, Richard Ohmann, Herbert Simons, Douglas Ehninger, Richard Young, and Paul Bator describe classical (and often specifically Aristotelian) rhetoric as emphasizing success or winning above all else, often depicting rhetors as attempting to coerce or impose their will on others. [14 In Ohmann's words, classical rhetoric is "concerned, fundamentally, with persuasion. The practical rhetorician—the orator—seeks to impel his audience from apathy to action or from old opinion to new, by appealing to will,
emotion, and reason. And the novice... learns the tricks...

Most of these writers claim that the new rhetoric, on the other hand, stresses not coercive persuasion but communication, understanding, and reduction of threat through dialogue.

The following figure summarizes the four distinctions which are persistently drawn between classical and modern rhetoric.

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Figure 1: Major Distinctions Typically Drawn Between Classical and Modern Rhetoric

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classical Rhetoric</th>
<th>Modern Rhetoric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Man is a rational animal living in a society marked by social cohesion and agreed upon values.</td>
<td>1. Man is a symbol-using animal living in a fragmented society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Emphasis is on logical (or rational) proofs.</td>
<td>2. Emphasis is on emotional (or psychological) proofs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rhetor-audience relationship is antagonistic, characterized by manipulative, one-way communication.</td>
<td>3. Rhetor-audience relationship is cooperative, characterized by empathetic, two-way communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Goal is persuasion.</td>
<td>4. Goal is communication.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the many points which could be made about these distinctions, one seems particularly crucial: they resolve to two contradictory claims about the nature of classical rhetoric. The first two distinctions, which view the classical image of man as a rational being and the logical proofs as supreme, discount classical rhetoric as too rationalistic. The latter two, which present the rhetor-audience relationship in classical rhetoric as antagonistic and unidirectional and...
its goal as persuasion (in the narrowest, most limited sense),
discount classical rhetoric as too dependent upon emotional manipulation
and coercion.

This disconcerting contradiction is perhaps the strongest evidence that the conventional understanding of classical rhetoric, as embodied in the above distinctions, is seriously flawed. The resulting confusion has led not only to major distortions and misrepresentations of classical rhetoric, but to critical misunderstandings of our own potential system as well. Although we believe a strong argument can be made that these distinctions distort classical rhetoric in general, space restrictions do not permit us to make such a case here. Instead, we have chosen to use Aristotle as the locus of our discussion because the Aristotelian theory is the most complete of all classical rhetorics and, more importantly, because many current misconceptions grow out of a limited reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. In particular, we wish to argue that the distinctions we have outlined reflect two major problems: 1) a failure to relate Aristotle’s Rhetoric to the rest of his philosophy; and 2) serious, persistent misunderstandings about the nature and function of the pisteis and of the enthymeme in Aristotelian rhetoric.

II

One of the most essential characteristics of Aristotle’s philosophical system is its integration. It is no accident, for example,
that Aristotle begins his work on rhetoric by carefully noting its relationship with dialectic. As William M. A. Crimaldi, S. J., observes in his Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric, Aristotle in this work "insists from the outset upon showing the relation of his comments to his work on dialectic, epistemology, ethics, and even metaphysics....Throughout the analysis his constant explicit and implicit reference to his own philosophic work clearly reveals that he was writing with his own philosophic system in mind."

A recent article by Christopher Lyle Johnstone on "An Aristotelian Trilogy: Ethics, Rhetoric, Politics, and the Search for Moral Truth" demonstrates how the failure to relate Aristotle's analysis of rhetoric to his discussion of ethics and politics has resulted in critical misinterpretations of Aristotle's intent. As an example, Johnstone cites the often-quoted passage in the Rhetoric in which Aristotle emphasizes the necessity of "putting the judge in 'a certain' or 'the right' frame of mind," a statement often used as evidence that Aristotle advocates crass emotional manipulation (p. 9). What commentators have failed to recognize is that in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle consistently uses the same phrase to mean "the morally right condition, the state in which emotion is amenable to rational guidance" (p. 9). This emphasis on rational guidance should not, however, be interpreted as support for the view that Aristotle advocates an exclusively rational rhetoric since the end of rhetoric,
as Aristotle clearly indicates, is krisis (judgment), "an activity of the practical intellect, and thus one directed by logos and pathos functioning in a complementary relationship. As a result 'The right frame of mind' can only be taken to refer to that emotional state that, when joined by reason in the process of judging or deciding, makes intelligent and responsible choice possible" (pp. 9-10).

This example is symptomatic of the misunderstandings that can occur when commentators ignore the fundamental connections among Aristotle's writings. Lawrence Rosenfield makes a similar point in "Rhetorical Criticism and an Aristotelian Notion of Process," which explores the relationship between Aristotle's concept of process, or "the way in which an object acquires characteristics or properties," and his concept of animism. Basic to Rosenfield's argument is his assertion that "the essential contribution of the concept of animism to Aristotle's notion of process is that of dynamic interaction between an agent and an object undergoing change" (p. 4). As a result, Rosenfield questions whether in Aristotelian rhetoric "the figure which best captures the communicator's role... is not that of a puppeteer, who manipulates his audience according to his skill at persuasion, but that of a midwife who focuses and directs energies inherent in the listener himself" (p. 8). In fact, Aristotle's metaphysics intrinsically rejects exploitative or "monologic" communication from speaker to listener (p. 15).

As even this brief discussion should suggest, investigations of the relationship between Aristotle's rhetorical and philosophical
writings can help us locate alternatives to previous interpretations of the Rhetoric which have, simplistically, tended to characterize that work as exclusively committed either to rational or emotional appeals. In order fully to resolve the reductive dilemma posed by these contradictory interpretations, however, we must finally turn to the Rhetoric itself, particularly to the pisteis and the enthymeme. For much of the confusion surrounding the Rhetoric can be traced, finally, to an inadequate understanding of the nature of and interrelationships among Aristotle's methods of proof.

As William Grimaldi observes, the traditional conception of the nature and role of the pisteis is that they are "three independent modes of rhetorical demonstration: non-logical (or quasi-logical) demonstration by the use of ethos and pathos, and logical demonstration by means of the enthymeme, the syllogism of rhetoric" (p. 65). Such a view encourages the conflict between the role of reason and emotion in the Rhetoric which has complicated interpretations of that work and led to the contradiction noted above. For if the pisteis are viewed as discrete, separable elements of discourse, then logos and its tool the enthymeme may be isolated and crowned supreme (as some commentators have done). Or pathos may hold sway instead, resulting in a view of rhetoric as overly emotional and manipulative. The solution to this dilemma must be to replace an oversimplified notion of the pisteis as elements that can be added to discourse—rather like ingredients in a recipe—with a more complex understanding of the
inseparable strands that link people engaged in discourse.

In his *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric* and *Aristotle, Rhetoric I, A Commentary*, William Grimaldi articulates such an enriched, corrective perspective. His complex argument cannot be fully described here, but particularly central to his discussion are: 1) his analyses of the multiple uses of the words *pistis* and *pisteis* in the original text and of the pre-Aristotelian history of the word *enthymeme*; and 2) his discussion of the relationship of the *eide* and *koinoi topoii* to the *pisteis* (*logos, ethos, and pathos*) and of these *pisteis* to *enthymeme* and *paradeigma* (example). The resulting analysis represents a powerful alternative explication of the basic method of rhetorical discourse as outlined in the *Rhetoric*. In this method, the *enthymeme* is not a mere tool of *logos*, nor do the three *pisteis* of *logos, ethos, and pathos* function independently of one another. Rather, they interact in the *enthymeme* and *paradeigma*, the two central methods of rhetorical demonstration—the former deductive, the latter inductive. Thus Grimaldi clarifies our understanding of the *enthymeme*, broadening its generally accepted definition as the limited tool of *logos* to one of the two modes of inference through which rhetor and audience together move toward krisis.

Grimaldi's analysis thus dissolves the apparent contradiction between reason and emotion in the *Rhetoric* and demonstrates that the contradictory interpretations of classical rhetoric described earlier represent a false dichotomy. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is neither an
abstract theoretical treatise in praise of logos nor a handbook of manipulative emotional tricks. Rather, through the enthymeme which, (along with paradeigma) integrates and organizes the pisteis of logos, ethos, and pathos, Aristotle develops a system of language use whereby individuals unite all their resources--intellect, will, and emotion--in communicating with one another. The Rhetoric, then, acknowledges that we are moved to krisis not just by knowledge but by emotion as well: "In rhetorical discourse the audience must be brought not only to knowledge of the subject but knowledge as relevant and significant for they are either indifferent, opposed, or in partial agreement. . . . If the whole person acts then it is the whole person to whom discourse in rhetoric must be directed" (Studies, pp. 146-147).

An understanding of how Aristotle's Rhetoric relates to his entire philosophical system and of how the enthymeme and the pisteis function in the Rhetoric suggests that the characterization of classical rhetoric summarized in Figure 1 (see page 5) is inadequate and misleading. The first distinction, which posits classical man as solely a rational being living in a stable society seems particularly oversimplistic.

As our discussion of the enthymeme indicates, the rational man of Aristotle's rhetoric is not a logic-chopping automaton but a language-using animal who unites reason and emotion in discourse with others. Aristotle (and indeed, Plato and Isocrates as well) studied the power of the mind to gain meaning from the world and to share that meaning with others. And far from being a highly stable society marked by
agreement on all values, Aristotle's Greece was one of upheaval: old beliefs in the gods were increasingly challenged; the political structure of the Greek city state system was under attack; the educational system was embroiled in deep controversy. 26

Equally inadequate is the second distinction, held by those who argue that classical rhetoric privileges logical proofs. As we have seen, such a view oversimplifies Aristotle's own complex analysis of the nature of reason, ignoring his careful discrimination of the speculative and practical intellect. In addition, this distinction misrepresents the nature and function of the enthymeme and the pisteis.

If logos, ethos, and pathos are dynamically related in the enthymeme, the third traditional distinction, which characterizes the rhetor-audience relationship in classical rhetoric as antagonistic and uni-directional, is equally unacceptable. Further support to this position is given by Lawrence Rosenfield's discussion of Aristotle's concept of process and by Lloyd Bitzer's analysis of the enthymeme in "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," which argues that since "enthymemes occur only when speaker and audience jointly produce them..." they intimately unite speaker and audience and provide the strongest possible proofs. 27 Far from being "one-way," "manipulative," or "monological," Aristotle's rhetoric provides a complete description of the dynamic interaction between rhetor and audience, an interaction mediated by language. Seen in the light of Aristotle's entire system of thought, the rhetorical elements of rhetor, audience, and subject matter are
dynamic, interlocking forces.

Finally, if the relationship between the rhetor and the audience in Aristotle's system is indeed dynamic and interdependent, then the goal of Aristotelian rhetoric can hardly be persuasion in the narrow or pejorative sense in which it is used by those who equate persuasion with manipulation and coercion. We suggest that a much more accurate way to describe Aristotle's concept of the goal of rhetoric is as an interactive means of discovering meaning through language. 28 It is, as Richard Hughes notes in "The Contemporaneity of Classical Rhetoric," "A generative process," one in which the rhetor "is both investigator and communicator." 29 As Grimaldi observes, rhetoric was for Aristotle "the heart of the process by which man tried to interpret and make meaningful for himself and others the world. . . ." (Studies, p. 54). This process may be termed "persuasion," only in the broad sense that all language is inherently persuasive. In his discussion of the function of rhetoric, Kenneth Burke says that "there is no chance of our keeping apart the meaning of persuasion, identification ('consubstantiality') and communication.... We have thus," Burke notes, "come to the point at which Aristotle begins his treatise on rhetoric." 30

III

In spite of the large body of scholarship which should have kept us from drawing misleading distinctions, the view of classical rhetoric as manipulative, monologic, and rationalistic still persists. We
believe that we, therefore, must also come back to Aristotle, to a
richer understanding of how his theory can enrich and illuminate our
own. Indeed, major distinctions between Aristotelian and contemporary
rhetoric do exist, but these distinctions are more fundamental than
those traditionally cited. While we shall note these distinctions, we
wish to stress what we believe are compelling similarities between
the two rhetorics, similarities which draw contemporary rhetoric
closer to the classical system rather than further away from it. Our
understanding of these similarities and of the profound distinctions
which must accompany them, as outlined in Figure 2, will help us
identify those qualities which must characterize any vital theory of
rhetoric.
Figure 2: Similarities and Qualifying Distinctions Between Classical and Modern Rhetoric

1. Both classical and modern rhetoric view man as a language-using animal who unites reason and emotion in discourse with another.

Qualifying distinction

Aristotle addresses himself primarily to the oral use of language; ours is primarily an age of print.

2. In both periods rhetoric provides a dynamic methodology whereby rhetor and audience may jointly have access to knowledge.

Qualifying distinction:

According to Aristotle, rhetor and audience come into a state of knowing which places them in a clearly defined relationship with the world and with each other mediated by their language. The prevailing modernist world view compels rhetoric to operate without any such clearly articulated theory of the knower and the known.

3. In both periods rhetoric has the potential to clarify and inform activities in numerous related fields.

Qualifying distinction:

Aristotle's theory establishes rhetoric as an art and relates it clearly to all fields of knowledge. Despite the efforts of modern rhetoricians, we lack any systematic, generally accepted theory to inform current practice.

One similarity between classical and modern rhetoric is their shared concept of man as a language-using animal who unites reason and emotion in discourse with another. Central to this concept is the role of language in the creation of knowledge or belief and its relationship to the knowing mind. We have already demonstrated the ways in which
Aristotle's *Rhetoric* unites reason and emotion. In addition, Aristotle's works on logic, ethics, and epistemology as well as the *Rhetoric* demonstrate that Aristotle recognized the powerful dynamism of the creating human mind. These works further indicate that Aristotle was aware of man's ability to use symbols and that he viewed language as the medium through which judgments about the world are communicated.

Modern theories, of course, also posit language as the ground of rhetoric. This view is articulated in Burke's famous statement that rhetoric "is rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is continually born anew; the use of language as a means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols." 31 Theorists as dissimilar as I. A. Richards, Chaim Perelman, and Wayne Booth hold parallel views on the relation between language and rhetoric.

As expected in rhetorics removed by 2300 years, however, Aristotle's system of language use differs from ours. The resultant distinction between the two periods is potentially profound: Aristotle addressed himself primarily to oral discourse; modern rhetorics have addressed themselves primarily to written discourse. Our understanding of the historical and methodological ramifications of the speaking/writing distinction has been hampered by the twentieth-century split among speech, linguistics, philosophy, and English departments. Despite the work of scholars such as Walter Ong, Kenneth Burke, and Jacques
Derrida, many questions about the relationship of speech and writing remain unanswered and, in some cases, unexplored.\textsuperscript{32}

The second major similarity we find between Aristotelian and modern rhetoric is the view of rhetoric as a techne or dynamic methodology through which rhetor and audience, a self and an other, may jointly have access to knowledge.\textsuperscript{33} We have already examined Aristotle's concept of the enthymeme and the ways in which it unites speaker and audience, logos, ethos, and pathos, in the pursuit of knowledge leading to action. In modern theory, particularly the work of Kenneth Burke, rhetoric provides the means through which we may both achieve identification with an other and understand that identification through the attribution of motives. Similarly, Chaim Perelman's rhetorical system posits rhetoric as the process through which speaker and other gain access to knowledge.

We believe that such a view of rhetoric as creative or epistemic must characterize any viable, dynamic rhetoric. And, indeed, any other view reduces the role of rhetoric to a "naming of parts" or to stylistic embellishment, reductions characteristic of many rhetorical theories. But this basic similarity should not mask an equally important distinction between classical and modern rhetoric. As we have seen, this distinction concerns not the notion of man, the nature of proof, the speaker-audience relationship, nor the goal of rhetoric. Instead, this distinction concerns the nature and status of knowledge.
For Aristotle, knowledge may be either of the necessary or the contingent. Knowledge of the necessary or universal, episteme, operates in the realm of the theoretical or scientific. Breaking with Plato, Aristotle admits of another kind of knowledge, that of the contingent. Such knowledge, doxa, is the way of knowing contingent reality (i.e., the world around us that is both characterized and limited by change). Rhetoric's realm is limited to the contingent, and the connections among language, thought, and that reality are grounded in an epistemology which posits reality independent of the knower. In short, rhetoric uses thought and language to lead to judgment (krisis) as the basis of action in matters of this world. And for Aristotle, that world of contingent reality, though itself in a state of flux, could be understood by systematic application of the intellect because that reality was itself thought to be informed by stable first principles.

Modern rhetorical theory rests on no such fully confident epistemology, nor does knowledge enjoy such a clearly defined status. In fact, we are in radical disagreement over what "knowledge" may be, though we generally agree on man's ability to communicate that disagreement. Hence, for the modern period, connections between thought, language, and reality are thought to be grounded not in an independent, chartable reality but in the nature of the knower instead, and reality is not so much discovered or discoverable as it is constituted by the interplay of thought and language. Though we lack a fully articulated
theory, Kenneth Burke, Richard Weaver, and Wayne Booth offer intensive investigations into the rhetoric of this interplay; and works in disciplines as diverse as anthropology, language philosophy, literary criticism, philosophy, psychology, and the physical sciences suggest that, as Michael Polanyi says in the opening of Personal Knowledge, "...we must inevitably see the universe from a centre lying within ourselves and speak about it in terms of a human language shaped by the exigencies of human intercourse. Any attempt rigorously to eliminate our human perspective from our picture of the world must lead to absurdity."35

Rhetoric's grounding in language and its potential ability to join rhetor and audience in the discovery of shared (communicable) knowledge suggests a third compelling similarity between classical and modern rhetoric: in both periods rhetoric has the potential to clarify and inform activities in numerous related fields. By establishing rhetoric as the antithelophos or corollary of dialectic, Aristotle immediately places rhetoric in relation to other fields of knowledge, and these relationships are painstakingly worked out in the Organon. Rhetoric, poetics, and ethics all involve doxa, knowledge of contingent, shifting reality. Hence, rhetoric is necessarily useful in addressing complex human problems in any field where certainty is unachievable.

In addition, Aristotle's Rhetoric provided a theory that was intimately related to practice. For the Greeks, and indeed for
the Romans who followed them, rhetoric was a practical art of discourse which played a central role in education and in the daily affairs of citizens. Aristotle's work established a theoretical relationship among belief, language, and action; Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian all adapted and acted out that theory, Quintilian using it as a basis for a rhetoric which would serve as a way of knowing and a guide to action throughout a person's life.

From the time of Quintilian, the history of rhetoric has been haunted by a whittling away of domain, a compartmentalization of its offices, and a frequent dramatic separation of theory and practice. The most obvious instance of rhetoric's diminution is Ramus's assignment of inventio and dispositio to logic, thus leaving rhetoric with a concern only for style. Even George Campbell and Alexander Bain, both of whom attempted to ground rhetoric in a full psychology, did not fully admit invention into the province of rhetoric. Not until philosophers began to recapture the crucial conception of language as a meaning-making activity, an essential element in the social construction of reality, has rhetoric had the opportunity to regain some of its lost status and scope, to inform both education and ordinary behavior and thus clarify a number of related fields.

Why, thus far at least, has this opportunity not been realized? A partial answer to this question must lie in what we see as a final qualifying distinction between classical and modern rhetorics. Aristotle's theory is revolutionary in that it establishes rhetoric as an art and relates it clearly to all fields of knowledge. Despite the efforts of
modern rhetoricians, we lack any such systematic theory to inform current practice. In fact, our age has witnessed a curious divorce between rhetorical theory and practice and an extreme fragmentation of our discipline. Earlier in this essay, we alluded to the large body of rhetorical "theory" which argues that modern rhetoric is characterized by understanding, mutual sharing, and two-way communication. Yet how well does such theory account for or describe twentieth-century rhetorical practice, which has surely reached new heights (or depths) of manipulative use of language?

The position of rhetorical theory and practice in education is equally fragmented. While theorists in speech departments consider the theoretical concept of "dialogic communication," their counterparts in English departments struggle over abstract questions of intentionality in literary texts, and scholars in linguistics departments strive to describe the abstract grammar of a sentence. Meanwhile, instruction in rhetorical practice—speaking, writing, and reading—is usually relegated to graduate students and part-time instructors and looked upon as menial "service." As a result, most of our textbooks offer compendia of "how-to" tips but fail to ground that advice in a theoretical framework that would relate language, action, and belief. 37

Such a situation is a far cry from Aristotle's elegant theory, from Cicero's powerful statesmanship, or from Quintilian's masterful pedagogy. But if our failure to articulate a systematic theory which informs current practice is great, our need is even greater. We
believe that the work of such theorists as Kenneth Burke, Chaim Perelman, Wolfgang Iser, Richard Weaver, and Wayne Booth offers a modern ground for the reunion of rhetorical theory and practice. But such a reunion demands that we attempt to reinstate rhetoric at or near the center of our curriculum, as the art of using language in the creation—and sharing—of knowledge and belief.

One way to begin this task is by eschewing the false distinctions that have been drawn persistently between classical and modern rhetoric and by building instead on their powerful similarities. If we see Aristotle's Rhetoric as a work which unites rhetor and audience, language and action, theory and practice, then we have a model for our own antistrophes. If rhetoric is to reach its full potential in the twentieth century as an informing framework for long-divorced disciplines and for instruction and conduct in reading, writing, and speaking, then we must define ourselves not in opposition to but in consonance with the classical model.


4 These definitions stem primarily from Kenneth Burke’s profound efforts to articulate a contemporary rhetoric, though Burke in no way upholds or sets forth the problematic distinctions we have previously detailed. For a discussion of man as communal, see Young, Becker, and Pike’s Rhetoric: Discovery and Change, pp. 7-9 and the articles on dialogic communication listed in footnote 9.


6 Rhetoric: Discovery and Change, p. 6. This notion is reiterated by Paul Bator in "Aristotelian and Rogerian Rhetoric."


See footnote 2 for full citations.

Ohmann, in Contemporary Theories of Rhetoric, p. 64.

They do so often in reference to Aristotle's condemnation, early in Book I, of pathos in the hands of the technographers. Yet Aristotle by no means denies that pathos is part of the rhetorical art. He is rather questioning the misuse of pathos by these technographers. See William Grimaldi, Aristotle, Rhetoric I, Commentary (Fordham University Press, 1980), p. 7.

As we were completing this essay, we were fortunate to receive a copy of an article by Floyd D. Anderson, "The Classical Conception of Communication as Dialogue." Professor Anderson makes a very persuasive argument in his essay for all of classical rhetoric as sharing what we argue is an Aristotelian view of communication. We are indebted to Professor Anderson for sharing his insights with us.


The failure to read the *Rhetoric* in light of Aristotle's other works if further exacerbated by difficulties in translation. In "The Greckless Reader and Aristotle's Rhetoric," Thomas M. Conley demonstrates that Lane Cooper's popular translation is seriously flawed in a number of places. In particular, Conley argues that where Aristotle discusses the importance of getting the "judge into the right frame of mind," the Greek does not "express the one-way view of persuasion" usually inferred. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 65 (1979), 75.


Douglas Ehninger notes, for example, in his discussion of "Campbell, Blair, and Whately Revisited," *Southern Speech Journal*, 28 (Spring 1963), 169-182, that in classical rhetorical theory the *pisteis* "... were viewed as autonomous. Each was considered as complete in itself, and as entirely capable of effecting conviction without the aid of the others" (172).


The heart of Grimaldi's analysis reveals that the Greek word for *pisteis* is used by Aristotle to indicate both *logos*, *pathos*, and *ethos* (the entechnic *pisteis*) and enthymeme and paradeigma (the apodeictic *pisteis*). See esp. the Appendix, "The Role of the Pisteis in Aristotle's Methodology," Commentary, pp. 49-356.

See Aristotle's Rhetoric, 1355a 27-28, 1395b 31-1396a 4, 1402a 33-34.

We are indebted to Michael Halloran for pointing out that the oratory of fourth-century B.C. Athens reveals much about contemporary cultural turmoil.

Grimaldi makes essentially the same point: "As soon as it is understood that rhetoric for Aristotle is an activity which engages the whole person in an effort to communicate meaning by way of language a major obstacle toward understanding the Rhetoric is removed" (Studies, p. 53).

Richard Hughes, "The Contemporaneity of Classical Rhetoric," College Composition and Communication, 16 (1965), 159.


Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 43.

In "The Decline of Public Discourse. " (unpublished manuscript), Michael Halloran traces the move from oral discourse to written discourse in American colleges and draws a number of provocative and insightful conclusions about the results of that move.

Grimaldi provides an illuminating discussion of the relationship of techné to dynamis in Commentary, pp. 5-6.

Among the articles we have read which draw distinctions between classical and modern rhetoric, Michael Halloran's works cited in footnote 2 deal substantively with this epistemological difference.


Otis Walter has recently argued that the opening sentence of the Rhetoric be interpreted as "Rhetoric must follow the lead of an informed, searching and brilliant intellect" and that this sentence is the most significant in the Rhetoric because it "carries Aristotle's revolutionary intent, because it suggests his concern for knowing, because it contains the ethical case for knowledge." Such an interpretation fits well with, and indeed supports, our view of Aristotle's concept of rhetoric and its relationship to knowledge and human action.
In "An Adequate Epistemology for Composition: Classical and Modern Perspectives," also in this volume, John Gage presents a persuasive discussion of how the concept of the enthymeme has been reduced to sterile formulae in modern texts, and he goes on to show how a fuller understanding of Aristotle's enthymeme can provide the kind of theoretical framework we are calling for here.