CHILDREN IN AND OUT OF SCHOOL

Ethnography and education

Edited by

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To the memory of

MARGARET MEAD

The keynote speaker and guiding spirit at the conference that culminated in this volume. The tribute to her is by Dell Hymes, and was originally presented to the Council on Anthropology and Education, 1978.

I saw Margaret twice in the last year. The first time was at these meetings a year ago, when late at night she sat in a small hotel room in Houston, elder of the tribe, responding patiently to questioning about the history of her people, anthropologists, as she had known them in the old days, for the benefit of two or three young students. The second time was when she came in April to my university to be keynote speaker, the drawing card, for a conference attempting to bring education and ethnography successfully together there. Her talk was ranging, reflective, concerned with the future. She had known for half a year that she had cancer, but she came to help. So much of what is being remembered about her seems to have that theme: She came to help.

The loss of Margaret Mead will be felt in many fields, but in none more than in education and its anthropological study. She was in the finest sense an educator, through anthropology, of us all. For this she gained great fame--who else among us can expect at our passing to have the head of our government speak of our use of the insights of cultural anthropology?--and for this she paid for a time a certain price. To be famous was to be not respectable in some quarters. There were those who spoke of her as "having left anthropology." Yet she lived to see her professional and her public roles jointly respected and honored. She is the great example of the joining of the two roles in our time, and her example is a resource to all of us who struggle to join them and extend them now.
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INTRODUCTION
PERRY GILMORE AND DAVID MARTIN SMITH

A retrospective discussion of the state of the art in ethnography and education

The articles in this volume were prepared for the Colloquium on Ethnography and Education hosted by Research for Better Schools, Inc. and the University of Pennsylvania in the spring of 1978. The date and the occasion are both significant. The date is important because the ethnography of education enterprise, which has since that time burgeoned, was then still in infancy; the issues debated at the colloquium have been foundational to much of this recent growth. On a sadder note, the date is memorable as one of the last public appearances of Margaret Mead.

The conference was conceived to try to resolve a dilemma. On the one hand we believed strongly that ethnography, with its inherent sensitivity to people, to culture, and to context offered the promise of valuable new practical insights that could lead to the improvement of schools. On the other hand, we found ourselves sharing a general apprehension that an easy enthusiasm without careful regard for the nature of the theoretical assumptions of ethnography could dramatically reduce its usefulness and desirability it to becoming simply another passing fad. The tension created by these two impulses, the one to go forward as quickly as possible in exploring new applications of ethnography to education, and the other to hold back, to clarify, to define and to set standards, created a tenor of cautious optimism at the conference.

The occasion itself was important for the kinds of people it brought together in intense discussion--staff of the federal Office of Education, state education officers, school practitioners, university researchers (including anthropologists, linguists, folklorists, developmental psychologists), and the staff of the regional educational laboratory--as well as for the impulses giving birth to it. The unusual mix of constituents at the meeting was noted by Margaret Mead in her Keynote Address. Having never addressed quite such a group, she commented that it was a "nice hot spot to do some thinking." It clearly was.

There were two distinct and significant contexts in which that "thinking" took place. First, there was considerable diversity among the presenters (those who were doing ethnographic research in education). Not only did they identify themselves with several disciplines, their approaches to the ethnographic study of children in and out of school were different.
The folklorists, for example, brought a rich familiarity with children's behavior in peer groups (see Bauman, Sutton-Smith, Kirshenblatt-Gimblett). Their view had not commonly been a part of the educational ethnography community (see Cazden for further discussion of this). The colloquium also brought together several of the ethnographers doing micro-analysis of children's interactions in school and home settings (see Mehan; Shultz, Florio, and Erickson; McDermott and Hood). One concern among the researchers themselves was to wrestle with the micro-macro dichotomy to come up with some compatible merging of the two approaches (see Hymes; Heath; and Cazden for their discussions of these issues). Other concerns reflected in the conference were the use of quantitative data and analysis in ethnographic research (see Jacob, for example) and the ethical dilemma posed in using ethnography for evaluation (see Kirshenblatt-Gimblett for discussion). Thus the researchers brought an agenda for debate among themselves that dealt most specifically with theoretical clarifications and definitions—the "holding back" impulse mentioned above.

The second communication context was defined by the interaction between the presenters and those practitioners, policy makers, and education researchers who were there not only to learn about ethnography, but also to help explore ways of making it useful to the education community.

In practical terms, this meant that the research findings presented were greeted with openness, by an audience receptive and generally hungry for insights into the reasons for the present condition of schooling or the promise of improvement. Each proffered set of findings was subjected to intense examination and discussion. We consider it significant that the major concerns of the audience were not so much with the validity of the findings but rather were voiced as two practical questions, "How is this information going to help Monday morning in the classroom?" and "given the way school systems are constructed, is ethnography really a practical approach to research?"

THE STATE OF THE ART

The first question was, predictably, asked by the practitioners in the audience, the second by those with an interest in research policy and management. Yet they reflect more than simply the occupational biases of the questioners. They were understandable, and serious, reactions to the state of the art in ethnography of education—as represented by the conference papers.

The classroom studies were seen as both costly and potentially intrusive, although yielding impressive results. The theory and history papers, on the other hand, raised a different sort of problem. Whereas seen as harmlessly academic by practitioners, to the thoughtful researcher they represent a radically different way of approaching the education research enterprise. If ethnography is based on the theoretical and historical underpinnings described in the Heath and Hymes articles it will inevitably have to address a set of new questions, sometimes seemingly tangential, and even alien to those of traditional education research. It will inexorably yield a data set not easily amenable to the statistical manipulation or correlations most frequently used in education research.

The attempt to view ethnography through the lenses of educational psychology and, indeed, even to translate its lexicon into that of educational psychology, can be seen as a subtle yet ubiquitous theme in the conference debate. The issue is taken up in McDermott and Hood's contribution in this volume. We raise it here simply because it leads to another major concern that has yet to be adequately aired by ethnographers of education.
Before we can even begin to formulate answers to the two practical questions posed by conference participants, ethnography must undertake to negotiate its relationship to educational research and practice. Ethnographers, partly by choice, are outsiders. They have come, as the conference presentations and discussion make clear, asking to be let in because they have something to offer. They have not, however, come with hat in hand asking to serve as "handmaidens" (cf. Smith 1977).

Ethnographers who find their roots in anthropology tend to view the transmission of culture as their own special purview. This view is quite appropriate for outsiders so long as they are addressing their own colleagues, or merely offering educators insights to use as they wish. It is another thing when they begin to act as though their expertise will yield definitive answers to pressing education problems or will confer the right to simply move in and displace educational researchers. Such an approach not only confronts issues of turf but risks, for ethnographers, denying in practice that which is basic to their science and which holds the promise of usefulness.

What ethnography should bring to education is not answers, but a listening, learning posture that--based in respect for informants--leads to the explication of the important, unaddressed questions. Educators are anxious to have this happen. They know best that schools are struggling and are viewed as being in serious trouble. They are the ones who are taking the heat. They have, albeit with understandable caution, opened the door to ethnography. The conference proceedings reported here stand as solid evidence.

Seizing the opportunity presented by this opening, however, will not depend on ethnography coming with a sophisticated, proven set of research techniques. Neither will a coherent, history-attested, theoretical perspective carry the day. The crucial ingredient will be a supportive, mutually rewarding relationship. Ethnographers cannot effectively operate as outsiders with little real vested interest in the practice of education or as wholesale replacement for the fallible expertise already in place. Any assessment of the state of the art of educational ethnography must first look at the relationship and secondarily at the fruitfulness of the research technology and the adequacy of theory. Despite the enthusiasm generated by the conference presentations and subsequent discussions, it is clear that progress on the relationship lags behind that on technology and theory.

FOUR MAJOR THEMES:
A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS

This excursion into the state of the art and the concerns of the various groups represented at the colloquium is not a digression, but provides a setting for the remainder of this essay. The overriding reason for the conference was the need to pause and take stock--this, of course, in the interest of guiding future efforts. But now the future has arrived. We, as the authors of this introduction, find ourselves in the unique position of being able to point up the major themes emerging from the conference and also tracing their evolution in the research efforts during the three years between the colloquium and the present. We take this as the central task of this paper. To accept the traditional mandate for an introductory chapter, that of synthesizing the conference proceedings, would be largely redundant. The Cazden paper and the discussion included in the final section of the volume serve the needs of synthesis.
One caveat at the outset: Although we are conversant generally with the major research efforts in the field, much of what we report here is based on our own experiences and on the reports presented at the first two Ethnography and Education Research Forums hosted by the University of Pennsylvania, which were in fact an indirect outgrowth of the conference reported in the present volume. For us, and for many of our colleagues as well, the Colloquium has had a direct influence on the direction our work has taken. Some of this can be traced to the presence of National Institute of Education and other Office of Education staff at the conference. These individuals were able to communicate to us their agenda and concerns and found time to hear what we were doing and could do.

Although this kind of dialogue between funding agencies and their contractors and consumers is important—and all too rare—the most long-lasting effects of a colloquium such as this are not to be found in the direction funded research is pushed. Funding is subject to vagaries outside the control of any single agency. The most permanent effects are traceable to the saliency of the themes and issues raised and resolved through the process of interaction.

We find that four important issues were raised again and again, either explicitly or implicitly. All of them are treated in the contributions in this volume as they appeared important to the authors at the time of the Colloquium. We are looking at them as they retrospectively have proven significant in subsequent research. These four themes are:

1. The discontinuity between school and the home/community contexts in which children live and the concomitant amount of "work" demanded of children in coping with the discontinuity;
2. The relative usefulness of micro- and macro-ethnographic approaches;
3. A concern for understanding the roots of ethnography and for guarding the integrity of its theoretical underpinnings; and
4. The tension between theory and practice.

Children's "Work" and Home-school Discontinuity

Anthropologists view schooling as a cultural process and schools as cultural institutions. This conceptualization inevitably throws into relief the differences between interactive contexts. Followed to its logical conclusion, schools are painted as alien institutions in the community, organized around a set of values and beliefs frequently not shared by the children they serve. Children, socialized in diverse contexts, come to school differentially prepared to cope with school demands. As a result they experience school differentially, to the decided disadvantage of some.

The view of home-school discontinuity further finds credence in the stereotypes many educators hold about the family and street life of the children. The micro-ethnographic studies of classroom social organization and of home contexts tend to reinforce the sense of distance between the two worlds. By highlighting contrasting interactional structures they depict the interactions as terribly complex. One is frequently left with the impression that children must do superhuman "work" simply to survive in the school contexts.

As a result, from the viewpoint of the school practitioner, although the onus for failure may be shifted from the child to the school, the picture that emerges is more hopeless than ever. It is in this context,
conscious of structural constraints they labor under, that school practitioners question the practical application of ethnography. Historically, anthropologists have had little practice in doing more than telling "how things are," so our attempts to provide answers to the question are typically feeble.

Recent research efforts are changing our notions of the nature of home/community-school discontinuity and the apparent work children have to do to negotiate in their various settings. As it turns out, the picture painted above is basically an adult or educentric view, and does not reflect the reality children themselves experience. In addition it suffers, as McDermott and Hood point out, by attempting to accommodate an ethnographic perspective on interaction to an educational psychology notion of children and the tasks they face.

To take up the latter point first, as long as we continue to locate the problem of school failure in social organizational processes and yet seek the solutions in changing what is in the heads of children and then assess progress by measures of competence, we are destined to have limited success. To find solutions we must go whole-hog from the perspective we have started with. We must assume children do not fail in school because they are not competent to deal with the new context but because, essentially, their survival needs are met by failing. If they fail not because the context is alien but because at least half the class must fail by definition, then the cards are stacked against them.

By the same token, blaming failure on the impossible work children are required to perform is the result of several misconceptions. The micro-ethnographic research itself serves to point up the amazing skill displayed even by the failures. Gilmore (1979), in a paper describing and analyzing a private language created by her son (5.5–6.9 years) and a Kenyan friend (6–7 years), has indirectly called into question some of our assumptions about the difficulty of social and linguistic tasks and the abilities of children to accomplish them. When faced with the need for communication and the absence of a common code, the two boys developed a language that adequately served their needs. The children created and spoke primarily in their pidgin during the 15 months they were friends and neighbors on an isolated hillside in the Kenya bush. Gilmore’s study details both lexical and grammatical creativity and invention in their language, including, for example, original syntactic devices for expressing tense and aspect. This study presents striking evidence that children are not only capable of, but can be quite ingenious at, transcending substantial linguistic and cultural differences. Differences much less extreme than those the two children faced are often represented as insurmountable in discussions of culture conflict in American classrooms.

As we turn our research attention to these aspects of peer culture, the Gilmore study being just one of a number of recent efforts, it is becoming apparent that the work children are called on to perform in the pursuit of success is not of the difficulty our models would suggest. This does not mean that their tasks are simple, it simply means that the complexity that overwhelms us in our research efforts is probably more a function of our models than of their realities. We err in equating the complexity of our analyses with the difficulty of their tasks.

We are not suggesting that there are no difficult tasks our children are faced with in urban classrooms. We are questioning whether we have been depicting the right ones as hard. McDermott and Hood (this volume) have questioned why it is a child can not learn appropriate turn-taking behavior after years of schooling. It is our position that the turn-taking behavior exhibited by the child must be adaptive given the social contexts. It has little to do with difficulty.
Returning to the issue of discontinuity, the distinctness of school and community/home environments has been questioned in several recent studies. Contrastive studies of community and school tend to focus on the differences in values, language and discourse styles, and interactional patterns. What is neglected are the reciprocal influences at work in these contexts. In our own research on literacy in the home we have been finding that much at-home time is structured by school culture. Not only do parents follow explicit directions about how to conduct homework sessions during the school year but even summer practice and assignments take up many at-home hours. In search of home literacy patterns it is difficult to sort out distinctly school from community aligned practices. McDermott and Morison in a recent report on a similar community literacy study discuss the formality that often characterizes these school-like interactions at home (1981).

Where does this leave us? It brings us scarcely closer to answering the questions of practical application posed by school practitioners. It does demonstrate the validity of their pessimism. Studies of children's peer subcultures make it clear that school-home/community discontinuity or the consequent work students are forced to engage in, are as empty as explanations for school failure as was the presumption of cognitive deficit. Furthermore, the answers seem not to be forthcoming from the micro-ethnographic studies alone which, to some, have become the trademark of ethnography.

Micro- and Macro-ethnographic Approaches to Education

In recent years the microanalysts of interaction have had a strong influence on work being done by many ethnographers. With approaches taken from ethnomethodology, kinesics, proxemics, linguistic, and with the technological advances in video recording techniques, classroom ethnographers found that they were able to intensively examine small units or strips of behavior. This is the basic character of much of the ethnographic classroom research being done at the time of the colloquium.

Although microethnography cannot claim direct lineage to the mainstream of traditional anthropology, the reasons for its popularity in educational research are not difficult to trace. Some ethnographers of education were trained in ethnomethodology, a tradition of analyzing selected behavior patterns with little immediate concern for the culture as a whole. To some degree the penchant for micro-studies can be seen as a natural extension of kinesic, proxemic, psychological, and linguistic interests in studying the interactive behavior of individuals. Finally, micro ethnography can be seen simply as an accommodation of ethnography to the problems of studying complex societies. Where it is impossible to make the society as a whole the unit of study, and no smaller unit appears to naturally emerge, an obvious solution is to focus on apparently bounded contexts, such as a reading group, or an identifiable series of events, like turn-taking, in a lesson or a meal.

Micro approaches have always had serious detractors both within and outside the ranks of ethnographic researchers. Ogbu, for example, has consistently argued that lack of attention to the wider social context dooms ethnographic research to impotency in its search for answers to school failures (cf. Ogbu 1980). Our own research, in which we have started with teacher-perceived problems in the teaching of language arts, and examined the issues they indicated both in the classroom and outside it, has convinced us that serious attempts to explain any school phenomenon

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will inevitably depend on the care with which leads are pursued through various levels of the school's social structure and into the wider community (Hymes et al. 1981).

These studies stand as responses to the Heath call (this volume) for research attention to wider contexts. Her own recent work (1980) as well as that reported by McDermott and Morison (1981) have also reflected this interest in out-of-the-classroom contexts. Of significance, having found ourselves free of the constraints of a micro-perspective, a new unit of focus has emerged, the school community. This community is more than simply a geographic entity. It is a cultural entity consisting of families and the school, which are bound by a set of attitudes, values, and social statuses.

Heath, without using the term "school community," describes what appear to be three community types. One, which she calls school-oriented, finds parents consciously seeking to socialize their children into the literacy culture of the school and then following through to see that they are enrolled in a school where their skills and values will stand them in good stead. A second relational type, her Roadville families, make the same sort of effort— but being limited in scope and follow-through leave the children disadvantaged in school. The third type, the Trackton families, appear to make little effort to accommodate the school's culture of literacy. Their children also find themselves at disadvantage in school even though they may have mastered some of the higher order skills valued by the school.

McDermott and Morison describe the culture of literacy of Irish American families in New York who send their children to a parochial school. They show how the families' organization of activities around literacy is in direct reaction to their perceptions of school demands. In presenting this analysis the authors explicitly point out that the micro-analysis they use is embedded in the context of the community culture:

Ethnography is a story telling enterprise, where the plot line is gradually filled in by the details of the lives people lead with each other...
We are aware, however, that good ethnography moves beyond well-told stories. There is a place in ethnographic analysis when the narratives can be broken down into pieces and the parts can be shown to relate to each other in quite specific ways. (p. 111-5)

These recent developments do not necessarily suggest that micro-studies must be abandoned as useless. They do suggest that their value is enhanced when they are embedded in or combined with understandings of wider cultural contexts. Two good examples of the power of combining micro and macro levels of analysis are provided by Theophano and Shultz (1981) and in the Gilmore study (1979a, b, c) referred to above.

In a presentation at the second University of Pennsylvania Ethnography in Education Research Forum, Theophano, who had done fieldwork in the community over a several-year period, contributed the cultural context in which Shultz and she analyzed a videotape of one meal. They examined "multiple layers of data" to explore correspondences between social interactions of specific events and basic cultural assumptions of the broader community.

Gilmore, in her analysis of the development of a spontaneous pidgin, found that structural or process questions were best answered through micro-analysis of tape-recorded discourse between the children. "Why" questions, however, concerning the values, beliefs, and social contexts of
the children's community could be answered only through macro-analysis. She found that the two levels of analysis not only complemented each other, provided a fuller picture of "what's going on," but more important, the two levels validated each other (1979b,c).

To sum up, it appears that movement in the past three years has been away from dependence on micro approaches in ethnographic research on education. Concomitant with this movement has been the identification of a potentially significant unit of research focus, the school community. This trend does not overlook the important contributions micro-ethnographic studies have made to our understanding of education. They are, in fact, the foundation on which the new is being built.

Not accidently these recent developments in ethnographic research have the effect of bringing us closer to a fidelity to our own roots. They further promise to help us answer what Hymes has claimed should be the central question for an anthropology of education, "what kinds of schools are there?" by yielding the cumulative data on individual schools that can be used in comparative generalizations or the creation of an educational ethnology (Hymes 1980a).

The Search for Historic and Theoretical Roots

The conference's attempts to define the essentials of an ethnography of education may not have been of pressing concern to many of the participants. The effort did, however, relate to a number of issues on their minds. How, for example, to get a fix on what was happening, to assess the usefulness of ethnographic research? If ethnography was simply an informal technique, amenable to use by anyone, as it sometimes appeared, how could one be assured that its findings were valid or reliable? A tracing of its historical development as a disciplined, and tested, perspective could presumably go far to allay these fears. A demonstration that a coherent set of theoretical principles had indeed been formulated and that, at least, some of the bewildering variety of research activities claiming to be ethnographic could be seen as consistent with this theory, should aid in sorting the wheat from the chaff. The efforts could well have the additional salutory effect of discouraging those not familiar with the theory from passing themselves off as ethnographers.

The effort was, of course, doomed to little more than partial success from the beginning. The fact is that ethnography as practiced by educational researchers did not have a single theoretical heritage. Developmental psychologists, linguists, sociologists, folklorists, ethnographers, cultural anthropologists, and a variety of social scientists not easily placed in any disciplinary box found themselves doing "ethnography of education" and all claimed that these approaches were consistent with their own disciplinary perspectives.

In some respects cultural anthropology's claim appears to be one of the weakest. It was developed and nurtured through studies of small societies significantly different from our own both in scale and cultural organization. It flourished in contexts where it was seldom called to answer to the people it studied or to demonstrate through practical application the usefulness and validity of its findings.

The sense that ethnography needed to demonstrate its theoretical and historical legitimacy to education was not born of paranoia. As a source of information useful to either practitioners or policy makers it did not seem to have lived up to some of its early promise. Both in the literature
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(e.g., Mulhauser 1974; Schwille and Porter 1976) and in the conference it was greeted with some skepticism by researchers and policy makers.

Even though this skepticism may have been a reaction to the faddish popularity that ethnography was coming to enjoy, hindsight would suggest that it was not to be dissipated by informing educators of the history and of the anthropological theory underlying ethnography. The roots of the pessimism went deeper than simple lack of information.

It seems to us that the skeptical reaction on the part of educational researchers and policy makers to ethnography sprang from two sources. One was the undefined or unnegotiated relationship that had developed almost willy-nilly between ethnography and the education establishment. The other, related to this, was the lack of reflective analysis on the part of ethnographers themselves as to the nature of their own science.

Working with educators presented a new challenge to ethnography beyond that alluded to above occasioned by the need to find a useful unit of focus in a complex society. Ethnographers have traditionally "studied down." (See Hymes 1969 and Nader 1969 for thoughtful discussions of this issue.) Furthermore, anthropologists typically assumed the position of "marginal natives" (Freilich 1970) in conducting their fieldwork. Some may have assumed the same positions in looking at schooling, that is, viewed it as down and themselves as marginal, but the stance turns out to be inappropriate.

The education system not only is part of the investigators' culture, it boasts its own set of highly skilled researchers. (It is interesting in this regard that CAE, the Council on Anthropology and Education, the organizational home for anthropologists researching education, and AERA, the American Educational Research Association, the educational researchers' primary professional organization, still hold memberships that are largely exclusive one from the other.) The ethnographers' marginality to the educational subculture, if it is characteristic, is not simply neutral outside-ness. They tend to align themselves or be seen as aligned with the social critics of schools. To take two examples, Rist's Urban School: Factory for Failure and Rosenfeld's popular monograph, Shut Those Thick Lips, while perhaps technically good ethnographies, could not easily be embraced as neutral descriptions by educators or education researchers. In these books, they, at least implicitly, are cast as the perpetrators of the state of affairs depicted in the studies.

The ethnographers, who took up the challenge of demonstrating the validity of their findings (as to some extent those defining the essentials from a historical or theoretical perspective were doing), found themselves in other traps. The cannons of validity held by educational researchers--adequate sample size, statistical significance, etc.--were consistent with a research perspective and had evolved in a research tradition radically different from that of ethnography. This perspective was not limited to affecting research but was widely shared by practitioners and policy makers, and indeed, the structure of schooling itself reflects this perspective. Therefore, the only kinds of research results that could be seen as useful, that is implementable in formulating policy or developing curricula, were those couched in the formats and language of educational research.

Whereas sorting out the details of this in real life practice would be complex and too time consuming for this essay, the result is that even presenting ethnography as an historically legitimate, theoretically consistent research tradition did little to allay the concerns of the educational community. Its results still are not presented in "useful" form (the argument in Mulhauser 1974, for example) and the tradition itself appears disturbingly unscientific. Even more problematic were attempts to translate these results, to quantify ethnographic data, and to adopt the
terminology of educational research. The differences proved much too profound.

We will return to the relational problem presently. First, however, we must come back to the second source of conflict between ethnography and traditional educational research, the lack of reflection by ethnographers on the nature of their science. A few scholars have attempted to examine the basic differences underlying the various research paradigms (see, for example, Magoon 1977 and Wilson 1977). Many ethnographers, however, seemed to view ethnography as primarily a set of techniques that could be contrasted with other techniques—such as the experimental, survey, or psychometric. It even became common to view ethnographic research and quantitative studies as mutually exclusive. On the other side, ethnography was frequently equated with qualitative, naturalistic, field-based, or participant observation research.

Considering ethnography as simply another technique presented no inherent problem to educational researchers. They had long been using observations and other informal measures in their own research. These were seen primarily as supplemental to other techniques or as preliminary approaches (in formative evaluations, for example). In fact, it was this view of ethnography as a technique that has lead to its faddish popularity—after all, being an ethnographer doesn't require the onerous work of learning statistics—and became a major concern to anthropologists.

In a nutshell, the skepticism of educational researchers toward ethnography, understandable from their perspective, appeared to create something of a no-win situation for the ethnographers. If ethnography is a simple technique, as the relatively unreflective use of it had suggested, it should be amenable to the kinds of rigorous testing applied to other techniques. If it is, in fact, a historically and theoretically legitimate research perspective, but one that leads to condemnation of the best efforts of education with little promise of practical solution to the problems it identifies, who needs it?

Recent experiences show a different picture emerging. When the relationship between ethnographers and school communities is given a chance to develop in a mutually respectful climate, establishing historical and theoretical claims to legitimacy takes on a new meaning and, in fact, as a practical matter is diminished. The needs of educational researchers, as they see them, and the essentials of ethnography turn out to be congruent.

For example, the essentials of ethnography as a perspective useful to understanding education are not participant observation or nonquantification of data. Insofar as these are important at all it is as means to ends, or as the unavoidable consequences of fidelity to the underlying perspective of holism, inductiveness, and the use of a cultural construct.

What is essential for educational research is the inherent collaborative-ness of the approach and the requirement for ethnographers to take an open exploratory, or "one down" (Agar's term, 1980), learning posture towards education. These are essential because they lead to such things as rigor in asking the right questions (in addition to rigor in the model of the kind traditional researchers are concerned with), the collection of cumulative data on individual school settings, and the possibilities of forming valid comparative generalizations about the kinds of schools that exist in our society (Hymes 1980b).

These are all issues educational researchers recognize as important and that their traditional approaches have done little to clarify. They know full well that their best efforts have not solved the problems of American Education. They are aware that validity and reliability in models are of no use if the wrong questions have been asked originally. Furthermore, they
have a vested interest in finding ways to look at these issues. When this kind of mutually respectful, long term, collaborative relationship is forthcoming, several unexpected results ensue. The issue of perspective versus technique disappears. Educators are not looking for new techniques to simply examine the questions they have already raised. When they are socialized into the perspective of ethnography they will find the techniques they need. (We have recently led 22 staff members of the Office of Research and Evaluation of the Philadelphia School System through an intensive one-week training seminar that demonstrated this can successfully be done.) These may include survey studies, for example, but the questions on the questionnaires will not be typical of those they used in other studies. It may even include mathematical manipulation of data—but not using the statistics they traditionally have facility with (Zachary 1981).

The outsider-insider problem resolves itself. Ethnography is not an esoteric set of skills that is the purview of anthropologists or sociologists and cannot be transmitted. It is a perspective that can be adopted if enough effort and good will are expended. Good ethnography, furthermore, rests definitionally on insider-outsider collaboration, collaboration in which both parties share the work as well as the rewards of the effort.

Finally, the search for historical and theoretical roots is not undertaken to legitimate our presence in an alien context. If undertaken at all it is done as a mutual effort, with our collaborators, to refine our theory and to better understand ourselves and our tasks. One of the most rewarding outcomes for an anthropologist, in doing ethnography of education is the professional growth he or she sustains, the sense indeed of being on the "cutting edge" of theory refinement.

What is emerging in ethnography and education, as we work out the nature of our relationship, is truly a "new animal." Surprisingly, however, it is a new creation characterized by the often overlooked "essentials" of the old ethnography. It is new in that in adapting itself to a new time and place, it has had to develop traits that were often only potentially present in the old contexts.

The Tension Between Theory and Practice

Developments relating to the final theme of the conference, the tension between theory and practice, have largely been anticipated in the foregoing discussion. This was not a tension between ethnography and traditional approaches to education, except insofar as ethnography professed to offer more practically useful results. At the conference, except in panels, there were few presentations by practitioners (teachers and administrators). The papers were the work of researchers with practitioners and policy makers assuming the reactor roles. In the recent conferences we have hosted or participated in (University of Delaware, 1980, and the first two Annual University of Pennsylvania Ethnography in Education Research Forums) this has not been the case. Practitioners have not only made presentations but theirs have typically been the most enthusiastically received.

The change has not been accidental. Ethnographers had long claimed that of all approaches to research, ethnography held the best promise of being democratic in keeping the ownership of research findings in the hands of those most directly involved in the work of making schools effective (e.g., Hymes 1980b). This claim was infrequently borne out in practice. Therefore, the appeal of the principal at the colloquium, "what am I
going to be able to take back and use Monday morning?" was regarded as a serious challenge.

The claim to ethnography's usefulness was more the result of armchair reflection upon the logical application of its perspective to school settings than of field experiences. Perhaps unfortunately, many of those doing ethnography showed little commitment to make practiceable this underlying philosophy. The results of ethnographic studies were reported in dissertations or in articles prepared for scholarly journals. Ethnographers who seem to have a keen sense of what we have considered the ethnographic perspective and who did prepare monographs that could be read by the practicing public, such as Wolcott's *The Man in The Principal's Office* (1974), tended to scare practitioners with the detail of their reportage and the clear conclusion that they were able to do this kind of work only because of the leisure their profession, professor of higher education, afforded. Ethnographic research was seen, like other modes of research, as the purview of professionals who studied subjects and settings.

The fault does not lie entirely with the researchers. Professional recognition that comes from publication for a research- or policy-oriented audience is where the pay-off lies. No adequate vehicle existed, nor does one yet exist, to reach practitioners with the results of research, at least not so that they are perceived as being of vital and direct importance. More seriously, the structure of the educational-research establishment is such that practitioners do not have a sense of their vested interest in research, nor does effective networking take place among teachers and administrators so they can share either the problems they face in common or the answers they have formulated. Too often practitioners are seen as, and see themselves as, end points on a linear research model--either they are the subjects on the one extreme or the consumers on the other. In both positions their role is that of passive object of the experts' attention.

For ethnographers this model represents a perversion of their perspective. Practitioners, in the contexts under investigation, are not subjects to be studied but informants, the ones who have the information, and collaborators in the process of reaching understanding. This view of participants as informants and collaborators is the uniquely rich resource for ethnography. It means that potentially both the answers and the research questions can ultimately be found in situ.

One of the reasons this resource has been so little exploited is again found in the unnegotiated relationship we have allowed to exist between the researcher and the participants in the setting. Ethnographers have frequently been content to allow themselves to be cast in the role of traditional educational researcher--the intruder who will be around for a while and then forever disappear.

Another barrier to our successful creation of a uniquely ethnographic model of school research is the reward structure that exists in the educational establishment. Heretofore, anthropologists have been able to research third world societies, and even pariah groups in our own society (such as street corner society), with little regard for rewarding informants for their part in the research. If we are going to truly make our informants collaborators it is not enough to simply establish long term, learning relationships with them. We must find ways to have them share in the rewards of our efforts.

For the researcher these rewards are articles published and read by colleagues, academic advancement, and professional recognition. School practitioners find the same or comparable rewards appealing to them. Although the same vehicles for publication and sharing do not presently
exist for practitioners, they do have the opportunities to conduct in-services or to produce newsletters, for example. In addition to professional recognition, they welcome other supportive adults in their classrooms or offices with whom they can reflect, without fear of being "put down" on their own experiences. Presentations of experiences at professional meetings is as meaningful to them as it is to researchers. Finding research models that reward both parties to the collaboration is not only an ethical imperative, it is good research strategy—both politically and substantively.

In our own research efforts we have experimented with a number of techniques for making the notion of collaboration not only real but rewarding professionally and productive of immediately useful results. Common to all of these is a conception of research as a dialectic between practitioners that investigates the simultaneous processes of question formulation, data collection, analysis, validation, and application. We attempt to avoid at all costs perceptions of the process as a linear progression with researchers controlling the flow of information and ultimately in a position to establish claims of ownership on any outcome.

As examples, we began one major project by asking teachers to identify the major issue they faced in the teaching of language arts. Then the researchers, in the classroom, worked with the teachers to uncover the dimensions of the issue and how it was perceived by students. After further pursuing the issue into the community and homes of the students, results were shared with the teachers so that they could take responsibility for implementing them in their teaching.

Teachers and administrators are given graduate program tuition credits as reward for participation in the research projects and, where appropriate, credit for the research is counted as part of the course requirement. Advanced doctoral students who have regular employment in schools are encouraged to do descriptive case studies in their own schools or school communities as their analytical project requirements for graduation. Several have already been awarded degrees and, in addition to the contributions their studies have made to our cumulative store of information about schools, they form a cadre of trained professionals in the field enhancing efforts at continued collaboration.

Practitioners are invited to make presentations at professional meetings, to prepare papers on their own, to serve on the planning committee for the annual Ethnography in Education Research Forum, and to participate in the development of funding proposals. Finally, a group of principals and teachers are presently preparing the Winter, 1983 issue of the Generator, the publication of AERA Group G. This will give them a wide audience for publicizing their research efforts. These experiments are not unique to us but are being reported by a number of our colleagues in other institutions and communities.

Although we do not pretend to have worked miracles, our experiences suggest that a model of researcher-practitioner collaboration is possible, a model that conceptualizes the needs of the two enterprises not simply as complementary but essentially the same. One practical result is that we now have far more requests to conduct "research" in classrooms and schools, requests by teachers and administrators, than we can honor.

Perhaps the most dramatic attestation to the change in climate from that at the colloquium is provided by the principal who raised the "what can you do for my Monday morning needs?" question. In a talk he gave at the University of Delaware's annual Educational Research symposium in the spring of 1980 this same principal remarked:
Prior to this relationship, the University had a very negative impression on many of the school people of Philadelphia. Our impression of the University was, that although it is situated in the city limits, it did not really involve itself in the issues confronting urban education until now. This program was a 180 degree turn in that situation. The University has been very accommodating and we have pretty much been given our heads. And to me this has been the greatest thing about this cooperative enterprise—we were not seen as people that they were going to foist something upon, but people to work with and develop team relationship. I really appreciate that.

(Matteo 1981:18)

**PLAN OF THE BOOK**

The chapters in the book have been divided into three sections for the convenience of the reader: A Search for Historic and Theoretical Roots, Explorations in the Practice of Ethnography, and Reflections on the State of the Art.

In the first section, *A Search for Historic and Theoretical Roots*, the chapters by Hymes and Heath provide a framework for the reader by setting ethnography in context. In this section the authors wrestle with definitions of ethnography, discuss its basic underlying principles, and propose ways in which it can be useful to education.

The second section, *Explorations in the Practice of Ethnography*, presents a range of ethnographic studies. This research defines by illustration some essential characteristics of ethnography. The first two articles in the section (Mehan; Shultz, Florio, and Erickson) present a range of ethnography using video data, which allows for a careful microanalysis of behaviors not possible when relying on participant observer field notes. Mehan offers an example of what he has termed "constitutive ethnography," which explicates details of the underlying structure of interactional events in the classroom. His analysis highlights the interactional competence required by children in classrooms in order to display their academic knowledge successfully. Shultz, Florio, and Erickson build on Mehan's structural model and meticulously examine and compare the participation structures of a family meal and a formal classroom lesson, examining home and school discontinuities and the ways children make sense of these two worlds. Jacob also looks at children's behavior across home and school settings. Her Puerto Rican study combines what she calls quantitative and ethnographic approaches used to answer questions neither approach could answer alone. Labov's chapter strongly echoes the theme of discontinuity between home and school by summarizing and detailing the sociolinguistic evidence for the existence of competing value systems found in inner-city schools. The final two chapters in the second section present folklore perspectives on informal learning, out of school. Bauman examines children's expressive folk culture revealing children's competencies that educators might easily fail to see. Sutton-Smith details the effects of economic, social, and historical notions about play and how they have framed our theoretical assumptions about children and their development.

In the third and final section, *Reflections on the State of the Art*, a range of reactions to the chapters is presented by five different authors. Their remarks reflect on the different themes, issues, and concerns of the field of ethnography and education in general and of the articles in the volume in particular. Cazden opens the review with a discussion of the
central themes of the volume: continuity vs. discontinuity in children's lives; the role of folklore in education; researcher/educator collaboration; and micro vs. macro levels of analysis. She not only summarizes the presentations of these issues but contributes further insights of her own. Scanlon sketches an educational context in which to judge the contributions and merits and stresses the obligations and responsibilities of ethnographic studies. As an educator and policy maker, he describes the present needs of the educational community to which ethnographers must address themselves. McDermott and Hood's remarks follow with a more cautionary note. They warn ethnographers not to blindly allow educators to define the problems to be addressed. They suggest that even the language used by educators to state their needs, grounded as it is in psychology, may obscure real issues meriting investigation. Sanday distinguishes between anthropological investigations of education and educational researchers' uses of ethnographic techniques in school studies. She notes that the views of Hymes and Heath, which frame this volume, are representative of the anthropologists' perspective. Finally, Kirshenblatt-Gimblett lists what she sees as some of the uses and potential dangers of ethnography in education.

REFERENCES


A SEARCH FOR HISTORIC AND THEORETICAL ROOTS
Ethnography in education: Defining the essentials

In the play Travesties by Tom Stoppard, a character makes the following comment about the meaning of the words art and artist: "Doing the things by which is meant Art is no longer considered the proper concern of the artist. In fact it is frowned upon. Nowadays, an artist is someone who makes the things he does." This article suggests that the state of the art of ethnography may have come to the point where anthropologists can echo Stoppard's character to describe the change in the meaning of the word ethnography: "Doing the things by which is meant Ethnography is no longer considered the proper concern of the anthropologist. In fact it is frowned upon. Nowadays, an ethnographer is someone who makes ethnography mean the things he does."

Recently, researchers in the field of education have been particularly prone to use the terms ethnography or ethnographic to describe studies using participant observation, naturalistic inquiry, and open-ended research designs (e.g., Wilson 1977; Rist 1975). Thus ethnography in education has become a set of techniques in search of a discipline within the social sciences. A variety of researchers, many nonanthropologists, either "do ethnography" or critique ethnographic methods without reflecting the historical, methodological, and theoretical links of ethnography to cultural anthropology. Numerous methods and approaches, described as qualitative, naturalistic, ecological, and holistic, are identified as ethnographic, characteristic of or having the form of ethnography. Though it is not necessary to claim that only anthropologists can do ethnographic research, it is important to recognize that many of the methods, rationales for open-ended research techniques, and theoretical guides to interpretation of data gathered by these means derive in large part from anthropology.

Therefore, it seems necessary to define the fundamental characteristics of ethnography as they derive from anthropology, and also to clarify the difference between a full-scale ethnography and ethnographic studies that use some essential methods of ethnography. An understanding of ethnography depends on linking it to its traditional disciplinary base in anthropology and its role in the anthropologist's study of human behavior in cross-cultural perspective. To grasp the distinctions of methodology frequently said to characterize ethnographic research in education, one
must recognize the similarities and differences between these research techniques and those found in social psychology, sociology, and other disciplines that have focused on the study of human behavior in formal institutional settings of complex societies. In essence, if the term ethnographic is to have a consistent identity in educational studies, researchers must be able to identify what it is that makes a particular study ethnographic. For example, they should be able to distinguish an ethnographic study from ethological work, from field studies, from systems analysis interpretations, and from case studies. Only in so doing can ethnographers meet the challenge of specificity of procedures, clarity of goals, and relevance of interpretations to theoretical considerations demanded in the numerous institutions now sponsoring ethnographic research in education.

This article considers: (a) methods of ethnography and an explanation of how some of these might be applied in ethnographic research in education; (b) some weaknesses and strengths of ethnography; and (c) suggestions on how some "essentials" of ethnographic research might be carried out in a community-to-school study with a topical focus on literacy.

**ETHNOGRAPHY: WHAT ARE THE ESSENTIALS?**

The goal of ethnography is to describe the ways of living of a social group, a group in which there is in-group recognition of the individuals living and working together as a social unit. By becoming a participant in the social group, an ethnographer attempts to record and describe the overt, manifest, and explicit behaviors and values and tangible items of culture. By long residence, the ethnographer learns the language of the society and structures and functions of cultural components, before attempting to recognize patterns of behavior that may be covert, ideal, and implicit to members of the culture. Ethnographers attempt to learn the conceptual framework of members of the society and to organize materials on the basis of boundaries understood by those being observed instead of using a predetermined system of categories established before the participant-observation.

The range of techniques the ethnographer uses includes mapping; charting kinship and other patterns of interaction; interviewing; collecting life histories; studying written documents relevant to the history of the group; and recording folklore of all types--narratives, songs, myths, riddles, rhymes, and proverbs. If used at all, survey data, questionnaires, and experimental methods play a much less significant role than participant-observation. The ethnographer's description will, ideally, deal with the totality of existence of a particular social group in its natural setting. Laboratory experiments, or any noncontextualized behaviors, tend, in the ethnographer's view, not to yield substantive conclusions generalizable to these same participants in their natural environment. Moreover, a priori hypotheses taken with the observer into a group are believed by ethnographers to reflect more the conceptual framework of the investigator than that of those being observed.

The concept of culture as holistic--more than the sum of the parts, both material and nonmaterial--forces ethnographers to place their descriptions in the context of larger purposes. Of major importance are knowledge of the universals in human experience and recognition of the unique aspects of human patterns of behavior that may develop within a group. Most frequently, the ethnographer's descriptive data will generate a cultural grammar, an abstract theory that provides the rules individuals within the society have to know to produce, predict, interpret, and evaluate behaviors in given settings or social interactions.
Simply put, the ethnographer's task is to describe the culture of the group being studied, and to identify specific cultural patterns and structural regularities within the processes of both continuity and change. For example, the ethnographer attempts to answer the question of what are the constraints on the system that contribute to predictable patterns of behavior? The ethnographer works with the following principles of operation:

1. Fieldworkers should attempt to uphold the ideal of leaving aside ethnocentricism and maintaining an open acceptance of the behaviors of all members of the group being studied.

2. When participation in and adequate description of the full round of activities of the group is not possible, fieldworkers should make a principled decision to learn and to describe as completely as possible what is happening in selected activities, settings, or groups of participants.

3. Data obtained from study of pieces of the culture should be related to existing knowledge about other components of the whole of the culture or similar pieces studied in other cultures.

Ethnography, perhaps more than any other social science, strives for a comparative perspective. Research conducted in one social group should be accessible for comparison with that conducted in other social groups.

As ethnographers in the past two decades have moved away from the study those social groups located far away from centers of modernization, and easily identifiable as bands, tribes, or villages, these methods and ideals of ethnography have been difficult to maintain. Many new techniques, theoretical perspectives, and comparative procedures have developed. Therefore, an array of diverse and often contradictory methods now subsumed under the term ethnography make it seem necessary to ask, "What is ethnography?" Alfred Kroeber, a figure prominent in the development of anthropology in the United States, asked this question in 1957 when anthropologists had begun their first major moves toward studying groups and institutions in complex societies. Kroeber noted that the shift of interest away from remote and less technologically advanced peoples to communities at home seemed to occasion neglect of "old-fashioned ethnography" (1957:196). For example, background ethnohistorical research carried out in libraries and supplemented by oral interviews and documentary evidence in the field formed an essential part of many of the ethnographies of cultures of Africa, Asia, and islands of the South Pacific. Ethnographers working in complex societies, however, often seemed to see no need for ethnohistorical research. In addition, Kroeber charged that anthropologists working in the communities of complex cultures often failed to elicit data beyond the "expectable obviousnesses" (1957:196). Too often, these studies focused on how the "different," e.g. the poor, ethnic groups, and American Indians became more like the mainstream, the power group of the nation. Thus, Kroeber charged that ethnographers were leaving aside the longstanding maxim of anthropology to deny ethnocentric interests. Kroeber warned that the study of an Indian tribe in earlier times and in its self-identified status as a group in relative isolation required methods no different from those used to study the assimilation of the current descendants of that tribe in an urban community.

Methods proposed by Kroeber as typical of "old-fashioned ethnography" warrant consideration for ethnography in education research. How might the methods and ideals used by anthropologists in the study of an
Indian tribe or an African village be applied in education research? Ethnographies, i.e., descriptive studies of a culture as a whole, are not usually written with a focus on formal education, but ethnographic methods characteristic of those used in preparing full ethnographies may be used in particular settings of formal education or other institutions. In several critical ways, ethnographic methods are distinct from other methods often termed ethnographic, though they may share philosophic bases with other research approaches (cf. Magoon 1977; Iannaccone 1975). For example, a case-study approach—the collection of intensive histories of individual units made from the perspective of development with relation to environmental factors (Smith 1978)—in and of itself does not constitute ethnographic research. Ethnographic studies involve more than simple participant-observation or naturalistic research in noncontrived settings (Furlong and Edwards 1977). What distinguishes ethnographic studies (whether carried out in formal education or other institutional settings, such as a hospital, bar) is consideration by the researcher of the applicability of methods and theories used by anthropologists (Wolcott 1975).

Those discussed here are ethnohistorical research, attention to definition of the unit of study, microethnographic work, linguistic investigations, and analysis of artifacts. Many "old-fashioned" ethnographies (e.g., Evans-Pritchard 1940; Malinowski 1932; Radcliffe-Brown 1933; Leighton and Kluckholn 1946) exemplify some or all of these essentials, and they are discussed in numerous descriptions of the science of ethnography (e.g., Lowie 1960; Kroeber 1957). Thus, their use in education research may be said to help establish the ethnographic character of specific studies.

**ETHNOHISTORICAL RESEARCH**

For any particular social group studied, ethnographers have attempted to relate the origins and history of the group through time to consider the social past as well as the social present. Fieldworkers studying a tribe or village in Africa, for example, collected data on the group before the arrival of European influences. Records of early travelers who contacted the group and oral accounts from older tribe members helped build this history. In addition, the story of European contact and the development of European influence in cultural values and behaviors was needed. Research for this portion was often done in libraries through records of European officials and missionaries, official correspondence, proceedings of specific councils, biographies of tribal chiefs, and newspaper accounts of European policies with respect to African cultures. Many ethnographers supplemented the published materials with unpublished accounts, such as the correspondence of missionaries, travelers, and merchants (cf. Schapera 1962).

Ethnographic research in formal education settings need not be different in type from that collected for the African tribe or village. An ethnographer writing about a particular school may, for example, learn much from documentary sources and unpublished accounts of the school. The nature, extent, and accessibility of these materials will vary according to factors such as the time, purpose, and agents of their preparation. Many other relevant materials are in the public domain: superintendents' reports, proceedings of local school board meetings, biographies of individuals influential in the development of the school or its system, and newspaper accounts. Evaluation studies of curricula, student performance, and labor relations are often less accessible, but failure to obtain these can often be partially compensated for through oral interviews and examinations of curricular materials at district libraries.

Ethnohistorical research is particularly relevant for determining the background of particular themes, such as "citizen education," "back-to-
basics movements, morals, education, in a particular school. Documents describing the rationales for these movements often contain specific goals and aspirations for students, as well as notions of how knowledge, skills, and dispositions help create the "good" student.

Few "ethnographic" studies of education have included ethnohistorical research, such as histories of the school, communities past and present that make up the student population, and special interest groups (such as labor unions, local businesses, and voluntary associations) that influenced school policies and programs. The need for an ethnohistorical component in the study of education is underscored by the work of historians of education (e.g., Katz 1968; Tyack 1974) whose works emphasize the strong effects institutions such as the school have had on what were formerly private primary groups, such as the family. The Paul and Jean Hanna Collection, begun in 1977 at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, contains materials from several nations that will help researchers answer such questions as what role textbooks play in political socialization and how ties between publishers and scholars, teachers and administrators, affect school curricula.

**ATTENTION TO DEFINITION OF UNITS OF STUDY**

Every anthropologist who undertakes a field study of a community or tribe, as well as those who engage in education research, must make a decision as to the specific social group, setting, and focus he or she will treat. Early sections of traditional ethnographies are often devoted to a definition of what is being studied—band, tribe, or village—and the reasons for the choice of the group. If an ethnographer chooses to carry out ethnographic research within a school or classroom, problems of definition seem simple; problems of reason for the choice are more complex. Often a particular classroom or school is studied because it was accessible, a friend was on the staff, or the local district was fairly lax about access of researchers to the school. Rarely are reasons for the choice made clear. Types of schools or classrooms are also often left unspecified, so that comparison of research across schools or classrooms is difficult. The particular categories chosen to describe schools or classrooms raise problems; for example, if the ethnographer chooses to work in classrooms of a particular subject or teacher style, will the ethnographer follow native usage (i.e., that of local teachers and administrators), or will new terms be devised in accordance with the patterns that evolve in the course of the study? There is no standardization across districts and states for many components of formal schooling.

Another problem of definition arises for the ethnographer, because within anthropology, education refers to the process of cultural transmission (which extends throughout life); formal schooling is only one aspect of this process. Therefore, when formal schooling is the focus of research, anthropologists attempt to study it in relation to the broader cultural and community context in which it exists. For example, the behaviors of pupils are ideally viewed not only in relation to fit or contrast with those of teacher, typical student, or successful pupil, but also with respect to home and community enculturation patterns of pupils and teachers. Thus, the ethnographer must be concerned with a definition of community if the study is to follow students into their home environments, or even if communities served by the school are viewed as background for development of the school. Communities served by schools may have one designation used in official maps, another known and used by current residents, and yet another known to former residents of that area who have now moved to other locations in the same city. Communities may
also be defined only with respect to neighborhoods in which students live, or they may also be used to refer to institutions that may or may not be locality-based (e.g., the Kiwanis Club) and yet exert a strong influence on particular school activities. Many of the community institutions may not be structurally interrelated; yet all impinge on the school.

MICROETHNOGRAPHIC WORK

Since the beginning of anthropology, there has been an emphasis on the holistic nature of culture and the need of the ethnographer to deal "with the total range of human activity as socially determined" (Lowie 1960: 485). As anthropologists came to admit that they could not do justice to the whole range of these phenomena, they urged collaboration, first with biologists, chemists, and others in the "pure sciences" and gradually, with other social scientists. For some anthropologists, a better way to represent the whole was to devise new techniques appropriate for the study of the minutiae of parts of culture. Linguistics, the scientific study of language, developed increasingly rigorous and precise techniques for describing the structures of languages. Anthropologists and other social scientists have attempted to devise systems of description and analysis of equal rigor and precision for other aspects of culture, such as nonverbal communication, and social interaction. (For discussions of these methods, see Frake 1976; McDermott and Aron 1978; Erickson 1976.)

This need for finer and finer distinctions of what makes up the whole of culture for any social group has led anthropologists to observe new units of behavior and to deal separately with these in an effort to provide adequate descriptions. Ideally, these pieces, such as a lesson within a classroom or a conversation between teacher and principal, are so discriminated that resynthesis may at some point be possible to provide a composite view of the whole. For the researcher, however, these pieces are "wholes," in that they have a structure and rules of their own, and justification for revealing details of their composition, participants, settings, and rules lies in their shedding light on such broader issues as the rule-governed nature of social behavior and questions of covert patterns of exclusion.

Interactions within the school, such as the lessons, athletic games, composing activities, and reading circles are the interdependent pieces that go toward making up the cultural phenomena of the school. Each of these activities has an organization and sets of rules, overt and covert (e.g., McDermott 1977; Mehan 1978; articles by McDermott; by Mehan; and by Shultz, Florio, and Erickson, this volume). Often one group of actors has one set of rules and operates according to this set; other participants have different sets of rules and operate accordingly. Neither recognizes that two sets of rules are in operation. In all situations, a pattern of interaction and rules for roles played by the actors emerges from a detailed account of the situation preserved in fieldnotes (and sometimes supplemented by videotape), so that the ethnographer can return again and again to the data for analysis. In traditional field settings, anthropologists often gave descriptive accounts of tribal leaders' orations, interaction of villagers in the marketplace, or the reaction of community members to the performance of medicine men. Recording these events for detailed analysis is no different from recording analogous events in formal educational settings, except that current methods make descriptions more detailed than before.

A critical point of microethnographic work is that it be linked with other types of research on schools or classrooms. Ideally, microethnographic work can contribute to comparative analyses of classrooms of the same or different types, to studies of schools of varying kinds, so that
some reasonable sense of wholeness or comparison may emerge. The lesson, peer teaching interaction, composition class, or any of the numerous types of teaching situations (Stebbins 1975) suitable for analysis should not be separated in concept and in practice from ways this knowledge can relate to other components of ethnographic research. Is the lesson to be viewed as a field, that is, simply a setting for research, or is it a sample, an illustration of a type; and if so, are the latter definitions carefully established (cf. Arensberg 1961)?

To gain a dynamic view of education, we need to coordinate micro-ethnography in the classroom with the study of communities and other institutions related to the school. The continuum from community to school, from school boards to schools past and present, should be units of study that reveal processes of change. Without special attention to the need for a diachronic perspective, there is the danger that research that focuses on the minutiae of streams of behavior will seem to portray behavior in closed, fixed, repetitive frames. A given mode of activity will be viewed as reinforcing others in such a way as to perpetuate itself within the social organization of behavior. Exclusive focus on this type of research reinforces the "fallacy of the ethnographic present" (Smith 1962: 77), that is, the belief that observed conditions are static and not subject to influences from beyond the immediacy of the social organization of the institutionalized moments, e.g., the lesson, space or time routines, or other teaching situations.

**LINGUISTIC INVESTIGATIONS**

Ethnographers contemplating work among tribes or villages in faraway places usually did not speak the language of those they proposed to study. Therefore, they had to learn the language, and often they recorded it in written form for the first time. In the study of formal education in our own society, ethnographers would seem to speak the same language and to share basic concepts and categories with the participants. Yet, the specific terminology of schools and the ways of thought of teachers and administrators enculturated through the rites of passage of teacher/administrator training are often more different from those of daily usage than would be expected. Many of the words are the same as those used in normal discourse, yet their uses and meanings differ. For example, the term "E designate" is used in some schools to refer to students who by standardized test performance have no promise of successful academic achievement. In other schools, "E" is a grade of excellent. The ethnographer's task is to understand the practical dimensions of daily language use in the school setting.

Classroom language is characterized by a special "register" or style appropriate to teaching or caregiving. As a conventional way of speaking used in particular situations, a register differs in intonation, vocabulary, grammatical structure, and accompanying nonverbal features from other ways of speaking. The connected units that make up the "discourse" or flow of speech in interactions in school settings often have particular characteristics, especially as they occur in certain situations, such as lessons. Interpretation of the units of language is highly dependent on the setting, social relations between speakers, and expectations of each party. For example, many directives used in classrooms are either statements ("I can't talk until you're ready to quiet down") or questions ("Why don't you check the encyclopedia?"). All of these, however, function not as isolated sentences, but as connected units dependent on prior and subsequent units.

Folklore studies, traditionally a component of many ethnographies, and in many cases, an extension, have had the goal of recovering the
lore of the folk, both verbal expressions and ways of integrating uses of these expressions into other aspects of behavior. Traditional tales, games, myths, legends, songs, chants, verses, proverbs, riddles, and mnemonic devices have been collected by anthropologists. Many of these genres exist in schools and are used by people across the boundaries of social role and social situations. Schools often have a set of folklore typically identified with the school, and legends, myths, riddles, jokes, and songs are carried on generation after generation. Some of these are known to all members of the school, e.g., the school song or cheers; others are known only to certain groups within the school. For example, students usually pass on mnemonic devices and riddles unknown to teachers. The use of these genres in connection with specific subject areas is particularly important, since they often reflect values and dispositions unspecified in written materials.

The organization and uses of written materials are particularly important for analysis by the ethnographer, since they often contain hidden expectations held for students. For example, the relationship between text and illustrations in textbooks across subject areas varies greatly. Reading texts at the primary level usually contain illustrations that tell more about what is happening than the text does. Children attuned to studying pictures do better at inferencing than students not so attuned. Teachers are often unaware of the cues given in illustrations for inferencing. Social studies texts often have "floating" illustrations, pictures that have no specific relationship to the text other than providing a detail that can be subsumed under a generalization proposed in the text. In a chapter on industrialization, for example, a picture of a steamboat may appear; yet there is no discussion of steamboats per se. In another culture, ethnographers would be certain to note that in certain written materials, illustrations repeated the text's message; in others, they did not. Because ethnographers studying formal educational systems in our own society are familiar with textbooks, and they themselves adjust unknowingly to the discrepancies in text-illustration links across subjects, they are unlikely to analyze texts with the eye of a stranger.

**ANALYSIS OF ARTIFACTS**

One of the first steps of ethnography is to inventory the tangible objects used in the range of activities of a social group. The forms of these are described, and observations allow the ethnographer to determine their functions, particular aesthetic patterns, spatial distribution, and relationships to status maintenance and role behaviors. Ethnographic studies in familiar settings of complex societies often given little attention to artifacts, since the material items of a modern technological society are so easily taken for granted by those socialized into that society.

Every school room is filled with material culture, some old, some new. Many of these artifacts may well be similar to those found in school rooms decades ago. Other artifacts are more recent and some are similar to items found in other institutions. Yet the artifacts and their arrangement are often unfamiliar to many children entering school in the first grade. These children must learn not only the names of these items, but also rules for their use in specifically designated time and space blocks. Students rarely question the function of these artifacts or their arrangement in time and space. For example, school desks have an appearance distinct from all other desks. They are also arranged in many classrooms in straight rows, and the desk of the teacher (not specifically a "school" desk) is placed at the front of all other desks. The functions of the desk in this particular space are not clear: teachers rarely sit at these desks and talk to the class as a whole. Instead, the teachers use the desk most
often when students are engaged in seat work or students are not present in the room. If the function of the desk at the front of the room is to see students (for example, to watch them during a test) this position for this practice is highly unusual. In other situations when one wants to watch others, observers place themselves so as not to be seen by those being observed, or, at the very least, to be as unobtrusive as possible. Placing the teacher's desk at the back of the room with students' "desks facing forward seems logical if one expects that knowledge used in similar situations is relevant to teachers observing students in the classroom. This is just one example of an occasion when rules for the use and placement of material objects in the world outside the classroom do not apply in the classroom. If an ethnographer were describing a group whose culture was unknown to him or her, such incongruities in behavior from one setting to another would be noted.

WEAKNESSES AND STRENGTHS OF ETHNOGRAPHY

The foregoing are only some of the techniques used in preparing full ethnographies that can be adapted for ethnographic research in formal education. Some methods of ethnography have been surrounded by debates throughout the history of anthropology, and most of these debates have pointed out particular weaknesses and strengths inherent in the anthropologist's approach to ethnography.

"So what?" is a question sometimes asked of the detailed descriptions provided by anthropologists of minutiae. To what extent is the material and the sense of a particular phenomenon developed for one social group generalizable to other social groups? The same question can certainly be asked of studies of a single school or classroom or situation within a formal education setting. How can classrooms, schools, or situations for comparison be determined? In the selection of one school as opposed to other schools, the ethnographer must consider how what one finds in that setting is representative of what occurs in other schools, and how the results of one ethnographic study can lead the ethnographer to explain the relation of this school to others. This problem is not unique to the study of formal education by ethnographers or social scientists. Those who carry out community studies have not yet determined a satisfactory typology of communities or explanations of how the study of one community can be generalized to others (cf. Arensberg and Kimball 1965). Recent arguments revolve around ways of locating community boundaries (Seiler and Summers 1974) and distinguishing community studies from locality studies (Stacey 1969). For the community, there are often no recognizable boundaries; a community may be known by various names, and any one geographic territory within a specific community may be known as a community to other groups. Schools, on the other hand, do have geographic boundaries, and it is predictable that numerous groups will be consistent in their identification of a school. The identification of parts or units of a single school and constellations of schools is much more uncertain, however. What is it that we have to see to know what a school is all about? What can ethnographers report that will help them identify other schools of a similar type as well as describe a particular school? How much new information does each ethnographic study of a school provide that can be related to the experiences of the past and provide any predictive value for the future? Most social scientists agree that evaluation in education research has had much more prominence than have process studies detailing innovations and other types of changes. Therefore, what can ethnography contribute to estimations of social change processes in formal education? These are
all questions related to the issue of the generalizability of ethnographic studies.

Another seemingly inherent weakness of ethnography is that it has traditionally claimed to do everything and to do it with objectivity. In actuality, all anthropologists know that no completely holistic study of a culture exists and that by definition, such a study is impossible. One cannot recreate the whole of a culture in an ethnography; therefore, the concept of holism is a guiding concept, one that holds out for anthropologists the constant reminder of the interdependent nature of culture, which is indeed greater than the sum of its parts. Similarly, anthropologists cannot be entirely objective in their studies. The constant goal of leaving aside value judgments is again a guiding principle, one that forces ethnographers to evaluate both the methods and the content of their studies in terms of this ideal. The ever-present call to value-free research has created, ironically, yet another weakness in ethnography—the absence of detailed attention to values, ethics, and morality in descriptions of cultures. Relatively few ethnographies provide descriptions of these topics that can be used in comparative analyses (Benedy 1953; Edel 1962).

The comparative perspective of anthropology, particularly of ethnology, is yet another guiding rationale of anthropology. It, too, has not produced as much as it has promised. Ethnology feeds on ethnography, because it has to do with the description and interpretive analysis of the cultural characteristics of diverse human groups. Ethnologists analyse the ethnographies of cultures (generally those of a particular region), and attempt to explain similarities and differences, to point out the distinct paths leading to comparable behavior traits in different social groups. Principles of borrowing, invention, diffusion, and other methods of social change are drawn from the comparative study of cultures. Ethnology, through its broad comparative surveys of human cultures, past and present, is often said to help explain processes of change and ways in which current complex diversities evolved.

There is, however, relatively little ethnology for present-day cultures of the United States. Ethnographies of communities are not abundant enough to permit the development of ethnologies. Ethnographic studies of schools and classrooms are neither numerous nor consistent enough to allow comparative analyses.

A relatively recent methodological and theoretical trend in ethnography may show the same divergence between ideal and real that the goals of holism, objectivity, and cross-cultural comparison have shown. This is the tendency among anthropologists to break apart portions of the field of ethnography, to develop new terms, and to apply these to the study of specific aspects of culture. Anthropologists have proposed such terms as ethnography of speaking (Hymes 1964), ethnography of writing (Basso 1974), and ethnography of literacy (Szwez 1981). What has not been realized by subsequent researchers using these titles to describe their studies is that the original proposers coined these terms to emphasize the need to include speaking, writing, and literacy in ethnographies, not to urge an exclusive focus on these aspects of culture. Anthropologists proposing these terms urged an extension of research by ethnographers and linguists, not a restriction. The explanation used for proposing the ethnography of communication often seems forgotten in the pieces of language behavior described as "ethnographies of speaking":

The needed term must be one not only for coordinating language with other things, or for suggesting a portion of the range of problems, but one of general scope. For anthropologists and anthropologically minded investigators from
other disciplines, ethnography of communication seems best to indicate the necessary scope, and to convey and encourage the fundamental contribution they best can make: studies ethnographic in basis, and of communication in the scope and kind of patterned complexity with which they deal.

... such an approach ... must take as context a community investigating its communicative habits as a whole, so that any given use of channel and code takes its place as but part of the resources upon which the members of the community draw.

Facets of the cultural values and beliefs, social institutions and forms, roles and personalities, history and ecology of a community must be examined together in relation to communicative events and patterns as focus of study (just as every aspect of a community's life may be brought selectively to bear on the study of a focus such as kinship, sex, or conflict). (Hymes 1964:2-3)

Thus far, ethnographies of speaking have not achieved the goals of comprehensiveness or consideration of holistic context proposed here. They have tended to cover specific acts, events, and situations within specific interactions, and there are as yet only programmatic statements on the methodology of the ethnography of communication.

If ethnography has all these weaknesses, what are its strengths? Why are educators interested in having ethnographic methods applied in education research? Much traditional research in education has been quantitative, global, sociodemographic, and dependent on large-scale comparisons of many different schools, or it has been experimental, based on studies of selected groups operating in controlled settings. Terms such as input, output, accountability, and management have characterised many of these reports. Input factors (independent variables) have been said to influence, predict, or determine output factors (dependent variables). Pieces of data about social groups, such as number of siblings, income of parents, time of mother-child interactions in pre-school experiences, have been correlated with the output of students expressed in test scores, subsequent income, and continued schooling. The effects of formal instruction have been evaluated by correlating these input factors with educational output. Gradually, many educators have begun to realise that large-scale surveys, correlational studies, and exclusively quantitative studies do not provide actual data about events either in the classroom or the communities of students and teachers. Moreover, their findings are often used to predict the academic future of certain groups of students. Used in these ways, they reinforce stereotypes and easy generalisations about abilities of students, the inability of "others" to fit, and the disintegration of family and community life. They often allow already overworked teachers and principals to have "reasons" for closing off innovations and options in instructional methods and evaluation techniques.

Recognising these limitations of traditional methods of educational research, some educators have begun to see the merits of ethnographic research in supplementing other types of research. The major emphasis from within education circles has been to use ethnographic methods in evaluating programs. Some groups involved in education research, such as education laboratories and research centers, are somewhat cautious about ethnographic research in education because they recognize that in
addition to the weaknesses noted above, ethnographic methods offer other problems in comparison to traditional methods of education research. Ethnographic methods to be used in a study cannot be specifically spelled out in research proposals; part of the strength of ethnography depends on its interactive-adaptive nature. The researcher, interacting with the group being studied, acquires data that enable the adaptation of methods of inquiry to the situation. Ethnographic research does not lend itself to being categorized, tabulated, or correlated, and it will not necessarily identify specific indicators that predict success of either programs or students.

In short, ethnographic research does not meet the criteria of traditional research in education in either methodology, format, or results. It cannot be carried out in a brief time period. It does not generalize the findings from one setting to another without comparable work elsewhere. It does not fit neatly into current calls for efficient, business-like approaches to education, and it will not specify discrete noncontextualized factors that may lead to improving either schools or students.

From the point of view of anthropology and ethnography, these weaknesses are the strengths of ethnographic methods. The validity of abstract representations of human behavior must rest on reality founded on disciplined observation and analysis. Ethnography provides an empirical data base, obtained through immersion of the researcher in the ways of living of the group. This immersion allows perception of the interdependence of parts and also permits frequent returns to the data. The descriptive power, the ability to incorporate in data the form, function, and context of the behavior of a specific social group, and retention of the data for considered and repetitive analysis are the major strengths of ethnography. Ethnographic data can often help provide the context for expanded interpretations of studies done by other researchers.

Correlational studies (e.g., low scores on reading tests and low socioeconomic class) can be amplified by ethnographic work. For example, an ethnographic study of a specific low socioeconomic group may reveal that reading scores correlate not only with economic level, but also with the degree to which reading is relevant to group membership, status achievement, work opportunities, and retention of cultural values for the group as a whole. Ideally such contextual evidence for specific communities helps educators reexamine school values for literacy in terms of how they can be related to home and community values. Another explanation of the correlation might be found in an ethnographic study of reading circles done through videotape analysis (cf. McDermott and Gospodinoff 1979). If certain students have less eye contact, verbal interaction, and time of direct reading instruction than others, these factors may contribute more to reading failure than socioeconomic factors.

In essence, ethnography is the background tapestry—busily detailed, seemingly chaotic; however, upon closer look, it reveals patterns, and with repeated scrutiny, it may reveal yet other patterns. Upon this tapestry may be placed the studies of others, psychologists, political scientists, and sociologists, in an effort to explain as fully as possible factors that help determine educational success or failure. Perhaps more important than an emphasis on success or failure is the power of ethnographic studies to provide data from which we may determine the principles that explain the processes of stability and change. Only by knowing the context provided by the ethnohistorical past, and by having an adequate accounting of the individuals, activities, and relationships involved in the events of formal education can researchers know the internal and external conditions that relate to processes of change.

Ethnography, because it is descriptive, has a highly individualized and particularistic quality about it that provides vivid details and concreteness, and allows readers to identify with situations described.
Unlike correlational or experimental studies that provide hypotheses and predictions, ethnographic descriptions have the quality of reality and undeniable nature. If one is a member of a group being described, and actions that have not before been recognized are described, one is forced to admit actions, to drop rationalizations, and to challenge the conflict between ideals and realities of behavior (Heath 1978). These characteristics are particularly important when education research is being considered by state superintendents, district supervisors, principals, and teachers in the formulation of programs or in new considerations of past practices. Those in the day-to-day action of teaching and providing environments for learning need detailed descriptions of those practices and programs that worked or failed to work, and the conditions or contexts that created change for students and programs. Kroeber (1957) asserted:

What the ethnographer is alone in doing within the "social sciences," and almost alone in anthropology . . . is two things. He tends to envisage his problems or objectives holistically; and he prefers to acquire his data by holistic contact, person to person, face to face, by word of mouth plus his own observations. (:193)

. . . the ethnographer makes his documents as he works. He knows their occasion and context, he can more or less judge their bias, he can extend or reduce the scope of his inquiry, he can return with fresh insight to recommence it. (:194)

These strengths are of immense importance to educators who, because they must make decisions for practice in the real world, need descriptive narratives and analyses derived from data that may help researchers answer as completely as possible the question "what is happening?" (McDermott and Aron 1978).

LITERACY: COMMUNITY TO SCHOOL -- PROPOSAL FOR A STUDY

In what ways might ethnographic studies provide an answer to this question for a particular topic in specific settings? The foregoing discussion has indicated that there are numerous settings for ethnographic studies, each making contributions to building a comprehensive view of education. Therefore, the study proposed here is for illustrative purposes only, and many other varieties of ethnographic studies are possible. The one chosen here takes the community as the focus, primarily to involve readers in considering how knowledge about uses of literacy in community settings may be useful for comparison with data about the uses and functions of reading and writing skills in schools. Within the United States, community studies have rarely been used in education research; the focus has been almost exclusively on the school and its subunits. Frequently, these units have been termed cultures in and of themselves; little attention has been given to the fact that these sociocultural units have few characteristics of the culture-bearing human groups traditionally studied by ethnographers. Schools and classrooms rarely have cross-generational self-identification, and their "culture," i.e., artifacts, values, and ways of behaving, is largely dependent on external forces (school boards, teacher-training institutions, test publishers). The relative degree and type of external force on schools as opposed to
classrooms has been the province of social historians, and a topic ignored by ethnographers. Little is known of the conditions that define and reinforce the character of certain classrooms.

Communities, however, are specific culture-bearing human groups with in-group recognition established through cultural transmission across generations. These are appropriate for studying education, both because they include and interact with the school and because they are the locus of enculturation forces (families, churches, voluntary associations) that exist apart from the school. Therefore, cultural transmission within the community involves the reciprocal influences of school and community as well as child socialization in primary groups, such as the family. Much of the relatively recent work in communities has been sociolinguistic (e.g., Labov 1966, 1972; Wolfram 1969), describing the language and ways of talking these students brought to school. The popular press and some teacher-training materials have occasionally overgeneralized conclusions from these studies to explain how the language forms and functions of groups included in these sociolinguistic studies contributed to the school failure of all members of specific ethnic or racial groups.

The growing emphasis on "cultural education" has made teachers anxious for materials on culture differences beyond those of food, music, and holidays. Thus, eye contact, the pimp walk, ritual insults, and characteristics of intimate space usage came to be handy additions to teachers' presentations of the cultural inventories of ethnic and racial groups. There is, therefore, a need for community studies that will help educators have more data on culture as both art and artifact, as ways of doing things (such as learning to read or categorize ideas) as well as material items made, acquired, and used.

Proposed here are the bare outlines of only one type of cross-cultural longitudinal project set in communities of the United States. The goal is to illustrate how ethnographic research can provide data about ways of becoming literate, specific areas of knowledge about reading and writing, and cultural items that are employed by community members in teaching and using literacy. A group of four ethnographer teams would meet to draw up an outline of ethnographic field methods and questions to be directed to literacy. Four communities that had in-group recognition of themselves as communities would be selected; ideally, four schools that members of these communities attend would also be chosen. Each team would go to one specific community. One member of the team in each site would initially work only in the community outside the school, the other member would work in the selected school. Prior to work in either community or school, ethnographers would study all available documents and ethnohistorical data. After an initial period in which there would be no contact between team members in each site, they would meet to formulate new questions by sharing data: following that, team members could switch positions, the ethnographer originally in the community now working in the school, and vice versa. This switch would allow team members to test perceptions and to verify adequacy of data collection. During the final period of the field study, teams from all sites would come together to develop a comparative framework before returning to the field for completion of the research. The final report would be prepared by members of each team, and summary findings on culture patterns in communities and schools would indicate patterns that promote or retard motivations for literacy—both its acquisition and retention. This kind of comparative approach would ideally help contribute to a typology of schools and an ethnology of communities.

What kinds of questions might the ethnographers bear in mind as they collected data? What knowledge about literacy would help focus these questions? Traditional anthropological approaches to literacy are
illustrated by the work of Kroeber (1948), who talked of literacy and its spread with respect to distinguishing two types of societies, preliterate and literate. Goody (1968, 1977) posited a similar kind of dichotomy between literate and nonliterate individuals, maintaining that literate individuals have particular ways of knowing, perceiving, and categorizing reality. The functions of literacy implied in these societal approaches to literacy have become the guiding rationale of educational and economic institutions of complex societies. The assumption has been that learning to read and write does something not just to what people know but to how they will go about knowing things. Coordinate with the view that literacy makes individuals and groups think differently is the view that literacy brings economic advancement, benevolent attitudes, critical faculties, and logical thinking. The recent work of social historians (e.g., Lockridge 1974; Stone 1969), psychologists (Scribner and Cole 1981), and anthropologists (Basso 1974; Szwed 1981; Heath 1981) challenges these traditional assumptions—economic, social and cognitive—about literacy. The challenge of these scholars (and an overview of research on literacy in multilingual societies in Ferguson 1978) suggests that the study of literacy using ethnohistorical and ethnographic approaches is critically needed.

In the hypothetical study proposed here as one of the possible approaches to an ethnographic study of literacy, a first step would be collection of artifacts of literacy, descriptions of contexts of uses, and their spatial and temporal distribution within the life of members of the community. The internal style of each artifact and the abilities of those who produce these should be considered part of this context. How are these artifacts presented to children? What activities and explanations surround their use? Do questions directed to children about these artifacts emphasize the acquisition of labels and description of discrete characteristics of items? Are there links made between these representations and uses of their real-world equivalents? An indication of the value of observing interactions with literacy artifacts is suggested by the difference in adult-child verbal exchanges which occurred in a community in which pictures drawn by children in kindergarten and first grade classes were collected in books for use by adults with young children (Heath, forthcoming). When adults attempted to relate to these "books," they were forced to ask real questions of the children about the objects, events, and attitudes depicted, because the adults could not understand the children's drawings. The young children responded with lengthy descriptions and narratives, not with single-word answers or labels. When adults chose books made by adults for children, and used these when reading with children, adults knew all the answers. However, when adults used books made by children, children knew all the answers, and children's language was much expanded over that produced when commercially prepared books were used.

Implications from this kind of detailed observation of the uses of literacy artifacts are reinforced in Ninio and Bruner (1978) reporting on labeling in parent-child dialogue cycles. In the introduction to the study, the authors make the general statement that "book reading is the major activity in which labelling occurs" (1978:3), suggesting that this is a universal characteristic among social groups. However, some groups do not teach labeling as an isolated linguistic activity linked with book reading; their young are expected to learn the names of objects and activities from their use in contexts, and only when children ask the name of something do parents offer labels (Heath, forthcoming). Schooling does, however, make book reading the major activity in which labeling occurs. Therefore, for students who learn labeling through adult-child interactions with books, there is a critical fit promoting the acquisition of specific reading skills. For students from communities in which labeling is not learned in book reading, we need to know how labels are learned, what
discourse surrounds their introduction, and how inferencing skills are taught. Specifically, in what proportion and in which circumstances do labeling or specific directions for inferencing strategies occur? Are there ways of learning labeling that do not relate to books, which might be transferred to schools as methods of expanding approaches to instruction for all students?

Related questions are those asking how the community verifies norms for producing and using written materials. For example, if an item appears only in writing in a community and its topic has not been introduced orally, what will the reception of that item be? Will the form of the item make a difference? Will there be a search for verification, e.g., contact with individuals or institutions that might be associated with the item, or will community members rely on other literate sources to verify its usefulness (e.g., book reviews)? What are the ways written materials are used, ranging from product names to books? For example, how is the name of a new product unknown to community members learned? Is it through reading the label, television advertising, recommendations by other members of the community, or by analogy to a similar item? When do oral directions or analogous experience take precedence over written messages? Is there discontinuity between adults and children in the use of product directions? If there are discontinuities, are there rationales that attempt to explain these away? For example, if a child attempts to put a toy together or play a game without reading the directions, does the parent scold? Yet if the parent does not read the directions for putting together a new type of flashlight, and this is pointed out by the child, are there appropriate rejoinders by the parent such as "Do as I say, not as I do"? Is reading for information held up as an ideal by the parent, yet not practiced?

Other aspects of the purposes of literacy also involve the total spectrum of the ways of living of a group. Is it appropriate to respond to reading emotively or primarily in terms of information? Do community members talk most frequently about reading done for instrumental purposes (e.g., to learn about a job possibility) or to gain information in a broad sense with no specific predetermined purpose (newspaper) or for pleasure (comics)? What is the extent of self-conscious knowledge about literacy in the community? When most of the members of a community are not literate, what happens to those individuals who do become literate? Are their services incorporated into community needs, ignored, deprecated, or seen to relate only to that individual's life outside the community? Is the acquisition of literacy by an individual seen primarily as a social index or evidence of individual efforts?

The tools of the ethnoscientist (an anthropologist especially interested in the determination of categories by members of a social group) are especially useful in literacy-related issues both within the community and the classroom. For example, taxonomies of reading derived from community members, from a teacher, and from students are often very different. A taxonomy of reading elicited from a teacher may include only reading that has been assigned, is from a textbook, or is relegated to a specific space and time (e.g., circle reading, free reading). In community settings, children may provide more items in their taxonomy of reading, and their bases of division may include such headings as materials, purposes, and settings. Materials (i.e., what people read) may include minds, signs, pictures, the sky, letters, books, funnies, house numbers, prices, etc. Inside a classroom, children may give only a very restricted taxonomy of reading, such as books, workbooks, clock, and board, and purposes related only to teacher-directed activities. Taxonomies are useful primarily as they can be related to ways in which they are derived. Thus the contexts of learning and using terms for categories within the
taxonomies would be essential to ethnographers as they observed within both the school and the community.

ETHNOGRAPHERS AND EDUCATORS AS RESEARCH PARTNERS

It may be helpful to readers if I make explicit the experience out of which the view of ethnography presented here comes, and the audience of readers envisioned. The experience of being a public school teacher, anthropologist, and educator trying to bridge the gap between the world of university training and research and that of public education is reflected here. With the background of being a public school teacher in a multicultural setting in the United States, I did anthropological fieldwork in communities and schools of Mexico. Following these experiences, I attempted to bring both roles together as an educator participating in training teachers and helping public school personnel develop policies and practices for multicultural student populations in the United States. The audience addressed here is therefore both educators and anthropologists; ethnography in educational research today should make sense to both groups. Anthropologists must not feel they have to change or lower standards for educational research. Educators should not have to feel that anthropology and ethnography are too esoteric, detailed, and removed from reality to be of use in their decision making.

Many of the views expressed here are drawn in large part from the experience of tracing the footsteps of anthropologists and linguists in Mexico who had written ethnographies about communities there. In many cases, either these anthropologists or their students had used information from these studies to influence educational policy making at national and regional levels. These ethnographies (cf. Redfield 1930, 1941, 1955; Redfield and Villa Rojas 1934) traced the history of the community and detailed in a descriptive account the language and culture of the group. Through a period of months, and sometimes years, ethnographers came to know the methods of self-identification held by the groups and the values, beliefs, and behaviors of group members of different generations and sexes. Therefore, when this information was used in determining educational policies and practices (cf. Caso, et al. 1954, 1964; Aguirre Beltrán 1957; de la Fuente 1964), community norms and needs were reflected. The uses of anthropological and linguistic studies in educational planning have differed in the various administrations of Mexican government in the past half century (Heath 1972), but increasingly since the 1940's, educators have provided for and paid serious attention to community studies in planning education; teachers and local community personnel have often played significant roles in recommending programs, practices, and personnel.

The multicultural nature of Mexican schooling has been recognized for decades. Within the United States, the multicultural nature of communities served by public education has only recently become an expressed concern and thus an impetus for change in educational processes. University teacher-training programs, research laboratories and centers, and policy makers at local and national levels have recently called for citizen advisory boards, citizen participation, and input from communities in a form that could be used in planning educational changes. The Mexican experience seemed a useful one for schools and communities of the United States. Therefore, during the past seven years, as an educator and anthropologist, I worked in schools and communities of the Piedmont region of North and South Carolina, attempting to incorporate the most successful aspects of anthropological and linguistic fieldwork in Mexico in educational planning in this setting. Teachers, administrators,
parents, and community leaders became involved in various aspects of the
process. During these years, we worked together to use ethnographic
findings from two closed communities (one black, the other transitional
Southern Appalachian) of similar socioeconomic and occupational status to
help make formal schooling work for these groups. My own focus and
methodology in the communities was that of traditional ethnographer:
observer/participant interacting with members of the communities in as
many different daily activities as possible. The same type of participant/
observation techniques was used in classrooms, schools, community ser-
vice centers, and vocational settings during portions of the study. The
topical focus was language learning and language use within the communi-
ties, schools, and service or work institutions. Given ethnographic and
linguistic data about these communities and intensive training in ethnog-
ographic and sociolinguistic field methods, teachers and administrators
collected instances of cultural fit and conflicts in learning styles, lan-
guage uses, respect behaviors, time and space usage, and other aspects
of culture. The teachers applied knowledge gained from the ethnographic
data of the communities to devise new strategies of classroom interaction,
to revise tests and instructional materials, and to reorganize space and
time usage in schools and offices. They rewrote units for reading and
social studies, handbooks for school volunteers, and mini-textbooks based
on ethnography of speaking research they conducted in their own institu-
tional settings (cf. Guinness and Heath 1974; Holland 1974). They ex-
tended the concepts, materials, and methods of ethnography through the
workshops and in-service training programs they provided fellow workers
in the region.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, standardized tests and sociodemo-
graphic correlational studies dubbed many of the children of the Piedmont
Carolinas as low in academic achievement and potential. The overriding
concern of the educational establishment became knowledge of how home
and community experiences formed the linguistic, cognitive, and cultural
behavior patterns of children. Initially, the focus centered on knowing
how these patterns were formed in pre-school experiences, but gradually,
the focus shifted to all out-of-school experiences, as teachers and ad-
ministrators came increasingly to recognize the role community life played
in supporting or denying school goals. For example, if students came
from a community in which 80% of the residents worked in textile mills and
never used writing skills of any type in their jobs, teachers could not
argue that successful compositions helped guarantee vocational opportuni-
ties. Neither could they argue that successful writing habits would bring
better wages, since many of the textile workers earned more than public
school employees (see Heath 1981 for an account of how ethnographic data
from communities were used to alter the teaching of composition). Re-
searchers observed and participated in various aspects of community and
school settings while bearing in mind some of these questions. How, and
in what proportions, did members of the closed communities ask questions
of the young? Was the greatest amount of question-asking done by par-
ents or by other familiairs, by adults or by children, by males or by fe-
males? How did community members construct the reality of virtues and
vices? What value-words were used to express taste and preference, to
criticize, grade, and evaluate, to warn, praise, reprove, and draw atten-
tion to rules and demands for respect? How widespread was the grading
of people, the giving of advice, the expression of dissatisfaction with dis-
plays of respect, and the use of persuasion and encouragement? What
kinds of references to written materials were expressed by community
members? Did they use writing to seek information, advice, emotional
outlets, or verification of their ideas and ideals? How did children learn
to label items, to recognize colors and other attributes, and to relate knowledge of these objects and their characteristics to other situations?

It should be emphasized that the goal of this ethnographic research in the communities (representative of approximately 70% of the local population) was not to catalogue folktales, list local folk heroes and occasions for celebration, and detail children’s games, so that teachers could use this cultural information as content to be taught in the schools (see Bauman, this volume, for a discussion of the questionable educational merits of teaching folklore to the children from whose parents the folklore has been collected). The emphasis in the Piedmont Carolinas was to have educators learn the ways of teaching and learning that were functional for members of these communities. Especially critical was knowledge about the functions of spoken and written language in community settings. Throughout the curriculum, teachers could then adopt and adapt these varied learning processes in their teaching techniques and materials. (For a full account of the project, see Heath, forthcoming.)

Ethnography in this setting was supplemented by experimental studies, repeated standardized testing, and numerous other traditional methods of evaluating educational progress. Data from urban planning, community centers, and transportation studies provided numerous leads on how and why communities were shifting in composition, recreational and work preferences, and associational networks. Many of the methodological guidelines were strengthened by these complementary data. For example, when reading scores for groups using a specific basal reading series in one school rose in a three-year period, and those in another school did not, teachers asked why. Teaching methods, in-service practices, sociodemographic characteristics of the populations, and access to audiovisual materials were ostensibly the same. A content analysis of the series was done, and the items and certain behaviors used in the stories were catalogued. Ethnographic data from the communities served by the two schools were checked to determine the presence or absence of these items and behaviors. In the communities attending the school with increased reading scores, at least 90% of the objects (such as elevator, escalator, apartment buildings) and cultural behaviors (such as riding a bus, interacting with a school-crossing guard dressed in a policeman’s uniform) used in the texts were familiar. In those communities where scores had not improved, only approximately 60% of the objects and behaviors were familiar. Had ethnographers in the communities not considered shopping trips, routes to school, and other seemingly useless details of daily activities worthy of recording, this check would not have been possible, and we could not have obtained an understanding of the context that contributed to the difference in scores between the two schools. Following this check, we were able to go back and analyze performance on various sections of the test. The vocabulary items and specific questions in which understanding of certain meanings of words was critical to comprehension constituted the greatest proportion of errors for students in the school that had the lower scores.

In addition to research in communities of students, communities of teachers and administrators were sites for ethnographic study. Knowledge about enculturation patterns of teachers and administrators helped explain their "set" toward particular school behaviors. Traditionally, the relative degree of fit between the norms of teachers and administrators and school goals has not been analyzed, except in such general terms as the "middle-class aura" they are said to bring to school (Payne and Bennett 1977). Such descriptions of these values and behaviors as do exist are not based on ethnographic analysis or studies of how the patterns of behavior of teachers and principals were actually acquired. Instead, these works speak of a generalized mainstream or middle-class "teacher lifestyle."
The answers to questions asking where the appropriate rules for behaving in school came from and why they are used and reinforced by teachers and administrators should provide information on how and why school officials acquire "readiness" for promoting school rules. Ethnographic study in the homes and communities of teachers and administrators reveals the enculturation patterns that provide frames into which institutional norms fit and from which they are reinforced. In Bernstein's terms (1974), classification and framing used by school personnel are only partially the creation of the school; they are also the creation of the socialization of the middle class. In short, research inside the classroom and school, when supplemented by studies of the content and process of cultural transmission in communities of all members of the school--teachers, administrators, and students--helps verify these frames.

Achievement of the essentials of ethnographic research suggested here depends on cooperation between ethnographers who focus on the community outside the school and those who focus on the classroom and also on the professional partnership of anthropologists and educators. We need to find out what it is that students need to know and do to become acceptable participants in classrooms in which their membership is imposed by others, and we also need to find out what it is they know and do to be acceptable home and community members. Through participating as research partners, teachers and administrators may gain specific insights into ways to alter what it is students need to know and do to be acceptable members of classrooms and still achieve educational goals. The purpose of the school as institution is to change some aspects of the behavior of every individual who passes through the process of formal education. The school has the task of socializing the young to a particular set of behavioral and informational norms characteristic of an idealized "good citizen." There are, therefore, limits as to how much the school's methods of operation can change without altering the basic purpose of the school. Nevertheless, certain changes in procedures and philosophic sets toward methods and materials can be made. For example, the hierarchical and sequential structure of classroom behavior can be changed to include structures that are not intrinsic to either institutional norms or enculturation patterns of the middle-class mainstream teacher or administrator.

From our research in communities, we learned that sequencing, over-lapping, and multiple coding within learning situations outside of classrooms were often much more complex than those of the classroom. Therefore, for students from these communities, the classroom slowing and simplification of interaction and presentation of discrete, specifically sequenced units in predetermined hierarchical form were indeed foreign. Teachers came to realize that the slowdown, breakup, and careful minimal layering of classroom interactions were not necessary, if they could adapt community teaching and learning interaction styles to classroom purposes. Teachers involved in ethnographic research therefore trained themselves out of some of their mainstream middle-class enculturation and institutionalized norms and learned to use some of the multiple and complex strategies employed in the communities studied.

CONCLUSIONS

In the past, emphasis has centered on ways to change individuals through formal schooling. Ethnographic studies should enable schools to broaden and expand the tasks individuals encounter in schooling. The essentials of ethnographic methods suggested here (ethno-historical research, attention to definition of unit of study, microethnographic work, linguistic investigations, and analysis of artifacts) derive from the anthropological goals of ultimately obtaining holistic comparative
studies of communities and schools as part of those communities. In so doing, education researchers may reverse the usual trend of being interested primarily in the influences of large social institutions on the cultures that participate in them. Instead, educators may be able to realize the potential of understanding the many patterns of culture represented in communities for expanding ways of learning and reflecting knowledge, skills, and dispositions in schools.

The future calls for the design of research projects from which we can proceed to identify other essentials of ethnographic research in education and perhaps construct a taxonomy of educational settings. With such a taxonomy, we could develop a model in which tested types would figure as expected results of variable forces at work and the processes of change in education would be clarified. In short, to return to Stoppard's character who questioned the definition of art, we may have a paradigm through which ethnographic studies in education can be considered the proper concern of the ethnographer, and we can have an image of wholeness to tell us what it is we are doing.

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EXPLORATIONS IN THE PRACTICE OF ETHNOGRAPHY
HUGH MEHAN

The structure of classroom events and their consequences for student performance

I take it that educators (researchers, practitioners, policy makers) are drawn to ethnography for similar reasons: We all want to achieve a better understanding of the teaching-learning process, the factors that contribute to the development of children's skills, and the role of schooling in society. I also take it that there is a general dissatisfaction with the dominant approaches taken toward these and other topics in education: the educational psychology and the survey research approach.

Although in the course of what follows I will be recommending a form of ethnography as a methodological strategy that has utility for the study of children in and out of school, I would like to make it clear at the outset how this recommendation is intended: I am recommending ethnography not because it has a list of answers to pressing educational problems, but because it provides an entirely different way of looking at schooling and asking questions about the educational process.

Despite running the risk of oversimplification, I think it is possible to say that the fundamental question asked, when a survey or other correlational study is conducted, is why?, where the "why" implies a search for causes of action in antecedent conditions. Examples of questions posed in this way are "Why do certain students achieve success in school and others fail in school?" "Why are certain programs more successful in promoting reading than others?" The formulation of this "why" question in this way organizes methods to reach its solution. Human experience is carved up into discrete elements. Some of these elements are treated as "input variables"; others are treated as "output variables." The goal of the research is to find correlations among these elements. A statistical correlation between input and output variables is taken as an explanation of the relationship.

The fundamental question asked by an ethnographer is different, it seems to me. It is not why, it is how. How is a given state of affairs organized as it is? This "how" question also influences the approach taken to find its answers. Instead of seeking causal explanations in statistical correlations, ethnographers seek the rules or principles that organize behavior in practical circumstances. This results in a holistic rather than an atomistic conception of human experience. The goal of the research is
to specify the machinery that generates the social order observed as people organize their lives together, with the additional proviso that the description be meaningful in participants' terms.

This difference in approach to research is recapitulated in the results of research. The results that accrue from the ethnographic approach do not look like the results produced by surveys, experiments, or other correlational studies. By and large, correlational studies produce numerical summaries. By contrast, ethnographies take the form of descriptions of the way people live their lives in social situations. Often, these descriptions are narratives. In some ethnographies, organizing principles are included in the description, and appear as "grammars," "models," or "rules." But, in any case, the final research report does not come out as a set of causal statements linking input and output variables, or appear as a frequency distribution of certain patterns of behavior.

If we are interested in understanding, and possibly changing the structure of education in society, then knowledge about organizing principles is crucial. Such knowledge informs us of the processes that organize education, and can relate what goes on inside schools to what happens in other aspects of society.

In this article, I ask questions about students' competence in classrooms, namely: What do students need to know and do to participate effectively in the classroom community, especially in the eyes of the teacher?

To address this question, the body of this article is organized into three sections. The first section presents my conception of ethnography as a research strategy that is suitable for the study of students' competence. In the second section I present a summary of research that examines the social organization of classroom events. In the final section I examine the consequences of this structure for students' performance in the classroom.

FIELD-BASED RESEARCH

Perhaps it is because I come from sociology where the dominant research strategy is survey research and I am entering a domain long associated with anthropology, but I believe that it is important to spend some time describing the field-based research approach called "ethnography." I provide this background to explain the rather special way I use that concept.

In the broadest terms, ethnography can be defined as a description of the culture of a community or society. This is a deceptively simple definition, because researchers attach different meanings to the terms involved. And depending on the meanings attributed, the very meaning of ethnography changes. More specifically, distinctions can be made between those who treat "culture" in a very general way, and those who approach culture in a more specific way.

General Ethnography

Tylor (10.1:1) is representative of those who interpret culture in a very general way: "Culture or civilization, taken in its widest ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, or any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." This designation of culture was meant to distinguish those aspects of the totality of human existence that are social and transmitted by symbolic means from those aspects that are biological and transmitted by genetic means.
The ethnography written about the culture of a group when it is defined in this way is similarly general. It takes the form of a narrative chronicle of the customary behavior and artifacts of members of a society. It is generally long and discursive, full of rich details of the group of people involved. The entire society is being described when culture is so defined, even though the source of information may be only one or two selected informants from a particular village or community.

Culturally Specific Ethnography

Culture has also been interpreted in more specific ways. Instead of approaching the totality of a group's social achievements, particular aspects of a society have received attention. Conklin's (1957) detailed report of the agricultural patterns among the Hanunóo, Frake's (1964b) structural account of aspects of Subanun religious behavior, and Gladwin's (1970) description of Pulawat navigational systems are exemplars in this version of cultural anthropology.

A change in the conception of ethnography has accompanied the development of more specific approaches to culture. There has been a marked shift in emphasis from accumulating considerable amounts of data in the form of an extended narrative account to a more formal analysis of particular cultural patterns. By this view, ethnography is not a "mere description" of the patterns of behavior associated with a cultural group; it is a cultural grammar or abstract theory, which provides the rules for producing and interpreting appropriate cultural behavior in given settings (Goodenough 1957; Conklin 1964; Frake 1964a).

Despite these differences in scope, ethnographies have many methodological features in common. First is the shared belief among ethnographers that a cultural description requires a long period of intimate study and residence among members of the community being studied. Because ethnography has traditionally been constructed in communities that are foreign to the researcher, a knowledge of the spoken language and subtle patterns of behavior of the community members has been considered a requisite. Indeed, a sign that an ethnography is proceeding well is that the researcher is acceptable to the participants themselves. This aspect of ethnography places a special burden on researchers studying scenes in their own culture. The ethnographer working in a foreign land is attempting to make the strange familiar so as to understand it, whereas the ethnographer in local scenes must reverse the process and make the familiar strange to come to an understanding of it.

Instead of relying on documentary evidence supplied by official agencies, or survey data gathered by brief, formal interviews, ethnography is characterized by a range of other systematic techniques, including prolonged face-to-face contacts with members of the local group, direct participation in some of that group's activities, and intensive work with a few informants.

The open-ended character of ethnographic data gathering avoids the limitations imposed by research categories determined in advance. Ethnographic research becomes self-correcting during the course of the inquiry, because questions posed at the outset are changed as the inquiry unfolds, and topics that seemed essential at the outset are replaced as new topics emerge (Hymes, this volume).

Hence, an ethnography is vigorously naturalistic. It is richly detailed and fine grained. The description is formulated on the basis of extensive unstructured research settings, although recently a number of "experimental" ethnographers (notably Cole, Gay, Glick, and Sharp 1971) have been applying controls to ethnographic data by the use of ecologically
valid experiments in conjunction with detailed field observation.

Yet another distinguishing characteristic of ethnography is its comparative or contrastive feature. The cultural system is not studied in isolation, but in relation to known systems of organization. A delicate matter in this desire for a comparative component is "cultural imposition"—employing the cultural arrangements of one system as an inappropriate explanatory device for another. A commitment to prolonged face-to-face contacts with members of the community under study is an attempt to ensure that the description of the culture is consistent with the perspective of the participants inside the setting. Categories imported to the setting from the outside are avoided. Instead, the goal of ethnographic research is to allow the reality of the situation to impinge on the investigator's subjectivity until the categories for description are determined by the scene itself (Stenhouse, as paraphrased by Doyle 1978).

More recently, ethnographers have taken advantage of technological developments in the audiovisual field. Videotape and film have been used to collect data for analysis. It is important to point out that tape and film have been used as a data base, not simply as fancy illustrative material. The social organization of naturally occurring events, especially in institutional settings, has been investigated piece by piece, from beginning to end, top to bottom.

Videotape and film are particularly important tools because they alleviate some of the problems that reliance on written notes causes in field studies. The videotape serves as an external memory, allowing repeated viewings and consideration of multiple perspectives of the activities captured on the tape. A more comprehensive view of the society's culture is, therefore, possible. Indeed, it may be the case that these technological advances have contributed to the shift from simple narrative description to more formal and abstract models.

In addition, it is possible to retrieve the grounds of an analysis from the data source when audiovisual materials are used. Furthermore, participants in social scenes studied can be shown film or tape and asked for their account of what is happening (Erickson and Shultz 1978; Cicourel, Jennings, Jennings, Leiter, Mackey, Mehan, and Roth 1974; Florio 1978). When researchers check their interpretation of events with participants, a sophisticated check on the validity of the research becomes possible.

Although film and videotape solve some of the problems associated with more conventional data collection techniques, these devices are by no means a panacea. In fact, they cause many problems of their own. For one thing, the camera angle and placement create a specific perspectival view of the social scene being recorded. It is by no means possible to capture an entire arrangement of people, or hear all conversations occurring in a group of people. Hence, the perception of a situation available in audiovisual materials, like other modes of perception, is selective. For another thing, there is always a certain reactivity effect when sophisticated research equipment is introduced into a social situation. Although I have been pleasantly surprised how quickly elementary school children adapt to, indeed, ignore, cameras and recorders in their midst, it is always important to realize that there may be a difference between a scene observed and a scene unobserved. This dilemma becomes a special case of what Labov (1972) has termed the "observer's paradox": The need of the researcher to gather naturally occurring (i.e., unobserved) behavior is contradicted by the necessity of observing behavior to gather material.

Perhaps the most important contribution that the introduction of audiovisual equipment makes to the ethnographic research process is making explicit the reflexive relationship that exists between researcher, participants, and research reports. Researchers are often described as passive vehicles, "open windows" (Gusfield 1976) through which the
objective facts of the matter pass unaffected. Viewing videotape and assembling transcripts remind us that the researcher plays an active role in the research process by organizing the scenes to be studied, assembling materials, and interpreting data. The inclusion of this reflexive aspect (Hymes, this volume; Jules-Rosette 1974) in ethnography is one of the important features that distinguishes this type of investigation from simple participant observation.

The Ethnography of Communication

A particularly important development in ethnography (especially for our purposes here) has been the extension of the focus of study to include the communicative and linguistic aspects of culture (Gumperz and Hymes 1964, 1974; Hymes 1972; Bauman and Sherzer 1974; Sanches and Blount 1975). Hymes has defined the concerns of "the ethnography of communication" as a description of the skills and abilities involved in the acquisition and use of language in different social situations.

Ethnographers of speaking stress that language does not occur in isolated sentences, but in natural units of speaking, like speech acts and speech events. Indeed, speaking is like other cultural systems of behavior (e.g., religious, economic, and political); it is organized in each society in specific ways that are to be discovered upon analysis by the investigator. This statement of relativism does not deny the existence of universals, however. Quite the contrary: It asserts that generalizations about speaking must emerge through comparisons of individual systems, investigated first in their own terms. The point of departure for the ethnography of speaking is the speech community, not the sentence. The speech community is defined through the shared or mutually complementary knowledge and abilities of its members for the production and interpretation of socially appropriate speech. Such a community is an "organization of diversity" (A.F.C. Wallace, quoted in Bauman and Sherzer 1974) insofar as this knowledge and ability is differentially distributed among its members; the production and interpretations of speech are thus variable and complementary, rather than homogeneous and constant, as grammatically based linguists have assumed.

Ethnographies of communication have concentrated for the most part on the verbal aspects of communication. They have produced descriptions of people's ways of speaking in contrasting social situations in different societies, or in contrasting institutional contexts within a given society (see Bauman and Sherzer 1974; Gumperz and Hymes 1974; Sanches and Blount 1975). Through their analysis of ways of greeting, taking leave, providing narratives, giving commands, making jokes in different groups, communities, and societies, these researchers have demonstrated that an intimate relationship exists among language forms, the functions they serve in discourse, and the social contexts in which they occur.

A Constitutive Approach to Culture and Ethnography

The developments in the ethnography of communication are particularly important, given our interest in descriptions of interaction in educational settings. We must be on guard, however, against both an overly mentalistic and an overly behavioristic conception of culture. The conception of culture provided by "sociolinguists" and "ethnoscientists" (Sturdevant 1964) has a strong cognitive orientation. This conception can lead
unwittingly to the position that competence is only things in people's heads (e.g., "ideas," "beliefs," "knowledge").

Culture is not a purely cognitive or subjectivistic consideration. Effective participation in interaction requires that people produce behavior and be able to interpret behavior in a manner that is acceptable to others. In Goodenough's (1957:167) terms: "As I see it, a society's culture consists of whatever one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members, and to do so in any role that they accept for any one of themselves." This means that the patterns of behavior, the "customs," the "folkways," and the rest that are observed to be repeatable ways of life within some cultural group need to be taken into account.

Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that this call to consider "patterns of behavior" is not simply a recommendation to substitute a behavioral definition for a cognitive conception of culture. Culture is neither purely objective, a "social fact" that simply exists "out there" in the world (Durkheim 1896), nor is it purely subjective (a mental state in an individual's head). Neither cognition nor behavior can exist without the other; they are in a constant dialectical relationship.

Freire (1968:35-36) has said that the separation of the objective from the subjective aspects of human experience, when analyzing reality or acting upon it, results in two simplistic positions. The denial of the subjective (in this case cognition) results in "objectivism"--a conception of the world without people. The denial of the objective aspects of human experience (in this case patterns of behavior) results in "subjectivism" and in extreme forms of "solipsism," for it posits people without a world.

Treating culture in purely cognitive or purely behavioral terms becomes "alienating" in that culture is divorced from its human modes of production, i.e., the constructive or constitutive "work" that assembles human experiences. Both of these extremes are ingenious, for "world and people do not exist apart from each other; they exist in constant interaction" (Freire 1968:36). The solution to this dilemma is to collapse the subjectivist-objectivist dualism by treating culture as intersubjective praxis (human productive and interpretive practices) instead of either a subjective state or an objective thing.

This position rests on the "constitutive" (Garfinkel 1963; Mehan and Wood 1975) premise that patterns of behavior are constructed in social scenes; they are assembled by people in their interaction together. By the same token, cultural knowledge (including ideas and beliefs) is enacted in social scenes; knowledge is displayed in people's interaction.

On the one hand, this means describing what people do with their cultural knowledge, how they use what they know about social structure, norms, and other people in ongoing social situations, encounters, and events. On the other hand, it means describing the active modes or practices of human production and construction, the concrete, observable "work" of people that assembles orderly entities. In both cases, it means recognizing that the world and people are in a constantly reflexive relationship.

Relating this discussion to the topic at hand, we come to the position that the objective facts and subjective states associated with education like those associated with other cultural domains, are interactional accomplishments. "Classroom organization," "curriculum programs," "teacher effectiveness," and other so-called "objective" aspects of schooling are intersubjective phenomena, constructed in interaction. Similarly, "students' abilities," "students' intelligence," "teachers' style," and other seemingly subjective states of individuals are intersubjective phenomena, displayed in interaction.
Therefore, this constitutive approach to ethnography (Mehan 1978, 1979) recommends studying the dynamic interactional work of participants that produces behavioral displays that are judged as "acceptable" or "unacceptable," "correct" or "incorrect," and recommends studying the interactional work that assembles aspects of schooling that become taken as "objective." This constitutive approach to ethnography is recommended as an alternative to correlational approaches—which merely seek relations between antecedent and consequent variables—because it focuses on the interactional machinery that constitutes educational environments.

**Summary**

The previous discussion provides some of the background necessary to investigate students' participation in the classroom. It provides a warrant for defining "interactional competence" in terms of effective participation or membership in the classroom. It instructs us to locate displays of competence in the talk, the gestures, and the other interactional work that people use to make sense of one another and to assemble the organized character of social situations.

This conception of competence is intentionally broad. It encompasses the requisites for communication with others (cf. Hymes 1974), as well as the interpretation of language, behavior, rules, and the other normative dimensions of classroom life (cf. Garfinkel 1967; Cicourel 1973). Hence, "competence" becomes interactional in two senses of the term. One, it is the competence necessary for effective interaction. Two, it is the competence that is available in the interaction between people. This interactional approach to competence contrasts with the more interpersonal view of competence adopted by Weinstein (1969) and by O'Malley (1977), who are concerned with the "productive and mutually satisfying interactions between a child and peers or adults" (O'Malley 1977:29; cf. Clement 1977).

What is involved, then, in competent participation in the classroom community? What do students say and do when they are judged as "effective" or "successful" in the eyes of other members of the classroom community, especially the teacher?

I address these questions in the next two sections by summarizing constitutive ethnographies that have examined the structure of classroom events and then by drawing conclusions about the consequences of classroom organization for students' performance.

**THE STRUCTURE OF CLASSROOM EVENTS**

A common feature of these studies is their view of classroom life. Instead of relying on categories that may have been devised by curriculum specialists, administrators, budget analysts, or others outside the daily life of the classroom, these studies attack the problem of the organization of education from the perspective of the participants inside the classroom. This commitment to achieve a convergence between researchers' and participants' perspectives has led researchers to concentrate on how the classroom is organized on a daily basis.

Perhaps one of the most pervasive features of everyday classroom life is its temporal organization. Teachers and students come to a single place (the classroom) early in the morning, and for the most part, remain in that setting until late in the day. The focused observation of the school day from its beginning to its end, either by concentrated participant-observation or by repeated viewings of audiovisual materials (or a combination
of both), shows that the stream of behavior between teachers and students is punctuated into relatively discrete segments. These segments can be called "events" (Frake 1964b; Hymes 1974) because certain activities regularly occur within these frames, and people conduct themselves differently in different frames. Furthermore, the participants themselves "formulate" (Garfinkel and Sacks 1970) segments of the stream of behavior as an event by keeping one another accountable during the course of interaction (McDermott 1976), and sometimes, in addition, by naming what is going on in so many words (e.g., "it's reading time, boys and girls") (Erickson and Shultz 1977; Mehan 1978; cf. Agar 1975).

Figure 1 is a hypothetical arrangement of events in one classroom for a morning. This arrangement did not occur in any one particular classroom. Rather, it is a composite assembled from the several ethnographies of specific events conducted in different classrooms. I have assembled this composite so that the general points about the structure of the school day can be presented and so that the implications that these organizational arrangements have on students' performance in classrooms can be described concisely.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events:</th>
<th>First Circle</th>
<th>Lesson</th>
<th>Reading Groups: Work Time</th>
<th>Second Circle</th>
<th>Recess</th>
<th>Reading Groups: Work Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Figure 1. A Composite View of a Morning in a Classroom**

Each event has unique organizational features that are assembled in the interaction between teacher and students. Some of these events (e.g., "circles," "lessons") are "whole-group" activities, in which all classroom participants are assembled in a single place and there is a single focus of attention. Other events are "small-group" activities. Here students conduct many activities in separate clusters, some under the supervision of the teachers (reading groups), others outside the direct supervision of the teacher (work groups).

The physical arrangements of the participants vary on these occasions. Students are assembled in a cluster on the floor surrounding the teacher during "circles," and are at their desks or in chairs facing the teacher during "lessons." During "reading groups" and "work groups" the students rotate between learning centers. At one such center, the teacher reads with a small number of students, while another, a parent or aide checks work. Students work independently at other centers. Setting up reading groups and circles entails the rearrangement of furniture (chairs, desks, chairs). The organization of each of these events involves the movement from place to place in the room, or is a matter of treating the same space in configurations a different way (Clement 1977:11). These differences in teacher and student configurations and major rearrangements mark the boundaries between events, and distinguish events from the background stream of behavior.

The ostensive purpose (at least from the point of view of the teacher) is likewise different for different events. Lessons and reading groups have a more academic or "instrumental" (Bernstein 1973) purpose, whereas circles have a more procedural or "expressive" (Bernstein 1973) emphasis. It is during these latter times that announcements about the day's activities are made, changes in procedures are announced, lunch money is collected, and the ubiquitous show and tell is conducted. Recess is recess.
The Segmentation of Events into Phases

Just as the school day can be segmented into constituents (called events), each possessing a unique organization, each event can be analyzed into its constituent parts. In this section, I will summarize some research on the segmentation of events into "phases." Then in a following section, I will describe the segmentation of lesson phases into their constituent parts, called "interactional sequences."

In one such ethnography, Bremme and Erickson (1977) have analyzed the procedural meetings ("circles on the rug") that took place across an academic year in a K-1 classroom. Upon repeated videotape viewings of these events, they found that these circles were organized into distinct phases. These included the call to the circle, warm-up, students' time, teacher's time, and wrap-up. The shift to students' time was announced by those at the edge of the circle rising to their knees and facing into the center, by the commencement of a long student's-turn-to-speak dealing with a personal experience or concern and by the teacher's ceasing to scan the group with her face and eyes, and focusing instead on one student (speaker). Teacher's time was marked by students' rearranging themselves into a sitting position, turning their faces and eyes toward the teacher, and by the commencement of the teacher's scanings as she initiated a topic of discourse dealing with organizational or "teaching" content. Transition times were signaled by the breaking up of either of these verbal-nonverbal patterns, i.e., by the individualization of students' gaze orientation, body positions, and conversational topics—along with increased body movement by both teacher and students.

In a related study, Florio (1978) found that "work time" in the K-1 classroom was composed of three constituent parts, which participants referred to as "getting ready," "focused time," and "wind-up." Work time as an event was set off from the flow of ongoing classroom activity by the assembly of participants in a single part of the classroom. Activities within this focused event were also marked posturally and spatially. During "focused time," the teacher and students were oriented toward the center of activity. Their focus was on the task before them. The teacher excluded children from peer-peer conversation by verbal means (e.g., "I just don't want to hear you now") while not maintaining eye contact with students. This centered focus of orientation contrasts with both "getting ready" and "wind-up." At these times, participants adopted a more decentralized focus. Florio reports that the task at hand was not a central focus during these phases, but was more of a sidelines.

Mehan, Cazden, Coles, Fisher, and Maroules (1976) found that nine "whole-group" lessons taught throughout the year in an ethnically mixed (Black and Mexican American) cross-age (first, second, and third graders) class had a similar hierarchical organization to which lesson participants were oriented. Each of these nine lessons was arranged into "opening," "instructional," and "closing" phases. Each phase was characterized by distinctive interactional work between participants.

In the "opening" phase, participants assembled at particular and recurrent places in the room, thereby, in effect, informing one another that they were to participate in a lesson. For example, the teacher shifted from a sitting position in a small group of students to a standing position in front of the chalkboard. At the same time, students put books and other materials away and faced the teacher. This behavior at the kinesic level was recapitulated at the verbal level. The teacher provided verbal directives (procedural instructions to the students to move chairs, sharpen pencils, take out or put away books), and informatives (verbal formulations that inform the students about what is going to happen in the lesson) (cf.
Sinclair and Coulthard 1975). After adjustments in physical arrangements had been made, the teacher and students focused attention on each other. This change from relatively active to relatively calm kinesic activity marks the shift from the "opening" to the "instructional" phase of the lesson.

The closing phase is a mirror image of the opening phase. Whereas at the outset of a lesson participants inform one another of what they are going to do, at its closing they inform one another what they have done. A set of directives, instructing students to move to the next event in the school day, often accompanies closing informatives.

In an exceedingly fine-grained analysis, McDermott (1976; McDermott, Gospodinoff, and Aron 1978) has located the constituent components that teacher and students in first grade reading groups employ to hold each other accountable to the ongoing course of interaction. The "top" reading group was organized into three "rounds" of interaction (roughly analogous to "phases"). The first round was a quick discussion and organization period in which the teacher told the children to open their reading books and called on volunteers to start to read. The second round was a long session in which each child in the group had the opportunity to read once. In the third round, the teacher asked the children questions, and the children answered in chorus; then, the students left the reading table and prepared for lunch. These rounds were marked off each from the other and from surrounding classroom activity in several ways. Bodies were oriented and 'props' were used differently in each round. In the first round, the students handled the books while they looked at the teacher. In the second round, the children all focused on the books; in the third round, the books were ignored, while all attended to the teacher. Students shifted their bodies at the end of a speaker's turn toward the teacher or toward the next person to read. In addition, each round was marked by different procedures for sequencing activities. In the first round, students vied for turns, in the second they were nominated by the teacher and in the third they responded in a chorus.

Although McDermott is able to demonstrate effectively that there is an equivalent social order in the "bottom" reading group, that reading lesson is organized somewhat differently. At the level of the lesson the groups are basically alike; but the bottom group has four rounds instead of three. This reading group starts with the teacher at the chalkboard, inviting children to underline words. Then the teacher passes out books. "Taking turns to read" is the third round to appear, and it takes a third of the total time. In the fourth round, children write words from the board on their work papers. As in the top group, each round is marked by different body orientations, use of props, and procedures for sequencing activities.

This phase or round level of the constituent structure of classroom events can be depicted by modifying Figure 1. This modification appears as Figure 2.

The Segmentation of Phases Into Interactional Sequences

The phases of classroom events, in turn, have constituent parts composed of the interactional work of teachers with students. I will illustrate the segmentation of even phases into "interactional sequences" by reference to my own work on the organization of the "instructional phase" of classroom lessons. 2

The instructional phase is the heart of the lessons. It is here that the bulk of academic information is exchanged between teachers and students. The instructional phase, like the opening and closing phase, is composed of characteristic interactional sequences. This exchange of academic information occurs in interactional units called "elicitation sequences."
These units are "interactional" in that they are a joint production of teacher and students; they are "sequential" in that they occur one after the other in interaction. These sequences have three interconnected parts: an Initiation Act, a Reply Act, and an Evaluation Act.

In effect, the three-part Initiation-Reply-Evaluation sequence contains two coupled "adjacency pairs" (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974). The "co-occurrence relationships" (Ervin-Tripp 1972; Gumperz 1964) in these sequences are schematically represented in Figure 3:

```
Initiation Reply Evaluation
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Figure 3: The Three-part Instructional Sequence

The Initiation-Reply is the first adjacency pair. When completed, this pair itself becomes the first part of the second adjacency pair. The second part of the second pair is the Evaluation Act, which comments on the completion of the Initiation-Reply pair.

Interational sequences during the instructional phase of the lesson are organized around topics. As a result, the instructional phase of classroom lessons can be characterized as a progression of "topically related sets of interactional sequences" (Mehan 1979). The "instructional topic" is established in a "basic sequence" that appears on every occasion of teacher-student interaction. On some occasions, the discussion of the topic ceases with the completion of this basic sequence. On other occasions, teachers and students expand on the basic topic with a series of "conditional sequences," progressing through these topically related sets of sequences in a systematic fashion.

The following transcript from the "Namecards" lesson exemplifies this hierarchical arrangement. In this transcript the teacher (T) asks the
students, Patricia (P) and Carolyn (C), to identify the name printed on a card.

### Initiation

4:9

T: Who knows whose namecard this is? (holds up namecard)

P: Mine

C: (raises hand)

T: Ah, if you see, if it's your namecard don't give the secret away if you, if...

### Reply

4:10

T: Let's see, I'll just take some people who are here. Um, if it's your namecard, don't give away the secret. Whose namecard, who could tell us whose namecard this is? (holds up card)

C: (raises hand)

4:11

T: Carolyn.

C: Patricia

4:12

T: Can you point to Patricia?

4:13

T: Is this your namecard?

P: (nods yes)

4:14

T: Whose namecard is this? Now, don't give away the secret if it's yours, don't give away the secret if it's yours, give other children a chance to look. (holds up namecard)

The teacher held up a namecard for identification (4:9). When Patricia identified her own card, the teacher gave further instructions and held up the card again (4:10). When Carolyn identified the namecard correctly (4:11), the teacher asked her to locate the student named (4:12) and asked Patricia to confirm the identification (4:13). As soon as that was done, the teacher lowered the namecard and said, "That's right." The cadence of the teacher's voice slowed as she pronounced these words. The lowered namecard, the changed cadence, and the use of "That's right" all marked the end of this topically related set of sequences. The identification of the namecard (4:9-11) was a "basic sequence" that established the topic. The linking of the card to the person (4:12) and the confirmation of that identification (4:13) were conditional sequences; their appearance was dependent on the prior appearance of the basic identification of the namecard.

By raising another card and quickening the pace of her voice, the teacher began another topical set (4:14). One topical followed another throughout the remainder of the instructional phase of the lesson.

This transcript also illustrates that interactional sequences between
teachers and students in the instructional phases of lessons appear in "three-part" and "extended" forms. The three-part sequence occurs when the reply called for by the initiation act occurs in the next turn, and is immediately followed by an evaluation (see line 4:12). The extended sequence occurs when the expected reply does not appear immediately (see 4:9-11), because students do not answer at all, or give partial or incorrect replies, or because interruptions or distractions occur. At such times, the initiator employs a number of strategies, including prompting after incorrect or incomplete replies and repeating or simplifying initiation acts, to obtain the reply, called for in the initial initiation act. The completion of extended sequences is marked in much the same way as three-part sequences: by the positive evaluation of the content of students' replies, slowed cadence, and manipulation of educational material.

The presence of extended sequences of teacher-student interaction suggests that the reflexive structures that tie speech events together are not limited to adjacent utterances (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974), but operate across considerable stretches of interaction (cf. Goffman 1975; Philips 1976). Because "reflexive tying" operates across extended sequences of interaction, teacher-student interaction does not appear to be under immediate stimulus control. Instead, the machinery governing teacher-student discourse in classroom lessons seems more akin to a generative, interactional model (Cicourel 1973; Mehan and Wood 1975) than to a stochastic model (Mishler 1975a, 1975b).

The complete sequential and hierarchical organization of the classroom event, formulated as a "lesson" by participants and researchers alike, is displayed in Figure 4. Included in this figure is the hierarchical arrangement of the major lesson components displayed vertically, with the smallest unit at the bottom. Sequential arrangements are displayed horizontally, with the first component in a sequence on the left.

| EVENT LESSON | | |
|--------------|--------------|-----------------
| Phase        | Opening      | Instructional   | Closing        |
| Type of sequence | Directive | Infor- | Topically related set | Topically related set |
| Organization of sequences | I-R-E | I-R- | Elici- | Elici- | I-R- | I-R- | I-R- | Elici- | Elici- | I-R- | I-R- |
| Participants | T-S-T | T-S-T | T-S-T | T-S-T | T-S-T | T-S-T | T-S-T |

Key:  
T = teacher; S = student; I-R-E = Initiation-Reply-Evaluation sequence; \( E \) = Evaluation optional in Informative sequence.

Figure 4. The Structure of Classroom Lessons

Summary

Teachers and students mark the boundaries of interactional sequences, topically related sets, event phases, and school events themselves through shifts in kinesic, paralinguistic, and verbal behavior. The presence of these boundary markers in the interaction indicates that participants are oriented toward the sequential and hierarchical organization of school events. The presence of this interactional work demonstrates that teacher-student interactions—like mother-infant (Brazelton, Koslowski, and Main 1974),
counselor-student (Erickson 1975), and psychiatrist-patient (Condon 1966; Schefflen 1972) interactions--are rhythmic, cooperative activities, involving the complex coordination of speech and gesture. Interaction is segmented, and to some extent controlled, by systematic shifts in participants' postures, conversational rhythms, and prosody. These changing arrays of postural configurations demarcate the division of the continuous flow of interaction into discrete segments. By indicating that something new is happening, these changes have profound effects on what is communicated. In the classroom, proxemic shifts, tempo changes, and unique lexical entries signal changes to lesson content.

In short, the following are the general findings from those ethnographies of classroom life:

1. The stream of behavior between teacher and students can be segmented into relatively discrete units.
2. The segmentation of behavior is describable with a small set of recursive rules.
3. The segmentation of behavior forms units of increasingly smaller size, with the "event" being the largest interactional unit; events, in turn, are composed of phases, and phases are composed of interactional sequences.
4. These constituents are interactional accomplishments, i.e., assembled in the interaction between participants.
5. The segmentation of behavior forms boundaries or junctures between events and other constituents.
6. These junctures are marked by participants' interactional work, including verbal and nonverbal behavior; the larger the unit, the more emphatic and redundant the juncture markers.

CONSEQUENCES FOR STUDENT CLASSROOM PARTICIPATION

These configurations are not merely elegant formulations of the structure of classroom interaction. They have practical consequences for students in schools. It will be my purpose in this section to describe some of the consequences that the structure of classroom events has for students' participation in classrooms.

Each configuration depicted in Figures 1, 2, and 3 provides a "hierarchy of contexts" (McDermott 1976) for interaction between teacher and students. Different contexts impose different constraints on students' actions in that certain ways of speaking and certain ways of behaving are normatively enforced in each context. These constraints may vary from event to event, from phase to phase within an event, and from interactional sequence to interactional sequence within an event's phase. These constraints require that students engage in active interpretive work to make sense of constantly shifting social circumstances. This implies that effective participation in the classroom entails recognizing different contexts for interaction and producing behavior that is appropriate for each context.
Contextual Constraints between Events

McDermott and Gospodinoff (1979) examine the consequences of the application of forms of behavior appropriate in one everyday-life situation to another situation, that of the classroom. At one point during the school day, a Puerto Rican first-grade student gets the attention of his (Anglo) teacher by touching her buttocks. The teacher responds negatively. McDermott and Gospodinoff ask why this student would engage in this behavior with this teacher nine months into the school year, no matter how acceptable that behavior might be for a youngster in Puerto Rican culture. These authors dismiss explanations that focus on conflicts in communicative codes (tactical Hispanic child vs. distant Anglo teacher) as too simplistic, and engage in a context analysis to locate the organizing principles of this incident. An analysis of the action surrounding this incident revealed that the student also broke a number of other rules at the same time, one a general rule (he called the teacher by her last name without the appropriate title), another specific to that classroom (he broke into a small group lesson to get the teacher's attention). McDermott says that the boy shows considerable respect for these rules at other times. A further analysis suggests that the boy picked his behavioral repertoire effectively, in that he not only gets the teacher's attention, but after a slight scolding, he gets the teacher to scold a child with whom he had been fighting. These authors imply that the boy's action was a strategic manipulation of available social resources. By importing behavior from one situation and using it in another, the boy gets a piece of interaction accomplished that is important to him. McDermott and Gospodinoff also suggest that this incident is functional for the teacher, as it results in time away from the bottom reading group but in behavior that is beneficial for the entire group.

Contextual Constraints between Phases

Bremme and Erickson (1977) found that certain behavior was acceptable during certain phases but not other phases of "circles." For example, talking without the teacher's specific permission was acceptable during "teacher time," and received her acknowledgment if the utterance met specific (though tacit) criteria of topical relevance. But this behavior was prohibited during "students' time." Then, students had to raise their hand or call the teacher's name and be acknowledged before the teacher would respond to their talk. In this situation, topical relevance did not matter. This means that at any given point, the student must decide which phase of the lesson(s) he is in—teacher or student time. This also means that the "same" behavior (e.g., talking) takes on a different meaning in different circumstances. To interact successfully in the circle, students had to coordinate certain behavioral displays with certain phases of the event. A lack of coordination led to negative evaluations. As a result, students had to "read" the subtle cues that signaled shifts in the phase of the circle, or find their behavior in disfavor.

Contextual Constraints between Interactional Sequences

Classroom lessons have been described above as composed of a series of Initiation-Reply-Evaluation sequences between teacher and students. Most of these sequences are initiated by the teacher. The teacher provides information to students, elicits information from them, and directs their
procedural actions. As the teacher is initiating these actions, she is simultaneously allocating turns to them.

Under normal classroom circumstances, the teacher allocates turns by nominating individual students, inviting them to bid for the floor, and by inviting direct replies. Each of these procedures prescribes different behavior. On some occasions, pupils can reply directly, although on others they must receive permission to reply. To contribute successfully to classroom lessons, students must discriminate among the subtleties of these normative procedures. When one particular student has been awarded the floor by name or nonverbal means, other students must know to be silent. When the teacher invites bids for the floor, students must know to raise their hands and not shout out the answers. When the teacher invites replies from the class, students must realize that they contribute directly. Those who misinterpret an invitation to Reply as an Invitation to Bid, and raise their hands instead of answering, lose the opportunity to display what they know.

When these two dimensions of classroom discourse were integrated, interaction between teacher and students proceeded smoothly. Students reply to teachers' requests for information, listen attentively to informative comments, and respond to procedural requests. Students raise their hands when Invitations to Bid are made, and reply in unison when Invitations to Reply are made.

Of course, not all interaction in classroom lessons conforms to this normative ideal. Students do not always synchronize what they know with these normative procedures for the display of academic knowledge. The separation of form and content leads to inappropriate social displays in the classroom and negative evaluations by the teacher. This is as much the case for the student who provides correct academic content without the appropriate social form as it is for the student who provides form without content.

The student who supplies correct academic information, but does not use appropriate turn-taking procedures to do so, typifies the case of content without form. For example, a student may reply direct with an academically correct answer when the teacher employs an indirect turn-allocation procedure, e. g., an Invitation to Bid. When students did not employ the normatively appropriate procedures for gaining access to the floor in the classroom I studied, their actions were routinely evaluated negatively by the teacher.

The student who has mastered the procedures for gaining access to the floor, but does not have simultaneous command over academic information typifies the case of form without content. There are numerous vignettes of the following sort from tapes of this classroom, especially in the fall of the year when the young first graders were still learning the classroom turn-taking rules. As the teacher asked a question, students jumped from their chairs, waved their hands frantically, and shouted for attention furiously. But when the teacher nominated one of these students, that student suddenly melted. Although their mouths opened and closed, they had nothing to say.

One particularly poignant example of this occurred during a reading preparedness lesson during the first week of school:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiation</th>
<th>Reply</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4:46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:47</td>
<td>Jeannie: (raises hand)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T: Jeannie</td>
<td>Jeannie: (pause) I had it and I lost it.</td>
<td>T: Uh, ya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When the teacher called on Jeannie who had been bidding for the floor vigorously, instead of giving the answer, she said, "I had it and I lost it."

A similar lack of congruence between the form and content of students' replies is found when students bid for the floor before a teacher has completed asking a question. One such example occurred during the teacher's introductory soliloquy to the "Cafeteria Trays" lesson (see Mehan, et al. 1976, Appendix III): Each time the teacher paused for breath as she explained the problems involved in cleaning up after lunch, one particular student raised her hand. Finally exasperated, the teacher chastised that student for not synchronizing her bid for the floor with the completion of her initiation.

Students have a repertoire of academic information and social knowledge available to them. When the teacher initiates action, they must be able to choose a reply from their repertoire that is appropriate for the occasion. When the teacher is allocating the floor to students, they must recognize the turn-allocation procedure that is operating and provide the behavior that is consistent with those normative expectations.

Once students have gained access to the floor, they must know what to do with it. That is, they must synchronize the appropriate form of their reply with the correct content. To do so, students must employ interpretive abilities that enable them to invoke required aspects of their potentially changing stock of social and academic knowledge in constantly changing social circumstances.

The Interactional Work of Students' Contributions

Although teacher-initiated action predominates classroom lessons, the students' role is not limited to replying when called on. Contrary to those mechanistic conceptions of classroom interaction that assume that the direction of causality is from the teacher to the student, close observation of teacher-student interaction reveals some evidence of "reciprocal causality" (Doyle 1978) in classroom relationships. Notable in this regard are the "mediating strategies" (Doyle 1978) that students use to initiate action during lessons.

There seem to be three component parts involved in having student contributions incorporated into the course of a lesson: (a) getting the floor, (b) holding the floor, (c) introducing news. Dynamic interactional work is represented by each of these component skills.

1 Getting the Floor. Having a turn to talk is the minimal requisite for influencing the course of a lesson. This involves "getting the floor." However, students cannot just talk any time. There are "proper places" for students to introduce their talk. Therefore, locating an appropriate floor-control juncture is a component skill in students' contributions to classroom lessons.

Although in ordinary, everyday conversation, speaker-change points can potentially occur after every speaker's turn (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson/1974), this state of affairs does not exist in classroom conversation. When the teacher initiates action, she allocates the floor, the students reply, and the teacher takes the floor back again as she evaluates the reply. That set of actions constitutes an integral unit, which means that the appropriate juncture for students to gain access to the floor is after Initiation-Reply-Evaluation sequence, not after every speaker turn.

The students in the classroom I observed became increasingly sophisticated in locating these "seams" in lesson discourse during the course of the year. They progressed from indiscriminately introducing talk in the middle of an ongoing sequence of interaction (which received sanctions from the teacher and occasionally from other students) to introducing ideas at the end.
of an Initiation-Reply-Evaluation sequence.

1 Holding the floor. Although locating appropriate floor control junctures was necessary for students' contributions to reach the floor, simply placing talk on the floor is not sufficient for effective classroom participation. Students must not only put their talk on the floor, they must have their contributions "picked up" by others.

Not all speech acts initiated by a student, even though they appeared in a "proper place," received responses from others. An example of this appeared in a reading preparedness lesson in which objects located on a walk around the neighborhood were being drawn on a large map. After the teacher had finished marking the place on the map where one student, Leola, was to draw her house, two other students, Carolyn and Jerome, introduced comments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiation</th>
<th>Reply</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4:77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T: But I think we ought to wait and let Leola, until Leola (prints Leola's name) comes and //Carolyn: (spells) L-E-O-L-A/T: Let her put her house, right?</td>
<td>Many: (nod yes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:78</td>
<td>J: I should put in my house.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:79</td>
<td>T: Um, what color should we make the street? (touches street on map)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although Jerome placed his informative in the proper place in the lesson (after an I-R-E sequence), his speech was ignored by the teacher and other students. The students remained silent, the teacher initiated a new sequence of interaction dealing with the color of the street on the map. This snippet of interaction illustrates that there is more to successful participation in lessons than locating the appropriate turn-change juncture. Contributions must be made relevant to the previous and subsequent course of discussion as well.

The students' mastery of the subleties involved in "holding the floor" is illustrated below. Near the end of the "S&M Words" lesson, the teacher asked the students to recapitulate the words they had offered previously that started with the letters S and M. After an initial list was produced, the teacher encouraged still more words:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiation</th>
<th>Reply</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3:52</td>
<td>Many: Potato salad, potato salad.</td>
<td>T: Salad, sandwich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: Potato salad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Audrey: Snake</td>
<td>T: Snake, good, good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Audrey, you re-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>membered.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After the teacher complimented Audrey for her contribution, Carolyn intro-
ected a comment on Audrey's reply:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiation</th>
<th>Reply</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3:53</td>
<td>C: But you can't eat it.</td>
<td>T: No, you can't eat it, but anything that begins with an S that's right you can't eat it</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Carolyn placed her informative at a proper juncture in the lesson. Furthermore, it did not disrupt the symmetry of the sequence that was in progress. Unlike Jerome's informative (4:78) described above, which was properly placed yet ignored by other classroom participants, Carolyn's comment was "picked up" by the teacher. She specifically responded to Carolyn's initia-
tion act. Her treatment of this informative was brief, however; the teach-
er provided only a minimal response. She did not pursue this student's topic; rather she continued to request more words for her summary.

These examples display some, but not all of the skills necessary for successful influence over the course of lessons. The students were able to gain access to the floor successfully; they were able to contribute some in-
formation of their own. But their time on the floor was momentary and fleeting. Their topics did not alter the course of the lesson. Although these topics were topically relevant enough to be picked up off the floor, they were quickly bound off by the teacher.

3 Introducing "news." It seems that for a student's contributior
to change the course of a lesson once it is in progress, it must not only be placed in the proper juncture and be related to previous topics, it must also make an "interesting" or "original" contribution as well. The addition of this component to the others enabled students to gain control over lesson format.

There was ample evidence of this combination of skills throughout the "Birthplaces" and "Martin Luther King" lessons that were conducted near the middle of the year. In the "Birthplaces" lesson, the teacher recorded the place of birth on a large wall map. In one such episode, after the teacher determined that Martha's mother was born in Kansas, she initiated a sequence of interactions in which she encouraged the students to locate that state on the map. One student, Roberto, completed this task success-
fully. As the teacher was writing this information on a card in her lap, a number of students introduced information that reached the floor but was not picked up by the teacher. Then Carolyn made the following observation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiation</th>
<th>Reply</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:71</td>
<td>C: Teacher, it's across from Arkansas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The teacher treated this student's informative differently from any of the others we have considered so far. She neither ignored nor "bound it off." Instead, she worked very hard to encourage Carolyn's observation:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiation</th>
<th>Reply</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:72</td>
<td></td>
<td>T: Um, um wait a minute.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8:73

T: Carolyn, what do you mean?
8:74

T: Are you ready to come and join us in the circle?
8:75

E: It's close to Arkansas.

She "closed out" another student's attempt to gain the floor (8:72), directed the attention of another student who was disruptive (8:74), and ignored Edward's observation (8:75) in order to give Carolyn further opportunities to express herself:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Reply</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:76</td>
<td></td>
<td>C: Cuz, you can see, cuz you can see Arkansas right next to it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Carolyn's informative was incorporated into the lesson because her observation was unique. It introduced genuinely new information. This characteristic also accounts for the students' success in introducing the topic of the co-teacher's birthplace later in this lesson (see Mehan, et al. 1976, Appendix III).

Wallace displayed the same skill in the Martin Luther King lesson. Just at the point when the teacher completed determining the students' ages at the time of King's death, Wallace asked about the teacher's age:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiation</th>
<th>Reply</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:62</td>
<td></td>
<td>T: Ah ha! //</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:63</td>
<td></td>
<td>//G: She was 23 years old //</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9:64

T: I'll tell you my age, ah, Wallace, and you see, you figure.

That Initiation act by a student changed the course of the lesson considerably. Discussion continued for minutes while guesses were made (9:64-69). Finally, the teacher assigned Wallace the task of actually computing her age.
arithmetically (9:70), and received an answer much later from Greg (after Wallace subtracted incorrectly).

These students were very successful in introducing their own topics into a lesson, and changing its course in the process. The success of these students seems to be attributable to their ability to introduce an interesting topic at the right juncture in the lesson.

Having contributions incorporated into lessons involves inserting information in the appropriate junctures, making topics relevant to the previous course of discussion, and making an original contribution. If students do not integrate all these components, they neither sustain control over the floor nor change the course of the lesson. If students attempt to initiate action without taking junctures into account, they will be sanctioned. If they introduce information at the appropriate juncture, but do not tie this information to previous topics, their comments will be ignored completely. If they introduce information at the appropriate juncture, and tie this information to previous topics, these comments will be picked up by others, but bounded off. When students weave all of these skills together, they successfully introduce their topics into lessons.

There is ample evidence that the students in this classroom learned the structure of these lessons as the year progressed. First, the total number of students' contributions increased during the year. Students initiated 10% of the sequences in lessons conducted in September, 4.6% in October, 4.1% in November, and 31.4% in January. Second, the quality of student-initiated interactional sequences changed across the year. This increase in sophistication can be seen in the decline of the teachers' sanction of inappropriate students' actions (10% during the first week of school, 8% in the 11th and 6% in winter), the decline of student-initiated acts that were ignored by others (6.2% first week, 41% in fall, 28.5% in winter), and a significant increase in student initiations that were incorporated into lessons (9.2% first week, 39% in fall, 48% in winter).

These figures point to a steady gain in the students' mastery of the interactional machinery driving classroom lessons. They also suggest that effective classroom participation involves the integration of academic content and interactional form.

CONCLUSIONS

Effective Participation in the Classroom

These studies demonstrate that competent membership in the classroom community involves interactional work in the display of academic knowledge. To be effective in the classroom, students must indeed master academic subject matter, which involves learning to read, write, compute, and the content of such subjects as history, social studies, and science. But effective participation in the classroom is not limited to academic matters. Although it is incumbent on students to display what they know, they also must know how to display their knowledge. This involves knowing that certain ways of talking and acting are appropriate on some occasions and not others, knowing with whom, when, and where they can speak and act. They also need to provide the speech and behavior appropriate for a given classroom situation, which involves relating behavior to different classroom situations by interpreting classroom rules that are often implicit.

There are practical consequences for students who do not unite form and content. This is as much the case for the student who provides content without form as it is for the student who provides form without content.
If a student provides correct content without proper form, that student will be sanctioned. A history of such inappropriate behavior can lead the teacher to treat the student negatively. If a student attends to form without an equivalent concern for content, that student loses opportunities to express knowledge. A history of lost opportunities can lead a teacher to believe that a student is inattentive, unexpressive, and the like. It is in this arena that teachers' expectations are built up, and worked out interactionally.

Mutually Constitutive Interaction

These studies also demonstrate that the organization of the classroom is not unidimensional, with activity originating only from the teacher and flowing toward the students (Dunkin and Biddle 1974:Ch. 12), but is multi-dimensional, with students and teacher jointly responsible for the flow of activity. The unidirectional perspective ignores the 'reflexive' (Garfinkel 1967:1) aspects of classroom interaction: that the student operates on the world, including adults, as much as the teacher (and the world) operates on the student. There is no doubt that students are influenced and modified by adults; but equally as important, students structure and modify their environments, just as they are structured and modified by it. That is, the student, the teacher, and the world are mutually constituting the classroom environment. This "mutually constitutive" (Mehan and Wood 1975:211-221, 229) view of classroom life recommends that future work give the same attention to students' contributions that has been given to teachers' contributions by approaching the classroom and other educational environments as reflexive, interactional networks instead of one-directional causal systems.

Ethnography and Educational Policy

A concern that policy makers, researchers, and educators share is the role of schooling in our society. Survey research methods have been used extensively, at least by sociologists (e.g., Coleman, et al. 1966; Jencks, et al. 1972; Sewell, Haller, and Portes 1969) in an attempt to come to grips with this problem. It is my position that, in and of themselves, results from such studies are not very helpful for this purpose. I would like to suggest that the constitutive approach to ethnography, which reveals the interactional work that structures educational environments, does have something to say to people concerned with educational policy matters. In adopting this position, I am taking exception to Mulhauser (1974) who has said that ethnography has nothing to contribute to educational policy.

Survey research is a correlational model that uses an input-output research design. Aspects of people's lives and social and historical contexts are treated as "variables" in this design. Some variables, like the social class, age, and sex of teachers, the size of classrooms, the ability of students, the attitudes of teachers, are treated as input variables. Other factors, like pupil achievement, economic opportunity, and subsequent career patterns are treated as output variables. The research task of surveys, like other correlational methods, is to test the strength of the relationship between the input and the output variables.

There is a methodological irony in the work of researchers who use survey designs to study the influence of schools on students. Although "schooling" is a major factor in the equation that links people's backgrounds and biographies to their success in later life, what goes on in schools has not been examined directly. Measures of schooling have been taken.
indirectly; e.g., the number of books in school libraries, the amount of equipment in science laboratories, the opinions of teachers and administrators toward the school have been counted. But what actually happens inside schools, in classrooms, in educational testing encounters, at recess, in teachers' lounges and lunchrooms on a practical daily basis has not been examined by researchers who use the survey method. The school becomes, in effect, a "black box" between input and output factors.

Large-scale surveys may be appropriate for studying gross differences between schools (Coleman, et al. 1966; Jencks, et al. 1972), but they are not helpful in revealing the social processes of education that take place within particular schools. We need rigorous descriptions about the processes of education in pragmatic educational environments and systematic ways of retrieving and presenting this data to researchers, educators, and members of the community so that well-informed decisions can be made about the nature of schooling. If we want to know whether teacher-student ratios, classroom size, and all the rest actually influence the quality of education, then we must be able to show how these operate in actual educational situations. Similarly, if we are to understand how so-called "input factors" like "social class," "ethnicity," or "teachers' attitudes" influence educational outcomes, then their influence needs to be located in actual educational environments. As a result, it is difficult to draw policy implications from survey data and implement these findings in actual educational settings.

For one thing, data gathered and analyzed in surveys is static. Products of the educational process, such as educational test scores, grades, or class standing, are correlated with students' background experience or teachers' styles. Thus, this approach does not capture the interactional work that assembled these facts, a lack that makes it difficult to decide which specific actions to take to make educational improvements. For another thing, the results of survey research are probabilistic; i.e., they report average distributions across a large population of cases. As a result, it is not certain that these general findings apply to the specific circumstances of a particular school or community.

In addition to being static and probabilistic, the results of correlational studies are also abstract. Presented as statistical summaries, they are far removed from the practical, daily activities of educators, parents, and students. Each of the numbers in an input-output model presumably stands on behalf of a constellation of activities between people; however, the activities themselves cannot be retrieved from the numerical summaries. As a result, it is difficult to translate abstract summaries into concrete action.

In short, the tabulation of data into frequency distributions obscures the processes of interaction that take place in practical circumstances. Dividing the flow of interaction into discrete variables destroys the relationship of action to its pragmatic context. The correlation of discrete variables does not reveal the interactional activity between people that produces the social structures that discrete variables presumably index.

I do not think that answers to questions about the role of schooling in society will come from large-scale comparisons between schools, but will come from careful descriptions of what takes place in educational environments, in and out of schools. To understand the process of education, we need to examine the teaching and learning process wherever it occurs in classrooms, on playgrounds, at home, and on the streets, and make comparisons of this process across these settings.

The ethnographic approach, which focuses on the methods people use to constitute their daily lives, provides information on an order different from the data of large-scale comparisons between schools. The findings from constitutive ethnography are presented as videotape or transcripts, not probabilistic summaries, which means that they apply to particular educational circumstances. Because these materials are concrete, not abstract,
they can provide the specific information needed to figure out what does make a difference in educational settings. Information available in this form would be helpful to those who are not only interested in understanding the educational system, but would like to change it.

In recommending ethnography for educational policy purposes, I would like to emphasize a point made by Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (this volume) that ethnography not be reduced to a diagnostic tool that would enable principals and others in positions of power to observe teachers more carefully for the purposes of evaluation. Because of its participatory and direct observational nature, ethnography is a research strategy based on trust. Using ethnography for decisions of hiring and firing would breed distrust, because an essentially nonjudgmental research strategy would be used in a judgmental way.

The Uses of Research

When the research process is completed, and the data are collected and analyzed, a question remains: What to do with it? Social science researchers, like their colleagues in the natural sciences, have an implicit obligation to report their findings to the community of scholars in their field. They do so by writing reports that become articles in journals or books.

Researchers working on issues related to teaching and learning not only have an obligation to make accurate reports to the community of scholars; they incur a commitment to make their work meaningful to the community at large. When this commitment has been met in the past, the conventional approach has been one of authority: Research is given to the educational community as "findings" or "results" at the conclusion of a project.

I have trouble with this conception of the uses of research for a number of reasons: (a) it treats research as static information, a "thing" to be transferred between people like a package; (b) it separates researchers from the educational community by treating the community as a passive audience, whose role it is to accept the findings of research; (c) the researcher assumes a privileged position vis-à-vis the educational community because of the presumed superiority of knowledge gathered by scientific methods.

A number of social scientists have pointed out that the bulk of social science research results goes to people in positions of power: governmental agencies and business executives (the latter because they sit on the boards of private research foundations and receive final reports). Gouldner (1968) advocated that social sciences researchers become partisans for the powerless by turning over their research results to the poor and disenfranchised.

The following comments will make it clear, I hope, that merely changing the audience who receives research does not solve the problem. Giving the results of research to the powerless instead of the powerful still treats the other in passing as a recipient of information. Even though the audience changes, the research is still being done about others, and reported to others.

Freire's (1968) vision of the ideal relationship between the teacher and student (which he calls "pedagogic action") invites us to consider an alternative relationship between the researcher and the educational community:

The teacher is no longer merely one who teaches, but one who himself is taught in dialog with the students, who in turn while being taught, also teach. They become jointly responsible for a process in which all grow. In this process, arguments based on "authority" are no longer valid... (1968:67).
By substituting "researchers and educators" for "teachers and students" in the above quotation, we have a recommendation that researchers act with educators and parents in a cooperative manner instead of doing research on or about them. The message being communicated here is that people are active subjects, responsible for their actions, not passive objects of received information.

A cooperative or participatory approach would place researchers and educators in a dialog. A dialog, unlike a lecture (which is based on authority), assumes a parity between participants. The purpose of such a dialog is not to give information or impose findings: it is to provide the participants with ways of looking critically at social circumstances, so that they themselves can take action to make changes. Hymes (1972:xiv) has talked about this as participants becoming "ethnographers of their own situations."

This approach has, in fact, been explored with classroom teachers. It was an implicit feature of the Cazden-Mehan collaboration (Cazden 1977; Cazden, Cox, Dickepsen, Steinberg, and Stone 1979; Mehan 1978, 1979), it was an explicit organizing principle of the Erickson group's work (see especially Florio 1978) and of the major study of functional language use conducted by the Center for Applied Linguistics (Griffin and Shuy Forthcoming). In these studies, the classroom teacher was not simply asked to be a subject of a prearranged research project, and then provided a list of findings at the end of the project. Instead, the teachers participated in the research (and in our case, initiated it), cooperating in research design, framing questions, analyzing data.

A particularly important aspect in the process of preparing participants as ethnographers of their own situations has been the use of "viewing sessions" (Erickson and Shultz 1978). Videotape from classroom situations is viewed by researchers and participants together. Not only does this procedure provide a method to obtain participants' perspectives and verify researchers' interpretations (Erickson, et al. 1963; Cicourel, Jennings, Jennings, Leiter, Mackey, Mehan, and Roth 1974), it can lead to research ideas that are collaboratively pursued (Florio and Walsh 1976) or that participants pursue independently (Griffin and Shuy Forthcoming).

Viewing sessions also serve as a device to enable participants to "see" the often covert aspects of communication, social organization, variations in language use, and the interactional "work" that organizes patterns of classroom behavior. This is perhaps the most important aspect of the participatory aspects of the ethnographic perspective, for, if people in a particular situation are blind to its nature, then the researcher cannot see for them. At best, they can provide insights and incongruous perspectives, suggest new things to notice, reflect on, and do. However, if research of any kind, but especially knowledge gained from ethnographically based research, is to be effective, then it must be articulated in locally meaningful terms—in the school and community context. Thus is the case, because in the final analysis, it will be the understanding and action of the people who participate in practical, concrete educational circumstances, not researchers who come and go, that will determine whether changes are implemented.

NOTES

1. When I conducted an analysis of teacher-student interaction during 'circles' (Mehan 1980), facilitated by a wireless microphone, I found evidence of teachers' agendas and students' agendas occurring simultaneously. Interaction in these circles proceeded smoothly when the teacher was able to incorporate students into the accomplishment of her agenda, while students were able to accomplish their agendas, gearing into the teachers while using the teacher's concerns to facilitate the completion of their own concerns.
Such incidents are similar to those reported by McDermott and Gospodinoff (1979) (one is summarized in the text above). Clement (1977) reported uncovering an equivalent set of covert activities occurring simultaneously with the teacher's more traditional concerns.

2. This discussion should be compared to Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) and Griffin and Shuy (Forthcoming). Although similar at a superficial level, there are considerable differences between this approach and the Sinclair-Coulthard approach. For an explication of these differences see Mehan (1979) and Griffin and Shuy (Forthcoming).

McDermott (1976; McDermott, Gospodinoff, and Aron 1978; McDermott and Gospodinoff 1979) also examines the organization of lessons at a level below the phase or round, which he calls "positionings." His analysis is oriented more toward how participants in classroom events organize interaction in nonverbal ways.

3. An expanded version of this discussion appears in Mehan (1979).

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JEFFREY J. SHULTZ, SUSAN FLORIO, AND FREDERICK ERICKSON

Where's the floor?
Aspects of the cultural organization of social relationships in communication at home and in school

Some educators, psychologists, and anthropologists are interested in a very basic reality of childhood—that growing and learning occurs in the home/community as well as in school. This reality has implications for those concerned with the structuring of the school learning environment as well as for those responsible for the assessment of children's performance in school. The study that follows attempts to illuminate, by means of close analysis of slices of children's lives, different ways of participating in social interactions at home and at school. It speculates about those differences as sources of potential misunderstanding between teachers and children as they engage in academic activities.

In conducting this study we were interested in learning more about the ways interactional events are organized—those social "environments or "contexts" through which children must learn to navigate in daily life at home and at school. By looking closely at the experiences of children who were both newcomers to primary school and culturally different from their teacher, we hoped to understand better the nature of the differences in interactional contexts at home and at school that appeared to "make a difference" to teachers and children in classrooms.

Why should such differences be a problem for children and their teachers? One could say "School is school and home is home and they are bound to be different," But the issue of home-school discontinuity is not as simple as that. In some cases there seem to be differing standards between home and school in what can be called communicative or interactional etiquette. Knowledge of that etiquette has been called communicative competence (see Hymes 1972, for discussion). This term has been used to refer to all the kinds of communicative knowledge that individual members of a cultural group need to possess to be able to interact with one another in ways that are both socially appropriate and strategically effective. Three aspects of communicative knowledge seem especially important: (1) knowledge of the shared set of implied assumptions—communicative traditions about what are the proper and expectable ways for people to interact in various social occasions, (2) possession of the verbal and nonverbal performance skills necessary for producing communicative action that is appropriate and effective in a given situation, and (3) possession of the interpretive skills necessary to make sense of the communicative intentions
of the other people one is interacting with in a given situation (see Gumperz 1977, 1979).

The communicative competence necessary to participate in face-to-face interaction with others is an extremely complex package of knowledge and skills. Anthropologists and sociologists have shown that the content of this shared knowledge varies greatly from one human group to the next. This is true not only among large-scale groups, such as ethnic groups, social classes, or nations, but also among small-scale groups--between one family and another within the same ethnic, racial, or social class group, between one neighborhood friendship network and another, and between one school classroom and another next door within the same school (cf. Goodenough 1971, Hall 1976).

Shared standards for communicative etiquette are culturally relative across all kinds of human groups, so the term communicative competence does not imply a single standard of knowledge and ability along which all children and adults can be ranked from low to high, from less fully developed or mature to more developed. Because the content of knowledge and skill in the communicative competence package varies from one group and social setting to another, the meaning of "competence" intended here is whatever the individual's practical knowledge is about how, when, and where to communicate, for what purposes. In that sense almost all individuals are "competent." What is of interest, then, is not the answer to the question "Who is more or less competent here?" Rather, what is of interest is the two-part question "What is the content of each individual's practical knowledge of how to interact (communicative competence) and how does that knowledge get realized in the patterned performance of face-to-face interaction?" To answer that question is a big order, and the current state of sociolinguistic research is not such that the former part of such a question can be answered. But the latter part, concerning the description of patterns of communicative performance, can be answered, and we think it sheds light on answers to the former part of the question, concerning the content of children's and teachers' practical knowledge of how to interact face to face.

STUDENT-TEACHER COMMUNICATIVE INCONGRUENCE

We are concerned with the interactional difficulties encountered by students and their teachers as they engage in academic learning tasks. In classrooms there seem to be children who repeatedly annoy the teacher and make it difficult for him or her to teach, and there seem to be teachers who repeatedly are much rougher on some children than on others. We assume that such recurrent difficulties reduce the effectiveness of the classroom learning environment.

There are at least four kinds of explanations for why children and teachers have recurring interactional troubles with each other. One class of explanations places the greatest explanatory weight on individual characteristics of the child--on the child's pathology of inadequacy in terms of motivation, intelligence, or physical and emotional state. (The whole field of special education is based on this kind of explanation, as was the earlier field of compensatory educatory to remedy so-called "cultural deprivation" in the children of poor people. See as examples of the "cultural deprivation" literature Riessman 1962 and Passow, Goldberg, and Tannenbaum 1967, and the critique of this position by Keddie 1973. Assumptions of "cultural deprivation" among children of the poor are now considered invalid by many social scientists, but these assumptions continue to be
A second class of explanations locates the main responsibility outside individuals, in the structure of a class-based society. In this view, to the extent that an individual is blamed for interactional troubles, it is the teacher rather than the child. The teacher is seen as an agent of the ruling classes, wittingly or unwittingly arranging everyday life in the classroom so that the children of lower class background (and/or of relatively powerless minority group background) are consistently expected less of than are middle class children. Lower class children are seen as being mousetrapped into misbehavior and low achievement in the present, which insures their assignment into the adult lower class or unemployed class in the future. Thus by the workings of interactional processes at the micro-social level of the classroom, an oppressive class structure in the society as a whole is reproduced across one generation to the next (Parsons 1959; Bowles and Gintis 1976; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; LERNSTEIN 1975; OGBU 1978).

In a third class of explanations, the teacher and student are seen as equally responsible for producing each other's interactional difficulties and misbehavior. Growing out of a model of psychopathology, which psychiatrists call the "double bind," this formulation posits that teacher and failing student are locked in inescapable and troubled transaction. Although they may alternate roles as "victim" and "perpetrator," the classroom interactants work at communicating inappropriately with one another and, ultimately, at insuring academic failure (see Bateson 1972 [= 1956], for the original formulation of the double bind theory). The apparent disposition of some students and teachers to do each other in relentlessly in face-to-face interaction may be related to issues of social class and cultural difference. These dispositions are seen by McDermott and Gospodinoff (1979) as multiply caused. Interactional behavior is considered to be influenced by the press of the larger social order and its class structure on the one hand, and by the personalities of individuals on the other.

A fourth class of explanation locates the problem of children's consistent misbehavior in lack of knowledge by the children and by the teachers of each other's culturally learned expectations for appropriate social behavior. This view assumes a mismatch between sets of standards of communicative etiquette.

In this article it is the fourth class of explanations--the cross-cultural "mismatch" or "interference" theory--that will receive the most emphasis. It was this set of assumptions that guided the data analysis to be reported. We should admit here that we believe this kind of explanation is the most generally applicable: It is likely to explain more cases of children's misbehavior than the others, at least in the early grades. Our hunch is that differing expectations about communicative etiquette are a major reason for young children who come from culturally "different" populations acting in school in ways that are judged by teachers as misbehavior. We say "a major reason" because we do not see it as the only reason, and because we have no large body of "hard" data by which we can demonstrate our hunch. Moreover, our preferred explanation does not exclude the alternative ones.

Each of the four classes of evidence may explain part of the variance. It may well be that teacher-student double binds occur frequently in the classrooms, and that although such relationships between teachers and children may begin out of children's simple naivete about how to act in school, double-binding may be the process by which children and teachers continue in more complexly motivated ways to get at each other for the rest of the school year. We must further grant that simple ignorance of social rules of the classroom is, by itself, no adequate explanation for
the misbehavior of children as they reach junior high and high school age. Some children may indeed be Huckleberry Finns, knowing cultural expectations but refusing to be constrained by them, whether because as Freud would argue, the id always reacts to civilizing impulses with discontent, or because as Marx would argue, people on the bottom of a social order tend to resist by struggle and rebellion. Our preferred "mismatch" explanation is not irreconcilable with a view of the school as an oppressive institution whose primary function is to maintain the existing class structure.

Finally, it is clear that some individual children do indeed have neurological impairments or metabolic states that are out of the ordinary, and this may explain why they are "hyperactive." Some children may be constitutionally of low intelligence and unable to "tune in" to the social and cognitive task environments of the classroom. But even with children in individual states of pathology, cultural standards for the conduct of interaction (and the violation of those standards by children) may be involved with the ways children get "diagnosed" and "treated."

We suspect that formal and informal clinical labels for students who are difficult to teach—"hyperactive," "dyslexic," "immature," "slow,"—often do not reflect accurate diagnoses of children's cognitive and emotional states. Rather, we think the clinical labels tend to be applied to children who interact inappropriately with other children and with the teacher, e.g., the term "hyperactive" can simply mean "this kid doesn't sit still and keeps interrupting all the time." This seems a perfectly reasonable everyday use of a clinical term. What makes us wonder about the diagnostic validity of such labels is that they are so often applied to children who come from so-called "culturally different" backgrounds. Some school critics would argue that the term "cultural difference" is itself merely a clinical label, which obscures the underlying fact of the child's social class, since those children labeled culturally different are also likely to be poor. We think that to read "cultural difference" as a social structural label is as much an oversimplification as it is to read it uncritically as a clinical label. Social class groupings and cultural groupings are not mutually exclusive sets, but they are not identical sets either. In our experience some children who come from families that are not poor do get labeled "culturally different," while other children from families that are poor are not labeled in this way by the school. Consequently we do not think that the cultural difference label is simply an index of social class.

There seems to be a general set of standards for how to act in school, a sort of American "classroom culture." Some aspects of this have been specified in recent research. Similar patterns of etiquette in the conduct of classroom lessons have been found in public and private school classrooms that differ markedly in the ethnicity, race, and social class of students (Mehan 1979, and Griffin and Shuy Forthcoming). These studies have focused mainly on patterns of conversational turn-taking during lessons. The kind of lesson we will be describing later in this article is one in which patterns of turn-taking occur that are similar to those identified by Mehan and in Griffin and Shuy. The student "misbehavior" we will be describing involves speaking in ways that, given the turn-taking etiquette of the lesson, are labeled by the teacher as "talking out of turn," or "interrupting." These same ways of speaking by children at home, however, are not always reacted to as interruptions by the child's parents and siblings. That children can act in ways that are judged appropriate at home, yet inappropriate at school, impresses us as important for understanding some sources of children's misbehavior in school, especially in the early grades. It also impresses us with the need to understand more fully children's socialization into communicative traditions at home and at school, traditions that may be mutually congruent or incongruent.
An illuminating study of these issues was done by Philips (1972, 1975), who studied Native American children at school and in community life outside school on the Warm Springs reservation in Oregon. Early in her research, she identified one possible source of school failure for the children in their apparently minimal talk in school lessons. Upon close examination of the children's interactional styles in task settings both at home and at school, Philips noted that "the social conditions that define when a person uses speech in Indian situations are present in classroom situations in which Indian children use speech a great deal, and absent in the more prevalent classroom situations in which they fail to participate verbally" (Philips 1972:371).

In Philips's work we have examples, on the one hand, of children's prior experience that is congruent with expectations for interaction in some classroom social situations, e.g., interaction with peers in small groups. In those situations the interactional behaviors of Indian children appear "normal, natural"—so as to go unremarked. On the other hand, Philips's evidence suggests that where situational expectations are inconsistent between home and school—as in the large group lesson situation—the sense-making of children, which continues to be reasonable in terms of their prior experiences, can be misconstrued by teachers. Thus to the extent that the patterns of life extend in home and community of the Warm Springs children differed from those in the classroom and found no legitimate place there, the results were, in Philips's words, "learning difficulties and feelings of inferiority" (1972:392).

In sum, we think that the culture factor often plays a part in the problems of face-to-face interaction that problem children and their teachers have with each other. Because those people and their interactional problems are complex, the cultural factor is likely not to be operating by itself, but together with other factors. This suggests that simple analyses and the proposal of simple, quick solutions would be inappropriate. But if cultural factors are part of the problem, they deserve investigation, and not just in global ways. It is necessary to be very specific about those particular cultural differences between home and school that may be having an effect on the conduct of everyday life in the classroom. If children who "misbehave" repeatedly in their early school years do so partly because of differences in expectations about interactional etiquette (not simply because they lack respect for teachers, nor simply because of emotional disturbance, low intelligence, poverty, or lack of breakfast), then what, specifically, is it about the organization of classroom interaction that is confusing to children from a particular group with distinctive cultural communicative traditions? If the cultural factor is indeed important, it is a question that must be asked and answered repeatedly, cultural group by cultural group, and perhaps family by family.

The following analysis is a beginning attempt to answer this question in a particular classroom occupied predominantly by children from a particular American ethnic group, members of which live in a working class neighborhood in a suburb of Boston. The ethnic group is Italian-American. The research focuses on selected aspects of life at home in two families of the neighborhood, and on selected aspects of life in one classroom in the neighborhood school.

**The Study**

Features of the study are detailed elsewhere (Florio 1978; Shultz and Florio 1979; Bremme and Erickson 1977). Here we will summarize those relevant to the present discussion. Field workers conducted participant
observation and periodic videotaping in a predominantly Italian-American suburb near Boston. During two years of data collection, the researchers observed both classroom interaction in a kindergarten/first grade and the interactions of two members of that class at home with their families. Whole days were observed at school, at first periodically, and then several days each week. Periodic videotapes were made of classroom activity throughout both years. Also during the first year of the study the two target children were periodically accompanied home after school where their complete afternoons and evenings were documented by means of participant observation and videotaping of naturally occurring activities. Ultimately the researchers hoped that by understanding the organization of face-to-face interaction in both settings, useful comparisons and contrasts could be made across them.

In the process of data analysis, the researchers developed ways of working that were useful in coming to understand the organization of interactional events that occurred within each site—s at school and at home (for details see Erickson and Shultz 1977). Discovering ways of validly and usefully comparing and contrasting interactional contexts across the two sites was a much more difficult endeavor. Philips’s work had taught us that some contexts for interaction at school had apparently resembled interactional contexts at home more than others. This finding implied that we ought to be able to identify points of contrastive relevance among contexts. Such contrasts might be great or very subtle, however, and we needed to locate those differences that “made a difference” from the perspective of participants.

We were looking for similarities and differences across the different kinds of contexts for interaction; or what Wittgenstein calls “games.” As we sifted through field notes and videotapes and talked to informants, we kept in mind Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblance”:

Section 66. Consider for example the proceedings that we call “games.” I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?—Don’t say: “There must be something common, or they would not be called “games.””—But look and see whether there is anything common to all. —For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look!... And the result of this examination is: We see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.

Section 67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than “family resemblances”; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc., overlap and criss-cross in the same way—And I shall say: “games” form a family. (Wittgenstein 1958:31-32)

To find family resemblances among games, Wittgenstein advises, “Don’t think, but look!” Implicit in this admonition is that what might appear at first blush to be useful, formal ways of noting comparison and contrast might be, in fact, red herrings. When we first began to look for interactional contexts at home and at school that might be usefully
contrastive, we looked at those that resembled one another in superficial form. Thus we thought of contrasting dinner time at home with snack time at school or story time at school with bedtime story reading at home. Then we realized that we had been thinking rather than looking. It seemed that despite superficial resemblances in interactional form these events failed to resemble one another with respect to the patterns of organization of interactional function within them—the uses people were making of one another, of space and props, of the abiding interactional rights and obligations of participants. All these aspects of the organization of function were involved in getting the instrumental work of the events accomplished.

We had been participant observers in family dinners and school snack times, in story time at home and at school. Our intuitions about these events, as well as our lurking impressions that something was wrong as we watched videotapes in an initial attempt at comparison of eating times and story times at home and at school, suggested that we were being too literal in our attempts at comparison. We were seeking instances in which children confronted with interactional events in school resembling those with which they were more familiar at home might be observed to apply strategies deemed appropriate in the home setting but inappropriate in school. Our initial looks told us that comparison and contrast was not to be found at the level of the event itself. We looked as well for comparison at the level of the speech act—again fruitlessly. We thought that we might be able to ascertain that a "reprimand," for example, at home could be contrasted with one at school. But we did not see children misreading school reprimands—at least not in the way we expected.

By attending to functional rather than formal similarities, we began to realize that we were interested in contrasting patterns of behavior that could be loosely construed as aspects of style or strategy. As such, we were in search of ways of interacting that cut across—and were therefore available for analysis within—levels of performance organization from phonology and syntax in speech to the level of the sequential structure of the whole event, e.g., the whole sequence of setting the table, having dinner, and cleaning up afterwards. (These levels of organization are usually held analytically separate by linguists on the one hand and ethnographers on the other. See Hymes 1974:177-178, 191-199.)

From this insight, we returned to our field notes and recollections of field experiences and did more tape watching. We reflected on those ways of interacting at home and at school that had seemed as though they were at least potentially comparable in terms of stylistic and strategic aspects of organization. We had the sense that mealtimes and teacher-directed group lessons might be such examples. Although we were no longer seeking isomorphism in the literal tasks to be completed, props to be used, configuration in space, or speech acts accomplished, we were identifying events within which participation structures, or patterns in the allocation of interactional rights and obligations among all the members who were enacting a social occasion together (cf. Philips 1972), seemed comparable. The work of Philips demonstrates that, particularly in differing cultural groups with different sociolinguistic traditions, different participation structures may be used to accomplish what on the surface seem to be the same interactional occasions. Similarly, our inquiry suggested that the same participation structures—perhaps in different relations—could constitute formally different events. Thus it follows that the study of cross-cultural miscommunication entails the discovery of specific points of difference in the organization of participation structures.

We expanded in detail three videotaped instances of mealtimes in two families, and three instances of mathematics lessons in the classroom. We noted, first of all, important functional similarities across the meals and
lessons. Both events involve one or several adults and a group of children in the completion of an instrumental task. In each case, the occasion for the gathering is other than mere conversation--a meal must be consumed, a lesson accomplished. Special locales are appropriate for the enactment of dinner and math lesson. Each of these social occasions, within its own spatial, temporal, and institutional "frame" (cf. Goffman 1974) has an occasion-specific array of props related to the completion of the instrumental task that is focal for the occasion--there are dishes of food to be passed and utensils to be used in dinners, and concept blocks to be held up and arranged on the floor in the "hands-on" math lessons.

In general, participants seem to be carrying into such interactional contexts expectations regarding the focal tasks to be accomplished, the relative rights and duties of participants in accomplishing those tasks, and the range of behaviors likely to be considered appropriate within the occasion. There seems to be a working consensus among participants about these expectations; an order to which, in various verbal and nonverbal ways, they all hold one another accountable. Cook-Gumperz and Corsaro (1976:11) have used the term "ecological environment" to refer to the totality of the social and physical features of the setting, which seem to cue participants to a particular accountable order according to which such an occasion should be enacted.

These accountable orders for the enactment of social occasions can be called participation structures, following Philips (1972:374). In previous research it had become apparent that participation structures differed not only across social occasions, but within occasions, from one moment to the next (Erickson and Shultz 1977). We had found shifts in patterns of allocation of interactional rights and duties among individuals across what we had come to be able to identify as primary constituent units or "chunks" of action within a whole social occasion.

As we looked at the videotapes of family dinners and math lessons, especially the dinners, it struck us that one aspect of participation structure is the notion of "floor"; the right of access by an individual to a turn at speaking that is attended to by other individuals, who occupy at that moment the role of listener. Simply talking, in itself, does not constitute having the floor. The "floor" is interactionally produced, in that speakers and hearers must work together at maintaining it. If either functionally interdependent party drops their end of the interactional log, there is no longer any "floor," but only (a) a speaker speaking unattended by any audience or (b) an audience attending to a person who fails to speak.

For some time we had been concerned that a recent model of turn-taking in conversation (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974) had made claims about the allocation of access to turns attended at speech--what was called a "turn exchange economy"--that were not valid cross-culturally. The model was claimed to be universally applicable to human conversations. It presumed that in getting and holding the floor there was one speaker at a time, and therefore one audience at a time. "Turn exchange" meant switching, between various individuals in a group, the role of speaker; one speaker at a time taking on that role and then dropping back into the role of audience member as another speaker ceased to be a (nonspeaking) member of the audience and took his or her own turn at speaking.

As we watched the videotapes of family dinners and school math lessons, we realized that the Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson model of the turn exchange economy--one aspect of the overall participation structure--did not account for how the people we watched were behaving in speaking and listening to one another. This was especially apparent in the family dinner tapes. At some times, there was more than one speaker talking simultaneously, yet nobody in the scene (including ourselves, who had
been participating in the meals as well as videotaping them) seemed to be acting as though any of the simultaneously talking speakers were "interrupting" any of the others. At other times when several persons were talking simultaneously, some person (always an adult or older sibling) would turn to one of the younger children and rebuke the child, as if for "interrupting." But these were very rare occurrences. It seemed that during these dinners, it was almost (but not quite) impossible to "interrupt" anyone else who was speaking. Our dinner table tapes looked and sounded very much like the "New York" family dinner scene in the Woody Allen film Annie Hall, as contrasted to the small town Wisconsin family dinner scene in that movie, in which turn exchange was conducted according to the Sacks, Shegloff, and Jefferson model.

Moreover, as we looked at our tapes it became apparent that at times there were not only multiple persons talking simultaneously, but there seemed to be multiple simultaneous audiences as well. Within these different audiences attending to multiple speakers (or perhaps more accurately, different levels of participation in attending, by different individuals and subgroups within the total set of interacting individuals), there were different apparent ways of listening. Some ways of listening involved remaining silent and maintaining eye contact with the speaker or speakers. Other ways of listening involved "pitching in" brief comments that overlapped the speech of the other simultaneous speakers. Such comments, which seemed to be a way of showing attention by talking rather than by remaining silent, never were reacted to by other family members as "interrupting. That those comments did not constitute "interruption" seemed to be part of the working consensus about one aspect of the participation structure appropriate for dinner table conversation.

In sum, in the dinners there seemed not only to be multiple simultaneous speakers occasionally, but also multiple audiences and ways of listening as audience members. That meant that there were multiple conversational floors that speakers could address. The most appropriate research questions then seemed not to be along the lines of the question, "Who's got the floor now, and how did (s)he get it?" More appropriate lines of inquiry seemed to lie in the direction of such questions as "Where's the floor? How many kinds of them are there, when?"

It occurred to us that in school classrooms, holding the floor, defending it from interruptions, and allocating it at appropriate times to students are significant concerns for teachers. As we looked at our school math lesson tapes, more of the floor allocation and turn-exchange processes seemed to occur according to the Sacks, Shegloff, and Jefferson model than had been the case with the family dinners. Even in the hands-on math lessons, however, there seemed to be times at which many children and the teacher were talking simultaneously, without anyone holding anyone else accountable for interrupting. Talking while another person was talking did seem at some times in the lessons to be interrupting and at those moments the teacher would invoke a "single speaker at a time" classroom "official rule. At other times in the lessons, talking while others were talking seemed to be an acceptable way of listening. We wondered what could account for these apparent inconsistencies; for the variation in participation structure within lessons and dinners as well as across them.

As we looked more carefully at the tapes, it seemed that changes in conversational floor pattern and changes in what Gumperz and Cook-Gumperz have termed "speech activities" (cf. Gumperz 1977) were occurring together. Speech activities are units of discourse in conversation that are longer than a sentence and may consist of one discourse topic, or may consist of a set of connected topics and subtopics.
The best way of characterizing what I mean by "speech activity" is to name some, using descriptive phrases such as "discussing politics," "chatting about the weather," "trying to catch someone's attention," and "lecturing about linguistics." Such descriptions imply certain expectations about the thematic progression, turn-taking rules, form, and outcome of the interaction, as well as constraints on content...

In a sense, speech activities function a bit like the psychologists' "plans" or "scripts." Note, however, that the descriptive phrases we use contain both a verb, and a noun which suggests constraints on content. Verbs alone, or single nouns such as "discussion," or "lecture," are not sufficient to characterize activities...

Distinctions among such activities as chatting, discussing, taking part in religious rituals exist in all cultures, but each culture has its own constraints not only on content but also on the ways in which particular activities are carried out and signalled. Even within a culture, what one person would identify as "lecturing," another might interpret as "chatting with one's child," and so on.

Since speech activities are realized in action and since their identification is a function of ethnic and communicative background, special problems arise because modern society is made up of people of widely varying communicative and cultural background. How can we be certain that our interpretation of what activity is being signaled is the same as the activity that the interlocutor has in mind, if our communicative backgrounds are not identical? (Gumperz 1977:205-206)

The notion of speech activity seemed useful in thinking about differences between home and school in the organization of conversational "floors" in the reciprocal relations between audience and speaker roles in the enactment of floors. The combination of a performative verb characterizing the communicative action of the moment (e.g., chatting in contrast to lecturing) together with nouns characterizing the topic of conversation allowed us to make useful distinctions among "chunks" of discourse in the dinners and lessons. In one of the dinner tapes, for example, chatting about how much everything costs in the stores nowadays and explaining why and where the father (a manual arts teacher) is going out of town for an "in-service" workshop this coming weekend are speech activities differing not only in the content of the two topics of conversation. They differ also in participation structure—in the relations between speaker roles and audience roles, in the kinds of conversational floors and floor-management strategies that are appropriate. The first speech activity is one in which multiple conversational "floors" are appropriate, and in which overlapping speech is appropriate. The second speech activity has only one "floor"—the parents participate in it as primary speakers, and all the children, regardless of age, participate as primary attenders to the explanation. Interestingly, however, overlapping speech by the child attenders as a way of showing they are listening is still entirely appropriate during the Sometimes overlapping) speech of the parents in explaining about the in-service workshop. Such overlapping speech by listeners during an explanation by an adult is not usually appropriate in the kindergarten-first grade classroom attended by the youngest child in this family. He and other Italian-American children in that classroom continually "interrupt" explanations by the teacher, by overlapping comments as she is talking.

We found that in the school hands-on math lessons and in the family dinners, usually as the speech activity changes, so does the participation...
structure. We have also found this to be the case even in two-person interaction, in an earlier study of conversations between school counselors and students, in varying ethnic combinations (Erickson and Shultz 1981). However, the speech activity notion, by itself, does not fully account for the overall patterning of shifts in either the school lessons or the family dinners. To understand the overall pattern of variation in participation structure within these social occasions, as well as between them, it is necessary to take a more comprehensive view, and consider the overall action-shape or ‘event-history’ of the dinner and the lesson occasions as wholes.

A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Interactional events are generally observed and experienced as a whole continuous flow of activity. To identify for analysis the participation structures that constitute social action it is necessary to segment the activity flow into its primary constituent units. Figure 1 displays our segmentation of the whole events, dinner and math lesson; into its main subevents or phases. These phases were inferred both by systematic observation of videotapes and on the basis of our experience as participant observers. The phase changes in Figure 1 have been noted when a participant reports explicitly that things have changed. When such information is not available (or when viewing-session comments by participants are available, but the participants are unable to articulate that information explicitly), we identify phases through videotape observation of behavioral changes across a number of communicative channels (e.g., postural shifts, changes in vocal pitch register, loudness, intonation contour, tempo, and other aspects of speech prosody), and when we also see that after such behavioral shifts the subsequent interaction patterns of participants are organized differently from the way before the changes in posture and speech prosody.

In the lessons and dinners, this kind of segmentation reveals similarities in overall sequential organization of the two events, which seem on the surface to be such different sorts of social occasions (see Figure 1). For example, each event requires an initial phase of supervised preparation and setting up of props. Next, each event includes a central phase of instrumental focus—the enactment of the event’s raison d’être—“eating the meal” or “teaching and learning” the academic material. Finally; each event involves a gradual wrapping up of the instrumental work that has been done—a clearing off of the boards—before participants can appropriately depart from its social/ecological life space.

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Prior
Scene or 
Event "Set-up"
Preparation
"Focused 
Activity" (including)
"Wrap-up"
"Clean-up")
```

Subsequent
Scene or 
Event

Figure 1. Invariant Order of Constituent Phases

In the central, focused phase, not only does instrumental activity predominate, but in some kinds of events there are points of instrumental climax toward which action tends, after which focus is lessened slightly, in a
pattern of ebb and flow. Thus the diagram points not only to adjacency relationships in a sequential order enacted in and across real time. The diagram also points to the teleology of the sequential order, at the level of the primary constituent phases within the whole event.

Figure 2 contains the invariant sequential order of primary constituent phases across both kinds of scenes—dinners and math lessons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DINNER</th>
<th>MATH LESSON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prior Scene</strong></td>
<td><strong>Focus</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preparation</strong></td>
<td><em>conversing</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scene</strong></td>
<td><em>main course</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Figure 2. Sequential Order of Primary Constituent Phases in Dinners and Lessons</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two narratives follow that describe the kinds of activity that takes place during each of the primary constituent phases of dinners and math lessons.

**Dinner Scene Narrative**

I. **Preparation of Main Course.** During this phase, there is more movement than talk as the mother sets the table and the children take their seats one by one. The mother "manages" this phase as she (1) prepares and delimits the space in which the interaction will occur; (2) lays out the props that will be used by family members to carry out the activity; and (3) issues commands and reprimands by which she makes explicit some of the etiquette operant in the contexts that follow. The noise level is high as people begin to serve themselves, and the talk is related to the meal.

II. **Focus: Main Course.** As this phase begins, the noise level drops. Family members spend more time eating than they do talking. People position themselves around the table in a "carpentering manner" and their eyes are focused down at their plates. Bowls are passed around the edge of the table and people lean across the table to reach for food. These actions serve the function of physically binding the group. During this phase, conversational topics are, in general, not meal-related.

III. **Wrap-up of Main Course and Preparation of Dessert.** As people finish eating, the ambient noise and the voices of family members get louder. 

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There is more talking and different kinds of talk. Family members lean back from the table and orient toward some of the participants, and away from others. More than one conversation is occurring at once. People outside the table area are called to, thus expanding the space within which interaction takes place. Two or three participants talk simultaneously most of the time. During this phase, the mother clears the table as the father and children remain seated. The mother walks to each place, around the edges of the table as she removes dirty dishes and replaces them with clean ones. Talk among all family members gradually subsides as people shift around and back into focused position for dessert. The talk is again meal-related as the mother distributes dessert.

**IV. Focus: Dessert.** As the mother leans into the table passing around the dessert, other family members are bent over their food. They no longer form small postural subgroups but rather orient toward the center of the table. The talk that occurs is not related to the meal.

**V. Wrap-up of Dessert.** During this phase, as people finish eating, they leave the table. However, as this is happening, multiple conversations develop among family members. They are more exaggerated than the multiple conversations that take place during the wrap-up of the main course, since some family members are now physically separated from the table. Some family members actually get up and stand near their conversational partners. The children drift away first, leaving the adults sitting at the table.

**Hands-on Math Lesson Scene Narrative**

**I. Preparation.** As the previous activity (often a reading lesson) is wrapping up the teacher goes to her desk to get materials for the coming lesson. She brings the materials in one or more trips to the "circle area" of the room. As she does so, some children who have finished their seatwork from the previous lesson are already sitting on the floor in a partial circle formation. Other students are still at their tables finishing up. There is considerable ambient noise with small groups of children chatting together at various places in the room; at tables and on the floor (carpeted) at the circle area. Then the teacher begins to call students over to the circle. Usually there is more than one call, but not more than three.

**II. Focus.** There are two or more constituent subphases within this phase: one or more introductory phases and then a "climax" phase toward which the introductory instruction tended. The introductory phases are accomplished by a series of "interrogative rounds" in which various children are singled out to manipulate the materials (such as blocks) and, with the teacher's interrogatory guidance, demonstrate to the other children the principles and concepts to be learned (such as the concept "set"). During each round there is an interrogatory slot, a demonstration slot, and an evaluation slot, which appear in invariant sequential order (although the evaluation slot may be optionally elided). During each round the primary speaker/attenders are the teacher and the student selected to do the demonstration. The other students participate in a secondary manner as "audience." (After the last call to order of the circle at the end of the preparation phase, this overall organization persists until the final clean-up phase.) If members of the audience speak overlappingly with the teacher and the focally addressed student who is demonstrating, the teacher negatively sanctions the overlapping talkers. After the climax phase begins,
however, and the teacher and children have leaned forward intently into the center of the circle their bodies outline as they sit on the floor, the teacher no longer negatively sanctions overlapping talk. In the previous introductory phases, the children sometimes responded in unison to questions asked by the teacher. In the climax phase they give much more "ragged" unison choral responses, which are interspersed and overlaid with overlapping comments about the action.

III. Wrap-up/Clean-up. The teacher and students sit up more erectly as the teacher gives directions about clean-up. During those announcements the teacher is the single focus of attention and the primary speaker. She negatively sanctions overlapping talk again. Then as the children begin to clean up, multiple conversations arise, as in the preparation phase.

Participation Structures

To examine differences in how interactional activities were accomplished at home and at school, a typology of participation structures by which persons collectively accomplished the interactional activity "talking during dinner" was developed. This typology follows. A short narrative description of each participation structure is presented, followed by a description of the different roles family members may play in the enactment of these participation structures.

Type I Participation Structure. Single conversational "floor," with only some of the persons present participating in the "floor" as primary speakers and attenders. Others present participate minimally as secondary attenders. There is little overlapping talk.

One conversation is occurring among one subgroup of the entire group. The persons involved in this conversation are referred to as "primary speakers/attenders." The remainder of the group is sitting and listening to this conversation. Those not directly involved in the conversation will be referred to as "secondary attenders."

Allocation of Interactional Rights and Obligations (Roles)--Primary speaker: address utterances to small group of others (primary attenders) and then attend to utterances made by other primary speakers; Primary attenders: pay attention to primary speaker, and respond as necessary; Secondary attenders: no active attending is required. However, enough attention is required to know not to interrupt primary speaker.

Type II Participation Structure. Single conversational "floor," with all persons present participating in it. There is only one primary speaker, who is addressing all those present. All who are addressed participate in similar ways as attenders. There is little overlapping talk.

One conversation is occurring, with one speaker addressing the whole group. In this case, there is no distinction made among attenders. There are basically two roles that are played: speaker and attender.

Allocation of Interactional Rights and Obligations (Roles)--Speaker: To speak to the whole group, and to continue doing so as long as one or more members of the group are providing appropriate listening behavior. Any member of the group can provide the listening feedback, and it could be a different member each time; Attender: Show a modicum of attention to what speaker is saying and not interrupt speaker. Also, from time to time provide "backchannel" listening feedback (e.g., nods, gaze shifts, "mhm," etc.).
Type III Participation Structure. Single conversational "floor," with all persons present participating in it. There is considerable overlapping talk. Two subtypes can be distinguished:

Type III-A. Single "floor" with multiple floor levels. Primary and secondary levels of participation, considerable overlapping talk. A Type I conversation is occurring among primary speakers/attenders.

One or more of the secondary attenders says something topically tied to what the primary speakers/attenders are saying. These comments by secondary attenders (who then become secondary speakers) are "tossed" out into the group conversation and do not require a response or acknowledgment from anyone. The primary conversation among primary speakers and attenders continues as comments are being made by secondary speaker/attenders.

Allocation of Interactional Rights and Obligations (Roles)--Primary speaker/attender: The same as for Type I. However, an additional feature for primary participants is avoiding actively attending to and responding to the overlapping comments being tossed into the conversation by secondary participants; Secondary speaker/attender: The same as for Type I, with the additional right of making comments related to the primary conversation. However, these comments might not be recognized or attended to by the other group members.

Type III-B. Interpolated single "floor" with single floor level. A collective commentary on a previous primary speaker's remark, during which the previous conversational "floor" is suspended.

A Type II or Type I conversation is occurring, and is interrupted by an interlude, or "side sequence," during which one or more of the attenders make comments related to what the latest speaker had been saying. These "commentators" overlap what other commentators are saying and sometimes speak continuously and simultaneously. The conversation that was going on when the comments began to be made stops its forward progress. The primary speaker in the ongoing conversation may or may not relinquish the previous floor; in some cases that floor is momentarily suspended for collective commentary, in which the primary speaker may participate too. In other cases, the earlier conversation may be dropped entirely as a new conversation evolves.

Allocation of Interactional Rights and Obligations (Roles)--Speaker: Throw comments into the conversational pool with the understanding that such commentary may not be acknowledged or recognized; Attender: The same as for Type II, except that in Type III-B attenders have the right to toss in comments as others are commenting, without having such tossings-in held accountable as the speech act/interrupting.

Type IV Participation Structure. Multiple conversational "floors," with subgroups of the persons present participating in topically distinct simultaneous conversations. Much overlapping talk across and within the various "floors."

Several Type I conversations are occurring simultaneously, conducted by sets of primary speaker/attenders. In most instances observed, each person present is a primary participant in at least one of these conversations. If a person present does not participate in a primary way, then (s)he participates as a secondary attender to one or more of the sets of primary speaker/attenders.

Allocation of Rights and Obligations--Within each of the simultaneous conversations, same as for Type I.

The participation structures differ along three dimensions. These dimensions, which can be thought of as being analogous to distinctive features, are (a) number of people talking at one time, either one or more
than one; (b) kinds of roles played by participants; that is, do all participants play equivalent roles, as in Type II and Type III-B conversations; or is a distinction made between primary and secondary participants, as in Type I and Type III-A conversations; and (c) the number of conversational floors, either one or more than one. Each of the dimensions has two possibilities: Either there is more than one person talking at once, or there is only one person talking; either all participants play equivalent roles, or they do not; and either there is more than one conversational floor or there is only one. The presence or absence of each of these features is noted in Table 1.

Table 1. Distinctive Feature Analysis of Participation Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation Structure</th>
<th>More than One Person Talking at Once</th>
<th>All Participants Play Equivalent Roles</th>
<th>More than One Conversational Floor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type I</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type II</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type III-A</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type III B</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type IV</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+ or -</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Type IV conversations are made up of multiple Type I conversations. It is possible that all participants could be primary participants in at least one of the conversations. If that is the case, then all participants play equivalent roles. If some of the participants are secondary participants in one or more of the conversations, then all of the participants do not play equivalent roles.

The method used to arrive at this typology of participation structures is described in Erickson and Shultz (1977). First, one of the dinner time tapes was examined in detail through repeated viewings and an initial typology of participation structures was formulated.

After the typology had been refined through further viewing of the tape, the validity of the typology was tested by examining other tapes of dinner time to see if the same kinds of participation structures were present in those tapes. Dinner time at the home of another student was studied, in addition to another tape of dinner time in the home of the student where the tape originally analyzed had been made. The typology was found to hold true for both the dinner times in the other home, and for the additional dinner time in the original home. In all, at least 60 hours of videotape viewing were involved in the analysis reported here.

Evidence for the validity of the typology came from several sources. Participant observation in the two homes and in the classroom provided us with intuitions regarding how dinners and math lessons were accomplished. In addition we had each participated in numerous dinners in our own homes and had taught and done research in other classrooms. These sources of personal observation were called into play while we watched the videotapes of dinners and math lessons as we applied our interpretive procedures to make sense of the recorded events. In this process of sense making, we relied less on personal observation and experience than is usual in traditional ethnography, but we relied more on these sources of evidence than is usual in ethnomethodological analysis of behavior records.

In watching the videotapes, we attempted to use the same behavioral evidence the participants appeared to be using to make sense of the
situation. We considered various forms of verbal and nonverbal behavior in distinguishing among the different participation structures. For example, the major difference between Type I and Type II participation structures is that Type I conversations involve two different levels of participation among listeners, whereas in Type II conversations no distinction is made among attenders. The differences in participation among attenders in Type I conversations are manifested in three areas: (a) posture and body orientation; (b) gaze direction; and (c) backchannel listening feedback. Primary attenders in Type I conversations are required to orient their bodies toward the primary speaker, direct their gaze toward that person as much as possible, and provide some sort of backchannel listening response. Secondary attenders, on the other hand, are not required to provide the same kind of nonverbal behavior as the primary attenders. They can look away from the persons carrying on the conversation, they can orient their bodies toward the center of the table instead of toward the primary speaker/attenders, and they do not have to provide listening feedback. In Type II conversations, some of the attenders have to provide listening feedback (otherwise the speaker would probably stop speaking) but their listening behavior does not have to be as intense as that of primary attenders in Type I conversations. In other words, the amount of attention provided by attenders in Type II conversations falls somewhere in between the amount of attention expected of primary attenders in Type I conversations and the amount of attention expected of secondary attenders in Type I conversations. Similar kinds of evidence of differences in verbal and nonverbal behavior were used to distinguish among all types of participation structures.

A second source of behavioral evidence regarding the validity of the typology presented is contained in the reaction of family members to violations of any of the patterns described. Two kinds of violations were noted: (a) production of inappropriate behavior: the youngest son in one of the families, during two Type I conversations in which he was a secondary attender, tried to get the attention of one of the primary speakers/attenders. He was told by one of his older brothers to keep quiet because "people are talking." Such a reprimand would not make sense during a Type III (A or B) or Type IV conversation during which more than one speaker may speak at a time; (b) absence of appropriate behavior: during another Type I conversation in which the same son was supposed to be a primary attender, he did not provide the kind of listening response required of a person in such a role. His father, who was the primary speaker at the time, made the absence of this listening response accountable (cf. Mehan and Wood 1975:132) by saying his son's name followed by "I'm talking to you." This kind of a reprimand would not make sense during a Type II conversation, because not all of the attenders are required to provide active listening feedback.

These four types of participation structures or "conversational arrangements" employed to accomplish the speaking activity "talking during dinner" are represented schematically in Figure 3, which shows the physical arrangement of the family around the dinner table (represented by the rectangle), as well as their postural and gaze orientations in the various participation structures.

As noted earlier, the participation structures depicted in Figure 3 are those used to accomplish the speaking activity "talking during dinner." They were developed by careful observation of the videotapes of dinner time in the homes. In school, the kinds of participation structures found at home are also found in slightly differing "family resemblance" versions, which seem to be functional equivalents to those used at home.

There are a number of specific differences between the home and school versions of enactment of the participation structures. First of all,
Figure 3. Schematic Representation of Participation Structures

LEGEND:
Arrows and lines indicate gaze orientation

= postural orientation
there is a much higher threshold of tolerance at home for a higher pitched, louder, and steeply rising and falling speaking intonation than there is at school with the teacher, who is not an Italo-American. Second, given the larger number of participants in the classroom, particularly when the teacher and all of the students are assembled as a group, the negotiation of and management of the interactional rights and obligations become more difficult. Much more orchestrating and managing is done by the adult present (the teacher) and more explicit directions for how to interact are given. (For example, Teacher: "Don't talk now, it's my turn," "Joey, whose turn is it now?") Although such reprimands are occasionally issued at home, directed for the most part at the youngest family members, they are heard much more frequently in the classroom, where the ratio of young participants to old ones is much higher. And finally, given the physical proximity of family members at the dinner table and the fact that each member is able to face every other member with a minimum of effort, it is much easier for the family to act as a group, posturally focusing on a point in the center of the table. In the classroom, when the teacher is assembled with all of the students, not everyone can face everyone else. And so by necessity, some participants have their backs to others.

These participation structures are distributed differentially across the constituent phases of the two events. (Review Figure 1.) Table 2 shows the distribution of participation structures across the phases of the two events. It can be seen from Table 2 that Type I, II, and IV participation structures occurred in school as well as at home. Type III participation structures occur in all three phases of dinner, but occur only infrequently during the math lesson. For the most part, this way of participating in lessons is referred to as "calling out" and is not permissible in classroom situations.

Type III participation structures were allowed during the "instructional climax" subphase of the instrumentally focused phase of the math lesson. During this subphase, the focus of the teacher is on the "point" of the lesson, and social interactional rules no longer seem to be foregrounded in her attention.

Even though all four participation structures occur during both dinners and math lessons, they are distributed differentially across the constituent phases of the two events. At the level of the event, then, the kinds of participation structures that occur and the rights and obligations of participants are essentially the same. It is only when one looks at the level of the constituent phases that differences in the enactment of the two events appear.

What is distinctive about each of the phases of the two events is the set of participation structures that does occur, and the relative frequency with which each of the participation structures occurs. The sequential order of the participation structures within a given phase does not seem to be obligatory, except that Type III-A and III-B participation structures must always evolve from either Type I or Type II conversations.

Not all of the participation structures occur in each of the phases; and the participation structures that do occur do not all occur with the same frequency. For example, during the focused phase of dinner, Type I and Type II participation structures are the most frequently occurring, but Type III-B participation structures, when they do occur, are negatively sanctioned by the teacher. This can be seen in the following text example from the lesson. This example begins toward the end of the focused instruction phase of the lesson. The discourse organization of that phase involved a series of successive interrogative rounds (see Bellack, Kliebard, Hyman, and Smith 1966; Mehan 1979; and Mehan, this volume).
Table 2. Distribution of Participation Structures Across Primary Constituent Phases of the Two Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Preparation</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Wrap-up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Math Lesson</td>
<td>IV, I</td>
<td>I, II</td>
<td>I, III-A (during instruc-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tional climax)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>II, IV (during clean-up)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For each constituent phase, participation structures are listed according to frequency of occurrence. Those participation structures that occur most often are listed first, while those that occur least often are listed last.

In each of the rounds a student was designated the "answerer," and engaged with the teacher in a series of question-answer turns. That is a Type I participation structure, according to our typology--two principal speakers, teacher and student, with other members of the interacting group in attending rather than speaking roles. (Children are occasionally allowed to echo in chorus the designated answerer's answer, and to laugh at the end of a round, but otherwise they are to remain silent.) During the interrogative rounds, and especially at the end of them, as the teacher is about to turn to a new student as the designated answerer, the children who have been attenders often do things the teacher reacts to as "interrupting." One thing reacted to that way was for an individual child who is not the designated answerer to try and get a turn at speaking. If that were allowed to happen it would make the conversational arrangement what we have called a Type III-B participation structure (more than two primary speaker/attenders). Another thing the teacher reacted to as an interruption was for one or more children who were not the designated answerers to make overlapping comments on a point one of the two primary speakers had made. If that were allowed to happen it would make the conversational arrangement what we have called a Type III-A participation structure (in which there are secondary as well as primary speakers and attenders, participating simultaneously in multi-layered conversational "floors").

Math Lesson Example

In the text that follows, the connection of lines with brackets (1) indicates overlapping talk, the connection of lines by brackets with "flags" going in opposite directions (\_\_) indicates that the talk of the second speaker begins abruptly just at the end of the prior speaker's word. Markedly slow speech is indicated by spacing between syllables. Multiple double dots (\::\::) indicate elongation of a syllable. A "full sentence terminal pause" of approximately one second is indicated by two diagonals (//), and a "half pause" of approximately one-half second is indicated by a single diagonal (/). (These are roughly equivalent to the
period and comma.) Stress (loudness) is indicated by capitalization of the stressed syllable, or by vertical marks preceding the stressed syllable. If the pitch of the stressed syllable is high, the vertical mark appears above the line, e.g., 'GOOD. If the pitch of the stressed syllable is low, the vertical mark appears below the line, e.g., ;GOOD. These marks account for stress and pitch in the absence of a pitch shift. When stress is combined with a pitch shift, diagonal marks are used. If the left side of the diagonal is high that indicates a shift from higher to lower pitch, e.g., 'GOOD. If the right side of the diagonal is high, that indicates a shift from lower to higher pitch, e.g., ;GOOD.

(Scene: Hands-on math lesson in a kindergarten-first grade classroom. The teacher, Miss Wright, and 14 first graders are seated on the floor in a circle formation. They orient to objects in the center of the circle area that has been defined by their bodies. Lying on the floor are two rope rings, which enclose sets of wooden blocks. In one of the sets, all the blocks have the same shape (triangle). In the other set, all the blocks are of differing shapes, but have the same color (yellow). The teacher has been introducing the children to the concept of "set property." At this point in the lesson she is about to review what the children have learned in the lesson up to now.)

(a) T: O.K. (Miss Wright speaks more loudly and holds up index finger to her lips. There is a steeply falling intonation contour on the "K" of "O.K.")

Now let's look // (laughter stops)

what have we decided have (children's general laughter is sustained as the teacher speaks, and stops in exact synchrony with the "K" at the end of the teacher's word, "look")

what //

(b) C: SHA:::PE 
Shape
Shape

(Class answers in chorus, with two individual "echo" answers)

(c) T: Shape/ so they go here even though they're different colors 
BL: [and they're the same shape] (during general giggling, one boy overlapping T's speech)

(d) (Alice picks up a block)

(e) T: a'right // (very rapidly)

put this down (softly, in an aside to Alice)
SHULTZ, FLORIO, & ERICKSON / Where's the floor? / 109

THESE SETS ALL HAVE THE PROPERTY OF THE SAME [WHAT?
B = \[That's yellow
Sh

(f) SS: Shag
Shape
C: SHAPE
B: Shape

(g) T: Color
C: color

(h) T: They're not all the same shapes //
This isn't the same shape //
They're the same COLOR //

(k) B: see this isn't ___

(l) T: \[RIGHT // (children are laughing)
Now // \[WAIT

DO THESE BLOCKS HERE HAVE
THE PROPERTY OF //
(stops)

COLOR? // //
(second screech)
(B looks away to door)
(C looks away to door)
(V looks away to door)

(m) T: Let's look here // // //

(B looks back to circle area)
Vito/ let's look here//
This is important//
(postural focus of circle is re-established)
Do these blocks here have the property of color AND the property of shape?//
Do they go in BOTH sets?

(loudly, with higher pitch register throughout)
(Bobby overlaps)
(the teacher says this softly to Bobby)
(individual students call out "shape," a chorus calls out shape, and then Bobby does so)
(to Bobby and the whole class)
(chorus response, subdued volume)
(low volume, pitch register)
(holds up a block)
(lifts the block higher)
(Bobby addresses Vito)
(louder, higher pitch register
(at pause, T puts finger to lips)
(two-second pause)

(slower, lower pitch register)
(three-second pause)

(half whistle, addressed to Bobby)
(low pitch register, even more intensely)
(rapidly, to Bobby)
These are 'YEllow

Do these blocks/ I want yellow blocks here // (addressed to Carol)
To they go in this set?

Yes 'cause they're 'YEllow
all I want here is triangle blocks can they go in here?//
(faster)

But they're not th/

I don't `CARE that color they are here//
Are they 'TRIANGLES is what I want to know//

so could they go in this //
set?/

Could they go in both sets?//

stop it
(addressed to child rocking back and forth while sitting in the circle formation)
(bb) D: YES: (wrong answer)

(cc) T: LET'S LEARN! (addressed to child who had been rocking back and forth. The rocking stops)

C: yes yes

(dd) ye:........a...............:hNO: (final shift to NO: is correct answer)

(ee) T: Why not?// (addressed to Bobby and whole group)

(ff) B: Because they also could go in here (Bobby takes a yellow triangle from the "triangles" set and places it in the "color" set)

(gg) T: // (T takes the yellow triangle and places it back in the "triangles" set)

But could they also go in 'here because they're triangles (addressed to Bobby and total group, falling intonation on "triangles")

(hh) C: YE: S (chorus)
yes yes (multiple speakers begin to introduce new comments)

(ii) T:

Alright this is tough// we're gonna do this again tomorrow// (faster, less volume)

THERESE BLOCKS HAVE TWO PROPERTIES/ (slower, louder, holding up blocks)

they go in BOTH sets//

B: Hm:

so we loop them over// (puts edge of one rope ring over the other)

and put them here//

and this is a new word/

it's called an 'IN TER sec ting set// (even slower, wide "step-wise" intonation fall)

and we'll talk about it later//

it's almost time to go home

WIND-UP PHASE BEGINS (Here a marked posture shift occurs. The teacher, who was sitting leaning forward up to this point sits back up and simultaneously the children move back a bit to enlarge the circle formation and sit up themselves. Speaking more rapidly the teacher explains "intersecting set" again to a child other than Bobby.)
Then she elicits from Bobby answers about the "intersection" at a traffic crossing, demonstrates the analogy between that kind of intersection and the looped rings on the floor (during which demonstration all the children look again at the rings), then tells the children to put the blocks in their storage bag and put their chairs up on their tables. The children disperse, clean up, and then leave the room.

Discussion. As the example begins, the class is still in a Type I participation structure. For one speaker to talk while another is talking is an "interruption," as evidenced by the teacher's reactions to overlapping talk by children. She reacts implicitly and explicitly to overlapping talk. In turn (a) the reaction is implicit. As the teacher stressed the word that in the phrase "what have we decided, have we decided THAT," the children stop overlapping talk instantly. The stress on THAT appears to function as an implicit cue for children to stop "interrupting." In turn (c), however, the teacher's cues are explicit. "SH::://SH!" Again, the students instantly stop overlapping speech. In turn (e) the teacher addresses a "Sh" to Bobby after he has overlapped her speech. In turn (1) the teacher employs a nonverbal cue to negatively sanction the occurrence of overlapping talk--the instant the teacher's finger is raised to her lips the children stop talking. From turns (a) through (1) the teacher has consistently been enforcing a Type I conversational arrangement as the participation structure by which the lesson discourse is being conducted.

In the next few interrogative rounds the teacher continues to enforce the apparent "only two designated speakers at a time" principle. Then, just before the point of instructional climax in the lesson (which comes just before the transition into the final phase of wrap-up/clean-up), the teacher does something unlike anything she has done previously during the focused instruction phase. Now (turns n--hh) the teacher no longer enforces the "two primary speakers" principle.

The instructional climax of the lesson--its conceptual "punch line"--involves the notion "intersecting set," which is announced with emphasis by the teacher at the end of turn (ii) in the example: "and this is a new word// It's called an intersecting set." (In an interview, the teacher said that the purpose of this lesson was to introduce this new concept. In the interrogative rounds leading up to the climax the teacher reviews the notions of set and set property by putting blocks in two clusters inside rope rings on the floor. One set consists of variously shaped blocks that are all yellow [the set property of color]. Another set consists of triangles. Most of the triangular blocks are green, but a few triangles are yellow. They belong in the triangle set according to shape property, but they belong in the yellow set according to color property. The seemingly anomalous yellow triangles can be accounted for by looping the edges of the two rope rings one over the other and placing the yellow triangles in that newly created space, which is an "intersecting set"; a logical abstraction concretely manifested in an arrangement of blocks and ropes.)

At the beginning of the turn in which she delivers the conceptual "punch line" (turn ii), the teacher begins to enforce again the "only two designated speakers at a time" principle, as she had done during the earlier part of the focused instruction phase. But in the 20 turns immediately prior to this point of instructional climax, the teacher does not enforce the "two designated speakers at a time" principle. This can be seen in the adjacent sets of turns (t-u-v), (w-x-y), (y,z) and (aa-bb). In the first of these instances (t-u-v) the teacher overlaps the class and then...
responds to a question initiated by a nonderecognized speaker. The teacher answers the child's question, and does so by overlapping the talk of the questioner. The child who asks the question is the same one whose attempt to ask a question a few moments before in turn (b) was negatively sanctioned by the teacher with a "SH:::"). Apparently at the point of turns (c-t-u-v), the turn allocation principle previously invoked has been temporarily suspended. In the next few turns the teacher's talk is overlapped by that of the children (turns x-y-z) and the children's talk is overlapped by the teacher, yet the teacher does not react to the overlapping as if it were interrupting. This can also be seen in turns (cc-dd). There the teacher's question talk is overlapped by the answer, called out by various individuals and by a chorus, as the teacher is engaged in addressing the question to a single individual, Carol, who is designated as the answerer by the teacher's gaze and by the tilt of her head towards Carol. Not only does the teacher not negatively sanction the children's overlapping talk giving the answer to the question addressed to Carol, but the child behavior that the teacher does negatively sanction in the same turn (by saying LET'S LEARN) is kinesic behavior (rocking back and forth) rather than speech behavior. The directive "LET'S LEARN" can be interpreted as evidence that the teacher still is enforcing some standards of appropriateness in children's participation--there are still for the teacher some thresholds of activity beyond which children are doing too much--but the thresholds maintained are those involving nonverbal behavior. The thresholds for overlapping speech behavior beyond which children are verbally interrupting no longer seem to apply.

In short, at this point in the lesson, the teacher acts as though what we have called participation structures of Types III-A and III-B were legitimate ways of allocating turns, across multilayered conversational "floors." Momentarily, some of the constraints on overlapping talk have been loosened. Then they are back in place. As the teacher begins turn (ii) she holds her finger to her lips and repeats the first syllables of the next word of the phrase "Alright this is tough." As she says this, the children (who have been overlapping one another and the teacher in the previous turn) stop the overlapping "spillover" from that turn. From then on until the clean-up phase begins, as the children begin overlapping talk the teacher stops them by saying "SH::" by raising her finger to her lips, or by using stress and pausing before continuing what she was saying, as in turn (a), during an earlier phase of the lesson:

T: What have we decided, have we decided THAT // these blocks stops [Laughter begins all have the property...]

A constant problem of group management for the teacher early in the year was children "chiming in" as secondary speaker/attenders while a dialogue was being conducted during a lesson by two primary speaker/attenders. This "chiming in" occurred not only in math lessons, but in other large group instructional contexts. In contrast, participation by "chiming in" was often appropriate for those children at home, as can be seen in the transcript from one of the videotaped dinner conversations in the home of Bobby, who was one of the designated "answerers" in the lesson transcript just presented.
Dinner Conversation Example

Scene: Dinner time in a kitchen in an Italian-American home. The four sons, the daughter, the mother, and one of the researchers are sitting at the dinner table dishing out food. The father is at the kitchen sink washing his hands.

(a) OS: What else is there besides chicken and...
   carrots...for the main...

(b) D: Any dessert?

(c) M: (Unintelligible)

(d) D: ANY DESSERT?

(e) M: Yes.

(f) D: Oh.

(g) M: You don't have to shout.

(h) D: Yes I do.

(i) S: (Unintelligible)
(j) D: Yes you are. (addressed to S.)
(k) R: It's a fancy dessert made by Julia Child.
     S: (Unintelligible)
(l) M: Made by...
(m) F: Where is she, where is she?
(n) M: What isn't she?
(o) R: Julia Grownup.
(p) OS: The best //
(q) M: Noisy? (?)
(r) OS: The best desserts are made by my mother.
(s) R: (laughs) F: Any, any dessert? Every night the same thing.
(t) M: (unintelligible)
(u) OS: The best desserts are made by my mother.
(v) R: I see.
(w) S: Right.
(x) M: Oooh.

(Father shuts off water and dries his hands as he walks to the table. Researcher rubs his hands together and smiles as he makes his comment.)

(Father stands by the table drying his hands as he joins in the conversation for the first time.)

(Several people are now talking at once. The father repeats his daughter's question, mimicking her intonation and high volume. As he does so, the daughter and the researcher raise their eyes and follow him with their gaze as he walks back to the sink to put back the dish towel.)

(Researcher turns to face oldest son and the mother walks back to her seat on the other side of the table but doesn't sit down yet. She continues to dish out food.)
(y) S: You'd better try some carrots.

(z) YS: And the best desserts are...

(aa) R: A commercial (referring to son's praise of mother's dessert)

(bb) M: (name of daughter), are you going to have some carrots?

(cc) D: Mm, mm.

(dd) M: Noooo?

(ee) D: Uh, uh, uh.

(two-and-a-half seconds of silence)

(ff) F: What doesn't she want?

(gg) M: Carrots.
Discussion. The example from the dinner occurred as the preparation phase was ending and the focused phase was beginning. As the food was being passed around the table, the oldest son (OS) asked a question regarding the meal (line a). The daughter (D), chimed in with a question of her own regarding dessert (line b). The mother answered the daughter's question, and the conversation so far was a Type I conversation. In line (j), the researcher, who joined the family for dinner, once again brought up the topic of dessert, and this comment opened the floodgates that lead to a Type III-B conversation. From line (k) through line (aa) family members chimed in with comments regarding the quality of desserts made by the mother and comments about Julia Child. This chiming in, with several persons talking at once (as in line (n) through line (t)), is characteristic of Type III-B conversations.

In line (bb), the mother asked the daughter a question about whether the daughter is going to eat carrots. As she did so, the other participants in the dinner became involved in eating, and the chiming-in characteristic of the previous conversation stopped. The noise level in the room dropped considerably, and in fact, there were two-and-a-half seconds of silence occurring between line (ee) and line (ff). This was the first time since the dinner began that no one was talking. The pattern of one-person-talking-at-a-time, interspersed with moments of silence, as is found in line (bb) through line (gg), is characteristic of Type I conversations. Conversations in which only one person was talking at a time continued throughout most of the remainder of the focused part of the dinner.

As can be seen from the transcript, the transition from a Type I conversation to a Type III-B conversation and back to a Type I conversation was accomplished smoothly and without any hitches by the participants at the dinner. There was no explicit mention that more than one person was talking at a time, and the only kind of verbal behavior that was negatively sanctioned was the volume of the daughter's questions in lines (b) and (d). The conversation during the dinner included a great deal of shifting from one type of conversation to another, without very much conversational managing work being done explicitly by any of the participants. This is in direct contrast to the example of the transcript from the math lesson presented earlier, where the teacher does a great deal more managing, like orchestral conducting, to indicate the type of conversation that is allowable at the moment.

Interactional Knowledge of Children and Teachers at Home and School

A student in a math lesson, at the transition between the lesson's preparatory and focused instructional phases, may interpret what is going on in terms of the norms for interaction he or she uses at home and may decide to perform a Type III-B participation structure during this phase. This kind of behavior is likely to have been considered appropriate at home. However, during the math lesson, it is perceived as a breach of interactional etiquette and is negatively sanctioned by the teacher.

It is therefore not enough for a child in the classroom to know which constituent phase of an event he or she is in to know how to behave appropriately according to classroom norms for interaction. The preparatory stage of dinner places interactional demands on the child different from the preparatory stage of the math lesson. A child entering school for the first time may make errors relative to the classroom's norms for interaction because of how participation structures and constituent phases are matched up in the
classroom as contrasted to the way they are matched at home. A situation at home in which more than one conversation is allowed may turn out to be a situation in the classroom in which only one conversation with the teacher as the focus is the norm. But exceptions to this general principle may also occur.

During certain activities, the teacher may allow the students to use the full range of participation structures that they use at home. This was especially true for the climax subphase of the lesson. It is during such times that students are allowed to use Type III participation structures—those which are the most "homelike" and least "school-like" of all of the ways of carrying on conversations. Allowing use of a wide range of participation structures may be adaptive for the teacher. At the most crucial place in the cognitive task environment of the lesson she "opens" the lesson's social organizational structure to ways of acting that are culturally congruent with ways of acting acceptable at home. Conversely, the teacher's "opening" of the social order in the direction of cultural relativity at such moments may be maladaptive. Children new to the classroom may be confused by this seeming "inconsistency," and this may be why they attempt to use Type III participation structures at other times during the school day when such behavior is reacted to as inappropriate by the teacher. Further research is necessary to develop this idea. There is, however, considerable evidence emerging from our own work with Native American teachers and students (Van Ness 1977; Erickson and Mohatt 1982) and that of the Kamehameha Early Education Program in Hawaii (Au 1979; Au and Jordan 1981) suggesting that minimal adaptations by teachers in the direction of participation structures that are culturally congruent with the communicative traditions governing children's interaction at home may not only not interfere with children's learning in the classroom, but may facilitate such learning. Such cultural adaptation by teachers is not at the level of academic "content"—that is, teaching about formal culture, cultural "heritage," and cultural group "heroes"—but at the level of interactional process and its informal, outside awareness, "transparent" rule structure—at the level of "invisible culture," as Philips (1975) so aptly puts it.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHERS**

Studying the interface between home and school as it is manifested in the differing interactional demands of participation structures has a great deal to say to teachers concerned with the structuring of school environments for learning and with the assessment of student performance. Our preliminary findings suggest an interesting paradox. The differences in interactional etiquette obtaining between home and school create a situation in which quality schooling seems to be related directly to the school's recognition that it is not the sole educative force in a child's life. Acknowledgment of the existence and legitimacy of different learned systems of interactional etiquette entails acceptance of the existence and legitimacy of the nonschool cultures in which some of those systems are learned. Such recognition also amounts to a willingness for educators to think in terms of differing "kinds of competence," which change systematically from situation to situation, rather than thinking of "incompetence" or "deficiency."

Practically speaking, it may turn out to be the case that teachers can become quite directly and behaviorally involved in easing the difficulties that result from differences in interactional contexts at home and at school. Certainly the aforementioned examples of the Odawa study and the Kamehameha Early Education Project attest that interactional process can be
renegotiated in classrooms, either to accommodate the styles that children bring with them to school or to communicate to children with greater consistency and clarity the interactional demands of school learning tasks as contrasted with more familiar and apparently similar tasks performed in less formal learning settings. It has further been suggested that such sensitivity and clarity, arising out of the careful analysis of the interactions constituting different sorts of learning tasks, might be applied to the enterprise of evaluation—thus rendering school testing situations more "ecologically valid" as well (Cole, Hood, and McDermott 1978).

However, it would be hasty to simplify the implications of this kind of research or to generalize from such single-case studies inappropriately to many classrooms of the same grade, many children of the same age, or many families of the same ethnic group. As was mentioned earlier, the cultural stylistic differences of interest here obtain not only at the "macro-cultural" levels of ethnic group or neighborhood, but there are also important and systematic differences in interactional etiquette at the more "micro-cultural" levels as well—from classroom to classroom within the same school, from family to family within the same neighborhood.

Well-intentioned teachers who recognize and value stylistic differences as part of the richness and diversity of American life still find themselves daily having to organize groups for the purpose of academic learning. Up against a range of stylistic variations brought from home by children, teachers may not be in a position to decide—particularly in the moment-to-moment fray of classroom activity—which minimal differences in interactional behavior are going to facilitate participation for which children.

If we think about the kinds of activities teachers engage in as part of their role, however, we begin to see the ways knowledge about such cultural variations of style (and the requisite interactional competence underlying them) can enhance the practice of teaching and may ultimately enhance as well student achievement and self-concept. Teachers are, among other things, observers of child behavior. From their observations they develop hypotheses about children—hypotheses about child competence and about the kinds of special attention children may require. Teachers are therefore also planners. They think about what will happen tomorrow in light of what happened today. Teachers think about individuals, they think about clusters of individuals in activity groups, and they think about the cognitive task environments in which those individuals and groups will work. In short, teachers are clinicians in the sense that they are continually observing, making judgments about what has been observed, and planning and acting according to those judgments. Thus the activity of teaching proceeds in a grounded and iterative way.

Insights about the interactional sense-making of students and about the possible clashes between those ways of making sense and the ways of making sense used by the teacher can contribute to a kind of clinical theory about teaching and learning that is potentially more comprehensive than that which obtains in the current state of the art. When teachers are afforded the opportunity to think more broadly about their students as learners they soon discover that learning occurs in places other than school, and that the social group is a powerful educative force in most of the learning situations in a child's life. These insights can enhance teacher decision-making about students and their progress as well as about the organization of learning tasks in school. When one is not bound to either a theory about child performance in school that rests entirely on the individual hypothesized "personality" of the child or on a theory about within-classroom "curriculum" and "management," one begins to see that what is really at issue is the intersection of such factors as individual difference (physical, psychic, cultural), the structure of academic tasks and of the social environment in which they are accomplished, and the very special aspect of
'socio-cognitive task environment' that is created when people who differ in life, experience and culturally learned patterns of expectations are gathered together in face-to-face groups for the purpose of task completion.

Such a comprehensive view of the processes and forces operant in any classroom interaction assures the teacher that (s)he is not entirely responsible for the things that go wrong both for individual children and for groups of children. Simultaneously, however, the identification of the range and diversity of influences at work in the school experience of children places in bold relief the kinds of things that a teacher **can be responsible for** as (s)he plans for the classroom life of children. Recognition, for example, that one powerful and often tacit source of inferences about children's intellectual competence, their interactional performance, may not point directly to changes in teaching behavior that would make it easier for children to "perform" in ways more appropriate to school. What is really of interest and potentially changeable are the teachers' criteria for deciding what constitutes "competent" performance and on what grounds it can be inferred by the teacher that children's performance "makes sense." The simple recognition that some children "interrupt" not out of stubbornness or slowness but out of incongruity between teacher and students in communicative traditions defining appropriate ways of organizing the exchange of speaking terms in conversations, may introduce an important extra ingredient into the teacher's practical logic of informal assessment--how the teacher decides whether the interruptors are, in fact, "problem children" or not.

Similarly, awareness of the interactional complexity of group interaction--particularly when that interaction is complicated by culturally stylistic differences among interactants--introduces an added dimension to the teacher's conception of the school learning task. Suddenly the cognitive load is seen as much heavier for children--taking turns, for example, involves continuous monitoring of the lesson situation and strategizing about interactional performance by both children and teacher. These activities happen in addition to the stated academic agenda of the group, such as mastery of math facts or reading a story in a primer.

Insights from research into the interfaces between home and school highlight that (a) children are potentially more sensible than might be thought if observed only in their interactional performances in limited classroom situations; (b) classroom learning tasks are more complicated and demanding events than we might have thought, with a "working consensus" of standards for appropriate behavior changing across and within participation structures as a part of getting academic activity accomplished; and (c) changes in teacher thinking about both child competence and the interactional complexity of task environments may inform planning and assessment--perhaps at a level ultimately more significant than mere changes in analytically isolated "teaching behaviors" hypothesized to be associated with changes in isolated "student behaviors" or "outcomes." Finally, such a cultural/interactional theory about teaching and such a method for the situational analysis of the action of actual teaching points to the very few but potentially powerful areas in which teachers can effect change in the lives of students. Practically speaking, within a school or in a classroom, not much can be done to change a child's race or ethnicity or first language (nor, one can argue on ethical grounds, should such attributes of children be changed or ignored). Within the classroom, not much can be done to change a child's neurological state or to change the kind of family life he or she has. These are some of the "givens" with which a child enters the classroom. Some of these things can and should be changed, but that must take place within the "larger society," which is not where children and teachers are each Monday morning. But then and there, teachers can do a great deal, both about structuring classroom life and about monitoring the
performance of individuals and groups therein. Moreover, teachers can enrich the conventional practice of observation of child performance by searching for evidence of child sensemaking, which will change the teacher's ways of thinking about what children know and do, and how they do it. By focusing on the "how" of interaction as well as on the "what" of it, as everyday life is happening in the classroom, teachers can learn to think in enriched ways about the children with whom they work despite—almost in virtue of—the stylistic variations possible in children's interactional performances within the richness and diversity of their actual lives outside and inside schools.

NOTES

1. Because of its unfortunate connotations in other people's scientific usage we will avoid henceforth the use of the term "competence." However, because communicative competence is so important a concept in our specialized field of study, we have thought it wise to define it at some length so that the way we are meaning it is not misinterpreted.

2. Some of the videotape viewing was done together with one of the participants in the scenes that were taped. We looked at lesson tapes with the classroom teacher in viewing sessions and discussed them with her. We did not do this with the parents and children in the two families whose dinners were taped (it would have been desirable to do this, but time and money constraints prevented us from doing so). We were participant observers both at school and at home, and in two of the three dinners taped and analyzed, two of us (Florio and Erickson) were active participants in the meals (one of us ate while the other operated the camera and then halfway through dinner we exchanged roles). In addition, one member of the research group (Florio) is Italian-American and had been raised in a speech community similar to the one the families we studied belonged to.

3. There are eight possible combinations of the distinctive features. Six of them are represented in Figure 3. The only two that are not (−−+) and (−++) would be cases in which not more than one person was talking at once and there was more than one conversational floor. Although this combination of distinctive features is theoretically possible it is not logically possible since it would be difficult to claim that there were in fact two conversational floors when only one person was talking. The only times this could occur would be at a pause in one of the conversations, and these pauses, if the conversation was to continue, tended to be of very short duration. The participation structures described in this typology therefore exhaust all the logical combinations of these features.

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Combining ethnographic and quantitative approaches: Suggestions and examples from a study on Puerto Rico

Ethnographic, anthropological, and qualitative research have been contrasted with the quantitative, psychological, and experimental research traditionally used in education. (See, for example, Cole and Scribner 1975; Edgerton 1974; and articles in Tikunoff and Ward 1977.) Although many researchers tend to use either one or another of these approaches, they are not incompatible in a single research design. In fact, these approaches should be seen as complementary in the context of the long term development of knowledge, which involves a cycle of qualitative observation, quantification, controlled observation or experimentation, and development of theory, which in turn motivates more observation, experimentation, and quantification (see Tinbergen 1958; and Scribner's 1976 discussion of Schneirla 1972). Much of the criticism leveled between the practitioners of the various approaches has stemmed from so many researchers having used a single approach to the exclusion of the other. Yet more is to be gained by combining approaches than by using only one in isolation.¹

It is true that these two approaches differ in basic philosophical, ideological, and epistemological assumptions (Rist 1977; Magoon 1977) and in their approach to theory development (see, for example, Cole and Scribner 1975; and Erickson 1977). This article, however, focuses primarily on methodological issues and leaves for another forum a discussion of the implications of combining theoretical aspects of the approaches. Specifically, I outline how one can include an ethnographic approach within the basic framework of a quantitative one and point out the benefits of its inclusion.² Where possible, examples from a study in Puerto Rico are used to illustrate the issues being discussed. The Puerto Rican study is not presented as a "model," rather as an example of an attempt to combine approaches. In the final section I discuss some research and policy implications of using a combined ethnographic and quantitative approach.
I should point out why the terms ethnographic approach and quantitative approach have been chosen for elucidation. Not much is gained from a methodological point of view by contrasting the disciplines of anthropology and psychology; there is considerable diversity within each discipline. Nor is much to be gained by contrasting ethnographic studies with quantitative studies; each can, and often does, contain a variety of approaches. Therefore, we are contrasting approaches, which are shared sets of underlying assumptions, and which, methodologically speaking, include such issues as types of questions to be asked, research design, acceptable data, and methods of data collection. To explain what is meant by "ethnographic" and "quantitative," some methodological characteristics of the two approaches are outlined in Table 1. These characteristics are not meant to be exhaustive; the two approaches can be compared on a number of other dimensions—both theoretical and methodological.

Table 1

Methodological Characteristics of Ethnographic and Quantitative Approaches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of Contrast</th>
<th>Ethnographic</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis Formulation</td>
<td>Formulated throughout study</td>
<td>Formulated at beginning of study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis Reformulation</td>
<td>Open to reformulation</td>
<td>Not open to reformulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions Asked</td>
<td>Descriptive, process</td>
<td>Descriptive, causal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Used</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods of Data Collection</td>
<td>Naturalistic participant observation, open-ended interviews</td>
<td>Nonparticipant observation, questionnaires, experiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern for Context</td>
<td>Central concern (ethnohistorical and immediate)</td>
<td>Minor concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to Generalization</td>
<td>Nonstatistical</td>
<td>Statistical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern for Validity</td>
<td>Central concern</td>
<td>Not of central concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern for Reliability</td>
<td>Not of central concern</td>
<td>Central concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to Meaning</td>
<td>Emic\textsuperscript{a} and locally relevant</td>
<td>Etic\textsuperscript{b}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Categories Used</td>
<td>Emic\textsuperscript{a} and locally relevant</td>
<td>Etic\textsuperscript{b}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}Emic refers to meanings and categories that are recognized by members of the culture being studied, i.e., the native's viewpoint.

\textsuperscript{b}Etic refers to meanings and categories that are imposed on the data from outside, usually from a theory or model, i.e., the researcher's viewpoint.
neither is this listing meant to be an entry in the debate concerning the "essential characteristics of ethnography." Table 1 presents those characteristics of the two approaches that are the focus of this article, and points out those characteristics of an ethnographic approach that might be (and in some studies have been) successfully combined with a quantitative one.

Before proceeding to the main discussion it will be useful to describe briefly the study from which my examples have been drawn so it is clear how these examples fit into a larger context (see Jacob 1977 for fuller discussion and details of the study).

A STUDY OF CULTURE, ENVIRONMENT, AND COGNITION IN PUERTO RICO

How culture and environment influence children's cognition was the focus of the study. Recent quantitative studies have indicated that several factors (for example, social class, birth order, education, urbanization, socialization experiences, and familiarity with specific objects) contribute to various aspects of children's cognitive performance and development (as manifested through test scores). One recurring drawback of many of these studies is that the cultural context of the nongenetic and cognitive factors is rarely discussed. For example, although many researchers have quantitatively examined the influences of Western schooling on cognition, few have discussed the place those schools have in the culture of the people they are studying. Another problem is that these studies provide little information about the daily experiences that contrast the lives of these groups of children. As Goodnow (1969: 455) points out, the "schooled" and "nonschooled" variables are used as "hopeful summaries of past experience but we have only a general idea of what these experiences are."

The study discussed here combined ethnographic and quantitative approaches to deal with these problems. As an ethnographic case study of kindergarten-aged children in Utuado, Puerto Rico, the research included descriptions of the broad sociocultural context of the children's lives as well as more detailed information on the environment and culture of the home and school, and descriptions of children's activities in these settings. A general model of the relationships among culture, environment, and children's cognition was also presented. Building on data frequency at home, detailed descriptions of children's activities at home, and the children's scores on a general cognitive test to test the model quantitatively.

Procedure

The fieldwork that is the basis for this study was conducted between November 1974 and September 1975 in Utuado, Puerto Rico. My first three months there were spent gathering background and ethnographic data on Utuado and in establishing and developing as many contacts in the town as possible. During this time I read local documents, interviewed local officials, went to public events, and accepted invitations to visit people's homes. Daily I wrote up notes of conversations and of my observations in the town. After two months I began observing in the local elementary schools on a regular basis. These were ethnographic observations in diary form and gave me an overview of the structure of the activities of the classrooms (i.e., how classes are arranged, formal and informal situations in the schools, time schedules, and
activities during play periods). Although I began more detailed observations of a sample of children in March, broader ethnographic observations in the town and schools continued throughout my entire stay in Utuado.

To obtain detailed and quantitative information about children's activities and cognition, their immediate environment, and the cultural values influencing their lives, I, with the help of local assistants, studied a sample of kindergarten-aged children in depth. Detailed observations of their activities at home and in school were collected, their teachers and female caretakers were interviewed, and their scores on cognitive tests were obtained. Using school lists, a random sample (stratified by sex) was selected. The mean age of the 29 children in the final sample was six years three months; there were 17 males and 12 females.

The observations of the sample children's activities were aimed at getting detailed descriptions of children's activities in naturalistic settings. After piloting the procedure and developing guidelines for training local assistants, I visited the children's teachers and caretakers to explain to them the procedure we would follow. I stressed that the children should be allowed to do what they normally do. The observations were collected over four-and-a-half months in the children's homes and schools by me and four Puerto Rican assistants. Only one observer was present during each observation. Four home observations were carried out on each child during summer vacation; two were approximately 15 minutes long and two were about 30 minutes long. Four 15-minute observations were collected for each child in the sample toward the end of the school year during kindergarten free play periods.

Observers were instructed not to interact with the child or others present during the observation. They were to try to maintain "the role of a friendly, nonevaluating, nondirective and nonparticipating person who is interested in what people do" (Barker and Wright 1971:211). Observers sat near the child they were to observe and placed a small tape recorder with a built-in microphone near the child. Before beginning the observation, the observers waited a few minutes after their arrival to allow for an adjusting period. During the observations we placed no constraints on the children; they were free to go anywhere or do anything they wanted to do. Observers made detailed notes of what the child did and said, of what others said to the child and did. In particular, their instructions told them to record what the child does, how she or he does it, and with whom she or he does it, what objects or toys are used, and the interactions between the child and others. They were also instructed to note, when possible, the actions and speech of those with whom the child interacts and of those near the child. Observer guidelines stressed that they were to provide descriptions and not evaluations of the children's activities. Observers were also instructed to indicate in their written notes the time at the beginning and end of the observation, and also to note approximately every minute during it. After completing the assigned observation, the observer expanded the notes and transcribed the tape made during the observation. The expanded description was then integrated with the transcription to form a continuous narrative. The narratives were then checked, revised, and typed. These narratives were used to produce a descriptive overview of children's activities at home and at school; the home observations were also coded for children's speech frequency and for their reactions to the observer.

The primary female caretakers of the children in the sample were interviewed twice. "Caretakers" refers to the adults who are responsible for raising the children or who babysit on a regular basis. In the sample they included parents, step-parents, grandparents, and aunts. The first interview was conducted before observations took place, and
covered the home environment, demographic characteristics of the household, and the caretakers' attitudes about certain aspects of child training. After the observations were completed, a second open-ended interview focused on the experiences of the children, on child-training practices, and on attitudes of the caretakers. The teachers of the children in the sample were interviewed after the school observations had been completed. In open-ended discussion they were asked to describe each child generally, the child's academic abilities, what things the child likes to do most in school, and the social behavior of the child.

After completion of all the detailed observations of the children's activities, a Puerto Rican psychologist administered several tests to the children in the sample. One of the tests given, the Stanford-Binet, was used in testing the model discussed below. Although this test has limitations, it was chosen because it covers a wide range of skills, the subtests can be analyzed for patterns, and because it is used in the local school system.

Overview of Ethnographic Findings

The focus of this study is the pueblo of Utuado, an urban community located in the western highlands of Puerto Rico. Approximately 11,600 people live in this town, which is the local center of business, religious, and governmental activities for people in the surrounding municipío (township). For the municipío as a whole, agriculture is the main source of employment, and the atmosphere of the town is influenced by the surrounding rural farm area. Yet very few people living in urban Utuado have farming or farm-related activities as their primary occupation; most are employed in manufacturing, commerce, or government. Women account for about a fourth of the labor force in the town. For both the male and female labor force, slightly more than half have blue-collar jobs and slightly less than half have white-collar jobs. The overall economic situation in the town is not a bright one, and 74% of the families have an income below the poverty level.

Utuadeños recognize three main social subdivisions in the town: los ricos, la clase media, and los pobres (upper middle class, middle middle class, and lower class, respectively). These three locally recognized social groups differ in aspects of their immediate environment and in their cultural values some of which can be hypothesized to influence children's cognition. Consequently, these groupings were used as a basis for intracommunity comparisons. (Seven children in the sample are upper middle class, seven are middle middle class, and fifteen are lower class.)

Home is one of the major settings in Utuadeño children's lives. Most children in the sample live with two parents. Only in upper middle class and lower class households are there adults other than the children's parents living in the household. In the upper middle class cases the other adults usually are the child's grandparents; for the lower class households the other adults are the child's aunts or uncles. These other adults play an active role in the children's lives, and often spend a great deal of their time playing with and watching the children. Young children in Utuado are involved in a wide network of caring relationships that extends beyond the immediate household to include family and friends (familiares). From this variety of relationships the children derive a highly valued sense of security and warmth.

Geographic mobility is an important part of the lives of Utuadeños. Even though most of the children in the sample have lived in Utuado at least five years, 59% have lived in two or more homes in Utuado and 25% have lived outside urban Utuado--either in Puerto Rico or on the mainland U.S., or both.
There are significant social class differences in the number of years of education of the children's primary caretakers and in the percentage of primary female caretakers who work outside the home. Upper middle class parents tend to have a few years of college; middle middle class parents usually have finished high school; lower class parents on the average have less than eight years of school. Middle class primary female caretakers are more likely to work outside the home than lower class female caretakers.

The kindergarten-aged children in the sample engaged in a variety of activities at home: motor activities, rule-bound games, card and board games, reading, writing, counting, building, conversation, chores, watching television, pretending, grooming, watching others, eating, and playing with miscellaneous toys. The children's activities are influenced by various cultural concepts, values, and standards. Capacidad is an important Puerto Rican concept. It refers to a person's present abilities, social maturity, and readiness to learn more complex skills and social behavior. It is thought that young children have no capacidad and that they acquire it little by little through accumulating experience. Because of their ideas regarding capacidad, female caretakers said that one should not demand much from children (no exigirles mucho), and that one must guide children, only gradually giving them more freedom and responsibility as they grow older.

To quantitatively test the general model discussed below, children's speech frequencies at home were examined in detail. These analyses indicate that in their homes lower class children speak less than middle middle class and upper middle class children when an observer is present. An examination of the cultural context of these data indicate that the lower class children are more likely to define the observer as a visita (visitor) with whom they would have a more formal relationship and that middle class children are more likely to define the observer as a visitor with whom they would have a more familiar relationship. Since different behaviors are appropriate for the two kinds of visitors, the children's different definitions of the observer may have influenced their speech frequency. The reported difference in speech frequency may be a real one (i.e., it would have occurred even if the observer was not present), an artifact of contextual factors, or a combination of the two. It was not possible to determine conclusively in this study which interpretation is correct because the analysis of "observer effect" was not a part of the original design of the study.

School is another major setting in the lives of children in the town. For most Utuadeño children more than five years old the calendar year is divided into the school year and summer vacation. In urban Utuado there are public elementary and high schools, a Catholic elementary school and high school, and a Head Start program. Directives from the central office of the Departamento de Instrucción Pública concerning curriculum, standards for teachers' credentials, and related matters are followed by all local elementary and high schools. Most children go to classes for about five hours a day; in elementary schools classes are held approximately between 8:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Kindergarten classes meet for three hours a day either in the morning or in the afternoon.

There is no sharp break between home and school for most kindergarten-aged children. The atmosphere of the kindergartens is relaxed, informal, and supportive. From discussions and interviews with teachers, we have seen that several aspects of the children's social behavior are salient to the teachers: the children's general level of activity and speech, their willingness to share with their peers and with the teacher, and their warmth toward the teacher.
Model Tested

Drawing from the anthropological tradition and previous research on the influences of nongenetic factors on cognition, a general model of the relationships among culture, environment, activities, and cognition was proposed. This general model indicated that over time all the factors in it are mutually interdependent. The study reported on here tested one part of the general model and focused on children. Figure 1 diagrams the specific relationships from the general model that were examined in the study reported on here.

![Diagram of the specific relationships examined](image)

**Figure 1. Model of the Specific Relationships Examined**

**NOTE:** Following the conventions of path analysis diagrams, singleheaded arrows indicate the direction of an assumed causal relationship, leading from each determining variable to each variable influenced by it.

Even though no aspect of surrounding environment was included in the path analysis, it is included in this diagram because it is in the general model.

The model tested suggests that factors in the children's immediate environment and the cultural values of the community influence children's cognition directly and also indirectly through their influence on children's activities. For the model, culture was defined as "standards for perceiving, believing, evaluating, and acting" (Goodenough 1971:41). Bronfenbrenner's (1974) distinction between the child's immediate and surrounding environment is a useful one and was followed in this study. The immediate environment is that which contains the child—for example, the home, school, and neighborhood—and includes the physical environment, people, and the activities of these people with one another. The surrounding environment may not include the child, but influences with whom and how the child spends his or her time—for example, shopping facilities, work hours, and governmental policies.

In the model, children's activities are presented as "mediating" the influence of culture and the immediate environment on children's cognition because activities give the children opportunities to develop competence in cognitive abilities and to learn the culturally specific "rules" for performance. Activities could include interaction with others, games, speech, chores, play, and school tasks.

As can be seen from Figure 1, cognition is separated in the model into competence and performance. Competence refers to one's underlying abilities and tacit knowledge, i.e., what one can do at a given moment in time. Performance, on the other hand, refers to one's actual behavior at a given moment in time (see Chomsky 1965; Cole and Bruner 1971; Dasen 1977). This distinction was included in the model (even though it was not possible to partition cognition into competence and performance components) because the distinction is important for conceptual clarity and useful for interpreting some data.
Quantitative Analysis and Results

Path analysis was used to quantitatively test the model presented in Figure 1. The children's scores on the Stanford-Binet were used as measures of their cognition and were viewed as reflecting both competence and performance. (See Jacob 1977 for discussion of the limitations of the Stanford-Binet and how scores on it were interpreted for this study.) This test involves a wide variety of skills and is heavily weighted on verbal ability. Many of its subsections test verbal skills and even those that do not test verbal skills explicitly require the children to understand complex verbal instructions (see Anastasi 1976; Valett 1965).

Because the Stanford-Binet is heavily weighted on verbal ability, frequency of speech at home was chosen as the measure of children's activities to test the model. Two measures were used: mean number of spontaneous utterances that were not addressed to the observer, and mean number of all spontaneous utterances.

Two aspects of culture were included in the path analysis. The first was the degree the children were included in long-standing, wide networks of family and friends, and, it was assumed, had a sense of security and warmth. On the basis of ethnographic data it was further assumed that mobility would decrease a child's sense of security and warmth. Several variables measuring mobility were used as "proxies" for the security-warmth value. The second aspect of culture included in the path analysis was the children's reaction to the observer (measured in mean number of looks directed at the observer and mean number of spontaneous utterances to the observer).

Several measures of the immediate environment were included in the path analysis: social class, education of the father, education of the primary female caretaker, amount of time the primary female caretaker works outside the home, birth order of the child, family size, type of family unit, and number of adults other than the primary caretakers living in the home. The child's age and sex were also included as independent variables in the analysis.

Using the variables discussed above, the results of the path analysis without the deviant cases indicate that the higher the education of the father, the more adults beside the primary caretakers that live in the same household with the child, and the more the child speaks at home, the higher the child's test score on the Stanford-Binet, and that the more places the child has lived, the lower his or her test score. The path analysis also indicates that the influence of the father's education was partially mediated through its influence on the child's frequency of speech at home. These results are diagrammed in Figure 2.

With this introduction to the study from which the examples will be drawn, we can proceed to discuss how an ethnographic approach can be combined with a quantitative approach and how that combination would make a difference. Most quantitative research follows a basic pattern: formulation of the problem and research design, formulation of hypotheses, operationalization of terms and concepts, development of procedure and design of quantitative instruments, piloting of the procedure and instruments, execution of the procedure, analysis and interpretation of the data, generation of new hypotheses and new studies, and presentation of results. This pattern will be used to structure the discussion of how the Puerto Rican study combined an ethnographic approach and ethnographic data with a quantitative approach.
Figure 2. Path Diagram of Regression Results (without deviant cases)

NOTE: Straight arrows represent assumed causal relationships; curved lines without arrows represent relationships that are assumed to be non-causal. The numbers on the straight arrows between two variables are the path coefficients (Beta values of regression equations); the numbers on the two arrows pointing to dependent variables but not from other variables represent estimates of path coefficients for latent variables (i.e., all other causal factors influencing those variables); numbers on the curved lines are zero-order correlations.

COMBINING ETHNOGRAPHIC AND QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES

Formulation of the Problem and Research Design

After selecting a topic, the researcher must formulate a specific problem or problems that can be investigated scientifically and choose a research design that corresponds to the goals of the study. The problem and research design chosen will obviously influence the rest of the research process. In quantitative studies the problem is usually stated in terms of a quantitative description of particular variables or as an examination of the quantitative relations among a set of variables. The research design in quantitative studies most often involves testing specific hypotheses that have been formulated at the beginning of the study.

Incorporating an ethnographic approach at this stage would mean including a commitment to determining the local significance and meaning of the variables of interest, a concern for how the naturally occurring systems in which the variables to be studied operate, a concern for the context of those systems, and an openness to reformulation of the problem.
as the study proceeds. Such an approach would usually mean including in the research design a period of ethnographic observation before the structured, quantitative study is conducted. The time needed for this observation will depend on what has been done before that is relevant to one's particular problem. The data collected during this period of ethnographic observation could be useful in determining the local significance of hypotheses, of terms, of categories, and of variables early in the study, in identifying new variables and hypotheses that are locally significant, in modifying one's methods to adapt them to the local settings, and in placing the study in context.

Two aspects of an ethnographic approach that are relevant to this early phase of a study (a concern for context and an openness to reformulation of the problem and hypotheses) will be discussed in detail in this section; other aspects will be discussed in following sections where they are more relevant.

Attention to context should include both the ethnohistorical context and the immediate context of the behavior being observed. The identification of the sociocultural and historical context of the area and group being examined is important for nonstatistical generalization of the findings of one's research and for an understanding of a deeper, historical meaning of the data. Bronfenbrenner's (1974) concept of the surrounding environment is relevant here, and enters into a consideration of background context. In the Puerto Rican study a variety of forces seem to have influenced contemporary urban Utuado. The Hispanic roots as well as the recent influences of industrialization have created bonds of similarity between urban Utuado and other areas of the island; however, factors associated with urban vs. rural living and those associated only with the coffee region in which Utuado is located contribute to urban Utuado's uniqueness. Taking these various factors into account, we would expect urban Utuado to be most representative of other towns in the coffee region, but also to share large parts of its culture, social environment, and behavior patterns with other areas of the island.

Concern for the immediate context should operate at both the micro and macro levels. At the micro level it means examining how such variables as other persons, physical environment, and topic may influence subjects' behavior with regard to variables being studied. On a macro level it means investigating how subjects' behavior in other settings may influence their behavior in the setting being studied. Data from the Puerto Rican study indicate the importance of micro-level contextual influences. As a later discussion of the deviant cases in the path analysis will show, there is evidence that contextual factors in the home and school settings were important influences on some children's different levels of verbal activity at home and school. An example of a concern for immediate context at the macro level can also be presented from the Puerto Rican study. Although extensive ethnographic research has been conducted in Puerto Rico, little of it has focused on small towns, and even less on detailed descriptions of children's activities or on cultural and environmental factors that might influence children's cognition. Because so little was known about the detailed context of children's lives, I decided to examine their activities in both home and school, the two major settings in young Utuadoño children's lives.

An openness to reformulation includes both an attitude as well as specific strategies. It means that as one formulates the problem of the study one allows "space" for new variables or a whole new question if ethnographic analyses indicate that they may be important. It also means that at the beginning and throughout the study one is open to rethinking one's initial formulation of the problem. For example, one might start out by asking how parents' education affects children's cognitive development.
After initial observations the researcher might then realize that before that question can be answered, he or she must understand something about variation in both parents' and children's activities that result from parents' education, determine whether another variable masks the effects of parents' education, and determine whether other variables may be more important than parents' education.

The Puerto Rican study offers a good example of reformulation of the problem. Initially the study was conceived as having two parts. The first was to be an ethnographic description of cultural standards for children's activities and intellectual activity as well as a description of the play, work, and learning activities of a sample of young children. The second part was to be a comparison of children's specific cognitive skills (analysis and conceptual grouping) in everyday activities and on cognitive tests. A task analysis of detailed observations of children's activities was proposed to isolate the cognitive skills used in these activities.

After three months of participant observation in the community, the initial detailed observation protocol, which combined checklist and diary-type approaches, was pretested. During this pretest phase problems arose with the instrument and in trying to determine which activities of the children to observe in detail. The participant observations did not provide data on the range of children's activities or the frequency of occurrence of specific activities, or the detailed descriptions needed to make preliminary decisions about whether analytic skills or conceptual grouping were involved in specific activities. Because of these difficulties it was decided that it would be more appropriate to gather detailed descriptions of the range of children's activities rather than focus on selected activities.

The overall goal of the study (understanding how culture and environment influence cognition) remained the same, but the focus of the detailed observations changed from specific activities involving analytic ability or conceptual grouping to a sampling of the range of the children's activities in school and at home. With the change in focus of the detailed observations, I decided to administer a more general test of cognition to the children in the sample rather than tests of specific skills; the interviews were also modified to coincide with the new focus of the detailed observations. The quantitative relationships to be examined were also reformulated in more general terms than those initially proposed for the study.

Formulation of Hypotheses

In a traditional quantitative approach, hypotheses are developed at the beginning of the study, procedures are developed to test the hypotheses, data are collected and analyzed, and results are published. A researcher who wants to combine an ethnographic perspective with a quantitative approach would see hypotheses formulation as an ongoing process, with some formulated at the beginning of the study, others developed after participant observation has been done, and with still others generated as ideas for future research.

Hypotheses formulated early in the study from previous research and theory would be open to modification after the initial ethnographic data have been collected and analyzed. If researchers are going to transpose hypotheses developed from data from other cultures, then they would want to know the local context of the variables transposed, something about how the system involving those variables operates, and the local meaning of the variables (see Berry 1969). These data would allow one to make informed hypotheses and to judge whether the hypotheses mean the same thing in the two cultures or settings. An example from the Puerto Rican study will illustrate this. Social class effects have been found to influence cognitive test scores (for example, Eells, Davis, and Havighurst 1951). Before
hypothesizing that such differences would exist in Utuado, the local social structure was examined to see if social class was a valid concept to use there. We found that social classes defined as "sociocultural groups or segments arranged in hierarchical order" (Steward 1956:8) have been part of the social structure in Puerto Rico for a large part of its history (see Lewis 1963; Steward, et al. 1956). *Utuadeños* use the term social class (*clases sociales*) to distinguish their locally recognized social groupings. These emic groupings also differed on variables that one might hypothesize to influence children's cognition, so they were used to study internal variation in the town (see Jacob 1977 for further discussion of *Utuadeño* social class).

An ethnographic perspective might also lead one to examine ethnographic data to see if factors other than those in the initial hypotheses might be important. For example, in the Puerto Rican study ethnographic analyses indicated that adults other than parents were often present in the children's homes and suggested that these adults might play an important role in the children's lives. Ethnographic data also indicated that young children are included in a wide network of relationships with both family members and friends (*familiares*), and that security and warm relationships are important cultural values. The presence of other adults and the security-warmth value were hypothesized to be important variables, and measures of these variables were included in the path analysis. Both were significant. If hypotheses had been developed only from previous studies and theory, these variables might not have been included.

**Operationalization of Terms and Concepts**

Operationalization involves specifying how the terms and concepts used in a study will be measured. An ethnographic approach at this stage would suggest that a researcher try to develop measures that have local significance, i.e., they have local relevance and, where appropriate, local recognition.

An example from the Puerto Rican study involves operationalizing "social class" for use with the *Utuadeño* sample. We were concerned first with identifying subgroups *Utuadeños* themselves recognize as well as subgroups that differ in environmental and cultural factors that can be expected to influence children's cognitive competence and performance. As discussed in the previous section, social classes met both criteria in Utuado.

Once social class had been identified as a valid concept in Utuado, it was necessary to operationalize the concept for use with the sample. Ethnographic analyses indicated that the emic distinctions among the three major social classes were based primarily on income, occupation, education, and area of residence. Family background was not significant in delineating a separate social class, as is characteristic of many other Latin American countries. Two of the emic criteria (occupation and residence) were used to subdivide the sample into social class groups. Although income is an important criterion of social class in Utuado, it was not used to operationalize group distinctions because we were not able to obtain reliable information about the incomes of the households of children in the sample.

**Development of Procedure and Design of Quantitative Instruments**

Having an ethnographic perspective can be important in sample selection and in designing an experiment, a detailed observation protocol, or an interview instrument. It leads one to be particularly sensitive to
validity, the local meaning of one's procedure and instruments, how these procedures and instruments fit a particular cultural context, and how the system (including the procedures and instruments) operates. Ethnographic data collected before this stage in the research project can be useful in responding to these concerns.

In quantitative studies, the issue of sample selection usually deals with the sample of people to be studied. An ethnographic perspective would also lead an investigator to be concerned about the sample of contexts. Whether focusing on people or contexts or both, a researcher interested in combining ethnographic and quantitative approaches might try to identify and examine locally relevant or locally recognized subgroups and settings before selecting a sample. In the Puerto Rican study the issues of people and contexts to be selected were intertwined in deciding which children to observe.

In Utuado, kindergarten-aged children are not required to attend kindergarten. If their parents do choose to send them, the children might go either to a public school or to a Head Start class. After conducting ethnographic observation in public schools and Head Start classes and after talking informally with several teachers, I decided to eliminate children in the Head Start program from the sample pool because of differences in the classroom procedures and the orientations and goals of the two programs. The data did not warrant their being treated as a single unit (i.e., kindergarten) for the study. Examination of school records and interviews with school officials did not reveal any systematic bias between the two sets of students, but inclusion of Head Start students would have made any interpretation of children's school behavior difficult because of the major differences in the two school settings.

Designing valid research instruments that take cultural meaning and context into account is no easy task. Recently, increased attention has been paid to adapting research instruments to the local setting, particularly in cross-cultural research. (See Brislin, Lonner, and Thorndike 1973; Frijda and Johada 1966; and Levine 1970 for some general discussions: for discussions of these issues with regard to experimental instruments see Berry 1969; Cole, et al. 1971; Cole and Scribner 1975; Glück 1975; and Scribner 1976.) Many of the issues raised for cross-cultural studies are relevant to studies in our own society, especially when the research deals with subcultural groups or is in settings that have not been documented ethnographically. We will focus here on some general issues, using examples involving interviews and observation protocols.

Ethnographic data allow the researcher to design interviews and questionnaires that use emic categories and phrases, that ask culturally meaningful questions, and that include questions that might not have been immediately obvious as being important before the ethnographic observations. An example of this last point can be drawn from the Puerto Rican study. While collecting the detailed observations of children's activities, we began to suspect (on the basis of ethnographic and detailed observation data) that children in different social classes might be reacting differently to the presence of an observer. One reason for this differential reaction might be that the subgroups of children had different standards for behavior in the presence of a visitor. Consequently, we incorporated questions about standards for appropriate behavior for children in the presence of adult visitors who are neither family nor close family friends into the second interview with the children's female caretakers. These data proved to be very useful in later analyses that focused on this differential reaction to observers. (See discussion of this issue in the Piloting section below.)
An ethnographic perspective would favor open-ended interviews rather than multiple-choice questionnaires unless the culturally significant dimensions of contrast are already known. Open-ended interviews allow one to find out what dimensions of contrast are significant locally. For example, in the Puerto Rican study we were interested in how the teachers of children in the sample characterized them. Rather than ask the teachers to rank the children along a continuum we thought was important, we asked them to describe each child generally, the child's academic abilities, the child's social behavior, and what things the child likes to do most in school. In this way we were able to identify dimensions that were relevant to the teachers and also have an idea of how the children sorted out on these dimensions. These data could have been used to devise a questionnaire that was more amenable to quantitative analysis if that type of data had been needed. As will be shown later (see section on Analysis and Interpretation) these data were important in the analysis of the deviant cases in the path analysis.

An ethnographic perspective at this stage could lead to an examination of the immediate social system in which the researcher's procedure and instruments will be operating. A data collection situation is a social situation. Researchers are part of this social situation and, consequently, are defined in some way by the participants. Moreover, the social situation itself is defined by the participants and they may have standards for behavior in the data collection situation very different from those that the researcher assumes they have. For example, Wolfson (1976) discusses the difference between the researcher's and participants' definitions of the situation when sociolinguists try to obtain "casual" speech through informal interviews in the United States; Berry (1969) and Scribner (1976) discuss the demand characteristics of experimental situations; Cole and his colleagues (1971) examine situational influences on cognitive performance. Ethnographic data could be useful in understanding the participants' definitions of appropriate roles and standards for behavior in structured data collection situations.

In the Puerto Rican study the issue of the social system in which data collection occurs was very relevant to the analysis of the differential influence of the observer's presence on middle class and lower class children during the detailed observations. This will be discussed further in the next section.

Piloting of the Procedure and Instruments

Anderson (1971), in his discussion of the psychology experiment, states that a pilot is

... useful for trying out the instructions, for making sure that the equipment works, for adjusting the conditions of the experiment so that the task is neither too easy nor too difficult, and for enabling the experimenter himself to master the routine of the experiment. (p. 69)

From an ethnographic point of view, piloting the procedure and instruments involves much more than this. It is an opportunity to examine the local meaning and relevance of terms, categories, and phrases, and a chance to identify the participants' definitions of appropriate roles and standards for behavior in the research setting.

An example from the Puerto Rican study deals with the influence of observers on the behavior (specifically, on the frequency of speech) of
children during detailed observations in their homes. We found that lower-class children spoke less at home than middle-class children, but we suspected that the two groups were reacting differently to the presence of a nonparticipant observer in their homes. Consequently, we examined a variety of data to try to understand how the children were defining the situation and what their standards for appropriate behavior in that situation were.

In Utuado, nonfamily visitors to a home are considered either familiares (close friends and fictive kin) or visitas (literally, visitors). We would expect both lower-class children and middle-class children to define an observer in their homes as a visita. When female caretakers of the children were asked how the children should behave in the presence of visitas, middle-class and lower-class women gave different answers. The lower-class women said that the child should be quiet and not speak (estar quieto y callado, no hable) and not pester the adults (no molestar). The most common response for middle-class women was that the children should not interrupt the adults' conversations (no intervenir, no interrumpir). Consequently, even if both middle-class and lower-class children define the observer as a visita with whom they have same degree of formality or familiarity, we would expect the lower-class children to be more "quiet" in their speech and gross body movements in the observer's presence than middle-class children. We would expect these differences between the groups to be increased because several factors indicate that lower-class children are more likely to define the observer as a visita with whom they would have a more formal relationship. These analyses from ethnographic data indicate that the reported quantitative difference in speech frequency between middle-class and lower-class children may be a real one (i.e., it would have occurred even if the observer had not been present), may be an artifact of the observer's presence and other contextual factors, or a combination of the two. Unfortunately, it was not possible to resolve this interpretive dilemma because this analysis was conceived after data collection, and middle-class and lower-class observers had not been counterbalanced with middle-class and lower-class children. The analyses do indicate, however, the importance of examining the social and cultural aspects of data collection before collecting one's quantitative data. Examining these issues while collecting ethnographic data and during the pilot phase will allow an investigator to adapt the procedures accordingly and will also give important insight into both the local cultural context and the data.

Execution of the Procedure

In most quantitative studies the execution of the procedure is relatively straightforward—the experiment is conducted or the questionnaire is administered. An ethnographic approach would lead to the view of the data collection situation as a social situation, and a researcher might "do" participant observation of the structured data collection situation itself. These ethnographic data could provide the researcher with important insights into the validity of the structured data, the local meaning and context of the data, and other factors that may have affected the data. The discussion in the previous section of the effect of the observer's presence on children's speech frequency at home is an example from the Puerto Rican study of an important insight that was generated by ethnographic observations made during more structured data collection.
Analysis and Interpretation of the Data

In many quantitative studies the analyses are heavily shaped before the data are collected. However, if the researcher has had an ethnographic perspective throughout the study, he or she will at this point have a variety of data besides that available in a traditional quantitative study. Questions may have been reformulated. New questions may have been asked. All this makes data analysis more complex than in a traditional quantitative study; the investigator must tie together a diverse array of data in the context of an unfolding understanding of the questions being asked.

Coding and categorizing are important in quantitative data analysis. An ethnographic perspective stresses the use of locally relevant, emic categories, but emic categories can be combined with etic categories in one's analysis. This has the advantage of producing an analysis that is meaningful locally, tied in with current theory, and amenable to cross-cultural comparisons (see Berry 1969). A brief example of how this was done in the Puerto Rican study follows. The detailed observations of children's activities at home were first coded following emic descriptions of the children's behavior. (After reading through all the home observations, answers were listed from an emic viewpoint to the question, "what is the child doing?" Using this list, the observations were reread and the children's major activities were coded using these emic categories.) Examples of the activities listed include the following: carrying out the garbage, playing tag, looking at a book, playing with a doll, climbing a tree, and playing house. These activities were then grouped for analysis into etic categories on the basis of theories and hypotheses in psychology about the types of activities influencing psychological development (e.g., Herron and Sutton-Smith 1971; Piaget 1962). The second-order categories used are chores; watching television; pretending; rule-bound games; board and card games; building; motor activities; reading, writing, and counting; other toys; grooming; and miscellaneous activities.

Ethnographic data also help one deal with unusual cases in the coding process. Coding always involves some judgment, and at times requires a great deal of judgment. Ethnographic data can help the researcher successfully interpret those cases that are "borderline," or exceptions. An example from the Puerto Rican study deals with the coding of occupation for the determination of the social class of the sample. As discussed, occupation and residence were used to subdivide the sample into locally recognized social class groups. Each family was categorized using the occupation of the male head of the household when he was present and employed. In two cases during the time of the survey, lower-class male heads of households were on the mainland U.S. doing agricultural work. Even though they were not physically present, they were considered present for coding because ethnographic data indicated that they would be gone only temporarily. Another coding rule was that when a male head of household was present but unemployed, his unemployed status was coded unless the female head of the household was working. If she was working, her occupation was then used to classify the household. In one case this rule was not followed, and the husband's former occupation was used to classify the household because the family's lifestyle was more consistent with others in that category. Exceptions and borderline cases are bound to occur; using ethnographic data as the basis for these judgments will increase the validity of the coding.

Another issue in data analysis and interpretation is how to coordinate ethnographic and quantitative data. At times the ethnographic data may be useful in interpreting quantitative results and placing them in
their broader context. (Two examples of this from the Puerto Rican study are presented below.) At other times the ethnographic and quantitative data may produce different results. In all cases the two types of data should be seen as complementary and the process of triangulation of results should be continually used in analysis and interpretation. If ethnographic and quantitative data produce different results, the researcher must strive to understand and reconcile the differences.

As mentioned, ethnographic data can help interpret quantitative results and place them in a broader context. Two examples from the Puerto Rican study will be presented: the interpretation of variables found to be significant in the path analysis and the analysis of deviant cases.

The results of the path analysis without the deviant cases indicated that the higher the education of the father, the more adults besides the primary caretakers that live in the same household with the child, and the higher the child's frequency of speech at home, the higher the child's test score on the Stanford-Binet; and that the more places the child has lived, the lower his or her test score. The influence of the father's education was partially mediated through its influence on the child's frequency of speech at home. Ethnographic analysis helped to interpret these results. They revealed that the other adults present in the children's households are usually the children's grandparents who spend time playing and talking with the children. Their presence probably provides intellectual stimulation as well as increases the children's sense of security and warmth. Ethnographic analyses also suggest that increased mobility decreased a child's test scores because the network of family and 

Two measures of verbal activity (speech frequency at home and the Stanford-Binet scores) were included in the quantitative analysis. For five children (three middle-class boys and two lower-class girls), high speech frequency at home was not correlated with high performance on the Stanford-Binet, which is heavily weighted on verbal ability. For the other 24 children in the sample, speech frequency at home was correlated with test scores ($r = .53$). Examination of characteristics of the children, of their immediate environment, and of their distribution over observations or observers did not reveal any systematic differences between the deviant cases and the other children. Open-ended interviews of the teachers of the children were examined. Four of the five deviant cases were characterized by the teachers as being quiet or timid (calludo, \textit{timido}); the fifth was characterized as being very active (inquieta) and nervous (nerviosa). Four of the children were also described as having some problem in their relationships with other students. Other ethnographic data indicated that the students' general level of activity and speech, their willingness to share with their peers and with the teacher, and their warmth toward the teacher are all salient aspects of students' behavior for the teachers: The combined results of the ethnographic and quantitative data indicate that factors in the immediate situations of the home and school may be influencing the children's differential behavior at home and at school.

Ethnographic data also may be useful in discussing the generalizability of one's results. The usual quantitative approach to generalizability is through the use of statistics, and is in relation to the population from which the sample was drawn. Factors such as age, sex, and social class are often considered in drawing a sample. Such cultural factors as subcultural affiliation and ethnohistoric relationships are often overlooked, however, even though they may be very important influences on the variables the researcher is studying. Analysis of cultural affiliation might lead one to generalize to populations that a purely statistical approach
would not indicate.

In the Puerto Rican study the local population from which the sample was drawn was all kindergarten-aged children in Utuado. Ethnographic observation throughout the community did not reveal any segment not represented in the school lists and therefore confirmed an earlier judgment that the random sample was representative of the local population. A broader population to which one might want to be able to generalize is kindergarten-aged children in Puerto Rico. To decide to what extent the findings from Utuado can be generalized to all kindergarten-aged children on the island, we must examine the cultural variation on the island.

Steward and his colleagues (Steward, et al. 1956) emphasize regional differences on the island based on historical differences in the agricultural base of the economy. However, in their conclusions they acknowledge that in the 1940s the influences of modern industrialization, primarily mediated through the influences of the United States, have had some unifying results. Gordon Lewis (1963), writing more recently, acknowledges local and regional differences, but adds that these variations "cannot disguise the general truth that in one degree or another the entire insular society is being forcibly repatterned by the institutional changes wrought by modernization" (p. 191). Steward (1972) states that the pueblos and other urban areas of Puerto Rico have responded more uniformly to the influences of industrialization and urbanization and that the rural areas are more differentiated on the basis of their agricultural base. It is within this general framework of similarities and differences that we must discuss the generalization of findings concerning environment, culture, children's activities, and cognition.

The pueblo of Utuado where the study was conducted is a small urban area in the western highland region of Puerto Rico. The western coffee region where Utuado is located is often seen as exemplifying the "typically Hispanic pattern which once characterised much of the sugar area as well as the coffee area [of Puerto Rico]" (Steward 1972:123). Because of its distance from San Juan, its relative inaccessibility, and the inappropriateness of the area for large-scale sugar production, the area has been, until recently, least affected by changes from the outside. Because of its historic base in coffee agriculture the pueblo of Utuado necessarily shares some aspects of its culture and social environment with the rural area and other pueblos of the coffee region. However, because of the recent industrialization, urban Utuado shares significant aspects of its social environment and culture with pueblos outside the coffee region.

Generalization of the findings of this study must take this variety of influences into account. Hispanic roots as well as the recent influences of industrialization have created bonds of similarity between urban Utuado and other areas of the island; factors associated with urban living and those associated only with the coffee region contribute to urban Utuado's uniqueness. Taking these various factors into account, we would expect urban Utuado to be most representative of other pueblos in the coffee region, but also to share large parts of its culture, social environment, and behavior patterns with other areas of the island.

Ethnographic data are also useful for identifying cultural links between the local community one is studying and other, noncontiguous, communities. Although one would hesitate to generalize one's findings to these other communities without some qualifications, the identification of cultural links between communities might lead to an examination of similarities and differences between the two communities and, if appropriate, offer findings from research in one community as hypotheses for future studies in the other community.

Some data from the Puerto Rican study can be used as an example of this approach. The mainland U.S. is a relevant aspect of life for
Utuadoño children. Many have lived there or have gone there for visits. Other studies (Fitzpatrick 1971; Lewis 1966) have reported that Puerto Rican children on the mainland often spend time on the island. These data indicate that the environmental and cultural influences on both these groups of children are not just those of the immediate community. Moreover, we could at least hypothesize that research findings from one community are relevant to the other.

In the Puerto Rican study the path analysis indicated that mobility negatively influenced the children's performances on the Stanford-Binet test. It was suggested that this was because the mobility reduces the children's network of family and friends and consequently reduces their sense of security and warmth, which are important values in Puerto Rican culture. If this is true, we would expect mobility to affect other areas of children's performance in school. The Puerto Rican study also indicated that the children in Utuado are accustomed to a warm, relaxed atmosphere in the schools and to close ties between their homes and school. Given the cultural link between the island and the mainland, we could hypothesize that these same factors influence the performance of Puerto Rican children on the mainland.

Data from a study by Alicea and Mathis (1975) of Puerto Rican high school students in three northeastern cities on the mainland U.S. support these hypotheses. Alicea and Mathis report that school dropouts have moved more often than students who did not drop out, and that students with a low truancy rate have greater residential stability and have attended their present school for a longer time than high-truancy students. They also report that whereas approximately 50% of both dropouts and stay-ins indicated that their teachers liked them, a higher percentage of stay-ins than dropouts felt that their teachers were fair to them and that they could go to their teachers for help and advice. These data, combined with results from the present Puerto Rican study, indicate that research conducted on the mainland and island are relevant to each other and that future research on the mainland that focuses on the school-related problems of Puerto Rican students should include an analysis of their mobility, of the teacher-student atmosphere in the school, and of other consequences of high mobility.

In this section the use of ethnographic data in the analysis and interpretation of quantitative data has been stressed. One may also be confronted with quantitative results with which one has very little relevant ethnographic data. In such a situation it may be necessary to return to the field to be able to meet the stated goal of including an ethnographic perspective in the analysis.

**Generation of New Hypotheses and New Studies**

Ethnographic data and analyses can be very useful for generating new hypotheses and ideas for future research—in fact, some have stated that this is the primary usefulness of these data. Both substantive and methodological examples can be drawn from the Puerto Rican study.

Quantitative analyses indicated that some children in the sample behaved very differently at home and at school on measures of verbal activity. The combined results of quantitative and ethnographic data indicated that factors in the immediate contexts of the home and school may have influenced their differential behavior. Studies aimed at understanding the contextual influences on children's behavior at home and in school are called for by these results. In another vein, several aspects
of children's activities and locally recognized concepts need further examination or clarification. For example, the concept of *capacidad* was often used by the children's caretakers when discussing the children's activities or development; it refers to a person's present abilities, social maturity, and his or her "readiness" to learn more complex skills or social behavior. Future studies might examine intracultural differences in this concept, and how these variations are related to children's activities and parental standards for these activities. A descriptive overview of children's activities at home was presented as part of the study. These data should be useful for generating hypotheses about the relationship between children's performance in their activities at home and on specific cognitive tests.

Ethnographic data used in the analysis of observer effect have raised an important methodological issue that needs further study. These data indicate that the observer's presence and other contextual features may have influenced children's behavior during naturalistic detailed observations. Many researchers are calling for studies of children's naturally occurring behavior; future studies should try to understand ethnographically how the observer and other features of the observation situation influence children's behavior. Studies that specifically focus on this issue in naturalistic settings would be extremely helpful because, as Johnson and Bolstad (1973) point out, there are few studies of observer effect in naturalistic settings.

**Presentation of Results**

One could continue the combined ethnographic/quantitative approach in the report. This might include presenting ethnographic descriptions as well as quantified data, indicating where variables were generated from ethnographic observations, discussing how the system operates, discussing the locally relevant and emic meanings of variables, explicating the cultural context of one's study, and examining the validity (as well as reliability) of one's data.

**Implications for Researchers, Practitioners, and Policy Makers**

What we have been discussing here is an attempt to combine the methodologies of more than one paradigm. As might be expected from Kuhn's (1970) discussion, this is not an easy or a straightforward task. It requires the researcher to explore his or her underlying assumptions about the world and about the problem being studied. It implies a continual self-conscious reflection on what exactly one is trying to accomplish and how one might best do it. It involves examining the benefits and limitations of various approaches and methods and making conscious decisions about how to proceed rather than reacting automatically on the basis of one's disciplinary affiliation. This approach is neither "neat" nor easy, but it is an important step in continuing our understanding of human behavior in a variety of settings.

As Hymes (this volume) has pointed out, ethnographic observation shares some characteristics with what we all do in our daily activities. Its concern with meaning, with the influence of local context, and with how the system operates means that it is very open to collaboration with those being observed. In school settings this could mean including teachers and administrators in the ethnographic research process. By seeing participants' interpretations of events, the meanings they attach
to behavior, and the categories they use to classify behavior, researchers can come closer to achieving their own ethnographic goal. Incorporating such an approach may have another added benefit. Research that has included participants, such as teachers and administrators, in an active role may find a more receptive audience than research that has not addressed itself to or involved those charged with implementing the findings. If the teachers and administrators have been involved in the research all along, they may be more amenable to implementing the recommendations of the study. They can identify with it and feel that they had some input, that they were not just passive objects of study.

From the point of view of those charged with implementing programs, data from a combined ethnographic/quantitative approach could also be useful. The success or failure of programs is closely tied to the meaning these programs have for the intended recipients and deliverers. Numbers alone tell little about these cultural perceptions. An ethnographic approach that includes an examination of how the programs are perceived and reacted to by those involved in them could be very useful in their successful implementation or modification.

A combined ethnographic/quantitative approach could also be beneficial in the area of policy development. Policy is concerned with real life and with the broad social context surrounding individuals' lives (Bronfenbrenner 1974). By including observations of naturally occurring behavior and by examining the context of these behaviors the researcher might be able to ground quantitative data in real life and link quantitative results with information relevant to policy decisions.

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NOTES

1. Pelto (1970:44) argues in a similar vein: "There are sound methodological reasons for maintaining an eclectic 'mix' of research operations--a blend of relatively nonstructured observations (high validity) plus structured interviews, tests, and other more formalized instruments (emphasizing high reliability and replicability)." See also Rist (1977), Cole and Scribner (1975), and Scribner (1976).

2. What I present is but one way to include an ethnographic perspective in educational research. There are many other ways. For example, one might choose to do an ethnography of an educational setting. For a discussion of the ethnographic method itself and other approaches to including ethnography in educational research see articles in Tikunoff and Ward (1977) and other articles in this volume.

3. Path analysis is an appropriate quantitative method for examining the relation among variables in a model such as the one proposed in the study discussed here. As Nie, et al. (1975:383) state, path analysis is "a method of decomposing and interpreting linear relationships among a set of variables by assuming that (1) a (weak) causal order among these variables is known and (2) the relationships among these variables are causally closed." (Italics in original.) Of course we cannot prove
causality with correlation data; however, by assuming a causal order we can use path analysis to test the model. More specifically, path analysis allows the researcher to determine how much of a causal relationship is direct and how much is indirect through other variables (Duncan 1966; Nie, et al. 1970:383-397). To do this, the hypothesized mediating variable (or variables) is included among the independent variables in a multiple regression equation for the primary dependent variable. To see how much of the influence of the other independent variables is through the mediating variable, this mediating variable is treated as the dependent variable in another multiple regression equation in which the remaining independent variables are treated as its independent variables. In the present study, measures of children's cognition (scores on the Stanford-Binet test) are the primary dependent variables. Measures of the children's activities (i.e., speech frequency) are the mediating variables, and measures of the immediate home environment and cultural standards and values are the independent variables (see Figure 1).

4. Some may believe that these measures of speech frequency are characteristics of individuals and are not related to sociocultural factors. However, the statistically significant relationship between social class and mean number of spontaneous utterances, the trend in mean number of spontaneous utterances not to the observer by social class, and the data on observer effect discussed later suggest that these measures of speech frequency are socioculturally conditioned rather than randomly occurring characteristics of individuals.

5. The results of the path analysis with the deviant cases included indicated that measures of socioeconomic status (social class, education of father) and of the security-warmth value were significant in explaining the variance in both speech frequency at home and scores on the Stanford-Binet test, but that these two measures of verbal ability were not related to each other. When the most deviant cases in the relationship between the two measures of verbal ability (n = 5) were removed from the path analysis, the results presented above were obtained. See discussion in the section on Analysis and Interpretation of the Data for a fuller treatment of the deviant cases.

6. The researcher might also consider using local assistants. Although this requires more time and effort for training, it has some advantages from an ethnographic viewpoint. Beyond their formal assistance they can also be helpful in the role of "principal informant." As one develops procedure and instruments, executes the procedure, and analyzes the data, one should view these assistants as important resources for understanding local meanings and categories, the local context, and how the systems (both those explicitly being studied and those involving the research instruments) operate.

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Steward, Julian; Manners, Robert; Wolf, Eric; Seda, Elena Padilla; Mintz, S.; and Schelle, Raymond. 1956. *The People of Puerto Rico.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
There are two oppressive facts in twentieth century United States life that are presented over and over again at meetings of social scientists. One is the growing poverty of the inner city; the other is the massive educational failure of the inner-city schools. Most of us have lived with these facts all our adult lives. As much as we deplore them, it is increasingly clear that we have come to accept them. Most of us, unless we are actively struggling to get a job or to teach children in the public schools, have come to place these facts in a category with death and taxes, rather than see them as irrational or unreasonable contradictions of our fundamental beliefs. In some theoretical approaches, poverty and failure in schools are seen as the natural result of the uneven distribution of abilities and motivations of various sections of our population. The solution for any particular group of people is to increase their motivation and ability to perform well in school or on the job.

In this discussion, I will take the opposite view: that poverty and school failure are not the results of natural disabilities, but rather the result of a conflict in our society between two opposed cultures; and that the conflict will not be resolved in any favorable way unless the dominant culture recognizes the values of the dominated culture, and changes its way of dealing with it.

Because there is a tendency to accept the group achievement differentials in school performance as factual, it will be appropriate here to look again at the size and stability of the problem.

Thirteen years ago, we began work in South Harlem to see whether the characteristics of the Black English Vernacular had any relation to reading failure among black children. The facts of reading failure were painfully obvious then. Harlem reading scores were almost two full years behind the scores for the rest of the city (Glazer and Moynihan 1963). Year by year, as our work went on, we saw the situation get steadily worse and the Harlem schools fall further and further behind. As I will show in more detail, these reports seriously underestimated the extent of reading failure among the majority, because they combined the situations of two populations with very different characteristics. If we turn to the Philadelphia schools a decade later, the situation is even more disastrous.
Table 1 is taken from the report of the city-wide testing program of the Philadelphia Board of Education (1977). I will examine here District 1, which includes the schools I am most familiar with as a parent. District 1 is characteristic of those districts in the city where the student body is almost entirely black. In Year 1, we see that the District 1 record is slightly above the national average with more in the 85th percentile or above than in the 16th percentile or below. In Year 2, the situation is only slightly worse. But there is a steady downward trend, so that year by year the number in the lowest category increases until Year 11, when there is a vanishingly small percentage above the 8th percentile, 91% are below average, and more than half are below the national 16th percentile. We should expect some kind of improvement in the 11th and 12th grades—those who are failing most badly drop out; yet the scores get worse, which means that the absolute decline is even more than we see here. Furthermore, these average values include many children in special individualized instruction programs. The situation of youth on the main track is then considerably worse than we see here.

These facts are too large, too heavy for us to evaluate. We are too close to them to understand their enormity. It is only when circumstances throw up a contrast with another culture, which we had always supposed was far behind us, that we come back to full awareness. We were recently visited here in Philadelphia by two sociolinguists: one from the Federal Republic of Germany, the other from the People's Republic of China. In their eyes we saw ourselves more clearly. The German linguist is working on the problem of the acquisition of German by immigrants from southern Europe. The people from Italy and Spain that he works with are poor and underprivileged. He is a Marxist and critical of our capitalist system. But nothing that he had read about the United States prepared him for the slums of North Philadelphia and Harlem: he could not have imagined that it was like this.

The Chinese linguist grew up after liberation, so that he was never fully exposed to the kinds of massive poverty that he found here. Because he was free to travel generally in the United States and studied at American universities, he absorbed the full impact of the contradictions in our society. The delegation of Chinese linguists that visited this country
in 1973 was not able to do so: They were told, for example, that Harlem was unsafe for them.

I myself experienced the reverse kind of cultural shock when I visited China with the linguistic delegation of 1974, and found that our normal expectations of failure were not shared by educators in that country. Just as we have come to accept the facts of poverty in the slums of North Philadelphia, we have come to accept that many children will not learn to read, and will not make it in our society. Our test procedures are constructed with the realistic understanding that they will fail a given percentage. But the Chinese working in the context of the Great Cultural Revolution had not accepted that understanding. Some members of our delegation kept asking about children who failed—the dyslexics. The chairmen of the local revolutionary committees who ran the schools answered us with the straight-faced exaggeration that there weren’t any. Our delegates pressed on. Was it possible that there was nobody who couldn’t get through the fourth grade? The Chinese finally admitted that yes, some children had trouble. But then, they pointed out, everyone “gets together and helps them get through.”

I do not intend this example to indicate that this was a realistic report or that the Chinese have solved all of their educational problems. The account illustrates the profound difference in cultural orientation between one society that accepts poverty and failure as natural and normal and the other that does not. Strangely enough, it is the rich society that believes that the poor will always be with us, and the poor society that does not.

One way an ethnographic approach can be turned to use in studying our educational problems is to examine with a fresh view the expectations and cultural norms of United States teachers, educators, and test designers. In many ways, it has been pointed out that the acceptance and expectation of failure lead to failure. Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968), Rist (1970), and McDermott and Gospodinoff (1979) have indicated that such expectations operate in the contact between teachers and students. But no one has examined the way that similar expectations operate at a higher level of organization, among those who design the tests and organize the schools. This is an ethnography that remains to be done. I will be turning my attention here to the other end of the social scale, to work done with children who are on the receiving end of the failing grades and of poverty and failure, rather than those who produce and deliver the product.

CONFLICTS OF VALUES IN SOUTH HARLEM

The linguistic analysis that we carried out in South Harlem in the late 1960s convinced us that the Black English Vernacular was more different from school-room English than any other dialect; but no matter how great those differences might be, it did not seem possible that they accounted for the massive reading failure that we were witnessing. The ethnographic side of our work pointed to other causes.

The first and most important result of that work is that we were able to distinguish many different social relations among the youth in the community, and many different kinds of relations to the vernacular culture. From the teacher’s standpoint, all but a small minority of the students in the classroom were members of a common and homogeneous culture. They were all black, spoke a dialect that would today be called “Black English,” came from disadvantaged homes, and appeared to share the same knowledge of the community and ignorance of the wider world. School records like those in Table I were naturally based on the performance of the class as a whole.
Ethnographic observation in the neighborhood showed a very different picture. The participant-observation of John Lewis with the Jets and Cobras, and Clarence Robins with the Thunderbirds and Aces, allowed us to distinguish clearly between central members of the named peer groups, secondary members, peripheral members, and outsiders or lames.

This type of ethnographic observation was not conducted as an end in itself but as an adjunct to our research on the vernacular. Sociometric diagrams and participant-observation gave us data on the social structures. Linguistic data confirmed those structures. A simple example is the use of has vs. have in the third singular present: Club members used only 19% of the has form, the lames used 60%, and white working-class adolescents 100% (Labov 1972b:273). More detailed linguistic analyses showed that the characteristic vernacular rules were used most consistently by members of the central peer groups, while any distance from those groups was reflected in the forms of the rules. Table 2 shows the use of contraction and deletion rules for the copula by subdivisions of the Jets, by peripheral members, and by lames. The contraction rule, used in both the black and white communities, shows no differentiation by peer group status: but the deletion rule is a good measure of the kind of social distance that we have been considering here.

Table 2. Use of Contraction and Deletion Rules for is by Subdivisions of the Jets and by Lames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>No. of Forms</th>
<th>Probability of Contraction</th>
<th>Probability of Deletion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core members</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary members</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lames</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For various reasons, the lames or outsiders are oriented more toward other cultures, and reflect more influence of the school dialect of English. It should be emphasized that these differences are slight: They are small differences in the probability of a rule being applied. They reflect patterns of communication and ideology, but in no way could they be conceived of as the causes of differences in reading achievement. They do confirm the validity of our ethnographic observations that separate the school-age population into members of the vernacular peer structures and more isolated individuals.

When we re-analyzed the school records of reading achievement by considering these two populations separately, we found the very different patterns shown in Figures 1 and 2, probably the most important results of the work in Harlem. Figure 1 shows chronological age against grade level in reading (measured by the Metropolitan Reading Test) for 32 isolated individuals or lames whom we interviewed in the neighborhoods of South Central Harlem. There are 8 people in the central diagonal that shows reading on grade, 3 people above, and 20 below. The mean reading score is approximately 1.5 grades below the national norm. This is somewhat better than we found reported for the school as a whole.
Figure 1. Grade and Reading Achievement for 32 Nonmembers of Street Groups in South-Central Harlem

Figure 2 shows comparable data for 46 members of the central peer groups: the Thunderbirds, Aces, Cobras, and Jets. One marginal member is on grade; everyone else is below grade level. There is evidently a ceiling on reading achievement of 4.9, and no evidence of any upward progress. It is evident that the reading problem must be understated by the overall figures: It is much worse for the majority of the youth who are full participants in the vernacular culture.

Much more can be learned from these two figures. I have done some new analysis of reading values of the various kinds of individuals in Figure 2, which gives us the breakdown of Table 3. The overall mean for all 72 individuals is 2.49 grades below reading level, which is about what the published figures for Harlem show. The isolated individuals are well above this level, only 1.44 below grade. The marginal members (open symbols on Figure 2) are -2.67, slightly below the overall mean, and the full members of the peer groups show -3.52, three and a half grades behind.

Several competing explanations could be put forward for these figures. The educational psychologists who developed the theory of "verbal deprivation" argued that children turn to the peer group as a source of satisfaction and reward only when they fail to get that approval and satisfaction from the school system. To quote Martin Deutsch, a leading exponent of this view:
Figure 2. Grade and Reading Achievement for 46 Members of Street Groups in South-Central Harlem

Table 3. Mean Reading Scores by Peer Group Membership and Lames in South-Central Harlem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Reading Level Compared to Grade Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lames</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal leaders</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-3.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavior problems</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-4.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All persons</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>-2.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the school, the child may suffer from feelings of inferiority because he is failing; he withdraws or becomes hostile, finding gratifications elsewhere, such as in his peer group. (1968)

Our work in Harlem and many other neighborhoods shows that this is exactly backwards. There are a few isolated individuals who see that membership in the corner peer groups is against their long-term interests, and apply themselves to school work as a part of a long-term project to get ahead. But few of the isolates that we have dealt with are isolated by choice. Some are prevented from associating with the street groups by their parents. Some boys are in fact kept at home, and not allowed out on the streets. Some are rejected by the groups because they are not up to the group standards: too stupid, too slow, or too weak. Others are isolated because they exhibit entirely different religious or language patterns. But on the other hand, the healthy, well-adjusted youth of normal or superior intelligence is a well-integrated member of his neighborhood peer group.

Another possible explanation is that the Black Vernacular culture is not a verbal culture, or does not give an individual free access to the resources of the English language (Bernstein 1975; Bereiter and Engelmann 1966). I and many other sociolinguists have dealt with this matter at some length, and many people have come to appreciate the tremendous verbal resources of the Black Vernacular culture (Labov 1969; Kochman 1972; Mitchell-Kernan 1969). Among the 31 peer group members, we identified 6 verbal leaders who were outstanding in their delivery of narrative, in singing, epic poetry, ritual exchanges, and logical argument. I have quoted them in other articles and received hundreds of requests to reprint these quotations, so that many of their voices have been widely heard. Their mean reading score shows -3.67, slightly worse than the average for the peer group members as a whole. This kind of data is not available in the schoolroom because this kind of verbal skill is not displayed in the schoolroom, but if the observations have any validity at all, there is no relation between verbal skills and success in school.

It was evident to us at the time that reading failure was the result of a conflict between two competing values systems. Those educational programs that recognize the impact of the peer group culture have set the goal of isolating individuals from it, and setting them on the path of upward mobility. Most teachers will point to the few individuals in Figure 1 who are above grade in reading and argue that "If John can do it, why can't the others?" The existence of a few individuals who perform satisfactorily is taken as evidence that the educational system is all right, and the fault lies in the inadequacy of the majority who fail.

The values of this kind of upward mobility associated with the school culture are well publicized. But the penalties of accepting those values and the losses to the isolated individuals are not so well publicized, though they are felt by every black and Puerto Rican youth who buys into the program. A number of psychological and sociological analyses have shown the kinds of stress that individuals suffer who are isolated from the society they grew up in (Kardiner and Ovesey 1951). But it is only from individuals who have rejected that path that we get a clear statement of the problem. Vaughn was a black youth from Washington Heights who had a top school record there, but joined the Jets when he moved to 112th Street. He explained his position to John Lewis:

These men have taught me everything I know about all this bullshit, because I'm uptown, that's like a different world an' shit. My mind was poisoned, y'know, when I moved down here
niggers started, you know, hipping me to little things an' shit, so you know, I figure I'm learning from it, so why not, y'understand, why not? . . . (John Lewis: Now dig, like, what sort of things have they taught you?) Well, they learned me about reefer an' shit. I'm not saying that tha's good. . . . They hip me to the whitey's bullshit, they hip me to that. Now I don't--I'm not saying that that's good, either, y'understand, but I'm just telling you what they did for me. (Labov 1972b:250)

For the black youth who saw the situation clearest, it was evident that accepting the school values was equivalent to giving up self-respect. When Vaughn says that the Jets hipped him to "the whitey's bullshit," it was clear to him that the rewards of the school culture are illusions as far as blacks are concerned.

The advantages of the school culture--for whites--are clear enough to many of the black youth. Junior Diggs put it very clearly:

Ev'ry whitey--ev'ry white, if they out o' school, they went through high school. If they didn't go to college they went through high school. If the whities didn't go through high school, how come they got everything? . . . 'Cause they had the knowledge.

For Junior, that route was closed. We can see the conflict between the school system and the peer group values in his disciplinary record: He was one of the 11 people who had been identified as "behavior problems" in the school records and were in the process of being expelled.

Nov. '63. Frequently comes to school without a tie. . . . He frequently calls out answer. When told not to call out he made an expression of disgust. He then refused to accept the Xerographed sheet the teacher gave to the class.

Nov. '63. When asked to rewrite a composition he adamantly refused. He said, "I will not." He doesn't practice any self-control.

Dec. '63. Was fighting with another boy in class today.

Sept. '66. F in citizenship.

May '67. Mother has been in touch with school regarding son's truancy.

CONFLICTS OF VALUES IN THE TESTING SITUATION

I have reviewed some of this earlier work in Harlem to document the existence of the conflict between the value systems in the schools. The tremendous gap between peer group members and isolated individuals gives weight to the view that it is this conflict of values and social systems that is the primary cause of reading failure, not the intelligence, ability, or family background of the children in school.

It is not likely that the conflict exists in its full form in the earliest years. First of all, it was observed in Table 1 that children in our Philadelphia school district are not behind in the first year in school, and many observers have noted the great enthusiasm that black children in the inner cities bring to the kindergarten and the first grade. Second, if the kinds of peer group structure that I have described are important factors, we
would not be likely to see their full effects until the fourth or fifth grade, because it is in the ninth and tenth years that pre-adolescent peer groups are formed (Wilmott 1966).

It is true enough that children in the early grades lack the firm support of peer group values and structure in their confrontations with the school values. There is no history of conflict or disillusionment. When then does the trouble first arrive? Rist's study (1970) indicates that his teacher had categorized kindergarten children in an irreversible way within the first six weeks. McDermott's videotapes of classroom interaction document the differential treatment of children in the earliest grades. Another evidence of value conflict can be found in test instruments.

One of the earliest encounters with the value systems is in the confrontation of the child with the testing situation. Those who construct standardized tests have built into them a strong demand for allegiance to the moral values of the classroom situation in a way that quickly demonstrates to the child the conflicts that are about to appear. Intelligence tests, tests of linguistic ability, achievement tests, all incorporate such demands for moral allegiance.

The Stanford-Binet (Terman and Merrill 1960) general comprehension test for seven-year-olds asks, "What's the thing for you to do when you are on your way to school and see that you are in danger of being late?" The question strongly presupposes a proper orientation towards school. Turning to the answer section, we find that "only those responses which suggest hurrying are acceptable." If the child's answer makes it clear that the idea is to "proceed with dispatch and no loitering," he passes. If he says, "I don't want to hurry and get run over. I'd rather walk than run" he also passes. If he says "Take the street bus" he passes. Thus we see that diligent children, extra-careful children, and children with money in their pockets are rated as intelligent. But if the child says "go on to school and tell my teacher why I'm late," he fails the test.

Though it might seem to any of us an intelligent and reasonable procedure, it indicates to the tester that the child doesn't have the intelligence to know what answer is expected. No matter what the child does, in fact, he must know what he is expected to say, if he is to pass the test, and say it. This question is far from a rare exception. Two items later we encounter, "What's the thing for you to do if another boy hits you without meaning to do it?" We read that "the only satisfactory responses are those that suggest excusing or overlooking the act." A child who says that he "would not play with him" is obviously missing the point and fails no matter how reasonable a procedure that might seem.

We find similar questions in the Wechsler intelligence tests; e.g., "Why is it better to give money to an organized charity than to a beggar?" Throughout all testing procedures, we encounter questions posed to test the child's allegiance to the disciplinary principles of the school system rather than his perception or grasp of meanings. We can only conclude that such questions are good predictors of a child's school performance and find their way into the test situations because without such moral alignment a child is bound to have trouble in getting through school.

The standardized intelligence tests develop this approach in the sixth or seventh years. We also find them in the tests that are designed to test children's verbal capacity. One series sent to me from a testing program in Brooklyn followed the Stanford Binet procedure from Year III. A child is shown a picture and told "look at this picture and tell me all about it." If there is no response, the request is repeated. "Tell me all about it."

I encountered this test procedure in a Newark school where educational psychologists were trying to determine the verbal capacities of black
children in an experimental kindergarten. They hoped to be able to use
a Language Experience method, but the test results using this experiment
demonstrated that the children were hopelessly nonverbal. They told me
that most children failed to produce any sentence longer than "The ball
boy playing basketball;" that they showed no ability to fantasize, tell
stories, or answer questions.

Elsewhere I have reported on how inadequate these tests were as
measures of the children's linguistic ability (Labov 1976), and how socio-
linguistically oriented methods produced an entirely different view of their
language abilities. Here I would like to examine how the testing situation
brings out the fundamental value conflicts that we have been examining.

In this situation, the tester showed the child a picture of some chil-
dren playing in the street and in a playground. In answer to the usual
demand, "I want you to tell me a story about this picture," the children
produced long silences and only a few words. Then the tester asked,
"What about all those papers in the street? How do you think they got
there?" The child might answer something like "Wind blew 'em." Then
the tester continued, "What do you think those children should do about
those papers?" Some children would give some kind of satisfactory answer
to this one, though never with more than a few words. But a good num-
ber showed resistance; they answered "Nothing." The tester could not
accept an answer like that; she would continue "Nothing? You wouldn't
pick up those papers?" If there was no further response, she would
circle back to this question, and continue to insist that the child give a
morally satisfactory answer.

Some children also objected to meaningless questions that the teacher
already knew the answer to.

"What grade are you in?"
"You know what grade I'm in!"
"No, I don't. You have to tell me!"

After several encounters with treatment of this sort, the children usually
lapsed into silence, and the tester would resort to such commands as
"Look at me!" "Talk to me!" which, of course, did not seem to have any
particular effect.

The issue here is not whether children should or should not become
good little citizens, learn to pick up papers, or give answers that are al-
ready known. The problem is whether giving the right answers to these
tests is or is not a measure of a child's intellectual abilities; or if these
questions actually prevent the child from displaying his abilities by warning
him in advance what the consequences may be if he fails. Because both
standardized testers and experimenters have found such threatening ques-
tions useful, it must be because giving the "right" answers to moral ques-
tions is an excellent predictor of success in school.

These same tests were administered six months later as a control for
our own experiments. The responses to the test questions were just as
short as the first time, but at this point the children no longer showed
this kind of rebellion against the demands for moral allegiance. They had
become socialized, at least in their external behavior. It had been proved
to them that the language they use, and their way of dealing with the
world, will not impress teachers in the right way. They must learn new
value systems if they are to survive in school. The older values are not
eradicated, however; it is worth turning to evidence that even for those
who maintain a surface conformity with the school norms, there is a covert
opposition to the values that are so brutally imposed.

The existence of such values is not easy to prove, since any direct
or formal inquiry reveals adherence to the standard norms of our society--
in language or behavior. Parents and teachers have absorbed these standards so well that any formal discussion brings them out in force. Children must sit up straight, be quiet, listen in order to learn. They must not call out the answers without raising their hands. They must not look at each others' papers, must do everything on their own, and direct all their questions and answers to the teacher. They must avoid ain't and double negatives, memorize the multiplication table, and walk in long lines toward the door. These are the basics that we are continually urged to go back to. Any departure from them is thought to be the result of laziness, ignorance, and a lack of discipline. The failure of the peer groups that I have documented is said to be the result of their inability to learn the basic patterns of behavior that the school imposes, rather than adherence to any competing standard of their own. It is therefore important to examine closely the evidence for a positive set of alternative values that moves children in a direction opposite to the standards set by the schools.

**COMPETING VALUE SYSTEMS IN THE PUERTO RICAN SPEECH COMMUNITY**

Wolfram's study of the English of Puerto Ricans of East Harlem (1974) gives us a close parallel to the study of the linguistic differentiation of the Jets and Cobras in South Central Harlem. Among the Puerto Rican youth he dealt with was a subgroup of 11 who had extensive contacts with blacks. One of them explained:

My brothers, when we first moved in, the only friends we had were Negro, and they were like, they say, we acted all cool with them. They all acted cool with us.

Table 4 shows one of the characteristic measures of black influence on the speech of this subgroup of Puerto Ricans.

**Table 4. Negative Concord for Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Puerto Ricans with Strong Black Contacts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black (East Harlem)</td>
<td>131/134</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>7/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black (Jets) Group sessions</td>
<td>149/151</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>13/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual sessions</td>
<td>360/370</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>25/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>63/65</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>7/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Ricans with strong black contacts</td>
<td>213/256</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>5/6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Negative concord is all but categorical in the Black English vernacular: Within a clause, the majority of speakers always incorporate a negative particle with a following indeterminate, yielding I don't see nothing instead
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of standard I don't see anything. The black speakers studied by Wolfram showed 97.8% negative concord, with 7/10 categorical. I have added for comparison the Jets of nearby South Harlem, showing a 97.9% negative concord, with 11/13 categorical. Puerto Ricans without strong black contacts show a significantly lower percentage of negative concord, with only 7 out of 21 showing categorical behavior. But those with strong black contacts (PR/BL) are practically the same as the Blacks in this respect.

Thus Wolfram's study demonstrates again the ways linguistic variation registers the influence of daily associations and communication networks. The Puerto Rican group is particularly sensitive to these conflicting pressures, not only from the Blacks but from other sources: the traditional Puerto Rican values and family structures, the standard value system of the schools, the white vernacular culture, and the Black English vernacular culture.

Thus Puerto Rican communities of the Northern cities offer a strategic research site for examining the competing values of American life as reflected in linguistic variables. In 1970, I began with Pedro Pedraza an exploration of the English and Spanish of Puerto Ricans in New York City, with special attention to the sociolinguistic factors that might promote or interfere with cooperation between blacks and Puerto Ricans. Pedraza's fieldwork was based on his status as a participant-observer in the New York projects where he was raised, in the community projects where he had worked, and in the Puerto Rican town where his family still lived. One of the products of the early interviews was a family background test. We selected recordings of 15 speakers from a wide range of social statuses, educational backgrounds, and orientations toward the black, white, and Puerto Rican cultures. Listeners were asked to register their impression of influences on the speaker's language:

When you're growing up in New York City, you hear many different kinds of English: Black English, white New York style, and Puerto Rican style. Some people speak just that one style, but others show several different influences in their speech. We'd like you to listen to fifteen New Yorkers on this tape, and tell us what kind of influence you hear in their English.

Judges were given the form shown in Figure 3 and told how to place a number for each speaker somewhere in the triangle.

Here is one of the speakers who was regularly judged to show strong Puerto Rican influence:

(1) I came first and I stood for five years. And then I came and stood for fifteen days, and then I came and stood for two weeks.

The phonetic versions of these extracts are needed to illustrate the great differentiation of dialect form better than the English spelling. But even in the ordinary spelling here the result can be foreseen. The first speaker's language was placed in the Puerto Rican section by 47 out of 49 listeners. His speech shows the staccato rhythm and syllable timing characteristic of a strong Puerto Rican accent in English, and the use of stood for stayed is a second-language learner's error.

Here is a second speaker from this series:

(2) Used to have this place in the back--you know, this wooded area. And when I was a kid, these big fellows used to tell me that there was snakes and crocodiles in there--and you know...
something, I ain't never went in that woods. Never, even when I went back to visit, man, I was scared to go in that wood, but I went in there just to check it out.

The three corners of the triangle show W for white New York style, B for Black English, PR for Puerto Rican Spanish influence. Start in the middle, and when you hear something that strikes you as black, or Puerto Rican, or white, go in that direction, and when you make up your mind how to locate a speaker write the number on that spot. If he's a straight Puerto Rican speaker, he'd go where you see A down below; but if he's got Puerto Rican and Black influence about half and half, and not very much white, then he'd go about where B is.

Figure 3. Triangle for Evaluating Varieties of English

This speaker's language was placed in the black section by 35 of 49 subjects. We can observe one heavily marked grammatical feature: "I ain't never went." This use of ain't for the past tense negative is used only in the Black English vernacular. Again, the timing and prosodic features identify the speaker as black more than the details of grammar or phonology.

The third speaker is a young woman:

(3) I go to school one week--the Coop course--and I work one week. . . . Well, if I want to work all summer, I work; and if I want to take a--some--a half--one month off, I take it, and I work just one month.

She was placed in the white area by 32 out of 49 judges. Here the transcript demonstrates only an absence of black or Puerto Rican influence, but the prosodic features and detailed phonetics shows a strong influence of the New York City vernacular.
Figure 4 shows the assembled judgments of 47 listeners for these three speakers. The separation is quite clear, and the extreme confidence in the assignments is shown by the placement of many tokens near the apexes.

![Graph showing the assembled judgments of 47 listeners for three speakers.]

**Figure 4.** White, Black, and Puerto Rican Influence on the English of Three Puerto Ricans as Heard by 47 New York Judges

The question that subjects responded to was phrased entirely as influence on language, not in terms of ethnic membership. But we asked afterwards how many of the speakers were black, Puerto Rican, and white. The answers were almost always the same as the distribution of judgments on language influence. People thought that the Puerto Rican-style speakers...
like (1) were Puerto Rican; black-style speakers like (2) were black; and white-style speakers like (3) were white. This was true of Puerto Rican and black and white subjects, working class and middle class as well. We thought that our question implied the actual state of affairs: that all 15 were Puerto Ricans, but people found it very hard to believe this.

We concluded from these experiments that the adaptation of Puerto Ricans to various English dialects was an effective means of social adaptation as well. In everyday life, most of the people that these speakers talked to— their family, friends, and fellow workers—know on other grounds that they are Puerto Rican. It is clear that the effect of the dialect shift is primarily to register an alignment of value systems rather than to disguise ethnic identity.

Pedraza's work in New York City showed that the alignment of value systems was a very live issue for Puerto Ricans. His own friends and associates had split into three groups. Some who (like Pedraza) were politically conscious had strengthened their command of Spanish and their Puerto Rican identity, and preserved a strong Puerto Rican influence in their speech. Others who had followed a path of upward mobility in the school and business world had lost most of their Puerto Rican features and adapted many of the characteristics of the white New York City vernacular. A third group participated in the life of the street, with strong black contacts, and their speech uniformly showed the kind of shift towards the Black English vernacular that was heard in (3).

Pedraza's observations indicated that the influences on speech were more than the result of frequency of communication: They reflected ideology and the competing influence of various value systems. We were particularly interested in the factors that would interfere with or promote political cooperation between Puerto Ricans and blacks. Pedraza asked the Puerto Ricans, 'If you had to fight with either the blacks or the whites, which would you choose?' (Si tu tenia que pelear, peleaba contra los negros o con los negros?) This provoked a very powerful response from almost everyone: Many people said that they had been thinking about that for some time. Some registered their alignment with whites: "I'd go with the whites—I've got good hair and good skin." Or "We're out to learn from the white man and stay away from the blacks—they have nothing to do with us." A second group argued that the Puerto Ricans should stay away from either side, and ought to go their own way. A third group was strongly in favor of cooperation with the blacks: "We have to stay under the wing of the black man, until we're ready to make it on our own."

In one sense, we have three major speech communities in our northern cities: white, black, and Hispanic. But another way to look at the matter is that there are only two, and that Puerto Ricans, poised between these two, have to move in one way or another. If the differences in linguistic behavior function as symbols of differences in value systems, then we can see in Puerto Rican the pull of these two value systems in either direction.

In 1975, a group at the University of Pennsylvania studied youth in the fifth grade of a North Philadelphia school that had a heavy concentration of Puerto Ricans and whites, with a smaller group of black youth. Shana Poplack has analyzed in some detail the ways the English of the Puerto Ricans reflects their oscillation between the influences represented by the white and black communities on either side (1977). In Philadelphia, the white vernacular system is moving steadily ahead in a series of vowel rotations that affect almost every element of the vowel system. One of the most characteristic shifts is the centralization of (ay) before voiceless consonants, giving [sæt] vs. [sæt]. Some Puerto Rican youth, especially girls, carry this form even further than the white Philadelphians. On the
other hand, the black community does not participate in these vowel shifts at all; if they do shift away from [æ], it is in the direction to monophthongisation and fronting of the nucleus: [saː:t].

The results of Poplack’s study of (ay) show the characteristic orientations found in other linguistic variables. Figure 5 shows that in careful speech, both boys and girls show a higher percentage of the centralized Philadelphia variant than in casual speech, where the shift is toward the black variant. Both boys and girls operate under the same system: The norms of careful speech are the white vernacular form, not the standard English of the networks; the competing norm that dominates in casual, peer-oriented speech is the Black English vernacular. Male and female are clearly differentiated in the extent of the shift: boys toward the black norm, girls toward the white norm.

![Figure 5: Use of Centralized (ay) Before Voiceless Consonants in the Speech of Puerto Rican Fifth Graders in North Philadelphia](From Poplack 1977)

It is evident from these results and other observations made by this group that the Black English vernacular is closely identified with that value system that is opposed to the school norms. This is a symbolic identification, and not the result of close association with blacks. In the particular classroom being studied here, there is only one black youth. Figure 6 shows a portion of the sociometric diagram for the classroom, showing that many of the Puerto Rican youth are oriented towards the one black student, while his orientation is outward, toward others outside the classroom.

Work done outside the classroom, in the neighborhoods, shows that the youth have very little association with blacks at home. The Puerto Rican mothers keep strict watch on these children and do not let them play
freely in the street. Their use of the Black English vernacular forms is the result of a general association of linguistic forms and values that is a pervasive characteristic of the Philadelphia speech community.

The sensitivity of Puerto Rican youth to these competing linguistic symbols shows clearly the attraction of the Black English vernacular system
for youth, especially for boys, and demonstrates the positive nature of the system that is competing for their attention and their loyalties.

COMPETING VALUE SYSTEMS AMONG WHITES

Our overall view of linguistic change in the northern speech communities shows that in each city—New York, Detroit, Philadelphia—there are two speech communities, not one, and that black and white are going in separate directions. But this is not the whole story. In each city we have observed some influence of the large black presence on whites who live near them. Most often these are whites who are in sharp conflict with the blacks, but who have unconsciously accepted the blacks as their reference group for the critical abilities needed for survival in the city. The result is that whites often absorb black features in their grammar and pronunciation without realizing it. This is the case in Highland Park, Detroit, a white enclave surrounded by blacks, and in those areas of Kensington (Fishtown) that are closest to the black communities, and among younger lower class whites in Manhattan.

Whites on the Lower East Side of New York City are in such a hostile relation with blacks. Jimmy Riley, 19, gave me the following account of how he was jumped by a group of blacks:

I went ice skatin' in Jersey—Hoboken. Came back two o'clock in the mornin'. Whole bunch of guys went—I come back, everybody says, "I'm hungry, I'm hungry." I say, "I'll be right back."

I go next door for a pizza. I come out, and there's five big niggers standin' there. They say, "Gimme that!" I say, "Give you what!" Yerrr whop! I went down. They kicked me, everything. Boom!

I got up, 'n' I ran in the house, 'n' grabbed a steak knife and chased them. A guy jumped into his car and chased them. Spanish guy named Rickey, he took out a bread knife, ran down the subway, and scared an old lady silly. Thought he was gonna kill her.

Bright cop comes over—cullud cop. "Wha' happened?" I say, "Five of your bright people jumped me." He says, "What were dey?" I say, "Yeah, they were colored." He says, "Den they—then they ain't my people." I said, "You cullud." He says, "They ain't my people." I say, "O.K., g'bye, I get everyt'ing." Went t'he hospital.

Jimmy was talking in his own kitchen, in front of five of his brothers. When he was finished, one of his younger brothers said, "You sound like a nigger yourself." Even in the transcript, we can see the marks of black influence, especially where Jimmy quotes himself talking to a black cop. "You cullud."

The clearest example of black influence on white speech is found among whites who attend schools that are predominantly black. Eileen Hatala studied one such school in Camden, and particularly the speech of one young woman Carla, who made a striking adaptation to that situation (1976). Carla was only 13 at the time, though she looked much older; she had won the general admiration of the black and Puerto Rican youth in the area. She was good looking, could dance well, dressed well, could handle herself in verbal interaction with great skill, and could fight when she had to.
My friends and me be walkin' down the street, when another girl come and one say to me, "Look at that white girl over there standin' with all them niggers." She insultin' my friends as well as myself. So I told her about herself. We got into a big fight and one of her friends passed her a knife and instead of usin' it she bluffed on me. But when I knocked the knife out'a her hand, I got it and I used it. I ain't bluff on her.

It is obvious that Carla's speech shows a strong adaptation to the Black English vernacular. In this passage, she shows the typical absence of third singular s and use of ain't for didn't, which are unknown in the white vernacular. It is not only in the grammatical details, but in her use of language that she was outstanding. One of her black classmates explained why Carla was so well liked:

She like one of the special white ones out in this school. She seem like she black to me. She be walkin' around, she be with Black people not no white people most of the time. When she talks, like most white people they shy and everything 'cause they surrounded by Blacks, but Carla, she ain't shy or nothin'. Whatever she got to say she say it out in the open.

Carla's adaptation of the Black English vernacular is not a completely accurate replica. It shows many idiosyncratic features from a linguistic point of view. But from a social viewpoint, it was a completely successful formation. Hatala tested the effect of Carla's speech by playing samples to a large number of white and black listeners. Without exception, all of the blacks were convinced that she was black. When they were asked, "Could she pass for white, speaking as she does?" all the black judges answered "no." When some subjects were given the reverse question, "Could she pass for black, speaking as she does?" they made no sense of the question, since it was obvious that the speaker was black, not white.

Carla's linguistic adjustment was symbolic of a much deeper ability to reach out across racial lines, and to defy the barriers between blacks and whites created in our society. Of herself she said

I have a lot o' friends here, a whole lot. But there are a few who don't like me, because of the friends that I do have that are black, you know. They hold that against me. But you know, like everybody get along.

She was able to accept and deal with the natural antagonism that blacks feel towards whites; her understanding of black-white relations was profound.

Every once in a while, somebody say--one of my friends will come up with a white saying, you know, sayin' [growling] "I DON'T LIKE WHITIES!", you know, somethin' like that. O.K., we're studyin' Afro-American History, you know. An' somebody in the room, you know, they would get mad because the whites holdin' the blacks as slaves, you know. They didn't like that idea, you know, an' they're always sayin', "Honkies should'n' do stuff like that," you know. They don't take it out on me, you know, because that was then, you know. They just didn' like the idea of their color bein' held back by the whites.
Carla represents one extreme of successful adaptation of a white speaker to the Black vernacular. In Hatala's vivid account of the social situation, we obtain a clear view of the positive forces that are associated with the black vernacular culture. It is also apparent that these forces are not necessarily in conflict with success in school and upward mobility. Carla's popularity among the students did not interfere with her progress through school, and her orientation toward acquiring a skilled vocation. She did resist sharply the more trivial aspects of socialization that the school system imposed on the students.

THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN

So far, I have documented the existence of two competing value systems within our schools, and indicated how the covert values of the vernacular culture have a strong attraction for the healthy, normal, well-integrated youth. The question remains, can the positive forces of the vernacular culture be used to good advantage in the school situation?

Many people would recognize the attraction of the vernacular culture but argue that it is entirely opposed to the goals of the school in teaching reading, writing, and learning of all other kinds. Most teachers view the vernacular culture as a destructive force that interferes with children's ability and motivation to learn, and would continue to the bitter end their battle to exterminate the cultural values that I have represented there.

I believe that this is a very limited view of vernacular culture, imposed from above without good knowledge or intimate acquaintance. There are many values associated with vernacular culture that are more suited to the learning process than the current standard values of the school system. I will limit myself here to one such issue.

The techniques of learning and studying imposed by our schools are avowedly individualistic and competitive. Each student is expected to learn by himself, and as I noted at the outset, interaction in the classroom is fundamentally confined to dealing directly with the teacher. The teacher is the main source of knowledge as well as authority. There are counter-currents, of course, but throughout grammar school, high school, and college every individual is encouraged to compete with every other individual, so that he or she will be the one to come out on top and not be one of the ones at the bottom of the curve who fail.

The school set-up develops individual differences in many ways, not just in examinations and competition for scholarships. From kindergarten on, teachers set up a group of "good" children who are intended to serve as models for others. Rist (1970) points out that within a few days, the teacher he observed had designated a fixed group of children who were continually being called on to "read the weather calendar each day, come to the front for 'show and tell' periods, take messages to the office, count the number of children present in the class, pass out materials for class projects, be in charge of equipment on the playground, and lead the class to the bathroom, library or on a school tour." Such children are of course given a great many special privileges and they end up with great advantages in future school careers (cf. "The linguistic consequences of being a lame" Labov 1972c). But there are also costs. One would have to follow Rist's children for many years to see the full consequences of following the elite path as well as the cost of remaining with the vernacular majority. But we have some insight into the situation from our studies of children outside of school, in a number of cities in England and America.

The school does more than confer privileges and responsibilities on the children who declare their unswerving allegiance to the dominant school
values. The school also involves them directly in a contradiction of value systems. The most typical situation occurs when the teacher chooses someone to stand at the head of the class and write down the names of those who misbehave when she goes out of the room.

The conflict of value systems is clearest on the issue of informing. The majority of children believe that it is wrong to inform on one another; most teachers believe that it is right, and they force their favored children to take sides with them. We find that this issue divides classrooms sharply. The children who are chosen for upward mobility are condemned by their peers on two counts: first because they are willing to act as spies and informers, and second, because they are encouraged to play favorites, and overlook the misbehavior of their friends at the expense of the majority. 5

The "good" children who develop their competitive spirit and elitist attitudes go on to become college graduates, and many of them eventually become the teachers and educators of a later generation, where the cycle is repeated and intensified. Their contempt for the vernacular value system is intensified by their early separation from it. They continue to encourage other children to separate themselves from the group and follow the same path that they did.

Attitudes towards violence are critical in this opposition of values. The elite group holds that all violence is bad, and condemns every child who gets into fights on school grounds. On the other hand, the majority who participate in the vernacular culture know that there is a wide range of values associated with street fighting. Fighting is not the simple aggression that the teacher sees: People have to fight to defend their friends as well as themselves. 6 The worst kind of person is someone who deserts his friends in the moment of crisis. Carla's ability to fight was an important factor in her role as a cultural leader; sometimes she fought to defend herself, but she also defended the mainstream vernacular values of fairness and justice. She gave Hatala an account of a girl named Gloria who got beat up because she was always causing trouble.

... and then they say, "Hey Gloria, you forgot your girl friend," right. She was too--too busy cryin' and screamin' to worry about her friend, you know, her cousin. And you know, everythin' gon' down, you know, and they're all--so all of them say, "Hey, you know, the people who didn' get Gloria, you know, you can get her cousin." So they started for her. And I jumped in front of her like a bull, you know.

I say, "Eh, you was after Gloria, not Violet." I hate the girl; I don' even know why I jumped out in front of her, you know, I hate the girl's guts. So I jus' jumped out in front and told them 'Ah, you better leave her alone, you know. She didn' do nothin', you know. She was with Gloria, but that don' mean, you know, she was the one makin' all the trouble.' So they say, "Yeh, we got Gloria for now, but, uh, if she do anythun' else we gon' get her for good, she gon' keep her mouth shut for ever." And they meant it, you know.

The main difference between vernacular culture and the school culture is the way that people deal with one another. It is not a simple opposition: there are ways that children are encouraged to cooperate in school, and vernacular groups often find it hard to stay together. Yet there seem to be profound differences in emphasis, and closer ethnographic study is needed of the development of cognitive skills in a vernacular setting. School learning is, on the whole, a matter of individual study and
competitive display before the group. The skills that are highly developed in vernacular culture depend on a different strategy. Sports, formal and informal, depend on close cooperation of groups. The same holds for music. Every group of black youth that we have dealt with is involved with the production of music in one way or another, and that requires the kind of group effort that is only incidental in our schools. Individuals practice by themselves, but the major steps in learning are done in tempo with the group. The kind of close cooperation that is best represented in a rock group would be called institutionalized cheating if it were done in examinations. We can find the same patterns of group interaction in the highly developed patterns of use of language in the black community: in church or on the street. Vernacular skills are not developed in the quiet of the study chamber, but in close exchanges of group members.

The power of group interaction can be used directly for learning. When the Cobras and the Thunderbirds were drawn into the culture of the Nation of Islam, they became profoundly interested in history and knowledge that could only be obtained from books. We reported in detail on how black youth who could not read in school became involved in the active pursuit of knowledge (Labov, Cohen, Robins, and Lewis 1968). There is a group institution called "on the square," where someone is faced with a series of questions by other members of the group under strong compulsion to answer correctly and truthfully. Boot was a verbal leader of the Thunderbirds whose school record showed almost zero reading ability. In the following record we see Boot on the square, being questioned by Clarence Robins. After Boot answered correctly the names of all the planets, he was asked about a central issue of Muslim theology:

CR: Who made the white man?
Boot: The white monkey.
CR: And what was--what was the name of the scientist that created the white man?
Boot: Uh ah . . . uh wait a minute! I know, cause I got in a book . . . I DO!
CR: You got it in a book?
Boot: I got it in a book at home.
CR: What book?
Alvin: It was a history . . . it was a history book.
Boot: A history book, correct!

Faced with Gray's reading test, Boot wouldn't keep going more than a few sentences. But under the force of group involvement in the learning of Islam, Boot was learning to read, and had developed a powerful interest in what could be found in books.

One of the major tasks for ethnography today is to study and understand the nature of such group forces, to see how they can be adapted to the school situation. If we continue to repress vernacular culture, and try to extract one or two individuals from their cultural context, we will continue the pattern of massive educational failure that we now observe in the schools. The other route is to understand the interests and concerns of the youth who come to school and use that understanding in a positive way. I have not attempted here to set out a blueprint for such an educational scheme, but only to indicate that there are powerful and positive forces available in the vernacular culture.

Ethnography inside and outside of the classroom has documented the fundamental thesis: that in the inner cities, youth of normal ability reject the school culture in favor of vernacular culture, and reject a certain number of school values in favor of vernacular values. It is my belief that
the kinds of school values that are rejected are the most trivial ones, external patterns of behavior that have nothing to do with the essentials of the learning process. These are the major sources of conflict. Once we have identified them, we can proceed to the constructive job of social engineering, to bring the forces of social cooperation and energy into the classroom, and use them to help the majority of our youth to move forward.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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NOTES

1. These data are taken from Labov and Robins (1969) and reprinted in Labov (1972) as "Note on the relation of reading failure to peer group status in urban ghettos," originally published in Teachers College Record 70:395-405, 1969, and reprinted in Language in the Inner City as Chapter 6.

2. This is the series referred to in Labov 1972a:205-207.

3. Chi-square for Wolfram's black population negative concord of the blacks vs. Puerto Ricans is 17.92, p < .001; for the number of categorical users, chi-square = 3.68, not quite at the .05 level. For the Puerto Ricans without strong black contacts as against those with strong black contacts, chi-square for negative concord is 8.10, p < .01, and for the numbers of categorical users, 4.73, p < .05. If all the black speakers in Table 4 are considered as a whole, these results are even stronger.

4. The line of research initiated here is being carried out on a larger scale by a group at the Center for Puerto Rican Studies in New York City, headed by Pedro Pedraza and associates.

5. The opposition between "good" boys and "bad" boys was clearly drawn by Mark Twain in the conflict between Tom Sawyer and Sid Sawyer. Everyone who reads the book sympathizes with Tom and condemns Sid; but in real life, parents and teachers take Sid's side against Tom.

6. We have learned to make a corresponding adjustment in our sociolinguistic interviews. In most working class neighborhoods, we ask, "What was the best fight you were ever in?" In most middle class areas, the same content has to be conveyed as "What was the worst fight you were ever in?"

REFERENCES


I am especially pleased to have the opportunity to address the subject of children's folklore within the context of ethnography and education. For nearly twelve years now, I have been hawking children's folklore to educators in one form or another, more often than not in conferences or workshops organized in terms of conceptions of children's expressive behavior and/or of research generally in varying degrees out of phase with my own. But not this time. Ethnography is exactly what I believe in and try to do, and I am convinced that a self-conscious consideration of what is distinctive about ethnography and children's folklore can highlight some important matters that otherwise tend to remain obscured.

Let me begin by specifying what I mean by children's folklore, namely, the traditional formalized play activities of children, including forms of speech play and verbal art, that are engaged in and maintained by the children themselves, within the peer group. Familiar genres of children's folklore include riddles, games, jokes, taunts, retorts, hand-claps, counting-out rhymes, catches, ring plays, and jump-rope rhymes, and several dozen others that most of you can probably remember as well as I can. Children's folklore is distinguished on the one hand from nursery lore, such as nursery rhymes, finger plays, knee-bouncing rhymes, tickling rhymes, and other routines that have their locus in the interaction between very young children and adults. It is likewise distinguished from, though it may share items and genres and have other continuities with, adult folklore.

**ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDIES OF PLAY AND OF CHILDREN'S FOLKLORE**

Anthropological students of childhood will be familiar with a whole range of what are generally identified in the literature as ethnographic studies of children's play, either full-length ethnographies, or more often parts of ethnographies conceived in broader terms. Characteristic of these studies, the feature that earns them the designation
ethnographic, is the consideration of children's play within the context of and functionally integrated with larger social and cultural systems. Most often, as pointed out by Helen Schwartzman in her review of the literature on anthropological studies of children's play (1976), these studies view children's play as an enculturation vehicle. The children are seen as proto-adults, learning things and acquiring competencies through play that will equip them for later, more mature stages of life beyond childhood. The view is a teleological one, taking children as incomplete, as yet unfinished bearers of adult culture, helped along toward adulthood by their play activities. Schwartzman (1976:298) quotes a nice example of the genre from Colin Turnbull's (1961) description of the play of Mbuti Pygmy children:

Like children everywhere, Pygmy children love to imitate their adult idols... at an early age boys and girls are 'playing house' or 'playing hunting.'... And one day they find that the games they have been playing are not games any longer, but the real thing for they have become adults.

This perspective, characteristic also of many psychological treatments of children's play, tends to be attractive to educators, because education tends overwhelmingly to be conceived--by educators and laymen alike in our society--as preparing children for, and moving them along toward, adulthood. At its best, the approach can be useful, for one of the universal facts about children is that they do indeed become adults, and moreover, because they do in fact operate to a significant extent in the world of adults.

Unfortunately, however, research on children's folklore with an eye toward enculturation and toward the potential application of folklore to education tends to be seriously skewed by the widespread underlying attitude toward play that it has to be useful in a moral sense, that it should contribute toward 'proper' and 'productive' adult ways of behaving. Thus, I have found in my own work with educators that my research was impelled toward the investigation of language skills in children's speech play and verbal art that are clearly implicated in reading proficiency, or of reasoning skills that contribute to mathematical or scientific proficiency. The tendency is to reduce the playful, whimsical, artful aspects of children's folklore to the merely instrumental, and to shun entirely the aggressive, obscene, scatalogical, anti-authoritarian, and inversive elements (e.g., Glory, glory, hallelujah! Teacher hit me with a ruler ...) that any student of children's folklore knows well to be a central part of the expressive culture of childhood.

It would certainly be ill-advised to argue against the appropriateness of excluding these latter elements from the classroom, and I don't propose to do so. But what role should they play in research on children's folklore? Should they be excluded from educationally sponsored research as well?

I'll return to this issue shortly, but first I want to establish a broader point, relevant to it, but stated so as to be more directly relevant to the matter of ethnography. What I want to do is point up a basic paradox implicit in the kind of ethnographic studies of children's play as enculturation that I was discussing a moment ago. One of the most fundamental commitments of ethnography, really a basic ideological principle, is to the necessity of accounting for the realities of a culture in its own terms, free of the bias inherent in the imposition of frames of reference, or functional imperatives, or a priori moral judgments from without. Anthropologists have a name for the violation of this principle, namely, ethnocentrism, and they view it as a cardinal sin.
But let us consider an anthropological study of children's folklore as it functions in the enculturation process in a particular culture that is carried out by the best relativist standards, and is innocent of any taint of ethnocentrism vis-à-vis that culture at large. Remember here, though, that children's folklore is uniquely the expression of children in the peer group, and the peer group, although situated within the society as a whole, undeniably has its own social structure, and, I would argue, its own distinctive culture. Perhaps subculture would be a better term, but in either case, a way of life and a way of perceiving, comprehending, and operating in a world that is not the same as that of adult members of the society.

What we are faced with, then, in viewing children's folklore by adult standards and imperatives, is something very much akin to ethnocentrism, perhaps adultocentrism, if you will permit. This may be an inescapable consequence of the fact that children are indeed in transit to adulthood, as I mentioned earlier, and of the quite legitimate interest and concern that adults—whether anthropologists, educators, or laymen—have in the process and its outcome. I want to use this occasion to argue, though, for the need to provide a counterbalance to this adultocentrism by turning our ethnographic lens on the peer group and its lore in its own terms, precisely in the manner that we undertake our ethnographic investigations of other cultural systems. Moreover, I would argue as well that this ethnographic focus on the peer group of children should logically precede the study of children's folklore as a mechanism of enculturation for adulthood, and still further that investigation of this kind has its own special usefulness for educators.

To describe the kind of study I am advocating for children's folklore, I will need to say something about what ethnography has come to mean in folklore research generally. For most of the history of folklore as a scholarly discipline the basic unit of analysis has been the folkloric text, the item of folklore, sometimes in relation to other versions of that item in historical or distributional perspective, sometimes in relation to other texts to which it bears a generic relationship, sometimes in relation to other aspects of society or culture, or even individual biography or personality, but overwhelmingly with a sense of folklore as isolatable stuff, like a pot or an axe or an arrowhead, with its essence somehow identifiable in its formal structure and content alone. More recently, however, there has been an increasing interest in folklore as situated communication, for the place and uses of folklore in the conduct of social life and the competence that underlies this use. (By competence, I mean the knowledge and ability to operate appropriately in a socially constituted and culturally defined world [Hymes 1971a].) This study of the patterns and functions of folklore as situated communication, rendered meaningful in terms of endogenously determined contexts of use, is what I mean by the ethnographic approach to folklore (see also Paredes and Bauman 1972; Bauman 1975, 1977a, 1977c).

An illustrative example might be useful here, to underscore the distinctive ethnographic perspective I am suggesting. A particularly effective example, directly relevant to children's folklore, concerns counting-out rhymes, those forms, like eeny-meeny-minie-mo or one potato, two potato, that children commonly use to allocate game roles or establish other kinds of priority orderings. Counting-out rhymes were an early focus of anthropological interest in children's folklore on the part of nineteenth century scholars, who saw in them a survival of ancient forms of divination (see, e.g., Bolton 1888). More recent scholars, including Roger Caillois (1961:36) and Brian Sutton-Smith (1959:89-90), concerned with the organizing principles of various game activities and the correlation between these organizing principles and aspects of adult social relations.
have classified counting-out as a game of chance, based on the formal
structure of the activity without regard to its actual use.

Kenneth Goldstein (1971), however, undertook to investigate ethno-
graphically how children actually conduct the activity of counting-out,
and made an interesting discovery, namely, that children employ a variety
of quite conscious strategies, including extension of the rhyme by addi-
tional formulae, selection of alternative rhymes, skipping regular counts,
changing positions, and the like, to manipulate the apparently random
mechanism of counting-out to ensure specific desired outcomes. That is,
for Goldstein's population, counting-out is actually a game of strategy,
masked over by a seeming reliance on chance. His findings demonstrate
counting-out to be a more complex activity than had formerly been recog-
nized, in which the public fiction of chance and impersonality is main-
tained at the same time that a series of strategies are available to the
counter and the counted for manipulating the outcome, and the counter
especially has a considerable amount of latitude and power in controlling
the activity. Goldstein's analysis thus reveals a more complex range of
competencies to be mobilized in the conduct of counting-out than just the
mastery of the rhyme and the associated kinesic and proxemic aspects of
the activity would suggest.

The various educators to whom I have presented this case have often
been made uneasy by it, as somehow suggesting that innocent children are
in fact duplicitous and manipulative, and that ethnography, by implication,
is the business of exposing the seamy underside of childhood. Still, it
seems to me that ethnography can do far worse than to stand as an enter-
prise that pursues an understanding of how people really go about the
conduct of their social lives; with reference to children's folklore, this
means investigating their folklore as a cultural system in its own terms,
attending to the ways and contexts in which it is used by them in the
conduct of peer group social life, neglecting nothing that is meaningful to
them--decorous or indecorous, sense or nonsense--without asking first if
it is meaningful or appropriate to adult sensibilities. Insofar as a rational
and responsive educational system must take fundamentally into account
what a child at any given stage of development already knows and can do,
nothing having to do with the competence of children is irrelevant to edu-
cation, whatever relation it may bear to adult competence, and whether or
not it ultimately makes its way into the classroom.

Now, much the same kind of argument could aptly be made for the
study of children's peer group culture in all its aspects, not just chil-
dren's folklore. Why single out children's folklore for special attention?
I believe that the investigation of children's folklore is especially produc-
tive because folklore represents communication in its special modes, modes
that are traditional, foregrounded, highly marked, valued, and enjoyed.
Folklore forms are display forms, public means for the presentation and
representation of oneself, one's culture, and one's social structure to
others in ways that underscore both their meaningfulness to the group
and one's own competence as a member of it. The forms of children's
folklore, as I conceive them, are the special traditionally shared means
for displaying one's competence to others, subject to evaluation for the
skill and effectiveness mobilized in performance, the most artful way of
speaking and behaving in the children's peer group repertoire. As such,
children's folklore is an index to what is important to children in the peer
group, and to their communicative competence within it.
NATURALISTIC OBSERVATION AND 
CHILDREN'S FOLKLORE

All that I have said thus far addresses the nature of ethnography as a perspective, centering on the goal of developing descriptive theories of what one needs to know and how one needs to behave to operate in a socially constituted and culturally defined world, from the point of view of endogenously organized meaning—meaning apprehended and interpreted through the eyes of members of the social group itself. There remains yet the matter of ethnography as method, usually identified as naturalistic, open-ended, and qualitative, by contrast with the more experimental, operational, and quantitative methods of behavioral research. There is already an extensive and growing literature debating the merits and shortcomings of these respective research orientations, much of it produced by people better qualified than I am to discuss these issues. Accordingly, I do not propose to deal at length with the general issue of methodology in the ethnography of children's folklore, confining my remarks instead to some of the special problems attendant on this research.

I do believe that the ethnographic perspective dictates at the very least a naturalistic frame of reference, whatever specific methodologies are invoked for the gathering and interpretation of data. By a naturalistic frame of reference, I mean at least an implicit concern for naturally occurring, contextually situated behavior, unmanipulated and unconstrained by externally imposed methodological imperatives. This is not to say that everything the ethnographer wants to know is evident in externally observable, naturally occurring behavior, or even that truly natural behavior is always accessible to the observer; if nothing else, the anthropological version of the Heisenberg principle calls into question whether any behavior, as observed by the researcher, is ever truly "natural." Nevertheless, a naturalistic frame of reference can and should be used as a guide and a standard for the evaluation of methodological validity in ethnographic research.

I raise these issues because naturalistic observation and participation is often a special problem in the study of children's folklore—the free peer group activity of children is by its very nature a privileged realm in which adults are alien intruders, especially so insofar as much of the children's folklore repertoire violates what children understand to be adult standards of decorum. The ethnography of children's folklore thus raises to special importance the need to establish rapport with informants, to convince them of the genuineness of interest in the full range of their folklore repertoire, in order to overcome their reluctance to open their expressive world to adult scrutiny.

Moreover, it is a fundamental characteristic of many, if not most, forms of children's folklore that they are spontaneous in occurrence and fleeting in duration, such that one never knows for certain whether or when a group of children will engage in them. Thus, direct elicitation, pump-priming, or the establishment of an induced natural context (Goldstein 1967), all requiring prior familiarity with the repertoire, may be necessary before the observer might have the opportunity to step back and allow the dynamics of peer group interaction to take their course.

On the other hand, rapport once established, adult interest can also be a stimulus to performance, by providing an occasion for it, since children do enjoy engaging in the performance and exchange of their folklore. Sometimes, the licensed ignorance of the adult outsider can itself provide a useful stimulus, as in cases where all the children in the group know and are tired of a particular routine, and the presence of someone who purports not to know it provides a fresh occasion to trot it out once more. The essential point is, whatever methodological ingenuity is called for, it...
should be informed by the goals of the ethnographic perspective and hew as closely as possible to the naturalistic frame of reference.

EXAMINATIONS OF SOLICITATIONAL ROUTINES

Let me turn now to a series of concrete and related examples drawn from an extended research project in children's folklore that I undertook with some of my students in 1973 through 1976 in conjunction with the Southwest Educational Development Laboratory. Our research was centered especially on children's verbal folklore in the conviction that the ethnographic study of these forms would reveal useful information about the communicative competence of children within the context of their own self-motivated and enjoyable peer group activity, information that might not be so readily accessible from the study of children's communicative behavior in more formal settings, or in interaction with adults. Moreover, because of the crucial centrality of language skills to contemporary American education, we felt that the strongest case for the potential contribution of children's folklore to education could be made in this sphere.

The project focused on the folklore repertoire of 5- through 8-year-old Anglo, black, and Chicano children in Austin, Texas. At the very beginning of our fieldwork it became apparent that perhaps the most popular folklore forms, at least among the Anglo and Chicano children in that age range, were riddles and related forms like knock-knocks and catches, to which I applied the collective label solicitational routines. These are expressive routines (Hymes 1971b:58), which are distinguished by their incorporation within the formal structure of a dyadic social exchange consisting of at least one solicitation (a speech act, the function of which is to elicit a verbal or kinesic response) plus the response (Bellack, Kliebard, Hyman, and Smith 1966: Sinclair and Coulthard 1975). At first glance, from the outside, solicitational routines appear as small, rather inconsequential forms, considered trivial and corny if not downright foolish by most adults. On closer examination through the ethnographic lens, however, solicitational routines reveal themselves to be fascinating in their complexity, implicating a wide range of linguistic and sociolinguistic virtuosity. Perhaps if I can leap the triviality barrier, to use Sutton-Smith's apt phrase, by showing something of the complexity of these small folklore forms, the productiveness of studying children's folklore intensively in all its richness will be more readily accepted.

I stressed earlier that the ethnographic study of folklore contrasts strongly with those investigative perspectives on folklore that draw conclusions based on the abstract, normative structure of verbal genres, without attending to their actual social use. Such normative conceptions of genre, together with allied conceptions of folklore forms as fixed, traditional texts, and as esthetic vehicles subject to evaluation for the skill and effectiveness with which they are done, make both scholars and laymen disvalue and tend to disregard flawed performances; who wants to record a garbled rhyme or riddle when it is possible to find someone who can perform it well? Yet these flawed but recognizable attempts at performing traditional genres constitute a significant proportion of the expressive output of young children in their first few years of peer group involvement, say, from 5 to 7.

Take knock-knock jokes, for example, one popular type of solicitational routine. In studying the use of solicitational routines among 5 through 8 year olds, we collected knock-knocks in varying degrees of approximation to the standard form, such as the following:
A: Knock, knock.
B: Who's there?
A: Lisa [child's own name].
B: Lisa who?
A: Lisa Nora [name of present peer].

2 A: Knock, knock.
B: Who's there?
A: Amos.
B: Amos who?
A: Amos mosquito bit me. Knock knock.
B: Who's there?
A: Amos mosquito bit me again.

3 A: Knock, knock.
B: Who's there?
A: Olive.
B: Olive who?
A: Olive [I love] you.

Only the last of these is a well-formed traditional knock-knock. What are we then to make of the others, both apparently flawed by the normative standards of the genre?

Matters are clarified somewhat if we reveal that the first of these routines was contributed by a child of 5 years/3 months, the second by a child of 6 years/1 month, and third by a child of 8 years/6 months. The flawed knock-knocks in fact represent stages in a developmental progression, beginning with a stage in which the child has mastered the generic form of the routine but does not recognize the traditionality of the entire routine or understand the speech play in the standard knock-knocks, and so coins her own third line as if she were really presenting herself at the door, and fifth line by arbitrarily conjoining another name from the immediate situational environment with her own. The child who produced the next routine is attempting to repeat a traditional knock-knock [Knock, knock/Who's there?/Amos/Amos who?/A mosquito bit me. Knock, knock/Who's there?/Andy/Andy who?/Andy bit me again), knowing that proper knock-knocks are ready-made, but is again defeated by the speech play, which rearranges lexical boundaries to transform Amos to a mos-quto (she may in fact not recognize Amos as a name) and Andy to and he. The final stage in the progression is the correct doing of a traditional knock-knock. Time does not permit me to elaborate more fully on what is involved in this process, though I have treated it at length elsewhere (Bauman 1977b). The point I want to make here is that taking the data as they come, consistent with the ethnographic perspective, allows us to take account of the flawed renditions together with the good ones, and to see them as exemplifying stages in the acquisition of competence to perform a particular genre, and as indices to the range of cognitive and communicative skills implicated in the performance of the genre, not merely as mistakes to be disqualified. This is enculturation within the peer group, not from an adultocentric perspective.

One of the principal hallmarks of recent ethnographically informed folklore research, consistent with the reorientation from a concentration on discrete normative texts, abstracted from context, is its attention to the structure of the situational context of the performance of folklore and the patterning of folkloric performance within such situations or events. Drawing another example from our study of solicitational routines, we may illustrate the productiveness of this analytical focus for the study of children's folklore. The example is drawn from John McDowell's penetrating
analysis of a riddling session involving three Chicano children, ranging in ages from 6 to 8 (1979:135-146). Embedded in this session, of approximately a half hour's duration, were eleven routines dealing with the semantic domain of locomotion:

1. What has eight wheels and rolls? 
   --Roller skates.
2. What has two wheels and pedals? 
   --A bicycle.
3. What has four wheels, no pedals, and a steering wheel? 
   --A car.
4. What has four legs and can run? 
   --A mustang.
5. What has three wheels and pedals? 
   --A tricycle.
6. What has four legs and can't walk? 
   --A chair.
7. What has two legs, it can walk? 
   --A monkey.
8. What has long legs and its hard to walk? 
   --A seagull.
9. What has two seats, four wheels, and they can roll? 
   --A car.
10. What has lots of windows and they can fly? 
    --Airplane.
11. What are those little clocks and its in your car? 
    --A dragger.

Two of these, numbers 1 and 6, are traditional riddles; the remaining nine are what McDowell has labeled descriptive routines (1979:34), in which the solicitation is in the form of a question, but the question is not ready-made, i.e., traditional, but rather newly coined by the child, following one of the syntactic and textural patterns characteristic of traditional riddles. Most commonly, the descriptive routine calls on the respondent to identify an object by describing it in the solicitation in terms of one or more (usually more) of its salient attributes. McDowell’s analysis demonstrates how, through the exchange of solicitational routines, the children participating in the session systematically construct and explore a folk taxonomy of locomotion, as represented in Figure 1. Though clearly not exhaustive, this taxonomy is yet highly logical and structured by the taxonomic relationships of inclusion and contrast.

McDowell goes on to show how the logic and order of the basic taxonomy is interpenetrated by another type of reasoning, in which prevailing cultural orders are dismembered and rearranged in apparently anomalous ways. The shift resides in items 4 and 6, which, by incorporating ambiguity, depart from the transparent description characteristic of descriptive routines. The metaphorical attribution of legs to chairs, which should thus be capable of locomotion but are not, suggests the possibility of restructuring the taxonomy on another basis, as does the association of an automobile with a wild horse, otherwise in contrast as machine and animal, but alternatively conjoined on the basis of fleetness. McDowell’s analysis thus reveals a group of children aware of the dual capacity of language to encode and convey shared cultural meanings, but also to re-arrange the structure of those meanings in alternative ways, all explored through the medium of traditionally organized speech play. Consider what an array of “language arts” is implicated here—mastery of generic form, encoding of salient descriptive attributes, logical relationships of inclusion and contrast, ambiguity in metaphor, and so on—not completely
evident in the solicitation routine texts taken singly, or from attention to
the traditional riddles alone, but from the systematic analysis of an aspect
of the patterning of the event as a whole.

![Diagram of Locomotion Taxonomy]

**Figure 1. The Taxonomy of Locomotion**
[From McDowell 1979:138]

A different kind of confrontation between order and disorder, impli-
cating not so much logic and classification as the very communicative re-
sources and rules by which conversation is conducted, is embodied in a
third type of solicitation routine, the catch. Danielle Roemer, who has
made an intensive study of these routines (1977), defines catches as two-
party, humorous, interactional routines that are strategically designed to
effect the surprise and victimization of one of the participants. They
provide for the enactment of a stylized conversation between two parties:
The child who initiates the exchange assumes the role of the trickster;
the respondent acts as the straightman (1977:13). Typical examples of
the genre, commonly represented in the repertoire, are the following:

1. **A**: Open up the gate. [The ends of A's index fingers are
together; his thumbs are pointing up]
   **B**: [Pulls A's index fingers toward himself.]
   **A**: Bang, bang, you're dead ![A's hands are now in the
   Fifty bullets in your head. ![A's hands are now in the
   shape of "guns" which he
   Brush your teeth and go to bed. "shoots" at B.]

2. **A**: Say a number after everything I say.
   I saw a dead buzzard layin' in the road.
   I one'd it.
   **B**: I two'd it.
   **A**: I three'd it.
   **B**: I four'd it.
   **A**: I five'd it.
   **B**: I six'd it.
   **A**: I seven'd it.
   **B**: I eight [ate] it.
3 A: What's your name?
B: Jane.
A: What's this? [Points to her own nose.]
B: A nose.
A: What's in my hand? [Shows empty palm.]
B: Nothing.
A: Jane knows nothing.

The catch, as a genre that almost universally incurs the disfavor of adults because of its violation of the interactional ideals of trust and reciprocity, its licensed physical aggression and verbal insult, and its encouragement of profanity, albeit in a playful way, must depend for its survival on the oral tradition of the peer group, receiving little or no reinforcement from polite riddle books, educational television shows, or teachers. Yet, if we can suspend moral judgment long enough to examine catches in their own terms, we find them to involve a remarkably sophisticated structure, centering on the manipulation of linguistic and social interactional resources and their interrelationships.

The principal communicative resource exploited in catch routines is the interpretive frame, the metamessage signaling how a particular message is to be interpreted. Through the mechanism of the routine, a context is established by the trickster that keys a particular range of meanings to lead the straightman on to further participation. At the end, however, the apparently harmless message keyed by the original frame is subtly reframed, to challenge or destroy the reputable social self of the straightman through licensed aggression, embarrassment, or other means of degradation. Even worse, this is done in such a manner that the straightman is revealed to have collaborated in his own fool-making. In the examples just presented, straightmen variously find themselves inviting symbolic aggression as an innocuous gesture is transformed into a symbolically dangerous one, admitting to the eating of carrion (consisting of a dead buzzard, which is itself an eater of carrion and so doubly polluted) by a shift from one meaning of a homonymic pair to the other, or constructing a verbal admission of their own ignorance through the establishment of discourse cohesion uniting three apparently unrelated utterances, one of which is itself reframed by a similar homonymic shift.

These catches are thus a striking lesson in the sensitivity of meaning to its context of use. Catch routines, thus analyzed, reveal their users not only to be possessed of a range of interesting linguistic competencies, but of a striking awareness of sociolinguistic nuances as well, all mobilized in the playful service of social disorder.

So far, I have been talking of children's folklore in fairly generalized terms, without much regard to the many dimensions of diversity that characterize American children. To a certain extent, this is warranted by the substantial degree of sharing of repertoire that does in fact exist among children throughout the country; I have a vague hunch that children's folklore may be more homogeneous nationwide than any other part of our American expressive repertoire. Nevertheless, there are many lines along which the repertoire is diversified as well, paralleling those that underlie the diversity of American society at large.

Exploring this diversity is a dual problem, part ethnographic, part comparative. The relationship between the two in anthropological inquiry has been treated by Dell Hymes elsewhere in this volume, so I will not dwell on it here, but simply suggest a few of the dimensions of social variability in the children's folklore repertoire. In doing so, I want to make clear that none of these dimensions operates in discrete isolation, sorting the children and their folklore into neat boxes. It is more accurately the case that such demographic factors as age, sex, ethnicity,
socioeconomic status, and language may all bear a simultaneous and interrelated influence on such folkloric variables as generic preference, performance style, content, and participation structures. Although the relative associations along these sets of variables is certainly amenable to statistical analysis, the work remains to be done. I can only suggest in fairly broad terms how some of the factors may sort themselves out.

I pointed out in an earlier example how developmental differences may affect the production of knock-knocks. To continue further with solicitational routines, it is clearly the case for the Austin children we studied that while Anglo and Chicano children both have a substantial investment in riddling, the Chicano children care relatively little for a range of solicitational routines, like knock-knocks and others I have not discussed here, that are great favorites among the Anglo children. Older Chicano children, though, beyond our 5 through 8 age range, do enjoy an adapted form of knock-knock that plays on code switching, as in:

1 A: Knock, knock.  
B: Who's there?  
A: Apio verde [celery].  
B: Apio verde who?  
A: Apio verde [happy birthday] to you.

or

2 A: Knock, knock.  
B: Who's there?  
A: Sue.  
B: Sue who?  
A: Sue [su] madre.

On the other hand, there is a particularly intriguing type of solicitational routine that we collected only from Chicano children, and only in Spanish. These involve a solicitation in the form of a statement in which the answer is concealed by the arrangement of word boundaries and can only be guessed by rearranging syllables, morphemes, or lexemes across these boundaries. For example (McDowell 1976:176):

1 Oro no es, plata no es. ¿Qué es?  
--Plátano.

2 Yo aquí, tú allá. ¿Qué es?  
--Toalla.

There are traditional English routines analogous to these (Emrich 1970:58-59), but they are not current among our Anglo population.

Even for forms that are popular in both ethnic groups, there are subtle differences of emphasis. In riddles and descriptive routines, for instance, the Anglo children's repertoire shows a far greater penetration of influences from popular culture--figures from television and comic books, for example--than does that of the Chicano children, reflecting perhaps the greater accessibility of these elements of mass culture to the more affluent Anglo children (McDowell 1979:Ch. 8). By contrast, the Chicano riddlers exploit body parts as comparisons and solutions far more than their Anglo counterparts, which McDowell convincingly attributes to a closer adherence to traditional riddling content, for body parts are unquestionably prominent in older riddling traditions.

By contrast with both the Anglo and Chicano children, the children in our black population have very little interest in traditional, ready-made
solicitational routines of any kind within the peer group, with one notable exception. The one form of solicitational routine that is popular, though, is a form of rhyming speech play that represents a kind of catch. Some of these are traditional, such as:

1 A: Say blue.  
   B: Blue.  
   A: You got the flu.  

or

2 A: Say brown.  
   B: Brown.  
   A: You're a clown.

Moreover, these are often associated, in performance, with other rhyming forms that are also contestive, putting down the person to whom they are addressed much as catches do, but not in solicitational form, as in,

My acka backa,  
My soda cracker,  
My B O booty hole.  
Your mama, your daddy,  
Your great granny  
Got a hole in her panty,  
Got a big behind  
Like Frankenstein,  
Don't eat no meat  
On Lincoln Street.  
Don't drink no wine  
On Chicago line.

Just scratching the surface in this manner, we have touched on ethnic and linguistic differences relating to generic preference and content. Let us invoke some other factors by reference to another genre, namely, handclaps, routines that involve a pattern of handclapping with one or more partners to the accompaniment of a sung or chanted rhyme. Handclaps are preeminently a girls' form, with a substantial sharing of the rhyme repertoire among the three ethnic groups we studied. The differences to be found here have principally to do with participant structure and style. Thus, Beverly Stoeltje (1978) has noted that among black girls, the signal offering to begin handclapping is nonverbal, i.e., the presentation to one's potential partner of the hands in the position for the opening clap: left palm up, right palm down. If the invitation is accepted, the initiator launches into the chosen rhyme, picked up immediately by her partner. Among Anglo girls, the invitation to handclap is made verbally: "Let's do Miss Mary Mack," or whichever rhyme the presenter wishes to perform. Again, black girls are far more likely than Anglo girls to use syncopated rhythms in handclaps, e.g., a three-beat handclap pattern in conjunction with a 2/4 musical rhythm in the rhymes, while the standard Anglo pattern is a two-move handclap with the same 2/4 rhymes.
Now, what do all these commonalities and contrasts imply for education? Beyond highlighting the unities and diversities of our society and culture in general, it is very difficult to say precisely at this early point in the research what the meaningful differences are, let alone what their educational implications may be. To be sure, certain hypotheses do suggest themselves as especially worthy of further research. To take only one example, drawing again on solicitational routines, it seems to me that insofar as riddles are expressive models of the kind of interrogation and interaction that is ubiquitous in the school setting (cf. Roberts and Forman 1972; Mehan this volume), engagement in riddling may have real adaptive value for children in the 5 through 8 age range we studied, as they come to terms with the participant structures of schooling in our society. Put another way, our prevailing educational practices may select against children, like the black children in our Austin study population, who, for whatever social or cultural reason, do not engage in speech play of this kind, though their expressive repertoire may be very rich in other forms that the Anglo children don't do. But the point is that the Anglo children don't lose anything in the classroom by not doing them.

Concerning the potential educational relevance of the ethnography of children's folklore, however, I can speak with more confidence. Here, I would stress two points. I am convinced, first of all, that the most significant potential contribution that the close study of children's folklore can make is in revealing the truly impressive range of linguistic and sociolinguistic competencies that is fostered by the children's own peer group culture. To repeat an earlier point, nothing having to do with the competencies of children should be foreign to education, and children's folklore shows children at their natural virtuoso best, mobilizing skills that are not evident in their social life outside the peer group. What makes this point still more telling is that proficiency in the peer group is not necessarily correlated for all groups of children, or individuals, with success in the classroom. I am far from the first to point out that for minority children especially, various kinds of true communicative virtuosity and communicative leadership may be excluded from or selected against in the school; William Labov has argued as much most impressively (1972), as have others. Surely, a humane and rational educational system ought to be responsive to such factors, by profiting from and building on the insights that the ethnography of childlore can provide.

The other major concluding point I would make stems from my conviction that the arts should play a significant role in education and my clear impression that increasing numbers of educators are coming to share this conviction. This suggests that children's folklore, representing what might aptly be called the indigenous art forms of childhood, unquestionably valued and enjoyed by the children themselves, might constitute a significant resource in the development of culturally responsive, locally relevant arts programs in the schools, together with--perhaps as an antecedent point of departure for--the general run of arts curricula that are oriented more to the fine art forms of western culture.

How these suggestions might best be implemented remains an open question, calling for a substantial amount of further research and program development. There are certainly problems to be confronted in the course of this research and development, not the least of which is the danger of sapping the vitality and spontaneity of children's folklore by neutering and sterilizing it for classroom use or polite consumption. What seems to me clear, though, is that the results of investigating children's folklore will
amply repay the effort, and above all that ethnography must play a lead-
ing part in these efforts.

NOTES

1. The following discussion of knock-knock routines draws upon unpub-
lished work by Andrea Meditch, undertaken as part of the above-
mentioned research project on children's folklore, under the sponsorship of the Southwest Educational Development Laboratory, Austin, Texas.

2. Note carefully that there is no implication here that they can't do them, or that they are in some way deficient for not doing them, simply that empirically they don't do them.

3. The discussion of black children's folklore draws upon unpub-
lished work by Margaret Brady, in conjunction with the children's folk-
lore research project mentioned earlier (see note 1). See also Brady and F. Eckhardt 1975.

4. Note again that I am not saying they don't have the capacity for them, only that they are not a real part of their repertoire, any more than Spanish language solicitational routines that depend upon rearranging word boundaries are part of the Anglo children's repertoire. They do other things.

5. These same children's folklore materials are also highly illumi-
\[\text{Note:} \text{ }\]
\[\text{These:}\] \text{rating of cognitive abilities, which are out-}\text{side the scope of this paper. See Park 1972; Shultz 1974; Sutton-Smith 1976; Whitt and Prentice 1977.}

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Goldstein, Kenneth S. 1967. The induced natural context: An ethno-


It has long been my contention that we learn as much or more about children by studying them out of school as in school. For me this has meant in particular the study of their folkways (1959, 1972). Unfortunately, even children in all their spontaneity do not offer themselves with naive realism to ethnographic grasp. They are more often possessed by us through our contemporary and sometimes contemptible obsessions about childhood. In this article, therefore, I wish to spend some time with these obsessions, in the hope that it might be easier to approach children's outdoor play and indoor schooling when we have greater insight into our own angles of approach.

This is, however, a difficult task because the histories that it requires for its support have not yet been written. Although I find support in my own "History of Children's Play--the New Zealand Playground, 1840-1950" (1981), this has too limited an application to be sufficient. For the rest I must rely on such occasional papers as those of Bernard Mergen, which he has delivered annually to The Association for The Anthropological Study of Play (1975, 1978, 1980). This means that I will present a thesis and give it illustrative support, though I cannot hope to fully defend it. The thesis is that there have been two major strands of theorizing about children's play, put bluntly, one for the rich, and one for the poor. Play theory for the rich is, not surprisingly, the dominant kind and most of the "psychologies of play" reflect this sociological origin. Although it will be apparent that I am suggesting there is an economic influence on play theorizing, the issue of causation is too complex for me to do more than bring it to light here as an influence previously neglected in this field of study.

A second and even more difficult problem entangled with the first one has to do with the way play theory should be conceptualized. Just as play theory for the rich has dominated most play theorizing, so most play theorizing has an individualistic philosophical basis. It assumes that one can talk sensibly about play by talking about the individual alone, whereas it can be argued particularly as a result of the work of Geertz (1971), Turner (1974a, 1974b), Handelman (1977), Manning (1977), Adams (1968), Babcock (1978), and others, that a conceptualization of play is not possible without a preliminary conceptualization of the total culture of
which it is a part. The work-play dichotomization of industrial civilization, which provides the economic basis for Western theories of play, is highly relative. There are many other possible arrangements of cultural functions, and theories of play usually reflect these. As Turner has argued, a primary dichotomization prior to modern society was into the sacred and profane, with play taking its place amongst the sacred activities.

In what follows, therefore, I will begin by discussing first how the rich and the poor treated their children, how the rich treated the children of the poor in Western society, and how this has affected play theory. I will then proceed, in the second section, to the implications of this kind of approach for future play theorizing. Finally, I will ask whether these theoretical notions about outdoor play are illuminating for our understanding of what goes on inside the school.

**THE NINETEENTH CENTURY PREDICAMENT**

During the nineteenth century, the Western world was in the throes of its centuries-long transition from an agrarian to an industrial society. Masses of people had been cut loose from the tribal and parochial ties that had previously ordered their lives (Katz 1975). The growing cities of the world were afloat with immigrants from farm or foreign places. One can detect three major kinds of attempts to take care of the children who were on the loose. The first was education, largely conceived of as "a process of mass instruction and rigid discipline designed to produce at a minimum cost a working population that is literate, orderly and not inconveniently critical of its lot" (Campbell 1941). The second was leisure control, first of children's games and later of company recreation, extolled as a means of improving the health of the employees and of building company spirit (Mergen 1978a). The current comparable social process is the control of family leisure through television. It is the most pervasive and most intrusive of the three major influences being discussed here.

In New Zealand the children who were to be brought into the schools of the nineteenth century were variously described as "larrikins," "urchins," and "cockatoos." It was said that if they were educated they would cease to be "pests" to society and victims of "low bred idleness." Despite the intensity of the sectarian friction between those who wanted to educate these children in this or that faith, in private dame or church school, these parties all ultimately overcame their sectarian bitterness in the face of their even greater fear of childish unruliness. In New York City the same kind of children were described in 1883 as "street Arabus," "gutter snipes," and "waifs" and in some quarters these categories were treated as if they were hereditary types (Dann 1978). In England they were portrayed in the various works of Charles Dickens, and their "idle-ness" once again lamented (Metcalf 1971).

Parallel to this problem of controlling the masses that vexed the nineteenth century, there was an even earlier concern for the improvement of those who would become the technical and professional leaders of their increasingly complex societies. Here the concern was less with social control, however, and more with the arts of self-improvement and character development (Cavallo 1981).

As we shall now attempt to demonstrate, appropriate theories of play were devised to meet each of these circumstances.
We need to establish first that the poor who flooded into the cities of the world were not so deculturated as they appeared in middle class writings (Goodman 1979). Rather they clung tenaciously to their ethnic and parochial backgrounds and carried on to the extent that was possible their traditional forms of recreation. In England the traditions of Ascension Day, May Day, and Harvest Day, the sports of bull-baiting, rabbit coursing, sparrow shooting, pigeon flying, cockfighting, and dog fighting gradually gave way in the crowded cities, but boxing, wrestling, quoits, pitch and toss, which could be staged in more confined spaces, continued, and gambling on spectator sports gradually became the central lower-class adult concern then, as it is today (Metcalfe 1971).

In the streets the children played the innumerable games that have been copiously recorded by the folklorists. There was probably more vitality in them in the nineteenth century than there is today (Gomme 1894; Opie and Opie 1969; Douglas 1916; Sutton-Smith 1959). In New York City there was Stoop Ball, Stickball, Baseball, Marbles, Hopscotch, Prisoners Base, One O Cat, and many others (Dann 1978). But middle class play theorists did not always see these as rich folk traditions. They saw only idleness and gambling. Henry Curtis in Education Through Play in 1915 describes the situation thus:

But what nearly every parent and observer of children has seen is that there has been little for the children to do in the cities and that in times of idleness the devil has found much for idle hands to do! That the children are an annoyance to their parents and the neighbourhood and that they acquire many vicious habits during their unused time. The boys often learn to smoke and gamble and tell and hear many obscene and otherwise dangerous stories.

He continues:

It is not the play but the idleness of the street which is morally dangerous. It is then that the children watch the drunken people, listen to the leader of the gang, hear the shady story, smoke cigarettes and acquire those vicious habits, knowledge and vocabulary which are characteristic. When they are thus driven from the street to play upon the sidewalk or the doorstep, the only common games which they can pursue are tops, marbles, jackstones, war, craps and pitching pennies. . . . The politeness and ethics of a game played on the street are on a lower plane than those of the same game played elsewhere. . . . play has probably reached the lowest ebb during the last half century than it has ever reached in the history of the world.

I quote Curtis at some length because it was a major conclusion of my study of games in New Zealand that on the contrary, the new public school playgrounds, as well as the city streets, at first gave more children a chance to pool traditions, without adult interference, than had ever hitherto existed in parochial areas. The result was a variety and number of games that rose to a peak towards World War I, after which this variety diminished with the increasing influence of the adult organization of children's play.

Even putting formal games aside, Dann (1978) makes quite a case for the liberating effects of urban life on any New York children.
who had come from the ghettos of Europe. As he sees it, though the street, the gang, the saloon, the pushcart, the candy store, the soda fountain, the tenement workshop may not have been the moral influences desired in middle class ideology, and though neglect cannot be gainsaid, there were also traditions and vitality in these ways of life. Norman Douglas's book on *London Street Games* (1916) is in fact a protest against the very advocacies that Curtis makes on behalf of organized play. Douglas argues that children are much more inventive when their play is not organized, and his lists of games and practices of London street children is meant to testify to that end.

In the nineteenth century then we have a vigorous play life among the masses, with an equally vigorous protest by the middle classes that the idleness of this play life must be brought under social control. Some of the items in this socialization or domestication of the play life among the masses are as follows:

1. There is very little attempt by teachers or adults to play any part whatsoever in the playground or the street play of children in public schools in the nineteenth century. This is true despite a burgeoning romanticism about children's play among the early childhood disciples of Rousseau, Froebel, and Pestalozzi. Nevertheless in some schools, in New Zealand as early as in the 1850s, there is gymnastic apparatus in these playgrounds. The advocacy of physical exercises and calisthenics in schools for children dates back to the prior century to Basedow, Guth-Smith, and others (Eby and Arrowood 1946). According to McIntosh (1968), in England calisthenics and drill were used in public schools to inculcate desirable habits and obedience. The same was probably true in the United States (Mergen 1975:409).

2. Military or cadet drill is the first regular kind of teacher control over leisure that became officially encouraged in New Zealand schools about the time of the wars with the Maoris in the 1870s. Although this drill flagged thereafter, it was revived in the 1890s when military instructors were provided and enthusiasm for the war in South Africa with the Boers reached a peak. This was an imperialistic period, and children were issued dummy rifles and other regalia. In 1910 Kitchener came to New Zealand: the enthusiasm he induced there as in England was to lead to one of the greatest slaughters of the unprepared volunteers in the annals of warfare. Although this particular kind of playground control did not persist as school policy in New Zealand, it does persist in many other parts of the world where military schools are a normal part of the social fabric and widely used for the domestication of 'uncontrollable' boys.

3. Organized sports. Both in England (McIntosh 1968) and New Zealand, it was the children who first organize games in the school playgrounds. In New Zealand, the need for new teachers was met by using pupil teachers': young adolescents who were a year or two older than their elementary school charges. These young boys organized what they had previously played as a part of folk tradition, or what they were themselves learning in their own communities. The second half of the nineteenth century saw the widespread growth of organized football clubs throughout the westernized world. The rugby or cricket or athletics played in these clubs were introduced to the children by the pupil teachers. Until the 1920s, athletics (running, jumping, etc.) were relatively more important than the organized team sports.

Out of these actual practices came various advocacies on behalf of the character training power of team sports. Rugby, of Arnold's and Tom Brown's school days, was well known. New Zealand had its own spokesman in H. A. E. Milne, a Teachers College principal, who in 1910 said (as quoted in Baird 1948):
The longer I live the more I am convinced of the need for active sweating exercises followed by cold baths for young people. It clears them mentally and physically. Games undoubtedly have a great effect on character, summed up in the one word "sportsmanship." They give it its true initiative, promptitude, courage, unselfishness and the power of leadership; they promote social growth and in many other ways improve one's powers, but when all is said and done, it is learning to "play the game" and never to "hit below the belt" that constitute the great values.

We have already quoted Henry Curtis on the deplorable state of the masses. Here he is on organized play:

In nearly all of our municipal playgrounds at least nine-tenths of all the play is scrub play, which the children make up themselves on coming to it. Many of the children loaf. Play of this kind can never give the training of either body or conduct which organized play should give; for in order to develop the body it must be vigorous, to train the intellect it must be exciting, to train the social conscience it must be socially organized. None of these results from scrub play.

The same view of the character training value of organized sports carries on throughout this century as one of the major advocacies for the control of mass leisure (Cozens and Stumpf 1953). It is to be found expressed unabashedly in the majority of the program statements of present-day organizations for young children, such as Little League Baseball, The Pop Warner Foundation, American Legion Junior Baseball, The American Junior Bowling Congress, and Biddy Basketball. Most of these organizations have at times proposed in their programs a number of other more specific—if equally uncertain—advantages, such as the reduction of delinquency rates, the reduction of racial discrimination, the promulgation of Americanism, and the unifying of labor and management. The emphasis on character appears to have been most explicit in the work of the Pop Warner Foundation, which has arranged in the past for "Pony Bowl" and "Santa Claus Bowl" playoffs for its winning teams. At these events, in addition to the usual awards for the winning teams, the boys also competed for All American honors. Character judges were placed on each team's bench to score the candidates' behavior as well as their playing ability. To be eligible a boy had to be a good scholar, have high standards in church activity, and pass a character screening test by an adult All American Team Candidate Committee. Each candidate had also to submit a huddle prayer and a character essay. As one such program opines:

The character conditioning of youth is America's last frontier to pioneer (Sutton-Smith 1953).

This advocacy of the training effects of games was not confined to sports. Recreationists, much affected by the demonstration of Groos (1898, 1901) of the many ways animal and human play contributed to the preparation of the adult, prepared lists of games and the particular socialization values that they afforded. The influential Johnson in 1907 selected over four hundred games and assigned them forty-six educational values, such as for mind, body, eye, muscle sense, and the like (Mergen 1975:408). The first \textit{Handbook} for the Boy Scouts in 1911 contains many games that were supposed to provide constructive outlets for a long list of basic instincts (Mechling 1980). Lee argued that the modern child could be fitted to the industrial world by teaching him the team spirit (1922). Others felt that the answer to gambling and idleness was to
strengthen the coercive elements in physical education and recreation.

4 Playgrounds. Leaders in the American playground movement preached much the same values for playgrounds as they did for organized sports. The names of Johnson, Curtis, Lee, and Gulick are associated with the early twentieth century advocacy of the playground and its equipment as a cure for the ills of the city. Just as the values of team sports were justified by their usage in upper status schools, so the virtues of the playground were thought to bring to the masses some of the recreative values to which upper status persons had access. The consumer recreative satisfactions of those of upper status, it seemed, helped contribute to their own idealization of recreative leisure. Although their focus was first on playgrounds for children, it later shifted to the leisure available in the parks and wilderness of the country. Thus, what was once called the Playground Association (1906) ultimately became the National Recreation Association of America (1930). Joseph Lee, who wrote Play in Education (1922), also became the President of the National Recreation Association from 1910 to 1937. Like many of the others he was much affected by Emerson's idealization of the wilderness and by his own experiences at Putnam Camp in the Adirondacks, where like James Putnam, William James, and many others he applied himself to the strenuous outdoor recreations of climbing and canoeing.

Extravagant claims were made for playgrounds. Curtis suggests that their apparatus of climbing structures acts like trees in luring the ancestral ape from the child into constructive activities. Fences make the school yard a place for the development of loyalties and keep out the rough elements, including loose men and women who have a corrupting effect on the children. Scattering the different apparatuses in different parts of the playground helps to break up the gangs. The playground as an extension of the school should produce children who could obey rules, cooperate and develop their physical and mental skills" (Mergen 1980:200). Some of the enthusiasts of the day hoped to extend this line of control also to commercial amusements. Thus in 1912, John Collier announced "Though not a socialist in some particulars, I am entirely a socialist when it comes to municipal ownership and operation of amusement places" (quoted by Mergen 1980:194). Curtis singled out urbanization and immigration as the two factors responsible for the crisis that he believed to be occurring in child development and education.

The argument being presented here is that a central educational predicament of the middle class educator or recreationist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was disorderly children and disorderly youth. In consequence there developed theorizing about play that dictated that it was of inherent value for such youth if their leisure behavior was organized on playgrounds, by games and sports, calisthenics or military drill. The values they were supposed to derive from these forms of organization were held to be analogous to the values derived by upper status persons from sports or from contacts with nature. The leisure values of the upper class groups were thus the primary source of notions about the leisure values that could be organized for the poor. In addition, however, two evolutionary theories of play made their own important contribution. Karl Groos in his two works The Play of Animals (1898) and The Play of Man (1901) argued that children's play has an instinctive basis and prepares the child for adult life. His notion that play socializes and is, therefore, of serious import, was itself a total contradiction to earlier puritanic points of view. In time it became the central thesis about play of the twentieth century. Its essential message was that you can control the future of children if you look to their play. The parallel recapitulation theory of Stanley Hall (1907), which was thought to be based on evolutionary biology, explicitly stated that children needed to play through their
primitive atavisms to mature into adult beings. This seemed even more to the point than Groos's preparatory theory. Playground apparatuses and organized games could presumably remove these atavisms from the primitive souls of disorderly children. It is probably not fair to Hall to ask whether he was looking at the disorderly immigrant groups in the Worcester township near Clark University when he developed this theoretical viewpoint.

Still, although the sources are various, in their own leisure habits as well as in academic play theory, what Lee, Gulick, Curtis, Johnson, et al. seem to have in mind is that play for the poor is something that should be organized, that it is a collective or a group phenomenon, and that it brings them the happiness of true leisure at the same time it builds character. Recent studies of middle- and low-class attitudes and behavior in Little League Baseball (Watson 1974) seem to show that some of these values are precisely those now attributed to play by Little League parents and children of the lower class. In particular, they value the game because it allows the parents and children to gather and do things collectively. Studies of the playground also show a steady increase in its domestication of violence throughout the twentieth century. The view that play could socialize, and the many attempts to make it socialize on behalf of a more orderly society may not have been without some effect.

More recent examples of upper-status attempts to organize collective behavior for the "masses" are the New Games Movement (Fleugelman 1976), the Meta Game Movement (De Koven 1978) and Adventure and Sculptured Playgrounds. So often these playgrounds are engineered by upper-class intellects with little actual knowledge of the kind of behavior of the children they will actually serve.

One of the most interesting books of our time is Homo ludens (1949). Johan Huizinga is perhaps the first historian to give play a central role in the development of culture. For him it is always a creative process that is present in cultural development. In a final chapter of this work, however, he irritable protests that modern professionalized competitive sports are not play at all. They lack play's essential voluntary and free qualities and its spirit of fun. Apparently only his upper status definition of play is acceptable. Unlike Curtis and the others, he is unable to find benefits, even play, in the collective organization of mass play behavior.

Play Theory for the Rich

Play theory for the upper status is orthodox play theory, and what it all has in common from Friedrich von Schiller in 1795 to Csikszentmihalyi (1977) is that play is defined as a voluntary and solitary activity of the individual as a result of which he increases his mastery or his creativity. Whereas both Schiller and Herbert Spencer (1873) attempted to ground their theories in individual physiology, there is perhaps an illuminating parallel between their notion of surplus energy and the increasing leisure time of the higher status groups in the industrial West. It is this fact of increasing real leisure time that according to Mergen is a key variable in the turn away from the work ethic. He says "Play, and later recreation and leisure, were symbols for a whole complex of values and attitudes about opportunity, creativity and self-fulfillment" (1980:55). The recreation theory of Lazarus (Groos 1891) is even more clearly a projection by persons of higher status. As Groos comments, "It occupies too much the standpoint of the adult who seeks recreation in a 'little game' after the burden and heat of the day" (1976[1901]:17). The majority of theories put forward from the 1890s, however, were instinct theories.
McDougall, one of the few to talk of an instinct for play, continues to give it something of the connotation of surplus energy and uselessness: 'Play is activity for its own sake, or, more probably, it is the purposeless activity, striving towards no goal' (quoted in Ellis 1973:38). This is a conspicuous consumption notion, whatever else it is.

The individualistic bias in all this becomes more explicit in the play therapies of psychoanalysis, which are applied in general to the disturbed children of wealthy parents. Here we are told that through his solitary and imaginative play the individual comes to master basic anxieties. In addition, psychoanalysis gives a new importance to the individual's imagination, though at first this is largely still seen as a "projective" expression of other more important conflicts. In time that imagination comes to be seen as the source of individual creative activity both in psychoanalytic theory (Erikson 1952) and in cognitive-developmental theory (Piaget 1951). In 1968, Sara Smilansky shows that in Israel there are disadvantaged children who do not know how to play imaginatively and she proposes to teach them to do so. In the U.S.A. Jerome Singer (1973), in a series of researches, shows that those who are more imaginative do better at school, are more joyful, less aggressive. Then his wife and he write a book called Partners in Play (1977) to show early childhood educators how to teach deprived children to play imaginatively. Earlier Brian and Shirley Sutton-Smith (1974) wrote a similar book on How to Play with Your Children for parents in which they also indicate ways of playing with children between infancy and twelve years. They contest that such play with children increases their creativity and flexibility. Beginning with the work of Lieberman in the mid-sixties (1965), there are an increasing number of researchers who demonstrate such relationships (Bruner, Jolly, and Sylvia 1976; Clark-Stewart 1973; Dansky and Silverman 1973; Feitelson and Ross 1973; Lovinger 1974; Lowe 1975; Overton and Jackson 1973; Petersen 1976; Pulaski 1973; Rosen 1974; Saltz, Dixon, and Johnson 1977; Stern 1977, Suomi and Harlow 1971; Sutton-Smith 1968; Yarrow, Rubenstein, and Pedersen 1975).

Whereas team games and playgrounds were once advocated for the deprived, exercises in imagination are now being advanced as essential for the deprived. Once again what is felt to be a natural propensity in those of upper status is being "organized" for those who lack this competence. It is not far-fetched to argue that whereas "character" and loyalty were regarded as leading requirements in the leadership training of the nineteenth century, creative ability is the new and critical ability that must be fostered in the present day world. Not surprisingly, the individualistic and symbolic character required for such leadership reflects itself in the psychological theories of play, which from the present point of view are theories about how it is desirable that the children of the economically advantaged should prepare themselves for the flexible management of the information culture in which they live.

Other modern play theories tend to differ in which particular variables they emphasize: neurological (Ellis 1973), cognitive (Piaget 1951), or phenomenological (Csikszentmihalyi 1977), but they share with the above approaches the concern for the solitary player encapsulated in his individual experience.

An apparent exception to these generalizations is the recent attempt to incorporate the collective ethnic folklore of the users into the educational curriculum of the children. Here, presumably, the actual play ways of the lower status persons become a central part of their own education. Examination of the preliminary reports from the Southwest Educational Development Laboratory in Austin, Texas, however, indicate that, since some of the folkways continue to be "depraved," they have to be neutered before their introduction into the classroom. Obviously when children are asked to bring in riddles and bring in Polish jokes or folklore (Knapp and
Knapp 1976), then the assimilating agency is in some difficulty if it cannot convert the children to a real or an imaginative distance from such materials. Yet in its own way this does count as a kind of critical case in outdoor-indoor relationships. Unlike the training in imaginative play, this at first appears not to be upper status imposition of upper status values. It is an attempt to reach out and include what hitherto was always excluded, as a part of the "secret education of American children" as the Knapps term it (1976). But in so doing it confronts the fact that children have much growing to do that has nothing to do with schooling; that the "primitive" right of any subculture is to consist in some forms as an antistructure to the major structure, and that by so doing identities are more securely grounded in the total nature of the major forms of cultural ambivalence (Edgerton 1976)--which means that a much more careful view needs to be taken of what happens when children are made self-conscious of their own folklore. Converting it to metafolklore, as the classroom manipulation of it inevitably must do, converts it to an imaginative reconsideration of folklore, rather than folklore itself. So what has happened with these introductions of "depraved" material is that the material is transformed into the material to be considered and reconsidered. This converts it to the stuff of individual thought and imagination, and takes it out of its original collective context--from which we may assume that, first appearances to the contrary, the introduction of the users' folklore into the classroom is a further effort at the upper status domestication of the deprived, and is an extension of the play theory for the poor we examined earlier.

By way of footnote to this sociology of play theory, let me emphasize that I am not here arguing that the above practices are necessarily undesirable. We are arguing that unless we make clearer their origins and intents they inevitably become self-deceptive. I ask you to consider in this light the recommendations of a committee of the Federal Trade Commission to ban television advertising to children under the age of 3 years on the ground that they cannot tell the difference between a commercial and a program. Elsewhere I have argued that once again children are being treated as a special kind of "primitive" in need of more carefully controlled indoor playgrounds. Once again the data are said to show that "heavy watchers" become "depraved" without such organized control of their recreative habits. The data on which the recommendation is based, are, paradoxically, derived from testing children verbally in interview situations away from the usual contexts of their behavior (situations that are standard practice within the individualistic philosophical tradition of Western Research), and then drawing conclusions as to their incompetence with strangers (experimenters) in these strange situations. No research is cited to show how children behave in a real context with their actual peers and parents. No challenge is made to the assumptions of the committee about who is to decide the issue of desirable recreation for other persons. Again advertising to young children may indeed be undesirable, but it is the implicit and upper status values of those who would organize the lives of the deprived that is at issue in this article.

THE DIMENSIONS OF PLAY

It was the purpose of the foregoing sketch to indicate that the "theories" of play may need to be re-examined in the light of the sociological ends that they have subverted. It has been argued that the definition of play as an organized, collective, and character-building phenomenon has been used by those of upper status to socialize those of lower status whose folk disorderliness they have found a threat and danger to
their own ways of life. The definition of play as a voluntary, solitary, and creative activity, on the other hand, has served the ends of those who are being socialized into the possibilities of upper status initiative in complex modern society.

Still it seems probable that whereas these play theories may reflect cultural concerns, they may also have something valid to say about the character of the culture and of the human organism. The distinction between what the culture has to say about play, and what play might be as an intrinsic property of the human organism is a distinction that exists regardless of the particular historical correlates that have been discussed above. Perhaps the major conclusion from the discussion to this point might simply be that any theory of play needs to make explicit its own cultural as well as its own psychological dimensions. For example, I recently chaired a conference of distinguished play researchers who were divided into two such groups. The first was composed of those whose studies are largely of solitary play and of individual play with objects (including: Thomas Stultz, Robert McCall, Roberta Collard, Greta Fein, Howard Gardner, Michael Ellis, Corinne Hutt, Jerome and Dorothy Singer, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi; in B. Sutton-Smith, Ed., Play and Learning, New York: Halsted, 1980).

Within this grouping of psychologists there are those who concentrate on the intrinsic motors within the players that determine their engagement with these objects. They couch these intrinsic motors in metabolic, neurological, physiological, cognitive, or information theory terms. Within these terms, play is defined and described through such concepts as metabolic recuperation, neural priming, arousal modulation, heart rate variability, cognitive distortion, information-uncertainty or information-consolidation. This group also often extends its interest to a concern for the stimulus characteristics of objects, or it may be solely occupied with this latter issue, speaking of the collative values of objects, their complexity novelty, and so on, which prompt the children to exploratory and play responses.

The second group of anthropologists and linguists, more influenced by Bateson (1956) and Gumperz and Hymes (1972), places its stress on play as a fundamentally communicative process of framing events and of creating rules for meaning. Play is here defined as a transformation of relationships within a system, or as the manipulation of alternative frames, or as a series of paradoxical statements (Catherine Garvey, Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Helen Schwartzman; in B. Sutton-Smith, Ed., 1980). My own response to these two quite different paradigms, one clearly psychological and the other anthropological, was to perceive the latter as more concerned with the cultural and social context of play (with the community of players, with their negotiations and with their metasignals), and to consider the earlier group, the psychologists, to be more involved with the play text, particularly its cognitive and affective character.

What this has implied to me is that it is impossible to define play without taking into account at the same time both the psychological dimensions that are the preoccupation of one group of researchers and the cultural dimensions, which are the preoccupation of the other group. Regardless of particular historical antecedents, both dimensions must be included in any play theorizing. At present we seem to know more about the psychological part of this conjoint phenomenon than we do about the cultural part, though that may be the ethnocentric illusion of this psychologist. Still, let me begin with the latter. Given that more complex species play more, that the nurturant mother-infant condition seems to be a universal precondition for play, and that there is accumulating animal and human evidence of play as some manifestation of flexibility in response systems, then it appears to me useful to conceptualize play psychologically as just one part of a dimension of bioadaptive behavior that varies between
focal goal-oriented adaptive behavior at one end, and flexible process-oriented behavior at the other. Piaget has put play into such a universal biological and psychological context wherein he sees it as one polarity of thought with the other polarity being the more directed kind. In his system it is play as assimilation versus imitation as accommodation. In Freidian theory this dimension is conceptualized as primary process versus secondary process. In educational practice it is said to be creative or undirected or associative thought versus critical or directed or controlled thought. Among these alternative conceptualizations, however, it is only the Freudian that gives a sense of the war between the worlds. Although that view is, as usual, unduly weighted by the data on trauma, it has the virtue of conceptualizing adaptation as constantly weighted in terms of one of these two polarities. It is one of the defects of Piaget's otherwise useful bipolar rendering of adaptation that nothing much happens on the assimilatory side. The outcome is always product and logic, and there is not much of an account of way of life or the job being done at the playful polarity (Sutton-Smith 1966). It is probable that this bioadaptive bipolar dimension of focal or flexible behavior is universal among human beings, but that it can be cast into various kinds of balances and imbalances according to the cultural overlay.

My present presentiment is that the cultural overlay is more culturally relative than the bioadaptive dimension just mentioned. Western industrial society has made us familiar with a sociological distinction between work and play. This value-laden bipolarity converted the flexibility polarity into play, meaning triviality, dilettantish variability, irresponsible naughtiness, idle chatter, and foolishness. The focal, alias work, polarity so crowded the lives of its believers with constraint and constriction, that David Riesman was led to suggest that the only room left for flexible exercise was in the evangelical and hell-ridden sermon. The essence of industrial society was to divide the world into things that are obligatory and focal versus things that are optional and flexible, and this distinction is still very much alive. There are, however, glimmers in the literature of quite other distinctions, showing implicitly that "bioadaptive flexibility" can become quite variably construed. For example, one can interpret a major relevant cultural dimension in Balinese society as described by Geertz (1971) as being one of the human versus the animal, with the "animal" being the flexible polarity. Alternatively, as in Adams's (1978) description of the Basotho, games and ritual can be seen as focal equilibrium and purposiveness and contrasted with the conflict, flexibility, and disequilibrium of war. In her studies of the play of Afro-American girls, Elizabeth Whatley (1978) has shown that even within the same playing ethnic group, a game of handclapping can be viewed as a highly collaborative effort, strictly group-goal-oriented as in the descriptions in Jones and Hawes (1972); whereas their jump rope games can be an occasion for cheating and conflict, for individualistic divergence and, if you will, flexibility. In the Basotho example both ritual and games are equilibrual. In Levi-Strauss (1966) the games serve the purpose of divergence and the rituals the purpose of convergence. These examples suggest that it is going to be difficult to even have the illusion of a single connotation for the cultural axis in our two-dimensional field for defining play. Should the cultural axis be optional-obligatory, profane-sacred, disequilibrium-equilibrual, normative-deviant, animal and human, autonomous-heteronomous, or play and work?

*Figure 1* introduces in schematic form some of the complexities with which play definition must contend.

Although there are insufficient data at hand to give any final verdict on the variety of possible combinations and permutations from different societies, clearly the definition of play is going to involve many
psychological dimensions as well as many cultural dimensions, clustered together into families of resemblance. The point being made here, however, is that at minimum play cannot be defined without taking both kinds of dimensions into account. The view that seems sensible is that the cultural dimensions provide the macro frames within which the psychological balances are cast for their culture-specific functions. Which is to say, it is preferable to talk of adaptation and of culture before talking of play. In talking of adaptation we have suggested one dimension, which varies between focal concentration and flexible reconsideration. And in talking of culture we have suggested that a dimension particularly appropriate for the Western scene is one that varies between obligatory and optional response. The word "play" in Western society more often has the connotations of the flexible and optional than of the focal and obligatory. On the other hand the definition of Western competitive games is usually that they are focal and optional (which is also Csikszentmihayli's definition of "flow," 1977). You choose to be in or out, but your attentions are highly focused in competitive games. Then again play is often both flexible and focal, but usually optional. Corinne Hutt's (1980) finding of great heart-rate variability in four-year-old children at play certainly suggests a situation where at one moment they are idling and at another concentrated. In both cases they are, of course, doing optional things. Sports are often obligatory and focal-like occupations, which is to be expected. Yet I remember that my greatest enjoyment when playing soccer for my university was not so much the game as it was the hours of practice where we dallied about kicking a ball back and forth in a great variety of ways. Here we had converted routine practice to flexible maneuvering. One finds a difference, often one between the sexes, in those who defend what children do as play, and those who defend what sportsmen do as play. In both play and sport there is relatively more optionality than in other cultural pursuits, and relatively greater freedom to move from the flexible to the focal and back during the activity. It is these various balances between the dimensions and the preferences for these balances in expressive activity that define what at
any given moment is being called play. In these terms play is particular balance between (say) focal-flexible psychological processes and obligatory-optional cultural behavior. There are intracultural as well as intercultural differences in the kinds of preference for kinds of balance of these functions.

SCHOOL AND SOCIETY

Given this present approach and our original assumption that our understanding of children is enhanced by our understanding of their outdoor play, it follows that we should be able to approach formal education with the use of these same dimensions. What balance is there in the school between focal and flexible adaptation, and between optional and obligatory activity? Just as we found different balances in operation in kinds of play, so we might expect to find a variety of patterns of informal-formal balance within schools and between schools and society.

In a sense the school of the nineteenth century with its emphasis on obligatory and focused work reproduced the values of what can be called the Scroogian Ethic of Play. In this ethic, obviously contrived for the victims of industrial society like Dick Cratchett, there is nothing but work. The struggle for redress, however, goes on by night, and in the form of nightmares finally catches up with Ebeneezer. His nightmares are flexible even if his daytime routines are not. And they deal with the dramatic subject matter of his wholesale victimization of the working class, until as it turns out, in his mind at least, the usual balance of work and play is overturned. Meanwhile among those of nineteenth century upper status, there is no such ideological attempt to reject entirely the flexible doing of the creative life of hunting and of sports. The man of substance may even be marked by his disdain for the focal and the obligatory twentieth century. Keynes once boasted that he spent only an hour a day at work, and the rest of his time in sensuous enjoyment. He was obviously a playful liar, but he caught the spirit of the upper class and the traditional "amateur" view (the Keynesian ethic). This latter view in its original form seems to invoke the cultural dimension of animal-human as much as any other. It was believed that the child as an animal could be trained if taken out to sports, or even if let out to recess. That jungle called recess has indeed been the major balance introduced by this century into the socializing of children in schools. Recess and afternoon games can be considered the first and primitive forms of recognition in our time that life between school and society can manifest a different balance than that recognized by Scrooge.

The Balance Inside the School

Increasingly in this century, however, there have been attempts to reconstruct life within the school to reflect a different balance between functions (focal-flexible; obligatory-optional). At the one extreme there is the A. S. Neill kind of solution that attempts to set aside almost everything that is obligatory (although then subtly introduces new kinds of obligation such as the deprecation of books). Mostly provision has been made in a more structured way for craft, drama, music, or art classes, or free periods, for cultural afternoons--any or all of which usually permit more flexible behaviors on the part of children. Sometimes these classes are themselves treated by the children as the jungle, and teaching is overwhelmed by flexible catharsis. Sometimes along with the art teachers, the children form a counter-culture within the school.
Wilson (1977), adopting Turner's dichotomy of structure and antistructure, has examined art classes to show that in some instances they have become the only place in the school apparatus where the children can be subversive, opt in or opt out, develop a spirit of community with extra-school activities such as playing and eating together, have a feeling of extended family, and have an esoteric discipline (art skills) and tradition as their model. As she says, "The primary contribution of this study lies not in the discovery of a means of enculturation of students in an art class, but in the demonstration of the substantial role of the anti-structural dimensions of education" (177).

Having given this example, however, I would hurry to add that although these kinds of school situations are not usually as mobile in their flexible framing as is play, they do have considerable malleability. In an educational project we (Sutton-Smith, Eadie, and Zarem 1978) have been engaged upon involving teaching children how to make films, some of the complexities that have arisen are as follows. The children who were volunteers to our Lower East Side workshop were dominantly of Spanish-speaking origin. From Chalfin's earlier work (1974) we might have expected that being of lower socioeconomic status, they would prefer to act in front of the camera and to do their editing in the camera at the time of shooting, rather than being technicians of the camera and cutting room. However, our teachers were middle class professionals and thought of teaching only in the middle class directorial sense. Without knowing it, and while trying to be as open as they could to permit the children's creativity to manifest itself, they nevertheless provided the traditional filmmaker's model for the children, in which editing and shooting (not acting) are the critical roles. In their own eyes they provided a frame of great flexibility, allowing children to choose their own film content; but unwittingly they provided a quite traditional technical model of how to use the frame. Chalfin, a student of Sol Worth, and an anthropologist, was very careful after teaching a technique, not to place his own value on its usage. In the content area, if not in the technical area, our children were permitted to introduce their own values. Their films were, as a result, predominantly about villainy, vampires, kung fu, and drug addicts. Furthermore, because this was an after-school club in a rather rough urban setting, the members were predominantly boys, and they favored working in groups on their movies. A masculine communitas of spirit was developed. So much so, that the few girls who did remain in the setting and did develop films, showed the same concern with macho themes, moderating them only to the traditional extent of having lovers or married persons murdered by the wandering vampires. So here we have a complex of overlapping cultural frames variously controlling the directions of the teachers and the children.

In yet another study in which we asked children for stories in response to a TAT picture card, or a Rorschach inkblot, or out of their own head, we even found that these frames in what was otherwise a very free situation made an enormous difference to their response. The more constraining the stimulus, the lower their level of response. They gave a structurally higher response to the free story request than to either the picture or the blot.

The point of these few examples is that the balances and results introduced even by creative programs are highly complex.

But if our arguments above have been sound, and if our reading of Turner on antistructure (1974a), Murphy on the dialectics of social action and alienation (1971), and Edgerton on deviance (1976) are not false, then what we are discussing here is not some marriage or catharsis between the focal work of the basics that must be accomplished and the flexible manifestations of individuality that must be permitted to occur in some...
noncentral "creative" byway; but instead a more fundamental re-examination of the focal-flexible optional-obligatory balance within the school system itself. Or as we shall call it for convenience henceforth, the informal-formal balance. For what the research on flexibility implies is that children who get the chance to "play with" what they have already learned in a routine way, then show more versatility in its use. As Chukovksky has said, it is difficult to know the full sense of a thing if you do not know the nonsense of it (1963). It does not seem, however, that this profound piece of wisdom has ever been systematically applied to education, which tends to think of sense and nonsense as quite distinct, just as it thinks of the focal and flexible as quite distinct (nonsense being only one species of the flexible).

In a way this is understandable. The school as a cultural system stands in opposition to the subculture of children, which is much more given over to the optional and the flexible, particularly those elements that children qua children share, and that clowns qua clowns would wish to extend in the lives of those around them. In consequence, quite often when "free periods" or "art classes" are introduced into schools and give a hitherto unavailable opportunity for the reconsideration of experience, there are times of considerable challenge to prior school-established rules and conventions of behavior. Although experienced teachers know how to weather these through until the new discipline and focus take over, most do not. In any case these exploratory periods are a part of establishing new boundaries for this "in-between" adult and child community that is being established. Which leads us to the conclusion that it is probably in classes that have their focus on the arts that there is a greater opportunity for effecting schooling in these novel aspects of framing. Because it is in the nature of the arts to permit self-representation a stronger hand, they are more amenable to the total variability of the child's adaptation. Although children must be focal to succeed here as anywhere else, they are allowed more flexibility in what they introduce and in their approach.

And yet having said that, the larger point to be made here is that what informal education teaches formal education primarily is that there is always some balance, that this balance is a part of mind and culture, and that it is better to understand it and to plan for it, than not to. Periods of art or periods of creativity are a kind of anstrever, but they cannot compare with the education that alternates across the same subject-matter, between the focal pursuit of skill and the flexible reconsideration of how that skill might be used. Ordinary spelling may be much more enjoyable as well as effective if it is sometimes followed by a game of lunatic spelling, that is, of course, in a school where this balance of autonomy-heteronomy is permitted both for teachers and children.

CONCLUSION

I have attempted to demonstrate that major theories of children's outdoor play reveal the social class biases of their originators. Most modern play theory is encapsulated in the individualism of Western philosophy, and its emphasis on the voluntary, the solitary, and the creative indicate its cultural relativity to those of higher economic status. The other kind of play theorizing, much defended but seldom made fully explicit, that play is a way of organizing and attenuating baser instincts through collective character-enhancing actions, has here been described as a reaction by those of upper status to their perception of the depraved and deprived behavior of the poor. They have sought to bring to bear the benefits of upper status recreative life and evolutionary theory to the problem of assimilating into the main stream members of immigrant and
impoverished groups.

The lessons to be drawn from this very schematic outline of a new sociology of play theory are from the scholar's point of view, that no description of play can ever be sufficient if it does not make explicit its cultural as well as its psychological assumptions. It is suggested further that anthropologists and psychologists have tended to cling to one or another of these dimensions as a sufficient description of the phenomenon at hand. The alternative is offered of always taking into account that there is some kind of psychological function of mind at work, but always within a specific and quite relative framework. Thus if our adaptive activity varies between focal-skill-acquiring activity and flexible reconsiderative activity as is here suggested, these kinds of adaptation will be variously apportioned culturally depending on other adaptive balances of the sacred and profane, obligatory and optional, equilibrial and disequilibrail, etc. This biocultural view of play has the advantage that it enables us to look at the educational process as a mesh of these dimensions giving varying allocations of these kinds of adaptations. It is suggested that there is some value in a more careful consideration of the balances that we do implicitly maintain.

REFERENCES


REFLECTIONS ON THE STATE OF THE ART
Four comments

My comments focus on two topical themes of this collection: continuity vs. discontinuity in children's lives, and the roles of folklore in education; and then on two aspects of the research reported here: researcher/educator collaboration and micro vs. macro levels of analysis.

CONTINUITY VS. DISCONTINUITY

One important theme is the question of continuity vs. discontinuity between aspects of children's lives outside and inside school. When considered from the child's point of view, this is the issue of "transitions" (the term being used by Jenny Cook and John Gumperz in their Berkeley School/Home Ethnography Project)--transitions that the child must make between home and school as well as between adjacent steps on the educational ladder (kindergarten to first grade; elementary to junior high school, etc.). When considered from the observer's point of view, the same phenomenon is often labeled "interference," but that term carries with it only a negative meaning. To borrow more completely from the field of second-language learning, we should recognize the possibility of positive as well as negative transfer, and seek to discover what a child knows from familiar situations that may make it either easier or harder to meet the interactional, as well as the cognitive, demands of the school.

This theme of interactional continuity/discontinuity is at least as old as the 1965 conference sponsored by the U.S. Office of Education that first brought together linguists, anthropologists, psychologists, and educators to talk about research needed to understand why schools were failing low-income and minority children. That conference led to the book *Functions of Language in the Classroom* (Cazden, John, and Hymes 1972), which in turn called for the kinds of research reported here.

One example of interactional discontinuity is Bauman's speculation about the effects of children's differential experience in asking and answering riddles: Do practice and enjoyment of this form of known-answer interrogation make it easier to cope with the demands of teacher-led lessons such as Mehan describes? Shultz, Florio, and Erickson compare participant
structures in a first grader's home and in his math lesson with respect to what constitutes an interruption: If a child comes from a home where "chiming in" is accepted conversational etiquette at meals, is it harder to learn not to chime in at school? On a more pervasive level, and with older children, Labov analyzes a profound conflict in values.

It is not hard to imagine how this value conflict could be a very serious source of school failure, particularly when we realize that the fifth grade -- when, as Labov reports, the peer group structure starts to exert its full influence -- is also when the achievement gap between richer and poorer children starts to widen, according to the California State legislative analyst (Palo Alto Times, 11/3/78). Because the first two examples of discontinuity may seem of much smaller significance -- different ways of interacting that could be easily taught and learned -- it is important to consider how they may exemplify powerful impediments to learning, especially in young children.

In discussing the effects of this continuity, we usually focus on children's differential understanding of how to display their knowledge and skills in appropriate form and at appropriate times, and on the resulting public identities they accumulate as more or less competent students. But it is also possible, though much less well documented, that differential degrees of familiarity with interactional settings can either facilitate or disrupt more basic cognitive processes. In other words, characteristics of settings may affect not only what children say and do, but even what comes into their minds. I will try to be specific about this hypothesis, though admittedly in a speculative fashion. To start with, it seems obvious that different participant structures make different cognitive demands, for instance on memory. In simple terms, if one can chime in, there is less strain on memory than if one has to wait for a turn to speak. We have probably all had experience with very young children who, when asked not to interrupt a grown-up conversation, complain (often with tears) that they'll forget what they were going to say. We adults have such problems too, but we have learned ways of coping with them. Think of an academic seminar where we are asked to go around the room introducing ourselves and our work. If the introduction is not already well practiced, we hardly hear the introductions that precede us, preoccupied as we are with internal rehearsals of our own forthcoming speech. In discussions where turns are not so predictable, we also often rehearse a question or comment for the time when we can get the floor. Discourse skills are involved as well as memory, because if we have to wait so long for a turn that the conversational topic has shifted beneath us, we introduce the comment so it still seems relevant: "I want to go back to something X said. . . ." Children are not so skilled at either internal rehearsals or such topical tying. So it is not surprising that the quality of being relevant figures prominently in teachers' assessments of children's language ability in school; e.g., in one California school system (reported in Cazden, et al. 1977) and by the teachers in one Washington, D.C. school (Griffin and Shuy forthcoming).

This strain on memory characterizes all turn-taking structures in typical school lessons. My hunch is that the cognitive load increases when the interactional situation is unfamiliar. A member of the Gumperz project research staff noted striking confusions in the behavior of first graders when a substitute teacher was in charge (Sarah Michaels, personal communication, 11/78): Because the substitute did not conduct the daily routines in the familiar ways of the classroom teacher, the children were disoriented; they didn't know where or when they were. One child asked, "Have we had sharing?" soon after it was finished. Another said, "We didn't do the calendar" after it had in fact been done. One child even asked, "Is it morning or afternoon?" And several children started to put
up their chairs (appropriate only at the end of the day) at earlier times. These confusions may be of more than superficial importance. Having one's focal attention, one's cognitive processing space, fully available for learning may be facilitated, especially in young children, by being in an environment so familiar that procedural knowledge is invoked routinely in the background of subsidiary attention. In other words, what Williams (1977) calls the "sociology of consciousness" should consider not only the development of consciousness over periods of an individual life or a historical period (as in the work of Soviet psychologists Luria and Vygotsky and the less familiar Volosinov 1973), but also a more momentary triggering or accessing effect of the situation on consciousness as well. Perhaps the clearest example of such an accessing effect is immersion in an environment where a language is spoken that one once knew but had thought totally forgotten for five, ten, or even twenty years. Somehow, one's memory of that language, or access to it, is changed dramatically within hours of getting off the plane.

Descriptive research on continuities and discontinuities is essential, but it does not itself guide us in their use. Certainly it is too simple to say that we should make school as much as possible like home. We know that all human beings, even young children, are capable of coping with differential demands, and of switching their response styles—e.g., from one language to another—with finely tuned appropriateness. By definition, we can consider three possible relationships between any two situations. One is the relationship of interference, or negative transfer: something that the child knows or values interferes with what the school is trying to teach. Second is a neutral, or parallel, relationship: the two situations, although different, co-exist separately in the child's world, neither seriously interfering nor enhancing each other. Third is positive transfer, where one can design a learning environment so as to activate children's energies, competencies, and preferences for the goals of the school. In our descriptive research, we seem to look first for the first kind, but it is the third kind that we must eventually learn how to create.

It was that third kind that Labov (personal communication, April 1978) saw in one of the tapes of peer teaching from the same San Diego classroom described by Mehan (Cazden, Cox, Dickinson, Steinberg, and Stone 1979). Viewing an episode in which a third grade black girl, Leola, is the assigned tutor, Labov suggested that it was the conflict between Leola and her male tutees that finally energized one of them, Wallace, to figure out for himself how to do the assigned reading task. To play the game of trying to put someone else down. Wallace learned the academic content. The Hawaiian English project, developed by Gerald Dykstra and imported into California as the Aloha program, uses the peer group as a positive context for learning, building a social tradition out of the transmission of information from child to child.

Unfortunately, we have very few case studies of attempts to design learning environments for such positive transfer. The Hawaiian English project seems to be such an example, but to my knowledge no one has described what happens in those classrooms in these terms. Shirley Heath refers to her own work in South Carolina, but a detailed report is not yet available (Heath 1982). The fullest description that I know of is of another Hawaiian program, the Kamehameha Early Education Project (Jordan, et al. 1977; Gallimore, Tharp, and Speidel 1978).

In trying to design a program that would foster school success in "educationally-at-risk Hawaiian children," Jordan, et al. found that applying information on children's out-of-school life was a complex process. They give examples of all three relationships listed above. Some patterns of behavior had to be reversed, so that children reared in a
Some patterns seemed neutral in their effects on education: For example, instruction did not have to be "creolized" to match the children's dialect. And some patterns turned out to be positively applicable, notably in a successful reading program that emphasized comprehension rather than phonic style of "talk-story." With such changes, the reading scores of the first grade Hawaiian children rose from an average of the 19th percentile in the preceding three years to the 69th percentile in the 4th year.

Jordan, et al. conclude:

The question is, which cultural data will be relevant for what kinds of classroom situation--and if relevant, should familial cultural behavioral patterns be encouraged, ignored, or reversed? Anthropologists are not yet at the point where predictions and situations can be specified in enough detail to provide such advice; and classroom teachers and educators are similarly not certain enough about teaching and learning situations to specify what from the cultural/community settings may be effective in helping children learn. The answers to person-by-situation issues such as these can only come from an interaction between classroom experiments and ethnographic interpretations and question-generation between educators and cultural and behavioral researchers.

In his comments on this program, Erickson asks:

What are the least changes in the nature of the situation (... construed as social interactional environments of learning and information transfer) which release performance among kids that manifest their underlying linguistic and cognitive competence?

(included in Jordan, et al. 1977; emphasis in the original)

More specifically, Erickson asks for analysis of the nature of the formal changes that create such functional equivalence. In the case of the Kamehameha reading groups, is it a change in the teacher's speed of interaction, her wider range of intonation, the possibility of co-narration--to suggest just three possibilities? We desperately need a series of case studies of efforts to diagnose and treat learning environments themselves, toward the end of learning how to create--in the felicitous words of the LAU Remedies (Cazden and Leggett 1981)--more culturally responsive education.

FOLKLORE AND EDUCATION

A newer theme in a book on educational research is the roles of folklore in education. The 1978 special double issue of Keystone Folklore, journal of the Pennsylvania Folklore Society, on "Folklore and Education" is an expression of current interest in the topic and, in the excellent 30-page annotated bibliography, a review of past work also. As both this issue and the present volume make clear, the study of folklore can provide analytical tools for investigating important educational issues. An example of such analysis in the 1978 volume is Cazden and Hymes's article on "Narrative thinking and story-telling rights: A folklorist's clue to a critique of education." The article is a discussion of the differential acceptability in certain educational settings of narrative and nonnarrative modes of clarifying meaning, and extends Hymes's discussion of alternative
modes of presentation in this volume. Briefly, Hymes recounts the experience of one of his students, Joanne Bromberg Ross, in a women's consciousness-raising group in which narratives of personal experience "solved the problem of differentiating two kinds of 'strength' (one good, one bad), when direct definition had floundered. The second mode of language use continued the purpose of the first, coming successfully to its rescue." This example of the importance of narratives as a way of clarifying meaning is contrasted with examples from my own experience at Harvard of a pervasive, I think, in formal education generally and felt most strongly by working class and Third World students—to substitute questions and arguments based on written texts for those based on personal experience. In his extended comments on these examples, Hymes develops the lesson for students of folklore:

If differential treatment of narrative experience plays an important role in present educational practice, then folklore can claim a special place in the study and change of education in this regard. (Cazden and Hymes 1978:21)

The study of folklore can provide curriculum content as well as analytical tools. This has not been emphasized in this collection, so I want to report several such efforts.

Traditionally, children's lore is often included in readers and other curriculum materials. To mention just three examples: The primary level of Interaction, the integrated language arts program created by James Moffett (for Houghton Mifflin), includes a booklet of Jump rope jingles and other useful rhymes with activity cards that encourage children to tell and write their own; this booklet was a favorite of Leola and the other black girls in my San Diego classroom. Castro (1971) describes how, as a speech-improvement teacher in a Brooklyn school, she collected games and rhymes from her pupils and used them to develop creative dramatics. In a larger research and development effort, a supplementary language arts program of chants, jump rope activities, riddles, and trading-time activities called Pass It On was developed by Bauman's Children's Folklore Project at the Southwest Educational Development Laboratory.

What does the inclusion of such traditional materials in the curriculum accomplish? For Pass It On we have the observations of a noted educational evaluator, Michael Scriven, and his team of observers. They praised the curriculum for its power to engage the attention and participation of early elementary schoolchildren. girls as well as boys:

[In the jump rope activities] we saw perhaps the most noticeable tendency toward producing social change in the children's behaviors. There was a widespread antipathy towards jump rope games by the boys when they were first introduced, but it was an antipathy that rapidly evaporated and almost universally turned into a highly participatory experience. [The handclap games] were also very successful, although—it was our impression—it was for a rather smaller number of the students. This is as good a time as any to stress the very successful integration of kinesthetic with cognitive and affective dimensions in this program. (Scriven n.d.:12)

It is not surprising that such materials stimulate and reinforce group participation and identification. Bernstein (1971b) stressed that function of traditional lore in children's lives.
But Bernstein (1971a) also cautioned that loosening the boundaries between community knowledge and school opens more of children's lives to adult social control. An example of what can happen appears in Scriven's notes:

The other grave implication can best be expressed in terms of a discussion I had with one boy [about how he had been first to raise his hand and then had been thrown out for telling a "Polish joke"]. The teacher was neither prepared nor able spontaneously to handle this intrusion of racism into riddling. (Scriven n.d.:25)

Concerns about such social control were expressed in discussion at this conference--concerns about the "neutering of folklife" and the "colonization of children's culture." In raising this issue, neither those who spoke from the floor nor I intend to condone racism in any form. But in education, neither punishing the performer nor laundering the texts seems likely to help.

Children's folklore is not the only possible folklore content in education. In social studies curricula, folklore can be a powerful addition to local history, both together perhaps an essential ingredient for true cultural pluralism. The contrasting experiences of a children's camp in upstate New York and a textbook controversy in West Virginia are instructive here. Both involved conflicts--potential or actual--between a conservative, white, rural culture and more radical, interracial, urban culture.

Even though I am not a folklorist, it so happens that my first experience working with children, in the summer of 1945, was at a remarkable children's camp that made folklore and local history the core of its program. Camp Woodland, an interracial camp, founded and directed by Norman Studer, existed for twenty years in the 1940s and 50s near Woodstock, New York, in the upper Catskill Mountains. City children from New York City--middle income children who could pay, and poor children sent by a union who could not--spent eight weeks exploring the life and lore of Ulster and Delaware counties. They took trips to try on the Calico Indian costumes worn by ancestors of the camp's neighbors in Andes during the Down-Rent Wars of the 1840s; they dug about in the ruins of a Spanish-Jewish community at Sholam, 1837-42; they visited the house in Hurley where the great abolitionist Sojourner Truth had been born a slave; they learned traditional songs and tall tales, kept alive in the lumber camps, from elderly itinerant workers, farmers, and forest rangers. Then, counselors and campers together wove these materials into plays and cantatas and festivals and performed them in the churches and grange halls of the local communities whose lives they portrayed. In Studer's words in the 1946 camp yearbook, Neighbors:

The reason why we've been able to make ourselves part of the larger community is that we have undertaken an important service for the people of the region. We have taken upon ourselves the job of recovering whatever we can of the folk heritage of the Catskill region and making it known to the people.

No one ever did any research on the effects of this one institution that came to life for only two months each summer. But circumstantial evidence is strong. Many of the campers and counselors went on to work in history, folklore, anthropology, and education--Richard Bauman and I among them. And the community was changed too. The strength of the
Camp's roots in the local community were tested at the end of the summer of 1955, when Studer was called before a "McCarthyite" committee of the New York state legislature investigating charitable organizations. He returned from that committee hearing late on the evening of the final banquet and spoke openly about the hearing, and about his refusal to testify, to banquet guests who represented a cross-section of rural America: minister, lumberman, real estate man, church worker, local historian, blacksmith, and a number of farmers and their wives. These neighbors spontaneously told of their personal experiences with the camp--of its interracial staff and children, and of its dedication, in the words of one neighbor, to "teaching the history and folklore of everyday life [that is] teaching real Americanism." The evening and the summer ended as we joined in singing together "Friends and Neighbors," a song collected at camp, originally written decades earlier about a local jail incident, but accruing to it in that moment of performance a new meaning:

Friends and neighbors, I'm going for to leave you.
I have no doubt that you think it is strange.
But God be pleased, I never have robbed,
Neither have I done any wrong.

The camp continued, stronger than ever, until it ended several years later for quite other reasons. In one article, Studer (1962) describes briefly his educational philosophy about the use of folklore to aid in the development of roots in the region and roots in one's own group, and to be a bridge between peoples. Unfortunately, he died in October 1978, while still at work on a book-length documentation of the camp's work. I hope that the book can be completed and published.

This positive picture of the effects of including local history and folklore in the curriculum is highlighted by a contrasting account of a controversy over language arts textbooks that might have had a happier outcome if such local material had been available. The goals of language arts and English education have always included the humanizing influence of the intensifications of experience provided by literature. This humanizing effect can be accomplished most effectively for all children if the literary selections include writings by and about diverse peoples, and newer texts do include a greater diversity of characters, cultures, and language varieties. But change toward a more pluralistic view of American life sometimes erupts into controversy, as in 1974 in Kanawa County, West Virginia.

Kanawa County includes the state capital, Charleston, but is otherwise largely rural Appalachian in culture. In 1974, the school board, the curriculum advisory council they appointed, and the top professional educators all represented the more educated, middle-class urban population. And a county-wide consolidation of schools in which more than fifty schools had been closed in the ten years between 1964 and 1974 produced increasingly centralized bureaucratic control. In the face of overwhelming control of education policies beyond the local community, the rural people fought for what they saw as a threat to their children and their traditions in a battle over words in books.

In the spring of 1974, language arts and English texts were selected by a committee of professional educators, in accordance with state curriculum guidelines requiring the selection of books "which depict and illustrate the inter-cultural character of our pluralistic society." A year-long protest ensued over two of the series selected: Communicating (gds. 1-6) by Morton Botel and John Dawkins, published by D.C. Heath; and Interaction (gds. 4-12) published by Houghton Mifflin. The protest was both about the parents' right to participate in textbook selection and about particular
writings in the books the professionals had chosen. Objections were made to writings by Eldridge Cleaver, Langston Hughes, and Malcolm X, among others; to the inclusion of Bible stories as "myths"; and to suggested assignments that would bring personal experience and home lives into the classroom. At the opening of school in September 1974, a school boycott was organized and 4,500 coal miners in Kanawa and neighboring counties walked out of the mines in sympathy. Violence broke out, and disruptions in the schools and communities continued throughout the 1974-75 school year. In the final resolution, the disputed texts were removed from the classrooms, and the goals of language arts and English were narrowed to an emphasis on skills.

Ironically, Kanawa County has its own radical labor history. But those local roots of social criticism were not represented in the nationally compiled texts. For example, there is no mention in these books of "Mother" Mary Jones—a woman born in Ireland in 1830 who became a charismatic labor organizer in West Virginia's bituminous coal fields. We cannot know whether giving an honored place to Mother Jones in Appalachian schools would have made the words of other people's leaders like Eldridge Cleaver or Malcolm X more understandable. But such a controversy forces us to realize that true cultural pluralism cannot be standardized and legislated from the top down. It must be grounded in respect accorded to very particular traditions in each local community. The active study of local history and folklore in school may thus be a critically important supplement to an otherwise increasingly standardized, nationally packaged, curriculum. From such a base, the experience of Camp Woodland suggests that it is then easier to build bridges of understanding and respect for the particular traditions of other peoples as well. 2

RESEARCHER/EDUCATOR COLLABORATION

The conference from which this volume derives was itself a researcher/educator dialogue, and some of the research reported here was carried on with the active collaboration of classroom teachers. At the end of his article, Mehan reviews the many arguments for such collaboration, but we know little about specific benefits or problems it actually brings. At the Institute for Research on Teaching at Michigan State, Charlotte Kennedy is conducting a systematic study of teacher-researcher interaction in projects all around the country, "attempting to describe the characteristics of collaboration and interaction that most often lead to professional and personal growth for teachers" (IRT Notes and News, 6/16/78). Until her report is available, we are left with fragmentary comments and impressions.

First, about the benefits. One researcher, Susan Florio, and the teacher in the Shultz, et al. study, Martha Walsh, have talked publicly about their work together:

One of the first areas of joint discovery for teacher and researcher... concerned the idea of educational "change." The issue of whether the research intended to change anything in the classroom was a problem for both teacher and researcher. Since so many strangers enter classrooms to engage in some sort of intervention, the role of participant observer implied that change might be one goal of the project. However, ideas about the complexity of behavior and about what might be meant by "change" grew and were refined in the teacher/research dialogue almost from the outset. In fact, thoughts about change
became more modest during the course of the study than they had been at the beginning. The teacher was not seen as someone in need of a "treatment"; and the researcher, who became in time less an outsider, is not seen as a conventional agent of change.

The task for the researcher... was to become more and more a part of the scene. She was continually asking, looking, and being with the children. Yet it was important for her to be both "stranger and friend,"... preserving a kind of "double vision" that enabled her to account in some larger arena for how and why things make sense to those members in the ways they did. For the teacher, the task was curiously reversed. She was continually immersed in the fray, and, like many other teachers, experienced loneliness and frustration in that immersion. The teacher learned gradually to look at her classroom problems not only with the company of her researcher colleague, but to reflect on those problems using more of the perspective and techniques demonstrated by the new colleague. She reflected on what she thought, did, and absolutely knew about her class. She was an insider gaining some internal distance on her role. She was thus able, at certain moments, to see the familiar in a new way. (Florio and Walsh 1981:93-94)

Sometimes, in addition to a new kind of reflectivity, the teacher gets insight into more specific problems. Martha Walsh (personal communication, November 1978) described how at one point she was worried about being inconsistent in her demands on her children, for example in whether children were or were not allowed to interrupt when she was working with small groups. I intuitively feel that consistency in supplying clear cues to the children about what is expected must be a critical aspect of the learnability of new patterns of behavior. The nature of cues is important too, and some of the often mocked, exaggerated intonation patterns of primary school teachers, and their accompanying nonverbal behaviors, may be adaptive in this regard—as they are in speech to even younger children (Sachs 1977; Garnica 1977). But consistency is necessarily relative to changing contexts within the classroom, so its analysis opens up all the questions about "when is a context" (Erickson and Shultz 1977). Susan and Martha together were able to figure out that Martha was actually being consistent, or "consistently inconsistent" as they came to call it, when instructional events were segmented into phases (as in Shultz, Florio, and Erickson, this volume), and then individual children were also taken into account.

Some of the most important insights for a teacher come from what Carrasco (1979) calls "expanded awareness" of the competencies of individual children. I personally realized this effect as I worked with graduate students on the analysis of peer teaching episodes taped in San Diego. With two children, especially, there were marked differences between the picture of the child that emerged from the official, teacher-led part of the classroom day, and the picture that emerged from the activities that the children carried on out of the teacher's awareness but had been caught for later viewing on tape. For example, Leola (one of the third-grade black students) was almost silent in the teacher-led lessons that Mehan analyzed. Yet, she did a fine job as tutor, teaching a difficult language arts task and handling potentially troublesome peers (Cazden, Cox, Dickinson, Steinberg, and Stone 1979). A first-grade Chicano child in that same classroom, Veronica, was also quiet in the lessons, in part probably because she was then just
becoming bilingual; yet she does a remarkable job in teaching an English spelling lesson, in Spanish, to a bilingual peer, complete to exaggeratedly crisp pronunciation of English consonants (Carrasco, Vera, and Cazden 1981).

Because these peer teaching analyses were done after I had left San Diego, they could not influence my ongoing relationships with the children. But Carrasco (1979) has documented a very short teacher-researcher collaboration that led to the teacher's expanded awareness of one child's potential in a matter of days after the tape was made, and then to significant long range changes in the child's behavior. Briefly, Carrasco arranged a spring visit to a bilingual kindergarten in Santa Barbara to study teacher praise. Early in his stay, one of the aides told him that it was too bad he couldn't capture on videotape how Chicano children "really speak." Out of curiosity, Carrasco did such taping, including taping Lupita, whom the teacher had "written off" as a child who was so far behind in reading skills that she should be retained in kindergarten another year. He happened to catch Lupita doing an excellent job, out of the teacher's awareness, of managing a small group working on puzzles and helping children who had trouble with them. He immediately shared the tape with the teacher, who said, "I'm going to have to suspend my assessment of Lupita till I get a closer look at her." Because Carrasco then returned to Harvard, there is no taped record of how the teacher's behavior toward Lupita changed, but we know from Carrasco's interviews with the teacher that she and the aides started working actively with Lupita, and encouraged her leadership abilities. In the last month of the school year, Lupita's score on a kindergarten readiness test jumped so significantly that she was passed on to a first grade; and at last report (Carrasco, personal communication, November, 1978) she was active in academic activities and generally a "model student." This experience affected not only the teacher's awareness of Lupita but her ways of thinking about all her children.

Of course, it is not possible for each teacher to have a researcher close at hand. And some of these benefits of enhanced reflectivity on a teacher's own actions, and expanded awareness of her children, can be fulfilled by teachers becoming observers, ethnographers if you will, for each other. At the end of their article, Florio and Walsh anticipate such a relationship:

If teachers were to share in the process of classroom inquiry in the absence of a trained ethnographer, it is not difficult to imagine that they could become eyes and ears for each other on a continuing basis, using both their member knowledge and the techniques of field research. They would work together as peers, avoiding the awkward tendency of researchers from the outside to take or have attributed to them more power or authority than the teachers with whom they work. Teachers working together could become sources of idea exchange and dialogue for one another in creatively thinking about classroom problems. (1981:101)

Separate from the gain to teachers themselves from such collaboration, there is the contribution that the teacher's intuitions as a "native" can make to more formal analysis. Here it is easiest for me to speak from my own experience, and recount one point at which the hunch of the teacher as participant seemed to make a difference. During the school year when "Bud" Mehan and I were collaborating, we met regularly each week to talk about life in our classroom and look at the videotapes that were being made. During those meetings, Bud presented his beginning analyses of
the early lessons, but I was so preoccupied with plans for the next day that I don't think I paid much attention to the details.

The next year, back at Harvard, I put my copies of the videotapes on a high shelf and became immersed in my normal university routine. It wasn't until well into the winter, when a small group working on classroom research assembled informally at UCSD, that I got mentally reinvolved with Bud's analysis.

At that point, as I remember it, he had worked out the 2- and 3-part sequences of teacher Initiation, child Response, and (sometimes) teacher-Evaluation. The more I thought about that structural description, the more incomplete it seemed. If that was the whole story, one could assemble those sequences in any order: clearly, in terms of topic, that wasn't true. Moreover, there was a question on the table from Jeffrey Shultz about why an evaluation component was sometimes present and sometimes not. While there in San Diego, I borrowed a transcript of one of the lessons and a large scroll of paper, and tried my hand at an analysis of these lessons for the first (and only) time. When we reassembled the next day, I had a glimmer, on a very messy chart, of larger structures, longer sequences of talk that started with markers in the teacher's speech like Now and ended eventually with an evaluation—but only after the Initiation received its appropriate response. Then I went back to Harvard. When Bud and I met again, later that same spring, he had the rest of the structure all worked out—extended sequences and topically relevant sets—all far more elegant than I had dared to imagine.

The final picture of this hierarchical organization rings very true to me. But, in Mehan's kind of research, proof of the validity of this analysis rests completely on behavioral evidence visible and audible on the videotapes: regularities in the talk; such as when Evaluations occur; co-occurring changes in interactional features like posture and pace; the occurrence of side-sequences at certain junctures and not at others. My original participant's hunch is now completely irrelevant. How important it was heuristically in the discovery—as opposed to the proof—is harder to say. I think Mehan would have found those larger units anyway—because he would have been driven by his commitment to a comprehensive analysis to find an explanation for seeming irregularities in the analysis up to that point; and because non-Markovian structures that extend contingency relationships across nonadjacent units were as familiar to him from the sociological concept of reflexive tying as they were to me from transformational grammar. But the participant's intuition may have shortened the discovery process.

Collaboration between researchers and teachers brings problems as well as insights. One problem is the matter of intergroup communication. We feel some of the discontinuity that we worry about with children. In our own professional groups—of anthropologists, folklorists, teachers, or administrators—we all learn special vocabularies, special ways of talking about the world of children and teachers and schools, and it is not immediately easy to communicate effectively across those group boundaries. We are one instance of a larger problem of cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural communication. I'm not trying to dismiss the problem by seeing it as an example of a larger one. But I do want educators to understand that it is not only they who have trouble. More effective communication is something we all have to work on—by being willing, as speakers, to translate our ideas into other terms and, by being open, as listeners, to the insights that a new label for a familiar event may bring.

Another problem that has been voiced comes from our different time frames. Teachers and administrators are understandably preoccupied with what to do on "Monday morning" (in San Diego, I was too): while
researchers often resent being pressed for answers on those terms. The story that Margaret Mead told, in her keynote address at this conference on Ethnography and Education about the Broad Street Pump has a moral for us all. As she told it, a typhoid epidemic in London was stopped when a doctor, who didn't know where typhoid came from but who did notice that everyone who drank from a certain pump got sick, simply took the pump handle off. Teachers are like that doctor; they've got real problems and they've got to act; that is, the immediate time frame. But we're all doomed to running 'round taking off pump handles unless there are some people who are studying the water and trying to figure out why it is making people sick in the first place. That is the longer time frame. There needs to be time and support for both kinds of work. One of the problems in educational research like this is that when somebody is talking about how to examine the water, someone else is worrying about the pump handle that has to be turned on Monday morning. There is a natural impatience within each group when the other group's question is being discussed. Some of this impatience is inevitable, but we can try to be as clear as possible about what kind of question—shorter or longer range—is going to be discussed at each point on a collaborative agenda.

A more specific problem that may arise when micro-analyses of teacher behavior are carried out in a context of researcher/educator collaboration is the problem of self-consciousness. Again, I turn to Margaret Mead. She asked a very important question about who should learn what ethnographers find out, especially about what Sapir calls "the unconscious patterning of behavior in society." Sapir himself expressed the same concern. Here's his final paragraph.

No matter where we turn in the field of social behavior, men and women do what they do, and cannot help but do, not merely because they are built thus and so, or possess such and such differences of personality, or must needs adapt to their immediate environment in such and such a way in order to survive at all, but very largely because they have found it easiest and aesthetically most satisfactory to pattern their conduct in accordance with more or less clearly organized forms of behavior which no one is individually responsible for, which are not clearly grasped in their true nature, and which one might almost say are as self-evidently imputed to the nature of things as the three dimensions are imputed to space. It is sometimes necessary to become conscious of the forms of social behavior in order to bring about a more serviceable adaptation to changed conditions, but I believe it can be laid down as a principle of far-reaching application that in the normal business of life it is useless and even mischievous for the individual to carry the conscious analysis of his cultural patterns around with him. That should be left to the student whose business it is to understand these patterns. A healthy unconsciousness of the forms of socialized behavior to which we are subject is as necessary to society as is the mind's ignorance, or better unawareness, of the workings of the viscera to the health of the body. In great works of the imagination form is significant only insofar as we feel ourselves to be in its grip. It is unimpressive when divulged in the explicit terms of this or that simple or complex arrangement of known elements. So, too, in social behavior, it is not the overt forms that rise readily to the surface of attention that are most worth our while. We must learn to take joy in the larger freedom of loyalty to thousands of subtle patterns of behavior that we can never hope to understand in explicit...
terms. Complete analysis and the "conscious control" that comes with a complete analysis are at best but the medicine of society, not its food. We must never allow ourselves to substitute the starving calories of knowledge for the meat and bread of historical experience. This historic experience may be theoretically knowable, but it dare never be fully known in the conduct of daily life. (1951:558-559)

Earlier, Sapir speaks of the "restless attempt [of the contemporary mind] to drag all forms of behavior into consciousness and to apply the results of its fragmentary or experimental analysis to the guidance of conduct" (p. 549). As Margaret Mead suggested, current pressures strengthening this "restless attempt" come from the positive ethic of democratizing expert knowledge (e.g., Miller 1969); and, I would add, from the equally serious concern about the dangers of deception. But even Sissela Bok in her fine book, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (1978) accepts limitations on the truth that one must tell; the ethical imperative not to deceive does not always require telling all we know.

In raising this question, I want to make clear that I am not criticizing microethnographic research, nor proposing any limits to scientific inquiry on human interaction in education or anywhere else (cf. Daedalus 1978). Nor am I at this point joining my Harvard colleague, David Cohen, in his fundamental questioning of the assumption underlying most R&D efforts to improve education that the best way to improve practice was to decompose it into the analytical language of social science; this done, and the keys to sound practice understood, the knowledge could be reconstructed and communicated in new form to other practitioners (1977:3)

though his arguments, and his contrast between social science and "craft," are provocative. But my focus here is more limited.

My concern first is for the teacher whose behavior is being analyzed. Perhaps recounting a personal experience will help. In Mehan's analysis of my behavior in San Diego, he discovered that to help hold the floor for certain children (often younger children or others who didn't speak very often) I would walk over nearer them and maintain very direct eye contact. I was aware that I wanted to do everything possible to give them a chance, but I was not aware of actions taken to carry this out. As Sapir points out, what knowledge we do have of the patterning of our own behavior is more of its function than of its form. One day, back at Harvard, I found myself doing exactly the same thing in my Child Language class when a black student who had not spoken before raised his hand from the back row. "Oh," I said to myself, "that's what Bud was talking about." And I almost wished such understanding had stayed out of awareness. One problem with becoming aware of forms of behavior that are normally run-off out of awareness is that such knowledge can be disruptive to smooth execution. (See many discussions of skilled performance, e.g., Polanyi 1964.) Another problem, the one that I felt, is that once formal aspects of behavior are uncoupled from the functions that they tacitly serve, they are available for manipulation--for deliberate enactment separate from the intentions that they supposedly express. At least temporarily, knowing more about what I was doing, I was less sure about why...

Sapir's, I think, the answer: "It is sometimes necessary to become conscious of the forms of social behavior in order to bring about a more serviceable adaptation to changed conditions" (p. 558), or in his blunter words, analysis and conscious control "are at best but the
medicine of society, not its food." In other words, where all is going well, we as researchers needn't tell all we know. When patterns of behavior need to be changed, then temporary self-consciousness may be the price.

But then my second concern arises: When help is needed, when feedback is to be given, what is the most helpful level of description for the practitioner? I am very sure that it is not necessarily the level of description of the original analysis. Howard (1977) presents an instructive contrast between the language used by scientists to describe the anatomy and physiology of the singing voice and the language used by vocal coaches to help singers improve their tone. The two descriptions of propositional knowledge on the one hand and procedural knowledge on the other are not even about the same thing: Scientists describe the vocal organs; vocal coaches describe the resulting tones as heard by the ear. And the ways of using language differ as well: In contrast to the "theoretical jargon" of the scientists, which is fully and literally defined, the "technical jargon" of the vocal coach and other craftsmen has very different characteristics:

a mostly ad hoc selection of metaphoric usages of terms and phrases borrowed from ordinary discourse the special meanings of which are drawn from the specific activities in question. The singer's vocabulary of "registers" and "breaks," "chest" and "head" voices, "cover," "placement" and "support," to mention just a few conspicuous items, is an excellent source of examples of technical jargon.

... by and large an action directed language the aims of which are to direct, discriminate, identify and classify... indispensable for communication about the details of one's efforts and their results from a practical standpoint.

... its terms are indexical pointers the meanings of which, like color terms, are "defined" by experience rather than equivalent, synonymous phrases. This is consistent with the primary aim of such discourse which is to induce the relevant perceptions and actions and only secondarily to describe and explain them. (Howard 1977:160, emphasis in the original)

To give examples from other domains, in teaching a motor skill such as square dance swinging, I have found it more helpful to use the metaphor of making your feet go "like a scooter" than to detail the component motions of each foot in turn. And it is reported that

... when Pablo Casals wants a certain rhapsodical kind of expression and exhorts his musicians to "play Jewish," his appeal to their intuition is more effective and more intelligent in this instance than trying to communicate with scientific precision. (Review of Casals, Joy and Sorrows, by Donald Hanahan, New York Times Book Review, 4/12/70, p. 7)

One aspect of all these metaphorical terms is that they direct attention to a quality of the intended goal, not to the formal means for accomplishing it. What would be the analogous language for communicating about teaching as a craft? I hope that is one of the questions that Cohen will address.

One final caution about a possible misuse of micro levels of analysis by supervisors and teacher trainers. Ray McDermott, who has done a very
detailed analysis of the behavior of a teacher and children in reading lessons (1976), reports (personal communication, May, 1978) that teachers viewing his tapes react with discussions about how to organize to get the reading job done. Administrators, on the other hand, notice a new set of discrete behaviors—the hand waving of the children or the posture of the teacher or whatever—that they can look for (and even count) the next time they enter a classroom. I am sure that microethnographers have no intention of providing yet another set of behaviors for competency-based training or assessment of teachers; and we just have to keep insisting that there is no one-to-one correspondence between any particular behavior and an educational outcome, apart from the integration of behaviors into an intentional and interactional whole.

MICRO VS. MACRO LEVELS OF RESEARCH

In her first address to the American Educational Research Association as Director of NIE (April 1978), Patricia Graham cautioned educational researchers not to oversell what education and educational research are likely to accomplish. Being a historian, she reminded her audience that in colonial America, education was supposed to bring salvation, and she suggested that even AERA members would have a hard time evaluating that outcome. When I was in a teacher education program at Bank Street in 1946-47, right after World War II, it was widely believed that education was going to bring peace. According to UNESCO's slogan, "wars are made in the minds of men"; and since education influences minds, some believed we could keep the world free from war by what happened in schools. I don't think many people believe that today. And I'm afraid schools alone can't solve serious problems of equity in our society either.

But our chances to make a significant contribution to these problems—as matters for social as well as educational policy—will depend on our finding ways to link more micro analyses of face-to-face educational interactions with more macro analyses of the society in which they take place. Shirley Heath expresses this concern well in her paper (this volume, p. 39):

To gain a dynamic view of education, we need to coordinate microethnography in the classroom with the study of communities and other institutions related to the school. The continuum from community to school, from school boards to schools past and present, should be units of study that reveal processes of change. Without special attention to the need for a diachronic perspective, there is the danger that research that focuses on the minutiae of streams of behavior will seem to portray behavior in closed, fixed, repetitive frames. A given mode of activity will be viewed as reinforcing others in such a way as to perpetuate itself within the social organization of behavior. Exclusive focus on this type of research reinforces the "fallacy of the ethnographic present," that is, the belief that observed conditions are static and not subject to influences from beyond the immediacy of the social organization of the institutionalized moments, e.g., the lesson, space or time routines, or other teaching situations.

We need research that pulls back from the microanalytic zoom lens in two dimensions: pulls back in space to see interactions in classrooms in the larger contexts of school and community and society; and pulls back in
time to see the present as a point in historical change. Having argued earlier that the sociology of consciousness must include analysis of the triggering effects of the momentary situation, I now want to argue that even such triggering effects depend on symbolic meanings that affect all educational interactions but are not created within them.

Parenthetically, and in conclusion, I wonder—from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge—about a possible relationship between the focus of the "now generation" on the intensity of immediate experience and what I would call the "now" (zoom lens) theories of human behavior. Surely, it is in general true that "social science is a part of the social world as well as a conception of it" (Gouldner 1970:13, emphasis in the original; see also Williams 1977, passim).

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NOTES

1. In a related discussion, Williams discusses formal similarities between narrative and nonnarrative texts as one example of "the multiplicity of writing":

   Argument, for example, can be distinguished from narrative or characterizing forms, but in practice certain forms of narrative (exemplary instances) or forms of characterization (this kind of person, this kind of behaviour) are radically embedded in many forms of argument. Moreover, the very fact of address—a crucial element in argument—is a stance (at times sustained, at times varying) strictly comparable to elements that are elsewhere isolated as narrative or dramatic. (1977:148-149)

2. One excellent high school history text, Mississippi: Conflict and Change (Loewen and Sallis 1974), includes a chapter on folklore and literature, with suggestions for involving students as folklorists themselves.

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Contributors’ perspectives in this volume represent differing research experiences—anthropology, education, linguistics, and folklore. The view they present, although highly coherent, is by no means exhaustive or definitive. Rather, its value is in the complementary sets of interests it identifies for ethnography and education. Its research and candid discussion of problems and issues are a stimulus for continuing dialogue, mutual support, and collaborative investigation of the problems facing today’s schools.

Many criticisms have been leveled at educational research. Lack of clarity is one. Another is that educational research is too theoretical to be of use to the classroom teacher. Other critics question the worth of outcomes and claim that the problems research is attempting to solve have little to do with the real day-to-day problems of schools. It has taken years of communication and cooperation among researchers, developers, and practitioners—teachers and administrators—for these criticisms to subside and for research findings to prove that they can make real differences in classroom teaching and learning. Ethnographic research in education is now opening itself up to these same charges. Knowing these pitfalls, the authors of this volume are careful to profess no instant solutions. They readily admit to debate about what ethnography is and how it should be used. They warn us that neither immediate impact nor practical guidelines for using ethnography to improve education exist. They also caution against possible misuses of ethnographic methods and concepts by those ill-equipped to use them. To this extent, the reader looking for a solution to Monday morning’s instructional or research tasks is likely to be disappointed.

A brief review here of some of the more critical problems teachers and administrators face and some discussion of recent and ongoing research activities designed to alleviate those problems can help put ethnographic research into perspective. It is within this perspective of contemporary educational demands that ethnography will, after all, have to demonstrate its usefulness.

Today’s schools are experiencing not only new problems, but also a change in the scope of their problems. They are no longer dealing with
isolated cases of vandalism or just a handful of students who aren't learning. Instead, they have before them a shocking rise of school crime and violence, dramatically dropping test scores, falling enrollments, skyrocketing costs, and an increased tendency on the part of the public to turn differences over to the courts. Damage to school property alone is estimated at $200 million a year. During eight of the last nine years, discipline, at least as parents see it, has ranked as the country's number one education problem, according to the Gallup Poll. Problems of school discipline are followed closely by those associated with integration, segregation, busing, as well as a genuine concern among parents about the lack of financial support for schools.

A look at the broader picture shows that society, itself, is going through a crisis where its fundamental values and goals are being questioned, if not rejected. Consensus on any public issue has become improbable if not impossible—let alone consensus about the best way to teach children. All of these complex factors are compelling profound changes in learning, in teaching, in school organization, and in some instances, in the very definition and goals of education itself.

Educational problems generally tend to fall into two categories: those that deal with teaching and learning and those that deal with school management. On the management side, we have school superintendents stranded in the center of contradictory demands. Daily, superintendents are called upon to respond to taxpayers who want more for their dollars, consumer activists setting public expectations, various interest groups with their own particular leanings, and legislatures who influence both purse strings and policy. Then too, administrators must deal with another major force shaping American education—the growing power and militancy of labor unions.

The administrator seeking to effect improvement in the school district must be sensitive to organizational adaptive change, to changes in external conditions, changes in the internal school structure, and changes in the relationship between the individual and the organization. All of this contributes to putting school administrators into a significant political role in the community.

It is within this scheme of things that educational management must strive to bring together the various parts of the administrative system in a proper relationship. Too many past reforms have failed simply because they proceeded on the assumption that only minor modifications in role structure and organizational patterns were needed to support the introduction and maintenance of new curricula or new instructional procedures. Today, the evidence is clear that minor modifications aren't sufficient. The organizational structure of an entire school district can and usually does influence the effectiveness of school improvement programs.

On the teaching and learning side, newspapers and national magazines are replete with stories about why Johnny can't add, subtract, multiply, and divide; complaints from parents and employers that students have failed to develop work habits and competencies required of them on the job are common; and lawsuits charging "educational malpractice" are being brought against school districts and state education departments.

What can educational research do in light of these seemingly overwhelming obstacles? For one thing, we can look at what influences these educational outcomes. There have been a number of studies conducted over the past decade aimed at determining if differences in schooling really do make a difference in what students learn. Several of these have suggested that measurable differences between schools are only slightly related to student learning. More recent work on school effects, however, has shown much stronger relationships between various aspects of schooling
and student learning than was earlier supposed. Part of this discrepancy between earlier and more recent findings may be because the latter work has focused on what happens at the classroom level rather than in the entire building. That is, the classroom as a smaller unit of analysis reveals a much more distinct and recognizable relationship between teaching and learning and consequently, gives a clearer picture of the immediate learning process. This level of inquiry has allowed us to ask some crucial questions: What are the characteristics of good teachers? What techniques are effective in teaching mathematics? Do the same kinds of activities and settings in other subjects lead to the same kinds of results? If the results are different, why are they different? But even once we have answers, these answers in and of themselves aren't enough. Then we have to turn them into something concrete teachers can do in the classroom to improve instruction.

Research is just now beginning to identify some of the important instructional patterns and learning environments that really do make a difference in student achievement. Basically, investigators are asking two questions: first, what variables are present in the learning process and, second, how can they be manipulated to make a difference. For instance, it's an established fact that the degree of learning is directly tied to the time spent in learning. Reduce the time spent on learning and the degree of learning drops; increase it and the degree of learning rises. Also, time appears to be one factor that cuts across many variables; that is, increasing instructional time may be a function of achieving better classroom control, or improved organization of instruction, or more effective use of instructional time.

Continuity of the instructional program through grade levels and subject areas is a second major variable in student achievement. If the arithmetic program at the fifth grade level duplicates rather than extends previous learning, it is unlikely that students will be adequately prepared for sixth grade arithmetic instruction. They may also show difficulty in other subject areas at the same grade level. For instance, they may not be able to do the computation required in a fifth-grade science experiment. Teacher attitude, and expectations, instructional integration and organization, and teacher-student interaction are other important variables. Researchers and educators agree that what a teacher knows, or feels, or thinks influences his or her behavior and this, in turn, affects student learning. Attitudes can include the extent of teacher agreement with the overall philosophy of the school, the goals of instruction, instructional content, and the measures of achievement. Expectations are defined by the extent of teacher expectations for successful student mastery of instructional content.

Instructional integration calls for high correlations between goals, content, and achievement measures; instructional organization is the extent to which classroom instructional activities are focused, structured, and related to student needs. Is there a detailed lesson plan with specific instructional objectives? Is there a logical progression of instructional units? Is there frequent monitoring of student progress?

All teacher-student interactions should, of course, support and reinforce students' learning. These interactions may be with individual students or groups; they may involve either verbal or written exchanges. Tutoring individual students, lecturing to the entire class, questioning students and responding to questions, and giving feedback on tests and papers are all interactions and reinforcement techniques that have proved effective.

Each of these variables might support or encourage student achievement. As every teacher knows, there are a number of conditions that tend to interfere with or mitigate against learning—discipline problems,
disruption in managing activities, or even interruptions for special programs or extracurricular activities. Therefore, classroom control—the degree to which the classroom environment is organized and operated with a minimum of distraction, disruption, and confusion—must also be considered an important learning variable.

The point in all of this research is, of course, to support school improvement efforts. Given this kind of information and some guidance in using it, schools can examine their educational programs and take appropriate steps to make adjustments where necessary. These steps might involve changes in curricula, teacher training, classroom management procedures, or administrative techniques.

Research into learning, though, has a long way to go. We still have much to learn about how to adapt teaching styles to learning style, how to ascertain pupil learning style, and how to use different teaching styles in a single classroom with many pupils. We need more investigation of how to change teacher behavior and how to create more effective inservice and preservice training programs. All along, changing conditions will demand a continuous reevaluation of educational needs and priorities and the development of new and innovative means to achieve them.

One of our more immediate needs is the creation of a comprehensive plan so that once the research is accomplished, it can be put to use in schools in a manner that reflects schools' goals as well as the goals of society at large. Some of these goals can be identified by social trends we see today. A brief listing of these trends will help illustrate.

One trend that has already influenced our lifestyle is that toward the individual's search for well-being and self-fulfillment. People in general are becoming more inner-directed and, consequently, are beginning to examine their role in society and how that role corresponds to their needs, capabilities, feelings, and values. As any tour through a bookstore will show, "How to Live Better" books are permeating the marketplace. This kind of questioning about personal goals and aspirations suggests that schools should encourage the growth of human potential and develop the individual's ability to learn, to organize time and work, and to exercise initiative.

We have also had dramatic increases in the kinds and numbers of social and interpersonal conflicts. Few of those conflicts have been over issues of right against wrong; most of the more serious ones, in fact, have been issues of right against right. The result has been mounting frustration and aggression between the have-s and have-nots. For their part, schools will be responsible for encouraging the growth of interpersonal skills: the art of negotiation, compromise, and conflict resolution.

A third area needing attention is the development of personal values and a social conscience. The battle of conflicting lifestyles is almost certain to heighten as we move further into the 1980s, thus making tolerance of differences and interest in the common good indispensable. Here, of course, ethical human conduct, along with civil sacrifice, political participation, and social commitment are the key.

There is also a critical need today to break down the barriers separating school and the world of work. This unfortunate separation has already led too many young people to choose careers with an inadequate base of information about themselves, the kind of career they really want, and the skills needed to prepare for a career. Increasingly, schools will be expected to give students the opportunity to develop the work skills and attitudes that lead them to respect and value work.

Competing interest groups are still another force with a new challenge for schools. As political parties, advertisers, newspapers, and a host of others vie for public support for their objectives, the need for independent critical thinking, decision-making, and problem-solving will be vital.
Schools will be called on to emphasize such skills as organizing, integrating, and using information.

We are also seeing a trend toward a more productive use of leisure time. Preparing students for personal interests--crafts, theater, sports, photography, and the like--and helping them identify and develop avocational and recreational interests is an educational responsibility that goes beyond the typical extracurricular activities offered in most schools today.

Finally, a major trend is that of moving learning outside the school building itself. There is a growing recognition that the local community is a rich resource that should be used to the fullest extent possible for educational purposes. Active participation in the operation of schools by community organizations, local residents, business and labor, cultural institutions, and government agencies provides a much-needed link between education and the local environment. Community participation is not a panacea for our ills, but it can be an effective means for achieving relevance in the school program. Students could engage in community service programs, explore the world of work, and, more important, communicate with adults at an adult level.

These trends present new educational challenges at all levels of the system. For the most part, the necessary materials and procedures already exist. A great array of innovations has been developed and tried out in schools during the last quarter century that provide educational systems with rich resources for achieving skills in each of these areas--individualized instruction, programs in achievement motivation, ethical action, career education, future-focused problem solving are just a few of such innovations. The problem, then, is not in the materials, but in designing and implementing local change programs that can make effective use of already available resources. For instance, there is still much to learn about transferring what research knows about curriculum and instruction to school districts, schools, and teachers.

Closer collaboration among researchers, developers, school districts, and state educational agencies is one approach that is taking hold. More and more state departments are adding instructional leadership alongside their more traditional administrative and legal functions. Statewide improvement programs initiated, coordinated, and implemented by state agency personnel are succeeding, and successfully applied all over the country.

More than thirty states have taken some kind of action toward Competency-Based Education. Sometimes the emphasis is on the learning of basic skills, but far more frequently, their programs emphasize broader learnings, many of which correspond to the social trends just mentioned. In addition to competence in the basic skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic, state education departments are asking their schools to prepare students in career awareness and citizenship competencies, and lifelong human competencies such as critical thinking, problem solving, information processing, and values clarification. States are also providing direct technical assistance in planning and conducting needs assessments, designing new programs, selecting appropriate materials, training teachers and administrators, and evaluating the total process.

In conclusion, all of these issues, both educational and social, pose problems that need to be addressed, not because they are interesting puzzles for contemplation, but because their solutions are urgent. Ethnographic insights in examining the educational system as a whole and the relationships among its many parts can prove to be a valuable resource and one that surely, we cannot afford to overlook. Ethnography can help in looking at our problems in a new way and from a different perspective. This volume is a means toward that end. It is a beginning for collaboration, understanding, and sharing. It is an attempt to create a new means to a mutual end--better learning for children, in and out of school.
There are a number of similarities between the theoretical language of educational psychology and the everyday political language of educational institutions in America. Both languages place the source of school success and failure inside the heads of individual children in their store of inherent abilities and acquired skills, and they both assume that the problems of failing children can be corrected by an increased efficiency in filling the children with various kinds of knowledge. Motivation enters, but only for the purpose of increasing efficiency. These similarities have allowed educational psychology to become institutionalized as the primary tool for interpreting the lives of children and schools to the wider society.

School ethnographers, among whom we can count ethnographic psychologists and sociolinguists along with more traditional community-oriented anthropologists, often pride themselves on not accepting the intrapsychic biases in the institutionalized ways of talking about education. They believe that there is something much more seriously social and cultural about the organization of school success and failure than any focus on individual cognitive functioning might reveal.

This article is directed to anyone interested in using ethnography to study schooling in America. Its effort is to deliver a warning. Ethnographers may have rejected the most blatant psychometric biases of educational psychology. But the hegemony of educational psychology in our language of education remains a source of error to ethnographic inquiries into the nature of schooling. Ethnographers continue to allow educational psychology to define research problems, to set limits on what can be studied competently by ethnographers, and even to dictate some key theoretical concepts.

As a consequence, ethnographers have not met well their descriptive responsibilities. Where educational psychology has left undescribed the rich complexities of the intellectual lives of children in everyday-life institutions such as school, ethnographers have not filled in the blanks. Where educational psychology has explained school failure in terms of individual children, ethnographers have struggled to describe how failing children may be successful in other life domains, but they have not produced adequate data to challenge successfully the individualistic and intrapsychic...
categories educational psychology uses to organize descriptions. Because they have bought into the conceptual dichotomy between cognitive and social skills, merely emphasizing the one over the other, ethnographers have not been able to show how the categories so popular in the study of children are themselves among the problems to be faced in the organization of schools that maximize the powers of our children. We seek a change in this situation. We must develop methods for describing the acquisition and display of intellectual skills that are more sensitive to the many social pressures and constraints on our children. We discuss some of the reasons for this development and hint at some directions it might have to take.

**PROBLEMS IN THE FOCUS AND METHODS OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY**

The focus of educational psychology is on individual differences in the learning rates of children. The underlying rationale seems to be that if psychologists could understand how different heads work, they might be able to invent various kinds of pedagogy for breaking the barriers to the cognitive growth essential to the school success of children who now fail.

Two kinds of concern restrict our enthusiasm for a focus on individual differences as the central problem of schooling. Although we are aware that schools have done more for social equality than other major institutions (Conroy and Levin 1976), we are nervous about the institutional recording of the differential display of various cognitive skills by different children. We take it as a basic presupposition of American culture, albeit one about which we have great guilt and around which we organize sometimes successful reform movements, that children are sent to school to do more than to learn to read and write.

American concern for documenting what children know appears as much organized by the pressures to sort out achievers from nonachievers as the desire to equip every citizen with a necessary stock of knowledge at hand. Jules Henry once noted that "although we love our own children, it is not clear that others--like industry or the Pentagon--love them in the same way and for the same reason" (1973:104). We must add schools to the list of suspicious others. Measures of success and failure are ubiquitous throughout our schools. In this context, despite an ideology celebrating universal success, an efficient educational psychology that focuses on differential learning rates is part of a social mechanism for sorting children; it is not a neutral conceptual tool for describing them. As such, educational psychology is part of the educational system that must be described by ethnographers of schooling. It cannot be used to define problem areas for research or units of analysis.

There is a second reason for rejecting an important institutional role for educational psychology, namely, that it is methodologically ill-equipped for tackling questions about the conditions that shape the learning trajectories of individual children. Educational psychology draws its methodological security from the power and prestige of experimental cognitive psychology. However, data from everyday life situations that cannot be shown to be controlled in the same way as data from laboratory situations are by definition data of a different logical type, and the systematic
extension of conclusions from the one to the other is not possible. Thus, in terms of its own claims to methodological purity, educational psychology is limited to silence or guesswork about the intellectual lives of children in homes and schools. Some elaboration of this point is necessary.

Experimental cognitive psychology produces data by (1) presenting subjects a series of well-defined, systematically varied task environments and (2) analyzing and measuring variation in the subjects' behavior as responses to assumed task stimuli. The theoretical story to be told about the relation between variations in both task environment and response behavior is the analyst's description of cognitive processes as they operate in these task environments. In large part, such methods use failures on some range of task conditions as a defining characteristic of the thinking process, although differential rates of performance may be used also. As long as the regularities in the organism-task environment relations are attributable in part to the workings of the organisms, a model of the cognitive machinery is possible for that specific organism-environment relation (see the exemplary works of Hayes and Simon 1977; Siegler 1976; and Simon, 1976 as illustrative).

As powerful as this procedure has been for generating structural models of cognition based on group data and statistical analyses, it runs into considerable difficulty when the analyst seeks conclusions about the cognitive machinery of individual organisms at any moment in time or in situations beyond the well-controlled experiment. The cognitive language allowed by laboratory procedures does not translate well for the description of everyday life scenes. Experimental procedures create constraints independent of the involvements and concerns of the people under analysis, and they rob them of many of the normally available resources for organizing their own behavior. Experimental procedures are intended to strip away the complexities of the real world so that it is possible to assume that subjects are responding to only the tasks defined by the experimenter. But this procedure of constraint (a) does not allow for the possibility that the stimuli-as-responded-to are systematically different from those assumed and (b) creates the illusion of a re-active organism because active struggles to organize the environment are suppressed in fact or in recorded fact by the procedures themselves (Cole and Traumann 1981).

Even if these limitations were not significant, experimental procedures leave open the issue of the relation between the assumed pure world and the as yet undescribed world of which it is supposed to be a model system. There are grave doubts about the "external" or "ecological" validity of experimental results. One effort to bridge the gap revealed that the two worlds were different primarily in the simplifying procedures used by their participants to organize interpretations. Whereas participants in everyday life use a wide range of procedures to simplify, alter, and negotiate tasks (in various categories glossing as what is going on, what is expected to happen next, what has to be accomplished), laboratory analysts achieve purity by the single simplifying assumption that subjects are responding to tasks predefined by the experimenter. This latter procedure is adequate for asking limited questions about the structural constraints on performing certain operations with strange demands, such as handling an excessive amount of information for a given instant (see here classics, from Miller 1956 to Estes 1975). But this is a thoroughly inadequate way to find out much about either specific persons or the everyday worlds in which they have to do their thinking. For in the daily lives we have examined, people can be shown to define task environments with quite different concerns and according to quite different criteria from those used by laboratory psychologists. This discrepancy became crucial when we
realized that the simplifying procedures used by laboratory analysts of cognitive performances were shown to be systematically distorting and diminishing the complexity of skills used by everyday life performers (Cole, Hood, and McDermott 1978). When the goal is to understand the kinds of intellectual skills people use and develop in social institutions, the methods of educational psychology do not apply. This is a particularly important point when we remember that there is a political price to be paid by the children who are badly described.

Although ethnographers have strong intuitions about the descriptive impotence of experimental approaches to the study of thinking in school and community settings, there are three ways the language of educational psychology has consequences for the ethnographer.

I. At worst, educational psychology defines the problems the ethnographer is called on to describe. Educational psychology documents school failure as a cognitive problem. Ethnographic studies of education in America almost invariably start with this issue. The gut reaction of most ethnographers is that there are children being hurt in our schools; institutionally, they are being left behind and educational psychologists record only that it is happening without an analysis of how it happens. Tests and skill-probing experiments do not simply record what seems to be known by some aggregate of faceless students and then attempt to generate a pedagogy for those lacking potential skills: they are also used to document who does not know how to do certain kinds of things and records the ignorance of the children for all to see and deprecate.

In response to the penchant of educational psychology to label and further disable failing children, most ethnographers rush to defend such children to show how smart they really are, and to point out the complexity of daily tasks not included in the tester's bag of ability problems--from the examples included in this volume, recall the ingenuity required in getting a turn to talk in the classroom, telling successful stories, or winning a ritual insult duel. This has been an essential and productive strategy, but we must begin to realize that this approach is characteristically unethnographic in impulse. Rather than moving into a community with an aim of delineating some of the basic principles of how the people organize their behavior throughout the community, we have allowed an unanalyzed set of themes from a subbranch of that community, namely, adult professionals (school personnel, testing services, schools of education) with institutional ties to displaying an adequate expertise about children, to define the focus of our research.

Allowing participation in a culture to dictate research agendas and findings is not rare in ethnography (Berreman 1962). It may even be the ideal way to proceed, if we are careful (1) to understand how our narrow range of focus is established and (2) to describe some of the details of what we are leaving out (Frake 1980; Goodenough 1978). It is not clear that educational ethnographers have managed enough distance on educational psychology. If only as a negative foil, we have accepted the psychologists' identification of failing children as a starting point for our investigations, but without sufficient warrant, without taking into account how we came to have such a focus and what we are not describing as a result. Showing educational psychologists to be wrong in their assumptions
about the overall adaptability of our children does not show us either how schooling is organized or how it might be better organized.

II. A second negative consequence of educational psychology provides a curious twist on the first. In addition to allowing educational psychology to define the defensive focus of school ethnographies, ethnographers have allowed psychology an illegitimate domain of competence in the analysis of the intellectual tasks encountered during schooling.

We think it curious that the ethnography of education has so little to say about the many intellectual tasks children face in school, that ethnographic accounts have so little to say, for example, about how children deal with the irregularities of the English spelling system or the complexities of subtracting numbers that demand a carryover from the tens column to the ones. Instead, we have various descriptions of the know-how needed to raise a hand or to use the most appropriate dialect form at the right time. There has been good reason for this focus, but there is reason to confront what it does not cover. There is no reason to render to psychology one of the most important dimensions of life in school. Psychology is not any more equipped than ethnography to deal with the description of intellectual displays in classrooms. In fact, we know horribly little about how to describe apparent mental events in social terms. In this section we can offer only a reason for trying. In a later section, we will offer both an account of how impotent traditional forms of psychological and more social disciplines are in the face of it and a programmatic account of how it might be otherwise.

In America, many social situations are organized around the scheduling of intelligence displays. "Who is smart?" and "Who knows?" are crucial questions for us and much of our time in school is organized around managing our respective places vis-à-vis such questions. The attribution of intelligence and cleverness unfortunately goes to the heart of what schooling is about in America. Intelligence displays are what people in schools talk about (consider teacher lunchroom evaluations or children with test jitters). Intelligence displays are also what people do in schools. They attend, remember, calculate, and ask questions while often concerned with the speed, efficiency, and articulateness with which they perform (consider only question prefaces at university lectures, "I may be wrong, but ... ").

Now it is hard to imagine that an ethnography of schooling would not take up such issues, that it would not attempt descriptions of what the attending, remembering, problem solving, etc., was addressed to. An ethnographer should first document just what seem to be the most important things happening in schools. After extended observation and conversation, some events stand out. We are increasingly overwhelmed with the importance of those times in every day when each child is put on the line, times when each child is asked to perform some difficult task with the consequence of being called either competent/incompetent or smart/dumb. A good part of any teacher's day can be understood in terms of occasioning such scenes and even worrying about their timing for different children so as not to put them on a line in ways that either underchallenge or embarrass them. Children who are in trouble--the learning disabled, so called--can be shown spending much of their day not getting caught at not being able to do something (Hood, McDermott, and Cole 1980). The analysis of such scenes and the intellectual and social work that occasions them will have to form a core concern of school ethnographers. Such scenes are at the heart of the problem teachers and children face during their time in school. Teachers and children demand being heard in ways that speak to their experience.

III. Educational psychology can be a danger to ethnography if it is allowed to dictate key concepts in our description of schooling. Most
ethnographers run fast from concepts borrowed from psychology, but the connections and clarifying arguments can be subtle enough to trip the most social of rhetorics into an intrapsychic account of behavior. We are particularly concerned here with the use of the notion of competence. Given great force in Chomskian linguistics as the silent throne behind performance, the term was easily adopted by psychologists to gloss the thinking and planning that appear to organize behavior. Along with competence, of course, incompetence, both linguistic and cognitive, became a topic of concern, a researchable one at that. Bad performances were traced back to incompetencies. Inarticulateness was the result of linguistic incompetence, school failure of cognitive incompetencies. The problem with all this was the yardsticks used for judging competence; whose measure of articulateness and whose measure of cognitive complexity were at issue.

Fortunately, this trend was given a serious reversal by sociolinguists (Labov 1973a,b) and ethnographic psychologists (Cole, Gay, Glick, and Sharp 1971; D'Andrade 1973) who raised the issue of alternative measuring devices for competence. In an important article, Hymes (1972) called for a focus on communicative competence, for a look at the actual conditions of a speech event in terms of which articulateness and efficacy could be understood. Most recently, we have a statement by Mehan (1980) that takes us toward a description of the conditions of conversational competence in a classroom, for which the rules of performance are painstakingly extracted from the orienting behavior of a group of children. All this work has formed the cornerstone of advances in the ethnography of schooling. Its particular strength has been in showing how problems of competence display are socially organized. Inarticulateness is not a linguistic problem, stupidity is rarely a psychological problem, and misbehavior seldom a problem of moral fiber. What is at the heart of each of these failures is a social order that insists on a particular scheduling of displays of articulateness, intelligence, or morality. The same person in different situations may be called to put on quite different performances. What this literature has done is to shift the theoretical focus from competencies as the properties of persons to competencies as the properties of situations. All this is as it should be, although there is much work left to be done.

Competence is a notion that is easily psychologized. Indeed, the very popularity of the sophisticated treatments we have had of the social organization of competencies is based precisely on their being useful in arguments over the competencies of different children. An understanding of the situational nature of competencies seems to disappear quickly, and competent and incompetent make their way back into the circle of ascription we call schooling. And even when we can keep our own heads straight, we have to put our arguments to a school system that has absorbed educational psychology as its language of interpretation and validation. The language of educational psychology seems to subvert ethnographic work on communicative competence by creating, on the one hand, the context or audience that makes the word so attractive and, on the other hand, the interpretative grid for giving the word a psychological reading.

As ethnographers seem to be quite susceptible to this lure, short of abandoning the term, we shall have to keep two questions in mind every time we interpret a study of the communicative or interactional competence of children in schools. First, we are going to have to worry about studies that socialize competencies and incompetencies into children and then use these to explain the children's performance across time and situation. This is especially the case for the notion of competence if we are dealing with a comparison of members of different groups. If blacks and whites perform
differently on some social task, e.g., raising their hands at the appropriate time for getting a turn to talk to the whole class, it is tempting to claim that the members of the different groups may have a differential experience in performing this task and therefore perform it differently. Such an analysis may even be correct, but it is not to the point of an ethnographic analysis of what happens over time in school and how. We are aware that most behavior is well organized within individuals across many situations, and we do not want to make light of that. We are only stressing that the documenting of behavior consistencies across situations does not make an ethnography, particularly not one that addresses the issue of differential competencies. We are only trying to raise a question the answer to which could help us escape from some of the overgeneralizing tendencies of educational psychology. The issue is as follows. Given the simplicity of most tasks in the social world and given how fast most people can be shown to pick them up, no matter how incompetent a person is at the start of a particular social scene, how is it possible to remain incompetent? (McDermott and Gospodinoff 1979). For days, weeks, and years, how can a child not know how to get a teacher's attention appropriately? This is not a question of incompetence in the child's stock of knowledge. Rather, it is a problem of social organization. How are scenes arranged for a child to display incompetence on such simple tasks year in and year out?

Our first question asked how a person, whether competent or incompetent, could remain that way over time and circumstance. A second question follows directly from the first, namely, what are the complexities of any given situation that has a person showing up incompetent? The notion of competence is troublesome here. Suppose we have a well-described situation from which we have derived some rules of behavior. What are we to do with the person who seems to break all of the rules? We can call the person an incompetent, or we can continue the analysis to find out what regularities there might be that help to organize this person in such apparently incompetent ways. The rules derived from our analysis are ideally the rules the people have been using themselves to organize each other. If they can use them to organize, they can use them systematically, of course, to disorganize. We will have to be careful about where we decide to stop analysis. It might be a good rule of thumb, in fact, to decide a priori that we have no incompetents, that the attribution of incompetence simply marks inadequate description on the part of the analyst, that the attribution of incompetence simply means that the analyst has not yet caught the point of the social constraints organizing persons to act with such apparent disregard for the normative order and their own good standing within that order. Whether such a strong stand is necessary may be argued; here we are only trying to alert the reader to a danger, namely, that incarceration within the language of educational psychology may be hard to avoid.

**HOW THE ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF THINKING AND LEARNING PERFORMANCES IN CLASSROOMS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE**

Neither traditional psychology nor the more social sciences give us many tools for the study of intellectual performances. Two orders of behavior seem to be at issue: mental and social. That is also the way the disciplines break down: psychology and sociology/anthropology. The marriage of these disciplines for the purpose of studying the social organization of thinking has so far resulted in a combination of mistakes, with
experts relying on the experimental procedures of psychologists to produce purified descriptions of thinking processes and the social-fact sampling procedures of sociology to produce a kinds-of-person grid against which to map the experimental results. Two important tools for inquiry into the organization of social behavior—the experiment and the social fact—can be of more harm than good when used as instruments of proof and confirmation rather than suggestion. In combination they are deadly, giving us such burdens as statements about the comparative intelligence of people from different groups (social facts) on the basis of their performance on standardized tests (experiments).

Ethnographers do not sit easily on such studies, and they generally point (again generally) to the wide, hard-to-catch-in-experiments range of skills people must have to participate in everyday life; skills, to cite some famous examples, for dealing drugs (Agar 1973), living alcoholic in the streets (Spradley 1970), navigating the high seas without instruments (Lewis 1972), or scheduling the agricultural round (Conklin 1975). But ethnographers do not generate data easily recognized by psychologists (Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition 1978, 1979). Getting high, staying out of jail, drowning, and eating and the relation of such events to other possible events in the culture are the crucial issues in the above examples, not smartness. But the ethnographer of schooling does deal with populations for whom the ascription of smartness and stupidity are primary, for whom remembering and problem solving are often claimed to be done for their own sake. It would be good to know how such situations are organized.

The psychologist's answer to the ethnographic examples and complaints, strongly felt if only occasionally well stated by ethnographers, will be allowably flippant until ethnographers generate adequate descriptions of intellectual displays and their apparent differential distribution across social groups. Until that time, psychology can simply proceed, seeking higher correlations between experimental findings and finer gradations of social organizational variables. Although no one can legitimately write any longer that the members of a particular social group are skilled uniformly in a particular way, it is still current for analysts to attempt to achieve differential experimental results for various subgroups--literate/illiterate, male/female, farmer/potter—for any single population. The underlying rationale for such a procedure is that members of different subgroups may consistently encounter different kinds of situations for developing and displaying their skills. The situation, i.e., the organism in a task environment, is the behind-the-scenes, root variable, and the workings of different situations (so that they occasion different amounts of practice on different skill displays) are the long range explanatory apparatus.

Analysts who use such a correlational means of extending experimental results to the social world should find themselves in a difficult position. Their effort is to map a model of how some aggregate of heads (subjects) work under some very specific condition (the experiment or test) against a model of how social constraints may be differentially organized across social groups in ways glossed by popular distinctions (social facts) group members have for talking about one another. The difficulty lies in that neither the cognitive operations nor the social constraints are immediately available for analysis. As currently phrased, there are no grounds for correlating performance on an experiment and group membership. There are currently no methods of analysis that would allow them to be enough like each other to allow for a comparison.

Ethnographers are going to have to help us out of this quandary by producing data that directly describe the organization of adequate and inadequate intellectual performances in schools (we include here psychologists who concern themselves with "situating" experiments within a
cultural description; see Scribner 1976). For the most part, social scientists have failed the study of thinking by supplying psychologists simply with the names of different kinds of subjects and a little information about their roles in a social milieu. Again the situation is the assumed root variable. The reasoning is that people from different groups have different experiences with each other that should be consequential over time for how they think; they constrain each other in ways that lead to a gradual internalization of different skills for remembering, problem solving, etc. However, only the surface facts about different groups are given to the experimenter, and the situations themselves are rarely looked at in any detail. Needless to say, the similarities between the supposedly determining social situations and the experimental situations modeling them are even more rarely examined.

Once ethnographers look more carefully at learning situations, the variable that seems to tie the ethnographic enterprise to experimental results, namely, the situation, undergoes a transformation. The data of ethnography are a different logical type from the data of cognitive psychology and not a possible source of comparison with variables isolated in the analysis of some aggregate of persons—particularly considered one at a time—in interaction with a predefined task environment. When situations are carefully examined, the unit of analysis is not the individual person. When the topic is the social organization of any kind of behavior, thinking included, the unit of analysis is concerted activities across persons. The study of the social order must not be directed, as Goffman has said well, to "men and their moments. Rather to moments and their men" (1967:3). This is equally the case for the study of the social ordering of learning and thinking. George Herbert Mead said it well: "Mind arises through communication by a conversation of gestures in a social process or context of experience—not communication through mind" (1934:50).

There is a methodological burden to taking seriously that people think and learn together. Despite the biases in how we have all learned to talk about psychological events, the individual is not the unit of analysis. The person is but a moment in a relationship (Birdwhistell 1970; Scheflen 1973). The proper unit of analysis for what people do together is what people do together (Kendon 1977; McDermott, Gospodinoff, and Aron 1978; McDermott and Roth 1978). At certain times, it may be useful to gloss over a description of the work people do with each other in social events. In fact, the bulk of sociology does exactly this in centering its attentions on social facts as adequate accounts of the constraints people have available in ordering their relations with one another. Such glosses can never be adequate, however, to the specification of how situations might operate to encourage the development and display of cognitive practices. (An equivalent proposition about emotional displays has made some headway in clinical psychology, attributable for the most part to the writings of Bateson [1972]).

Once the analyst attempts a careful description of some social situations in terms of how people organize themselves as environments for one another, individual group members and their mental activities are nowhere to be seen. How then can social situations be used as an independent measure or variable in the study of apparent mental activities? Given current conceptions of mental, they cannot be. As long as cognitive skills are understood as in the head and called forth as responses to predefined problems, the description of cognitive processes must remain incompatible with the description of social processes.

To suggest a rapprochement for those interested in both intellectual development and social institutions, a new language must emerge for the description of mental activities as constituent parts of the communication stream by way of which social situations are organized. Individual \( \text{ideas and skills are no more units of analysis for social situations than the} \)
individuals who enact them. Ideas and skills are not fruitfully analyzed as the properties of individuals. What we intuitively recognize as psychological skills are best approached as particular kinds of behavioral displays that both mark and constitute certain contexts in the development of social situations (see Goffman 1976 for an equivalent discussion of gender skills). The relation between such displays, actual learning occasions, and the actual constraints organizing and scheduling either one of them will remain problematic for a long time to come.

Some classroom examples might be helpful here. For the past few years we have been spending much of our time in different kinds of classrooms in and around New York City. From the two in which we spent hundreds of hours, we gathered videotape records of life both in the classroom and in other school (tests), school-like (afternoon activity clubs), and everyday life situations. Long-term analysis of the records revealed an endless web of connections between the behaviors of the different participants. What each of us was willing to call a thinking or learning behavior by an individual early in the analysis often became a significant part of a more complicated behavior involving a few people. When we looked for examples of a successful or unsuccessful reading, cake making, or cookie dividing, we at first thought we could find them. But as soon as we went looking for the borders of the behavior to find out how it was organized, other people entered the analysis. If a child was disattending what we thought to be the obvious task at hand, subsequent looking revealed that the task—measuring flour for a cake recipe, for example—turned out to be only a brief moment in a long series of multiple person activities that arranged for that moment. Not attending to what we believed to be the most crucial time often turned out to be a key ingredient in organizing getting the task done at a next moment or in some way we least expected.

Our problem was that we could not rigorously define any behaviors as exemplars of what both common sense and experimental psychology would suggest take place in such scenes. Individual memories, problem-solving strategies, or printed information processing were nowhere to be found. What we could see were brief displays of remembering, problem solving, and reading, but each of these turned out to be staged by multiple person participation webs. Well-defined tasks seemed forever bobbing up and down on the rough seas of social interaction and required the reflexive, retrospective-prospective occasional attention of many persons over time (Cole, Hood, and McDermott 1978). What then was our phenomenon? The tasks were illusive. What was left was the work people did to arrange both for a task to get done and for different people to have different display roles around the organization of the task. Individual heads and the differences between them were no longer the issue. Groups of heads and how they arranged for individuals to look good and bad became the issue.

It is in the light of this descriptive problem that we attempted to define what it means to be a nonlearner in school. Consistently (if not well) defined by the various tools of educational psychology, what could be meant by having a learning disability? We started with the question of where could it be found, exclusively in the head, for example, or in the social scene that seemed to organize its display? But the issue for us was only metaphorically where the disability could be found. Our real concern was where we could find the tools to describe the disability in a way consistent with how it was organized and made manifest in the classroom.

The stories of two such children are important to mention. Rosa was studied intensively in one movie of a classroom lesson (McDermott 1976) and Adam in many videotapes across a range of situations (Cole and Traupmann...
Both children were in great trouble in that they were far behind their peers in learning to read. Worse, from extended looking, it became clear that under ordinary classroom circumstances, neither child would have much chance of catching up. For each of them, the day was not made of opportunities to learn to read, but of either occasions in which it was possible to try to read without fear of degradation or occasions in which the display demands were so high that the best results could be had by working at not getting caught not knowing how to read. When it was safe, both children would have a go at it; when accusing eyes were on them, they would have only a show at it. In a reading lesson, Rosa was particularly masterful at calling for a turn to read at the wrong time or in the wrong way. In making a cake, Adam was particularly skillful at organizing other children to do before him what he was likely to be called on to do. Their ploys were numerous and their occasions for doing them frequent.

So far, Rosa and Adam are easily recognizable characters from almost any classroom in America. The story of their life in the classroom is often used as an adjunct to an educational psychologist's account of the children's problem. The logic is that, faced with difficult cognitive tasks and armed with inadequate cognitive machinery for handling them, both children developed ways of minimizing their embarrassments. By looking closely at their behavior we have only documented what everyone has always known, namely, that there is a social underlife of the classroom that functions as a motivational resting place for the children who cannot do the work.

But there is a more interesting story to be told, for it is not the complexity of the tasks that necessarily predicts a child's performance. Some situations allow for time on task no matter how difficult, whereas other situations are inhibiting. It depends on what the group organizes for a particular moment. Degradation, getting-by, and shining with intelligence are not individual accomplishments; it takes a group to notice them, appreciate them properly and, more profoundly, to organize them in the first place (for theories of trait ascription, see Garfinkel 1956; Pollner 1974; Wieder 1974). The unit of analysis is not the individual complete with ascribed traits, but the process of ascribing as it is organized by the group. Both Rosa and Adam get through some difficult moments with the help of others in the group. And at other times, apparently simple tasks are used to spotlight a child's weakness. It is not high and low abilities that are at issue in the classroom, but rather the scheduling of people being called on to display and show off their apparent abilities and disabilities. This point deserves some elaboration, first from Rosa, then from Adam.

Rosa's life in the classroom seems painful. She seems to find difficult most of the tasks other children do readily. There are many possible reasons for this, one being that she has had the job of adjusting to a new language since starting school, another being, as the school system eventually decided, that she is "slow" to the point of retardation (on the complexities of acquiring such institutional statuses, see Mehan, Meihls, Hertweck, and Crowles 1981). Other reasons could be enumerated, but for the moment it is not important. Our question has less to do with where in Rosa's history lies her problem than with how in the present her problem is organized, recognized, and used in the classroom.

In reading groups, Rosa often "hid" herself at turn-relevant moments; she was often on the wrong page, looking in the wrong direction, calling out at just the wrong time, or with just the wrong words for arranging being called on. Occasionally, the teacher would push through this veneer, and Rosa would be forced to perform (sometimes successfully). More often, the teacher and other children would cooperate with Rosa's various ploys and move on as if she had not really called for a turn. Finally, there were
a few occasions on which the children seemed to highlight Rosa's problem, by complaining that the teacher had passed over her or by refuting outright her claim that she could read if called on.

The interesting thing is that these different kinds of moments in Rosa's life do not depend solely on her reading level, but upon the pressures on the group. In one complex example analyzed in detail by Dore and McDermott (1982), the group faced confusion about what they were doing together. In this context, Rosa's claim, "I could read it," by virtue of its timing and performance particulars, served as a confirmation signal that some other child already had the turn to read. In short, the whole group was helped to a solution of their organizational dilemma by Rosa's utterance, and they responded by offering her no uptake and moving instead on to the business of listening to the reader. What this suggests is that all the members of the group, in collusion with one another, arrange conditions under which Rosa's duplicity displays are made useful; just how she is to be understood (whether she is exposed, encouraged, or ignored), is organized through how they find her utterances useful.

From the short end of a long analysis, our point is that displays of competence and incompetence are carefully attended to by classroom participants and how they are to be interpreted depends on the different kinds of pressures put on the group. This raises the question of just where Rosa's disability lies, for the conditions for her behavior and whether or not it is noticeable, degradable, or worthy of celebration all lie in the concerted behavior of those about her.

Adam's case points to the same phenomenon in a more obvious way. Adam has a hard time reading, but he voluntarily came to an after-school cooking club to make cakes. The scene required reading recipes. Sometimes the scene would allow Adam time on task; when he would work with his favorite partner, Adam would take on the job of gathering and measuring materials while his friend would read. Interestingly, under such conditions, Adam could also be seen practicing reading. At other times, the scene would spotlight various individuals for a display of reading competence. At such times, there were two behavior patterns. In one, Adam would hide his performance with the cooperation of the other members of the group who would offer help, easier questions, or a cover for his duplicity. In the other, group members would turn on Adam and expose his problem for public scrutiny. Just which pattern was chosen seemed to depend on the arrangement of pressures on group members, e.g., on how competitive the children were asked to be by the adults. We came eventually to talk about Adam's disability as a "display board" for the weaknesses of the group (Hood, McDermott, and Cole 1980). Whatever its original etiology, Adam's disability lived on in his struggle to arrange his days to minimize getting caught. He was a game warrior and worked on reading when the chances of degradation were small. On less agreeable terms, he was disabled by his caution. We have painted here a picture of psychological functions, inadequate ones in the cases of Rosa and Adam, as group-organized and group-recognized behavioral displays. These should in no way be confused with either actual learning occasions or laboratory elicited models of psychological process (neither of which should be confused with each other). We have painted this picture to raise the question of how ethnographers might better study success and failure in schools. Our answer is that they should concentrate on those moments when success and failure are ascribed to persons. In particular, we have stressed that it is crucial to understanding such scenes that we move beyond the bias that the phenomenon of interest lies behind the eyes of the individual and that we should instead begin with the proposition that successful and unsuccessful moments in the
classroom, and their patterning over time into individual biographies of
gifted and disabled children, are the organized accomplishments of many
persons, only one of whom is spotlighted at a time for particular kinds of
intelligence display. The ethnography of schooling then should take a
direct aim on describing the social organization of thinking and learning
displays. They may be the key to the system.

Note that the kinds of descriptions necessary for illuminating psy-
chological displays will have to be quite detailed indeed. Specifically, we
will need descriptions of the intellectual task environments faced by par-
ticular children at particular times in terms of how their conceptual behavior
helps to organize and is organized by these tasks. Various approaches to
the detailed description of classroom behavior are available in the works of
Cazden, Cox, Dickinson, Steinberg, and Stone (1979), Erickson and Mo-
hatt (1982), Florio and Shultz (1979), Griffin and Humphrey (Forthcom-
ing), McDermott (1976), Mehan (1979), and Moore (1978). Much of this
work was stimulated in opposition to the conclusions of educational psy-
chologists about failing children. When psychologists look at videotaped
records of children's behavior, it is our experience that they invariably
work on various versions of the same question, namely, "Who is doing
something smart here?" (Psychiatrists suffer a similar preoccupation with
the question of "Who is crazy here?"") Ethnographers are different in ask-
ing "What is going on here?" If someone is being called smart or dumb,
sane or crazy, it is not those persons as individuals who are theoretically
most interesting. Instead, ethnographic descriptions are in the long run
aimed at describing the features of the social order that lead people to
being understood as smart/dumb or crazy/sane. In moving from psycho-
logical to ethnographic questions, descriptions become thick in detail.
The answer to the ethnographic query requires a rigorous description of
what all parties are up to throughout a scene in which intellectual perform-
ances are at issue. Whether such descriptions are yet available is a ques-
tion, but the recent efforts cited make such a description plausible.

If such detailed work on intellectual displays does get done, we can
look forward to two ironic developments that will require constant clarifi-
cation. On the one hand, while emerging from the methodological failings of
educational psychology, the ethnography of important moments in any
school may play a role in recovering the subject matter of educational psy-
chology, namely, individual differences in rate and extent of learning.
After it is clear that thinking displays are group organized in classrooms,
it will still be the case that some kids pick up math or reading faster than
others and, as an apparent result, that they are accorded differential
status within different kinds of intellectual display events in their class-
room. The challenge here will be to keep from falling back into intra-
psychic accounts of this phenomenon. The effort will be to ask first why
people seem to notice such learning differences and what use they make of
them. The answer to such a question requires that we detail the condi-
tions for doing one display rather than another. It will be the features of
the display system and the social structure that orchestrates it that will
make up the answer, not the different personal traits of individual children.
To keep our tools of inquiry open to such a language will be difficult.

A second ironic development will be that careful descriptions of edu-
cational settings, ethnographic in approach, rhetoric, and data processing,
are not easily articulated with data gathered from the comparative com-
munity study perspective traditional to most ethnography (as pointed out
in this volume by both Heath and Hymes). For the time being, this is a
small price to pay for the conceptual recovery of psychological functioning
in social terms. We would agree that the politics of a community should be
the self-conscious beginning point and testing ground for any ethnographic
description. But this is not to say that we know how to do this very well in the area of intellectual development. Issues of method are primary at both ends; at present, students of community structure have no more to say about learning than students of the classroom have to say about the more inclusive constraints engendered by the particulars of the political economy. Innovative methods and connecting links have to be forged at both ends. One place to start is with the question of how individual children and their consociates organize successful and failing biographies. It is at this level that educational psychology has made both its claims and its institutional gains, and it is at this level that we need to confront the very categories of success and failure that we use to interpret the schools. Social theorists working on the schools without ever trying to describe the constraints on a particular child (Bourdieu, Bowles and Gintis, Jencks, whatever) will not be able to lead the way for us here. We need a powerful angle of vision for pulling psychological events into their social parts. Sociolinguistics has been able to address the interface between community structure and speech events to the extent that it has had a powerful descriptive linguistics to help break speech events into parts. Psychology has not been able to perform a similar magic for the ethnographer interested in thinking performances. A detailed search for units of analysis and an adequate descriptive language has to accompany the development of a comparative ethnography of schooling.

CONCLUSION

We have attempted to point to some hidden difficulties ethnographers must face if they are to offer adequate descriptions and constructive interpretations of schooling in America. As appropriate to a young field, much argument must be held over methods and adequate theories. Issues recognized in such debates have a chance of being understood. The issues dealt with in this article have received little recognition to date and might be serious stumbling blocks in the organization of ethnography as either a field of inquiry or an agency of social change. We have elaborated some of the pitfalls of contemporary psychological accounts of children in school and pointed to the development of a new set of tools for dealing with intellectual performances in ways that allow for an identification of the social constraints that organize them.

There is a hopeful side. Forced to deal with the description of apparent psychological events, an ethnography of schooling may lead the way in the development of a social science that can inform us about the construction of the important life moments that make up human experience in different kinds of social structure. As an ally in such an effort, we could use a psychology that has reorganized its methodological priorities in the direction of understanding real life developments within social scenes. It would be wonderful to have a solid theory of how skills are organized (required, allowed, and even discouraged) in the actual situations that constitute a social order. Such a theory will not come easily. Indeed, we may have constantly to challenge the social order that so comfortably harbors current biases in order just to begin. If that can be the fun of it, then there is a chance.

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NOTES

1. Although we claim a tight fit between theorizing in educational psychology and public institutional ideology, we make no effort in this article to elaborate the connections. Rather, our concern is to alert ethnographers to how they might engage in descriptive work that would help to overcome blind spots in the theorizing of educational psychologists and the ideology of schooling personnel. If we were to make the connections, Dorothy Smith's (1974) account of the ideological side of various theoretical steps in sociology could be a useful model. It would be nice if the same critique could not be written about an ethnography of schooling of a next generation.

2. Among serious anthropologists, the recent ethnographic trend in educational research smacks of scandal. Appropriated without regard for the descriptive standards ethnographers use to hold each other accountable for reports well done, the rhetoric of ethnography—the rhetoric of taking people seriously enough to describe what they know in ways sensitive to the contexts in which they seem to display their knowledge—has been used to support a wide range of inquiries governed nonetheless by traditional research categories, such as race, class, institutional roles, intelligence quotients, and the usual measures of school success and failure. Bad wine in broken bottles, and all in the name of a good thing. The cry for qualitative methods has become an excuse for no methods at all. The cry for taking children seriously has led only to new ways of being blind to the constraints on their growth and development. The result has been descriptive drivel. The hopes some of us had in carrying ethnography to education now look naive. Beneath the embarrassments and justifiable cynicism, however, there is a positive side to the institutional use of ethnography. The effort has a unity and positive direction in running away from the narrow and rigid version of educational psychology that has dominated most efforts to understand our children. This article is about some of the pitfalls to be faced in attempting an ethnography of schooling free of the institutional influence of educational psychology.

3. In a recent interview (MrDermott 1980), Ray Birdwhistell has offered a necessary warning that what natives recognize as teaching-learning performances may be elaborate behavioral shows or displays of learning that occurred elsewhere under quite different conditions. The following form'attion, strikingly similar to Vygotsky (1978), is as rich as the illustrative example from dance is fun.

We've always assumed that teaching is a special activity which necessarily goes on in special contexts in which certain orders of learning also occur. In my opinion in organizing such an activity, you are dealing with a calibration in which the behavior is at least as parallel as it is complementary and in which there are acted out, patterned participations, systematic dances which take place.

I've been concerned with the difference between that model of teaching which is seen to come out of a dyadic (the so-called teacher-student) relationship and that model of teaching which
comes from a contextually well-defined relationship in which the critical issue is the maintenance of the appropriate contact at the appropriate level. What I am concerned with are the conditions that maintain the contact in which the information not yet stored in specific instructions moves into the system and becomes a part of it so that "learning" can take place.

This concern has its roots in my work on what made a good dancer. We were looking at good ballroom dancers. We interviewed the girls, and they said that the good male dancer held firmly and led strongly. The boys said that the good female dancer was actually leading and what made a good male dancer was anticipating the lead he followed. Once they heard our account, they fell all over themselves because what they needed was to have the other image, the other myth, at that level of understanding. The way you taught them was to have them stay together long enough so that they could learn to dance, and you were careful not to offend that other proposition (p. 16).

4. Adam actually was in a quite extraordinary private school in which less debilitating circumstances were often arranged for him, and he made much progress over the two years we followed him. But that is not relevant to the point being made here.

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Within the educational research community the traditional quantitative and experimental paradigms, though still dominant, are increasingly considered too restrictive to cope with the complexity of learning and schooling. In response to this concern, a new genre of educational research is developing that aims to uncover the context and the texture of the events studied. Variously referred to by such labels as educational ethnography, participant observation, qualitative observation, case study, or field study, the new method is used as if it were a recent discovery having no precedent.

In response to this general lack of knowledge regarding the ethnographic method, educational anthropologists have made various attempts to think through the underlying conceptions to provide a context and logic for the application of this methodological paradigm. The articles in this volume by Dell Hymes and Shirley Heath represent the most recent efforts to bridge the gap between anthropological and educational ethnography. Another recent attempt is that of Louis Smith (1979), in which he presents "a patterned analysis" of the "educational ethnographic, participant observational" genre of educational research.

Interesting differences can be discerned in these efforts. Smith explicitly states that he is directing himself "largely to the educational research community." Drawing from a broad spectrum of scholarship ranging from the sociology of knowledge, sociology, social psychology, and anthropology, Smith outlines the logic of educational ethnography. Hymes and Heath address themselves to the educational anthropology community. By focusing their attention more exclusively on the theory and practice of anthropological ethnography, their suggestions for the application of ethnography in the school-community context fall more squarely within the discipline of anthropology.

These different but overlapping approaches are crucial as we elucidate the ethnographic paradigm. It is important to keep in mind that two rather different audiences are being addressed—one consisting of educational anthropologists and the other of educational researchers. Because scholars trained in these two traditions will be increasingly working in
tandem, we need to work toward an understanding of the somewhat different uses they will make of the same general methodology.

In pursuit of this understanding, I will address myself in the following to several programmatic issues that need clarification from the perspective of the anthropology of education. The first, and perhaps the most important issue, concerns the question raised by Dell Hymes, "What is ethnography?" Though, as Hymes points out, anthropologists do not share a unified conception of ethnography, I would venture to conjecture that a more unified conception exists among school ethnographers.

Ethnography, at least as it is practiced by school ethnographers, represents a large bag of tools varying in degree of measurement precision. These tools, which can range from participant observation, key informant interviewing to videotaping and the eliciting techniques of ethnoscience, are applied to analysis units varying in degree of magnification. The whole society may be adopted as the main unit of analysis or, at the other end of the spectrum, interaction at the dinner table may be the primary unit of analysis (see the article by Shultz, et al. in this volume for the latter).

Despite the differences in the tools and the variety of situations studied, the goal of ethnography is almost always the same. Ethnography is a way of systematically learning reality from the point of view of the participant. No matter how it is conducted, the purpose of ethnography is to uncover and to communicate to others what one needs to know to understand another person's or group's social reality.

There are two general ways of approaching the task of learning another's reality. The first is what can be broadly referred to as the macro approach. The main goal of macroethnography is to describe the flow of behavior in a way that allows us to comprehend at an emotional level the events set before us and to understand the context motivating these events. Human behavior is displayed in its own terms with a minimum of anthropological jargon. Despite the absence of jargon in macroethnographic reporting, however, a large body of anthropological theory guides the selection of events to be reported.

The conduct of macroethnography requires systematic training in ethnology and standard fieldwork techniques. Central to ethnological training is knowledge of cultural theory as this has been defined by American anthropologists. In addition, the structural-functional approach of the British social anthropologists orients the macroethnographer when working in the field situation. In this situation a variety of techniques may be employed. The most essential of these techniques is extended participant observation. Participant observation demands complete commitment to the task of understanding. The ethnographer must become part of the situation being studied to feel what it is like for the people in that situation. This takes time and psychological energy. The ethnographer who really becomes immersed in other peoples' reality is never quite the same afterward. The total immersion creates a kind of psychological disorientation because of the need to identify with, at the same time remaining distant from, the process being studied.

Some of the best examples of the macroethnographic approach are illustrated by such books as Tally's Corner, Soulside, Man in the Principal's Office, and The Urban Villagers. These books are classic examples of the macroethnographic genre because they make human beings and social situations come alive in a way no other social science research method can possibly accomplish. In each case the author joins systematic field observational techniques and a technical understanding of the culture concept with the ability to render human beings believable on the printed page. Each
of these books describes situations in a manner that impresses on the reader the expectations and constraints motivating behavior.

The second general approach to the task of learning another's reality is the micro approach resulting in the microethnography. The terms macro- versus microethnography are variously used in anthropology. I like to think of these approaches as being differentiated on the basis of tools employed and the goals of analysis. Macroethnography relies on the observer who is also a participant to capture the gestalt of behavior. Microethnography employs techniques such as videotapes and ethnoscience to gauge the underlying rules for behavior and the implicit categorizations by which people order their world. These rules and categorizations are as precisely stated by the ethnographer as is the means for arriving at them. Because they are so precise, microethnographic studies ordinarily concentrate on short segments of behavior and require a large expenditure of time and money for analysis.

The articles by Mehan and by Shultz, et al. in this volume represent one aspect of microethnographic work. By specifically laying out the elements of teacher-student dialogue, Mehan both gives information to the scholarly community and provides participants with ways of understanding the covert patterns that organize their behavior vis-à-vis one another. By analyzing interaction at the dinner table in an Italian-American home, Shultz, et al. show how the structure of interaction is repeated in the school setting. Though these efforts focus on a small slice of human interaction, the sophistication both in method and analysis reveal the "deep structure" organizing face-to-face interaction. It remains to be seen whether the typology of participation structures outlined by Shultz, et al. and the classroom behavioral segments identified by Mehan are part of the "deep structure" of our culture.

There is much about the methodology of macro- and microethnography that I cannot possibly cover here. Nor can I speak about the ways these two approaches have been combined. My guess is that anyone who has read Man in the Principal's Office will understand what Mehan describes more fully. Conversely, Mehan's approach enables us to take another look at the principal's behavior and to see it in a different light. While watching a videotape presented by Shultz and Erickson of dinner table interaction in an Italian-American home, I found myself feeling at home because I had recently read The Urban Villagers. I was able to see things going on at the dinner table which Shultz and Erickson did not discuss but which Gans does. While Shultz, Florio, and Erickson lay out the structure of interaction, Gans provides the content of life in an Italian-American community.

The structure of behavioral interaction uncovered by microethnographers paves the way for contrastive and comparative studies. Such studies, I believe, ought to be classified within the rubric of ethnology rather than ethnography. Evelyn Jacob's study, in this volume, is an example of what I would prefer to call school ethnology. Though she builds her data base from microethnographic observations, her main interest is in comparing individuals along a variety of dimensions to test specific hypotheses. Her approach also involves more macroethnographic work in order to lay out the cultural context within which she frames specific hypotheses. Her orientation toward seeking and explaining nonrandom associations between diverse phenomena requires that she remove herself from the emotionality of events. By deriving the behaviors to be quantified from an ethnographic basis, her work straddles the fence between educational anthropology and educational research.
Jacob's paper raises an issue that Hymes also mentions. This concerns the need for typologies. If, as I have suggested, school ethnology must be based on comparison, contrast; and hypothesis testing, we need to think of appropriate typologies not only for types of schools but for types of situations. School ethnology should employ typologies that are ethnographically based. Typologies are needed not only for schools within a district, but for schools within a nation and for schooling cross-culturally. By comparing and contrasting types of schools in the U.S. and in other nations, we come to a better understanding of the similarities and differences within our own nation.

Finally, by way of concluding these overly programmatic remarks, I would like to return to the issue of presentation. The well written ethnography has the capacity of reaching an audience in a way no other scholarly product can possibly aspire to. Similarly, the sensitively conducted presentation to teachers of videotaped interaction has the capacity to change behavior in a way that a manual for proper conduct in the classroom can not. It is important that we keep this in mind as we continue to explicate the ethnographic paradigm. It would be a mistake to sacrifice the art and the empathy that characterize the ethnographic endeavor on the altar of science. If ethnography becomes a brief-lived fad among educational researchers, it will be because the quantitative-experimental paradigm overruled the desire to uncover the content and texture of behavior. I do not believe ethnography will go out of style as long as anthropologists continue to explicate this approach.

NOTES

1. For a good summary of other attempts by anthropologists to speak to the issue of school ethnography see Wolcott (1975).

2. See Pelto (1970) for a discussion of these techniques.

3. See Liebow (1967); Hannerz (1969); Wolcott (1973); Gans (1962).

REFERENCES


This volume has attempted to clarify the nature of ethnography and to identify the value of ethnography for education. The problem of defining ethnography, which may be of greater interest to the academicians than to practitioners, generates neither clear consensus nor heated controversy. Indeed, the approaches to the ethnographic enterprise presented here have exhibited a healthy eclecticism. The application of ethnography to education, which is of primary interest to practitioners, may generate considerable controversy. Accordingly, I will confine my remarks to the potential usefulness and dangers of applying ethnography to education, and will leave to others the task of defining ethnography.

One major concern has been how ethnography can deepen our understanding of formal education through observational studies of the school as a functioning whole, as a "culture and community." Although such an investigation can be an end in itself, ethnographic studies of schools can also supplement other types of educational research by introducing a greater degree of reflexivity and by generating hypotheses on the basis of open-ended observations of natural settings.

Because ethnography carries as its legacy from anthropology a "holistic" perspective and a preoccupation with culture, ethnography is well suited to studies of the school both as a cultural whole and as a cultural part that articulates with family and community. Thanks to the work of Heath and others, there is increasing awareness of "cultural factors" in education. Whereas intelligence and aptitude tests are designed to identify the personal and idiosyncratic, ethnography is designed to increase our understanding of the cultural factors. How does a child's home and community think and act with regard to learning, formal education, literacy, socialization, authority, peer relationships, etc.? How can insights into culture-specific patterns of the child's out-of-school milieu be used to enhance his experiences in school? Ethnography is an effective research method for exploring these and related questions.

Because ethnography is so open-ended and descriptive an enterprise, researchers can explore natural settings without preformulated hypotheses. Researchable problems are identified as they emerge in the course of
ethnographic observation. In this way, ethnography can serve as a preliminary to other kinds of research. Recognizing that the formal educational system could work better than it does, an ethnographer could observe the everyday life of a school with an eye to generating hypotheses that might have implications for practical problem-solving.

Because ethnographic observation may be directed to any sphere of human activity, including the research effort itself, "scientific method" is not immune from ethnographic scrutiny. Ethnographic studies of educational research itself, particularly if conducted in an ethnomethodological mode, could offer fresh insights into the assumptions and practical reasoning that researchers in school settings generally take for granted, and could lead to a greater degree of reflexivity in the research design. Observational studies of educational research would also offer a way of checking for investigator bias, a point made by Jacob.

A second major concern has been with how ethnography can deepen our understanding of informal education. When children are left to their own devices, how do they organize themselves? How do they transmit knowledge, skills, values, and attitudes? Much informal learning goes on in peer group interaction and in play contexts. These settings have been of special interest to Labov, who focused on the moral orientations in peer group culture; Sutton-Smith, who has been concerned with how children work their way through problems and structures as they select ways of playing appropriate to their developmental needs; and Bauman, who examines the expressive behavior characteristic of peer group culture. These studies raise such questions as: Where, when, and how does learning occur in the child's life? What skills are displayed under what conditions? To what extent can educators achieve a better fit between the learning strategies children devise for themselves and those devised for them?

A third concern is the implications of turning the research enterprise over to the researched, that is, of engaging teachers and students and administrators in ethnographic studies of their own schools and communities. In this way ethnography becomes curriculum, but curriculum of a very special kind, since self-study can heighten the awareness of students and teachers of the nature of teaching and learning in a variety of settings. Such awareness can prepare them to serve as the agents of change.

In the early history of anthropology, ethnography was used primarily to describe "others." The challenge when describing "exotic" societies was to show how customs a Westerner might find abhorrent could be taken for granted and followed without question in some remote part of the world. Today, as we use ethnography to study ourselves, the challenge is to make the familiar strange, to make the taken-for-granted problematic. As a result, ethnography can become an extremely valuable exercise in self-reflection. Indeed, for many ethnographers, "life is a field trip," and the commonplace is never boring, precisely because observational skills have been honed to a fine point for the purposes of penetrating the apparent seamlessness of everyday life. When students and teachers are engaged in studying themselves, the result may be "consciousness raising," or simply deeper insight into life and learning in and out of school.

For many years ethnography has entered the curriculum through social studies, in the form of textbook descriptions of other cultures. The possibilities for engaging children in doing ethnography—rather than presenting them with the information garnered by other ethnographers—have been ably explored by Rae Alexander Minter, who involved students in Frankford, Pennsylvania, in an oral history of their own community. During this project, children forged links with older generations. They
developed an awareness of the durability and continuity of their community across many years and lifetimes. And, they acquired a more positive feeling about the place they live.

Now that we have considered the potential usefulness of ethnography as a research strategy and as curriculum, let us consider some of the potential dangers—the ethnographer as spy; the colonization of children's culture; and narcissism.

Practitioners have recently expressed an interest in how ethnographies of the classroom could provide supervisors with a better basis for identifying problems and evaluating teachers. It is applications such as this that could give ethnography a bad name. To use an essentially non-judgmental research strategy for the purpose of making judgments would violate the moral integrity of the ethnographic enterprise and jeopardize the validity of the results. Ethnography is based on trust; if ethnography were to be the basis for evaluation and attendant decisions regarding firing and hiring, ethnographic research would breed distrust on the part of the subjects. Only with trust and openness will people yield the knowledge of themselves that ethnography seeks. To have ethnography an instrument of control, a spying effort, would be to destroy its ethnographic usefulness.

By colonization of children's culture, I mean attempts to formalize informal education, to incorporate children's folklore into the curriculum. Although we can and should gain important insights into how children learn by examining their informal acquisition of skills through folklore, we should be cautious about intervening in this area, whether by incorporating their folklore into the curriculum or by interfering with their spontaneous involvement with folklore.

Narcissism raises questions of self-awareness versus self-consciousness. We need a better understanding of the cultural nature and value of tacitness, a point beautifully developed by Cazden. There are dangers in making everything explicit for everyone. The dynamics of self-investigation need careful attention, before we engage children in the enterprise, particularly given considerations regarding their development. We need to think about how children who have trouble with basic interactional conventions will cope with the kind of meta-communicative requirements involved in watching themselves on videotape, for example.

These dangers aside, ethnography holds great potential for education, a point made dramatically by this volume.
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