Political power tends to overlap with economic power, thus favoring those with access to land, livestock, capital, and other productive resources; in virtually all societies women have fewer of those productive resources than men, which reflects and explains women's limited political power. Growing documentation indicates that men disproportionately benefit from rural development programs, such as educational and training opportunities, job placement, capital and technology transfers, and land commoditization. Until women participate more extensively in politics at all levels, they will continue to be marginalized in the development process. Utilizing women's organizations is a strategy which offers unique advantages for responding positively to modernization. The document's three part argument is drawn primarily from the scholarly and development practitioner literature. The first section reviews literature on women's participation in elite and mass politics and emphasizes rural women's organizational participation. The second section analyzes constraints on the organizational participation of women. The final section suggests policy implications in the areas of organizational strategies, employment/institutional strategies, and data collection. A 119-item bibliography concludes the document. (BRR)
WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT

Women's Organizations in Rural Development

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WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT

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If people are to be able to develop they must have power. They must be able to control their own activities within the framework of their village communities. And they must be able to mount effective political pressure nationally also.

---Julius Nyerere, July 13, 1979, UN/FAO World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development

In his address to the UN/FAO World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development on July 13, 1979, the President of Tanzania reminds people of the highly political nature of rural development. Political power tends to overlap with economic power, thus favoring those with access to land, livestock, capital, and other productive resources. In virtually all societies, women have fewer of those productive resources than men, which reflects and explains their limited political power. Thus Nyerere's point applies to women: if they are to control their own activities and to mount effective political pressure in national and local political arenas, they, too, must have power.

The most fundamental of all resources and the basis for acquiring other resources, political empowerment is recognized as essential for development and change by writers from all ideological spectrums. Increasing numbers of studies also demonstrate that peoples' participation optimizes the success of development efforts (Cohen and Uphoff 1977; DAI 1976; Korten 1980). Despite this growing consensus about

*Selections of this paper have been drawn from my Women and Participation in Rural Development: A Framework for Project Design and Policy-Oriented Research (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, Center for International Studies, Rural Development Committee, 1979). I am grateful to Norman Uphoff and John Cohen for their comments and suggestions on that monograph. I also appreciate comments from Jane Jaquette on this paper.
participation, the point is not always applied to women and to the expression of women's interests in local and national political settings. Instead, it is often assumed that men represent women's interests, or that male heads of household represent the interests of all family members, including women.

Growing documentation indicates that men disproportionately benefit from rural development programs, such as educational and training opportunities, job placement, capital and technology transfers, and land commoditization. Despite these preferential patterns, women continue to engage in productive activity, including farming, trading, and income generation, to provide water and firewood which enables productive activity and household maintenance, and to manage households in significant proportions. In many parts of the world, women's labor is untouched by labor-saving technology (Boserup 1970; Tinker 1976; Palmer 1977; Mintz 1971). The differential and unequal distribution of development benefits suggests that men are not effectively representing women's interests. Not only are women disadvantaged by these processes, but overall development goals are compromised with this misuse of human resources.

Until women participate more extensively in politics at all levels, they will continue to be marginalized in the development process. Utilizing women's organizations is a strategy which offers unique advantages for responding positively to marginalization. The three part argument that follows is drawn primarily from the scholarly and development practitioner literature. The first section reviews literature on women's participation in elite and mass politics and emphasizes rural/
women's organizational participation. The second section analyzes constraints on the organizational participation of women. The final section draws the policy implications from the previous sections. First, however, the underlying argument will be developed: that political empowerment and women's organizational participation are fundamental.

Political Empowerment: The Essential Resource

Many types of governments recognize peoples' right to participate in decision-making about policies and programs which affect them and which require their contributions. The rationale for this is quite clear. First, greater participation contributes wider perspectives, expertise, and information to the decision-making process, and is thus expected to improve that process. Second, participation creates a stake in the outcome of development programs which helps them to become self-sustaining. Finally, and most importantly, it is through participation that people are able to influence and control decision-making and to represent their interests and needs.

It is in political institutions that decisions are made which confer status, resources, rewards, and related responsibilities. Participation in those institutions, as well as direct access to those institutions through both individual contacts and organizational mediation, are crucial determinants of the resources, choices, and opportunities available to a society's members. In virtually all societies, relatively high socio-economic status groups tend to participate politically more than those of lower status (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Cohen and Uphoff 1977; Huntington and Nelson 1976). Men also tend to
participate more than women (Cohen and Uphoff 1977; Staudt 1979; Whyte 1978).

Reviews of anthropological literature indicate that women are universally subordinate to men, although this subordination varies in degrees (Lamphere 1977; Rosaldo and Lamphere 1974; Giele and Smock 1977). And, as much of this volume shows, resource disparities between men and women tend to be aggravated with the development strategies now taking place.

Greater balance in the distribution of economic opportunities and resources will begin to redress subordination. Yet unless women participate in institutions which determine the value of labor and redirect the allocation of resources, they will continue to be disadvantaged relative to men. In other words, it is inadequate political power, not inadequate economic resources alone, which explains subordination. Political power permits the acquisition of economic resources and/or facilitates the continuing control of economic resources. The quality of participation is vital as well. Participation must involve a conscious recognition of shared interests and the collective will to act on those interests.

I. Women's Participation: The Literature

In this section, conventional measures of political participation, such as voting, party membership and public officeholding are examined. Also analyzed are less conventional measures for which data are available, including access to government and organizational participation. More difficult to assess are those indirect or unconventional
indicators such as sporadic violence, behind-the-scenes bargaining or "political social work," which operate more diffusely to support, influence, or make demands from a regime (Schmidt 1976: 243; Jaquette 1976: 66). Although this paper is focused on rural development, data broken down by urban-rural residence are unavailable across national boundaries. Thus much of the material pertains to whole national populations. The discussion of mass participation is followed by material on elite participation.

**Mass Participation**

**Voting.** Virtually everywhere around the world, women were legally excluded from direct political participation in elections and office-holding of modern representative governments until the turn of the twentieth century. Now women may vote and stand for election equally with men in nearly all societies. Women do not vote at the same rate as men (Newland 1975: 4-11; Duverger 1955). Late entry into this part of the political mainstream partially explains the lag in voting participation rates relative to men. Nevertheless, other factors, such as level of education, labor force participation, stake in political decisions, and control over one's life are compelling explanations as well (Amundsen 1977; Jaquette 1974).

Cross-national information on women's voting participation is limited. Basic information available on the year suffrage was granted to women (Boulding 1976: 250-251), tells us nothing about whether women exercise their right to vote or whether their voting patterns differ from men's. More important, the mere act of voting tells little about the degree to which candidates are responsive to voters and thus, the
effect of voting on government performance. When women perceive them-
selves as a group and vote to advance the interests of their sex

group, they are more likely to ensure politicians' responsiveness.

Whether voting is meaningful or not, winning the right to vote focuses
women's attention on the political process (Chaney 1979: 83).

Contacting. A second participatory mode is that of initiating
contacts with government personnel and/or political representatives.

Initial contact may also be made by government personnel; once the

norm of interaction is established, citizens may initiate further inter-

action. Thus an important process of communication and responsiveness

can be created between government and citizen.

Rural extension services exemplify the exclusion of women from
this type of political process. Agricultural extension staff tend

overwhelmingly to be men and to communicate with men (Staudt 1975–76;

Bond 1974; Fortmann 1979). For female heads of households, access

problems are particularly acute. Both male staff and female clientele

may avoid such contacts due to cultural constraints against interaction

between unrelated men and women. Extension workers assume that infor-
mation transmitted to husbands will diffuse to wives, although one

study shows this transmission to be uneven and irregular (Fortmann

1979).

In many instances, women are the most appropriate group with

which staff should interact, given agricultural work and decision-
making patterns. Yet governments are unable to reach this key group
due both to insufficient female staff and to inadequate incentives
promoting male staff interaction with women. In such cases, women's
groups provide effective alternative vehicles for the dissemination of information and services. One study, focusing on Latin America, argues that technology transfer via democratically organized small groups best overcomes subsistence farmers' aversion to risk taking and permits extension workers to increase their case loads without loss of efficiency (Jedlicka 1977). Were women's groups to interact with extension staff, the bias problem would begin to be addressed. Interaction between organized women and extension staff can institutionalize economic change in long-term ways as well as enhance the quality of administration. Just as important, a stepping off point for other or more vigorous demands is created.

Classic studies of the U.S. agricultural extension and credit systems illustrate how organized clientele are able to secure more responsive administration (McConnell 1966; Lowi 1979; for a Kenyan example, see Leonard 1977). The Cornell Center for International Studies monograph series on the effects of local organization on various measures of development in Asia countries confirms this as well (Cohen and Uphoff 1977). Indeed, Esman argues that nonroutine services cannot be effectively provided to marginal publics unless they are organized (1978). This is illustrated well with women, who often form a marginal public. In a study among the Wolof of Senegal, where crops are grown in joint household plots and in men's plots and women's plots, the newly introduced mechanical sowers and weeders were systematically made available for the women's plots two and one weeks after the joint and men's plots, respectively. Not surprisingly, women's yields were lower than those of the joint and men's plots. Only after women
organized to complain to the government development agency (CNRA), was the technology made available during the appropriate times for sowing and weeding (Venema 1978: 112).

Organization. It is in voluntary organizations that mediation between the individual and government occurs. For the disadvantaged, organization provides either direct access to political power or access to the economic means of power acquisition (Huntington and Nelson 1976). Studies indicate that while high socio-economic status (and the attitudes associated with that status) predispose people to be politically active, organizational involvement and group consciousness can substitute as alternative routes to participation and can stimulate further political action (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Ambrecht 1976).

Anthropological research supports this as well. A comparison of four African preindustrial societies suggests that women's collective utilization of their economic and labor resources is a prerequisite to public participation. Among the Mbuti and Lovedu, where women's productive activities are collective and extend beyond the household, women are relatively equal to men. Women represent themselves in legal proceedings, participate in socializing opportunities, and hold political office. In contrast, Pondo and Ganda women, who work individually and produce for the household alone, face active discrimination in a variety of spheres.

Data on comparative male-female organizational participation are limited, although an early study of five countries (U.S., U.K., West Germany, Italy, and Mexico) indicates that men participate two to three times more frequently in organizations compared with women,
with the exception of the U.S. (Almond and Verba 1963). A more recent seven-country study, designating four levels of organizational affiliation, indicates that women comprise more of the "nonpoliticized" group in each country, and men more of the strongly affiliated, "politicized" group. These differences were particularly aggravated in India, Yugoslavia, and Austria where men were, respectively, twenty-one, three, and two times as likely to be "politicized" as women (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978: 247).

People may have common problems and interests, but they do not automatically share the perception of these commonalities which is necessary for organized action. The conditions associated with group awareness include:

- the opportunity to interact and communicate with one another,
- the absence of strong competing loyalties, and
- actual shared values or deprivations.

Studies of women's organizations find that they appear to flourish under certain conditions: the absence of men, the sense of relative deprivation, sex segregated work settings, and reciprocally-based female coping strategies in marginal economic settings (Leis 1974; Stack 1974; Freeman 1975; Brana-Shute 1976; Sanday 1974).

Organizations are uniquely able to address disparities between men and women, both economic and political. Through organization, women can pool common resources and utilize the benefits of scale to develop income-earning activities, reduce labor burdens, and commercialize labor production and thereby acquire public value for that labor. The Cameroon corn mill societies are classic examples of this process. A
community development officer introduced hand-operated corn mills which were loaned rather than donated and each group collected fees to repay the loan. Mills were loaned rather than donated and each group collected fees to repay the loan. With profits and by-products, activities expanded to include tree planting for fuel and poultry schemes using bran from the milling process (Bryson 1979: 93). In societies where women are secluded within households, organizational activity provides a setting to break isolation and share common interests. One study of income-generating activities in South Asia advocates central workplaces for women rather than home-based cottage industry for exactly this reason (Dixon 1978).

Support from and involvement in organizations provides access to information and contacts. In groups, women gain experience in leadership, management, and other skills translatable to other spheres. Indeed, voluntary organizational involvement is an important recruitment channel to elite political participation. In one study, over three-fourths of the female state legislative representatives interviewed gained experience and support via this route (Kirkpatrick 1974). Only when groups regularly make demands and control resources over which they can bargain will governments be responsive to members' needs. Such mobilization will spur the creation of structures within government to respond regularly to women and channel resources in their direction. In this way, governments will begin to serve female as well as male political constituencies and administrative clientele.

In a U.S. AID-supported project example, women's groups in two Tanzanian villages, which were local branches of the women's party wing, identified, prioritized, and developed solutions to local com-
munity problems. An important thrust of this project was to develop women's organizational capacity to make demands on and secure resources from their political environment. This goal was attained when a local party official who owned the only shop in town and was hostile to women starting another shop with more competitive prices was overruled by a high-level party office (Stanley 1979).

Colonial officials and early ethnographers were sometimes blind to women's authority structures, organizational activities, and solidarity networks outside the home. However, more recent studies provide a sense of the wide scope of women's organizational activity in those excolonies. Women's organizations tend to reflect (1) the sex division of labor (Caplan and Bujra 1978), (2) community needs which women perceive as their responsibility, and (3) the focus of national and international program intervention, as illustrated below.

Sex division of labor. Women's solidarity patterns are often based on a sex division of labor in which women work on similar tasks, labor separately from men, and consequently, share related interests. Among the Bamileke in Cameroon, where women's involvement in food production is long-standing, female farmers may be admitted into the Mensu, a women's society composed of the best cultivators. Among the same people, the Mandjon was a group of important women who administered village work done by women, such as clearing paths (Delaziere, cited in Bryson 1979: 25, 114). Several analyses of southeast Nigeria describe women's authority structures which parallel men's and functioned as women's courts, market authorities, and community developers (Okonjo 1976; Leis 1974). Organizations among low-income neighborhood
women in parts of the Caribbean and Lebanon provide mutual aid, disseminate information, and distribute food during times of shortage (Joseph 1976; Sutton and Makeisky-Barrow 1977). A study of Surinam women's clubs describes how entertainment is regularly organized for profit. Halls were rented, bands commissioned, and tickets sold, with returns redistributed through group services (Brana-Shute 1976). In Ghana, women organize to advance the economic interests of their occupational group. Such groups include traders, breadbaker cooperatives, fishmonger's associations, and butcher unions (Klingshirn 1971).

Common organizational forms are rotating credit and savings societies found among communal agricultural groups, and contract laborers all over the world (Misch 1975; Bryson 1979; Epstein 1961; Staudt 1980; Dixon 1978; Pala 1976; Hull 1976; Lewis 1976). Typically, members contribute a fixed sum on a regular basis, the lump sum of which is provided to one member at a time. These groups range from arisans in Java, friendly societies in Jamaica, mabati groups in Kenya, susu in West Africa, mushti in Bangladesh, dhikuri in Nepal, kutu in Malaysia, and gamayas in Egypt.

Community and group needs. Some women's organizations are also a response to community needs which women perceive as their responsibility or to their efforts to support or advance women. The largest category of this type of women's organization is concerned with social welfare; these provide hospital services, orphanages, vocational education, and child care. Often they are sponsored by urban, elite women (Bruce 1976: 293). Also included in this category are organiza-
tions which advance the interests of women and reduce discrimination (more of which are described in Section II). For example, affiliates of the YWCA lobby for legal equality between the sexes and provide safe shelter to women in urban areas.

External promotions: The availability of resources and trust of program interventions influence the form and substance of women's organizational activity. In central Kenya, a women's organization successfully sought available government resources for productive ventures. With these funds, members acquired loans to purchase land, shares in business, and agricultural inputs (Watchel 1975-76). A U.S. AID project in Upper Volta makes loans available to women's groups for productive ventures in grain milling, collective agricultural plots, shops, and other activities (1976). Other interventions, described more fully in Part II, promote a domestic, housewifely orientation to the virtual exclusion of all other women's roles. Such efforts also affect women's organizations, and may have detrimental consequences on equality.

Cross national indicators of women's organizational activity are only beginning to develop. One available indicator is the number of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) in a country. At least one INGO is found in virtually every country (for exceptions, see Boulding 1976). Although the presence of an INGO indicates little about the extent of women's influence within national political settings, but it does imply the existence of communication channels, resource availability, and enhanced leadership experience. The greater the number of INGOs, the larger the potential for networks, resource flows, and coalition prospects to enhance representativeness. A study of the
Brazilian suffrage movement notes the importance of international networking for catalyzing action and sharing action strategies (Hahner 1980: 98–99).

The frequency of INGOs is instructive. Virtually all Western European and North American countries have more than ten INGO national sections. One-third of Near East countries, around a quarter of African and Asia countries, and three-fourths of Latin American Caribbean countries have over ten sections. It is primarily in African and Asia countries that there are less than ten national sections and thus INGOs are underrepresented (adapted from Boulding 1976). Although, according to ethnographic materials, Africa has the largest number of rural women's organizations, it is paradoxically the area with the fewest national sections of INGOs. The International Directory of Women's Development Organizations (U.S. AID 1977) lists almost five hundred organizations, about two-thirds of which are located in developing countries.

Although much analytical writing concentrates on conventional participation mechanisms such as voting, other forms of mass participation such as contacting government officials and participating in formal organizations, appear to tap the larger political reality of development. Yet such mass participation will little increase government responsiveness to women unless it is linked to political elites. Representation is thus as crucial an issue as mass participation (Jaquette 1976: 60).

Elite Participation

Women have occupied prominent positions around the world as heads
of state in Argentina, India, Sri Lanka, Bolivia, Israel, Portugal, and the U.K., and as mayors in Freetown, Lome, Nairobi, Gabarone, and other capital cities. Nevertheless, compared to men, women in positions of authority have been exceedingly rare. A comparative elite theorist concluded that "women are the most underrepresented group in the political elites of the world" (Putnam 1976: 32). Political stratification is a universal feature of societies, and women are virtually excluded from top strata. The consequences of this imbalance are most certainly detrimental for the majority of women. The ineffectiveness of mass participation at the individual voting, contacting, and/or organizational level will persist without linkage and reinforcement at the elite level. Further, female exclusion is indicative of continuing cultural devaluation of women.

Will women in power represent the larger population of women, having an impact on the disparities between men and women? There are few examples in which a sufficiently larger number of women participate to determine whether there is a "critical mass" at which elite women form an effective and cohesive group. One rare piece of evidence, comparing two nineteenth-century charity organizations in Massachusetts, supports the argument that women policy-makers do make a difference regarding service to poor women. In the city where, despite the predominance of female members in elite charity organizations, male elites controlled charity policy: here policy was to ferret out the "unworthy." In the other city, women gradually took control of charity policy and reoriented the organization into one of advocacy for poor women. Various reforms were initiated, such as nutrition educa-
Lion, vocational training programs, female police matrons, and nurseries. Moreover, decreasingly smaller percentages of the poor were deemed "unworthy" and removed from welfare, as women took control (Crumbler 1980). Another case illustrates the effects of male-controlled decision making. Following the drought in the West African Sahel, government programs replaced Tuareg men's cattle, but not the livestock women had owned. The exclusion of women from decision-making explains the allocation of these resources (Cloud 1977).

**Elected public officials.** Women's participation in elective office varies little around the world. In most parliamentary democracies, women are approximately 5-10% of the national legislature. Strikingly similar is the current de facto ceiling of ten percent for women's participation in the central committees of Communist parties in China and the Soviet Union. Only in Scandinavian countries and the national assemblies of selected one-party socialist systems, such as the USSR, Eastern Europe, China, and Guinea is women's participation higher, typically around 20%.

Women's participation in public office at the regional and local levels is slightly higher, although women never number more than half, even in one-party socialist systems (Newland 1975: 6-9, 13-15, Appendix B; Putnam 1976: 33). According to the Law of Increasing Disproportion, the "disproportionate advantage of male educated, high-status elite recruits increases as we move up the political stratification system" (Putnam 1975: 33).

In some countries, seats in national parliaments are reserved for women in groups ranging from national assemblies to village committees. Seats are set aside for women in Kenya, Bangladesh, Guinea-
Bissau, and the Sudan and other countries. The proportion of seats for women is typically five percent or less, but some village committees have provided that two-fifths of all seats be held for women. Reserving places is a common technique utilized to increase the participation of disadvantaged groups in representative and bureaucratic institutions. For decades, India has had preferential policies for scheduled castes, tribes, and other "backward classes" and Anglo-Indians (Newland 1975: 15; Katzenstein 1978):

But getting a foot in the door, however desirable, is not enough. The proportion of female representatives is a critical determinant of the ability to advance women's interests as a group. Without a minimal critical mass, prospects for bargaining, leverage, and coalition building are dim. Even when women represent a significant proportion, they are not likely to have identical interests. No research exists on the minimal threshold for achieving group outcomes, but a study of proportions in a large bureaucratic institution indicates rough guidelines. A "skewed group" containing up to twenty percent women (or other disadvantaged group) tends to be treated as tokens; twenty to forty percent presence, called a "tilted group," provides for a minority group in which alliances and coalitions can be made; forty to sixty percent presence represents a "balanced group" (Kanter 1977: 209).

**Appointed, Career Positions**

Both the advent of complex, technologically advanced society, drawing heavily on bureaucratic expertise, and the decline of representative politics, increase the significance of bureaucratic
involvement in policymaking. It is in government bureaucracies that key decisions are made about implementation processes that ultimately affect who has access to resources. The access of disadvantaged groups will increase when their advocates gain positions influencing or controlling resource allocation, decision making, and other policymakers. Furthermore, representation within the bureaucracy favors permanent, institutionalized, and routine responsiveness to the special circumstances of particular clientele. One study estimates that women represent only six percent of all mid to top-level policymakers around the world (Boulding 1976: 36).

Women-sensitive policymaking entails a setting in which appropriate tone and coordination exist to meet women's needs. Strategically placed people at key access points in the bureaucracy appear to be a minimal prerequisite to the redistribution of resource flows. It is often argued that appointing members of disadvantaged groups will redirect resources to those groups. The concept "representative bureaucracy" refers to the recruitment of a more socially representative bureaucracy in order to offset political power disparities in representative institutions outside the bureaucracy.

The recruitment of representative bureaucracy can be based on physical attributes or origins, as well as on attitudes. Staff who are recruited according to the color, sex, or caste attributes of those groups poorly served by the administration are presumed to be willing to protect group interests. They also provide role models for group members (in this case, women), resulting in improved self-image and increased expectations. Also female staff can interact with women in
sexually segregated societies where men cannot. But representative bureaucracy, recruited by external attributes, may not ensure these results. People seek jobs for a variety of reasons, the least of which may be to advance the interests of their group. Furthermore, appointees from subordinate groups may embrace the ideology rationalizing inequality, interpreting their own advancement as a sign of personal superiority. Probably most importantly staff members, whatever their attributes, operate within a bureaucratic framework with constrains independent and discretionary action.

One possible remedy for these uncertainties about representative bureaucracy, with recruitment by physical attributes, is to specify knowledge and commitment as selection criteria. Thus women appointed to represent their group should both understand how sex bias occurs in the field in question and be committed to its elimination. One workable approach is to include the responsibility of explicit advocacy on behalf of women into the job description.

The proportion of women or of any other disadvantaged group within a structure is a major determinant of the group's impact on bureaucratic activity. Studies of lone, token women (and members of racial minorities) in large institutions document the high visibility, performance pressures, and limited support such employees face. A minimum level of proportional participation is necessary before power balances are altered (Kanter 1977). The precise threshold is likely to vary according to institutional history, function, and style. A study of women in politics in Peru and Chile dramatically illustrates the performance pressure women feel. Moreover, women's use of power
differs from men's, and women tend to be excluded (often by choice) from internal politicking (Chaney 1979: 132-133).

If "representative women" are scattered within and across bureaucratic institutions and their impact somewhat dissipated as a result, it may be useful to focus on women in a committee, bureau, or ministry. A structure (or substructure) with the mandate of promoting women's integration or eliminating sex discrimination has the advantage of concentrated staff and monetary resources. It can also catalyze action within a larger structure and stimulate or reinforce interest group activity outside the bureaucracy.

In 1963, the U.N. Economic and Social Council recommended that member states appoint national committees on the status of women, to plan and recommend ways to improve women's position. The International Women's Year Plan of Action also recommended that machinery be created to review, evaluate, and recommend measures to ensure women's equality with men and to integrate women into all sectors (Boulding 1976: 248-249, 404-410).

A U.N. study which analyzes the effectiveness of "national machinery" for women, based on questionnaire responses from 79 countries, found a wide range of structural options. Some national machinery was formally affiliated with the state, such as a women's bureau, a ministry, or advisory committees. Others were women's wings of the party and extra-governmental autonomous women's organizations. Despite the now widespread existence of national machinery for women, they are constrained by limited financing and staffing, social and religious attitudes which legitimize women's subordinate status, and
mandates which limit their operations to welfare issues of low priority. Although such machinery has contributed to increased data collection and advocacy, women are "still a marginal consideration in development strategies." Indeed, in some cases the establishment of national machinery has pre-empted efforts to improve women's status by bureaucratizing initiative and neutralizing grass-roots efforts (Ooko-Ombaka 1980).

The strategy of building separate women's machinery runs the risk of becoming isolated and marginalized, and being charged with more responsibilities and with higher expectations than its resources allow. Yet without a structure and resources, efforts to integrate women will be unfocused and dissipated. Optimally, each functional ministry would have such machinery, providing multiple access points to integrate women into the structure. To further optimize internal monitoring efforts, groups outside the bureaucracy can act as supplementary monitors and supports. The Ghanaian Council of Women and Development plays such a role, advising and monitoring government activity for sex bias, conducting policy-oriented research, and promoting income-earning projects for women (Nantogmah, personal communication 1979). Only when outside organizations support those structures within government, and women's equality generally, will the issues be persistently addressed.

Political Parties

The significance of parties varies across the political systems, as do party membership rates. In some one-party states, party membership is the primary vehicle for political and economic mobility, ideological education, and political appointments. In multi-party
systems, party significance ranges from that of dormancy between election times, to that of active project work, educational activity, and ideological guidance, influencing voter choices in between and during elections. Elsewhere, parties are skeletal structures, functioning to legitimize military regimes or to provide contained, within-system focus for opposition. Whether periodic or continuous, party participation can be the key for recruitment to elective office and establish a framework within which to measure government performance, make political appointments, and provide other patronage activities. Through party participation members make contacts and acquire experience.

Women's party membership is highest in the one-party socialist states, although even in these states women rarely number more than a quarter of the total membership (Jancar 1974; with the exception of East Germany; Newland 1975: 17). Studies of women's party participation in the U.S. indicate that women generally provide behind-the-scene support which enables more effective male campaigning (Kirkpatrick 1974).

Women's party participation is often separated into women's divisions or committees which focus on culturally acceptable women's concerns, such as social services. A study of Latin American politics finds this separation to be resented by women leaders who perceive that they are excluded from party policy-making (Chaney 1973). On the other hand, it may be strategically appropriate to capitalize upon such female roles. Women can build on areas in which they are considered to have an expertise not threatening to men (such as concerns derived from the nurturing mother role) (Jaquette 1976: 192). Further-
more, there exist numerous women's party wings which overtly seek to advance the status of women, such as those in Tanzania, Cameroon, Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville, Togo, Sud...a, and Mali, among others. What is meant by "advancing the status of women," of course, varies from place to place.

A Columbia study focuses on the token roles women play in party politics. Many women entering through the women's wing have stagnating careers and move laterally only. This is explained through the dynamics of tokenism and the consequences of the uneven sex rates in "skewed groups" (according to the theories of Kanter mentioned above) (Harkess 1980). A women's party wing can potentially create a network which disseminates information and responds to grass-roots demands. The balance between top-down and bottom-up flows varies across political systems. The Malian party women's wing disseminated information to women about the Marriage Code (specifically, that a couple had the option of choosing polygamy or monogamy at the time of marriage). These sex-segregated communication networks have been criticized, however, for not informing or building support among men, who ignore the Code's features (McNeil 1979: 115).

The Sudan has machinery in place to reach women in far-flung parts of the country. The structure of the party wing also provides a certain amount of access within government, particularly in government ministries. The Women's Union, a voluntary organization, is linked to the Women's Secretariat of the Sudan Socialist Union, which has political appointees drawn from and overlapping with Women's Union leadership. The combined structure reaches into each village and...
farig councils, in which a quarter of the 24 seats are reserved for women. Overlap between organizations is matched by interlocking relationships with the Women's Department, located in the Ministry of Information and National Guidance. Of that nine-person staff, five are lent to the SSU Women's Secretariat and Women's Union to provide professional assistance and aid in coordination. The Department budget includes resources for promoting women's activities, including such as adult literacy and early children's education (Badran 1979).

The modes and levels of women's political participation are numerous, though underutilized. Efforts toward better utilization, particularly through improved organization, are vital. This is no easy task, as the following section demonstrates.

II. Obstacles to Increased Women's Organizational Participation

As the previous section points out, women's political participation is more limited than men's, a primary factor explaining their continuing subordination and limited receipt of benefits from government. Women do participate politically, even though their influence on the larger political system does not always advance their interests in optimal ways. In many societies, women are part of networks and organizations, providing a general model upon which to build. This discussion of organizational strategies will address several key issues and obstacles: the larger system, organizational development, risks of joining the political mainstream, the utility of sex-separate organizations, elites within groups, and skill development through outside
intervention.

The Political System

For governments attempting both to stimulate development and to manage what are often volatile, unstable political environments, organizational development simultaneously offers threats and benefits. Organizations facilitate information collection and improve implementation efforts. When they act on the advice and under the influence of organizations, government decision makers can probably anticipate greater public acceptance of programs as well as active support from some sub-groups. Nevertheless, governments must be willing to share power and to accept potential disagreement and conflict over goals selection and resource allocation. Participatory strategies also make greater demands on administrators' time and can increase coordination problems (U.N. 1975). An open political climate must exist so that participation can occur without repression or other risks to potential participants. The absence of such a climate may be the primary obstacle to organizational strategies in development.

Political systems differ in the degree to which organizational affiliations affect political activity. They range from those where individual high socio-economic status is the prime resource for acquiring political influence to those where organizations are the only acceptable channel for political action. One study classifies political systems into five institutional types, three of which are pertinent here. In the first, "weak institutional," affiliations have no impact on political action. Rather, an individual's socio-economic resource level alone explains political action; at high socio-economic levels, individuals
are involved, and at low levels, uninvolved. In the second type, "additive institutional," organizational activity can complement or substitute for high socio-economic status in promoting political action. Third, in the "dominant institutional" type, organizations are the necessary and sufficient condition for political action; individual status has no effect on political activity (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978: 112). Participatory strategies must take into account the political system type. Because women generally have lower socio-economic status than men, prospects for participation are worst in the first type, better in the second, and optimal in the third (assuming that female organizational participation is considered legitimate).

Representative structure also has an effect on the extent to which women will be able to wield decisive power. Many electoral systems are organized on the basis of geographically-based constituencies. If political loyalties and voting patterns are based on kin ties, co-terminous with residence and constituent boundaries, women as a group will cut across those loyalties and boundaries, and their power will be diluted in the process (Staudt 1978). Women's electoral patterns are unlikely even to parallel those of other political minority groups, such as income, ethnic, and racial groups, who live segregated from the dominant group because social segregation fosters separate political identifications (Hacker 1951; Staudt 1970). In a corporate structure, on the other hand, the state recognizes functional groups and institutionalizes their integration into decision-making structures. For example, "women" might be represented alongside "youth," "peasants," or the "military." Questions, however, must always
be raised about leadership selection processes (and consequent representation) within each category, as well as about government cooptation and control. Moreover, women may well be underrepresented in the other categories to which they belong.

**Is national ideology enough?** The political programs of one-party socialist societies often contain an ideological commitment to the emancipation of all groups, including women. Moreover, central planning and concentrated state power have the potential capacity to create swifter attitudinal and distributional change than in pluralist societies where opposing interests create stalemates and, at best, only incremental change (Jancar 1974). Such an ideological commitment is a possible contributor to women's political empowerment, although the relation of ideology to practice is not always certain.

In Tanzania, where socialist ideology, along with its emphasis on women's equality, has unevenly penetrated rural areas, women in Ujamaa villages were excluded from controlling significant household assets, such as land and cash proceeds from their agricultural labor (Brain 1976; Fortmann 1979). In China, where women's status has probably changed more dramatically than anywhere else in the world, patrilineal, exogamous marriage patterns tend to exclude women from local-level leadership positions. Women marry into communities as outsiders, and thus lack the social and political base so essential to the acquisition of leadership positions. This lack of political power affects the value accorded different kinds of labor and the level of compensation for that labor. Women's work is accorded fewer work points than men's, and household labor is not accorded any public,
paid value. Cultural restrictions, such as the exclusion of menstruating women from agricultural fields, reduce the number of paid work days open to women (Diamond 1975). Furthermore, the ability of women's organizations to flourish has been dependent on other party factions which control policy-making machinery (Leader 1973).

Ideologies stressing individual and even group emancipation and equality are insufficient. Whether in socialist or non-socialist societies, women's direct participation and women's autonomous organizational activity appear to be critical to translating numerical strength and economic contributions into effective power.

Building and Strengthening Organizations

Creating, building, and strengthening organizations are as problematic for women as for other disadvantaged groups in society. By definition, disadvantaged groups have less access to resources, such as contacts, money, and information, which all support successful organizational action. For those living at or near survival levels, time for group activity may be limited (unless the group activity itself reduces time and labor). Disadvantaged groups also lack experience, skills, leadership, and organizational alliances, in contrast to the edge possessed by longstanding, well integrated groups. Finally, if people are excluded from government and program benefits, they lack the positive reinforcement associated with participation, while those within the distribution network have incentives to continue. As recipients of limited or no benefits, women lack the reinforcement associated with sporadic or continual success from group action.

A more subtle aspect of disadvantaged status is the stigma that
goes along with it; an attitude learned by all, including the disadvantaged. If women, minority, poverty, or caste groups internalize values which denigrate them, the will to act on common interests is inhibited. These factors, unless countered by a positive affirmation of group culture, attenuate collective consciousness among women, as in other subordinate groups.

Although women may share many interests, they face special problems in developing both consciousness and organization. Isolated from one another in some social settings, and residing intimately with the dominant group, women's identification tends to be based on the family or on male interests, which cut across (or compete with) female interests. These factors reinforce the difficulty of expressing and acting on sex-based concerns (Staudt 1980). Strong organizational capacity ultimately requires external support, including both the horizontal ties such as alliances and vertical ties such as federation membership. Horizontal integration can be particularly problematic for women advancing the interests of their sex if male allies see female gains as their losses, or if gains are seen publicly as threats to social institutions such as the family.

Some development programs consciously address that mindset. The Rural Feminine Credit program of INCORA, an agrarian reform institute in Colombia, emphasized how the program would unify families and "ayudara al hombre..." (help a man to...), reflecting the need for male consent and support (Cebotarev 1976). A women's mobilization effort in western Kenya, initiated by the male chief, developed into a judicial and political representational system. Women elders judged other women
in women's courts, and women formally represented other women in local and distant barazas (community meetings). Women elders infringed on the territory of male judicial elders, and women's mobility was alleged to increase prostitution. One of several reasons for organizational collapse was that male elders withdrew their support: this outcome underlines the ongoing dilemmas of dependence and seeking power (Staudt 1980).

**Tapping organizational incentives.** Theorists disagree about the preconditions to organizational emergence. In one perspective, differentiation, disruption, and subsequent communication cause organizational growth (Truman 1971). Yet this explanation lacks sufficient precision to predict women's organizational emergence. In virtually all societies, evidence can be found of increasing task differentiation and/or disruption in resource balances between the sexes, as men disproportionately acquire new opportunities, resources, and other benefits.

In another perspective, organizational "entrepreneurs" catalyze organizational emergence (Salisbury 1969). This entrepreneur, or leader, demonstrates the balance of contributions and benefits to potential members. Underlying this perspective is the notion that people enter relationships because they derive some benefit, and entrepreneurs make potential members aware of the benefits to be received. This exchange perspective provides the basis for explaining the various incentives which prompt people to join and participate in organizations. Although disruption may be necessary for "entrepreneurs" to better make their case, the exchange perspective suggests that members must perceive some clear incentive for participation, including: (1) individual
material gain; (2) social benefits (or 'status') from associating; (3) purposive reasons; that is, satisfaction from contributing to a worthy cause (such as collective group benefits); and (4) compulsion and avoidance of sanctions (Wilson 1973).

A study of over fifty Asian and Latin American peasant communities found material and social incentives to be predominant in societies undergoing integration into the larger political economy. Potential group members commonly asked "what's in it for me, or people close to me?" and of established members, "what has the organization done for me lately?" (Migdal 1974: 9). Even if people recognize common interests, they may not consider participation to be worth their own time and effort if benefits derived ("collective goods") will be conferred upon all members of the group, regardless of whether they participated in the organization. Thus leaders either rely on coercion or develop voluntary incentives accessible to active participants only to induce individual member participation (Olson 1965).

Economic incentives appear to be the critical feature tying together successful groups of nonelite women, as a study in Korea, the Philippines, and Colombia points out (Misch 1975). A study of the Korean Mothers' Clubs, established to facilitate the dissemination of family planning ideas, indicated that the more successful clubs were supplemented with income-earning or consumption-oriented savings activities such as credit unions, cooperative stores, land purchases, agricultural and construction projects (Kincaid, et al. 1973). Interviews with Ghanaian women on cooperatives illustrated the importance of direct economic incentives supplementing informal contacts, to sus-
tain women's interest (Data Beh 1978). Sierra Leonean petty traders expressed self-interested motives for joining the women's party organization, including the prospect of acquiring scholarships for children, securing jobs, loans, and safeguarding husbands' jobs (Steady 1975).

The economic advantages of collective action may be more apparent to women who lack monetary resources to provide labor and assistance during needy times. As one observer noted, "Most women express economic needs before others. Why not build on identified self interest?" (Bruce 1977).

Of course, not all women control the fruits of their labor. In such cases, unless authority patterns within the family are changed, women will be less attracted by material incentives. And authority structures do change. A milk cooperative in India set up milk collection points where cash was paid twice daily upon delivery. Although women care for milk cows, men initially took the milk to collect payments. Soon, however, men tired of the trips, and women began making the deliveries and receiving the payments themselves. Gradually, women's authority over that income increased with families (Dixon 1978: 54ff.).

Yet there are limits to material incentive strategies. Collective savings and purchases would appear to be beneficial arrangements for traders. But among Abidjan women traders, collective savings organizations are declining in favor of individual banking arrangements, and efforts to promote purchasing cooperatives have failed. In this highly competitive market environment, where one woman's gain is seen as another's loss, mutual trust is lacking, and a tendency is developing...
to seek individuated means of economic advancement.

This tendency, however, varies with women's ethno-religious affiliation. Ethno-religious affiliation, here discussed in terms of southern or northern origin, is related to differing associational modes outside the market place. Northern women’s non-market associations explicitly utilize individual material incentives that are carefully balanced between individual contributions and benefits; the particular norm of fairness, dependent on strict accounting and reinforced by religious cohesion, provides a sturdy associational mode. The northerners’ associational pattern is conducive to successful group organization in the competitive market place. In contrast, southern non-market women’s associations are group-oriented and less tolerant of self interest orientations and the consequent tensions which arise when collective savings schemes are launched. Southern women have the greater tendency to utilize individual savings strategies. This contrast illustrates how groups functioning with a particular balance of individual and collective incentives may prosper under some conditions, but founder in another setting. Southerners’ associational mode cannot be sustained in the face of intense market pressures, but promotes collective action for certain ethnic neighborhood activities in which all enjoy benefits, regardless of individual contributions (Lewis 1976).

In another example, welfare mothers in Massachusetts participated in organized protests to secure special need grants from local welfare departments. Administrators usually capitulated to group demands made in a confrontational manner. Once grants were secured, members tended
to drop out of the organization. Organizers then tried to supplement material incentives with other material incentives, such as selective credit and counseling. Even more significant, when the government eventually withdrew special need grants, the organization declined further. The sole use of material incentives, without supplementary social and purposive incentives to maintain commitment, partially explains the organization's early demise (Wilson 1973: 67ff.).

Social incentives such as companionship, shared outlook and a common life situation, are an important glue which holds members together, above, and beyond other incentives. Women unaccustomed to interaction and to pooling resources tend to distrust one another. Recruitment from existing social networks, as examples from South Asia demonstrate, can enhance cohesion (Dixon 1978: 144). Lacking other supplementary incentives, however, the social glue can quickly become undone by personality conflict and disagreement. As examples from U.S. women's organizations indicate, groups which coincide with friendship networks are less easily directed toward productive tasks because so much energy is put into process. Moreover, recruitment of those outside the friendship network is difficult (Freeman 1975: 4).

Economically homogeneous communities may provide the best basis for organizational emergence: A controlled comparison of two village women's groups in Tanzania indicated that group cohesion and attitudinal change was more positive in the poorer, more homogeneous village (Stanley 1979). U.N. RISD and studies from South Asia support this finding as well (Dixon 1978: 141-142).

The satisfaction of contributing to a collective cause which pro-
vides benefits equally to all members is a second organizational building block which may complement individual incentives. As suggested in the Eyoirian example, the degree to which an imbalance between contribution and individual return is acceptable to members, and the degree to which satisfaction from contributing to a cause overlaps with return, will very well determine the success of group efforts toward collective (rather than solely individual) benefits. One might deduce that imbalance is less acceptable at the margin of survival, and thus among low-income women. One certain dilemma, however, is that basing a group on individual material incentives, although probably easier to organize, may forestall the advancement of collective interests. Nevertheless, it is possible to supplement material incentives with social solidarity and collective consciousness about long-term group goals. Indeed, one study of over fifty peasant societies suggests a sequential pattern, in which positive experience in achieving simple, individual goals leads to the next level of political action—that of seeking group benefits (Migdal 1974: 219).

Compulsory membership, sanctioned by fines, is the basis of some women's organizations (Leis 1974; Okonjo 1976). In an analysis of a west Kenyan women's mobilization, the male chief authorized women leaders to utilize compulsion as a strategy to induce membership participation. Initially compulsion was acceptable to members because it was supplemented by status as well as material benefits. Nevertheless, during conflict over the dispensation of member savings, compulsion heightened suspicion of leaders, producing some estrangement and ultimate organizational collapse (Staudt 1980). Compulsion as an organizational incentive is fraught
with costs, including the potential of mistrust and grave accountability problems. These risks will vary, depending on the legitimacy of that person or organization authorizing compulsion. As studies of peasant societies indicate, compulsion alone is inadequate for gaining the behavioral changes demanded by institutions (Midgal 1974: 241).

**Joining the Mainstream: Cooptation, Dependence and Other Risks**

Organizations adapt to the surrounding environment, a process which has significant effects on organizational goal transformation, leadership strategies, and leader-member relations. A wide variety of political structures create, legitimate, and sometimes co-opt women's organizations, their motivation ranging from self-seeking manipulation to a genuine ideological commitment to empower a subordinate group (Massell 1974; Calloway 1976; Scott 1974). While organizations are always affected by their political environment, co-opted organizations, or those organizations created and absorbed into a power structure, are likely to become dependent on that structure for survival. Such dependency complicates goal attainment and strains leader-member relations. Indeed, cooptation can result in considerable exploitation of members, as illustrated below.

The National Congress of Sierra Leone Women (Congress), the women's wing of the All Peoples Congress (APC), has been labeled an "autonomous" body, although the general party constitution declares that the Congress shall be under the complete control of the APC's central organization (Steady 1975: 5). Through regular meetings of the Working Committee (composed of regional branch leaders) and the Executive Committee, women's issues are theoretically linked to APC policy formation.
Congress gain wide support for the party by recruiting members and serving larger party needs. For example, women challenged soldiers during an attempted coup, participated in anti-American demonstrations, and created a women's militia unit to protect the Prime Minister after an assassination attempt. The National Congress of Women's leverage was tested when its leader sought to contest an election under the party symbol. The party forced her to run as an independent, and she lost the election (Stepdy 1975: postscript). Returns to members are also questionable, although they pay both entry and monthly fees. Most of the members are middle and low-income petty traders who hope to increase their profits with concessions gained from membership. Yet few receive material benefits from participation. The following account of a vegetable seller's views is said to be typical of members.

She feels that she has to appear in favor of the government and join Congress or else they would be thrown out of their one-room apartment and her husband would be thrown out of his job. She finds being a member financially impoverishing. She is a member of Congress because all the people in her yard (compound) are APC supporters. (Stepdy 1975: 25-26; 69).

In Malaysia, numerous party-affiliated, but independent, women's associations, previously organized along ethnic and geographic lines, were consolidated into one association, the Kaum Ibu, and established as a women's auxiliary in the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in 1947. An examination of procedural motions in the early 1950s indicates women's dissatisfaction with their limited access to party decision-making arenas. One resolution called for an independent women's league to deal with UMNO, while another called for Kaum Ibu branches to be responsive to the Kaum Ibu division rather than to party
branches. During elections, Kaum Ibu members played active political roles, distributing polling cards and party manifestos and discussing (primarily male) candidates. In between elections, however, Kaum Ibu's activities were similar to those of the apolitical Women's Institutes, which provided classes in literacy, cooking, sewing, and religion. At annual assemblies, concern with advancing the interests of women was evident; motions called for women's education, scholarships, women's participation in religious courts, legal change, social welfare, and increased female participation in civic life. Yet these motions were not promoted in party machinery. Rather, women concentrated on women's participation in government. After Kaum Ibu threatened to boycott elections, women in the Kaum Ibu were permitted to contest elections. The party made some concessions to women, the Kaum Ibu had limited success in changing traditional attitudes about women (Manderson 1977).

The National Union of Malian Women (UNFM), the women's wing of Mali's only party, is described as a co-opted organization, designed to tie the women's segment of the population, like the youth and worker segments, to the national government. The meaning of cooption is illustrated by the report of women party officials that the UNFM could not support a women's issue that the party did not support. It is often unclear whether women's party wings in one party states can apply leverage on government leaderships; the question may be precluded by a shared concern with government survival and an awareness of shared vulnerability. The ouster of governments, and of their women's wings with them, is a not uncommon occurrence. In Mali, the demise of the UNFM's predecessor was caused by the fall of Mali's first government in 1968.
The Afghan Women's Organization, founded in 1946 and affiliated with the Ministry of Education, offers similar evidence. Having established sixteen branches, it was replaced after the 1978 revolution by the decade of Afghan Democratic Women's Organization affiliated with the Ministry of Social Affairs. The Kabul compound of the AWO now contains the new organization, and similar training and educational activities continue (Hunte 1978: 87). Thus massive personnel changes among political elites make political affiliation risky for leaders of women's groups. Even when a government remains in power, policy shifts may leave women's political organizations powerless.

In Tunisia, planned change directed at upgrading women's status in the mid-1960s was slowed after internal party strife resulted in consolidation of the conservative wing and a decline in participation generally (Tessler 1976).

There is no sure avenue to political influence for women's associations. In apolitical groups operating outside political institutions, women's collective ability to influence and control their lives is limited. Inside those institutions, influence is still limited, although variable depending on the regime's resources and women's bargaining leverage. In separate organizations, such as women's wings, women can easily become isolated and marginalized. Numerous complications arise in linking and integrating women's issues into the larger political agenda. Moreover, bargains within the elite can be struck which reduce the access and benefits to the larger female membership. It is common for leadership to divorce itself from the membership base and to function as an appendage of the coopting institution.
Regardless of the quality of participation, the political process itself assists in the development of political skills and leadership (Ambrecht 1976: 10). The dilemma is described succinctly, with respect to economically marginalized groups:

Co-optative participation . . . can help the poor develop a set of political interests, increase their political resources and acquire the know how to intervene effectively in the political process. In other words, co-optative participation by the poor can lead to interest-oriented participation and the development of indigenous leadership. (Bachrach and Baratz in Ambrecht 1976: 10)

For women, as for the poor, perhaps some participation is better than none at all.

Sex-Separate v. Integrated Organizations

Concern is sometimes expressed that sex-based mobilization will polarize and divide communities, with two significant consequences. First, it is argued that intra-community conflict between men and women will adversely affect the delicate survival balance of those families near the margin of subsistence. Second, divided communities are more susceptible to encroaching state control. Indeed, women's subordination to local patriarchal institutions may be substituted for subordination to the state.

But existing social patterns appear to favor a sex-segregated strategy. There are already women's informal and formal networks in many settings which provide a basis for the development of expanded organization. Moreover, in sexually segregated societies, cultural barriers to interaction between the sexes must be taken into account. In Afghanistan, proposals have been made to establish "women's houses" with nurseries attached, where women would assemble for income-earning activi-
ties such as rug weaving, milk and cheese production (Hunte 1978: 31). It might be argued that sex-based organization reflects rather than challenges existing distinctions and thus perpetuates sex disparities. Yet without organizational experience, women may not develop skills or have their needs taken as a priority. In India, sex-integrated cooperatives rarely permit women to develop leadership and management skills, because men tend to dominate those roles. Only in women's cooperatives do women have such opportunities (Dixon 1978).

Women may view their participation in what outsiders perceive to be community groups as inappropriate involvement in men's groups. In a Tanzanian pilot project which used dialogue to develop a participatory approach to solving grain storage problems, special efforts were made to attract women to discussion groups to little avail. Women viewed these discussions as formal meetings in which they do not customarily participate (Tanzania, Community Development Trust Fund 1977). Separate meetings for women should have been tried. Women's groups can also provide peer support for risk-taking, change, and mobility. The previously cited Mothers' Clubs in Korea provide such support.

When women are prematurely integrated into larger, mixed-sex organizations, women's interests are often given low priority, regardless of the society's ideological persuasion. Without sufficient resources and power to press claims and acquire bargaining leverage, those resources women bring to organizations have often been appropriated by existing leadership. In an example from a Central American peasant communal union, which introduced programs to expand the role of women within the organization and publicize the problems of campesina
women, a membership survey indicated that women comprised only a half percent of the total participants in the organization (Staudt 1979).

An increased awareness of women and of their interests among the remaining 99 percent is unlikely, particularly because sex-segregation prevailed in internal structures of the organization.

The danger that sex-segregated organizational strategies divide communities appears to be slight. An analysis of unsuccessful Soviet attempts to polarize Central Asia during the 1920s indicates that sex roles are less susceptible to polarization than are class roles (Massell 1974: 397). Women's intimate relationship and residence with men, and the bond of children, forestall polarization between men and women.

This in turn raises questions about the prospects for redistributing power balances if women are not integrated into organized groups with men. It is certain that until women are integrated into mixed-sex organizations and institutions at all levels, they will remain marginal to the mainstream. In the meantime, however, separation permits the development of organizational capacity, skills, and resources for leverage in mainstream interaction.

**Competing Loyalties: Elites within Larger Groups**

To the extent that women depend on their relationships with men, those attachments will be reflected in women's organizational affiliations, loyalties, and identifications. Women's interests as women will be less clear as long as their resources and life chances are more or less contingent on household relationships. Competing identifications obscure a clear awareness of common interests, thus diminishing actual
or potential organizational strength. Social structures in numerous societies, particularly patrilineal and exogamous societies, bear witness to such competing loyalties, and mechanisms are consciously created to reduce or eliminate divisiveness within communities produced by in-married women (Collier 1974: 92; Staudt 1978b).

**Women's interests.** What interests do all women share? With the exception of reproductive potential, there are few universal, worldwide women's interests, because societies vary in the type of work women do, the context in which women work, and relations between the sexes. As residents in a community, women have general interests in improved health care, more schools, potable water supplies, and farm-to-market roads. Nevertheless, through locating sex disparities in work, opportunities, and resource control, the following women's issues are identifiable.

- special health care needs, as reproducers and as guardians of children's health,
- less access to agricultural and vocational opportunities and to training and support services for those occupations than men,
- less access to education than men, and stereotyping in schools, resulting in differential skills between the sexes and a narrower range of occupational choices than for men,
- imbalance between the sexes in domestic work and compensation, a result of men's work patterns outside the home and a cause for women's more limited options outside the home,
- legitimacy of overt physical abuse toward women or covert abuse continued through a reluctance of public authorities to interfere in "private" matters, and
- underrepresentation and nonparticipation in political and bureaucratic institutions (a dimension that spans and affects other interests).

The rank women assign to these interests will vary across societies.
and economic strata. For example, women born in wealthy families face fewer problems in access to education and employment, and even employ domestic help to alleviate household chores.

Representativeness of women's organizations. Those persons who focalize interests, set agendas, and establish boundaries around women's interests merit close attention. Organizational leaders may foster their own interests, or interests aimed at maintaining the organization, rather than member interests.

Elite dominance is a potential problem affecting virtually all organizations, men's or mixed sex. There is little reason to doubt that elite control does not similarly affect women's organizations. In Latin America, upper and middle class women appear to identify little with lower class women (Chaney 1973; Nash and Safa 1976). A study in an economically stratified community in Bangladesh reports that high status women were selected as officers, even though they were not trusted by organizational members. Members felt constrained to select those women, as their families depended on the elite for other goods and services. It was recommended that cooperative members be from the same class in future projects (Dixon 1978: 142). A study in Indonesia argues that the kind of education women receive (focused on etiquette, embroidery, and domestic specialties) has created an elite unprepared to participate in development. Presumably, some of these women lead women's organizations (Hull 1976: 19-20). An analysis of India indicates that if an elite takes control over new political institutions designed to enhance popular participation, the benefits of rural development will continue to be inequitably shared, further rigidifying the class structure via the
political process (Rosenthal 1977).

Both the strength of competing loyalties and household decision-making patterns vary by economic class. As family income rises, both men and women may aspire to realize the limitations of female family role confined to domestic and child care functions. High family status depends, in part, on the realization of this ideal. Affluence makes women's withdrawal from production possible. In these circumstances, women have sometimes worked to extend household interests and the values and visions of the class in which she resides. Papanek labels this one type of "status-production work" (1979: 778-779). The needed class redistributive vision of female solidarity is limited by this pattern.

Women's situation in wealthier households may be fundamentally different from that of other women. Several studies in Indonesia indicate that women's contribution to subsistence and decision making is lower in middle-income than in low-income homes. Even though middle-income women obtain more schooling than lower-income women, they are more home and family centered. Also middle-income women are more likely to belong to organizations, and these activities match their home and family ties, concentrating on cooking, flower arrangement, and home decoration. Lower-income women's involvement in economic activities precludes participation in such organizations (Stoler 1977; Hull 1976: 10). A study in Peru illustrated how the different material levels influence the character of women's agricultural work. Utilizing land as a proxy for class, it was found that among landless households, women contribute about a third of farm labor requirements, among smallholders, a quarter, and middle peasants, a fifth. Even more significant was the
difference in female tasks, where poorer women's work involved the greatest physical exertion. These differences are reflected in household decision-making patterns. Landless women always make or share decisions in product disposition, control over inputs, and organization of production, in contrast to women in the middle strata (Deere 1977: 14-17, 24). These different material realities will influence what issues women perceive as "women's issues." In a west Kenyan case study, wealthy women farmers who articulated women's interests to candidates and bureaucrats had equal access to agricultural services (compared to men), unlike most ordinary women. In addition, wealthy women were five times more likely to be exposed to domestic-focused government programs. These factors accounted for agriculture not being seen as a women's issue, despite the fact that agriculture is women's prime source of livelihood in that region (Staudt 1979a).

Although potential elite domination raises serious questions, on balance it would seem that all women will benefit from elite women's involvement in women's organizations. First, substantial divisions between elite and non-elite women are questionable, because relatively few women independently control productive resources and/or hold high paying positions in the formal economy. Societies differ in the extent to which household resources (particularly income and land ownership) are shared, ranging from separate incomes in some sub-Saharan African societies, to formal, legal co-ownership in others. Even in societies where women control spending decisions, these decisions are usually limited to family consumption. In numerous societies, women's status is in part derived from her male relatives. If relationships are
severed, women may lose control of all formerly shared resources. As an analysis of women's INGOs indicates, the existence of separate women's professional and sports organizations makes a significant statement about women's opportunity to participate in the conventional, mainstream organizations and power structure. Members of those separate organizations have been labeled an "elite of the powerless" (Boulding 1975: 12, 19).

Because women's status may be only tenuously linked to family class status, conventional political theorists are beginning to choose surrogate measures instead. One study of seven countries utilizes education level as a surrogate for class status (an indicator which is equally as unsuitable as household income, for educational achievement often bears little relationship to educational utilization). The authors hypothesized that educational resources, like socio-economic resources, could be converted into political activity. The relationship holds for men much more than women. Among "elites" in India, Nigeria, Austria, Japan, and Yugoslavia, participatory gaps between the sexes are as glaring as among "non-elites" (the exceptions were the U.S. and the Netherlands) (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978: 237). Thus female elite status may have a very different meaning for politics than male elite status.

Prospects for the representativeness of women's organizations are greater in two contexts. First, in economically egalitarian societies, elite control over women's organizations will be less problematic than in societies with wide economic disparities. Also traditions may exist which encourage cooperation among women across kin, class, and neighborhood lines. Second, in rigidly sex segregated societies, differentiation
among women may be more limited than among men. The absence of hierarchy among peasant women in some Arab villages illustrates an enforced solidarity of women. In a dialogue about reciprocal obligations between women, one woman spoke to another of other women, "they are not better than us. It is forbidden" (Rosenfeld 1975). One study of Hausa women agricultural laborers who struck for higher wages from a multinational firm in northern Nigeria describes women as undifferentiated, unlike men in that society. In addition, most Hausa women have three to four marriages before menopause; this absence of solid competing conjugal loyalties fosters the development of solidarity among women (Jackson 1978: 27-30).

Even if these several factors reduce the social distance between elite and non-elite women, the possibility persists that elite women will dominate women's organizations and that their issue agenda will reflect a class bias. But as with any political strategy, trade-offs must be considered: in this case, heterogeneous class membership may be the best strategy. Possible reductions in representativeness can be offset by the greater clout, resources, and leverage which elite members can bring. Elite skills offer the potential of institutionalizing women's issues in government policy making and implementation. Elite women of good standing within a community may be a crucial channel through which to gain support. An analysis of a Soviet female mobilization strategy in central Asia illustrates the weakness of efforts to work through the "disaffected" (such as widows, runaway child brides, and illegitimate children) (Massell 1974: 381). Most importantly, structures can be created within groups to increase accountability and
spread distributional benefits equitably, through leadership rotation, nondivisible benefits, and neutral procedural criteria for benefit distribution. A genuine process of empowerment will provide non-elite members with techniques with which to control elites. The first and fundamental tactical question remains: How can the entrepreneurial talents of elites be tapped to direct their efforts into broadly distributive and beneficial activities?

Organizational Skill Development

In most disadvantaged groups, the level of skill development within organizations is likely to be low. Most women's groups, lacking experience and contacts, will be disadvantaged by their slight knowledge of strategies, internal organizational options, and resource-seeking capacity. Late entry into the political process reinforces all this. Unlike some voluntary organizations with paid, professional staff, women's group members are often unpaid volunteers, balancing time investments for organizational activity with work and household chores. Resolving the problem of organizational skill underdevelopment is fraught with both problems and possibilities. The examples below illustrate women's underdeveloped skills.

Women traders in Abidjan have unsuccessfully utilized a variety of strategies to defend their interests, including that of reducing market rental fees. In the past, women traders had supported a mayoral delegate (who had since forgotten them). Faced with increased market fees, these women formed ad hoc delegations, and sought an audience with any influential who would hear them. Funds were even collected to facilitate entree with officials. Travel funds were also raised to
send delegates to see the President in his village; he, it was thought, might remember women's sacrifices during early party days. Yet these attempts were for naught. Internal organization was absent and the collective effort was fragmented (Lewis 1976).

Women beer brewers in Nairobi are also reported to rally against threats to their interests. Some successes are evident, due to women members of KANU (party) committees and Committees of Elders. For example, women have secured for women a proportion of household units in a relocation project, as well as piped water. Delegations, begging for the President's mercy, forestalled City Council bulldozing of slum units. Nevertheless, women have no access to formal jobs and education, and they deny birth control to daughters, consigning them to a life like their own. While female solidarity is present, it attains only ad hoc, short-term solutions in an environment fraught with comprehensive, long-term problems—an environment in which women are stigmatized, subject to police harassment, and condemned to insecurity and survival at the margin (Nelson 1978).

Women's organizations have often been seen as welfare-oriented, amateurish and devoid of real developmental concerns. This view is accurate in some cases. For example, the charitable activities of some middle and upper class, urban-based women's organizations in South Asia increase dependency by promoting handicraft production in a context of limited market demand (Dixon 1978: 155). The past development efforts of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) have sometimes deserved a similar characterization (Sommer 1977). But such characterizations are neither fully accurate nor are the organizations in question fixed and
immutable in nature. NGOs, like women's organizations, can undergo a process in which skills are upgraded and developmental orientations acquired.

As discussed earlier, leaders catalyze organizational emergence and sustain organizational maintenance. The stimulus for organization often comes from outside a community. If political action is to surpass that of individual accommodation and passive resistance to central control, rural people must confront the obstacles to forming organizations and building alliances. Outside initiatives are often required to overcome these obstacles, concludes an examination of over fifty Asian and Latin peasant communities (Migdal 1974: 207ff.). Similarly, organization among welfare mothers in U.S. communities, catalyzed by a national organizer, always involved a combination of outside organizers and indigenous leaders (Wilson 1973: 67ff.). The development of organizational skills and resources enable rural residents to influence and manipulate external control. While some fear organizers manipulate rural residents, studies indicate that local communities have self-protective responses: they view outsiders with caution and skepticism and accept such initiatives only when they are congruent with local values. Without such local support, communities will evade, resist and deflect the efforts of outsiders (Massell 1974: 391; Migdal 1974).

Questions are often raised about the appropriateness of outside development interventions, whether regional, national, INGO, NGO, and/or through foreign assistance. Assistance for women and women's organizations is subjected to even greater scrutiny. These reservations, common to all external interventions, rest on several arguments. First,
political criteria, which serve national or international interests, rather than rural peoples' needs, may be the basis for assistance. To the extent that outside intervention is "tainted" with this recognition, organizational effectiveness may be reduced. Second, extensive external control and/or excessive resource infusion can lead to dependency and loss of local initiative and self-reliance. Third, outsiders mistakenly perceive community organization and needs, or impose their own values upon a community, thereby reducing project effectiveness. Finally, the goals of economic projects may involve trade-offs with the requirements of effective political mobilization.

The most effective resolution to such problems is for local organizations to acquire their own leverage, autonomy, and control. Several case studies below illustrate the problems of outside intervention.

External intervention. Soviet intervention in and control of Russia's Central Asian provinces during the 1920s was in part directed at male-female relations. Women, a "surrogate proletariat," were to be mobilized to polarize the feudal-like, Moslem society and destroy its vitality and resistance to the Soviet regime. In attempts to modernize the area "from above," numerous obstacles were faced, and strategists searched for the "weakest link," a group whose engineered alienation would drain traditional institutions of their vitality. In this setting of extreme, institutionalized female subordination, women's grievances were elicited through party and women's department activities. Freedom for women was never an end in itself, and organizers repeatedly sought to avoid independent voluntary organization among
women or the sole pursuit of "female" activities.

Soviets pursued a sequence of ever-hardening strategies, first legal reform, then administrative incentives, and finally revolutionary assault. These sequences are illustrated by their (1) moves against "crimes based on custom" (such as rape during abduction, bride-wealth, child marriage, and the levirate), (2) vocational social service activities to spur cultural reorientation, political education, economic participation, and party recruitment, and (3) systematic coercive social engineering, such as the forced mass unveilings. The response, however, was massive reaction and backlash, with the development of "waves of terror" against women in the form of public beatings, sexual harassment, murder, and forceable unveilings—all serving to reinforce tradition. In the end, Soviets failed to provide support for women or to satisfy the aspirations they had encouraged (Massell 1974). This case suggests that seeking to impose wholesale social change through external intervention can be counterproductive.

The generation of dependency. The central government in Korea has increasingly focused on local women's groups in order to achieve nutrition, family planning, and other rural development program goals. The development of elaborate top-down guidelines, transmitted through provincial government offices, has tended to undermine local initiative (Misch and Margolin, in AID 1976). Official government registration can often burden organizations with rigid, complex procedural requirements which stifle or inhibit growth. Excessive funding, without consideration of organizational absorptive capacity, can also be detrimental to local initiative, engender dependency, and invite corruption.
Heavy-handed intervention raises the charge of dependency and endangers the prospect of self-sustained, redistributive development. One study, comparing seventeen development projects in Niger and Kenya, concluded that most successful projects were those which supplemented locally led community-funded efforts in a low-profile manner (DAI 1979).

Cultural imposition. Outside intervention may also involve the imposition of inappropriate cultural values. In foreign assistance efforts to work with new migrants residing in a Central American city, organizers were insistent that local men provide leadership. Yet it was the women who led efforts to obtain piped water and reduced dairy prices; men had little interest in these community problems. The women leaders were only minimally supported by project organizers (Logan 1975). Ironically, the development practitioners' assumptions about local sex roles were ill grounded and undermined the project.

In India, most training programs for rural women (Mahila Mandals) have not promoted economic self-sufficiency and management. Rather, emphasis is on improving women's status as housewives and informed citizens, thus promoting a particular ideology of women's roles. There are programs in health, nutrition, education, mother and childcare, home improvement, adult literacy, recreation, cultural activities, and family planning (Dixon 1978: 154; Bruce 1976: 297). While those programs address women's domestic roles, they exclude non-domestic roles, and result in the reinforcement of domesticity. Because they overlook the disparate economic problems women face, such programs can fail to increase women's productivity or political par-
Economic v. political development. The kind of organization described as successful in economic project terms is sometimes very different from that of successful, effective political organizations. Such potentially contradictory goals have been observed in federal resource allocation to low-income communities in the U.S. (Ambrecht 1976).

In an economically focused evaluation of nine AID small farmer group projects (not women's projects) in Latin America, groups achieving project "success" were single-purpose, organized around short-term concrete goals, and were small and insular (Tepdlet 1976). Successful political organization tends to have multiple goals, which enhances organizational continuity and coalition prospects; insulation can inhibit genuine empowerment (Staudt 1979; Uphoff and Esman 1974). Concrete material goals as an incentive to organization can divert or delay members from seeking long-term collective goals (see the discussion of African women traders and party members above).

Alternatives to governmental intervention. The problems associated with government intervention, whether national or foreign, increase the appeal of alternative organizational strategies operating more independent of official political channels. Moreover, alternative organizational channels such as NGOs provide greater flexibility and speed and reduce procedural red tape and administrative costs.

International Women's Nongovernmental Organizations, established structures through which skill training and resources may be channelled, have become increasingly appropriate vehicles for development initia-
Over the last half century, religious orientations among women's INGOs have declined while there has been a growth in focus on justice and social welfare (Boulding 1975).

All too commonly, decisions in most national and international assistance efforts are based on political criteria, money obligation within rigid budget timeframes, and/or economic criteria without regard for power and distributional effects, both by sex and class. The conditions prevailing when a project is initiated can be totally altered by the time money is allocated, because of extensive paperwork and resulting delays. While social analysis and beneficiary-focused evaluation are beginning to be institutionalized in some of these assistance agencies, they are still underdeveloped with respect to women's economic, organizational, and political activities.

The selection and evaluation criteria of the U.S. InterAmerican Foundation represent a unique approach compared to most official efforts described above. The IAF provides assistance to Latin American organizations and intermediaries, such as churches, independent of official channels. Project selection criteria focus on accountability relationships between leaders and members, dependency consequences, and enhanced distributional justice. The organization's evaluation criteria, not considered "hard" enough by some national and international assistance agencies, focus on power redistribution, gains in access, bargaining ability, choices, status, legitimacy, and reflective capability (IAF 1977). Although difficult to measure objectively, such criteria are the essence of political development.
III. Conclusion

This essay argues that, if the development process as a whole is to be sustained and if women are to benefit along with men from this process, then the "primacy of politics" must be acknowledged. In his background paper for the 1980 World Bank/World Development Report, Uphoff argues that an understanding of human development programs "must begin with an appreciation not only of the structure and dynamics of politics generally, but also of the politically weak position of the poorer sectors whom such programs are to serve" (1980: 6).

No definition of development is complete without attention to the growth of political capability. Section I reviewed literature on conventional political participation. From voting to party, executive, and legislative participation, women participate less than men. In government, women comprise a minute percentage of decision makers, a numerical condition which reduces the potential for women's interests to be forcefully articulated. Sociological studies discuss the importance of the presence of a "critical mass" for representing "minority" interests. In government and political organizations, where decisions are made about public resource allocation and the value of work, men are predominant participants, partially explaining the underevaluation of women's work, women's limited access to public resources, and continuing economic disparities between the sexes. But participation also involves communication and contact among women and between women and other groups or government organizations. This broader view of participation can be attained primarily through groups which are
horizontally and vertically linked to other groups and to official
decision makers. The review of studies on women's organizational par-
ticipation has indicated numerous existing models of organizing and
networking activity among women, often in a sex-separate form, on
which increased participation can be built.

The essay's second section has underlined many constraints on
strategies to increase women's power through organizational participa-
tion. Before even undertaking an analysis of such constraints, an
understanding of the surrounding political context is essential. More-
over, the difficulties typically associated with developing and strength-
e ning organization among disadvantaged and relatively powerless publics,
such as poor women must be recognized. While economic incentives may
appear to be the most appropriate vehicle by which to mobilize women,
unless they are supplemented by other social incentives and collective
purposes, they alleviate immediate needs, only to inhibit the develop-
ment of long-term collective action enhancing political empowerment.
Although sexually integrated organizations are ideal, the need to sup-
port a transitional period of sex-separate organizations has been em-
phasized. First, separateness is a strong tradition in many societies,
and second, such separateness provides women with the opportunity to
develop leadership skills and to accumulate resources for leverage and
coa lition building with other groups. Women's issues are often accorded
a low priority in integrated groups. Various risks related to joining
the political mainstream were noted, but deemed less risky than opting
not to participate. The oft-cited tendency of "women elites" to
misunderstand or to fail to represent poor women's interests is signifi-
cant, but a consideration of the trade-offs leads to the conclusion that the resources such women hold may nonetheless usefully be tapped to serve all women's interests. Moreover, because women elites have characteristics unlike male elites, they may respond differently than male elites to increased political resources. Finally, women elites, like any others, can be held accountable to non-elites through a variety of organization techniques.

The last constraint examined was the legendary problem of external intervention. If interveners are sensitive to women's activities, the sexual balance of power and the importance of developing economic as well as political capability, those problems can be partially alleviated.

It is appropriate to conclude with the words of third world women on the necessity of power for women. Participants at an international workshop sponsored by the Asian and Pacific Centre for Women and Development in 1979 called for "organized collective strength of women from the grass roots" (i.e. poor and working women) "... to stimulate and institutionalize women's power." A mobilization of women, independent of government machinery, can "influence government policy and insure that women receive a fair share of development resources and attention of government" (U.N./APCWD 1979: 6, 8, 12-13).

IV. Policy Recommendations

In any development strategy, participation is an essential element, and in all participatory strategies, women must be considered equally with men. The following specific policy recommendations are based on the preceding discussions.
Organizational Strategies

1. Development practitioners sometimes view politics as something to be kept at a distance. Yet the essence of development involves enhanced political capability.

Emphasize political and organizational development strategies in conjunction with individual-oriented economic development strategies.

2. Foreign assistance institutions are often constrained by organizational norms which allocate pre-established amounts of money without regard for organizational absorption capability. Institutionalized minimum amounts can suffocate small rural women's organizations. Conversely, women's projects may be permanently situated in a small-sum, pilot project category and never receive sufficient funds for a larger women's project.

Create mechanisms to transfer a full range of financial sums—from small to large amounts—to women's organizations.

3. Unlike official bureaucratic organizations which have resources and procedures to respond to complex design requirements, organizations may be staffed with volunteers operating with scarce resources.

Establish flexible procedures to meet the diverse capabilities of organizations seeking assistance.

4. Numerous problems associated with official intervention organizations which can be alleviated by channelling assistance through private voluntary organizations.

Increase support for intermediary funding through International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs), particularly women's INGOs.

5. Promote policy-oriented research on women's organizations to provide guidance for reaching women. Among significant variables are political context, accountability procedures within organizations, leadership style, alliance and coalition building, interaction with government organizations, goals and goal achievement, internal communication, benefit distribution within organizations, and incentive strategies. Also conduct research on the effects of proportional representation by sex in integrated groups on group goals, style, structure and articulation of women's interests (see Staudt 1979 for fuller statement on research questions).

6. Provide resources based on criteria that promote self-defined economic and political group goals. Limit sex-role stereotyping in resource allocation strategies.
7. Promote sex-separate organizational strategies in contexts where separate sex communication networks exist and where women's priorities and skill development are likely to be subordinated in integrated strategies.

8. Supplement organizational strategies based on material incentives with social and purposive incentives.

9. Develop project selection criteria which include the accountability of organizational leaders to members, leadership representativeness, and maximum distribution of benefits.

10. In projects based on single organizations, consider the effects of class differences among women on representativeness, benefit distribution, and overall political leverage. In areas where women have divergent interests, support several organizations.

11. The success or failure of pilot project models in part depends on the surrounding political context. Yet decisions about replication are often divorced from a consideration of that context. Consider political system type in applying organizational development strategies and replicating existing pilot project models.

Employment/Institutional Strategies

12. Support and provide incentives for employment practices in official bureaucracies which

- create a more representative bureaucracy, in both the physical and advocacy senses, and

- increase staff interaction with women's groups outside the bureaucracy in the larger public.

13. Provide incentives for recruiting women so that the bureaucracy, training courses, job programs, or other institutional settings in question have at least one-third females.

14. Provide for a women's monitoring and resource-allocation structure in all ministries. This is important even where a women's bureau exists, as a complement to the efforts of that bureau.

Data Collection

15. In pre-project social analyses, provide data on women's organizational networks and participation in decision-making
institutions, both local and national.

16. When conducting evaluations, seek indicators to evaluate political as well as economic impact. Note particularly increases in organizational skills and information, expansion of participation, and extra-organizational linkages, as well as the actual distribution of the valuables generated by the project.
Pluralists see participation, and especially competition between groups, as a process leading to optimal public policy decisions. Marxists see participation as the motor for the fundamental restructuring of society along more egalitarian lines. Even elitists who generally prefer that the initiative be left with top officials and elite political activists value participation of a select, educated and informed citizenry. The notion that political empowerment is a fundamental resource is drawn in part from public pronouncements of World Bank head Robert McNamara. Various government agencies advocate citizen participation in policy-making, and the U.S. Agency for International Development has endorsed (following U.S. Congressional mandate) the notion of popular participation in development.

Bourque and Warren (1976) define subordination as "differential access to the definition of and control over the valued goods of the community." In societies with class stratification, women are subordinate to men of their class, but class differences may obscure sex stratification (Staudt 1979; Caplan and Bujra 1978).

For an attempt to document the relationship between economic and political resource control (and to address the methodological difficulties in documenting that relationship), see Staudt 1980, also Bourque and Warren 1976.

Some exceptions include the USSR Supreme Soviet with 35 percent women and the Bulgarian Council of People with 37 percent women. Questions may be raised about the extent to which representatives have power in institutions like these and about the equivalence of these institutions with other bodies that meet more frequently and control such significant processes as "the purse."

Other characteristics that Tendler describes mesh well with politically vital organizations, such as that of building on indigenous organization, avoiding unnecessarily sophisticated procedures, and engaging in tasks which could be achieved better cooperatively rather than individually.

INGOs (international non-governmental organizations) are defined as international in character with the intention of operating in at least three countries and with open membership (Boulding 1976: 412).
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