COMMUNICATION AND INTERRACIAL CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF DISAGREEMENT, PREJUDICE, AND PHYSICAL ATTRACTION ON THE CHOICE OF MIXED RACE, MIXED SEX WORK-PARTNERS.

AUTHOR
Mohajer, Farideh; Steinfeld, Thomas M.

TITLE
Communication and Interracial Conflict: The Role of Disagreement, Prejudice, and Physical Attraction on the Choice of Mixed Race, Mixed Sex Work-Partners.

PUB DATE
Feb 82

NOTE

ABSTRACT
In a study of how race versus shared belief affected work partner choice, 91 white college students, most of them from the southern United States, participated in group discussions of topics that were relevant or irrelevant to racial prejudice. Members of each group, in addition to the one subject, were one Hispanic male, one Hispanic female, one white male, and one white female, all of whom were "confederates" in the experiments and varied their agreement and disagreement with the subject's views on the chosen topics. Analysis of both postdiscussion measures of work partner preferences and interpersonal attraction and pretest measures of racial attitudes revealed the following: (1) Belief rather than race was the major determinant of choice of work partner. (2) For female subjects, belief was significant in determining work partner; for males this factor fell just short of significance. (3) Nonprejudiced subjects were just as likely as prejudiced subjects to discriminate against Hispanics as work partners. (4) The prejudiced subjects tended to select either Hispanics who agreed or whites who disagreed. (5) Members of each "undesirable" group (disagreeers, Hispanics, and disagreeing Hispanics) apparently became more acceptable as work partners when they were physically attractive. In conclusion, race, the communication of agreement, and physical attraction all mediated the choice of work partners, though in complex but predictable ways.

(ERL)
Communication and Interracial Conflict: The Role of Disagreement, Prejudice, and Physical Attraction on the Choice of Mixed Race, Mixed Sex Work-Partners.

Farideh Mohajer
University of Wisconsin-Whitewater

Thomas M. Steinfatt
Auburn University

ABSTRACT

This paper reviews two competing theories of the relationship between prejudice and discriminatory choices of work partners in a communication experiment and discusses two communication variables—1) a simple statement of agreement or disagreement with a subject on a topic relevant or irrelevant to the type of prejudice involved during a small group discussion, and 2) the subject's assessment of nonverbal physical attractiveness emitted by confederates during the group discussion—which are found to be significant mediators of work partner choice in the data of this experiment.

A major portion of the time a person spends in communicating on a given day involves the avoidance, resolution, management, or seeking of conflict. Some of these conflicts are potentially violent with important consequences for the persons involved. Others are simple disagreements with consequences that may be minor or far-reaching. Many variables have been shown to affect the communication which occurs during the process of conflict (Miller and Simons, 1974) and the role of human belief systems in prejudging other persons is one of the more important variable sets. This paper is concerned with the role of disagreement, prejudice and physical attraction in interracial conflict: specifically, do communication variables influence the choice of a work partner in an interracial situation containing elements of conflict and racial prejudice?

While prejudice and conflict have been studied for many years, the work of Smith (1943) provides a beginning for the theoretical background of this paper. His classic study found that anti-black prejudice was reduced in white male college students who talked with blacks of equal social status. Deutsch and Collins (1951) in another widely cited study suggest a similar finding: that moving into a neighborhood containing blacks of equal social status reduced prejudice in middle class whites. Rokeach, Smith, and Evans (1960) interpret each of these studies as suggesting that racial prejudice may be a far more "surface" phenomena rather than lying deep within the structure of the personality. They suggest that the important variable is not equal status, but the attraction of belief congruence to another person of equal status, which results from interpersonal communication. A white housewife placed in proximity to black neighbors of equal status to her, is likely to receive messages from these neighbors indicating similar beliefs on childrearing, sexual behavior, problems with the lawn and house, etc. Rokeach, et al., point out that if these messages produce lowered prejudice, then a fundamental change in personality structure is unnessary explanatory baggage in predicting prejudiced behavior. Initial prejudice can be explained as an assumed difference in beliefs between the subject, and the object of prejudice. Thus, the form of communication necessary to reduce prejudice is seen as a more-surface form than would be necessary if prejudice lay in deep seated personality structures. Specifically, the communication of simple agreement or disagreement should be sufficient to trigger a belief congruence judgement. The exchange of messages concerning deep self
disclosures and the analysis of repressed feelings of anger, sadness, hatred, bitterness, etc., should be necessary to reduce prejudice if the "deep structure" view of prejudice is correct.

Rokeach, Smith and Evans (1960) conducted three studies designed to determine if persons exhibit discriminating behavior based on the outgroup's perceived racial characteristics alone, or on the beliefs ascribed to the outgroup by the subject. They conjecture that "the basic principle governing the way in which we organize the world of people is not in terms of abstract ethnic or racial categories as such, but in terms of how congruent or incongruent others' belief systems are to our own. The more significance we attach to another's agreement or disagreement with us as grounds for reacting to him, the more the intolerance. ... we organize our social world not once and for all in terms of, say, Negro-white distinctions, but in terms of Negroes and whites who agree with us and Negroes and whites who disagree with us on specific issues we care about. ... the current [1960] conflict in the South is not a conflict between Negroes and whites, but a conflict between two sides, each composed of Negroes and whites, one for desegregation in education and the other for segregation" (1960, 134-135).

Each of the three studies of Rokeach et al. used the same paper-and-pencil methodology. Three sets of subjects, 65 Northern white college students, 136 Southern white college students, and 50 northern Jewish grade school and high school students participated. Subjects were asked to rate statements which associated a white or a Negro (in the first two studies) or a Jew or a Gentile (in the third study) with a belief either congruent or discrepant with the subject's belief. The ratings used a nine-point scale ranging from "I can't see myself being friends with such a person" to "I can very easily see myself being friends with such a person" to rate statements such as "A Negro who believes in God", "A Negro who is an atheist", etc. Their results indicate that subjects in the first two groups prefer those of the same "race" and those who agree with the subject, more than those of opposing race or opposing belief, but the agreement effect is much stronger than the effect for race. In the third group, the Jew-gentile ("race") difference is nonsignificant, while the agree-disagree difference is both significant and very large. Rokeach et al. list several examples which illustrate this type of finding in everyday life. In 1956 both a black and a white were hanged in effigy in Montgomery, Alabama. The placard on the white read: "He talked integration". In Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957 the white newspaper editor and many white ministers were opposed to Governor Faubus' actions to prevent integration of Little Rock Central. And in Africa, the Mau Mau killed far more blacks than whites even on a percentage basis. The blacks were killed when they refused to take the Mau Mau oath.
of belief. The point, of course, is that while we think of prejudice and racial conflicts being organized along racial lines, with all blacks (or Jews, or Hispanics, or Women) on one side and all whites (or whatever) on the other, this is not how the sides in such conflicts are actually composed. One group composed of men-and-women are disgusted by Phyllis Schlafly's opening remarks on a television program thanking her husband for allowing her to appear, while another mixed sex group would applaud this remark. The conflict appears to be demographic, but is actually one of belief.

The opposing side to the view that belief rather than demographics is the major determinant of conflict and discriminatory behavior is represented by Triandis (1961, 1971) and Dawes (1966, 1972). Triandis (1971, 131) suggests that the findings of Rokeach, Smith, and Evans are limited to the specific choice studied by Rokeach et al., that of friendship. He argues that race, not belief, is the more important determinate of discrimination in intimate situations: the answer to the question "would you want your sister to marry one?" is determined by race, not belief. Triandis and Davis (1965) and Inkso and Robinson (1967) suggest that an interaction between the prejudice type of the individual subject (some persons are seen as racially prejudiced; others as belief prejudiced) and the intimacy of the situation will determine the relative importance of race versus belief in producing discriminatory behavior.
Rokeach, et al. counter this type of argument by pointing out that the black desiring to marry the white's sister is automatically placed in the "Uppity nigger" category by racist whites (1960, 133, 166). Thus, their behavior toward the black in intimate situations is based on belief discrepancy, not race. To argue that a white wishing to marry the sister would not be discriminated against in this fashion could be countered by arguing that the white is not violating the tenants of the prejudiced belief system. Thus, Rokeach's overall claim is that belief accounts for a much greater portion of the variance in discriminatory behavior (on the order of 30 times as much) than does race (Rokeach and Mezei, 1968, 64).

Rokeach, Smith and Evans believe that the degree of institutionalization of the prejudice, rather than the intimacy of the social situation, is the principal factor qualifying their claim of belief over race as a determinant of discriminatory behavior. Examples of institutionalization might include segregation of blacks and the forced wearing of the Star-of-David by Jews in Nazi Germany.

The more institutionalized such discrimination becomes, the more is the illusion created that there is a deep rooted instinctual or psychological basis for it. But as the data in the present research suggest, this is not so. The psychological basis for discriminating one person from another and one group from another seems to be belief. From an individual standpoint, prejudice is conceived to arise from a conditioned avoidance of belief systems incongruent with one's own, and not from a general conditioning to hate outgroups as a class... (1960, 164).

Rokeach and Mezei (1966, 1968) extended the "paper-and-pencil" work of Rokeach, Smith and Evans in three experiments by asking a naive subject to choose two of four confederates he would prefer to have coffee with or work with. The first two experiments were performed with Northern white college students (N=20 and 48) who were "elected" to chair a group discussion on one of five controversial topics chosen by the subject as chairperson. One white and one black confederate agreed with the
subject and another white and black disagreed. Subjects were interviewed by the experimenter in another room following the discussion. During this interview, the subject was told that because each participant had to be interviewed individually, there was enough time for the subject to have coffee with two of the "other subjects". The major dependent variable was the subjects' choice of coffee partners.

In the third experiment 26 black and 24 white job applicants for manual labor positions at Michigan Mental Hospitals were escorted to a "waiting room" with four other "job applicants" who initiated a discussion of permissive versus rule-oriented responses by staff members to minor transgressions of patients after the experimenter left the room. The subject's own opinion was sought out and a black and a white confederate agreed, while the other black-white pair took the opposing position. The experimenter then re-entered the room and passed out cards to each person asking him to write the names of those with whom he would most prefer to work. In all three experiments the predominant choice was the two confederates who agreed (40%). Only 3% of the subjects chose the pair that disagreed, 6% chose the same-race pair and 6% the opposite race pair. However, 28% chose a same-race confederate who disagreed together with an opposite-race confederate who agreed, and the remaining 18% (these figures add to 101 due to rounding) chose a same-race confederate who agreed and an opposite-race confederate who disagreed. Rokeach and Mezei interpret the approximately seven-to-one ratio of same-belief to same-race choices as supporting their position, but give consideration to the 28% and 18% who chose mixed race-belief pairs, speculating that subjects may have felt some pressure to form mixed-race groups.

Dawes (1966) suggests that such pressure might come from a norm in liberal circles in the North that it is impolite to form same-race groups when forming mixed race groups is possible. Triandis adds that "The Rokeach data, then, are limited to a very special condition that is applicable to liberal Northern social circles. There is much doubt that these results would be replicated in the South" (1971, 132).

Dawes (1972) continues this attack by reinterpreting the results in terms of individual choices rather than pairs of choices. While 68% of the confederates chosen had agreed with the subject, 50% were of the same race. Thus the ratio of belief choices to race choices is 4 to 3 rather than 7 to 1. And since the preponderance of pair choices was of racially mixed groups (88%) Dawes calculates that race is clearly an important factor, as choices were made to avoid segregation by skin color (1972, 129).
Rokeach and Mezei (1968) responded to Triandis and Dawes.

It is interesting to speculate about the results we might have obtained...in the deep South. An attempt to set up such a study in the deep South was unsuccessful, mainly because of anticipated reprisals toward research collaborators, confederates, and cooperating subjects. Had such a study proved feasible we would have predicted results considerably different from those reported here, namely, that because of greater social pressures existing under private conditions, choice of coffee-and-work-partners would have been more uniformly along racial rather than belief lines (1968, 77).

They add that regardless of how one looks at the data, similarity of belief is a more frequent basis for choice than either dissimilarity of belief or similarity of race (1968, 73).

The implications of the race versus shared belief controversy for communication research are obviously important. If the discriminatory behavior is a "surface" phenomena as suggested by the "belief" theory, then messages which change such beliefs should reduce this level of conflict produced by prejudice and discriminatory behavior. But if the phenomena is "deep" or attached to race or skin color itself, then messages which change beliefs about attributes of outgroup members should have little effect on conflict and discriminatory behavior. We were more persuaded by Rokeach et al.'s arguments that discriminatory behavior and prejudice is a belief-based phenomena than by Triandis and Dawes skin-color theory. But there are several points of attack on the Rokeach, Smith, and Evans study and that by Rokeach and Mezej which need to be met. We set out in this study to meet them.

First, we wondered along with Triandis, Dawes, and Rokeach about the effect of a Southern setting on the race-belief findings. While we cannot know what the results would have been in the 1960's, we guessed that the South of the 1980s would provide very similar results to the North of the 1960s. We based this both on personal observation and experience with the two environments, and the generalized belief in the New South concept currently being promoted in the media. Thus, we hypothesized that (H1) belief rather than race will be the major determinant of choice of work partner in the South in the 1980s.

Second, Rokeach's studies used blacks and Jews as outgroups. If the belief theory is correct, it should apply to all outgroups, not just blacks and Jews. Given the high level of anti-Hispanic feeling throughout the South following massive crime increases in Miami and elsewhere which occurred shortly after the arrival of over 100,000 Hispanics in Southern Florida in 1980, we decided to use Hispanics as the object of prejudice in our study and hypothesized that (H2) belief rather than race will be the major determinant of choice of work partner by white subjects when choosing between whites and Hispanics.
Third, the subjects in the Rokeach and Mezei experiments were all males and all confederates were male. If belief is robust as an explanation for discriminatory behavior then it should apply equally to men and women. Thus, (H3) both men and women will select work partners based on belief more than race. We did not form hypotheses concerning the choice of male versus female confederates, but suspected that sexual attraction might play a role, and attempted to control for this effect as discussed below under Method.

Fourth, Dawes' (1972) major criticism of Rokeach and Mezei was their failure to examine the pair choices, used as the dependent variable, closely as pairs, rather than as individual choices. We asked our subjects to rank order the four individuals they were to choose among, and then to choose a pair of subjects they wanted to work with after completing this ranking. Thus, we had individual ranks and pair choices with which to work, which allowed us both to determine the reliability of subjects' choice behavior and to examine individual choices in comparison with pair choices. We did not have to rely on pair choices for individual choice data.

Fifth, in both Rokeach studies, no effect for prejudiced attitudes on choice was found. In Rokeach and Mezei (1966) it would have been all but impossible to find such an effect even if it existed due to the small numbers of subjects in the twelve cells formed by high and low prejudice scores with the six group choice possibilities. Power to detect such an effect, even if the effect were large, was near zero. Our use of ranked choices in addition to pair choices allowed a reasonably powerful test of the effect of prejudice level on work partner choice. While Rokeach's position is that beliefs (cognitions) not attitudes (evaluations) are the determinant of most human behavior, we think that Rokeach may have undersold the power of beliefs as an explanatory mechanism for the functioning of attitudes, just as he may have undersold beliefs as predictive of Southern behavior in the face of institutionalized racism. Persons high in racial prejudice do not invariably discriminate against members of the outgroup. Sometimes they do and sometimes they do not. Perhaps it is belief congruence which triggers such attitudes which then influence behavior: a comparison of one's own direct perspective with one's metaperspective on the outgroup member's belief. This speculation certainly seems in line with Rokeach's belief system theory, though Rokeach does not seem to have pressed the point. If the speculation is correct, then prejudice should influence the choice of work partner more when the work partner disagrees with the subject, than when he agrees. Thus, low-prejudiced subjects should be influenced by both Race and Communication of Agreement in their work partner choices, but this effect should be far more pronounced in highly prejudiced subjects. Which leads us to hypothesize that (H4) for prejudiced subjects (but not for unprejudiced ones) there should be significantly fewer choices of Hispanics who disagree than Hispanics who agree;
and, for prejudiced subjects only, there should be significantly fewer choices of Hispanics who disagree than of whites who disagree.

Sixth, Rokeach and Mezić used a twelve minute discussion period. While the length of this period allows communication to flow between the subject and confederates, it also introduces problems of control in terms of what is said, since confederates must use their wits to respond "properly" to messages from the subject. While this may be good in allowing many types of belief related messages to enter into the interaction, thus insuring a degree of generality in the findings, it also provides more opportunities for confederates to misinterpret questions and statements by the subject, to misanalyze their own appropriate responses, and to misstate these responses. Rokeach and Mezić provide no data on this point except to mention that subjects were asked "to identify the opinions expressed by the participants" (1968, 67). Though it is possible that a relatively lengthy (12 minutes) discussion is necessary in order to produce a judgment of belief congruence or discrepancy, we suggest that if the belief congruence explanation is robust, then only a brief message should be necessary in order to convey agreement or disagreement with the subject. Thus for reasons both of control and a test of robustness, we used only very brief messages from our confederates, usually lasting 15 seconds or less per confederate and always less than 30 seconds.

Seventh, the Rokeach and Mezić studies differ from most other studies of discriminatory behavior including Rokeach, Smith, and Evans by using the actual choice by the subject of other human beings present in the situation as the dependent variable, rather than a paper-and-pencil measure of the "what would you do if" variety. We see such choices as far more compelling evidence than "what would you do if" questions since subjects are notoriously poor predictors of their own behaviors and reasons for so behaving in many situations. However, the choice of a coffee-break partner as in studies one and two of Rokeach and Mezić is perhaps less compelling than the choice of a work partner in the third study, since subjects might choose a coffee partner out of interest or curiosity, knowing that the interaction will both be brief and a simple episode. But a work partner is something else again. If the person chosen is incompetent, unpleasant, or possesses any negative characteristics at all, the interaction with that person over an extended time, perhaps in many episodes, could become unpleasant indeed. Yet Dawes (1972, 129-130) raises an ethical question concerning the use of work partner choices as data: if a person is actually seeking employment, as were the subjects in the third study, and if they were not informed before the fact that they were in a communication experiment rather than the job interview in which they presumed themselves to be participating, did Rokeach and Mezić have a right to study their behavior under
such conditions? Miller (1966), Maloney (1966), and Standen (1966) have raised similar questions. Thus, while choice of work partner offers the more compelling evidence, the obtaining of this evidence may involve questionable ethics. In order to resolve this apparent dilemma we informed our subjects that they were in an experiment, by the act of asking them to sign up for the experiment, which gave them extra credit points in one of their classes: our subjects were informed and were not seeking employment. But we were able to use choice of work partner as our dependent variable by referring to a "second part of the experiment" in which subjects would have to work closely with the confederate of their choice. Our subjects believed that they would have to work closely with the person of their choosing on an, as yet, unspecified task.

Eighth, while the choice of another actual person in the situation provides a more solid evidential base then does the subject's speculation as to whom he would choose if he were in a particular situation, the idiosyncratic characteristics of particular confederates provide an opportunity for alternative explanations for choice of work partner other than the independent variables. Our use of twelve confederates to play four roles serves as a partial control on individual differences of confederates. Rokeach and Mezei (1968) apparently used the same confederates for all subjects, thereby increasing the opportunity for interactions of individual confederates with the independent variables to influence the results. They also make no mention of attempts to measure subjects' perceptions of individual confederates.

In addition to using different confederates, we asked our subjects to rate each of the four confederates they encountered on the confederates' physical attractiveness, social attractiveness, and task attractiveness and then examined these ratings to see if they might have influenced subjects' choices. We suspected on the basis of a review of the physical attractiveness literature (1977) that the non verbal attractiveness of confederates would be important in determining their choice behavior, especially if the confederates had nothing else going for them; i.e. when the confederates disagreed and were Hispanic. Thus, (H5): confederates who either disagree, are Hispanic, or, especially, both, will be chosen primarily when they are seen as highly physically attractive.

METHOD

Subjects. One-hundred-and-one undergraduates at a large university in the heart of the deep South were given extra credit in two Speech Communication classes for participating in the experiment. Ten subjects were eliminated from the data analysis for reasons of either a) incorrect procedures used by confederates, b) prior experience of the subject with one or more of the confederates or, c) failure to complete the dependent variable measures, leaving the data of 91 subjects for
Sixty-seven subjects were female and 34 were male with ages ranging from 17 to 31. All subjects were white with 53% from the rural South, and 44% from the urban South. Fewer than 4% were from non-South backgrounds.

Procedures. Subjects signed up for the experiment in their individual classes and were scheduled to arrive at the experimental room 15 to 20 minutes apart. About a week before sign-up sheets were circulated, all students in each of the classes to take part in the experiment filled out a pre-test form containing prejudice scales toward blacks, Hispanics, and Jews. These were passed out by the instructor and returned to him. Identification used was the last four digits of the students' number, which students knew could not be traced back to them. Upon arrival, they were greeted outside of the appointed room by an administrator who explained to them that the conditions of the experiment required that they remain in a private waiting room for several minutes before the start of the experimental session. This was done for two reasons. Subjects often arrived while another subject was in the room with the confederates, so the waiting room excuse was in part legitimate. But it also allowed us to explain to the subject who had been in the waiting room that "everyone else is here now, and we have taken them from their private waiting rooms into the experimental room. Since we have kept you waiting this long and you will be the last person to enter the room, we will interview you first after this part of the experiment." This provided cover for the confederates to remain in the room after the experimental session. Since the experiment was conducted in a large classroom building, many potential subjects to be passed the door of the classroom, and would have had an excellent opportunity to see the confederates together as a group, had we allowed them to go as a group or even individually into the hall.

As the subject entered the experimental room, the confederates were apparently just getting settled since they asked questions of the experimenter such as "where should we put our books?" and "how will our instructor know to give us credit for this?". These were questions which were normally asked by subjects, and it gave the experimenter the opportunity to explain the credit procedure and to ask the subject to take his books with him to the next part of the experiment, so that subjects would not attempt to re-enter the experimental room once they had left and see the confederates together with another subject. The experimenter directed the subject to the one empty chair around a hexagonal table, thanked the subjects for coming, and then began an oral statement of the instructions for the experiment. He picked up a set of five forms prearranged on another table where sets of forms had been randomized and counterbalanced for conditions, handed one to each person at the table, and explained that the task for this part of the experiment was to engage in a brief group discussion and that they would need a leader for this discussion.
In order to elect a leader, they would have to know each other's names so he turned to the person at his left, always the white female, and asked her to "tell us your name." He proceeded to the subject, who was next, and then around the group. The white confederates usually used their own names, except when the name had a possible Hispanic ring to it. Some Hispanic confederates used their own names while others were told to use a more Hispanic sounding name. Since the "race" (skin color) variable manipulation depended on both visual and cues with Hispanics, we used only names that all confederates and the experimenter agreed were distinctly Hispanic sounding for Hispanic confederates, and non-Hispanic sounding for non-Hispanic confederates. "Now that each of you know each others names, I want you to take a moment to think of who you want to vote for for leader. The leader's task is actually very simple and does not involve much work. The leader has to choose one of two topics to be discussed, state his or her opinion on the topic, and then record everyone else's opinion on the topic. That's all there is to it. Now, are you ready to vote? O.K., ... (pause) was it Teri?" (The experimenter stated the name of the white female confederate correctly, but hesitated as if he were unsure that he remembered it correctly.) The white female nodded and the experimenter said, "Teri, who do you vote for?" She looked at the group for a moment and then chose the subject. The subject was next and usually voted for one of the confederates. The remaining confederates voted for the subject. The experimenter then asked the subject to change places with the Hispanic female, who was seated at the experimenter's right because "the leader has to sit in position 'A'". He then pointed out that a letter was taped to the table in front of each person in order to identify them. This was done to insure that if the subject forgot a person's name, he could remember who the person was by the position in which they were sitting. "A" was always the subject, "B" the white male, "C" the Hispanic male, "D" the Hispanic female, and "E" the white female.

Pointing to the form previously handed to the subject, the experimenter indicated the two topics the subject was to choose between. These were printed on the form. Allowing the subject to choose was an attempt both to provide a topic in which the subject had some degree of interest and ego involvement, and to provide a degree of commitment to the topic through a feeling of free choice. The subject was told to circle the topic he chose after the experimenter left the room, to announce his choice to the others, to give them a few moments to think about the topic, to state his views on the topic, and then to ask the others for their views and to record these next to the letters representing their positions on his form. Regardless of the length of the subjects' response, each confederate took less than 30 seconds, usually less than 15 seconds to state a brief position
on the topic. This was always prefaced by "I agree with (you or subject's name) on that" (looking at the subject) or "I don't agree with (you or subject's name) on that". These messages constituted the belief congruence (agree-disagree) factor.

The experimenter left the room and closed the door behind him before the "leader" began his work.

When the subject had recorded the responses of each person he opened the door and summoned the experimenter who was waiting in the hall. The experimenter re-entered the room and said "Have you completed this part? O.K., good. Now since (name of subject) had to wait the longest earlier, I'll begin the next part of the experiment with him(her). As soon as he(she) is started on the next part, I'll come back and take each of you to the individual rooms you were originally waiting in."

He then escorted the subject back to the subject's original waiting room and instructed the subject to fill out the remainder of the form. As he left the room, he mentioned that he would be back to bring the subject to the next part of the experiment which might involve close work with one or more of the other members of his group on a complex task. The subject then completed the form, was told that in the particular condition of the experiment he had drawn he would not have to engage in the task, was thanked for his participation, asked not to discuss the experiment until a debriefing session was held, and was invited to the debriefing session to be held between 14 and 3 days hence, depending on when the subject went through the experiment.

Training of Confederates. Twelve students served as confederates. They were trained by first explaining the experimental procedures to them and then having them go through the procedures with an experimenter playing the role of the subject until the experimenter was satisfied that the confederates knew their roles.

Materials. The pre-test booklet consisted of a two page form. Page one stated that all information given would be used only for the purposes of the study: identifying feelings that people with certain ages and backgrounds had about other people. It asked for the last four digits of the student number, age, hometown, father's occupation, and subject's ethnic background. The second page contained Bogardus-type scales for blacks, Hispanics and Jews. The subject was asked to write either Yes, No, or Not Sure to seven actions the subject might take with respect to each group. Five of the seven actions were designed to tap prejudice. These were: Admit to my personal circle of friends, Have on my street as neighbors, Would marry or allow a member of my immediate family to marry, Would allow in employment with me in my occupation at my same level, and Would admit as citizens to my country. A Yes response was scored as zero, Not Sure as 1, and No as 2. Thus, prejudice scores could range from zero to 10 for Hispanics and from zero to 30 for total prejudice.
Subject needed about 7 minutes to complete this booklet.

The experimental test booklet consisted of six pages. The first page contained a statement of the instructions the experimenter had presented orally, two topics, and blanks for making agreement or disagreement for each of the five group discussants. For the irrelevant topics condition the two issues concerned the presidential election of 1980. For the relevant topics condition, topics concerned equal rights for Hispanics and large scale Cuban immigration. The subject filled out this page while in the experimental room since only the "leader" needed to fill out that page. The remaining pages were completed when the subject returned to the private waiting room. On returning to the room the subject filled in the remaining information in the following order. 1) A single item ego-involvement-with-the-topic scale. 2) Four questions to see if the subject remembered who agreed and who disagreed with him. 3) The rank ordering of the work partner preferences. 4) The choice of a pair of work partners. 5) Three 5-item 7-point scales measuring social, physical, and task attraction toward each of the four confederates. 6) A 5-item, 2-point scale measuring past contact with Hispanics, and 7) a 7-item, 2-point scale measuring source of information about Hispanics. Subjects took about 15 minutes in filling out the last five pages of this questionnaire.

Design and Analysis. The design included 21 variables, 4 demographic, 8 independent, 2 dependent, and 7 control. Demographic variables were age of subject, hometown, father's occupation, and ethnic background of subject. Dependent variables were ego involvement with topics, scores for each confederate individually on physical attraction, social attraction, task attraction, and the sum of these three called total attraction, prior Hispanic contact, and source of information about Hispanics. Independent variables were 1) Total Prejudice, the sum of the three prejudice scores divided by 3, 2) Hispanic Prejudice, 3) Agreement-Disagreement, 4) Race of Confederate, 5) Sex of Confederate, 6) Sex of Subject, 7) Sex congruence, whether subject sex was same or different from confederate sex, and 8) Topic relevance to Hispanic issues; relevant or irrelevant. Data were analyzed by crosstabulation, correlation, analysis of covariance, and multiple discriminant analysis. This paper reports a first wave analysis based primarily on crosstabulation.

Reliability, Power, Tests of Significance and Effect Sizes. Test-retest reliability of the Bogardus instrument used for the prejudice scales varied between .78 and .89 for the three individual scales and their sum, with a separate group of 27 subjects measured four weeks apart. These same subjects were asked to fill out the three attraction scales for each of four black-and-white head-and-shoulders pictures, two of women and two of men. Four week test-retest reliabilities on these scales and their sum ranged from .66 to .84. Coefficient alpha for these data in
both first and second waves ranged from .58 to .86.

Power of the 2x2 crosstab comparisons was .99, .81, and .16 respectively for large, medium and small effect sizes using a Chi-square test with all 91 subjects. For 3x2 tables with 91 subjects these figures are .99, .72, and .12. Power for arcsine transformation tests with 91 subjects are .99, .92, and .27, for large, medium, and small effect sizes, respectively. Specific powers for tests of hypotheses which are non-significant are given in the results section.

The two-tailed .05 level was used for significance. All significance levels reported are two-tailed. For tables with a total N of less than 24, Fisher's Exact Test was used. For tables with N's greater than or equal to 24, Chi square was used. Pearson's r (which is equivalent to Phi and to Kendall's Tau B for 2x2 tables) was used as the effect size measure for these tests. For tests of proportions, we used the normal curve test applied to the arcsine transformation of the proportions (Cohen, 1977, 180-182), with h, the difference between the two arcsine transforms, used as the effect size measure. Since Fisher's exact tests were used only where total Ns were less than 24, power of these tests was lower than with Chi-square and most arcsine tests. Power of the Fisher's exact tests reported here is no higher than .77, .39, and .10 for large, medium, and small effect sizes, respectively.

RESULTS

Results for this study are reported first for individual variables of importance, and then for increasingly higher order interactions of interest. The major dependent variable reported is first-choice of work partner. Second choices and group choices are also identified such and discussed where relevant.

Belief/Agreement: Communication indicating agreement versus communication indicating disagreement. Sixty-two percent of our subjects chose a confederate who agreed with them as their first choice of work partner, which is significantly higher than the 50% to be expected by chance (h=.34, p<.05, arcsine). This is a medium-to-small ES by Cohen's (1977) system.

Race. Fifty-seven percent chose a white confederate (all subjects were white) which is not significantly different from 50% (h=.20, N.S.D., arcsine). This ES is equal to Cohen's "small" effect size.

Prejudice. a) Black Prejudice. On our 11-point scale from 0 to 10, mean Black prejudice was 2.9 (s=2.0, Md=2.3, Mode=2, range, 0 to 10) with 42% of the cases at the mode. b) Hispanic Prejudice. Mean Hispanic prejudice was 2.0 (s=2.7, Md=1.0, Mode=0, range, 0 to 10) with, again, 42% of the cases at the mode. c) Total Prejudice (Black + Hispanic + Jewish)/3. Mean total prejudice on the same scale was 1.7 (s=2.0, Md=2.0, Mode=0, range, 0 to 8.7) with 26% of the cases at the mode.
Communication of Agreement versus Race. Given a choice of the four confederates, 33% of our subjects selected a white who agreed with them while 14% chose a Hispanic who disagreed, 24% a white who disagreed, and 29% a Hispanic who agreed. Chi-square on this 2x2 table is not significant ($\chi^2 = .75$, $p < .38$).

Communication of Agreement versus Race versus Hispanic Prejudice. For subjects with zero scores for Hispanic prejudice, 55% chose a white confederate while 59% of the group with scores above zero chose a white. These two proportions are not significantly different. Of the 55% of low prejudiced subjects choosing a white, 24% chose a disagreeing white while 75% selected a white who agreed with them. But only 53% of the unprejudiced subjects picking an Hispanic work partner selected an agreeing Hispanic, while 47% selected an Hispanic who disagreed. The difference between 76% and 55% is not significant given a harmonic mean $N$ of 19 with the arcsine test. The direction of these proportions reverses and is significant with the 53 subjects scoring as prejudiced against Hispanics. Of the prejudiced subjects choosing a white, 55% chose a disagreeing white while 45% chose one who agreed. But 77% of the prejudiced subjects who chose an Hispanic selected one who agreed, while only 23% chose one who disagreed ($h = .806$, $p < .01$, arcsine). This overall difference in agree-disagree choices between white and Hispanic confederates is significant ($\chi^2 = 5.46$, $p < .02$, $r = .32$). In addition, among prejudiced subjects, but not unprejudiced ones, 77% of the disagreeing confederates chosen were white ($h = .806$, $p < .01$, arcsine). For prejudiced subjects with agreeing confederates, 45% were white and 55% Hispanic (N.S.D.).

Communication of Agreement versus Race versus Hispanic Prejudice versus Topic Relevance. As mentioned above, 77% of prejudiced subjects who chose an Hispanic, chose an agreeing Hispanic. For whatever reason, this effect was most pronounced with subjects randomized to the Irrelevant Topics condition: 92% of these prejudiced subjects who chose an Hispanic, chose one who agreed, while only 60% of the Relevant Topic prejudiced subjects who chose an Hispanic, chose one who agreed. Non-prejudiced subjects did not show a significant preference for an agreeing Hispanic over one who disagreed, regardless of Topic Relevance condition.

Communication of Agreement versus Race versus Subject Sex. Females selected an agreeing confederate 63% of the time while males chose one at a 58% rate. These differences are not significant. Females selected a white on 62% of their choices, while males selected 48% whites, a non-significant difference. There were no significant differences between males and females in their choices of the four confederates.

Communication of Agreement versus Race versus Hispanic Prejudice versus Sex of Confederate. Female confederates were chosen in 51% of the cases and male
confederate in 49%. But 59% of the females chosen were Hispanic while only 24% of
the males selected were Hispanic. Fully 76% of the males chosen were white. Chi-
square for Race by Sex of Confederate is 10.97 (p<.001, r=.35). This difference is
significant and large (h=.769, p<.0005, arcsine). For the female confederates
there were no differences in the proportion of agreeing confederates chosen between
whites and Hispanics (56% versus 57%), but with male confederates this difference
is significant and in the medium-to-large range (h=.673, p<.05, arcsine): 93% of
the disagreeing male confederates chosen were white and only 7% were Hispanic.
Alternatively, 91% of the male Hispanics chosen agreed and only 9% disagreed. To
put this in absolute terms, only one of the 91 confederates chosen was a disagree-
ing male Hispanic. This compares with 12 of the confederates chosen who were
disagreeing female Hispanics. It seems safe to say that at least in our data, a
male Hispanic must agree in order to have a chance of being selected as a work
partner. If he disagrees, he is exceptionally unlikely to be chosen. This does
not hold true for female Hispanics.

There was a distinct choice bias against white females just as there was
against Hispanic males, even without considering agreement. Only 35% of the whites
chosen were female, while 72% of the Hispanics selected were female ($X^2=12.32,
p<.0005, r=-.37$). This choice bias is equal in strength in both prejudiced and
unprejudiced groups.

Sexcongruence. Results for the sexcongruence variable were all non-
significant.

One effect which barely missed significance (p<.052) would have suggested that pre-
judiced subjects who chose opposite-sex work partners required opposite-sex
Hispanics to agree with them far more often than opposite-sex whites.

Communication-of-Agreement versus Race versus Sex of Confederate versus
Physical Attraction. We have remarked that whites were selected by 57% of our sub-
jects, but that this percentage is not significantly different from the 50% expected
by chance. But for the 13 confederates rated low in physical attractiveness, this
difference is significant: 77% of these 13 were white and only 23% Hispanic. (77%-50%
yields h=.806, p<.01, arcsine). If one is low in physical attractiveness, it is a
distinct advantage (.80 is a large effect size) to be white. This effect is non-
significant for confederates either middle or high in physical attractiveness.

We also pointed out the bias in our subjects' choices in favor of white males and
Hispanic females. This bias interacts with the physical attractiveness of the confed-
erates. It does not occur with confederates of low physical attractiveness
(p<.68, power=.60 for ES estimated on overall ES for all attractiveness conditions),
but does occur separately in both medium ($X^2=4.81, p<.03, r=.44$) and high ($X^2=.32;
p<.004, r=.40$) physical attractiveness conditions. Further, the communication-of-
agreement affects this interaction. While 10 male Hispanics who agree are chosen, only one male Hispanic who disagrees is chosen, and while 4 of these 10 are medium-to-low in physical attractiveness, the single disagreeing male Hispanic chosen was rated as very high in physical attractiveness by the subject who chose him. While the Ns involved in the previous statement are too low for significance testing with any power, we view them as suggestive of the pattern: male Hispanics who disagree appear to need high physical attractiveness in order to provide any chance of being chosen. For female Hispanics, none are chosen when of low physical attractiveness, but the door to employment as a work partner seems to open at a lower level of physical attractiveness than for Hispanic males, even if the females disagree. While the numbers are higher for agreeing female Hispanics, 4 disagreeing Hispanic females of medium physical attractiveness and 7 of high physical attractiveness were chosen. Of the 34 disagreeing confederates chosen, 28 are mid-to-high in physical attractiveness. This is significantly more than would be expected by chance (h=.98, p<.001 arcsine).

Communication-of-Agreement versus Race versus Sex of Confederate versus Total Attractiveness. The results for the Total Attraction variable ((Physical+Task+Social)/3) are identical to the results for physical attraction discussed above, with one exception. While the reason is unclear, white females were chosen only when they were either low (11 choices) or high (8 choices) in Total Attractiveness, never when they were medium in total attractiveness (0 choices). Both the low and high total attractiveness conditions for white females are significantly different from the medium attractiveness condition by the arcsine transformation test, using a 50% chance as the comparison (h=1.571 for both low and high groups, p<.01 in both cases).

Second Choices and Group Choices. For most variables, second choice of work partner mirrored the first choice, but with a weaker effect. In the case of Agreement by Race by Hispanic Prejudice, the effect seen with the first choices reverses. For low prejudice subjects, 81% selecting a disagreeing confederate chose a white and 71% choosing a disagreeing confederate chose a Hispanic ($\chi^2=10.23$, p<.002, r=.52). For first choices these same figures were 39% and 36%, respectively. With prejudiced subjects selecting an agreeing confederate second, 63% chose a white compared with 45% for first choices.

In choice of groups, the major finding of interest is that female subjects tend to select an all white group more often than do males (72% versus 51%, h=.435, p<.05 arcsine). Space does not permit the discussion of other group differences, which are generally of minor interest.
DISCUSSION

H₁ states that belief rather than race will be the major determinant of choice of work partner in the South in the 1980s. This hypothesis was confirmed. The communication of agreement by confederates by itself was a significant factor in choice of work partner, while race of confederate was not, when taken alone. H₂ was confirmed by these same data. It stated that when choosing between whites and Hispanics as work partners, belief rather than race will be the predominant factor. The confirmation of H₁ and H₂ provides support for Rokeach's belief congruence theory and extends that theory's domain into the deep South, where Rokeach was hesitant to extend it and where Triandis flatly predicted it would not work. In fairness, Triandis was discussing black prejudice in the 1960s and we studied Hispanic prejudice in the 1980s, but we see no reason for hypothesizing a different effect based on different ethnic groups in Triandis' rationale. What would have happened in this experiment in the South 20 years ago must remain a matter for speculation.

H₃ was partially confirmed. For female subjects, belief was significant in determining work partner choice, but for males this factor fell just short of significance. Race taken alone was not significant for males or females. Taken together, the confirmation of H₁ and H₂ and the partial confirmation of H₃ suggest that even a brief message communicating agreement on a topic under discussion can be a major factor in overcoming discriminating choice behavior. While long, intimate self-disclosures may be helpful (we have no data on this), it appears from our data that even brief exchanges indicating agreement can promote (and those indicating disagreement can inhibit) the selection of an outgroup member as a work partner.

H₄, the prediction of an interaction between prejudice, race, and communication of agreement, was derived by extending the notion of belief to that of a mediator of attitudinal effects. Rokeach did not find such an effect and played down the attitude notion. But our data gave H₄ resounding confirmation beyond our expectations. Non-prejudiced subjects are just as likely to discriminate against Hispanics in their choice behavior as are prejudiced subjects. But unlike nonprejudiced subjects, those with prejudice who select a Hispanic select one who agrees, and when selecting a disbeliever, select one who is white. The effect of prejudice on behavior, thus, is not simple, but complex, as are most attitude-behavior relationships. Hispanic prejudice influences discriminatory behavior through demanding either a white or an agreeing Hispanic, not by eliminating all or most Hispanic choices.
H₅ concerns the "nothing else going for them" prediction that disagreeers, Hispanics, and, mainly, disagreeing Hispanics will be more likely to be chosen when they are highly physically attractive. This hypothesis was confirmed for all three groups. Members of each such "undesirable" group apparently became more acceptable as work partners when they were physically attractive. In conclusion, race, the communication of agreement, and physical attraction all mediate the choice of work partners, though in different complex but predictable fashions. Both communication and non-communication variables are necessary to the understanding of complex human behaviors, and attempts to either eliminate communication from consideration, or to focus on it alone, are doomed to predict at a level of complexity below that at which human function. Among other things, this study has demonstrated the effect which a brief anti-conflict message can have in a potential conflict situation with strong racial overtones. We hope it will inspire further research either to extend these findings or to prove us wrong.
REFERENCES


