This handbook was prepared to provide guidance and suggestions primarily for school officials who are developing a plan for school desegregation or who are trying to revise an existing plan. Indications of what has and has not worked in other districts are based on experts' recommendations, on case studies from other communities, and on the findings of a research project that examined school desegregation in 52 American cities. Chapter one describes some publications that can serve as practical guides to school desegregation. Chapter two examines the historical and legal context of school desegregation by reviewing early court cases and desegregation policy standards that emerged from them, changes that have taken place in schools over the years, and the issues of white flight and metropolitan plans in connection with desegregation. Chapter three deals with strategies and techniques, and reviews findings from experience and research of practices which yield the best results. Chapter four discusses issues and problems involved in busing. Chapter five considers the public leadership role in school desegregation. A concluding chapter summarizes the handbook. Appendices include some guiding principles for desegregation planners, a directory of desegregation assistance centers, and information on how to locate court decisions. (Author/MWL)
DESEGREGATING PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
A HANDBOOK FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS

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Norman, Oklahoma 73019

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"It's Not Over in the South" was the way the Alabama Council on Human Relations characterized the status of school desegregation in 1972. That statement is still true today, and it certainly applies as much if not more so to nonsouthern parts of the United States as it does to the South. As a recent report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights notes, in the 1978-79 school year over 60 percent of minority students in this country attended schools that were at least 50 percent minority. Despite years of litigation and pressure by the federal government, desegregation thus remains an unresolved issue particularly in many of the nation's largest school districts.

Much has been written about school desegregation in the United States—some of it analytical and some designed to provide insights and guidance to practitioners facing the awesome responsibility of preparing, revising, or implementing desegregation plans. This handbook, as the title suggests, is explicitly designed for school officials, desegregation planners, and perhaps even the courts as they all search for effective remedies to reduce racial isolation in America's public schools. This volume grew out of a research project conducted for the National Institute of Education (Grant NIE-G-80-0142). The project's purpose was twofold: (1) to systematically analyze the case study literature to learn as much as possible about the effectiveness of various strategies in achieving school desegregation and minimizing white enrollment losses among large school districts; and (2) to prepare a handbook or manual to assist school desegregation practitioners drawing in part on the results of the analytical research task. The final report to NIE containing the systematic analysis is entitled "Assessing the Progress of Large City School Desegregation: A Case Survey Approach," by David R. Morgan with Robert E. England (Norman: Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, 1981).

I wish to thank several people who assisted with this project. In addition to the authors, Karen Selland and Dian England helped in gathering data for the research project. Professor Franklin Wilson, Center for Demography, University of Wisconsin (Madison) supplied the data tape containing the information on levels of school segregation and other useful information for the 52 school districts that were a part of the larger study. Dr. Joe Garrison, formerly head of the Desegregation Consultative Center at the University of Oklahoma, read and made helpful comments on the final draft of this volume. A fine job of copyediting for the final manuscript was performed by Norma McLemore Swoyer with the Department of Philosophy at the University of Oklahoma. Finally, Pat Stermer, Bureau secretary, deserves my special thanks for the outstanding job she did in typing the manuscript and the tables and preparing the figures for the text.

Here we should explicitly indicate that the views and recommendations found in this volume are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the National Institute of Education.

David R. Morgan  
University of Oklahoma
CHAPTER 1

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW

Over a quarter of a century has passed since the U.S. Supreme Court declared that "separate but equal" public schools were no longer constitutionally acceptable. Since then communities all over the country have struggled with the question of how to fairly and effectively desegregate the local school systems. Tremendous progress has been made in some places, but in others genuine racial balance in the schools remains a largely unrealized goal. In fact, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission recently reported that segregation in many schools "remains at discouragingly high levels." The Commission's 1979 survey of 47 districts reveals that almost 4.9 million minority children still attend schools considered at least moderately segregated. This represents 47 percent of all minority pupils. No doubt the task of desegregating the public schools has been more difficult than many expected. This has been especially true in large urban areas with high minority populations. Yet the question today is not whether to desegregate but how? As Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman in Desegregating America's Schools put it:

How far must desegregation go: how far can it go? When must school districts participate in the desegregation of a neighboring district? When does the remedy exceed the degree of culpability? How many racially identifiable schools can remain in a district before it ceases to be desegregated?

Obviously this handbook cannot provide all the answers or respond in great depth to such far-reaching questions. Our ambitions are more modest. We hope to provide some guidance and suggestions primarily
for school officials who are struggling with the preparation of a plan to desegregate or are trying to revise an existing plan. This handbook will provide some indication of what has and has not worked in other districts, based on the recommendations of experts in the field, on case studies from other communities, and on the findings of a recent research project examining the school desegregation process in large U.S. districts.

No blueprint for action will be set forth here. Only a few do's and don'ts will be offered. It would be presumptuous for us to recommend a specific course of action for any given school district, as any plan must take local circumstances into account. Whatever final course of action is agreed upon will undoubtedly come as the result of a combination of forces and pressures involving the school board, the school superintendent, the minority community, perhaps other local groups, and most likely the federal district court.

Assistance Available to Desegregation Policy Makers

School districts do not stand alone in this struggle to develop effective plans to end racial separatism. A number of desegregation consultants are available to assist in drawing up or rewriting a desegregation plan. State departments of education will almost always have an office designated to provide some guidance and assistance to communities undergoing desegregation. Such offices also may have written material that may help desegregation planners. An example of some "guiding principles" for desegregation planners issued by the Office of Intergroup Relations of the California State Department of
Education is found in Appendix A. In addition, a group of desegregation assistance centers exist around the country for the purpose of helping school districts with various desegregation-related issues and problems. A list of the names and addresses of these centers can be found in Appendix B. In Appendix C we have also included some information on how to locate a court decision. As a way of acquiring a bit more detailed information on exactly what a court has held, the actual text of the case may be indispensable. Finally, several other practical guides to school desegregation are available. A few comments on each of these might be in order at this point.

One of the best and most current volumes is Desegregating America's Schools by Larry Hughes, William Gordon, and Larry Hillman. This hardcover book is billed as a "handbook for the development of a good desegregation plan." The authors explain in some detail how to read and interpret a court order and how to acquire the data needed to prepare a desegregation plan. They also discuss second-generation desegregation problems. For those practitioners looking for a brief history of significant cases or information necessary for plan preparation, this volume is a good choice.

A very practical orientation toward desegregation can be found in the Desegregation Resource Handbook, edited by Leronia Josey and issued by the Office of Community Affairs of the Philadelphia School District. The "Resource Handbook" is a "how-to" book based on Philadelphia's own experience as well as those of other areas. It also synthesizes much material from the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and other ERIC publications. Perhaps the most important chapters from a practitioner's point of view
are those presenting a chronology of the Philadelphia School District's interaction with the federal courts, the district's policies on non-discrimination, and court findings relevant to desegregation in Pennsylvania.

A good companion text for Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman is *Achieving Effective Desegregation* by Al Smith, Anthony Downs, and M. Leanne Lachman of the Real Estate Research Corporation. It addresses itself to the attitudes of the community and school leadership. In a pull-out sheet, Smith, et al., diagram the process for achieving effective desegregation. The diagram covers a two-year period (pre-opening to second-year opening day) as well as actions that might be taken by four groups: faculty, administrators, community leaders, and students.

Two other volumes might also be mentioned. A group of eminent scholars has just completed a large scale study of desegregation under the sponsorship of the Office of Civil Rights and the National Institute of Education. The result is a series of nine volumes available from the Center for Education and Human Development Policy, Institute for Public Policy Studies, Vanderbilt University. These volumes represent the most comprehensive effort yet to assess the current knowledge about the effectiveness of school desegregation strategies. If one doesn't want to acquire all nine, certainly the summary volume should be considered. It is entitled *Strategies for Effective School Desegregation: A Synthesis of Findings* (by Willis Hawley and eight others). In this report, the authors deal with such things as pupil assignment plans, community preparation and involvement, and changes within schools. Although not a cookbook, this summary volume represents a variety of
ideas, suggestions, and proposals that should be quite useful to policy makers.

The second book, *Making Desegregation Work: A Professional Guide to Effecting Change*, by Mark Chesler, Bunyan Bryant, and James Crowfoot was issued by Sage Publications in late 1981. It draws on experiences of schools throughout the country to provide insights and guidance to various groups concerned with the desegregation process. Specific steps are offered by which school officials and others may be able to alleviate problems and reduce tensions associated with desegregation.

Finally, we might mention another volume that provides information of a practical sort based on actual desegregation experience. This report (volume V) is one of those issued in 1981 by Vanderbilt University under the direction of Dean Willis Hawley. The title is *A Practical Guide to Desegregation: Sources, Materials, and Contacts* by Meyer Weinberg. The volume includes (1) selected sources of information on various school desegregation issues (e.g., bilingualism, classroom organization, housing, magnet schools, and the press); (2) "how to" sources on school desegregation; (3) information on cities that have been desegregated for a comparatively long time (e.g., Berkeley, Boston, Charlotte, Milwaukee, and Tampa); (4) and a list of government agencies, private organizations, and persons with specialized expertise on desegregation implementation. This practical guide is a veritable treasure trove of useful sources and contacts.

**The Scope of This Volume**

As suggested above, this handbook, although specifically designed for practitioners, is not intended to provide highly detailed,
step-by-step guidance for policy makers. Indeed the volume is limited in several ways. First, it is a direct outgrowth of a larger study of school desegregation conducted by the Bureau of Government Research at the University of Oklahoma under sponsorship by the National Institute of Education. The intent of the project was to determine, from case studies of school desegregation, the relative effects of various external forces, community characteristics, district influences, and desegregation strategies on desegregation success (defined as the amount of change in a widely used index of segregation). The study also included an analysis of white enrollment change ("white flight"). The research was limited to school districts with 20,000 or more students with a minority enrollment of at least 10 percent. Moreover, because the desegregation index was available only between 1968 and 1976, the study was restricted to school districts which implemented desegregation plans during that period.

A concerted effort was made to obtain written material on all desegregating districts meeting these criteria. The search yielded 52 case studies. Some of the discussion to follow is based on the more systematic analysis of these districts, while many of the examples are taken from the general narrative description of the desegregation process in some of the 52 school systems. Even though this study generated a great deal of information, its principal purpose was to evaluate those forces contributing to desegregation success using an aggregate, comparative research design. Such an approach permits some degree of generalization across districts as to what strategies contribute to success. It does not lend itself readily to providing the more detailed steps or procedures for effectuating a plan that practitioners
in a given community might find helpful. Again, however, some general suggestions and guidance can be derived from such a comparative study.

This handbook is limited in one other important respect. As an outgrowth of the larger research project to isolate the factors contributing to desegregation success, this volume is restricted to helping practitioners identify those steps or strategies that might contribute to the development of an effective plan to reduce racial separatism in their school systems. It will not deal with the various programs or activities districts might undertake to make the desegregation process work more smoothly internally. Hence, curriculum changes, faculty desegregation, and human relations training will not be covered.

Here we might ask, just what is an effective desegregation effort? Smith, Downes, and Lachman describe it in the following words:

Effective desegregation is a process of educational change which eliminates any inequalities in the educational opportunities provided by a state in a public school system which are caused by race, color, or nationality. This process involves three separate elements, all of which are essential to its success. They are (1) meeting specific desegregation requirements established by the Supreme Court, (2) avoiding any undue disruptions in school and community life, and (3) achieving the positive goal of quality unified education for all students.

Even though all three elements are required to achieve a total desegregation effort, neither the second nor the third component is possible without the first. Above all, a district must find acceptable and workable ways of meeting the constitutionally mandated requirement for equal educational opportunity for all students. It is our hope that this handbook will make a modest contribution to that end by offering suggestions, ideas, and proposals that might facilitate the creation of genuinely unitary schools throughout the nation.
This volume has been organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 offers an overview of the search for effective desegregation strategies. An understanding of the historical and legal context of the effort to eliminate the dual school system should help ensure that current efforts are consistent with the legal policies and guidelines established over the past several decades. This chapter will also briefly treat two of the major controversies surrounding school desegregation—busing and cross-district or metropolitan plans. Chapter 3 will deal exclusively with strategies and techniques. Here we will review what others have said about those practices that seem to yield the best results, and will present some of our own findings based on the 52 cases. Since the issue of busing is so controversial, Chapter 4 will be devoted to a more complete discussion of the issues and problems involved in transporting students to improve racial balance. Chapter 5 considers what many people believe to be the most crucial ingredient for success—public leadership. Finally, our concluding chapter summarizes the handbook and offers some predictions as to the future.
NOTES

CHAPTER 1


2. Larry Hughes, William Gordon, and Larry Hillman, *Desegregating America's Schools* (New York: Longman, 1980), p. 1. A useful annotated chronology of events and significant court cases (from 1849 to 1979) along with a glossary of terms applicable to school desegregation can also be found in Appendix A and B in this volume.


5. The list of nine volumes in the series "Assessment of Current Knowledge About the Effectiveness of School Desegregation Strategies" is as follows (total cost of $87.00):

   - **Volume I:** Strategies for Effective School Desegregation: A Synthesis of Findings (195 pages)
   - **Volume II:** An Agenda for Further Research on Desegregation (94 pages)
   - **Volume III:** A Proposed National Study of School Desegregation (38 pages)
   - **Volume IV:** A Practical Guide to Desegregation: Sources, Materials, and Contacts (122 pages)
   - **Volume V:** A Review of the Empirical Research on Desegregation: Community Response, Race Relations, Academic Achievement, and Resegregation (370 pages)
   - **Volume VI:** Qualitative Literature and Expert Opinion on School Desegregation (182 pages)
   - **Volume VII:** Desegregation Strategies and the Courts (72 pages)
   - **Volume VIII:** State Strategies for Reducing Racial Isolation (112 pages)
   - **Volume IX:** School Desegregation Strategies: A Comprehensive Bibliography (184 pages)


7. The project was funded by the National Institute of Education, Grant NIE-G-80-0142 and was entitled "Assessing the Progress of Large City School Desegregation: A Case Survey Approach." For a more complete description of the scope and methods of the larger study see Appendix D.

CHAPTER 2

THE QUEST FOR EFFECTIVE DESEGREGATION REMEDIES:
THE HISTORICAL-LEGAL CONTEXT

In order for policy makers to be assured that their plans comply with federal guidelines, it is essential that they have some understanding of the historical and legal context of past efforts to desegregate America's schools. To that end, this chapter is devoted to delineating the legal ramifications of those court cases that have shaped the course school desegregation must take in this country. We will begin by considering some of the early court cases, and the standards for desegregation policies that emerged from them. Then, tracing the effects of these cases, we will briefly examine the changes that have taken place in our schools in the past several decades. Finally, we will direct our attention to two issues of particular concern to policy makers today—white flight and metropolitan plans.

Early Court Cases

The history of school desegregation is studded with notable Supreme Court decisions. Brown I (1954) set the chain of events in motion. It was quickly followed by Brown II (1955), with its now famous statement that school must be desegregated "with all deliberate speed." Despite the radical transformation promised by the Brown decisions, however, there was very little genuine change in the following decade. The South, the only area of the country initially affected by the Court's action, was the site of destructions, delays, and massive...
resistance. And although the Brown decisions marked the end of "separate but equal," it was far from clear what the Court would accept as a nondiscriminatory school system. The lower courts were forced to assume most of the burden of assessing the legality of various plans and proposals put forth by the local school boards.

Some progress, however, began to be made in the mid-1960s. According to law professor Frank Read: "Spurred by the quickening pace of the civil rights movement and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, new plaintiffs embarked on the choppy seas of segregation litigation, with new case filings increasing almost geometrically."¹

The first, United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education (Jefferson I), heard by Judge John Minor Wisdom for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1966, consolidated seven cases from Alabama and Louisiana, and is described by Read as one of the four most important school desegregation cases yet decided.² Some of this case's importance can be attributed to the rather succinct, pragmatic way in which the judgment defined a good desegregation plan. In Judge Wisdom's words: "The only school desegregation plan that meets constitutional standards is one that works" (372 F. 2d at 847, 1966). And lest it be doubted that the Court meant business, the judge added: "The clock has ticked the last tick for tokensim and delay in the name of 'deliberate speed'" (372 F. 2d at 896).

Judge Wisdom's words were prophetic. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court issued another critical decision that would have a major impact on the slow pace of desegregation in the South. The 1968 case, Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Va. (391 U.S. 430) marked the end of all freedom-of-choice desegregation plans.
School boards were ordered to eliminate every vestige of the dual system created and perpetuated by law throughout the South, and a unitary system was mandated: one 'without a 'white school' and a 'Negro school,' but just schools." The Green case also contained the telling directive to local schools "to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work . . . now." Still, it was not clear just what specific steps a desegregation plan would require in order to produce a unitary system.

Swann and Specific Remedies

The issue of specific methods for desegregating schools was faced squarely a few years later in the landmark case, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg (402 U.S. 1 (1971). In the Swann case the Court addressed four problem areas:

- racial balance or quotas
- one-race schools
- remedial altering of attendance zones
- transportation of students

On the issue of racial quotas the Court, in a unanimous opinion, declared that "the constitutional command to desegregate" does not require that every school in the district have the same composition as the entire system. But the ruling did state:

Awareness of the racial composition of the whole system is likely to be a useful starting point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional violations. In sum, the very limited use made of mathematical ratios was within the equitable remedial discretion of the District Court (402 U.S. at 25).
The Court went on to say that "one-race schools" should be scrutinized by the lower courts to ascertain that such schools are not the result of past or present discrimination: "[T]he existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually one-race, schools within a district is not in and of itself the mark of a system which still practices segregation by law."

The issue of student transportation is that with which Swann is most often associated. The Court, after pointing out that busing "has been an integral part of the public education system for years," and that approximately 39 percent of all school children across the country had ridden buses to school during the year 1969-70, ruled that "desegregation plans cannot be limited to the walk-in school." The use of busing to facilitate school desegregation thus became the law of the land.

In brief, the following points were made in the Swann case:

- The desegregation plan must be coextensive with the problem: the remedy must be tailored to the constitutional violation.

- The numerical ratio of blacks to whites may be taken into account but not imposed as an inflexible requirement.

- There is a presumption against one-race schools but the existence of such is not a constitutional violation per se.

- The redrawing of attendance zones and the pairing and clustering of schools are permissible tools of desegregation.

- Busing is an acceptable means of implementing a desegregation plan, although there might be limits beyond which busing would become unreasonable.

Desegregation Developments in the North

Up to this point, the Supreme Court decisions were unanimous, and involved only southern districts. This state of affairs changed with the 1973 case, Keyes v. School District No. 1 (413 U.S. 189), in which
the Court laid out the basic standard for desegregation in northern and western school districts. The plaintiffs initially sued for remedy in only one area of the Denver school district—the predominantly black Park Hill area. Then, having succeeded in Park Hill, the plaintiffs pressed for desegregation of all Denver city schools. The Court accepted the plaintiffs' argument that although the school system had not operated under a constitutional or statutory provision mandating racial segregation, the official actions of the school board had nonetheless sustained a segregated system such that de jure (by law) segregation did exist.

This ruling is important for two reasons. First, in so holding, the Court perpetuated the basic de jure/de facto (in fact) distinction, previously used only in dealing with southern districts. In the absence of laws requiring racial separation in the public schools, the issue became that of determining whether or not officials had acted with "intent to segregate." Second, the Court held that it is not necessary for plaintiffs to prove that all parts of a system are intentionally segregated. Justice Brennan wrote that if intentional segregation in one part of a district could be proven to exist, segregative intent with respect to other parts of the district could be inferred.

Since Keyes the U.S. Supreme Court has been less committed to extending the scope of its school desegregation rulings. In Milliken v. Bradley (U.S. 418 U.S. 717, 1974), for example, the Court ruled that suburban school districts around Detroit could not be included for purposes of desegregating the central city district. In a 5 to 4 decision, Chief Justice Burger repeated the Swann principle that the
scope of the remedy must be determined by the extent of the constitutional violation. In this case the majority held that before a cross-district or metropolitan-wide solution could be imposed, it must be shown that "... there has been a constitutional violation with one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district (418 U.S. at 744). The Court found no evidence of such a violation in Detroit. The issues surrounding metropolitan desegregation plans will be considered in more detail below.

**Discriminatory Intent and Systemwide Remedies**

One other important case should be considered briefly: *Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman*, 97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977). In 1976, the Sixth Circuit Court had ordered a systemwide desegregation plan for the coming school year. In June of 1977, the Supreme Court vacated that judgment by a 8 to 0 vote and remanded the case to the lower courts on the grounds that the violation did not warrant a systemwide solution. In this instance the unconstitutional action of the board affected only the three Dayton high schools. But later in 1977, the district judge issued a similar ruling, and the Dayton Board of Education returned to a "freedom of choice" approach for its elementary schools. Here the violation was thought to have affected too unsubstantial a portion of the system to justify applying the *Keyes* doctrine. Apparently, where nonsouthern school officials can show that intentional discrimination affects only a part of the system, they are required to eliminate only that amount of segregation resulting from their unconstitutional actions.
Discriminatory intent was an important component of the Dayton case. On this point the Court declared:

The finding that the pupil population in the various Dayton schools is not homogeneous, standing by itself, is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of a showing that this condition resulted from intentionally segregative actions on the part of the Board (97 S. Ct. at 2772).

In other recent litigation involving Austin, Omaha, and Indianapolis, the Supreme Court has returned cases to the lower courts on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence of intent to segregate. Clearly, more than just racial imbalance in the school system is required to prove de jure segregation outside the South.

Recent Decisions: A Period of Retrenchment?

Recent school desegregation decisions by the high court have led some observers to characterize the period since 1974 as a retrenchment. William Taylor, Director of the Center for National Policy Review, contends that this changing posture is "responsive to the drumbeat of criticism from the Administration and Congress." Nonetheless, the fundamental doctrines seem secure. In the words of attorneys Mary von Euler and David Parham:

The landmark decisions of Brown, Swann, and Keyes remain intact in their holdings that state-mandated segregation, whether by statute or by other intentional efforts of school officials, is constitutionally impermissible; and, when it is found, Federal courts continue to have broad power to order whatever remedies are necessary to eliminate all vestiges of that segregation.

Yet much remains to be done, especially in large urban areas, including those in the South. Controversies over methods of implementing desegregation orders continue, and other issues remain unresolved. Some of these problems will be addressed briefly below. First, however,
it is necessary that we get clear on the results of this enormous desegregation activity beginning in the late sixties.

Desegregation Change: The Results of the Past 25 Years

The results are clearest when one looks at the segregation figures. When school segregation is measured by the percentage of blacks attending 95 to 100 percent minority schools, the nationwide average of black students in segregated school systems in 1968 was 61 percent, most of them in the Deep South. Almost 93 percent of the blacks in Mississippi were attending segregated schools at that time. The segregation figure for Alabama was 91 percent, while South Carolina, Louisiana, and Georgia all had over 80 percent of their black student population enrolled in segregated schools. But in 1970 and 1971, over 214 districts across the nation acted to end racial isolation. The nationwide segregation level dropped to 38 percent in 1970, almost entirely because of changes in the South. Mississippi's segregation figure decreased to 30 percent, and only 39 percent of the black students in Alabama still attended segregated schools. In 1970, the state with the highest percentage of segregated school systems was for the first time located outside the South. That state is Illinois, which at that time had 71 percent of its blacks attending 95 to 100 percent minority schools.

Research done by the Office of Civil Rights reveals the same trend, even though a somewhat different measure of segregation was used. In this study, school segregation is measured as the degree of interracial contact. The higher the index the greater the level of segregation. The differences by region for 1968 and 1972 are as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Segregation Score</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West South Central</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Regions</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=874)

As you can see, there was very little change in racial proportions in nonsouthern districts over the four-year period. But in the southern regions, especially in the Southeast, the drop in segregation levels was enormous.

**School Desegregation and White Flight**

An argument commonly presented in opposition to busing and to extensive desegregation, especially in large cities, is that they increase the likelihood of white student outmigration. Although considerable research has been done on this topic in the past few years, the controversy persists. Among academic researchers, however, a consensus has begun to appear. First, as political scientist Micheal Giles observes after reviewing the bulk of the studies, "declines in white student enrollments are not an inevitable consequence of school desegregation . . . ."11

The best summary of the current state of knowledge in this area has been offered by Harvard professor David Armor whose general conclusions are as follows: (1) white enrollment loss is associated with desegregation in some instances; (2) such loss is conditional; that is, it occurs
under some circumstances but not others; and (3) the loss is most apparent in the first year of desegregation. A number of other points upon which there seems to be general agreement are as follows:

- Most of the exodus of whites from the central city is related to factors other than school desegregation.
- White reassignment to black schools considerably increases white flight.
- White losses are greater in elementary schools than in secondary schools.
- Phased-in desegregation plans may result in greater white flight than single-year implementation plans—the more advance notice white parents receive, the greater the white losses.
- Adverse media publicity may induce greater white losses.
- Above a certain level of black enrollment in the school system (30-35%), white flight may substantially increase. The degree to which white flight increases after that threshold is a bit uncertain. Giles reports that "the rate of white withdrawal increases exponentially with higher percent black enrollments." But our recent 52-district study did not uncover such a threshold; the relationship between white enrollment decline and percentage black enrollment was strictly linear.
- The greater the extent of resistance to desegregation (e.g., protests, violence), the greater the white flight.
- White enrollment losses are smaller under metropolitan plans and among countywide school districts.
- The long-term effects of school desegregation vary with the size and type of district and the proportion minority. In large central city districts with above 30 or 35 percent minority, white enrollment may continue to decline as a result of school desegregation.

In addition to these propositions, Armor insists that court-ordered desegregation leads to greater white withdrawal than board initiated or "voluntary" plans. Boston University's Christine Rossell disagrees. She contends that court-ordered plans increase white flight only if they include mandatory white reassignments or the threat of them.
The above list clearly suggests that school desegregation itself does not automatically lead to white flight. And virtually all white withdrawal that does happen—comes in the year of plan implementation. It may be the case that school authorities can effectively reduce white enrollment losses. Unfortunately, there is at present no consensus on this matter. Some systematic research suggests that white leadership support for school desegregation has little effect on white flight. But as Rossell notes, few white leaders will publicly come out in favor of an extensive desegregation plan that, for example, requires white reassignments. In any event, other studies of the desegregation process insist that a positive approach on the part of school officials in fact crucial to overall success. And, according to research on desegregation by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, taking preparatory steps by keeping the community well informed enhances the chance for success.

Thus careful and sensitive preparation for desegregation may well be a crucial factor in reducing white flight.

Media coverage, too, seems to have an important effect on the number of white losses. As was said above, Rossell believes adverse media publicity may induce white flight. Fortunately, however, the relationship between media influence and public attitudes is generally thought to work the other way as well. Rossell contends that the more positive the media coverage in the year before implementation, the less likely white flight is to occur.

As might be expected, the concern with white flight has found its way into the courts. The Supreme Court's position, announced in 1972,
has been "while [white outmigration] may be a cause for deep concern to the [school boards], it cannot . . . be accepted as a reason for achieving anything less than complete uprooting of the dual public school system" (United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education (407 U.S. at 491)).

The lower courts have followed this lead in cases involving the Louisville, Boston, and Indianapolis school districts. In other cases, however, courts have not only permitted testimony regarding the potential for white flight, but have allowed the introduction of evidence regarding a potential "tipping point" beyond which white outmigration may accelerate. In such instances, the court has indicated that potential white flight may be considered in devising a particular type of desegregation action. Although the case literature is not completely consistent, the courts generally do permit testimony regarding white flight, but do not allow that concern to excuse the school system from its constitutional responsibilities to desegregate.

One last point should be made regarding white flight. Almost all of the experts agree that white student outmigration is considerably reduced under a metropolitan desegregation plan. As noted previously, however, the courts have been severely limited by the Milliken decision in imposing such a remedy. The advantages and disadvantages of the metro-wide approach, and the effects of the Milliken decision on it, is our next topic.

Metropolitanwide Approaches

The Supreme Court's 5 to 4 decision in 1973 to limit the desegregation of Detroit's schools to the central city (Milliken) has imposed
strict requirements on efforts to create areawide desegregation plans. In this case the Court ruled that the obvious school segregation existing throughout the Detroit metropolitan area was essentially the result of private housing choices and demographic trends and was not the product of deliberate government action involving suburban communities. This decision created almost insurmountable obstacles to successful desegregation in the central city. Detroit lost over 200,000 people, mostly white, during the seventies. On the other hand, the black population increased from 44 to over 50 percent during the same period. Since such developments as these affect most large, older northern cities, desegregation plans that are limited to the central city "... are not likely to remain stable whatever the level of minority enrollment in the system." For this reason, many authorities believe that desegregation plans covering the entire metropolitan area are indispensable for large cities with heavy concentrations of minorities.

Several recent developments involving metropolitan plans are worth noting. First, consider the case of Louisville-Jefferson County, for which a metropolitan plan was created in 1975. In reality, Louisville was not a multidistrict case, since under state law the county and city district were merged before the court order was implemented. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit opinion contains language suggesting that the two systems would have been forced into a metro-wide plan in any event. The court found that both systems had "failed to eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed segregation. Consequently, as contrasted with the outlying Michigan districts, they are guilty of maintaining dual school systems" (510 F. 2d at 1359, 1975).
The second case involves Wilmington, Delaware. Upon discovering cooperative action by Wilmington and New Castle County school systems to send public school children across the city line to segregated schools, the district court ordered the adoption of an interdistrict plan in May, 1976. Wilmington-New Castle County began its first year of desegregation in the fall of 1978. Eleven suburban school districts were merged with the central city district, a move requiring the reassignment of over 24,000 children. According to Jeffrey Raffel, "Over 60,000 school children, 20,500 now bused for desegregation, were being educated in 99 schools in the new county school district." Nonetheless, New Castle County School District came into existence in 1978 without trouble.

One additional effort at metropolitanwide remedies in the North should be considered. The Indianapolis school system was adjudged to be unconstitutionally segregated in 1971. After several appeals, the Seventh Circuit Court finally approved an interdistrict solution. Their approval was based partly on the fact that the state had recently created Uni-Gov, a partial metro-wide government, but had left the school systems out of the new governing arrangement. Upon appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals judgment was vacated without an explanatory opinion; the Court merely cited two cases that require proof of racially discriminatory intent. Finally, in the spring of 1981 the district court approved a plan that required busing about 5,500 school children into six adjacent townships in Marion County. Three other townships were exempt because racial balance in those schools was at an acceptable level.
These three cases clearly indicate that under the proper circumstances the courts will order metropolitanwide desegregation plans. The essential fact to be shown, in light of Milliken, is that intentional discriminatory acts of state officials or a cooperative act involving city and suburban school systems have produced segregative effects extending beyond one district. If such can be proven, the courts are well within their powers in mandating metropolitan plans.

What benefits would a metropolitan solution offer? Gordon Foster, head of the desegregation assistance center at the University of Miami, gives a number of advantages to a metro plan of school desegregation: 27

- Pupil reassignment is easier because, frequently, less transportation is required. In some communities black city schools and white suburban schools are virtually "across the street" from one another.
- Better academic programs can be provided to inner-city schools. "When suburban white pupils-teachers are assigned to these schools, their very presence tends to guarantee equal treatment."
- White flight is reduced, as there is less reason to move because of "preferential school facilities."
- Inequalities in educational conditions now existing between the suburbs and the central city can be lessened.
- Possibilities will be created for innovative combinations of centralized and decentralized administration and operation. One vast district is not essential; some centralization of administration and support can be provided along with considerable decentralization of operations.

Do interdistrict plans work? In some cases they clearly do, or at least so claims political scientist Gary Orfield. In his book, Must We Bus?, Orfield cites the remarkable stability achieved in Florida, where countywide desegregation plans exist throughout the state. 28 Under the Milliken doctrine, however, most large northern
cities cannot be desegregated on an areawide basis; it is just too
difficult to show that actions of outlying districts helped create
central city school segregation. Without a change in the current
position of the high court regarding metropolitanwide remedies, it
will be increasingly difficult for most large northern and midwestern
districts to effectively desegregate.

Conclusion

The search goes on. The courts, school officials, and consultants
continue to seek desegregation remedies that are both workable and
acceptable. Of course, no one plan exists that can be imposed on all
communities, but the efforts to identify those practices and policies
that hold the most promise must be pursued. Ultimately, it is the
courts that provide the parameters in which these efforts must operate.
Some observers contend that the U.S. Supreme Court has entered a period
of retrenchment, and it is certainly true that the Milliken decision,
for example, has erected major obstacles to providing an optimal
desegregation remedy in some cities. Nonetheless, the fundamental
decisions of the late 1960s and early 1970s stand largely intact, and
allow local officials considerable latitude and discretion in their
search for effective desegregation plans.

In recent years, school desegregation has become the object of
undue pessimism. Vanderbilt's Dean Willis Hawley and his colleagues
state in Strategies for Effective School Desegregation: "It is widely
believed that school desegregation has not 'worked' and moreover,
that it is not likely to 'work.'" They feel that this assessment
is unjustifiably negative. The fact is that a great deal has been accomplished with regard to school desegregation, and much of it in relatively few short years. Why, then, has pessimism set in? It seems in part attributable to the difficulties encountered by school systems that are not pursuing the fairly obvious practices and policies that might most enhance their prospects for effective desegregation. Clearly, it is imperative to the success of desegregation that policy makers familiarize themselves with those strategies that appear most promising.
NOTES

CHAPTER 2


2. Ibid., p. 23.


8. These figures are found in David R. Morgan, A Handbook of State Policy Indicators (Norman: Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, 1978), p. 53. Minorities include blacks, American Indians, Orientals, and Spanish-surnamed Americans.


15. Giles, "White Enrollment Stability."


22. Ibid., p. 11.


24. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Desegregation of the Nation's Schools, p. 6.

26. This information was provided in a telephone conversation with Mr. Matt Winters, Director of Planning, Indianapolis Public Schools, July 7, 1981.


CHAPTER 3

DESEGREGATION TECHNIQUES

In developing a desegregation strategy, school district officials, desegregation planners, and the courts must attempt to strike a delicate balance between local values, mores, and environmental conditions, on the one hand, and the national policy mandate to end dual school systems, on the other. As stated earlier, no foolproof blueprints exist. There are, however, a number of proven desegregation strategies from which planners may pick and choose. Of these strategies, some enjoy tremendous success in certain kinds of districts, but fail in others. Some work better at the elementary school level than at higher the reverse is true. Faced with a variety of techniques, the planner must learn how to select those that seem most likely to work, or those that might best be tailored to work, in local conditions. The successful strategy, then, is a mixed product of careful research and inventiveness. As Robert Crain and Willis Hawley put it, "once armed with criteria for reassignment and with a knowledge of the alternative strategies that can be employed, the desegregation planner is an artist, not a technician or scientist."¹

In this chapter, we present information that we hope will aid school officials in assembling and implementing a successful desegregation plan. The first section is a general overview of the many different kinds of strategies available. Our primary concern here is to understand the goals desegregation plans in general are designed to accomplish, and to evaluate various strategies as to their success in meeting these
goals. The second section briefly reviews the results of our larger 52 district study, in which the effectiveness of five common desegregation strategies is systematically examined. A third section reports on the relationship between school desegregation and white flight among these 52 districts. Next, we present six case profiles, including three districts that achieved considerable success in reducing racial isolation and three districts in which efforts were not as successful. In the final section, the chapter is summarized and its implications are discussed.

School Desegregation and Desegregation Techniques

Desegregation Goals

While school desegregation has many goals, its primary one is to redefine the racial mixture of students. Hughes, et al. view desegregation plans as "body mixers pure and simple." The successful plan ends racial isolation both among and within schools. Desegregation among schools primarily concerns how closely the racial mix of students in individual schools conforms to the districtwide norms. Desegregation within a school concerns those actions which impede interracial contact, such as tracking and exclusion from extracurricular activities, or as Hawley and associates put it, "a range of practices that result in racially identifiable classes or groupings with no demonstrable educational necessity." Even if a district is successful at achieving racial balance among its schools, the positive value of that achievement is negated if within school desegregation is lacking.

A desegregation plan ought also to be designed in such a way as to preclude resegregation. Thus it aims not only at ending racial isolation but at preventing it from recurring in the future.
Resegregation may be due to one or a combination of factors including
(1) "flight" from the district (moving or enrolling in private schools),
(2) changed residential patterns within the district, or (3) a shift
in births within the district. A good plan must take these factors
into account.

Further, if desegregation is to be effective and equitable, it
should result in improved race relations (ideally, "color blindness"),
among students, improvements in educational quality for all races, and
community commitment to the local school system (which might be shown,
for example, by reduced opposition to desegregation and better fiscal
support for the schools).

What are the basic components of a school desegregation plan that
can accomplish these goals? Charles Willie, professor of education at
Harvard, suggests the following:

... (a) there is a systemwide approach; (b) the school and
not the student is the basic educational unit; (c) such units
or schools that complement each other may be grouped into
common attendance zones, districts, or regions for more
effective and efficient operation and administration; (d) a
uniform grade structure facilitates interchange between and
easy access to all units or schools within the system;
(e) opportunities are provided to pursue specialized
interests as well as common concerns; (f) the existence of
a monitoring structure insures good-faith implementation of
the systemwide plan; (g) faculty is diversified.

While local school officials are primarily responsible for the
formulation and implementation of desegregation plans, they must make
decisions within the context of federal court rulings. University of
Michigan Professor Charles Vergon suggests that the courts may invoke
five general standards in assessing the adequacy of local plans.
... the obligations of school officials is to bring about 'the maximum amount of actual desegregation in light of the practicalities of the local situation' ... (Green v. Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 1968; Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 1971).

... the primary criterion for assessing the legal adequacy of a plan ... is its effectiveness in eliminating one-race or racially identifiable schools. (Green).

... while prohibited from requiring school districts to achieve a precise racial mix or balance ... courts are authorized to use racial ratios as a starting point in formulating or evaluating the effectiveness and legal adequacy of proposed plans (Swann; Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 442 U.S. 449, 1979).

... where racially identifiable buildings persist, school districts are generally required to utilize, and courts to order the utilization of, the most effective desegregation technique reasonably available (Green; Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile, 402 U.S. 33, 1971).

Vergon is quick to note, however, that a host of other district-specific influences help guide federal court decisions, such as practical considerations (e.g., logistics of desegregation), education factors (e.g., curriculum capacity), and equitable principles (e.g., disproportionate racial burden).

Thus, while school policymakers must follow the law, they are not required to operate within a strategic straightjacket. In fact, the range of strategies that may be employed to reduce racial isolation is surprisingly large and includes everything from open enrollment and redrawing attendance zones to magnet schools. In the remainder of this section, these various desegregation techniques and their effectiveness will be discussed.
Desegregation Strategies and Effectiveness

Close examination suggests that many desegregation techniques are variations of a few basic strategies. In considering desegregation in northern communities, Kirby, et al. isolate 27 different desegregation actions, which they then divide into three groups: (1) **symbolic-procedural** (e.g., appointing a committee to study a specific problem), (2) **voluntary participation** (e.g., initiating compensatory education, hiring more black teachers), and (3) **forced participation** (e.g., instituting open enrollment, redrawing boundaries, closing schools, busing).

Most of the literature further divides those techniques falling under the above heading of "forced participation" into a number of other categories. For example, Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman enumerate six popular techniques for pupil assignment: rezoning, contiguous pairing, noncontiguous pairing, clustering, single-grade centers, and islands, listed in order of "ease and economy of implementation." Desegregation specialist Gordon Foster discusses five basic means: redrawing zone lines, pairing and grouping, modified feeder patterns, skip zoning, and site selection and construction policies, along with several so-called "optional methods" (including open enrollment and magnet schools). In their research on California school desegregation, Professors Eldon Wegner and Jane Mercer construct a "desegregation action index" from six techniques: relocation, new construction, boundary changes, open enrollment, mandatory busing, and pairing. Table 1 summarizes the various techniques identified by these as well as other authorities.
### TABLE 1

**A SUMMARY OF DESEGREGATION TECHNIQUES IDENTIFIED IN SELECTED STUDIES**

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<thead>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rezoning</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairing</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clustering</td>
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<tr>
<td>Single-grade centers</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islands</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modified feeder</td>
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<tr>
<td>Skip zoning</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Site selection/const./ reloc./ closing</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open enrollment (voluntary)</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory busing</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnet</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Areawide/metropolitan (multidistrict)</td>
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<td>Educational parks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reorg. of grade structures</td>
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</table>

*a This listing of four desegregation techniques from the Kirby, et al. study includes only those that could actually be used to desegregate the school system.*
Vergon suggests that while the names assigned to techniques vary from study to study, all desegregation strategies are of two generic types: voluntary desegregation strategies (e.g., open enrollment, magnet-only, majority to minority transfers), and mandatory desegregation strategies (e.g., rezoning, pairing, clustering). For purposes of discussion we will adopt Vergon's categories in assessing the effectiveness of different desegregation strategies in reducing racial isolation.

**Voluntary Techniques**

Voluntary desegregation strategies such as open enrollment and free transfers represent the customary initial approach to a school desegregation order. Since voluntary desegregation plans allow students, or their parents, to select the school in the district they will attend, this type of desegregation plan is often the least objectionable and arouses the least controversy.

One means of voluntary assignment is majority to minority transfers. Called M and M transfers, these permit students to attend schools in which their race is a minority. Thus a white student may elect to leave his or her all-white or predominantly white school to attend a predominately black or desegregated school. Minority children have the same option.

In general, voluntary assignments have not proven effective in reducing racial isolation. In 1968, the Supreme Court held that "If there are reasonably available other ways . . . promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system, 'freedom of choice' must be held unacceptable" (Green v. Kent County). In response to this, many communities tried a novel voluntary desegregation
strategy—magnet schools. Magnet schools are highly specialized schools that draw students from all over the district. Frequently, these schools offer courses in the sciences, humanities, or performing arts. Students must apply to attend and are usually required to meet strict entrance standards. Magnet school plans may be of two types: Magnet-only plans, which rely on voluntary participation, and magnet-mandatory plans, which require student assignment to either a desegregated magnet school or to another desegregated school within the district.

Figure 1 provides an illustrative example of the magnet school approach.

Daniel Levine and Connie Campbell offer various reasons for the appeal of magnet schools: They offer a variety of options as to curriculum, put great emphasis on quality instruction, and are funded from state, local, and federal sources. All of these are, of course, definite advantages, providing that magnet schools are effective at reducing racial isolation. The question is, are they effective?

A recent comparative study by Christine Rossell of 18 school districts' experiences with magnet schools suggests that the effectiveness of magnets may depend on whether they are only part of a mandatory citywide plan or are the sole means of school desegregation. Rossell advances two models of decision making. The first, labeled "conflict control," is associated with a magnet-mandatory plan. The conflict control model "assumes that coercion is necessary to induce whites to leave their segregated schools, but that some element of choice, however real it may be, is necessary to reduce hostility and white flight to manageable levels." The second model is based on "public choice"
FIGURE 1. MAGNET SCHOOLS

theory. This model assumes that parents will choose the school their child will attend "on the basis of curricular incentives." In other words, a district may opt to use a (voluntary) magnet-only plan on the assumption that parents choose only the best schools for their children. Rossell suggests that this assumption may be false: "... the only reason why some parents might choose a magnet school is that their neighborhood school is becoming predominantly minority."15

Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman are even more critical in their appraisal of magnet schools:

Though this voluntary mechanism appeals to many educators and school boards, it has not proved effective in school desegregation. School systems in Dallas, Houston, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia point to their magnet programs as important parts of their school desegregation plan; in fact, these programs have had minimal impact on the overall racial balances of these systems.16

Elsewhere, they flatly state that magnet schools "simply have not worked as a tool of desegregation."17

Two unanticipated problems are associated with magnet schools. First, as the authors point out, they are expensive to establish and maintain, especially in light of their documented ineffectiveness in reducing racial isolation—their intended purpose. In these times of fiscal stress and nationwide decline in school enrollments, magnets may simply prove not to be cost effective. Second, it is believed that the use of magnet schools sometimes results in inequities among schools in a district, and are a form of "institutional racism" in that they may receive a disproportionate share of a district's per pupil educational expenditures. Rossell's analysis of "quality education indicators" in magnet and non-magnet schools in Boston lends some support to this notion. Table 2 summarizes Rossell's findings.
TABLE 2

BOSTON: CHARACTERISTICS OF MAGNET AND NON-MAGNET SCHOOLS, 1975-1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality Education Indicators</th>
<th>Magnet</th>
<th>Non-Magnet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average per-pupil expenditure on regular teachers in dollars</td>
<td>843.9</td>
<td>714.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average per-pupil expenditure on special instruction in dollars</td>
<td>221.1</td>
<td>184.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average per-pupil expenditure on instructional supplies in dollars</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average facility age in years</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average pupil/teacher ratio</td>
<td>15:1</td>
<td>20:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Table 2 reveals, per-pupil expenditure on regular teachers, special instructions, and instructional supplies are higher in magnet than in non-magnet schools. Also, the average age of the educational facilities as well as the pupil/teacher ratio are smaller.

Consistent with this charge of "institutional racism" is the fact that to make a magnet school work, a district will on occasion take the best teachers and the best students in the district, further "ghettorizing" black students. For example, in Detroit, as Foster notes:

... the magnet middle schools had not aided desegregation but had served as an escape route for whites assigned to predominantly black schools; and the magnet concept itself set up a new type of dual structure with unequal educational opportunities. If one-fourth or one-half of the schools in a system are developed as magnet schools with above-average expenditures and superior programs, then a dual structure has been established.18
Rossell concludes: "If a dual system based on race is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, it is not at all clear that a dual system based on educational quality is not also such a violation."¹⁹

Considerable attention has been devoted here to weighing both the advantages and limitations of magnet schools. The bulk of the evidence collected thus far would seem to support a federal court ruling concerning the use of magnets in Boston: reliance on a magnet school approach "would be to place the realization of the rights of Boston's black students in a vessel that would begin rudderless against the world" (401 F. Supp. 228). This is not to suggest that magnet schools should be abandoned as a desegregation strategy. As Hawley, et al. reminds us, "when magnets are part of a mandatory plan they can effectively attract students to desegregated settings."²⁰ However, plans should continue to be closely scrutinized by desegregation planners, academics, and the courts.

Mandatory Reassignment Techniques

Under mandatory desegregation strategies, school officials, and not students or parents, decide which schools a student will attend. In contrast to voluntary desegregation techniques, Vergon contends "the effectiveness of mandatory plans utilizing geographic reassignment techniques is suggested by the number and proportion of approved plans which incorporate this approach to a significant extent."²¹

According to Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman, the "most desirable assignment patterns are ones that keep distances that must be traveled
to and from school to a minimum . . . ." In addition, the authors note three other assignment consideration: "(1) the burden of the desegregation must not fall disproportionately on one race or economic level; (2) once desegregated, each school must have a racial ratio that reflects the overall racial ratio of the school district; and (3) the number of students assigned to any building must not exceed the established building capacity."22

Four of the most commonly employed reassignment techniques (see Table 1) are: construction of new schools, pairing and/or clustering, rezoning, and magnet-mandatory schools. Let us consider each of these in turn.

New schools are usually built in minority, mixed, or "neutral" neighborhoods. The rationale for building new schools is relatively straightforward: If the educational facilities are new or modern, white parents may be more easily persuaded to send their children to integrated facilities; also, by building new schools in neutral neighborhoods, commuting time may be reduced; and finally, some older schools are simply not large enough to accommodate the increased number of students due to integration.

Pairing and/or clustering is a technique whereby two or more schools are grouped together to form a single school. Children attend one school for a few years, then attend the other. If, for example, a black school containing grades 1 through 6 was paired with a white school nearby containing the same grades, all students in grades 1 through 3 might attend one of the schools while grades 4 through 6 attend the other school. For a more detailed illustration of how pairing or clustering might work, see Figure 2.
FIGURE 2. PAIRING/CLUSTERING

Before

Mostly Black

Mostly White

GRADES K - 6

GRADES K - 6

After

Desegregated

Desegregated

GRADES K - 3

GRADES K - 3

Rezoning of school boundaries is also a widely used desegregation technique. Rezoning is said by one expert to be the "least disruptive and easiest way to achieve desegregation," especially at the secondary school level. Hughes, et al. comment:

Redrawing attendance boundaries causes minimal disruption within the school community and achieves the desired goal of racial balance. This technique is easier to use with high schools because high school attendance zones draw from a larger geographic area. This is the first technique that should be considered when preparing a desegregation plan.

Figure 3 provides an example of how rezoning might be accomplished.

Finally, magnet-mandatory schools may be used as a component part of a large school desegregation plan. Under these arrangements, students have several school options according to Rossell. They can "(1) leave the school system, (2) accept the forced reassignment to a desegregated school, or (3) choose a desegregated magnet school."

To date, few studies have attempted to assess the impact of desegregation techniques on desegregation success using a systematic, comparative research design. Most analyses of effects rely on singular case studies. Wegner and Mercer's study of 49 California unified school districts is a notable exception. As mentioned above, these authors combine six techniques into a "desegregation action index." To assess the impact of the desegregation techniques on their dependent variable (change in racial balance from 1966 to 1971), three analyses were performed. First, using a dichotomous variable (0/1), the researchers compared average (mean) changes in racial balance for those districts that used one of these techniques with those that did not. Second, a multiple correlation coefficient was calculated between desegregation actions and change. Finally, the desegregation action index was
FIGURE 3. REDRAWING SCHOOL ATTENDANCE ZONES (REZONING)

Before Rezoning

After Rezoning*

*Dotted line depicts outline of original school zone.

correlated with the dependent variable. In each analysis, the results were not statistically significant. Wegner and Mercer conclude: "the number and kind of Desegregation Actions taken by a district does not significantly influence the extent to which that district will experience a change in the percent of minority children attending racially balanced schools." In other words, desegregation success may not be facilitated regardless of the strategy used.

For the desegregation planner responsible for formulating and implementing a desegregation plan, these findings are not very promising. However, it should be remembered that this is but one study. Our own study of 52 large school districts yielded somewhat different results, while using a more representative sample of school districts, a more commonly employed measure of desegregation success, and a data collection and aggregation technique that facilitates the creation of several measures of common desegregation techniques. The next section provides a brief review of our findings.

The Effectiveness of Desegregation Techniques: 52 Case Experiences

Many school officials lack a comprehensive understanding of what desegregation strategies have worked well in other districts. Yet information as to how desegregation efforts have worked across the country, especially in similar locales, would seem to be a vital source of guidance and assistance for officials at all levels struggling with the task of devising equitable and effective desegregation proposals. Accordingly, this section summarizes the findings of our larger study of desegregation efforts in 52 school districts. The reader is referred
to Appendix D for a discussion of the scope, data, and methods employed in the larger study.

This section is divided into two subsections. In the first, the desegregation strategies most commonly employed across the 52 districts by school level are identified; their effectiveness in reducing racial isolation is then assessed in a preliminary fashion; and finally the significance of these strategies allowing for local influences (e.g., region, percent minority, etc.) is examined. In short, the first subsection presents an aggregate picture of 52 school desegregation efforts. The second gives more specific information by profiling three districts which achieved considerable desegregation success and three which were not as successful.

**Aggregate Findings**

Before assessing the effectiveness of various strategies it might be instructive to examine the strategies that were most widely used across the 52 districts by school level.28 Table 3 provides this comparison. Although a variety of combinations appear, only a limited number of strategies are extensively employed as the primary tool for purposes of desegregation. At the elementary level, three techniques clearly predominate—rezoning (with 27% relying primarily on that technique), pairing and clustering (25%), and pairing and clustering in combination with rezoning (20%). For secondary schools, only one strategy was heavily used—rezoning (61%).

In order to assess the effectiveness of these most frequently used desegregation strategies, a three-step process was followed in this study. In the first step, the level of racial isolation in elementary
### TABLE 3
THE EFFECT OF DESEGREGATION STRATEGIES ON DESEGREGATION SUCCESS
FOR 52 SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND BY SCHOOL LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N^a</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol. assign.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Const. new school</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pair./Clust. (P/C)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnet</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rezoning</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/C-Rez.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol.-P/C-Rez.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol.-P/C-Mag.-Rez.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol.-Const.-P/C-Rez.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mag.-Rez.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol.-Mag.-Rez.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol.-Const.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Const.-P.C-Rez.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol.-Mag.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^a^Two districts' desegregation efforts (Stockton and Colorado Springs) did not include elementary schools.

^b^Desegregation in four districts (San Francisco, Lansing, Pontiac, Clark County) did not include elementary schools.
and secondary schools was measured both before and after the major desegregation effort. A widely used segregation index generally referred to as the "index of dissimilarity" (DI) was used as an indicator of racial isolation. This index was created originally by demographers Karl Taeuber and Alma Taeuber to measure residential segregation in American cities. It represents the amount by which each school in a district departs from the precise racial composition of the entire district. In other words, the index value indicates the percentage of the total minority and white students that would have to change schools in order to achieve racial balance. According to Karl Taeuber and Franklin Wilson the index "provides the most useful operationalization of relevant features of the concept 'segregation' for the purposes of policy analysis."

In the next step, a second change indicator was created to measure white outmigration from the district. This change measure reflects white student enrollment before and after the major desegregation effort, again by school level.

In the final step, mean (average) changes in the level of desegregation and white enrollment decline were calculated for districts that used one of the most frequently employed desegregation strategies and for districts that did not use the technique.

Table 4 contrasts the effects of each of the most used techniques (under base group) with all others that are used (comparison group) by school level. To see how this table functions, consider desegregation change at the elementary level. The 12 districts using pairing and clustering reflect a 35.9 point decline in level of segregation. This
TABLE 4

EFFECTS OF PRIMARY DESEGREGATION STRATEGIES COMPARED TO ALL OTHERS BY SCHOOL LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Base Group</th>
<th>Comparison Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elementary Level</td>
<td>Secondary Level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>-29.4</td>
<td>-12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P/C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P/C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P/C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-40.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
contrasts with the 27.1 drop for the remaining 35 schools employing all other techniques. The average change in the level of segregation for the 13 districts using rezoning is -31.6 points with the comparison group (34 cases) achieving an average of a 28.5 point decline. Table 4 also reveals that pairing and clustering in combination with rezoning resulted in the greatest amount of desegregation success (40.5 point decline). At the secondary school level the 29 districts using rezoning achieved more desegregation change (-27.8) than those using all other techniques (-18.5).

With respect to white enrollment decline in elementary schools, pairing and clustering in combination with rezoning not only results in significant desegregation success but also minimizes the loss of white students (5.8% decline vs. 13.8% decline for all others). At the secondary level, the method associated with the least amount of white student withdrawal is rezoning (2.2% loss compared to 18.5% loss for districts not using rezoning as the primary desegregation technique).

Based on this preliminary analysis of desegregation strategies and desegregation success three major findings are noteworthy. First, the effectiveness of any one desegregation strategy varies according to school level. Second, the combination of pairing and clustering with rezoning appears to be an effective strategy for reducing racial isolation in elementary schools while at the same time minimizing the unintended impact of white student withdrawal. Third, the data tend to support a conviction shared by Foster and Hughes, et al. that the secondary school level rezoning is the strategy local officials should consider first.
It should be kept in mind, however, that these conclusions are preliminary. It would be premature to accept these strategies as wholly responsible for prompting desegregation success if local conditions affect it as well. And in fact this is generally believed to be the case. Previous desegregation research suggests that four contextual variables may significantly affect local desegregation efforts: region (South/non-South), type of school district (countywide/noncounty-wide), percentage minority, and size of school district (total enrollment). Briefly, the South has made greater progress than the non-South in desegregating its schools, thus, southern region should help explain desegregation success. Countywide districts, because they generally encompass large areas, also are more successful in reducing racial isolation. A large minority enrollment should be a barrier to success, since historically those schools with large minority percentages have been more segregated. And larger districts tend to experience more difficulty in desegregating than smaller ones.

To assess the independent effects of the desegregation strategies identified above while simultaneously (statistically) accounting for the effects of the four contextual variables, a technique known as multiple regression is required. (For the reader who is acquainted with this statistical technique Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix D summarize the quantitative results of the regression analyses.) In general, the regression analyses suggest the following:

- Regardless of the desegregation technique employed (re zoning, pairing/clustering, or rezoning and pairing/clustering in combination) at the elementary level, the relationship (direction) of the four contextual variables with desegregation success is constant: southern region and countywide school districts are positively related to desegregation success, and percent minority and school district size
(school enrollment) are negatively related to changes in desegregation. The specific effect of each variable, however, varies with the type of technique used. For example, in those districts where rezoning and pairing/clustering in combination are used as the primary desegregation techniques, southern region and the size of the school district seem to be less important influences than in those districts where rezoning or pairing/clustering alone are used.

- Of the three desegregation strategies commonly employed at the elementary level, only pairing and clustering in combination with rezoning has a (statistically) significant impact on desegregation change when controlling for the four contextual variables.

- At the secondary level, southern region and type of school district are positively related to desegregation success, and percent minority and school district size are negatively related to success. Of the five variables, percent minority and rezoning as a desegregation technique are the weakest predictors of desegregation success.

What lessons for desegregation planning can be drawn from these findings? First, regarding secondary schools, the most commonly used technique--rezoning--does not seem to be much more effective than other techniques when district and environmental characteristics are considered. This is not to suggest that secondary grades are not desegregating; clearly they are. But at this level, the particular technique used seems to matter little. Apparently rezoning is widely employed only because it is relatively easy to do. Of course, this should not be taken to mean that districts should not rezone, but only that other strategies or combinations may work almost as well. At the elementary level, however, the specific action taken apparently does make a difference, and a combination of pairing and clustering with rezoning seems the best choice. Obviously, a desegregation planner or an educational consultant for the district or the court should not arbitrarily impose a preconceived plan on a group of elementary schools. The particular
needs and requirements of the district must be taken into account. Yet, this research suggests that where possible, officials might consider first the combination of rezoning with clustering and pairing of various elementary grades. At the secondary level, rezoning as the primary technique seems to work as well as anything and is likely to be relatively easy to implement.

Desegregation Strategies and "White Flight"

As we suggested in Chapter 2, the loss of white students as a result of desegregation, commonly called white flight, remains a major concern of school officials and politicians. Before proceeding we should note that the term "white flight" is often used, erroneously according to Christine Rossell and Willis H. A. Ley, to describe any decline in white student enrollment. They think the term implies that such losses are primarily the result of desegregation. Such is not the case, of course. Most of the enrollment shrinkage, especially in large central city districts, stems from moves to the suburbs for a variety of nondesegregation reasons and from a general decline in white birth rates. Nonetheless, the term remains in popular use and serves as a useful shorthand for the more cumbersome phrase, white enrollment decline. For purposes of variety we will continue to use white flight interchangeably with white student enrollment loss.

Gary Orfield points out that large city school districts in particular have often relied on the fear of white flight in an attempt to avoid significant desegregation. For example, in Atlanta a compromise plan was accepted by the courts after the NAACP and black school officials
agreed to drop litigation for a far-reaching busing plan. The decision was partly because of the fear of accelerated white flight. Orfield comments that the plan did not produce the intended effects; large white enrollment declines happened anyway. By the 1978-79 school year the system was 90 percent black. For years Chicago has fought for a voluntary desegregation approach primarily as a way to minimize white flight. Very little desegregation exists in the Chicago schools, and Orfield reports that the school system has been forced to abandon the entirely voluntary approach. Houston likewise asked the federal court not to impose a mandatory desegregation plan largely on white flight grounds.

In some instances the courts have been sympathetic to the fervent pleas of school officials; in other cases, white flight has been rejected as a grounds for watering down a desegregation plan. Until the U.S. Supreme Court rules directly on the question of white flight, lower courts undoubtedly will take differing positions. In 1972, the high Court did rule, as indicated in Chapter 2, that white student loss could not be used as a justification for failure to desegregate. Yet some lower courts have continued to hear evidence on the potential effects of white flight in devising an appropriate remedy to eliminate racial isolation.

As discussed earlier the social science research on this issue has begun to reach agreement. Specifically, recent studies now find some desegregation-related white enrollment loss at the year of implementation. The extent to which this loss continues beyond the first year remains in dispute. Some research, which aggregates data from a large number of districts, finds no long-term white enrollment declines. Yet Rossell
contends that when these districts are divided into smaller groups, different effects appear. In particular, she finds "... that the school districts least likely to make up their implementation year losses... are big city school districts with minority white populations." At this point we want to examine the white enrollment declines among our 52 large school districts. This information is shown in Table 5. Since evidence suggests that white loss is greater for elementary than secondary schools, the table also shows the 52 districts divided by school level. Before examining the data we should clarify the nature of the "time points" shown in the table. These appear as T-2 through T and on to T+3, rather than by actual year. This is necessary because the various districts did not desegregate during the same year. The letter T thus stands for the desegregation implementation year. Likewise T-2 indicates two years prior to that year, while T+3 represents the third year past the year of implementation. So the table shows the average (mean) percentage white student loss for the two years before desegregation and the three years after. For the entire group of districts Table 5 reveals that prior to desegregation (T-2 and T-1) the districts lost an average of about 2 percent of their white students. At the year of implementation the mean white student decline reached almost 10 percent (9.8%), but then it returned to approximately pre-implementation levels (2.7%). With no other influences taken into account, school desegregation is associated with about a 7 percent one-time decline in white enrollment for the group of 52 districts.

When the schools are divided by level, some variations appear. As Table 5 shows, during implementation year elementary schools lost, on
TABLE 5  
MEAN PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN WHITE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT,  
BY SCHOOL LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Level</th>
<th>(T-2)</th>
<th>(T-1)</th>
<th>(T)</th>
<th>(T1)</th>
<th>(T+2)</th>
<th>(T+3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Systemwide</td>
<td>-2.2(N=32)</td>
<td>-2.0(N=43)</td>
<td>-9.8(N=50)</td>
<td>-2.7(N=37)</td>
<td>-2.7(N=39)</td>
<td>-2.7(N=34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>-3.1(N=34)</td>
<td>-4.9(N=43)</td>
<td>-12.1(N=47)</td>
<td>-5.1(N=39)</td>
<td>-3.5(N=39)</td>
<td>-4.0(N=33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>-1.1(N=28)</td>
<td>-0.3(N=39)</td>
<td>-4.7(N=46)</td>
<td>-2.1(N=39)</td>
<td>-1.8(N=36)</td>
<td>-1.8(N=33)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*T equals desegregation implementation year. White enrollment changes are calculated as percentages. For example: \((T-2) = \frac{(T-2)-(T-3)}{(T-3)}\).

Since the districts desegregated at different times between 1968-76, in some cases a time point was not available to calculate a white school enrollment change measure. Thus, the N varies across time.
the average, about 12 percent of their white students. In contrast, secondary schools experiences only a 4.7 percent white student enrollment decline. That difference between the two levels is not as great as it might first appear if one considers the pre-desegregation trends. For example, by T-1 white loss at the lower grades had reached about 5 percent. So the net loss at implementation is only about 7 percent. The average decline before desegregation at the secondary level was less than 1 percent. Here the net loss associated with desegregation is just over 4 percent. So overall this group of elementary schools did experience about a 3 percent greater one-time net loss of white students than did secondary schools.

Several more analyses of white flight might be conducted. First, Rosell argues that desegregation plans phased in over a period of several years tend to have greater losses of white students than plans implemented in one year. When plans are carried out over several years, disaffected parents are likely to have more time to flee. In effect, advanced notice creates greater white flight.

As a test of this proposition, the 52 districts are divided into two groups--those that spread their desegregation efforts over two or more years (phased-in plans) versus those that desegregated in one year. Table 6 presents the white school enrollment changes for these two groups.

As Table 6 reveals, the 18 districts employing phased-in plans lost 2.5 percent more white students, on the average, than the 32 districts implementing desegregation within a single year (-11.4% and -8.9%, respectively). But white enrollment losses were also higher
### TABLE 6
**MEAN WHITE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT CHANGE BY WHETHER DESEGREGATION PLAN WAS PHASED-IN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Category</th>
<th>White Enroll. Chg. Year Prior to Implementation (T-1)(^b)</th>
<th>White Enroll. Chg. Year After Implementation (T+1)(^d)</th>
<th>White Enroll. Chg. Year After Implementation (T)(^c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phased-in Plan(^a)</td>
<td>-3.3(N=15)</td>
<td>-1.6(N=8)</td>
<td>-11.4(N=18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonphased-in Plan</td>
<td>-1.3(N=28)</td>
<td>-2.9(N=28)</td>
<td>-8.9(N=32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Mean</td>
<td>-2.0(N=43)</td>
<td>-2.7(N=37)</td>
<td>-9.8(N=50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Primary desegregation effort occurred over two or more years.

\(^b\)Percentage change (T-1)-(T-2)/(T-2).

\(^c\)Percentage change (T)-(T-1)/(T-1).

\(^d\)Percentage change (T+1)-(T)/(T).
the year prior to implementation in districts using phased-in plans (-3.3 compared to -1.3). This means the net loss difference between the two plans is not great—8.1 percent for phased-in plans (11.4 minus 3.3) and 7.6 percent for one-year plans (8.9 minus 1.3). Taking account of pre-implementation loss yields a difference, then, of only .5 between the two types of plans. Moreover, one-year efforts show greater enrollment declines the year following desegregation than phased-in plans (-2.9% compared to -1.6%). So, if losses before and after the period of implementation are considered, phased-in plans appear in a more favorable light.

Large central city districts with high minority enrollments may suffer unusual white flight. And, moreover, such districts may not recover their pre-desegregation white enrollment levels over the succeeding years. In addition, Rossell mentions that white enrollment losses should be less in metropolitan wide districts than among those covering less area. These previous findings, applied to our 52 districts, are shown in Table 7.

First, for the 20 countywide districts among the 52, we find very little white student loss at the year of implementation (-2.9%). In the few years following desegregation a very slight downward white enrollment trend continues. This seems to confirm Rossell’s position regarding metropolitan desegregation. A much different picture appears for big city districts with large minority enrollments (Table 7). Such districts are defined here as being located in a city of 250,000 or greater with a minority enrollment of 30 percent of above. For these 13 school systems, the drop among white students is drastic--
TABLE 7

MEAN PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN WHITE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT
BY TWO TYPES OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of District</th>
<th>Time Point&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>(T-2)</th>
<th>(T-1)</th>
<th>(T)</th>
<th>(T+1)</th>
<th>(T+2)</th>
<th>(T+3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countywide districts (N=20)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(N=19)</td>
<td>(N=19)</td>
<td>(N=17)</td>
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<sup>a</sup>T equals desegregation implementation year. White enrollment changes are calculated as percentages. For example: (T-2) = (T-2)-(T-3).

Since the districts desegregated at different times between 1968-76, in some cases a time point was not available to calculate a white school enrollment change measure. Thus, the N varies across time.

<sup>b</sup>Large equals over 250,000 population; high minority school enrollment equals ≥ 30 percent.
21.3 percent. The pre-implementation losses were somewhat greater than average as well; even so, the average net loss at the year of desegregation approximates 16 percent. And, of perhaps greater significance, the post-desegregation decline continues at a fairly high rate—the average for the three years is about 10.5 percent. This compares to about an average 5 percent loss prior to desegregation.

Finally, Table 7 depicts the white enrollment changes for districts that are neither countywide nor large city with high proportion minority. The white loss for these districts (N=17) parallels the figure for the entire group of 52—9.2 percent. The average loss following desegregation is slightly more than occurred for the two years before implementation.

Since all these figures can be a bit confusing even presented in tabular form, Figure 4 provides a graph of these trends: It shows the average white enrollment declines over a six-year period for the entire group of 52 districts plus the three subcategories discussed above—countywide districts (N=20), large city with high proportion minority (N=13), and the balance of 19 districts. Perhaps only two really important facts stand out from this entire analysis—countywide districts have less white loss and large city high minority districts have considerably greater losses compared to all others.

In summary, for policymaking purposes several findings appear from this analysis of white flight.

- In general, there is a significant one-time loss of white students at the year of desegregation implementation.
- White enrollment decline is less than average for countywide districts and by implication for metropolitanwide desegregation plans.
- White flight is likely not only to be much greater than average at the desegregation year for large city districts with high minority enrollments, such loss continues at a level somewhat beyond that for the years prior to desegregation.
FIGURE 4. CHANGES IN WHITE ENROLLMENT OVER TIME FOR 52 LARGE SCHOOL DISTRICTS

- countywide
- large city districts with high minority enrollment
- all districts
Case Studies of Desegregation Efforts

While aggregate data analysis is particularly helpful in formulating generalizations about the effect various influences have on the desegregation process across a number of locales, case studies provide a more in-depth analysis of location-specific efforts. The remainder of this section presents six case profiles, three of successful desegregation and three that were not as successful. In addition to the profiles, a brief narrative describing the desegregation process in each district is also presented. The six districts are drawn from our larger collection of 52 on the basis of completion of information, and success or nonsuccess of the desegregation effort. A brief guide for interpreting the case profiles and the sources consulted in preparing the profiles and narratives can be found in Appendix E.

Three Success Stories

Exhibits A, B, and C depict the desegregation efforts in Greenville County, South Carolina; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and Pasadena, California. In all three districts the desegregation impetus came from the federal court. In fact, in Oklahoma City the court appointed a "special master" to develop a desegregation plan. The primary desegregation techniques used in the three districts were rezoning along with pairing and clustering. Community reaction in Greenville County as well as in Pasadena seemed to facilitate the desegregation process. The effort in Oklahoma City received less community support. The average decline in the level of segregation for the three districts before and after the major desegregation effort was approximately 50 points (49.8). A brief narrative description of desegregation actions in each of the three districts follows.
Greenville. Following a series of court orders and appeals between the years 1963 and 1970, Greenville County school system was ordered to desegregate in February, 1970. According to then-Governor Robert E. McNair, "the school district had 'run out of courts' and out of time .... We have come to the crossroads where we must choose between defiance and compliance." He counseled compliance.42

The local school board was given the option of accepting a plan formulated by HEW, by the Court, or designing a plan of its own. It chose the latter option. The board plan relied heavily on rezoning of secondary schools, and rezoning and phasing of elementary schools. The ultimate goal of the plan was to achieve an approximate 80/20 white-to-black student ratio in all schools in the district (the percentage minority in the district was 23%).

In 1969, prior to desegregation approximately 20,000 students were bused daily by the district's 201 buses. School officials estimated that desegregation would result in about a 10 percent increase in busing. Despite the end of the dual school system, white student enrollment increased by about 2 percent between 1969 and 1971.

Greenville's desegregation efforts exemplify the difference that leadership can make in the desegregation process. Through the combined efforts of the governor of South Carolina, the mayor of the city, the school superintendent, school board members, the local clergy, the local Chamber of Commerce, and student and parent coalitions, "58,000 students, 2,000 teachers and administrators and 105 schools were peacefully desegregated."43 In short, Greenville's desegregation efforts are a clear success story. In one year school segregation in the district was reduced from 80.3 to a level of 12.2 (based on the index of dissimilarity).
A. SCHOOL DISTRICT: Greenville County, South Carolina (Greenville)

B. DEMOGRAPHICS: Population 248,518 No. of Students 56,688
No. of Schools 96 % Black 23 % Minority 23

C. DESEGREGATION EFFORTS: Following a federal court decision, Greenville desegregated in 1970 under a plan formulated by the school board.

D. PRINCIPAL DESEGREGATION STRATEGIES: While rezoning was employed for both elementary and secondary schools, it was used principally for secondary schools. Elementary schools were primarily paired.

E. BUSING AND WHITE ENROLLMENT CHANGE: Desegregation resulted in an increase of 10 percent in the number of students bused. White school enrollment increased by 1,096 students (2%) between 1969 and 1971.

F. COMMUNITY REACTION: The effort in Greenville was unusual in that the district began to desegregate within two weeks after they were so ordered by the court. The desegregation process advanced quite smoothly. In fact, community residents pitched in and helped move desks, books, etc. in order to facilitate the process.

G. DESEGREGATION OUTCOMES: Greenville was quite successful in its desegregation effort. In 1969, the district had a DI value of 80.3. In 1971, one year after desegregation, the score had fallen to 12.2. Clearly, Greenville is a success story.
Pasadena. On January 20, 1970, federal district court judge Manuel Real ordered the desegregation of the Pasadena school system (Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 1970). According to the Civil Rights Commission, "Prior to the court order, Pasadena operated a neighborhood school system which resulted in highly segregated elementary schools... There was evidence that school attendance zones were redrawn on several occasions to avoid assigning white students to majority black schools."^44

The local school board formulated the desegregation plan, which called for rezoning the district into four racially and ethnically balanced areas. Pairing and clustering of elementary schools was also used. One high school was moved to another area of the district. The plan did require large-scale busing: approximately 60 percent of elementary, 50 percent of junior high, and 27 percent of senior high students were bused.

Between 1969 and 1971 the district experienced about a 22 percent decline in white student enrollment. Despite the white flight, community leaders and the local school board generally supported the desegregation effort. For example, the school board voted 3 to 2 not to appeal the district court's ruling to desegregate. However, an organization known as the Pasadena Appeal Committee (primarily composed of white parents opposed to desegregation) was founded for the purpose of recalling the three school board members who voted against appealing the federal court ruling. The group was unsuccessful, and all three incumbents retained their seats.
A. SCHOOL DISTRICT: Pasadena, CA

B. DEMOGRAPHICS: Population 178,411 No. of Students 27,727
   No. of Schools 39 % Black 36 % Minority 50

C. DESEGREGATION EFFORTS: Pasadena Unified desegregated local schools in 1970 following a decision by a federal district court on a case initiated in 1968. The local school board formulated the plan.

D. PRINCIPAL DESEGREGATION STRATEGIES: The school board's plan used pairing, clustering, and rezoning for elementary schools. Rezoning and the construction of new schools was used for secondary schools. Voluntary enrollment was not employed. The plan also created a ninth grade center for all students in the district.

E. BUSING AND WHITE ENROLLMENT CHANGE: In 1969, approximately 3,882 students rode buses to their respective schools. After implementation of the plan in 1970, school children riding buses increased to about 12,882. White school enrollment in local systems decreased by 3,987 (22%) between 1969 and 1971.

F. COMMUNITY REACTION: No violence and little anti-desegregation behavior was manifested during plan implementation. This may be attributed to the fact that white community leaders seemed to favor desegregation. While there was some opposition on the school board, in general, members were in favor of desegregation.

G. DESEGREGATION OUTCOMES: Pasadena was quite successful in reducing racial isolation. From a DI score of 50.3 in 1969, the district was able to enhance racial balance to a 1971 figure of 10.1.
In sum, the district's plan significantly reduced racial isolation in the district. From a 1969 desegregation index score of 50.3, the level of school segregation was reduced to 10.1 in 1971.

Oklahoma City. Resulting from a suit first filed in 1961 (Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City), Oklahoma City was ordered to desegregate local schools in 1972. The desegregation plan, called the "Finger Plan," was created by a court appointed desegregation consultant. Rezoning of school boundaries was the primary desegregation strategy employed. The federal court also ruled that: "Bus transportation as a means to eliminate segregation may be validly employed." In 1971, approximately 14 percent of the students rode school buses. Following plan implementation about 38 percent of the total student enrollment was bused. White student enrollment figures before and after school desegregation reveal a 24 percent white student loss rate.

Desegregation in Oklahoma City had little white leadership support. The Civil Rights Commission observed that "According to school officials and civil rights leaders, Oklahoma City's political, business, and community leaders have provided little or no leadership on behalf of desegregation. The leadership role fell to the NAACP and the Urban League." Prior to desegregation, all five school board members were white. In 1972, the year of major desegregation efforts, a black was elected to the school board. By 1981, the seven-member board was composed of five whites, one black, and one American Indian.

As measured by the index of dissimilarity, Oklahoma City's desegregation efforts were quite successful. In 1971, almost 67 percent of the white or minority students (or some combination of both) would have
A. SCHOOL DISTRICT: Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

B. DEMOGRAPHICS: Population 319,798  No. of Students 62,550
   No. of Schools 110  % Black 25  % Minority 30

C. DESEGREGATION EFFORTS: The Oklahoma City school system desegregated in 1972 following a court directive of the same year. The plan employed, called the "Finger Plan," was created by a "special master" appointed by the court. In 1977, the court declared Oklahoma City a unified school system.

D. PRINCIPAL DESEGREGATION STRATEGIES: The "Finger Plan" called for the use of only one desegregation technique--re zoning.

E. BUSING AND WHITE ENROLLMENT CHANGE: In 1971, prior to desegregation, about 9,279 students (from a population of 68,840 students) rode buses to school. Following plan implementation, total student enrollment was about 60,674 of which about 23,080 or 38 percent rode buses. Between 1971 and 1973 white school enrollment declined 24 percent.

F. COMMUNITY REACTION: Little or no support of school desegregation was provided by political, business, or community leaders.

G. DESEGREGATION OUTCOMES: Oklahoma City has made significant progress in its efforts to reduce racial isolation. In 1971, the district had a DI score of 66.6. Two years later the DI score for the district was 24.4.
had to change schools in order for every school in the district to mirror districtwide racial percentages. Two years later, the index value had decreased to 24 percent. In 1977, the federal court ruled that district schools were sufficiently desegregated and declared the district a unified school system.

Three Not So Successful Stories

The desegregation experiences of Atlanta, Georgia; Richmond, California; and Tulsa, Oklahoma, are profiled in Exhibits D, E, and F. Two of these three districts desegregated under court order (Richmond voluntarily desegregated). The plan in all three districts, however, contained a voluntary component: Atlanta used majority to minority transfers; Richmond employed voluntary transfers; and Tulsa relied on open enrollment. In general, in all three districts the white community opposed extensive desegregation. The lack of success is best shown by the change in level of school segregation. The three districts experienced an average decline of only 7.4 points as a result of plan implementation. The desegregation experiences of each district are further discussed below.

Atlanta. Following 15 years of litigation federal judge Albert J. Henderson, Jr. finally ordered Atlanta public schools to desegregate in 1973. The desegregation plan, called the "1973 Settlement Plan," represented a compromise between the local school board and the NAACP. Majority to minority transfers, the closing of nine schools and construction of three new schools, pairing, and rezoning were among the desegregation techniques used.
A. SCHOOL DISTRICT: Atlanta, Georgia

B. DEMOGRAPHICS: Population 450,130 No. of Students 97,316

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C. DESEGREGATION EFFORTS: In litigation since an original court order to desegregate in 1958, Atlanta desegregated its school system in 1973. The plan was created as a compromise between the NAACP and Atlanta's Board of Education.

D. PRINCIPAL DESEGREGATION STRATEGIES: Majority/minority transfers, construction of new schools, pairing, and rezoning.

E. BUSING AND WHITE ENROLLMENT CHANGE: Because the Atlanta school system is so predominantly black, the burden of complying with the plan was slightly more heavily borne by the white students. White students who rode buses to school increased about 16 percent, while black student passengers increased by about 10 percent. Overall, busing increased by about 11 percent. One year prior to implementation of the plan (1972), white school enrollment was 21,683. One year after implementation (1974), white school enrollment was 12,884 (41% decrease).

F. COMMUNITY REACTION: Neither the black nor white communities of Atlanta were overwhelmingly in support of the plan. Most felt it was either too much or too little so opposing views cancelled each other out. The school board was closely divided on the plan. A court appointed citizens' group was involved in both formulation and implementation of the plan.

G. DESEGREGATION OUTCOMES: Atlanta's efforts to end school racial isolation have not been very successful. In 1972, the district had a DI score of 80.2. One year after major desegregation efforts the DI score was still a relatively high value of 75.0. By 1976, the DI score maintained a similar high level of segregation--73.2.
A black superintendent was hired as part of the Settlement Plan. Community reaction to the initial prospect of desegregation was not favorable. Nonetheless, led by citizens' groups (black and white) and with the support of the Atlanta Constitution, the desegregation process experienced a peaceful beginning.

Perhaps the major impediment to effective desegregation in Atlanta was the high minority enrollment in the district. The average minority enrollment between 1968 and 1976 was 75 percent. For the 1977-78 academic year the percentage was 88.8 percent. As whites fled the school system (41% decline in white school enrollment between 1972 and 1974) this problem was exacerbated. As measured by the index of dissimilarity in 1976 almost three-fourths (73.2%) of the black or white students would have had to change schools for the racial balance of schools to match that of the district.

Richmond. School desegregation came to Richmond in 1969. In that year a "liberal" school board voted 3 to 2 to adopt a districtwide desegregation plan. Aware that the decision would arouse community controversy, the board first consulted with local legal authorities and secured state court approval of the action in an attempt to employ the court as a means of facilitating and protecting the desegregation decree.

The desegregation order did indeed generate opposition. Only three weeks after the proposed plan was made public, the liberal school board was swept out of office by one of the largest votes in Richmond's history (2/3 of those registered, voted). Moreover, the state courts, rather than proving an ally of desegregation, provided little help in ending racial isolation in the district.
A. SCHOOL DISTRICT: Richmond, CA

B. DEMOGRAPHICS: Population 181,314 No. of Students 39,756

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C. DESEGREGATION EFFORTS: Richmond Unified school district voluntarily desegregated in 1969. The plan was created by the local school board following public hearings on the issue.

D. PRINCIPAL DESEGREGATION STRATEGIES: Voluntary transfers, clustering, and rezoning.

E. BUSING AND WHITE ENROLLMENT CHANGE: Prior to 1969 Richmond did not bus any children to or from school. With desegregation in 1969, 1,100 children rode buses to school for the first time. Between 1968 and 1970, white school enrollment declined by 2,676 students (9% decrease).

F. COMMUNITY REACTION: In the late 1960s, a liberal school board tried to instigate massive school desegregation. The community resisted and the board was voted out of office. A more conservative board emerged and set up a freedom of choice plan coupled with clustering of schools.

G. DESEGREGATION OUTCOMES: In 1968, one year prior to desegregation, and 1970, one year after desegregation, Richmond had DI scores of 50.4 and 44.9.
The newly elected "conservative" school board quickly proposed the "Richmond Integration Plan," which employed open enrollment, clustering of schools, and rezoning as desegregation strategies. The history of school desegregation in Richmond, post-1969, must be characterized as an incremental process. Local community leaders (both black and white), local school officials, and the courts continue to struggle with the process. Richmond's experience reflects the drawbacks often associated with voluntary desegregation that primarily relies on a "freedom of choice" option in school assignment. In 1968, the district's segregation index score was 50.4. Eight years later, only a moderate change had occurred with a score of 39.3.

Tulsa. As mandated by Oklahoma state law, in 1954 Tulsa schools were totally segregated. After the 1954 Brown decision, school desegregation was accomplished in Tulsa only after considerable litigation. Perhaps the first major effort to significantly desegregate schools occurred in 1968 when the attorney general of the United States filed suit against the Tulsa school district for operating, in essence, a dual school system. However, the Civil Rights Commission reported that: "prior to August, 1971, efforts to integrate the school system could truly be described as meager."47

In 1971, a new desegregation plan, which had been negotiated between the Department of Justice and Tulsa public school officials, was approved by federal Judge Fred Daugherty. Under the proposed plan, elementary schools were to be desegregated through the use of majority to minority transfers, pairing and clustering of schools, and the closing of one small school. Rezoning and the construction of a new high school were among the strategies to be employed at the secondary school level.
A. SCHOOL DISTRICT: Tulsa, Oklahoma

B. DEMOGRAPHICS: Population 329,927  No. of Students 72,311
   No. of Schools 108  % Black 15  % Minority 20

C. DESEGREGATION EFFORTS: Desegregation efforts in Tulsa began in 1971 under a federal court order and were completed in 1973. The school board wrote the plan implemented.

D. PRINCIPAL DESEGREGATION STRATEGIES: Elementary schools were desegregated through open enrollment, pairing/clustering of seven schools, and closing one school. At the secondary level, rezoning was employed as the primary strategy. In addition, the plan called for one new school plus one magnet-mandatory school at the junior high level.

E. BUSING AND WHITE ENROLLMENT CHANGE: In 1970, about 7,621 students rode school buses. In the third year of the plan, about 13,817 rode buses for an increase of 6,196 or about 81 percent. The white school enrollment system-wide in 1970 was 64,077. In 1974, the number of white students decreased to 50,462 (21 percent loss).

F. COMMUNITY REACTION: In general, the white community tended to oppose the desegregation plan. After implementation, however, opposition dissipated. In contrast, the black community displayed greater opposition during implementation. While there is some evidence of scattered violence, reaction to the plan was manifested primarily in the form of boycotts and nonviolent demonstrations.

G. DESEGREGATION OUTCOMES: Tulsa appears to have altered only slightly the racial balance of its schools. The DI scores pre- (1970) and post-desegregation (1974) are, respectively, 67.1 and 55.6. In fact, as of 1977 only 21 of 76 elementary, 10 of 21 junior high schools, and 5 of 10 senior high schools were desegregated (10-40% minority).
Tulsa’s experience has been summarized best by the Civil Rights Commission report:

... desegregation in Tulsa is a prologue of fear, suspicion, and distrust. It is a story of confrontation, demonstration, and frustration—but a story climaxed by groups of concerned citizens coming together to hammer out solutions to a problem that has left many communities smouldering in hate and bitterness.48

The initial reaction of the white community toward school desegregation was not favorable. Motivated primarily by the fear of increased busing, an antibusing group was created. Indeed, desegregation resulted in an approximate 81 percent increase in the number of students bused. But the disproportionate share of this busing increase was placed on black students. As a result white opposition dissipated and black opposition intensified during plan implementation.

Tulsa school officials continue to struggle with desegregation. In 1970, the district’s segregation score was 67.1; four years later the score had declined by only 11.5 points (55.6). Part of this nonsuccess record can perhaps be attributed to the 21 percent white student enrollment decline occurring between 1970 and 1974.

Summary

The courts, school officials, and desegregation planners continue to struggle with the difficult task of devising effective, equitable, and enduring desegregation strategies. Unfortunately, a generic strategy is not transferable from one district to the next, for the success of a strategy is contingent upon local environmental stimuli. Nevertheless, research suggests that mandatory student assignment techniques (e.g., rezoning, pairing, clustering, magnet-mandatory) are generally more
effective in reducing racial isolation than are voluntary desegregation techniques (e.g., freedom-of-choice, M to M transfers, magnet-only).

Our study of the desegregation efforts of 52 large school districts also suggests the following propositions:

- The effectiveness of desegregation strategies varies by school level.
- Strategies combining pairing/clustering and rezoning seem to be effective in reducing racial isolation in elementary schools while at the same time minimizing white student withdrawal.
- The rezoning of secondary schools appears to be a popular and effective desegregation strategy.
- Environmental and school district characteristics (e.g., region, percent minority, type of school district, district size) may affect the degree to which various desegregation strategies are effective in ending racial isolation.

With respect to "white flight" and desegregation strategies, the following findings emerged from the study: (1) on the average, elementary schools experienced a 3 percent greater white student loss than did secondary schools during the implementation year of desegregation; (2) districts that "phase in" desegregation plans tended to lose slightly more white students than did districts that implemented plans in a single year; and (3) white flight from central city school districts with high minority enrollments was higher than white student withdrawal from countywide or other types of school districts.

Finally, we would argue that desegregation strategies should not be viewed as ends in themselves; they are only means by which districts may achieve appropriate racial balances. The local environment in which the desegregation effort is to take place also will determine the level of success. For example, the logistics of desegregation (e.g.,
geographical size of district, number of students being bused) and community leadership are important factors to be considered in developing a desegregation plan.
NOTES

CHAPTER 3


4. Ibid., pp. 2-3.


8. Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman, Desegregating America's Schools, p. 54.


13. Ibid., p. 308.

14. Ibid., p. 305

15. Ibid., p. 310; also see Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman, Desegregating America's Schools, p. 19.


17. Ibid.


22. Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman, Desegregating America's Schools, p. 54.


24. Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman, Desegregating America's Schools, p. 54.


26. Wegner and Mercer, "Dynamics of the Desegregation Process." The desegregation action index did not take into account the degree to which each of the six techniques were used, only if they were used or not used.


28. For both levels these techniques represent the primary but not exclusive desegregation strategies used by particular districts. The extensiveness of use was measured by the analyst-reader's interpretation of the case study.

29. The formula for calculating the index of desegregation is:

\[ D = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \frac{T_i (P_i - P)}{2 TP (1-P)} \]

where \( P_i \) = proportion of students in a school who are minority group members;

\( P \) = proportion of the minority population of the total school district population;

\( K \) = total number of schools in district;

\( T_i \) = total population of the ith school; and

\( T \) = total population of the school district.

31. Foster, "Desegregating Urban Schools"; Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman, *Desegregating America's Schools*.


36. Multiple regression is an interval level statistical technique that employs several independent variables (e.g., percent minority, size of school district) to predict or explain a dependent variable (desegregation success). The technique is based on minimizing squared error.


41. Ibid.


44. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Five Communities: Their Search for Equal Education (USCCR Clearinghouse Publication 37, December 1972), p. 4.


48. Ibid., p. 56.
CHAPTER 4
BUSING FOR DESEGREGATION

Busing is perhaps the most controversial issue associated with desegregation. The opponents of busing range from the families of some of the children bused to members of the U.S. Congress, and include persons who are not opposed to other desegregation measures. As television footage from the mid-1970s clearly demonstrated, busing for desegregation arouses volatile emotions in a way few other issues do. And having seen films of burning buses, children hurling rocks at school buses, and picketers chanting hate slogans, it is little wonder that school leaders today become apprehensive when ordered to bus their children.

Despite the enormous antagonism to busing for desegregation, children have been riding school buses for years, of course. In fact, the proportion of public elementary and secondary school children transported at public expense has increased steadily over the past 50 years. In 1930, for example, only 7.4 percent of public school pupils rode public-supported transportation. By 1960, as shown in Figure 5, the amount had increased to 37.6 percent. In 1968, before massive desegregation in the South, the figure had reached 42 percent. By 1972, when most of the southern school desegregation had been completed, the proportion of school children riding public transportation had risen to 46.1 percent. This four-year increase is less than that which took place in the next four years, between 1972 and 1976, when the figure climbed to 52.8 percent.

How should the information in Figure 5 be interpreted? No doubt most of the growth in busing over the past few decades has come as the
FIGURE 5. PERCENTAGE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL PUPILS TRANSPORTED AT PUBLIC EXPENSE

result of two primary developments—school consolidation and the continuing decentralization of urban America. Most genuine school desegregation occurred between 1968 and 1972 when, as mentioned above, there was only a 4 percentage point increase in the amount of busing. Obviously the historical trends suggest that not all of this increase resulted from desegregation. In fact, data from a national survey of school superintendents done by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights shows that desegregation-related busing increases were relatively small.\(^2\) The published report acknowledges that busing data are difficult to obtain and analyze. But information from 229 districts was obtained on the proportion by race bused before and after the year of desegregation between 1966 and 1975. The before busing figure for minorities was 47.1 percent; after desegregation it rose to 55.9 percent, a 9 percentage point increase. For whites, the figures were much smaller. The change went from 50.0 percent to 53.2 percent—a 3 percentage point difference. Thus the overall average increase in busing as a result of school desegregation was only about 5 percentage points. This suggests that a number of students reassigned as part of a desegregation plan were already riding school buses.

Despite such evidence as this, busing for purposes of racial balance remains a favorite target of desegregation opponents. Busing looms as such an emotional issue with many white parents that school officials need as much factual information as possible to explain if not defend any increases that might be necessitated as a result of desegregation. Because of highly specific conditions existing in community, however, it seems advisable to offer a firm set of guidelines regarding how busing
should be handled. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to provide certain background information that helps put the issue in perspective and then consider some cases that might help point out some of the factors that seem to help contribute to greater or lesser success when additional busing must be undertaken. Specifically, we will consider some of the following. How much opposition is there and by whom? What are some of the fears and myths surrounding busing? Are there any stories of busing success? What might we learn from places where busing has not worked well?

Before proceeding, we might briefly comment on the quantitative analysis of busing we undertook using the 52 large districts. We also found such information difficult to obtain and consider it less reliable than most of the other data gathered through the case survey approach. We found that desegregating districts did indeed expand the degree of school-supported public transportation. The average increase was about 10 percentage points. Yet the analysis suggests that the degree of busing is only tangentially related to the amount of desegregation success achieved. That is, reductions in racial isolation are only marginally related to increases in busing when other forces are taken into account. Moreover our analysis of white student enrollment declines ("white flight") suggests that the degree of busing is only tangentially related to the amount of desegregation success achieved. That is, reductions in racial isolation are only marginally related to increases in busing when other forces are taken into account. Moreover our analysis of white student enrollment declines ("white flight") suggests that here too increases in busing have little effect when other influences are
statistically held constant. Frankly, we are not sure what to conclude from this aggregate analysis of busing. Fairly large increases in busing were recorded for many of the 52 districts we studied. Yet these increases alone did not seem to contribute much to lowering the level of school segregation in these various districts. Apparently, as suggested in Chapter 3, desegregation success depends far more on other external events and local conditions than it does on mere increases in busing.

Opposition to Busing

Many people seem to think that the courts order extensive busing when a school system is desegregated. This is not strictly true. Courts rarely mandate busing per se as part of a desegregation plan. However, busing is frequently required in order to implement other features of a court order aimed at school desegregation. As politicians and the press frequently point out, busing for racial balance is most strongly opposed by whites. A 1980 Gallup poll shows that 78 percent of the whites surveyed "oppose busing children to achieve a better racial balance in the schools." Among the blacks surveyed, only 31 percent are opposed. These figures reflect a slight increase in opposition among both groups from previous years. In 1974, for example, 72 percent of white respondents were negative toward busing for desegregation, while only 25 percent of nonwhites were opposed.

Many elected officials are likewise hostile to busing. New legislation aimed at limiting busing, or prohibiting it altogether, is introduced in Congress each year, and a constitutional amendment to that end has also been introduced. Several of these restrictive measures have found their way into law. The Eagleton-Biden amendment, attached
to the FY 1980 Labor-HEW Appropriation Act, continues a stipulation begun in 1978. This amendment states that federal funds may not be used to force any school to bus students or to assign them to particular schools over their parents' objections. According to a recent report by the Civil Rights Commission, this restriction has severely limited federal desegregation enforcement.\(^5\)

Faced with antagonistic patrons and hostile politicians, the local official may find the already difficult task of desegregation becoming even harder. No one wants to increase busing unnecessarily, not for any purpose. Yet because of pervasive residential segregation, efforts that seriously address the issue of racial balance may inevitably be confronted with the prospect of pupil reassignment and additional transportation requirements. Unfortunately, no magic formula exists by which communities might completely avoid conflicts over busing. Armed with the best information possible, however, local officials can help to reduce the severity of these conflicts. As Gary Orfield points out in his book *Must We Bus?*, the more accurate a citizen's information, the less likely he or she is to be opposed to busing.\(^6\)

**Some Myths and Fears Surrounding Busing**

When busing is mentioned in connection with school desegregation, there typically arise a variety of anxieties and misgivings. Careful research has shown that most of these anxieties are unfounded, and are based on misconceptions. A few of the misconceptions or myths surrounding busing are:\(^7\)
A child has the right to attend a "neighborhood school."

Busing puts a child who is injured or becomes ill at school beyond the reach of his or her parents.

School buses aren't safe.

Fights and racial clashes occur on buses and in desegregated schools.

Busing forces children to spend long hours away from home, thereby reducing time for play and study.

Busing is too expensive.

Busing money would be better spent on educational programs.

Busing prevents students from taking part in extracurricular activities.

Busing carries children into dangerous neighborhoods where drugs and violent crime are commonplace.

Busing penalizes white students by holding them back until minority pupils "catch up."

In order to make clear that these are misconceptions, let us examine each statement in turn:

A child has the right to attend a "neighborhood school"—Children have not in fact been conferred the right to choose their schools. That choice is up to the Board of Education as it decides where boundary lines are drawn, new schools constructed, and old ones closed down. For years prior to desegregation, students were assigned to schools outside their own neighborhoods for reasons ranging from consolidation of schools and overcrowding to random luck. And while parents have always had the option of moving into the boundaries of a particular school, even this did not ensure that their children would be allowed to attend that school.

Busing puts a child who is injured or becomes ill at school beyond the reach of his or her parents—As the Civil Rights Commission notes, this consideration has never been of great concern to parents with
children in consolidated schools, nor to parents in rural areas. One point to consider is that in many families today, both parents work, so that easy access to even a neighborhood school may be nonexistent for them, especially if their jobs take them to other parts of town. Most (if not all) schools employ full-time nurses or other medical professionals to handle school emergencies. And should the child require emergency transportation, it might well be the case that time is saved by having the school transport the child in its own vehicles to home or hospital.

School buses aren't safe—The safety of school buses is a concern shared by all parents with children being transported. A study done over six years by the Pennsylvania Department of Education concluded that bus riding is considerably safer than walking. Only one accident for every 898 students riding school buses was reported, while one out of every 280 students walking to school was involved in a reported accident. Also, in 1972, the National Safety Council's statistics showed that while there are 2.4 fatalities per 100 million miles of travel in private automobiles and .29 in airplanes, the figure for school buses is .06.

Fights and racial clashes occur on buses and in desegregated schools—The idea that fights will occur on buses and in desegregated schools seems to overlook the fact that fights break out in schools for reasons other than race. As the Civil Rights Commission puts it: "Scuffling, bullying, and other childish behavior have always been a part of growing up and always will be." This is not to deny that racially motivated incidents can occur in schools. But one should bear in mind that a fight between a black and a white is not necessarily a fight over racial identity.
Busing forces children to spend long hours away from home, thereby reducing time for play and study—As the Civil Rights Commission points out, many children ride buses to distant schools for reasons unrelated to desegregation:

New Mexico has two bus routes measuring 74 miles one way and three others about 70 miles in each direction—none having any connection with desegregation. A bus route in the Needles, California area stretches 65 miles one way and the pupils spend about 3 hours a day on the bus.8

Interestingly, no one has ever made a major issue of the long rides these children encounter.

Clark County, Nevada, is perhaps the largest district in land area to desegregate. The county district covers 8,000 square miles—an area as large as Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Delaware combined—and includes more than 72,000 students. When Clark County desegregated, "six thousand additional children were bused, but 'the average distance and time of ride for most students was and remains 11 miles and 30 minutes.'"9

Busing is too expensive—This statement seems to ring true. However, in Must We Bus?, Orfield states that most of the blacks and whites he studied thought busing expenses to be over ten times the actual local cost: "Although the cost was usually about 2 percent or less of a school system's budget, six people in seven polled in 1972 thought it was at least 25 percent."10 The major financial impact of busing is usually in the first year of desegregation, when the district must purchase additional buses and replace old ones. Even then, however, busing costs remain a very small portion of a school's total funds. When Jackson, Mississippi, desegregated, the total cost of student
transportation was only 1.8 percent of their budget; Nashville's metropolitan plan required only 3.8 percent of the district's operating expenditures; in Raleigh, busing costs were only 1.7 percent of the budget; when Charlotte desegregated its 400 square-mile district, busing expenditures required only 1.6 percent of the budget; and finally in metropolitan Tampa, busing costs rose only .35 percent, from 1.35 to 1.7 percent.  

**Busing money would be better spent on educational programs**—Berkeley, California, is an interesting counterexample to this claim. Prior to voluntarily desegregating, Berkeley established compensatory education programs in minority schools, but these had little apparent effect on the "educational gap" between minorities and whites. Berkeley proceeded to desegregate its schools and used buses to facilitate reassignment. Subsequent research indicated advanced achievement by all students. In this case, busing clearly contributed to measurably improving educational performance.

**Busing prevents students from taking part in extracurricular activities**—Students have ridden buses for years without sacrificing extracurricular activities. Moreover, many districts undergoing desegregation offer "activity" buses which leave school late so that students can participate in sports and other activities. This is not to say that there may not be some difficulties in arranging such buses, but with competent planning, such difficulties can be kept to a minimum.

**Busing carries students into dangerous neighborhoods where drugs and violent crimes are commonplace**—This is a major concern to all parents. However, it does not constitute an argument against busing.
While suburban schools used to be relatively free of crime and drugs, they are now facing many of the problems found in urban areas. No child, minority or non-minority, should have to risk his or her personal safety to go to school, whether by bus or on foot. If a school is in a dangerous area, and the city cannot protect its students, the school should be closed and the students transferred. Busing should not be an issue in this case, only the safety of all children.

Busing penalizes white students by holding them back until minority pupils "catch up"—Many opponents to busing for desegregation feel that white students are penalized scholastically in this way. However, Orfield points out in his book that most researchers, regardless of their scholarly or ideological orientation agree that desegregation itself has "little if any effect on the educational success of white students, as measured by achievement test scores." In 1973, a study was made of 555 newly desegregated southern school districts. The findings indicated that busing had no negative consequences on achievement and, in fact, found "no evidence that attending one's own neighborhood school has any effects, positive or negative, on a school's achievement level."

Some Factors Associated With Success and Failure

Perhaps at this point it would be informative to present a few concrete examples of cities in which busing plans either succeeded or failed. Our goal is to isolate those factors that seem to contribute to successful busing, and those that seem to hinder it.
Unsuccessful Busing

Boston, Massachusetts. Boston is a city of ethnic groups. Many of its families have lived close to one another for generations, and have developed a strong neighborhood identity. The violence at South Boston High in 1974 has been attributed in some measure to this ethnic identity.

In From Brown to Bakke, Harvie J. Wilkinson sees the clash as having been ignited by both real and imagined cultural differences. South Boston residents, called "Southies," have patriarchal families and are members of trade unions and the Catholic church. They regarded the blacks as representing matriarchal families, crime, drug abuse, idleness, and uncertain male roles. The differences in speech and dress reinforced their impression that black society was radically different from their own. According to Wilkinson, it was the friction between these differences and the Southies' strong neighborhood identity that led to the racial violence. In short, the Southies perceived the blacks as a threat to their neighborhoods--one that had to be warded off.

Wilkinson's analysis is consistent with Ernest H. Buell, Jr.'s. In his article "Busing and the Defended Neighborhood," Buell contends that Boston's Southie neighborhood had all the characteristics of what he calls a "defended" neighborhood. Four general relationships form this basis of a defended neighborhood:

1. shared perceptions of a common plight by area residents;
2. shared feelings of safety and community;
3. the presence of other supportive networks for interaction by which residents are bonded together;
4. willingness of at least some residents to use coercion to ward off threats from outside.
Buell analyzes the response to busing in South Boston in light of these relationships. The people of South Boston are clannish, devoutly Catholic, and politically involved. When busing came to their high school, most of the Southies saw it as an intrusion, and as an infringement of rights they had enjoyed for decades. Their retaliation was vigorous:

Throughout the neighborhood, residents painted, chalked and sprayed anti-busing slogans and racial epithets on hundreds of lamp posts, building sites, walls, sidewalks, streets, intersections, benches and street signs. In the heyday of protest, hundreds of residents took part in the seemingly endless round of marches, motorcades, rallies, boycotts, pray-ins, and other demonstrations.

San Francisco, California. San Francisco had done virtually no busing of students before desegregation. When ordered to desegregate, they proceeded to reassign only elementary school students. The percentage of students bused increased from approximately 0.05 percent to about 22 percent. The attrition rate of white children in the city's elementary schools was about 32 percent from 1970 to 1972, which seems a particularly high figure when one considers that white loss overall between 1968 and 1976 was 52 percent. This could be interpreted as indicating that parents do not want their younger children bused. However, it should also be pointed out that the school board reacted to the desegregation order with more concern for racial numbers than for developing an effective and efficient plan.

Memphis, Tennessee. Memphis' school board was in general opposed to desegregation, and approached the task of formulating a busing plan without enthusiasm. The students were likewise unenthusiastic; 40 percent of them (mostly whites) staged a two-day boycott. The lack of
violent confrontations was attributed to the strong support the plan received from the local chamber of commerce. Although peacefully implemented, however, the plan was hardly a success. Memphis had had no school buses before desegregation, and was ordered by the court to purchase 60 buses. Nevertheless, the number of students transported to school by alternative means increased radically. Before the court order, about 8,697 students rode public transit buses to school. In 1973, the year of implementation, this figure more than tripled: 27,171 students rode public buses to their schools. Between 1971 and 1974, Memphis lost about 50 percent of all its white students.

Pontiac, Michigan. School desegregation in Pontiac was undertaken in the wake of a series of incidents that had polarized the white and black community. Prior to court intervention in 1970, the school board adhered explicitly to a neighborhood school concept as the basis for pupil assignment. In 1967-68, nearly two-thirds of black children attended schools in which more than 60 percent of the enrollment was black. Although recommendations for desegregating the school system had been made by the state of Michigan Civil Rights Commission in 1968, no significant changes took place until the Pontiac NAACP filed suit in 1969.

At the time the suit was filed racial tensions had developed in the community primarily over the location of a new high school. Racial unrest grew as race relations training was instituted in the school system and dissension erupted over the efforts to appoint a black assistant school superintendent. A teacher's boycott, patron picketing, and student disruptions took place as the controversy grew. All this happened, remember, before the court handed down its desegregation decision.
In February of 1970, the district court found the school district of Pontiac guilty of de jure segregation. The judge ruled that school officials for some years had manipulated boundaries to assure segregated schools. An extensive desegregation plan was ordered by the court requiring the busing of 9,000 students, two-thirds of which were white. Prior to this time, only about 3,000 Pontiac students had ridden buses. The plan was implemented in the fall of 1971. Finally accepting the inevitable, a widespread campaign to inform the public was begun by the school administration. But perhaps it was too late.

Prior to the fall opening of school, an antibusing organization was formed under the leadership of a small group of militantly segregationist white mothers. An antibusing rally was held in Pontiac featuring George Wallace, who expressed his support for the busing opposition. Violence soon followed. Ten buses were dynamited and burned, picketers yelled racial epitaphs at black children, rocks were thrown, and at one elementary school law enforcement officials had to escort black students to their classes. In October of 1971, Senator Robert Griffen, Michigan Republican, pushed for a constitutional amendment banning "forced busing," stating that the Pontiac busing program was "counterproductive" and was producing "bitterness and polarization." Some Detroit suburban congressmen also joined the antibusing effort.

Little assistance for the desegregation effort was forthcoming from the community's business and labor leadership. Neither General Motors, the area's largest employer, nor the United Automobile Workers took a stand. Perhaps if these two major community organizations had helped to inform and calm the citizens, desegregation might have been less
tumultuous. As William Serrin, a reporter for the Detroit Free Press, points out, the Pontiac busing program was not massive (about 37 percent of the students were transported). He concludes that large-scale violence failed to materialize because of the efforts of the majority of the parents and students as well as the Parent-Teachers Association. Had other community leadership groups joined the effort the Pontiac story might have been different.

Successful Busing

Hillsborough County, Florida. Hillsborough County schools were desegregated in 1971 by rezoning and pairing. All grades in all schools were involved. Since the school district is countywide, busing preceded desegregation in Hillsborough, with about 32 percent of the county's students riding school buses prior to 1971. Following desegregation, that figure increased 52 percent. Busing caused no "white flight"; in fact, white enrollment actually increased by 2,434 students.

Omaha, Nebraska. Omaha’s desegregation plan called for the pairing and clustering of its elementary and junior high schools. After the plan was put into effect, there was a 12 percent decline in white enrollment. However, this seems to have been the full extent of community opposition to desegregation and busing. Many attribute Omaha’s success in smoothly implementing its plan to the coalition the court-appointed committee formed with a local religious organization. Calling themselves the Concerned Citizens for Omaha (CCFO), this coalition divided itself into ten groups, each representing a different segment of the community (e.g., business, labor, and human service agencies). These groups,
directed by strong leadership, worked hard to win community support for school desegregation in Omaha.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina. Efforts to end racial isolation in this community's schools resulted in the famous 1971 Supreme Court case (Swann v. Mecklenburg), which explicitly endorses busing as a tool for school desegregation. But busing did not come easy to Charlotte. Following the U.S. District Court order in 1969, groups of all sizes, from the Jaycees to the Classroom Teachers Association, came out against busing. Ministers denounced busing from the pulpit, and the Charlotte News condemned the district judge responsible for the order. Vocal opposition was also expressed by the school board chairman, whose intransigence was primarily responsible for the system's inability to comply with the court order or to draw up its own workable desegregation plan (ultimately a plan was prepared by a court-ordered expert). Finally, an antibusing organization, the Concerned Parents Association (CPA), eventually accumulated 80,000 signatures on antibusing petitions. All this, of course, was to no avail.

Busing was not new to the Charlotte area and, in fact, had been used extensively prior to desegregation: over 23,000 students rode buses before 1971. The Swann case doubled the number being bused. Yet following the Supreme Court ruling, a planned CPA boycott fell short of predictions, and over the next several months "obstinancy mellowed into resignation." Although disturbances have erupted at most of Charlotte's junior and senior high schools, no widespread violence has accompanied desegregation. In school board elections following the Supreme Court decision, outspoken antibusing candidates fared poorly. A poll in 1972...
revealed that only 35 percent of Charlotte adults cited busing as the feature of the schools that most bothered them.

According to newspaper reporter Frank Barrows, the results of the first two and a half years of busing in Mecklenburg County are difficult to assess. School administrators from other cities facing extensive desegregation have come to Charlotte seeking to use it as a primer. Yet, it would be incorrect to think that total desegregation has been fully accepted in the community. School administrators acknowledge that busing is working slightly better than its opponents feared, not quite as well as its supporters hoped, and considering all the initial furor, probably as smoothly as could be expected.

Why busing has seemingly worked better in Charlotte than in some places is not clear. Barrow stresses the community's pride in its educational system as one factor. At one point following the court order lapel buttons proclaiming "Education Is the Important Thing" popped up across the city. In addition, the desegregation plan was created in such a way that a pupil can tell from the first day of school where he or she will attend classes in any given year. Four thousand parents are actively involved as teacher's aides, as well. As more classes have grown accustomed to busing and desegregation, the system has gained stability. Some dropoff in white enrollment took place in the initial year of desegregation, but white flight has not continued at a significant level.

Conclusions

From the above sampling of school districts in which busing was implemented, few general points emerge that may be of use to officials devising busing plans or putting them into effect.
It was stated earlier that many of the fears associated with busing for desegregation are based on certain misconceptions or myths. It should be noted that many of these myths are directed at busing in general, and are not peculiar to busing for desegregation purposes (for example, the myths that buses aren't safe, that they are too expensive, and that busing reduces time for play and study). If the theory that much of the opposition to busing for desegregation is based on such myths is correct, it stands to reason that there should be less opposition in areas where fewer of these myths are operative; that is, in school districts in which residents were accustomed to extensive busing prior to desegregation. The above analyses seem to bear this out. In both Hillsborough County and Charlotte-Mecklenburg—areas in which extensive busing had always been common—busing for desegregation purposes was a success. On the other hand, when massive busing was introduced into districts in which there had been virtually no prior busing (as was the case in Memphis and San Francisco), white flight and violence occurred.

The particulars of the busing order seem also to affect how it is received. For example, in Richmond, where two white suburbs were excluded from the court order, there was massive white flight to the schools in these suburbs. "Break-up busing" seems also to contribute to failure, as it makes it especially difficult for students to establish strong ties to a school. Further, two-way busing, in which both whites and minorities are transported, seems to be more effective in the long run than busing minorities exclusively. One-way busing leaves whites uninvolved, and tends to perpetuate the misconception that
desegregation is a minority problem. Experts favor two-way busing because it is more equitable—minorities and whites share the burden of sending their children to schools outside their neighborhoods. Not surprisingly, minority communities react more favorably to two-way busing. Planners prefer it because it offers them more options for reducing racial isolation. There are a number of compelling reasons, then, to bus whites as well as minorities. However, it should be pointed out that two-way busing appears to lead to greater white flight than one-way busing, especially when the elementary grades are involved.

But on the positive side, mandatory two-way busing plans have achieved substantial reductions of racial isolation all over the country—even in areas where white flight has taken its toll.

Leadership would appear to be a major factor in determining whether a busing plan will or will not succeed. The Concerned Citizens for Omaha admirably demonstrates the effectiveness of committed individuals in ensuring a plan's success. In Hillsborough County, the support of the school superintendent was crucial in overcoming obstacles to the district's plan, and in Minneapolis, the strong leadership of the superintendent and the local media kept difficulties in check. (For a more detailed examination of the importance of strong leadership, see the next chapter.)

While certain factors in successful busing for desegregation (such as whether or not prior busing was used) are outside the control of local officials, it should be clear at this point that most factors are well within their control. Trouble can be bypassed at the outset if officials make a concerted effort to keep the busing plan itself as
efficient and convenient as possible. As one desegregation expert
suggests:

If busing is required, the transportation system should be
well managed: buses should operate on time, routes should
be efficiently planned, adequate but not excessive discipline
should be enforced, seating should be comfortable, transpor-
tation should be available for activities after school hours
and for emergencies.²³

The administration might consider publishing in the local newspapers,
several days before school starts, the names of the children, which
routes they will be on, times of pick up and delivery, bus numbers, etc.
Also, activity buses might be provided so that students can stay after
school for extracurricular activity.

The importance of understanding one's community and keeping the lines
of communication open cannot be too strongly emphasized. No two school
districts are exactly alike, so each requires a strategy appropriate
to its unique circumstances. If the community to be desegregated is
found to be a defended neighborhood, perhaps an intensive campaign for
desegregation should be used there. If a community has never bused
its school children before, the administration might hold public meetings
to dispel unwarranted fears. Meetings of this sort would not only
provide the leadership with an opportunity to explain to the residents
the need for buses, but to familiarize them with the practical
aspects of the plan—how students will be assigned to buses, the different
routes that will be followed, and so on.

Due to parental opposition, most desegregation plans omit kinder-
garten students. Some also exclude elementary grades. While such
omissions tend to keep parents happier, and to reduce white flight,
they are difficult to justify ideologically. Empirical research has
shown that young children's racial attitudes are not nearly so clear and stereotypic as those of older children—and hence are not nearly so resistant to change. However, it should be understood that opposition to busing younger children can be particularly fierce, and may well call for special measures. School officials might consider holding meetings with parents at the new schools, or arranging for them to attend classes. Also, officials might have monitors ride the buses to ensure that small children are not intimidated by older ones.

Finally, we might note that while busing may never win community popularity contests, evidence does show that local opposition may fade considerably over time. For example, in 1981 a celebration was held in Charlotte to honor the district judge who made the initial decision in the Swann case and the NAACP attorney who represented the plaintiffs. According to the Charlotte Observer, more than 300 citizens representing an impressive cross-section of Charlotte-Mecklenburg turned out for the event, and the school board canceled its meeting to attend the dinner celebration. The paper noted in retrospect:

Prior to busing, Charlotte was much more segregated than it is now. Not only were its schools identifiably white or black, but the community itself was divided along racial lines... Through the use of busing, schools are no longer black or white, but are simply schools... The center city and its environs are a healthy mixture of black and white neighborhoods. In fact, there is reason to believe school desegregation has encouraged neighborhood desegregation to a degree that allows a reduction in busing.

Perhaps there is a silver lining in every cloud.
NOTES

CHAPTER 4

1. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 1970, p. 120.


4. Gallup Opinion Index, no. 113, November 1974, p. 4. The racial category for this survey includes only white/nonwhite. For 1970, blacks constituted about 89 percent of all nonwhites.


7. This discussion of the misconceptions about busing, unless otherwise indicated, is taken from U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Your Child and Busing (Washington, D.C., May 1972).

8. Ibid., p. 5.


10. Ibid., p. 114.

11. Ibid., pp. 131-132.

12. Ibid., p. 124.

13. Ibid., p. 120.


16. Ibid., pp. 177-178.

106


21. Ibid., p. 216.


CHAPTER 5
LEADERSHIP AND DESEGREGATION

The need for effective political leadership is not confined to communities undergoing school desegregation. One hears the cry for better leadership at all levels of government. But when school desegregation is in the offing, the strength and quality of political leadership is especially critical; it can spell the difference between genuine success and a protracted, agonizing process that satisfies no one. This assertion is not based on idle speculation. Ample evidence from communities around the country, from Boston to Hillsborough County, Florida, testifies to the power leadership holds in determining the future of school desegregation.

Leadership can come from various sources. The obvious group to look to first is the school board and the superintendent, since it is they who bear the official responsibility for developing a satisfactory plan to end racial isolation in the public schools and for seeing that such a plan is carried out as efficiently and peacefully as possible. Strong, positive leadership from these officials enhances a desegregation plan's chances for success considerably. When, for example, the school board and superintendent not only urge compliance with the court order, but espouse cogent and compelling reasons for acting affirmatively, resistance and protest are minimized. Evidence of this leader-follower relationship appeared in an early analysis of 91 northern cities, and abundant confirmation can be found in case studies and aggregate research.
Others in the community can help, too. The media, for example, can be a vital influence. Their role in providing timely and accurate information, and their treatment of potentially inflammatory incidents can have a significant effect on the public's perceptions of and reaction to the desegregation process. Further, religious groups and civic organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce and the League of Women Voters may play a strong supporting role in paving the way to an effective desegregation effort. Finally, action by the state government may prove helpful in assuring success. After all, local school boards are legally creatures of the state and as such are substantially affected by legislation, policy, and leadership emanating from it.

This chapter will begin by discussing the leadership role of the board and superintendent. Then we will consider the role of the media, the need that may arise for an official group to monitor desegregation, the place of other community organizations, and the responsibilities and actions of the state government.

Civic and School Leadership

School board members are usually elected at large, so that they represent the constituency that controls the largest number of votes. In most cities this means they represent white voters. And because whites are generally perceived to be against busing if not school desegregation itself, school boards may attempt to resist a desegregation order in hopes of preserving the status quo and the dominant group in power. Frequently, this resistance takes the form of legal appeals, many of them mounted for extended periods of time and at a
great deal of expense. Sometimes these appeals do result in postponing implementation of the desegregation order. However, it is almost never the case that an appeal succeeds in reversing a desegregation order.

Extensive research shows that if school and civil officials take positive steps to implement a desegregation plan, disruption and conflict are less likely to occur. The Commission on Civil Rights recently completed a survey of 532 school superintendents whose districts had desegregated. No serious disruptions related to school desegregation had occurred in 411 of these districts. The Commission found that in 65 percent of these successful districts, business leaders were either supportive or neutral on the issue of school desegregation. Political and religious leaders were supportive or neutral in 67 and 86 percent of these districts, respectively. On the other hand, business, political, and religious leaders were supportive or neutral in only 27, 30, and 66 percent of 95 districts reporting serious disruptions. The Commission concluded: "Where civic leaders publicly oppose desegregation . . . they provide sanction to its opponents, who believe they have been given license to disobey the law and disrupt the community . . . ."3

Here we should note that school boards seem to be learning the value of a positive approach to desegregation. According to a 1976 survey of school superintendents, the attitude of boards shifted considerably between the mid-sixties and the mid-seventies. In 1966, only 47 percent of the boards manifested support for desegregation. By 1975, that figure had reached 75 percent. Of the other 25 percent,
only 7 percent of the boards were opposed, while 18 percent remained neutral.

Examples of Positive Leadership

In Omaha, the school board (although it appealed the original court order to the Supreme Court) emphasized that the desegregation order was the law and as such must be obeyed. As the board president put it: "We are a nation of laws, a society of laws, and the board is one of the laws." Similarly, the mayor of Omaha was quite clear in stating his expectation that the law would be obeyed. Primarily as a result of the strong positive position taken by the board and community leaders, Omaha experienced minimal amount of resistance to desegregation.

Another example of the effects of affirmative leadership comes from Hillsborough County, Florida. There the superintendent, in anticipation of the court order, began preparations for a desegregation plan. The school board then elected not to appeal the court's decision but rather to make every effort to achieve peaceful and successful desegregation. The board created a 156-member task force representing various segments of the community to facilitate citizen involvement in the desegregation effort. Although local officials in Tampa and Hillsborough County took a neutral position, they refrained from making desegregation a political football, and did not impede the efforts of school officials to make the plan work. So largely as a direct result of this kind of leadership, desegregation in Hillsborough County was implemented without disruption or violence.
The Consequences of Negative Leadership

Negative leadership can sometimes be worse than none at all. In districts where the leaders hint that violence will be tolerated, violence may well occur. As Greenblatt and Willie explain:

When public officials speak out against court order to desegregate the public schools, they stimulate resistance by the public at large which may get out of hand and become violent. Judicial appeals of court orders to desegregate by public officials sometimes are taken as a sign that resistance by any means will be tolerated.6

A prime example of the results of this sort of leadership (or the lack of affirmative leadership) can be found in Mobile.7

In response to desegregation efforts in Mobile and other Alabama cities, the governor successfully urged the state legislature in 1956 to enact massive resistance laws. Encouraged by the position of state leaders, the Ku Klux Klan embarked on a "campaign of terror" against any who sought to desegregate Mobile. During the 1960s, the Mobile school board sought delay after delay. Taking its cue from the school board, the White Citizens Council instigated violent incidents particularly aimed at a prestigious all-white high school.

By the late sixties various limited desegregation plans had been tried without much success. Then in 1970 a final decision of the Fifth Circuit Court ordered a modified version of a Department of Justice plan to be implemented. The community continued to resist. In September of 1970 Governor George Wallace appeared at a local rally, along with other political leaders, to urge continued defiance of federal court desegregation orders. A new anti-desegregation umbrella organization, the Concerned Parents and Citizens of Mobile County, passed out fliers urging parents to demand that their children be placed in schools of
their own choosing. Because of the refusal of a number of nonconformers to attend their assigned schools, the projected desegregation did not occur. In the words of Albert Foley, Director of the Human Relations Center in Mobile, "This defiance indicated not only the extent of the intransigence of the parents but also the powerlessness of the school board to enforce its orders." School authorities had also refused to expand the bus transportation system necessary to fully implement the plan.

Finally, in April of 1971 the Supreme Court issued a final ruling in the Mobile desegregation case. In the meantime a new chairman of the school board had been elected. He and a new school superintendent decided that further delays and resistance would not be productive. In negotiation with NAACP representatives and black community groups, the Mobile School Board finally came forth with a "voluntary" plan that was submitted to and adopted by the district court. In Foley's words, "This would be the first school year in which the school board had abandoned its resistance to desegregation and had committed itself to a plan that would promise realistically to work now to achieve a unitary system . . . ."

Prior to the opening of school in the fall of 1971, school authorities launched a widespread public relations effort to communicate the plan to all segments of the community. A number of speeches were made by the superintendent, and conferences were held with local elected officials and various community groups. School began in September without the violence that had marked previous years. Foley gives considerable credit to the Mobile League of Women Voters for their
active campaign to make desegregation work. Also of importance was an intensive mass media campaign conducted by a nonprofit organization called Mobile Committee for the Support of Public Education.

In sum, Mobile represents a dramatic case of the importance of community leadership for successful desegregation. At the outset and for some years thereafter local school officials refused to act affirmatively for various reasons. They were intimidated by extremist groups; they would have been in violation of state laws requiring resistance; and in all likelihood their own views were not sympathetic with the basic objective of school desegregation. After a period of lengthy conflict marked by sporadic violence, when all legal remedies had been exhausted, school authorities gave in. With their now strong positive support, peaceful desegregation came to Mobile.

Leadership Guidance for School Leaders

There is widespread agreement that the nature of the leadership provided by the board and superintendent is according to the Civil Rights Commission, "...a critical factor for acceptance and peaceful implementation of desegregation." But how should that leadership be exercised? A few points seem to be agreed upon by those who have studied this process.

- The board and superintendent should act quickly to seize the initiative. If they fail to do so their inaction could create a vacuum regarding what the schools will do, and local groups and citizens with strong feelings for and against desegregation might try to fill that vacuum. Since such groups lack official decision-making authority, the
result is not a resolution of the issue but a heightening of uncertainty, tension, and conflict, which could in turn lead to disruption and violence. As social scientists Al Smith, Anthony Downs, and Leanne Lachman put it: "The faster local school authorities take positive action... and the more unwavering their support for accomplishing desegregation effectively, the less the chances that anti-desegregation forces within the community will succeed in rallying enough support to create significant disruptions." 9

Before and during the first year of desegregation, school officials should establish community relations as their top priority. Obtaining community acceptance is critical to creating a climate within which the educational function can proceed without undue tensions and disruptions. 10

The nature of communication with the public should vary depending on whether desegregation is voluntary or involuntary and on the degree of opposition within the community. According to Smith, Downs, and Lachman: 11 (a) where desegregation is voluntary, a long participatory "dialogue" involving all relevant community groups is desirable; (b) if, on the other hand, desegregation is court ordered and intense feelings divide the community, school authorities should probably limit initial communication to small groups of key leaders. These might include the mayor, newspaper publishers, major business leaders,
civil rights leaders, and other "influentials" who would not be expected to denounce school officials for their actions. This strategy, however, requires switching to an intense, widespread communications effort just prior to plan implementation to reduce initial anxiety and uncertainty; (c) where the court orders desegregation and community feelings are not strong, school authorities should, according to these authors, carry out a much broader initial communications campaign.

School officials, in presenting their views to the public, should emphasize educational programs that will be available as a result of desegregation. Often court orders or even board-initiated plans create opportunities for introducing educational innovations. Stressing such positive features helps alleviate the anxiety or discontent sometimes felt by the white community because they have been found "guilty" of segregation.

Although both formal and informal means of contacting the public should be employed, major emphasis should be on creating effective informal channels. These might include small meetings in the homes of parents; visits by teachers and administrators to homes and club meetings; "rumor centers" staffed by volunteers; and informal counselling with parents and students. Active participation in such informal communications by the superintendent and school principals is vital to their success.
School authorities should emphasize certain key words and symbols in soliciting community support. Appeals stressing lawful conduct seem to be effective. According to Greenblatt and Willie, "Evidently the appeal for law and order strikes a set of values more deeply ingrained in the public than those values that reject racial desegregation." 13

The Role of the Media

The press and television media should be considered important elements of community leadership. These media sometimes exert enormous influence on how the public views a controversial issue, and school desegregation is no exception. As the Civil Rights Commission points out, media coverage of school desegregation has "an enormous impact on local and national opinions and perceptions."14 Much of the time this impact is negative. Newspaper and television reporters tend to emphasize the more dramatic responses to school desegregation, which all too often are demonstrations, protests, and conflicts. Such coverage is likely to be counterproductive, causing further parental opposition and white flight. On the other hand, a study by Christine Rossell has shown that positive media coverage sometimes lessens white flight.15 Thus it may be essential to the success of a desegregation plan that school authorities work closely with the media to assure balanced treatment.

In communities in which close contact was maintained, results have been positive. In Denver, for example, the court-appointed monitoring committee met with media executives to ask their cooperation in presenting the positive side of desegregation. A committee member
later assessed the result of this meeting: "... I think that both of the newspapers have, in general, done a good job of this... They have reported the facts, they have traced down rumors before putting them on the front page." In Charlotte, the superintendent reported that progress there could not have been made without the cooperation of supportive media—both the print and electronic media. In that city, live TV coverage was provided for discussion of the desegregation plan. Hawley, et al. report other examples of cooperation on the part of the media:

In Louisville, 'self-censorship' agreements were worked out with local newspapers. In Columbus, a citizen's group worked closely with the schools and media to provide reporters with information and news sources.

In brief, because the media could provide such a vital source of information on events surrounding desegregation, every effort should be made to supply newspapers and television with favorable stories on desegregation and evidence of positive school performance. Obviously, school authorities cannot control what the news media report, but close contacts with them may be crucial in making the positive effects of school desegregation known to the general public.

**Monitoring Agencies**

If a community is under court order, the court may appoint a monitoring commission to supervise implementation of the desegregation plan. Such commissions are usually charged with overseeing, analyzing, and evaluating a school's compliance with the court order, and ordinarily report implementation progress directly to the presiding judge. As an independent agency, they also provide the court with valuable
information as to the public's perception of and cooperation with the desegregation plan. Monitoring commissions usually exist for only a short time. Some disband after a year; others continue until the court declares a unitary system to exist.

In his book *The Sociology of Urban Education*, Charles V. Willie argues that monitoring commissions are sometimes necessary in order to keep school boards honest in their implementation of desegregation plans. Willie contends that one cannot expect a school board that has fought against desegregation to openly and honestly implement a court-imposed plan. "In most instances, school boards are defendants in court cases." Moreover, many school desegregation plans, at least initially, were created not by educators but by lawyers and local office holders. Their purpose oftentimes was to prevent or at least minimize systemwide desegregation. In such cases, a group that does not wish to abide by the law, according to Willie, could hardly be expected to formulate a good desegregation plan and implement it in good faith, unassisted and unmonitored.

Willie goes on to urge that monitoring commissions should not be impartial, as if they were juries. Their function is to serve as an extension of the court, to oversee the implementation of the judicial relief mandated for those who won the court case. He says in some communities, unfortunately, such groups include those who oppose as well as those who favor school desegregation. But the purpose of monitoring commissions is not to reconsider the facts or the law or to express its views about what should be done. It exists solely to facilitate the implementation of the court order. Thus it is imperative that members of such groups be in sympathy with the court order.
Funding and staffing of monitoring commissions can be a major concern. Several commissions have no official budgets, and depend on community contributions and volunteer help; others have budgets ranging up to $200,000 per year. Both Detroit and Boston have directors, clerical assistance, and other staff. Other districts, such as Denver and DeKalb County, function without staff. Financial support for these commissions comes from state and/or local education funds. Other assistance, including technical assistance, has come from the Community Relations Service of the U.S. Department of Justice, universities, and other outside consultants.

Although court-appointed monitoring commissions exist to provide information and help uncover problems, they are not universally accepted. Some see them as outside interference in governing and managing schools as well as competition for other citizen groups. However, monitoring commissions do serve a variety of useful functions for both the schools and the courts. One unintended, but sometimes invaluable function they serve is that of a scapegoat. A district that is desegregating can point to the commission as looking over the school's shoulder, forcing the district to do things it would not ordinarily do. In this way, the monitoring commission inadvertently takes some of the heat from the school administration.

Community Groups and Coalitions

Coalitions formed during the desegregation process can be either beneficial or detrimental to it. Anti-busing groups may combine their efforts to stall or negate desegregation. Pro-desegregation groups and/or groups wanting peaceful implementation may also join
forces. Coalitions of groups that support desegregation have in the past taken on many functions. Some act only as rumor control agents; others become actively involved in the formulation of desegregation plans. Some other activities undertaken by coalitions are:

1. providing legal and other information
2. organizing speaker's bureaus
3. calling neighborhood meetings
4. establishing community forums
5. reviewing past desegregation efforts
6. creating telephone hotlines and information centers
7. working with the news media
8. building public information programs
9. mobilizing influential support
10. promoting understanding in the schools (by way of, for example, parent seminars, student seminars, and drama productions)22

Community groups and coalitions played a crucial role in Wilmington, Delaware's desegregation success. In 1978, the Wilmington School District was by court order merged with ten surrounding suburban districts to form the New Castle County Public Schools; 80,000 students were reorganized in this desegregation effort. The smoothness with which this reorganization proceeded is attributed by experts to the community groups that arose to bridge the gaps between different sectors of the area. Many of these groups were coalitions of religious organizations: the Delaware Equal Educational Process Committee (DEEP); the National Conference of Christians and Jews (NCCJ); the Interfaith Task Force (ITF); and
the Delmarva Ecumenical Agency (DEA), an organization of Christian
churches in Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia.

The contributions of each of these groups in ensuring peaceful
desegregation in Wilmington is inestimable. DEEP's most valuable asset
was its chairman, the Rev. F. David Weber, who cajoled, advised, argued,
and persuaded others to work for desegregation. According to political
scientist Jeffrey Raffel in his book The Politics of School Desegregation,
it was DEEP's uncompromisingly pro-desegregation stance that enabled
a number of formerly neutral groups to move to a support position with-
out seeming radical. The NCCJ established human relations programs
for schools and community groups in an effort to ease the way for
peaceful desegregation. This coalition was also instrumental in the
formation of new pro-desegregation organizations of high-level community
leaders. In July, 1977, it sponsored a meeting of top business,
religious, and government officials that precipitated the creation of
an intergovernmental staff task force. The DEA focused on strengthening
relations between the clergy and the police, while the ITF was
established to pursue desegregation activities in general.

These groups were generally far more successful in their efforts
than the business groups in Wilmington. Raffel attributes this to the
disparity between the social skills and general orientations of the
two groups. The business leaders tended to be secretive, overly
confident, and calculating. By contrast, the religious leaders were
morally inspired, open, and people-oriented, "willing and eager to
demonstrate their personal commitment to desegregation." Further,
the business groups did not seem as aware of the pressures--political
and otherwise—constraining school personnel. Nor were they as efficient as the religious groups in reorganizing and redirecting their efforts to meet the needs of the specific situation.

One Wilmington community group, however, did rival the success of the religious coalitions: the Breakfast Group. The Breakfast Group—which consisted of school officials, local and state government leaders, religious leaders, and other interested parties—is thought to have had more influence on community leaders than any other group. The Group met informally every other week over breakfast to discuss problems in implementing school desegregation. These meetings allowed members to compare notes, trade information, and generate new ideas with regard to alleviating the difficulties involved in desegregation. Although no formal rules or authority were ever established, the Breakfast Group is said by Raffel to have been "acknowledged by many to have been a significant factor in the desegregation process, for it established a structure in which key leaders could reach agreement on implementation issues."25

Business Groups in Dallas.26 An example of the business community being the main impetus of desegregation can be found in Dallas and the Dallas Alliance. As Geoffrey Alpert, H. Ron White, and Paul Geisel point out, Dallas is a business-controlled community: "The political structure, the educational system, voluntary health and welfare associations, and even the churches and synagogues all are controlled by business."27 The Dallas Alliance was originally created by the top business leadership to serve as a catalyst to stimulate and encourage community groups to seek resolutions to urban problems.
affecting Dallas. When desegregation came to Dallas, the general opinion of the Alliance trustees was that a consensus plan developed by a racially mixed community group could provide the stimulus for community support. To this end, the Alliance created the Education Task Force. This group was comprised of 21 members (seven Anglos, seven Mexican-Americans, six blacks, and one American Indian), who represented a diversity of professions and socioeconomic classes—businessmen, lawyers, blue-collar workers, civic leaders, clergy, homemakers, government professionals, and educators. The Alliance sought, and was granted, "Friend of the Court" status and eventually developed the desegregation plan accepted by the court in 1976.

This example should not suggest that desegregation in Dallas was a model case. In fact, the plan left about half of the black students in racially segregated schools and was appealed by the Dallas NAACP in 1978. The Fifth Court of Appeals then found the student-assignment section of the Dallas plan unacceptable. The district court was ordered to develop a new student-assignment plan. In effect, Dallas had to redo a substantial part of its 1976 plan.

State Leadership

The obligation to take supportive actions with regard to school desegregation is not that of superintendents and boards of education alone. It is also the states' obligation. In their article, "What the Courts Have Said About State Responsibility for School Desegregation," Ben Williams and Mary Rashman explain the state governments' responsibility as follows:
State action is the basis for all constitutional violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Local school boards themselves can be held liable for school desegregation only by virtue of their status as state agencies. From this perspective there is no question but that state liability is involved in all school desegregation cases.28

School boards are creations of the state. Thus, by inference, states are responsible for the boards' actions. In the South this was not so difficult to prove because the dual school system was required by state law. In non-southern states, however, the states' responsibility for their school boards is more difficult to prove.

Regardless of the traditional de jure/de facto distinction, courts are beginning to require state action in desegregation remedies. In Delaware, a three-judge district court ordered the state legislature to reorganize the Wilmington and New Castle County schools into one district. The court also said that if the state legislature did not do so, the court would itself consolidate the districts into a county-wide district. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals approved the lower court's opinion but indicated its preference for a state legislative plan rather than a court plan. In St. Louis, now under court order to desegregate its schools, the court has asked the state along with the St. Louis Community Development Agency, "to develop a plan for operating federally assisted housing programs in the St. Louis area in such a way as to facilitate, rather than impede, school desegregation efforts."

The St. Louis ruling underscores another shift in courts' attitudes: Racial imbalance in the schools is no longer being seen as an isolated issue but as part of a more general problem which includes discrimination in housing. This attitude is also evident in a recent ruling by the
Seventh Circuit Court in Indianapolis which approved a lower court's order prohibiting further (predominantly black) public housing within the boundaries of the Indianapolis Public School System.

State Strategies

Despite the courts' prodding, many states remain reluctant to take the initiative in school desegregation. Some experts attribute this reluctance to a lack of leadership. However, a recent study portrays the problem as being somewhat more complex. Ben Williams and Carol Anderson, part of the Hawley desegregation study team, contend that a state's capacity to assume leadership is in part dependent upon "structural and financial constraints, as well as tradition." Financial constraints can be particularly limiting. A lack of money can prevent a state from doing as much as it wants or needs to do for its schools, not only in the area of desegregation but in all areas.

Within these constraints, however, there is much that states can accomplish. Options available to them include:

- **Statewide planning**, which might encompass strengthening non-magnet schools, providing an efficient transportation system, or encouraging interdistrict cooperation.

- **Financial incentives**, such as construction aid for new schools, offered to encourage school districts to pursue desegregation goals.

- **State policies and regulations** mandating improvements and reforms. These might include setting up new requirements for teachers; making provisions for structural and curricular change; or instituting formal standards that would ensure an adequate administrative structure at the district level. Also, states might establish guidelines guaranteeing that minorities will not be expected to bear a disproportionate burden in the desegregation process.

- **Technical assistance** to ease the way for desegregation. Such assistance could be an invaluable aid to districts in planning, monitoring, and evaluating desegregation strategies. State technical assistance might also be used to develop and implement in-service training programs for teachers and administrators.
Above all, states have the power to consolidate school districts or to compel interdistrict cooperation for any purpose. These sound like drastic measures. Yet over the past several decades school consolidations in massive numbers have taken place all across the country. In 1957, for example, there were just over 50,000 school districts in this country. By 1977, the number had dropped to just over 15,000. Few consolidations have been for purposes of desegregation, of course. Rather the objectives have been educational and financial. Most school officials have long assumed that tiny districts (e.g., those with less than 12 grades) could not offer the essential curriculum for today's complex society. In addition, very small districts are considered uneconomical. The point is, legislation has been used in every state to effect school consolidation for legitimate educational needs. There is no reason why such action could not be taken to create a metropolitan or interdistrict remedy for school desegregation. In the words of Harvard Professor Thomas Pettigrew, "Public education is, after all, the responsibility of the state; and boundary lines that create and perpetuate segregated schools are the creation and responsibility of the state."31

An Example of State Assistance in Wisconsin

Prompted by a 1975 federal court order to desegregate Milwaukee, the Wisconsin legislature created a program to assist with interdistrict student transfers. Popularly known as the Conta bill after its sponsor Dennis J. Conta, in its initial year of operation, 1976-77, the statute provided $8 million to facilitate 14,000 intradistrict and 360 interdistrict desegregation related transfers in Milwaukee and Racine. The
law provides financial incentives to both sending and receiving school districts. All transportation costs are assumed by the state, and state funds are available to assist any desegregation program mandated by court order. A second provision of the law establishes 17 joint educational councils between each of the suburban school districts of Milwaukee County and the Milwaukee City School Districts. According to Professor Pettigrew, "Each council must submit a transfer plan; however, each school district retains veto power over these plans."

Pettigrew notes that interdistrict cooperation occurs in other states, from Rhode Island to Washington, often as a way of achieving economies of scale. Although not necessarily involving desegregation, such statutory provisions by state government provide valuable precedents and incentives that may facilitate later interdistrict desegregation efforts.

The above is only a sample of ways in which states can assist their school districts. Considering the extent of their power to promote peaceful and effective desegregation, the states should be encouraged to become as involved with the process as possible. Since school districts are creatures of the states, the states should be as responsible for their care in this vital area as they have been in more traditional areas of education.

**Summary**

We have seen that strong leadership significantly influences school desegregation. Without it a void exists that may be filled by unqualified people, resulting in confusion, inefficiency, or even serious damage to the desegregation plan. But with leadership from school authorities, the media, the community itself, and state officials, desegregation can be implemented smoothly and effectively.
The leadership of school officials is thought to be the single most important factor in the success of a school desegregation plan. The attitudes of superintendents and school boards greatly influence the public's perceptions of the desegregation process. Thus it is imperative that these officials not only take an affirmative stand for desegregation from the very beginning, but that they follow up with a program of intensified communications with the community.

The media can also exert tremendous influence on how a community reacts to the desegregation process. Hence it may be essential for school officials to establish a cooperative relationship with the press and local television stations at the outset. And since the news media are to be expected to focus on the dramatic, officials should attempt to make the positive effects of school desegregation as "newsworthy" as the negative.

Community leaders, too, can provide valuable assistance to school districts by becoming actively involved in pro-desegregation groups and coalitions. In many cities, these groups fulfill a variety of essential functions, and have successfully strengthened community solidarity and cooperation.

Finally, the states have at their disposal the power to implement a wide range of measures affecting school desegregation within their borders. Whether and how they use that power might well spell the difference between successful and unsuccessful desegregation.
NOTES

CHAPTER 5


3. Ibid.


6. Ibid., p. 324.


10. Ibid., p. 28.


12. Ibid., p. 29.


18. Ibid.


21. Ibid.


24. Ibid., p. 136.


27. Ibid., p. 159.


32. Ibid., pp. 176-177.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN BE DONE NOW?

Despite the immense changes in levels of school segregation in the past decade, much remains to be done. At this point, the "easy" desegregation has been accomplished; what is left will be difficult indeed. Frank Read believes that the federal judiciary's involvement in southern desegregation is largely complete. He further argues that school segregation in all large cities may be so intractable that the judicial approach cannot and should not be expected to solve the problem of segregated education.\(^1\) Willis Hawley is more optimistic. He insists that we should not succumb to the "new mythology" claiming that school desegregation "doesn't work"—that we have tried our best but the costs of imposing desegregation on an unwilling community now outweigh the benefits. Against this view, he contends that: "(1) on balance, desegregation has resulted in positive outcomes for children and the society; and (2) it is increasingly possible to identify the conditions and practices that enhance the potential benefits of desegregation for both whites and minorities."\(^2\) However, even those who agree with Hawley that desegregation can work recognize that the obstacles to successful desegregation in big cities with large minority populations are formidable.

Clearly, optimism as to desegregation is in short supply. However, if officials assume at the outset that school desegregation will fail, this may well become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Rather than give in to pessimism, then, school officials should try to understand its causes so as to better equip themselves to surmount the obstacles in
their way. Some of the factors that might account for the recent pessimism surrounding school desegregation are as follows:

- The country seems to have become more conservative in recent years. This is interpreted by some to mean that the public wants less federal involvement in state and local affairs. Applied to school desegregation this trend could result in a reduced commitment by federal enforcement agencies and a slowdown in desegregation. Indeed, federal enforcement agencies are already backing away from vigorous desegregation enforcement. One clear case in point is the Department of Justice's recent reversal in the desegregation case involving the Seattle School District. Initially the Department had intervened in favor of a court challenge to the constitutionality of a Washington state initiative mandating neighborhood schools. Now the Justice Department has switched sides and is urging the Supreme Court to let the state provision stand as a valid exercise of state constitutional authority over public education.

- Busing for school desegregation remains tremendously unpopular with whites.

- The courts, according to most authorities, are in a period of retrenchment.

- Congress continues to erect barriers to effective desegregation particularly when busing is required.

- No real changes in patterns of housing segregation have taken place in recent years. Thus desegregation by "natural processes" remains a remote possibility at best.

Despite these obstacles, accumulated evidence suggests that successful desegregation can be achieved even in "problem" districts. Reports of policies and practices that have been particularly helpful in achieving effective desegregation recur in study after study. An important objective in promoting quality desegregation at this point is to identify and describe such strategies in hopes that school authorities, desegregation planners, and the courts will be able to implement those practices that will yield the desired results.
One of the first prerequisites, Gary Orfield argues, is the development of an adequate information base. Because desegregation can be so extraordinarily complex and highly controversial, its major advocates must be armed with the best information possible. A good data base and an understanding of the social forces at work within a community can't guarantee success, of course. But as Orfield says, "It can ... make obvious the futility of some courses of action and put the judicially imposed changes in a context of ongoing social change." He suggests, therefore, that decision makers have basic statistical information on school and housing segregation trends, both in the city and the metropolitan area. He further advises that yearly desegregation indices be developed for each minority group in the school system for at least the past decade. Of special note is the importance of identifying and keeping tabs on neighborhoods with stable integrated schools so that they may be accorded special treatment in desegregation planning. Not only should data on past trends be compiled, but projections should be made of future developments. Trend data may be especially useful in assessing the effects of desegregation on white flight. As Orfield observes, projections can help decision makers separate the impact of the desegregation plan itself from other long-term community forces.

After creating a complete information base for desegregation planning, officials should familiarize themselves with those strategies that have been successful in other areas. The following discussion of these strategies comes not only from our earlier chapters, but also draws on the first volume of the comprehensive study of desegregation recently conducted by the group headed by Willis Hawley.
Before proceeding, we need to clarify a couple of points. First, as an outgrowth of a larger research project, this handbook is concerned only with school desegregation, not integration. As Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman note, integration is a more subtle, social process that cannot be mandated by a court. It requires subjective, attitudinal change that can come only from mutual acceptance and some level of cultural assimilation between races. As they put it, "If the ultimate result of desegregation is to be integration, then it will be done through the extra-legal efforts of leaders in the school, the community and the nation as a whole." The policies and practices considered below are designed only to facilitate desegregation, which, of course, must precede genuine integration.

Second, the proposals and suggestions to follow are not intended to provide a precise blueprint for action. Because of the uniqueness of each community, such a volume as this cannot prescribe in detail what steps should be taken to achieve successful desegregation in any given school district. What we offer is more in the nature of what Hawley and associates call "middle-level" strategies, which often require modification to fit the specific conditions of each locality.

With these limitations in mind we will now summarize some of the policies, strategies, and practices that we think will be helpful to those charged with the onerous responsibility of desegregating the public schools.

- Positive, forceful leadership by school, political, and business leaders is virtually indispensable to success. Abundant research affirms that a host of problems can be avoided if community leaders insist that the law must be followed and that violence or other disruptions will not be tolerated.
The community must be prepared and involved. School authorities must widely promulgate details prior to implementation so as to allay as many fears and anxieties as possible. Unfortunately this procedure is not as common as one would expect. As Hawley and associates put it, "... typically the school district ignores parents and community groups, the mass media exacerbates their fears by covering white flight and protest, and the business and community leadership remain silent." 

Regarding specific techniques for assigning students to achieve racial balance and maximize white to minority contact, several recommendations can be made:

1. Pairing and clustering with rezoning seems to be an especially promising method of reducing racial isolation in elementary schools.

2. Rezoning of secondary schools should probably be the first technique considered.

3. Voluntary plans are ineffective and should be avoided.

4. Where racial composition permits, the maximum number of minority students should not exceed 30 to 35 percent. Otherwise, white flight may become a serious problem.

5. Desegregation plans normally should not be phased in; plans should be implemented in one year. Again this is partly to reduce white student losses.

6. Generally, magnet voluntary (or magnet only) plans are not very effective, especially in districts with sizable minority enrollments. However, magnet schools as part of a larger, mandatory effort may attract white students, especially if the school is located in a white, racially mixed, or commercial area.

7. Busing distances should be minimized.

8. White reassignments to formerly all-black schools should be minimized so as to reduce white flight.

Desegregation plans should avoid disrupting "naturally" desegregated neighborhood schools. Clearly, integrated neighborhoods should be exempt from busing, as was done in Louisville and Wichita. As Fisher and Orfield point out in their discussion of Columbus, Ohio (where exemption was denied), children should not be bused "as if the goal of the litigation was equal busing as an end itself rather than a tool for achieving integrated education."
A continuing effort must be made in behalf of metropolitan desegregation. *Milliken v. Bradley*, of course, makes this goal difficult to achieve except in those cases where suburban districts can be shown to have intentionally contributed to central city school segregation. It is not clear at this point what the courts will accept as definitive in this regard. Metropolitan desegregation can be pursued on a voluntary basis, of course, where a mandatory remedy is unavailable. In fact, Karen McGill Arrington, writing for the Civil Rights Commission, indicates that some northern districts under court order to desegregate contend that only a metropolitan plan will successfully accomplish the task. She mentions St. Louis as an example of a city in which the board of education has developed an interdistrict plan for voluntary cooperation with several school districts in the county.

In 1980, the court of appeals ruled that St. Louis suburban districts "collaborated with each other and with the City of St. Louis to ensure the maintenance of segregated schools ..."12 Nonetheless in 1981 the district court agreed to try a voluntary plan in which five of twenty-two county districts volunteered to cooperate with the central city system for purposes of desegregation. A major provision of the plan called for majority to minority transfers allowing, in theory, central city blacks to attend the suburban schools of their choice. In reality, however, blacks were admitted to only four of the suburban schools, and even these restricted minority enrollments to 50 students in 1981. Thus the plan affected a total of only 200 minority students. The city system in return received 39 white students from the county plus 280 more whites in the city's magnet schools.13 Predictably,
this miniscule number has had almost no impact on the metropolitan
system of 250,000 students, which is about 25 percent black, nor on
the city system of 60,000 students, which is 80 percent black.14 The
district court in the meantime has asked for feasibility studies for
a mandatory metropolitan plan. Five have been submitted, only two of
which the NAACP has found acceptable. The plaintiffs in the case hope
for a more substantial remedy and, according to Arrington, view the
voluntary plan as little more than an interim solution.

The St. Louis case provides little support for those who hope that
a voluntary metropolitan approach will work. So despite the current
push to reduce federal involvement in school desegregation, coercion
may be the only way to achieve genuine areawide desegregation. Although
inadequate as an overall plan, however, metropolitan open enrollment is
an inexpensive way to begin. Moreover, such a plan may provide tremendous
advantages to some minority students. Orfield suggests that metropolitan
open enrollment "would make possible the transfer of a few of the most
talented and highly motivated minority children, children who are
specially damaged by the narrow curricula and lack of academic challenge
in many inner city schools."15

Metropolitan desegregation will not come easily, of course. So much
depends on how willing the courts are to accept certain evidence as
proving discriminatory intent on the part of suburban districts or the
state government itself. Orfield contends that plenty of evidence is
there, if the courts will only be receptive.16 As he points out, the
underlying legal issue is the extent to which school desegregation is
a direct result of unconstitutional housing segregation. He believes
that such a connection exists and that the effects of housing discrim-
inination in the suburbs on metropolitan school segregation is evident
in a variety of common practices, including restrictive covenants,
exclusion of subsidized housing, and discrimination by realtors licensed
by the state governments. In some places, the courts have been sympathetic.
The federal courts in Indianapolis and Cleveland, for example, ruled
that housing segregation in those cities was intentionally perpetrated.

Large city districts in both North and South are now expressing an
increased interest in metropolitan plans. Orfield reports that in
Detroit and Richmond, central city school boards joined civil rights
groups in suing the suburbs. The school system in Kansas City, Missouri,
has also urged a metropolitan remedy for that area. In 1977, the Kansas
City board alleged that "areawide unlawful segregation caused the racial
isolation of plaintiff's district, and only areawide desegregation can
undo the effects of these practices." In an amended complaint in 1979,
the district urged the court to "order the State to submit a plan to
eliminate all vestiges of the dual segregated school system in the metro-
politan area." The suit is still pending.

As previously discussed, metropolitan plans appear to be the only
way of achieving effective desegregation of big cities with large minority
populations. Other reasons can be found to push for metropolitan
remedies, not the least of which has to do with housing segregation.
Professor Diana Pearce has recently shown that a metropolitan desegrega-
tion plan, by removing white enclaves, reduces white enrollment loss
and increases housing integration. Based on research comparing
metro with city-only plans, she concludes that "... only in
the cities with metropolitan school desegregation is there substantial
reduction in housing segregation levels." An areawide approach to desegregation has a number of other
advantages. As Arrington observes, interdistrict consolidation should help minimize the fiscal inequities that exist among school districts in most metropolitan areas. In addition, a metro system would permit pooling of resources and the expansion of programs for students with special needs—the slow learners, the handicapped, and the gifted. Finally, contrary to popular assumption, metro plans may not require more busing. Arrington points out that in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, a school district covering 550 square miles, the desegregation plan required a maximum bus ride of 35 minutes. This was less time on the average than had been required prior to desegregation. Diana Pearce's research shows similar results. In Riverside, California, her sample city with the longest experience with metropolitan desegregation (15 years), busing is required in only four of twenty-one elementary schools. The reason some metropolitan plans may entail so little busing is that certain minority neighborhoods of the central city may be quite close to predominantly white suburbs.

One important misconception about metropolitan plans might be briefly addressed here. As Thomas Pettigrew notes, the successful areawide school systems in such places as Charlotte, Nashville, and all large Florida counties, have led people to equate metropolitan desegregation with large-scale consolidation. He contends this does not have to be. For example, he mentions a recently devised metro
design for the Los Angeles area where, for example, eight separate
confederations of school districts are envisaged. Each would be
significantly smaller than the present Los Angeles Unified School District.
Pettigrew has also been involved in a similar arrangement in Richmond,
where seven individual districts were proposed, each smaller than the
smallest of the three existing districts. So, a metro plan does not
have to create a vast new super school district. All sorts of imaginative
possibilities exist for developing a desegregation plan for an entire
area. Thus a metro system might result in the best of both worlds—
centralized planning and coordination along with decentralized operations.

A metropolitan approach may be the only way for large cities to
successfully desegregate their schools. The Supreme Court must someday
decide what it will accept as evidence of discrimination by the suburbs.
In Orfield's words: "Eventually the Supreme Court or the nation's
political leaders will have to choose between segregation and metropolitan
change."22

Two final points should be made. First, we must guard against
expecting too much from school desegregation. Surely it was naive to
assume that using the schools to bring "black and white together" would
immediately end the prejudices and inequalities deeply rooted in our
culture and institutions.23 Second, we should not become so preoccupied
with racial balance that we overlook the broader educational and social
purposes to be achieved through school desegregation.24 The fact
remains that not only is school desegregation a well established national
policy, but when properly implemented it can yield important educational
and social benefits for all racial and ethnic groups.
NOTES

CHAPTER 6


12. Arrington, With All Deliberate Speed, p. 32.
13. Information on the current status of the St. Louis plan is based on a telephone conversation with Mr. Gene Uram, Assistant Superintendent for Desegregation Monitoring for the St. Louis school system, January 21, 1982.


16. This comes from ibid., pp. 408-411.


18. Quoted in Arrington, With All Deliberate Speed, p. 34.


20. Arrington, With All Deliberate Speed, pp. 35-36.


22. Orfield, Must We Bus? p. 420.


APPENDIX A

SOME GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR DESEGREGATION PLANNERS

1. Nothing should be promised in program changes or improved services which cannot reasonably be expected to be provided or to occur.

2. The most important responsibility of the local Board of Education is the adoption of clearly defined desegregation plan requirements, constraints, goals, and timetables; and the adoption of a system of accountability clearly understood by the staff and other persons and agencies which have planning responsibilities.

3. The planning process must be comprehensively organized with line and staff and community involvement responsibilities clearly identified.

4. Involve the community in every phase of the planning process but don't expect lay persons to assume responsibility for tasks and functions which are clearly those of the staff.

5. Staff persons who are responsible for specific planning tasks and program development should not also have responsibility for developing community involvement and public interpretation.

6. In the midst of various pressures of planning for the first year of desegregation the temptation to develop and implement new and untried programs should be resisted. Programs which have proved over time to be ineffective should be eliminated, but those which have proved successful should be replicated and expanded.

7. Most of the fears and problems attributed to desegregation are in the anticipation of desegregation; most if not all of the fears and problems can be minimized or eliminated if there is orderly planning and firm, committed implementation.

8. Children of elementary and early junior high school age are the least disturbed of any group in the community by any negative fears or problems attributed to desegregation.

9. The need for desegregation assumes that the right of equality of education has been abridged. Will the plan in all of its aspects and within a reasonable time frame, address total equality of educational opportunity?

10. No one school district in the country has provided a perfect model of the desegregation-integration process. Studying and observing the experiences, problems, and successes of other districts is useful but should not be considered an end in itself.

APPENDIX B

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SOURCE: Division of Equity Training and Technical Assistance, U.S. Department of Education.
APPENDIX C

HOW TO FIND A COURT DECISION

Anyone who works in a particular district or who wishes to do research on desegregation should not be hesitant to go to the text of a district court decision. It is usually written in straightforward, nonlegal language. Much is necessarily lost in attempts such as this one to summarize in three or so pages an opinion of perhaps 150 pages or more. Judges in school desegregation cases are usually sensitive to the need to make their actions comprehensible to the local community. Local newspapers, however, are faced with the difficult task of summarizing or excerpting the essentials of long opinions.

Legal citations have been included in this booklet not as esoteric signs of the lawyer's cult but to aid in the location of a decision. Any small law library will include volumes of Federal decisions.

A district court citation will look something like this:


It means the case can be found in volume 367 of the Federal Supplement at page 179. Court of appeals citations look like:

521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975).

This means the decision appears in volume 521 of the Federal Reporter, second series, at page 530.

There are three different editions of United States Supreme Court decisions, which slightly complicates citations. For example, 423 U.S. 946 (1975) refers to the official United States Reports. However, these are slow to be published, so many law libraries carry the West Publishing Company's edition, which are listed, for example, as 97 S.Ct. 2905 (1977), meaning volume 97 of West's Supreme Court Reporter at page 2905. A third version is that of the Lawyers' Cooperative Publishing Company, which will look like: 10 L.Ed. 2d 338 (1963), meaning volume 10, page 338, of the Lawyers' Cooperative Edition, second series. Important Supreme Court decisions are published in full a few days after they are handed down in United States Law Week, a publication of the Bureau of National Affairs. These citations might look like:


If you have a citation for one edition, but the library carries another, seek help.

APPENDIX D

ASSESSING THE PROGRESS OF LARGE CITY SCHOOL DESEGREGATION:
A CASE SURVEY APPROACH--SCOPE, METHODS AND DATA

This report is part of a large research project supported by the National Institute of Education (Grant No. NIE-G-80-0142). The larger study employs a relatively new technique called the case survey method, which combines features of aggregate analysis and case studies. The approach requires that an analyst-reader record information about individual cities' desegregation efforts on a closed-ended questionnaire so that these experiences can be quantified, aggregated, and subjected to system-wide analysis.

In searching for cases to be included in the study a four-point selection criterion was employed:

1. A district's desegregation effort had to be documented in a published or unpublished report (e.g., book, journal article, Civil Rights Commission report, court case). Expert testimonials or interviews with local officials could not serve as the primary data source.

2. The major desegregation effort of a district must have occurred between 1968 and 1976. (Data for the desegregation index and white school enrollment employed as dependent variables in the study were limited to this period.)

3. The total school enrollment of the district had to exceed 20,000 students. The intent of the project was to include only "large" districts on the basis that more published information would be available than for small districts. In addition, research has shown that size of district may affect the desegregation process. Imposing a size limit then precludes a perhaps incongruous comparison between a group of very large and very small districts.
(4) The minority percentage in the school system had to equal or be greater than 10 percent for at least one of the years between 1968-1976. Essentially, the 10 percent minimum was established on the assumption that districts with a very small proportion minority are not likely to face the same issues and problems in desegregating that confront other districts.

In total, the search resulted in identifying 52 usable case studies.

A survey of previous school desegregation research findings suggested that four classes of variables may influence school desegregation success:

1. School district characteristics such as percent minority in the district and school district size;
2. External pressure in the form of court or HEW coercion;
3. Desegregation process variables such as citizen participation, elite support, superintendent and school board support; and
4. Specific desegregation techniques or strategies by districts.

Unlike the first class of variables, school district characteristics, concepts such as external pressure, citizen participation, elite support, and desegregation strategies are much more elusive and, therefore, more difficult to operationalize. Moreover, the effects of many of these variables on school desegregation, with the exception of external pressure and district characteristics, are for the most part not tested in previous aggregate studies. Thus, the collection of desegregation process indicators became the central focus of the case survey instrument.

Table 8 presents the principal variables employed in the study and the source from which each variable was derived. Tables 9 and 10 provide the detailed results of the multiple regression analyses discussed in Chapter 3.
## TABLE 8

**PRINCIPAL VARIABLES EMPLOYED IN STUDY AND DATA SOURCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Desegregation change (1968-76)</td>
<td>OCR school district file (from Franklin Wilson)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White school enrollment change (1968-76)</td>
<td>OCR school district file (from Franklin Wilson)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Independent</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>External Influences</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Region (0/1)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>County-City Databook, 1977</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coercion (0-7)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Case survey--questions 10, 16, 17, 62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suburban escape&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972 (Table 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. pre-implementation white enrollment decline&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>OCR school district file (from Franklin Wilson)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>School District Characteristics</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of school district (0/1)&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Case survey--question 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority students (%)</td>
<td>OCR school district file (from Franklin Wilson)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of district (total student enrollment)&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>OCR school district file (from Franklin Wilson)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Desegregation Process Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent and school board support (0-4)&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Case survey--questions 56, 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen participation (factor score)&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Case survey--questions 57, 59, 60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elite support (factor score)&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Case survey--questions 51, 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desegregation resistance (factor score)&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Case survey--questions 68, 70, 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiring of new school superintendent (0/1)&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Patterson's American Education, Vols. 54-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School board insulation (0-3)&lt;sup&gt;j&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Mail survey of 52 school districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Desegregation Techniques</strong>&lt;sup&gt;k&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Open enrollment</td>
<td>Case survey--questions 18, 38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction of new schools</td>
<td>Case survey--questions 19, 39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pairing/clustering</td>
<td>Case survey--questions 20, 40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Magnet schools</td>
<td>Case survey--questions 21, 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rezoning</td>
<td>Case survey--questions 23, 43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 8 CONTINUED

a0 = Nonsouth; 1 = South. South includes the District of Columbia, the 11 states of the Confederacy, and six border states (Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia) that had laws requiring separate school systems at the time of the 1954 Brown decision.

bA seven-point index that sums: (1) source of desegregation impetus, 0 = local, 1 = HEW, 2 = court order; (2) court order plan parameters, 0 = none, 1 = recommendations, 2 = specified plan; (3) court specify racial balance, 0 = none, 1 = recommended minimum and maximum racial balance, 2 = ordered minimum and maximum racial balance; (4) court mandated special master, 0 = no, 1 = yes.

cIndicator of availability of alternative schools in the metropolitan area. Operationalized by dividing total school enrollment in the suburban ring of the SMSA by total district enrollment for the central city. The higher the ratio the greater the availability of other schools in the area.

dUsed in the white flight analysis as a control measure to represent trends in pre-implementation white enrollment change. Calculated by summing pre-implementation percentage white enrollment changes and dividing by appropriate number of time points.

e0 = noncountywide, 1 = countywide.

fYear before major desegregation effort.

gSchool board support, 0 = opposed, 1 = neutral, 2 = favor; superintendent support, 0 = opposed, 1 = neutral, 2 = favor.

hThese three variables represent dimensions of community and local elite involvement in and support of local desegregation efforts. The original eight variables from the case survey instrument were factor analyzed using the common factor model. Based on Kaiser's criterion (eigenvalue > 1.0), three factors emerged: Factor 1 was labeled citizen participation; Factor 2, elite support; and Factor 3, desegregation resistance. In total, 73.5 percent of the common variance was captured by the three dimensions.

iA district received a score of 1 if a new superintendent was hired the year before or year of the district's major desegregation effort.

jA three-point index measuring the degree to which local school boards are more insulated from outside influences: size of school board > 7 = 0, ≤ 7 = 1; term of office < 2, 3 = 0, ≥ 4 = 1; number of meetings per month > 2 = 0, 1 = 1. Thus, the smaller the size of the school board, the longer the term of office, and the fewer the number of meetings per month, the more insulated the school board (see Morgan and Fitzgerald, 1980).

kThe case survey instrument also allowed the analyst-reader to record educational parks as a desegregation strategy. However, this method was not used as a primary technique by any of the 52 districts.
# TABLE 9

**EFFECTS OF FOUR CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES AND THREE DESEGREGATION STRATEGIES ON DESEGREGATION SUCCESS: ELEMENTARY SCHOOL LEVEL (N=47)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Equation 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Equation 2</th>
<th></th>
<th>Equation 3</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>t-score</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>t-score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (0/1)(^a)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of district (0/1)(^b)</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% minority</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School district size(^c)</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>1.69*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rezoning (0/1)(^d)</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.01 (.61)</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairing/clustering (0/1)(^d)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>1.39*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairing/clustering &amp; rezoning (0/1)(^d)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R\(^2\) = .15  
R\(^2\) = .19  
R\(^2\) = .24

\(^a\)Nonsouth/South  
\(^b\)Noncountywide/countywide  
\(^c\)Total school enrollment  
\(^d\)Do not use/use  
\(^e\)Unstandardized regression coefficient  
* p < .05
### TABLE 10

EFFECTS OF FOUR CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES AND REZONING ON DESSEGREGATION SUCCESS: SECONDARY SCHOOL LEVEL (N=46)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t-score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contextual</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region(0/1)(^a)</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of district (0/1)(^b)</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% minority</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School district size(^c)</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rezoning (0/1)(^d)</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.08(2.75)(^e)</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Nonsouth/South  
\(^b\)Noncountywide/countywide  
\(^c\)Total school enrollment  
\(^d\)Did not use/used  
\(^e\)Unstandardized regression coefficient  

\(R^2 = .31\)
The following is a summary of the principal findings of the study. A preliminary examination of desegregation techniques revealed that among elementary schools the combination of pairing and clustering with rezoning proved most successful in reducing racial isolation (operationalized as a change in the index of dissimilarity). For secondary schools the most effective technique was rezoning. These two techniques were associated, in the bivariate case, with the lowest amount of white enrollment loss as well. A multiple regression analysis also showed the most effective desegregation technique to be of some importance (although not statistically significant) in achieving desegregation success when various external, community, and district level forces were taken into account. In the multivariate case, the specific technique was of greater import at the elementary than the secondary level. Other features of the desegregation process, especially support by school officials, were important predictors of desegregation success as well, although the most powerful forces were federal coercion (positive) and size of district (negative). A multivariate analysis of white enrollment change for those 52 districts confirmed recent research that school desegregation does produce a significant one-time decline in white student enrollment. The most important predictor of white student withdrawal was percentage black in the school system. The research concludes that desegregation process variables are important contributors to success, and certain desegregation techniques may work better than others.
Before presenting the sources that were consulted in order to prepare the case profiles, a brief note about the information contained in Exhibits A–E is in order.

Each case profile is composed of seven sections (A–E). Section A identifies the school district, while Section B provides demographic information about the district: school district population (1970); mean number of students and schools (1968–1974, 1976); and mean percent black and minority school enrollment (1968–1974; 1976).

In Section C the year of the principal or major desegregation effort is given. Thus, a statement that, for example, Dallas desegregated in 1976 does not mean that this was the first or only attempt, just that this date marks the most extensive desegregation effort for that community. In addition, information is presented concerning the primary impetus for desegregation (e.g., voluntary, court order, HEW order) and those persons responsible for plan formulation.

Sections D, E, and F document, respectively, information on: principal desegregation strategies employed by the district (e.g., rezoning, magnet schools, clustering); busing and white student enrollment data; and community reaction (e.g., support, opposition, protests) to the desegregation plan, implementation, and/or desegregation per se. Finally, in Section G an attempt is made to measure empirically desegregation success.
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GLOSSARY OF DESEGREGATION TERMS

Compiled primarily from:

Desegregation Resource Handbook  
(Josey, 1974)

Desegregating America's Schools  
(Hughes, Gordon, and Hillman, 1980)

A Practical Guide to Desegregation  
(Weinberg, 1981)
Busing—refers to any means by which students are transported between home and school when paid for by public funds. Most of the transportation is indeed provided by district-owned or contract buses. In some larger cities, however, students may ride existing public transportation systems.

Clustering—a desegregation technique that combines three or more schools, any of which may have been previously segregated, into desegregated facilities with different grade levels in each.

De facto segregation—the separation of students by race or ethnic identity as the result of sheer accident, custom, or housing patterns and not official state or local government actions.

De jure segregation—although frequently equated with "southern" segregation in the 17 southern and border states, de jure segregation in fact refers to any separation of students by race as a result of official school board, city, or state action.

Desegregation—the elimination of dual school systems (separate schools for white and minorities). The basic goal of desegregation is to promote interracial contact.

Educational parks—the creation of a large, comprehensive school site with several buildings, centralized administration, consolidated media, and physical education facilities. Seldom found in practice.

Equal protection—the Fourteenth Amendment requires that no state shall deny to its citizens the equal protection of the laws. In the Brown case (1954), the Supreme Court ruled that laws requiring "separate but equal" schools deprived black children of equal protection of the laws and were inherently unconstitutional.

Feeder patterns—an arrangement under which students from specific lower schools are assigned to specific upper schools in the same school system.

Magnet—mandatory plan—a form of magnet school that is not optional. The choice is not between a segregated neighborhood school and a desegregated magnet school. Parental choices are: (1) leave the school system, (2) accept forced reassignment to a desegregated school, or (3) choose a desegregated magnet school.

Magnet-only plan—an essentially voluntary program under which parents may choose to send their children to a citywide or areawide school offering a special curriculum or educational program. Magnet-only plans depend on making such schools sufficiently attractive to induce parents to voluntarily leave their segregated neighborhood schools.
Majority-to-minority transfers—a method of voluntary student assignment by which students who are enrolled in schools in which their race is in the majority may transfer to any school (in the same district) where their race is in the minority. Ordinarily the school district must provide transportation. The hope is to produce a voluntary leveling of racial imbalances between schools.

Metropolitan plan—a desegregation strategy that either compels the consolidation of two or more separate school districts into one larger district or requires two or more districts to join together in a cooperative relationship for purposes of desegregation.

Monitoring commission—a group of citizens either appointed by the court or school board to observe and report on the implementation of a court-ordered desegregation plan.

Open enrollment—a voluntary student assignment approach that permits parents to choose any school within a district for their children to attend. In the North, it is frequently the first hesitant step taken by a desegregating school district; in the South, it was the predominant form of desegregation under the name of "freedom of choice."

Pairing—a method of desegregating two schools, one predominantly white, the other minority, that serve the same grades. Instead of both schools containing K-6, after pairing one school might have grades K-3 and the other grades 4-6, with students drawn from the former attendance zones of both schools. Both schools would share the white and minority populations of the enlarged zone.

Racial balance—a requirement that the racial makeup of each school in a district equal or approximate the racial composition of the entire school district.

Resegregation—the reappearance of racial segregation in a formerly desegregated school system. Changing birth and residential patterns as well as the propensity of some parents to send their children to private schools are often cited as reasons for resegregation.

Rezoning—a frequently employed desegregation technique that requires the redrawing of school attendance boundaries. The goal of rezoning is for each attendance area to reflect the racial composition of the entire district.

School closing—usually employed as part of a larger desegregation plan. By closing a school and redistributing its student body to other local schools, the racial makeup of the district at large is modified.
Special master—an expert appointed by the court to act as the representative of the court in the development of a desegregation plan.

Voluntary desegregation—a desegregation plan in which the school district decides to desegregate its schools in the absence of a court order.

White flight—a term often used instead of white enrollment decline. Although it generally refers to the tendency for white middle- and upper-class families to relocate out of communities that implement desegregation plans, it may also include those students who have opted for private schools.
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Volume III A Proposed National Study of School Desegregation
Volume IV A Practical Guide to Desegregation: Sources, Materials, 
and Contacts
Volume V A Review of the Empirical Research on Desegregation: 
Community Response, Race Relations, Academic Achievement, 
and Resegregation
Volume VI Qualitative Literature and Expert Opinion on School 
Desegregation
Volume VII Desegregation Strategies and the Courts
Volume VIII State Strategies for Reducing Racial Isolation
Volume IX School Desegregation Strategies: A Comprehensive 
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