Analysis of changes in federal education policy in the 1960s, based on archival research and other sources, suggests a reinterpretation of the causes of the success or failure of the new federal programs. A review of the literature on these "Great Society" educational policies finds that most authors feel the policies sprang from a coalescence of legislative, racial, religious, and presidential factors in the mid-1960s. Archival evidence on that period, however, points to three further factors: the activist role of the federal budget bureau on task forces formulating educational policy; federal economic advisors' call for an expansionary budget in 1965; and President Lyndon Johnson's practice of proposing new Great Society programs while underfunding the old ones. The new policies also created "iron triangles" of educational interest groups that helped replace old federal education bureaucracies with new ones. Based on a perspective from the 1980s, an evaluation of the Great Society educational programs concludes that most have worked poorly, been underfunded and over-ambitious, and tended to resegregate some of their beneficiaries. Evaluation from an even longer perspective, however, may show that the programs worked. (Author/RW)
"The Ambiguous Transformation: Federal Education Policy and the Second Reconstruction"

by

Hugh Davis Graham*

I

Last fall the University of Texas Press published a book entitled Exploring the Johnson Years, and its fifth chapter was my essay on the evolution of federal education policy during the Johnson administration. Two years before, I had been invited by the Johnson Foundation—specifically by the symposium's director and the planned anthology's editor, historian Robert A. Divine—to write an essay on quite a different topic, collective violence. In my previous eight books and two dozen or so articles I had claimed to know something about southern history and politics, race relations, desegregation, civil rights, collective violence, and related topics that centered on the Second Reconstruction of the 1960s. But I had never heretofore claimed to know anything special about the history of education. Now here I am, on the podium at the AERA—like a lawyer representing

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himself, who hence has a fool for a client. Unlike my distinguished University of Maryland colleague, Donald Warren, I am a minister in the history of education almost without portfolio. Worse, as a historian of education and of the second reconstruction generally, I am lacking Warren's approximate century of perspective and research on the events I seek to interpret.

But we contemporary historians of the 1960s do have at least a decade or two of perspective, and most of the archival evidence concerning the development of federal education policy during the 1960s is open in Boston and Austin and Washington. So two years ago I persuaded the NIE to award me a research grant to dig into those archives, and three months ago I presented a paper at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Los Angeles that represented a preliminary and somewhat speculative report on that research. But that paper was 40 pages long and contained more than 50 rather long footnotes; I had to present it orally by starting in the middle. I shall not try to do that sort of formal analysis here today.

Instead, I want first to comment somewhat editorially on the research and the interpretation that we have received to date on the dramatic development of
federal education policy during the 1960s. Then I will advance several tentative and probably controversial interpretations of these events, which cluster around the 1965 "breakthrough" of ESEA and HEA, and include their associated programmatic components through 1969. In doing so, I will first suggest three ways in which the archival evidence requires a revised interpretation of those events. Then I will speculate that enhanced historical perspective, as brief as it must be since those programs began, calls for a re-examination based upon what we know about their implementation and evaluation. I also will try to be concise, and in doing so I will consciously forfeit many of the customary cautious, scholarly qualifications. And I will minimize the footnotes.

II

This introduction, then, leaves me with three remaining sections of my paper, each with several brief arguments to make. The first section concerns the extant body of literature on the evolution of federal education policy during the 1960s, which has strengths that are more obvious than its weaknesses, which grow more obvious with time. The strength of this body of social science scholarship is that these helpful books -- by such respected social
analysts as Stephen Bailey, Edith Mosher, Eugene Eidenberg, Roy Morey, Norman Thomas were prompt and contemporary assessments, researched and written by scholar-practitioners who enjoyed privileged access to policy actors whose memories were fresh. These studies were largely external analyses of congressional, agency, and constituent group behavior. Their case study methods combined legislative hearings of agency and interest group testimony with customarily anonymous interviews, which sought to maximize candor by masking sources. Their weaknesses, then, mirrored their strengths, in that such contemporary portraits inescapably lacked the perspective that only time could bring, their anonymous interviews blocked the evidential specificity that historians demand, and the somewhat episodic quality of their case studies encouraged discontinuity of process and a short-ranged view of policy evolution.

They generally shared another weakness, one more policy—substantive than research—procedural: their authors tended to share editorial or ideological biases in favor of federal intervention. Indeed, most students of the federal role in education, Donald Warren certainly included, have generally deplored its belated and half-hearted intervention. Warren would, indeed, Enforce it. I sympathize
with much of this argument — how could I not? I attended public schools in my native Arkansas and in Tennessee that were racially segregated by state law and also by federal judicial decree. My high school graduation present was Brown v. Board of Education, but it was too late to have any impact on my own Jim Crow schooling. I submit, however, that while much of the federal intervention in the Second Reconstruction has been salutary, especially in regard to what "Doc" Howe called the "things" programs, like federal school construction loans and grants; it has also ranged toward the wasteful and even occasionally the disastrous, especially concerning what Howe called the "people" programs, like ESEA Title I and bilingual education. I shall return to that editorial argument at the end of my paper.

The published literature on federal initiatives in education policy during the Second Reconstruction represents a bibliographic burst of the late 1960s, with very little follow-up. Most of it rests on the social science model of research in contemporary published sources plus anonymous interviews, and much of it centers on the controversial role of the Gardner task force in policy formulation. This literature reflects a consensual view that four
circumstances coalesced in 1964-65 to make possible Johnson's Great Society breakthrough with the ESEA and the HEA of 1965. First, and most obvious, is the Democratic landslide in 1964, which added 38 new Democratic seats in the House and two in the Senate, and effectively broke the Kennedy stalemate. Second, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had at least temporarily defused the race or school desegregation issue. Third, the bitterness of the church-state dispute had been considerably reduced by the Johnson administration's adroit combination of negotiation that offered Catholics limited gains under the Everson formula of aid to the child, not the school, and that overall appeared more attractive to combatant groups on both sides than continued mutual veto and recrimination. Fourth, in addition to this potential political, racial, and religious accommodation, there was former school-teacher Lyndon B. Johnson's passionate faith, which was at-once naive and touching, in the panacean powers of education as the best passport out of poverty. Given this magic constellation of stars in fleeting alignment, Camelot came not with John F. Kennedy, but with Lyndon Johnson -- for one brief shining moment in the middle 1960s.

The standard literature so fully explicates these
political, racial, religious, and personal factors, that one may safely take judicial notice of them. But I will argue in this second section of my paper that the archival evidence and broader secondary analysis call for new attention to three additional and little appreciated circumstances surrounding the breakthrough events of 1964-65, and powerfully shaped their consequences. First, I want to deflect attention away from the Congress and HEW and even from the White House staff, toward the strategic but customarily obscured position of the Budget Bureau, and especially toward its distinctively cynical attitude toward many of the line agencies, particularly those regarded as captive of their clientele groups—like Labor, Commerce, and Agriculture—and most especially of all toward HEW and USOE. In developing educational policy, the Bureau's strategic position was individually occupied by William B. Cannon, who was Chief of the Budget Bureau's Education, Manpower, and Sciences Division, and who was executive secretary for the Gardner task force of 1964 and the Friday task force of 1966-67, and who also sat on Keppel's important interagency task force in 1965. In his capacity as staff director for the Johnson administration's two major outside policy-planning task forces on education, Cannon and hence the Bureau enjoyed a
substantial measure of initiative and control over the agenda and information flow of the part-time task force, which typically met twice a month for five or six months, and Cannon did much of the early report drafting.

This process of policy evolution was so complex and the archival documentation is so extensive that only a summary assessment of the Bureau's role can be attempted here. But basically, the Budget Bureau's senior staff deeply resented their relegation during the Eisenhower administration to the role of federal "green-eyeshades" accountants, and they responded to the Kennedy initiative to get the country "moving again" by engineering an enthusiastic and smooth transition in 1960-61, and by strengthening their renewed policy planning function throughout the Kennedy administration: This momentum carried the Bureau's initiative in policy formulation through the crucial early years of the Johnson administration, when the superstructure for the Great Society was being designed. Of the 14 legislative task forces of 1964, which Johnson created in almost paranoid secrecy to programmatically transform Kennedy's New Frontier into LBJ's Great Society, the Budget Bureau provided the executive secretary and staff coordinating function for all but two (one of which was dropped).
In the case of education, which ranked very high on Johnson's legislative agenda, Cannon's leverage was extraordinary—partly because he got along so famously with John Gardner, and partly because he controlled the logistics and agenda of a widely dispersed, part-time group of policy advisors, one that contained such overcommitted luminaries as Clark Kerr, David Riesman, Francis Keppel, James Allen, Sidney Morland, Time editor Hedley Donovan, Polaroid president Edwin Land. The upshot of this strategic positioning of the Bureau staff was that, in the case of education, Cannon's searing contempt for USOE as an "incompetent stodgy agency with no program except that furnished by outside bureaucrats," combined with the outside task force's freedom from Washington's bureaucratic inertia to help create, in ESEA's titles III (supplementary educational centers) and IV (educational research and development laboratories), two consciously subversive models of federal intervention in education. Budgetarily, they of course pale before Title I, but their existence symbolized the Bureau's assessment of USOE as a hopelessly hidebound bureaucracy. Indeed, Cannon appears to have regarded the local public school systems themselves as largely hopeless, like USOE. The Gardner report
Bureau's obscured role, and Cannon's leadership in particular, because I want to suggest how archival history can and should more fully inform the abundant and too often self-serving public record that Congress and the executive agencies continually generate. But my second set of circumstances, which so crucially conditioned the breakthrough events of the mid-sixties, involved less personality and bureaucratic structure than a magic moment of fiscal and budgetary happenstance. In discussing this, I will allude to only three documents. The first two are memoranda from Gardner Ackley, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, to President Johnson, and third is from Budget Director Charles Schultze to Johnson. They range, in excruciating brevity and agony, from boom to bust.

On June 2, 1965, Ackley wrote Johnson that the CEA had met with eight of its senior academic consultants and all agreed that in light of a slowing growth rate, "they would like to see more fiscal stimulus in early 1966. In any case, they urged a strongly expansionary budget for fiscal 1967." On this note the budgetarily huge and fiscally redistributionist ESEA and HEA went roaring through. But by December of 1965, Ackley was calling for "a significant tax increase...to prevent
an intolerable degree of inflationary pressure."  

By the fall of 1966, with rising inflation and Vietnam expenditures whipsawing the administration, Budget Director Charles Schultze wrote the President to warn about one major budget problem that stood out above all others:

That problem is simply that we are not able to fund adequately the new Great Society programs. At the same time, States, cities, depressed areas and individuals have been led to expect immediate delivery of benefits from Great Society programs to a degree that is not realistic. This leads to frustration, loss of credibility, and even deterioration of State and local services as they hang back on making normal commitments in order to apply for Federal aid which does not materialize. Backlog, queuing, and griping build up steadily.

Schultze was especially concerned because the burgeoning staff of Joseph Califano, who had replaced Bill Moyer's as the ranking presidential aide in July of 1965, had cranked up the task force machinery to a fever pitch, thereby generating a profusion of new legislative proposals that would attract congressional and clientele support in a period of increasing fiscal deterioration that was certain to underfund even the existing Great Society programs.

...we are now in the process of developing a wide range of new legislative proposals. Adequate funding of already authorized Great Society programs will be a very tough problem even if there are no new programs...in the present budget situation I see very little hope of any significant expenditure buildup on
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existing Great Society programs. ... As I see it, the situation will get worse instead of better unless we decide to digest what we already have on our plate before reaching for more. We should be extremely selective in adopting new Task Force recommendations.

Yet while Schultze was writing, twelve new outside task forces, including William Fridays task force on education, and 34 interagency task forces, including Keppel's on education, were brain-storming toward new proposals, while the recently enacted Great Society programs were already beginning to starve.

Recalling Califano's task force operation of 1966, Budget Bureau's Harold Seidman, who had been White House Liaison for Donald Price's 1964 outside task force on government reorganization, complained that:

Task forceitis ran rampant. At least forty-five task forces were organized in the fall of 1966. Papers were circulated on an "eyes only" basis and when agency people were included on the task forces they were reluctant to tell even their bosses about what they were doing. The task force operation bred a miasma of suspicion and distrust without producing very much that was useable.

Seidman is basically right about Califano's—and, ultimately of course, Johnson's—abuse of the task force device, with 46 in 1966 and 35 in 1967 busily generating program proposals while Vietnam and inflation
crippled the budget, and the ghetto and campus beneficiaries of the Great Society programs began to riot. But it is here that the historian's sense of the uniqueness of time and circumstance must assert itself. For to generalize abstractly about the utility of the task force device is to commit a social science. Far wiser is the immortal observation of Chief Dan George— that "Sometimes the magic works, sometimes it doesn't." The magic worked for John Gardner in 1964-65. In 1966, a sea change quietly set in; Vietnam and inflation heated up, and in the off-year elections the Republicans gained 47 seats in the House and three in the Senate. So the magic didn't work for William Friday in 1966-67. That sets the stage for my third and final set of unusual circumstances that so powerfully conditioned events during the Johnson years, and it is especially striking because it centers on a vast contradiction.

The files on the Friday task force on education of 1966-67 in the Johnson Presidential Library in Austin and in the National Archives reveal an intensive effort by 14 unusually talented and experienced people whose 149-page report probed widely and imaginatively into the problems and options of educational policy, and boldly recommended (since
they didn't have to pay the bill, at least not directly) a "moon shot" for the poor, a doubling of Title I expenditures, imaginative and aggressive methods for racial integration, and flirted with such novel notions as a free freshman year in college. William Friday recalled his task force's meeting with President Johnson in the White House on May 20, 1967, to deliver their report: "We talked about the report for maybe five minutes, and then he spent the next 45 minutes talking about Vietnam." 15

So the far-reaching and expensive Friday proposals went nowhere. As was his custom, Califano appointed an interagency task force under Gardner to consider the Friday recommendations and price them out. Gardner bucked the chairmanship down to Keppel's successor as Commissioner of Education, Harold Howe II, and Howe reported somewhat lamely to Califano in an "Eyes Only" memorandum of October 23, 1967 that his task force was so demoralized by the underfunding of existing programs that it could not faithfully recommend any of the new Friday proposals. 16 The report itself was prefaced by an unusually candid political analysis that denounced the growing gap between Great Society promises and budgetary reality, wherein appropriations for education programs were often only
half of authorizations. Similarly, the 1968 interagency task force on education, nominally chaired by newly promoted HEW Secretary Wilbur Cohen, but actually chaired by Howe, recommended full funding for existing programs rather than creating new ones - "We have an overdose of underfunded legislation on the books." Resentment in the agencies built up over the professional trespass of the outside task forces, and especially over the heavy-handedness of Califano's growing staff of young domestic policy planners. Halperin recalls:

I think Mr. Califano gave the impression from afar that he would only deal with Secretaries of Departments or with God Almighty—and then only grudgingly. Califano went to great lengths to make decisions. I don't believe he checked with the President on many key issues. With as few people around who knew the details of what was going on as possible, many of the decisions were made by him with a person such as Secretary Gardner who did not really know the substance and the detail of many of the proposals and couldn't be expected to. I found that Mr. Califano was arrogant, uninformed, bright but exceedingly thin because he was spread over such a broad area.

By 1967-68, everyone was tired:

I had the impression, particularly in '67, '68, of great haste, great superficiality. And political naivete of the highest order...the staff work of (James) Gaither and Califano doesn't begin to compare, for example, to the sophistication of the staff work that Mr. Cater engaged in, let's say, in '64-'65. I have to say that by '67-'68 perhaps all of us were doing sloppier work. We were over-extended, over-tired, and our morale left a lot to be desired.
Such exhaustion fits comfortably with our understanding of the cyclical flow and ebb of presidential power. So where is the contradiction?

The contradiction lies in the sustained output of Great Society legislation even into the eleventh hour of a lame-duck administration, which Johnson and his White House staff and his task forces pushed relentlessly, even in the face of Vietnam and soaring inflation and budget deficits and race riots and campus disorders. Even after Johnson announced his stunning decision not to run for re-election on March 31, 1968, Califano appointed 19 interagency task forces on topics as disparate as marine science, product test information, workmen's disability income — and two more on education. An acknowledged master of the legislative process, Johnson was also a master raconteur who cherished a revealing metaphor about the momentum of legislative interest groups. Douglass Cater recalls Johnson's fondness for the yarn about the country boy who on first seeing a locomotive, doubted that they would ever get it going. But when he saw it build up steam and roar down the track, he concluded: "They'll never stop her!" Hence Johnson would wheedle and beg for startup funds for new programs even while slashing the budget for established ones.
Consider, then, the extraordinary profusion of Great Society legislation in lame-duck 1968 in the field of education alone, either in new programs or renewals: school breakfasts, the Indian Bill of Rights, bilingual education, dropout prevention, Aid to Handicapped Children, co-operative education, Networks for Knowledge, college tutoring, Talent Search, college housing, Education for the Public Service, international education, Teacher Corps, National Science Foundation, Arts and Humanities Foundation, NDEA, Law School Clinical Experience, HEA, Higher Education Facilities Act—the list rattles on. Typically, major renewal programs like the various ESEA titles received lower appropriations than they had enjoyed the previous year, but the new programs like bilingual and handicapped education got their budgetary camel’s nose into the tent.

Clearly Johnson instinctively understood the coalescence of what political scientists had come to call "iron triangles." Indeed, Johnson’s senior aide for education, Douglass Cater, had written one of the major books on the alliance-formation process, whereby clientele groups forged enduring bonds of mutual interest with congressional subcommittees who authorized and funded programs affecting their interests,
and with agency officials who ran them. The classical examples of iron triangles are the agricultural extension network and the Army Corps of Engineers, and Hugh Hechó is right to remind us that the U.S. Office of Education is not the Army Corps of Engineers. But we know from the experience of the 1970s, when the education lobby's "Big Six" and Charles Lee's Committee on Full Funding turned back President Nixon's attempts to dismantle the Great Society programs in education (Nixon in fact ended up supporting a much heavier federal involvement in higher education), and also from the NEA's love affair with President Carter, that the triangular alliances forged in education were powerful indeed — and that it all basically started with Lyndon Johnson, and especially from his rather frenetic task forcing.

A final irony is that the relative immaturity of iron triangles in education in the early 1960s provided the Gardner outside task force of 1964 and the Keppel interagency task force of 1965 with unusual room to maneuver. But by the end of the Johnson administration, the very proliferation of Great Society programs that task forcing had spurred, in turn reinforced the growing network of iron triangles.
with a vested interest in maximizing their profit from the programmatic status quo. So Johnson and Gardner and Cater and Keppel and Cannon all enjoyed their magic moment in the middle 1960s, and these extremely capable civil servants exploited it superbly. Their task forcing considerably short-circuited the bureaucracies, as they were designed to do. Yet to the considerable degree to which they came eventually to represent the bureaucracies themselves, they gave themselves a kind of beneficent hotfoot. But if the fastest game in that most political of towns in the 1960s was task forcing, by the 1970s the smart money was on the iron triangles that had flowed from the Great Society's programmatic largesse, and that ironically represented the Weberian triumph of bureaucratic hegemony that task forcing was designed to circumvent or subvert in the first place. The work of Charles Lee's Committee on Full Funding was remarkably effective in that effort, but Thomas Wolanin knows far more about that than I do, so I will turn to the 1970s with proper deference.

That final Weberian irony is reinforced by the circularity of our present political circumstance, which finds the Reagan administration moving boldly to dismantle the superstructure of the Great Society, with federal education programs high on his hit list.
and with the public school system in dangerous disrepute. My own historical narrative must blessedly end with 1969, but I intend to write an epilogue that brings us to the ironical present, one based on the secondary literature and designed quite frankly to make some value judgments about how well this extraordinary programmatic legacy of the 1960s has worked—and why. I will do this self-consciously as a historian of public policy dealing in perilous contemporary terrain, but concentrating primarily on policy implementation and evaluation, rather than on my earlier concerns for policy origin, innovation, and legislative formulation.

Clearly, much of what was done was of great and timely benefit to public educational purposes. Doc Howe's "things" programs were helping open a new community college almost every week during the late 1960s, and doing so without a Federal Ministry of Education telling them what to teach. Even many of the more vulnerable "people" programs were investing public monies wisely, providing scholarship grants and generously subsidizing tuition loans for the talented needy, as well as the middle class, and providing research and artistic grants for the national endowments to award to such deserving scholars as you and me.
But many of the "people" programs of the Great Society, and especially the Title I guts of the ESEA, with its assorted Head Start and Follow Through accouterments, were both theoretically and politically based on the antipoverty model. They were grounded in the vogue new social science theory of human capital, and thereby generated naive expectations that programs and practice were bound to disappoint. And disappoint they did, with a vengeance that led so many of our colleagues in the 1970s to disown, like Pontius Pilate, the troubled legacy of their own handiwork. We all witnessed that torrid debate during the late 1960s that ranged through the 1970s over Coleman and Jencks and the Westinghouse and the Tempo study, and Milbrey McLaughlin's devastating RAND study of Title I. The debate continues, with more recent assertions from the NIE and the National Assessment for Educational Progress that compensatory education can work, and yet another new Rand study blasting Title I programs as disruptive and confusing to the students. So who are we to believe, and how does the historian best sort this out? In my own layman's view, such federal interventionist "people" programs seem generally to have worked poorly, and for a combination of rather different reasons.
Far too much was expected of them, owing to the misplaced euphoria of human resources theory, and the concomitant arrogance of applied and reformist social science. Federal funds were widely but thinly applied to remedy a massive problem; even annual expenditures of $1-2-billion represented less than ten percent of the nation's educational budget. Evaluation was built into their programmatic design, producing early and morale-sapping disappointments. The nature of the federal political system, and especially the nonfederal educational system, produced political compromises that blunted efficiency. Worse, such compensatory education programs led to segregation of the disadvantaged target groups, partly for reasons of accounting and auditing and logistics, as with Title I, partly because of political and ideological demands, as with bilingual education. Indeed, the best analyses that I have seen of the bilingual education programs (as distinct from bilingual pedagogical theory, which had very little to do with the controlling politics of the programs), would rank it as the pre-eminent example of Great Society Disasters. 28

But as Wilbur Cohen cautions, it may be too early to make historical judgments about such recent programs.
with much confidence or fairness. We would not have wanted to pass final judgments on the Morrill Act's land grant college system in, say, 1882. Head Start was begun with spectacular public promise in 1965, and a decade of subsequent and constant evaluation was devastating. Yet a symposium on early childhood intervention sponsored in 1977 by the American Association for the Advancement of Science found accumulating evidence of a "sleeper effect" of late developing gains that seemed permanent, but that could not have been detected earlier. Perhaps historians have the ultimate advantage in evaluation research because they are custodians of the temporal dimension. Lester Salamon has recently demonstrated the utility of long-term evaluation by studying the New Deal's "resettlement program", which opened land-ownership opportunities to thousands of black southern sharecroppers in the late 1930's and early 1940's. A conservative Congress killed the Farm Security Administration during World War II with a whoop, but Salamon concludes that the resettlement program transformed a group of landless black tenants into a permanent landed middle class that emerged in the 1960's as the backbone of the civil rights movement in the rural South.
So I stand properly cautioned in my assessment of the Second Reconstruction in federal education policy, while rather critically emphasizing its ambiguous quality, its unintended consequences, and the mutual frustrations that flow from the federal-state-local relationship. After all, that ambiguity seems to be inherent in the nature of reconstructions in America. The authors of the First Reconstruction scarcely intended their crowning achievement, the Fourteenth Amendment, to be used for a century primarily as a defense for corporate freedom, and scarcely at all as a defense for freedmen's freedom. I believe that Donald Warren will join me in hoping that the Second Reconstruction fares better than the first, but also in insisting upon a toughminded analysis of its goals in relation to its achievements.
NOTES


4 See Graham, "Federal Education Policy," 159-61. The standard scholarly citation, beyond the published literature listed above, is Philip Kearney's unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Presidential Task Force on Education and the ESEA of 1965" (Ph. D. diss., University of Chicago, 1967), especially 277-83. This is unfortunate, because we now have an excellent analysis based on archival sources—


9Memo, Cannon to Staff, 9 December 1964, Box 12, OMB Records, Division, National Archives. Similarly dim, though less extreme, views of USOE are generally reflected in the memoranda of other such senior BOB staffers as William Carey, Emerson Elliott, Phillip Hughes, Harold Seidman, and Hirst Sutton.

10Cannon, personal interview with the author, 15 September 1981. My interviews have included Joseph Califano, William Carey, Douglass Cater, Wilbur Cohen, Myer Feldman, William Friday, John Gardner, Samuel Halperin, Harold Howe, Francis Keppel, and Charles Lee. But primary reliance is on the archival evidence, which is massive and can only be lightly sampled here. Eidenberg and Morey, Act of Congress, covers the 1967 battle from the perspective of the Hill.

11Memo, Ackley to the President, 2 June 1965 FG 11-0, White House Central Files (WHCF), Johnson Library.

12Memo, Ackley to the President, 17 December 1965, F 14, WHCF, Johnson Library.

13Memo, Schultze to the President, 7 November 1966, Ex FI 14, Johnson Library.

15 William C. Friday, personal interview with the author; 15 May 1981.

16 Memo, Howe to Califano, 23 October 1967, Box 39, Files of Douglass Cater, Johnson Library.

17 Summary Report, White House Task Force on Education, 11 October 1968, 1. No new outside task forces were appointed in 1968. Califano's senior staff had institutionalized the practice of spring visits to prestige campuses to brainstorm for new ideas and identify potential task force recruits. Califano's growing staff had also, by 1967-68, largely displaced the senior Budget Bureau staff in domestic policy formulation. A persuasive argument to this effect is the paper of David C. Mowery and Mark S. Kamlet, "Killing the Messenger: Fiscal and Budgetary Processes in the Johnson Administration," delivered at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Los Angeles, 28 December 1981.

18 Transcript, Samuel Halperin Oral History Interview, 24 February 1969, 10-11, Johnson Library.
One was Cohen's; the other was on Higher Education and the Administration of Academic Science and Research Programs, co-chaired by Ivan Bennett and Alice Rivlin.


The rubric "Great Society Disasters" is suggested by Peter Hall's irreverent
see Noel Epstein, Language, Ethnicity, and the Schools: Policy Alternatives for Bilingual--
Bicultural Education (Washington: George Washington University: Institute for Educational
Leadership, 1977); and Abigail M. Thernstrom, "Language: Issues and Legislation," in
On September 29, 1981, the Washington Post reported
on Alan L. Gribberg and Beatrice F. Birman's
unreleased study for the Department of Education
that severely criticized the bilingual education
programs as being wasteful, ineffective,
politically motivated, and based on false
assumptions.

Bernard Brown (ed.), Found: Long-Term
Gains from Early Intervention (Boulder, Colorado: