A study was conducted to determine whether unit-level individual skill training is being provided to prepare Army enlisted personnel to perform critical job tasks within their military occupational specialty (MOS). The General Accounting Office reviewed the Army's skill training programs at 10 active units in the continental United States and five active units in Europe and administered questionnaires to more than 6,300 soldiers throughout the Army. Results showed that 54 percent of the noncommissioned officers believed only half or fewer of the soldiers they supervise were adequately trained for combat duty in their MOS. Factors impeding effective training were shortage of experienced trainers, high personnel turnover rates in operational units, and lack of functional training equipment and ammunition. It was recommended that the Army's management oversight system for training be strengthened by increased monitoring of programs and improved evaluative information. It was found that the Army has recently announced initiatives to improve individual skill training effectiveness, including assignment changes to make more trainers available, rotation policy changes, and an extended basic training program. (Appendixes include questionnaires and lists of units reviewed.)
Soldiers are not being trained in all the tasks the Army considers critical for proper job performance and survival in combat. As a result, many soldiers cannot perform to the standards prescribed by Army criteria.

The Army has taken steps to improve training; however, additional initiatives are needed. As near-term options, the Army can strengthen individual skill training programs at the unit level to insure that soldiers receive essential training. GAO recommends several actions which can be taken to enhance these programs, including strengthening its management oversight of individual skill training.

Because of the extensive training problems at the unit level, GAO believes the Army also needs to determine if soldiers should be provided more skill training prior to their being assigned to a unit.
Request for copies of GAO reports should be sent to:

U.S. General Accounting Office
Document Handling and Information Services Facility
P.O. Box 6015
Gaithersburg, Md. 20760

Telephone (202) 275-6241

The first five copies of individual reports are free of charge. Additional copies of bound audit reports are $3.25 each. Additional copies of unbound report (i.e., letter reports) and most other publications are $1.00 each. There will be a 25% discount on all orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address. Sales orders must be prepaid on a cash, check, or money order basis. Check should be made out to the "Superintendent of Documents".
To the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives

This report discusses individual skill training for Army enlisted personnel and suggests ways of improving training effectiveness. Written comments provided by the Army are in Appendix I. The comments were not received in time to be evaluated as provided by Public Law 96-226.

The likely needs of the Congress for decisionmaking information, the growing concern about the trained capability of the Army, and the need to assess the fundamental policy changes to the training philosophy motivated our study of Army training.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the Chairmen, House Committee on Government Operations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services.

Acting Comptroller General of the United States
In the mid-1970's the Army changed its skill training philosophy for individual soldiers. In an attempt to reduce the cost of formal schooling for new soldiers and at the same time make its training programs more specific, the Army shifted its emphasis from the formal school environment to the operating unit and designated specific tasks to be trained at each level. As a result, most training now takes place in Army units, and the effectiveness of this training is a primary factor in the success or failure of our forces.

GAO reviewed the Army's skill training programs at 10 active units in the Continental U.S. and 5 active units in Europe and administered questionnaires to more than 6,300 soldiers throughout the Army.

The Army, in principle, has developed a training program for individual soldiers which sets forth specific training criteria. Army trainers have been provided guidance which specifies what tasks soldiers must know as well as the performance conditions and standards for each task. (See pp. 2 and 3.)

In practice, however, the Army's trainers are not teaching soldiers all tasks the Army considers critical for proper job performance and survival in combat. GAO's questionnaire results show that 54 percent of the Army's noncommissioned officers (NCOs) believe that only half or fewer of the soldiers they supervise are adequately trained for combat duty in their military occupational specialty. (See pp. 6 to 8.)

In recent months, the Army has announced a series of programs designed to improve individual skill training effectiveness. These
efforts will make more trainers available to units in the United States and increase the amount of basic combat training soldiers will receive prior to joining an active unit. These initiatives are evidence of the Army's desire to improve training. (See 42 to 45.)

ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN
UNIT LEVEL TRAINING PROGRAMS

GAO found that unit level training must be strengthened if the Army is to achieve its training objectives. Many soldiers are not receiving training which will enable them to perform all tasks the Army considers critical for proper job performance and which commanders consider critical to mission success. GAO found that soldiers are not being fully trained because

--individual skill training does not receive enough emphasis at the battalion and company levels (see p. 8);

--unit commanders do not take advantage of all available time to provide individual skill training (see p. 14);

--aids specifically designed to enhance training are not used as extensively as they should (see p. 18);

--there is a shortage of experienced trainers (see p. 28);

--personnel are constantly being rotated in and out of the units (see p. 26); and

--equipment, ammunition, and other training items often are not available for use in training. (See p. 27.)

To better realize its training goals, the Army should require specific and immediate action to improve unit level programs. Accordingly, the Secretary of the Army should:
--Emphasize to Army commanders the importance of unit skill training and the commanders' responsibilities for providing skill training to enlisted personnel.

--Require commanders at the battalion level and above to better monitor skill training in their subordinate units. This monitoring effort should insure that primary trainers:

--Use Soldiers Manuals as their program criteria.

--Develop a training plan which provides for training in all Soldiers Manual tasks.

--Maintain job books to document each soldier's training needs.

--Use training extension course lessons in their training programs.

--Incorporate individual training into all phases of unit activity and make use of available slack time to provide opportunity training.

--Use job books, skill qualification test results, and Soldiers Manuals to develop programs which provide training in tasks where additional work is needed. (See p. 22.)

--Determine ways existing resources, including NCOs, can be better used to improve training. More specifically, alternative management techniques should be identified to reduce personnel turnover, training should be consolidated to make better use of experienced trainers, and young NCOs should be more rapidly prepared to be effective trainers. (See pp. 29 and 30.)
MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT OF TRAINING NEEDS STRENGTHENING

The Army should strengthen its management oversight of training programs. The present oversight systems do not identify major program breakdowns so that across the board corrective actions can be taken. As a result training problems often go undetected.

An effective monitoring and evaluation system would provide Army commanders at all levels program evaluation data and other management information needed for informed decision-making. Therefore, the Secretary of the Army should:

--Establish a more effective Army-wide system to monitor the accomplishment of skill training provided to enlisted personnel. As a part of this oversight system, the Department of the Army should

-encourage division level Inspector Generals to evaluate skill training effectiveness at the company/battery level; and

-require personnel at the Department of the Army Inspector General's office to independently monitor skill training effectiveness, both from a resource constraint standpoint and from a management effectiveness standpoint. (See p. 40.)

ARMY TRAINING PHILOSOPHY SHOULD BE EVALUATED

Although the Army's present individual skill training methodology has been in operation for almost 4 years, efforts to evaluate its effectiveness have been fragmented. Without comprehensive evaluations of the training methodology, the Army does not know whether it is meeting established training goals and
standards. The fact that many soldiers were not fully-trained in their occupational specialty demonstrates the immediate need for the Army to determine whether its present training philosophy is the most effective way to prepare soldiers for duty. The Secretary of the Army should:

--Require the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to evaluate fully the current individual skill training doctrine, taking into account the quality of school training, the proficiency of school graduates in terms of unit needs, and the effectiveness of individual training in operational units. The results of this evaluation should be used to determine whether the present decentralized training concept is the best method for the Army to use or whether additional training in the formal school setting should be initiated. (See p. 40 and 41.)

--Require TRADOC to evaluate the effectiveness of the Battalion Training Management System. Such an evaluation is essential in light of the importance of the system goals. (See p. 41.)

--Assure that the Army implements an effective individual skill training program. This can best be accomplished by requiring an independent organization—perhaps the Army Audit Agency—to perform periodic assessments of training effectiveness within the Army. (See p. 41.)

AGENCY COMMENTS

Written comments provided by the Army are in Appendix I. The comments were not received in time to be evaluated as provided by Public Law 96-226.
Chapter 1

Introduction

The Army's skill training criteria are specific and task oriented. Army unit commanders are responsible for training most individual skill tasks. Objective, scope, and methodology.

Chapter 2

Army personnel are not being trained to perform essential occupational and survival tasks. Many soldiers may not be able to perform effectively in combat. Individual skill training needs greater emphasis at the battalion and company levels. More individual skill training can be accomplished in the time available.

Greater use should be made of training aids specifically designed to enhance individual training.

Conclusion

Recommendations

Chapter 3

Factors affecting unit training that cannot be addressed at unit level. There are not enough experienced trainers to fully train soldiers. Personnel turnover seriously affects training effectiveness. Equipment, ammunition, and other resource shortages are hindering effective training.

Conclusion

Recommendation
CHAPTER 4
THE ARMY NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN ITS MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT FOR INDIVIDUAL SKILL TRAINING

Individual skill training should be better monitored by the Department of the Army.

Training evaluations should be improved to fully identify skill training deficiencies.

The Army should more effectively evaluate its individual skill training programs.

Conclusion

Recommendations

CHAPTER 5
ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE ARMY TO IMPROVE INDIVIDUAL SKILL TRAINING

Assignment policy changes will make more trainers available for stateside units.

Rotation policy changes are planned to enhance unit effectiveness.

An extended basic training program is planned to improve soldier performance in combat tasks.

Other initiatives planned by the Army to improve training effectiveness.

Conclusion

APPENDIX

I Agency comments

II Explanation of GAO questionnaire administration and validation procedures

III Army skills selected for review

IV Army units visited by GAO where detail audit work was performed

V Army units visited by GAO where questionnaires were administered but detail audit work was not performed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>military occupational specialty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SQT</td>
<td>skill qualification test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>United States Army Training and Doctrine Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In recent months, increased attention has focused on the Nation's military preparedness and the capability of the Armed Forces to meet our military commitments. This concern has been fueled by the crisis in Iran and the unstable world situation caused by fighting in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. Much of the concern has focused on the manpower problems of the All-Volunteer Force, particularly those of the Army. Questions have arisen as to the extent to which Army personnel—particularly those in combat units—can perform their jobs.

The provision of adequate individual skill training is one of the keys to the Army's combat effectiveness. Yet, within the context of ever-more sophisticated weapons systems and an exodus of skilled, experienced noncommissioned officer (NCO) trainers, there is concern that the Army program designed to teach the necessary skills for battlefield performance and survival has not been fully successful. Driven by budgetary constraints and an attempt to make its programs more specific, the Army in 1977 cut their formal school program and transferred a significant portion of the overall individual skill training responsibility to the units in which the recruits were serving. This decentralization of training placed on the unit commander the primary responsibility for developing highly trained soldiers capable of carrying out their occupational assignments.

The Department of Defense has contended that the capability of our military has not diminished; however, recent actions by the Army Chief of Staff aimed at improving the Army's fighting capability have continued to spur concern as to how battle ready our Army is. The most recent of these actions occurred in September 1980, when the Army Chief of Staff announced plans to reduce the troop levels in Europe and Korea by some 7,000 soldiers, primarily sergeants, to provide additional trainers for units in the United States. In announcing this plan, the Army Chief of Staff acknowledged that past policies aimed at maintaining a ready and fully manned force overseas had created a "hollow Army" at home, with training activities at their lowest level since World War II.

Most likely the Congress in the upcoming fiscal year will be confronted with addressing the training needs of the Army and the budgetary and policy alternatives for their accomplishment. These decisions must be made with some view of the Army's present training program and the extent to which it is meeting established goals and objectives.

The likely needs of the Congress for decisionmaking information, the growing concern about the trained capability of the
Army, and the need to assess the fundamental policy changes to
the training philosophy motivated our study of Army training.
The focus of our study was directed at assessing the unit level
skill training program. What we found indicates that there are
significant opportunities for improvements in the program, and
we offer several recommendations for change.

THE ARMY’S SKILL TRAINING CRITERIA
ARE SPECIFIC AND TASK ORIENTED

Prior to 1977, individual training in the Army was much less
well defined than it is today. While soldiers in the past were
provided skill training within a general framework at one of the
Army’s Advanced Individual Training schools, subsequent job train-
ing was directed primarily by the personal experience of the NCOS
in the units where soldiers reported after their school training.
Soldiers received training in those tasks based on what was per-
ceived as critical by their NCOS. There was no assurance that
soldiers having the same job received training in the same tasks.

Today, this situation has been drastically changed. In 1977,
the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) implemented the
Soldiers Manual concept. TRADOC and its school commands analyzed
each Army occupational specialty and identified its critical per-
formance elements. This job analysis—which was based on input
from field unit personnel, actual observations of soldiers at work,
and input from subject matter experts in the schools—resulted in
lists of tasks that soldiers in the various occupational special-
ties perform to accomplish their jobs. These lists were then ana-
alyzed to identify those individual job tasks which are critical
to effective job performance and survivability of the individual
in combat. These critical tasks are listed in a Soldiers Manual
for each military occupational specialty (MOS) 1/which also pro-
vides the performance conditions and standards for each of the
tasks. While there is some debate over the criticality of cer-
tain tasks listed in the Soldiers Manuals, military officials we
contacted generally agree that the Soldiers Manuals currently
issued are perhaps the best training tool the Army has ever had.

With inception of the Soldiers Manual concept, a companion
document—known as the Commanders Manual—designed for unit com-
manders and NCOS was also prepared by the TRADOC schools. For
every Soldiers Manual, there is a Commanders Manual for the same

1/Currently, the Soldiers Manuals for all MOSs have not been de-
veloped. The Army developed the Soldiers Manuals for its high
density MOSs first. Consequently, to date only about 77 per-
cent of the Army’s MOSs have Soldiers Manuals. The 81 MOSs
which do not presently have a Soldiers Manual should have one
by April 1982.
MOS. Basically, the Commanders Manual lists each task shown in the Soldiers Manual and designates who is responsible for providing training in the task—school personnel or unit personnel. 1/ The majority of the individual job training is the responsibility of unit personnel as discussed below.

The Army spends more than $3 billion a year to provide soldiers individual skill training in its schools. The total cost of Army individual skill training could not be computed since cost data is not accumulated for on-the-job skill training performed in operational units. Given the present cost of personnel, however, the cost of individual training must be enormous.

ARMY UNIT COMMANDERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR TRAINING MOST INDIVIDUAL SKILL TASKS

Nearly all of the men and women recruited for the enlisted ranks by the Army require formal training in a military skill. For fiscal year 1980, the Army estimated about 96 percent of all soldiers enlisted would be sent to a formal skill training school to receive initial training in a military skill. Of the remaining 4 percent, the Army estimated only about 1 percent would have a civilian-acquired skill which precluded the need for additional formal training before being assigned to a unit, and only about 3 percent would be assigned to a unit for on-the-job training without formal school training first. Other than the initial school training and on-the-job training, enlisted personnel normally receive no further formal training during their first enlistment.

The amount of initial skill training provided by a service school prior to a soldier's first unit assignment varies by occupational specialty and is based on several factors which include: complexity of the job; safety considerations; availability of equipment for training at the unit level; and time allowed for school training. The tasks to be taught by a formal school rather than by unit personnel are determined by the various Army school commands under the guidance of TRADOC. Generally speaking, unless a skill is very technical or involves medical services, the Army schools provide training in fewer than half of the tasks considered critical to proper job performance in the skill. Initial training in the majority of tasks, as well as refresher training in school trained tasks, is the responsibility of Army unit commanders.

1/The use of the term "unit" in this report refers to company/battery.
OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

We made this review to determine whether unit level individual skill training is being provided which prepares Army enlisted personnel to perform critical job tasks within their MOSs.

In order to understand the Army's training philosophy and approach, we performed work at Department of the Army Headquarters; TRADOC; Headquarters U.S. Army Forces Command; Headquarters U.S. Army Europe; The Army Transportation School; The Army Quartermaster School; and the Army Infantry School. Additionally, we had meetings with representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Headquarters U.S. Army Health Services Command; Department of the Army Inspector General's Office; The Army Training Board; The Army Training Support Center; The Army Audit Agency; and The Army Research Institute.

Our review effort involved work at 10 active Army units in the continental United States and 5 units in Europe. At each of these units we spent 2 weeks evaluating the skill training being provided for 16 Army MOSs. Our evaluation consisted of discussions with division, brigade, battalion and company/battery level officers; discussions with a selected sample of company/battery enlisted personnel; observations of training; review of training guidance; and review of training schedules.

In addition to our detail work at 15 active Army units, we also used a questionnaire to obtain information on training strengths and weaknesses as well as training practices. First, we administered questionnaires to all available enlisted personnel at the 15 units where detail audit work was performed. Second, we visited an additional 28 units for a period of one-half day to administer our questionnaires. And, third, we sent our questionnaires to a random sample of enlisted soldiers in a sample of units throughout the Army. Consequently, the data developed allows us to address training practices throughout the Army. In total, questionnaires were administered to 3,825 soldiers E1-E4 and 2,510 soldiers E5-E9.

Appendix II explains in detail our questionnaire approach. Included in this appendix is a summary of our administration and validation procedures, and exhibits showing the questionnaires used.

Appendix III lists the 16 Army skills evaluated. The specific skills reviewed were selected to provide (1) information on high-density skills, (2) a balance of combat arms and combat support skills, and (3) a balance of technical and less technical skills.
Appendix IV shows the divisions, battalions, and company/battery level units visited where detail audit work was performed. We selected these units according to the following criteria:

--Units designated as high priority by the Army (this criteria applies only to U.S. based units).

--Units where a concentration of personnel within the selected skills had taken an Army skill qualification test (SQT).

--Units which provided geographical coverage, both in terms of different Army installations and different major Army commands.

The 16 Army occupational specialties chosen and units visited within the United States were selected with the concurrence of officials from TRADOC and the U.S. Army Forces Command. Officials at both these commands agreed that our selection of occupational specialties included representative Army skills. Further, they agreed that our criteria for unit and installation selection would provide us good coverage in terms of training throughout the Army.

Appendix V shows the Army units visited where questionnaires were administered, but detail audit work was not performed. These units were randomly selected with the cooperation of installation officials so that units in an intensive training cycle were not disturbed during training.

As a part of our study, we reviewed relevant audit reports, discussed our work with internal auditors, and where appropriate, reached agreement with internal investigators on any followup action required on their part in connection with our findings.
CHAPTER 2

ARMY PERSONNEL ARE NOT BEING TRAINED TO PERFORM

ESSENTIAL OCCUPATIONAL AND SURVIVAL TASKS

The move by the Army to a more decentralized individual skill training philosophy in the mid-1970's placed a greater requirement on the lower organizational echelons to achieve training goals. Battalion and company commanders are faced with a situation whereby the soldiers they receive from advanced training have been schooled in only the basics of their occupational specialty. This places responsibility on the unit commanders to provide the training necessary for soldiers to progress from the apprentice to journeyman level within their specialty. Based on our review, we believe the unit programs should be strengthened so that the Army can more closely achieve its training objectives. Although soldiers, NCOs, and officers, have been provided, through Soldiers Manuals, the most specific and probably the best training guidance ever developed by the Army, many soldiers are not receiving the unit training which will enable them to perform all tasks considered by the Army as critical for proper job performance and survival in combat, and which commanders consider critical to mission success. We believe unit training efforts can be enhanced by

--placing more emphasis on individual skill training at the battalion and company levels,

--making more effective use of available training time by Army trainers at the company/battery level, and

--increasing the use of training aids specifically developed to enhance individual proficiency.

MANY SOLDIERS MAY NOT BE ABLE TO PERFORM EFFECTIVELY IN COMBAT

The ultimate objective of individual skill training programs is to provide soldiers with the capability to perform their combat and occupational tasks. Our questionnaire results showed that 54 percent of the Army NCOs believe that only half or fewer of the soldiers they supervise are adequately trained for combat duty in their MOS. Further, at each of the 43 Army companies/batteries visited during our review, we asked soldiers to tell us whether they could perform each of their Soldiers Manual tasks. The results, which are summarized by the following table, show that soldiers cannot perform a significant number of tasks the Army considers critical for proper job performance.
### Percentage of Soldiers Manual Tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS designation and title</th>
<th>Number of soldiers we contacted</th>
<th>Number of tasks all soldiers should be able to perform (note a)</th>
<th>Percentage of soldiers who said they could perform:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11B Infantryman</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>85 (*)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11C Indirect fire infantryman</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>93 (*)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11H Heavy armor crewman</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>85 (*)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12B Combat engineer</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>117 (*)</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13B Cannon crewman</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13E Cannon fire directional specialist</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16D Hawk missile crewman</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16E Hawk fire control crewman</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19E Armor crewman</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>88 (*)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19F Armor driver</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>84 (*)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63B Wheel vehicle mechanic</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63C Track specialist</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91B Medical specialist</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91C Patient care specialist</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91D Operating room specialist</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92B Medical laboratory specialist</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note a:* The number of tasks shown in this column represent all the basic level (skill level 1) tasks in the Soldiers Manual for the MOS, except for the MOSs marked (*). The tasks for these MOSs have been segregated into duty positions by the Army. Therefore, for all MOSs marked (*), our analysis only included the tasks all soldiers in the MOS should know; not tasks associated with a specific duty position.
The need to improve unit training existed in varying degrees at all units we visited. Some units had initiated efforts to improve their programs; however, in all instances more needed to be done. The European units we visited had fewer personnel and equipment problems; but they still had not reached the level of quality needed to insure that individuals are skilled in all occupational tasks considered critical by the Army. We believe that the quality of training at all units can be improved through better management of training as discussed below.

INDIVIDUAL SKILL TRAINING NEEDS GREATER EMPHASIS AT THE BATTALION AND COMPANY LEVELS

The Army's skill training philosophy involves all command levels within the Army. The following chart provides a simplified illustration of individual training responsibilities within one Major Army Command. While our chart only shows one division, brigade, battalion, and company; in reality many would be involved. The purpose of the chart is to show the various levels involved in skill training, and their responsibilities. As shown, the responsibilities for carrying out individual skill training occur at the battalion level and below.

[Diagram of Army command structure showing individual skill training responsibilities at various levels.]
Battalion level commanders become involved with individual skill training primarily from a planning standpoint. Generally, personnel at the battalion level support company level commanders' training activities by providing training resources and coordinating training activities among companies. The responsibility for accomplishing individual skill training is delegated to commanders at the company/battery level.

Because the activities requiring a battalion or company commander's attention are numerous, commanders must assign a high priority to those activities perceived as the most important to commanders at the brigade and division levels. Because unit commanders feel that there is no higher level emphasis on individual training, they put a low priority on assuring that the unit has an effective program. We found that the lack of command emphasis on individual skill training impairs the management of this function at the unit level and has resulted in soldiers not being trained in all critical MOS tasks.

Soldiers are not being trained in all their critical MOS tasks.

Commanders at the companies/batteries we visited had delegated individual training responsibilities to the lowest supervisory level, normally to the squad or section leader. This philosophy is consistent with the Army's training guidance and regulations. At the squad and section level, however, we found that soldiers were not being trained in all Soldiers Manual tasks considered critical for their MOS.

The majority of enlisted soldiers (E1 through E4) at the 43 units we visited told us they had not received sufficient individual training in their MOS. Through use of a questionnaire which provided individual confidentiality, we asked soldiers to tell us whether they strongly agreed, somewhat agreed, or did not agree with statements concerning training in their units. The results are summarized in the following table on page 10.
Frequency Tabulation of Responses Provided by Soldiers at 43 Units (note a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions posed by GAO</th>
<th>Strongly agreed</th>
<th>Somewhat agreed</th>
<th>Do not agree</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Our unit's NCOs really take an interest in training me.</td>
<td>299 (13.7%)</td>
<td>1,057 (48.4%)</td>
<td>751 (34.4%)</td>
<td>77 (3.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our unit spends a lot of time training MOS tasks.</td>
<td>297 (13.6%)</td>
<td>886 (40.6%)</td>
<td>918 (42.0%)</td>
<td>83 (3.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our unit's NCOs really prepare for our training courses--(they make certain they know what they are talking about).</td>
<td>366 (16.8%)</td>
<td>935 (42.8%)</td>
<td>800 (36.6%)</td>
<td>83 (3.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our unit instructors make sure any equipment needed for training is available.</td>
<td>379 (17.4%)</td>
<td>900 (41.2%)</td>
<td>825 (37.8%)</td>
<td>80 (3.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have received training in all the tasks in my MOS.</td>
<td>327 (15.0%)</td>
<td>630 (28.8%)</td>
<td>1,132 (51.8%)</td>
<td>95 (4.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My NCOs are really trying to give me good training.</td>
<td>448 (20.5%)</td>
<td>997 (45.7%)</td>
<td>630 (28.8%)</td>
<td>109 (5.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My commander is really trying to give me good training.</td>
<td>552 (23.9%)</td>
<td>891 (40.8%)</td>
<td>657 (30.1%)</td>
<td>114 (5.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In this unit special duties and details are more important than MOS training.</td>
<td>838 (38.4%)</td>
<td>582 (26.6%)</td>
<td>680 (31.1%)</td>
<td>84 (3.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ The results of our Army-wide mailout questionnaires showed that the opinions reflected by this table prevail throughout the Army.

Our detail work at 15 of the units represented by the above statistics confirmed what the soldiers told us. Their NCOs and officers had not implemented training programs to provide soldiers training in all occupational and combat tasks. NCOs and commanders
at units we visited said that there is no incentive at the battalion or company level to emphasize individual skill training in all Soldiers Manual tasks. NCOs and commanders also felt that there is no higher level emphasis on individual training in all Soldiers Manual tasks and that commanders generally are not evaluated on the effectiveness of individual training programs. This has created the perception that individual training is less important than other unit activities. An article written by the past Executive Officer of the Army's Field Artillery School illustrates this point. It states:

"** Recent research indicates that battalion level commanders are relieved for the following reasons:

- TPI failures 1/
- Poor maintenance records.
- Unfavorable statistical showings (AWQL, crime, accident).
- Safety-connected accidents.
- Right time and place incidents (parades, guards, etc.).
- Administrative shortfalls (Annual General Inspection failure, accountability, etc.).

'Narry' a single relief for a poorly-trained unit; simply because command pressure is not placed on training, the commander is not made to train and he can max an OER 2/ without training. We don't seem to think training is important enough to the success of the Army to fire the guy that fails in his training." 3/

As a result of the lack of emphasis on individual training at the battalion and company levels, soldiers receive infrequent training or no training in some tasks their commanders and NCOs consider critical to proper performance in their MOS. For example, we asked officers and NCOs at units visited to tell us which

1/Technical Proficiency Inspections are designed to insure nuclear readiness.

2/Officer Evaluation Report.

Soldiers' Manual tasks all soldiers must know how to perform for certain MOSs in the unit. Then, we asked them to tell us, for the same tasks, how often each task is trained in their unit. The results show that soldiers are not being trained in many tasks specified in Soldiers Manuals, or even in those tasks considered critical by unit officers and NCOs. For example, at one armor company and one of the medical companies visited, we were provided the following information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>Responses provided by</th>
<th>Total number of tasks at skill level 1</th>
<th>Number of tasks considered critical for all soldiers in the MOS to know (note b)</th>
<th>Number of tasks considered critical which are only taught less than once every 6 months or never (note c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19F</td>
<td>Platoon Leader</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>3 (3.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19F</td>
<td>Tank Commander</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>3 (3.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19F</td>
<td>Tank Commander</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>29 (36.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19F</td>
<td>Tank Commander</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>6 (8.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19F</td>
<td>Tank Commander</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>16 (22.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19E</td>
<td>Platoon Leader</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>3 (3.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19E</td>
<td>Platoon Sergeant</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>26 (31.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19E</td>
<td>Tank Commander</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19E</td>
<td>Tank Commander</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>34 (39.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19E</td>
<td>Tank Commander</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>4 (5.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91B</td>
<td>NCO - E6</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>38 (35.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92B</td>
<td>NCO - E6</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19 (41.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91D</td>
<td>NCO - E6</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>48 (70.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91C</td>
<td>NCO - E6</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>33 (50.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91C</td>
<td>NCO - E7</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>2 (1.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91C</td>
<td>NCO - E6</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91C</td>
<td>NCO - E6</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2 (2.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/This is the number of basic level (skill level 1) tasks listed in the Soldiers Manual for the MOS.

b/This is the number of the basic level tasks considered critical by the person who responded.
Soldiers assigned to a unit in a support position receive less training than other soldiers.

We also found that soldiers assigned to combat units in support positions receive less training in Soldiers Manual tasks than soldiers who are assigned in the basic unit MOSs. Commanders and NCOs tend to exclude soldiers in support positions from training because, as one commander told us, "they have a job to do and can't be spared for training." The result is that soldiers assigned to a combat unit in a support capacity do not receive frequent training in Soldiers Manual tasks. For example, at one of the infantry companies, and one of the armor companies we visited, unit trainers provided the following information regarding training for assigned medical support personnel.

Information Provided at One Infantry Company

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Total number of tasks at skill level 1</th>
<th>Number of tasks considered critical for all soldiers in the MOS to know</th>
<th>Number of tasks considered critical which are only taught less than once every 6 months or never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>91B</td>
<td>NCO - E7</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>10 (9.3%) 30 (28.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91B</td>
<td>NCO - E5</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>46 (52.3%) 6 (6.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91C</td>
<td>NCO - E7</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>10 (9.2%) 53 (48.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information Provided at One Armor Company

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Total number of tasks at skill level 1</th>
<th>Number of tasks considered critical for all soldiers in the MOS to know</th>
<th>Number of tasks considered critical which are only taught less than once every 6 months or never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>91B</td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>58 (54.2%) 18 (16.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91B</td>
<td>NCO - E6</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0 (0.0%) 107 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91C</td>
<td>NCO - E6</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>15 (13.0%) 100 (86.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Individual skill tests should be used to determine areas of training emphasis.

The lack of emphasis on the management of individual skill training at the battalion level is exemplified by the manner in which many training managers had chosen not to use Army SQT results in managing their unit training programs. In April 1977, the Army initiated its SQT program as a means of measuring individual proficiency in MOS tasks, and to determine which soldiers should be promoted. Unlike the old MOS test system, which was a written examination, an SQT requires a soldier to actually
demonstrate that he can perform selected MOS tasks, as well as take a written test. The tasks tested by an SQT are taken directly from the Soldiers Manual. The Soldiers Manual and SQT, when used together, tell commanders and soldiers what must be taught in training, and how well the training has prepared soldiers to perform their jobs.

Army commanders at the units we visited need to insure that greater use is made of the SQT results to measure their units' individual proficiency and determine individual training needs. The SQT program not only provides individuals with test results in a format which readily shows specific tasks passed and failed, but also provides company commanders this same type of analysis for each individual and all unit members in total. This feature of the SQT program makes the results an excellent basis for structuring individual training programs. However, fewer than 20 percent of the NCOs at the units we visited said they used SQT results to determine the tasks which required additional training. Throughout the Army, 23.9 percent of the NCOs said they use the SQT results to determine training needs.

The reasons given us by unit commanders for not using SQT results were:

- lack of confidence in the results of the tests since many soldiers have reading problems;
- lack of emphasis on SQT results from higher command elements; and
- delay in getting results back to the unit. (Many soldiers have been reassigned to other units before test results are received.)

We recognize that there may be some shortcomings to the SQT results, especially with regard to timing. The results do offer, however, an excellent indicator of a soldiers' training deficiencies. Such information can be invaluable in determining where training emphasis needs to be concentrated both from an individual and unit perspective. Because of the level of detail the tests provide, we believe they should be used as one of the primary data sources for structuring individual skill training programs.

MORE INDIVIDUAL SKILL TRAINING CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE TIME AVAILABLE

Army regulations pertaining to training management state that individual training is to be integrated into all phases of unit activity, and undertaken whenever the opportunity arises.
This policy is consistent with the fact that TRADOC has identified skill deterioration as a critical training problem. While there is limited knowledge about the rate of skill deterioration or retention for specific Army jobs, studies performed by the Army Research Institute demonstrate that for a soldier to maintain skill proficiency, he must receive adequate initial training and subsequent refresher training in his MOS tasks.

Personnel at the company level who are responsible for individual training need to better manage available training time by not concentrating on training primarily for a specific SQT test and by requiring NCOs to provide opportunity training. This will insure that the maximum amount of time is devoted to needed task training.

Training programs concentrate on those tasks soldiers will be tested on during proficiency tests.

Army divisions have implemented programs which divide the training year into cycles. Most divisions have adopted a three-cycle program which consists of a mission training cycle, an individual training cycle, and a support cycle. Other divisions have two-cycle or four-cycle programs, but the concept is the same; i.e., specific time periods are designated for training and support activities. While one cycle is specifically dedicated to providing individual training, we found that in the units we visited the individual training which took place concentrated almost entirely on those tasks which would be on an upcoming SQT. This practice is facilitated by the fact that soldiers are provided a test notice about 60 days prior to the SQT which, through sample questions, identifies the tasks which will appear on the test. The reason that training focuses on the SQT notice is that commanders want to improve their soldiers' scores.

Because the SQT only tests a soldier on a sample of the tasks listed as critical to proper job performance, the primary individual training emphasis is on a small percentage of the tasks which the Army considers critical, and more specifically, those tasks individuals will be tested on by the Army to measure individual proficiency. If training is concentrated on those tasks that will appear on an upcoming test, the soldier may not receive training in other tasks considered critical to his or her MOS. This leads to training deficiencies which in turn may affect a soldier's ability to perform his/her job effectively. Because several test cycles would be required to cover all tasks in a particular MOS, several years may pass before an individual receives training in all critical tasks.
All available training time is not being used for training.

Army training regulations require trainers to use every opportunity to provide individual training. According to regulations, individual training should be integrated into all unit activities. Consequently, training should be accomplished not only during scheduled training periods, but also during those slack periods in a training day.

Company level commanders are required to prepare weekly training schedules. These schedules are event-and-time oriented—i.e., the daily activities of unit members are scheduled for specific times. While these schedules account for literally every minute of a training day, the activities planned frequently do not last as long as the period of time scheduled. This time is commonly referred to as "slack time" by soldiers, and represents the duty time available between scheduled events.

The failure of NCOs and junior officers to provide training at every opportunity has been reported to the Army in numerous studies. The following chart provides some examples.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finding reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Our review of the 7th Transportation Group indicated that the Group needs to significantly increase its emphasis and participation in individual job-skill training. Individual task-oriented training was not a major element in the Group's training program, and even when scheduled, the training was often not given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There was little evidence that units understood and practiced the concept of multi-echelon training. In many instances, commanders failed to establish individual training objectives to be accomplished during collective training activities. The conduct of individual training during periods of slack time was almost nonexistent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training classes were frequently canceled and attendance at classes conducted was low. Training could be improved by limiting cancellations of scheduled training, increasing attendance, and making more inspections of training classes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There has been insufficient progress in training our junior commissioned and noncommissioned officers. Indicators of a unit's failure to develop its junior leaders are: poor weapons maintenance, soldiers loitering in post facilities and wandering around the installation during duty hours, and the misunderstanding and misuse of opportunity training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There was considerable evidence that training time was not always productively used. There were instances when soldiers were observed sitting around waiting for some training event. Some perceptions of some junior leaders were that &quot;going to the field&quot; equates to training. Much of the individual training is centralized as &quot;SOT Training.&quot; There was little understanding of opportunity training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During our visits we found little opportunity training taking place. The attitude we found was that unless whole squads or sections could be assembled, training could not be conducted. We observed that during slack training time soldiers are more likely placed on a detail or released until some other scheduled activity occurs.

One of the main reasons why opportunity training is not provided, and perhaps a reason why scheduled training classes are canceled, is that NCOs often do not feel qualified to teach MOS tasks. At the 43 units visited, we asked 868 NCOs if they felt qualified to teach the tasks in their MOS to subordinates. Only 60 percent of these NCOs said they felt qualified to teach all tasks in their MOS. More than 36 percent said they felt qualified to teach only some tasks, and more than 3 percent said they did not feel qualified to teach any. Throughout the Army 35.0 percent of the NCOs indicated that they felt unqualified to teach all tasks in their MOS.

We believe the concern of many NCOs—that they are not qualified to teach many of the MOS tasks—reduces their incentive to maximize training time and thus contributes to the generally passive attitude towards individual training that we noted at the unit level. Further, the NCOs' perception that individual skill training is not their commander's first priority reduces the NCOs' emphasis on training. For example, the Army Research Institute asked commanders within the Army's Forces Command to indicate their personal priority for 16 activities unit personnel could accomplish on a routine basis. The results showed that training was ranked as numbers one and two on the list. However, when the subordinates of those commanders were asked to rank according to priority the same items based on their perception of the commander's priorities, they ranked unit training as number 10 out of the 16 activities and individual training as number 11.

GREATER USE SHOULD BE MADE OF TRAINING AIDS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO ENHANCE INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

The Army has distributed Soldiers Manuals, job books, and training extension courses to soldiers and units. These training aids are specifically designed to help soldiers and trainers identify, learn, and teach critical MOS tasks to achieve a standard proficiency level. Use of these aids, however, has been minimal. Most soldiers do not use Soldiers Manuals or the extension course materials, and the majority of supervisors do not use 'job books. We believe the quality of training could be improved through greater use of these helpful training tools.
Soldiers Manuals

The original theory behind the Soldiers Manual was to provide every soldier one document which outlined all critical MOS tasks to be learned. From the outset, distribution of Soldiers Manuals became a problem. Some schools issued Soldiers Manuals for graduates to keep, some schools issued manuals which had to be returned, some units had Soldiers Manuals to be issued, and other units found they could not get the Soldiers Manuals they needed. Demand for the manuals simply outpaced the supply. Now, the Army's policy regarding Soldiers Manuals has changed, and soldiers are no longer held responsible for maintaining their own manual. If needed, the unit is supposed to make one available. Throughout the Army, 81.8 percent of of the enlisted soldiers (E1-E4) stated that they were issued a Soldiers Manual and 73.8 percent stated they now have a Manual. Most soldiers, however, told us they do not use the manuals.

Soldiers Manuals are vitally important to the Army's training philosophy and methodology. Soldiers and supervisors should regularly use them, because, as a minimum, according to Army Circular 310-87, each Soldiers Manual:

--Defines the soldier's job in terms of the critical tasks required.

--Defines the conditions under which the soldier performs the critical tasks.

--Sets forth minimum acceptable standards of performance.

--Assists the commander and supervisor in evaluating performance and serves as an aid in training management.

We asked 868 NCOs in 43 units how many of the soldiers they supervised were interested enough in MOS training to study Soldiers Manuals on their own. More than 67 percent of the NCOs stated that half or fewer of the soldiers they supervise would use their manual, and 20 percent of these NCOs stated that none of the soldiers they supervise would use it on their own. To confirm what the NCOs told us, we asked more than 1,000 soldiers (E1-E4), who had taken an SQT, whether they used a Soldiers Manual to study for it. More than 40 percent said no. Our Army-wide questionnaire results showed that 32.5 percent of the E1-E4 enlisted personnel who have taken an SQT did not use a Soldiers Manual to study for the test.

NCOs also are not making extensive use of the Soldiers Manual to identify individual training needs. Since the Soldiers Manual prescribes the critical tasks of an MOS as well as the training conditions and standards, we asked the 868 NCOs at the 43 units visited to tell us how they identified the MOS tasks in
which soldiers they supervised needed to be trained. We gave them five choices and asked them to indicate all that applied. Only 82 (6.5 percent) of the 684 NCOs who responded said they used a Soldiers Manual. Those who did not use a Soldiers Manual said they determined training needs by observing soldiers' work (40.1 percent), by observing soldiers during Army Training and Evaluation Program exercises (23.1 percent), by using SQT results (19.8 percent), or by being told what to teach (10.5 percent). Throughout the Army, only 11.4 percent of the NCOs indicated that they used Soldiers Manuals to determine training needs.

**Job books**

The Army's training philosophy calls for first-line supervisors; e.g., squad leaders, section chiefs, or tank commanders; to identify an individual soldier's weakness in a certain skill area and train the soldier accordingly.

Along with the introduction of Soldiers Manuals, TRADOC also developed and distributed MOS job books to first-line supervisors. The job book is intended to be an extension of the supervisor's memory. When used properly, it documents for each of the soldiers supervised their demonstrated ability to perform the individual tasks of their MOS. Job books are broken into duty positions with all associated Soldiers Manual tasks grouped under that duty position. Common soldier tasks listed in the Soldiers Manuals are separately identified in the job books. As soldiers demonstrate the ability or inability to perform individual MOS tasks, the supervisor initials and dates the task in the job book. The job book is designed to provide the supervisor with a record of proficiency for each of the soldiers he supervises and a record of individual training needs.

According to our Army-wide questionnaire results, more than 29 percent of the Army's trainers did not use job books as a guide for individual training. In addition, at the 15 units where we performed detail work, job books were not being used by all supervisors in accordance with Army guidance. NCOs we talked with who did not use job books stated they do not use them because (1) it was too much trouble to carry the books for all the soldiers they supervise, (2) they have trouble getting the job books they need, and (3) their supervisors have not told them to use them.

It is important that Army unit commanders insure that supervisors maintain job books for the soldiers they supervise. Without the information provided by properly maintained job books, commanders and supervisors lack information on the training status of individuals in the unit—information which is important in structuring individual skill training programs.
Training extension courses

In 1972, the Army began developing a video-tape training aid which has become known as a training extension course. These audiovisual aids provide a description of Soldiers Manual tasks. They have been distributed to combat battalions and companies throughout the world. The extension course is currently being expanded to cover service and support MOSs. The video-taped lessons are designed to improve a soldier's proficiency in individual tasks in his MOS. Research conducted by the Army Research Institute indicates that extension course lessons can be a highly effective training device. The Institute concluded that they are more effective than conventional lecture-type instruction sessions. Generally, however, most soldiers have not been encouraged to use the lessons. For example, we asked a random sample of soldiers at 35 of the units visited to tell us how often they used course tapes. In total, we interviewed 208 soldiers (E1-E4). The results of this effort revealed that:

---59 percent had never used an extension course lesson covering common soldier tasks.

---64 percent had never used an extension course lesson covering any of their duty position tasks.

Reasons given were that the soldiers and supervisors are not fully informed as to what the taped sessions are and how they can be used. Further, we noted that these materials can only be used at some units during off-duty hours which naturally discourages their use.

CONCLUSION

If the Army is to more nearly achieve the level of training effectiveness desired, greater command emphasis must be placed on the management of this function at the company/battalion level. It is important that unit commanders stress the importance of training and assure that their unit has a well-managed program which makes use of available training tools and training time. Such training should be geared to providing a well-rounded program rather than a training program which concentrates on an upcoming SQT. Until this command emphasis is achieved, the trained capability of soldiers will be below Army standards.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Better realization of training goals will require specific and immediate actions to improve the quality of current unit level skill training programs. With regard to those actions that can and should be pursued, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army:

--Emphasize to Army commanders the importance of unit skill training and the commanders' responsibilities for providing skill training to enlisted personnel.

--Require commanders at the battalion level and above to better monitor skill training in their subordinate units. This monitoring effort should insure that primary trainers:

---Use Soldiers Manual as their program criteria.

---Develop a training plan which provides for training in all Soldiers Manual tasks.

---Maintain job books for the soldiers they supervise so that training needs are documented.

---Use training extension course lessons in their training programs.

---Incorporate individual training into all phases of unit activity and make use of available slack time to provide opportunity training.

---Use job books, SQT results, and Soldiers Manuals to develop training programs which provide training in those tasks where additional work is needed.
CHAPTER 3

FACTORS AFFECTING UNIT TRAINING THAT CANNOT BE ADDRESSED AT UNIT LEVEL

Chapter 2 addressed training management practices which Army units can improve with greater emphasis on training and better management of existing resources. This chapter addresses factors which are impeding effective individual training, but are difficult to control at the division level and below. These factors are:

--The lack of an adequate number of experienced and qualified NCOs to serve as trainers.

--The high personnel turnover rates being experienced by operational units.

--The lack of functional equipment and ammunition which can be used in training.

The absence of enough experienced trainers and equipment, combined with constant turnover of unit personnel, inhibits the delivery of training. The main effect of this situation is that soldiers are not trained in tasks supervisors cannot perform or in tasks associated with equipment which is unavailable or inoperative.

THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH EXPERIENCED TRAINERS TO FULLY TRAIN SOLDIERS

The Army's skill training philosophy for enlisted personnel depends on having an adequate number of experienced and trained NCOs within its units. The importance of the NCO to effective training is highlighted by the fact that the commanders at the units we visited stated they rely primarily on their NCOs to provide the necessary skill training to unit personnel.

Many Army units, however, both in Europe and the continental United States do not have an adequate number of skilled NCOs to provide individual training. This critical problem involves two issues. First, the Army is losing NCOs who are experienced in their MOS. Second, many newer NCOs not only lack job experience but also have not been trained to perform as trainers.

In recent years, the Army has found it increasingly difficult to retain experienced NCOs. At most units we visited the number of NCOs actually assigned was less than the number authorized for the unit. As NCOs fail to reenlist, the Army loses its most precious resource—an experienced and qualified trainer. While our review did not specifically focus on NCO retention problems, we
did explore some of the reasons why NCOs are not reenlisting. NCOs cited various reasons for not reenlisting, including low pay, the declining value of Army benefits, decreasing discipline in the Army, the quality of current enlistees, and Army rotation policies.

As a result of declining retention rates for experienced NCOs, the Army is not only losing its experienced trainers, but it is also forced to replace the NCOs with personnel who are less experienced and less trained. For example, at the 43 Army companies visited, we solicited information from 868 NCOs. Nearly 95 percent of them were in ranks E5 through E7, and 92 percent of them were assigned to a supervisory position within the unit, such as squad leader, platoon sergeant, or section leader. While 78 percent of these NCOs said they are required to provide MOS training to the soldiers they supervise, more than 25 percent had not been to any Army NCO leadership schools, and only 37 percent had attended the Army's Battalion Training Management System workshops which are designed to teach the basic principles of performance-oriented training and training management. Throughout the Army 24 percent of the NCOs had not attended a leadership school and only 35.8 percent had attended the Battalion Training Management System workshops.

Commanders at a number of the companies we visited commented that while their NCOs are charged by Army regulations and training guidance with training responsibilities, many have not been adequately trained to serve as trainers. These comments are supported by an Army Research Institute report, released in April 1979, on the status of unit training within units stationed in Europe. The report contains the following comments from commanders concerning the experience and ability of NCOs within their units.

"Qualified NCOs--I'm disappointed. So many are unprofessional (mostly E5-E6)--not experienced enough, do not know their jobs."

(Battalion Commander)

"My E6s are very good, but E5s cannot function as an NCO because of inexperience. Also because of the erosion of NCO responsibility and they're young. They have not been given any responsibility and can't function as NCOs."

(Company Commander)

"There is not much squad level instruction because the squad leaders are not experienced. I rely on qualified people to instruct. The platoon leader may not be too knowledgeable on the subject, but he does have the ability to research for the class."

(Company Commander)
According to our Army-wide questionnaire results, 39 percent of the Army's NCOs were not receiving training in their MOS tasks; and 35 percent said that they did not feel qualified to teach all the tasks of their MOS to subordinates.

We also found that many NCOs cannot perform some of the critical tasks within their MOS which, because of their supervisory positions, they are responsible for teaching to lower ranked enlisted personnel. Some examples of tasks basic to proper job performance, which NCOs at the 43 units visited told us they could not perform, are shown below.

MOS 91B, Medical Specialist:

--27.5 percent (11 of the 40) of the NCOs said that they could not or were not sure they could administer emergency medical care to a chemical agent casualty.

--35 percent (14 of the 40) of the NCOs said they could not or were not sure they could administer emergency care to an open neck wound.

MOS 12B, Combat Engineer:

--25.9 percent (14 of the 54) of the NCOs said they were not sure they could recognize threat vehicles.

--40.8 percent (22 of the 54) of the NCOs said they were not sure or could not identify components of a float bridge anchorage system.

--37 percent (20 of the 54) of the NCOs said they were not sure or could not identify components of a floating bridge erection set.

MOS 16E, HAWK Fire Control Crewman:

--50 percent (9 of the 18) of the NCOs said they were not sure how to or could not install/recover an electrically armed claymore mine.

--27.8 percent (5 of the 18) of the NCOs said they were not sure how to or could not align and orient the HAWK missile system using the first alternative method.

MOS 13E, Cannon Fire Direction Specialist:

--50 percent (4 of the 8) of the NCOs said they were not sure how to or could not enter a hasty fire plan into their weapon systems fire control computer.
--50 percent (4 of the 8) of the NCOs said they were not sure they could assemble/disassemble an M203 grenade launcher.

PERSONNEL TURNOVER SERIOUSLY AFFECTS TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS

The quality of Army skill training is being degraded by personnel turnover, i.e., the constant movement of soldiers in and out of units. Personnel turnover or "turbulence" occurs for a number of reasons including: discharges; assignments to schools; overseas rotation; and transfers to other Army units or commands. Personnel turnover at units we visited was as high as 65 percent for soldiers E1 through E4 and 49 percent for NCOs per year. 1/

The ultimate results of personnel turbulence are an increased training load on unit personnel, and degraded unit performance. Most newly assigned personnel, regardless of whether they are reporting directly from an Army initial skill training school or from another unit, require training at the new unit. The Army Research Institute study of unit training in European units mentioned earlier included the following table showing the average percentage of newly assigned enlisted personnel who needed additional training. The figures in the table were reported to the Institute by a representative sample of experienced company/battery commanders, battalion commanders, and training officers from 15 battalions stationed in Europe.

### Average Percentage of Newly Assigned Enlisted Men Who Need Additional Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type MOS</th>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Infantry, Armor</td>
<td>E2  E3  E4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
<td>89  89  66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>68  64  46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>99  89  68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>85  80  60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
<td>68  64  49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>77  72  58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>67  64  49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>99  94  71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80  76  59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

a/ Based on response of only one commander.

b/ No respondents.

1/Chapter 5 of this report provides information on recently announced programs the Army hopes will reduce personnel turnover.
Personnel turnover, especially turnover of one-half or more of a unit's personnel per year, increases the unit level training burden because each newly assigned soldier requires additional training. This constant requirement to provide additional training to new unit members "to bring them up to speed," reduces the time NCOs have to provide training in all tasks a soldier should know how to perform to be prepared for combat. We asked the NCOs at units visited how many of the soldiers they supervise are adequately trained for combat duty and what factors affect training effectiveness. Fifty-seven percent of the 868 NCOs told us that half or fewer of the soldiers they supervise are adequately trained for combat duty, and 39 percent of the NCOs cited high turnover of personnel as a reason for reduced training proficiency.

EQUIPMENT, AMMUNITION, AND OTHER RESOURCE SHORTAGES ARE HINDERING EFFECTIVE TRAINING

The commanders at 10 of the 15 companies/batteries where we performed detail audit work stated that resource constraints and/or equipment shortages are hindering their individual skill training programs. Four of these 10 companies/batteries are located in Europe.

The most frequently mentioned shortages involved practice ammunition, access to training areas, and fuel for vehicles. The commanders at six of the units visited stated that resource allocations in these areas were less than what they feel is necessary to conduct effective individual training. The Army Audit Agency in a recent report cited the limited amount of antitank ammunition available for training. The report states that live firings not only increase the proficiency of antitank weapon system gunners, but also help to instill confidence in the capability of the weapon systems, and acquaint gunners with the backblast, noise, and shock associated with live missile firings. The Army Audit Agency found that most gunners have never fired a live antitank missile. The report states:

---To determine the live missile firing experience of Dragon gunners, we administered questionnaires to 131 individuals designated as Dragon gunners in 5 divisions. Of the 131 Dragon gunners, only 51 had fired a live missile.

---To determine the live missile firing experience of TOW crewmembers, we administered questionnaires to 259 crewmembers in five high priority divisions. Of the 259 crewmembers, 99 had fired a live missile.

The commanders at five of the units we visited provided information showing equipment shortages which they feel are precluding fully effective individual training. The shortages described and the impact on training, according to unit personnel, are shown in the following table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of unit</th>
<th>Shortage stated</th>
<th>Impact on training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Weapon system simulators</td>
<td>We were told the battalion should have 233 personnel assigned who are qualified on the DRAGON anti-tank missile system. This qualification goal is difficult to achieve and maintain because while the battalion is authorized 4 DRAGON simulators, only 2 were on hand and both were inoperative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Demolition simulators and bridging equipment</td>
<td>Officials at this unit told us that the lack of realistic demolition training aids, such as &quot;real&quot; train mines, has created such unrealistic training that the soldiers do not take it seriously. The unit is presently using &quot;home-made&quot; wooden mines which precludes training in fusing tasks. Unit officials told us they also lack the necessary bridging equipment to conduct fully effective individual training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
<td>(1) Spare parts for self-propelled howitzers</td>
<td>We were told that 4 of the unit's 6 howitzers were not available for training because of engine and road wheel failure. This battery was allocated $1,070 for spare parts the entire 3rd quarter of fiscal year 1980. About $800 of this allocation is required just to replace the filters on the 6 guns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Fire direction computer</td>
<td>We were told also that training for the fire direction personnel in this unit is affected because their fire direction computer (FADAC) is not available about 25 percent of the time due to spare parts shortages, generator problems, and loan commitments to other units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of unit</td>
<td>Shortage stated</td>
<td>Impact on training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>Specialized trucks</td>
<td>We were told that the training capability of this unit is adversely affected because, while 82 XLWB trucks are authorized, none is on hand. The unit has been told that the trucks will not be available until 1983.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery (HAWK)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>Spare parts for Improved</td>
<td>We were told that the radar equipment at this battery has been non-operational since March 1980. (We visited the battery in May 1980.) Since system upgrade, (HAWK to Improved HAWK), the battalion has found it difficult to obtain spare radar and fire control computer circuit boards. Those spare circuit boards received have shown a failure rate of 24 percent. Since spare parts cannot be obtained, battery personnel cannot be fully trained on the weapon system. During our visit, we observed an unannounced Operational Readiness Evaluation of the Battery. The evaluation was terminated shortly after it began because of a catastrophic equipment failure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>HAWK fire control system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Improved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWK)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONCLUSION**

The absence of enough experienced trainers and the lack of sufficient training equipment, combined with constant turnover of unit personnel, is seriously affecting the Army's capability to meet its training objectives. Desired goals cannot be achieved when Army trainers cannot perform and teach tasks subordinates need to know. The Army is finding it increasingly difficult to reenlist its experienced NCOs; this compounds the problem. Furthermore, the impact of personnel turnover on unit training effectiveness is significant, and training goals achievement is seriously impaired by the need to constantly bring individuals "up to speed."

**RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army:

--Determine ways existing resources, including NCOs, can be better used to improve training. More specifically, alternative management techniques should be identified to
reduce personnel turbulence, consolidate training to make better use of experienced trainers, and more rapidly prepare young NCOs to be effective trainers.

During our meeting with Army officials to obtain views on the matters discussed in this report, one idea which surfaced with regard to the recommendation was to use the more experienced NCOs in the units to train the less experienced NCOs. Actions such as this could contribute significantly to increasing the knowledge of NCOs.
CHAPTER 4

THE ARMY NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN ITS MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT FOR INDIVIDUAL SKILL TRAINING

The actions discussed in the preceding chapters are essential to unit level training enhancement, and several can be accomplished in the shorter term. In the longer term, however, the Army should direct attention towards strengthening its management oversight of individual skill training. The criticality of training to mission success necessitates an active, effective monitoring and control system which provides managerial information so that program and budgetary decisions are made with a full view of their impact on program results. It is important that the individual skill training program be monitored and evaluated by Army commanders at all levels to enhance their decisionmaking capability and to insure that established criteria are implemented and desired training goals are met.

In July 1979, we reported that the Office of the Secretary of Defense did not have an effective system of oversight for individual skill training in the services. During this study, we found that the Department of the Army has also not implemented a fully effective system of oversight to assure compliance with training criteria and permit informed decisionmaking. The amount and type of information obtained by Department of the Army Headquarters and subordinate Army commanders does not fully identify training problems. As a result, training problems persist and the Army's training criteria have not been fully implemented.

The Army can strengthen its management oversight system for individual skill training and further enhance it by:

- Increasing its monitoring of individual skill training programs to insure compliance with training criteria.
- Improving evaluative information so that it can be used to assess the effectiveness of training programs in relation to established criteria.

Enhancing the Army's management oversight system would assure that individual skill training problems are identified for correction and that the best possible individual training program is in effect. Further, top level emphasis on monitoring training

would go a long way towards creating the environment needed to motivate unit commanders to correct many of the deficiencies noted in chapter 2 concerning unit level management of training.

As a part of its management oversight, it is also important the Army insure that the current training philosophy is the most appropriate method to achieve training goals. The move in the mid-1970s from a school oriented approach to a unit oriented approach has not been fully evaluated to determine its impact on the trainer's capability to train the individual soldier. This evaluation is needed to determine whether it would be more effective to continue skill training at the unit level or to provide the soldier more skill training prior to being assigned to a unit.

**INDIVIDUAL SKILL TRAINING SHOULD BE BETTER MONITORED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

In October 1978, the Army centralized its training programs under the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. This new organization was formed to combine the separate functions of individual training, unit training, and training support into a single point of contact for all training issues. One of the primary functions of the office is to monitor the implementation of Army training concepts. More specifically, the office is charged with the responsibility of providing guidance regarding the utilization of training resources and monitoring the status of training within Army institutions and units.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans could improve its oversight of training by (1) determining the amount and type of management information needed to fulfill its oversight responsibilities and (2) implementing a systematic program for obtaining the data. Presently, the office uses information from unit readiness reports, ammunition usage reports, and unit visit trip reports to monitor individual training effectiveness. While the information available from these sources does provide some insight into training, these reports do not provide enough detail to allow a complete assessment of training effectiveness. For example:

---Unit readiness reports contain an assessment or rating of unit training. This rating is determined by the commander of the unit, and is based primarily on (1) performance during the annual Army Training and Evaluation Program, and (2) an estimate of the time required to overcome known training shortfalls. We visited units which were rated highly in training, where individuals were not being trained to perform critical MOS tasks and soldiers admitted they could not perform critical MOS tasks. These ratings, therefore, can mislead a reader as to the actual state of training in units.
Ammunition usage reports provide information on ammunition expended for training purposes. The reports, however, do not provide information on who is receiving the training. This is important because the Army Audit Agency found that the gunners expending the limited number of available TOW and DRAGON antitank missiles were gunners who have previously fired one, and not the gunners who need the experience in firing live rounds.

Visits to active units by Department of the Army personnel provide first hand information on training. However, Department of the Army training evaluators told us there is not enough money available to make the trips necessary to fully evaluate training. These evaluators told us they only visit three or four installations a year.

In mid-1979 the Department of the Army Inspector General established a Training Management Inspection Division to conduct Army-wide inspections of training. The first major inspections by this division were accomplished in late 1979 and early 1980. The results, which were provided to the Army Chief of Staff in mid-1980, highlighted many training problems affecting Army unit readiness.

Prior to the formation of the Training Management Inspection Division, the Department of the Army Inspector General conducted only limited training management inspections as part of its general inspection program. As a result there was no formal feedback mechanism to provide insight into training problems at the Department of the Army level. The Training Management Inspection Division, therefore was formed to provide the Army with information on training problems.

However, we were told that the inspections will not involve testing individuals, testing units, comparing units, or evaluating how the Army should train. We believe this could inhibit a complete evaluation of training problems and that the Army still may not have all the oversight information it needs.

With increased training being provided through on-the-job training at the company/battery level, the need for complete and detailed oversight data becomes more important. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff should insure through a review of all evaluative reports available and personal observations of training that the Army's training criteria is effectively implemented. Because the Office has not implemented an oversight system which surfaces training deficiencies, major Army commanders have been left to interpret training criteria on their own, and training programs have been implemented which do not insure that soldiers are trained in all critical skill tasks.
TRAINING EVALUATIONS SHOULD BE IMPROVED TO FULLY IDENTIFY SKILL TRAINING DEFICIENCIES

Under the Army's philosophy of decentralized training, Army commanders at all levels are responsible for the training in their units. Consequently, all commanders share with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans the responsibility for assuring that approved training criteria are implemented and that training is conducted effectively. Additionally, since individual skill training accomplishment has been decentralized to the lowest operational level, Army commanders at all levels need oversight information to insure that soldiers are being trained in accordance with established criteria.

Army commanders within the major operational commands receive a variety of evaluation reports designed to provide information on training effectiveness within their battalions and companies. They are provided evaluations which result from Inspector General (IG) visits, unit proficiency evaluations, and SQT results. The purpose of these evaluations is to provide commanders with information on the effectiveness of unit operations—including training. These reports should identify training deficiencies for correction. However, the management oversight information we reviewed did not provide Army commanders data on the extent of individual skill training deficiencies. Further, as was explained in chapter 2, SQT results, which focus entirely on individual proficiency and highlight specific training deficiencies, are generally not used as a management tool to improve training effectiveness.

IG reports

Division/brigade IGs serve as the "eyes and ears" of the commander and, as such, generally concentrate on checking items of interest to the command. However, the IG reports at the divisions we visited reflect, in most cases, only a superficial review of individual skill training. With respect to individual skill training, the efforts of the inspectors have generally concentrated on such areas as Soldiers Manual accountability procedures and conduct of required training subjects, such as the requirement to once a year have each soldier qualify on his individual weapon (M-16A1) and go through a gas chamber to develop confidence in his gas mask. The reports we reviewed did not address the effectiveness of unit level skill training programs in relation to established criteria; i.e., these reports did not address whether programs were in effect to insure that individuals are properly trained in all critical skill tasks.

The Inspector General of the Army, in a February 19, 1979, letter to major commanders, recognized the need to change the thrust of inspections. He pointed out that there was a problem with the inspection system and a need to shift emphasis from
compliance to identifying causes of problems (by tracing the problems throughout the system) and determining solutions. He said he was hopeful that this approach—which he termed "systemic"—would not only provide commanders a better evaluation of mission performance, but would also have impact on units' preparations for inspection and "**discourage last minute spasms and concentration on superficials like painting rocks and waxing floors."

We agree with the IG's efforts to change the emphasis of general inspections since such a change could surface the reasons for training problems and serve as a basis for corrective action. At the 82nd Airborne Division, for example, we noted that due to command emphasis and the initiative of the IG, unit commanders receive systemic as well as compliance-type findings which aid in strengthening individual skill training. The Division has instituted a two-phase IG inspection system. The first inspection involves a detailed review of the unit and its training programs. This review, however, does not "count" for record. Instead, it is designed as a diagnostic tool for the unit commander. After the problems are discussed with the unit commander, a second IG visit is scheduled to inspect the progress of the unit, and the results become the IG "for record." This system provides unit commanders with information they can use to improve training, decreases the perceived need to have everything perfect for the IG, and reduces the perceived threat associated with these inspections, which often results in commanders trying to hide known deficiencies.

The effectiveness of expanded IG reviews in providing commanders with needed management information becomes apparent when one compares a program such as the 82nd Airborne Division's with another division's program where the inspections are not so complete. For example, one armor battalion we visited at Fort Stewart, Georgia, had been inspected by the division IG only 4 months prior to our visit. The IG rated the battalion and its subordinate companies' training management program as satisfactory. The deficiencies noted by the IG centered on Soldiers Manual issuance procedures, deficiencies in nuclear, biological, and chemical training, and individual weapons qualification practices. Our review, however, disclosed several individual training problems: soldiers were not being trained in all job tasks; job books were not maintained; opportunity training was not being provided; and instructors (NCOs) could not perform tasks they were responsible for training. In May 1980, this battalion undertook an external evaluation. While the IG report indicated a satisfactory unit training management program, the Army Training and Evaluation Program revealed the battalion could not fully perform its mission. Five of six major mission tasks tested were failed.

Inspector General activities can contribute substantially to improving individual training effectiveness. However, before
this contribution can be realized, IG activities should be expanded to provide commanders with complete and detailed oversight information. We believe the Army Inspector General should move forward to implement systemic evaluations as outlined in his February 1979 letter and insure that its inspections provide the information needed for guaranteeing training effectiveness and highlighting training deficiencies.

Unit proficiency evaluations

Unit proficiency evaluations are normally conducted by division or brigade level training management sections and take the form of announced or unannounced evaluations to determine unit and individual skills proficiency. These evaluations play a vital role in providing the division/brigade commander with oversight information on training in his units. They also serve as a guide to units on training expectations of higher command. These evaluations, however, have mainly concentrated on unit training without giving much attention to individual skills training.

All of the Divisions we visited had established programs to evaluate training on an informal and formal basis. The informal program included inspections of training classes, visits to training sites by senior level commanders, and at one division, a skill fair day where units competed in performing tasks from the Soldiers Manual. The Army Training and Evaluation Program is the Army's formal evaluation of unit proficiency.

The Army Training and Evaluation Program is built around a list of critical tasks that must be performed collectively by unit sections, companies, or battalions under stated conditions. These tasks are based on the units' mission and weapon capabilities. Once a year, each Army unit is evaluated by its higher headquarters on its ability to perform Army Training and Evaluation Program tasks.

Army training guidance states that training is a building block of knowledge. Individuals in a squad, for example, should have mastered individual skills before a squad, as a group, can train in these skills. We were told, however, that units can, and do, bypass the stop of insuring individual proficiency because most unit training evaluations do not measure proficiency at these levels. For example, one armor company visited had tank drivers who were not fully proficient at driving a tank. The company commander told us that to avoid a problem, he could hold the platoon with poor drivers as reserves, or have them drive in areas which would not require close maneuvers during the unit's evaluation. Training deficiencies, therefore, could go undetected during unit proficiency evaluations. The point is that Army commanders view their annual Army Training and Evaluation Program as a proficiency test, even though Army guidance states...
it is an evaluative tool rather than a pass or fail test. As a result of this perception, and because Army Training and Evaluation Programs do not presently measure individual proficiency in many tasks, training deficiencies from an individual skill standpoint can, and do, go undetected by the evaluators.

THE ARMY SHOULD MORE EFFECTIVELY EVALUATE ITS INDIVIDUAL SKILL TRAINING PROGRAMS

Well-trained individuals are the backbone of an effective Army. Therefore, the training philosophy and methodology for meeting individual training goals should be the best available. To insure that current training programs are the best possible and that individual training goals are being accomplished, effective evaluations should be made of existing programs and strategies. Additionally, such evaluations are necessary to insure that the Army spends its more than $3 billion for skill training wisely.

In the mid-1970's the U.S. Army made a significant change in its individual skill training philosophy. It went from a predominately school-oriented approach to an approach where a large part of an individual's skill training takes place in the unit environment. The Army, however, has not fully evaluated this change in philosophy to insure itself that its current individual skill training programs are meeting its needs.

The Army's present decentralized individual skill training philosophy encompasses two distinct elements. The first element involves the individual skill training soldiers must receive. This training requirement manifests itself in the Soldiers Manual for each of the Army's MOS's, and the methodology for accomplishing the training; i.e., some tasks are taught in Army schools and others are trained by unit personnel. The second element of the Army's philosophy involves training for the trainers. The Battalion Training Management System has been implemented by the Army to inform supervisors of their training responsibilities and to provide basic assistance in conducting training. The Army should insure that its training for soldiers and trainers is the best possible if training goals are to be met. Consequently, the Army needs to systematically and completely evaluate its training philosophy and methodologies.

More evaluation is needed of training methodologies

The Army's present decentralized individual skill training philosophy was developed by TRADOC. It was implemented in 1977 when the first Soldiers Manuals were issued. The training philosophy, as well as all training guidance, was developed through use of a five-phase process known as Instructional Systems Development.
Phase I of the process includes five steps: analyzing the job (MOS); selecting tasks for training; constructing job performance measures; analyzing existing courses; and selecting the training setting, i.e., school or unit.

Phase II of the process, the design phase, includes detailing training objectives and tests, describing student entry characteristics, and determining the sequence and structure of the training.

The development of the training, Phase III of the process, includes specifying the learning activities, reviewing and selecting available existing materials, and developing and validating new instruction.

Phase IV, the implementation of instruction, includes using the complete management plan and conducting the actual course in its designated setting.

The final phase of the process is quality control. Internal and external evaluations of training effectiveness are called for by the Instructional Systems Development model.

--Internal evaluations consist of collecting progress data, process data, performance data, and pertinent data from students, instructors, and administrators to insure that the actual learning outcome equals the intended learning objectives.

--External evaluations require following graduates of the training program to their job assignments to determine whether they can do the job for which they were trained.

Although the Army's present individual skill training methodology has been in operation for more than 3 years, efforts to evaluate its effectiveness (phase V of the Process) have been fragmented. For example, we visited three of the Army's School Commands--the Infantry School, the Quartermaster School, and the Transportation School--and found that none had completed internal and external evaluations of the effectiveness of their designed training programs. Because of the emphasis within TRADOC on developing training products (Soldiers Manuals, Commanders Manuals, and SQTs), resources which should have been devoted to evaluating program effectiveness were devoted to reviewing training products. The Directors of Evaluation at the schools we visited said that because they did not have the number of people required, and because of the emphasis on training products, their evaluation activity was limited to resolving serious problems brought to their attention.

Without comprehensive evaluations of the training methodology for each of its skills, the Army does not know whether it is
meeting the needs of soldiers in these skills, or the needs of the units where the skills are an integral part of the unit team. They also do not know whether their current programs are the best way to spend more than $3 billion a year. The officers and NCOs at all the units we visited told us that many soldiers arriving directly from an Army school cannot perform as effective unit members—even in those basic tasks which the schools are responsible for teaching. This indicates a real need for the Army to evaluate its methodology for training soldiers and the effectiveness of its training programs.

TRADOC recognizes the importance of performing a systematic and comprehensive evaluation of the Army's skill training philosophy and training programs. In recognition of this need, TRADOC has developed a Training Effectiveness Handbook. This handbook, which is now in draft form, is designed to aid the Directors of Evaluation at Army schools in evaluating the effectiveness of current training philosophies and methodologies. We encourage the Army to increase its efforts to develop and implement a comprehensive evaluation system for its training programs.

The effectiveness of the Battalion Training Management System should be evaluated

In February 1979, the Army began implementing the Battalion Training Management System, a series of unit level workshops designed to reemphasize the importance of individual skill training and provide basic assistance to officers and NCOs in conducting training. The initial implementation phase of this program is expected to be completed during 1981, and efforts are being planned to expand on the initial program and include the program principles in school curriculums. The success of the program is critical to the Army's training goals. Officers and NCOs at all levels must understand their responsibilities in the Army's training program and how the Army expects them to accomplish performance oriented training. However, despite its importance, the Army has not evaluated its effectiveness as presently structured and implemented.

The importance of the Battalion Training Management System concept mandates that it be evaluated in principle and implementation to see if it is the best way to inform trainers of their responsibilities and teach basic teaching techniques. Evaluation is warranted because proper management dictates it and also because our work revealed that in its present implementation format this concept may not be achieving its intended goals. Our review indicated that the principles taught by the workshop are not being implemented in many units. For example, while the workshop stresses decentralized training at the lowest supervisory level, squad leaders cannot perform some tasks they are responsible for.
teaching. This results in a breakdown of the Battalion Training Management System philosophy. In addition, because commanders know that some of their NCOs are not good trainers, they do not hold these NCOs responsible for many of the training management principles taught by the workshops. The end result in both instances is the same—training principles are formally taught, but soldiers are not trained according to the principles.

CONCLUSION

Because the Army does not have an effective Army-wide management system to oversee the skill training program, it is difficult to identify where improvements are needed. An effective monitoring and evaluation system is needed to provide Army commanders at all levels the program evaluation data and other management information needed for informed decisionmaking.

The Army also has not fully evaluated its training methodology to insure that training goals are being met. Similarly, the Army's Battalion Training Management System which was implemented to inform supervisors of the importance of individual skill training, their role in the training effort, and to provide basic assistance in conducting training has not been fully evaluated. The importance of the Battalion Training Management System concepts mandates that they be evaluated in principle and implementation to see if program objectives are being achieved.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army:

--Take action to see that the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans establishes a more effective Army-wide system to monitor the accomplishment of skill training provided to enlisted personnel. As a part of this oversight system, the Department of the Army should

---encourage division level IGs to perform systemic evaluation of skill training effectiveness at the company/battery level; and

---require personnel at the Department of the Army IG's office to independently monitor skill training effectiveness, both from a resource constraint standpoint and from a management effectiveness standpoint.

---Require TRADOC to evaluate fully the current individual skill training doctrine. In order to implement the most effective doctrine, TRADOC must fully evaluate the quality of school training, the proficiency of school graduates in terms of operational unit needs, and the effectiveness
of individual training in operational units. The results of this evaluation should be used to determine whether the present decentralized training concept is the best method for the Army to use; or, whether additional training in the formal school setting should be initiated.

---Require TRADOC to evaluate the effectiveness of the Battalion Training Management System. Such an evaluation is essential in light of the importance of the system goals.

The Secretary of the Army also should insure that the Army implements an effective individual skill training program. We believe this can best be accomplished by requiring an independent organization to perform periodic assessments of training effectiveness within the Army. We encourage the Secretary of the Army to consider using the Army Audit Agency for such assessments.
CHAPTER 5
ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE ARMY TO IMPROVE

INDIVIDUAL SKILL TRAINING

Throughout the course of our study, Army officials demonstrated a genuine interest in having a quality training program. This interest was exemplified by the outstanding cooperation we received from the Army while selecting occupational specialties for review, selecting units to visit, and arranging access to soldiers and training records. In developing our questionnaire instruments which were used to identify training strengths and weaknesses, the insights provided by training managers from various Army commands greatly increased the usefulness of the products. The Army's assistance in developing our questionnaires and reviewing our analysis methodology is an indicator of their desire to obtain independent information on the effectiveness of present training programs and improvements which could further enhance training.

Recent actions proposed by the Army to improve training provide further evidence that Army commanders are interested in having a quality training program and are willing to take steps to improve existing programs. In recent months, to improve soldier morale and training, plans have been announced to change existing personnel rotation and assignment policies, increase training in basic soldier tasks, and change officer promotion policies and assignment practices. These changes are a step in the right direction. Further, if these planned efforts are coupled with (1) actions aimed at correcting the training management deficiencies we noted during our study and (2) a program to improve the proficiency of its primary trainers, the quality of skill training should be greatly improved.

A discussion of recent actions taken by the Army to enhance training and our thoughts on these actions follow.

ASSIGNMENT POLICY CHANGES WILL MAKE MORE TRAINERS AVAILABLE FOR STATESIDE UNITS

One of the primary factors impeding effective skill training is the shortage of experienced and qualified trainers as discussed on page 23 of this report. In recent years the Army has found it increasingly difficult to retain experienced NCOs who form the backbone of its training philosophy. The fact that the Army has not been able to reenlist as many experienced NCOs as needed, coupled with past policies which overstaffed units in Europe and Korea for Defense reasons, has resulted in severe shortages of NCOs for units stationed in the United States. Past assignment
policies favored units overseas with more NCOs than authorized, at the penalty of understaffing units at home.

In September 1980, the Army Chief of Staff announced that in the future, units overseas would not be overstaffed with NCOs. A plan has been implemented which will reduce NCO levels in Europe and Korea by about 7,000 soldiers. These personnel, primarily sergeants, will be assigned to units in the United States rather than being sent overseas. Consequently, in the future there will be more trainers available for our stateside units.

The purpose of this action, according to the Army Chief of Staff, is to provide more trainers to units in the United States to beef up Army readiness and ability. By assigning more sergeants to units in the United States, the fighting ability of units will be enhanced over the long run according to the Army Chief of Staff. We believe that the Army's plan to provide United States units with more trainers is a positive step towards improving training effectiveness. Nevertheless, simply increasing the number of trainers in units may not achieve the goals intended by the plan; i.e., increasing the fighting ability of the units. Our work revealed that many sergeants in stateside units and overseas units have not been trained to perform all the tasks they are responsible for teaching. Additionally, many sergeants have not been trained in how to effectively organize their training programs or in how to conduct performance oriented training. Therefore, we believe the action the Army has taken is a positive step towards improving training in units based in the United States. However, it is equally important that these NCOs be qualified in all job tasks and proficient in conducting training.

**ROTATION POLICY CHANGES ARE PLANNED TO ENHANCE UNIT EFFECTIVENESS**

Another major initiative announced by the Army Chief of Staff is aimed at ending the rapid turnover of enlisted men and officers in small fighting units, such as platoons and companies. To do this the Army is planning to test a new personnel rotation concept at stateside posts during 1981.

Presently, the Army replaces individual soldiers in its units when the need arises. Such practices result in high personnel turnover rates which detract from unit cohesiveness. As mentioned earlier, some of the units we visited had annual turnover rates in excess of 50 percent which means that at any given time as many as one-half of the units' personnel could be newly assigned. This situation has a tremendous impact on training effectiveness in the units because supervisors find it hard to keep up with the training needs of individual soldiers, the soldiers do not get to know or trust their supervisors, and the desired atmosphere of a fighting "team" is degraded.
Beginning in 1981, the Army plans to test the practice of rotating units rather than individuals. Initially, the test will involve only about 20 Army companies. These companies will be formed from newly enlisted soldiers who will train together and stay together for their entire 3-year enlistment. It is hoped that such a practice will encourage unit identity, improve soldier morale, improve training effectiveness, and ultimately result in more soldiers remaining in the Army. Many of the nearly 5,000 soldiers who completed one of our training questionnaires commented that present Army rotation policies impede unit training.

There is little doubt that rotation policies which replace individual soldiers in units, especially large numbers of individual soldiers, do have an impact as discussed in chapter 3, on training effectiveness. We believe that rotation policies designed to keep units together could improve training effectiveness, and that the Army's test of unit rotation concepts is another step in the right direction towards improving its individual skill training program.

**AN EXTENDED BASIC TRAINING PROGRAM IS PLANNED TO IMPROVE SOLDIER PERFORMANCE IN COMBAT TASKS**

One of the most common complaints voiced by officers and NCOs, we talked with was that soldiers assigned to their units directly after their initial school training could not adequately perform basic soldier tasks. Basic soldier tasks are taught to new enlistees during their initial 7 weeks of training and include such tasks as rifle marksmanship, first aid, and chemical/biological/radiological procedures.

Recently, the Commander of TRADOC, which conducts the Army's basic training program, announced that the basic training phase of a soldier's formal school training would be increased by 1 week. The additional week will be used to provide soldiers more training in basic soldier tasks. Initially, beginning in January 1981, the increased instruction will be offered only at those installations which conduct separate basic training programs. Soldiers sent to installations which conduct one station unit training programs—where soldiers remain in the same unit for basic training and MOS related training—will not receive the increased amount of basic soldier training. The reason for increasing the basic training for only some of its enlistees, according to the Army, is a lack of training funds to lengthen the training at all posts where it is offered.

We view this increase in basic training as a very positive step towards improving unit effectiveness by the Army. Many officers and NCOs at the units we visited said they could provide
more technical training if soldiers arrived at their unit better trained in basic soldier tasks.

OTHER INITIATIVES PLANNED BY THE ARMY TO IMPROVE TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS

Recent news releases from the Army highlight planned training improvements in addition to those we have described above. These initiatives for the most part involve changes to policies regarding how officers are promoted and assigned. For example, the Army has announced it is considering

--- authorizing waivers of eligibility time before promotion to the rank of captain to fill shortages in authorization levels,

--- establishing a standard 18-month company command tour to give officers more time in command, and

--- extending battalion and brigade commander tours from 18-months to 2- or 3-years assignments.

CONCLUSION

The Army has announced plans to initiate a series of programs aimed at improving a number of the factors which presently inhibit effective training. These initiatives as well as the interest shown in our study demonstrate the Army's willingness to recognize needed improvements and its desire to have a quality training program. While it would be premature to judge the impact of these planned initiatives on training effectiveness, or their impact on the Army's fighting ability, we do believe the plans represent progress towards correcting some of the training problems we observed. If these plans are combined with action to strengthen individual training programs at the unit level, as recommended, we believe Army training could be greatly improved.
Dear Mr. Krieger:

This is in reply to your letter to the Secretary of Defense, dated 19 December 1980, concerning your draft report, "The Army Needs to Better Train Its Soldiers", OSD Case #5582, FPCD-81-29. This GAO draft report generally parallels findings made by Army agencies.

The Auditor General (AAA) and the Army Inspector General (DAIG) determined in separate reports in 1980 that shortages of NCO's and personnel turbulence are primary factors affecting training. As the GAO report indicates, the Army has initiated programs to combat many of the weaknesses detected in this audit.

Army leadership has continually emphasized the importance of training. The Chief of Staff's 1979 White Paper laid the foundation for an Army strategy for the 1980's. The White Paper charged all commanders with the responsibility to maintain training as their number one priority. This priority has more recently received reinforcement at the 1980 Army Commanders' Conference.

More specifically, we have initiated programs that directly address weaknesses detected in individual training conducted in units. Individual training received by the soldier prior to his initial unit assignment will be lengthened and toughened. This will provide unit commanders with a more skilled and better conditioned soldier. As the GAO recommends, we will continue studies to evaluate the balance of individual training necessary in units and in the training base.

Sufficiently qualified NCO's are critical to the success of the individual training effort in units. Critical shortages of NCO's, particularly in our combat occupational skills, have been attacked in several ways. The Chief of Staff recently directed a cross-leveling of NCO's between Europe and CONUS that should provide some improvement in strength for the CONUS based units. Secondly, the overall numbers of NCO's should improve through recently approved Promotion policies for the junior level NCO grades. NCO professionalism will be improved through the expanding NCO education program. The recently fielded NCO Development Program should provide the basis for better NCO professional development in units.
Regarding GAO's recommendation that the Army needs to optimize the use of training time and equipment, there are two major programs ongoing to correct this shortcoming. The Army-wide standardization program and the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS) will contribute to improved individual training in units although full implementation of these programs is not complete. The positive implications of these programs should be realized this fiscal year. For example, standardization of training will eliminate some of the negative effects of present rotation requirements out of CONUS. The soldier will be required to accomplish tasks using the same procedures Army-wide, thus eliminating the debilitating requirement to re-learn an individual skill due to a unit's unique methodology.

The GAO recommended that the Army improve its monitoring of skill training through a more effective oversight system. This recommendation was recognized in other reports to the Chief of Staff as early as November 1979. The Chief of Staff then directed the DAIG to establish a Training Management Inspections Division. By Spring of 1980, findings from this division, similar to those in the GAO report, triggered renewed emphasis or initiation of programs previously discussed. The role of the DAIG requires no change. The Chief of Staff, Army has already outlined specific training areas of interest to the DAIG for review during this fiscal year. We will also continue to use the Army Audit Agency. These agencies have and will continue to provide meaningful feedback on training to commanders and the Army staff.

Many of these specific comments and others were provided representatives of the GAO at a 9 January meeting hosted by the Director of Training, ODCSOPS. The written and verbal comments should contribute to the completeness of an already generally accurate and useful audit.

In closing, it should be emphasized that critical to the implementation and fulfillment of many of the GAO recommendations is the necessary resourcing for our training programs, and to attract and maintain the personnel the Army needs. The basis of our training weaknesses continues to be shortages of qualified trainers, the NCO. We remain committed to maintain the Army at a high level of training proficiency.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Acting... (Signature)

Note: The Army's comments were not received in time to be evaluated as provided by Public Law 96-226.
EXPLANATION OF GAO QUESTIONNAIRE

ADMINISTRATION AND VALIDATION PROCEDURES

Our assignment involved a two-phase questionnaire administration approach. First, GAO personnel administered questionnaires to enlisted soldiers at 43 units. The criteria used to select these units is explained in the report scope section. Secondly, we mailed questionnaires to a randomly selected sample of soldiers assigned to units throughout the world. We randomly selected the units involved in our mail-out effort from all units which report readiness. The purpose of both these efforts was to develop a data base of information concerning how soldiers are trained to perform tasks identified by the Army as critical for proper performance and survival in combat.

PROCEDURES FOLLOWED BY GAO
AT 43 UNITS ACTUALLY VISITED

The procedures used by GAO to administer and validate questionnaires at the 43 units visited were standardized; i.e., the same procedures were used at each unit.

Company/battery commanders were asked to assemble as many enlisted personnel as possible in one location. Seated by grade and MOS, soldiers in grades E1-E4 received one questionnaire (see pp. 53 to 57), and soldiers in grades E5-E9 received another questionnaire (see pp. 58 to 64). Soldiers, regardless of their grade, in preselected MOSs (see report appendix III) were also provided a separate questionnaire instrument which solicited information on which tasks they could perform (see pp. 65 and 66).

At the 43 units, questionnaires were completed by 2,184 soldiers in grades E1-E4, and 868 soldiers in grades E5-E9. The responses by specific grade and MOS are shown in the following tables.
### Responses by Grade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Number of responses</th>
<th>Percent of group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E1</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (note a)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,184</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Number of responses</th>
<th>Percent of group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (note b)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/These soldiers completed a questionnaire designed for the E1-E4 population but did not answer the question which requested their current grade.

b/These soldiers completed a questionnaire designed for the E5-E9 population but did not answer the question which requested their current grade.
APPENDIX II

Responses by MOSs Selected for Review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS (note a)</th>
<th>E1-E4 responses</th>
<th>E5-E9 responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent of group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11B</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11C</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>11H</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>19F</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>63B</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63C</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91B</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91C</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91D</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92B</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other MOSs</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,184</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/See appendix III for a description of MOSs selected for review.

The GAO auditor in charge of the questionnaire administration delivered introductory remarks which explained the purpose of the questionnaire and assured individual confidentiality. He also was present during the time questionnaires were completed to answer any specific questions the soldiers had.

While the questionnaires were being completed, the GAO personnel selected separate random samples of the E1-E4 and the E5-E9 populations present. Using a roster of personnel present which was furnished by company officials, we selected a 10-percent random sample of each group. To validate questionnaire results, we interviewed selected soldiers from this group. The interview technique was designed to determine whether the soldiers fully understood the questions asked and to determine the validity of responses provided on the questionnaire. In total, we interviewed 208 E1-E4s and 118 E5-E9s.

During the interview process, which lasted about 30 minutes per individual, the GAO interviewer completed a separate questionnaire based on the soldier's oral response. For the E5-E9 personnel interviewed, the GAO auditor completed the same type questionnaire originally completed by the soldier. For the E1-E4 personnel interviewed, a different validation document was used.
only validated the original responses, but also solicited additional information (see pp. 67 to 72). GAO developed a computer program to compare the original questionnaire responses with the interview responses. The results showed a high degree of correlation between the original questionnaire responses and the interview responses which means that the soldiers understood the questions and answered them honestly.

PROCEDURES FOLLOWED BY GAO TO ADMINISTER THE MAIL-OUT QUESTIONNAIRE

Since the 43 units actually visited by GAO were not randomly selected, our observations and conclusions concerning training effectiveness at these units cannot be projected to training in all Army units. However, we recognized the advantages and benefits of being able to address training throughout the Army. Consequently, we developed and implemented a questionnaire methodology which involved sending the same type questionnaires used at the 43 units to randomly selected E1-E4s and E5-E9s in a sample of units throughout the Army.

The procedures and data bases used by GAO to select its sample of Army units and personnel within these units to receive questionnaires is explained below.

-- A complete copy of the Enlisted Master File was provided by the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center.

-- An extract file from the Unit Readiness and Reporting System data base was prepared and provided by the U.S. Army Command and Control Support Agency.

-- The unit file was ordered by unit identification number.

-- Records were selected from the unit file which met the following criteria:

   -- Unit was active.

   -- Unit reported readiness or parent unit reported readiness to Department of the Army.

   -- Unit was not created solely for logistical purposes, nonpermanent party personnel, or table of Distribution and Allowances augmentation.

   -- A random interval sample was drawn from the edited unit file. GAO calculated the appropriate sample size of 333 units.

   -- The sample unit file was matched to the Enlisted Master File to select all individuals assigned to the units in
The selected records were split into two output files: grades E4 and below and grades E5 and above. The files were ordered by Unit Identification Code.

The sample unit file and the E4 and below file were combined to create one record containing the personnel information and the unit information for each individual selected; this step was also performed on the E5 and above file.

A random sample of five individuals from each unit was drawn from both the E4 and below file and the E5 and above file.

Mailing labels were printed and questionnaires were sent to the sample of individuals selected. Two mailouts were used during this effort: an original mailout took place June 1980, and a followup effort took place August 1980.

Our sample sizes for the El-E4 group and the E5-E9 group were 1,641 and 1,642 respectively. Our response rates from these two groups were 59.7 percent and 61.7 percent respectively. More importantly, however, we received responses from soldiers El-E4 in 321 units and from soldiers E5-E9 in 325 of the units sampled. Since our sampling methodology was based on units, we actually received responses from 98 percent of the elements sampled. Such a response rate enabled us to project the questionnaire results to all Army units which report readiness.

While selecting our samples and projecting our mail-out questionnaire responses to the universe of all Army units which report readiness, we used acceptable statistical sampling procedures. We believe that the projected results are representative of the state of individual training in the Army. This conclusion, however, is dependent upon the validity of the Army data supplied by U.S. Army Military Personnel System and U.S. Army Command and Control Support Agency. The Army assured us the data supplied was the most recent and accurate available. Notwithstanding, we did not perform a reliability assessment review of their computer systems.

Our world-wide sample was designed so that the maximum sampling error at the 95 percent confidence level (occurring at a finding of 50 percent) would be 7 percent.
This questionnaire was developed by the U.S. General Accounting Office, an agency which does studies and reports the results to the U.S. Congress. This questionnaire was written to get information from you about your military training.

Your help is very important. Please read all of the questions carefully and give us honest answers.

You will see that we have not asked for your name on the questionnaire. Your answers will not be made known to anyone in the Army. Our report to Congress will only say how soldiers answered in total.

Thank you for your help.

1. Location: ____________________________
2. Unit: _______________________________
3. Grade: E-____________________________ (10)
4. Primary MOS: ________________________ (11-13)
5. Duty MOS: ___________________________ (14-16)

(Write in your duty MOS even if it is the same as your primary MOS)

6. Were you going to school when you decided to join the Army? (Check one.)
   1. [ ] Yes, I was going to high school
   2. [ ] Yes, I was going to college
   3. [ ] Yes, I was going to some other school
   4. [ ] No, I was not going to school

7. Were you working when you decided to join the Army? (Check one.)
   1. [ ] Yes, I was working full time
   2. [ ] Yes, I was working part time
   3. [ ] No, I was not working

8. How old were you when you entered the Army? (19-20)
   ________ years old

9. When you first entered the Army did you have a high school diploma, a GED certificate or neither one? (Check one.)
   1. [ ] High school diploma
   2. [ ] GED certificate
   3. [ ] Neither one

10. If you did not graduate from high school or get a GED certificate before you entered the Army, what is the highest grade you completed in school? (Check one.)
    1. [ ] 8th grade or less
    2. [ ] 9th grade
    3. [ ] 10th grade
    4. [ ] 11th grade

11. Since you entered the Army did you earn a high school diploma, a GED certificate or neither one. (Check one.)
    1. [ ] High school diploma
    2. [ ] GED certificate
    3. [ ] Neither one

12. When you enlisted in the Army did you need a waiver because of an arrest and/or conviction record? (Check one.)
    1. [ ] Yes
    2. [ ] No
    3. [ ] Don’t know

13. When you enlisted in the Army did you need a waiver because of marijuana or other drug usage? (Check one.)
    1. [ ] Yes
    2. [ ] No
    3. [ ] Don’t know

14. When you enlisted in the Army did you need a waiver because of a health or medical problem? (Check one.)
    1. [ ] Yes
    2. [ ] No
    3. [ ] Don’t know
15. When you enlisted, what grade were you given? (Check one.) (22)
   1. ☐ E-1 (GO TO QUESTION 17)
   2. ☐ E-2 (GO TO QUESTION 16)
   3. ☐ E-3

16. If you were enlisted as an E-2 or E-3, what were the reasons you were given this grade? (Check all that apply.) (28-33)
   1. ☐ I had training after high school
   2. ☐ I had work experience after high school
   3. ☐ I helped in recruiting other enlistees
   4. ☐ I had ROTC training
   5. ☐ I was in the military before
   6. ☐ Other (please specify) ________________________________

17. How well did you do in basic training? (Check one.) (34)
   1. ☐ Honor graduate
   2. ☐ Average
   3. ☐ Below average
   4. ☐ Don’t remember

18. How well did you do in AIT or OSUT? (Check one.) (35)
   1. ☐ Honor graduate
   2. ☐ Average
   3. ☐ Below average
   4. ☐ Don’t remember

19. Since entering the service, how many times have you been promoted? (Check one.) (36)
   1. ☐ Haven’t been promoted yet (GO TO QUESTION 21)
   2. ☐ One time (GO TO QUESTION 20)
   3. ☐ Two times (GO TO QUESTION 20)
   4. ☐ Three times

20. What were the reasons for your promotion(s)? (Check all that apply.) (37-40)
   1. ☐ Completed training
   2. ☐ Completed OJT period
   3. ☐ Completed time-in-grade
   4. ☐ Meritorious performance or conduct

21. Since you have been in the Army, have you received any article 15 punishment? (Check one.) (41-43)
   1. ☐ Yes How many? __________
   2. ☐ No

22. Since you have been in the Army, have you been convicted by any courts martial? (Check one.) (44-46)
   1. ☐ Yes How many? __________
   2. ☐ No

23. What enlistment are you now serving? (Check one.) (47)
   1. ☐ 1st
   2. ☐ 2nd
   3. ☐ 3rd

24. How long have you been in the Army? (48-51)
   (Years) __________ (Months)

25. How long have you been in this unit? (52-55)
   (Years) __________ (Months)

26. Were you issued a soldier’s manual for your primary MOS? (Check one.) (56)
   1. ☐ Yes (GO TO QUESTION 27)
   2. ☐ No
   3. ☐ Don’t remember (GO TO QUESTION 28)

27. Do you now have a soldier’s manual for your primary MOS? (Check one.) (57)
   1. ☐ Yes
   2. ☐ No
   3. ☐ Don’t remember
28. How well did your AIT or OSUT training prepare you to do your MOS tasks at your first unit? (Check one.)

1. [ ] Very well
2. [ ] Somewhat well
3. [ ] Not well/not poorly
4. [ ] Somewhat poorly
5. [ ] Very poorly

29. During the last month have you performed duty in your primary MOS? (Check one.)

1. [ ] Yes
2. [ ] No

30. Could you pass an SQT in your primary MOS now? (Check one.)

1. [ ] Definitely yes
2. [ ] Probably yes
3. [ ] Unsure
4. [ ] Probably not
5. [ ] Definitely not

31. In this unit, how often do you do tasks which are not part of your MOS, such as taking leaves, policing trash, or doing other special details on the base? (Check one.)

1. [ ] All or almost all of the time
2. [ ] Most of the time
3. [ ] About half of the time
4. [ ] Some of the time
5. [ ] None or hardly any of the time

Your MOS has a number of tasks listed in your soldier's manual. They can be divided into 3 kinds of tasks.

(1) COMMON SOLDIER TASKS - such as, loading and unloading an M16A1 rifle, camouflaging and concealing equipment, map reading, etc.

(2) DUTY POSITION MOS TASKS - those tasks which you need to know for your duty position (i.e., those which you perform on a regular basis in your job)

(3) OTHER MOS TASKS - those tasks in your MOS which apply to other duty positions (i.e., those which you do not perform on a regular basis in your job) - also called cross-training in other duty position of your MOS.

32. At this time, how well can you perform the common soldier tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. [ ] Very well
2. [ ] Somewhat well
3. [ ] Not well/not poorly
4. [ ] Somewhat poorly
5. [ ] Very poorly

33. At this time, how well can you perform your duty position MOS tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. [ ] Very well
2. [ ] Somewhat well
3. [ ] Not well/not poorly
4. [ ] Somewhat poorly
5. [ ] Very poorly

34. At this time, how well can you perform the other MOS tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. [ ] Very well
2. [ ] Somewhat well
3. [ ] Not well/not poorly
4. [ ] Somewhat poorly
5. [ ] Very poorly

35. Did you receive a test notice at least 45 days before your last SQT? (Check one.)

1. [ ] Yes
2. [ ] No

(GO TO QUESTION 36)

3. [ ] I have never taken an SQT   (GO TO QUESTION 40)
36. What score did you get on your last SQT? (Check one.)
   1. ☐ I have not taken an SQT
   2. ☐ I have not received my test score yet
   3. ☐ I scored between 0 and 59
   4. ☐ I scored between 60 and 79
   5. ☐ I scored between 80 and 100

   (GO TO QUESTION 40)

37. Who in your unit talked to you about tasks you missed on your last SQT? (Check all that apply.)
   1. ☐ No one
   2. ☐ Squad leader
   3. ☐ Platoon sergeant
   4. ☐ Platoon leader
   5. ☐ Training NCO
   6. ☐ Company commander
   7. ☐ Other (please specify) ____________________________

38. Did you use a soldier's manual to study for your last SQT? (Check one.)
   1. ☐ Yes
   2. ☐ No

39. Did your last SQT ask questions about tasks or ask you to do tasks you have not been trained to do? (Check one.)
   1. ☐ Yes
   2. ☐ No

40. In this unit, are SQT results used to decide promotions? (Check one.)
   1. ☐ Yes
   2. ☐ No
   3. ☐ Don't know

41. In this unit, are SQT results used to decide who can reenlist? (Check one.)
   1. ☐ Yes
   2. ☐ No
   3. ☐ Don't know

42. In this unit, how would you rate the MOS training that you get to help you with the SQT? (Check one.)
   1. ☐ Very good
   2. ☐ Good
   3. ☐ Not good/not poor
   4. ☐ Poor
   5. ☐ Very poor

Please turn the page and continue.
43. Please read the following comments. Tell us whether you (1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, or (3) do not agree with each statement as it applies to your unit's MOS training program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Our unit's NCO's really take an interest in training me</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Our unit spends a lot of time training MOS tasks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Our unit's NCO's really prepare for our training courses - (They make certain they know what they are talking about.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Our unit instructors make sure any equipment needed for training is available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I have received training in all the tasks in my MOS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. My NCO's are really trying to give me good training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. My commander is really trying to give me good training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. In this unit special duties and details are more important than MOS training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

44. If there is anything else you would like to say about training in the Army, please do so here. (18)
This questionnaire was developed by the U.S. General Accounting Office, an agency which does studies and reports the results to the U.S. Congress. This questionnaire was written to get information from you about your military training.

Your help is very important. Please read all of the questions carefully and give us honest answers.

You will see that we have not asked for your name on the questionnaire. Your answers will not be made known to anyone in the Army. Our report to Congress will only say how soldiers answered in total.

Thank you for your help.

1. Location: ____________________________

2. Unit: ________________________________

3. Grade: ____________________________ (10)

4. Primary MOS: ________________________ (11-13)

5. Duty MOS: ___________________________ (14-16)

(Write in your duty MOS even if it is the same as your primary MOS.)

6. What kind of supervisory position do you have in this unit? (Check all that apply) (17)

1. □ Squad leader
2. □ Platoon sergeant
3. □ Section leader
4. □ Other supervisory position (please specify) ________________________________
5. □ Non-supervisory position (please specify) ________________________________

7. How many months have you been in your current position? (18-19) ________ months

8. How many months have you been in this unit? (20-21) ________ months

9. How many soldiers do you currently supervise? (22-23) ________ soldiers

10. What is the highest grade you completed in school? (Check one.) (24)

1. □ 8th grade or lower
2. □ 9th grade
3. □ 10th grade
4. □ 11th grade
5. □ High school graduate (diploma or GED)
6. □ Some college
7. □ College graduate or higher

11. Have you been to NCO leadership schools? (Check one.) (25)

1. □ Yes
2. □ No

12. Have you been to any of the Army's Section Training Management System (STMS) workshops? (Check one.) (26)

1. □ Yes (GO TO QUESTION 13.)
2. □ No (GO TO QUESTION 14.)

13. How much use was this training in helping you train others? (Check one.) (27)

1. □ Very great use
2. □ Great use
3. □ Moderate use
4. □ Limited use
5. □ Little or no use
14. Have you had any other training in how to teach soldiers? (Check one.)
   1. [ ] Yes (Please list training.)
      ____________________________
      ____________________________
      ____________________________
   2. [ ] No

15. How are you provided training in your skill tasks? (Check all that apply.)
   1. [ ] Supervised OJT
   2. [ ] Formal classes conducted by high ranked NCO's in this unit
   3. [ ] I am not currently receiving training in my skill tasks
   4. [ ] Other (please specify) ____________________________

Each MOS has a number of tasks in it which are listed in the soldier's manual. They can be divided into 3 kinds of tasks.

1. COMMON SOLDIER TASKS - such as, loading and unloading an M-60 rifle, camouflaging and concealing equipment, map reading, etc.
2. DUTY POSITION MOS TASKS - those tasks which a soldier needs to know for a given duty position (i.e., those which a soldier performs on a regular basis in his/her job)
3. OTHER MOS TASKS - those tasks in a soldier's MOS which apply to other duty positions (i.e., those which the soldier does not perform on a regular basis in his/her job) - also called crosstraining in other duty positions of the MOS.

COMMON SOLDIER TASKS

We would like to find out how the soldiers in your platoon or section get training in the common soldier tasks. (For example, loading and unloading an M-60 rifle, camouflaging and concealing equipment, map reading, etc.)

16. How often do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section get scheduled classroom training in the common soldier tasks listed in the soldier's manual? (Check one.)
   1. [ ] Daily
   2. [ ] At least once a week
   3. [ ] A few times a month
   4. [ ] About once a month
   5. [ ] Once every few months
   6. [ ] Once a year or less
   7. [ ] Only when studying for an SQT
   8. [ ] Never
   9. [ ] Don't know

17. Just before an SQT, do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section get any extra scheduled classroom training in the common soldier tasks listed in the soldier's manual? (Check one.)
   1. [ ] Yes
   2. [ ] No
   3. [ ] Don't know

18. How often do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section get OJT (on-the-job-training) in the common soldier tasks listed in the soldier's manual? (Check one.)
   1. [ ] Daily
   2. [ ] At least once a week
   3. [ ] A few times a month
   4. [ ] About once a month
   5. [ ] Once every few months
   6. [ ] Once a year or less
   7. [ ] Only when studying for an SQT
   8. [ ] Never
   9. [ ] Don't know

Each MOS has a number of tasks in it which are listed in the soldier's manual. They can be divided into 3 kinds of tasks.

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APPENDIX II

19. Just before an SQT, do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section get any SQT OJT (on-the-job-training) in the common soldier tasks listed in the soldier’s manual? (Check one.) (36)
1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No
3. ☐ Don’t know

20. How often do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section have field exercises where they can practice the common soldier tasks listed in the soldier’s manual? (Check one.) (37)
1. ☐ Daily
2. ☐ At least once a week
3. ☐ A few times a month
4. ☐ About once a month
5. ☐ Once every few months
6. ☐ Once a year or less
7. ☐ Only when studying for an SQT
8. ☐ Never
9. ☐ Don’t know

21. Just before an SQT do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section have any extra field exercises where they can practice the common soldier tasks listed in the soldier’s manual? (Check one.) (38)
1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No
3. ☐ Don’t know

22. How well can the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section perform all the common soldier tasks listed in the soldier’s manual? (Check one.) (39)
1. ☐ Very well
2. ☐ Somewhat well
3. ☐ Not well/not poorly
4. ☐ Somewhat poorly
5. ☐ Very poorly

DUTY POSITION MOS TASKS

Next we would like to find out how the soldiers in your platoon or section get training in duty position MOS tasks - those tasks which a soldier needs to know for a given duty position.

23. How often do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section get scheduled classroom training in the duty position MOS tasks listed in the soldier’s manual? (Check one.) (40)
1. ☐ Daily
2. ☐ At least once a week
3. ☐ A few times a month
4. ☐ About once a month
5. ☐ Once every few months
6. ☐ Once a year or less
7. ☐ Only when studying for an SQT
8. ☐ Never
9. ☐ Don’t know

24. Just before an SQT, do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section get any extra scheduled classroom training in the duty position MOS tasks listed in the soldier’s manual? (Check one.) (41)
1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No
3. ☐ Don’t know

25. How often do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section get any SQT OJT (on-the-job-training) in the duty position MOS tasks listed in the soldier’s manual? (Check one.) (42)
1. ☐ Daily
2. ☐ At least once a week
3. ☐ A few times a month
4. ☐ About once a month
5. ☐ Once every few months
6. ☐ Once a year or less
7. ☐ Only when studying for an SQT
8. ☐ Never
9. ☐ Don’t know
26. Just before an SQT do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section get any extra OJT (on-the-job-training) in the duty position MOS tasks listed in the soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No
3. ☐ Don't know

27. How often do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section have field exercises where they can practice the duty position MOS tasks listed in the soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. ☐ Daily
2. ☐ At least once a week
3. ☐ A few times a month
4. ☐ About once a month
5. ☐ Once every few months
6. ☐ Once a year or less
7. ☐ Only when studying for an SQT
8. ☐ Never
9. ☐ Don't know

28. Just before an SQT do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section have field exercises where they can practice the duty position MOS tasks listed in the soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No
3. ☐ Don't know

29. How well can the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section perform the duty position MOS tasks listed in the soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. ☐ Very well
2. ☐ Somewhat well
3. ☐ Not well/not poorly
4. ☐ Somewhat poorly
5. ☐ Very poorly

30. How often do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section get scheduled classroom training in the other MOS tasks listed in the soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. ☐ Daily
2. ☐ At least once a week
3. ☐ A few times a month
4. ☐ About once a month
5. ☐ Once every few months
6. ☐ Once a year or less
7. ☐ Only when studying for an SQT
8. ☐ Never
9. ☐ Don't know

31. Just before an SQT do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section get any extra scheduled classroom training in the other MOS tasks listed in the soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No
3. ☐ Don't know

32. How often do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section get OJT (on-the-job-training) in the other MOS tasks listed in the soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. ☐ Daily
2. ☐ At least once a week
3. ☐ A few times a month
4. ☐ About once a month
5. ☐ Once every few months
6. ☐ Once a year or less
7. ☐ Only when studying for an SQT
8. ☐ Never
9. ☐ Don't know
33. Just before an SQT do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section get any extra OJT (on-the-job-training) in the other MOS tasks listed in the soldier's manual? (Check one.)

☐ Yes (GO TO QUESTION 38.)
☐ No. Who does it? ____________________________
(If you answered no, GO TO QUESTION 39.)

☐ Don't know

34. How often do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section have field exercises where they can practice the other MOS tasks listed in the soldier's manual? (Check one.)

☐ Daily
☐ At least once a week
☐ A few times a month
☐ About once a month
☐ Once every few months
☐ Once a year or less
☐ Only when studying for an SQT
☐ Never
☐ Don't know

35. Just before an SQT do the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section have any extra field exercises where they can practice the other MOS tasks listed in the soldier's manual? (Check one.)

☐ Yes (GO TO QUESTION 40.)
☐ No
☐ Don't know

36. How well can the soldiers (E-1 thru E-4) in your platoon or section perform the other MOS tasks listed in the soldier's manual? (Check one.)

☐ Very well
☐ Somewhat well
☐ Not well/not poorly
☐ Somewhat poorly
☐ Very poorly

37. Are you required to determine the MOS training needs of the soldiers you supervise? (Check one.)

☐ Yes (GO TO QUESTION 38.)
☐ No. Who does it? ____________________________

38. How do you determine which skill related MOS tasks the soldiers you supervise need to be trained in? (Check all that apply.)

☐ By observing them at work
☐ By observing them during KTEP exercises/training
☐ SQT results
☐ I am told what to teach
☐ Other (please specify) ____________________________

39. Do you use MOS job books as a guide for training? (Check one.)

☐ Yes (GO TO QUESTION 40.)
☐ No
☐ Don't know (GO TO QUESTION 41.)

40. How long have you been using the MOS job books? (Check one.)

☐ Less than a month
☐ At least a month but less than 3 months
☐ At least 3 months but less than 6 months
☐ At least 6 months but less than a year
☐ A year or more

41. How many of the soldiers that you supervise do you feel are interested enough in MOS training to study soldier's manuals on their own? (Check one.)

☐ All or almost all of them
☐ Most of them
☐ About half of them
☐ Some of them
☐ None or hardly any of them
APPENDIX I

42. In your opinion, how many soldiers under your supervision with at least 1 year of experience in their MOS can perform all the skill level 1 tasks of their MOS? (Check one.) (63)

1. □ All or almost all of them
2. □ Most of them
3. □ About half of them
4. □ Some of them
5. □ None or hardly any of them

43. Are you required to provide MOS training to the soldiers under your supervision? (Check one.) (64)

1. □ Yes
2. □ No

44. Do you feel qualified to teach the tasks that are in your MOS? (Check one.) (65)

1. □ Yes, all of the tasks
2. □ Only some of the tasks
3. □ No, none of the tasks

45. How often do you have the training equipment you need for demonstration and hands-on exercises to train your soldiers? (Check one.) (66)

1. □ All or almost all of the time
2. □ Most of the time
3. □ About half of the time
4. □ Some of the time
5. □ None or hardly any of the time

46. Do you feel all soldiers in your MOS should be able to do all duty jobs at their skill level? (Check one.) (67)

1. □ Yes
2. □ No

47. How many of the skill level 1 tasks listed in the soldier's manual for your MOS are critical in that soldiers should know how to do the task to properly perform in the MOS? (Check one.) (68)

1. □ All or almost all are critical
2. □ Most are critical
3. □ About half are critical
4. □ Some are critical
5. □ None or hardly any are critical
6. □ Don't know

48. How many of the soldiers that you supervise do you think are adequately trained for combat duty in their MOS? (Check one.) (69)

1. □ All or almost all
2. □ Most
3. □ About half
4. □ Some
5. □ None or hardly any

49. Why are some of the soldiers that you supervise not ready for combat duty? (Check all that apply.) (70-74)

1. □ High turnover of personnel makes it hard to maintain-trained proficiency
2. □ More time is needed for training
3. □ Soldiers I get are difficult to train
4. □ I don't know
5. □ Other (please specify)

50. How long would it take to prepare all the soldiers you supervise to be able to do all skill level 1 tasks listed in their soldier's manual? (Check one.) (75)

1. □ Less than 4 weeks
2. □ At least 1 week but less than 4 weeks
3. □ At least 4 weeks but less than 1 month
4. □ At least 1 month but less than 3 months
5. □ 3 months or more

51. Are there soldiers under your supervision with a different MOS from yours? (Check one.) (76)

1. □ Yes (GO TO QUESTION 52.)
2. □ No (GO TO QUESTION 55.)

52. Are you required to teach those soldiers who don't have your MOS specific tasks as listed in their soldier's manual? (Check one.) (77)

1. □ Yes (GO TO QUESTION 53.)
2. □ No (GO TO QUESTION 54.)

53. If yes, do you feel you are qualified to teach those tasks that are not in your MOS? (Check one.) (78)

1. □ Yes, all of the tasks
2. □ Only some of the tasks
3. □ No, none of the tasks
54. If you do not train soldiers with other MOS's, who trains these soldiers? (Check all that apply.)

(10-15)

1. [ ] An NCO in the unit having the appropriate MOS

2. [ ] Consolidated training in the battalion

3. [ ] Formal courses on post or school

4. [ ] Soldier must learn it on own

5. [ ] Don’t know

6. [ ] Other (please specify) __________________________

55. If there is anything else you would like to say about training in the Army, please do so here. (16)
## APPENDIX II

### TASKS FOR ARMY MOS 915, Medical Specialist

Please read each task and tell us whether you can perform the task.

- If you can - check the box labeled "Yes."
- If you are not sure - check the box labeled "Not Sure."
- If you can't - check the box labeled "No."

Your answers will not be shown to anyone in your company or anyone in the Army.

What is your grade?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Can you perform the task?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Administer emergency medical care for burns</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Apply nasopharyngeal respiration</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Administer emergency medical care to a chemical-agent casualty</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Immobilize a fracture</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Apply wire-ladder splint to a fractured upper extremity</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Apply a splint to a fractured lower extremity</td>
<td>Not Sure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Initiate a US Field Medical Card (DD Form 1380)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Apply a first aid dressing to a wound</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Perform the Heimlich maneuver</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Perform chest-pressures with life method of artificial respiration (modified Sivler)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Can you perform the task?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Administer emergency medical care to a patient who has ingested</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a corrosive poison</td>
<td>(54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Manage a patient who is unruly and/or emotionally disturbed</td>
<td>(55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Administer emergency medical care to a patient who has suffered</td>
<td>(56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insect bites and/or stings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Administer emergency medical care for a diabetic emergency</td>
<td>(57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Administer emergency medical care to a casualty with a sucking</td>
<td>(58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chest wound</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Perform medical sorting (trage)</td>
<td>(59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. Obtain a blood specimen (syringe)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Obtain a blood specimen (vacutainer)</td>
<td>(61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Initiate an intravenous infusion of a prescribed fluid</td>
<td>(62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Administer a blood transfusion</td>
<td>(63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. Measure intake and output</td>
<td>(64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. Administer a cooling sponge bath</td>
<td>(65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. Put on a gown</td>
<td>(66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54. Remove a soiled gown</td>
<td>(67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55. Prepare an open wound for operative treatment</td>
<td>(68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56. Change a sterile dressing</td>
<td>(69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57. Suction patient’s tracheotomy/endotracheal tube</td>
<td>(70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58. Irrigate an ear</td>
<td>(71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59. Administer eye irrigation</td>
<td>(72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60. Install eye drops</td>
<td>(73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61. Apply heat applications to a patient</td>
<td>(74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62. Apply an ice bag</td>
<td>(75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63. Administer tube feeding (gavage) to a patient</td>
<td>(76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64. Administer a rectal suppository</td>
<td>(77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65. Administer an intramuscular injection</td>
<td>(78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66. Administer an intradermal injection</td>
<td>(79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67. Administer a cleansing enema</td>
<td>(80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68. Administer a subcutaneous injection</td>
<td>(81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69. Complete a Clinical Record: Temperature - Pulse - Respiration</td>
<td>(82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Fahrenheit) (SP 311)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Can you perform the task?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70. Mechanically restrain a patient</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71. Ambulate a postoperative patient</td>
<td>(83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72. Administer passive exercise</td>
<td>(84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73. Ambulate a patient with crutches</td>
<td>(85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74. Move patient from bed into a wheelchair</td>
<td>(86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75. Transfer patient from bed to stretcher using a three-man carry</td>
<td>(87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76. Perform routine mouth care on a bed patient</td>
<td>(88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77. Monitor signs of increased intracranial pressure</td>
<td>(89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78. Collect specimens for diagnostic tests</td>
<td>(90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79. Assist patient with postdural drainage</td>
<td>(91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80. Perform Foley catheter care</td>
<td>(92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81. Provide a controlled environment in a group tent</td>
<td>(93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82. Check oxygen content of an isolate of group</td>
<td>(94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83. Perform the preoperative skin prep</td>
<td>(95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84. Scrub, gown, and glove</td>
<td>(96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85. Remove sutures</td>
<td>(97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86. Put on a protective mask</td>
<td>(98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87. Maintain protective mask and accessories</td>
<td>(99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88. Give NBC alarm</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89. Interpret NBC alarms and signals</td>
<td>(101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90. Take cover as protection against NBC hazards</td>
<td>(102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91. Decontaminate self, equipment, and supplies</td>
<td>(103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92. Disinfect a thirty-six (36) gallon water purification bag (Lytser)</td>
<td>(104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93. Sec up/maintain garbage and litter disposal facilities</td>
<td>(105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94. Sec up/maintain human wastes disposal facilities</td>
<td>(106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95. Disinfect a canister of water with iodine tablets</td>
<td>(107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96. Collect/report information - SALUTE</td>
<td>(108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97. Use challenge and password</td>
<td>(109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98. Camouflage/conceal equipment</td>
<td>(110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99. Camouflage yourself, your load-bearing equipment, and</td>
<td>(111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>your individual weapons and equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100. Construct individual/patient defensive positions</td>
<td>(112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101. Engage targets with an vital title</td>
<td>(113)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX I

I-1 thru I-4 Interview Form

(Do not punch ID code. Code is for use in matching this interview form with questionnaire form.)

1) Verify questions 29, 31, and 43 on the questionnaire form. Place an asterisk (*) after the answer given during interview.

2) Verify questions 32, 33, and 34 on the questionnaire form by re-asking the questions in the sequence they appear on this interview form. They follow questions 30, 32, and 33, respectively. The answers as given to these questions on the questionnaire form should be transferred to this form.

Your MOS has a number of tasks in it which are listed in your soldier's manual. They can be divided into 3 kinds of tasks:

1) COMMON SOLDIER TASKS - such as, loading and unloading an M16 rifle, camouflage and concealing equipment, map reading, etc.

2) DUTY POSITION MOS TASKS - those tasks which you need to know for your duty position (i.e., those which you perform on a regular basis in your job).

3) OTHER MOS TASKS - those tasks in your MOS which apply to other duty positions (i.e., those which you do not perform on a regular basis in your job) - also called cross-training in other duty position of your MOS.

COMMON SOLDIER TASKS

First we would like to ask some questions about how you get training in the common soldier tasks. For example, loading and unloading an M16 rifle, camouflage and concealing equipment, map reading, etc.

45. Since you have been in this unit, how often have you had scheduled classroom training in the common soldier tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. Daily
2. At least once a week
3. A few times a month
4. About once a month
5. Once every few months
6. Once a year or less
7. Only when studying for an SQT
8. Never

46. Since you have been in this unit, how well has scheduled classroom training helped you with the common soldier tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. Very well
2. Somewhat well
3. Not well/not poorly
4. Somewhat poorly
5. Very poorly

47. Since you have been in this unit, how often have you had on-the-job-training in the common soldier tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. Daily
2. At least once a week
3. A few times a month
4. About once a month
5. Once every few months
6. Once a year or less
7. Only when studying for an SQT
8. Never
48. Since you have been in this unit, how well has OJT helped you do the common soldier tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)
   1. [ ] Very well
   2. [ ] Somewhat well
   3. [ ] Not well/not poorly
   4. [ ] Somewhat poorly
   5. [ ] Very poorly

49. Since you have been in this unit, how often have you used Training Extension Course (TEC) tapes to learn about the common soldier tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)
   1. [ ] Daily
   2. [ ] At least once a week
   3. [ ] A few times a month
   4. [ ] About once a month
   5. [ ] Once every few months
   6. [ ] Once a year or less
   7. [ ] Only when studying for an SQT
   8. [ ] Never

50. Since you have been in this unit, how well have field exercises helped you do the common soldier tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)
   1. [ ] Very well
   2. [ ] Somewhat well
   3. [ ] Not well/not poorly
   4. [ ] Somewhat poorly
   5. [ ] Very poorly

51. Since you have been in this unit, how often have you used Training Extension Course (TEC) tapes to learn about the common soldier tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)
   1. [ ] Daily
   2. [ ] At least once a week
   3. [ ] A few times a month
   4. [ ] About once a month
   5. [ ] Once every few months
   6. [ ] Once a year or less
   7. [ ] Only when studying for an SQT
   8. [ ] Never

52. Since you have been in this unit, how often have Training Extension Courses (TEC) tapes helped you do the common soldier tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)
   1. [ ] Very well
   2. [ ] Somewhat well
   3. [ ] Not well/not poorly
   4. [ ] Somewhat poorly
   5. [ ] Very poorly

53. Since you have been in this unit, how often have you looked at your soldier's manual to see how the common soldier tasks are done? (Check one.)
   1. [ ] Daily
   2. [ ] At least once a week
   3. [ ] A few times a month
   4. [ ] About once a month
   5. [ ] Once every few months
   6. [ ] Once a year or less
   7. [ ] Only when studying for an SQT
   8. [ ] Never
APPENDIX II

34. Since you have been in this unit, how well has the soldier's manual helped you do the common soldier tasks? (Check one.)

1. Very well
2. Somewhat well
3. Not well/not poorly
4. Somewhat poorly
5. Very poorly

35. At this time, how well can you perform the common soldier tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. Very well
2. Somewhat well
3. Not well/not poorly
4. Somewhat poorly
5. Very poorly

DUTY POSITION WOS TASKS

Next we would like to ask some questions about your job in your duty position. Please choose the tasks which you need to know for your duty position.

36. Since you have been in this unit, how well has your OJT helped you do your duty position WOS tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. Very well
2. Somewhat well
3. Not well/not poorly
4. Somewhat poorly
5. Very poorly

37. Since you have been in this unit, how often have you had OJT on-the-job-training in your duty position WOS tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. Daily
2. At least once a week
3. A few times a month
4. About once a month
5. Once every few months
6. Once a year or less
7. Only when studying for an SQT
8. Never

38. Since you have been in this unit, how well has your scheduled classroom training helped you do your duty position WOS tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. Very well
2. Somewhat well
3. Not well/not poorly
4. Somewhat poorly
5. Very poorly

39. Since you have been in this unit, how often have you had scheduled classroom training in your duty position WOS tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1. Daily
2. At least once a week
3. A few times a month
4. About once a month
5. Once every few months
6. Once a year or less
7. Only when studying for an SQT
8. Never
59. Since you have been in this unit, how often have you had field exercises where you practiced your duty position MOS tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1.  Daily
2.  At least once a week
3.  A few times a month
4.  About once a month
5.  Once every few months
6.  Once a year or less
7.  Only when studying for an SQT
8.  Never

60. Since you have been in this unit, how well have field exercises helped you do your duty position MOS tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1.  Very well
2.  Somewhat well
3.  Not well/not poorly
4.  Somewhat poorly
5.  Very poorly
6.  Never

61. Since you have been in this unit, how often have you used Technical Extension Course (TEC) tapes to learn about your duty position MOS tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1.  Daily
2.  At least once a week
3.  A few times a month
4.  About once a month
5.  Once every few months
6.  Once a year or less
7.  Only when studying for an SQT
8.  Never

62. Since you have been in this unit, how well have Technical Extension Course (TEC) tapes helped you do your duty position MOS tasks listed in your soldier's manual? (Check one.)

1.  Very well
2.  Somewhat well
3.  Not well/not poorly
4.  Somewhat poorly
5.  Very poorly
6.  Never

63. Since you have been in this unit, how often have you looked at your soldier's manual to see how your duty position MOS tasks are done? (Check one.)

1.  Daily
2.  At least once a week
3.  A few times a month
4.  About once a month
5.  Once every few months
6.  Once a year or less
7.  Only when studying for an SQT
8.  Never

64. Since you have been in this unit, how well has the soldier's manual helped you do your duty position MOS tasks? (Check one.)

1.  Very well
2.  Somewhat well
3.  Not well/not poorly
4.  Somewhat poorly
5.  Very poorly
APPENDIX II

At this time, how well can you perform your duty position MOS tasks listed in your soldier's manual? Check one.

1. Very well
2. Somewhat well
3. Not well/not poorly
4. Somewhat poorly
5. Very poorly

SHER 40S TASKS

In this section, we would like to ask some questions about how you get training in other MOS tasks within your MOS which apply to other duty positions—also called cross-training.

Since you have been in this unit, how often have you had scheduled classroom training in the other MOS tasks listed in your soldier's manual? Check one.

1. Daily
2. At least once a week
3. A few times a month
4. About once a month
5. Once every few months
6. Once a year or less
7. Only when studying for an SQT
8. Never

Since you have been in this unit, how often have you had OJT (on-the-job-training) in the other MOS tasks listed in your soldier's manual? Check one.

1. Daily
2. At least once a week
3. A few times a month
4. About once a month
5. Once every few months
6. Once a year or less
7. Only when studying for an SQT
8. Never

Since you have been in this unit, how often have you had field exercises where you practiced the other MOS tasks listed in your soldier's manual? Check one.

1. Daily
2. At least once a week
3. A few times a month
4. About once a month
5. Once every few months
6. Once a year or less
7. Only when studying for an SQT
8. Never
APPENDIX II

70. Since you have been in this unit, how well have the field exercises helped you do the other MOS tasks listed in your soldier’s manual? (Check one.)
   1. □ Very well
   2. □ Somewhat well
   3. □ Not well/not poorly
   4. □ Somewhat poorly
   5. □ Very poorly

71. Since you have been in this unit, how well have the Technical Extension Course (TEC) tapes to learn about the other MOS tasks listed in your soldier’s manual? (Check one.)
   1. □ Very well
   2. □ Somewhat well
   3. □ Not well/not poorly
   4. □ Somewhat poorly
   5. □ Very poorly

72. Since you have been in this unit, how often have you used the Technical Extension Course (TEC) tapes to learn about the other MOS tasks listed in your soldier’s manual? (Check one.)
   1. □ Daily
   2. □ At least once a week
   3. □ A few times a month
   4. □ About once a month
   5. □ Once a year or less
   6. □ Only when studying for an SQT
   7. □ Never

73. Since you have been in this unit, how well have the soldier’s manual helped you do the other MOS tasks? (Check one.)
   1. □ Very well
   2. □ Somewhat well
   3. □ Not well/not poorly
   4. □ Somewhat poorly
   5. □ Very poorly

74. Since you have been in this unit, how well can you perform the other MOS tasks listed in your soldier’s manual? (Check one.)
   1. □ Very well
   2. □ Somewhat well
   3. □ Not well/not poorly
   4. □ Somewhat poorly
   5. □ Very poorly

At this time, how well can you perform the other MOS tasks listed in your soldier’s manual? (Check one.)
   1. □ Very well
   2. □ Somewhat well
   3. □ Not well/not poorly
   4. □ Somewhat poorly
   5. □ Very poorly

78.1
### Army Skills Selected for Review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Unit Visited</th>
<th>Military Occupational Specialties Reviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11B</td>
<td>Infantryman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11C</td>
<td>Indirect fire infantryman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11H</td>
<td>TOW crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12B</td>
<td>Combat engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13B</td>
<td>Cannon crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13E</td>
<td>Cannon fire directional specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63B</td>
<td>Wheel vehicle mechanic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63C</td>
<td>Track vehicle mechanic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16D</td>
<td>HAWK missile crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16E</td>
<td>HAWK fire control crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63B</td>
<td>Wheel vehicle mechanic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63C</td>
<td>Track specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19F</td>
<td>Armor driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91B</td>
<td>Medical specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91C</td>
<td>Patient care specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91D</td>
<td>Operating room specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92B</td>
<td>Medical laboratory specialist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX IV

**ARMY UNITS VISITED BY GAO WHERE DETAIL AUDIT WORK WAS PERFORMED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Designation</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company B, 2nd Battalion 505th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 82d Airborne Division</td>
<td>Ft. Bragg, North Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B, 307th Medical Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division</td>
<td>Ft. Bragg, North Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company A, 1st Battalion, 92nd Field Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division</td>
<td>Ft. Hood, Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B, 1st Battalion, 66th Armor, 2d Armor division</td>
<td>Ft. Hood, Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B, 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry (Mechanized) and HHC (Medical Personnel only), 1st Brigade 4th Infantry Division Mechanized</td>
<td>Ft. Carson, Colorado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C, 1st Battalion, 19th Field Artillery, 1st Brigade 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Ft. Carson, Colorado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th Combat Support Hospital, Quarter Master Brigade</td>
<td>Ft. Lee, Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B, 1st Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, 9th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Ft. Lewis, Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B, 5th Battalion, 32nd Armor, 2d Brigade 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Ft. Stewart, Georgia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX IV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Designation</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 5th Field Artillery, 41st Field Artillery Group, V Corp.</td>
<td>Babenhausen, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B, 3rd Battalion, 59th Air Defense, 10th Air Defense Artillery Group</td>
<td>Butzbach, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company A, 82nd Combat Army Engineer Battalion, 7th Engineer Brigade, VII Corps</td>
<td>Bamberg, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company A, 2nd Battalion, 50th Infantry (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Garlstedt, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company A, 1st Battalion, 30th Field Artillery, 17th Field Artillery Brigade, VII Corps</td>
<td>Augsburg, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company A, 4th Battalion, 68th Armor, 82d Airborne Division</td>
<td>Fort Bragg, North Carolina 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C, 1st Battalion 319th Field Artillery, 82d Airborne Division</td>
<td>Fort Bragg, North Carolina 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC 2d Battalion, 508th Infantry Battalion, 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division</td>
<td>Fort Bragg, North Carolina 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B, 2d Battalion 508th Infantry Battalion, 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division</td>
<td>Fort Bragg, North Carolina 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company A, 2d Battalion 505th Infantry Battalion, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division</td>
<td>Fort Bragg, North Carolina 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company E, 505th Infantry, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division</td>
<td>Fort Bragg, North Carolina 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C, 307th Engineering Battalion, 82d Airborne Division</td>
<td>Fort Bragg, North Carolina 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company A, 307th Medical Battalion, DISCOM, 82d Airborne Division</td>
<td>Fort Bragg, North Carolina 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A, 2d Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Division, 82d Airborne Division</td>
<td>Fort Bragg, North Carolina 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company A, 307th Engineering Battalion, 82d Airborne Division</td>
<td>Fort Bragg, North Carolina 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B, 3d Engineering Battalion, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Fort Stewart, Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company A, 5th Battalion, 32d Armor, 2d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Fort Stewart, Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Description</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B, 24th Medical Battalion, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Fort Stewart, Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A, 5th Battalion, 52d Air Defense Artillery, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Fort Stewart, Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C, 5th Battalion, 52d Air Defense Artillery, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Fort Stewart, Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC &amp; C Company, 1st Battalion 10th Infantry, 1st Brigade 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Fort Carson, Colorado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company A, 6th Battalion, 32d Armor, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Fort Carson, Colorado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Battery, 1st Battalion 19th Field Artillery, 1st Brigade 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Fort Carson, Colorado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C, 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Division, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Fort Carson, Colorado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company F, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division</td>
<td>Fort Riley, Kansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery D, 1st Battalion, 5th Field Artillery, 1st Infantry Division</td>
<td>Fort Riley, Kansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry</td>
<td>Fort Riley, Kansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B, 1st Medical Battalion 1st Infantry Division</td>
<td>Fort Riley, Kansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A, 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery Division, 9th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Fort Lewis, Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C, 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry, 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Fort Lewis, Washington</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit Description</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC &amp; B Company, 9th Medical Battalion, 9th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Fort Lewis, Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop D, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, III Corps</td>
<td>Fort Hood, Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C, 5th Signal Battalion, 3d Signal Brigade, III Corps</td>
<td>Fort Hood, Texas</td>
</tr>
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</table>