This report sets forth some notions which attempt to provide some perspective on the relationship between work on discourse and the needs of educators. The position is taken that a perspective focused on the individual school and setting is necessary and that educators themselves must participate in the research if the growth of research in discourse is to be helpful to education. The first section of the report deals with the question of what educators can expect to learn from studies of classroom discourse. The second section considers how the study of discourse has developed in relation to the various fields taking part in it, especially linguistics. This section reviews and critiques the literature in linguistics and discourse analysis, philosophy of language, ethnography, and interaction and cultural orientation. The third and final section considers critically the notion of language itself in relation to the notion of discourse. It suggests that the evolution of studies of language and discourse may be toward the establishment of a style of work which has special relevance to education. (Author/AMH)
ETHNOLINGUISTIC STUDY OF CLASSROOM DISCOURSE

Dell H. Hymes, Ph.D.
Principal Investigator

Final Report
to
The National Institute of Education

Marcia Farr, Ph.D.
Project Monitor

April 10, 1982

University of Pennsylvania:
Graduate School of Education
NIE-G-78-0083
This report follows upon a brief initial report, prepared for the conference on Teaching as a Linguistic Process (July 9-11, 1979), and two detailed letters of 30 April 1980 and 24 May 1980, and "A Partial Bibliography of Discourse Analysis", prepared by myself and Ann Houston. The present report is accompanied by an additional bibliography prepared especially for it. The report extends and integrates more fully the findings of the earlier materials.

The study of discourse has become a major concern of scholars in many fields. With regard to children, education, and schooling alone, there is a great accumulation of work. Much of this work is readily available and summarized. What is most lacking, perhaps, is perspective on the relation between this work and the needs of educators. Such a lack is indicated in the bewildering variety of definitions and understandings of the term 'context'; the diversity of approaches to the relation between 'form' and 'function'; and the uncertainty as to the pedagogical relevance of various outlooks.

In this report I try to set forth a few key ideas which seem to me to provide such perspective. These ideas have emerged from consideration of a considerable quantity of published material, and from discussions with a number of researchers in the field of discourse in relation to education. My main contention is that notions of 'context', 'form', 'function', and the like are relative to certain trends in the development of linguistics, as a field central to the study of discourse. I shall argue that a fairly radical perspective, focussed on the local school and individual setting, is necessary, if the great growth of research in discourse is to be helpful to education. I shall argue that educators themselves must participate in the research. These conclusions seem to me to follow from a consideration of the directions and limitations of much current work. They also, of course, reflect a long-standing orientation of my own. I do believe that this orientation is increasingly justified by the issues and trends that arise in the study of discourse today.
The report begins with the question of what educators can expect to learn from studies of discourse. This question, indeed, is the theme that informs the entire report.

The second section of the report considers how the study of discourse has developed in relation to the various fields taking part in it, especially linguistics. What can be expected and what can be learned depends very much on the place of a piece of work in that evolving context. It is important that policy-makers and educators take it into account. Progress in linguistics is not always pay-off in pedagogy.

The third section of the report considers critically the notion of language itself in relation to the notion of discourse. It suggests that the evolution of studies of language and discourse may be toward the establishment of a style of work of special relevance to education.

These three essential themes intersect, but I shall focus on each in turn.
What can educators expect to learn from studies of classroom discourse? A useful general framework is that of Frederick Ericson. Ericson points out that the results of research may be something that educators did not previously know, or something that they already knew; and he points out as well that this distinction is crosscut by another. What is found out may be welcome or unwelcome.

The following table shows these distinctions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Already known</th>
<th>Not already known</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welcome</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwelcome</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Ericson presented this framework in his concluding address to the Ethnography and Education Research Forum at the University of Pennsylvania in March 1980).

What counts as what part of the table, of course, depends upon the educators. Ericson has suggested that category B, welcome results not already known, is most likely to persuade people of the worth of research. Information as to an unsuspected cultural rule for showing respect, or taking turns, or speaking up, might count here, enabling a teacher better to gauge the intentions of students of different backgrounds, and involve them in the work of the classroom. Such information might depend upon observation in settings outside the school to which educators themselves did not have ready access. An important instance of this kind of finding is that of Susan Philips (1972), showing that the apparent 'shyness' of Indian children from Warm Springs Reservation, Oregon, was a function of the organization of activities. In participant structures more like those of the home community, the seemingly taciturn children were more verbally active. As Philips points out, such a finding does not solve the question of how to take into account the communicative expectations the children bring to school and at the same time provide them with experience of communicative expectations that will affect their subsequent lives. The finding does give solid grounding to practice, and may help give confidence to teachers of Indian background...
who find use of their familiar patterns effective. Again, such a possibility does not predict what will happen in a given case, nor does it dictate selection of teachers of a particular ethnic background. Ethnic origin in itself is compatible with a range of degrees of experience of traditional etiquette in discourse, and individuals vary in their own view of such identity. Wise practices and successful outcomes depend on sensitive knowledge of particular circumstances. But careful ethnographic observation of communicative patterns can replace superficial perceptions and all-or-nothing stereotypes.

Results in category A, welcome results already known, may give rise to the response that research was not needed to find them out. Sometimes, however, independent findings of this sort may confirm the insights of educators and help to legitimate action upon them. In a recent study of interaction in a West Philadelphia classroom, for example, it was found that individual teachers were very perceptive as to the relation between what normally counted as paying attention on the part of a pupil, and whether or not attention was actually being paid. They were alert to evidence from grades and other outcomes as a means of assessing their day-to-day perceptions. Observational research supported their skills, while at the same time bringing to light some instances of activity beyond their notice which did involve attention to the purposes of the lessons, although not perceived as such. It is important to investigate in general the conditions under which teachers, and other educators, are accurate observers and interpreters of behavior. There is perhaps a widespread impression that the only thing to investigate is the ways in which teachers are wrong. Students, former students, parents and others may have a lively sense of the injury done one time or another, when their behavior, intention, or even personal identity was mistaken. Yet much of the time many teachers are making largely shrewd assessments in certain respects. They are willy-nilly ethnographers of their own classrooms. Under favorable circumstances, independent observation of discourse can strengthen and legitimate that role.
Results in category C, unwelcome and already known, may be felt to be disloyal to the trust developed between educators and researchers, or at least to be embarrassing. Every institution has stories and problems it does not welcome being made public. Individuals have stories and understandings they are quite willing to share in conversation or private interview, but unwilling to put on record in writing of their own. There is an inescapable contradiction here between the goal of understanding fully how something works, and the responsibility of participants in the institution to protect its reputation. Yet sometimes an accurate account of the difficulties and limitations faced by educators may be ultimately helpful, by disabusing others of unrealistic expectations. Anonymity may protect the reputations of those directly involved, while making available to the larger educational community a desirable depth of understanding of the processes of a kind of situation.

Results in category D, unwelcome and not already known, may of course be regarded not as something to be known, but as something to be disbelieved. Of course such findings can be a challenge to improved practice. The kind of findings in this category most troublesome are those that suggest that educators make little or no difference. Larger forces of the society, or established patterns of interaction in the classroom, or both, may be regarded as perpetuating outcomes that belie the commitment of public education to equity and advancement.

It is striking that a major tendency in research in discourse weighs in principle against such a dispiriting conclusion. As will be seen, a major tendency is to assume or discover how much the understanding of discourse depends upon local knowledge—knowledge of the history of the event, and the histories of the participants, knowledge particular to the local setting. There are grave limitations to what can be established and inferred on the basis of what is purely linguistic and general to the language. Insofar as what happens and what is meant are emergent properties of situations, dependent upon factors that are open to negotiation among the participants, not amenable to satisfactory prediction in advance,
just so far the premises of leading tendencies in discourse research imply that participants in situations shape their outcomes, educators among them. A fatalistic or deterministic assessment is mistaken. If undesirable outcomes recur, it is because they are brought about, perhaps unwittingly. Within certain limitations, the same set of participants and circumstances could have a different configuration and other outcomes.

Educators need to believe that they can make a difference, even in very difficult circumstances. Such a view finds support in the spirit of ethnographic research in discourse and education. The leading ethnographers of education are not determinists; they cannot be. They cannot assume that the efforts of individuals are unavailing against the forces that shape the economy and structure of society. Their own principles of research require them to assume that the situations in which people participate are in an essential respect created by the people themselves. That is why ethnography is necessary. If what people do, and the meanings of what they do, were entirely determined by demography, budget, administrative organization, and the like, there would be no continuing need for ethnography. A few accounts, one for each type of case, according to demographic, budgetary, administrative and other circumstances, would be sufficient. One would know what to expect of every other school or situation that fitted the external characteristics.

Many people do indeed seem to think that way. Tell them that a school is in a large eastern city, 90% black, and a picture comes to mind. Tell them that a school is in a politically autonomous suburb of a large eastern city, 90% white, and another picture comes to mind. And so on. And of course it is true that similar social circumstances contribute to similar characteristics. Those of us who have come to know a number of schools, however, know that schools not very far apart, and quite alike in general circumstances, can differ in important ways. The character of the principal, the teachers, the force of traditions, the dynamics of relationships with parents, the utilization of resources within the surrounding area, may all be distinctive. The point applies to
individual classrooms as well. For children, their parents, and ultimately the society as a whole, what happens in the individual classroom for the children there is crucial. And what happens in the individual classroom is something that to a crucial extent emerges in the interactions that take place within it. The persons within the classroom, teachers and children, are not prisoners of its walls and resources. Surroundings and support from outside the classroom are of great importance, of course; external forces can make the population of a classroom too large or too unstable for effective learning to be sustained. Still, within the limits of what they have to work with, the persons within the classroom may create many different kinds of world.

The patterning of discourse is central to such worlds: the arousal and satisfaction, or frustration, of expectations as to what will follow what, what kinds of discourse will occur, who will participate when and in what way, what counts as serious and what as play, how turns are to be taken, what counts as having the floor, and the like. Of course there is much that is common and recognizable from one classroom to another. There are many respects in which most classrooms are one kind of situation, and not some other. Yet differences in the backgrounds of the pupils, the teachers, and in what goes in their lives, can create very different local worlds.

This fact is welcome in one respect, as we know, since it goes together with the fact that educators themselves make a difference in their situations. Yet the fact puts a great difficulty in the way of benefitting from research. Within the usual academic and scientific conception, the goal of research is generalization. Yet insofar as each school and each classroom may be a somewhat distinct world, the effect of a particular policy, curriculum, technique or material can not be easily anticipated. As an innovation, it will enter a variety of worlds, each of which may to a certain extent have a certain structure of its own. An innovation may mesh with some of these worlds and not with others. The people in some of these worlds may make one thing out of it, and those in others make out of it something else. The meaning of the innovation in the intention of those who
propose it may be changed. If evaluation afterwards finds that the innovation was accepted in some cases, and not in others, effective in some cases and not in others, even productive of unanticipated beneficial side-effects in some cases, perhaps including those in which it was not much accepted—the explanation is likely to lie in its having had different meanings in different local worlds. And those meanings and local worlds can not be taken into account by measurement alone. To take them into account requires interpretation by some one who has been present in them.

Here is the great difficulty that an ethnographic perspective faces. If educations do indeed make a difference to their situations as the perspective assumes, how can the manifold differences they make be taken into account?

The answer, I think, must come from an involvement of educators themselves in the ethnographic perspective. There is, to be sure, an essential role for ethnography by non-educators. Observation is partly a function of role, and the principal or classroom teacher can not readily lose that role in the home of a pupil or on the playground. Someone with a different relation to these situations may be better able to observe certain things. Nor can any person be a complete and objective observer of themselves. In addition, there are features of a school that involve integrating observation of a number of different settings, and the perspectives of different participants. It is never the case that knowledge is served adequately by accounts solely from self-study. The 'native' or insider has invaluable insights and interpretations to make that the outsider may be unable to provide. The outsider has a distance and strangeness to the situation that may provide necessary insights and interpretations as well. The ideal of knowledge is best served by common cause. That point is important in a world in which knowledge is politicized. Insofar as the country as a whole has reason to know about Philadelphia, its interests would not be fully served if no one not from Philadelphia was allowed to provide such information. On the other hand, research which excluded any one from Philadelphia would be seriously suspect too. We all understand this point, this need for collaborative common cause in
knowledge, when the knowledge in question is about someone else. As seriously as we may take their own story, we weight it together with what else we know. The mature ideal of ethnographic research is to be able to accept application of that standard to ourselves. In a world of inequality the ideal is difficult to attain, but working toward the ideal may make equality somewhat more real.

The fundamental fact that requires involvement of educators is a quantitative one. There are not and never will be as many ethnographers, let alone ethnographers of discourse, as there are classrooms and teachers. For most classrooms to be known in this regard, someone present to them must be involved in securing the knowledge. Even if the purpose is simply to benefit from what has been learned in studies elsewhere, the teacher in the particular classroom must bridge the gap between the statement of findings and the phenomena before him or her. Decisions must be made as to equivalents, as to the definition of notions and terms, as to the significance of variation and discrepancy. Even to apply the findings of some ethnographer somewhere else, the teacher must become partially an ethnographer of his or her own world.

This issue becomes particularly difficult in connection with discourse. Part of the study of discourse, of course, has to do with matters of context, turn-taking, getting the 'floor', and the like, matters of social behavior and social roles, which require it would seem, mainly the ability to observe daily behavior. But discourse is centrally a matter of the use of language, and details of wording, pronunciation, tone of voice, construction of sentences, organization of would-be narratives, may effect what the context is taken to be, who gets a turn or the floor, and what happens when one does. Students learn a good deal about teachers in these regards, and teachers about students. But how to record for reflection? Everything depends upon the relation of form and function, the relation of form and meaning. The two covary in communication. A difference in observable form, if relevant to communication, involves some difference in meaning. Yet the
form of messages escapes our ordinary orthography. Our punctuation marks, period, comma, question mark, are conventions of writing that only partially and imperfectly relate to the contours of the voice at the end of phrases and utterances. For the distribution of stress and pitch across words we have no conventions at all. For the voice qualities that may define intention, serious or play, friendly or unfriendly, we have only adjectives, loosely applied. Our common-sense label, 'interruption', covers a multitude of different sins and moves.

The educator who is to be a sensitive observer of classroom discourse needs to have been sensitized to the forms of speech and to a means of notation. The task of any observer of verbal interaction can be said to be that of relation the signals of speech to the roles and relationships of those involved. But where is this to be learned? Some sociologists, under the heading of 'ethnomethodology', have developed conventions for transcription of verbal behavior (cf. Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson 1974). Not that any set of conventions can be simply copied, for choice of transcriptional conventions can influence the interpretation of the data (cf. Ochs and Schieffelin 1979, and Edelsky 1981). A certain number of linguists address these problems scrupulously (Griffin, Gumperz, Shuy, Tannen, among others). In sum, there are people to whom one could go to learn something of this kind of work. But there are not many of them, and the kind of work is not regularly taught as a standard part of either linguistics, or sociology, or education, or even anthropology. The tradition in which anthropologists intending to do field work had to learn to transcribe unfamiliar sounds is almost dead. Most cultural and social anthropologists appear to be happy to think that linguists are taking care of languages. Yet in linguistics, the training one can expect in the sounds of language is in relation to theories of language. The features and relationships to be learned are those that fit into formal models of linguistic structure. Even insofar as the features are relevant to verbal interaction, nothing is done to show how to relate them
to verbal interaction. The questions have to do with the difference that is made to an abstract model of grammar, not with the difference that is made to the outcome of an event.

As said, there are a number of individuals who make valuable contributions in this kind of work. The crucial fact remains that non-linguists are very seldom expected to be able to identify speech signals, even when their object of study is interaction, and that linguists are very seldom expected to be able to relate speech signals to persons and contexts. Social scientists may be expected to know theories of social order, and linguists to know theories of grammatical order. Nowhere is it taken for granted that either should know how to combine social and verbal order in the study of the order of interaction and discourse. Even at universities famous for their work in sociolinguistics and the like, the training in research is directed toward problems in linguistic theory.

The answer to this problem that is likely to occur to many is the choice of a system of categorization. Code the tape recording or videotape for one of a set of six kinds of speech act or other category. What is required for such coding is reliable recognition, not the ability to transcribe or relate the signals of the categories to each other. It is the view of this report that coding categorization can never suffice. It typically leads to results in terms of the distribution of frequencies. Such counts necessarily abstract from the immediate verbal context and differences in vocal texture: They impose a logic on the sequence of interaction that is unlikely to reveal its actual logic. Not every feature is relevant all of the time, of course, and after study one may be able to conclude that just certain signals, certain choices, were the ones that counted. The principle of an ethnographic perspective, however, is that one does not know with certainty in advance just which features, at what level, will be the revealing ones. The very same sequence of speech acts, or even of words, may have quite different significance, once tone of voice and features of vocal
style are taken into account. Put otherwise, one does not know in advance just where the information of interest will be located. It may shift from word choice to pronunciation to mechanisms of taking turns and getting the floor. Any interacting group is likely to develop some selection and grouping of verbal means specific to itself, whose status as such would need to be known properly to interpret its occurrence.

The methodological problem thus remains the same. Insofar as we accept the educators can make a difference, and therefore accept that educational situations are partly what educators make them, just so far we accept that educational situations can not be fully understood through application of an a priori grid. Understanding will require attention to the unfolding and shaping of meaning with the means available to the participants. Central to meaning will be the verbal signals involved in interaction. We cannot in principle rule out significance of one kind and concentrate only on others. Immediately present to a situation, we may be able to interpret spontaneously what is going on in virtue of our understandings. When our task becomes that of reporting what has gone on to others, and relating that report to what is similar and different in other situations, we need a way of recording and relating the verbal signals. Remarkable as it ought to seem, neither linguistics nor the social sciences, whatever they may say about the importance of language, regularly teach and practice such ways.

If education, then, is going to have the insight into classroom discourse that it needs and deserves, it can not wait upon the progress of linguistics and the social sciences. It must make demands of its own upon what is taught about language and what skills are considered essential. It must not follow, but take something of a leadership role, in these regards. In such a role there is the comfort of the company of some of the major trends in the study of discourse today. Why these things should be so about linguistics, and what these trends may be, are addressed in the next section.
The notion of 'discourse' has become the symbol, if not the substance, of an integration of the study of language. As a symbol, the notion of 'discourse' is appropriate to the point at which we find ourselves in the development of the systematic study of language.

It is important to have a historical perspective on the present situation. When scholars speak about what they are doing, they tend to speak in terms of the goals they seek, the discoveries they expect, and perhaps in terms of the superiority of their present way of doing things to the ways of the past. They tend to see their work in terms of simple progress. What is being done is justified by tools available and the needs of science. It seldom occurs to the active researcher that what appears to be available as a tool to be used, and what appear to be the needs of science, may be relative to the climate of opinion of a particular generation, a certain country, a certain set of cultural values and beliefs. And that the accounts of the past believed by them may be myths, rationalizing the present, just as the myths of American Indians explained how an unsatisfactory state of affairs had been set right by certain transformers.

In education we need to have a broader perspective. We need to be able to analyze the current state of what a discipline such as linguistics, or discourse analysis, has to offer, in relation to the needs of education itself. We need to be able to have a certain objectivity and distance, so as not to be uncritical of what appears to those inside a discipline as inevitable progress, if it is not entirely progress from the standpoint of understanding language in education. A knowledge of history serves this end.

It is helpful to have a sense of the ways in which the purposes of the serious study of language have varied and changed, and continue to vary and change. It is particularly helpful to have a sense of the inner logic, as it were, the momentum, of linguistics in the present century in the United States. Against that background, one can understand that 'context' has had a constant meaning, yet a changing content. It has always been a word for what lay beyond the object of attention. (In that respect, it has been like a personal
pronoun; one knows that 'you', if referring to a participant in a speech event, always refers to the one addressed, but who is 'you' changes from turn to turn and event to event). 'Context' has been a periphery to which to appeal, not something to analyze. Finally to incorporate the analysis of context into linguistics would transform linguistics, making it a realization of the program of the 'ethnography of speaking', or other sociolinguistic perspectives. Such a realization would make it normal, indeed inevitable, to analyze linguistic features and devices in relation to the participants and purposes of speech events, first of all, rather in relation to the requirements of a grammatical model or logic. Such a realization would be compatible with a conception of competence as the actual abilities, unevenly distributed and realized, of people, rather than 'competence' as an ideal abstraction, divorced from individual differences and divisions of labor. Such a study of language would build up a theory of speech acts inductively from what is observed and created in the many different conditions of life and kinds of culture in the world, rather than from an a priori starting point, assuming English and isolated individuals. General models of turn-taking and taking or holding the floor would be informed by insight into the ways in which different communities raise their children and conduct themselves to be persons of one kind or another, to honor certain standards of behavior, to realize certain beliefs and values as to the place of talking.

That we have so little of such a study of language can not be blamed on hostility to education and its needs for perspective on language use, or any other bad intention. Whatever the motives of individuals, one can recognize in the present state of affairs the working out of a development which has led linguistics to realize itself as a discipline first of all in the study of the structure of individual languages, apart from context. Gradually linguistics has developed, through an internal logic of its own, to the point at which its next stage, if one can predict, may well be the kind of study of language just sketched above. Whereas the nineteenth century focussed on historical problems, and the
twentieth century has focused on structure, the coming century (using the term 'century' loosely in all these cases) may focus on function and use.

To understand the way in which the study of language and related aspects of human life are organized today, and the prospect before us, we need to take into account the fact that an autonomous discipline of linguistics did not even exist a century ago.

A century ago the study of language was distributed among a number of disciplines, most prominently the several disciplines that had emerged around the study of languages and their literatures in the leading national cultures of Europe: English, French, German, Spanish, Italian, and others, and the study of their relations within the Indo-European family of languages, to which most of the major languages of Europe belonged. The 'comparative philology' of Indo-European, as it came often to be called, was central to the development of general ideas about language. In the nineteenth century itself, the development of general methods for the establishment of relationship among languages in terms of a common ancestor, the reconstruction of early stages and a common ancestor itself, were major accomplishments, along with the refinement of methods for tracing the processes of change leading to present diversity and transformation of structure. (There was also attention to ideas about the basic types of language, and the relation of such types to ideas of the evolution of mind, but such concerns are now mostly forgotten, as part of that century, although newly revived in recent years, as regards basic types and structural evolution, and as regards evolution of mind as well, if one takes into account some studies of the development of semantic classification and the presumed consequences of the invention of writing).

Alongside Indo-European and the national philologies of European languages grew up Oriental studies, reflecting fascination with 'wisdom from the East' and the increasing involvement of Europe in the world from Islam and India to China and Japan. There also grew up increasing activity by missionaries and pioneer anthropologists, with concern for practical phonetics and orthographies, description and classification
of unfamiliar kinds of languages, and preservation of
'monuments' to the traditions of societies without writing of
their own. Here and there also developed important studies in
local dialectology in Europe, and, as branches of natural science,
experimental phonetics and psychophysics. To these one would add
more easily today than a generation ago the interests of the
time in logic and the philosophy of language.

This diversity prevailed until after the First World War.
A half-century ago there began to take shape in the United States,
and elsewhere, the crystallization of a new discipline,
distinct from those just reviewed, narrower in some respects,
yet general in a way that none of them were. There had existed
a sense of linguistics as a scientific activity a century before,
as the writings of a man such as William Dwight Whitney,
professor at Yale and editor of the Century Dictionary, attest;
but there had not been an institutional reality for it. In
the United States the beginning of the reality can be dated
from the formation of the Linguistic Society of America, and
the launching of its journal, Language, in 1924. It was to be
almost another generation before the impulse that found
expression in the society, the journal, summer Linguistic
Institutes, and other activities would find fruit in
separate departments in universities. Departments of
Linguistics in the United States are all a phenomenon of
after the Second World War.

The newly organized discipline continued earlier lines
of study, especially Indo-European, but it soon found an
original focus in the study of phonology, the sounds of speech.
Phonology came to be conceived as the study of the structure of
speech sounds in individual languages, as subject to principles
of structure common to all languages. This focus united the
many special philologies of particular languages and language
families in a general science; it cut across the boundary between
the study of speech sounds in scientific laboratories and as
an adjunct to literary history; it linked the field work of the
missionary and anthropologist with issues in the philosophy of
science, and associated methodological principles, debated under
such rubrics as behaviorism, phenomenology, and the like. It
gave the recruit to the new discipline something with which to dismiss or put down established disciplines, a way to claim a piece of academic turf: to talk about language, one had to know about the 'phoneme'.

What united linguistics then was not a common position, but a common problem. The analysis of phonology was the common problem. Linguists argued as to the methods and the philosophies behind them, then as now.

From the initial focus on phonology, the discipline of linguistics has passed through stages and changes, some called 'revolutions', that all can be seen as tending in the direction of the study of discourse. Debate and practice of phonology was followed almost immediately by morphology, the internal structure of words. Syntax, the internal structure of sentences, became a frontier by the 1950s, and then a weapon in the hands of transformational generative approach. For a time the transformational generative approach made syntax central, but soon semantics became a respectable and active field, followed by 'pragmatics', dealing with the use of sentences. During this same period after the Second World War, other disciplines were acquiring the skills of the linguist, first of all psychologists. Soon psychologists were contributing empirical studies of their own to what was known about the characteristics of language. Study of the acquisition of language in children first reflected, then affected the development of linguistics proper, becoming a major interdisciplinary area in its own right. A certain number of sociologists have become active contributors to analysis as well, joining the continuing tradition of anthropological work.

Throughout this history each temporary focus has been followed by another. Each barrier set by a stage of analysis, or a school of thought, beyond which language appeared to be a blooming buzzing confusion, has fallen in turn. It is as if there had been an implicit logic, a principle of empirical adequacy, such that linguistics could not stand still. The various levels of the structure of language can be distinguished,
and studied in isolation for a time, but each raises questions about the next. Linguistics broke through into the academic arena in the study of the level of language most remote, as it were, from meaning and use, the level of phonology. From that starting point, it has worked its way to the whole of language as a means of communication. Analysis of phonology could not always be wholly kept separate from analysis of morphology; analysis of morphology from that of syntax; syntax from semantics; semantics from pragmatics. The result is that linguistics, the science of language, once again finds itself part of a circle of disciplines concerned with language. 'Discourse' is the term that has emerged as a common term for designating the use of language in ways that are of interest to linguists, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, folklorists, literary critics, philosophers, and others.

There appear to be four main ways in which 'discourse' is used to designate a research concern.

(1) For many linguists, 'discourse' defines a larger stretch of linguistic context. The study of discourse is the study of elements that occur within sentences beyond the limits of the sentence. The meaning of conjunctions and adverbs, for example, may depend upon relations between sentences.

(2) For many linguists, psychologists, folklorists, students of literature, and others, 'discourse' refers to whole stretches of language, and to the structure such stretches may have as wholes. The stretch may be a literary text, a personal experience narrative, an interview, or something constructed to test a hypothesis about memory, or to use in a simulation.

(3) For some sociologists and philosophers, 'discourse' and 'language' are terms that refer to a category of human experience and human nature. The interest is not so much in understanding specific instances, as in discussing issues of
methodology, epistemology, the goals of social science, and the like. Sometimes such discussions reject the possibility of ever asserting that any finding is a fact to be accepted as such. The open-endedness of discourse is taken to mean that anything's status as a fact is always subject to question in a continuing conversation. From such a standpoint it seems difficult to recognize the considerable advance in what is empirically known about language and languages in the last century.

Sometimes discourse as a category is taken to provide a standpoint from which existing social reality can be critically examined. Talk is taken to imply an ideal goal, such that discussion of a problem should be open-ended and all concerned have full opportunity to take part until consensus is reached. Situations falling short of the ideal can be criticized as involving systematically distorted communication.\(^2\)

Often discourse is taken to involve the formulation of universal principles underlying any particular instances of language use. Uses of language are referred to one or another universal set of 'speech acts' or 'conversational principles'. Although discussion proceeds in terms of examples from English usually, it appears to be assumed that the analysis should apply in principle to every language community.

(4) For many researchers, the study of 'discourse' involves reference to specific abilities, whose development and distribution in a society, and in different societies, varies; whose development and realization is interdependent with the experience of particular settings and persons; and whose organization may reflect particular values and orientations towards language and its use.

It seems fair to label these four kinds of approach succinctly as (1) linguistic, (2) text analysis, (3) philosophical, and (4) sociolinguistic, or ethnolinguistic, or ethnographic.
Each approach may contribute something useful to the understanding of discourse in relation to education.

(1) The linguistic approach extends our knowledge of the meaning and uses of elements of the general language. Its limitation is the limitation of all general linguistics which restricts itself to the goal of an underlying formal model, and to the study of examples referred to something called 'English' in the abstract. Much of what is written about discourse, and related issues in semantics and pragmatics, chooses its examples for the promise they have of judging between alternative formal models, definitions, and the like, not for the light that might be shed on everyday life. If one imagines a user of language behind the examples, one commonly must imagine a user able to take advantage of the entire systemic potential of the language at once. Counter-arguments take the form, often enough, of showing how a certain meaning or implication or effect could be reached. This literature does not usually address the question of the meanings or implications or effects that are actually reached by any definite set of people.

Such analysis continues an important practice in formal linguistics. Within a formal tradition, the questions, what are the other ways in which this might be said? What is the set of alternative ways of saying something, refer to the set of formal possibilities provided by a particular part of the grammar: syntactic rearrangements of a particular set of words, for example. These formal alternatives expose the theoretical potential of the system implied. But these formal alternatives may have little relationship to the choices made by users of the language. Asked the different ways of saying something, users of the language may only sometimes suggest syntactic rearrangements, for example. Much of the time they may suggest alternative lexical choices, changes of intonation, and combinations of these. For them, the questions, what are the other ways in which this might be said? What is the set of
alternative ways of saying something refer to choices among styles in relation to situations and people, governed by an intention or sought-for effect. Their attitude toward the means at their disposal is that of the use of a resource, a set of ways of accomplishing specific ends. And what count as alternative means will vary considerable from situation to situation. The means carry social meanings, such that they are not equally available for use, or even to awareness, in all contexts.

A great part of the work in linguistics, then, is restricted to data which is abstracted from behavior and particular settings. (Intonation, for example, which is essential to interpretation in actual speech, is often omitted from consideration, even in work in 'pragmatics'). Much of it is internal to the formal concerns of formal linguists. The arguments are not about new facts, but about the preferred way of handling accepted facts. Some of the argumentation can be considered 'boundary dispute': what should be the respective spheres of 'syntax', 'semantics', 'pragmatics'? Of 'presupposition' and 'implicature'? Some of the argumentation can be considered to be about 'vantage point'. Should one take syntax as the starting point for analysis of these phenomena? Or semantics? Or lexicon, conceived in a certain way? Does one starting point capture certain properties of the language best? Can the use of conjunctions ('and', 'but', etc.) be explained in terms of the logical definition of such conjunctions and certain principles of interpreting their implications in different circumstances? Or must the logical definitions of conjunctions be referred to one variety of language use, and kept distinct from the conjunctions of everyday language?

One can see throughout such argumentation the standard linguistic concern for underlying unity and explicit modelling. Noam Chomsky's definition of the goal of linguistic theory as the explanation of the competence of an ideal speaker-listener, unaffected by behavioral and social factors, is indeed the appropriate conception of language users for such work. Any other conception of users of language would subvert the satisfaction
of finding underlying unit and explicit models and calling the result 'English'. Schooling, however, is patently concerned with sets of language users who are not alike in their linguistic abilities, and who are much affected by behavioral and social factors. It might be thought that the ideal models sought in formal linguistics provide a basis from which to apply linguistics to educational settings. That is not the case. Although work with ideal models is referred to commonly as 'theoretical linguistics', educational linguistics is not its application. Educational linguistics requires a theoretical groundwork of its own. What is now called 'theoretical linguistics' leaves out of account too much of what educational linguistics must consider. The teacher interpreting the verbal behavior of children must take into account intonation, classroom context, personal histories, community background. The teacher must always take into account what abilities, means, and intentions that can be operating in the context in question. This set is likely to be less than the formally imaginable ideal set of the language as a whole, on the one hand, and is likely to include possibilities not taken into account by the formal models.

To add sectors of formal linguistics which in principle deal with language use, such as 'pragmatics', and to speak of 'pragmatic competence', as is now done by Chomsky, does not suffice, so long as the empirical base of analysis does not come from educational settings, and so long as the goal of analysis is not the understanding of the abilities and means operative in the educational settings. The distance between 'English' as it is modelled in formal linguistics, and 'English' as it exists in educational settings is very real and very great, and the notion of 'application' will not bridge it.
The approach labelled text analysis may share in the limitations just reviewed, seeking to model abstract, perhaps mathematical properties of text formation in general. The term, however, may include a number of useful kinds of work, which extend our knowledge of the ways in which stretches of language are organized in relation to educational settings. The principle contribution of such analysis may be to show us patterning where we had not expected or perceived it. Our image of composition and writing may be limited, and analysis of a wider range of texts may correct our naivete. Narrative behavior, as in telling of stories in class, that seems disorderly to us, because of our own assumptions about narrative order, may actually express an order of its own, coming from another set of cultural understandings as to what it is to report experience, tell a story, make a speech, and the like. Texts from minority cultures that seemed dull may take on life and richness, properly analyzed and presented, and so add to the discourse available in the classroom.

The limitation of any kind of text analysis, of course, is that not all discourse can be readily construed as constituting a text. To be sure, the widespread interest in language as representative of cultural behavior as a whole, and in linguistic methods as a source of methods for the study of culture as a whole, has led a number of scholars to refer to stretches of behavior as a 'text'. In such usage, the term 'text' seems to replace 'context' itself. There seem good reasons for not adopting this usage. First of all, to extend 'text' to 'context' leaves us without a ready term for what is ordinarily considered 'text'. Secondly, the extension of 'text' in this way invites a misplaced expectation of consistent patterning, and of common intention. Texts in the ordinary sense, of course, may be inconsistent and show every sign of change of intention. Such texts may represent the very kinds of interaction among multiple parties that the extended notion of 'text' seeks to encompass. And an ethnographer's account of complex interaction becomes
his or her text. Still, it seems important to maintain the distinction between those verbal sequences which can be said to have been authored, or at least written, and those which cannot. A novel or a play or a television program depicting a classroom may be a text, and something learned from it about actual patterns of classroom discourse. Yet it seems a needless confusion to use the same generic term for such accounts and for what appears on a videotape of an actual class. The difficulty does not seem to be overcome by prefixing -text with modifiers such as semio- or socio-. It is necessary to the understanding of the specific role of language in learning and life generally that it be kept distinct from what is not language. The cognitive and social space, the functional load, as it were, occupied by the verbal varies from person to person and activity to activity. Lumping all together under a verbal label, such as 'text', is a disservice.

Notions such as script, and related notions such as schemata, frame, and routine, have a readier extension to actual behavior (see Tannen 1979 on these notions). Such notions address the fact that much of verbal behavior follows established patterns or seeks to enact already existing expectations of what will follow what. Verbal behavior of this kind is most often called 'script' and 'schemata' and 'frame' when the work is concerned with artificial intelligence, computer processing, and semantics. It is more often called 'linguistic routine' or 'conversational routine' when the work is concerned with observed behavior and sociolinguistics (see now Coulmas 1981a, 1981b). The advantage of these terms is that they bring out the conventional aspect of much verbal behavior, as organized beyond the sentence, while not reducing verbal behavior entirely to pre-existing sequences. Such conceptions fit more readily with attention to actual abilities and competence. Whereas the notion of 'text' would seem to invite contemplation of a completed object, notions such as 'script', 'frame' and 'routine' invite consideration of patterned sequences available to actors as part of their competence, but to which actors are not restricted. One can depart from a script, embroider upon it, forget one's place, and the like. And a script or routine can have a context, a setting. It does not become its own context, or attempt to swallow it.
An interesting comparison is possible between work under the heading of oedemas, and work under the heading of readability formulas, as both relate to reading comprehension, in regard to the predictions each makes about the comprehensibility of a given text, and the important of linguistic features in each. Readability formulas evaluate the difficulty of a passage in terms of features such as vocabulary (often measured by the mean word length of a text), sentence length (number of words per sentence), and sentence complexity (number of clauses per sentence). Measures such as these can be compared on a quantitative basis, and materials said to be a particular grade levels. In short, a scale for evaluating the comprehension of discourse results measured in terms of countable verbal features.

Schema theories generally address internal schemas possessed by a reader prior to reading a text. Several levels may be distinguished, from letter and word processing, through clause and sentence processing, to processing involving motives and goals. For schema theories, syntactic processing appears to be a fairly low level activity, but it appears to be central for readability formulas. For a schema approach, a person might comprehend a text less well, if lacking the internal knowledge structure appropriate to it. Ease of processing the syntax of the text would not predict comprehension of the whole. Some researchers point out that children might have high comprehension of the syntax of simply written materials, but not understand them overall (Hemingway's novels, for example), although a readability formula might predict high comprehension.

The gap between form and content in these approaches at their extremes ought obviously to be bridged. There are routines and patterning of linguistic features, beyond the sentence, and within the sentence, that provide for comprehension within a culture, apart from quantitative complexity. Recent studies of oral literature among American Indians and other groups indicates the presence of underlying patterning which has jointly formal and semantic character. The narratives of the Chinookan peoples of Oregon and Washington, for example, show organization in terms of combinations
of a three-part sequence, which can be described as a sequence of onset, ongoing, outcome. This implicit logic of action can recur from a sequence of actions in three phrases ('he turned, he looked, he saw...') to sequences of sections of the narrative as a whole. Many American Indian groups appear to employ the same principle in terms of patterning of sequences in pairs and fours. These relationships, which are not explicitly talked about or taught, but remain implicit in discourse, like syntax in a society without grammarians, convey, it would seem, a deep sense of the regular order of experience, when put in narrative form. They apparently become expectations, which well formed narratives repeatedly arouse and fulfill. Often the patterns are overtly marked by such linguistic means as pairs of initial particles ('Now then..., Now then..., Now then...,' and the like), repetition of key verbs ('they lived there.... they lived there..... they lived there....'), etc. Such patterns, however, may be without explicit linguistic marking, although the sequencing of actions in a discourse conforms to them.

Where such patterns exist--and there is some trace of them in oral narratives collected in English by Labov, Wolfson, and others--one would expect that knowledge of them would make discourse that conformed to them easier to follow and comprehend. The finding that such patterns may sometimes be overtly marked linguistically and sometimes not suggests that the contribution of specific linguistic features to comprehension is not constant across communities. The finding that such patterns are not matters of internal complexity, but of parallelism and repetition of local frames, indicates that qualitative relationships must be included in analyses of readability, and interpretability generally: It would appear that approaches which assess comprehension without attention to verbal form, or that measure verbal form without attention to narrative logic as a formal as well as substantive structure, cannot encompass all that discourse does in the lives of children.
The approach I have labelled 'philosophical' encompasses more than might ordinarily be understood by that term. I use the term to group together conceptions that appear to offer a general framework for understanding discourse, a framework that provides, two, or a few, categories, considered to have universal relevance. Such frameworks may indeed call attention to dimensions that have universal relevance, but a dimension is not the same thing as a category. A dimension, as I use the term here, is an aspect of discourse to which one should attend, but whose status in a particular case remains to be discovered. It is 'etic' in the sense established by Kenneth Pike, as a generalization of the role of phonetics in the analysis of the sounds of unanalyzed languages. One may assume that any community will make some use of aspiration in oral discourse, but it remains to be discovered whether the use is to distinguish words of different meaning, or to convey emphasis. Similarly, one may assume that any community will show some range from fixed formulas to largely unpredictable sequences, but it remains to be discovered whether fixed formulas go together with fixed social relationships or polite hinting and discretion, or both.

Dichotomies and frameworks with few categories attract us, because they offer order in a complex sphere. Yet it is the hard truth that what goes on in given situations, classrooms, homes, and elsewhere, escapes such categorization. There is particularly a tendency today to seek the satisfaction of universal frameworks without realizing the empirical inadequacy of them. Our sense of historical and cultural relativism and diversity seems attenuated, if not lost. The appeal of universal grounding tends to overcome any fear of ethnocentric origin. Yet just as educators make a difference, because their situations are inherently partly their own making, so with users of language everywhere. Nor is this simply wrinkling of a cloth that analysis can shake smooth. Differences of social structure, ecology, class, religion, historically derived character, give rise to very distinctive cuts of cloth, grounded in fundamental concerns and motives of different kinds.
The categories of analysis of four famous figures, each of whose work has been much discussed, can be placed here.

Bernstein's distinction between 'elaborated' and 'restricted' codes has been much criticized in the United States, especially for its mistaken application to minority children. Yet it has the strength in its home setting, England, of calling attention to organization of linguistic means that cuts across the single language, 'English', and involves family socialization and class in ways that have significant educational consequences. Bernstein's labels invite pre-existing stereotypes, perhaps, yet it is realistic to insist that some uses of language differ from others in the range of alternatives available. Where Bernstein falls short is in retreating to theoretical elaboration of his notions, rather than in pursuing them into the diverse realities of empirical situations. His dimensions have potential universality, only not as a single package. His early interest in 'now-coding' vs 'then-coding', speech being organized at the moment of use as against speech already packaged (as in proverbs and routines), is permanently relevant. Only it does not necessarily coincide with a second dimension of importance to him, 'personal' vs. 'positional' orientation. For Bernstein, some speech consults the interests and discretion of the other, as an individual person, while other speech treats individuals as members of categories of age, gender, class, and the like. His general contrast of 'elaborated' vs. 'restricted' coding subsumes both 'now-coding' and 'personal' orientation under 'elaborated' coding, since both are taken to involve a greater range of alternatives. But in many societies, including sometimes our own, 'then-coding', as in proverbs, is a way of consulting personal interest and discretion, stating something that applies to the individual without openly calling attention to the individual. The words may appear positional, but the application is personal.

Bernstein's limitation is representative. A certain form of discourse is taken to have always a certain meaning. Empirical study of use in actual situations will show that the same form of discourse may have different meanings for different groups and in different contexts. A fixed wording, as in a proverb or
prayer, may invoke nd intend a positional, pre-determined meaning in some cases, and may be a subtle, tactful suggestion in another.

Again, Bernstein recognized a social difference in discourse and addressed it in terms of polar opposites, a dichotomy. The primitive state of our knowledge of discourse is reflected in the general prevalence of dichotomies. If 'elaborated' vs. 'restricted' is controversial because of applications it has received, so should be 'oral' vs. 'written' and 'formal' vs. 'informal' and 'standard' vs. 'vernacular'. Such dichotomies do us the service of naming diversity. They do us the disservice of reducing diversity to polar opposites. Such oppositions recurrently invite evaluation, so that one is seen as good and the other bad, or one as complex and the other simple, or one as systematic, explicit, ordered, or rational, and the other not. Many among us continue to think of writing as explicit, precise and lasting, as against speech. To think that way is to invoke a received idea of our culture that is invalidated by our own experience, not to mention cross-cultural evidence. The writing exchanged in a department of the government may be highly allusive, compared to what workers there say to each other off the job. A transcript of an oral narrative may be far easier to interpret than writing intended for an intellectual audience. Particular persons may be far more systematic and logical in their speech than in their attempts at writing. Particular kinds of writing may be quickly destroyed, while valued oral traditions may be perpetuated for centuries. To think that the material mode of existence determines meaning and function is really to think in terms of technological determinism. Certainly there are some things that can be done with one set of means, whether plows or pens, that cannot be done with others, whether digging-sticks or tongues. The means condition the outcomes; but they do not entirely determine them. Abundance of salmon and other foods made the American Indians of the coast of British Columbia wealthy to the level of horticultural peoples elsewhere in the world. Mind and tongue can preserve, make explicit, and the like.
If there were such a thing as an ORAL style in the use of language, American Indians and Black Americans would be alike. They are vastly different. Typical attitudes towards interaction in terms of language, discourse, vary greatly. Nor of course are all Black Americans and American Indians alike, or for that matter, all white Americans in their oral styles and conversational etiquette. Speech and writing are means, resources, which different groups and individuals make different use of, and what those uses and meanings are must be established empirically in the given case.

The same situation applies to a common dichotomy between 'formal' and 'informal'. We all recognize a difference to which the opposition answers; what is entailed in a given case is uncertain. As with 'standard' vs. 'vernacular', all that one can say in general is that one term of the opposition is applicable to uses that are culturally established for public use under certain circumstances. Which is appropriate to what circumstances, overall, and what the implication of such use may be, is again an empirical matter. Formality may be a quality to which one fails to rise adequately in one case and which one intrudes inappropriately in another. Formal discourse may be the only means accredited for decision-making occasions, or only the prescribed means for enacting decisions arrived at in informal proceedings. Standard usage may be cogent or obscure, pithy or prolix, satisfying or infuriating. So may 'vernacular' usage. It was the heart of Labov's argument about Black English vernacular that individual instances of non-standard vernacular could embody a wit and logic utterly escaping the maunderings of a standard speaker's discourse on a certain occasion. This is not to say that lack of one-to-one relationship implies lack of any relationship. Again, means condition outcomes, even if they do not control them. Difference in appropriate means in different levels or varieties of a language may well go together with difference.
in what can be done easily or well with each, differences in what is expected and cultivated in each. When different means are put to different uses, cultivated most in different contexts, there is a dialectic between what is done and what is available to do it with.

The genuine difficulty, then, is this. Prejudice may stereotype the user and context in terms of a variety of language, whether written or oral, formal or informal, standard or vernacular. Language users and their means are too creative and adaptive to be reduced to such stereotypes. At the same time the complexity of the cases does not mean that there is no connection whatever between varieties of language and what can be done with them. As part of the verbal repertoires of persons, groups and societies, varieties of language acquire to some extent the status of signs, sociolinguistic signs. Although linguists, liberally inspired, may wish to ignore differences in evaluation and appropriateness, granting each variety carte blanche in principle, social reality does not. The very choice of a variety conveys meaning and affects the meanings that can be conveyed.

These observations may be fairly familiar. What is striking is that so many among us do not recognize that the same sorts of consideration apply to approaches to language that very much occupy the center of the stage today.
Since classroom discourse involves the activities of teachers and pupils, a general theory of speech acts would appear to be central to it. The notion of speech acts has indeed played a vital part in extending the work of linguists beyond syntax and semantics to what is called 'pragmatics'. The study of pragmatics is considered equivalent to the study of a general theory of language use by many linguists, psychologists, philosophers and others. What must be borne in mind is that the primary impetus to the study of speech acts came within philosophy, and that it carries with it much of the concern traditional in the philosophy of language for the truth and falsity of propositions, and other aspects of a philosophical theory of meaning, sense, and reference.

The recent history of the notion is to be traced to the late British philosopher, John L. Austin, and lectures he gave at Harvard, later published as How to do things with words (cf. the review by Hymes in the American Anthropologist 67: 587-588 (1965), relating the ideas to the ethnography of speaking). Austin's interest in speech acts fitted a shift in British philosophy from a focus on logic and language as the statement of propositions of which it could be asked, true or false, to a concern with the other kinds of things that language evidently is used to accomplish, such as to christen and marry. The shift has a background in the work of the most famous of twentieth century philosophers of language in England, perhaps, Ludwig Wittgenstein. In his first famous work in the 1920s Wittgenstein had tried to analyze the logic of propositional language as a key to philosophical understanding. Later he turned away from such an effort and developed the notion of 'language games'. With this notion he emphasized the respect in which the meaning of language is not invariant, but crucially dependent upon the activities of which it is part. The meanings of a word might have only the resemblance of the members of a family as between one social activity and another. Wittgenstein coined the often quoted remark, 'Don't look for the meaning, look for the use', a remark that symbolizes the shift in his thinking.

Against this background Austin focussed upon uses of words that could not be said to stand for propositions. He pointed out
that it made little sense to ask of 'I now pronounce you man and wife' whether it was true or false. It is not a report about a state of affairs, but a bringing about of a state of affairs, that is, if properly said by a person with authority to do so before persons going through a wedding ceremony, etc. The kind of question to be asked about such utterances was not whether or not they were true or false, but whether or not the conditions for their successful performance were satisfied. What needed to be the case about the participants, their attitudes and beliefs and respective states of knowledge, about the setting, and the like?

Austin's approach became influential in linguistics most of all through the work of the American philosopher, John Searle. In his most recent formulation (a reformulation of Austin's classification), Searle sets forth five basic types of speech act (1976). He recognizes some twelve dimensions in terms of which speech acts can differ, including (setting aside for the moment the first three):

(4) the force or strength with which the point is presented (cf. suggest vs. insist)
(5) the status or position of the speaker and hearer
(6) the way the utterance relates to the interests of the speaker and hearer (cf. boasting, lamenting; congratulations, condolences)
(7) relations to the rest of the discourse (a reply, an objection, etc.).
(8) the propositional content determined by devices indicating illocutionary force (e.g., a prediction is about the future, a report about the past)
(9) whether what is done must be, or need not be, a speech act (one can classify some things by physically arranging them, rather than saying what their arrangement is)
(10) whether extra-linguistic institutions are required or not (to bless, to excommunicate, to christen, to sentence to jail, to call a base-runner out; etc., require some specific extra-linguistic institution)
(11) acts in which the verb can be used to perform it, and those cases in which it can not.

(11) acts in which the verb can be used to perform an act of stating, 'to promise' to perform a promise; and so on, but Searle judges that 'I hereby boast' does not perform an act of boasting.

(12) the style of performance

(to announce and to confide may have the same propositional content and illocutionary point, differing only in style, e.g., 'She just had a baby')

One can see that much of sociolinguistics and ethnography of speaking is entailed in some of these later dimensions. The way an utterance relates to the interests of speaker or hearer involves much of the analysis of politeness phenomena undertaken by Brown and Levinson (1978) (dimension 6). While it is obvious that a church or a court or an organized sport may be required to bless; pronounce guilty or declare safe at home, it is not obvious that any speech acts require no extra-linguistic institutions at all. An adequate understanding of the rights and duties understood to obtain between members of a community would likely involve an account of roles and statuses that required reference to family, kinship, and community membership itself, as a kind of institutional grounding. Even lovers and strangers speak against the background of relationships which define them as such (dimension 10). And the style with which an act is performed goes to the heart of politeness, persuasion and competence in the generic sense of communicative abilities (dimension 12).

Searle, however, considers the most important dimensions these three:

(1) the point (or purpose) of an act (which is part, but not all of its illocutionary force, in that the point of a request and the point of a purpose both are to get a hearer to do something, but the illocutionary force of each is different).

(2) direction of fit between words and the world (see below)

(3) expressed psychological states (belief, intention, desire, want).
The five basic categories presented by Searle in terms of these three dimensions are:

I. **Representatives** (later, assertives). Their point is to commit the speaker to something being the case (in varying degrees, so commit); the direction of fit is of words to world (in that one can ask if the words are true or false of some state of affairs); the relevant psychological state is that of belief (the belief that the propositional content (p) is so).

II. **Directives.** Their point consists of attempts (in varying degree) by the speaker to get the hearer to do something; the direction of fit is that of the world to words (in that one uses words to get the world to have some state of affairs); the relevant psychological state, or sincerity condition, is that of want (wish, desire).

III. **Commissiones.** Their point is to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to some future course of action; the direction of fit is that of the world to words (in that one's words commit one to some future state of affairs); the relevant psychological state, or sincerity condition, is intention.

IV. **Expressives.** Their point is to express some psychological state, which is that of the sincerity condition involved, about a state of affairs, which is that of the propositional content. Representative examples would be 'to thank', 'to congratulate', 'to apologize', 'to condole', 'to deplore', 'to welcome'. There is no direction of fit between words and the world--one is not trying to get either to match the other. Rather, the existence of fit is presupposed. If I apologize for having stepped on your toe, it is not either to claim that it was stepped on (words to world) or to get it stepped on (world to words).

V. **Declarations.** Their point is to bring about a correspondence between propositional content and reality, and they do so solely in virtue of the fact that a declaration is successfully performed. The direction of fit is both that of words to the world and of the world to words. No sincerity condition is involved.
Searle's scheme has elicited a great deal of discussion, both as to its details and as to its basic assumptions. Let us first recognize in its favor that it does focus attention on important dimensions; for that alone it is significant and deserving of praise. When one considers its application to discourse as a whole, however, three kinds of concern arise: its own internal implications; what it may leave out of account, just in terms of types of speech acts; and where it may fall short if used to classify and categorize activity in a classroom or community.

**Internal Implications.** First of all, there is a relation between directives and permissives that is missed. Searle himself notes that the direction of fit is the same for both, that of the world to words, but is unable to unite the two categories. The difficulty seems to be that it is assumed that one can obligate oneself (the speaker), but not another (the hearer). To promise seems somehow fundamentally different than to request or command. Yet cultures and institutions are known in which a promise or a request would be taken to obligate the hearer, such that one may avoid explicit request, since the hearer would then have no choice but to comply. It is a point of conversational etiquette among many American Indian groups, such as the Ojibwa, to leave it to the hearer, indeed, to decide whether or not a request has been made. One mentions something, perhaps a meeting that will take place, and the hearer can decide whether or not to notice it as an invitation. So strong are the underpinnings of obligation among kin in some American Indian groups that one kinsman can hardly mention certain topics, such as hunting, in the presence of another, without being understood to be asking for the loan of a set of snowshoes or the like. Among the Wolof of Senegal, a member of the lowest caste, the griots, need only name his own status to invoke the obligation of a member of the highest caste, a noble, to reward him. Standing institutional relationships of this sort are far more common in the world than seems to be easily imagined by English-language scholars.
One can also imagine a speaker making a statement in order

to commit himself or herself to something, not as a promise to

a hearer, but as a monitoring or admonishing of oneself. In short,

all four possible combinations of speaker and hearer, obligation

and attempt, are imaginable. What a speaker says may be an attempt
to get either a hearer or the speaker to do something to make the
world fit the words; it may obligate either the speaker or the
hearer.

Here we see that the permanent contribution of Searle's
taxonomy is a set of dimensions, whose combination in the analysis
of actual cases may be found to vary.

Secondly, the account of expressives seems to miss the

common practice of villains in television to indulge in expressives
of a sort to be considered sardonic: "I am sorry that you must
now die, Captain Smith". The villain appears to be apologizing
for or offering condolences about a state of affairs that his own
words do in fact initiate, bringing the world into fit with them.

In general, the dimension of 'key', of the tone or attitude
of an activity, especially the distinction between that which
is mock and that which is serious, may complicate analysis of
speech acts, and again show that participant structure,
institutional relationships, and standard expectations within
genres, have to be taken into account.

Thirdly, it does not seem accurate to exclude psychological
state from declarations. A priest's declarative actions may be
affected as to their validity by his psychological state. In general,
Searle fails to take into account the constitutive effects of
diverse religious beliefs and practices.

Fourthly, Searle does recognize one class of speech
acts in terms of his own classification: representative
declarations. If a judge declares a person guilty, one can
consider it as a fit of words to the world on the one hand (the
person being indeed guilty on the evidence), and of the world to
words (since the judge's statement is necessary to the legal
finding of guilt). When one reflects on declaratives, however,
one may be led to wonder if other circumstances do not result
in a declarative effect by speech acts and discourse that are
not ostensively declarations. Searle's mixed class of 'representative declarations' involves an act which changes a state of affairs. But is not much that is said to children in the course of socialization, whether in American Indian performances of myths, or in classroom history textbooks, 'declarative' in effect, although 'representative' in form? From a larger standpoint, the world is being made to be like this instead of that. Such things happen often enough in interaction, as when a person in authority asserts a statement of fact that subordinates are constrained to accept as 'the way the world is'. The moment of assertion may be the first moment that they recognized that the world was that way, but the circumstances may make clear that for the time being all official representatives of the institution will speak of it as being that way. Subordinates who have to have all this spelled out may not qualify for long tenure.

All of this brings irresistibly to mind the speech of Ko-Ko to the Mikado:

"It's like this: When your Majest says, 'Let a thing be done', it's as good as done--practically, it is done--because your Majesty's will is law. Your Majesty says, 'Kill a gentleman', and a gentleman is told off to be killed. Consequently, that gentleman is as good as dead. Practically, he is dead--and if he is dead, why not say so?"

To which the Mikado replies: "I see. Nothing could possibly be more satisfactory".
There is a common kind of speech act, important in
discourse, which appears to fall between the five types of
notes that opinions, such as "I think (that) this room should be
painted blue" do not fit Searle's category of assertives, or
representatives, because in many cases it does not make sense
to ask if the opinion involves a proposition that is true or
false. The point of an opinion is not what the speaker takes
to be the case, but what the speaker desires to be the case.
Nor need opinions involve a fit of words to the world. Thus,
opinions would seem to fit best Searle's category of expressives.
Again there are difficulties. Searle says that expressives
presuppose the truth or existence of something, but opinions
need not. They may desire a state of affairs that does not
exist and is not now true of the world. Expressives are like
opinions, to be sure, in that they involve a psychological
state to which sincerity is a relevant condition. A speaker
must indeed believe something to express an opinion sincerely,
but, unlike Searle's examples of expressives, he or she need
not explicitly say so. Expressives, for Searle, involve explicit
use of words like 'thank', 'congratulate', 'condole', and so on;
opinions are not necessarily like that.

Finally, opinions appear to be like Searle's expressives in
lacking a direction of fit between words and the objective world,
but there appears to be an actual difference of some importance.
With opinions, the direction of fit can be any of the three logical
possibilities: words to world, world to words, or neither. Given
a social world, a person may fit the words of his or her opinions
to the world as defined by a teacher or employer; a person may
state an opinion as part of an attempt to get the world to fit
the words expressed; it may be difficult to determine a direction
of fit of any kind.

The effect of Atelsek's observations is to support the
usefulness of Searle's underlying dimensions, such as state of
belief about a proposition, and direction of fit between words
and world, but to find inadequate the limited set of ways in
which Searle has put the underlying dimensions together. And
with some recasting of Searle's categories, reflection on
opinions could lead to a simplified recasting of his categories
along one of his dimensions.

As said, Searle himself, pursuing the logician's goal of
a simple formal starting point, thought that it would be good to
reduce directives and commissives to a single class, because
both had the same direction of fit, that of the world to

On the other side, that of fitting words to

On the other side, that of fitting words to

On the other side, that of fitting words to

On the other side, that of fitting words to

On the other side, that of fitting words to

On the other side, that of fitting words to
room were painted blue'), and to relax Searle's requirement of explicit wording of the act (so as to allow 'If only this exam were over' and 'This room's should be blue') would accommodate many opinions. One would then have two general sets of speech acts along the dimension of fit between words and the world:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>words to world</th>
<th>world to words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>assertives</td>
<td>directives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expressives</td>
<td>commissives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(some opinions)</td>
<td>(some opinions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The basic point remains the one that the dimensions are useful, but not to be applied a priori. One might find a discourse situation in which the essential thing, the revealing thing, was to understand what was said in terms of the distinction between acts fitting world to words (in various degrees and manners) and acts fitting words to the world. That distinction might be the clue to a pattern of socialization or social interaction: It might, however, distort some other pattern of socialization or social interaction. There is now a careful demonstration of this problem in the work of the late Michelle Rosaldo (1982). Rosaldo used Searle's five categories to examine speech acts among the Ilongot of the Philippines. She found some fit, but found fundamentally that for the Ilongot the basic distinction was between commands (directives) and all other kinds of speech act. She found further significant implications of the preference for one and other of the two broad kinds in different social relationships and activities. In short, Searle has recognized dimensions that are part of the Ilongot world as well as ours, but what the Philippine people make of the dimensions, how they sort and integrate them into their lives, could not be predicted from the classification. To have counted all observed speech acts among the Ilongot into one or the other of Searle's five categories would have misdirected energy. What was needed on Rosaldo's part there, and what is needed among educators and
other researchers here, is to observe as participants until one understands the verbal cuisine the particular set of people make out of the common ingredients.

It would be mistaken to assume that Searle's dimensions, though useful, are complete or are the only perspective from which speech acts can be viewed. A study of current work in discourse indicates that the professional and disciplinary background of scholars leads to rather different vantage points. Searle comes from a philosophical background to which propositional truth and falsehood is a fundamental concern. William Stiles comes from a background of research in the helping professions, conducting research in psychotherapeutic settings and doctor-patient interviews. Like Rosaldo from a cross-cultural experience, Stiles finds it essential to regard speech acts as involving not just the speaker as point of departure, but as involving two sources of experience, the speaker and others; and the possibility of using either the speaker's or the other's frame of reference; and the possibility of having either the speaker or the other as focus. With these three dimensions, source of experience, frame of reference, and focus, Stiles (1981) derives eight verbal response modes (VRMs), which can be shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of experience</th>
<th>Frame of reference</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Verbal response mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Disclosure (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Edification (E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Confirmation (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Question (Q)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Interpretation (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Acknowledgement (K)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Reflection (R)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In his interesting paper, Stiles discusses the linguistic correlates of these modes, their use in research, their range of applications (including student-professor interactions), the profiles of modes that have been observed for different persons, and roles, and the relation of the approach to other approaches to speech acts.

The inadequacy of the isolated speaker as a reference point is brought out critically also by Hancher (1979). Referring to work by Searle and others, Hancher finds that all slight two important kinds of act that involve cooperation. The first kind combines the forces of Searle's commissive and directive types. Others have noted sequences, such as 'Stay and I'll make you a drink' (directive plus commissive), or 'Stop or I'll shoot'. But to invite, someone is to combine both in a single utterance. An invitation is directive in trying to get the hearer to do something, and also commissive in obligating the speaker. (If you accept and come and are denied admittance, you have a right to object). The same is true of offering: one tries to get the hearer to accept what is offered, but also commits oneself to provide what is offered. (Clearly, of course, degrees of sincerity may be involved). Hancher calls 'offering, tendering, bidding, inviting, volunteering, formal challenging' and the like 'commissive directives', and regards them as sui generis, requiring a distinct place in Searle's or any one else's taxonomy, because the two ingredients of force are equal.

The second kind of cooperative act pointed out by Hancher explicitly requires two participants to act. Commissive directives, indeed, look toward completion by the hearer's response. Giving involves an offer (commissive directive) and an acceptance (déclaration) if it is successfully accomplished. One can not successfully appoint someone if the person does not accept. Marriage requires not only the celebrant's pronouncement, but also the exchange of vows.

Hancher's insights point to the general question of necessary sequences. One can ask, what are the permissible and what the required sequences of acts in this activity, event, group? To do
this is to raise the question of the placement of speech acts in interaction. Not only are there cooperative sequences among two parties, but sequences by the same person. "Stop or I'll shoot" is an example in a single utterance. A teacher may announce a lesson, then call on the first student to respond. Communities differ in what is considered a necessary series to accomplish kinds of activity we may label with a single word, such as 'greeting', 'thankning', 'offering', 'promising', and the like.

In sum, Searle's five-part classification captures the nature of a number of relevant dimensions, but the world to which it points can not be restricted to one of individual speech acts alone. It appears to be a world of dimensions of speech acts, on the one hand, and combinations of dimensions, on the other. The dimensions may combine and divide in various ways in particular groups, both in regard to individual acts and in regard to sequences of acts. There is, in other words, a syntax of speech act dimensions and features: paradigmatic relationships, having to do with the combination of features in single acts and with the dimensions along which choice of individual acts is made, and syntagmatic relationships, having to do with the necessary and appropriate sequences in interaction.

Speech acts appear not to be an isolable subject, reducible to a fixed classification, but a mode of entry into the study of action through speech.

This conclusion is evident when one considers several kinds of evidence, having to do with communicative or conversational acts, of which speech acts are presumably a part.

First of all, someone studying speech acts from the standpoint of actual behavior may arrive at a quite different taxonomy. Thus Dore (1979) proposes six broad categories:

- requestives: solicit information or actions
- assertives: report facts, state rules, convey attitudes, etc.
- performatives: accomplish acts (and establish facts) by being said.
responsives: supply solicited information or acknowledge remarks
regulatives: control personal contact and conversational flow
expressives: nonpropositionally convey attitudes or repeat others

The last three categories especially indicate the difference in starting, not from the fit between words and worlds, but from the interaction between persons. Dore requires categories for all the acts that may be observed in discourse. Dore's requestives do pretty well match Searle's directives, and his assertives Searle's representatives. The others do not match up well. Some of Dore's responsives would be Searle commissives, some not. Searle's expressives may appear among Dore's assertives, responsives, regulatives. Searle's declarations are not much in evidence, perhaps because Dore's focus is on children, but seem to be included in Dore's assertives. Just as Searle recognizes degrees within his categories, so Dore has many subcategories. The main point to notice here is that one recognizes need for responsives and regulatives, and for expressives that repeat other attitudes, when one starts from actual interaction. Such a starting point inescapably involves one, not only in the relation of words to propositions about the world, but also in the relation of words to the management of social order and the small worlds that are created in face-to-face talk.

Such a starting point also makes clear the complexity of relating speech acts to the organization of talk. There is no generally agreed upon conception of the essential concepts for the organization of talk, but turns, moves, and floors can be distinguished. Observationally, a turn would be distinguished whenever there is a change of speaker, but one must take into account the sense that a speaker may have, when interrupted, that 'It's still my turn', and the various kinds of activity that may go on (called 'side-sequences' by Gail Jefferson in some cases) in the course of a turn without being counted as a change of it. A move may be taken as what a participant
is up to, including the statement of a proposition. Having
the floor is perhaps sometimes equivalent to what some members
of our society mean when they speak of having a turn, but
it involves rights which are one degree more complexly removed
from simple changes of sentence and speaker.

In respect to all these elementary terms it is clear
that different groups of people can organize them in different
ways to different purposes. Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974)
thought it apparent that good order in conversation required that
one person speak at a time, but this appears to reflect either
our own conventional politeness or an approach to the issue
of social order in talk which defines problems entirely in
terms of behavioral problems to be solved, omitting the possibility
of distinct cultural definitions of the situation. Various
reports from different societies indicate that it is not
unusual to have one person talking at the same time as another.
I am told (Vartan Gregorian, personal communication) that it
is traditional in the Mediterranean area in families for
a rule of one person at a time to obtain when a senior,
respected elder of the family is present, but otherwise not.
Karl Reisman has reported the practice in the Caribbean island
of Antigua of a person joining a public group and beginning
to speak, tossing his or her contribution in, as it were, until
it is taken up. Turns, like silence, are culturally variable
in occurrence and meaning.

With regard to moves, one may notice that studies of
telephone conversations in the United States, studies which
indeed have made very valuable contribution to our understanding
of sequencing in conversation, nevertheless took for granted that
when the summons of a ringing phone was answered, the next move
was up to the person called. Not so in Norway, where the caller
is expected to identify himself or herself. And in France it
appears that the obligation on the part of the caller is so great,
for having possibly intruded and imposed, that a routine sequence
of questions must be initiated, checking as to the right number
having been reached, and going on, before it is proper to open the
topic of the call. Again, then, the common physical setting of a telephone call, two communicators not seen by each other, does not determine identical solutions of propriety from country to country.

Another example of the variable relation of move to turn is provided by Keenan, Schieffelin and Platt (1978), who show in talk between mothers and children the accomplishment of a single proposition, sequentially, across three utterances in two turns. In an example taken from Lois Bloom's work, 28 month old Allison and her mother speak:

1  A: oh I don't want drink it out cup/
2  A: uh want drink it out can/
3  Mo: Oh, what did I say about that?
4  Mo: What did I say about drinking it out of the can?
5  A: (pointing to can) I want drink it out can/
6  Mo: Aw, well that's not such a good idea, honey.

The authors observe that the question in (4) presents the major argument of a proposition, while subsequent responses predicate something of the argument. Together they constitute a proposition that 'is (roughly) 'What I said about drinking juice of out of the can is that it not such a good idea'. They suggest that the spreading out of a proposition over a sequence of utterances is a defining feature of caretaker speech, and of distressed communication generally.

Edelsky (1981) relates notions of turn to notions of floor. She concludes that the general failure to discriminate between the two notions reflects a prevailing image of turn, floor, and lone speaker as merged. She finds it most appropriate to define turn as 'on-record 'speaking' (which may include nonverbal activities) behind which lies an intention to convey a message that is both referential and functional' (403). This definition is rather equivalent to the use made of move above, and since there appears to be no other term than 'turn' for the minimal change of participation, I would continue to recommend 'move' for what Edelsky identifies as 'turn'. Following a careful review of the literature, Edelsky defines 'floor' as 'the acknowledged what's-going-on within a psychological time/space' (405). Within
her data she distinguishes three kinds of conversational contributions as 'turns', 'side comments', and 'encouraging remarks' (409). As her examples show, it is possible to take a turn (make a side comment) without having the floor, and it is possible for there not to be a common floor for a given group at a given moment of time (406, 408). Particularly interesting is her finding that there were two kinds of floor in the multi-person interaction of five informal committee meetings at an education institution, which she used for data: a floor developed by one person (F1), and a collaborative venture (F2), in which several people may seem to be operating on the same wave length or engaging in a free-for-all. Her initial sense of gender differences in regard to having the floor was substantiated, but relative to the type of floor being developed. Men took more and longer turns, and did more of the joking, arguing, directing and soliciting of responses in the first type. Differences in length of turn and frequency were neutralized in the second type, and women did more joking, arguing, suggesting, soliciting responses, validating, directing, were more proactive and on center stage, in the second type (416). She suggests that the latter type provides a more comfortable context for women to display a fuller range of language ability that might be considered assertive.

Clearly Edelsky's findings indicate that the notion of 'having the floor' may be different for different groups; that it might have different implications for different kinds of person; that assessment of abilities in the context of one kind of floor might be significantly altered if the same persons were observed in the context of other kinds of floor. Like other elementary notions for the study of discourse, 'floor' is a dimension of verbal interaction whose specification depends on local evidence.

Recognition of the complexity of these matters, of the many exceptions to universal definitions, led Erving Goffman a few years ago (1976) to despair of order. Conversation cannot be tidily contained in a box of sequentially constrained patterns, he argued; not only can't the lid be kept on, there is no box.
The first thing that is said may be a comment upon, statement about, response to almost anything; the next thing that is said may start in a different direction. A subsequent article continues this theme (1978). The interactionist view that establishes a statement-reply relationship is shown to require complementation by utterances that enter the stream of behavior at peculiar and unexpected places, producing communicative effects but no dialog. There are appropriate occasions for 'self-talk', showing perhaps that one is aware of a slip or embarrassment, but not qualifying as communication. And there are vocalizations ('response cries') that can be overheard, and may even require listeners to hear and understand, but act as though the utterance had not occurred. In addition to imprecations, Goffman illustrates a series of standard cries that he labels as: the transition display, the spill cry, the threat startle, revulsion sounds (all these largely by persons present to others, but not 'with' any of them); and, in an open state of talk, the strain grunt, the pain cry, the sexual moan, floor cues, audible glee.

Goffman places response cries as ritualized acts in the ethological sense (1978: 801):

"Unable to shape the world the way we want to, we displace our manipulation of it to the verbal channel, displaying evidence of our alignment to the on-going events; the display takes the condensed, truncated form of a discretely-articulated, non-lexicalized expression. Or, suddenly able to manage a tricky, threatening set of circumstances, we deflect into non-lexicalized sound a dramatization of our relief and self-congratulation in the achievement."

Goffman's response cries might be considered 'expressives' in Searle's classification, but notice that they are acts in speech, not speech acts in Searle's sense. They express a psychological state and there can be said to be a sincerity condition for their appropriate performance, but they lack propositional content. Goffman's description and apt labelling of response cries shows the limitation of a study of discourse that is limited to language in the usual sense. One way to put the linguistic significance would
be that Goffman's response cries direct attention away from verbs, the usual focus of the study of speech acts. Response cries are at best what would be grouped loosely in a grammar as 'particles'. They join the other lines along which the neglect of particles, as having no internal grammatical structure (by definition), has been remedied by recognition of the diverse ways in which they organize discourse, from the management of interaction to the shaping of verbal art.

Goffman's general point, that sequences of talk may not be closely ordered, tightly constrained in 'adjacency pairs' (Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson 1973) is surely true. Even the syntax within a sentence may be revealingly response to immediate interactional situation, as shown by Ochs (1981). Certain kinds of phrase that would never occur initially, or almost never, in writing in Italian are found to occur frequently first in interaction ('left dislocation'), and their initial occurrence is found to fit their relevance to the interaction itself, often warranting the speaker's taking that turn. A related kind of finding is illustrated by Charles Goodwin (in Psathas 1979), showing a single sentence to fund unpredictably in relation to a particular conversational setting.

The lack of strict order, however, is not the absence of any order at all. To abandon the fixity of a priori general categories is not to be lost in a sea of exceptions. Persons, events, and groups have characteristic tendencies, dispositions, and styles, recognizable to others and in principle describable by investigators. We do not experience conversational interaction as chaos ordinarily. This is so for at least three kinds of reason:

(a) There are some recurrent types of sequence

(b) Persons, events, and groups have recognizable patterns, even though each sequence may not be predictable in advance

(c) Persons and groups bring to conversation expectations and resources which contribute to a sense of its orderliness. Moreover, the very dimension of degree of predictability or
fixity is an important dimension on which to compare and contrast persons, styles, activities and events.

Goffman himself has contributed to the identification of some recurrent types of sequence, or routine (cf. Coulmas 1981a, 1981b) in calling attention to 'supportive' and 'remedial' exchanges (1971). Each is a common four-move pattern of daily life in the United States. A supportive exchange might be:

A Do you have change for a dollar?
B Sure, here.
C Thanks a lot.
D Don't mention it.

There are very likely many more of these cooperative routines, or minor genres, of daily life than have been described and placed. Marilyn Merritt (1980, and work cited there) has prominently called attention to 'service-encounters'. They have partly a direct linguistic interest; because a logically expected part may so often be omitted and implied, as in

A Any coffee left?
B Black or with cream?

wherein one question answers another and implies that the first question has the answer, 'yes'. Service-encounters have also a social interest, inasmuch as their terseness in some cases and elaboration in others may be evidence of personal relationships, degrees of shared understanding, and conflicting norms. An exchange in which some see efficiency may be brutally curt to others. Certain persons or situations may be avoided by some because of the expectation that much will be discussed about other topics before coming to the point. Others may avoid persons and situations, if possible, in which such establishment and maintenance of discourse relationships is missing. What counts as taking an interest in other people in an office, classroom, or institution, may be one of the most interesting dimensions of variation in discourse style—a polite question here, an extended conversation there.
This critique of the 'philosophical' approach associated with Searle and speech acts has entered the sphere of the ethnographic approach. That is indeed the direction of all the critiques of approaches labelled 'philosophical' here. Each of them calls attention to features or dimensions of discourse that are embedded in practices of various kinds, and practices call for ethnographic study. Before addressing the ethnographic approach directly, however, several other major philosophical approaches must be discussed, those of Garfinkel, Grice and Habermas.

Harold Garfinkel is the pioneer figure in the approach that has come to be known as ethnomethodology, whose development by Harvey Sacks, Emmanuel Schegloff, Gail Jefferson, and others has been a major element of the landscape of the study of discourse in the last two decades. Those who have associated themselves with this development have many differences among themselves, which cannot be addressed here. I shall only try briefly to characterize Garfinkel's own ideal and to say a little about the strengths and limitations of the field itself from the standpoint of this report.

Garfinkel's inspiration is in the phenomenological philosophy of the late Alfred Schutz. The essential concern is to understand the ways in which ordinary people make sense of daily life. An essential premise is that daily life has the meaningfulness and orderliness it is experienced as having fundamentally because people bring to it ways of making sense and imputing orderliness. The conventional practices of sociology (and the movement is deeply rooted in sociology) are inadequate, because they take such orderliness for granted. Survey research, questionnaires, categorization and coding of responses, and their quantitative manipulation assume a stability, or a non-problematic character, in what are taken to be the features of social life. Ingenious inquiry and systematic observation show that the research methods themselves take many unexamined practices for granted, and that ordinary people make use of practices that escape the attention of such research methods. Garfinkel asserts that no coding-manual or set of instructions or other explicit guide can ever wholly account
for what actually is done. There will always be recourse to another level of understanding, constitutive of social reality in a more fundamental way, in which principles are invoked such as 'enough is enough', 'other things being equal', and the like. Such principles are invoked regularly, and whenever one looks closely at instances of anything that are taken to be the same in meaning or description, one finds variation. 'You never step into the same protocol twice' might be a Garfinkel maxim. Realities are regularly postulated without being demonstrated or demanded, as when doctors tell each other, 'I had a case once in which...', and the like. To repeat, the apparent stability and orderliness of the social world is regarded as a creative, contingent accomplishment of the members of such a world, not as an objective property that it would have without them.

From this starting point, with its revolutionary rejection of standard ways of doing sociology, many paths have been taken. Some remain essentially critical of any claims for objective order, status as fact, and the like, reducing social science to unending critique and conversation. Others engage in empirical observation that puts forward regularities of a different kind, regularities found in conversational life. The claims for these regularities remain true to the original critique in that they are not attributed to cultural patterns, social norms, historically derived traditions: Rather, these regularities are thought to be the result of quasi-ethological considerations: persons engaged in interaction under one or another set of circumstances will find themselves faced with certain kinds of problem, such as how to open the interaction, how to close it, how to monitor and interpret it when not face-to-face, and so on. Transcripts of interaction may be thought to provide sufficient evidence of the arising and solution of such problems, no recourse to interview, participant observation, and other usual ways of getting at social norms and cultural patterns of interpretation being required.
As has been noted above in regard to telephone conversations, one and the same functional or 'ethological' situation does not in fact give rise to one and the same interpretation and answer. It is not even the case, as some have proposed, that 'face-to-face' interaction need be the norm, explained because of the obvious advantages in monitoring interaction, given the frontal location of the eyes and sources of facial gesture. Among the Mescalero Apache, the normal and preferred physical relationship for friendly conversation is side-by-side, shoulder to shoulder. A woman finding herself face-to-face with another may go to some effort to get into the right position (side-by-side). (I owe this information to Claire Farrer).

The close attention that researchers inspired by ethnomethodology have given to verbal interaction has been of great benefit to the general study of discourse. Their close attention to transcripts of behavior and their desire to discover general devices, used in making interaction meaningful and orderly, has influenced the work of many others. The sizeable literature on 'turn-taking' is stimulated by them, even if the postulate that orderliness requires talking one party at a time is empirically wrong. Notions such as 'adjacency-pair' (e.g., that question implies an answer, and the absence of an answer can be seen as a significant absence, perhaps a refusal), even if applicable only to a degree, are part of the general equipment for discourse analysis. Some who adhere to the ethnomethodological school have contributed some of our most valuable and careful studies of classroom interaction (most recently, Mehan 1978, 1979), studies so ethnographic in character that one might not think of 'ethnomethodology' in connection with them. In sum, the inspiration to understand the orderliness of interaction as an accomplishment of those who interact is a major source of revealing work, affecting anthropologists like John Gumperz, whose notion of 'conversational inferencing' can be seen to have an ethnomethodological character, in that it interprets the
notion of context as something not fixed throughout an interaction, but as something evolving and redefinable by the participants (see Gumperz 1977, 1978). Gumperz is able to combine such a processual, emergent notion of context with recognition of stable characteristics on the part of different ethnic and minority groups. Such combinations of pattern with process are to be hoped from the stimulation of ethnomethodology generally.

An analogous outcome is to be hoped from the influence of another philosopher whose ideas have stimulated a great deal of formal and empirical work, H. B. Grice.

H. P. Grice (1967) has been concerned with a theory of meaning in general, and we will not take up that aspect of his work, fundamental as it is to him. His influence in the study of discourse has come through his formulation of four maxims, which appear to give considerable leverage in interpreting the relation of literal meaning, propositional content usually, to the effect that an utterance actually has. Grice postulates a 'cooperative principle', such that the parties to a conversation can assume the intention of each other to be understood, to maintain communication, and the like. Grice considers the cooperative principle to imply four maxims, those of quality, quantity, relevance, and manner. The four maxims can be stated as follows:

Quality: Say only what you believe to be true.
Quantity: Say only as much, and just as much, as is necessary.
Relevance: Be relevant.
Manner: Be perspicuous. Don't be ambiguous, don't be obscure, be succinct.

Grice does not hold that the four maxims describe all conversation, but rather that departure from a maxim invites an interpretation. What is called 'conversational implicature' results. A standard example is the inference one would draw from finding on a recommendation of a student for a fellowship: "He has very nice handwriting", and nothing more. The interpretation presumably would be along these lines: in a recommendation one should mention
the person's good points; this is the only good point mentioned, and is hardly relevant to the fellowship in question; therefore, the writer of the recommendation cannot think of any relevant good points, and has put down the only good point of which he can think; so far as this evidence goes, the person does not deserve a fellowship.

Notice that such an effect can be obtained directly by intonation. The late Henry Lee Smith, Jr., used to offer the illustration: "He has a very pleasant personality", said with the usual falling intonation at the end, as a fact, and the same thing said with steady, level pitch, as if there were more to be said, relevant and unfavorable.

A joke illustrates an implicature on the basis of the maxim of quantity. Entries in a ship's log can be taken to be concerned only with significant events, not with states of affairs that are taken for granted. One night a seaman on watch was found drunk by his captain, and despite pleas on the grounds of long years of faithful service and sobriety, the captain entered in the ship's log: Williams was drunk last night. The seaman found an opportunity for revenge. Charged with making the entries in the log one night sometime later, he wrote: The captain was sober last night. A factual statement, but one inviting implicature.

These two illustrations suggest ways in which the maxims proposed by Grice might be part of a general descriptive enterprise. Given a purpose to be accomplished, such as an unfavorable implication, when is it accomplished by what means? how are means such as sentence implicature per se, and intonation, interconnected? among certain people, in certain settings, such as classrooms? what differences may obtain across settings, activities, communities? And insofar as implicature appears to involve understandings about genres (letters of recommendation, ships' logs, and the like), what is the set of genres and their associated understandings?

The use of Grice's maxims probably has appealed to many...
scholars on just such grounds. Yet their statement as maxims poses a number of problems.

First of all, like Searle’s formulation of speech acts, the maxims are very much tied to propositional statements. The standard approach is to interpret the actual effect of utterance in relation to the truth or falsity of the proposition involved. In a fresh and convincing article, Sperber and Wilson (1981) have shown that such an approach cannot account for many instances of irony. Some instances appear to fit a Gricean interpretation, as when ‘Nice weather, isn’t it?’—said to someone standing beside one in a downpour can be said to be ironic in virtue of its falsity in relation to the actual situation evident to both. A great many cases of ironic utterance, however, cannot be sensibly so interpreted. The relevant proposition may not be actually used; the relevant fact may be mention of an expression which might refer to it. In the first example below, the expression is used as a question, is actually asked, but in the second is mentioned without actually being asked:

(A) ‘What is irony?’
(B) ‘What is irony?’ is the wrong question.

Whereas Grice sees violation of truthfulness (maxim of quality) as a necessary and sufficient condition for ironical interpretation, Sperber and Wilson first note that the implication of an ironical utterance cannot be added to the literal meaning, as is the standard case with implicatures, because the result would be a contradiction, and go on to point out that violation of truthfulness is neither necessary nor sufficient for ironical interpretation. The existence of ironical questions, ironical understatements, and ironical references to the inappropriateness or irrelevance of an utterance, rather than to the fact that it is false, show violation of the truthfulness of a proposition to unnecessary. And of course, as Grice has himself pointed out, not every falsehood or irrelevance is ironical (Sperber and Wilson 1981: 309). The key to ironical interpretation is that it involves mention of utterances, whose mentioned propositions have been, or might have been, entertained. The mentioned proposition might have just been said, or said long...
ago, or even anticipated. Echoic mention may involve appeal to standards or rules of behavior that are culturally defined, and so always available for echoic mention. This perspective explains a considerable asymmetry, in that one is more likely to say 'How clever' to imply 'How stupid' than the other way round. If inversion of propositional meaning were the root of irony, there would be no reason for it to work less well in one direction than in another. On the principle of echoic mention, it is always possible to make ironical mention of the norm in the face of an imperfect reality. It is always possible to say of a failure, ironically, 'That was a great success'. To say of a success 'That was a failure' without the irony falling flat requires the existence of past doubts or fears to be echoed (Sperber and Wilson 1981: 312). In general, argue Sperber and Wilson convincingly, the propositional basis of traditional interpretations of irony as figurative speech, and of Grice's interpretation, falls short, by failing to notice that irony depends upon echoic mention, not use, of a proposition, and by failing to realize that figures of speech, irony in particular, crucially involve the evocation of an attitude—that of the speaker to the proposition mentioned—and such attitudes can not be reduced to a set of propositions.

This conception of irony itself needs completion by reference to the means, such as intonation, that may support an ironic interpretation (e.g., 'That was a great success?'), and Sperber and Wilson do note that their approach makes sense of the existence of an ironical tone of voice (p. 311). The conception points to ethnographic description as a necessary context for recognizing irony, and, conversely, to detection of irony as evidence for ethnographic description, given the interdependence between irony and echoic mention of standards of behavior. And specific persons and settings, such as teachers and classrooms, could be characterized in terms of the presence, or absence, or degree of irony as an aspect of utterance; whether or not echoic mention for ironic effect was
permitted to anyone other than the teacher; in general, how echoic mention for ironic effect was distributed in relation to superordinate-subordinate relations, peer relations, and the like. Intonation and other communicative means would have to be taken into account in order to assess ironic acts themselves. The Sperber and Wilson approach provides a criterion for the presence of irony, but irony is an ingredient of more complex acts, whose full configuration may show them to be hostile, insulting, bantering, or ingratiating in tone or key.

In another article, Sperber and Wilson (1982) have rejected the Gricean apparatus for understanding implicature in favor of a single principle, which they call the standard of maximal relevance. This proposal will be mentioned later in connection with mutual knowledge, since Sperber and Wilson deny that mutual knowledge of speaker and hearer is necessary to the interpretation of conversation and the drawing of implicature. (Their view suggests some connection with Goffman on 'replies and responses'; discussed above). Here the relevant consideration is that the four Gricean maxims make better ethnographic sense, because of their greater 'articulation', but not in the formulation given them by Grice.

A key study is that by Elinor Ochs Keenan (1976). She presents evidence from the Malagasy of Madagascar that interactants regularly provide less information than required by others, and that an implicature need not be made from this. The people generally do this, because new information is a rare commodity, and because one avoids committing oneself explicitly in order not to be held responsible for what may happen as a result of the information.

Keenan does not say that the Malagasy never make implicatures of the sort that the maxim of quantity would underlie. Rather, she describes a society in which how much one says is governed by a principle of reticence, whose applications are bound up with degrees of kinship, local ties and gender. The Malagasy disclose as little direct information as possible, especially when speaking to persons outside their family. Such indirectness
is cultivated as the public style of speaking by men. Such a norm of indirectness fits the grammar of the language, which has, alongside an active and a passive, a further syntactic voice, the circumlocutory, for making the indirect object of a construction the subject. Women are not held to the same public norm as men, and are considered deficient speakers in this regard. Just because they can speak directly, they can be invaluable in breaking through an impasse in negotiations between groups; and they have come to flourish in trading with outside groups.

The Malagasy, then, can not be easily understood in terms of a maxim of quantity, formulated perhaps as the injunction, Be informative. Rather, the men can not, but perhaps the women can. The complexities of discourse in the culture make sense in important part in terms of a contrast between men and women in regard to quantity: Be informative, for women; be reticent, for men. (And 'be reticent', specified variously for degrees of kith and kin, for everyone).

Given this contrast between men and women, it does not make sense to say that the Malagasy have a maxim, 'Be relevant', but simply interpret 'relevance' differently. Whatever interpretation one imagines for the men must be reversed for the women.

The difficulty is largely in the formulation of these aspects of conversational interpretation as maxims. It would be bizarre to postulate as basic to Malagasy verbal conduct and language acquisition an underlying maxim which the males at least consistently violate. The evidence is that the Malagasy men think themselves to be accomplishing and upholding a norm when they speak traditionally as they do, not culprits or sinners. Such an example, indeed, brings out the ethnocentric enormity of the maxims. Without any reference whatever to the studies of the values and ethical postulates of the many cultures of the world, without any consideration of the ways in which verbal etiquette would be part of the rights and duties owed to others in a society, and an instrument of a society's conception of the realization of individual and group good, it is implied that any account of any culture must postulate as part of its
character structure:
Say only what you believe to be true.
Say only as much, and just as much, as is necessary.
Be relevant.
Be perspicuous. Don't be ambiguous, don't be obscure,
be succinct:

It can be objected that no one maintains that the maxims describe conversation; they underlie it and allow for interpretations departing from them. The difficulty with the objection is that it offers no account of how the maxims might come to be underlying. They could hardly be explained as merely situational, since it is evident that many situations are approached with assumptions of other kinds. The Navajo are said to feel that one should tell the truth to a kinsman, but that one is almost obliged to lie to a Zuni. One might reply: the fundamental thing is the cooperative principle, from which the maxims are derived, and it appears that the Navajo hold to the cooperative principle among themselves, but not in interaction with Zuni. That reply is reasonable, but it grants the fundamental point: the cooperative principle itself is not universally employed. Thus it is an empirical question as to which situations, events, activities, relationships are conducted on such a basis, and which are not. It is an empirical question of great interest as to what are the other kinds of underlying principle that may be present in situations where the cooperative principle is not. One enters the true world of conversational organization, the world in which the means of discourse are organized to diverse ends by peoples around the world. Truth and deception; reticence, precision, and prolixity; relevance and divagation; clarity, ambiguity, allusive obscurity; all become optional bases of a personal, situational, or cultural style. Such styles may establish themselves as the norms from which departure invites implicature. Why true when usually evasive or deceptive? Why precise when usually prolix? Why relevant when usually fanciful? Why clear when usually hermetic?
The value of the Gricean maxims, then, can be realized when they are restated as dimensions. It can reasonably be assumed that any community will have some orientation to the dimension of quality (truthfulness), of quantity (informativeness), of relevance, of manner (clarity). What that orientation will be, and how complexly articulated in relation to kinds of person and context, would be an empirical question. The Malagasy orientation to the maxim of quantity would appear to be something like, 'Be reticent; disclose as little information as possible, since you may be held responsible for what is done with it; especially outside the family, and if you are male. This formulation is crude but it shows the nature of the difference from Grice. It seems that implicature would be invited in the case of a Malagasy male if one indeed observed what Grice’s maxim of quantity would entail, because of the departure from the operative Malagasy maxim.

This reinterpretation of Grice’s maxims in terms of dimensions answers a concern that has occurred to some linguists. How could there be a society in which one never knew that utterances were true? in which utterance was never precisely informative? in which utterance was never relevant? in which utterance was never clear? Some linguists have thought that the improbability of such societies justified the universality of the maxims. What is justified, of course, is the universality of the dimensions.

The sense of usefulness that many have had with Grice’s maxims is probably because they have in fact been used as dimensions, not imperative maxims. As maxims, they suggest an idealization of middle-class American etiquette. Some who have studied nineteenth century manuals of etiquette report that the maxims can be traced in them.

The importance of making the dimensions culturally relative is brought out by a recent experience. A research paper from Israel addressed the problems of the children of Oriental Jews in school. Teachers appeared to respond differently
to the speech of such children. The author of the paper focused on the linguistic characteristics of the responses of teachers. No need was felt to discover and describe the actual patterns of speech on the part of the children. That was covered by a restatement of Grice's principles. Yet of course the very subject of the research was an apparent contrast in conversational behavior. The appeal of universal principles is so great that the author belied her own starting point, and the children in whose interests the research was undertaken.

The way to use Grice's maxims in understanding discourse, then, is as calling attention to universal dimensions, whose interpretation and significance will vary, and may indeed contrast, within the same group. The appropriate comparison between groups may not be in terms of contrast as wholes, one having one basic principle, and another another, but in terms of contrast in the location and distribution of principles. For Malagasy men, and public life, reticence is the norm, open informativeness the exception. We are likely to think of ourselves as the opposite, as valuing frankness and informativeness in public life. We readily criticize public figures on these grounds. Yet many positions require their incumbents to be reticent about what they disclose, for the sake of the business, the institution, perhaps the country, whose interests the person represents. Such a person could well be criticized for being informative. Witnesses sometimes believe their lives to be in danger if they testify, and more than one government official has been fired for saying as much as an interlocutor considered necessary.

That last phrase of course indicates another fundamental difficulty with the Gricean approach. It bespeaks a conversational world of harmony. It does not allow for conflict and contradiction in what the parties to conversation consider true, sufficient, relevant and clear. It does not speak to implicature mistakenly taken, because of different norms, or to negotiation of what is to count as the norm. And, as indicated above, it does not
recognize that the sphere of the cooperative principle itself is an empirical matter. One is brought to ethnographic inquiry into what is considered appropriate and inappropriate in speech.

Let me close this section with an illustrative joke:

Scene: Grand Central Station
Psychiatrist A: Where are you going?
Psychiatrist B: Philadelphia.
(Pause)
Psychiatrist A: You liar, you are too going to Philadelphia.

Brown and Levinson. The work of Brown and Levinson on politeness has a central empirical content, and it may seem odd to include it among philosophical approaches. As will be seen, however, the work is directly based on philosophical approaches already considered, and its limitations derive from its own philosophical model. The limitations to be detected do not detract from the value of the work as the richest articulation of specific options and strategies involve in politeness (and, one might add, rhetoric) of which I know. The work should be closely read by anyone studying discourse as verbal interaction.

Brown and Levinson draw on their own observations of usage in English, Tamil (a Dravidian language of South India), and Tzeltal (a Mayah language of Chiapas, Mexico). They are attentive to social dimensions and social differences. Their goal, however, is to avoid explanation in terms of specific cultural norms and rules (pp. 90-2, 249, 297-8(n. 22), 298-9(n. 28)). Rather, they wish to explain the patterns to which they call attention in terms of universal dimensions and a universal model of what a rational actor potentially would do. They posit the universality of concern with face, and rational action devoted to satisfying the wants of others with regard to face, together with mutual knowledge of these two things by those interacting (p. 249).
The basic notion of 'Face' is indebted in great part to the work of Erving Goffman. Brown and Levinson argue that all competent members of a community have (and know each other to have), as face, the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself or herself. This self-image has two aspects:

(a) **negative face**: a basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction, that is, to freedom of action and freedom from imposition;

(b) **positive face**: a consistent self-image or 'personality' claimed by interactants (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of).

All competent members also have certain rational capacities, particularly consistent modes of reasoning from ends to means that will achieve these ends, as we have noted. The many similarities around the world are held to result from the practical reasoning of people in these terms in analogous situations. In rejecting what they take to be inflexible and fixed implications of notions such as 'norms' and 'rules', they also reject explanation due to innate predispositions of a detailed sort. Their own approach seems to them to involve a 'flexible and infinitely productive, strategic usage' (p. 91).

The two kinds of face can be rephrased as the want to be unimpeded by others (negative face) and the want to have one's wants be desirable to at least some others (positive face). Negative face can be said to be the politeness of non-imposition, and positive face the politeness of understanding, approving, admiring.

Central to the explanation of specific forms of politeness is the notion of face-threatening act (FTA). One might want to perform some act with maximum efficiency, more than to preserve one's own or another's face; but otherwise, one will want to minimize the threat of the FTA. There are a few basic ways of doing so, some three. At the other extreme from neglecting face is the decision not to do the act at all. The five alternatives can be shown in a diagram, numbered from 1 to 5.
At the top of the diagram is estimation of the risk of face loss as lesser, while at the bottom is estimation of the risk as greater.

**LESSER**

1. no redressive action
   
   On record
   
   Do FTA

2. positive politeness
   
   with redressive action

3. negative politeness

4. Off-record

5. Don't do FTA

The assessment of the seriousness of an FTA involves the three basic kinds of factor noted:
(i) the social distance (D) of the participants
(ii) the relative 'power' of the two (P)
(iii) the absolute ranking (R) of impositions in the particular culture.

These social dimensions are treated as giving rise to the same sort of pattern wherever the same sort of relation holds between them (249):

"Since we have excluded extrinsic weighting of wants, we cannot account for cultural differences in terms, say, of greater desire for positive-face satisfaction than negative-face satisfaction in some society (in the U.S.A. compared with England, for example). Note that if we allowed extrinsic weighting of face wants, then cultural (emic) explanations of cross-cultural differences would supersede explanation in terms of universal (etic) social dimensions like D and P. Ours is the stronger hypothesis (it may of course be wrong) requiring a correlation between D and P levels in a society and the kind and amount of face attention."

Interestingly enough, the most specific factor, R, drops
out of discussion temporarily, a point which suggests the weakness of the argument. (See discussion below on their explanatory model).

Brown and Levinson are attentive to the work of Searle and Grice. They encompass a larger range of aspects of verbal interaction than Searle. On the one hand, while a number of the kinds of speech acts identified by Searle can be connected with Brown and Levinson's face-threatening-acts, the lists of kinds of act given by Brown and Levinson add many things not taken into account by Searle (interruption, status terms that may misidentify). It seems that the classification of speech acts from a propositional starting point is to gross to encompass the distinctions required to account for this aspect of discourse. This conclusion is borne out by consideration of the kinds of acts Brown and Levinson identify as potentially threatening to the face of a speaker (and hence to that of a hearer, if the two are cooperating to maintain face):

Threatening to a speaker's negative face: thanks, acceptance of thanks or apology, excuses, acceptance of offers, responses to faux pas, unwilling offers.

Threatening to a speaker's positive face: apologies, acceptance of compliment, bodily mishap, confessions, admissions, emotional loss of control, self-contradiction.

Brown and Levinson furthermore consider that the set of practical-reasoning premises within their model of a rational actor includes, but is considerably larger than, the set of felicity conditions on speech acts identified by Searle (p. 143). That is, they take into account a broader range of conditions on appropriateness and success of an act of speech.

The maxims of Grice are essential to the Brown and Levinson analysis. The type of strategy they call 'bald on record', from which other types of strategy depart, is in effect speaking in conformity with the maxims (pp. 99-100). The thrust of their study, indeed, is that a powerful, pervasive motive for not talking literally in terms of the maxims is the desire to give attention to face. (Other motives no doubt exist, they point
out. The want to avoid responsibility emerged in their fieldwork as one (p. 100)).

Brown and Levinson go on to describe how the calculation of strategies might work, and to describe a great many particular strategies under the five general types. A few examples must suffice to suggest the rich detail:

1. Bald on record
   (1) simply not minimize FTA: other demands override face concerns.
   (2) oriented to FTA. E.g.; if Hearer may be concerned not to impose, and Speaker assumes this, and so politely alleviates anxiety by pre-emptively inviting H to impinge on S's preserve: 'Come in!'

2. Positive politeness
   A. Claim common ground, Strategy 1: notice, attend to H
      2: exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy)
      3: intensify interest in H
      4: Use in-group identity markers
      5: Seek agreement
      6: Avoid disagreement
      7: Presuppose/assert/raise common ground
      8: Joke
   B. Convey that S and H are cooperators
      9: Assert or presuppose knowledge and concern for H's wants
      10: Offer, promise
      11: Be optimistic
      12: Include both S, H in activity
      13: Give or ask for reasons
      14: Assume or assert reciprocity
   C. Fulfill H's want for some X
      15: Give gifts to H (goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation)
The full list is far more extensive. The discussion reaches to specific verbal means and details, and draws out parallels in the means available in the three languages focussed upon (English, Tzeltal, Tamil), from which many examples are given.

The range of examples and cases is impressive, and any student of the subject can only benefit from being sensitized to the possibilities brought out. Nothing of similar scope has been done by anyone else. Yet the work remains incomplete as an approach to discourse. The empirical limitation seems connected with the philosophical stance. The core of their work comes to consist at certain points of rational choices directed toward another, and so to miss some of what is involved in considering the role of the speaker. There is missing as well the explanatory power in some instances of acceptance of the existence of conventional institutionalized understandings.

The evidence for universality from the three languages consists of individual utterances. In this respect, the work does not after all escape the limitation of speech act analysis in that respect. Discourse sequences are not analysed as the domains of strategies. What one has, in effect, is evidence of the existence in three widely separated languages of parallel devices. The model might be called a model of politeness devices, or rhetorical devices. It does not after all succeed in showing how devices might be combined in situations, interactions, and the like. It seems likely that an extension of the work to characteristic events, interactions, and the like, would weaken the appeal of the universal rational actor as an explanatory model, and place more importance on historically derived social institutions and cultural orientations. This limitation is perhaps obscured by the use of 'strategy' for single devices. One might better reserve the term 'strategy' for ways of planning and conducting interactions and sequences of devices. With the list of devices we have in effect an impressive framework and exemplification for Searle's twelfth factor, the style of doing an illocutionary act.
The interest and limitations of the study appear in the initial account of 'bald on record' usage. Brown and Levinson observe that where maximum efficiency is very important, and this is mutually known to the participants, no redress of face is necessary. Indeed, they shrewdly observe that redress would detract from the communication of urgency in some cases; cf. 'Help!' with 'Please help me, if you would be so kind'. Cross-linguistically, they report equivalent urgent imperatives in Tzeltal and Tamil (p. 101).

Such imperatives probably exist in every language. What is necessary for a general theory of their relation to politeness is to account for the full range of cases in which they occur. Brown and Levinson go on to consider several types of case, such as communication difficulties and noise in the channel, which may motivate bald-on-record speech acts, and cases where the act in question is primarily in the hearer's interest, so that the doing of the FTA conveys concern for H and H's positive face—sympathetic advice and warnings may thus be baldly on record: "Careful! It's slippery", as may granting permission for something that the hearer has requested.

Brown and Levinson also consider cases in which one speaks as if maximum efficiency were very important, thus providing metaphorical urgency for emphasis. Attention-getters used in conversation, such as 'Listen...', 'Look....', are given as examples. They recognize that metaphorical 'as if' explanations are a problem for a model, since any counter-example might be treated as 'as if'.

What is missing from these accounts is consideration of the norms of interaction and cultural orientations that may place a specific linguistic form, such as an imperative, in a different light. The universal presence of such forms is worth knowing, but one needs to know as well the ways in which such forms are selected and grouped together with others in cultural practices. An unpublished study by Judith Irvine ('How not to ask a favor in Wolof') is valuable in this respect. Irvine reports her experience in trying to be polite in making requests in a Wolof-speaking community in the West African country of Senegal, and finding herself corrected. 'We know you mean well, but we don't do things that way' was the gist of the instruction she received. She learned that
a direct request or demand was actually more polite than an expression that was hedged or qualified by mention of the wishes or situation of the speaker. For a large number of possible everyday requests, the Wolof view is that participants in situations are entitled to make them in relation to what is evident in the surrounding context. If there is coffee, and one wants some, one can simply ask for coffee. To do what we might think of as hinting or indirection would seem to the Wolof to be putting one's ego where it did not belong, to be putting one's own self forward. If there is coffee, you are entitled to some; ask for it directly. If you speak of what you wish, want, think, or like, you are asking us to give you attention as an individual beyond what you deserve as a party among those present. Or so the Wolof logic of etiquette in such situations seems to run.

Irvine found that the form of a directive in making requests was more reduced, more bald on record, the greater the difference in rank between the speaker and hearer. The two polar-opposite castes in traditional Wolof society are nobles and griots, the latter being a caste that performs, sings, makes speeches for entertainment and various public affairs. A griot simply demands of a noble: 'Give me money!' (may ma xaalisi!), or even just 'Money' (Xaalisi!) One might even say merely 'Hey! I'm a griot' (E! gewel laa') and have it count as a request for money.

The reason these utterances have these effects is that the Wolof believe exertion, including speaking, to be contrary to the dignity and honor of the nobility. Such efforts belong to the sphere of public display in which a noble should not engage. (In older times the Wolof king was said to have appropriately made grammatical mistakes, so as to show disdain for outward show of that kind). Nobles need griots to do these things, speak, sing, honor, insult, and the like, and griots are entitled to money from nobles for doing them. Griots may indeed get money from nobles for not singing in ways the noble would not appreciate. Thus the reciprocal relationship between the two cases, money and verbal services, is a standard fact of the society, a fundamental feature of its structure. A griot's right to request money follows so
automatically from the social relationship of griot and noble that it is sufficient simply to call attention to that relationship for the remark to be understood as a request.

By the same token, a noble can demand of a griot, 'Sing for me!' (Woy ma!), or just hand the griot a coin, a non-verbal action that counts as a request for a song as well. (In fact this is a particularly suitable way for a noble to make the request, since bestowing money enhances his rank and he does not have to speak).

This kind of explanation in underlying social structure seems to make sense of a kind of case cited by Brown and Levinson than does their cautious mention of metaphorical urgency:

"This metaphorical urgency perhaps explains why orders and entreaties (or begging), which have inverted assumptions about the relative status of speaker and hearer, both seem to occur in many languages with the same overt syntax—namely, imperatives. Thus beggars in India make direct demands like (11) Kaacu kuTu 'Give money'" (101).

(I have slightly rephrased the passage, spelling out S(peaker) and H(earer) and substituting 'overt' for 'superficial').

Clearly the occurrence of parallel forms of utterance is not enough to provide the basis for a universal theory. One has to know the social structure in which the forms of utterance occur, and the cultural values which inform that structure. Brown and Levinson are right that 'metaphorical urgency' can be too ready an explanation. One needs to know about the place of beggars in social structure, the rights and duties associated with them in relation to others, and the evaluation that others would give to their forms of utterance. Is their relation with others reciprocal, as is the relation between noble and griot in Senegal? Do their bald on record utterances activate an existing social wiring? Or are beggars in India sometimes outside the sphere of politeness, outside the sphere in which the cooperative principle and the dimensions it entails considered to operate? The Zuni appear to be outside the Navajo sphere of the obligation to be truth-telling. Perhaps some sets of people, residing among others, are outside the sphere in which they consider the maintenance of regard for face
apply.

Let me note that Brown and Levinson instructively discuss a second kind of bald-on-record usage, one in which it is not the case that other demands override attention to face wants, but rather one in which the speaker alleviates the assumed anxieties of another about infringement of the speaker's preserve, and pre-emptively invites the other to impinge. They remark that the classic example of invitations of this kind is perhaps 'Come in'. Alongside these cases of recognition of another's concern for one's negative face (imposition) are cases of another's concern for one's positive face (disregard), such as 'Don't worry about me', 'Don't let me keep you'. These cases, however, do not appear to fit the Wolof examples.

Another kind of limitation seems to emerge in the course of the long study. The broader explanatory framework appears at times to come down to a focus on the effect of what one says on a hearer. The larger framework is based on cooperation in maintaining face. Specific explanations sometimes come down to the 'rhetorical' function of effect on others alone, neglecting what may be called, following Goffman, the speaker's own 'demeanor' (concern for the speaker's negative and positive face, in the terms of Brown and Levinson). Let me give two instances of this limitation. At one point Brown and Levinson state (p. 79):

"If an actor uses a strategy appropriate to a high risk for an FTA of less risk, others will assume the FTA was greater than in fact it was, while it is S's intention to minimize rather than overestimate the threat to H's face. Hence in general no actor will use a strategy for an FTA that affords more opportunity for face-risk minimization than is actually required to retain H's cooperation".

This statement seems to reduce politeness to rational instrumentality, and to forget what may be proper or required because of a speaker's position or personal style.

The same limitation appears in a later statement (p. 143):

"For instance, 'Would you mind doing A?' is unlikely to have any idiomatic function as an indirect speech act in social
relations dominated by power. If $S$ is powerful, he doesn't care if $H$ does mind; if $S$ is dominated, then it is presumptuous to assume that $H$ might not mind, and even if he didn't, his not minding would not provide him with any motive to do $A$.

Again, rational instrumentality in relation to social distance and power seems to be the only consideration. Conventional discretion in the use of irony and other modulations of key are overlooked, and some rather obvious considerations of status style. In 1969 the film "The Royal Family" showed Queen Elizabeth and others at the Court of St. James. In a scene showing the Queen at work in Buckingham Palace, early one morning, she says to a man something like 'Do you think you could find those papers we were looking at yesterday?' It seems unreasonable to assume that the Queen doesn't mind if the person to whom she spoke does mind, and it seems unreasonable to assume that the utterance was unrepresentative in its solicitious form. Certainly the utterance, said by the Queen, has the force of an instruction. At the same time it is the style of a gracious leader who is able to get things done in a solicitous style. The demeanor of the person and the office both appear to require such a style. Normally it will get things done directly, and, given its character, it allows occasionally for nuance and new information in the getting done. If one is certain one is boss, one can perhaps increase one's own sphere of feedback and discretion with such a style.

If research into politeness is to be useful in understanding classrooms, certainly both deference and demeanor must be taken into account, taking deference broadly as what is owed to the other, and demeanor as what one owes to oneself. Both involve respect, for the other and for oneself. If we combine this distinction introduced by Goffman with the concern of Brown and Levinson for positive and negative face, we seem to have three useful categories. Goffman's 'deference' is like the negative face of the other, the other's right not to be impinged upon, to be respected. Goffman's 'demeanor' is like negative face in respect to oneself, or the speaker, that person's right to be respected. Both have to do with a dimension that might be called 'autonomy'. The notion of 'positive
face adds a concern with one's wish to have his or her likes, preferences, traits, well regarded. Insofar as either party to an interaction speaks to such concern, we may associate it with Kenneth Burke's term for the heart of rhetoric in the modern world, identification.

If we consider the way in which each of these three spheres contributes to the success or failure of communication, discourse, in keeping with the general concern of contemporary work for the 'sincerity' conditions of a speech act, the 'happiness' or 'felicity' conditions of an act, the conditions which must be satisfied for an act to be counted as such, we can say, roughly, that identification has to do with such things as establishing common ground (where one is from, who one knows, what one does, what one likes, etc.); deference has to do with regard for the other's self-respect; and demeanor has to do with expectable regard for one's own. Failure in each of these respects might sometimes be characterized as 'having nothing in common'; 'being rude'; 'loosing one's cool'.

Interaction may fail, or pall, however, for reasons of a fourth kind, the lack of a contribution to it, or of a contribution of interest, from one of the parties. One may find common ground, be polite, and self-controlled, and still be too dull to bear. This consideration suggests a logical possibility to be added to the intersection of the categories of Goffman and of Brown and Levinson. Their categories give two spheres of concern for the other (identification, deference), but only one of concern focussed on the speaker (demeanor). From another standpoint, their categories give two spheres of concern for respect (avoiding insult and imposition toward the other and oneself (deference, demeanor)), but only one for concern for what may unite, integrate, the speaker and hearer (identification). Let us call a fourth category, one that unites and integrates and has its focus on the speaker, 'expression', the contribution one may be expected to make to the interest of what goes on. Often enough one's overriding concern in a new environment, as new teacher, new student, new fieldworker, is politeness, avoiding disrespect. One
may forget that others may be as concerned with not being bored as with not being insulted.

These four spheres of concern can be shown in a table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Hearer</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Deference</td>
<td>Demeanor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>Expression</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sum, it appears that Brown and Levinson provide a storehouse of possible devices, upon which an observer might draw in identifying and interpreting forms of discourse in educational and other settings. What they have accomplished would not seem to be upset if the formal framework, including the derivations from the maxims of Grice, were not treated as a logical model, but a framework of descriptive dimensions. Insofar as the model can serve in an explanatory way, as Brown and Levinson intend, it seems able to serve as a source of explanation for the presence of devices and dimensions, but not as an explanation of the organization of devices and the significance of dimensions in particular settings and societies. The force of social structure and cultural orientation is stronger than allowed by them, and the consequences of the insertion of specific forms of utterance in discourse sequences not addressed.

I will say something about the possible context for the appeal of a model such as Brown and Levinson advance at the present time shortly. Let me address their own concern for it briefly here. They consider that the detailed parallelisms they find across the three languages studied (English, Tzeltal, Tamil) could arise independently, from rational adjustments to simple constraints (the face wants), presumably of an ethological origin (that is, something built into the human condition as part of human biologically given nature), and then become normatively stabilized within cultures. It is important to them to stress throughout the likely processes of a rational actor. In the end this seems to entail a deterministic model of actors. No matter how much persons may choose among
alternative strategies, and develop specific weightings of general types of imposition; no matter how much something of rational and ethological origin may become normatively stabilized; explanation in terms of a design historically created by the members of a continuing community is not permitted. One is not to speak in terms of, say, Navajo culture or of Navajo norms as an explanatory basis. One is not to invoke a specifically Navajo, or American Indian, configuration and distinctive weight to the dimensions of social distance, 'power', and imposition. (As pointed out above, they omit to mention culturally-specific weight of imposition in the passage in which they choose the prospect of explanation in terms of culturally-external relationships of distance and power.)

Once such a model allows, as it must, for normative stabilization, however, such as that of the reciprocal relations between nobles and griots among the Wolof of Senegal, it would seem to have given room for what it seeks to exclude. Different patterns of use of the strategies of politeness may become normatively stabilized in different communities. The current, active basis for choice and interpretation of strategies in communities may be stable norms. The model of rational action, including its use of Grice's maxims, would have the status of an ultimately historical or evolutionary origin. Ontogeny need not recapitulate phylogeny. Just as a reconstructed model of the grammar of the parent language of a family of languages may provide a reference point to which all the features of the descendents can be traced, but not an adequate model of the way those features are organized in existing languages, so with a rational reconstruction of politeness. It may explain the origin of similarities but not the patterning of difference.

If this analogy is correct, then the difference between speaking of normative stabilization among the Navajo of one among a set of universal possibilities, and speaking of Navajo culture or Navajo norms, seems simply terminological. The relationship between the set of people and general human nature seems the same in either case. One still has to use the modifier, 'Navajo'.
Ideals and perfections. The 'philosophically' grounded approaches that have been considered seem each to involve a tacit ideal image of discourse. Each implies perhaps a 'representative anecdote' or two, to use a term of Kenneth Burke, as the story from which it starts. It may be helpful to consider these together.

Bernstein's successive analyses of 'elaborated' and 'restricted' coding seem always to involve a contrast between a dimension on which many choices can be made, and a dimension on which few choices can be made. The nature of the choices may be many or few options in vocabulary, in syntactic sequence, in discretion as to role, in the classification of what is taught, in the organization or framing of how it is taught. His thought appears constantly to revolve around this contrast, many choices vs. few. Bernstein can be alert to ways in which the pole of many choices may be deceptively preferable, and he has sometimes been eloquent on the values and meaningfulness of the regional and working class modes of life, evoked by his concept of 'restricted code'. Overall, however, he would seem to come down on the side of the greater range of choices. It is only through the 'elaborated' code, and its capacity for metalanguage, for talk about talk, that the appearances of things can be analyzed, and codes, and the part they play in maintaining the existing order, themselves transformed.

Garfinkel can be said to reject the 'restricted' code of standard sociology, its stable categories of status, rank, gender, event structure, and the like, in favor of the infinite range of choices of social action as always contingent accomplishment of order. Pushed to the end, his view would seem to say that not only does a correct view show fixed social order to be an illusion, any appearance of social order at all is something constituted by participants as they go along, although they may not realize this to be the case.

Grice might be said to posit an original garden of discourse in which cooperation between speaker and hearer can be taken for granted, and propositions and information available without the
fig-leaves of other motives. Propositional clarity is a starting point from which other motives are taken to be departures. Brown and Levinson would seem to incorporate this starting point as well, as would seem also to be the case with Searle’s analysis of speech acts, where the relation of words to world is the fundamental consideration.

It is hard to define precisely a common basis for these diverse lines of work, but they seem to me to have in common a certain orientation. The worlds in which persons live and talk are secondary, not primary; insofar as these worlds have distinctive characteristics, these characteristics are departures, violations, limitations, not constitutive of order; discourse is to be analyzed in terms of a speaker (and hearer) freely placed to relate words and world, and to each other, on the basis of a few universal principles.

There seem to me two things crucially wrong with such an orientation. First, as discussed above, the sense of universal application invites an invisible ethnocentrism. Ways of life, emergent configurations of meaning in particular settings, are given little weight or positive value. Most fundamental of all; it is not considered that history and adaptation may have led a particular group so to organize their modes of discourse as to make the most appropriate account one which starts from some other assumption about the relations between speakers and hearers than that of a simplified universal model. The existence within different communities of distinctive ideal models and representative anecdotes of children acquiring language, adults using language appropriately and well, does not come into view (except in Bernstein). Mostly there is lacking a conception of totality, or configuration, or, alternatively, emergent pattern, as possibly defining the vantage point from which discourse in a particular place could best be analyzed and explained. Discourse (again with the partial exception of Bernstein) is seen in terms of a single actor, not in terms of participants in an on-going way of life.
A relevant example is M. Rosaldo’s account of the subtle oratory in the handling of disputes among the Ilongot of the Philippines. Indirectness is an essential ingredient, partly to allow for the feelings of the parties addressed, partly to maintain order insofar as past grievances and claims are indicated. In recent years some Ilongot have gone away from the traditional life and returned as administrators for government outside. Such administrators may use a plain style, not the traditional allusiveness. This style is experienced as harsh and authoritarian by traditional Ilongot. So much fits the Brown and Levinson model of negative politeness, no doubt. But Rosaldo goes on to compare the plain style of the new administrators with the advocacy of a plain style among English scientists in the late seventeenth century. In that context the contrasting style, more allusive and figurative, was seen as an obstacle to knowledge, a means of concealment perhaps, a cloak for traditional authority and privilege, as against the ideal of opening knowledge plainly to demonstration and communication to all. This view might be seen as somewhat conforming to Brown and Levinson’s model of negative politeness as well: where maximum efficiency is important, and this is mutually known, no face redress is necessary; one can be bald on record. For the scientists, the plain style would contribute to mutual identification, whereas for the traditional Ilongot, its use by administrators showed power without deference. Yet very likely, among the Ilongot administrators, there was a contribution to mutual identification by the sharing in the use of the new style. In English society, the scientific plain style was not without some connotation of power without deference in relation to others outside the scientific community, and perceived as such. And in both cases, over time, the introduced style would become the normal way of doing something without necessarily evoking either connotation. It would be less clearly felt to be addressed.
Such considerations make these universalistic accounts very much in the same boat as the ideas associated with Whorf, strangely enough. Yes, one can and may believe that a particular configuration in the usage of a language, a fashion of speaking, a prevailing mode of politeness, came to be chosen, was selected by members of a community over time. Given the existence of the mode of discourse at the present time, however, and no other information, one can not say what significance it has for one who uses it. The Navajo of a monolingual may show an emphasis on meanings and verbal choices having to do with motion and shape. One can well conclude that over time Navajo speakers have chosen to report experience consistently with attention to such meanings. How else could the meanings have become embedded in the obligatory patterns of the language, so that to speak the language correctly is to be forced to employ them? But what of the Navajo of a multilingual? What of the Navajo of someone who learned the language as an adult? The grammatical patterns may be the same in the speech of all, but the inferences that can be made to the cognitive consequences for each are not obviously the same. The obligatory grammatical patterns may most likely be most involved the consciousness of the monolingual who acquired them as sole means of verbal expression as a child, and least, most likely, in the mind of the multilingual adult who came to the language late.

Such considerations apply to patterns of discourse generally, whether coding orientations, speech acts, politeness, contingent accomplishments, or other considerations are involved. The same behaviors, the same verbal conduct, may have different implications for different actors. The repertoires of individuals may differ in a given language and in a given range of discourse. The context of acquisition may have been different. What is a meaningful choice for one person may be the only way another has of defining anything of the kind at all. It makes little sense to refer to a general model of types of strategy, if sometimes some people are not able to choose among those types, having only one
or two available.

Of course the model may be used to explain the choice that a community appears to have made historically. Positive-politeness is focussed upon here, negative politeness there, for example. The crucial difficulty for the interpretation of occurring behavior, as in a school, is that the relation between convention and choice is constantly subject to modification and dislocation. Depending on what has happened in that regard, the location of the relevant information in discourse may change. If daily greetings become stereotyped, so that everyone in the community uses the same set of formulae, that does not mean that the exchange of greetings lacks information about current social relationships. The formulae may be evidence only of past choices, but the intonation and mode of articulation of one and the same greetings may be a significant clue to the shifting political alignments of the group.

In sum, simple models of rational actors and participants in discourse, while seeming to clarify experience, actually may obscure and mystify it. Their apparent power invites one to insert observations into their categories; to assign the motivations they allow to observed patterns; to look no further. Their power, however, seems to be that of a yin to a yang. Rational choice, propositional clarity, clear turn taking and the like are not models from which to predict the movement of participant-particles, but half of a dialectic between convention and choice.

The second thing crucially wrong with the tendency of these models seems to me to be the respect in which they appear to express the outlook of academic intellectuals. I can only speculate on limited information, but it appears to me that the world in which academics write is one in which the overriding consideration is freedom of choice, freedom from structural constraint, whereas for many of the people in our communities, whose children and schooling one seeks to assist, the overriding consideration is security. The life-chances of children are difficult today, and the first concern of many
parents and schools is that the right choices be made. There is concern that the children find some place at all in an ordered society, rather than drop out of school, take up drugs, become members of street gangs, and the like. How to find order and security amidst circumstances that are often disruptive is the great concern.

Against this background it seems strange to read scholars and students of literary discourse who congratulate themselves on the liberating consequences of undermining the sense of order and structure in literary works. From their standpoint, often enough, the appearance of plot and pattern in a novel, say, must be unmasked, 'deconstructed', because it is a mask for traditional authority. The sense of freedom that is gained, however, seems entirely limited to themselves. It is not apparent that it is any gain for the ordinary people whose name the politics of such work may invoke.

Again, it seems inadequate to invoke the psychoanalytic analogue of distorted communication, as is done by the brilliant German social theorist, Jurgen Habermas. According to Habermas, discourse should be defined as that verbal interaction in which the ideal of free exchange is realized. Its goal is the working through of a topic or problem to consensus. Such working through should not be interfered with by the denying of anyone a turn or the imposition of an appeal to authority. Furthermore, writes Habermas, this discourse ideal is implicit in all speech. All speech carries in ideal intention such a sphere of free discourse.

Such a conception has philosophical problems, of course, since it seems to leave behind entirely the fit of words to the world as a criterion of truth, and to substitute consensus, which could easily be a truth by community declaration. The great problem here is that it seems entirely to reduce the human motives for discourse to consensus. The principle has power indeed, when used to criticize structures of authority as constraints on free discussion and open solution of problems.
It proposes that societies, like psychiatric patients, have repressed or concealed from themselves portions of what they have experienced and know, and that their health depends upon bringing that experience and knowledge to light. We can perhaps all think of circumstances to which we would like to apply that canon. At the same time the ideal is an impossible one to posit as underlying societies. There simply are many occasions in which the accomplishment of a task or the satisfaction of a taste require giving the lead or the floor to one or a few people. One can understand Habermas' desire to find in discourse a principle that can provide for systematic critique of society. He comes from the theoretical Marxist tradition associated with the Frankfurt school, a group of major scholars and thinkers who took the Marxist tradition as a reference point, but went their own ways in applying it to the mid-twentieth century, often the way of pessimism. The nineteenth century Marxist movement had a millenary hope that history was on their side and revolution not long to await, not unlike the Christians of the first century. When the First World War found socialists killing each other, rather than uniting, and economic collapse and depression brought fascism, rather than communism, to major countries, the hopes placed in the capitalist system to produce a proletariat to replace it seemed less and less grounded. To be sure, since the Second World War, one has seen something of that faith revived in connection with countries of the Third World, such as China. But for Europeans, it was clear that the economic order was not, however troubled, inevitably bringing its own replacement. Such considerations turned the minds of many thinkers to cultural factors that had been relatively neglected by Marx in his focus on the economic order and social structure. In Italy Antonio Gramsci, a martyr to Mussolini's jails, formed in his prison notebooks a conception of 'cultural hegemony'. Crudely put, the conception was simply that the course of historical change depended not only on the economic order, but also on cultural beliefs and values. The institutions of the existing society
shaped and controlled the ideas and attitudes and incipient actions of people, not through direct exercise of economic or even political power, but through the dominance of available ideas.

Habermas' concern with 'discourse' and 'systematically distorted communication' fits within this search for a critical understanding of the cultural forces shaping stability and change. The attempt to root all discourse in the ideal of free exchange, however, seems misplaced. Selectively employed, such a criterion is indeed analogous to the liberal criterion of freedom of speech, and of essential value to a democratic society. Descriptively employed, however, such a criterion simply imposes a distortion of its own on the ways in which different sets of people have come to organize their speech.

In general, each of these ideals or representative anecdotes singles out as fundamental a partial truth. There are occasions of discourse that answer to each, and there are often occasions that do not. The approach of a scientific concern with discourse, as it relates to actual communities, schools and classrooms, must be to encompass the full range of what occurs. Sometimes what is found will fit a conception of elaborated coding, sometimes of restricted coding, sometimes of a pattern that cuts across the given categories. Sometimes what is found will show that the participants place a premium on contingent accomplishment of order, and other times that they seek out previously fixed structure that can be taken for granted. Sometimes discourse will take place within what can be regarded as a sphere of cooperation, and sometimes not. Sometimes the meanings of what occurs will be describable in terms of Searle-like speech acts, sometimes not (cf. Hirsch 1975). Sometimes the ideals or practices of a group will answer to the principle of free discourse, sometimes not. Sometimes the choices people make will appear to fit the choices analyzed and modeled by Brown and Levinson, sometimes not. The actual wants and goals of people are too complex to be assigned to any one of these categories or models.
It is Bernstein who stands out in this context, as having consistently articulated the existence of alternative ideals of discourse, organizing the means of the same named language in contrasting ways. And it is probably not by chance that the part of his work for which he has been most severely criticized is the part that has talked of a 'restricted' code.

Let me try to place the threads of consistency among these diverse approaches into a broader intellectual context, by considering what would be the case if they, and others, were to achieve their own goals. That will take us to the heart of the matter in one respect—the respect in which one can or cannot consider these prominent theories and models adequate bases for the 'applied' research of schools and classrooms.

There are many disputes and difficulties associated with each of the approaches, and much has been and no doubt will be written in the course of working them out. Rather than try to guess that one approach will win out over another, or choose one for whatever reason, let us ask the overriding question: Suppose the aims of an approach were perfectly achieved? What would we have?

It seems to me that the perfect accomplishment of the purposes of all three of the approaches so far discussed would not contribute much to the understanding of teaching and learning, in a way useful to educators in particular situations, however much might be gained in other respects.

Some approaches would provide a perfect knowledge of some aspect of the organization of the human mind. If there are educators who do not recognize the complexity and subtlety of the human mind, especially in its linguistic aspect, they should be told; but the means for doing so have been available for some time. Educators deal crucially with particular minds and differences among them.

Some approaches would provide a perfect model of those aspects of English that enter into linguistic discussion (notably
tending to exclude intonation). It seems inherent in the logic of argumentation in the development of such models to consider every theoretical possibility. Intense reflection on consciously imaginable examples and counter-examples appears to lead in the direction of a model of the language appropriate to an ideal speaker-listener, indeed, one to whom all the potentialities of the system were available. Such an omnipotent and omniscient user of language might also be honorable, polite and good, but remote from the working organization of language in a variety of particular minds. Intense reflection and conscious imagination of possibilities distort the object of study, if the object of study is the use of language in everyday situations, such as schools. On the one hand, none of us has the entire systemic potential of 'English' available. On the other hand, any of us may do things we are not aware of doing and can not always bring to mind. Observation of situated activity is essential.

Some approaches apply observation, but insist on restricting attention to a particular form of observational data, such as a videotape or a transcript. The work is often of great value, but participant observation in settings not open to camera or tape-recorder is necessary too.

Limitations such as those just reviewed seem to have in common a concern on the part of researchers--a very understandable concern--to do work that is considered scientific and significant by a group of peers. What is considered scientific and significant at a given time and in a given place is not entirely a function of the advance of knowledge. It is also partly a function of broad changes in climate of opinion and outlook, on the one hand, and the attraction of new technology, on the other. Both are powerful forces in American society, but one can hope to moderate their influence, channel it constructively.
In our present climate of opinion about what is rewarding as a finding in research, and about what is valuable as a goal for a discipline, we appear to be in the midst of a major change in the value placed on the individual instance. Such a change can be glimpsed behind the proliferation of terms for approaches and subfields, and the debates about methodology and philosophical perspective. There has been a liberal consciousness with each stage, but what is taken to be liberal, and liberating, has not remained the same.

In the early development of linguistics as a discipline, especially in the United States, great emphasis was placed upon the structure of a language, as against instances of speech. The goal of the new science was to discover the invariants of the code, the code underlying the message, the language underlying and making intelligible speech. The methodological inspiration and training of linguists drove toward the end of finding regularity underlying apparent physical variation. At the same time the liberal concern of many linguists with the languages of peoples such as the American Indians, both as evidence for the science of linguistics and as expressions of distinctive ways of life, involved a positive valuation for individuality at the level of a whole language, and a distrust of generalizations predicated of all languages. Linguists working with diverse languages had too often found in them pattern and structure that prevailing generalizations did not fit. The worth of the languages, and the peoples who spoke them, had too often been disparaged on the grounds of lack of structure or some lesser embodiment of a general structure. American anthropology and linguistics were shaped in a climate in which to find order in what ethnocentric perception had seen as a disorder was a progressive cause. Nor is some need for that impulse irrelevant still today.

The formative attitude of these generations can be summarized by a plus for positive evaluation, a minus for negative evaluation, in the following two respects:
A close reading of the times will find them much more complicated than the chart allows, but the chart does bring out clearly a dominant outlook.

The impact of Noam Chomsky on linguistics in the last twenty-five years did not change the left-hand side of the chart. The notions of 'language' and 'speech' (or 'la langue', and 'la parole' in French terminology) were replaced in his writing by 'competence' and 'performance', but the evaluation remained intact. 'Competence', defined as the underlying knowledge of his or her grammar on the part of an ideal speaker-listener, was good and the goal of linguistic research. 'Performance', comprising everything else: from behavioral manifestation to social activity, was either a negative distraction or an area whose examination was to be postponed until the study of competence was complete. The right-hand side of the chart, however, changed radically. The differences among languages in particular were held to be minor. The true goal of linguistic theory was what was true of language in general. And the expected findings of inquiry into what was true of language in general were to account for the rapid acquisition of competence in language by the developing child, and to provide a specification of a power unique to and within human nature. Universal linguistic structure radically distinguished human beings from any other creatures, and could not be explained as a derivative of general mental abilities; its organization was sufficiently unique to require explanation as innate.

One can see that the climate of opinion engendered by the potent influence of Noam Chomsky could be summarized in the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>language : speech</th>
<th>Language : languages (in general)</th>
<th>(in particular)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In neither of these orientations was the individual user of language singled out for attention. In the first orientation the patterning that could be attributed to the general culture or way of life was the dominant concern, as against individual differences. In the second orientation the ideal speaker-listener was by definition a perfect model of the language of the whole community. Even when anthropologists and sociologists attended for individuals as different in regard to personality, character, interest, role, status, and the like, they usually assumed that language was invariant and common to all. A sense of the invariance and systematicity of language was indeed an important part of the appeal of linguistics as a model to others.

The structure of the code that seemed a liberal accomplishment to several generations has come to seem an imposition, even an unreality, to many younger scholars today. What seemed something to discover is felt to be unwarranted. This orientation is increasingly widespread among sociologists and anthropologists. The work under the heading of 'ethnomethodology' began with the premise that accepted social categories were questionable, likely to be arbitrarily imposed in the coding of data, and not fundamental. What was fundamental was the human ability to make sense out of experience. Making sense was a contingent accomplishment, something accomplished from moment to moment. The rewarding outcome of inquiry was not to find structure beneath variation, but to find uniqueness where convention had expected structure. Regularity was expected, not in historically developed customs and norms, but in the relation between particular situations and general processes and practices of the human mind.

This orientation informs advanced work in the understanding of politeness in verbal interaction, the differentiation of reading groups in an elementary classroom, and much else. A great part of the work in linguistics in the analysis of conversation assumes that a few universal principles provide an adequate basis for interpretation of what is said in any language and culture.
This climate of opinion can be summarized in the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language (in general)</th>
<th>Language (in particular)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>speech</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In other words, what is sought and found rewarding is a particular instance to be explained in terms of a universal principle. Many linguists, to be sure, retain a concern with the structure of particular languages. This interest sometimes combines with an interest in process and individuating function that can be considered the emergence to a degree of an orientation that would answer to the following summary description:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language (in general)</th>
<th>Language (in particular)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>speech</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That is, the interest in language in general is retained, but is balanced by an interest in particularity as well. The focus is on what languages of a certain type of grammatical structure may have in common, and the respect in which a particular language may exemplify a particular possibility or development within the type. And speech is seen as a source of what becomes coded in grammar, dialectically interacting with it.

Scholars may speak in terms of 'linguistics', as if it were a single entity, but educators should know that orientations of all four kinds still exist in linguistic work. The kind of research that is done on teaching and learning will be partly a function, not of the classroom, but of what it is rewarding for an aspiring or committed scholar to find.

Alongside linguistics proper, there is a parallel development in fields which study language in ways of relevance to education. Just as linguistics for some time focused mainly on the structure of grammar, setting aside speech, so folklorists and anthropologists, studying verbal behavior of valued kinds in communities, focused upon the structure of genres and plots.
rituals, as against the variation of individual performances. The famous work of Claude Levi-Strauss on myth carries this tendency to its perfection, as it were, just as the famous work of Noam Chomsky carries the tendency to its perfection in language as such. Each seeks a universal underlying structure that is unaffected by individuals and particular ways of life. During the past decade or two, however, there has grown up in folklore and anthropology a considerable interest in the study of the performance of texts, rituals, and other behaviors as positive accomplishments. One could say that the view of particular cases as simply instances was replaced by a view of them as instantiations. The patterning of interest was not simply some underlying code of which the observed behavior might be a more or less imperfect manifestation. The patterning of interest became the complex organization of the performance, to which a variety of underlying codes might partially contribute. Complex organization was sought as something emergent above the codes underlying.

All these orientations can be said to be concerned with the place of individuation, the realization of generic possibility, in terms of the relation between a structure and instances of structure. The orientations differ in the attitude toward the two poles, both at the level of code in relation to message-form, and at the level of the nature of a kind of code in general in relation to particular codes. Notice, incidentally, that the dialectical logic of inquiry advocated by the linguist Kenneth Pike applies equally to both levels. Pike formulated the logic in terms of the relation between codes in general and particular codes, under the labels 'emic' and 'etic'. An initial frame of reference is necessary as a way of observing and describing what is found. Such a frame depends upon the generalizations and known possibilities already available in the field of study. The goal is to discover the pattern or structure implicit in the given case. The features, elements, relationships, found to
obtain should be demonstrable within the case itself. Once these 'emic' findings are available, they may become the basis for an extension or revision of the 'etic' foundation of further studies and the general subject. Pike devised the terms 'emic' and 'etic' from the endings of the terms 'phonemic' and 'phonetic', which have had just such a relationship in the study of the sound systems of languages. Discussion of the notions in anthropology and the social sciences has usually been at the same level: individual case vis-a-vis general subject. The experience of field workers and others studying particular cases is describable in the same terms. A provisional formulation may be made as to the patterning that exists. New instances are observed, whose internal character is determined. These new instances affect the provisional formulation, becoming the basis for its extension or revision. In other words, the researcher, present at a particular occasion, can not but describe it in terms of whatever general understandings of such occasions he or she has reached. He or she has a responsibility, however, not to assume automatically that the particular occasion is simply another instance of an already known structure. He or she has the obligation to attend to what may be particular to it. Its 'emic' particularities, though seeming exceptions to the researcher's own generalizations about the given case, may deepen what is understood about the case. It is when this iterative process is found unrewarding that one can decide that one has a warranted general analysis.

The notion of individuation, then, can usefully illuminate all levels of study. The linguistic application has its analogue in education. The public tends to talk in terms of 'the' public school, 'the' high school, and the like. Research is sometimes valued for its apparent contribution to the understanding of schools in general, sometimes for its contribution to the understanding of particular schools. Teachers and researchers may take an interest in an instance of behavior only insofar as it seems evidence of an underlying
structure; or they may take an interest in what appears unique or unusual.

For the notion of individuation to be fully useful, however, in education as in the study of discourse, it needs to be applied to the study of the individual. That is indeed its point of origin. I owe all these reflections to the stimulation of a discussion with Kenneth Burke on the principle of individuation in relation to language and the body. For Burke, language is something that is shared by people; and that provides for something in common in the symbolic realm. It belongs, in his terms, to the realm that is distinctively human, the realm of action. Any physical entity, such as a body, is in and of itself part of the realm of motion, sheer nature, lacking symbolicity. And yet it is the intersection of the two that provides for the individual. The notion of pain is part of the language and shared. Pain as an experience is the experience of particular bodies. Burke's view is like that of St. Thomas Aquinas, as he recognizes, for whom "matter" was the principle by which "form" was individuated. It has connect ons, as he points out, with the Marx of The German Ideology, who sought to ground social theory in "the real living individuals themselves, as they are in actual life...consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness. And one can see that physical reality, material reality, is the basis of individuation in the relation between code and message, text and performance, as previously discussed.

The great limitation of orientations to language and discourse throughout the recent history of linguistics can be said to be their lack of a principle of individuation that reached to the living individual and the living performance. Attitudes revolved around the relation between language in general and particular languages; speech itself, as a material reality, was subordinated, seen as lacking structure or as mere externality. Individuals were considered in terms of their common knowledge of a language, and their presumed common membership in a speech community. Language and community tended to be...
treated as equivalent. It is only in the last two decades with
the close empirical study of variation in actual speech, as
part of the study of on-going change in language, by Labov
and others, that the relation between individuals and
speech community has become open to empirical analysis in
large urban centers. Debate rages as to the way in which the
relationship is to be adequately conceived; but it is the empirical
observation of instances of speech on the part of individuals
that permits the question to be at last addressed.

The great limitation of what has been said so far is
that the principle of individuation, and the idea of the instance
or individual, has been mostly considered as the opposite of
patterning. Individuation has been considered as limitation to
generality, as variation in relation to structure. Only in
the case of the study of performance was it noted that the
individual case could be the locus of a complex organization of
its own. To complete the picture, we need now to consider
the equivalent aspect of the individual. The individual too
can be seen as the locus of the realization of complex
patterning. Indeed, in ordinary life we commonly speak of
such things as personality, character, style, and in
literature, of personal voice. The great limitation of all
linguistics is that it has found no way to reach to the
recognition of personal voice. The individual figures either
as surrogate for what is the same in all individuals, or as
a locus of variation. Consistency, pattern, style are not
sought or regarded as rewarding. But just as a single
performance can be seen as more than an instance, rather as
an accomplishment, an instantiation, so can an individual's
ability and use of language. One way to think of a speech community
is as a distribution or organization of features of pronunciation,
grammar and vocabulary, according to certain boundaries and
proportions. Another way to think of a speech community is as
a configuration of voices. In planning with regard to language,
it does not make too much sense to be for or against a certain
distribution of features of pronunciation, grammar and vocabulary,
in and of themselves. Behind strong emotions about such things lies, I think, an association of them with kinds of person. And it does make sense to think of the future of a community as having or lacking, being rich or poor, in certain kinds of voice.

The notion of individuation, applied to the relation between language and person, on the one hand, and to the relation between code and message, on the other, is essential, I think, if one is to make sense in linguistic terms of educational realities. The realization of the potential power of a language, of the systematic grammar implicit in a language, is so great that it is difficult for linguists to deal with any suggestion of its limitation in individuals. In this respect all individuals are to be thought of as equivalent instantiations of the general powers of language. This relationship is unwittingly confused, I think, with another, the relation between grammar and message. If it is suggested that an individual's verbal performance is limited, the first thought is that the particular circumstances may have inhibited performance, or certainly not allowed for the full range of what the individual might be able to do with his or her linguistic capacity. That is a liberal point, and a valid point. It is the point of William Labov's well known discussion of Black English, in which he shows that great wit and logic can be found in its use, and that children who are reticent in experimental settings with white investigators may be far more open and talkative in settings with black investigators. Similarly, Susan Philips showed that the apparent shyness of Indian children from Warm Springs reservation in classrooms dominated by white teachers was a function of the type of 'participant structure' in which talk was expected. The more the participant structure was like the structures of the Indian way of life, the more verbal the Indian children became.

It remains the case that some individuals may have different potentials than others in verbal ability. The fact that any individual's 'underlying' ability may exceed what a particular event discloses does not imply that all underlying abilities are
the same. If one assumes that the only relationship of importance is between general language ability and particular occasions, it may seem reasonable that general language ability will develop in an equivalent way. If, however, one grants that there exist enduring configurations of norms, practices, and types of personality, which may govern access to verbal experience differentially for individuals, then one would expect what indeed we experience in everyday life. Differences in individual native ability interact with differences in access and opportunity to yield a very varied distribution of levels and kinds of ability with language.

The difference between much of the orientation of linguistic thinking and the facts of education is almost ludicrous. The one tends to deal with an imagined world of equivalent individuals. The other addresses and to some extent produces individual differences.

These considerations bring us again to the ethnographic approach.

(4) The ethnographic approach is not a single thing, if one takes the term to cover the activities of all those who practice ethnography, whether as anthropologists, folklorists, educators, sociologists, or otherwise. I will understand the notion of ethnographic approach here in the sense in which it has been discussed in my recent book (Hymes 1980), and sketched in the first part of this report. My main concern here is to relate ethnographic practice to discourse, especially in terms of an adequate framework for the full context of discourse in education, and in terms of the increasing focus of other work on discourse on the question of shared knowledge.
The leading trend in discourse analysis of relevance to educational settings has the properties singled out by Corsaro (1981: 53) in his helpful review of discourse analysis models. All the models share the importance of studying actual discourse in natural settings; all also stress the importance of social context and of the abilities of participants to adapt to contextual features and also to create and transform contextual features of discourse events; all recognize that the information offered and received in discourse is found at more than one level of the interaction, whether linguistic or behavioral.

Within the empirical study of discourse itself there is a logic of a sort that forces analysts away from the assumptions of formal linguistics. Analysis cannot stay with linguistic features alone, but must come to grips with the understandings and expectations that participants bring to discourse. In so coming to grips, analysts find it difficult to proceed on an assumption of shared, already given knowledge among participants in terms of which what is said is understood. The representative anecdote, as it were, of formal linguistics, the ideal speaker-listener representative of a uniform speech community, recedes from view. This course brings empirical study of discourse into the world of ethnography, but not always to a recognition that that is where one has arrived.

Let me review briefly some of the work that reflects this development, before suggesting a dimension specifically ethnographic in the anthropological sense.

Recent discussion of shared knowledge in the literature of formal linguistics, pragmatics and cognitive psychology seems unaware of a long history of definition and discussion of the notion of culture in terms of shared knowledge in the course of this century in anthropology, and unaware of the centrality to anthropological studies of meaning, cognitive anthropology and general conceptions of ethnography itself since Ward Goodenough's statement in 1957 of the goal of ethnography as understanding of what a member of culture
needed to know to participate in it. The current trend appears headed into territory fairly well mapped already by discussion and debate of Goodenough's criterion.

Early in the development of sociolinguistics there was consideration of the range of background knowledge relevant to participants' interpretation of discourse (Kjolseht 1972). Much linguistic discussion has been concerned with what aspects of knowledge could properly or best be included in what sector of a grammar, of a semantic description, and of general account of the abilities of speakers. The major tendency has been to set aside many aspects of knowledge, as not in principle capable of being formulated within a model of language. This view has held particularly for specific, conventional forms of knowledge restricted to a particular society or culture. Recently, in a clear and penetrating book, Gazdar (1979) has addressed this problem. His conception of pragmatics is that it deals with those aspects of the meaning of utterances which cannot be accounted for by straightforward reference to the truth conditions of the sentences uttered.

"Put crudely: PRAGMATICS = MEANING - TRUTH CONDITIONS" (p. 2).

Gazdar's purpose is to present a formal system that tells us what an utterance implicates and presupposes. (It was Gazdar who advised Brown and Levinson that 'metaphorical urgency' in their formal model would allow any counter-example to be explained away). Discussing Grice's maxims (ch. 3), Gazdar find difficulty in formalizing them—the maxim having to do with 'relevance', for example, and because of this, concludes that parts of Grice's effort are probably unusable by linguists at present, while the usable parts have to be defined so restrictively that much of their potential power and generality is lost. For Gazdar, 'not to stick to formalist methodology in an area like this can only lead out of linguistics and into literary criticism' (54).
Accepting Keenan's account of Malagasy speakers, Gazdar concludes that the generalized conversational implicatures of Grice might better be regarded as conventional (relative to a culture), than as generalized conversational principles (that is, inherent in the nature of human conversation anywhere) (54-5).

Together, these statements seem representative of the dilemma and choice made by many formal linguists, as the study of discourse leads out into the study of cultures. The criteria of the field of work require adhering to the formal account, even if the result is irrelevance to political conjunctures and the situations of children in schools, among others. There seems as well something of a charitable double standard. Ethnography is accepted in other cultures, but our own is taken as directly available to us, and only logic as needed. (On the limitations of this view, see Silverstein 1977, 1981). But what standing would one give to a finding that a group within American society, say, systematically disregarded, or even denied, implications and presuppositions arrived at in the course of formal analysis, or at least did so in certain contexts. There is comparative evidence that reasoning in a logical framework must itself be considered one genre among others, variably distributed in space and time. (Scribner 1979: 241). It is possible that a focus on implicature and presupposition leads in part to the creation of relationships, at least in the consciousness of analysts, adding these relations to those already present in a larger community? If a set of ordinary speakers were found not to accept logical findings or to who evidence of sharing them, would they simply be wrong? Possibly so some of the time. Their conduct might imply inescapably assumptions of which they are unaware. But possibly there are various dialects of implicature and presupposition, just as there are of syntax and phonology, such that field work is needed to identify and describe them.
Sometimes one suspects simply a naivete about culture and society, a lack of sociological imagination (as in the proposals of Bach and Harnish 1979, reviewed by myself in Language in Society 10: 270-4 (1981). But awareness of cultural diversity in these regards probably motivates some of the turn to principles of interpretation, available to human beings in interaction, and general beyond specific cultural knowledge and experience. The effect of Sperber and Wilson's rejection of Grice's maxims in favor of a single principle of maximal relevance seems along these lines (1982). Sperber and Wilson note that comprehension is a function of the context, and that some recent work suggests that the relevant context involved in the comprehension of an utterance is restricted to the mutual knowledge, beliefs and suppositions of speaker and hearer, where mutual knowledge is knowledge that is not only shared, but known to be shared, and known to be known to be shared, and so on. On this approach, they point out, the identification of mutual knowledge is a major factor in every aspect of comprehension, and one of the most urgent goals of pragmatic theory is to explain how it is achieved.

Such a sense of goal is certainly evident in some of the very best of current work, as in Prince (1981), which moves from precitability in terms of linguistic context within the sentence, to saliency, to 'shared knowledge' as a necessary wider frame within which to understand what is given and what is new in the information conveyed in language. Prince discards the debated term 'shared knowledge' in favor of 'assumed familiarity', partly because it does not assume symmetry in what is assumed. McCawley (1981) moves in a similar direction, regarding pragmatic presupposition as based on what the speaker and addressee take to be shared at the given point in the discourse; 'shared' is thus relevant to a particular context. Gumperz' work on conversational inferencing has a similar character, as we have seen (1977, 1978). Kreckel (1981: 25-32) brings a valuable discussion to this issue in
the course of an important empirical study, when she speaks of conceptual convergence among speakers. Individuals may have common knowledge, knowledge in common, without having met, because of parallels in their experiences and interests. Such separately acquired knowledge is held to be significantly distinct from knowledge mutually acquired through interaction. The degree of conceptual convergence among persons is dependent in part on past mutual interaction, and also on the factor of shared perspective, defined as the desire to participate or share in future activities. The greater the degree of background knowledge, however acquired, and of shared perspective, the greater the degree of conceptual convergence that can come about through mutual interaction.

This perspective brings out the respect in which what is shared as a context and basis for understanding discourse may be negotiated in the course of discourse itself. Such negotiation would involve the generic ways of making sense and order in the world attended to by ethnomethodology along Garfinkel's lines, but it would also involve ways specific to a set of people and a setting. And given a view of such negotiation as including convergence, one can integrate recognition of the contingent, active process with recognition of the existence of stable patterns, continuing perspectives, ways of doing and understanding things that emerge and persist. Such an integration is necessary to a foundation for the relevance of discourse to educational settings. A focus on the contingent, negotiated aspect of discourse alone would allow for educators to make a difference, but not to make a difference that could last. Process and pattern are two sides of the same coin in this respect. That there is more than pre-existing pattern allows for making a difference through what one understands, interprets, and does. That there is more than sheer process allows for making differences into accomplishments.
It is this double recognition that brings a fully ethnographic perspective to the study of discourse in educational settings. Ethnography entails close observation of actual behavior in natural settings. It entails attention to what persons say about their behavior, and, indeed, uses whatever information may help make sense of a way of doing things. Within the anthropological tradition, however, ethnography goes together with 'ethnology', the comparative analysis of different ways of doing things (cf. Hymes 1980: 119-125). The great growth of empirical work in discourse today often joins consideration of speech acts with consideration of interaction (cf. Edmondson 1981, Kreckel 1981, Corsaro 1981, and others). It begins to pay needed attention to intonation and the interrelations of all levels of communicative conduct (cf. Kreckel 1981, for her own work and other work discussed). Such empirical work, however, may limit itself to conversation as some sort of naturally given unit, not realizing that verbal conduct is always relative to a local set of genres and modes of conduct. Such empirical work may seek to go directly to underlying universal models and principles, failing to pause to consider persistent or emergent local patterns. In these respects, much current work in the analysis of discourse recognizes only two of the three moments, or aspects, of the dialectic of discourse in human life. It recognizes the perspective of shared, given patterning, pre-existing interaction. It recognizes the perspective of contingent, negotiated interpretation of what occurs in interaction. It does not usually recognize the perspective of pattern emerging from interaction.

Such a perspective of three moments in the unending relation between pattern and process is coming to the fore again in linguistic proper, where some students of syntax seek to relate its crystallized regularities to the still optional patterning of discourse beyond the sentence. What is needed is to recognize that codification of regularity occurs in respect, not only to syntax, but also to conduct.
I see no way of choosing one among the various sets of terms and categories emerging in current empirical work. For the most part, one can regard these proposals as potentially useful indications of devices that may be relevant in a given case. It would be a mistake to accept any single set of terms or descriptions as an a priori coding scheme.

One does indeed need sensitivity to such terms and categories, for one cannot see what is going on in discourse without some framework sufficiently fine to capture linguistic and interactional detail. The point, of course, is to validate the relevance of the noticed detail in the case in question.

As an aid to the study of discourse in classrooms and other educational settings, the general framework proposed by myself some years ago may still be useful. It perhaps has the value, as a heuristic device, of being self-evidently general, comprising rubrics which specific investigation must make concrete. This framework distinguishes settings, as physical environments, and scenes, as culturally defined contexts; participants; ends in view and ends as outcomes; the sequence of action itself, including both content and form; the key in which activity is done; the instrumentalities employed, both codes and channels; the norms of interaction and the norms of interpretation that pertain; and the genres in terms of which what is done goes on. This broad framework, so summarized, can be given the acronym S-P-E-A-K-I-N-G.

In any given case, of course, everything depends upon discovering which dimensions are relevant and active. Not all will be all the time. One definition of context would be to take 'context' as those dimensions are taken as given at a given point. The other dimension or dimensions would be the location of information in the sense that choice was occurring. One can readily see that choice could be operative for any one of the dimensions while the others were held constant. This place or that? this kind of occasion or that? these participants (guests, onlookers, speakers, audience, etc.) or those? this purpose or that purpose? this sequence of actions or that? this key
or that (serious or mock, inviting or discouraging, etc.); this channel or that (write, phone, meet to talk)? this code or that? (formal or informal style, English or Spanish, etc.) this norm or that (formal or informal manner, strict or free, as evidence or entertainment, etc); this genre or that (conversation, monologue, hint or passing remark, etc.).

A characteristic of different occasions may well lie in just which of the dimensions are in view, are negotiable, even are in conflict. Where one can make a difference, through interpretation and process, may sometimes be in one dimension only or one dimension most easily.

All that has been said about the study of discourse points to the conclusion that the relevant ingredients cannot be assumed to be known in advance. This conclusion applies to the notion of language itself, and its formal analysis in linguistics. Language, or a language such as the English language, cannot be taken as a monolithic entity, inserted into relations with factors outside itself. Linguistics that studies language in such a way cannot provide an adequate foundation for the study of discourse in actual settings. One needs to recognize that only some of the features of language may be the relevant ones in a given context. The essential perspective on linguistic features may be that of style. When one recognizes someone as speaking formally or informally, elegantly or crudely, appropriately or inappropriately in relation to some context, the set of features that inform the judgment often will consist of features from several different levels of language as formally studied. Something of pronunciation, something of grammatical construction, something of lexical choice, together with matters of intonation, and matters of communicative conduct otherwise, such as gesture and posture, will likely be involved. The formal study of linguistics today offers little opportunity to acquire training in the study of language from such a perspective. Courses which teach one to recognize specific features of sound, grammar, syntax and the like normally assume that the context in which the relationships of such features will be studied is
that of a given language or a formal model of language. The study of discourse in educational and other settings, however, requires that one be able to recognize specific features of language and be able to discover their relationships to kinds of participants, roles and statuses, kinds of event and activity, kinds of setting, and the like. One needs to be able to relate styles to contexts.

It is important for those who wish to see the study of discourse in educational settings prosper to do whatever they can to encourage the provision of training of the latter kind. The growth of attention to language in institutional settings of all kinds may help. We need to create a different kind of linguistics, a kind in which the levels of language usually studied are seen as resources, not as ends in themselves. Such a kind of linguistics would address grammar at the level of discourse. It might distinguish indeed between resource grammar and discourse grammar, the former relating features of language to each other, and the latter relating features of language to participants, scenes, and the other dimensions of speaking, and of all use of language. Such a perspective would be consistent with a view of languages themselves as selections and groupings among the possibilities of language in general, shaped variously over time in different communities, and showing different internal relationships among their levels, just as languages. Because such a perspective on languages themselves contributes to breaking away from the hold of formal linguistics in its present guise on the study of discourse, I turn to it in a final section.
The great impetus to formal models in linguistics came from the success of Noam Chomsky in associating such models with the prospect of discovering fundamental principles of mind and an explanation for the rapid acquisition of language by the child. Chomsky's impact came in the context of a previous development of models by the linguists now often called 'neo-Bloomfieldians' or 'structuralists'. Setting aside questions of the appropriateness of those labels, it is clear that the generation in question, working in the 1940s and 1950s, was especially concerned to relate two levels of structure, those of phonology and of morphology (the make-up of words) to each other. Structure was often understood as mediating between two spheres outside of language proper. Beyond phonology was the undifferentiated sphere of sounds, or phonetics; beyond morphology and the rest of grammar was the infinite sphere of possible meanings. The structure of language related sounds to meanings, meanings to sounds, giving their relation form, through discrete qualitatively defined units and their patterns of distribution relative to each other.

Chomsky entered the scene at a time when syntax was coming to the fore, and made syntax central to a model of language. One started there, and specified how syntactic units and relations were mapped into sound, on the one hand, and given semantic interpretation, on the other. After a time some of his students sought to make semantics a starting point from which to proceed to syntax, morphology, and phonology. For a time debate went on in a period in which the discovery of the one right model, or nearly right model, seemed within reach. The idea that there might be more than one perspective from which to describe the organization of linguistic elements, or more than one basic purpose for such description, was rejected by most. Together with the focus of the majority went an implicit assumption that the core of language could be studied in terms of a single function, which can be roughly designated 'semantic' or 'referential' meaning.
In recent years the work of formal investigation has seen a proliferation of alternative models. Montagu grammar has gained a number of adherents; there continue to be adherents to 'stratificational grammar', as developed by Lamb and others; there are models derived from the work of Michael Halliday; non-transformational grammars have been proposed by Richard Hudson, Michael Kac, and others; Ronald Langacker has proposed a different model which he calls 'space' grammar; and so on. Within the work of Chomsky himself there has been continuous revision and change of the role of the transformational relations which his work first made famous and central.

Along with this development there has come increased attention to specific aspects of grammar, such as grammatical relations that apply to many, but not all languages: ergativity, transitivity, and other ways of structuring the relation between participants in the events reported by speech; types of basic word order; categories of the verb, such as aspect; case-relations; and so on. All this takes into account a world of differences among languages, while seeking recurrent relationships. Differences among languages that can be ordered in relation to each other and related to a few underlying types, or put on a single scale, are sought. In many ways this work is a rediscovery of the interests and perspective of Franz Boas and Edward Sapir, whose studies of American Indian languages were directed toward discovery and comparison of types.

Within the study of discourse and grammar there is renewed attention as well to the possibility that some aspects of a grammar may reflect communicative situations and needs. Such attention opens up consideration of grammatical structure in relation to a multiplicity of functions. Such a functional perspective has always been available in the traditions of linguistics in this century, through the work of the Prague School, and others, but peripheral in linguistics in the United States.

All these developments move away from a conception of a language as a monolithic structure, tightly constrained from level to level in terms of a single communicative function. Along with renewed recognition of the integrity of the organization
of individual languages, informed by universal principles, but not deformed by them, goes sensitivity to the respect in which any language can be understood as a specific selecting and grouping together of elements and relationships, having a configuration formally and culturally distinct.

Sometimes, indeed, debates in formal linguistics seem to partake somewhat of this outlook. There are models which seek to approach grammar from the standpoint of the lexicon; there are debates as to the proper scope or restriction of levels of semantics and syntax; there are debates, indeed, as to what is to be assigned to grammar as such, and what to other aspects of the communicative agent, such as memory, cognitive processing generally, interactional constraints, and the like. Such discussions, though, tend to seek an approach which would apply equally to all languages and which would presumably be inherent in language as such, independently of whose language it might be.

Certainly there are some general aspects of the organization of language which are universal and have a universal basis. The conventional organization of a description of a language into phonology, grammar and lexicon has a warrant that is more than traditional. Yet even this broad pattern takes different form in different communities. When one addresses the competence of speakers, one finds cases in which a large group may share a single phonology for what are distinct grammars and lexicons. It has even been reported that long coexistence has led to convergence of syntactic order as well as pronunciation, so that lexicon alone distinguishes two named languages. From the standpoint of the participants in a community, then, the relationship between phonology, grammar, and lexicon, in organization of linguistic means, may be various.
That a language in itself must be approached as a particular selecting and grouping together of features and levels is patent enough if one looks at vocabulary and dictionaries. (Perhaps this fact is related to the secondary status often assigned to vocabulary and dictionaries). Vocabulary (lexicon) is a universal sector of language, yet it is clear that the users of different languages have chosen over time different ways of constructing it. Such differences come forcibly to the fore when one faces the problem of organizing a dictionary of a language, and must decide what information to list and what information must be already known by the dictionary user.

In English we are able to have the impression that a dictionary can be produced by writing whole words from left to right, and alphabetizing the lot. But in Arabic, the basic invariant of a lexical entry is not all of any word; it is a consonantal matrix, such as k-f-b 'book, write'. The slots are filled by various vowels, or nothing, according to grammatical processes. Some American Indian languages, such as Yokuts of California, have a similar structure. In Chinese, consonants and vowels are not enough; there must be tone as well. The sequence ma is 'horse' with one tone and not with another. In many American Indian languages, such as Chinookan, a sequence of alphabetized words would be grotesque. There would be thick volumes under a few letters. That is because every noun must begin with one of a few initial prefixes, and every verb with one of a few other initial prefixes. At the same time, one and the same verb stem would occur in different alphabetical lists, sometimes under one letter, and sometimes under another, depending on its inflection. (In Chinookan, verbs would be found mostly under A, N, I and G; nouns would be found mostly under A and I).

In such a language, were the prefixes stripped away, and just the basic root or stem alphabetized, the result would be inadequate in another way. Roots are not alike in their consequences. They belong to different grammatical classes. Some require one set of affixes to be the skeleton of a word, and others others. One has to specify for a root just which
affixes are permitted, which required, if the user of the dictionary is to know how the root can be part of a grammatical possible word, and what meanings it will take on in conjunction with the affixes added to it. A Chinookan verb, for example, may require, or permit, just one prefixed marker of a participant in the action, or two, or three (subject; subject and object; subject, direct object, and indirect object). Some verbs must have a specific marker in one of these positions. One can't say 'jum' in Chinookan with the root -bna alone; one has to have -s- 'dual' in the prefix position for direct object, implying two diminutive feet involved in the action. (A word for 'feet' does not itself occur in the sentence). And so on in variations of many kinds.

Vocabulary may seem the more obvious aspect of language, not as complex as grammar, not as awkward to learn as pronunciation. And there is a case to be made for the stability of vocabulary elements across grammars and pronunciations and indeed dialects and languages. Yet as part of the system of a language, vocabulary reflects historically different choices over time on the part of speakers. Different phonological elements are selected and grouped together, employing some of the formally possible combinations of sounds in the language, and not others; new vocabulary items come into being through blendings and irregular formations, so that only a small part of the vocabulary of a language like English can be simply traced back to etymological origins through regular changes; different grammatical concomitants of permissible or obligatory co-occurrence are implied; different grammatical meanings are implied as well. (Thus one can say of the verb stem in a language such as Yokuts of California that it is inherently of a certain category of aspect; of a noun in some languages that it is inherently singular, or nominative, unless marked otherwise; and so on).

In short, the very minimal requirement of fitting the vocabulary of a language into its formal description brings into view the diversity of orientations toward the character of vocabulary in languages. One can add to this the well known
differences among languages in the sectors of meaning that are elaborated; the complexities of connection between associated sectors of meaning, such that a seemingly few terms in one area, such as property rights, may be interactive with a rich terminology of rights and duties between persons, as the basis of a system of courts and jurisprudence (as is the case among the Barotse of Africa); the complex relationship between the accumulation of vocabulary in a language as a whole, and the command of terminology on the part of individual speakers; the historical tendency of some languages to be receptive to words from other languages, as against the stance of others against borrowings in favor of new formations from their own lexical stock; the changes over time in this very regard in the same language community, as when the Lithuanians accepted many Polish words in one period, only to reject them in another; and one can see that the lexicon of a language is a complex, specific configuration of historical forces and choices. Its character in terms of grammatical connections and social connotations can be quite specific.

The organization of sounds in languages, the area known as phonology, has been the focus of attention for many years. What has been missing has been a conception of phonology parallel to the conception of vocabulary that forces itself on our recognition. Phonology has not been seen as a sector of language to which communities might have different attitudes. What is needed is to think of the use of sound in speech as a sphere in which one might be more interested— or less, and interested in diverse ways. One needs to ask, not only how the phonological structure of language is organized, but what the speakers of a language make of its phonic aspect.
It is well known that some languages make use of alternations among consonants, or vowels, to express symbolic contrasts of largeness or smallness, disdain or affection. Not all languages do so. Languages differ in their tolerance for variation in pronunciation. Some insist on a certain standard, others allow a good deal of latitude. In some languages there appears a great interest in shades of meaning associated with small distinctions of sound, and in others not. Thus Korean has a great many words, almost alike in sound, and meaning, as the result of play with gradations of sound. In the Kaluli language of New Guinea the association of specific sounds with specific types of sound in the world is so precise that new words can be coined by combining them: the anthropologist Steven Feld was told a new Kaluli word for his typewriter, coined by such a process in a way that he could come to understand as appropriate. Interest of this kind in the phonic substance of language is not the same throughout the world. It seems likely that some groups consider it satisfying to make use of the physical production of speech, and others perhaps embarrassing.

The central point is that speech sound is more than level of formal structure. It is a material resource, made use of in different degrees and different ways in different communities. A fundamental question about speech sound, from the standpoint of the meaning of speech to members of groups, would be simply: what are the ways in which the group makes use of the possibilities of sound? In sound symbolism, in expressive particles, in voice qualities, in vocal segregates, in creation of vocabulary, in grammatical derivation, in speech play, in games and rituals and art. Like other material resources, it may be differentially of interest and differently shaped.

The relation of phonology to the rest of a language also varies, just as does the relation of vocabulary. In some languages the specification of pronunciation seems rather transparent, almost a simple spelling out. In other language,
to go from the grammatical elements, the morphemes, to their shape in sound may be to pass through a mountain range of complexities (morphophonemics). In some cases one may be able to describe the morphology and grammar without much reference, if any, to phonology, and in others not. Conversely, in some cases one may be able to describe the phonology without much reference to the morphology and grammar, and in others not. The degree of interpenetration between the levels, or sectors, differs. To speak metaphorically, it may seem in one language that grammar has invaded the sphere of phonology, and in another language that phonology has intruded into grammar.

Such circumstances are of course the result of paths of historical change, and of factors which may have thrown up one kind of mapping between phonology and grammar or another. It remains that the separateness or interpenetration, and the direction of interpenetration, do vary, and that in at least some fundamental respect, the fact of the matter is the result of choices made collectively over time by members of a community.

It is perhaps easier to think of vocabulary and sound as areas differentially developed by communities, like resources of the body or the environment, than to think of grammar in such a way. Yet the relations within the grammar of languages vary as well. In some languages it is easy to establish a boundary between the makeup of words (morphology) and the relations of words in sentences (syntax). In other languages the boundary appears to fade away. A thorough description of morphology, the makeup of words, seems to leave little to say about syntax. Conversely, in a language such as English, syntax seems prominent, and morphology slight. Within morphology itself, the relation between inflectional morphology, markings that relate words to each other and grammatical meanings such as tense and person, and derivational morphology, markings that qualify the sense of a word or give it another grammatical status, is immensely varied. English has not much inflectional morphology: singular vs. plural at the end of nouns,
tense at the end of verbs, most notably. There is something of derivational morphology: -dom to qualify a title as a name of sphere or realm (duke-dom, king-dom, earl-dom); -ing to make nouns of verbs (buy-ing and sell-ing we lay waste our powers); and so forth. In a language such as Chinookan, it is far otherwise. Once the inflectional and derivational morphology in a verb has been worked out, there may be no need for anything more in a sentence: participants, act, scene, and quality of action may all be established.

It seems likely that the working out of the relations between a level of syntax and a level of discourse relations will show similar variation.

In sum, whatever the attractions and compulsions of a single model of language, relating the universal levels of language to each other in a single way, actual languages show considerable diversity in their degree of elaboration and in the ways they are connected. An element of historical choice must be granted.

One can set aside here the question of kinds of explanation for such historical choices—world views on the part of a community, after-effects of formal changes, consequences of diffusion and contact, and the like. The essential point is that languages themselves, however narrowly defined, do come put together in the same way. It is more accurate to think of phonology, morphology, syntax, and vocabulary as loosely connected spheres than as formally, tightly mapped levels.

All this is consistent with the nature of styles in discourse. As noted earlier in this report, styles select and group together features from various sectors of a language. It is in terms of styles that the language use of people is most often evaluated in interaction. All the general analysis of the relations among discourse features, presupposition, shared knowledge, and the like, will not reach to the ongoing coherence of styles in a community or
institution. Connotations of identity and membership may depend upon selection and grouping together of particular features of language in a particular continuing setting. The very nature of style in discourse, then, points to the need for educators themselves to be observers and analysts of discourse in their own settings. Language itself, as organized in human life, is not a monolith, but a loosely coupled network of sectors, cross-cut by diverse purposes in the organization of styles. Indeed, it can be argued that the fundamental organizational principle of language is not grammar, but a repertoire of styles. It can be argued that the seeming centrality of grammar in our society is a consequence of a particular cultural tradition. It originated, one can recognize, in the need to teach Greek and Latin to speakers of other languages. Certain aspects of a standard language were recognized and promulgated. Philosophy and logic became associated with grammar more persistently than rhetoric and dialectic, perhaps because the study of the latter is inherently more difficult, requiring field work, the equivalent of ethnography, the comparison of cases. It may be that the inherent logic of the development of the study of discourse out of the autonomous study of language will lead in the decades ahead to a view of language that sees our present concerns as a temporary stage. Instead of grammar, one will speak of style and verbal repertoire; instead of speakers and hearers, one will speak of the configurations of abilities and verbal resources of specific kinds of person in relation to specific kinds of scene. In such a time the ethnographic study of classroom discourse would not be an extension or application of linguistics, but a natural and central field for its normal concerns.
REFERENCES FOR REPORT


Kroch, Anthony S. and Donald Hindle. 1980. Progress report to the National Institute of Education on Grant No. G78-0169, "A quantitative study of the syntax of speech and writing".


---. 1982 (ms). The role of language and the language of role in institutional decision making.


Michaels, Sarah and James Collins. 1981 (ms.). Discourse styles, classroom interaction and the acquisition of literacy.


FOOTNOTES


2. This liberal ideal has been developed by the sociologist and philosopher Jurgen Habermas in the context of what is known as 'critical theory'. See my discussion of his approach, and that of Basil Bernstein, in my Language in Education: Ethnolinguistic Essays (Washington, D. C.: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1980), pp. 39-51.


4. I owe assistance on this section to Ann Houston.

5. This discussion of Chinookan myth draws on my 'In vain I tried to tell you' (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981).

6. See discussion in Esther Goody 1978b of interrogative modes among the Gonja. There is valuable material also in Ruth Finnegan, 'How to do things with words: Performative utterances among the Limba of Sierra Leone', Man 4: 537-552, (1969), and her 'Attitudes to speech and language among the Limba of Sierra Leone', Odu (1970).

7. See Judith Irvine, 'Formality and informality in communicative events', American Anthropologist 81: 773-790 (1979). For background on the Wolof, see her 'Strategies of status manipulation in the Wolof greeting', in R. Bauman and J. Sherzer (eds.), Explorations in the...


12 See my review of Bach and Harnish (1979), in Language in society 10(2): 270-274.